SUCCESSION ROUND 11

PARTITION
Arts. 1078-1087, 1089-1105

JLT AGRO V BALANSAG

Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and had two kids namely Josefa
and Emilio.
After her death, he married Milagros Teves and they had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose
Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro Teves.
Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement.
When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of land known as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The
property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given
other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial areas, and the
house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian.

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with
Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner).
Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental
Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of petitioner.
The appellate court ruled that the supplemental deed, conveying ownership to JLT agro is not
valid because the Compromise Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julians two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively
adjudicated to them and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court in
holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it contained a prohibited preterition of Don
Julians heirs from the second marriage.

ISSUE: (A.) Was there preterition in the case? (B) Whether or not the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated
and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian

HELD:
(A) None. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his
legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.
(B) As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even
future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,
considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from
the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the supplemental deed in
favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass
to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.

DIZON-RIVERA V DIZON
In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate
children and 1 legitimate granddaughter.
Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants
Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7
compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included
real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceaseds estate
 In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her testamentary
disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her entire estate
among her heirs.
Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less
the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where Marina
and Tomas were to receive considerably less
The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court
cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy
which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

SSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The
words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the
trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will,
amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors,
heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion
for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the
decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in
accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be
divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real
property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs."

CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete
their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the
decedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of
partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants
whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the
same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors'
proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to
Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of
her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her
clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and
that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne
out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in
this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I
bequeath to said deceased."

ALSUA-BETTS V CA

FACTS
- On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all
their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson,
and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial ,
over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Florentina.
- On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separately executed their
respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the
extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949.
- On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending
and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On Feb. 19, 1957, their respective holographic wills and the
codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
- Doa Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic and instructed his
attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on Nov. 14, 1959
contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of Jan. 5, 1955 and the codicil of Aug.14, 1956; a
statement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken
into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain
specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future,
before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
- Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will of Nov. 14, 1959,
filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the CFI Albay and was docketed as.
Oppositions thereto were filed by respondents Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. CFI allowed the the probate of the will of
Don Jesus Alsua.
CA reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two sales subject of the complaint and
ordered the defendants-petitioners, to pay damages to the plaintiffs-private respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WON CA erred in denying the probate of the will

HELD
YES
- CA erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus
being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could
not revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or
dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a
partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be
given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
- Upon careful examination of the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doa Tinay, there was no indication
whatsoever that Doa Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free
portion of her share in the conjugal assets.
- Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 and had in fact
conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Doa
Tinay, which CA sustained. However SC ruled that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his previous
holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is
clear: "A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void."
There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil
previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated
- The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated
otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free
portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.
- If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot and
may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so.

CHAVEZ V IAC

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which (1) annulled the sale
made by Manuela Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez and the
subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the earlier deeds of sale
signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct.

The land in question is the paraphernal property of Petitioner Manuel Buenavista who had six (6)
children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the
plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,
executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.
Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her
mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same
price of P450.
Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the
same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion,
Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the
land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
In all the documents, there was a stipulation that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or
distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas,
Barrio Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under
Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at P1,630.00.
The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land and the
enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier,
Manuela Buenavista, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her
daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez.
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother
Manuela and their sister Raquel.
Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer with right to repurchase.
Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the preliminary
injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court did not award
damages.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez
and Gerardo Jimenez and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio,
and declaring further that the documents are evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE
WON the IAC erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act inter vivos considering that examining
the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista

HELD
NO
RATIO
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos
or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the
compulsory heirs.

While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a
case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code). Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person
two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a
partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the
law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may
even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of
the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will
recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties
as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground
that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
REASONING
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina
and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in
question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but
also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a
contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and
gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from denying and repudiating
the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to
disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)

ARROGANTE V DELIARTE

A conjugal property of the spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria Placencia who had nine
children, including herein respondent Beethoven Deliarte and petitioner Fe Deliarte Arrogante.
The other petitioners, Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr., all surnamed Arrogante, are
the children of Fe and, thus, nephews of Beethoven. Respondent Leonora Duenas is the wife of
Beethoven.
A series of misfortunes struck the Deliarte family.
The first tragedy occurred when a brother of Beethoven and Fe was hospitalized and
eventually died in Davao. Beethoven shouldered the hospitalization and other related expenses,
including the transport of the body from Davao to Cebu and then to Daanbantayan.
a year after, when Gregoria was likewise hospitalized and subsequently died on July
29, 1978. Once again, Beethoven paid for all necessary expenses. Soon thereafter, it was Bernabe,
the parties ailing father, who died on November 7, 1980. Not surprisingly, it was Beethoven who spent
for their fathers hospitalization and burial.
In bet the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe: the Deliarte siblings agreed to waive and convey in favor
of Beethoven all their rights, interests, and claims to the subject lot in consideration of P15,000.00.
At the signing of the deed of absolute sale, the siblings who failed to attend the family
gathering, either because they were dead or were simply unable to, were represented by their
respective spouses who signed the document on their behalf.
Bernabe, who was already blind at that time, was likewise present and knew of the
sale that took place among his children.
from then on, Beethoven occupied and possessed the subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the
concept of owner. He exercised full ownership and control over the subject lot without any objection from all
his siblings, or their heirs, until 1993 when the controversy arose.
In fact, on March 26, 1986, all of Beethovens siblings, except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of
sale in favor of Beethoven to ratify the 1978 private deed of sale.
PETITIONERS:
the petitioners averred that Beethoven does not own the whole of the subject lot because Bernabe
was still alive in 1978 when Beethovens siblings sold to him all their rights and claims to and interests in that
lot. Thus, the siblings could sell only their respective inheritance from one-half of the subject lot, representing
Gregorias share in the conjugal property. Corollarily, the petitioners claimed that Fe continues to own 1/9 of
one-half of the subject lot, comprising Bernabes share of the property, which allegedly was not contemplated
in the conveyance in 1978. According to petitioners, this contention is supported by Fes failure to sign the
deed of confirmation of sale in 1986.
RTC rendered a Decision quieting title on the subject lot in favor of respondents
CA affirmed the trial courts decision
courts upheld the validity of the 1978 sale as between the parties. Considering that petitioner Fe
signed the document and consented to the transaction, she is now barred from repudiating the terms thereof.
In this regard, the RTC and the CA applied the parole evidence rule and allowed the introduction of evidence
on the additional consideration for the conveyance, namely, the expenses incurred by Beethoven during the
three tragedies that had befallen the Deliarte family.

ISSUES:
1. Is the Deed of Sale in 1978 valid?
2. Is the parole evidence rule applicable to this case?

HELD:
1. The 1978 private deed of sale, insofar as it disposed of Bernabes share in the conjugal partnership
prior to his death, is void for being a conveyance of the Deliarte siblings future inheritance.
Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void.
The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of
the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
right which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the contract was entered into, succession to Bernabes estate had yet to be opened, and the
object thereof, i.e., Bernabes share in the subject lot, formed part of his children inheritance, and the children merely
had an inchoate hereditary right thereto.

True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future inheritance admits of exceptions, as when a person partitions his
estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil Code. However, the private deed of sale does not purport to
be a partition of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the application of Article 1347. Nowhere in the said
document does Bernabe separate, divide, and assign to his children his share in the subject lot effective only upon his
death. Indeed, the document does not even bear the signature of Bernabe.
The 1978 deed of sale, albeit void, evidenced the consent and acquiescence of each Deliarte sibling to said
transaction. They raised no objection even after Beethoven forthwith possessed and occupied the subject lot.

The foregoing arrangement, vaguely reflected in the void deed of sale, points to a meeting of the minds among the
parties constitutive of an innominate contract, akin to both an onerous and a remuneratory donation. [21] In this regard,
Bernabes waiver and relinquishment of his share in the subject lot is effectively a donation inter vivos to his children.
However, the gratuitous act is coupled with an onerous cause equal accountability of the Deliarte siblings for the
hospitalization and death expenses of deceased family members to be taken from their shares in the subject lot. In
turn, the remunerative cause pertains to Beethovens recompense for the family expenses he initially shouldered.
During his lifetime, Bernabe remained the absolute owner of his undivided interest in the subject lot. Accordingly, he
could have validly disposed of his interest therein. His consent to the disposition of the subject lot in favor of
Beethoven, agreed upon among his children, is evident, considering his presence in, knowledge of, and acquiescence
to the transaction. Further, the arrangement was immediately effected by the parties with no objection from Bernabe or
any of the Deliarte siblings, including herein petitioner Fe.
2. The parole evidence rule is applicable. While the application thereof presupposes the existence of a valid
agreement, the innominate contract between the parties has been directly put in issue by the respondents. Verily, the
failure of the deed of sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties supports the application of the parole
evidence rule.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the absence of Bernabes signature in the 1978 deed of sale is not necessarily
conclusive of his dissent or opposition to the effected arrangement. As previously adverted to, the agreement had
multiple causes or consideration, apart from the P15,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. To repeat, the agreement
between the parties had both an onerous and a remunerative cause. Also worthy of note is the moral consideration for
the agreement given the relationship between the parties.

ALEJANDRINO V CA
the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in
Mambaling, Cebu
Upon demise of the Alejandrino spouses; the property should have been divided among their
children with each child having a share of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of the
Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
(total of 219 sqm)
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square meters of
Gregorios share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriacos share and 12.17 square meters of Abundios share
thereby giving her a total area of 97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square
meters.
It turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private
respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square meters
from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio through Laurencia, 12.17 square meters
from Abundio also through Laurencia and 36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area
of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters of the property)
later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against private respondent
Nique.
Laurencia filed civ case against Nique but was dismissed in favor of Nique
Laurencia applealed to CA but withdrew under Rule 50
Mauricia also filed a civ case against Nique:
 alleged that private respondent Nique never notified petitioner Mauricia of the
purchase of 121.67 square meters of the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did he give petitioner
Mauricia the preemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the same lot.
Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed before the Court of
Appeals. In due course, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on
August 25, 1993.
As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia manifested her willingness to deposit
with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the acquisition cost of the portion purchased by
private respondent Nique.; that Mauricia laso demanded from Nique

Meanwhile: CIV CASE filed by NIque: a motion for the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion of the
property that had been declared by the trial court as his own by virtue of purchase., which was granted
Nique owning 146 sqm and Mauricia 75sqm:(Exh. '16', Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
par. 1) (underscoring supplied), and that the parties assure each other and their successor in interest
that a right of way of two meters is granted to each party by the other permanently (Exh. '16', par. 2).
This partition is signed by the parties and their witnesses. Although not notarized, it is certainly valid
as between the parties, Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino, being an immediate party, may not renege on this.

ISSUE:
whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to
a third party.

HELD:
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons.
Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro
indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share
in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the
Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the
object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a
co-owned property shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership, the Court said:
x x x (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in
the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere
part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on
the elementary rule that `no one can give what he does not have
 `x x x since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The legality of Laurencias alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was
settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case had become final and executory with
Laurencias withdrawal of her appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of
the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect calling
for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may
only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the
third person designated by the testator.
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title.
As there is no pending administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino spouses can only
be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on
the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the
order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not deny
the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its
validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia evidence their
intention to partition the property. It delineates what portion of the property belongs to each other.
That it was not notarized is immaterial in view of Mauricias admission that she did execute the deed
of extrajudicial settlement. Neither is the fact that the trial court only mentioned the existence of such
document in its decision in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. That document was formally offered in
[16]
evidence and the court is deemed to have duly considered it in deciding the case. The court has in
its favor the presumption of regularity of the performance of its task that has not been rebutted by
petitioner Mauricia. Neither may the fact that the other heirs of the Alejandrino spouses, named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio did not participate in the extrajudicial settlement of estate
affect its validity. In her amended complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia
herself admitted having acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her brothers.
On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her rights over portions she
had acquired from her brothers to private respondent Nique. The sale was made after the execution of
the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate that private respondent himself witnessed. The
extrajudicial settlement of estate having constituted a partition of the property, Laurencia validly
transferred ownership over the specific front portion of the property with an area of 146 square
meters.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order for the segregation
of the property. In so doing, it was merely reiterating the partition of the property by petitioner
Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate.
The order may likewise be deemed as a clarification of its decision that had become final and
executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper execution of the decision be rendered futile.

ANCOG V CA

The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio Yap
and Rosario Diez.
In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario, and children, petitioners Jovita
Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap ashis heirs.
Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed
land, which was annotated on its OCT.
When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering the land as security, the banks lawyer, Atty. Serna,
suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the
approval of her application.
The suggestion was accepted. The extrajudicial settlement, which was prepared by
Atty. Serna, was signed by the heirs, with the exception of Gregorio, Jr., then only a minor.
 After the document was notarized, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued. Upon the
execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land.
She brought an ejectment suit against Jovitas husband and son to evict them from
the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent.
Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario had offered the land for sale. She informed her younger
brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an action for partition.
As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition against their mother, she was impleaded as
a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void.
They claimed that in signing the instrument, they did not really intend to convey their
interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain the loan on these curity of the
land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees and for household repairs.

Issue: 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against petitioners?2.) Whether or
not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the property?

Held:
1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The record reveals that there was an
intention on the part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their interest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that
they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan.Under Art. 1082, CC, every act which is intended to
put an end to in division among co-heirs is deemed to be partition even though it should purport to be a sale,
an exchange, or any other transaction.

2.)No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At the time the extrajudicial settlement
was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration
of the land in his mothers name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC, which provides that
when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust
is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resulting trust arises
where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and
circumstances existing at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. For prescription to run in
favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved
by clear and conclusive evidence.A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years
from the time when the trust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must be counted from the date of
issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration
Decree. Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by
Jovita of their mothers effort to sell the property, his claim cannot be considered barred either by
prescription or by laches.

TUASON V TUASON

Doctrine: Supreme Court found no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. Supreme Court
find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel
held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year
1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the
partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the
Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period
not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the
four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

The sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a
parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion.
Nieves wanted and asked for the partition of the common property, but failing in this, she offered to
sell her 1/3 portion.
The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. It
was offered to their mother but the mother declined to buy, saying that if the property increased in value, she
might be suspected of having taking advantage of her daughter.
Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., domestic corporation and a new
certificate was issued covering the same property.
The three owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the
proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. (Agreement is embodied in the Memorandum of
Agreement).
Atty. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of Angela
 Tuason and Antonio Tuason and at the same time was the member of the Board of Director of the third co-
owner, Araneta Inc.
Contract stated that the three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing
roads and curbs on the same and then subdivided it into small lots for sale.
ARANETA INCS DUTIES
-It was to finance the whole development and subdivision
-It was to prepare a schedule of prices and conditions of sale, subject to the approval of the two other co-
owners
-It was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided
-Execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale
-It was also to pay the real estate taxes
-To furnish each of the two co-owners copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and
collections made thereon
Angela Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her lawyer J. Antonio Araneta.
Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
Memorandum and abuse of powers granted to it in the document.
Thus, she had decided to rescind said contract and asked that the property held in
common be partitioned.

Angela filed a complain asking the court to order the partition of the property in question and she be
given 1/3 of the same including rents.
She had been tricked into signing it
She was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that
said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale
entered into Gregorio Araneta and the heirs of D. Tuason
But it turned out that the contracts were widely different from each other
from the first contract.
FIRST CONTRACT: The terms of contract is more favorable to the owners therein and less
favorable to the Araneta Inc.
Atty. Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was
one of the officials of Araneta Inc.,
That the defendant company did not previously show the plans of subdivision, the schedule of
prices and conditions of sale
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. infringed the terms of the contract for:
It failed to make the necessary improvements on the property
It failed to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and conditions under which
the subdivided lots are to be sold
To furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plants
The Brother Antonio Tuason did not agree to the suit and its purpose for he evidently did not agree to
the suit and its purpose for he joined Araneta Inc. as a co defendant
TRIAL COURT ruled that the complaint be dismissed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2 contracts are different which may lead to rescission?
Whether there is a ground for partition of property?
HELD: No. Both contracts are similar and practically the same.
RATIONALE:
The Supreme Court ruled that the copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a
broker and both had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage
in entering into the contract; that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc., being a member of
the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that contract was executed, he was not the party with which Angela
contracted and that he committed no breach of trust. The act of Atty. Antonio Araneta in giving the
plaintiff a copy of the contract before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts.

With respect to the charged that the defendant corporation failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivisions plans
x x x the Court ruled that it has no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff
periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount
corresponding to her but without justifiable reason, refused to accept them because of that attitude the company
thought it was useless for the corporation to continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and other things.
So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided lots without the approval of the
plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the
majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the agreement,
the general rule is that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for
such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).
PARTITION: Supreme Court found no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. Supreme Court
find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel
held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year
1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the
partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the
Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period
not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the
four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

BAUTISTA V GRINO-AQUINO

Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of
extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.
Based on the parties stipulation of facts:
The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under
TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966, a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and
the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although
petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition. Upon registration of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was
issued. The private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale,
T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista.
On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other
private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-
15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents. Petitioner Manuel
Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo. Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana
Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949. the property in question was
the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the
late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the
Extrajudicial Partition of Property. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the
questioned signature of Manuel Bautista. The NBI concluded that the questioned document was
authentic.
The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. CA affirmed

ISSUE
WON the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased
wife

HELD
NO
RATIO
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left
by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent
certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void
ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of
the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of
the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial
partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the
property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of
Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would
wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that
he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister
to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must
be rescinded.
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance of the title in their names,
private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the
latter in whose name the title was also issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by
Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private respondents in whose names the respective titles were
thus subsequently issued. This series of transactions between and among private respondents is an indication of a
clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner,
Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law. 3
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel
Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same property between and
among the private respondents are also null and void. Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners'
right to sue their co-owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even assuming that the present action
may prescribe as ruled by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista who are not
parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only soon before they filed the complaint in
court. Certainly the action has not prescribed.

LEGAL REDEMPTION
Art. 1088

HERMOSO v CA

GARCIA V CALALIMAN

- Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land Iloilo.

O n his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late
brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
- A group of heirs signed a document entitled Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale. In the same document, the
heirs transferred the land to Spouses Calaliman.
- The document was inscribed in the RD of Iloilo.
- 2 weeks after, another group of heirs sold to Spouses Calaliman their shares, rights, interest and participation in the
same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the RD of Iloilo.
- 5 months after, some of the heirs (petitioners herein) filed a case for legal redemption of the of the land which was
sold by their co-heirs to Spouses Calaliman.
- The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordering defendants to resell the property.
- However, the CA reversed the decision and ordered for the dismissal of the complaint.
- Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether petitioners exercised their right of redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088.

- YES. The SC reversed the decision of the CA and reinstated the decision of the trial court.
- No notification in writing was ever received by petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of some of their
coheirs in the parcel of land they inherited from the late Gelacio Garcia.
- Also, the SC held untenable the argument of respondents that the requirement that the notice must be in writing is
deemed satisfied when petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and saw for himself,
read and understood the contents of the deeds of sale.
- By citing another case, the Court did not consider the registration of the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds
sufficient notice, most specially because the property involved was unregistered land.
- Thus, the SC held that petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
- The SC also declared that petitioners can claim attorney's fees for bad faith on the part of respondents, first, for
refusing redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire land as theirs, although they knew some heirs had not sold
their shares.
- In the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written
notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided
for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular
form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
- In the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period provided in Art. 1088 has not
even begun to run.

ALONZO V IAC

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name
of their deceased parents.
One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale.
 A year later, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements,
the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
the portions sold to them.
The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen.
Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial
court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty
days from notice of the sales.
Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And
there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question
and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of
it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to
give effect to the law makers will.

MARIANO V CA

Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao.

In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan.
Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo,
Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina,
Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo.
Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for
recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.
RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of
said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?

HELD:
No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs
during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner
does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it
will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors,
the 30-day period has not even begun to run.