Lim vs.

Felix

G.R. No. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

Ponente : GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
March 17, 1989, 7:30am, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. & security escorts, Provincial Guards Cortes, Amaro, &
Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin at the Masbate Domestic Airport . Only Dante Siblante survived
although he suffered a gunshot wound
the designated investigator Tandiado, filed an amended complaint with MTC of Masbate accusing the petitioners of the
crime multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.,
MTC issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Bail
at 200k.
August 29, 1989, 261 pages records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor, Respondent Acting Fiscal
Antonio C. Alfane.
September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case
October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the RTC Masbate, 4 separate informations of murder against the 12 accused
with a recommendation of no bail.
November 21, 1989, petitioners Lims filed with SC petition for change of venue.
December 14, 1989, SC issued en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from RTC Masbate to RTC Makati.
Raffled to Br. 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Lims filed manifestations: (1) An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of the respondent
Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt; (2) that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie
case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.
July 5, 1990, respondent court denied the petition and issued warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent Judge
said: the PI was conducted by the MTC of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the
offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon
review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the RTC 4separate informations for murder. Considering that
both the 2competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause,
each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and
proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information.

July 17, 1990 SC issued TRO, CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without bail
issued against the petitioners.

Issue: WON a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification or
recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?

SC ruling:

Decided in favor of petitioners.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor, where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he
or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent
Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was
no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a
probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
 the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

(1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the prosecution's job, a
function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations,
courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted
does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.

while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for
the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to
determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this
distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the
authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination
of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is
judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .

the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of
the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in
view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the
recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go
beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him,
he issues a warrant of arrest.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch
56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining
Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.

Manalili v. CA [GR 113447, 9 October 1997]

Facts:

At about 2:10 p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat.
Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official
car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming
the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was
holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male
person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the
wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The
male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl.
Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected
marijuana contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988, Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan
City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment on 21 April 1988,
Manalili pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. With the agreement of the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a
P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on
provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 1989. On 19 April 1993, the
Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated
20 January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.

Held:

In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of effective
crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. What justified
the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. It did not, however, abandon
the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must
be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case
of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained
that in these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has
already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search
warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a
police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation,
they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk.

People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991]

Facts:

On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr.
(Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi
that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of
a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter,
Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring
developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers
were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his
team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the
police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro
at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the
chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense
charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.

Issue:

Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such
arrest is admissible.

Held:

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is
that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among
the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission
of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of
transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize
the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

People vs. Valdez [GR 129296, 25 September 2000]

Facts:

At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya, received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y
Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut.
Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately 5:00 a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found Valdez alone in his nipa
hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana
plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.
Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she
found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination,
the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September
1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of
the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then
made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle
of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko
Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him,
because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise
be would "be put in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants
seized by the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana
plants. On 15 November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued. On 18 February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
3105, found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Hence, the automatic review by the
Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless search and seizure, based on the plain
view doctrine.

Held:

The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable
search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that
they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where
the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that
there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended
the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without
warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to
Solicitor General's contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the
police officers first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the
cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot
the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum,
the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made
to apply.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]

Facts:

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of
Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different
from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by
his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that
the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands,
carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into
a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid
introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano,
Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with
his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he
signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional
rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to find a
resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was
"apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence
and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was
detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of
Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her
qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended
complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters
assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to
acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and
telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct
where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a
bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7
kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his
acquittal before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines,
Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can
return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."

Held:

No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people
have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the
Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua
was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the
obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that
"accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent
reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e.
he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or
package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor
or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case.
There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore
bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest.
There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already
shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence,
the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain
Chuas conviction.

People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts:
In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police
Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed not only against
persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs based on informations supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag
who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the
red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag
were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his name and
the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for
further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced
him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben appealed.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Courts ruling in People vs. Aminnudin.
Held:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section
12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not
unmindful of its decision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from
an informer that accusedappellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was
seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, herein, the case presented
urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly.
There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons
are associated.

People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts:

Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California,
U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia
Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an
operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest
women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed
outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson
gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought
out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a
total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area
of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On
14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.

Issue:

Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in
either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far
from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs
of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991] En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave

Facts:

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen
Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out
to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier,
each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges
inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at
Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also
contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the
same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objects examined as hashish.
Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not
owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided
to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered a
plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued warrant

Held:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein,
Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest.

Valmonte vs. de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May 1990]

Facts:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of
responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C.
Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They aver that, because
of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. They
further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National Capital Region District Command a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme
Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, Valmontes and ULAPs petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.

Issue:

Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search and seizure and, thus,
are violative of the Constitution.

Held:

Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under
all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as
where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such
grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events have pointed to the
continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. Although no one can be compelled, under
our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to
pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal
right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one
of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the
vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If
vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men
at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an
international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.
Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning
the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power
to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena. In any
situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to
the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their
authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.

People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994]

Facts:

The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by
the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various
government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora"
planes. At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base,
while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon
Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30
November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the
driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office
watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd
and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching
group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the
right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that
civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching
them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the
16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons
of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that
the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two
separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide
(Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to
posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from
November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.

Issue:

Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup detat.

Held:

It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that
time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to
the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun
store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not
be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous
and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The
courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under
the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
I. THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and
tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutors office of a
crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the
type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x
x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations,
x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be
dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by
the Constitution?

2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend
or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires
a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools
and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than
an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just,
and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative
of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard
is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined
by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace
serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer
to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing
methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to
know basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect
the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
 Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in
the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics
in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors office with a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness
and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in
the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team to back up all the files
in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over
to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that
most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing expedition when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal
charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In view of the
absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to
the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
 The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground
that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further
denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation
of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his
constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.

OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer. In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs
authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test
under which government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570
SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be
such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the
contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the
computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.