855878_PECK_FINAL.

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ForTrailblazers,WhentheU.S.
ConstitutionisNotEnough

ROBERTS.PECK*

ABSTRACT

Stateconstitutionshavedistinctivelanguage,histories,andprovisions
that combine with the unique nature of state police power and cultural
orientations to produce singular takes on American constitutional
jurisprudence. The welcome occasion of the publication of The Law of
AmericanStateConstitutionsbyRobertF.Williamsprovidesanopportunity
toexaminesomeofthecomplexitiesandproperrolesofstateconstitutions.
Thebookprovidesrichinformationaboutthedebates,interpretation,and
applicationofstateconstitutions,anditadvocatesfortheadvancementof
independent state constitutional jurisprudence. Williamss publication
should cause a reexamination of how advocates have relied upon state
constitutions to advance their causes, particularly in the areas of school
finance litigation, tort reform, and samesex marriage. Based on the way
state courts have handled these issues, it is clear that they must look to
their own constitutions for workable solutions to these complicated areas
oflitigation.

*RobertS.PeckisPresidentoftheCenterforConstitutionalLitigation,PC,aWashington,

D.C.lawfirm.HealsoholdsadjunctappointmentsatthelawschoolsofAmericanandGeorge
Washington universities, where he teaches seminars on state constitutional law. As a
practitioner, he has argued cases in the United States Supreme Court, as well as numerous
statehighcourts,whentheapplicationofthestateconstitutionwasatissue.

855
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856 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

INTRODUCTION

E
ver since the 1977 publication of a seminal law review article by
JusticeWilliamBrennan,1manyscholarsandpractitionershaveheld
heightened expectations about the potential of state constitutional
jurisprudence to blaze new trails.2 After all, before enforcement of the
Federal Bill of Rights in the twentieth century, many landmark federal
precedentstraveleddownapathpreviouslytrodbysimilarrulingsinstate
courts applying their own declarations of rights, including school
segregationcases,3appointedcounselforindigentdefendants,4adoptionof
theexclusionaryrule,5andreligiousinstructioninpublicschools.6
As a leader in the Warren Courts revolutionary reshaping of federal
constitutional law,7 Justice Brennan was well aware of the retrenchment
fromWarrenCourtprecedentsthattheCourtassumedunderChiefJustice

1WilliamJ.Brennan,Jr.,StateConstitutionsandtheProtectionofIndividualRights,90HARV.L.

REV.489(1977)(emergingfromaspeechJusticeBrennandeliveredatHarvardLawSchool).
2For example, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart G. Pollock called Brennans

articletheMagnaCartaofstateconstitutionallaw.StewartG.Pollock,StateConstitutionsas
SeparateSourcesofFundamentalRights,35RUTGERSL.REV.707,716(1983).
3Compare,e.g.,Clarkv.Bd.ofDirs.,24Iowa266,274,277(1868)(prohibitingthedenialof

admissiontoaschoolbasedonraceundertheIowaConstitution),andStateexrel.Stoutmeyer
v.Duffy,7Nev.342,34748(1872)(relyingontheNevadaConstitutiontoupholdsegregation
in schools), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating segregated
schools).
4Compare, e.g., Carpenter v. Cnty. of Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 25051 (1859) (examining the

Wisconsin Constitution to determine whether the county must appoint counsel for indigent
defense), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 34445 (1963) (requiring appointment of
counselforindigentdefense).
5Compare,e.g.,Statev.Sheridan,96N.W.730,732(Iowa1903)(usingtheIowaConstitution

toadopttheexclusionaryrule),withWeeksv.UnitedStates,232U.S.383,346(1914)(adopting
theexclusionaryruleforillegallyseizedevidence).
6ComparePeopleexrel.Ringv.Bd.ofEduc.,92N.E.251,251,257(Ill.1910)(findingthat,

undertheIllinoisConstitution,readingtheBibleinschoolconstitutedinappropriatesectarian
instruction), Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 116, 12122 (La. 1915) (prohibiting
sectarianeducationinpublicschoolsundertheLouisianaConstitution),andStateexrel.Weiss
v.Dist.Bd.ofSch.Dist.No.8oftheCityofEdgerton,44N.W.967,981(Wis.1890)(holding
thatreligiousinstructioninpublicschoolsisclearlyagainsttheWisconsinConstitution),with
Sch.Dist.ofAbingtonv.Schempp,374U.S.203,225(1963)(holdingcompulsorypublicschool
prayer and Bible reading unconstitutional), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433, 436 (1962)
(strikingdownrequireduseoftheRegentsprayerinpublicschoolsundertheEstablishment
ClauseoftheFederalConstitution).
7SeeDennisJ.Hutchinson,HailtotheChief:EarlWarrenandtheSupremeCourt,81MICH. L.

REV. 922, 924 (1983) (To the extent that the Court over which Warren presided has any
intellectuallegacythatisaccessibletothosetrainedindoctrineandnotinethics,itisBrennan
whoisresponsible.).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 857

Warrens successor, Chief Justice Warren Burger.8 Finding himself in

dissent in Michigan v. Mosley,9 Brennan declared: In light of todays
erosionofMirandastandardsasamatteroffederalconstitutionallaw,itis
appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from
adheringtohigherstandardsunderstatelaw.10
JusticeBrennansdissentwasanakedinvitationtostatecourts,relying
ontheirownconstitutions,toreachadifferentresultthantheU.S.Supreme
CourtreachedinMosley.Seeingprecedentshestronglysupportedcrumble
in the hands of his new Supreme Court colleagues, he appealed to the
parallel judiciary of the states to keep the flame alive by reading their
cognateprovisionsasmoreprotectiveofindividualliberty.11
Justice Brennan then reinforced the sentiments he expressed in his
MosleydissentonthepagesoftheHarvardLawReview:
[T]he point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest
whentheyhaveaffordedtheircitizensthefullprotectionsofthe
[F]ederal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Courts interpretation of federal
law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state lawfor without it, the full realization of our
libertiescannotbeguaranteed.12

Justice Brennan also described the redundant guarantees of civil liberties

through the state and federal constitutions as a double source of
protectionfortherightsofourcitizens.13

8SeeBrennan,supranote1,at49598.

9423U.S.96,111(1975)(Brennan,J.,dissenting).

10Id.at120.JusticeBrennanwasnotaloneamongSupremeCourtjusticeswhosuggested

that state courts, applying state constitutions, could reach results different from those
mandatedbytheU.S.Constitution.Others,too,haveusedthepulpitofajudicialopinionto
preachtotheirstatecounterparts.See,e.g.,PruneyardShoppingCtr.v.Robins,447U.S.74,81
(1980)(statingthatnothingintheCourtsprioropinionslimit[s]theauthorityoftheStateto
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
libertiesmoreexpansivethanthoseconferredbytheFederalConstitution);Oregonv.Hass,
420U.S.714,728(1975)(Marshall,J.,dissenting)([I]tseemsmuchthebetterpolicytopermit
the state court the freedom to strike its own balance between individual rights and police
practices....).
11SeeMosley,423U.S.at111.Thus,BrennanlaterdecriedthattheSupremeCourtwasnow

involved in a new curtailment of the Fourteenth Amendments scope and was treating
civil and political rights . . . as inferior to the everincreasing demands of governmental
authority. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
ConstitutionsasGuardiansofIndividualRights,61N.Y.U.L.REV.535,546(1986).
12Brennan,supranote1,at491;seealsotextaccompanyingnote10.

13SeeBrennan,supranote1,at503.
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858 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

In calling for state courts to examine their own constitutions, Justice

Brennanwaswellawarethathewasseekingtoawakenalargelydormant
force in jurisprudence.14 Dubbed the New Judicial Federalism, reliance
on state bills of rights to determine constitutional questions became a
means of achieving results not otherwise available under the Federal
Constitution.15By1998,commentatorshadobservedthat,inlightofJustice
Brennansarticle,[s]tatecourtshavenowrenderedhundredsofdecisions
which grant greater protection to individual rights... than the Supreme
CourthasbeenwillingtoaffordundertheFederalConstitution.16Justice
Brennan himself was happy with what he had wrought, describing the
development he helped spawn as the most significant development in
American constitutional jurisprudence today.17 State courts, previously
unmindful of the history, textual differences, and other indicia for
construingtheirconstitutions,forthemostpart,enthusiasticallyjumpedat
the opportunity to look at state liberty guarantees without the burden of
following in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the task
provedburdensometosomecourts,atleastastosomeissues,resultingin
anunevenapproachtotheinterpretativeenterprise.
The New Judicial Federalism was not without its critics, many of
whomcalleditlittlemorethanthemanipulationofstateconstitutionallaw

14See id. Many sitting state supreme court justices agreed with that assessment. See, e.g.,

Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1985) (noting, as a Wisconsin Supreme Court
justice, that the Warren Court dominated statecourt constitutional thinking from the 1950s
throughtheearly1970sandlamentingthattheresultwasalmostasifstateconstitutionshad
disappeared); Charles G. Douglas, II, State Judicial ActivismThe New Role for State Bills of
Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1144 (1978) (stating his opinion as a New Hampshire
Supreme Court justice that state constitutions are moribund); Ellen A. Peters, State
Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 587 (1986)
(statingheropinionaschiefjusticeoftheConnecticutSupremeCourtthatstateconstitutional
lawsufferedgenerationsofneglectforwhichstatecourtsundoubtedlybearagreatdealof
theresponsibility).
15SeeG.ALANTARR,UNDERSTANDINGSTATECONSTITUTIONS16162(1998).

16James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of Independent

StateConstitutionalInterpretation,61ALB. L. REV.1507,1509(1998);seealsoRonaldK.L.Collins
etal.,StateHighCourts,StateConstitutions,andIndividualRightsLitigationSince1980:AJudicial
Survey,PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM,Summer1986,at141;KaTinaR.Hodge,Comment,Arkansass
Entry into the NotSoNew Judicial Federalism, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 835, 835 (2003)
(To date over onehalf of the states have utilized their own constitutions to acknowledge
moreindividualrightsthantheFederalConstitutionprovides.).
17WilliamJ.Brennan,Jr.,Foreword:RemarksofWilliamsJ.Brennan,Jr.,13VT. L. REV.11,11

(1988);seealsoBrennan,Jr.,supranote11,at549(Statecourtshaverespondedwithmarvelous
enthusiasm to many notsosubtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by the
decisionsoftheSupremeCourtmajority.).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 859

to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory.18

The unpredictable and irregular nature of state court construction of
fundamentalrightscausedonecritictodubstateconstitutionallawavast
wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible
pronouncements.19AnumberofcommentatorshavefoundthattheNew
JudicialFederalismisonthewanetoday,afterapriorperiodofsignificant
embrace by state courts. Thus, for example, one has noted that the
MontanaSupremeCourtappearsreticenttorecognizebroaderprotections
under the Montana Constitution, except when the express right of
privacy...comesintoplay,andthatbroadandindependentconstruction
ofitsstateconstitutionappearstohaveunfortunatelyreacheditszenithin
the1990s.20
Likenearlyallcharacterizations,thetreatmentofstateconstitutionsas
littlemorethanersatzconstitutions,thecelebrationofstateconstitutionsas
anew,largelyuntappedfountofrightsandliberties,andthelamentation
of state courts as reticent to read and apply their state constitutions
overstate each of their cases. The welcome occasion of the publication of
The Law of American State Constitutions by Robert F. Williams provides an
opportunitytoexaminesomeofthecomplexitiesandproperrolesofstate
constitutions.21Williams,aleadingscholarandprolificauthorofarticlesas
well as a casebook in the field, teaches at Rutgers Law School and has
compressedasurveylikestudyofstateconstitutionsintoasinglevolume
in this book. While the book provides an enormously rich amount of
information about the debates, interpretation, and application of state
constitutions,agreateraccomplishment,andgreaterevidentpurpose,isto
fosterataskthatWilliamshaslongadvocated:advancingastrongerbasis
for state courts to develop truly independent state constitutional

18SeePaulM.Bator,TheStateCourtsandFederalConstitutionalLitigation,22WM. & MARY L.

REV.605,606n.1(1981)(alsolabelingBrennansMosleydissentasanotatallsubtleinvitation
ofthissort);seegenerallyEarlM.Maltz,FalseProphetJusticeBrennanandtheTheoryofState
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988) (finding fault in the focus on
federalisminstateconstitutionalanalysis).Thecriticslamentwassharedbyanenthusiastic
supporter. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, widely regarded as the intellectual
godfather of the New Judicial Federalism, warned, as a law professor, that the movement
had to be more than searching ad hoc for some plausible premise in the state constitution
only when federal precedents will not support the desired result. Hans A. Linde, Without
DueProcess:UnconstitutionalLawinOregon,49OR.L.REV.125,146(1970).
19JamesA.Gardner,TheFailedDiscourseofStateConstitutionalism,90MICH. L. REV.761,763

(1992).
20Betsy
Griffing, The Rise and Fall of the New Judicial Federalism Under the Montana
Constitution, 71 MONT. L. REV. 383, 383 (2010). But see Bettman, supra note 14 (analyzing the
trendtowardNewJudicialFederalisminOhio);Hodge,supranote16,at835.
21SeegenerallyROBERTF.WILLIAMS,THELAWOFAMERICANSTATECONSTITUTIONS(2009).
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860 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

jurisprudence.22 The state constitutions have distinctive language,

histories, and provisions that combine with the unique nature of state
police power and cultural orientations to produce a singular take on and
contribution to Americanconstitutional jurisprudence, which need not be
either carbon copies of what the U.S. Supreme Court has declared or so
obstinateinitsrejectionofthelogicoffederaldecisionsthatitlacksitsown
legitimacy.
An indepth examination of the complexities that hinder, while
simultaneously encourage, an independent state constitutional
jurisprudence falls outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless,
publication of Williamss book should cause a reexamination of how
advocates have relied upon state constitutions to advance their causes.
Three areas of litigation will provide the prism through which this
questionisexaminedhere.PartIscrutinizesschoolfinancelitigation,Part
II looks at constitutional challenges to tort reform, and Part III considers
attacks on laws that limit marriage to samesex couples. The treatment of
these distinctive issues strongly suggests that state courts are looking to
theirownconstitutionsandstruggling,ascourtsmust,inapplyingfamiliar
principlestonewissues.

I. SchoolFinanceReformLitigation

Schoolfinancereformlitigationprovidesanexampleofresorttostate
constitutions when the U.S. Constitution has proved unavailing. Though
the initial foray into this subject area was made in the California courts,23
advocates for equalization of funding between school districts saw a
successful federallitigation strategy as a potential knockout blow that
wouldforeclosetheneedtolitigatetheissueoverandoveragain,stateby
state.24Thathope,however,wasdashedbyanadverseresult.
Unlike many state constitutions that attest to the fundamental
significanceofeducationinourdemocracy,theU.S.Constitutioncontains
nomentionofeducation.25Nonetheless,advocatesforequalizingeducation
financeputtheirfaithintheringingdeclarationfoundintheseminalcase
ofBrownv.BoardofEducation.26

22Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 190

(1983).
23See,e.g.,Serranov.Priest,487P.2d1241,1244(Cal.1971)(holdingthatunequalfunding

of public education across school districts, resulting from disparities in district wealth,
violatedthestateconstitutionsequalprotectionguarantee).
24See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Whos Winning the War?, 57

VAND.L.REV.2351,2353n.5(2004).
25SeegenerallyU.S.CONST.

26347U.S.483(1954).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 861

[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and

local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society.Itisrequiredintheperformanceofourmostbasicpublic
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundationofgoodcitizenship.Todayitisaprincipalinstrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
laterprofessionaltraining,andinhelpinghimtoadjustnormally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
mayreasonablybeexpectedtosucceedinlifeifheisdeniedthe
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
statehasundertakentoprovideit,isarightwhichmustbemade
availabletoallonequalterms.27

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the advocates

wererebuffedwhentheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesheldthatthe
Federal Constitution did not require states to equalize schooldistrict
spending on education.28 Thus, advocates embarked on a retaillitigation
strategy,relyingonstateconstitutionsthatspecificallydeclarededucation
tobeabasicstateresponsibility.29Itwasnot,however,simplyamatterof
forum shopping to pursue funding equalization in the state courts.
Rodriguez appeared to encourage a testing of stateconstitutional theories
when an element of the Courts analysis suggested that respect for
federalismpreventedtheCourtfromimposingaconstitutionaloverlayon
publiceducation financing that would, in effect, abrogate systems of
financingpubliceducationpresentlyinexistenceinvirtuallyeveryState.30
That same consideration obviously does not accompany a state
constitutional challenge, which asserts that the State itself imposed that
overlay as a feature of its organic law. After Rodriguez, state challenges
multipliedfreely,thoughhardlywithuniformresults.31
A considerable number of state courts chose to follow the logic
expressedinRodriguezandfoundnoconstitutionalremedytotheadmitted
problemthatasystemthatfundededucationonthebasisofpropertytaxes
will always produce significantly greater funding in wealthy school
districtsthaninpoorerones.Thus,theColoradoSupremeCourt,despitea
constitutionalprovisionthatrequirestheGeneralAssemblytoestablisha
thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the

27Id.at493.

28See411U.S.1,4041,55(1973).

29See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, 2; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, 1;

N.C.CONST.art.IX,2.
30Rodriguez,411U.S.at44.

31See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48

VAND.L.REV.101,10506(1995).
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862 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

[s]tate,32 held that disparate financing and its alleged impact on

educationalopportunitywasamatterofsocialpolicythatcourtsareill
suited to resolve as a matter of constitutional law.33 The Colorado
Supreme Court also found that Colorados educational provision did not
createafundamentalright.34Otherstatesreachedsimilarconclusions.35
Inotherstates,educationwasdeemedafundamentalright,thoughstill
notdeservingofstrictscrutiny,andthestatesunequalfundingregimewas
upheldutilizingarationalbasistest.36
The advocates, however, enjoyed success in a number of states.37 For

32COLO.CONST.art.IX,2.

33Lujanv.Colo.StateBd.ofEduc.,649P.2d1005,1018(Colo.1982).

34Id.
35See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 16768 (Ga. 1981) (affirming the

constitutionality of the system of financing public education in Georgia); Thompson v.

Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647 (Idaho 1975) (refusing to classify the right to education as a
fundamentalrightortodeclarethesystemofschoolfinancingunconstitutional);Comm.for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1194 (Ill. 1996) (holding that education is not a
fundamental right for equal protection purposes); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
458A.2d758,786(Md.1983)(recognizingthevitalrolepubliceducationplaysin...society
but finding no fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis); Milliken v.
Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Mich. 1973) (denying that any inequality in school financing
resultsinaconstitutionalviolation);Bd.ofEduc.v.Nyquist,439N.E.2d359,366(N.Y.1982)
(holding that disparities in schooldistrict funding did not result in any constitutional
violations); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 81819, 826 (Ohio 1979) (holding that
Ohios system of education financing did not violate the Ohio Constitution); Olsen v. State,
554P.2d139,145,149(Or.1976)(affirmingtheconstitutionalityofOregonsschoolfinancing
system);Dansonv.Casey,399A.2d360,367(Pa.1979)(refusingtostrikedownthelawfully
enacted scheme by which public education is funded in Pennsylvania); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 14142 (Va. 1994) (finding that education is a fundamental
rightundertheConstitution,butnowheredoestheConstitutionrequireequal...funding);
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 57980 (Wis. 1989) (admitting, to a certain degree, a
fundamentalrightbutdenyingthatanyequalprotectionviolationexistedwithintheschool
fundingsystem).
36See,e.g.,Shofstallv.Hollins,515P.2d590,59293(Ariz.1973)(affirmingthateducationis

afundamentalright,butfindingthattheschoolfinancingsystem...meetstheeducational
mandate of [Arizonas] constitution); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 316 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that while education is a fundamental right, Minnesotas financing system was
constitutional);FairSch.Fin.Councilv.State,746P.2d1135,114950(Okla.1987)(Assuming
that education is a fundamental interest, . . . state funds do not have to be allocated to the
districtsonanequalperpupilbasis....);Scott,443S.E.2dat142(agreeingthateducationis
a fundamental right under the Constitution, but denying any unconstitutional inequality in
theschoolfinancingsystem);Kukor,436N.W.2dat580.
37See,e.g.,Hortonv.Meskill,376A.2d359,374(Conn.1977)([P]upilsinpublicschoolsare

entitledtotheequalenjoymentof[education]....);SeattleSch.Dist.No.1v.State,585P.2d
71, 95 (Wash. 1978) (holding that the Washington Constitution requires fully sufficient
funds for public schools); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (finding the
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 863

example, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme

Courtfoundeducationtobeafundamentalrightandthatthethenexisting
schoolfinancingsystemdidnotsatisfytheconstitutionalrequirementthat
the General Assembly provide an efficient system of common schools
throughout state.38 Saying so and ordering its remedy, however,does not
alwayscuretheconstitutionalviolation.
The intractable nature of the problem is demonstrated by Ohios
experience.39 In DeRolph v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the
state had failed in its constitutional responsibility to provide a thorough
and efficient system of public schools, after engaging in a thorough and
farranging recitation of the history of the state constitutions educational
provision.40Yet,demonstratingdeferencetotheGeneralAssembly,within
whom the state constitution reposed responsibility for assuring thorough
andefficientpublicschools,theCourt neverthelessstayeditsdecisionfor
one year because a new funding system will require time for adequate
study, drafting of the appropriate legislation, and transition from the
present scheme of financing to one in conformity with this decision.41 In
2002,afterallowingadditionaltimeforthelegislaturetoactinconformity
with their declaration, the Ohio Supreme Court took up the same
constitutional challenge to the states educational finance system a fourth
timeanddeclareditunconstitutionalagain,requiringacompleteeducation
overhaulbythelegislature.42

schoolfinancing system unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the West
VirginiaConstitution);WashakieCnty.Sch.Dist.No.1v.Herschler,606P.2d310,333(Wyo.
1980)(assertingthattheschoolfinancingsysteminWyomingdoesnotmeetequalprotection
interestsunderthestateconstitution).
38Rosev.CouncilforBetterEduc.,790S.W.2d186,206,21314(Ky.1989).

39SeeDeRolphv.State(DeRolphIV),780N.E.2d529,530(Ohio2002).Some,nodoubt,point

tothedifficultyofresolvingtheschoolfinanceissuethroughrepeatedinstancesoflitigation
as a demonstration of the limits and perhaps the inappropriateness of using constitutional
litigation as a method of achieving this type of reform. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Reforming
SchoolReform,68FORDHAM L. REV.257,284(2000).Yet,thedifficultyofsatisfactorylegislative
resolution and the real fiscal problems states face cannot ever excuse a constitutional
violation. When the State undertakes to provide a service, it is plainly evident that it must
offertheserviceonanequalbasistoallwhoaresimilarlysituated.Theexpense,thepolitics,
and the practical difficulties of achieving a solution should not trump a constitutional right.
DeRolphIV,780N.E.2dat530.
40DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ohio 1997). The Ohio Constitution

provides, in pertinent part, that [t]he general assembly shall make such provisions, by
taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a
thoroughandefficientsystemofcommonschoolsthroughouttheState.OHIO CONST.art.VI,
2.
41DeRolph,677N.E.2dat747.

42DeRolphIV,780N.E.2dat530.
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864 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

New Jerseys experience with schoolfinance litigation is similar to

Ohios. Nonetheless, one leading scholar of state constitutions calls
Robinson v. Cahill the most important rulingor set of rulingsin state
constitutionallawduringthelastquartercentury.43Theseriesofdecisions
intheNewJerseycase,ProfessorG.AlanTarrstates,notonlyaffecteda
majorareaofstatepolicymaking[butit]emboldenedothercourtstobase
decisions on their respective state constitutions.44 He makes this claim
because the initial decision in Robinson,45 the first of seven trips the case
madetotheNewJerseySupremeCourtwithinathreeyearperiod,46came
justthirteendaysaftertheU.S.SupremeCourtrejectedsimilararguments
in Rodriguez and encouraged others to seek vindication through state
constitutions. Despite the plaudits he rains upon Robinson, Tarr terms the
case a failure. He finds that, despite the ringing declaration of what the
NewJerseyConstitutionrequired,itfollowedratherthanstarted,aprocess
of funding equalization among New Jersey school districts, and it did
nothing discernable to speed up that process; it did not result in
substantiallyincreasedschoolfunding,anditdidnotimproveeducation.47
EvenaftertheRobinsonlitigationcametoanend,anewseriesofeducation
fundingchallengescommencedinNewJersey.48
While educationfinance litigation has had mixed success in
establishingtheprinciplethattheamountofmoneyspentperpupilaffects
the quality of education and ought to be equalized, as a constitutional
requirement, so that the wealth of a students school district does not
determine the quality of education, translating that grand principle into
realityhasprovenelusive.Yet,astheNewHampshireSupremeCourthas
discovered,orderingthatitoccurcanraisesignificantchallengestojudicial
independence. New Hampshires educationfinance litigation took place
within the context of Claremont School District v. Governor, a series of
decisions commencing in 1993.49 In that first decision, New Hampshires
Supreme Court held that the State was required to provide an adequate
education, to guarantee adequate funding, and to establish broad

43G.AlanTarr,Robinsonv.CahillandtheNewJudicialFederalism,59ALB.L.REV.1753,1753

(1996).
44Id.

45303A.2d273(N.J.1973).

46Tarr,supranote43,at1753n.1.

47Seeid.at1754.

48See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 36263 (N.J. 1990). The Abbott litigation continues to

thisday,withgreatcontroversy.SeeDianeDAmico,PendingSupremeCourtRulingCouldBoost
Aid to New Jersey Schools, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.pressofatlantic
city.com/education/pendingsupremecourtrulingcouldboostaidtonewjersey/article_e3ad
a07e5d9211e0bf6e001cc4c002e0.html.
49(ClaremontI),635A.2d1375(N.H.1993).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 865

educationalopportunitiesneededintodayssocietytopreparecitizensfor
their role as participants and as potential competitors in todays
marketplace of ideas.50 In so ruling, the court expressed confidence that
the legislature and the Governor will fulfill their responsibility.51 In the
cases return engagement, Claremont II, the court emphasized that the
fundamental right at issue is the right to a statefunded constitutionally
adequate public education. It is not the right to horizontal resource
replicationfrom school to schoolanddistrict to district.52 To guide what
the court regarded as inadequate legislative action, the court adopted
sevenbenchmarkspreviouslyarticulatedbytheKentuckySupremeCourt:
(1)communicationskills;(2)sufficientknowledgeofeconomic,social,and
political systems; (3) understanding of governmental processes; (4)
knowledge of a students mental and physical wellness; (5) grounding in
thearts;(6)academicorvocationaltraining;and(7)academicorvocational
skills.53Thebackandforthbetweenthelegislatureandthecourtcontinued,
sothatbythetimethecourtheardClaremontVII,itadoptedstandardsof
accountabilityandheldthestandardsareanessentialcomponentofthe
Statesdutyandthattheexistingstatutoryschemehasdeficienciesthatare
inconsistent with the States duty to provide a constitutionally adequate
education.54
TheissuecontinuestoroilNewHampshirespoliticalbranchestoday.
In 2007, the governor proposed, but the state House rejected, a
constitutionalamendmentthatwouldhavelimitedjudicialauthorityover
schoolfunding.55FollowingtheNovember2010election,theconstitutional
amendmentappearedtohavebeenrevived.56

50Id.at1381.

51Id.

52ClaremontSch.Dist.v.Governor(ClaremontII),703A.2d1353,1359(N.H.1997).
53Id.(quotingRosev.CouncilforBetterEduc.,790S.W.2d186,212(Ky.1989)).

54ClaremontSch.Dist.v.Governor(ClaremontVII),794A.2d744,745(N.H.2002).

55Litigation: New Hampshire, ACCESS QUALITY EDUC., http://www.schoolfunding.info/

states/nh/lit_nh.php3(lastupdatedDec.2008).
56Tom Fahey, Constitutional Amendment to End Court Role in School Funding Approved,
MANCHESTER UNION LEADER (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.theunionleader.com/article.aspx?
headline=Constitutional+amendment+to+end+court+role+in+school+funding+approved&articl
eId=5dd15747768e4cd28b402bed68639459(reportingontheconstitutionalamendmentthat
passed the New Hampshire House and was headed for Senate consideration). Taking a
similarstance,NewJerseysnewgovernor,ChrisChristie,haschallengedtherationalebehind
that states schoolfinance litigation when the state cannot afford to fund education at the
levels required by the state supreme courts prior rulings. See John Reitmeyer, Christie
ConfidentStateSupremeCourtWillSidewithHimonEducationFunding,NORTHJERSEY.COM(Mar.
24, 2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/state/politics/032311_Christie_confident_state
_Supreme_Court_will_side_with_him_on_education_funding.html.
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866 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

Schoolfinance litigation under stateconstitutions thus has takenon a

dynamic that demonstrates some of the difficulties that come from
construing a constitution that contains provisions without federal cousins
andinwhichpoliticaltensionandbudgetaryimplicationsarehigh.

II. ConstitutionalChallengestoTortReform

Another area of dynamic litigation under state constitutions involves

challengestotortreform.Whiletortreformtakesonmanyforms,57thesine
qua non of tort reform is an artificial limit on damages so that a jurys
compensatorydamage verdict is reduced, after the fact, to some number
establishedbylegislation.58 TheoldestoftheselawsisCalifornias,which
limits noneconomic damages59 in medical malpractice cases to $250,000, a
limitthathasremainedunchangedsinceitsenactmentin1976.60Othercaps
limitallcompensatorydamages,economicandnoneconomic.61
While some state courts have steadfastly held that these caps are
constitutionally valid, others have beenequally adamant that they do not
passmuster.62Forexample,theIllinoisSupremeCourtoriginallyruledthat
the states first damage cap violated the state constitutions special
legislation clause in 1976.63 A subsequently enacted damage cap was
invalidated in 1997 on separationofpowers and speciallegislation
grounds.64 Nonetheless, the Illinois legislature enacted the caps yet one
moretime,andin2010theIllinoisSupremeCourtfoundthiscapviolated

57Foralistingofvarioustortreformissues,includingabolitionofthecollateralsourcerule,

productliability reform, and juryservice reform, see ATRA Issue Pages, AM. TORT REFORM
ASSN,http://www.atra.org/issues/(lastvisitedMay16,2011).
58See, e.g., Richard E. Anderson, The Case for Legal Reform, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A

PHYSICIANS SOURCEBOOK201,21423(RichardE. Andersoned.2004)(identifying a$250,000

cap on noneconomic damages as the most important reform), available at http://www.scribd
.com/doc/37973402/MedicalMalpracticeAPhysiciansSourceBook; Robert S. Peck & Ned
Miltenberg,ChallengingtheConstitutionalityofTortReform,inAAJS LITIGATING TORT CASES
29:20(RoxanneBartonConlin&GregoryS.Cusimanoeds.,rev.ed.2009).
59Noneconomic damages cover compensation for loss of a limb, disfigurement, loss of

reproductive capacity, loss of consortium, and pain and suffering. See Noneconomic Damages
Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASSN, http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7340 (last
visitedMay16,2011).
60MedicalInjuryCompensationReformActof1975(MICRA),CAL.CIV.CODE3333.2(b)

(West2009).
61See,e.g.,IND. CODE ANN.3418143(a)(LexisNexis2008);VA. CODE. ANN.8.01581.15

(2007).
62SeeVictorE.Schwartz,Fostering MutualRespect andCooperation BetweenStateCourtsand

StateLegislatures:ASoundAlternativetoaTortTugofWar,103VA.L.REV.1,510(2000).
63Wrightv.Cent.DuPageHosp.Assn,347N.E.2d736,743(Ill.1976).

64Bestv.TaylorMach.Works,689N.E.2d1057,1081(Ill.1997).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 867

separationofpowers.65
This pattern of invalidation and reenactment has continued in a
numberofstates.Forexample,legislaturesinbothOhio66andWisconsin67
have reenacted caps after their respective high courts have declared the
previous cap unconstitutional. In two states, Louisiana68 and Texas,69 the
state constitutions were amended to permit the caps declared
unconstitutionalbythestatesupremecourt.
While thirtyseven states boast righttoaremedy or opencourts
provisionsintheirstateconstitutions,70whichprovideavaluablebasisfor

65Lebronv.GottliebMemlHosp.,930N.E.2d895,914(Ill.2010).

66In Ohio, caps were invalidated in Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ohio 1991)

(holding the $200,000 cap on general damages in medical malpractice cases violated due
process, though not equal protection) and State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward,715N.E.2d1062,1076,1101(Ohio1999)(holdingthatthestatutethatcontainedlimits
onnoneconomicandpunitivedamagesviolatedseparationofpowersandthesinglesubject
rule, while noting that such caps are also inconsistent with the right to trial by jury).
Subsequently,theOhioGeneralAssemblyenactedanothernoneconomicdamagescap,which
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007
Ohio6948,880N.E.2d420,at4042.Foradetailedaccountoftheongoingwarfarebetween
aprotortreformOhiolegislatureandastatesupremecourtthatpreviouslystruckdownthe
enacted measures, see Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform Versus State
ConstitutionalMandates,32RUTGERSL.J.1045,1047(2001).SeealsoStephenJ.Werber,OhioTort
Reformin1998:TheWarContinues,45CLEV. ST. L. REV.539,57677(1997);StephenJ.Werber,
OhioTortReformVersustheOhioConstitution,69TEMP.L.REV.1155,1199(1996).
67InWisconsin,noneconomicdamagecapswereinvalidatedonequalprotectiongrounds

inFerdonexrel.Petrucelliv.Wis.PatientsCompensationFund,2005WI125,187,284Wis.2d
573,701N.W.2d440,491,butweresubsequentlyreenacted.WIS. STAT. ANN.655.017(West
2010).Todate,nochallengetothenewcapshasbeenmounted.
68The Louisiana Supreme Court declared that a $500,000 cap on general damages

recoverable in personal injury cases against the state when sovereign immunity is waived
violatedtherighttoaremedyclauseinthestateconstitutioninChamberlainv.State;then,the
stateadoptedaconstitutionalamendmenttoauthorizethecap.624So.2d874,884(La.1993),
supersededbyconstitutionalamendmentLA.CONST.art.XII,10(c)(amended1995).
69In Texas, the supreme court held that a $500,000 cap violated the state constitutions

opencourtsguarantee.Lucasv. UnitedStates,757S.W.2d687,690(Tex.1988),supersededby
constitutionalamendmentTEX. CONST.art.III,66(amended2003).WhentheTexaslegislature
decided to enact a new damage cap in 2003, an amendment to the state constitution was
added to prevent that precedent from being a vehicle for invalidating the new cap. See TEX.
CONST.art.III,66(amended2003).
70See JENNIFERFRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS,AND DEFENSES347n.11(2ded.,Michie1995).Oneadditionalstate,NewMexico,has
found such a guarantee implicit in its state constitution. See Richardson v. Carnegie Library
Rest.,Inc.,763P.2d1153,1161(N.M.1988),overruledinpartonothergroundsbyTrujillov.City
ofAlbuquerque,1998NMSC031,32,125N.M.721,965P.2d305.Forabriefdiscussionof
thehistoryantecedenttotherighttoaremedy,seeRobertS.Peck,TortReformsThreattoan
IndependentJudiciary,33RUTGERSL.J.835,839n.14(2002).
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868 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

challenging these damage caps,71 it is perhaps helpful to consider the

treatment state courts have given their provision, guaranteeing a right to
trial by jury.72 Jury trial constitutional provisions are usually read to
providejurieswiththesameauthoritytheyexercisedatcommonlawatthe
timethestateconstitutionwaspromulgated.73TheSeventhAmendments
analogue guarantee of a right to jury trial in civil cases is similarly
evaluatedunderahistoricaltesttiedtothecommonlaw.74Yet,advocates
challengingdamagecapswereunabletoinvoketheSeventhAmendment
because it has never been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendmentandmadeapplicabletothestates.75

71SeeBoswellv.Phx.Newspapers,Inc.,730P.2d186,194(Ariz.1986),cert.denied,481U.S.

1029 (1987) (holding that retraction in lieu of damages in defamation actions violates state
opencourts provision); Smith v. Dept of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam)
(holding that a $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages recoverable in actions for personal
injuryviolatesopencourtsandjurytrialprovisions);Chamberlain,624So.2dat988(holding
that a $500,000 ceiling on general damages recoverable in a personal injury suit against the
State violates right to remedy where sovereign immunity has been waived); Trovato v.
DeVeau,736A.2d1212,1216(N.H.1999)(upholdinga$50,000caponwrongfuldeathclaims
wherenodependantrelativesurvivesviolatesrighttoaremedyandequalprotection);Lucas,
757S.W.2dat690(findingthatthestatutelimitingliabilityto$500,000fordamagesinmedical
malpracticeactionsviolatedopencourtsguarantee).
72OnlyColoradoandLouisianafailtoprovideaconstitutionalrighttoajurytrial.SeeKaitz

v.Dist.Court,650P.2d553,554(Colo.1982);Duplantisv.U.S.Fidelity&Guar.Ins.Corp.,342
So. 2d 1142, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 1977). The other states constitutions provide for a jury trial.
See,e.g.,WIS.CONST.art.I,5.
73See,e.g.,Lakinv.SencoProds.,Inc.,987P.2d463,468(Or.1999)([W]hatevertherightto

ajurytrialinacivilcasemeantin1857[atthetimetheOregonConstitutionwasadopted],it
has the same meaning today.); Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Ferguson, 979 P.2d 1107, 1113
(Haw. 1999) ([A]rticle I, section 13 preserves the jury right that existed under the common
lawofthisstateatthetimethattheHawaiiConstitutionwentintoeffectin1959.);Deptof
Revenuev.PrintingHouse,644So.2d498,500(Fla.1994)(holdingthattheinviolatejurytrial
rightpreservedintheFloridaConstitutionis the sameastherightenjoyedat thetimethis
statesfirstconstitutionbecameeffectivein1845(quotingInreForfeitureof1978Chevrolet
Van,493So.2d433,434(Fla.1986))).
74See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting Balt. &

Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ([W]e have understood that [t]he
rightoftrialbyjurythuspreservedistherightwhichexistedundertheEnglishcommonlaw
whenthe[Seventh]Amendmentwasadopted.)).
75See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 90, 91 (1875); see also City of Monterey v. Del

MonteDunesat Monterey,Ltd., 526U.S.687,719(1999);Palkov.Connecticut,302U.S.319,

320(1937),overruledonothergroundsbyBentonv.Maryland,395U.S.784(1969).Recently,the
U.S.SupremeCourtheldthattheSecondAmendment,longorphanedfromtheIncorporation
DoctrineliketheSeventhAmendment,qualifiedforincorporationandthuswasapplicableto
the states. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 303436, 3046 (2010). Under the
modern standard for incorporation articulated by the McDonald Court, the Seventh
Amendmentshouldqualifyforincorporation,asitisfundamentaltoourschemeofordered
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 869

Thus,advocateschallengingdamagecapsasinconsistentwiththeright
to a jury trial have relied exclusively on state constitutional guarantees,
with mixed results. For example, Ohios constitution guarantees an
inviolate right to trial by jury,76 a formulation common to many state
constitutions.77 In aseries of decisions, the OhioSupreme Court held that
determining the amount of damages is a function constitutionally
committedtojuries,ratherthanjudgesorlegislators.Thus,thecourtheld
that the right to a jury trial included within it the right to have a jury
determineallquestionsoffact,includingtheamountofdamagestowhich
the plaintiff is entitled.78 Any deviation from that approach was found
unconstitutional. For example, a statute that delegated the assessment of
punitive damages to the judge, rather than the jury, was held
unconstitutional.79Similarly,astatutethatauthorizedjudgestoorderthat
paymentsfor future damages, which exceed $200,000, be paid inperiodic
installmentsratherthaninalumpsum,uponentryofjudgmentwasalso
found violative of the jurytrial right. Those future payments are already
reduced to present value by the jury, and the periodpayment provision
amountstoafurtherreductionofthejurysaward.80
In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated an omnibus tort reform
law, which included caps on noneconomic and punitive damages. In
describing the caps obvious conflict with the jurytrial right, the court
treatedthecapsascreatingacruelillusionofcompliancewiththejurytrial
right by allowing the jury to determine damages but denying the litigant
thebenefitofthatdetermination.81Suchanapproachtolimitingdamages,
the courtadded,stands on no better constitutionalfooting thanone that
precludesthejuryfrommakingthedeterminationinthefirstinstance.82
Nonetheless, the Ohio legislature enacted a cap on noneconomic
damages once again. When the cap came up for review in the Ohio
Supreme Court, the courts new majority found the new cap sufficiently
differentfromthepreviousenactmentstoavoidtheblanketapplicationof

liberty and system of justice, . . . deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition, . . . .
[and] fundamental from an American perspective. Id. at 3034, 3036, 3046 (quoting
Washingtonv.Glucksberg,521U.S.702,721(1997)).
76OHIOCONST.art.I,5.

77See,e.g.,GA.CONST.art.I,1,XI.

78Sorrellv.Thevenir,633N.E.2d504,510(Ohio1994).

79Zoppov.HomesteadIns.Co.,644N.E.2d397(Ohio1994),cert.denied,516U.S.809(1995).

80Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied sub. nom.

Damianv.Galayda,516U.S.810(1995);cf.Sorrell,633N.E.2dat510(holdingthatdeductionof
collateralbenefitsfromjuryaward,interalia,violatesrighttotrialbyjury).
81Stateexrel.OhioAcad.TrialLawyersv.Sheward,715N.E.2d1062,1091(Ohio1999).

82Id.
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870 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

staredecisisandtowarrantafreshreview.83Thecourtconcededthatthe
extentofdamagessufferedbyaplaintiffisafactualissue,[so]itiswithin
the jurys province to determine the amount of damages to be awarded,
andtheconstitutionalguaranteeclearlyprotectsthisfactfindingfunction
from outside interference.84 Still, the court continued, [s]o long as the
factfindingprocessisnotintrudeduponandtheresultingfindingsoffact
are not ignored or replaced by another bodys findings, awards may be
alteredasamatteroflaw.85
A jurys factual determination that the proper compensation of
noneconomic harms caused by a tortfeasor is $750,000 should not be
susceptible,bylegislativefiat,ofbeingreducedto$250,000,orthreetimes
economic damages up to $350,000, as the Ohio cap statute provides.86
Nonetheless, the court found that the legislatures requirement that the
damageawardbereducedwasmerelytheapplicationoflawtothejurys
verdictafterthejuryhadcompleteditsjob.87Asexamplesoflawsthattreat
a jurys verdict similarly without offending the constitutional right, the
court listed judicial authority over remittitur88 and laws that treble
damages.89 Other courts upholding damage caps have used the same
construct,essentiallyassertingthatthecapismerelytheapplicationoflaw
tothefactfindingofthejuryafterithascompleteditsjob.90
That reasoning, which ignores the fact that a plaintiff is entitled to
reject a remittitur and insist instead upon a new jury trial91 and confuses

83Arbinov.Johnson&Johnson,116OhioSt.3d468,2007Ohio6948,880N.E.2d420,at

24.
84Id.at3435.

85Id.(emphasisomitted).

86OHIOREV.CODEANN.2315.18(West2010).

87Arbino,116OhioSt..3dat37.

88ForanargumentonhowremittiturviolatestheSeventhAmendment,seegenerallySuja

A. Thomas, ReExamining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64

OHIOST.L.J.731,733(2003).
89Arbino,116OhioSt..3dat3839.

90See,e.g.,Kirklandv.BlaineCnty.Med.Ctr.,4P.3d1115,1120(Idaho2000)([Plaintiffs]

hadajurytrialduringwhichtheywereentitledtopresentalloftheirclaimsandevidenceto
the jury and have the jury render a verdict based on that evidence. That is all to which the
right to jury entitles them.); Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 183 (Mich. 2004)
(Plaintiffs right to a jury trial is not implicated. She has had a jury trial and the jury
determined the facts of her case. The jurys function is complete.); Adams v. Childrens
Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992) (Here, the jury assessed liability and then
determined damages, both economic and noneconomic. With that the jury completed its
constitutionaltask.).
91See, e.g., Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (per curiam)
([R]equiringtheDistrictCourttoenterjudgmentforalesseramountthanthatdeterminedby
the jury without allowing petitioner the option of a new trial, cannot be squared with the
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 871

theapplicationofthejurytrialrighttocommonlawcausesofactionextant
at the time the constitution was promulgated with statutory causes of
action that exist only as a matter of legislative grace, is emphatically
rejected by courts that have found the cap to violate the jurytrial right.
Thus,theOregonSupremeCourt,adoptingastancepreviouslytakenbyits
counterpartinWashington,declaredthattreatingthejurysjobcompleteat
verdicttoapplyacapmerelypayslipservicetotheformofthejurybut
robstheinstitutionofitsfunction.92
The Oregon Supreme Court, after tracing the history of the jurytrial
right,wentontostate:
Althoughitistruethat[theOregoncapstatute]doesnotprohibit
a jury from assessing . . . damages, to the extent that the jurys
award exceeds the statutory cap, the statute prevents the jurys
awardfromhavingitsfullandintendedeffect.Weconcludethat
to permit the legislature to override the effect of the jurys
determinationof...damageswouldviolateplaintiffsrightto
TrialbyJuryguaranteedin[theOregonConstitution].Limiting
the effect of a jurys . . . damages verdict eviscerates Trial by
Juryasitwasunderstoodin1857and,therefore,doesnotallow
thecommonlawrightofjurytrialtoremaininviolate.93

As the Florida Supreme Court has put it, a plaintiff has not received
theconstitutionalbenefitofajurytrialaswehaveheretoforeunderstood
that right when a jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped.94 More
recently,theGeorgiaSupremeCourtreachedasimilarconclusion,finding
thatthecapclearlynullifiesthejurysfindingsoffactregardingdamages
andtherebyunderminesthejurysbasicfunction.95
Interestingly, both sides of this debate invoke federal cases to bolster
their view. Those seeking to uphold damage caps cite a U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Tull v. United States, for the proposition that the
assessmentofcivilpenalties...cannotbesaidtoinvolvethesubstanceof
acommonlawrighttoatrialbyjury,norafundamentalelementofajury
trial.96Infact,applyingTulltoadamagecapchallenge,theFourthCircuit

Seventh Amendment.); Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 166 N.E. 186, 19091 (Ohio 1929)
([N]either the trial court nor any reviewing court has the power to reduce the verdict of a
jury or to render judgment for a lesser amount without the consent of the party in whose
favor the verdict was rendered to such reduction, otherwise a reduction under such
circumstancesinvadestheprovinceofthejury.)
92Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 473 (Or. 1999) (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard

Corp.,771P.2d711,721(Wash.1989)).
93Id.

94Smithv.DeptofIns.,507So.2d1080,108889(Fla.1987).

95AtlantaOculoplasticSurgery,P.C.v.Nestlehutt,691S.E.2d218,223(Ga.2010).

96481U.S.412,42627(1987).
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872 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

held that once the jury has made its findings of fact with respect to
damages,ithasfulfilleditsconstitutionalfunction;itmaynotalsomandate
compensationasamatteroflaw.97
However, Tull involved a civil penalty under the Clean Water Act, a
lawwithoutacommonlawanaloguepredatingtheSeventhAmendment.
Inasubsequentdecision,applyingitsSeventhAmendmentjurisprudence
for commonlaw causes of action, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
declaredTullinapposite.98InFeltnerv.ColumbiaPicturesTelevision,Inc.,a
copyrightdispute,99thedefendantsuccessfullyarguedthathewasentitled
to a jury determination, even though the plaintiff opted for statutory,
rather than actual, damages.100 The plaintiff responded that statutory
damages were equitable in nature and that the Constitution does not
provide a right to a jury determination of the amount of the award. The
FeltnerCourtrejectedthatargument,foundthatmonetaryreliefislegalnot
equitable,andheldthattheassessmentofdamagesincommonlawactions
are peculiarly within the province of the jury,101 that if a party so
demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of... damages.102 It
addedthatanyotherapproachtofinalizingtheawardofdamageswould
failtopreservethesubstanceofthecommonlawrightoftrialbyjury,
asrequiredbytheConstitution.103
Thebattlesovertheconstitutionalityoftortreformmeasures,suchas
caps on damages in personal injury cases, will no doubt continue. Often,
with a religiouslike fervor not merited by empirical results, legislatures
will continue to reenact damage caps even after declarations of
unconstitutionality.104 Judges who strike such caps will become targets in
states that elect their judiciaries.105 Yet, even more so than in the school

97Boydv.Bulala,877F.2d1191,1196(4thCir.1989).

98SeeFeltnerv.ColumbiaPicturesTelevision,Inc.,523U.S.340,341(1998).

99Copyrightactionshaveacommonlaworigin.Id.at348(notingthatpriortoratification

of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes in England and this country
grantedcopyrightownerscausesofactionforinfringement).
100Id.at355.

101Id.at353(quotingDimickv.Schiedt,293U.S.474,480(1935)).

102Id.at355.

103Id.

104SeeLeonardJ.Nelson,IIIetal.,DamageCapsinMedicalMalpractice,85MILBANK Q.259,

26364(2007);seealsosupranotes6667andaccompanyingtext.
105Justice Alice Robie Resnick, who wrote the Sheward decision striking down Ohios

omnibus tortreform measure, subsequently faced what the Columbus Dispatch called the
dirtiestjudicialraceinOhiohistory.JoeHallett,OfficialsPonder aVaccinefor ViciousJudicial
Campaigns, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 2001, at 2B. After merely joining the majority in
Lebron,whichstruckdownthestatesmostrecentcap,IllinoisChiefJusticeThomasKilbride
successfully rebuffed an extraordinarily expensive campaign orchestrated by the U.S.
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 873

financing arena, courts have a duty to determine these issues. Here,

however,theexistenceofacognateprovisionintheU.S.Constitution,even
if the U.S. Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the issue,
allows for a dialogue between courts that enriches the constitutional
debate.

III. SameSexMarriage

Perhapsnomorefascinatingmodernstateconstitutionaldevelopment
exists than the battle over samesex marriage. Advocates of samesex
marriage have engaged in a carefully orchestrated, statebystate battle to
achieve theirgoal,utilizing a constitutional litigation strategy that recalls,
insomeways,thefederaleffortssomeseventyyearsagooftheJehovahs
Witnesses.106 That group, brandishing the First Amendment, brought
multiple cases that slowly not only allowed them to engage in activities
theybelievedtobereligiouslymandatedbutadvancedreligiousliberty,107
freedom of speech,108 and freedom of conscience109 for all. A
countermovementhassuccessfullyamendedstateconstitutionstoprohibit
samesexmarriages.110
The strategic approach in favor of samesex marriage unfolded
slowly.111Earlyforaysintothefield,whichbuiltconstitutionalgloss,were

ChamberofCommercetodefeathisefforttoberetained.AnnKnef,JusticeKilbridePrevailsin
Costly Ill. Retention Election, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM (Nov. 3, 2010, 1:12 AM), http://www.legal
newsline.com/news/229640justicekilbrideprevailsincostlyill.retentionelection. Though a
change in the courts membership provides no principled reason to abandon stare decisis,
electoraljudicialpoliticsseekspreciselythatchange.
106SeegenerallyMERLINO.NEWTON,ARMEDWITHTHECONSTITUTION:JEHOVAHSWITNESSES

INALABAMAANDTHEU.S.SUPREMECOURT,19391946,at45(1995)(describingtheirapproach
intheirfightforFirstAmendmentprotectionofreligiousexercise,aswellasofspeechand
press).
107See,
e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (upholding the right of
religiousproselytizingagainstachargeofincitingabreachofthepeace).
108See,e.g.,Murdockv.Pennsylvania,319U.S.105,110(1943)(upholdingtherightofdoor

todoorreligiousproselytizerstocanvasswithoutpayingalicensetax).
109See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (upholding the

righttorefusetoparticipateinamandatoryflagsaluteceremony).
110See Marriage & Relationship Recognition: Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.

hrc.org/issues/marriage/marriage_laws.asp(lastvisitedMay16,2011).
111Severalfailedattemptstochallengelawslimitingmarriageweremadeinthe1970s.See,

e.g.,Jonesv.Hallahan,501S.W.2d588,590(Ky.1973);Bakerv.Nelson,191N.W.2d185,186
(Minn.1971);Singerv.Hara,522P.2d1187,1197(Wash. Ct.App. 1974).Anotherattemptin
Hawaiiintheearly1990sverynearlysucceeded.InBaehrv.Lewin,852P.2d44,5960(Haw.
1993), superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, 23 (amended 1998), the Hawaii Supreme Court
cautiously ruled that, absent a showing of compelling interest, the denial of samesex
marriage unconstitutionally discriminated as a sexbased classification. After the case was
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firstmadeinchallengingtheconstitutionalityofantisodomylaws,where
advocates found success in the states112 after an initial defeat in the U.S.
SupremeCourt,whichlateroverturneditsownadversedecision.113
On the marriage issue, Vermont became an early successful
battleground for the advocates. Invoking the Vermont Constitutions
common benefits clause,114 advocates challenged the law that permitted
only oppositesex couples to marry.115 In Baker v. State, the Vermont
supreme court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The opinion described at
lengththehistoryofthecommonbenefitsguarantee,reviewedthecaselaw
interpretingthatprovision,andconsideredtheprovisionssimilaritiesand
differences with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.116
Findingthemultitieredanalysisusedbythefederalcourtstoevaluate
equalprotectionclaimsinappropriate,thecourtthenadoptedarelatively
uniform standard, reflective of the inclusionary principle at [the common
benefits clauses] core.117 That standard looks at what part of the
community is disadvantaged by a law and whether the government has
shownthattheexclusionisreasonablynecessaryinordertoaccomplishits
claimedobjectives.118Amongthefactorsconsideredindeterminingwhatis
reasonablynecessaryarethesignificanceofthebenefitsandprotectionsof
the challenged law;... whether the omission of [some] members of the
community... promotes the... stated goals; and... whether the
classificationissignificantlyunderinclusiveoroverinclusive.119
Onthisbasis,thecourtheldthatexcludingsamesexcouplesfromthe
benefits accorded married couples violated the state constitution.120 It

remanded to the trial court to consider any evidence of a compelling state interest, a
constitutional amendment approved by the voters foreclosed final judicial resolution. See
HAW.CONST.art.I,23(amended1998).
112See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492, 502 (Ky. 1992) (Simply
becausethemajority,speakingthroughtheGeneralAssembly,findsonetypeofextramarital
intercourse more offensive than another, does not provide a rational basis for criminalizing
thesexualpreferenceofhomosexuals.).
113Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.

558, 564 (2003). Bowers invited states to consider whether their own constitutions would
sustain such laws. See id. at 19394 (tracing the ancient roots of antisodomy laws and
indicatingthenumberofstatesthatstillretainsuchlaws).
114VT.CONST.ch.1,art.7.

115Bakerv.State,744A.2d864,867(Vt.1999).

116Id.at86977.

117Id.at878.

118Id.

119Id.at87879.

120Id.at867.
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 875

furtherfoundthatalegislativefixthateitherprovidedformarriageorfor
civil unions would satisfy the constitutional injunction.121 The Vermont
Legislatureadoptedacivilunionlaw.122
Evenso,theseismicwavescausedbyasamesexmarriagedecisiondid
not come until Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts
case that held that the state may not deny the protections, benefits, and
obligationsconferredbymarriagetoindividualsofthesamesexwhowish
to marry.123 Thus, the court recognized that marriage provides an
abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits, as well as weighty
legal,financial,andsocialobligations.124Thecourtheldthatthemarriage
ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal
protection.125Indoingso,itrejectedtheStatesprofferedrationalesforthe
ban: (1) providing a favorable setting for procreation; (2) ensuring the
optimalsettingforchildrearing,whichthedepartmentdefinesasatwo
parentfamilywithoneparentofeachsex;and(3)preservingscarceState
and private financial resources.126 The Massachusetts decision did not
allowcivilunionstobesubstitutedformarriage.127
ThebreakthroughGoodridgedecisiondidnotnecessarilyfindaccordin
other states, some of which found the rationales the Massachusetts
SupremeJudicialCourtrejectedtobeentirelysatisfactory.TheWashington
Supreme Court, for example, applied a rationalbasis test and narrowly
concluded that limiting marriage to oppositesex couples furthers the
States interests in procreation and encourag[es the creation of] families
with a mother and father and children biologically related to both.128 A
NewYorkdecisionsimilarlyconcludedthatthelegislaturecouldrationally
assumethatchildrenwilldobestwithamotherandfatherinthehomeand
employ the legal recognition of that fact as an inducement to form
oppositesexhouseholds.129
Thus, while courts have been divided in their conclusions about the

121Baker,744A.2dat886.

1222000Vt.Acts&Resolves72.
123Goodridgev.DeptofPub.Health,798N.E.2d941,948(Mass.2003).
124Id. at 948. The court also labeled the benefits accessible only by way of a marriage

license[as]enormous.Id.at955.
125Id.at961.

126Id. The court found that the procreation rationale could not be given much credit

because neither procreation nor fertility were requirements for marriage, that the optimal
setting rationale had to give way to considerations about the changing nature of families
today, and that the preservation of financial resources had little to do with marriage. Id. at
961,96364.
127Seeid.at948.

128Andersenv.KingCnty.,138P.3d963,985(Wash.2006)(enbanc).

129Hernandezv.Robles,855N.E.2d1,7(N.Y.2006).
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876 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|855

constitutionality of laws limiting marriage to oppositesex couples,130 and

some states have foreclosed such judicial rulings,131 the issue has largely
playedoutasamatterofstateconstitutionallaw.

CONCLUSION

Criticsoftengrousethatjudgesreadtheirpersonalpolicypreferences
into the law, rather than construe the law properly. The complaint,
usuallymadebythosewhodisagreewiththeresultinaparticularcase,is
notonlylodgedagainststatejudiciaries,butalsofindstractionincriticism
directedatthefederaljudiciary,includingtheSupremeCourtoftheUnited
States.
Whenstatecourtsreachconclusionsbasedontheirstateconstitutions
that are at odds with comparable federal cases, the decisions are
particularlyvulnerabletothecriticismthattheyareresultoriented,rather
than principled. Critics who assail state constitutional law as endlessly
elastic so as to be stretched at will by state high court judges to achieve
results at odds with those announced by the U.S. Supreme Court fail to
appreciatetheinterpretativeenterprisethatstatejudgesmustundertake.132
Atthesametime,theyerroneouslyassumethatconclusionsreachedunder
theFederalConstitutionmustbeacceptedasimmutablefromconstitution
toconstitutionasthoughtheyaretheproductofadivinewill.133

130Compare Kerrigan v. Commr of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008) (finding

restrictions against samesex marriage unconstitutional), and Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862,906(Iowa2009)(holdingthatdenialofsamesexmarriageviolatesequalprotection),with
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the constitutionality of
samesex marriage restrictions), and Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 634 (Md. 2007)
(upholdingrestrictionsonsamesexmarriage).
131See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, 15; MO. CONST. art. I, 33. After Californias Supreme

Courtfoundthatthestateconstitutiondidnotpermitmarriagetoberestrictedtooppositesex
couples in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), the states voters approved a
constitutional amendment that overruled the court. CAL. CONST. art. I, 7.5; Perry v.
Schwarzenegger,704F.Supp.2d921,92729(N.D.Cal.2010),appealfiled,628F.3d1191(9th
Cir. 2011). A subsequent federal lawsuit successfully argued that the state constitutional
amendmentviolatedtheU.S.Constitution.Id.at100304.
132As Oregon Justice Hans Linde observed, a demand that each states court reach

whatever desired result courts in other states have reached, in the common law manner of
generic judgemade formulas, denies significance to the lawmaking act of choosing and
adopting the constitutional provisions on which claims of unconstitutionality rest. Hans A.
Linde,AreStateConstitutionsCommonLaw?,34ARIZ.L.REV.215,229(1992).
133Professor Paul Kahn has argued that the unique state sources of law, such as its

historyandtext,arelessimportantthantheintercourtdialogueaboutbroaderconstitutional
meanings, at least when momentous constitutional issues are at stake. See Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1993).
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2011 When the U.S. Constitution is Not Enough 877

As with construing any constitutional provision, neutral principles

must guide the interpreter. Necessarily, the interpretive enterprise is one
that must rely on text, where a states constitution can differ from,134 or
contain guarantees not included in,135 its federal counterpart. The two
constitutions may include identical language, but the fact that the state
constitutional provision was adopted in an era when a particular
understanding of the right at issue prevailed may dictate a different
result.136 As Professor Lawrence Sager has noted, [s]tate judges confront
institutional environments and histories that vary dramatically from state
tostate,andthatdiffer,inanyonestate,fromthehomogenized,abstracted,
nationalvisionfromwhichtheSupremeCourtisforcedtooperate.137
Thethreeareasbrieflyexaminedhereschoolfinance,tortreform,and
samesex marriageexemplify some of the issues and problems state
courts face in developing a principled jurisprudence that is true to their
states organic document. Schoolfinance litigation forces courts to plumb
the depths of education clauses in the context of equal protection and
determine the extent that constitutions (and courts) can address unequal
educationalopportunitythatisaproductofdistrictwealthandasystemof
school finance that relies heavily on property taxes. Because of state
preeminenceontheissueandthelackofcognateprovisionsintheFederal
Constitution,thebattlesappearwhollyappropriateforstatedecisionsthat
candivergefromthesingularfederalprecedent.
Thebattlesovertortreform,whichgototheheartofwhatcourtsdo,138
raisetheapplicabilityoflongstandingandfamiliarconstitutionalconcepts
involving access, remedies, and juries in the context of modern litigation.
Selfimposedfederallimitsontheapplicabilityoffederalconcepts,suchas

WhileKahnsapproachdoesnottreatanysingulardecisionasauthoritative,itseesallcourts
construingconstitutionsengagedinacommondiscourse.Ofcourse,nojudgehaswarrantto
ignore the specific constitutional text or other interpretative tools that help explicate the
questionpresented.
134CompareWASH. CONST.art.I,11(Nopublicmoneyorpropertyshallbeappropriated

fororappliedtoanyreligiousworship,exerciseorinstruction,orthesupportofanyreligious
establishment....),withU.S. CONST.amend.1(Congressshallmakenolawrespectingan
establishmentofreligion....).
135See,e.g.,ILL. CONST.art.X,1(TheStateshallprovideforanefficientsystemofhigh

qualitypubliceducationalinstitutionsandservices.);MD. DECL.OF RTS.art.46(Equalityof

rightsunderthelawshallnotbeabridgedordeniedbecauseofsex.).
136See,e.g.,Statev.Gunwall,720P.2d808,812(Wash.1986)([H]istoryoftheadoptionofa

particularstateconstitutionalprovisionmayrevealanintentionthatwillsupportreadingthe
provisionindependentlyoffederallaw.).
137LawrenceGeneSager,Foreword:StateCourtsandtheStrategicSpaceBetweentheNormsand

RulesofConstitutionalLaw,63TEX.L.REV.959,97576(1985).
138SeePeck,supranote70,at843.
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the right to a jury trial, to state courts open the door to independent
conclusionsbasedonstateconstitutions.
Finally, the battle over samesex marriage places state courts and
constitutions in the vanguard of determining modern constitutional law,
eitherthroughcourtdecisionortextualamendment,inmuchthewaythat
earlier state cases139 and constitutional provisions140 paved the way for
what we now recognize as federal constitutional law. The dynamics of
independent state constitutional interpretation plainly enrich the overall
constitutionaldialogue.

139Seesupranotes1617andaccompanyingtext.

140 State constitutional texts provided models that federal framers utilized in drafting the

U.S.Constitution.SeeWILLIAMS,supranote21,at71.