of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.

METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION vs PASTORIN Case
Digest
[G.R. No. 154295. July 29, 2005]
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-PE,
petitioner, vs. JOHNNY PASTORIN, respondent.
FACTS
Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the petitioner company,
but because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not effected.
However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a magazine dealer
and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped collecting the outstanding dues of
the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay
the loan but gave no definitive explanation for the same. Thereafter, he was penalized
with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field work, and was transferred to a new
position. Despite the completion of his suspension, respondent stopped reporting for
work and sent a letter communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other money
claims with the labor arbiter.
This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally
from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld
that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue
of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the
party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon
the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an appeal with the Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not
NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over respondents estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.
complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter. Decision of the CA is set aside.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no jurisdiction over
the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator.
However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA. The CA held that the active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure
to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is
pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
bodys jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA during
appeal.

HELD

The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA
during appeal.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack
Lourdes Eristngcol vs partnership relations. Thereafter, with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing
powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to
CA, G.R. No . 167702 . March homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)

20 , 2009
FACTS: Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati
City started constructing a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations, respondent UVAI, an association of
homeowners at Urdaneta Village, imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00
and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working
on her property. This prompted petitioner to file the subject complaint before
the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the Home Insurance
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues that the subject
matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need
not be filed before a specialized body or commission.

ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?

HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that

in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of an
action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of
the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for. Ostensibly,
Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls
within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one
occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols
complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy
only superficially delves into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules.
The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of
UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict
between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now
wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth
in UVAIs Construction Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic
Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and
administrative functions over homeowners associations originally vested
with the SEC as well as controversies arising from intra-corporate or