l

lCayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution
provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
 Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The advertisements
complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of ractice of lawis laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely
a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
lIN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of
a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved
with hazing which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where
he applied a probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court.
He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for
a petition to allow him to take the lawyer oath of office and to admit him to
the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated. The court
note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was
terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer oath office and admit
him to the practice of law.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court
upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members,
keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public
and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by
the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has
become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of
individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known
Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer
oath, sign the Roll of Attorney and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
lAGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
without the latter engaging respondent services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that ractice of lawmeans any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege.
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a
full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty.

Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, irateda client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in
support of Atty. Linsangan allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano calling card which appears
as follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
ParalegalBACK

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied
authorizing the printing of such calling cards.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional
services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer should not steal another lawyer client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By
recruiting Atty. Linsangan clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted
he actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was
connected to his law office. Through Labiano actions, Atty. Tolentino law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Labiano calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will
finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the client case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept
a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a
personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished
with severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was
suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.

lAlawi v Alauya
January 31, 2016Thinker Bell

Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
Through Alawi agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One
of her grounds was Alauya usurpation of the title of ttorney,which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, ttorney,by the assertion that it is exically
synonymouswith ounsellors-at-law.a title to which Shari lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of ttorneybecause ounselloris often mistaken
for ouncilor,konsehalor the Maranao term consial,connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:
He can . The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya use of the title of ttorney,this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered ounsellors,in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an ttorney.The title of ttorneyis reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction

lBlandina Hilado vs Jose Gutierrez David

April 23, 2014
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84 Phil 569 Legal Ethics Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was
represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and
he thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said
that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing
Hilado story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that
later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that
however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his
firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado;
that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared
a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit;
that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read
the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm
cannot take on Hilado case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no
confidential information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the
Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her
right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court
for four months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and
Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the
latter consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must
be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity
as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client preliminary
statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as
when he is drawing his client pleadings, or advocating his client cause
in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does
not matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-
client relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other
representations against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but
was only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was
the real author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client
by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his
associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty.
Francisco filed his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The
length of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be
disqualified, based on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does
not prescribe. Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment.

lMercedes Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez

vs Judge Gregorio Lantin
4 SCRA 219 Legal Ethics Counsel Assertiveness
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter failure
to pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor.
The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k.
This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more
than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he
amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the
sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damaso 210 shares of stock approximately worth
P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to
enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC
ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous
petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme
Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by
their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they
claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that f
there was delay, it was because petitionerscounsel happened to be more assertive . . .
a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD: No. A counsel assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a
lawyer insistence despite the patent futility of his client position, as in the case at
bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client propensity to litigate. A
lawyer oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

lADELINO H. LEDESMA vs. HON.

RAFAEL C. CLIMACO G.R. No. L-
23815 June 28, 1974

FACTS:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte of one of the accused when he was appoi
nted as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections. He then filed a motion
withdrawing as such, but Judge Climaco denied it and appointed him as counsel d
e officio for the two defendants. Again, Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw
on the ground that his appointment requires full time, but the Judge still denied i
t. Consequently, the defense obtained 8 postponements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio
considering his appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:
No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the welfare of the a
ccused could be prejudiced as stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgad
o in these words: Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill i
n the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ig
norant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so impl
emented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise a
n accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one
de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own.
It has to be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened wit
h conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the pr
ofession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. However, the ad
monition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that t
here are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes pre
cedence over the promptings of self-interest.

lPETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE

FIRM NAME YCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ
& CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME YCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner name in a
professional firm name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area,
which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already passed
away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and
client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name
for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm
reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property.Thus, it has been stated that he use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely
on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,

quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or

the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international

or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,

instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any

penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or

higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest

may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the

consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the

practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall

not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special

courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the

Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil

Service Law.
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. Citizens of the United States of
America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the
Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines,
do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are
enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district
court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory
certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946,
and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without
examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two
preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law
for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and
recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or
school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a
law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public
and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the
following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court
the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not
embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required
by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to
practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing.
Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court
in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the
examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected
to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political
Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation;
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and
Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. Persons taking the examination shall not bring
papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof,
in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from
anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his
answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the
questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall
be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the
City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The
subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and
Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed
by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman,
and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall
hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the
official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during
examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The
candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the
same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken
in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In
determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per
cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and
International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as
soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The
examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in
interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times
shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled
in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the
candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and
the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has
been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of
the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record
be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll
shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws
of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses
only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent
with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and
to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any
man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person
may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power
of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose,
whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear
in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall
be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing,
and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by
the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may
be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He
may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the
attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the
client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of
Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved
and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had
full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if
upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it
appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect
the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient
cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney
employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is
allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred
pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital
offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to
appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has
an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues
submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and
may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the
same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.

lIN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney
in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court
139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension
for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition
to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment
is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction
over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to
pay their annual dues.

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of
the law was, n Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in
the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
1The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3The law is an encroachment on the Court primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission
to the practice of law.