Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
Associate Justice NACHURA
EN BANC Associate Justice

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA Associate Justice Associate Justice

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
general circulation.
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
January 22, 2008. privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
(Sgd.) information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

REYNATO S. PUNO SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in
Chief Justice cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice SANTIAGO
Associate Justice (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when
the action concerns public data files of government offices.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any
judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
Associate Justice Associate Justice
collected or stored.

(Sgd.) (ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any
justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction
Associate Justice Associate Justice over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The (ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent confidentiality of the data or information; and,
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.

(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who
commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise
disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the
public due to its nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
of; and (a) Motion to dismiss;

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. (b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;

SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the (c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in
case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may
deputize any officer or person serve it. (d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.
(f) Third-party complaint;
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the
writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the (g) Reply;
court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.

(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or
by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service (i) Intervention;
shall apply.
(j) Memorandum;
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following:

(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
of the petition;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data
or information, and the purpose for its collection;
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three
or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of (3) newspapers of general circulation.
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the
writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated
by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.

SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days
from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the
proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and
articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.

The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent,
as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.

SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the
parties and act accordingly.

SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.

SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not
preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ,
the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas
data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in
the petition.

SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party
by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas
data.

SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office,
Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule
191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, 2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special
Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13). 3 The
questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data. 4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan
was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief
of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial
Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O.
275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission, 8 was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them
before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. 9 Upon the conclusion of
its investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private
Armies Report to the President" (the Report). 10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, 11 and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG.12Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, 13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for
each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities." 16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as
"Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country
according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom
these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa
Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on March 24,
2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of
one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been
dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms
confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the
more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities
of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which
has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel
in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao
stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now
everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP.
Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being
destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in the
field, the PNP complied with the Commissions recommendation that they revise their validation system to
include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April
26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven
(7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. 21 Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print media. 22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zearosa Commission. 23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion
in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as
her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed
a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. 25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information
forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering
respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from
making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial court
(a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and
any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to
any other government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of
the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits;
and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in
conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. 29 The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for
murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and
multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was
violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files,
registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information. 31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life,
liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the
day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her
reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was certainly
intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor.
After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents, who
are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the Zearosa Commission to
include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x. 34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa
failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and
that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions,
information on her may have already been acquired. 36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa Commission, as the
body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been
impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition. 37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010, 38 raising the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to [sic] the
PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the
trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof
showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG. 40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle
PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and
forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also reiterates that she was
able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents. 42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is
called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as
an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize
the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right.
This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said
for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from
unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The
right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is,
to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the
Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres, 45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in
Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property
Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x. 46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 47 this Court underscored
that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees
respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right
to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held
that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the
right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not
absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government
agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the
assailed legislative investigation. 48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required
to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that
even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its
origins from the European tradition of data protection, 51 this Court can be guided by cases on the
protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is
Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their
private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander
(Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval
Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone. 53 He was refused employment when the
requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret
police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was
prevented access. 54 He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of
the European Convention of Human Rights 55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political
background would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk. 56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of
Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private life. 57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate
indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release
of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow
judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).
 59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation,
the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on
the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of
the interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and
store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this information
when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate interests through the
consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the
other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia,
the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own
choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent
State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for
achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander
cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass
and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969,
including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule
of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be
effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the
Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that
in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant
(see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy,
may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a
delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state to dismantle
private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police force
that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and
records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. 63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all
necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. 64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded
to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing
her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding
of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened
her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate,
and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the
Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity
to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1wphi1 Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. 66 Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To
do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,
resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively
to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy
is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities
in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." 67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature.1wphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for
this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported
damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in
the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas
data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

(On official leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official business)

ARTURO D. BRION** DIOSDADO M. PERALTA***
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Republic of the Philippines

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
SUPREME COURT
Senior Associate Justice
Manila
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT
BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of
the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify
persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and
social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to
achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A
decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social
security providers is hereby established.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23,
1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary,
with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as
secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support
to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated
by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social
Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics
Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press
Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead
agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media
information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the
importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be
sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular
reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of
implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue
of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner
has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment
of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show
their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass
judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a
fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but
a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws
and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be
allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a
stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The executive
power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
 for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject
the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative
structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government,
Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on
Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on
Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the
organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch,
the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies,
the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by
administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the
internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials
on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established
approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted
in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make
laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of
privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando,
we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has
come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The
concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
 xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is
an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the
Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant
the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as
a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively
stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A
behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and
keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for
initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or
entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and
turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored
in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This
technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another
method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern
of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another
biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination
of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the
thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat
distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the
individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a
new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual
for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics
and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it
threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation
of population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely
for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals
with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government
agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the
agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent
the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the
electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other
basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No.
308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how
these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data,
under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information.
When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an
individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data
and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a privileged
character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger
to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback
posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not
immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could
consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the
reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and
practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics
and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of
protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the
file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely
drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely
implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion
to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to
the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS
employment records and reports. 74These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the
SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part
of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its
enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using
the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and
speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of
income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308
may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for
the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated,
even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This
approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights
and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that
will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized
computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a
doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify
parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use
but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a
centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors,
claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized
data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize
them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of
privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an
individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the
statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the
statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous
drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision
made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the
matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against
indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage
and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited
public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we
discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use of
computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many
information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective,
such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and
insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used
wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive
information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer
has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of
cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal
computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected
to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance
public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this
stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards
a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case
at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent
fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr.,
"the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his
limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign
capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.