FIRST DIVISION motion.

motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
[G.R. No. 136804. February 19, 2003]

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL MA. SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
GUERRERO, respondent.
Public documents are:
DECISION

CARPIO, J.: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

The Case
x x x.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of Appeals [1] Decision of August 24, 1998
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving
and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 [2] affirming the trial courts denial of petitioners motion for partial
foreign law:
summary judgment.

The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC for
brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized
conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New
York law and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the
issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Banks argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to
move with the supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the Walden
affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the
parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must
still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa The Issues
Waldens affidavit (Walden affidavit for brevity) stated that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
authenticated the Walden affidavit.

The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and
July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC
Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of
Appeals denied the Banks motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY
NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS HEARSAY AND
THEREBY CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x.[3]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the
stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
 Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a
trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as hearsay. The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since
Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden
affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such
event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[4]
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?[5]
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.[6]
A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal
trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is
seeking damages for what he asserts as illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, a
returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account. In its Answer,
the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than
actual.Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Banks
answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court.However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for partial summary
judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the
contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are
substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in
dispute.[7] The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial
court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. [8]Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. [9] Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law
applies to Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1)
an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy
must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals[10] which held that:
x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al.,
upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the
State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal
properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derrings
California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was
offered in evidence by respondents.Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered. Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to
support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular
foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified
in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but
also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
3. In New York, [n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded both in
tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove actual
damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal
damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use
the phrase temperate damages in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase in all published New York cases, and
have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs many aspects of a Banks relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
Guerreros claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful dishonor. However,
the UCC states that justifiable refusal to pay or accept as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check for reasons
such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a forgery, 3-510, Official Comment 2. .. to the Complaint, MHT
returned the check because it had no signature card on . and could not verify Guerreros signature. In my opinion, consistent with the
UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that neither
consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law. UCC 4-103
further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New York
common law, which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful
dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction
Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dept 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of
Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National
Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d
387, 390 (3d Dept 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dept 1976).Damage to reputation is
also not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the
performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck v.
Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dept 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were the type that would naturally arise from the breach
and if they were brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to
contracting. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N.Y.
32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees unless they are provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179
A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dept
1991). There is no statute that permits attorneys fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with
malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of chester[11]_v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dept 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110
A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dept 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by
defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,
179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of
contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance
Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept 1978).[12]
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the
alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court
decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the
U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records
or decisions of foreign courts.
The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the
failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did
not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York
law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent
provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term may as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory.[13]
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden
affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although he
did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because
the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the
veracity of the statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if
Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the
movant.[14]
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the
Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden
affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Banks motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not
be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing
and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has
successfully defeated the very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated
December 14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
[1]
Twelfth Division composed of Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (ponente), Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Mariano M. Umali. Manila

[2]
Entitled Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank, Petitioners, versus Hon. Hermogenes R. Liwag, Presiding Judge, FIRST DIVISION
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, and Rafael Ma. Guerrero, Respondents.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 8-9. G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
[4]
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180 (1999).
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,
[5]
Diman v. Alumbres, 299 SCRA 459 (1998). vs.
[6]
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
Paz v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 26 (1990).
[7]
National Irrigation Administration v. Gamit, 215 SCRA 436 (1992). PADILLA, JR., J.:
[8]
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000).
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's
[9]
Ibid. complaint to enforce the judgment of a Japanese court. The principal issue here is whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction
[10]
over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation
296 SCRA 539 (1998). at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.
[11]
Illegible.
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
[12]
Rollo, pp. 26-30. Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Manila, a judgment
[13] rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation
Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 (1990). incorporated under Philippine laws.
[14]
Natalia Realty Corporation v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 (1989).
As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision of 10 November 1993, 1 the following are the factual and procedural
antecedents of this controversy:

On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan branch,
entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to
sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of
the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for
collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.

On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan
against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma,
Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a
person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in
Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980.

On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept
the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the defendant.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the the case here because the defendant was served with summons in the Philippines and not
complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the in Japan.
Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through
diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila.
Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on July 11, 1989 moved for reconsideration of the decision, filing at
the same time a conditional Notice of Appeal, asking the court to treat the said notice of appeal "as in effect
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276, after and upon issuance of the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration."
Records). Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo
Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the
Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration to which a Reply dated August 28, 1989 was filed by the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum
plaintiff.
from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed (pp. 12-14, Records).

On October 16, 1989, the lower court disregarded the Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to the
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not
plaintiff's Notice of Appeal. 3
having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait 4 wherein it
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the
was held that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by
judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54. 2
serving him beyond the boundaries of the state." To support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:

On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to be
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of summons within the forum is
enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper
required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA
notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp. 41-45,
230). To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant not
Rec.).
extraterritorial service is necessary (Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 739).

Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the merits. After the plaintiff rested its case, defendant
But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the collection suit filed is an action in personam, it is its theory that a
on April 21, 1989, filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds:
distinction must be made between an action in personam against a resident defendant and an action in
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said
personam against a non-resident defendant. Jurisdiction is acquired over a non-resident defendant only if he is
judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of law. Plaintiff filed
served personally within the jurisdiction of the court and over a resident defendant if by personal, substituted or
its opposition after which the court a quo rendered the now assailed decision dated June 21, 1989 granting the
constructive service conformably to statutory authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the defendant-
demurrer motion and dismissing the complaint (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In granting the demurrer
appellee maintains branches in Japan it is considered a resident defendant. Corollarily, personal, substituted or
motion, the trial court held that:
constructive service of summons when made in compliance with the procedural rules is sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction to render judgment in personam.
The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that this is an action in
Such an argument does not persuade.
personam; the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant be served with summons in
Japan in order for the Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served outside the territorial limits of the
Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction of the court from which it issues (Carter vs. Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201) and this is regardless of
jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at the residence or citizenship of the party thus served (Iowa-Rahr vs. Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC,
bar. Boudard versus Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff contends that the Japanese Court NS, 292, Am. Case 1912 D680). There must be actual service within the proper territorial limits on defendant or
acquired jurisdiction because the defendant is a resident of Japan, having four (4) someone authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a resident or not in the forum where
branches doing business therein and in fact had a permit from the Japanese government to the action is filed, must be served with summons within that forum.
conduct business in Japan (citing the exhibits presented by the plaintiff); if this is so then
service of summons should have been made upon the defendant in Japan in any of these
But even assuming a distinction between a resident defendant and non-resident defendant were to be adopted,
alleged four branches; as admitted by the plaintiff the service of the summons issued by
such distinction applies only to natural persons and not in the corporations. This finds support in the concept
the Japanese Court was made in the Philippines thru a Philippine Sheriff. This Court
that "a corporation has no home or residence in the sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons"
agrees that if the defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign
(Claude Neon Lights vs. Phil. Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited by the defendant-appellee in its
court such court could acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but it must be
brief:
served upon the defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court. Such is not
 Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural person, and can be predicated on an artificial being only by more
or less imperfect analogy. Strictly speaking, therefore, a corporation can have no local residence or habitation. It
has been said that a corporation is a mere ideal existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law an
invisible being which can have, in fact, no locality and can occupy no space, and therefore cannot have a
dwelling place. (18 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v. Hartfold F. Ins.
Co., 13 Conn 202)
Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or domestic character of a corporation is to be determined by the place of
its origin where its charter was granted and not by the location of its business activities (Jennings v. Idaho Rail
Light & P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of the state in which it
is incorporated and no other (36 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 49).
Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation duly organized under the Philippine laws. Clearly, its residence
is the Philippines, the place of its incorporation, and not Japan. While defendant-appellee maintains branches in
Japan, this will not make it a resident of Japan. A corporation does not become a resident of another by
engaging in business there even though licensed by that state and in terms given all the rights and privileges of a
domestic corporation (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co. vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248, 4 S Ct. 401).
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-resident corporation. As such, court processes must be served upon
it at a place within the state in which the action is brought and not elsewhere (St. Clair vs. Cox, 106 US 350, 27
L ed. 222, 1 S. Ct. 354). 5
It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was null and did not
confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was void.
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending that the respondent court
erred in holding that SHARP was not a resident of Japan and that summons on SHARP could only be validly served within that
country.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. 6
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 7Being the party
challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an
attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines
was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by
the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 8 In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It
may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. 9Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law
on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no
such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is
without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. 11
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance
Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the
service. 12
SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of process upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Superintendent of
Banks, and the Insurance Commissioner, as the case may be, presuppose a situation wherein the foreign corporation doing business in
the country no longer has any branches or offices within the Philippines. Such contention is belied by the pertinent provisions of the
said laws. Thus, Section 128 of the Corporation Code 13 and Section 190 of the Insurance Code 14 clearly contemplate two situations:
(1) if the corporation had left the Philippines or had ceased to transact business therein, and (2) if the corporation has no designated
agent. Section 17 of the General Banking Act 15 does not even speak a corporation which had ceased to transact business in the
Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This
silence could only mean, or least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or on
any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. The respondent, however, insists that only service of any of its officers
or employees in its branches in Japan could be resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent court, two attempts at service
were made at SHARP's Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On the first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the
person authorized to accept court process, was in Manila. On the second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept the summons because,
according to him, he was no longer an employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the
officers or agents of SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not preclude service upon
the proper government official, as stated above.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office
in the Philippine's after the two attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to
cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan
sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the
same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign
Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is
equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of
the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water. 17
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court sustained the trial court's reliance on Boudard vs. Tait 18where this Court held:
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment,
must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country
against a resident of this country having no property in such foreign country based on process served here, any
effect here against either the defendant personally or his property situated here.
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into another, and although a nonresident
defendant may have been personally served with such process in the state or country of his domicile, it will not
give such jurisdiction as to authorize a personal judgment against him.
It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Nieto 19 and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 20 as well as the principle laid down
by the Iowa Supreme Court in the 1911 case of Raher vs. Raher. 21
The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard involved the enforcement of a judgment of the civil division of the Court of
First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China. The trial court dismissed the case because the Hanoi court never acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant considering that "[t]he, evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee [the
defendant] nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard
had never, at any time, been his employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid resulting in the failure of the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in an action in personam was the service of summons through publication
against non-appearing resident defendants. It was claimed that the latter concealed themselves to avoid personal service of summons
upon them. In Dial, the defendants were foreign corporations which were not, domiciled and licensed to engage in business in the
Philippines and which did not have officers or agents, places of business, or properties here. On the other hand, in the instant case,
SHARP was doing business in Japan and was maintaining four branches therein.
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the past. In that case, a divided Supreme Court of Iowa declared that the
principle that there can be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render a personal judgment against anyone upon service made
outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of residents and non-residents. The principle was put at rest by the United States
Supreme Court when it ruled in the 1940 case of Milliken vs. Meyer 22 that domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent
defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service or
personal service without the state. This principle is embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which allows service of
summons on residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the country. The rationale for this rule was explained
in Milliken as follows:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.
The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile
may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant
right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That
relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges
incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is
amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against him. 23
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. 24 In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a
corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation. 25
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in which it has offices
and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction and apropos thereto, it may be necessery to quote what we stated in State
Investment House, Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit:
The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands"
as that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law . . . or residents of the state under the laws of which
they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains
no definition of the term, resident, or any clear indication of its meaning. There are however other statutes,
albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity, from which enlightening notions of the term may be derived.
The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the term "'resident foreign corporation' applies to a foreign
corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines," as distinguished from a "'non-resident foreign
corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in trade or bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec. 20, pars. (h) and
(i)].
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. 1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries, affiliation,
extension offices or any other units of corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign
country operating in the Philippines shall be considered residents of the Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].
The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places "branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign
banks . . . (which are) called Philippine branches," in the same category as "commercial banks, savings
associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which
have been formed and organized under Philippine laws), making no distinction between the former and the
latter in so far as the terms "banking institutions" and "bank" are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the
contrary that in "all matters not specifically covered by special provisions applicable only to foreign banks, or
their branches and agencies in the Philippines, said foreign banks or their branches and agencies lawfully doing
business in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws, rules, and regulations applicable to domestic banking
corporations of the same class, except such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the creation, formation,
organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix the relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of
members, stockholders or officers of corporation. [Sec. 18].
This court itself has already had occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine Advertising
Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a
civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment
against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the
Code of Civil Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other
 words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that the the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the Philippines and is consequently and complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party
not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered
Costs against the private respondent.
a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed
out that:
SO ORDERED.
. . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly
licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act Padilla, Bellosillo, Quaison and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely out of line with this
Footnotes
policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner,
and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied
not only with every requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but in 1 Annex "A" of Petition. Per Associate Justice Antonio M. Martinez; concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio
addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. . . . C. Garcia and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.

Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the status 2 This is Civil Case No. 83-17637.
of domestic corporations, subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in the
country.
3 Rollo, 28-31.

The same principle is recognized in American law: that the residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a
residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate functions . . .;" that it is considered as dwelling "in the 4 67 Phil. 170 [1939].
place where its business is done . . .," as being "located where its franchises are exercised . . .," and as being
"present where it is engaged in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation licensed 5 Rollo, 32-34.
to do business in a state is a resident of any country where it maintains an office or agent for transaction of its
usual and customary business for venue purposes;" and that the "necessary element in its signification is locality
of existence." [Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 493]. 6 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments 1237 (1969).

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit 7 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments 1237 (1969).
against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving 8 JOVITO R. SALONGA, Private International Law, 100, 1967 3rd ed.; 16 Am Jur 2d Conflict of laws 125
process. 27 (1979).

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption
but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. We find no
evidence that would justify an award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damaged. There being no such proof presented by NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be adjudged in its favor.
9 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compedium, vol. 2, 1989 ed., 526, citing In re Estate of Johnson,
39 Phil. 156 [1918] and Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]; EDGARDO L. PARAS, Philippine Conflict of
Laws, 1984 ed., 45, citing Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 [1922] and Sy Joc Lieng vs. Syquia, 16
Phil. 137 [1910].
10 Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472 [1917]; International Harvester Co. vs. Hamburg-American Line,
42 Phil. 845 [1918]; Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30 [1948]; Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. Fisher, 1 SCRA 93 [1961].

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in sustained the
trial court's dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST
11 Poizat vs. Morgan, 28 Phil. 597 [1914]; H.B. Zachry Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106989, 10 May
1994.
12 Section 190, Insurance Code; Section 17, General Banking Act; Section 128, Corporation Code.
 Should there be no person authorized by the corporation upon whom service of summons, processes, and all
legal notices may be made, service of summons, processes, and legal notices may be made upon the
Superintendent of Banks and such service shall be as effective as if made upon the corporation or upon its duly
authorized agent. (Emphasis supplied).

13 It reads:
16 Decision of the Court of Appeals, 2; Rollo, 29.

Sec. 128. Resident Agent; service of process. . . . Any such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and
17 Appellee's Brief, 18.
file with the Securities end Exchange Commission an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper
authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
18 Supra note 4 at 174-175 (citations omitted).
. . . if at any time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or
shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any summons or other 19 125 SCRA 758 [1983].
legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any
business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or
20 161 SCRA 737 [1988].
other legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that
such service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized
officers of .the corporation at its home office. (Emphasis supplied). 21 150 Iowa 511, 129 NW 494.

14 It reads: 22 311 U.S. 457.

Sec. 190. . . . Any such foreign corporation shall, as further condition precedent to the transaction of insurance 23 Id., at 463-464 (citations omitted).
business in the Philippines, make and file with the Commissioner an agreement or stipulation, executed by the
proper authorities of said company in form and substance as follows:
24 18 A Jur. 2d Corporations 159 (1965).

. . . if at any time said company shall leave the Philippines, or cease to transact business
25 36 48 Jur 2d Foreign Corporations 32 (1968).
therein, or shall be without any agent in the Philippines on whom any notice, proof of
loss, summons, or legal process may be served, then in any action or proceeding out of
any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any notice 26 203 SCRA 9, 18-20 [1991].
provided by law, or insurance policy, proof of loss, summons or other legal process may
be made upon the Insurance Commissioner, and that such service upon the Insurance
Commissioner shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the company. 27 36 Am Jur 2d Foreign Corporations 516 (968).
(Emphasis supplied).

15 It provides:

Sec. 17. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 Republic of the Philippines While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to
SUPREME COURT accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting
Manila to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was
duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and
filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,
EN BANC
appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this
connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930 proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make
the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been
made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix
on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the
probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal.
We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the
allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as
certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction
do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws
of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the
petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West
Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty
of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted
of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the
Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 9403. November 4, 1914. ]
ALLAN A. BRYAN ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EASTERN & AUSTRALIAN S. S. CO., LTD., Defendant-Appellant.
Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher, for Appellant.
Southworth, Hargis, Adams & Jordain for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. SHIPPING; TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS AND BAGGAGE FROM HONGKONG TO MANILA; LAW OF CONTRACT.
A contract made in Hongkong for the transportation of persons and baggage from Hongkong to Manila will be construed according
to the law of the Colony of Hongkong and will be enforced in the Philippine Islands in accordance with that law, provided it is not in
violation of a law or the public policy of the Philippine Islands.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF CARRIER. A contract printed in legible type upon the back of a ticket
purchased in Hongkong for the transportation of purchaser and his baggage to Manila, limiting the liability of the carrying company
with respect to purchasers baggage, is, according to the law of that colony, a valid and binding contract even though the attention of
the purchaser is not specially drawn thereto at the time of purchase, and will be so regarded here provided it does not violate a law or
the public policy of the Philippine Islands.
3. ID., ID.; ID., ID. A contract printed in legible type upon the back of a ticket purchased in Hongkong for the transportation of
purchaser and baggage to Manila, providing that "the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or damage to or detention,
or overcarriage of luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever unless it has been booked and paid for as freight" is valid and binding
in the Colony of Hongkong upon the purchaser of the ticket. Such a stipulation, however, does not, according to the law of that colony,
relieve the carrying company from liability for negligence of its servants by which the baggage of the passenger is lost or damaged.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Such a limitation, according to the law of the Colony of Hongkong, is strictly construed against the carrier and
will not, by construction or interpretation, be held to include an exemption from damages by negligence.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DAMAGES. Therefore, when the baggage of a passenger who has purchased a ticket with the
limitation as to liability above set forth, is injured or destroyed in Manila by the negligence of the carriers servants, the passenger is
entitled, under the lex loci contractus, to recover for the damages caused thereby in spite of the limitations upon the carriers liability
as above set forth.
6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE. Where it appears undisputed that the usual and customary method of unloading baggage from a ship is by a
rope or wire net attached to a rope running over the end of a crane, which net completely surrounds and incloses the baggage and
thereby prevents it from escaping, or by means of a cargo chute running from the deck of the ship to the pier, it is negligence for a
carriers servants, in unloading the baggage of a passenger, simply to wrap a single rope about the center of the pieces of baggage, and,
suspending the same by a rope running over the end of a crane, swing it over the water; and where said baggage, by reason of such
negligent handling, slips from the rope so attached and falls into the water, the carrier is responsible for the damages naturally and
ordinarily flowing from such negligence.
7. EVIDENCE; FOREIGN STATUTES. This court is not, by reason of the opinion expressed by an expert witness as to the law of
a foreign country, precluded from advising itself from other sources as to the law of that country.
DECISION
MORELAND, J. :
This is an action to recover P1,915.30 damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in handling the
plaintiffs baggage, whereby it fell into the sea and was injured or destroyed.
The plaintiffs wee passengers on the streamer St. Albans, which, at the time herein complained of, was the property of the defendant
corporation and was engaged in carrying freight and passengers between Shanghai, China, and Manila, Philippine Islands. It arrived in
Manila on the morning of the 7th of January, 1913. Shortly after its arrival plaintiffs baggage was taken out of the hold of the ship for
the purpose of being placed on the dock alongside of which the vessel was berthed. The baggage was placed in a sling, consisting of a
single rope wound once around the trunks, and was swung from the side of the vessel. While still several feet above the wharf, the
employee of the defendant company who was operating the winch, by some act or other, permitted the baggage to drop with great
rapidity. in its passage downward it struck the side of the ship with such force as to release it from the sling and it dropped into the
water alongside of the ship. The damages are stipulated at P1,188.
The defendant, while admitting the damage caused to plaintiffs baggage, denied that it was the result of the companys negligence and
set up as a special defense the limitation of liability established by the contract under which the defendant undertook to transport the
plaintiffs from the city of Hongkong to Manila.
The record shows that on or about the end of December, 1912, the plaintiffs bought of the defendants agent in Shanghai two first-
class tickets for Manila, which entitled steamship St. Albans. The tickets delivered to them were in English, which language plaintiffs
read with ease and understand perfectly, and bore on their face, in large print, a statement that they were issued subject to the
conditions printed on the back. One of these conditions, printed in legible type, was as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This ticket is issued by the company and accepted by the passenger subject to the following conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The company will not hold itself responsible for any loss or damage passengers may sustain from the following causes: From
advance in or delays after advertised date of sailing, either through the performance of His Majestys mail service or any other cause,
from detention on the voyage, or at any of the intermediate ports, or through streamers not meeting, or delays from accident, from
perils of the sea, or from machinery, boilers or stream, or from any act, neglect or default whatsoever of the pilot, masters, or mariners,
nor from any consequences arising from any sanitary regulations or precautions which the companys officers or local government
authorities may deem necessary.
"Personal baggage. In order to insure as far as possible the safe custody of luggage, passengers should personally see their luggage
delivered on board. Each adult saloon passenger may carry, free of charge, but at his own risk, 20 cubic feet of luggage; and each
steerage passenger 10 cubic feet, under similar conditions (all in excess of these quantities must be paid for at the current rate of
freight); but the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or damage to or detention, or overcarriage of luggage, under any
circumstances whatsoever unless it has been booked and paid for as freight."cralaw virtua1aw library
At the time the tickets were delivered to plaintiffs in Shanghai their attention was not especially drawn to the provisions on the back of
the ticket. The plaintiffs put their baggage on the St. Albans without paying for its transportation as freight and traveled with such
baggage to Manila.
The trial courts finding as to the negligence of defendant is based particularly on the testimony of J. S. Stanley Deputy Collector of
Customs, and I. V. Chapman, chief wharfinger in charge of pier No. 5.
Mr. Stanley testified: "While standing at the extreme end of Pier No. 5, I witnessed a number of trunks being lifted from the deck of
the steamship St. Albans to an elevation of about 10 or 12 feet from the deck and practically the same height above the pier. The
winchman was instructed to let go. The sling dropped suddenly and was not checked at the proper time, and the sling of trunks struck
the side of the wharf, with the result that the trunks were forced from the sling and fell into the water. It is customary to use a rope
sling or a cargo chute running from the deck to the pier. The slings vary in size but are sufficiently large to contain a large number of
trunks and are formed of ropes running in opposite directions forming a rope net. If these trunks had been in a rope sling they would
not have fallen in the water."cralaw virtua1aw library
Mr. Chapman testified: "When the steamship St. Albans came alongside the pier I took all her lines and berthed her in a position for
the gangway and hatchways to work. Immediately after the ship was made fast I requested to be informed from the chief officer where
the baggage would be discharged from; he told me hatch No. 4; I went to No. l hatch and asked the second officer who was there in
charge of the hatch where the baggage was to be discharged from; he said, Right here, indicating No. 4 hatch. I then told him I would
have a chute there for him right away and he answered: All right. I immediately went into the pier and ordered one of the foremen
and the men to take a chute to No. 4 hatch. I was following with the foreman and behind the chute when Mr. Stanley informed me that
the baggage was over the side. The chute at this time was just through the door about 75 feet from the hatch. On arriving there I saw
that the sling and these trunks were all lying in the water. The stevedore had a lot of his men over the side picking up the trunks with
the men from the pier helping."cralaw virtua1aw library
responsible for any loss under any circumstances whatsoever." (See also Wheeler v. O. S. N. Co., 125 N. Y., 155; Nicholas v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. R. Co., 89 N. Y., 370.)
The reasonableness of the strict rule of construction that the courts of England and of the State of New York apply to contracts
restricting the liability of carriers with respect to their negligence is apparent when one considers that such contracts are held to be
contrary to public Policy and invalid in the Federal courts and in most of the State courts of the Union. (The Kensington, 183 U. S.,
263.)
In this connection, it may not be amiss to state that a critical examination of the deposition of Mr. Ernest Hamilton Sharpe, Master of
Arts and Bachelor of Civil Law of the University of Oxford, Barrister at Law of London, Shanghai and Hongkong, and Kings
Counsel at the latter colony, does not disclose anything contradictory to the rule just stated. Mr. Sharpes examination was confined to
the question of the validity of the contract indorsed upon plaintiffs ticket exempting the defendant company from liability for damage
to their baggage. In view of the accurate answers of the learned witness to the questions put to him as to the validity of the condition in
question under English law, there is no reason to suppose that he would not have stated correctly the rule as to the construction of the
condition had his attention been directed to that point. In any event, this court is not, by reason of the opinion expressed by an expert
witness, precluded from advising itself as to the common law of England. (Sec. 302, Code of Civil Procedure.)

It is the contention of the defendant company that it is exempt from liability by virtue of the contract appearing on the tickets already The judgment is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
referred to and quoted; as that contract was valid in the place where made, namely, the Colony of Hongkong, and that that being the
case, it will be enforced according to its terms in the Philippine Islands. It is also urged that it was not necessary specifically to direct Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
the attention of the passengers to the stipulations on the back of the ticket introduced in evidence.

The evidence relative to the law governing these contracts in Hongkong consists of the testimony of a Hongkong barrister, learned in
the law of England and her colonies, and is to the effect that, under the law in force at the place where the contract was made, the
contract was valid and enforceable, and that it is not necessary that the attention of persons purchasing tickets from common carriers
be drawn specially to the terms thereof when printed upon a ticket which on its face shows that it is issued subject to such conditions.
The barrister also testified that under the law of England and her colonies everything was done which was necessary to make the terms
printed on the back of the tickets a part of the contract between the parties.

It is our conclusion that the judgment must be affirmed.

It is undoubted that the contract found upon the back of the tickets is a contract perfectly valid in England and her colonies and one
which would be enforced according to its terms in British jurisdictions. The question is what were its terms? It will be remembered
that the contract provides "the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or damage to or detention, or overcarriage of
luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever, unless it has been booked and paid for as freight." Ordinarily this language would seem
to be broad enough to cover every possible contingency, including the negligent act of defendants servant. To so hold, however,
would run counter to the established law of England and the United States on that subject. In the case of Price and Company v. Union
Lighterage Company (Kings Bench Division, 1903, Vol. 1, pp. 750, 754), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An exemption in general words not expressly relating to negligence, even though the words are wide enough to include loss by
negligence or default of carriers servants, must be construed as limiting the liability of the carrier as assurer, and not as relieving him
from the duty of exercising reasonable skill and care."cralaw virtua1aw library

The result of this decision seems to be that unless the contract of exemption specifically refers to exemption for negligence, it will be
construed as simply exempting the carrier from his liability as insurer, in other words, from his common law liability as carrier. This
decision of the Kings Bench Division is supported by many authorities and apparently has never been questioned. Among other
references made in that case is that of Compaia de Navegacion La Flecha v. Brauer (168 U. S., 104), in which the opinion was
rendered by Mr. Justice Gray, who reviews with great thoroughness and erudition both the English and American authorities, many of
which contain exemptions quite as comprehensive as those contained in the condition under which plaintiffs baggage was accepted by Republic of the Philippines
the defendant in this case, such as that the baggage "was to be carried at the risk of the owner" and that the "carrier is not to be SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the
same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate
Estate of Mrs. Hodges.

THE FACTS
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
follows:
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA
A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING,
FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR,
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO
ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating,
sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in
the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining
manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private
respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8,
1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966
denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto
him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided.
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided
among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death
of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother
or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will
and testament, and direct that no bond or other security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the administration of my
estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and appraisement of my
estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the SO ORDERED.
widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in
which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS

MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR
IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING WHILE
HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN
DECEASED WAS LIVING
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.

Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is attached to the
petition for probate of the same.
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the
surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to have the right by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was
placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband,
wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him,
during his natural lifetime."
my said husband, during his natural lifetime.

3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the business of buying
and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except brothers and sisters
and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner and the deceased,
especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all these
transactions.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be
allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been
doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee
has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges
was and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the business of
buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable Court.

which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which said
petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and
appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real and
personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all the sales, leases,
conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
 5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages executed by the Executor,
be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with
the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also
be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed can also
be accounted for, especially the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed
by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages in consonance with the wishes of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with
authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders the following account
of his administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be
found in detail in the individual income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral
part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return
for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for
the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted
likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders
approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In
connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee
Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
 estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's
Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the
Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the
pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important and
decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until
December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been
previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions
and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court,
most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957,
the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such.

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo
"heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of
Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the
the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy
death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of
deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in
the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. . 3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real
and personal properties that may remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties
shall be equally divided among their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did
Hodges, which need to be administered and taken care of.
file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property
interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered: 4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet
been determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate
and distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and
legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the
Charles Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid." 5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament
of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified
safe in his office, and will be presented in due time before this honorable Court.
and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was
given him by his wife's will. 1
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed for the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his
required by law, to administer, collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated expressly that her
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the
estate which has come into his possession as executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance
Rules of Court.
sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
 7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last will and testament of
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an
administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in
danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been
employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the
most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special
Administratrix and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be
immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the
reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor dated December 25,
1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the
latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the
real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after
having done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru Atty.
Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had)
arrived from the United States of America to help in the administration of the estate of said deceased" was
appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to
be replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion
of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with instructions
from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the
Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the
will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on
February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this
latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty.
Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided that "at the
death of my said husband I give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike ". Accordingly, it became
incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate,
in order that upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly
distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is
the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State
she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that
as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse "except for purposes of administering the
estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now
before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so,
quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack
proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its
questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the
matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover
and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which the
respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in
the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And
while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal,
reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges
contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss
Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A.
Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on
September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the
representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore the
harmonious relations between the parties, the Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus
operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and their
counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol
and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court
until October 3, 1964.
 SO ORDERED. (e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of
both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any
authorized representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was made in the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:

Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208
authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the
Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks and
estates should not close it without previous consent and authority from this court.
keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent
motion that Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral SO ORDERED.
damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all
doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place thereon its own
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be
locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and
deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer operative,
supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.

A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo
stating therein that she was compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the
order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both
estates should remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the office of both
estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments
of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at
206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy
clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the
office of said estates could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and
estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be
withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of
C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers she may have in her possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also
found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as
the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family
who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel
representing the aforementioned parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this
Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates would be
administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion,
namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the
alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its
order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-described basic demand by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both
estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as
to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by
respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is
for the purpose of retaining their services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these
proceedings and the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as expenses and motion it is alleged that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never
for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307). delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in
the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the
death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the
Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation
and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that
conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
V, Sp. 1307).
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been presented in support thereof.
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate
wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services
to the executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the 3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which represented by said attorneys;
stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-
1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307). 5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is
not an heir of the former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol.
V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an
order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this
manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol.
VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the
consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith
(1) said manifestation and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII,
Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of
the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion.
The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or
sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965 asking that the
order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk
of court and the administratrix and administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to
enforce or comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said manifestation
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July
15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto be considered submitted for consideration and
approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and
of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
for the reason that the said order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the
lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said manifestation and urgent motion dated
June 10, 1964 is being treated and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated
January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates
and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual services rendered. However, the
fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty.
Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances,
reimbursement for expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers have
already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the administratrix of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to implement the
approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed
to countersign the said check or checks as the case may be.
 SO ORDERED. properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate expedientes in
Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the
conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous administrations.

As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale
the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read:

Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the prospective buyers
Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty.
under said contracts have already paid the price and complied with the terms and conditions thereof;
Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the
opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the
allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the "2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their debts secured by
PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the
Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was not an isolated instance. Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for the
approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court
upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the assets of the two Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower court on July William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
1825-1828), which was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a
flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the estates
and cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.
so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend."

A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D.
R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated
November 4, 1964 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this honorable
February 3, 1965 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of real
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters
promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent court
allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions,
Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator
of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the administrator of the testate estate
of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two
estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the
other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved payments
made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records
in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay dated December 10,
1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration chargeable to the
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged
against the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late
Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime
pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they
were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the
death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7,
1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador
Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife,
which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of his
wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his
wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar
Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo
Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges
on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively,
pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the
death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo
Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose
Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death
of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of
appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966,
respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the
death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the "As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the reasons stated in
concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner points this out his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all the sales,
on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus: conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have already been discussed
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will
previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already explained before, it
and testament of the latter."
was, as admitted by the lower court itself, superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of
sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular
orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial (p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and
which are now therefore final.
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October
5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION Honorable Court."
OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND
INCOME THEREFROM.
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other things:
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned
attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of the
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor for the
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie
Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place of
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in a Motion dated
examining the herein account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of the
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)

(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.

issued the following order:

(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding
No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault
or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste,
unless a Special Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable
Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary
for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix
having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued
Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
For Sale
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal
counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva de
propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado Charles
Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente
pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca
tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de cada hipoteca
este totalmente pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la aprobacion de
este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for those "contracts to sell" entered into by
C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been demanding the execution
of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the
Administratrix and by the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms and
conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered in the name of the
deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo
thusly:
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying sums of money to
sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before this Honorable Court
on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the
deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election
by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the
administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under
her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from
manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will
claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments
 and income therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court, after due hearing,
order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she
first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as the undersigned
attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N.
Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "T",
Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by
herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges
approved by the court, and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country
of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING
AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND
C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and
to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through
the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-
542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement entered into on January 23,
1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p.
912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No.
1672) and issuing letters of administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as
the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family
who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel
representing the aforenamed parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different
claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates would be
administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion,
namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the
alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended its
order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic demand by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This
Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United States, this Honorable
Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly
carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts,
among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets in
the Philippines of both estates including those claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on
August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by this Honorable
Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and how much
they may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks issued by the PCIB
payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee agreement approved by this
Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.
 (c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the records
and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon Family, Mr.
James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB drawn to
pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check drawn to
reimburse the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported due
and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24 and February 1,
1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased
C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property." (p. 914,
CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate exclusive
possession and control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets,
including the documentary records evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N.
Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his name alone. The PCIB
knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the
assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were
derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights
of the previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable Court appointed
Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to
replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed Special
Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co-
special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-
111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies
resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was
appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno
who at that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this
Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of
the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took
possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession
of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take
over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With
the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in
substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole
and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec. S.P.
No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family who
claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964, filed
February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
 (c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting submitted
by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or
special administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting of Harold
K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18,
1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of same date, the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records,
properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were
in the possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the possession of Miss
Magno in her capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe
Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets of
the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges
effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street
and denied the PCIB access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this
Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208
Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical possession of all of
the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records,
properties and assets because Miss Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6,
continues to use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and
continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within
the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges
during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid
on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated
in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the
aforesaid assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid
Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the records,
properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court
in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took
possession of them before his death and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said
assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to all interested
parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of
any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her
representatives to stop interferring with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its
duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an
employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31,
1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss Magno
from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges
without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "U"
Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late
C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens
originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the
Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted
their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders dated
March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----),
conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in
Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the time of
their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present issue are
the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in full hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have
the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is
hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate by
sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he
may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest
so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income
from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he
shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as above provided. He shall have the right
to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman
and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as
his beneficiary using the identical language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by more than five (5)
years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She
was survived also by various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we
shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C.
N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights,
and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However,
the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra)
should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables
(personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to
properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Thus
applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the
case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this
stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in
Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the
jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be
divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of
the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to
Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the
only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and
specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing
after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income
from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal
of said estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal
estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of inheritance
by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time
of her death on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving
no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-
half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly
affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her
estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of
the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the
moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir with full
authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only
with regards certain properties "owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even
without relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific
testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are transmitted from the death
of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately
upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex
"C" a graph of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with Philippine
law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges,
shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all
the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in
his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was
still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession
and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders of
this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged in the verified
Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis
supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges
are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis
supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by
C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of examining the herein
account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance
with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in
accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the
spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court
sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets
as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of his wife, this
Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2)
delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of
her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had
no assets or properties located in the Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death of C.
N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to the extent of the
Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is
valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without
merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway,
affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by
way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership to her
estate. In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary provision, the Supreme
Court held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de
Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge,
condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by a testator.
Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the
legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid
insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2
portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our
Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes
referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution
(Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution
provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first
heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be present,
namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should not
wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void. Manresa, commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that: "...
cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por fallecimiento de este nombra otro u
otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a tener
efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o no
esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when
another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation
can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not
that was the true intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie
Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N. Hodges'
inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and was
registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate.
Therefore
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the
other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any testamentary disposition),
their remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the
present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration, where the administratrix
of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting
exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this Honorable Court
declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in the
conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death
pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
 5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents,
emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution
to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody, control
and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has
no right to intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own
"Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto
this Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who died at the
City of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the original of this will
now forms part of the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I,
pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court
issued an order admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against the decedent, Linnie
Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the
reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been
asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said
estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate contains an institution of
heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have
the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and, he is
hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by
sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general
or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas
and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in such property as he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part
of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full right to
lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the
right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman
and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth,
above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a
life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-
estate or the naked title over the same estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last will and testament,
but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete
knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as
Administrator of the estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly
through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and
testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased 15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with residence concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute
at the State of Texas, United States of America; them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.

10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner (together with WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a
her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal properties existing as hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes
separately by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C.
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David
N. Hodges but all of which are under the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to her estate;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and wife in the combined
conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, both interests have
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the system enunciated in
continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been
paragraph 14 of this motion;
continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive;

c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was earning "rents,
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong
emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges
and appertain.
or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents,
emoluments and income" by virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by
Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane (Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
Hodges;
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal estate the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part
existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and that:
income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges,
expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a
Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";

14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this Honorable Court, such
they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%)
as:
as compared to the portion to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can
be exactly determined by the following manner:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the
allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges "through ... written
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they
declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated life-
existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 one-half of these assets
estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N. Hodges of
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all these assets
All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
again one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom";
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, disbursements and
other dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his own personal
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
account from May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf since December 25,
1962 up to the present; d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno
under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
 which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being matters of record,
and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily threshed out in the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only results in confusion and
is unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by
Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected
and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the estate but also
third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964,
Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all
the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to
the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding
thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB praying
that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the
rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order
Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for
declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as (a) the examination
already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles
Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery
to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various
motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts and only require
the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C.
N. Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left
by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the wishes contained in the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru
counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the
only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and testament already probated
by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the executor C. N.
Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the
annual statement of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by
Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging
to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix
Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed
asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the possession of
administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated September
14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on
the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a
 prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found
meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will
become moot and academic since they are premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie
Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official
declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined
only in the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since
the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging that the
motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of the motion
for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
closed and for administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been filed
alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made by C. N.
Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N.
Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C.
N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a
motion to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years
after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of
heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the opposition and
rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason
that so far there has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore
no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late Charles
Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in the Philippines are
concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges rights
over said properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of the properties
left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable Court "for the
reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages
executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages ..." be approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the
reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles
Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually, although not legally,
closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his
wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for
reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered
or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another
docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and
1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green
Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965,
(pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be co-signed by
respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint account and
the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration
of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of the
respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of Technology to
make payments to either one or both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order of March 7,
1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
 6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in XIII to XV
favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and
Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
(pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
no motion for reconsideration was filed.
XVI to XVIII
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to
surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES
the certificates of title covering the lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
reconsideration was filed either.
NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or
persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us,
XIX to XXI
for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of them covering also the fundamental
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose
of all these cases together. 4
XXII to XXV
The assignments of error read thus:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
I to IV
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS
XXVI to XXIX
OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
V to VIII
GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
XXX to XXXIV
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
IX to XII

XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE L
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE,
THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED
BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN
WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.

XXXIX to XL
LII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE,
THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
RULES OF COURT.
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.

LIII to LXI
XLI to XLIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L.
LUCERO.
XLIV to XLVI
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF
NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED
HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
WITH.
BANK.

XLVII to XLIX
LXIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965,
THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR
WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES
OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXIV
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3,
1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT
TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS
A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY
APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF
ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR
LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS
TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE
LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF
ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS
TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE
PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN
EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-
83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned
that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the proposed
appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court
declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution
of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer
for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a
motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in
Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired by
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of
respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the
injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with
respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause
with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners'
continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of
PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that some of
them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no consequence
whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in
view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to
take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved
in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent
eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and
time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do
hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is
alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of
the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and
unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic
issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the
conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of
conflict between the parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly,
respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the
petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further
recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of
administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said
date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her
will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the
contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his
wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special
Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs.
Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is
examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of
said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of a
decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than
definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the
creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective
rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding
precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases.
While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed
among themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties
are adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still
it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the
parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and
relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested
in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be
deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the
decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the
"debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but
logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested
party or parties, and not of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of
heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed.,
Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-
ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an
intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the
persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the above
indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied
with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the
issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E,
and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of
December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after
the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with
wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication of the estate
of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order
in question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges)
is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in
the Philippines during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either the
enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only
during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the
authority referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in
appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or distribution when
the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal
partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the
tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded
that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in
the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the
contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its order We have
quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there
is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be
stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on
pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the
order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for
determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable
implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts
to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever should remain
thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so
much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his
motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected
or diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for
surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to
himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor,
of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been
worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None
of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that
no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of
them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said
motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final distribution and
adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor,
which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the
conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only
because of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and
hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in the sense
contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof
appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs.
Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution ordained
by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial
court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other
heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the
lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no se
hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y
de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan
sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los
bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del
expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues,
segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de
los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la
administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros;
2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria,
Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano,
Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra
Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador,
declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados
por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme
esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por
la administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el
testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma del
finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y
adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y,
finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la administracion, revelandole toda
responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor
and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was the
intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and
M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining herein account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner
and without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not
legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the
terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases
indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru
counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that "proper accounting will be had in
all these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his
responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal
estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the
net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for
the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this,
he filed an "individual evenly between him and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
(pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her
"heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of
the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy
Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of
deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in
the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to
the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual
transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively
referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his
being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to
rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar
provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir,
pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and
whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the
internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the
aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26,
1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged
that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain
at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing
that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the situation,
implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of
Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation from respondent
Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated.
However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was
mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline
Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it
is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased
Roy Higdon in the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer
Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions
of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's
answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax
return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed
affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions made in his or her favor
by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower, curtesy, or a
statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any action described
under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax Return was filed
in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive
the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page
29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made
in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of
the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit
is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957.
(Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on
them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to note that
their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957.
5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of the
governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other
evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that
Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated to him
without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise.
On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of
his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-
914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal property in the hands of the
defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in connection
with section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24,
1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty
of liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240;
Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10;
Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil.,
153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
 In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing
416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the administration of the that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from the Court
community property. Attention was called to the fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very
conjugal property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any
committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree of
trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest in his
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet
own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title
been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the
by prescription against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against
properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of
his ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil
Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties
Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a continuing
constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own administration.
and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate
Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties
occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any
included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take
portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and
part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action should be
liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property which came into his
filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the
possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and
one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
subsisting trust. He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to
take advantage of his own wrong. One of the conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil
Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim
would be a manifest fraud. of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB
of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in
the community properties, were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving
specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title
nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate
analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said
and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders void issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to
for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and how the authority declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already
therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her
orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to will?
consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations
based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the parties in these
technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the estate, such as
cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December,
the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such parties
1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any
are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We
showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough
find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders.
indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to
This solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the
his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of
deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any
the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation
prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good
could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death.
faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the
administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which would necessarily include
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time
designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said which properties should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are
Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole
owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively
upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof that
for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe said that
Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or
even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently
less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our
implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion in
conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so
that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into account,
inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their
properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be
administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement
warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to
do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an
executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the
administrator of an executor like PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife,
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses
who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence
allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be
made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with
by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed for more than five
years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there
were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself.
Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on
the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the pose of PCIB that
there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen.
All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or
any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion
and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates
have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the
testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention is
correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil
Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by
the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when
another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.)
and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for
Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to
certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his
brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become
operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the
Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also
during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under
Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate,
considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as
her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims
that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to
the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other
fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor
burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of
the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of
America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said
Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide
for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced
his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier,
the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the
pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these
conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple
reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and
memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be
adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable
proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent
Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is
not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating
and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless
of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the respective
contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence
that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges
himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be
disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch
as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that
the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges it
being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all
future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings
in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the
applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at
this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the
estate therein involved; and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the
foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether
or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming
there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the
applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even
our finding above about the existence of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the
size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their
pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more
concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard to the
foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in
relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet
passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding
might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of
Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which,
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased
Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature
for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at
this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the
lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than that
We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in
the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled
upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p.
41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the
Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States
of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of
the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties
herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if We took into
account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said
provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of
Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the
trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of
will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the
Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p.
426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here to take
judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words
clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our
courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States.
Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same section,
where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union
whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois
on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not
state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and,
secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based
on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in
the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture
was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to
pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by
which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is
very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do
not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case
before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise
would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both
parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be
otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the
estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be
more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
 Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary successions both with respect The subject of successional rights.
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of the spouses,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found",
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half
while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law
pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-
rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions and
half of the conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share,
successional rights over movables or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine
and not by virtue of any successional rights. There can be no question about this.
law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable
properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the
case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
situated in the Philippines.
hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other
half.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo
The law governing successional rights. mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the
legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American citizen. There is
latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding
also no question that she was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that
paragraph.
she had her domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the
above-cited orders of the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule
39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil
code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition
to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of
the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the order of succession and to a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables or personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the successional rights
immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as well as immovable property situated in
over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.

c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to the deceased,
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the
Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.
case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well
as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in the d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the
Philippines. remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
 e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the
substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void
(pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges properties and the
probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was
the status of the properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of
Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to
the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have
already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering
that We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her
brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is
untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two
propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the
Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already
finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both
of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the
laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations
in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and
act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5
Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how
much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas
do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived
his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further
protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any
express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of
his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals,
corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife,
it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other
disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such
exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges
should go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as
covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could
not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar
provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges
should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are
predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting his
wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has
been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various
assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution
holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates
should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of error
have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective orders in
question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent
Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further claims that either the
matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in
accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the
lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges
which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and
perform all her acts complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is
such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority to act independently from her.
And considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act
independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the
attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all
be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only
that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the
subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual
circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the
least disturbance in rights already being exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in
accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's
continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the separate estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the
resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely barred from any participation in the administration of the
properties herein involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672
should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly none of them to act singly and independently of
each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the said
properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous
position which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be
regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be
gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged
failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they
were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the
more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the
order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred
to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N.
Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take
the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the
order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also
dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the account of either of
the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of
C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have
in her possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner,
the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966,
denying, among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of
September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said the
trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already
stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide
for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the
two estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be,
as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as
Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error
Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting,
in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court and three
other persons for services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the
incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December
19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-
232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to
LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between
Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys
Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to
prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo , more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing Administratrix
Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion"
as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-
320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number
LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should
counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of
Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs.
Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures from the estate of
Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is
incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result
will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows,
therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for
her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due
appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in
the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We
see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and
considering the obvious size of the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional
standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at
most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the
heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture
cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the
interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the
matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is
without personality to question the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges.
Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that
when the two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will
prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and other
expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself by
their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno
questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the
attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the
parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of
respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and
identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both
Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and
economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite
remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the
same would be a matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No.
1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate
and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial
distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any
event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small
amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the
counsel of an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final analysis,
when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire
whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of
Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of
corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when
his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November
27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May
26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on
June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on
February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon,
executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to
have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales that
he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts may be
undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees
were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose
Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in
the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As already
explained earlier, 1 1* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be
deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the
sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned
subsequently by Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the
time of his death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve
transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be considered as payments to
the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At
first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of
PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights
that have somehow accrued already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a
pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-
observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties
concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they should not be made
to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely on were
submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had
reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions
with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the
sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise
sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or
independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed
precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from
some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of
the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as
executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed
any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the
questioned deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
which would have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal
partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to in
the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would be only the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of
the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8
and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by
appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of
May 27) which according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges
acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the
legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main contention in these cases.
On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would
still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were based were
executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered
by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity
attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting,
and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of
rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms
and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them
never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose
Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant
to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's
posture is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the
properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it
can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or
not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective
buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not
be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government
because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or
that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any
consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the
deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as administrator of
the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in
so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties
against the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the
respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is
worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative
of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made
by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already held that the
properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it
is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the
real parties in interest having the right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones
who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must accordingly
be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective
owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in
the light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the
court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As
will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the death
of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its
purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from
PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in
the case of PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due account", on the other
hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to
reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which,
after alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it should pay
PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending resolution of the conflicting
claims of the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the
narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant
can pay to both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no
judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that
PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November 23,
1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is prayed for
in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate
court and that the order authorized payment to a person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute
had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the
lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing irregular in the
court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants'
motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.)
Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions We
have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety
of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the
parties to a contract to convey property executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the
executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be
taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties
are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto
pursuant to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the
contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said
contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of
being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) the pactum
commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous
notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in
connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and
varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo,
if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief
restatement of the whole situation be made together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who
predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them
provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration
expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to
hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the
other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters
of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in
a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and
selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on
December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof,
upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his administration, with the
particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision
in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters,
share and share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that
the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified,
no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears
therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and
then merely divided the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more
importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns for each calendar year for
each resulting half of such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income
distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the
name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper
correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that
they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his
wife's brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance tax authorities
indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is
supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and
in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife's
will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which
has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307
and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to
waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No.
1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as
Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced
eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with the
other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions
it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow,
however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and independently of each
other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted
the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles
Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate
of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually
correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably
approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant
than anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate
association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal
complications arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the
annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with
the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since
then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by
Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower
court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings
1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs.
Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but
inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective
and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the
Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs.
Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of
Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary
injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of
administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still
registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are
being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all
the properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be
finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction of past
and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her
position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of
the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no
system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties.
She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and,
therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders
of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the present
existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually
correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to
her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not
warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said
orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet
reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that
such disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his
inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible
prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges'
purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of
the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during
the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative
dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing
to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs.
Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can
already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to
her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in
the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is
such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words,
hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no
longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less
than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like
any other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes
ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime
usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband,
with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what
would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to
inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the
essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is
coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not
prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this
would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the
pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the
state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of
these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo,
as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered
opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part
thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended
by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such
one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the
Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption,
albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that respondent
Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and
the determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the
Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of
administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons
stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the evidence
of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and administration expenses in question.
23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared
legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-
appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of
this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the
determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial
court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share
thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of
the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive
administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent
and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges
shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the
pending motions for its removal as administrator 12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and
partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.

Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties
shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them hereof in
registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made between those predicated
accordance with the rules.
on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered
into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of
sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her
will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total
Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the
government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to
raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs.
Separate Opinions
Hodges or the government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said
orders to be set aside.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
DISPOSITIVE PART
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860
and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80
to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's
writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6, 1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that
the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 2 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton)
Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall
continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court
on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband
C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957
(supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as
sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was
thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs
after him, 4 is wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer
exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and
judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his
wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered
the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years
up to the time of his own death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator
of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous
admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator)
recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers
and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its
order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the
rejection of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno
is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc
No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various
individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate
estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail a result of the
Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such an estate and that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be
administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in
G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the
trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of
whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of
the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967,
is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A.
Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and
the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective
estates; provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs.
Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her
estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in
Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administrative of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the
said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion. 8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters
with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her estate consists as
a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to
one-half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under her will) of "one-
fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds
of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if he is
held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges
even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated
heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion
over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..." 9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that
while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do
so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of
her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and
"absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters
as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder
his right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her brothers and
sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the
suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's
death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges
could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra and thereby render ineffectual
and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife
Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making
such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate
court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie
Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her
conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the
numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were
resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her
estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the
minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the
partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of
Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the pressing question of expediting the closing of the
estates which after all do not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be
promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full
enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an
expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two
assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or
"reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the
civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their
succession) with the result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her
husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then
be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the
law of the State of Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to
succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges had
totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these
conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to the
inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and
reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by
respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems
"are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby
ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1)
whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2)
whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law
calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way
of inheritance considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively it was felt that
the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing of
the protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its
resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two questions
of renvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But as
already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter
to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane
Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N.
Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court
would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or
that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate
court in resolving the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of the
Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in
the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate
of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as
surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to
discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the
probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistently reported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or coownership and then divided the same equally between
himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes for each resulting half
of such combined income corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he
adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not
only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
20
By operation of the law of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his
wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate and were so reported and
treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that no gratuitous dispositions,
if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should be deducted from her separate estate as held in the main opinion.
On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or
right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her
succession upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and
December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of their
unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been
conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share
alike since the conjugal partnership remained unliquidated which is another way of saying that such transactions, purchases and
sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie
Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only
left unliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year
period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed
jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from
the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by the administrators of the two
estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should
be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations
so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5.
Antly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB
evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more than the minimum of one-
fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions
of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by
the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various
documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C.
N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under his wife's will in
favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of the deceased
to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N.
Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the
rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I
do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right
on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This
affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies
of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said
State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named
heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation
executed four years later for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to
his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established by the probate court, the
renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-
half share of the community properties since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then
under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs
upon her husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective
estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid,
attorneys' fees and other like expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and sisters
(and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and
our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his
inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of
the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of
"one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have to be
sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-
fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article
900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the
Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's
assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N.
Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of
paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters
of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and
holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing or
conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges
"full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient
of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters as his
co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they
would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are
also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since
Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would be called immediately to her
succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her
estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal notwithstanding
"any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate,
which at the time of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her
estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold with
him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, ...
to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best ... . All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned
by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that
"(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such deceased brother or
sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all transactions and sales made by
Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for
and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, with the express authorization of
the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership
business of buying and selling real estate even after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had called her brothers and
sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code
dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period or its
expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon
the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as
instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C. N.
Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be
uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall commence"
is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or
a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is
not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term
would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is
entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years
counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is
advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of
the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be
closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of
intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid
assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not
prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N.
Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs
representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently
degenerated into a running battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as
the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and
their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the mandate
of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert themselves to
close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors
and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a
yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to
whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno.
Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of administration
executed and performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at
bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face and
state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of
the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the timeliness
of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been
timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect
of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's
concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal
interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper
and just determination of a litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled
respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition" "despite the
conceded availability of appeal" on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-
three appeals (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single
special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the
petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly
expensive or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for
which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the
magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice
Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed
orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a
legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law
of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties.
There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie
Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of
the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum
share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime,
then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-
fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute
ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and
adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance
of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's
writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6, 1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that
the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 2 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton)
Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall
continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court
on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband
C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the
decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957
(supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate
to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as
sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was
thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs
after him, 4 is wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer
exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and
judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his
wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered
the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years
up to the time of his own death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator
of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous
admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator)
recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers
and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its
order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the
rejection of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno
is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc
No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various
individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate
estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail a result of the
Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such an estate and that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be
administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in
G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the
trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of
 whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated
the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
Differences with the main opinion
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion
over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..." 9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967,
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that
is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of
while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A.
so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of
the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
her estate then." 10
partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective
estates; provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and
Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters
as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder
his right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her brothers and
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her
sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the
estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in
suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administrative of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges
administrator; could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra and thereby render ineffectual
and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making
corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the
such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
said resolution.

I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her
foregoing opinion. 8
conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the
numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were
resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the
with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her estate consists as minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the
a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
one-half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under her will) of "one-
fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds
Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the pressing question of expediting the closing of the
of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to
estates which after all do not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be
be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if he is
promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full
enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an
expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two
assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or
"reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the
civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their
succession) with the result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her
husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then
be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the
law of the State of Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to
succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges had
totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these
conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to the
inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and
reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by
respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems
"are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby
ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1)
whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2)
whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law
calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way
of inheritance considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively it was felt that
the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing of
the protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its
resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two questions
of renvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But as
already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter
to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane
Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N.
Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court
would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or
that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate
court in resolving the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of the
Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in
the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate
of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as
surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to
discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the
probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistently reported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or coownership and then divided the same equally between
himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes for each resulting half
of such combined income corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he
adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not
only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his
wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate and were so reported and
treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that no gratuitous dispositions,
if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should be deducted from her separate estate as held in the main opinion.
On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or
right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her
succession upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and
December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of their
unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been
conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share
alike since the conjugal partnership remained unliquidated which is another way of saying that such transactions, purchases and
sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie
Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only
left unliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year
period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed
jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from
the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by the administrators of the two
estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should
be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations
so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5.
Antly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB
evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more than the minimum of one-
fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions
of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by
the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various
documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C.
N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under his wife's will in
favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of the deceased
to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N.
Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the
rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I
do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right
on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This
affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies
of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said
State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named
heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation
executed four years later for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to
his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established by the probate court, the
renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-
half share of the community properties since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then
under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs
upon her husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective
estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid,
attorneys' fees and other like expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and sisters
(and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and
our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his
inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of
the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of
"one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have to be
sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-
fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article
900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the
Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's
assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N.
Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of
paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters
of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and
holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing or
conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges
"full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient
of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters as his
co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they
would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are
also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since
Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would be called immediately to her
succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not
become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating their succession to her
estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal notwithstanding
"any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate,
which at the time of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her
estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold with
him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, ...
to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best ... . All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned
by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that
"(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such deceased brother or
sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all transactions and sales made by
Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for
and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, with the express authorization of
the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership
business of buying and selling real estate even after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had called her brothers and
sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code
dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period or its
expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon
the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as
instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C. N.
Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be
uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall commence"
is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or
a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is
not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term
would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is
entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years
counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the only remaining issue (involving the two questions
of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased
spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is
advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of
the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal
partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with
the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be
closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of
intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid
assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not
prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N.
Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs
representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently
degenerated into a running battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as
the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and
their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the mandate
of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert themselves to
close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors
and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a
yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to
whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno.
Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of administration
executed and performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at
bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face and
state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of
the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the timeliness
of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been
timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect
of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's
concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal
interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper
and just determination of a litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled
respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition" "despite the
conceded availability of appeal" on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-
three appeals (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single
special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the
petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly
expensive or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the
resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for
which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the
magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees.
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice
Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed
orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a
legitime in his deceased wife's estate which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law
of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties.
There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie
Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of
the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum
share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime,
then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-
fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute
ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and
adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.
Footnotes
1 Actually, the affidavit reads as follows:
"I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax Return was filed
in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive
the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as shown by the statement contained in schedule M at page
29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
"The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made
in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of
the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit
is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957."
( annex 5, Answer of respondent Avelina Magno, p. 264, L-27860 Rollo.)
2 The will of Hodges executed on November 14, 1953 contained mutually similar dispositions as those of his
wife as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my beloved wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, to have and to hold unto her, my said
wife, during her natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control,
use and enjoy said estate during her lifetime, and she is hereby given the right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which she may think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property
which she may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property
as she may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to her, and she is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as she may need or desire. It is provided herein,
however, that she shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located
at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but she shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during her lifetime, as above provided. She shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots.
xxx xxx xxx
the surviving spouse, except for purposes of administration and distribution to the devisees and legatees named
in the will of his wife, and further disclaimed and renounced any right on his part to receive rents, emoluments
and income therefrom because he wanted to be "absolved ... from liability for the payment of income taxes on
income that has accrued to the estate of" his wife. While We cannot make any definite ruling on the point now,
We might at least express the impression that reading all these statements together, one can hardly escape the
conclusion that in the literal sense the idea conveyed by them is that Hodges waived not only his rights to the
fruits but to the properties themselves.

FIFTH: At the death of my beloved wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of my
6 With the exception of the limitations referring to the Texas properties.
half brother, Robert Hodges, who is now deceased, a half brother's share of my estate.

7 "Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
SIXTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of my
deceased full sister, Mattie Hodges Simpkins, a full sister's share of my estate.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
SEVENTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of my
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
deceased half sister, Barbara O'dell, a half sister's share of my estate.
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (Article 16, Civil Code.)

EIGHT: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of my full
7* The question of what is the law of a foreign country is one of fact subject to proof like any other factual
brother, Joe Hodges, deceased, a full brother's share of my estate. .
issue. (Sy Joc Lien vs. Sy Quia, 16 Phil. 137; Ching Huat vs. Co Heong 77 Phil. 988.)

NINTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of my half
8 PCIB claims that pursuant to the laws of Texas, Mrs. Hodges' estate is only one-fourth of the conjugal estate,
brother, Willie Carver, deceased, a half brother's share of my estate.
while, on the other hand, Magno contends that under said laws, it is one-half of said estate since there is no
legitime for the surviving spouse provided in said laws.
TENTH: At the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
9 The motion for contempt will be separately taken up in due time.
my other full brothers and full sisters, share and share alike, namely: J. A. Hodges, B. F. Hodges, Laura Holland
and Addie Elliot.
10 The issues We have expressly reserved for later resolution. (See pp. 111-114 of this opinion.)
ELEVENTH: In case of the death of any of my full brothers and/or full sisters named in Item Tenth above, prior
to the death of my wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased full 11 If it should be found by the court later that Hodges did renounce his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, as seems
brother or full sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such full brother or full sister had he to be indicated in the documents mentioned in the opinion, Schedule M of the Inheritance Tax Return filed by
or she survived. Hodges in the United States, Annex 4 of the Answer in G. R. Nos. L- 27860 & L-27896, and the affidavit of
Hodges, Annex 5 also of the same answer, it is likely that Hodges did not have to pay any inheritance tax, and it
would only be after these proceedings are finally terminated with a judgment favorable to the brothers and
xxx xxx xxx
sisters of Mrs. Hodges that taxes could be assessed against them according to their respective individual shares.

All erasures and interlineations made before signing."

11* See page 114-I ante.

3 None of the two records on appeal contains any copy of the motion and the opposition upon which the court
12 See page 89-A of this decision.
acted.

TEEHANKEE J., CONCURRING:

4 More specific factual details related to these appeals will be stated later in the course of the distribution of the
assignments of error.
1 This writ enjoined respondent court from acting in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 (Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges)
and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno from interfering and intervening therein, pending determination of
5 It should be noted that in his affidavit, Hodges ratified and confirmed the "declaration made in Schedule M (of
the main issue raised by petitioner-appellant PCIB as to whether or not Mrs. Hodges' estate continued to exist as
the inheritance tax return he filed in the U.S.)" wherein he declared that no property interests passed to him as
such so as to require the services of said Avelina A. Magno as administratrix thereof in view of PCIB's 16 At page 109, main opinion; emphasis supplied.
contention that her (Mrs. Hodges') entire estate had been adjudicated in 1957 by the probate court to her
surviving husband C. N. Hodges as "the only devisee or legatee" under her will, which contention
17 "SEC 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death
has now been rejected in the Court's decision at bar.
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
2 This resolution was based on "the inherent fairness of allowing the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." (Rule 73) 18 At pp.
[Avelina A. Magno] to jointly administer the properties, rights and interests comprising both estates [Linnie Jane 129-130, main opinion.
Hodges' and that of her husband C. N. Hodges] until they are separated from each other" in order to give
adequate protection to the rights and interests of their respective brothers and sisters as their designated heirs
19 At page 103, main opinion, fn. 5.
rather than "if the whole [both] proceedings were to be under the administration of the estate of Mr. Hodges
[PCIB] to the exclusion of any representative of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges."
20 Pamittan vs. Lasam, 60 Phil. 908 (1934), where the Court stressed the "high degree of trust" reposed in the
surviving husband as "owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to
3 See page 5 et seq of main opinion.
administer" and that the conjugal property which thus comes into his possession upon his wife's death "remains
conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust" for as long as it remains unliquidated.
4 See page 91 et seq of main opinion.
21 Order of August 6, 1965, p. 248 Green Record on Appeal; see p. 30, main opinion.
5 See page 100 of main opinion.
22 Appealed order of November 23, 1965 against Western Institute of Technology, Inc. as purchaser-appellee,
6 "Sec. 2. Judicial Admissions. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial pp. 334-335, Green Rec. on App. see pp. 33-34, main opinion.
or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been
made through palpable mistake." (Rule 129). See also 5 Moran's 1970 Ed. 65 and cases cited.
23 At p. 137, main opinion.

7 See p. 114-1 et seq. of main opinion.

24 At pp. 108-109, main opinion.

8 At pp., 136-137 of main opinion; paragraphing and emphasis supplied.

25 At p. 114, main opinion, which notes that "the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matter
here in issue is . . . one of fact, not of law."
9 At page 121 of main opinion.
26 See p. 102 et seq. main opinion; Annexes 4 and 5 Answer, pp. 163-264 of Rollo.
10 At pages 110-11 of main opinion.
27 Annex 4, Answer, p. 263 of Rollo; emphasis supplied. 28 Annex 5, Answer, see p. 103, main opinion;
11 See In re: Testate Estate of Edward E. Christiansen, deceased, Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, 103, 107 emphasis supplied. 29 See pp. 114 et seq. main opinion.
(1963).
30 "ART. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default
12 At p. 112, main opinion. See also p. 103, where the main opinion refers to still other documents evidencing of the heir originally instituted." (Civil Code)
Hodges' renunciation and observes that "we cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record." (emphasis
supplied).
"ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such
heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
13 At p. 113, main opinion.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in
14 At p. 114-I, main opinion, emphasis supplied. the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided." (Civil Code, emphasis supplied)

15 At page 112, main opinion. 31 6 Manresa 116, cited in III Padilla's Civil Code 1973 Ed., p. 241.
32 At pp. 110-112, main opinion; emphasis supplied. 48 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304, cited in Berkenkotter vs. C.A., L-36629, September 28, 1973, per
Esguerra, J.
33 At p. 134, main opinion.
49 See the writer's concurring op. in Sison vs. Gatchalian, L-34709, June 15, 1973 and dissenting op. in Velasco
vs. C.A., L-31018, June 29, 1973.
34 At page 110, main opinion.

50 At pp. 90-91, main opinion.

35 Text reproduced in fn. 30 hereof.

51 At p. 91, main opinion.

36 C.N. Hodges' own will contained identical provisions in favor of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges to "manage,
control, use and enjoy (his)estate during her lifetime" and making specific bequests of his whole estate to his
full and half-brothers and sisters in clauses Fifth to Tenth thereof all "at the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane
Hodges. "At p. 18 et seq. main opinion.

37 Second of seven clauses of will, emphasis supplied.

38 Third clause of will, idem.

39 Fourth clause of will, idem.

40 Fifth clause of will, idem.

41 Art. 871, Civil Code provides that "(T)he institution of an heir may he made conditionally, or for a certain
purpose or cause."

42 An analogous case is found in Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491 (1962) where the testatrix provided that
the property willed by her to a grandniece was to pass to her brothers "to be effective or to take place upon
the death of the (grandniece)" whether this happens before or after the testatrix's own death.

43 Padilla's Civil Code, 1973 Ed. p. 284. The main opinion at pp. 110-111 also concedes the suspensive and
resolutory effects of Mrs. Hodges' institution of heirs.

44 Linnie Jane Hodges' brothers and sisters at her death on May 23, 1957 had ages ranging from 62 to 74 yrs.
(except for Nimroy Higdon who was then 50 yrs. old) and most likely have all passed away or are already too
old to enjoy their inheritance. Green Rec. on Appeal, p. 2.

45 At page 89-a, main opinion.

46 Medina et al. vs. C. A., L-34760, September 28, 1973, citing Lizarraga Hnos. vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124 and
other cases.

47 At p. 90, main opinion.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30587 December 4, 1929
SABINA REYES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
E.C. WELLS as Administrator of the Estate of John Northcott, deceased, ET AL., defendants. E. C. WELLS, appellant.
J. W. Ferrier for appellant.
Iigo R. Bitanga and Ignacio P. Santos for appellees.
VILLAMOR, J.:
On June 7, 1923, the plaintiffs filed their original complaint against John E. Rader and John Northcott, the original defendants in this
cause.
Several demurrers were interposed, and in consequence the complaint was amended several times. The seventh amended complaint
was filed on June 11, 1925, and was admitted by the trial court in August the same year. In the meantime the defendants Rader and
Northcott died, and in said seventh complaint they have been substituted by their respective administrators, E. C. Wells, administrator
of the estate of John Northcott and Alberto Suguitan, administrator of the estate of John E. Rader.
The complaint prays that the promissory notes and deeds executed by the plaintiffs in favor of said Rader and Northcott, as well as
their record in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Norte, be cancelled, and that the defendants, as administrators, be ordered to pay the
damages set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint, with costs.
It is alleged in the complaint: (1) That said J. E. Rader and J. Northcott had installed a maguey stripping machine in the municipality
of Burgos, Ilocos Norte, and an International truck in a shed on a lot; that J. E. Rader told plaintiff Saturnino R. Guerrero that he had
purchased said articles from Macleod & Co., for the sum of P23,600, and offered to sell them to said plaintiff for P23,000 payable in
installments, but that Guerrero replied that he could not do so for lack of money to operate the machine; (2) that said J. E. Rader
promised to furnish said plaintiff with the amount of P12,000 for that purpose, and delivered to the latter of P400 "in advance" to
commence the exploitation of said machine; (3) that after said sum was delivered, the same plaintiff was required to make out two
promissory notes; one for P7,000 and the other for P5,000 in favor of said Rader "guaranteed by a mortgage on certain property
sufficient to cover said sum of P12,000;" that said mortgage shall be endorsed to some business houses in the City of Manila; that
Saturnino Guerrero executed two mortgage deeds, attached to the complaint, signed by Saturnino R. Guerrero, his mother and his
brothers, coowners pro indiviso of the real property mortgaged; that said mortgage deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds of this
province (Ilocos Norte); (4) that J. E. Rader and Saturnino R. Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 1922 the former endorsed
the mortgage deed for the amount of P5,000; (5) that neither said amount of P5,000 nor any part thereof was delivered to Saturnino R.
Guerrero or to any of his coplaintiffs; and the aforementioned Rader and Northcott promised to pay when the latter (Northcott)
received some money he had asked for from a certain firm in San Francisco, California; and in consideration of said promise,
Saturnino R. Guerrero "obligated himself to pay to Macleod & Co. in installments, the price of said property, machinery truck, shed,
and lot where they are installed," the aforesaid Rader having stated that he had not yet paid Macleod & Co. for said property; (6) that
in the month of October, 1922, Saturnino R. Guerrero demanded payment of said sum of P5,000 from J. E. Rader, because the periods
stipulated by Macleod & Co. fell due, and both of them again repaired to the aforesaid Northcott to discuss the P12,000 secured by the
two mortgage deeds; the latter told them that he had not yet received the agreed amount; and he again promised, for the second time,
that he would pay it "as soon as he received the amount owed, from the West Coast Life Insurance Co.; " and at the same time, he
asked that Saturnino R. Guerrero, in his own behalf and in behalf of his mother and brothers, renew the other mortgage deed for
P7,000 executed in favor of said Northcott, which the plaintiff Guerrero "blindly" did, whereupon Northcott gave him a check for P98
wherewith to pay the land tax; and (7) that due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,000, the
plaintiff sustained damages in the amount of P23,600, which is the value of the machinery and other property "attached by Macleod &
Co." for default in the payment of the installments due, besides P10,000 which is the market value of the property of Saturnino R.
Guerrero attached by a writ of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the cause instituted by said Macleod & Co. for foreclosure of
mortgage; and the amount of P2,000 "for filing and prosecuting the complaint."
The administrator of the estate of the deceased J. E. Rader filed an answer denying generally and specifically each and every
allegation of the complaint.
The other defendant, E. C. Wells, administrator of J. Northcott's intestate estate, generally and specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraphs 2 to 8 of said complaint, and by way of special defense sets up as a counterclaim and cross-complaint that: (a)
The mortgage executed in favor of J. Northcott, deceased, on October 23, 1922, made a part of the last amended complaint, for P7,000
has fallen due and none of the plaintiff-mortgagors has paid said amount, in whole or in part, nor the interest stipulated in the
mortgage deed, "nor the additional sum equal to 20 per cent of the total due as attorney's fees in case of litigation;" (b) that by the
violation of the terms and conditions contained in the mortgage deed, which is also a part of the aforesaid complaint for the sum of
P5,000, executed by said plaintiffs on June 14, 1992 in favor of J. E. Rader, and by the latter assigned on June 29, 1922, the mortgage
has fallen due and the mortgagors therein have failed to pay the amount or any part thereof and the interest thereon; (c) that in said
mortgage of June 14, 1922, the mortgagors bound themselves to pay to said J. Northcott, deceased, an additional sum equal to 20 per
cent of the amount fue as attorney's fees in case of litigation, and the conditions of the mortgage deed not having been complied with,
the mortgage should be foreclosed.
Evidence having been adduced by both parties, the trial court, after a careful examination thereof reached the conclusion that the two
sums of P5,000 and P7,000 were never delivered to the plaintiffs by J. E. Rader or J. Northcott either before or after their death, and
therefore held that the two realty mortgage deeds, one of which was assigned by J. E. Rader to J. Northcott, must be cancelled, being
null and void, and, in consequence, the counterclaim and cross-complaint set up by administrator Wells are untenable and must be
dismissed.
Wherefore, the trial court ordered the cancellation in the registry of deeds of the mortgage credit of P5,000 on the real property
assigned by J. E. Rader in favor of Northcott, and the cancellation of the other mortgage deed for P7,000 executed by the plaintiffs in
favor of J. Northcott.
And the court dismissed the claim for damages against the defendants, as well and the counterclaim and cross-complaint of the
administrator of J. Northcott's intestate estate. From this judgment, administrator E. C. Wells appealed.
We find from the record that Dr. John E. Rader, deceased, was a resident of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, about the year
1922, and owned in the municipality of Burgos, of said province, a maguey stripping machine, an International truck, a shed, and a lot.
In order to get rid of them, he persuaded the plaintiffs, particularly Saturnino R. Guerrero, to buy them; and as the latter pretended that
he had money with which the purchase it and exploit the business, the former proposed to lend him P12,000 with understanding that
Guerrero would execute two promissory notes for P5,000 and P7,000 in his favor, securing said notes by two mortgage deeds upon
realty property. In view of this proposal, the plaintiffs subscribed a promissory note for P5,000 dated June 14, 1922, and another in the
amount of P7,000 also dated June 14, 1922.
These two promissory notes were guaranteed by two mortgage deeds exhibited herein as X, both drawn in favor of John E. Rader.
These two mortgage deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
After the execution of these two mortgages, it appears that John E. Rader was only able to deliver P400 to Saturnino Guerrero, saying
that they could obtain the remainder as a loan from John Northcott. For this purpose, they came to Manila in the month of June, 1922,
to solicit the money and also to arrange for the purchase of the machine from Macleod & Co. Saturnino Guerrero was presented by
Rader to the manager of Macleod & Co. as the purchaser of the machine in question, and to this end Guerrero signed a promissory
note for P20,000 payable according to the periods and conditions set forth therein. Putting aside for the moment Saturnino Guerrero's
contract with Macleod & Co. for the purchase of the machine in question, it appears that Rader and Guerrero went to the office of the
West Coast Life Insurance Company in order to ask Northcott for the money promised by Rader. But Northcott could not deliver to
Guerrero more than P98 with which to pay the land tax, promising that as soon as he received the money he had asked for from San
Francisco, California, he would deliver to Guerrero the P12,000 covered by the first two promissory notes subscribed by Guerrero and
secured by the two above-mentioned mortgages. The plaintiffs allege that with the exception of the two amounts of P400 and P98
already mentioned, the sums in question in the promissory notes secured with mortgages have not been paid either by Rader or by
Northcott, and therefore pray for the cancellation of the promissory notes and mortgage deeds executed by the plaintiffs in favor of
said Rader and Northcott, and of their record in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Norte.
The main contention of the appellant in this case is that the plaintiff-appellees' allegation that the promissory notes in question have
not been paid, is not supported by the evidence, inasmuch as the only witness who testified upon this point, that is, Saturnino
Guerrero, is incompetent to testify upon transactions had between himself and the deceased John E. Rader and John Northcott, in
accordance with section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is true that Saturnino Guerrero, as an interested party in the case, is incompetent to testify upon transactions had between himself
and the deceased Rader and Northcott but the record shows that there is another witness, Eduardo Bustamante, who has no interest in
this case, and who testified that he witnessed and heard the conversations between Guerrero and Rader, and Northcott, respecting the
delivery of the money represented by the promissory notes in question, and his testimony appears to be corroborated, in so far as it
refers to the conversations between Guerrero and Rader, by Marcelino Benito and Apolinar Pasion. The testimony of said witness
Eduardo Bustamante is admissible to prove that the defendants never delivered the money which was the consideration of said
promissory notes.
In 28 R. C. L., 499, it is stated: "By the weight of authority statutes rendering a party to or person interested in the event of an action
against the estate of a decedent or a lunatic, incompetent to testify concerning a personal transaction had with the latter, do not
disqualify such party or person from testifying to communications or transactions between a deceased and a third person had in his
presence or within his hearing, if he took no active part therein himself. Unless the transactions or communications are personal, and
had with the deceased by the witness, either literally or in practical effect, as by participating in or influencing them, they do not fall
under the prohibition of the statute."
In Mallow vs. Walker (115 Iowa, 238), the court said: "Code, section 4604, declares that no party to an action nor one interested in the
event shall be examined as a witness as to any transaction between him and one deceased against the executor, administrator, heir, next
of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor. Held, that the statute does not prevent a witness from testifying as to a conversation
between deceased and another in the presence of the witness, in which the witness took no part."
And in Mollison vs. Rittgers (140 Iowa., 365), the same court said: "The interest which disqualifies a witness from testifying to a
transaction with a decedent is that which relates to the event of the particular suit and not merely to the subject of the controversy."
Section 4604 of the Code of Iowa provides: "No party to any action or proceeding, nor any person interest in the event thereof, nor any
person from, through or under whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or title by assignment or otherwise, and
no husband or wife of any said party or person, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal transaction or communication
between such witness and a person at the commencement of such examination deceased, insane or lunatic, against the executor,
administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of such deceased person, or the assignee or guardian of
such insane person or lunatic. But this prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such executor,
administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or guardian shall be examined on his own behalf, or as to
which the testimony of such deceased or insane person or lunatic shall be given in evidence."
The prohibition contained in said law against a witness' testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a
deceased person, is substantially the same as that contained in section 383, No. 7, of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2252. And therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar.
Among the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to prove that the two sums of P5,000 and P7,000 promised have not been received by
said plaintiffs, is Exhibit F, signed with the name of John E. Rader, reading as follows:
MANILA, P. I., May 20, 1923
Mr. SATURNINO GUERRERO
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, P. I.
DEAR SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the tenth instant. I immediately showed it
to Mr. Northcott and he told me that you please wait for a short time as the money he borrow from
the West Coast Life Insurance Co. in San Francisco, California, is now on its way according to the
cablegram received by him recently.
After we receive it, therefore, we shall send you the sum of P12,000 so as to cover the two mortgage
debts of P5,000 and P7,000 due you which, hitherto, remain unpaid.
I went to Macleod & Co. and asked for the withdrawal of the complaint against you inasmuch as
you will soon have sufficient amount to pay the Co. in the sum P4,000 corresponding to that which
is due on November, 1922, after receiving the P12,000. I was told that Mr. Forst will see to it that
the complaint shall be dropped.
Yours truly,
(Sgd.) JOHN E. RADER
"En/s"
The parties discussed the genuineness of this letter, Exhibit F, at great length, each presenting the report of its handwriting expert, the
one employed by the plaintiffs maintaining that the signature on said letter is the genuine signature of the deceased John E. Rader,
while that of the defendants contends the opposite.
The trial court, in turn, after examining the undisputed signatures of John E. Rader contained on Exhibits G and H of the plaintiffs and
the other Exhibits 1 to 6 of the defendants, found dissimilarities between the signature on Exhibit F and that of said exhibits of both
parties, as there are in those not disputed and that of Exhibit 6, which is acknowledged to be genuine by the defendants; and the court
concluded with the statement "that it is difficult to make sure that the disputed signature , Exhibit F, was not written by John E. Rader,
and considering that said exhibit is a reply written in Manila to a letter of Saturnino Guerrero's as to the straits in which the latter was,
and his frequent insistence that the money promised by the writer of said letter and John Northcott be delivered, it is more than likely
that the letter, Exhibit F, was written and signed by John E. Rader."
We have carefully examined the signature Exhibit F, comparing it with the genuine signatures admitted by both parties, and we have
found dissimilarities between the signature Exhibit F and the genuine signatures, Exhibits G and H, and between said signature and the
genuine signatures, Exhibits 1 to 6. But on pages 30 and 59 of his brief, the appellant, after denying that the signature Exhibit F was
written by John E. Rader, suggests that the signatures on Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 indicate the probability that the signature on Exhibit F
was written, not by the deceased John E. Rader, but by John E. Rader, jr. We are inclined to accept the conclusion reached by the court
below; but admitting the probability suggested by the appellant that said signature Exhibit F was written by John E. Rader, jr., we
believe that if John E. Rader, jr., really signed said letter in question, he must have done it with the knowledge of his father, the
deceased John E. Rader in which case the contents of said letter must be given the same effect as if it had been written by the said John
E. Rader. Aside from this, the record contains something which, we believe, strongly upholds the plaintiffs' contention that the money
promised by John E. Rader and John Northcott, which was the consideration of the aforementioned promissory notes has not been
delivered by them to Saturnino R. Guerrero, except the P400 and P98 already mentioned; the mortgage, signed by Saturnino R.
Guerrero in favor of Macleod & Co. to secure the payment of the maguey stripping machine, was foreclosed by Macleod & Co. by
virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 11, 1923, as a result of the complaint filed by
Macleod & Co., Inc., against Saturnino R. Guerrero on March 10, 1923, for default in the payment of the first installment of said
promissory note. The attached property of Saturnino R. Guerrero, valued at P47,430, was sold at public auction for only P3,862.84.
We believe that Saturnino R. Guerrero, in the ordinary course of business, would not have abandoned the execution of his property for
an amount relatively small, had he at that time the money which he expected to receive from Rader or Northcott.
But the appellant insists that during his lifetime, the deceased Northcott delivered to John E. Rader the sum of P5,000, on account of
the P5,000 promissory note, secured by Guerrero's mortgage. To prove this, the appellant presented Exhibit 14, and the testimony of
R. P. Flood and S. H. Deebel. flood testified that on June 30, 1922, he lent Northcott P2,000 which was paid directly to Rader by
means of a check, upon the former's request. On the other hand witness S. H. Deebel, on direct examination, testified: "On or about
June 1, 1922, Mr. Northcott called me and told me that he knew somebody who would borrow money from me. Mr. Northcott told me
that he had to wait until Mr. Rader arrived, because Mr. Rader was the one who would receive the mortgage money. Mr. Rader then
came to Manila between June 25, and July 1, 1922, and I met him at Mr. Northcott's office in Manila. I made out a check for two
thousand seven hundred pesos in favor of Mr. Northcott. Mr. Northcott wished me to deliver said money to Mr. Rader with interest at
twelve per centum, but I told him I would rather give it to him at ten per centum, and that he could charge Mr. Rader twelve per
centum . . . Mr. Rader was present, and when Mr. Northcott got the check, he told Mr. Rader: "Here is the check," and gave him the
check." But on cross-examination, this witness said: ". . . I gave the check to Mr. Northcott who told Mr. Rader: "Here is Deebel's
check for the money." I don't know what Mr. Northcott did with the check, but as it was in Mr. Northcott's name, it was he who had to
cash it. I don't know whether Mr. Northcott endorsed the check to Mr. Rader, and whether Mr. Rader cashed it or not, or whether Mr.
Northcott cashed it."
Exhibit 14 is an unsigned document, apparently a statement of account between Rader and Northcott, which mentions the names
Guerrero, Flood and Deebel.
In view of the evidence adduced by the defendants, the trial court held that "it is probable that John Northcott gave John Rader the
sum of P2,000 in July 1922, loaned by R. P. Flood for the P5,000 promissory note given to the former; and we do not know whether
the other sum of P2,700 was given to J. E. Rader. And it held, furthermore, that John Northcott could not legally give Rader the sum of
P2,000 on account of the P5,000 requested of him, because said sum of P2,000 was owed to the plaintiffs on account of the P5,000
promissory note given and executed with the understanding that the money would be given after the execution."
We are of the opinion that these conclusions reached by the court below are supported by the evidence, and we are equally of the
opinion that supposing John Northcott gave Rader the P2,000 loaned to the latter by Flood, the delivery of said amount to Rader did
not destroy Guerrero's right to claim the delivery of the money which is the consideration of the P5,000 promissory note endorsed by
Rader to Northcott, for the reason that when Rader endorsed said note to Northcott on June 29, 1922, the latter knew positively that
the money represented by the endorsed note had not been actually delivered to Guerrero. His personal knowledge that the money of
said note had not been delivered to Guerrero is sufficient to destroy the presumptions of section 334, Nos. 17, 19 and 36, of the Code
of Civil Procedure, invoked by the appellant.
The same may be said of the P7,000 promissory note. The appellant does not maintain that the deceased Northcott delivered to
Guerrero the money of this note, but only argues that, as Guerrero executed the mortgage deed securing the payment of P7,000 in
favor of Northcott on October 20, 1922, it is presumed that there was sufficient consideration.
It is to be noted that this mortgage was originally executed on June 14, 1922 in favor of Rader, but that on October 23, 1922 the latter
asked the registrar of deeds of Ilocos Norte to cancel said mortgage, saying that he had received from Guerrero the amount guaranteed,
which seems strange, because in such cases, it is not the mortgagee but the mortgagor who is interested in asking that the record of the
mortgage be cancelled once the debt is paid. It is hard to conceive how Guerrero could consent to pay Rader the P7,000 of the
promissory note, when he complains that he never received said sum. And it is observed that the cancellation of the mortgage by
Rader is prior to the alleged mortgage in favor of Northcott. On the other hand, what good would it have done Guerrero to receive the
P7,000 from Northcott in order to give it to Rader, when he himself wanted to use the money represented by the promissory note and
secured by the mortgage? What advantage would Guerrero have derived from a change of mortgage creditors? All of which indicates
that the execution of the mortgage deed in favor of Northcott was probably suggested by Rader as a part of the plan to unite in
Northcott the rights, if any, arising from his agreements with Guerrero.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
This action was commenced on June 7, 1923, in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against John Northcott and John E. Rader
as original defendants. After much delay cause by demurrers, amended complaints, motions, etc., and said Northcott and Rader having
died in the meantime, the action was prosecuted against the above-named administrators of their estate. The record does not disclose
the date when Northcott and Rader died. The last amended complaint was filed against said administrators on June 11, 1925. Upon
demurrer of E. C. Wells, Rufino R. Guerrero was included as plaintiff.
The purpose of the action was to secure the cancellation of two promissory notes and the two mortgages given as security, executed by
the plaintiffs in favor of said Rader and Northcott, for the sums of P5,000 and P7,000. The plaintiffs alleged that they did not receive
the value of said promissory notes and the consideration named in the said mortgages, except the sum of P400 which they received
from Rader and the sum of P98 from Northcott. They prayed for the cancellation of said notes and motgages, and for damages in the 1. In admitting certain testimony of one of the plaintiffs over the objection of the defendant-appellant, contrary to the
sum of P35,600, and costs. Said notes and mortgages were attached to, and made a part of the complaint. provisions of section 383, paragraph 7 of Act No. 190;

The defendant Alberto Suguitan answered, denying generally each and every allegations of the complaint. 2. In finding that there was no consideration for the two promissory notes and mortgages of P5,000 and P7,000, and in
ordering the cancellation of said mortgages;
The defendant E. C. Wells answered, denying generally and specifically each and every allegation of the complaint. As a special
defense this defendant alleged (1) that the deceased John Northcott had paid the sum of P5,000 to John E. Rader in consideration of 3. In dismissing the counterclaim and cross-complaint of the appellant;
the assignment to him by the latter of the mortgage for P5,000 executed in favor of said Rader by the plaintiffs; that the claim for
damages not having been presented before the committee on claims and appraisals of the estate of Northcott, the plaintiffs did not have
4. In not rendering a judgment in favor of the defendant-appellant and against the plaintiffs for the payment of P5,000 and
any right to recover them in this action.
P7,000, the value and consideration of the promissory notes and mortgages, with interest and attorney's fees, as stipulated
in said notes and mortgages; and
The defendant E. C. Wells also presented a counterclaim and cross-complaint, alleging (1) that the mortgage for the sum of P7,000
executed by the plaintiffs in favor of John Northcott was long due and unpaid; (2) that the mortgage for P5,000 which had been
5. In finding that the signature "John E. Rader" appearing at the bottom of Exhibit F, is the true and genuine signature of
assigned by John E. Rader to John Northcott was also overdue and unpaid; and (3) that the terms and conditions of said mortgages had
said John E. Rader.
been violated by the plaintiffs for their failure to pay the amounts thereof at the time stipulated. Said defendant prayed that he be
absolved from all liability under the complaint, and that a judgment be rendered in his favor and against the plaintiffs, ordering them to
pay to him jointly and severally the following amounts of said mortgages: A careful examination of the evidence shows the following undisputed facts:

(a) Seven thousand pesos, with 12 per cent interest from October 20, 1922, until paid; (1) On the 14th day of June, 1922, the plaintiffs, with the exception of Rufino R. Guerrero, executed two promissory notes in favor of
John E. Rader for the sums of P5,000 and P7,000, secured by two mortgages of the same date on several parcels of land situated in
Ilocos Norte. Said promissory notes were payable within one year from the date thereof, or not later than June 14, 1923, with interest
(b) Five thousand pesos with 12 per cent interest from June 14, 1922, until paid;
at 12 per cent, and also 20 per cent as attorney's fees in case of plaintiffs' failure to pay the same at maturity. (Exhibit X.) The note for
P5,000 reads as follows:
(c) Twenty per cent of said amounts as attorney's fees;
P5,000.00.
(c) And costs.

Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence adduced by both parties, and on May 25,
1928, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, arrived at the following conclusions: (1) That the plaintiffs had not received the value of LAOAG, I. F., junio 14, 1922
the promissory notes and the consideration of the mortgages in question; (2) that John E. Rader having made an assignment to John
Northcott of the mortgage for P5,000, every juridical relation between him and the plaintiffs had ceased; (3) that the promissory note En o antes de dia 14 de 1923, por valor recibido nos comprometemos a pagar a la orden del Dr. John E.
and mortgage for P7,000 originally executed by the plaintiffs in favor of John E. Rader having been cancelled, and said instruments Rader la suma de cinco mil pesos (P5,000), moneda filipina, con intereses sobre dicha suma en igual
having been later executed by the plaintiffs in favor of John Northcott, every juridical relation between John E. Rader and the moneda, desde esta fecha hasta que se pague, a razon de doce por ciento (12%) anual.
plaintiffs as to said note and mortgage had also ceased; and (4) that the plaintiffs not having presented their claim for damages before
the committee on claims and appraisal of the estate of John Northcott, their right to recover the same had prescribed.
Este pagare esta garantizado por una hipoteca, a favor del Dr. John E. Rader, sobre bienes immuebles en
Dingras Ilocos Norte, I. Filipinas.
In harmony with the foregoing conclusions, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant E. C. Wells,
as administrator of the estate of John Northcott, ordering the cancellation of the mortgages in question. Plaintiffs' claim for damages
was dismissed, as well as the counterclaim and cross-complaint of the defendant E. C. Wells. Each party to pay one-half part of the Se estipula ademas, que en caso de falta de pago del capital o de los intereses de este pagare, como y
costs. From that judgment the defendant E. C. Wells appealed. cuando venza y sea pagadero, una suma adicional igual al veinte por ciento (20%) de la suma total que
entonces sea pagadera sobre el mismo, se pagara al tenedor o a los tenedores de este pagare para
honorarios de abogados y de cobro." (Exhibit 9.)
The appellant now makes nineteen assignments of error relating to questions of both fact and law. However, only a few of said alleged
errors are material in this appeal, and the same may be condensed as follows:

The lower court erred: The promissory note for P7,000 contains the same terms and conditions. (Exhibit X.)
(2) On the 29th day of June, 1922, John E. Rader, with the conformity of the plaintiffs, assigned to John Northcott the mortgage for
P5,000, "in consideration of the sum of five thousand pesos Philippine currency to him in hand paid by John Northcott" (Exhibit X).
The corresponding promissory note of P5,000 was on the same date (June 29, 1922) indorsed by John E. Rader to John Northcott.
(Exhibit 9.)
(3) On October 21, 1922, John E. Rader addressed a letter to the register of deeds of Ilocos Norte, asking for the cancellation of the
mortgage of P7,000 executed in his favor by the plaintiffs, with the exception of Rufino R. Guerrero, on June 14, 1922, as above
stated. In said letter John E. Rader stated that he had received from the plaintiffs the sum of P7,000 the consideration of said mortgage.
The register of deeds made an entry of said cancellation on November 17, 1922. (Exhibit X.)
he is prohibited by law from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Northcott and Rader. (Sec. 383, par. 7, C.
C. P.) We have also disregarded Exhibit F, because it is irrelevant and because the signature appearing thereon is not that of John E.
Rader.
Therefore, the consideration in the sum of P7,000 of said mortgage not having been delivered to the plaintiffs, the lower court
committed no error in ordering its cancellation.
The foregoing discussion of fact and law answers all of the assignments of error above noted and also disposes of the two questions
presented in this appeal.

(4) On October 20, 1922, the plaintiffs executed a promissory note for P7,000 in favor of John Northcott, payable on or before June
14, 1923, secured by a mortgage of the same date, executed by the plaintiffs in favor of said John Northcott. (Exhibits 10 and 11.)
The foregoing statement of facts clearly shows that all the rights and obligations between John E. Rader and the plaintiffs arising from
the two promissory notes and mortgages had ceased (a) by virtue of the assignment of the mortgage for P5,000 to John Northcott, and
(b) by virtue of the cancellation of the mortgage for P7,000. Therefore, the questions for determination in this appeal are:
(1) What rights and obligations exist between the plaintiffs and John Northcott, arising from the assignment of the mortgage of P5,000
made by John E. Rader to Northcott?
(2) What rights and obligations exist between the plaintiffs and John Northcott, arising from the promissory note and mortgage for
P7,000, executed by the former in favor of the latter on October 20, 1922?
In harmony with all of the foregoing the judgment appealed from should be modified. The promissory note and mortgage for P5,000
in favor of John Northcott should be held valid and subsisting; and the plaintiffs, with the exception of Rufino R. Guerrero, should be
ordered to pay jointly and severally said sum to the defendant-appellant E. C. Wells, as administrator of the estate of John Northcott,
together with interest and attorney's fees; and in case of their failure to pay said amount within three months from the date hereof, the
lands give in security should be ordered sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of said mortgage. The plaintiffs should also be
ordered to pay to the defendant-appellant the sum of P98 which was paid to them by Northcott sometime after the execution of the
note and mortgage for P7,000.
That part of the judgment of the lower court ordering the cancellation of the mortgage for P7,000 should be affirmed. As modified in
accordance herewith, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with one-half of the costs against each party.
Johns, J., concurs.

With reference to the first question, it may be said that John Northcott, as assignee of the mortgage and holder, by indorsement, of the
note for P5,000, is entitled under the terms and conditions of said mortgage to recover from the plaintiffs, with the exception of Rufino
R. Guerrero, the amount thereof together with interest and attorney's fees as expressly stipulated in said note and mortgage. The
assignment was made with the written conformity of the plaintiffs. John Northcott paid to his assignor John E. Rader the sum of
P5,000, as expressly stated in the deed of assignment (Exhibit 13). This payment is corroborated by the testimony of Raymon P. Flood
and Samuel H. Deebel, from whom Northcott borrowed the money which he paid to Rader. Northcott paid the consideration of the
mortgage and the value of the note, and his rights as such mortgagee and holder of the note for value, should be enforced in
accordance with the law and the terms and conditions of said mortgage.

Said note and mortgage for P5,000 fell due on June 14, 1923. The appellant E. C. Wells, as administrator of the estate of John
Northcott, is entitled to receive from the plaintiffs, with the exception of Rufino R. Guerrero, the amount thereof, together with interest
at 12 per cent and attorney's fees equal to 20 per cent of the full amount due. The appellant's counterclaim and cross-complaint for this
amount should have been sustained by the lower court.

The second question, as above stated, relates to the rights and obligations existing between the plaintiffs and John Northcott, arising
from the promissory note and mortgage for P7,000 executed by them in his favor on October 20, 1922. We agree with the lower court
in its conclusion that the plaintiffs have not received the value and consideration of said note and mortgage. A preponderance of the
evidence shows that the value of said note and the consideration named in the mortgage were not delivered to the plaintiffs; that
Northcott promised to pay them the value of said note (P7,000) as soon as he had raised the required amount; that the note and
mortgage were delivered to him with that understanding, and that up to the time of his death he had been unable to pay said note, with
the exception of the sum of P98 which he paid to the plaintiffs at or about the time of its execution. There is sufficient proof to
overcome the presumption that Northcott became the holder of said note for value and that he paid to the plaintiffs the consideration
named in the mortgage. In arriving at this conclusion we have disregarded the testimony of the plaintiff Saturnino R. Guerrero because
 trial judge in his decision found against the insurance company on all points, and gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
P8,188.74. From this judgment the insurance company has appealed, and it is to the first and fourth errors assigned that we would
address particular attention.

Considering the result at which we arrive, it is unnecessary for us to discuss three of the four special defenses which were made by the
insurance company. We think, however, that it would be a reasonable deduction to conclude that more than 3 per cent of the total value
of the merchandise contained in the warehouse constituted hazardous goods, and that this per cent reached as high as 39. We place
reliance on the consular invoices and on the testimony of the adjuster, Herridge. Having thus swept to one side all intervening
obstacle, the legal question recurs, as stated in the beginning of this decision, of whether or not warranty F was null and void.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT To place this question in its proper light, we turn to the policy issued by the Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company in favor of
Manila the plaintiff. The description of the risk in this policy is as follows:lawphil.net

EN BANC
Ten thousand pesos Philippine Currency. On general non-hazardous merchandise, chiefly consisting of
G.R. No. L-33637 December 31, 1931 chucherias, also produce, Cacao, Flour, all the property of the Insured, or held by them in trust, on
commission or on joint account with others, or for which he is responsible, while contained during the
currency of this policy in the godown, situate No. 643 Calle Reina Regent. . . .
ANG GIOK CHIP, doing business under the name and style of Hua Bee Kong Si, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SPRINGFIELD FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant. This policy is subject to the hereon attached "Ordinary Short Period Rate Scale" Warranties A & F, Co-
insurances Clause "and Three Fourths Loss Clause," which are forming part of same. Co-insurance
declared:
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Paredes and Buencamino for appellee.
Gibbs and McDonough and Ramon Ozaeta as amici curiae. "P20,000. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. (K & S)." (Emphasis inserted.) Securely pasted on the left hand
margin of the face of the policy are five warranties and special clauses. One of them is warranty F,
specially referred to on the face of the policy, reading in part as follows:

WARRANTY F
MALCOLM, J.:

It is hereby declared and agreed that during the currency of this policy no hazardous goods be stored in the
An important question in the law of insurance, not heretofore considered in this jurisdiction and, according to our information, not
Building to which this insurance applies or in any building communicating therewith, provided, always,
directly resolved in California from which State the Philippine Insurance Act was taken, must be decided on this appeal for the future
however, that the Insured be permitted to stored a small quantity of the hazardous goods specified below,
guidance of trial courts and of insurance companies doing business in the Philippine Islands. This question, flatly stated, is whether a
but not exceeding in all 3 per cent of the total value of the whole of the goods or merchandise contained in
warranty referred to in the policy as forming part of the contract of insurance and in the form of a rider to the insurance policy, is null
said warehouse, viz; . . . .
and void because not complying with the Philippine Insurance Act. The court has had the benefit of instructive briefs and memoranda
from the parties and has also been assisted by a well prepared brief submitted on behalf of amici curiae.
The applicable law is found in the Instance Act, Act No. 2427, as amended, section 65 reading:
The admitted facts are these: Ang Giok Chip doing business under the name and style of Hua Bee Kong Si was formerly the owner of
a warehouse situated at No. 643 Calle Reina Regente, City of Manila. The contents of the warehouse were insured with the three
insurance companies for the total sum of P60,000. One insurance policy, in the amount of P10,000, was taken out with the Springfield
Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The warehouse was destroyed by fire on January 11, 1928, while the policy issued by the latter "Every express warranty, made at or before the execution of a policy, must be contained in the policy itself, or in another instrument
company was in force. signed by the insured and referred to in the policy, as making a part of it." As the Philippine law was taken verbatim from the law of
California, in accordance with well settled canons of statutory construction, the court should follow in fundamental points, at least, the
construction placed by California courts on a California law. Unfortunately the researches of counsel reveal no authority coming from
Predicated on this policy the plaintiff instituted action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant to recover a the courts of California which is exactly on all fours with the case before us. However, there are certain consideration lying at the basis
proportional part of the loss coming to P8,170.59. Four special defenses were interposed on behalf of the insurance company, one of California law and certain indications in the California decisions which point the way for the decision in this case
being planted on a violation of warranty F fixing the amount of hazardous goods which might be stored in the insured building. The
Section 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act corresponds to section 2605 of the Civil Cod of California. The comments of the Code
Examiners of California disclose that the language of section 2605 was quite different from that under the Code as adopted in 1872.
That language was found too harsh as to insurance companies. The Code Examiners' notes state: "The amendment restores the law as
it existed previous to the Code: See Parsons on Maritime Law, 106, and Phillips on Insurance, sec. 756." The passage referred to in
Philips on Insurance, was worded by the author as follows:
"Any express warranty or condition is always a part of the policy, but, like any other part of an express contract, may be written in the
margin, or contained in proposals or documents expressly referred to in the policy, and so made a part of it." The annotator of the Civil
Code of California, after setting forth these facts, adds:
. . . The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the
policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof: . . . .
mistake made by himself and the local agent in attaching the wrong rider to his application, elects to retain the policy issued to him,
and neither requests the issuance of a different one nor offers to pay the premium requisite to insure against the risk which he believe
the rider to cover, he thereby accepts the policy.
We are given to understand, and there is no indication to the contrary, that we have here a standard insurance policy. We are further
given to understand, and there is no indication to the contrary, that the issuance of the policy in this case with its attached rider
conforms to well established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere. We are further given to understand, and there is no indication
to the contrary, that there are no less than sixty-nine insurance companies doing business in the Philippine Islands with outstanding
policies more or less similar to the one involved in this case, and that to nullify such policies would place an unnecessary hindrance in
the transaction of insurance business in the Philippines. These are matters of public policy. We cannot believe that it was ever the
legislative intention to insert in the Philippine Law on Insurance an oddity, an incongruity, entirely out of harmony with the law as
found in other jurisdiction, and destructive of good business practice.

We have studied this case carefully and having done so have reached the definite conclusion that warranty F, a rider attached to the
What we have above stated has been paraphrased from the decision of the California Court of Appeals in the case of Isaac Upham
face of the insurance policy, and referred to in contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under section 65 of the Insurance Act.
Co. vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ( [1922], 211 Pac., 809), and thus discloses the attitude of the California courts.
Accordingly, sustaining the first and fourth errors assigned, and it being unnecessary to discuss the remaining errors, the result will be
Likewise in the Federal courts, in the case of Conner vs. Manchester Assur. Co. ([1904], 130 Fed., 743), section 2605 of the Civil
to reverse the judgment appealed from and to order the dismissal of the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs in either
Code of California came under observation, and it was said that it "is in effect an affirmance of the generally accepted doctrine
instance.
applicable to such contracts."

Street, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

We, therefore, think it wrong to hold that the California law represents a radical departure from the basic principles governing the law
of insurance. We are more inclined to believe that the codification of the law of California had exactly the opposite purpose, and that
in the language of the Federal court it was but an affirmance of the generally accepted doctrine applicable to such contracts. This being Separate Opinions
true, we turn to two of such well recognized doctrines. In the first place, it is well settled that a rider attached to a policy is a part of the
contract, to the same extent and with like effect as it actually embodied therein. (I Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec. 159.) In
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
the second place, it is equally well settled that an express warranty must appear upon the face of the policy, or be clearly incorporated
therein and made a part thereof by explicit reference, or by words clearly evidencing such intention. (4 Couch, Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law, sec. 862.) I fully concur in the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Imperial, and further say that a rider or slip attached to an insurance policy,
though referred to therein as making a part of it, is not one of the forms prescribed by section 65 of the Insurance Law in which an
express warranty may be made to appear validly so as to be binding between the insurer and the insured. There are two, and only two
Section 65 of the Insurance Act and its counterpart, section 265 of the Civil Code of California, will bear analysis as tested by reason
forms provided in said section by which an express warranty may be made to appear validly, to wit: by embodiment either in the
and authority. The law says that every express warranty must be "contained in the policy itself." The word "contained," according to
insurance policy itself or in another instrument signed by the insured and referred to in the policy as making a part of it.
the dictionaries, means "included," inclosed," "embraced," "comprehended," etc. When, therefore, the courts speak of a rider attached
to the policy, and thus "embodied" therein, or of a warranty "incorporated" in the policy, it is believed that the phrase "contained in the
policy itself" must necessarily include such rider and warranty. As to the alternative relating to "another instrument," "instrument" as Now the question arises as to whether the rider or slip containing said warranty F attached to the policy in question and referred to
here used could not mean a mere slip of paper like a rider, but something akin to the policy itself, which in section 48 of the Insurance therein as making a part thereof is one of the two forms provided in said section 65 of the Insurance Law.
Act is defined as "The written instrument, in which a contract of insurance is set forth." In California, every paper writing is not
necessarily an "instrument" within the statutory meaning of the term. The word "instrument has a well defined definition in California,
It is admitted that it is not the second form, because not being signed by the insured it does not constitute an instrument. (Hoag vs.
and as used in the Codes invariably means some written paper or instrument signed and delivered by one person to another,
Howard [1880], 55 Cal., 564; People vs. Fraser [1913], 137 Pac., 276.)
transferring the title to, or giving a lien, on property, or giving a right to debt or duty. (Hoag vs. Howard [1880], 55 Cal., 564;
People vs. Fraser[1913], 137 Pac., 276.) In other words, the rider, warranty F, is contained in the policy itself, because by the contract
of insurance agreed to by the parties it is made to form a part of the same, but is not another instrument signed by the insured and Is it the first form required by law, that is, is it contained in the policy itself? It is so contended in the majority opinion and authorities
referred to in the policy as forming a part of it. are cited in support of such contention.

Again, referring to the jurisprudence of California, another rule of insurance adopted in that State is in point. It is admitted that the
policy before us was accepted by the plaintiff. The receipt of this policy by the insured without objection binds both the acceptor and
the insured to the terms thereof. The insured may not thereafter be heard to say that he did not read the policy or know its terms, since
it is his duty to read his policy and it will be assumed that he did so. In California Jurisprudence, vol. 14, p. 427, from which these
statements are taken with citations to California decisions, it is added that it has been held that where the holder of a policy discovers a
In 1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, par. 159, it is said that "as a general rule, a rider or slip attached to a policy or certificate of
insurance is, prima facie at least, a part of the contract to the same extent, and with like effect, as if actually embodied therein,
provided, of course, that it does not violate any statutory inhibition, and has been lawfully, and sufficiently attached, ..." (See also 32
Corpus Juris, 1159, par. 270).
Does the attachment of a rider or slip containing an express warranty contravene the provisions of section 65 of the Insurance Law?
When the law, in order to protect the insured, requires that an express warranty be contained in the policy or in another instrument
referred to therein as making a part thereof, it could not have been its intention to permit that such express warranty be contained in a
piece of paper not signed by the insured although it is attached to the policy and referred to therein as making a part thereof, because it
would be contrary to the requirement that such express warranty be contained in an instrument signed by the insured. It is a general
rule of statutory construction that a law should not be so construed as to produced an absurd result. It would certainly be an absurdity
if section 65 of the Insurance Law were construed as requiring that an express warranty be contained only in the policy or in another
instrument signed by the insured and referred to therein as making a part thereof for the protection of such insured, and at the same
time pertaining that such, express warranty be contained in a piece of paper not signed by the insured but simply attached to the policy
and referred to therein as making a part thereof, thus opening the door to fraud, it being easy to detach such rider or slip and change
it with another, which is precisely what the law is trying to prevent. It will thus be seen that the attachment of a rider or slip
containing an express warranty to a policy, although referred to therein as making a part thereof, is contrary to the evident intent and
purpose of section 65 of the Insurance Law.
In the case of Isaac Upham Co. vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (211 Pac., 809), cited in the majority opinion, the question
was whether a warranty contained in an application for insurance, which was not referred to in the policy as making a part thereof,
incorporated said warranty in the said policy and was valid. The Supreme Court of California held that it was not, for lack of such
reference. Of course an application for insurance is a document signed by the insured, and an express warranty contained therein if
referred to in the policy as making a part thereof, will be considered as contained therein in accordance with law.
In the case of Conner vs. Manchester Assur. Co. (130 Feb., 743), also cited in the majority opinion, the question was whether an open
policy was a warranty and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Northern District of California held that it was not, and further said that
"section 2605 of the Civil Code of California (from which section 65 of the Insurance Law was taken) was evidently intended to
express in statutory form the rule that no express warranty made by the insured shall affect the contract of insurance, unless it be
contained in the policy or in the application, or some other instrument signed by the insured and made a part of the contract, and is in
effect an affirmance of the generally accepted doctrine applicable to such contracts." It will be seen from this statement that the court
in enumerating the forms in which an express warranty may be express or made to appear does not mention any paper which is not
signed by the insured.
The fact that for many years it has been the practice of the insurance companies to use riders or slips of paper containing express
warranties without the signature of the insured in violation of the law is no reason why such practice should be permitted to continue
when its legality is questioned.
In view of the foregoing consideration, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority.
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
The decision of this case depended principally, but wholly, on the validity of the warranty F, Exhibit A-2. This instrument consist of a
slip of paper pasted on the margin of a page of the fire insurance policy. It contains the stipulation that the insured is permitted to store
in the building concerned the hazardous goods specified, to an amount not exceeding three per cent of the total value of the
merchandise stored. The policy makes reference to this rider as follows: "This policy is subject to the hereon attached `Ordinary Short
Period Rate Scale,' Warranties A and F, Co-insurance clause and `Three Fourths Loss Clause' which are forming part of the same"; but
the rider is not signed by the insured.
Section 65 of Act No. 2427 (Insurance Law) reads as follows:
Every express warranty, made at or before the execution of a policy, must be contained in the policy itself, or in another
instrument signed by the insured and referred to in the policy, as making a part of it.
An express warranty, then, made at or before the execution of the policy, like warranty F, is valid only if it is contained in the policy
itself, or in another instrument signed by the insured and referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof. Examining warranty F, it
may be seen that it does not form an integral part of the policy but appeals on another slip of paper pasted on the policy; it is therefore
an instrument other than the policy and comes under the second paragraph provided for in section 65. And, according to this provision,
warranty F cannot be valid or binding, for the simple reason that it is not signed by the insured, and has no weight, notwithstanding the
fact that reference is made to it in a general way in the body of the policy. This reference is not equivalent to including it in the policy,
for the simple reason, as we have said, that it was made in a general way. It is mentioned simply as warranty F, without giving any idea
of its contents. The term of the rider might be changed and the heading "Warranty F" retained, and, following the appellant's line of
reasoning, it might, with equal plausibility, be defended as the express warranty agreed upon, because it was headed "Warranty F." It is
just such alterations as this that the law seeks to prevent in requiring that all warranties of the kind are to be signed by the insured and
referred to in the policy.
Setting aside for the moment the legal question of the validity of the warranty, and assuming warranty F to be valid, we have to
consider another circumstance which indicates that the insured did not violate it. The trial court found that at the time of the fire, the
inflammable goods in the warehouse or building of the insured did not exceed the amount permitted by the insurance company, that is,
three per cent of the total value of the merchandise stored. This finding is borne out by the evidence, and there is no reason for
changing it and making another.
For these reasons, I believe the judgment appealed from should be affirmed in its entirely.
Avancea, C.J., concurs.