Immediate Inferences

If we expand the scope of our investigation to include shared terms and their
complements, we can identify logical relationships of three additional varieties.
Since each of these new cases involves a pair of categorical propositions that are
logically equivalent to each otherthat is, either both of them are true or both are
falsethey enable us to draw an immediate inference from the truth (or falsity) of
either member of the pair to the truth (or falsity) the other.

Conversion

The converse of any categorical proposition is the new categorical proposition

that results from putting the predicate term of the original proposition in the subject
place of the new proposition and the subject term of the original in the predicate
place of the new. Thus, for example, the converse of " Nodogsarefelines" is "No
felinesaredogs," and the converse of "Somesnakesarepoisonousanimals" is
"Somepoisonousanimalsaresnakes."

Conversion grounds an immediate inference for both E and I propositions That

is, the converse of any E or I proposition is true if and only if the original
proposition was true. Thus, in each of the pairs noted as examples in the previous
paragraph, either both propositions are true or both are false.

In addition, if we first perform a subalternation and then convert our result,

then the truth of an Aproposition may be said, in "conversion by limitation," to
entail the truth of an I proposition with subject and predicate terms reversed: If
"Allsingersareperformers" then "Someperformersaresingers." But this will
work only if there really is at least one singer.

Generally speaking, however, conversion doesn't hold

for A and O propositions: it is entirely possible for "Alldogsaremammals" to be
true while "Allmammalsaredogs" is false, for example, and for "Somefemales
arenotmothers" to be true while "Somemothersarenotfemales" is false. Thus,
conversion does not warrant a reliable immediate inference with respect
to A and O propositions.

Obversion

In order to form the obverse of a categorical proposition, we replace the

predicate term of the proposition with its complement and reverse the quality of the
proposition, either from affirmative to negative or from negative to affirmative.
Thus, for example, the obverse of "Allantsareinsects" is "Noantsarenon
insects"; the obverse of "Nofisharemammals" is "Allfisharenonmammals";
the obverse of "Somemusiciansaremales" is "Somemusiciansarenotnon
males"; and the obverse of "Somecarsarenotsedans" is "Somecarsarenon
sedans."

Obversion is the only immediate inference that is valid for categorical

propositions of every form. In each of the instances cited above, the original
proposition and its obverse must have exactly the same truth-value, whether it
turns out to be true or false.

Contraposition

The contrapositive of any categorical proposition is the new categorical

proposition that results from putting the complement of the predicate term of the
original proposition in the subject place of the new proposition and the
complement of the subject term of the original in the predicate place of the new.
Thus, for example, the contrapositive of "Allcrowsarebirds" is "Allnonbirds
arenoncrows," and the contrapositive of "Somecarnivoresarenotmammals" is
"Somenonmammalsarenotnoncarnivores."

Contraposition is a reliable immediate inference for

both A and O propositions; that is, the contrapositive of any A or O proposition is
true if and only if the original proposition was true. Thus, in each of the pairs in the
paragraph above, both propositions have exactly the same truth-value.

In addition, if we form the contrapositive of our result after performing

subalternation, then an E proposition, in "contraposition by limitation," entails the
truth of a related O proposition: If "Nobanditsarebiologists" then "Somenon
biologistsarenotnonbandits," provided that there is at least one member of
the class designated by "bandits."

In general, however, contraposition is not valid for E and I propositions: "No

birdsareplants" and "Nononplantsarenonbirds" need not have the same
truth-value, nor do "Somespidersareinsects" and "Somenoninsectsarenon
spiders." Thus, contraposition does not hold as an immediate inference
for E and I propositions.

Omitting the troublesome cases of conversion and contraposition "by

limitation," then, there are exactly two reliable operations that can be performed on
a categorical proposition of any form:

A proposition: AllSareP.
Obverse NoSarenonP.
Contrapositive AllnonParenonS.

E proposition: NoSareP.
 Converse NoPareS.
Obverse AllSarenonP.

I proposition: SomeSareP.
Converse SomePareS.
Obverse SomeSarenotnonP.

O proposition: SomeSarenotP.
Obverse SomeSarenonP.
Contrapositive SomenonParenotnonS.

Existential Import

It is time to express more explicitly an important qualification regarding the

logical relationships among categorical propositions. You may have noticed that at
several points in these two lessons we declared that there must be some things a
certain kind. This special assumption, that the class designated by the subject term
of a universal proposition has at least one member, is called existential import.
Classical logicians typically presupposed that universal propositions do have
existential import.

But modern logicians have pointed that the system of categorical logic is more
useful if we deny the existential import of universal propositions while granting, of
course, that particular propositions do presuppose the existence of at least one
member of their subject classes. It is sometimes very handy, even for non-
philosophers, to make a general statement about things that don't exist. A sign that
reads, "Allshopliftersareprosecutedtothefullextentofthelaw," for
example, is presumably intended to make sure that the class designated by its
subject term remains entirely empty. In the remainder of our discussion of
categorical logic, we will exclusively employ this modern interpretation of
universal propositions.

Although it has many advantages, the denial of existential import does

undermine the reliability of some of the truth-relations we've considered so far. In
the traditional square of opposition, only the contradictories survive intact; the
relationships of the contraries, the subcontraries, and subalternation no longer hold
when we do not suppose that the classes designated by the subject terms
of A and Epropositions have members. (And since conversion and contraposition
"by limitation" derive from subalternation, they too must be forsworn.) From now
on, therefore, we will rely only upon the immediate inferences in the table at the
end of the previous section of this lesson and suppose that A and O propositions
and E and I propositions are genuinely contradictory.

Diagramming Propositions
 The modern interepretation of categorical logic also permits a more convenient
way of assessing the truth-conditions of categorical propositions, by drawing Venn
diagrams, topological representations of the logical relationships among the classes
designated by categorical terms. The basic idea is fairly straightforward:

Each categorical term is represented by a labelled circle. The

area inside the circle represents the extension of the categorical
term, and the area outside the circle its complement. Thus, members
of the class designated by the categorical term would be located
within the circle, and everything else in the world would be located outside it.

We indicate that there is at least one member of a specific class

by placing an inside the circle; an outside the circle would
indicate that there is at least one member of the complementary
class.

To show that there are no members of a specific class, we shade

the entire area inside the circle; shading everything outside the
circle would indicate that there are no members of the
complementary class.

Notice that diagrams of these two sorts are incompatible: no area of a Venn
diagram can both be shaded and contain an ; either there is at least one member
of the represented class, or there are none.

In order to represent a categorical proposition, we must

draw two overlapping circles, creating four distinct areas
corresponding to four kinds of things: those that are members
of the class designated by the subject term but not of that
designated by the predicate term; those that are members of both classes; those that
are members of the class designated by the predicate term but not of that
designated by the subject term; and those that are not members of either class.

Categorical propositions of each of the four varieties may then be diagrammed

by shading or placing an in the appropriate area:
 The universal negative (E) proposition asserts that nothing
is a member of both classes designated by its terms, so its
diagram shades the area in which the two circles overlap.

The particular affirmative (I) proposition asserts that there

is at least one thing that is a member of both classes, so its
diagram places an in the area where the two circles overlap.

Notice that the incompatibility of these two diagrams models the contradictory
relationship between E and I propositions; one of them must be true and the other
false, since either there is at least one member that the two classes have in common
or there are none.

The particular negative (O) proposition asserts that there is

at least one thing that is a member of the class designated by its
subject term but not of the class designated by its predicate
term, so its diagram places an in the area inside the circle
that represents the subject term but outside the circle that represents the predicate
term.

Finally, the universal affirmative (A) proposition asserts

that every member of the subject class is also a member of the
predicate class. Since this entails that there is nothing that is a
member of the subject class that is not a member of the
predicate class, an A proposition can be diagrammed by shading the area inside the
subject circle but outside the predicate circle.

Again, the incompatibility of the diagrams for A and O propositions represents

the fact that they are logically contradictory; one of them must be true and the
other false.