61. Mayo v. People, G.R. No. 91201,
December 5, 1991
Facts: That on or about the 7th day of August,
1982, at more or less 4:10 oclock in the
afternoon, along the Mac Arthur Highway, the
accused Eustaquio Mayo, being the driver and
person in charge of a Philippine Rabbit bus,
without observing traffic rules, regulations and
ordinances, without exercising due precaution to
avoid accident to persons and damage to
property, by giving the said bus a speed far
greater than is allowed by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously drive,
operate and manage said vehicle in a careless,
reckless and imprudent manner, causing as a
result of his carelessness, recklessness and
imprudence to bump and hit a Lancer car,
thereby causing damage to the said Lancer car
in the total amount of P67,925.41 and belonging
to June Navarette, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner, in the total amount of
P67,925.41, likewise causing injuries causing
partial disfigurement on the facial portion of the
said Linda Navarette, a total loss of vision on her
right, also causing physical injuries upon Narciso
Yandan, and also causing physical injuries upon
Mae Custodio, likewise causing physical injuries
upon June Navarette, Noel Reynaldo Navarette,
Legionaria Panopio, Mercy Panopio and Raymond
Asprer.
The Lancer car was then cruising steadily at the
right lane of the road in Bo. Mamatitang,
Mabalacat, Pampanga at a rate of speed of
about forty kilometer per hour (40 kph),
southbound for Manila. No other vehicle was
preceding the Lancer car. There was, however,
the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by accused
Eustaquio Mayo, Jr. trailing closely behind the
Lancer car. Behind the Philippine Rabbit bus was
a Tamaraw jeep driven by Danilo Miranda
Concepcion.
The Rabbit bus swerved to its right in an effort to
return to the right lane to avoid collision with the
oncoming vehicle, and in the process it hit and
bumped the left rear side portion of the Lancer
car with its right front bumper. Because of the
impact the driver of the Lancer car lost control of
the wheel and the car swerved accross to the
left and hit Narciso Yandan, a bystander, and
thereafter crashed against the concrete fence.
Thus because of the impact, precipitated by the
reckless imprudence of the accused, a chain
reaction occurred; the driver of the Lancer car
lost control of the wheel and the car swerved to
the left and darted across the road, hitting
thereat Narciso Yandan, a pedestrian, and
stopped only when it crashed against the
concrete fence of Mr. Bernie Reyes.
The Lancer car was heavily damaged. It was
almost a total wreck; the passengers, including
the driver, sustained physical injur
ies in varying degrees.
Issue: Whether or not the said findings of the
trial court justify the award of moral damages in
the amount of P700,000.00 in favor of
complainant Linda Navarette.
Held: We agree that complainant Linda
Navarette is entitled to moral damages. She
suffered injuries as a result of the criminal
offense of the petitioner. Moreover, her injuries
resulting in a permanent scar at her forehead
and the loss of her right eye undoubtedly gave
her mental anguish, wounded feelings and
shock. The psychological effect on her as
regards the scar on her forehead and her false
eye must have devastated her considering that
women in general are fastidious on how they
Iook.
Nevertheless, we find no justification to award
moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette for
the loss of her boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of
her boyfriend after the accident added to her
mental and emotional sufferings and
psychologically affected and disturbed her.
Moreover, there is no clear evidence on record
to show that her boyfriend left her after the
accident due to her physical injuries. He may
have left her even if she did not suffer the
slightest injury.
The reasons for the break-up of a courtship are
too many and too complicated such that they
should not form the basis of damages arising
from a vehicular accident Moreover, granting
that her boyfriend left her due to her physical
injuries, we still find no legal basis for the award
of moral damages in favor of complainant
Navarette because of the loss of a boyfriend.
Article 2719 quoted earlier enumerates cases
wherein moral damages may be granted. Loss of
a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries
suffered after an accident is not one of them.
Neither can it be categorized as an analogous
case.
This discretion is, however, conditioned in that
the amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive so as to indicate
that it was the result of prejudice or corruption
on the part of the trial court.
In determining the amount of moral damages,
the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
party and the gravity of the injuries must be
considered. Finally, moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at theexpense of the defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendant s
culpable action.
Applying these principles in the instant case, we
rule that the award of P700,000.00 as moral
damages in favor of complainant Linda
Navarette is unconscionable and excessive. We
rejected Navarette's claim for the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages for the loss of
her boyfriend. We note that she asked for the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages due
to her personal injuries. Therefore, the award for
moral damages should not exceed the amount of
P500,000.00. We rule that under the
circumstances of the instant case, the amount of
P200,000.00 as moral damages in favor of
complainant Linda Navarette is reasonable, just
and fair.
62. Samson v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, G.R. No. 150487, July 10, 2003
FACTS: Gerardo Samson deposited to his BPI
account a Prudential Bank Check in the amount
of P3,500. When he asked his daughter to
withdraw P2,000 in order to pay his creditor who
came to his house, he came to know that his
previous deposit was not credited to his account.
Because of this he was embarrassed in front of
the creditor. Moreover, when petitioner informed
the respondent of his concern, the respondents
manager displayed arrogance, indifference and
discourtesy. Petitioner then filed a case for
damages against the respondent.
The RTC awarded P200,000 as moral damage.
The CA reduced the same to P50,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or no the award of moral damages is
correct.
DOCTRINES: Moral damages are meant to
compensate the claimant for any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injuries
unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the amount must somehow be
proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature and were never intended to
enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts
are given discretion in determining the amount,
with the limitation that it should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive. Indeed, it
must be commensurate to the loss or injury
suffered.
The SOCIAL STANDING of the aggrieved party is
essential to the determination of the proper
amount of the award. Otherwise, the goal of
enabling him to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements to restore him to the status quo
ante would not be achieved.
We believe that the award should be
increased to P100,000, considering (1) that
petitioner was a businessman and was the
highest lay person in the United Methodist
Church; (2) that he was regarded by respondent
and its officers with arrogance and a
condescending manner; and (3) that respondent
successfully postponed compensating him for
more than a decade.This amount is more than
the P50,000 granted by the CA, but not as much
as the P200,000 granted by the RTC.
That petitioner reported the missing check
deposit to respondent only after three weeks did
not constitute contributory negligence. The
injury resulted from the denial of his withdrawal
due to insufficient funds, an injury he suffered
before learning that his check deposit had been
lost. Respondent, not he, immediately knew that
a deposit envelop was missing, yet it did nothing
to solve the problem. His alleged delay in
reporting the matter did not at all contribute to
his injury.
Though the amount of P3,500 was already
credited back to his account, this step was made
only after his persistent prompting. Prior to this
development, he suffered damages that could
no longer be reversed by the belated restoration
of the amount lost. It is for this suffering that
moral damages are due.
63. Villanueva v. Salvador, G.R. No.
139436, January 25, 2006
DOCTRINE: While proof of pecuniary loss is
unnecessary to justify an award of moral
damages, the amount of indemnity being left to
the sound discretion of the court, it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant
satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual
basis of the damages AND its causal connection
to defendant s wrongful act or omission. This is
so because moral damages, albeit incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are designed to
compensate the claimant for Torts & Damages
2013 Atty. Jess Lopez 330 Agas, Anzures, Buan,
Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B
actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. There is thus merit on
petitionersassertion that proof of moral
suffering must precede a moral damage award.
CONDITIONS REQUIRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES:
(1) there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant;
(2) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
 (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant Evidence does not support petitioners claim that
must be the proximate cause of the injury at the time of the accident, the truck was at the
sustained by the claimant; and left inner lane and that it was Stephen Huangs
(4) the award of damages is predicated on any car, at its right, which bumped the right front
of the cases stated in Article 2219. side of the truck. The court took note of the
testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an
While there need not be a showing that the expert in the field of physics.
defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent Given that 1. Two vehicles collided; 2. One
manner, as this is a requirement for an award of vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than
exemplary damages, there must still be proof of the other; 3. Both vehicles were moving in the
fraudulent action or bad faith for a claim for same direction and at the same speed of about
85 to 90 kilometers per hour; 4. The heavier
moral damages to succeed. Then, too, moral
vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane,
damages are generally not recoverable in culpa
while the lighter vehicle was at its right, Dr. Daza
contractual EXCEPT when bad faith supervenes testified that if the lighter vehicle hits the right
and is proven. front portion of the heavier vehicle, the general
direction of the light vehicle after the impact
64. Mahinay v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 152753, would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle,
January 13, 2004 not the other way around. The truck, he opined,
is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the
car, the lighter vehicle, which would move to the
65. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R.
right of, and away from the truck.
No. 172122, June 22, 2007
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis
Facts: Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a
of the same assumptions except that the car is
6-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck. It has in its
on the left side of the truck, in accordance with
employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as
the testimony of Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza
driver. Spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
concluded that the general direction of the car
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and
after impact would be to the left of the truck. In
own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan. Both
this situation, the middle island against which
vehicles figured in an accident in Taguig.
the car was pinned would slow down the car,
Stephen Huang was driving the car, weighing
and enable the truck to catch up and hit the car
1,450 kg., while Del Rosario was driving the
again, before running over it.
truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were traversing
Petitioners tried to show the damages that the
the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the
truck sustained at its front right side. The
general direction of Alabang going to Pasig. The
attempt does not impress. The photographs
car was on the left innermost lane while the
presented were taken a month after the
truck was on the next lane to its right, when the
accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic
truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed
who repaired the truck and authenticated the
into the front right side of the car. The collision
photographs, admitted that there were damages
hurled the car over the island where it hit a
also on the left side of the truck.
lamppost, spun around and landed on the
Considering that the car was smaller and lighter
opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran
than the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly
over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally
caused by the car when it hit the truck could not
stopped in front of Buellah Land Church. At the
possibly be so great to cause petitioner to lose
time of the accident, Del Rosario only had a
all control that he failed to even step on the
Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers
brakes. The evidence proves petitioner Del
license had been confiscated because he had
Rosarios negligence as the direct and proximate
been previously apprehended for reckless
cause of the injuries suffered by respondent
driving.
Stephen Huang.
Stephen Huang was paralyzed for life from his
Mercury Drugs liability
chest down and requires continuous medical and
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 is
rehabilitation treatment. Respondents fault
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a
petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
prior recourse against the negligent employee,
negligence and reckless imprudence while
or a prior showing of insolvency of such
driving, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise
employee. It is also joint and solidary with the
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
employee. To be relieved of liability, Mercury
selection and supervision of its driver. Torts &
Drug should show that it exercised the diligence
Damages 2013 Atty. Jess Lopez 146 Agas,
of a good father of a family, both in the selection
Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete, Ongchuan,
of the employee and in the supervision of the
Reposo, & Roco 3B
performance of his duties.
Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due
Thus, in the SELECTION of its prospective
diligence of a good father of a family in the
employees, the employer is required to examine
selection and supervision of all its employees.
them as to their qualifications, experience, and
Trial court found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario
service records. With respect to the
jointly and severally liable. CA affirmed.
SUPERVISION of its employees, the employer
Issue: Whether Mercury & Del Rosario are
should formulate standard operating procedures,
solidarily liable.
monitor their implementation, and impose
Held: YES.
disciplinary measures for their breach. To
Drivers negligence
establish compliance with these requirements,
employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on
its hiring procedure. According to the
Recruitment and Training Manager of Mercury
Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical
and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination
In the case of Del Rosario, however, it was
admitted that he took the driving tests and
psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he
applied for the position of Truck Man. It was also
admitted that Del Rosario used a Galant which is
a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the
driving tests. No tests were conducted on the
motor skills development, perceptual speed,
visual attention, depth visualization, eye and
hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner
Del Rosario.
No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario
attended only three driving seminars and the
only seminar he attended before the accident,
which occurred in 1996, was held twelve years
ago in 1984. Mercury Drug does not provide for
a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the
accident, Del Rosario has been out on the road
for more than 13 hours, without any alternate.
Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it
exercised due diligence on the supervision and
discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day
of the accident, Del Rosario was driving without
a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless
driving. He testified that he reported the incident
to his superior, but nothing was done about it.
He was not suspended or reprimanded. No
disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against
petitioner Del Rosario.
In awarding damages, the court took into
consideration the ff:
He was only 17 years old, nearly 6 feet tall and
weighed 175 pounds. He was in 4th year high
school, and a member of the school varsity
basketball team. He was also class president and
editor- in chief of the school annual. He had
shown very good leadership qualities. He was
looking forward to his college life, having just
passed the entrance examinations of the
University of the Philippines, De La Salle
University, and the University of Asia and the
Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas even offered
him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship,
but the accident prevented him from attending
the basketball tryouts. Without doubt, he was an
exceptional student. He excelled both in his
academics and extracurricular undertakings. He
is intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as
testified by Francisco Lopez, respondent Stephen
Huangs godfather and a bank executive. Had
the accident not happened, he had a rosy future
ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a
banking career, get married and raise children.
The mother was talking about the irony of it all:
Mercury Drug caused the injury and yet they
have no choice but to buy the medicines for the
injury from Mercury Drug.
66. Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA
433 (1997)
Facts: On the evening of February 28, 1987, a
Pantranco bus was travelling along EDSA
towards Balintawak. Then, the driver lost control
of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and
then to fly over the center island occupying the
east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus
bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup
driven by Porfirio Legaspi.
As a result, the points of contact of both vehicles
were damaged and physical injuries were
inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila
Kierulf, both of whom were treated at the QC
General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a
pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.
Despite the impact, said bus continued to move
forward and its front portion rammed against a
Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building
and gasoline dispensing equipment.
As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered
injuries which required major surgeries like
tracheotomy, open reduction, mandibular
fracture, intermaxillary repair of multiple
laceration and prolonged treatment by
specialists. Per medical report of Dr. Alex L.
Castillo, Legaspi also suffered injuries.
The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by
Spouses Kierulf was smashed to pieces. The cost
of repair was estimated at P107,583.50.
Sps Kierulf and their driver Legaspi filed an
action to recover damages against Pantranco.
According to Pantranco, the bus driven by Jose
Malanum, while cruising along EDSA, a used
engine differential accidentally and suddenly
dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus.
Said differential hit the underchassis of the bus,
throwing Malanum off his seat and making him
lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the
left, hit the center island, and bumped the
pickup of the spouses.
RTC awarded the ff:
(1) Actual, moral, and exemplary damages in
favor of Lucila Kierulf.
(2) Indemnification in favor of Victor Kierulf for
the damage to the Isuzu vehicle
(3) Moral damages in favor of driver Legaspi and
also reimbursement to Sps. Kierulf for incurring
medical expenses for the treatment of Legaspi.
On appeal, CA modified the RTC decision as
follows: Torts & Damages 2013 Atty. Jess Lopez
331 Agas, Anzures, Buan, Cusi, Navarrete,
Ongchuan, Reposo, & Roco 3B
Under the first cause of action, the defendant is
hereby ordered to pay Lucila H. Kierulf the
following:
(1) For actual damages incurred for
hospitalization, medical case (sic) and doctors
fees, the sum of P241,861.81;
(2) For moral damages the sum of P200,000.00;
(3) For exemplary damages the amount of
P100,000.00.
Under the second cause of action, to pay Victor
Kierulf, by way of indemnification damage to the
Isuzu Carry All with plate No. UV PGS 798, the
amount of P96,825.15.
Under the third cause of action, to pay Porfirio
Legaspi the following:
(1) For moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.00;
(2) To reimburse the plaintiff the amount of
P6,328.19 for actual damages incurred in the
treatment and hospitalization of the driver
Porfirio Legaspi.
The defendant is further ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 as fair and reasonable
attorneys fees. And to pay costs of suit.
Hence, this petition.
Essentially, Spouses Kierulf and Legaspi argue
that the damages awarded were inadequate
while Pantranco counters that they were
astronomical, bloated and not duly proved.
Issue: How much moral, exemplary, and actual
damages are the victims entitled to.
Held:
MORAL DAMAGES:
LOSS OF RIGHT TO CONSORTIUM / IMPAIRMENT
OF SEXUAL LIFE
The established guideline in awarding moral
damages takes into consideration several
factors, some of which are the SOCIAL AND
FINANCIAL STANDING of the injured parties and
their WOUNDED MORAL FEELINGS and
PERSONAL PRIDE.
The Kierulf spouses add that the CA should have
considered another factor: the LOSS OF THEIR
CONJUGAL FELLOWSHIP and the IMPAIRMENT OR
DESTRUCTION OF THEIR SEXUAL LIFE.
The spouses aver that the disfigurement of
Lucilas physical appearance cannot but affect
their marital right to consortium which would
have remained normal were it not for the
accident. Thus, the moral damages awarded in
favor of Lucila should be increased to
P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for
her husband Victor who also suffered
Psychologically. A California case, Rodriguez
vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, is cited as
authority for the claim of damages by reason of
loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal
fellowship and sexual relations.\
Pantranco rebuts that Victors claim of moral
damages on alleged loss of consortium is
without legal basis. Article 2219 provides that
only the person suffering the injury may claim
moral damages. Additionally, no evidence was
adduced to show that the consortium had indeed
been impaired and the Court cannot presume
that marital relations disappeared with the
accident.
67. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979,
September 5, 2012
FACTS:At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16,
2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old
nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room,
when the appellant hugged her and kissed her
nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant
covered her and BBB with a blanket.6 The
appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants,
and underwear; he then took off his short pants
and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of AAA,
and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the
appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and
then tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.8 The appellant stopped when AAAs cry
got louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper
thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The
appellant put his clothes back on, and
threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the
incident to anyone. Immediately after, the
appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself
with a blanket and cried.10
The prosecution charged the appellant
before the RTC with the crime of rape
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It
explained that a slight penetration of the labia
by the male organ is sufficient to constitute
rape.
ISSUE: WON the rape was consummated.
HELD:The Court ruled in the negative. We
find that the prosecution failed to prove the
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of consummated rape. We convict him
instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on
record shows the presence of all the elements of
this crime.
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the
appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely
touched (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In
fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination
that the appellant did not succeed in inserting
his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs
Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the
appellant was holding the victims hand when he
was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
circumstance coupled with the victims
declaration that she was resisting the appellants
attempt to insert his penis into her vagina
makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not
improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records
supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants
penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims
female organ.
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the
slightest penile penetration of the labia majora
or pudendum of the female organ."27 Without
any showing of such penetration, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness.

, the prosecution failed to present sufficient
and convincing evidence to establish the
required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did
not establish that the appellants penis touched
the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from
AAAs testimony, no other evidence on record,
such as a medico-legal report, could confirm
whether there indeed had been penetration,
however slight, of the victims labias. In the
absence of testimonial or physical evidence to
establish penile penetration, the appellant
cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, states that there is an attempt when
the offender commenced the commission of the
crime directly by overt acts but does not perform
all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In People v.
Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the
intent to penetrate, attempted rape is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is
merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant
commenced the commission of rape by the
following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and
neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and
briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and
parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis
into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to
perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause
other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e.,
the victim's loud cries and resistance. The
totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the
unmistakable objective to insert his penis into
the victims private parts.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the
primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes
the only logical and inevitable conclusion."42 We
emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to
rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving all the elements of
consummated rape.
68. People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603,
January 16, 2013
69. Fores v. Miranda, G.R. No. L-12163,
March 4, 1959
70. Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc., v.
AGO Medical and Educational Center,
G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005
Facts: On 14 December 1992, the trial
court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and
Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court
held that the broadcasts are libellous per se. The
trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that
their utterances were the result of straight
reporting because it had no factual basis. The
broadcasters did not even verify their reports
before airing them to show good faith. In holding
FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that
FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial
court ruled that Rimas only participation was
when he agreed with Alegres expose. The trial
court found Rimas statement within the
bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and
of the press. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
court finds for the plaintiff. Considering the
degree of damages caused by the controversial
utterances, which are not found by this court to
be really very serious and damaging, and there
being no showing that indeed the enrollment of
plaintiff school dropped, defendants
Hermogenes Jun Alegre, Jr. and Filipinas
Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio station
DZRC), are hereby jointly and severally ordered
to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine
(AMECBCCM) the amount of P300,000.00 moral
damages, plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of
attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether AGO Medical is entitled to
moral damages.
Held: YES. A juridical person is generally
not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a
natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock.
The CA cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB,
et al. to justify the award of moral damages.
However, the Courts statement in Mambulao
that a corporation may have a good reputation
which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for
the award of moral damages is an obiter
dictum.
 NEVERTHELESS, AMECs claim for moral
damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes
the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Article
2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is
a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous
per se, the law implies damages. In such a case,
evidence of an honest mistake or the want of
character or reputation of the party libeled goes
only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a
case is the plaintiff required to introduce
evidence of actual damages as a condition
precedent to the recovery of some damages.
In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per
se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award of P300,000 moral
damages unreasonable. The record shows that
even though the broadcasts were libelous per se,
AMEC has not suffered any substantial or
material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we
reduce the award of moral damages from
P300,000 to P150,000.
ATTORNEYS FEES
The award of attorneys fees is not proper
because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its
claim for attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce
evidence to warrant the award of attorneys
fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate
courts failed to explicitly state in their respective
decisions the rationale for the award of
attorneys fees.
While it mentioned about the award of
attorneys fees by stating that it lies within the
discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case, the CA failed to
point out any circumstance to justify the award.