Chiquita Julin Expert Report of FBI Agent Manuel Ortega

Case 0:08-md-01916-KAM Document 1338-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/04/2017 Page 1 of
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EXHIBIT 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION 4
(1) Experience and Training 4
a. FBI experience and training (1986 to
2012). 4
b. Private sector experience (2012 to
present). 6
c. Education. 7
d. Publications and testimony. 7
(2) Awards and Recognition 7
B. SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT 7
C. METHODOLOGY 8
D. BASIS FOR OPINIONS 11
(1) Background: The Mankins, Tenenoff, and
Rich Families 11
a. The missionaries work in Pcuro. 11
b. The kidnapping. 15
c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and
investigation. 16
(2) Background: The Welsh and Van Dyke
Families 17
a. The missionaries work in Villavicencio. 17
b. The kidnapping. 20
c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and
investigation. 22
E. OPINIONS 24
(1) The FARC is responsible for the kidnapping,
captivity, and murder of the three American
missionaries kidnapped in Pcuro, Panama 24
a. Location off the kidnapping relative to
FARC Fronts. 24
b. Evidence of circumstances surrounding
the kidnapping and initial
communications and negotiations. 28
c. Governmental triangulation of the radio
frequencies during negotiations. 30
d. Interviews of FARC defectors. 31
e. The Colombian and U.S. governments
concluded that the FARC was responsible. 37
f. The totality of documentary and other
evidence supports the conclusion that the
FARC was responsible. 42
(2) The FARC is responsible for the kidnapping,
captivity, and murder of the two American
missionaries kidnapped in Villavicencio,
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Colombia 43
a. Location of kidnapping relative to FARC
fronts. 43
b. Physical evidence. 48
c. Evidence of circumstances surrounding
the kidnapping and initial
communications and negotiations. 51
d. Governmental triangulation of the radio
frequencies during negotiations. 52
e. Testimony from witnesses. 54
f. The Colombian and U.S. governments
concluded that the FARC was responsible. 56
g. The totality of documentary and other
evidence supports the conclusion that the
FARC was responsible. 58
(3) The FARC committed violent acts such as
kidnappings against Americans and was
politically motivated 58
(4) Payments of thousands of dollars would have
been a supporting source of funding for the
FARC 59
a. The FARCs organizational structure. 59
b. The FARCs use of funds. 60
c. Chiquitas payments to the FARC. 61
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A. INTRODUCTION
My name is Manuel Ortega. I am the CEO of International Security Consultants and

Providers LLC, an entity I formed in 2012 to provide investigative services for clients overseas,
security assessments for private companies, and design upgrades to security system protocols in
order to counter criminal and terrorist activity. I spent the majority of my career, 1986 to 2012,
working as a Special Agent for the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The
FBI is the lead investigative agency for acts of terrorism committed against U.S. citizens. I am a
native Spanish speaker who is an authority on the subject of terrorism, investigation of
kidnappings overseas, and terrorist groups in Colombia. I am familiar with the kidnappings of
the five American missionaries at issue in this matter from my review of materials provided in
this case. I have personal knowledge of the kidnapping of the three American missionaries from
Pcuro because I was assigned to that case from 2004 to 2012. I am also familiar with Chiquita
Brands International, Inc.s (Chiquitas) payments to terrorist groups in Colombia as I was also
involved in that investigation prior to my retirement from the Bureau in 2012.
(1) EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING
a. FBI experience and training (1986 to 2012).
From 1986 to 2012, I worked as a Special Agent for the FBI. During my 25 years at the
FBI, I gained significant experience in conducting criminal and counter-terrorism investigations.
This included investigations into the identity of groups that conducted kidnappings of American
citizens in Colombia, Panama, as well as other Latin American and Caribbean countries. I also
gained significant experience regarding terrorist groups that operated in Colombia, such as the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the FARC), the Ejercito de Liberacion
Nacional (the ELN), the Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (the EPL), the M-19, and the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (the AUC).
I attended FBI academy at Quantico, Virginia in 1986. At the academy I received

training on numerous topics, including how to develop and run cases, legal training (presentation
of evidence, admissibility of evidence, etc.), case documentation, development and evaluation of
evidence, evidence collection, chain of custody, case investigation, protocols, informant
handling, informant development, collection and evaluation of physical evidence, and
interviewing techniques. Throughout my career, I also received ongoing in-service training.
This in-service training focused on subject matters related to work on particular squads
(terrorism, kidnapping, and drugs), and the nature of investigative duties on each squad. I
received training on, among other things, identification of terrorist groups responsible for
perpetrating kidnappings, and substantive training on terrorist groups globally, geographic reach,
nature, and history of such groups including the FARC, the ELN, and Al Qaeda, which had some
presence in the tri-border area of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Additionally, through my
experience and work in the field, as well as case-related research on Latin American terrorist
organizations, I have familiarity with the EPL, the M-19, paramilitary organizations, and
Panamanian dissident groups. I also received in-service training on how to conduct
investigations (criminal, kidnappings, drug trafficking, etc.), source handling (handling of
informants), undercover operations and undercover certifications, as well as training on how to
develop and evaluate the credibility of evidence to support a case for possible prosecution.
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Through my experience at the FBI, I am also very familiar with FBI and government agency
documents and appropriate protocols for communications between the FBI and different U.S.
government agencies. Depending on the case, I also interacted directly with different foreign
government officials as needed or appropriate to advance the investigations.
From 1987 until 1990 I worked with the Bank Robbery/Fugitive Squad in Miami,
Florida. In this role, I investigated and developed evidence regarding bank robbery cases in
south Florida. From 1990 through 1997, I worked on Drug Squads and focused on drug
trafficking and drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. During this time period I became
familiar with the history and operation of groups perpetrating organized crime in Colombia, such
as the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the M-19. I liaised with foreign intelligence services, and
coordinated routes being used by drug traffickers, including routes from Colombia into Panama.
I also developed high profile Colombian sources (including sources within the Colombian
government) and initiated major drug investigations, culminating in the trial of several major
Colombian drug traffickers (including FARC drug traffickers).
From 1997 until 2001 I performed Racketeering Enterprise Investigation. In this role, I
generated sources and developed cases for transfer to case agents. In this time period I became
very familiar with the history and operations of the AUC by conducting source interviews. For
instance, I interviewed individuals who were closely connected to one of the founders of the
AUC, Carlos Castanos.
After 9/11, my focus shifted to terrorism. From the fall of 2001 until my retirement from
the Bureau in 2012, I focused exclusively on counter-terrorism investigation, including the
kidnappings of American citizens by foreign terrorist organizations. Initially, from 2001 to
2004, I worked with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, investigating domestic counter-terrorism. I
then served the remaining eight years of my FBI career on the Extraterritorial Squad. In this role
I coordinated international terrorism and kidnapping investigations in Caribbean and Latin
American countries, negotiated safe release of American kidnap victims, and liaised with United
States embassy personnel, foreign police personnel, and foreign and U.S. intelligence services.
Since 1990, most of my work has involved investigations of criminal activity in

Colombia. This included organized criminal groups in Colombia. Since the fall of 2001 I
focused on terrorism, including kidnappings of American citizens abroad. This included
investigation of groups responsible for kidnapping American citizens in Colombia, and other
parts of Latin America. Almost every kidnapping case I worked on involved an investigation
and determination of the group responsible for the kidnapping. Over the course of my career, I
interviewed or assisted with interviews of hundreds of former terrorist group members, including
the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC. I also have significant on-the-ground experience in
Colombia, having traveled extensively across the country throughout numerous investigations.
Throughout my tenure on the Extraterritorial Squad, I also coordinated and conducted

training presentations and domestic and international seminars. This includes the Fourteenth
Session of the Latin American Law Enforcement Executive program in 2010, where I worked
with executive law enforcement leaders from Latin American countries on international
coordination of criminal investigations, and the Seventy-Ninth Session of the International Law
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Enforcement Academy in 2011, where I mentored mid-management police from Croatia, Bosnia,
Hungary, and Kosovo regarding source handling and investigation tactics.
In addition to numerous other investigations, from approximately 2004 until 2010, I

investigated Chiquitas payments to the AUC. My investigative work included interviewing
incarcerated AUC members to determine amounts paid by Chiquita to that organization. I also
interviewed demobilized former-AUC members. I am familiar with Chiquitas payments to
terrorist groups in Colombia due to my role investigating Chiquita. I was also involved in
investigations related to the kidnapping of the three American missionaries from Pcuro, Panama
during this time period, as well as another American citizen who had been kidnapped from
Panama by the FARCs 57th Front.
b. Private sector experience (2012 to present).
After my retirement from the Bureau, I worked for Engility Corporation, a private
security company, from January through August of 2013. Engility provides broad logistical
support to the U.S. military. During my time at Engility I spent six months working as a Law
Enforcement Professional where I mentored, advised, and trained the United States Marine
Corps in law enforcement tactical site exploitation (i.e., evidence collection in the field to
identify the person/group responsible), evidence borne operations (i.e., generation of operations
based on intelligence obtained through evidence collection and evaluation to tie evidence
together to identify and locate responsible individuals/groups), and provided necessary evidence
to foreign law enforcement agencies to apprehend and prosecute responsible individuals/groups.
I also advised on the development and handling of human sources of information and evidence.
I have been working as a consultant in the area of security assessment and investigative
services through International Security Consultants and Providers LLC since 2012. My recent
consulting experience includes advising a private company in Colombia regarding terrorist
groups such as the FARC, the ELN, as well as BAGRIMs (local bandit groups). I also offer
assistance with negotiations for successful release of kidnap victims.
My consulting work involves teaching and advising private clients in Latin American
countries regarding how to detect risks associated with kidnapping and how to avoid being
kidnapped. I teach escape and evasion tactics and implement kidnap response protocol for
corporate clients. This protocol includes steps that should be taken immediately following a
kidnapping such as notifying the government and setting up a framework for conducting
negotiations with the kidnapper through an intermediary negotiator.
I speak as an authority on the subject of terrorism in the Spanish media (television and
radio), including Telemundo 51, Televisa, Mega TV, America TV, and 107.1 Miami with Pedro
Sevcec. I have spoken in the media regarding dozens of terrorist incidents including, but not
limited to, the recent Orlando terrorism attack at the Pulse nightclub on June 12, 2016, Paris
terrorist attacks including the Charlie Hebdo attack on January 14, 2015, and the November 14,
2015 attacks on a concert hall, a major stadium, and restaurants and bars, the Nice terrorist attack
in July of 2016, and the Canadian Parliament lone shooter attack in October of 2014.
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c. Education.
I received an Associates Applied Science degree in Biological Technology in 1975 from

the State University of New York Agricultural and Technical College and a Bachelor of Science
degree in Arts and Science from the South Dakota State University in 1978. I then studied
veterinary medicine in Spain from 1979 through 1983.
In addition to my formal education, as noted above, I received continuous, ongoing

training during my tenure at the FBI.
d. Publications and testimony.
I have not authored any publications in the previous ten years, and I have not testified in
any court proceeding in the last four years.
(2) AWARDS AND RECOGNITION
Throughout my career I have received numerous awards and recognitions including a

Certificate of Commendation from the United States Marine Corps in 2013, the Attorney
Generals Award, issued by Attorney General Eric Holder, for Excellence in investigation in
2012, a Certificate of Appreciation from the United Stated Department of Justice in 2008, a
certificate for Professional Assistance from H.M. Customs and Excise, National Investigative
Services in 2008, and a U.S. Coast Guard Meritorious Team Commendation from the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard in 1998. I also received Outstanding Law
Enforcement Officer recognition for excellence from the Office of the United States Attorney in
the Southern District of Florida in both 1992 and 1995.
A copy of my curriculum vitae is provided in Attachment A.
B. SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT
I was retained by the Plaintiffs to do the following:
(1) Examine the case evidence and provide an opinion regarding which guerilla group, if
any, kidnapped, held, and killed the three American missionaries (Dave Mankins, Rick
Tenenoff, and Mark Rich) living in Pcuro, Panama and the two American missionaries
(Steve Welsh and Tim Van Dyke) living in Villavicencio, Colombia. This analysis was
conducted on behalf of the Julin Plaintiffs.
(2) If I concluded that a guerilla group kidnapped, held, and killed the five American
missionaries, provide an opinion as to whether the group committed violent acts such as
kidnappings against Americas and whether the group was politically motivated during the
time period in which the five American missionaries were kidnapped, held captive, and
killed by the group.
(3) Provide an opinion regarding whether regular payments of thousands of dollars would
have been an important and supporting source of funding for such a group.
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I was not asked to, nor do I offer any opinion on Chiquitas conduct as alleged in these
lawsuits nor do I reach any conclusions about that conduct other than to assume, for purposes of
this Report, that Chiquita did in fact make payments to the FARC during the period in question.
I received compensation at the rate of $300 per hour for time spent as an expert preparing
this report. I have not billed any time for non-expert related work. I have not received any
compensation for providing factual information based on my knowledge of the case.
I reserve the right to supplement my opinions throughout the discovery period and at
trial.
C. METHODOLOGY
I formed my opinions based on my training and experience investigating terrorism,

kidnapping, and drugs over the course of my career as a Special Agent in the FBI and as a
private consultant. Since 1990, my work as a Special Agent required me to spend a lot of time in
the field in Colombia, dealing with Colombian sources. From 2004 until 2012, when I retired
from the Bureau, I spent approximately three or four months per year (or two weeks per month)
in Colombia. While in Colombia, I investigated FARC, AUC, and ELN kidnapping cases. My
investigation of American kidnap cases in Colombia involved extensive coordination with the
Director of the Departmento Administativo Seguridad (the DAS)1, the Colombian National
Police (the CNP), and the Colombian military. I obtained intelligence from these
organizations on the terrorist groups who kidnapped American victims, and assistance in
identifying demobilized FARC and ELN members of the Fronts associated with kidnapping of
American victims. Once individuals who may have knowledge of events related to a kidnapping
were identified, my co-case agent and I located them and interviewed them. I interviewed or
assisted with interviews of hundreds of former guerilla combatants, including former FARC and
ELN members who were in Colombias reinsertion program. This is a program designed to give
guerillas an opportunity to defect and become reintegrated into Colombian society. Occasionally
I interviewed FARC or ELN members who were incarcerated in Colombia. I prepared countless
investigative reports summarizing these interviews. During my drug investigation work, I also
learned extensively about the various Colombian guerilla groups operations. I obtained this
information by debriefing sources, speaking with confidential informants, and speaking with
individuals who had been arrested. During my investigations, I had access to a wealth of FBI
resources including Colombian guerilla group organizational charts as well as databases of other
materials.
In performing investigative work, I followed certain procedures and protocols. The

general approach to a kidnapping investigation is as follows:
Initial Debrief of Eye Witnesses. This involves an initial questioning of family members
and other individuals who may have witnessed the kidnapping events. Typically these
individuals are taken to the U.S. Embassy for questioning. The purpose of the initial
1
In this time period, the Director of the Colombian DAS was a position similar to the Director of the FBI and was
appointed by the Colombian president.
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debrief is to obtain descriptions of the individuals or groups who perpetrated the

kidnapping, the circumstances of the kidnapping, and potential leads that will be helpful
in securing the release of the victims.
Evaluation of Physical Evidence. Physical evidence is obtained from the kidnapping site,
if available (i.e., a note or other instructions left behind for the family member or
employer). Physical evidence is evaluated to determine, if possible, who is responsible
for the kidnapping and to identify other leads that should be investigated.
Interviews of Leads. Interviews are conducted of any leads identified during the initial
debrief of eye witnesses or during the evaluation of the physical evidence.
Communications with Kidnappers. Communications between family members,

negotiators, and the kidnappers are monitored and advice is given on how to conduct the
negotiations. Negotiations are recorded and studied to determine whether the
communication fits any particular known pattern of a kidnapper and to identify relevant
information that may be useful in locating or securing the release of the victims.
Geography of Location Where Kidnap Victims are Held. The agent studies the
geography of the area surrounding where a kidnap victim was taken to determine who is
responsible. This includes evaluation of signal intelligence (i.e., triangulation). To
perform an evaluation of signal intelligence, the strength of the radio transmission is
measured in order to determine where the signal is coming from. The location of the
signal is then cross referenced with intelligence in order to determine whether it provides
any suggestions regarding who is holding the kidnap victims.
Ongoing Investigation. The agent searches for individuals who may have knowledge
regarding the kidnapping by coordinating with government officials and other groups.
These sources will often then provide notice when an individual belonging to the group
suspected of perpetrating the kidnapping is available for questioning (i.e., after a
defection from a group or otherwise). An interview can then be conducted with these
individuals.
Government Reports. A review of reports prepared by government agencies that may

relate to a kidnapping is conducted. For instance, reports prepared by the Colombian
army after it debriefs FARC defectors are reviewed in order to identify any additional
individuals who may have knowledge of the events in question.
Evaluation of Consistency of Evidence. During the investigation, different sources of

evidence (i.e., accounts given in different interviews) are evaluated to determine whether
the evidence fits together. For instance, I typically determine whether a witness
accounts fits with prior evidence deemed reliable (i.e., eye witness accounts or accounts
subject to polygraph) and examine whether details and nuances match up.
Other Categories of Evidence to Evaluate. Various sources of documents and other

evidence is evaluated to obtain information that may be helpful in pinpointing the
identify of captors and securing release of victims. This includes eye witness testimony,
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physical evidence, documents, government intelligence reports, signal intelligence,

recordings of radio communications, etc.
The methodology I used to form my conclusions and prepare this report is primarily
drawn from my FBI experience and training. As an FBI agent, I had access to information that is
not available to me in preparing this expert report. Although my years of training and experience
and personal knowledge of some of the documents and information in this matter inform the
opinions set forth in this report, I did not rely on any classified or other non-public information in
forming my conclusions and preparing my report.
Notwithstanding the differences between information that was available to me during my

tenure in the FBI (for example, informants, wire taps, databases, etc.) and the scope of my
research in this case, my general approach was to employ the tried and true methods of
investigation and evaluation of evidence I learned during my FBI career (as outlined above).
This means, that in order to confirm my findings and my research, I cross-referenced sources of
information by, for example, comparing eye-witness accounts to contemporaneous government
records of events, and looking at patterns of past FARC methodology and tactics and comparing
them to the established facts relevant to this case. Although I relied on official written reports by
the U.S. government and gave significant credence to the information gathered by New Tribes
Mission (NTM) during the hostage negotiations and to the recollections of the surviving
spouses of the missionaries, as an investigator I attempted to cross-check the information.
In addition to utilizing my training and experience and performing the investigative

procedures that I utilized as an FBI agent, in forming my opinions, I researched the FARC and
reviewed numerous sources of information, including:
Unclassified Colombian government documents;

Unclassified U.S. government documents;
Materials disseminated by the FARC;
Media Coverage of FARC activity;
Photographs;
Court Records;
Transcripts of radio communications with the FARC;
Summaries/transcripts of interviews with FARC defectors and other informants;
Deposition testimony;
Discussions with FARC kidnap survivors;
Recordings;
Internet research;
Interviews conducted with two of wives of the Americans kidnapped from Pcuro,
Panama, and Villavicencio, Colombia (Tania Julin and Lorraine Martinez); and
Interviews conducted Daniel Germann, Ron Van Peursem, Macon Hare, and Bob
Klamser, who were involved in the events following the kidnappings.
A list of documents I considered in preparation of this report is provided in Attachment B.
I corresponded with several of my contacts in Colombia, including German Osorio, who

was a colonel in the Colombian National Police, regarding authentication and verification of the
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report prepared by the Colombian National General Prosecutors office in Medellin in 2007
(JULIN013624) and regarding authentication and verification of the letters left during the
kidnappings of the two American missionaries taken from Villavicencio in 1994. I also
contacted Juan Carlos Guitierrez, who is a Colombian DAS official, regarding verification of the
letter. I obtained maps depicting FARC and ELN Front activity from a retired Colombian army
intelligence officer, Sergeant Luna.
I have also read a number of books that, in conjunction with my training and experience,
inform my understanding of the FARC. These books are listed in Attachment B.
Through the course of an investigation, it would be relatively routine to visit the location
of the abductions, if security considerations permitted. Although I reviewed geographic
information (satellite images of the locations of the kidnappings and photographs from the two
locations) and eye witness statements (testimony from individuals who were present the day of
the kidnappings and interviews of the wives), in my view, based on the available evidence and
the substantial lapse in time, a site visit was not necessary to reach my opinions. However,
subject to logistical and security considerations, I may visit Panama and Colombia to survey the
locations where the kidnappings of the five American missionaries took place and will
supplement my report if any of my conclusions change as a result of newly-acquired
information.
My report is based solely on the information I have identified above. I reserve the right
to supplement my report based on additional information that becomes available at a later date.
D. BASIS FOR OPINIONS
(1) BACKGROUND: THE MANKINS, TENENOFF, AND RICH FAMILIES
a. The missionaries work in Pcuro.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, several
American families moved to Panama to
perform missionary work in the village of
Pcuro. Pcuro is a remote village in the
Darien region of the country. Approximately
300 Kuna populated the village during this
timeframe. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 41:19-20; Julin
Dep. Tr. 66:11-15). Image 1 to the right is an
aerial image of the village.
The Mankins, the Tenenoffs, and the

Riches (depicted in Image 2, below) moved to
Pcuro to perform missionary work in this time
period. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 30:15-31:8; Julin
Dep. Tr. 29:4-11, 35:17-20; Labutes Dep. Tr.
21:19-20; 28:10-11).
Image 1
(Source: NTM@work cover
provided by Robert Klamser)
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Image 2 (JULIN019210)
The Tenenoffs, the Mankins, and the Riches
The purpose of the missionary work was [t]o reach people groups who didnt even
have a written language in order to provide them an opportunity to hear about the Lord, about
God . [T]hat was o[u]r mission. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 31:1-8). Fulfilling this work involved
many years of work and preparation, and, to do this work, missionaries had to first learn the
language of the people. (Hare Dep. Tr. 20:15-25). The American missionaries also provided
humanitarian services to the local people groups, and were often the first source of healthcare to
that the indigenous groups. (Hare Dep. Tr. 21:2-6).
Dave and Nancy Mankins moved to Panama with their two children, Chad and Sarah, in
August of 1984. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 37:5-7). The Mankins family is depicted in Images 3 and 4.
As time went on, the Mankins son Chad moved back to the United States to attend college, and
their daughter Sarah moved to Chame, Panama for work. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 145:22-146:7).
Image 3 (JULIN019190) Image 4 (JULIN019204)

Dave and Nancy Mankins Dave, Nancy, Chad, and Sarah Mankins
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The Mankins were followed by Rick and Patti Tenenoff, who moved to Panama in 1986
and lived there with their three children, Dora, Connie, and Lee. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 21:19-20,
25:13-15, 38:14-39:1). The Tenenoff Family is shown in Images 5 and 6. Dora Tenenoff was in
Chame, Panama attending boarding school while her parents performed missionary work in the
field. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 61:19-20). Connie and Lee Tenenoff, who were not yet school age,
lived with their parents in the village. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 92:6-24).

Rick and Patti Tenenoff with their eldest, Dora Rick, Patti, Dora, Connie, and Lee Tenenoff
The Tenenoffs were followed by Mark and Tania Rich, who moved to Pcuro in 1992
with their two daughters, Tamra and Jessica. (Julin Dep. Tr. 14:18-19, 65:18-22). Mark and
Tania Richs young daughters were in the village at the time of the kidnapping. (Julin Dep. Tr.
130:17-131:7). Photos of the Rich family are provided in Images 7 and 8.

The Rich Family (Mark, Tania, Tamra, and Jessica) Mark Rich with his two daughters
Upon moving to the village, each missionary family established a residence. Their
homes did not have electricity, and were simple screened-in structures that were built off the
ground. (Julin Dep. Tr. 67:9-11). Furnishings, such as hammocks and benches, were also
simple. (Julin Dep. Tr. 131:8-10). The missionaries daily lives included caring for their young
children, minding their daily life in a rustic jungle village, and engaging in relationship building
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with the Kuna. (Julin Dep. Tr. 67:6-24). The three families lived on different ends of the
village. (Julin Dep. Tr. 138:21-25; Interview with Tania Julin on 8.11.2016). The following
photos depict the village of Pcuro:2
2
Images 9 and 10 were sent to me by Robert Klamser. Mr. Klamser informed me that the photos were taken by Joe
Goodman of NTM during a trip to Pcuro after the kidnapping. The purpose of the trip was to obtain the
missionaries personal belongings and to interview witnesses regarding the attack, and the direction the kidnappers
took when they left the village. (Interview with Robert Klamser on 8.10.2016).
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b. The kidnapping.
On the evening of January 31, 1993, guerillas entered the village of Pcuro, Panama and
kidnapped Rick Tenenoff, Dave Mankins, and Mark Rich. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 145:22-153:13;
Julin Dep. Tr. 130:17-142:1; Labutes Dep. Tr. 92:6-104:15). The kidnappers were dressed in
similar attire, wearing dark, camouflage clothing and rubber boots. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 153:16-18;
Labutes Dep. Tr. 104:25-106:7; Hamm Dep. Ex. 49 at 30; Interview with Tania Julin on
8.11.2016). The guerillas did not mention which organization they were affiliated with and there
were no insignias on their uniforms. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 154:1-3). The kidnappers did not appear
to be familiar with the local Kuna language. (Julin Dep. Tr. 134:12-15).
Though specific details differ between accounts, the evidence suggests that the guerillas
had previously scouted out the area to conduct due diligence regarding their three targets. One
account indicates that lead people went in to Pcuro a week before to the kidnapping and sold
cigarettes and studied the village and the movements of the missionary families.
(JULIN004415). Another report provided by someone deemed credible by the Colombian
National General Prosecutor stated that a guerilla who was expert in wood cutting and gathering
intelligence was sent from the Colombian jurisdiction of ACANDI to the indigenous
community of PCURO in Panama for the purpose of infiltrating the area as a logger, making
contact with the populace, verifying the presence of the Americans, studying the lay of the land
and retuning with the information obtained. (JULIN013624).
Despite the fact that the missionaries homes were spread out across the village of
Pcuro, the three kidnappings occurred nearly simultaneously and were carried out in a similar
fashion. Armed guerillas burst into each of the missionaries homes with machine guns leveled
at the missionaries. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 147:1-3; Julin Dep. Tr. 131:22-24). Each missionary was
forced to the floor so that the guerillas could tie the mens hands behind their backs. (Hamm
Dep. Tr. 147:18-21; Julin Dep. Tr. 132:20-133:2; Labutes Dep. Tr. 93:24-94:5). Other armed
guerillas contained the wives and ransacked the homes, taking items such as electronics,
batteries, medications, food items, and money. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 147-148, 150, 152-53; Julin
Dep. Tr. 132-134; Labutes Dep. Tr. 97). Each wife was also forced, at gunpoint, to pack a
suitcase for her husband. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 148; Julin Dep. Tr. 134-135; Labutes Dep. Tr. 95-97).
Before departing with the three men and the stolen goods, the guerillas asked the wives for a
phone number and were provided with NTMs contact information. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 149-150).
The guerillas told the wives that this would all be over soon. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 153:9-10; Labutes
Dep. Tr. 98:1-3). The villagers reported that the men were taken out of Pcuro via a Kuna trail
that led to Colombia. (Interview with Robert Klamser on 8.10.2016).
The kidnapping ordeal likely lasted an hour or two. (Julin Dep. Tr. 142:24-143:21). The
guerillas pointed weapons at the wives and barked orders at them. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 145:24-
148:4, 149:20-150:19; Julin Dep. Tr. 132:12-133:9; Labutes Dep. Tr. 95:15-22). At various
points in time during the ordeal, the guerillas held guns to the womens backs. (Hamm Dep. Tr.
155:17-156:13; Julin Dep. Tr. 133:19-134:23). Nancy Mankins testified at her deposition that
she felt threatened and feared she would be raped. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 155:17-156:13). Patti
Tenenoff testified that in Spanish, [a guerilla] said Oh, you females; youre all so stupid. And
I understood that. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 97:14-18).
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The guerillas forced Mark and Tania to leave their home without their two children, who
were sleeping in a back room during the attack. (Julin Dep. Tr. 135:17-21). As soon as she was
able, Tania returned back across the village to retrieve Tamra and Jessica. (Julin Dep. Tr.
137:12-21; 138:21-139:20). Patti Labutes recalled sitting on the floor holding her two children
when the guerillas first entered her home. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 93:8-23). Patti held her son, Lee,
while her daughter Connie clung to her skirt as the guerillas forced her to pack a bag for her
husband. (Labutes Dep. Tr. 96:1-6).
Following the kidnapping, the three wives spent the night in Pattis home and decided
they needed to leave the village and get to safety. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 162:15-163:22). The next
morning, the three women and the four children left Pcuro and headed down river in a boat with
one of the Kuna men. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 162:15-164:17; Julin 141:16-24). A few hours later, the
wives and children arrived in Boca de Cupe and were able to make radio contact with NTM, let
NTM know about the attack, and arrange for an airplane to pick them up in El Real. (Julin Dep.
Tr. 155:7-158:24; Interview with Tania Julin on 8.11.2016). The wives also made contact with
the U.S. Embassy, but after waiting for several hours for the Embassy to send a helicopter, the
women opted to continue on to El Real. (Julin Dep. Tr. 158:1-24). The group continued another
three hours or so down river and arrived in El Real, where they hiked through the jungle to get to
the air strip. (Julin Dep. Tr. 158:17-159:10). The women and children boarded the plane and
were taken to Panama City. (Julin Dep. Tr. 159:11-23). After their arrival in Panama City, the
wives were debriefed by the FBI, the U.S. Embassy, the Panamanian police, and by Guy Sier of
NTM. (Hamm Dep. Tr. 170:18-23).
c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and investigation.
The first radio communication from the guerillas was received on February 6, 1993.
(JULIN009249). During this radio communication, the guerillas identified themselves as [t]he
Avengers, stated [y]ou say that you have the right to take also any person from any part of the
world, and indicated that the purpose of the kidnapping was [s]o that you feel yourselves in
your own flesh how much that hurts. (JULIN009249). The guerillas also presented a ransom
demand of $5,000,000. (JULIN009249). Radio communications in the weeks and months
following the initial contact took place every day or every other day (JULIN009249;
JULIN013329). The NTM negotiator requested a proof of life, which the guerillas provided on
February 15, 1993. (JULIN009261-9264). Thereafter, NTM informed the guerillas of its no-
ransom policy and the guerillas threatened that the lives of the missionaries were in jeopardy if
the ransom negotiations were not conducted in good faith. (E.g., JULIN009265; JULIN009269;
JULIN009274). On February 24, NTM offered $3,000 for release of the three missionaries.
(JULIN009277). The guerillas responded [W]hat you think, that we are charity or what, man
and stated if you think you are so religious then why do you care more for the money than you
do for human lives. (JULIN009277). The guerilla negotiator also stated [N]othing interests me
except the money the gringuitos have a lot of money. (JULIN009286).
In the radio communications that took place in May of 1993, the NTM negotiator played
a tape of one of the missionaries wives (JULIN013348) and allowed the guerilla to
communicate directly with another of the wives, who presented a $6,000 offer of payment.
(JULIN013350-13351). The guerilla rejected the $6,000 offer and said tell the other wives to
cry for their husbands. (JULIN013351). Following this impasse, there was a period of
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approximately five months where there was no radio contact. (JULIN013329; JULIN013306).
When communications resumed in October of 1993, negotiations over the ransom amount and
proof of life recommenced. The NTM negotiator presented a new offer of $9,000, which the
guerilla rejected, saying if you all continue with double-cross, you already know what will
happen. (JULIN013312). A second proof of life tape was presented during radio
communications on December 15, 1993. (JULIN013198). Not long thereafter, another impasse
was reached regarding payment of the ransom and communications were again cut off on
January 18, 1994. (JULIN013280).
NTM was assisted by FBI agents throughout the process. (Hare Dep. Tr. 62:25-63:6;
Germann Dep. Tr. 48:5-14).
While the radio communications were ongoing, and even after they ceased, NTM made
countless efforts to learn the status of the three kidnapped missionaries. There are different
accounts in the records regarding the fate of the missionaries after they were kidnapped on
January 31, 1993. Ultimately the State Department sent a summary of the facts of the case to the
family members of the kidnapped missionaries for use in securing a legal determination as to the
three mens deaths from the state of Florida. Death certificates for each of the three American
missionaries were issued in the 2000s. (JULIN017919; JULIN018012; JULIN018039;
JULIN013937; JULIN019170; JULIN013608).
(2) BACKGROUND: THE WELSH AND VAN DYKE FAMILIES
a. The missionaries work in Villavicencio.
Outside of Villavicencio, Colombia,

NTM owned a school facility that it referred to
as the Finca. (Van Peursem Dep. Tr. 36:10-13;
Martinez Dep. Tr. 49:11-20; Geihsler Dep. Tr.
52:12-16). The Finca is approximately 5
kilometers north of Villavicencio and 60
kilometers southeast of Bogota.
(JULIN003176). The purpose of the Finca is to
provide a school for children of missionaries.
(Geihsler Dep. Tr. 52:14-53:21). Approximately
74 adults and children were living at the Finca in
1994. (Interviews with Macon Hare, Ron Van
Peursem, and Lorraine Van Dyke on 8.12.2016; Image 11
(Source: Macon Hare)
JULIN003176). The Finca is depicted in the
following images:3
3
I obtained these images from Macon Hare. Image 11, Image 12, and Image 13 were taken by Mr. Hare during a
recent trip to the Finca. Images 14 and 15 were taken by a NTM pilot in the late 1990s or early 2000s. Mr. Macon
informed me that, notwithstanding that the buildings have been painted and subject to minor improvements over
time, the photos contain an accurate depiction of the Finca as it existed at the time of the kidnapping.
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Image 12 Image 13
(Source: Macon Hare) (Source: Macon Hare)
Image 14 Image 15
(Source: Macon Hare) (Source: Macon Hare)
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The layout of the Finca is shown in the following figure:4
Figure 1 (Plaintiffs Dep. Ex. 87)
Steve and Sandy Welsh were among the 74 individuals who resided at the Finca in the
relevant time period. They moved to Colombia to do missionary work in approximately 1989
with their three children, Scott, Shad, and April. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 11:21-22; 15:6-8; 52:7-9).
The children were in grade school at the time. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 52:7-9). While living at the
Finca, Steve and Sandy Welsh performed a number of different jobs. They were dorm parents
for a majority of their time in Colombia. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 34:1). Photos of the Welsh family
are provided in Images 16 and 17.
4
This depiction was prepared by Tracey Whidden at her deposition. Whidden Dep. Ex. 87; Whidden Dep. Tr. 89:8-
90:17 (describing the depiction as a general layout.).
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Steve and Sandy Welsh Steve, Sandy, Scott, Shad, and April Welsh
Tim and Lorraine Van Dyke, along with their four children (Timothy, Tracey, Katrina,
and Jacqueline) also moved to Colombia to do missionary work in approximately 1989.
(Martinez Dep. Tr. 14:17-24; 16:20-17:2; 71:15-72:1; 83:8-15). Tim worked as a preacher and a
teacher at the Finca, and Lorraine ran the dorm. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 24:5-11). Images 18 and 19
depict the Van Dykes.

Timothy Van Dyke Timothy and Lorraine Van Dyke and Family
b. The Kidnapping.
At approximately 7:30 A.M. on January 16, 1994, twelve to fifteen guerillas entered the
Finca. (JULIN003176; FBI000244). Another group of approximately fifteen guerillas formed a
road block to prevent anyone else from entering or leaving. (JULIN003176). The guerillas were
dressed in green, were wearing boots, and were armed with weapons including rifles and AK-
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47s. (CCI0000006434l CCI0000006462; Martinez Dep. Tr. 72:18-73:5; Interview with Lorraine
Martinez 8.12.2016). Armed guerillas came to the Welshes home, forced Mr. Welsh to his
knees, and wrapped a cord around his neck, hands, and feet. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 90:5-19). Sandy
Welsh was forced to pack a bag for her husband before the guerillas loaded him into the back of
a Jeep. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 90: 20-91:13). The Welshes children were in the United States at the
time. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 92:25-93:5). Lorraine Van Dyke witnessed Steve Welsh on his knees
in a field with his hands tied behind his back and with a gun held to his head. (Martinez Dep. Tr.
73:3-5, 74:18-19).
Meanwhile, other guerillas went house-to-house, forcing missionaries to come outside,

corralling them into the Fincas racquetball court, and taking electronics, a radio, weapons, and
vehicles. (JULIN003176; CCI000006439; CCI000006462; Martinez Dep. Tr. 78:18-22;
Geihsler Dep. Tr. 91:14-92:11, 94:9-13; CCI000006443; CCI000006448). As the guerillas were
approaching their home, Lorraine hid in a back bedroom with three of her children (Timothy,
Tracey, and Katrina). (Martinez Dep. Tr. 73:6-14). Once the guerillas burst into the home, they
forced the family, at gunpoint, to march to the racquetball court. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 73:6-14).
Tim and Lorraines youngest daughter, Jacqueline, who was 6 years old at the time, was staying
in town with a missionary friend. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 83:6-15; 85:17-86:3).
While the missionaries were contained in the racquetball court, the guerillas identified
themselves as the 53rd Front of the FARC, gave an ideological speech, and passed out
propaganda. (JULIN003176; CCI000006439; CCI000006443; CCI000006448; CCI000006462;
CCI000006460; JULIN018948; JULIN018942; JULIN018937). The propaganda distributed by
the FARC set forth the FARCs platform for restructuring the Colombian government.
(FBI000156).
A handwritten note was also handed out, identifying the guerillas as members of the
FARCs 53rd Front. (JULIN003176; JULIN003597; JULIN018945 ). The handwritten note
stated that the fundamental objective of the kidnapping is money and to make some
clarifications of our struggle and the American [gringo] involvement [uninvited] in our own
country first, robbing us of our riches and now militarily. (JULIN003597). The note also
directed the missionaries to purchase a certain type of radio a Yaesu 757, and to report each
day at noon using a specific frequency. (JULIN003597). Codes were identified for changing
frequencies and for identifying one another. (JULIN003597). The note was signed by Jose
Antonio Ansuategui of the FARCs 53rd Front. (JULIN003597). The following two images
depict copies of the handwritten original note as well as a translation of the note.
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While all of this was taking place inside the racquetball court, Lorraine explained that the
missionaries were lined up and it was very threatening, as it was unclear whether the guerillas
were going to shoot them. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 79:19-24). Ultimately, the guerillas took Timothy
Van Dyke, and forced him to get into the Jeep with Steve Welsh. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 92:3-11;
JULIN003176; CCI000006439; Martinez Dep. Tr. 78:4-17, 79:5-13). Lorraine and the three
children were present when Tim was taken away. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 71:18-72:9). At the time,
Timothy Jr. was 12 years old, Tracey was 10 years old, and Katrina was 8 years old. (Martinez
Dep. Tr. 71:18-72:9).
After the kidnapping, Lorraine immediately gathered clothing for her children,
belongings, and paperwork. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 80:14-80:21; Interview with Lorraine Martinez
on 8.12.2016). Sandy did the same. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 92:13-18). She tried to pack photos,
mementos, and whatever else she could fit in her two bags. (Geihsler Dep. Tr. 92:13-18). The
two women and the three children were flown to Villavicencio, where Lorraine and the three
children were reunited with Jacqueline, to spend the night in a guest house. (Martinez Dep. Tr.
80:14-21, 83:6-23; Geihsler Dep. Tr. 92:19-22). The group spent one night at the guest house.
The next day they were transported to Bogota via airplane, where they were debriefed by the
FBI. (Martinez Dep. Tr. 83:6-23; Interview with Lorraine Martinez on 8.12.2016).
c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and investigation.
From January through May of 1994, NTM made numerous broadcasts in an attempt to
reach the guerillas, and radio contact was made frequently during this time period. The first
radio contact took place on January 30, 1994, approximately two weeks after the kidnapping.
(CCI000006641). A guerilla negotiator responded to NTMs broadcast using code word
identifiers specified in the note left at the Finca by the kidnappers. The NTM negotiator
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requested proof that the men were alive and the guerilla negotiator immediately agreed to
provide a recorded tape. (CCI000006641).
A similar radio transmission was made approximately one week later on February 6,
1994 (JULIN012899, JULIN012901; JULIN012903, JULIN012906), and a proof of life tape was
received on February 8, 1994. (JULIN003471). The guerillas only recorded Stephen Welsh,
explaining that they did not record Timothy Van Dyke because he did not speak Spanish well
and they would not allow the cassette to be recorded in English. (JULIN012915;
JULIN012919). After sending the proof of life, the guerillas asked to negotiate right away and
stated that they wished to get over with this situation real soon. (JULIN012909;
JULIN012912; JULIN012915; JULIN012919). The guerilla negotiator encouraged NTM to
arrive at an agreement soon because the longer it takes, the more complicated things get.
(JULIN012915; JULIN012919). The negotiator also warned NTM that it better be taking the
negotiations seriously. (JULIN012923; JULIN012928).
A $3 million ransom demand was made in a radio communication on February 19, 1994.
(JULIN012932; JULIN012938). The NTM negotiator responded that there was a policy that
prohibited payment of ransom. The guerilla negotiator then stated that he would delay the next
proof of life by one or two months. However, on March 12, 1994, the guerillas allowed the
NTM negotiator to speak directly with Stephen Welsh. (JULIN012996). Not long after this
proof of life, the ransom negotiations began again. (JULIN013009). The guerilla negotiator
reiterated the $3 million demand and stated that payment of ransom is non-negotiable because it
is an order from a superior. (JULIN013009). NTM responded by deflecting and commenting on
how the U.S. troops had left the area; thus, one of the guerillas objectives behind the kidnapping
had been accomplished.
In a communication on April 6, 1994, the guerillas again pressed NTM to pay a ransom,
commenting that you guys have an insurance policy from the Embassy, and reducing the
demand to $1.5 million. (CCI000006573). The guerillas also threatened that if the deal was not
made that day, something more horrible would happen. Negotiations surrounding the new
demand of $1.5 million continued in April of 1994.
In a radio communication on April 27, 1994, the guerilla negotiator requested that he and
the New Tribes Mission negotiator meet in person to reach an agreement and talk more
extensively. (JULIN013094). As a consequence, the New Tribes Mission negotiator, Ron Van
Peursem, traveled into FARC territory to meet with the missionaries captors. (JULIN007767;
Van Peursem Dep. Tr. 144:14-150:7). Mr. Van Peursem left the meeting with instructions on
how to resume radio communications, including a new frequency and new codes names.
(Interview with Ron Van Peursem on 08.12.2016).
After the meeting, NTM continued to press for a political solution. (JULIN013125). The
guerillas were not receptive to this, stating [t]here wont be other agreements except that one,
period, referring to payment of ransom, and threatening to kill the missionaries.
(JULIN013132). Radio communications died off not long thereafter. (Interview with Ron Van
Peursem 8.12.2016). NTM was assisted by FBI agents throughout the negotiation process.
(Hare Dep. Tr. 62:25-63:6; Germann Dep. Tr. 48:5-14; Van Peursem Dep. Tr. 47:7-48:6).
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Continuous efforts were made to gain information on the status of the two American
missionaries in the wake of the kidnapping. There are different accounts in the records regarding
the fate of the missionaries after they were kidnapped on January 16, 1994. It was determined
that the men had been killed in June of 1995 after Daniel Germann positively identified Steve
Welsh and Tim Van Dykes bodies. (FBI001345 at 1396).
E. OPINIONS
(1) THE FARC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING, CAPTIVITY, AND MURDER OF THE
THREE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES KIDNAPPED IN PCURO, PANAMA
After evaluating evidence related to the events surrounding the kidnapping, captivity, and
murder of Mark Rich, Rick Tenenoff, and Dave Mankins, and following the tried and true
kidnapping investigation methods I used in the FBI, it is my opinion, based on the totality of the
available information, that it is very probable that the FARC kidnapped, held, and killed the
American missionaries living in Pcuro. Although this opinion is based upon the totality of the
evidence, the following categories of evidence are particularly important to my conclusion:
a. Location of the kidnapping relative to FARC Fronts.
The American missionaries were kidnapped from Pcuro, which is located approximately
15 miles from the Colombian border (depicted in the blue line).
Map 1
(Source: adapted from google maps)
As is depicted on the following maps, in 1993 the FARCs 5th, 34th, and 57th Fronts
primarily controlled the area of Colombia bordering the Darien-region of Panama where the
three Americans were kidnapped. The ELN did not have a strong presence in this area at the
time.
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Map 2 Map 3
(Source: Sergeant Luna, Colombia Army Intelligence) (Source: Sergeant Luna, Colombia Army Intelligence)
I obtained copies of these maps from Colombian Army Intelligence. The maps were
created based on human sources, RDF data, and other intelligence. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that while intelligence indicated that FARC and ELN Fronts were active in these
particular parts of the country, the Fronts were not stagnant, and their movements were more
fluid. In other words, Fronts did not remain in permanent locations, but rather moved about in
the areas depicted on the maps.
The following map, generated at my direction, indicates where these FARC Fronts were
located in relation to Pcuro, where the three American missionaries were kidnapped:
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Map 4
Government reports and witness testimony (described in greater detail below) also
indicates that the men were executed in the area surrounding Acandi, depicted on the following
map:
Map 5
This, again, is in the same FARC-concentrated region bordering Panama.
Pcuro is a very remote and isolated jungle village. There are no roads leading to the
village, and at the time of the kidnapping Pcuro was only accessible by the missionaries
airstrip, by canoe, or by trekking across jungle terrain that is very difficult to traverse. The
FARCs geographic proximity to Pcuro would have afforded it the ability to utilize its
familiarity with the environment and the terrain to carry out this operation in these conditions.
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Proximity would also have afforded the FARC the ability to conduct surveillance and other
advance preparations that would be necessary to execute this attack.
In addition, the FARC was known to enter Panama during this time period. For instance,
Panama was one of the FARCs main logistical hubs for supplies in the early 1990s. The FARC
maintained known and clandestine operations in Panama at this time. There were also drug
routes between Colombia and Panama passing through this region and the FARC was known to
coordinate with these drug traffickers.5 One such trail passed through Pcuro (Interview with
Bob Klamser on 8.11.2016; Interview with Daniel Germann on 8.12.2016). Based upon my
experience and knowledge, there were no other guerilla groups that had a dominant presence in
the region during this time period. This is confirmed by Maps 2-3, above, depicting locations of
FARC and ELN fronts in the relevant time period, as well as by the fact that FARC was the only
group to perpetrate a kidnapping of an American in this region in the timeframe from 1980-1998,
as is depicted on Figure 1, below:
Figure 2
5
Some evidence suggests that the FARC suspected the men as having been associated with the DEA.
(JULIN013635). This suspicion also came out during in-person negotiations between NTM negotiator Ron Van
Perusem in connection with the kidnapping of Steve Welsh and Tim Van Dyke from Villavicencio, Colombia. The
FARC suspected Mr. Van Peursem of being involved with the CIA. (JULIN013094 at 7-8).
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Figure 2 was generated using data collected in a State Department report describing cases
involving kidnapped American citizens from 1980 to 1998. (JULIN018623). The report
identifies which group was responsible for each kidnapping in most instances. The government
does not always attribute kidnappings to a particular group.
The FARC maintained a dominant role in that region bordering Panama into the 2000s.
For instance, I was co-case agent for a kidnapping case involving an American citizen, Cecilio
Padron, who was kidnapped from his work site in Panama City and held captive by the FARC in
Colombia in 2008.
Apart from the FARC, there were no guerilla groups (including the M-19 and the EPL) in
this geographic region with the operational capacity to carry out this operation. Neither the M-
19 nor the EPL were major players in this area. In fact, the M-19 and EPL had disbanded or
were starting to disband by 1993. When it was in existence, the M-19 was mainly an urban
group.
In this timeframe, the AUC was not yet in existence. Other predecessor paramilitary
groups in the area did not have the operational capacity to carry out this type of operation, and
tended not to be engaged in this type of kidnapping. For example, at this time, paramilitaries
typically were providing protection from guerillas to cattle barons, wealthy Colombian coffee
growers, and other producers.
Similarly, the political dissident groups that had existed prior to 1990 in Panama tended
to be located in urban areas. By 1993 these groups had been absorbed into mainstream
Panamanian politics. Even if these groups were still active in 1993, based upon their typical
locations in urban settings, I find it unlikely that they would have undertaken a kidnapping
operation in this remote portion of Panama.
In my opinion, the geographic location of these events makes it highly unlikely that any
other groups would have been able to execute this kidnapping.
b. Evidence of circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and initial communications

and negotiations.
Eye witness accounts by the wives of the three American missionaries (through
deposition testimony, documents, related publications, and interviews) provide details of the
actual kidnapping. These details include the following:
A path was cut through the jungle by woodcutters in advance of the kidnapping
from Colombia to the village;
The woodcutters stayed in the village for a few days after cutting the path, and prior
to the kidnapping;
The three American missionaries were kidnapped after dark;
They were kidnapped by a number of men;
The men were all wearing similar attire;
They were kidnapped at the same time;
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They were kidnapped in the same manner;

They were tied up in the same manner;
The wives all received similar instructions from the guerillas to pack bags for their
husbands (including details of what to pack);
The homes were ransacked for the same types of items (electronics, radios, food,
money, medicines);
The men were heavily armed with machine guns;
The wives were asked for a phone number;
The guerillas took the American missionaries into the jungle in the direction of
Colombia;
The guerillas initiated communications and negotiations in earnest approximately
seven days after the kidnapping; and
The guerillas carried out negotiations via high frequency radio.
These facts indicate to me that the kidnappings were perpetrated by a highly organized
guerilla group. The sequence of events indicates that the kidnappers were highly organized, well
trained, followed a command structure, and had considerable resources. The kidnappers must
have known the whereabouts and movements of the three missionary families, indicating
advance preparation for the kidnapping. Carrying out the kidnappings at the same, or near same,
time required planning, multiple men, and coordination, especially since the American
missionaries lived on opposite sides of the village. The fact that the men were wearing similar
gear and had machine guns suggests that the group had access to a high level of funding, which
is uncommon in the region, especially in 1993. The fact that a path was cut several days prior to
the kidnapping and visitors remained in the village to scout the area indicates advance planning
and sophistication. The fact that the men were all apprehended and the homes ransacked in the
same manner indicates advanced planning and the fact that the men were well trained. That the
guerillas took the missionaries into the jungle in the direction of Colombia indicates that the
kidnappers originated in that direction and were returning to an established camp. The path of
least resistance, and the fastest route, would have been to travel downriver by boat into Panama.
The fact that the kidnappers did not initiate negotiations for seven days after the kidnapping
indicates that the kidnappers were well funded (had the means to carry out an extended
kidnapping), planned for an extended kidnapping, and had the organizational capacity to support
such an endeavor. The fact that negotiations were not initiated for seven days after the
kidnapping may also indicate that the victims had to travel some distance to a remote location
where the kidnappers felt secure. These actions are consistent with a highly organized, large,
well-funded guerilla group such as the FARC, which had a large presence along the
Panamanian/Colombian border.
It would be unlikely for local bandits or a group of common criminals to carry out this
type of kidnapping of multiple American targets at the same time and in this manner. Most well-
known, large guerilla groups were either not known to have a strong presence in this area, had
previously disbanded, or were not yet in existence.
These facts inform my conclusion that it was very probable the FARC who perpetrated
the kidnapping of the three American missionaries and it is unlikely that another group is
responsible.
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c. Governmental triangulation of the radio frequencies during negotiations.
It is standard practice in kidnapping cases for governmental agencies to triangulate on the

frequencies being used for communication in the negotiation process in order to further identify
the location of the kidnappers and to identify who perpetrated the kidnapping. Triangulation, or
Radio Direction Finding (RDF), involves measuring the strength of the radio signal from
different locations. RDF is used during radio communications to identify the location of the
transmittal. Once this location is established, intelligence from human sources is reviewed in
order to determine which group controls that geographic area.
In this case, triangulation was evaluated, and revealed that the kidnappers were
communicating from FARC-controlled territory in Colombia. Numerous documents describe
this triangulation by the U.S. and Colombian governments.6 From several of these documents, it
is possible to identify precisely where the kidnappers were located when they were engaged in
the kidnapping negotiations. For instance, a report of a February 20, 1993 meeting with the U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia discussing use of RDF to locate a transmission site in FARC territory
indicated that the embassy had been:
[S]uccessful in locating the transmission site. Numerous RDF fixes, the latest this
morning at 0700, places them at Piaorroa (sp?), along the Gulf coast up in the spur of
Colombia. They have not moved in a week and so must have a safe house there. The
men are most likely being held in the jungle somewhere. This is the traditional area of
34th Front FARC.
(CCI000002271). Another report documenting a meeting at the Embassy dated February 21,
1993 indicated that:
[The] Ambassador said that they have been successful in RDFing the radio contacts, as
recently as Sat. (yesterday). He said that is FARC-Frente 34 country, from a town called
PINOROA. He feels that the 3 fellas are probably not with the radio but in the jungle
nearby.
(JULIN008428). This report also stated that RDF taken by the Colombians in April of 1993
indicated that radio contacts were coming from the same area. (JULIN008428; JULIN009113).
The following image depicts the RDF location:
6
For example: CCI000002271 (report of February 20, 1993 meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Colombia discussing
use of RDF to locate transmission site in FARC territory); JULIN008428 (log dated February 21, 1993 indicating
that the Ambassador had been successful in RDFing the radio communications); JULIN003727 (log dated January
31, 1994 indicating that the FBI would attempt to get RDF locations of the guerilla transmissions); JULIN009113
(meeting report dated April 15, 1993 indicating that the Colombians had taken RDF); JULIN009467 (meeting report
dated May 24, 1993 indicating that the Colombian embassys RDFs had consistently shown that signals were within
a 5 mile radius of Pinaora and Acandi).
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Map 6
In my experience, victims are often held within a short distance from where radio
communications are transmitted by the captors.
The RDF data shows that the kidnappers were located in FARC-controlled territory in
Colombia, which strongly indicates that the FARC kidnapped and was in possession of the three
Americans.
d. Interviews of FARC defectors.
In my time at the FBI, I conducted hundreds of interviews of guerilla and former guerilla
group members. Statements by defectors from guerilla groups need to be evaluated in
accordance with other known facts, statements from other witnesses, and other sources of
evidence to determine the reliability and veracity of the statements. In my experience, testimony
from human sources who witnessed certain events is often inconsistent in certain respects (i.e.,
certain details). In these types of investigations, agents examine human source information
based on the largest percentage of consistency (i.e., how much of the account is consistent), for
purposes of corroboration.
When someone defects from a guerilla group in Colombia, the person typically turns
himself or herself into the Colombian army. The army interviews the defector to look for
actionable intelligence such as the location of the group and its command structure. Once this
debrief process is completed, the individuals are then turned over to the CNP, the DAS, the
Fiscilia (a prosecutors office), and may enter the Colombian Reinsertion Program. This
program allows reintegration of defected guerillas into Colombian society. Case agents
coordinate with the Colombian army, the CNP, the DAS, and the Fiscilia to determine when
individuals who may have knowledge of a case of interest defect and are able to coordinate an
interview with those individuals through these Colombian governmental entities.
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In this case, numerous FARC defectors were identified through this process and
interviewed. Several accounts given by defectors who had been members of FARC during the
time the three American missionaries were kidnapped, held captive, and killed were similar,
detailed, corroborated, and subject to polygraph by the Colombian government, and later, the
FBI.7 Some of the substance of these interviews is contained in governmental reports, as well as
in notes and other documentation prepared during the ongoing investigation of the kidnapping.
Prior to my retirement from the Bureau in 2012, I personally interviewed two human sources
with personal knowledge of the FARCs involvement in this kidnapping.
From these interviews, the following information was obtained:
The FARC had engaged in preparation work and intelligence collection done in
advance of the kidnapping;
Numbers of the FARC Fronts involved in the kidnapping (all of which are known
to operate in the area along the Colombia/Panamanian border);
The FARC aliases of several individuals involved in the kidnapping;
Where the men were held captive by the FARC within Colombia; and
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the three Americans (including
their refusal to cooperate during evasive maneuvers in the midst an attack on the
FARC Front by the Colombian military and orders from Front leadership to
confirm that the three men had been killed).
In addition to the interviews I personally conducted, I reviewed several sources of

information containing summaries of FARC defector interviews or other testimony. These
sources include:
Colombian National General Prosecutor (NGP) report dated 2007

(JULIN013624);
State Department reports; and
NTM interview and meeting notes.
i. Colombia National General Prosecutor Report
I reviewed the signed original of the 2007 NGP report (JULIN013624), which contains a
summary of information obtained from several FARC defectors, including the two sources I
personally interviewed prior to my retirement from the Bureau. The 2007 NGP report at
JULIN013624 is a translated copy of the original. I personally requested this translation by
obtaining the original from the NGP office in Medellin, and providing it to the Miami Division
of the FBI. To the best of my knowledge the translated copy at JULIN013624 is an accurate
translation of the original. What is noteworthy and adds to the credibility of the testimony is the
fact that it was provided against self-interest.
7
These sources provided detailed information regarding the missionaries that could only have been obtained by
someone who had direct contact with them. Moreover, their stories were consistent with each other as well as the
other facts known about the case. The polygraph test results showed that they were telling the truth. Daniel
Germann of NTM separately interviewed these sources and reported that these individuals seemed to have credible
information and that their accounts were consistent.
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This report indicates that in 2006, a source with knowledge about the location of the three
American missionaries remains was identified. This source was interviewed and stated that he:
[W]as a member of FARCs 57th Front for more than ten years a group involved in
criminal activities in Darien, Choco and Uraba and he stated that they also made
incursions into Panama, especially in a jungle area in the jurisdiction of the city of
Acandi, Choco.
(JULIN013624). He stated also that:
[I]n 1989 three American missionaries were kidnapped by FARCs 57th Front guerilla
fighters near the indigenous community of Boca de Cupe inside Panamanian territory and
that they were later brought into Colombia where they were held captive in different
camps, initially at a location near Vigia del Fuerte, were then taken further north and
ultimately to a camp located in the jurisdiction of Acandi, Choco; it was there that they
were executed after having been held captive for five years.
(JULIN013624-13625). The Colombian government then undertook additional investigative

work to confirm the veracity of the information provided by this source. (JULIN013625).
This included re-interviewing demobilized members of FARCs 57th Front who had testified in
1997 that all three missionaries had been executed by their captors in mid-1996 at the time
of an assault by National Army troops on a FARC camp where the kidnap victims may have
been held at the time. (JULIN013630-13631). The report specified that both of these sources:
a. [B]elonged to FARCs 57th Front during the years the kidnapping was in
progress, even though they joined on different dates;
b. [B]elonged to the Company that carried out the crime and they were operating in
the same area under the same direct command, though they were in different
Units;
c. [W]ere members of the Front for many years after the crime; this enabled them
to learn more details and obtain more information; and
d. Were appointed by their commanders to proceed to the scene of the incident and
verify the circumstances.
(JULIN013633). Based on the aggregate INFORMATION obtained through a combination

of individual accounts of the same manner, the NGP concluded that:
The missionary capture operation took place in early 1993 in Pcuro, located
on the banks of the river of the same name, a rural area under the jurisdiction of
BOCAS DE CUPE, DARIEN province, Republic of Panama;
The KIDNAPPING could only have been carried out under the direct authorization
of alias IVAN MARQUEZ and the 57th Fronts General Staff whose members
at the time were:
Alias VICTOR TIRADO
Alias RIGOBERTO LOZADA
Alias ROBER
Alias RODOLFO
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Alias SILVER
Alias TITO
Alias GUILLERMO
The above-named commanders, especially VICTOR TIRADO, ROBER
[and]Silver planned the operation. Among the preparatory actions, they
designated a trusted guerilla fighter by the name of FABIO who was an expert
logger (wood cutter) as well as in matters of intelligence. They sent him in from the
Colombian jurisdiction of ACANDI to the indigenous community of PUCURO in
Panama for the purpose of infiltrating the area as a logger, making contact with the
populace, verifying the presence of the Americans, studying the lay of the land and
returning with the information obtained.
Following Fabios return, the guerillas took about four or five days to analyze the
information and plan the operative.
Those involved in the kidnapping operation departed from the same location in
ACANDI, crossed over into Panamanian territory and marauded the indigenous
community of PUCURO. Here they immobilized the inhabitants, located the
American missionaries and captured them. The Indians tried to prevent the
Kidnapping by using their usual rustic weapons and exchanged fire with the guerilla
fighters.
THE KIDNAP VICTIMS INITIAL ROUTE INTO COLOMBIA: At night they
proceeded in the direction of a stream some distance from the village and there they
spent the night. On the first day they advanced along the Pucura [sic] river toward
the Colombian border, reaching a place on the border called LA ESCALERA. Two
days later, now inside Colombia, they reached EL LIMON . There they received
the Commission assigned to guard over them.
The Captivity Commission received [the group] in EL LIMON . The
kidnapped missionaries were kept in that area for a year, but were frequently
located to different camps, known only to the Captivity Commissions.
The SECRETARIAT itself, through IVAN MARQUEZ, was in charge of
negotiations regarding the freeing of the hostages.
(JULIN01363613641).
ii. State Department Reports
Unclassified State Department Reports contain summaries of interviews with FARC

defectors.
In an October of 1999 unclassified State Department document, it was reported that:
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(JULIN017993).
In a November 2001 unclassified report, the State Department stated that:
[A] former member of the 57th Front of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC), known as [redacted], who was serving time in Bella Vista prison in
Medellin on charges of rebellion, might have information about the fate of the
missionaries. [Redacted] was initially contacted at the Bella Vista prison by Legatt and a
Colombian prosecutor in charge of the NTM case. [Redacted] admitted he had been one
of several FARC members guarding the missionaries when they were brought into
Colombia. He said he was later given other duties in another location and subsequently
heard that the three missionaries had been killed.
(JULIN018693-18697).
iii. NTMs Interview Reports
It is common practice to review a wide range of sources of information in kidnapping

investigations. Not all of the information will be true, accurate, or reliable. I have reviewed
numerous NTM interview reports. Some of these reports contain information that is consistent
with other statements or interviews deemed credible through polygraph or witness corroboration.
Below are examples from NTMs reports regarding interviews with human sources.
An interview report of FARC defectors from the 57th Front, dated August 25, 1999,
contains extensive interview with Alexis Cordoba Cordoba and Geraldo Mena Palacio. This
interview report noted the following:
e. Alexis had been working with the military since May of 1999. He was born and
raised in Turbo and was with the FARC for 8 years. (57th Front the entire
time.).
f. [I]t was apparent that [Alexis] had spent considerably more time with the men
than he alluded to at the beginning.
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g. Describing the missionaries, Alexis stated that [o]ne was bald and one had grey
hair. One spoke much better Spanish than the other two. If the other two didnt
understand the one who spoke well explained. The younger one is blond and has
a front tooth (Pointed to right front) that is platino (silver color). He continued
that one of them had a Bible that he kept in a bag.
h. Victor was the commander of the 57th Front but the second in command was
Rigoberto. Rigoberto planned the kidnapping, was in charge of carrying out the
kidnapping and had the control of the missionaries during the entire time of
captivity.
i. Alexis said that Nanci had told him that a couple of years ago (he thinks it was in
1997) that the missionaries had been killed. A guerilla that was guarding the men
had killed his commander and had escaped to the paramilitary. The paramilitary
had returned with this guerilla who identified the area. There was combat.
Manuelito and El Zarco were [ ] in charge of the missionaries. They didnt have
authority to do anything with the missionaries. As they were fle[e]ing the area
they got a hold of Ivan Marquez. Marquez gave the order to kill the missionaries.
They were killed at a place called La Sosa (a small stream). (Alexis made a map
for me to see where this place was located.) The bodies were all in one place and
not buried. There is an old house and then a trail along La Sosa. The bodies were
left about twenty minutes hike from the old house. You can get to the house by
climbing a hill on the left side of Acandi Seco. They had kept the missionaries
between Acandi Seco and Cano Asti the entire time of captivity.
j. Regarding who would have been present at the time of the shooting, Alexis said
Manuelito was there. Manuelito has since turned himself into the paramilitary.
Alexis knows Manuelito well because about three years ago he was Alexis [sic]
commander (for about one year). Nanci was also there. She and her husband,
Rubin, turned themselves into the military about a year after the men were killed.
El Zarco was present and is still with the 57th Front. Katerine was there and is
still a guerilla. Ramirez was there but is now with a different front on the Pacific
coast near Jarado [sic].
k. Alexis and Geraldo said, regarding the possibility of recovering the remains, that
after several years, so much [h]as grown up. It would be difficult but they
thought that it could be done. They said that they would be willing to go with
some military and look.
(JULIN004355-4360). It is interesting to note that the description of the missionaries is fairly

consistent with Mark Rich, Dave Mankins, and Rick Tenenoff. Mark Rich grew up in Boliva
and was raised in Peru, so was as comfortable in Spanish as he was in English. Dave and Rick
were more limited in Spanish. Similarly, Dave Mankins was balding. (Interview with Daniel
Germann 8.16.2016). This is just one example of an eye witness account providing a description
that is consistent with the three men.
In a trip report dated September 5, 1997, prepared by Daniel Germann, it was reported by
the International Committee of the Red Cross that a FARC defector named Guissdo Suarez
Jorgelio Antonio, alias Hector, turned himself in to the military on April 19, 1997. He
reportedly said that the three missionaries were killed in May of 1996. Hector also reported that
the three men escaped at some point and made it to the town Albania, which was made up of
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FARC militia, and the men were returned to the FARC. The International Committee Red Cross
reportedly found this witness to be credible. (JULIN004465-4469).
A May 8, 1996 meeting report prepared by Guy Sier of NTM, reports that Dwight
Dennett, the Legat, informed NTM that captured 57th Front FARC guerilla, Milton Valois,
passed all aspects of the polygraph. The report also stated as follows:
Dwight talked about some information from interview and polygraph. He confirmed the
last date our men seen by Valois as 23 Feb 1996. He also confirmed the location of our
men within the general area NW of Acandi, in the lowlands below the foothills .
Dennett then discussed information gained both from Valoi and Gen. Del Rio,
commander of the 17th Brigade, concerning FARC strength in region. The General
admitted that FARC was well entrenched in the entire region . Dennett drew a rough
diagram of the Uraba region, outlining the approx. FARC Front areas. He depicted the
area up the spur, where our men are being held, as an R&R area for Gs controlled by the
57th Front.
(CCI000001703-1705).
A NTM trip report dated April 16, 1996, contains notes of an interview between Daniel
Germann and Milton Valois. In this interview, Milton provided detailed information regarding
the missionaries, their language abilities, physical descriptions, sleeping arrangements,
recreation, and conditions in the camp. He also indicated that the men were kept in the Acandi
area. (JULIN013525-13532).
On January 31, 1996, Tim Wyman of NTM reported on a conversation with Dario
Pizarro. Mr. Pizarro had spoken to Rodrigo Tovar, who reported that the three men were seen on
a mountain between Panama and Colombia. (JULIN004411).
On August 22, 1995, New Tribes reported a conversation with Abadio Green and Daniel
Germann in which Abadio said:
That he was told that the men were taken by the 5th Front but that they have been held the
entire time west of Acandi. Right now they are in a camp which is actually in Panama.
This camp is quite large right now due to the guerilla movement to the west. He was
quite confident that the information he was given was true since the source was actually
present at the time of the kidnapping.
(JULIN004415). Mr. Green also stated that [h]e was told that the missionaries are trained in
linguistics and that they are helping the guerillas in the area of languages. (JULIN004415).
e. The Colombian and U.S. governments concluded that the FARC was responsible.
A March 25, 2013 unclassified State Department report stated that:
[S]ince 1980, when kidnapping became a serious problem in Colombia, the embassy has
learned of 138 U.S. citizen kidnap victims. The vast majority of these kidnappings were
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perpetrated by guerillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the

National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . January 31, 1993, the FARC kidnapped New
Tribes Missionaries (NTM) Mark Rich, Dave Mankins, and Rick Tenenoff, in Pucuro,
Darien province, Panama, and later moved them to the Colombia side of the border. The
FARC demanded a ransom of five million USD. The three men are presumed dead.
(JULIN018698). The State Department chronicled 138 kidnappings of Americans in Colombia

from 1980 to 2013. The State Department did not attribute a particular guerrilla group to many
of the kidnapping cases.
In the Colombian NGP report dated February 7, 2007 discussed above, the Colombian
government concluded that the FARC kidnapped, held, and killed the American missionaries. In
particular, the Colombian government found that:
On January 31, 1993, three American missionaries were kidnapped by guerilla fighters
belonging to FARCs 57th Front near the indigenous community of Pucuro located in the
province of Darien, Republic of Panama. They were later taken into Colombia where
they were held at different camps. At first they were held at a place called Vigia del
Fuerte; they were then taken further north and eventually to a camp located in the
jurisdiction of Acandi, Choco; it was here that they were executed in mid-1996.
(JULIN013624-13641).
In a December 2001 State Department Report addressed to Congressman Barr (letter and
attached report), the State Department stated:
The hostages were then moved to Colombia and the kidnappers established radio
contact with NTM. The kidnappers are believed to be guerillas of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
On February 2, 1993, the FBI opened a hostage taking/international terrorist case
[redacted]. This was followed in February 1993 by a FARC demand for $5 million
in ransom during negotiations with NTM representatives.
December 1996 Costa Rican president Figueres, with USG support, begins and
involvement in the case through contacts with FARC. FARC tells Figueres they
have NTM hostages.
June 24, 1997 Costa Rican Vice Foreign Minister Carreras meets with FARC
representative in San Jose. Reversing its previous position, FARC representative
says his front knows nothing about hostages.
March 27, 1998 [redacted] FARC member detained by the Bolivian National
Police (BNP), was interviewed by USG official in La Paz and in Santiago
concerning his knowledge of the three NTM men. [Redacted] stated that the FARC
was not responsible for the kidnapping and opinioned that the missionaries were
kidnapped by a paramilitary group that operates in the area.
In October 1999, the Colombian military worked with [redacted] who provided
information on an alleged gravesite of the three missionaries near Rio Murri in the
town of La Playa in Northeastern Colombia. The Colombian Army conducted a
search for the bodies of the missionaries but were unsuccessful. The informant
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described how the kidnapping and execution allegedly took place. According to the
informant, FARC commander [redacted] and twelve of his men kidnapped the
missionaries and held them for two years. The informant said that two years after
the kidnapping, [redacted] orders via radio from [redacted] to tell commander
[redacted] to get rid of those men. A group was chosen among the FARC
members who took the three missionaries for a twenty minute walk. After several
shots were heard, only the FARC members returned to camp. He also stated that
according to his coordinates, the missionaries were buried by the river next to a tree
that has since washed away, presumably along with their remains.
In June 2000, a U.S. Government official followed-up on previous information by
interviewing and polygraphing another former FARC member who stated he may
have information on the NTM men.
(JULIN018012).
In a January 31, 2001 press statement, the State Department stated:
These dedicated missionaries were kidnapped in Panama by members of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on January 31, 1993 and then taken to
Colombia. Throughout 1993, members of the FARC tried to exact a multi-million
dollar ransom for the missionaries. The FARC as repeatedly declined to provide any
information on the three missionaries, despite direct appeals for information by President
Pastrana and senior Colombian officials, by a state department official in December of
1998 and by members of congress and other concerned individuals. The FARCs
unwillingness to account for its actions has imposed inhuman hardship on the
missionaries families. We again call upon the FARC to respond to the request for
information on the whereabouts of Mr. Mankins, Mr. Rich and Mr. Tenenoff.
(JULIN018193-18199).
In an April 20, 2000 letter from the State Department to Senator Robert C. Byrd,
Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs Barbara Larkin wrote:
Mark Rich, David Mankins, and Rick Tenenoff were taken hostage in Panama in January
1993 by terrorists belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
. Colombian president Andres Pastrana met with the missionaries wives in Washington
on October 27, 1998, to discuss the Colombian governments efforts on their behalf.
President Pastrana has also raised the issue of the NTM hostages with the FARC on a
number of occasions since July 9, 1998, when he first met with the FARC prior to taking
office . On December 13 and 14, 1998, the State Department officer met with
representatives of the FARC in Costa Rica to demand an accounting of the missionaries
welfare and whereabouts. Government of Colombia representatives were also present.
Although the FARC has previously blamed the kidnappings on bandits and renegade
FARC deserters, who it claimed were attempting to discredit the guerilla organization,
the State Department believes the FARC is responsible. From October 12-14, 1999,
Colombian military and forensic experts excavated an area near the Rio Murri, where an
informant said the New Tribes Mission members were buried. That search turned up no
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evidence of any remains, but Colombian authorities are continuing to investigate other
credible reports concerning the fate of the missionaries.
(JULIN018002-18004).
In a January, 31 2000 State Department press release, the deputy spokesperson stated
Today marks the seventh anniversary of the kidnapping of our fellow U.S. citizens by members
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). (JULIN018188).
In a September 1998 Terrorism Review, the CIA noted that:
The FARC kidnapped US missionaries Mark Rich, David Mankins, and Rick Tenenoff in
January 1993. The terrorists have not provided proof of life since 1994, but information
from a captured guerilla indicates that the hostages were alive in FARC captivity in early
1996. However, FARC leaders have repeatedly denied that they kidnapped the US
missionaries.
(CIA00029-30).
On May 14, 1998, the following question was posed: What is the USGs reaction to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) internet statement denying responsibility for
the January 31, 1993 kidnapping of three New Tribes missionaries? Madeline Albright
responded on behalf of the State Department that:
Context: Through intelligence sources, we know that the FARC did this. The men
were transferred to Colombia and ransom negotiations were conducted throughout 1993
.The FARC has never publicly admitted taking the men hostage and have made a
number of unconvincing public statements to that effect. On February 6, the Department
issued a public statement calling upon the FARC to return these men or to provide
information about their whereabouts and condition.
A: We have heard these denials by the FARC before and we reject them. We again
repeat our February 6 appeal to the FARC to return David Mankins, Mark Rich, and
Richard Tenenoff to their families out of a sense of compassion, justice, and simple
humanity, or to provide information about their whereabouts. We have no doubt that
the FARC perpetrated this heinous crime of kidnapping these missionaries as well
as many other Americans over the years. This conclusion is based on credible
information, which frankly we are not/not prepared to share publically.
(JULIN018184-18185).
In a report dated April of 1998, the U.S. State Department concluded that the FARC
kidnapped, held, and killed the American missionaries. (JULIN018623). The U.S. government
does not attribute kidnappers to a particular group without credible evidence. For example, the
Department of State issued a report of all kidnappings of American in Colombia from 1980 -
1998. Several of the kidnappings were not attributed to a specific group because insufficient
evidence was available.
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A CIA document dated February 23, 1993 indicated that:
The abduction last month of the three U.S. citizens working for the US-based New Tribes
Mission (NTM) in rural Panama was probably the work of FARC, although no group has
claimed responsibility:
-- The hostages were seized in Panama near the Colombian border, in an area where
the FARC is active.
(CIA00003).
A July 1995 CIA Terrorism Review provided the following:
(CIA00017-21).
A FBI Colombia kidnapping assessment dated May 23, 1995 stated:
Mark Rich, David Mankins, Richard Tenenoff . Kidnapped near Panama/Colombian

border 1/31/93. Last proof of life 12/93. Last communication 1/94. Believed held by the
FARC 34th Front then transferred to the 5th. Possible location of hostages:
Acandi/Turbo/Apartado, Antioquia. Six sightings have been reported: Alive 11/94 near
Acandi, alive 1/95 near Turbo, alive 3/95 in Antioquia, alive 4/95, reported dead 3/95
(killed in 6/94), dead 3/95.
(FBI000687).
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f. The totality of documentary and other evidence supports the conclusion that the
FARC was responsible.
While individual statements may lack indicia of reliability due to the second or third hand
nature of the information and the inability to verify sources, I have nevertheless considered and
evaluated these statements based upon my experience and training at the FBI, and compared
them to other evidence deemed more reliable. Some of the information is consistent with other
sources that have been previously deemed credible through polygraph or verification. Few
documents indicate involvement by groups other than the FARC. Examples of these types of
accounts are provided below.
In 1994, a Belgian organization, IDAS purportedly established a dialogue with the

kidnappers through our different contacts. (FBI000769). IDAS commented in a letter to NTM,
stated that it had started to notice positive reactions from the direction of the F.A.R.C. and that
[t]he F.A.R.C. agrees to release Mr. D. Mankins, Mr. M. Rich, and Mr. R. Tenenoff under
certain circumstances. (FBI000769). The FBI confirmed in December of 1994 that IDAS, the
Belgian based International Danger and Disaster Assistance Company had met in central
America with representatives of the Colombian FARC to discuss New Tribes Mission (NTM)
hostages. (FBI000775).
A memorandum dated August 26, 1997 indicates that the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) had met with a guerilla, Milton Valoyes Ortiz, who had been with the 57th
Front for nine years. The report notes that Milton knew a lot of the three missionaries history
and told ICRC, with a lot of details and the names of all the persons involved that Mark Rich,
Rick Tenenoff and David Mankins had been killed around May 1996. Miltons story was as
follows:
(JULIN004483).
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NTM prepared a chronology of its own internal investigative efforts undertaken from
1996-1997. Without judging the validity of these reports, I would note that the reports primarily
implicate the FARC. One report from April September 1996 contains a reference to a FARC
contact that suggests that a sister group had the men. It is not clear what this reference refer to
(what sister group purportedly had the men). This report is also difficult to understand because
the report began by describing a FARC commanders statement that the men were alive.
Overall, it is difficult to make any conclusions from this report. There is no mention in any of
the entries in the chronology to the ELN. (JULIN004436-4439; JULIN009097-9100;
JULIN004416-4419; JULIN009101-9104).
Another chronology of investigative efforts, dated 1996, refers to numerous reports that
FARC kidnapped and was holding the men. Of the seventy-five report entries, most reference
the FARC in relation to the kidnappings of the American missionaries. There are two references
to the ELN. In the January 16 entry, there is a report that someone named:
Tomy says he just returned from seeing the three men. Rick & Dave are in a camp nearer
to Puerto Obalda than Acandi. Mark is now in the hands of ELN in Panama near the San
Blas area. The commander is named either Alberto or Miguel. Tomy didnt know who is
over Rick and Dave now. The man who was injured that he thought was Mark was
someone else. There was supposedly a letter from Mark which Tomy said he sent with an
anthropologist friend to give to Amalia.
(CCI000002133-2138). In the March 15 entry, Jaime Jaramillo says that according to both
ELN and EPL leaders in Itagui our men our dead. It is not clear what to make of these
accounts. However, in the absence of verifiable, credible, corroborating evidence it is difficult to
place much weight on these report entries. (CCI000002133-2138).
(2) THE FARC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING, CAPTIVITY, AND MURDER OF THE
TWO AMERICAN MISSIONARIES KIDNAPPED IN VILLAVICENCIO, COLOMBIA
After evaluating evidence related to the events surrounding the kidnapping, captivity, and
murder of Steve Welsh and Tim Van Dyke, and using tried and true investigation methods, it is
my opinion, based on the overwhelming evidence that the FARC kidnapped and held the
American missionaries living in Villavicencio. I also conclude, based upon strong circumstantial
evidence, that it was very probable that the FARC killed the American missionaries living in
Villavicencio. Although this opinion is based upon the totality of the evidence, the following
categories of evidence are particularly important to my conclusion:
a. Location of kidnapping relative to FARC Fronts.
The two American missionaries were kidnapped from the Finca, located in the vicinity of
Villavicencio, Colombia. Villavicencio is depicted on the following two maps.
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Map 7
(source: google maps)
Map 8
(Source: google maps)
As depicted in Map 9, Map 10, and Map 11 below, in 1990-1995, the mountainous area
surrounding Villavicencio was controlled by numerous FARC Fronts, including the 27th, 31st,
51st, 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Fronts.
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Map 9 Map 10
(Source: Sergeant Luna, Colombian Army Intelligence) (Source: Sergeant Luna, Colombian Army Intelligence)
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Map 11
As noted above, I obtained these maps from Colombian Army Intelligence. The FARC
Front information was generated using human sources, information obtained from RDF analysis,
and other intelligence. As described above, while these maps give a sense of where FARC Front
activity was taking place throughout the country, the Fronts were not fixed to a particular
location. The following image was generated at my direction depicting the FARC Front
locations in the vicinity of Villavicencio.
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Map 12
Maps 9-12 show that while there was some ELN presence in the vicinity of
Villavicencio, the FARC had a significantly more predominate and concentrated presence in that
area. There were no other guerilla groups, bandit groups, or common criminal groups operating
here. As noted above, the EPL and M-19 were not engaged in this type of operation in 1994,
when the two American missionaries were kidnapped. Further, the AUC was not yet is existence
and paramilitary groups were also not engaged in this type of kidnapping at the time. As noted
above, paramilitaries typically were providing protection from guerillas to cattle barons, wealthy
Colombian agricultural producers, and others.
In my opinion, the geographic location of these events makes it likely that the FARC
perpetrated the kidnapping of Tim Van Dyke and Steve Welsh.
FBI documentation and witness testimony indicates that the bodies were recovered from
an area known as Farallones de Medina (FBI0111393; JULIN012815), shown on the following
map:
Map 13
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Map 14, below, was generated at my request using the Colombian Army Intelligence
FARC maps to demonstrate the location where the bodies were recovered in relation to the
FARC Front locations.
Map 14
As was the case with the location of the kidnappings, these maps show that the two
American missionaries remains were recovered in a heavily concentrated FARC area. This
evidence informs my belief that it is very likely that the FARC killed the two American
missionaries.
Additionally, Figure 2 above shows numerous other FARC kidnappings perpetrated in

this region during this time period.
b. Physical evidence.
The kidnappers left behind several pieces of physical evidence, two propaganda
documents and a handwritten note. Using my experience and training, I evaluated this physical
evidence to determine whether there were any characteristics that helped to identify which group
was responsible for the kidnapping.
The propaganda documents set forth a platform for restructuring the Colombian
government as well as various conclusions from the Eight National Conference of the FARC-EP.
(JULIN003176; CCI000006439; CCI000006443; CCI000006448; CCI000006462;
CCI000006460; JULIN018948; JULIN018942; JULIN018937; FBI000156). Both of these
documents were marked by the FARCs 53rd Front:
(JULIN018942)
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(JULIN018948)
Similarly, the handwritten note was signed by Front 53 Jose Antonio Ansuategui.8
(JULIN003597).
(JULIN003598)
Also on the signature line was the acronym C.G.S.B. This stands for Coordinadora
Guerillera Simn Bolivar, which the name of an agreement reached in the 1980s between several
guerilla groups, including the FARC. The purpose of the agreement was to coordinate guerilla
activity related to the different groups. The fact that the kidnappers left behind a note and
propaganda materials signed by or referencing the FARCs 53rd Front is strong evidence
indicating that the kidnappers were in fact members of the FARC. The note is similar to other
notes I have seen in cases involving subjects kidnapped by the FARC in that it is handwritten,
and contains instructions for initiating post-kidnapping radio communications. In my experience
investigating Colombian kidnapping cases, I have never seen or heard of a case involving FARC
propaganda materials or a FARC-signed note being distributed by a group claiming to be the
8
Jose Antonio Ansuategui is another name for the 53rd Front. Several FARC Fronts are identified by number and by
an individual of political significance to the organization.
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FARC in a copycat operation. Based on my experience, this physical evidence provides strong
support indicating that the FARC perpetrated the kidnapping of the two American missionaries.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the materials distributed by the kidnappers
are also consistent with FARC ideology. The handwritten note stated that the fundamental
objective is money and to make some clarifications of our struggle and the American [gringo]
involvement [uninvited] in our own country first, robbing us of our riches and now militarily.
(JULIN003597; JULIN003176; JULIN003597; JULIN018945 ). Through my experience and
training, I have learned that the FARC indoctrinates its members on the bad things that the
United States allegedly does to Colombia, emphasizing that America does not produce anything
and is bleeding Colombia dry. The FARC vigorously protested U.S. presence in Colombia,
especially its assistance to the Colombian military. That one of the fundamental objectives of
the kidnapping was to address the uninvited American involvement in Colombia is consistent
with FARCs ideology and political objectives. The note also directed the missionaries to
purchase a certain type of radio a Yaesu 757, and to report each day at noon using a specific
frequency. (JULIN003597). Codes were identified for changing frequencies and for identifying
one another. (JULIN003597). Based on my experience and training, I know that the type of
radio referenced in the note is common and readily available in Colombia and that the FARC
regularly relayed instructions requiring purchase of this type of radio and requiring use of codes
for different frequencies and for identification to make it more challenging for other parties to
listen in on the communications.
Other physical evidence includes the remains of the two American missionaries as well
as the metal fragments removed from the two bodies and analyzed by the FBI. To identify the
remains of the two men, Mr. Germann flew to Villavicencio and then traveled by car to Apiay.
Apiay is located just outside of Villavicencio:
Map 15
From Apiay, a Colombian Army helicopter departed to the site where the bodies were found, and
returned approximately 40 minutes later. (FBI001396). The FBI report summarizing the effort
to recover and identify the bodies, dated June 23, 1995, indicates that GERMANN was
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displayed the two bodies and immediately identified them both as those of Timothy Van Dyke
and Steven [sic] Welsh. (FBI001396). Steve Welshs autopsy report noted the following
findings: [b]ased on a limited examination, multiple gunshot wounds of the face, head, right
chest, right portion of the abdomen, right upper extremity, and the right lower extremity.
(JULIN021276 at 21307). Tim Van Dykes autopsy report found evidence of a gunshot wounds
to the head, neck, upper right thigh, left lower back, and left hand and wrist. (JULIN021312 at
21346).
The FBI Laboratory Division examined the metal fragments removed from the bodies of
the two American missionaries. (FB001394-1395). The analysis showed that several metal
fragments recovered from the bodies were not consistent with any military grenade known to
the Laboratory. (FBI001263). None of the metal fragments exhibited any type of explosive
damage that would normally be found in the case of an exploded grenade. (FBI001263). Other
specimens indicated that bullets were fired from barrel rifles. (FBI001264). The analysis
revealed that certain specimens were fired from the barrel of a .30 caliber rifle.
(JULIN001265). Other specimens were .30 Winchester cartridges manufactured in Colombia by
the Industria Military (FBI001205), in Israel by the Israeli military, in the United States by Lake
City Arsenal, or in South Africa. (FBI001205-06). Stephen Welsh had been shot five times.
(FBI001238). Three of the shots left powder residue and were fired at less than two meters while
two of the shots were fired from more than two meters. (FBI001238). Timothy Van Dyke had
been shot nine times. (FBI001238). One shot was fired at less than ten centimeters, six shots
were fired at less than two meters, and two shots were fired at more than two meters.
(FBI001238).
A review of the reports generated related to this physical evidence supports my opinion
that it was highly probable that the FARC killed the two American missionaries. The fact that
three shots were fired at Stephen Welsh at less than two meters, one shot was fired at Tim Van
Dyke at less than ten centimeters and another six at less than two meters demonstrates that the
men were executed at close range. The types of ammunition identified are generally consistent
with what the FARC would have had available to it. One of the types of ammunition, the .30
Winchester cartridge manufactured in Colombia, could be consistent with what the Colombian
military would have used. However, the FARC may also have had this type of ammunition.
This at most suggests that there could have been some cross fire in the events surrounding the
deaths of the missionaries. However, the shots fired at close range provide strong evidence that
the men were in fact executed by their guerilla captors.
c. Evidence of circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and initial communications

and negotiations.
Eye witness accounts by the wives of the three American missionaries (through
deposition testimony, documents, and interviews) provide details of the actual kidnapping.
These details include the following:
The Finca was infiltrated by approximately twelve to fifteen men (another group of
similar size formed a road block at the Fincas entrance);
The two American missionaries were kidnapped in the morning of January 16,
1994;
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The men were all wearing similar attire;

The men went house-to-house to ransack items (such as electronics, a radio,
weapons, and vehicles) and to force the missionaries and children to gather in the
racquetball court;
The armed men forced the missionaries and children to line up and then proceeded
to give an ideological speech;
Sandy Welsh was instructed to pack a bag for her husband (including details of
what to pack);
The men were heavily armed with machine guns;
The guerillas took the American missionaries into the mountains west of
Villavicencio;
The guerillas initiate communications and negotiations in earnest approximately
two weeks after the kidnapping; and
The guerillas carried out negotiations via high frequency radio.
These facts indicate to me that the kidnappings were perpetrated by a highly organized
guerilla group. The sequence of events indicates that the kidnappers were highly organized, well
trained, followed a command structure, and had considerable resources. The kidnappers were
able to target one of the American missionaries immediately, and then were able to secure the
area by corralling a large number of people into a central location so that they could ransack the
homes in a relatively short timeframe. This type of operation required advance planning, trained
men, and coordination, especially given the size of the Finca.
The fact that the guerillas took the missionaries into the mountains on the western side of
Villavicencio indicates that the kidnappers originated in that direction and were returning to an
established camp. The fact that the kidnappers did not initiate negotiations for approximately
two weeks after the kidnapping indicates that the kidnappers were well funded (had the means to
carry out an extended kidnapping), planned for an extended kidnapping, and had the
organizational capacity to support such an endeavor. The fact that negotiations were not initiated
for approximately two weeks after the kidnapping may also indicate that the victims had to travel
some distance to a remote location where the kidnappers felt secure. These actions are consistent
with a highly organized, large, well-funded guerilla group such as the FARC, which had a large
presence in the region surrounding Villavicencio.
It would be unlikely for local bandits or a group of common criminals to carry out this
type of kidnapping of multiple American targets at the same time and in this manner. Most well-
known, large guerilla groups were either not known to have a strong presence in this area, had
previously disbanded, or were not yet in existence.
These facts support my conclusion that it was very probable that the FARC perpetrated
the kidnapping of the two American missionaries and it is unlikely that another group is
responsible.
d. Governmental triangulation of the radio frequencies during negotiations.
As noted above, it is standard practice in kidnapping cases for governmental agencies to

triangulate on the frequencies being used for communication in the negotiation process in order
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to identify the location of the kidnappers and to identify who perpetrated the kidnapping. This is
done using RDF (measurement of signal strength from different locations) and comparison of
RDF findings with intelligence to determine which group controls that geographic area.
In the case of the two American missionaries kidnapped from the Finca, triangulation was
evaluated, and revealed that the kidnappers were communicating from FARC-controlled territory
in Colombia. Numerous documents describe this triangulation by the U.S. and Colombian
governments.9 For example, in March 15, 1994 meeting with the FBI, coordinates of the RDF
fixes from Fridays contact (Mar. 11): 73 degrees W and 4 degrees 15 min. N. were given.
(JULIN009687). The FBI communicated on March 19, 1994 that RDF information from the last
contact indicated movement back toward the site of the kidnapping. (JULIN009695). On
April 14, 1994, the FBI shared information regarding RDF on todays contacts 40 mi N.E. of
the town (understood by LR to be V/cio). This is a different location than any previous
RDFs. (JULIN009754). The following map depicts these locations:
Map 16
Again, as previously noted, victims are often held within a short distance from where
radio communications are transmitted by the captors.
9
For example: JULIN008845 (U.S. Embassy meeting report dated June 14, 1995 indicating that [c]urrently the
U.S. is gathering intelligence and using RDF to locate the radio site being used for the Bello (another Col. hostage
being held with Tim & Steve) negotiations.); JULIN009687 (log dated March 15, 1994 describing receipt of
coordinates from RDF fixes from the FBI (73 degrees west and 4 degrees 15 minutes N)); JULIN009695 (log dated
March 19, 1994, summarizing conversation with FBI regarding RDF information indicating movement back
toward the site of the kidnapping); JULIN009705 (log dated March 25, 1994 summarizing meeting with U.S.
Ambassador regarding intelligence recently gathered is that the RDFs are still east of the mountains in the Illanos
(plains). They have been told by the military that that is one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia. It is
controlled by Gs and the army does not even send patrols into that area. He also said that means they can not [sic]
send human intelligence into that area.); JULIN009754 (log dated April 14, 1994 summarizing call from FBI agent
re RDF on todays contact: 40 mi. N.E. of the town (understood by LR to be V/cio). This is a different location
than any previous RDFs.); JULIN012832 (summary of meeting with Major Florez, dated June 14, 1995, indicating
that [t]hey have been able to RDF the transmissions.).
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Having an RDF/triangulation data shows that the kidnappers were located in FARC-
controlled regions of Colombia during the negotiations, which strongly indicates that the FARC
kidnapped and was in possession of the two Americans missionaries.
e. Testimony from witnesses.
As previously explained, I have extensive experience conducting interviews of guerilla

and former guerilla group members as well as other individuals with personal knowledge of
events related to kidnappings. Witness accounts, especially statements made by defectors, need
to be checked for consistency against other sources of evidence. In this case, there are several
noteworthy accounts from individuals claiming to have personal knowledge about the two
American missionaries.
In August of 1995, a meeting was conducted with Geronimo Pimentel by Colombian

army officials. Mr. Pimentel was kidnapped and held by the FARC. He was later released after
his family paid a ransom. Upon his release, Mr. Pimentel stated that he had been held with the
two American missionaries, that the two missionaries had given him a note, and that the FARC
was holding them. The report of this meeting states the following:
Mr. Pimentel was kidnapped from his farm in southeastern Cundinamarca.

[N]egotiations were handled over a frequency given to the family by the guerillas. The
captors told the family to get a radio and they set the schedule and frequency.
Mr. Pimentel was with Tim and Steve during the last 30 days of his captivity.
Mr. Pimentel was kept near the Farallones de Medina mountains, in a building with
three small rooms measuring 2 m. by 2 m. . He and the other Colombian captives had
their own rooms, but Tim and Steve were kept together.
After his family paid the ransom to the FARC and he was released, Mr. Pimentel was
shown 8 photos of American hostages (photos of each of the 6 missionaries plus two
extra photos of Tim and Steve). He picked out 1 photo each of Tim and Steve.
Mr. Pimentel told Tim and Steve that he was going to be released. Tim asked if he
could get in touch with his family. Tim and Steve gave a small slip of paper with the
phone number of Steves dad to Sr. Bello who in turn gave it to [Mr. Pimentel] . The
note from Steve reads as follows:
308 534-8658
George Welsh
NEBRASKA
Mr. Pimentel hid the letter and the phone number in the inside waistband of the pants he
was wearing when taken hostage.
Mr. Pimentel last saw Tim and Steve on Thursday, 18 May 95/ 1600 hrs, as he was
being escorted from the camp.
(JULIN012815).
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An August 10, 1995 report from the Legat in Bogota to the Director of the FBI in Miami
summarized numerous interviews related to the kidnapping and deaths of the two American
missionaries. The report states the following:
8/8/95 [redacted] returned to Bogota and met with Legat Dwight Dennett and Alat
William Ramos. [Redacted] that while at Villavicencio she was able to conduct a total of
50 interviews regarding instant matter. [Redacted] that through the interviews she was
able to positively identify a total of 8 FARC Front members directly involved in the
kidnapping of Van Dyke and Welsh.

[Redacted] that the interviews are consistent with the previous accounts of the encounter
with the guerillas provided by the first three soldiers interviewed. [Redacted] that
[redacted] on 6/19/95, was re-interviewed. [Redacted] interviewed, related the following
version of events: on 6/19/95, as the patrol was conducting anti-guerilla operations in the
Farallones de Medina area, and marching up a very steep hill, the patrols point man
detected a guerilla patrol coming down the same path. COLAR point main, after hearing
the guerilla alert his men, himself alerted the other COLAR soldiers and took shot at the
fleeing guerilla. The point man feels very confident that he hit the guerilla, but the man
did not go down surmising that the shot could have hit him in the Ruck Sack carried on
the guerillas back. A firefight ensued and the COLAR patrol advised that at that initial
encounter they only fired approximately 20 rounds. This was so because only three
members of the COLAR patrol, that were in front of the patrol and thus, were able to see
in what direction the guerillas were fleeing. [Redacted] stated that approximately 15
minutes after initial encounter, as the patrol made their way uphill, they heard two volleys
of gunfire out in the distance. [Redacted] the guerillas had ran into another COLAR
patrol. Approximately another 15 minutes later, [redacted] was able to observe a person
laying in the grass a few meters ahead. [Redacted] it was the guerilla, laying in ambush.
[Redacted] after observing the person for a few minutes, they noticed that the person had
not moved that that his toes (boots) were pointing upwards, obviously laying on his back.
This caused the patrol to carefully move forward and in doing so, located a second body
laying close to the first one . This lead [redacted] to think that the two bodies could in
fact be Americans.
(FBI01233).
On August 18, 1994, several individuals form NTM and a Colonel from the Colombian
military met with and interviewed Judith, a woman formerly with the FARCs 54th Front. A
summary of that meeting indicates the following:
Judith was responsible, along with another person, to care for and watch over Tim &
Steve for three (or four) months, through May of 1994.
Judith recently deserted the FARC, and turned herself in to [sic] the authorities.
Tim and Steve suffer times of depression.
The camp is moved about every one or two weeks.
[T]o do a kidnapping, the local Front does a study on a particular target, to
investigate potential assets. The results of the study are then passed to the
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Secretariate [sic], from whom the order will be given to carry out a kidnapping. The
release of a hostage must also be approved by the Secretariate [sic].
Judith asked the commander what he would do with Tim & Steve if no money was
offered, and he said, wed have to look for a political-type solution.
Tim and Steve spend a lot of time reading their bibles and other books that they are
given.
Judith said that Tim has a harder time with Spanish.
(JULIN008025).
In May of 1994, Ron Van Peursem traveled into FARC territory to meet with the
missionaries captors. (JULIN007767; Van Peursem Dep. Tr. 144:14-150:7). The guerillas
identified themselves, stating we are commanders of the FARC EP. (JULIN013094 at 5).
During the course of the meeting, the FARC accused Mr. Van Peursem of being international
intelligence and international communication, that [he] was involved in CIA type involvement
and military type involvement. (JULIN013094 at 7-8). But the impression from this meeting
was that the FARC wanted to investigate NTM further to determine whether they would be able
to extract money in the negotiations. (JULIN013094 at 6, 8). After testing Mr. Van Peursem,
and figuring out whether his primary goal was to place blame on the FARC, the guerillas assured
him that he was in the right place, and eventually admitted that they held the men. (Van Peursem
Dep. Tr. 148:2-149:6; JULIN013094 at 9, 13). Before he departed, the FARC provided Mr. Van
Peursem with new frequencies, code names, and contact times to reinitiate the negotiations.
(Interview with Ron Van Peursem, 8/12/2016).
Having an account by an individual who was held hostage with the two American
missionaries, supported by physical evidence in the form of a note containing one of the mens
fathers phone number, is very strong evidence that informs my opinion that the men were
kidnapped and held by the FARC. The account by Judith and the circumstances surrounding Mr.
Van Peursems visit into FARC territory to discuss the status of the two missionaries lends
further support to the conclusion that the FARC held the men. A government report detailing
the events surrounding the murder of the two American missionaries, prepared after conducting a
substantial number of interviews is highly credible evidence that informs my opinion that the
FARC is responsible for the death of the missionaries.
f. The Colombian and U.S. governments concluded that the FARC was responsible.
In a report dated July 12, 1995, the CIA noted that:
Hostages Timothy Van Dyke and Steve Welsh were executed by the FARC around 18-19
June because they had witnessed contacts and cooperation between FARC leaders and
politicians in the Department of Meta during their captivity. Several months ago, the
leaders of the FARCs 51st and 53rd Fronts decided that the Americans knew too much
and must be killed. Since then, the leaders of the two fronts were looking for a pretext to
murder the two U.S. citizens. Finally, they decided they would blame the execution on
the presence of Colombian troops in the area where the kidnap victims were being held.

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An alternative explanation for the victims murder is that FARC members, anticipating or
already in a battle with army troops, simply did not want the army to get their captives
alive.
(CIA00001).
A July 1995 CIA Terrorism Review provided the following:
The Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) killed two American
missionaries, Steve Welsh and Timothy Van Dyke, after a firefight with the Colombian
military on 19 June. Both men were kidnapped by FARC guerillas in January 1994. The
guerillas apparently assassinated the two hostages in an attempt to facilitate their escape
from a military patrol. [Redacted]. The Minister of Defense said that the patrol engaged
the terrorists during normal antiguerilla operations. [Redacted].
(CIA00029).
In a report dated June 26, 1995, the FBI stated that:
Approximately 17 months ago, captioned victims (Missionaries from the New Tribes
Mission) [Timothy Van Dyke and Stephen Welsh] were taken as hostages by captioned
Front [the FARC 53rd Front]. On 6/19/1995, members of the Colombian Armed Forces
(COLAR) 4th Division, 7th Brigade, Anti-Guerilla Units stumbled, during normal patrol
duties, into a FARC Guerilla encampment located in the FARALLONES DE MEDINA
mountain range (approximately 20 nautical miles east from the city of Bogota,
Colombia). According to COLAR reports, after the initial firefight, the guerillas
(unknown front at this time) were able to disengage and retreat from the combat area.
The COLAR Unit pursued the guerillas for approximately one-half hour when they came
upon the bodies of the two individuals (later identified as the hostages). The bodies were
subsequently transported to the town of VILLAVICENCIO where autopsies were
performed on 6/21/95. The bodies were subsequently transported to the City of Bogota
prior to transport to Miami, Florida where a second autopsy was conducted on both
victims.
(FBI001393-1394).
The April 1998 State Department report summarizing cases of American citizens
kidnapped in Colombia concluded that the FARC kidnapped, held, and killed the American
missionaries. (JULIN018623). The U.S. government does not attribute kidnappers to a
particular group without credible evidence and, in fact, several of the kidnappings described in
the report were not attributed to a specific group because insufficient evidence was available. A
second report prepared by the State Department summarizing additional cases contains the same
conclusion. (JULIN018698-710).
A meeting report, dated August 18, 1994, indicated that Colonel Aponte of the
Colombian Army had concluded that the 54th Front was holding the men. (JULIN008025).
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g. The totality of documentary and other evidence supports the conclusion that the
FARC was responsible.
I have considered each of the above-described sources of evidence, compared them to

sources deemed most credible, and made an evaluation of the evidence based on my experience
and training regarding the consistency of the evidence. The evidence provides strong support for
my conclusion that it was the FARC who kidnapped, held, and killed the two American
missionaries.
(3) THE FARC COMMITTED VIOLENT ACTS SUCH AS KIDNAPPINGS AGAINST AMERICANS
AND WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED
Based on my experience and training as an FBI agent, including the countless interviews
I conducted with former FARC members, I am able to state that the FARC commits egregious
violent acts against Americans, and is politically motivated in doing so. For example, when the
FARC recruits new members, it gives ideological propaganda speeches. Every day, each Front
had a designated time for ideological training. During this training, FARC combatants are taught
that the United States does not produce anything, steals from Colombia, and bleeds Colombia
dry. FARC combatants are taught to resent the presence of the U.S. in the country, particularly
its support of the Colombian military. The FARC also preached against the Colombian upper
class in the ideological training and distributed readings from Marx and Lenin.
The FARC has been engaged in violent acts since its inception in 1964, and certainly by
the late 1980s. Prior to the kidnappings of the five American missionaries and Mr. Pescatore, the
FARCs actions included include kidnappings, murders, attacking refinery pipelines, burning
trucks on the roads, and destroying bridges, railroad tracks, and other infrastructure.
Historically, the FARC has killed individuals for collaborating with the Colombian military or
police.
These acts of violence are described in countless documents, including State Department
reports summarizing kidnappings against American citizens. (JULIN018623; JULIN018698-
710). While the State Department declined to attribute each kidnapping incident to a specific
individual or group, it identified a large number of kidnapping cases that had been perpetrated by
the FARC.
A Human Rights Watch dated November 1, 2007, found little evidence that the FARC
makes an attempt to conform its methods to international standards, which its members
flagrantly violate in the field. The report notes that:
When the FARC perceives a political advantage, it emphasizes its respect for
humanitarian law, as in the case of sixty soldiers captured after an armed forces-FARC
clash at the Las Delicias base in the department of Putumayo in 1996 and released ten
months later.

However, in dozens of other, less publicized cases, when no political advantage is
apparent, the FARC makes little if any attempt to abide by international humanitarian
law.
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(JULIN021171). The report states that a member of the FARCs General Secretariat told a
Colombian journalist in 1997 that some FARC units continued to kidnap for political and
economic reasons. The report also highlights numerous examples of the FARCs violent acts,
including:
[A]t least twelve massacres in 1997;

204 murders of Esperanza members and amnestied EPL guerillas from 1991 to 1995;
Continued kidnappings, i.e., 408 kidnappings [in 1997] alone;
Failure to enforce the ban on hostage-taking;
[K]illings and kidnappings used against civilians to spread terror;
Murder and torture of numerous individuals;
Numerous kidnappings;
Attacks on medical workers, installations, and ambulances; and
Other acts that violate the laws of war.
(JULIN021171).
The FARC specifically targets U.S. interests within Colombia and indoctrinates new
recruits to accept the premise that the United States has raped the country and is bleeding it dry.
It purposefully conducts due diligence to discover United States companies operating in
Colombia to target for extortion payments. Funds collected from such targets enter the FARCs
coffers and are used to finance the revolutionary war. Similarly, the FARC obtains intelligence
regarding prospective American kidnap victims and takes hostages in order to negotiate money
payments or to use as political leverage.
(4) PAYMENTS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS WOULD HAVE BEEN A SUPPORTING SOURCE OF

FUNDING FOR THE FARC
a. The FARCs organizational structure.
Based on my experience and training as an FBI agent, including the countless interviews I
conducted with former FARC members and other investigative work I performed, I am generally
aware of how the FARC funds its guerilla warfare in Colombia. Although the FARC has
evolved over the course of its more than 50 years of operation, during the relevant time period
the FARC maintained a relatively sophisticated top-down structure. Each FARC Front was led
by a Front-Commander. Each Front was usually broken down into two Columns. Each Column
contained two Companies, which were broken down further into two Guerillas. Each Guerilla
generally had two Squads, and each Squad typically had twelve combatants. The general Front
organizational structure is depicted in the following figure:
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Front (led by Front

Commander)
Column Column
Company Company Company Company
Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla Guerilla
squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12
combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants)
squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12 squad (12
combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants) combatants)
Figure 3
The organization was led by the Central High Command and the Supreme Commander.
Beneath the Supreme Commander was the Secretariat, which is composed of the strongest FARC
Front commanders. Within the Secretariat, some Front Commanders were more powerful than
others. Membership in the Secretariat fluctuated if a Commander died or a weaker Front merged
with a stronger Front. Though not bound the same degree of military formality as a conventional
army, the FARCs Fronts were roughly equivalent to a battalion or military outfit. Fronts were
grouped into Blocs that correspond with geographic regions, though their precise locations
varied over time depending on the ebb and flow of Colombian army efforts against them. In
general, there were approximately five Fronts per Bloc. In addition to the Supreme Commander
and the Secretariat, the Central High Command was also comprised of the Estado Mayor, which
was an administrative, logistics, and planning body (similar to the Pentagon). In contrast, the
Secretariat was a political body.
b. The FARCs use of funds.
While Fronts generate revenues in different ways, during the relevant time period the
FARC financed its war primarily through extortion of companies, kidnapping ransoms, war tax
on peasants as well as wealthy landowners, drug protection money paid by owners of narcotics
farms to the FARC in exchange for protection from the Colombian military, and in some cases,
through more direct involvement in the drug trade. The Secretariat, through the Estado Mayor,
designated how money and resources were spent within the organization and how much each
60
80
Front received. The Central High Command also ordered money to be transferred across Fronts
(as well as munitions, food, and other resources). These types of decisions were made based on
an annual budget. Lucrative Fronts carried other Fronts in less lucrative regions. Front
Commanders were expected to produce income in order to finance the FARCs objectives.
It is impossible to precisely calculate the sums of money that the FARC obtained through
ransom and extortion payments in the relevant time period. Suffice it to say that these sources of
funding aided the FARC in its efforts to combat the Colombian military and security forces, to
survive for more than 50 years while controlling a vast portion of the Colombian countryside,
and to force the government of Colombia to negotiate with it. The revenue streams from
extortion and kidnapping payments aided the FARC in recruiting, training, and maintaining a
robust organization comprised of thousands of personnel so that it could continue pursuing its
terrorist objectives in Colombia.
It is also not possible to obtain a true accounting of how money is generated or spent
across different Fronts. However, through accounts of numerous FARC defectors that I have
deemed credible, I learned some information regarding the FARCs operational costs during the
relevant time period. For instance, weapons utilized by the FARC were purchased on the black
market and were not standard-issue across Fronts. A weapon with a market value of $400-$600
may have cost a minimum of $1,200 on the black market. It cost approximately $12,000 to outfit
a FARC guerilla. This included the cost of the rucksack, uniform, clothing, towel, tarp, hat,
boots, and weapon. Each item purchased on the black market was purchased at an above-market
value rate.
Camps are built using primarily materials in the jungle, with the exception of barbed wire
and other items that needed to be purchased. The camps are typically designed to be temporary
because Fronts were constantly moving. Accordingly, camps were very basic. Food provided to
guerilla combatants and to hostages was also typically basic, including rice and beans. Guerilla
combatants had red packets used to flavor their water. The FARC for the most part did not use
permanent buildings, infrastructure, equipment, or vehicles. Generators were only rarely used.
Guerilla combatants generally lived off the land, and pillaged for other supplies. For all of these
reasons, even a small amount of money would go a long way toward sustaining operations within
this organization.
c. Chiquitas payments to the FARC.
Chiquita and its former Colombian management have admitted that beginning in 1987
Chiquita made payments to Colombian guerillas in the amount of $100,000 to $200,000 per year.
See Chiquita 30(b)(6) Dep. Tr. (Ordman) 164:17; Keiser Dep. Tr. 172: 1-15 (Discussing
payments of $100-$200,000 per year and peaking during years of greatest FARC activity).
Chiquita also admitted to making payments to the FARC for approximately one decade.
Chiquitas Amended and Supplemental Response to the ATA Plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 3
(Attachment C).10
10
It is worth noting that the breakdown of payments to FARC set forth in Chiquitas interrogatory responses are
likely significantly underestimated. For instance, when adjusting for the exchange rate during the time period in
question, many of these payments amount to less than $500. It would be unheard of for FARC to accept such a
small payment, which would be seen as insulting and undoubtedly would be unacceptable to the FARC.
61
80
In the time period in which Chiquita states that it was making payments to the FARC
(1989 through May of 1999), the exchange rate ranged from approximately $693.32 to $1,611.48
Colombian pesos per U.S. dollar. Colombian Pesos Market Exchange Rate, http://www.banrep.
gov.co/en/node/29467 (recording exchange rate information from 1991 until the present day).
As shown in Attachment C, Chiquita made numerous, ongoing payments to the FARC for a
decade, generally in the amount of thousands of U.S. dollars each time. The period of time when
Chiquita was making these payments overlapped with the period of time when the five American
missionaries and Frank Pescatore11 were kidnapped, held captive, and killed by the FARC.
It is not possible to trace these sums in a manner that links Chiquitas payments to the
FARC to a specific act of violence, however, the sums described were, from a law enforcement
point of view, operationally significant to the FARC. These payments were a steady stream of
income that the FARC benefited from for over a decade. The FARCs Central Command would
have dictated how those funds should be transferred and spent within the organization, including
what objectives should be pursued. As noted above, it only cost the FARC $12,000 to outfit a
new recruit and combatant living expenses and other operational expenses were typically
minimal. The money paid by Chiquita to the FARC would have allowed the FARC to obtain
intelligence as well as to recruit, train, and feed guerillas. The FARC would also have used this
funding to build bunkers, camps, and to establish command centers. Funds also would have
allowed the FARC to coordinate with the Colombian Communist Party so it could get
Communist politicians on its side and push its political agenda. Simply put, the money would
have entered FARCs pool of resources and would then have been transferred across the
organization at the direction of the Supreme Commander and the Secretariat to accomplish
terrorist objectives.
11
Mr. Pescatore was kidnapped in 1996.
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MANUEL ORTEGA
Weston, Florida, 33327
Cell: (954)673-2301
BACKGROUND
CEO of International Security Consultants and Providers LLC. Provided investigative services, to private
clients. Assessed private corporations on security matters, and devised upgrades to their security systems
protocol, to counter common criminal elements and terrorist activities. Taught and advised private clients,
in how to detect and avoid being kidnapped. Taught escape and evasion tactics to corporate clients, and
set up corporate and private kidnapping protocol .Helped locate hidden foreign assets.
Law Enforcement Professional, with Engility Corporation. Contracted to the United States Marine Corps,
to provide supervision of other Law Enforcement Professionals, in the training of Law Enforcement
issues, the operation and handling of human sources, and the collection of intelligence.
CEO of International Security Consultants and Providers LLC. Provided investigative services to private
clients. Helped negotiate the successful release of a kidnapped victim for the victims family.
Extensive investigative and overseas experience with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), at
Miami, Florida. From 1987 to 1990 conducted bank robbery/fugitive investigations. From 1990 to 1997,
investigated domestic and international drug trafficking organizations (OCDETF and HIDTA). From
1997 to 2001, developed a drug intelligence data base targeting the Caribbean and Latin America. From
2001 to 2004, was assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). From 2004 to 2012 assigned to
investigate overseas terrorist acts against American citizens and American interests. In 2008, trained the
Afghan police and the army in Biometrics, in Afghanistan. In 2009, participated in the Haitian Threat
Assessment study, for the State Department. In 2010, participated and mentored the fourteenth session of
the Latin American Law Enforcement Executive Development Seminar. In 2011, participated, taught and
mentored the seventy ninth session of the International Law Enforcement Academy at Budapest,
Hungary. Native Spanish speaker.
EMPLOYMENT
International Security Consultants and Providers LLC 8/2013 - Present

Weston, Florida
CEO
Conducted investigations, to locate hidden assets for private clients in family inheritance disputes, in
two different foreign countries. Taught and trained private/corporate clients, tactics in the detection and
avoidance of criminal/terrorist kidnapping attempts. Taught escape and evasion tactics, and set up
corporate and private kidnapping protocols. Assessed private corporations on security matters, and
devised upgrades to their security systems, to counter common criminal elements and terrorist activities.
Engility Corp. 1/2013 8/15/2013

1320 Braddock Place.
Alexandria, Va. 22314
Law Enforcement Professional. Mentor, advised and trained the United States Marine Corps. (USMC),
in law enforcement tactical site exploitation, evidence borne operations, and all other law enforcement
procedures in the United States and in Afghanistan. Advised in the development, handling of human
80
sources, and the collection/exploitation of intelligence obtained. Supervised fifteen other Law
Enforcement Professionals located in forward operating bases in Helmand province in Afghanistan, to
ensure compliance with company training standards. Studied Forward Operating Bases (FOB) security
protocol, and helped institute new upgraded security measures.
International Security Consultants and Providers LLC 7/2012 - 1/2013

Weston, Florida
CEO
Conducted investigations to locate individuals for private clients. Provided assistance in the
negotiations for a successful release of a kidnapped individual in Venezuela. Help negotiate, between a
Federal AUSA and an indicted individual, his arrest.
Special Agent 10/1986 7/2012

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Extraterritorial Squad, Miami, Florida 2004 - 2012

Coordinated international terrorism and kidnap investigations in the Caribbean and Latin America
Negotiated the safe release of American kidnap victims
Liaised with U.S. Embassy personnel, police and intelligence agencies, as well as foreign police and
intelligence services
Made presentations to U.S. and foreign dignitaries. Coordinated and conducted training presentations.
Conducted domestic and international seminars
Coordinated domestic terrorism investigations. Directed an investigative team of eight people. Liaised
with federal and state law enforcement agencies
Conducted training seminars for federal and state police services on hostage negotiations and domestic
terrorism matters
Traveled extensively throughout the Caribbean and Latin America on high-profile international
investigations, and provided training to foreign law enforcement agencies
Liaised with United States Attorney's offices, in Washington D.C., Southern District of New York and
coordinated the investigation, prosecution and trials of several major high profile Colombian terrorist
kidnappers
Coordinated the investigation and successful prosecution of several high profile material support terrorist
cases
Extensively used my Spanish abilities
2008 liaised with the United States Department of Defense in Afghanistan, in the training and deployment
of Biometrics systems for the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense
2009 participated in the US State Departments Haitian Threat Assessment, to determine where the
United States Government was to spend funds to augment and improve Haitian security
2010 participated in the fourteenth Latin American Law Enforcement Executive Development Seminar,
in which Latin American police executives were taught modern police enforcement tactics
80
2011 participated in the seventy ninth International Law Enforcement Academy session, in which mid-
management police officers, from the Balkans received modern police management training
Joint Terrorism Task Force Squad, Miami, Florida 2001 - 2004
Coordinated domestic terrorism investigations

Directed an investigative team of six people
Liaised with federal and state law enforcement agencies
Conducted training seminars for federal and state police services on domestic terrorism matters
Racketeering Enterprise Investigation, Miami Florida 1997-2001
Coordinated the collection of drug intelligence in the Caribbean and Latin America
Developed high profile Colombian sources and initiated major drug investigations
Liaised with drug squads and the United States Attorney's office, and coordinated the trials of several
major Colombian drug traffickers
Drug Squad, Miami Florida 1990-1997
Conducted investigation of major Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO), OCDETF and HIDTA
investigations
Worked on fugitive and due diligence investigations
Liaised with foreign intelligence services and coordinated routes being used by drug traffickers
In charge of an investigation of thirteen individuals who were convicted of drug trafficking charges
Bank Robbery/Fugitive Squad, Miami, Florida 1987-1990
Conducted investigation of Bank robberies, Liaised with state and local police services the coordination
of bank robbery investigations in Miami, Miami-Dade County and Hialeah, Florida
Conducted fugitive investigations
Liaised with federal, state and local police services the coordination of fugitive investigations in Miami,
Miami-Dade County and Hialeah, Florida
Coordinated the investigation and successful prosecution of several high profile bank robbery cases
Prudential Bache, New York 1984-1986
Managed investment portfolios, possessed series seven investment license
AWARDS AND RECOGNITIONS
Certificate of Commendation 2013

U.S. MARINE CORPS
Regimental Combat Team 7
II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)
80
Helmand, Afghanistan
Attorney Generals Award for 2012

Excellence in Law Enforcement
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Certificate of Appreciation 2008

United States Department of Justice
United States Attorney
District of Columbia
Certificate for Professional Assistance 2003

H.M. Customs and Excise
National Investigation Service
Coast Guard Meritorious Team Commendation 1998

The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard
Washington, D.C.
Outstanding Law Enforcement Officer (OLEO) 1995

Office of the United States Attorney
Southern District of Florida
Outstanding Law Enforcement Officer (OLEO) 1992

Office of the United States Attorney
Southern District of Florida
EDUCATION
Associate in Applied Science (AAS): Major in Biological Technology 1973-1975

State University of New York Agricultural and Technical College at Farmingdale, N.Y.
Bachelor of Science (BS): Arts and Science 1975- 1978

South Dakota State University, Brookings S.D.
Veterinary Medicine 1979-1983

Cordoba, Spain
FBI Academy 1986-1987

Quantico, Va.
SKILLS
80
Bilingual native Spanish fluency
Police Instructor
80
In addition to the documents referred to and cited in the body of my report, I considered
the following documents and sources of information in forming my opinions:
Documents:
o CCI000000001-CCI000011985
o CIA00001-CIA00030
o FBI000001-FBI001731
o JULIN000001-JULIN029557
o FARC and ELN front-activity maps prepared by Colombian Army Intelligence
documenting the years from 1986 through 1995 in the case of the FARC maps
and 1978 through 1995 in the case of the ELN maps.
Books:
o Alvaro Leyva, La Guerra Vende Mas

o German Castro Caycedo, Con Las Manos En Alto
o Leon Valencia, Mis Anos De Guerra
o Andre Lopez Lopez, El Cartel De Los Sapos
o Juan Carlos Giraldo, Rasguno
o Jorge Enrique Botero, Simon Trinidad El Hombre De Hierro
o Institutode Estudios Politicos Y Relaciones Internacionales, El Plan Colombia
o Dario Arizmendi, 7 Anos Secuestrado Por Las FARC
o Alvaro Valencia Tovar, Mis Adversarios Guerrilleros
o Mauricip Aranguren Molina, Mi Confesion
o Fernando Rodriguez Mandragon, El Hijo Del Ajedrecista
o Alberto Giraldo, Mi Verdad
o Virginia Vallejo, Amando A Pablo, Odiando A Escobar
o Gustabo Bolivar Moreno, Sin Tetas No Hay Paraiso
o Alfredo Serrano Zabala, Las Prepago?
o Juan Carlos Torres, Operacion Jacque
o Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Tom Howes, Out of Captivity Surviving
1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle
80
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA/JOHNSON
IN RE: CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL,

INC. ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
SHAREHOLDERS DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
/
This Document Applies To:
ATA ACTIONS
08-20641-CIV-MARRA
09-80683-CIV-MARRA
11-80402-CIV-MARRA
/
DEFENDANT CHIQUITAS AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL

RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO
THE ATA PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (Chiquita) amends and supplements as follows its
responses and objections to the ATA Plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) First Set of Interrogatories to
Chiquita dated January 8, 2016. Except as otherwise amended below, Chiquita adopts and
incorporates its responses and objections dated February 8, 2016.
SPECIFIC RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS
3. Please list each payment of money by Chiquita to FARC by date of payment and
amount for the period January 1, 1987 through December 31, 2000 and state the total
amount of money Chiquita paid to FARC for each calendar year for the period 1987
through 2000.
Amended Response: Chiquita objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds set
forth in the General Objections, incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. Chiquita
specifically objects to this request as unduly burdensome and overly broad. Chiquita objects to
this Interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information that is equally available to Plaintiffs,
80
because it is contained in produced documents already in Plaintiffs possession, and therefore the
burden is equal for Chiquita and Plaintiffs.
Subject to and without waiving its general or specific objections, after
undertaking a reasonable inquiry, Chiquita offers the below chart of its best understanding to
date of the extortion payments made to the FARC by Chiquitas former subsidiaries in
Colombia. The below chart reflects information reasonably available to Chiquita at this time.
Chiquita states that although one or more of its former Colombian subsidiaries made payments in
response to the FARCs extortion demands from time to time beginning in 1989, Chiquita has
not been able to confirm details of those extortion payments except for the information contained
in the entries below. Chiquita will supplement, correct or amend these answers if it learns
additional responsive information during the course of discovery.
Date (Approx.) Amount

1989 US$10,000
10/02/1992 COL$1,000,000
10/20/1992 COL$1,000,000
11/1992 COL$500,000
1992 COL$1,500,000
02/17/1993
COL$2,000,000
or
05/15/1993
06/15/1993 COL$2,000,000
07/13/1993 COL$2,000,000
08/30/1993 COL$2,000,000
12/09/1993 COL$2,000,000
2
80

01/20/1994
COL$2,000,000
03/4/1994
COL$6,000,000
03/28/1994 COL$3,000,000
04/07/1994 COL$5,000,000
05/11/1994 COL$5,000,000
06/20/1994 COL$5,000,000
07/11/1994 COL$5,000,000
08/22/1994 COL$5,000,000
10/04/1994 COL$4,000,000
11/01/1994 COL$8,000,000
02/17/1995 COL$4,000,000
04/04/1995 COL$4,000,000
04/10/1995 COL$5,000,000
04/21/1995 COL$5,000,000
05/23/1995 COL$5,000,000
05/31/1995 COL$5,000,000
06/18/1995 COL$5,000,000
07/14/1995 COL$4,000,000
09/05/1995 COL$1,000,000
10/12/1995 COL$7,000,000
11/13/1995 COL$10,000,000
12/18/1995 COL$15,000,000
3
80

01/27/1996 COL$1,000,000
01/27/1996 COL$1,000,000
01/27/1996 COL$1,000,000
01/27/1996 COL$1,000,000
01/27/1996 COL$1,000,000
02/02/1996 COL$5,000,000
03/13/1996 COL$10,000,000
03/13/1996 COL$3,000,000
04/07/1996 COL$10,000,000
07/22/1996 COL$1,000,000
08/12/1996 COL$3,000,000
10/09/1996 COL$5,000,000
10/19/1996 COL$6,000,000
01/23/1997 COL$5,000,000
04/15/1997 COL$10,000,000
06/2/1997 COL$10,000,000
07/21/1997 COL$2,000,000
08/01/1997 COL$10,000,000
08/01/1997 COL$5,000,000
09/01/1997 COL$10,000,000
10/20/1997
COL$10,000,000
03/09/1998 COL$2,000,000
4
80

05/03/1998 COL$4,000,000
05/03/1999 COL$5,500,000
Total FARC-
related extortion COL$253,500,000 + US$10,000
payments
5
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15. Please identify each payment that Chiquita paid to any Guerrilla Group in Colombia
from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 2000 and include in your answer the
payment amount, payment date, specific payment location, e.g., Turbo or Santa Marta,
and identity of the specific group and sub-group paid, e.g., FARC, 59th Front.
Original Response: Chiquita objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds set forth
in the General Objections, incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. Chiquita
specifically objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly
burdensome, to the extent that it seeks detailed information, including information about
extortion payments to Guerrilla Groups other than the FARC, that is neither relevant to this
litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Chiquita
further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent it seeks information not within Chiquitas
knowledge, possession, custody, or control. Chiquita objects to this Interrogatory to the extent
that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product
doctrine. Chiquita also objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information that is
equally available to Plaintiffs, because it is contained in documents already in Plaintiffs
possession, known by persons identified in Plaintiffs initial disclosures, readily accessible or
publicly available, and therefore the burden is equal for Plaintiffs and Chiquita. Subject to and
without waiving its general or specific objections, Chiquita refers Plaintiffs to Chiquitas
response to Interrogatories No. 2-7 for information regarding extortion payments to the FARC.
Supplemental Response: Chiquita repeats its original response to Interrogatory 15
and further offers, subject to and without waiving its General or Specific Objections, and after
undertaking a reasonable inquiry, the below chart of its best understanding to date of the
extortion payments made to left-wing guerrilla groups other than the extortion payments
included in response to Interrogatory No. 3 by Chiquitas former subsidiaries in Colombia. The
below chart reflects information reasonably available to Chiquita at this time. Chiquita states
6
80
that although one or more of its former Colombian subsidiaries made payments in response to
extortion demands by left-wing guerrilla groups from time to time beginning in 1989, Chiquita
has not been able to confirm details of those extortion payments except for the information
contained in the entries below and in response to Interrogatory No. 3. Chiquita will supplement,
correct or amend these answers if it learns additional responsive information during the course of
discovery.
Date (Approx.) Amount Group1

12/1992 COL$22,500,000 ELN
12/1992 COL$3,000,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
01/1992 COL$20,000,000 ELN
02/1992 COL$5,000,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
05/1992 COL$2,000,000 EPL
(Caraballo)
06/1992 COL$150,000 CRS2
07/1992 COL$300,000 CRS
08/1992 COL$10,000,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
09/1992 COL$500,000 CRS
10/1992 COL$1,500,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
12/1992 COL$20,000,000 CRS
04/05/1993 COL$4,000,000 ELN
06/15/1993 COL$4,000,000 ELN
1
If known with a reasonable degree of certainty at this time.
2
Corriente de Renovacin Socialista.
7
80

07/13/1993 COL$5,000,000 ELN
7/29/1993 COL$2,000,000 CRS
8/30/1993 COL$3,000,000 ELN
10/13/1993 COL$3,000,000 CRS
11/29/1993 COL$5,000,000
12/09/1993 COL$2,000,000
02/14/1994 COL$500,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
05/06/1994 COL$1,500,000 EPL
(Caraballo)
05/30/1994 COL$10,000,000 ELN
08/01/1994 COL$2,000,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
08/08/1994 COL$10,000,000 ELN
09/14/1994 COL$10,000,000 ELN
11/04/1994 COL$10,000,000 ELN
03/03/1995 COL$10,000,000 ELN
03/09/1995 COL$2,000,000 EPL

(Caraballo)
04/05/1995 COL$7,000,000 ELN
05/03/1995 COL$5,000,000 ELN
05/16/1995 COL$5,000,000 ELN
05/31/1995 COL$10,000,000 ELN
06/21/1995 COL$5,000,000
08/18/1995 COL$5,000,000
10/23/1995 COL$1,000,000 ELN
8
80

11/13/1995 COL$1,000,000 ELN
02/18/1996 COL$5,000,000 ELN
02/18/1996 COL$5,000,000 ELN
02/20/1996 COL$5,000,000
03/13/1996 COL$2,000,000 ELN
03/13/1996 COL$10,000,000 ELN
03/29/1996 COL$5,000,000
05/03/1996 COL$6,000,000
06/18/1996 COL$5,000,000
07/02/1996 COL$8,000,000
07/15/1996 COL$6,000,000
07/30/1996 COL$4,000,000
09/01/1996 COL$5,000,000
09/01/1996 COL$3,000,000
11/18/1996 COL$6,000,000 ELN
12/03/1996 COL$20,000,000 ELN
12/05/1996 COL$5,000,000
12/16/1996 COL$9,000,000
02/13/1997 COL$30,000,000
03/06/1997 COL$3,000,000
04/01/1997 COL$3,000,000
05/05/1997 COL$3,000,000
9
80

05/13/1997 COL$3,000,000
07/04/1997 COL$4,000,000
07/04/1997 COL$3,000,000
09/22/1997 COL$4,000,000
10/08/1997 COL$3,000,000
11/04/1997 COL$2,500,000
11/24/1997 COL$10,000,000
12/22/1997 COL$10,000,000
Dated: April 13, 2016
By: /s/ Maureen F. Browne

John E. Hall Sidney A. Stubbs (Fla. Bar No. 095596)
Maureen F. Browne Robert W. Wilkins (Fla. Bar No. 578721)
Shankar Duraiswamy James C. Gavigan, Jr. (Fla. Bar No. 0085909)
Jos E. Arvelo JONES, FOSTER, JOHNSTON & STUBBS, P.A.
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 505 South Flagler Drive, Suite 1100
One CityCenter West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
850 Tenth Street, NW Telephone: (561) 659-3000
Washington, DC 20001-4956 Fax: (561) 650-0412
Telephone: (202) 662-6000
Fax: (202) 662-6291
Jonathan M. Sperling
Eric Hellerman
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
The New York Times Building Counsel for Defendant Chiquita Brands
620 Eighth Avenue International, Inc.
New York, NY 10018
Telephone: (212) 841-1000
Fax: (212) 841-1010
10
80
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically mailed the foregoing document to the
below counsel of record on this 13th day of April, 2016 in accordance with the Courts
Discovery Scheduling Order:
Steven M. Steingard Gary M. Osen

Stephen H. Schwartz Joshua D. Glatter
KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. Aaron Schlanger
One South Broad Street, Suite 2100 Ari Ungar
Philadelphia, PA 19107 OSEN LLC
(215) 238-1700 2 University Plaza, Suite 201
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
Gregory P. Hansel (Fla. Bar No. 607101) (201) 265 6400
Jeffrey T. Edwards
PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU & PACHIOS Beth J. Kushner
LLP VON BRIESEN &ROPER, S.C.
One City Center 411 East Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 700
P.O. Box 9546 Milwaukee, WI 53202
Portland, ME 04112-9546 (414) 287-1373
(207) 791-3000
Counsel for Julin Plaintiffs
Nathaniel A. Tarnor
nathant@hbsslaw.com
HAGENS BERMAN
555 Fifth Ave., Suite 1700
New York, NY 10017
(212) 752-5455
Counsel for Pescatore and Sparrow Plaintiffs
By: /s/ Maureen F. Browne

Maureen F. Browne
Counsel for Defendant Chiquita Brands

International, Inc.
11

Chiquita Julin Expert Report of FBI Agent Manuel Ortega

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Chiquita Julin Expert Report of FBI Agent Manuel Ortega

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Case 0:08-md-01916-KAM Document 1338-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/04/2017 Page 1 of

My name is Manuel Ortega. I am the CEO of International Security Consultants and

(1) EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

a. FBI experience and training (1986 to 2012).

I attended FBI academy at Quantico, Virginia in 1986. At the academy I received

Since 1990, most of my work has involved investigations of criminal activity in

Throughout my tenure on the Extraterritorial Squad, I also coordinated and conducted

In addition to numerous other investigations, from approximately 2004 until 2010, I

b. Private sector experience (2012 to present).

I received an Associates Applied Science degree in Biological Technology in 1975 from

In addition to my formal education, as noted above, I received continuous, ongoing

d. Publications and testimony.

(2) AWARDS AND RECOGNITION

Throughout my career I have received numerous awards and recognitions including a

A copy of my curriculum vitae is provided in Attachment A.

I was retained by the Plaintiffs to do the following:

I formed my opinions based on my training and experience investigating terrorism,

In performing investigative work, I followed certain procedures and protocols. The

debrief is to obtain descriptions of the individuals or groups who perpetrated the

Communications with Kidnappers. Communications between family members,

Government Reports. A review of reports prepared by government agencies that may

Evaluation of Consistency of Evidence. During the investigation, different sources of

Other Categories of Evidence to Evaluate. Various sources of documents and other

physical evidence, documents, government intelligence reports, signal intelligence,

Notwithstanding the differences between information that was available to me during my

In addition to utilizing my training and experience and performing the investigative

Unclassified Colombian government documents;

A list of documents I considered in preparation of this report is provided in Attachment B.

I corresponded with several of my contacts in Colombia, including German Osorio, who

D. BASIS FOR OPINIONS

(1) BACKGROUND: THE MANKINS, TENENOFF, AND RICH FAMILIES

a. The missionaries work in Pcuro.

The Mankins, the Tenenoffs, and the

Image 3 (JULIN019190) Image 4 (JULIN019204)

Image 5 (JULIN019371) Image 6 (JULIN019371)

Image 7 (JULIN019366) Image 8 (JULIN019365)

c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and investigation.

(2) BACKGROUND: THE WELSH AND VAN DYKE FAMILIES

a. The missionaries work in Villavicencio.

Outside of Villavicencio, Colombia,

The layout of the Finca is shown in the following figure:4

Figure 1 (Plaintiffs Dep. Ex. 87)

Image 16 (JULIN004273) Image 17 (JULIN004282)

Image 18 (JULIN004274) Image 19 (JULIN004281)

Meanwhile, other guerillas went house-to-house, forcing missionaries to come outside,

Image 20 (JULIN003176) Image 21 (JULIN003597)

c. Negotiations with the kidnappers and investigation.

a. Location of the kidnapping relative to FARC Fronts.

This, again, is in the same FARC-concentrated region bordering Panama.

b. Evidence of circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and initial communications

They were kidnapped in the same manner;

c. Governmental triangulation of the radio frequencies during negotiations.

It is standard practice in kidnapping cases for governmental agencies to triangulate on the

The following image depicts the RDF location:

d. Interviews of FARC defectors.

From these interviews, the following information was obtained:

In addition to the interviews I personally conducted, I reviewed several sources of

Colombian National General Prosecutor (NGP) report dated 2007

i. Colombia National General Prosecutor Report

(JULIN013624). He stated also that:

(JULIN013624-13625). The Colombian government then undertook additional investigative

(JULIN013633). Based on the aggregate INFORMATION obtained through a combination

ii. State Department Reports

Unclassified State Department Reports contain summaries of interviews with FARC