LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Legislative power
Initiative, referendum and Recall
- Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, GR 127325, March 19, 1997

Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits
of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval
1 set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
2 caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and
3 instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul
Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the
foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a
revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes
revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is
pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:
1 Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for Peoples Initiative to amend the constitution specifically
to lift term limits of elected officials.
2 Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.

Ratio:
Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3
of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and
cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that . . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by
the Local Legislative Body. Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include peoples initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution.

Indirect Initiative
- SBMA v. Comelec, Sept. 26, 1996

Recall
- Garcia v. Comelec, Oct. 5, 1993

FACTS:

In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the
inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accord with RA
no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992.
May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. In the said
petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they include their municipality
with SSEZ.
Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission, which
prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991
whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution.

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 Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Morong, wrote a
letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative as it will
just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.
July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject
is merely a resolution and not an ordinance
July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjaminn Casiano, to
hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners

ISSUE:

Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an
initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and
not an ordinance?)

HELD:

Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power:

1. ORIGINAL- possessed by the sovereign people
2. DERIVATIVE- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original
power of the people.
One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the
legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of peoples initiative was thus installed which endows the
people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Which spelled out the requirements
for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and
their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives.
LOCAL INITIATIVES- legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or
matters that can be taken up in a local initiative.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote
something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws,
judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in
violation of the Constitution.
Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the power of
initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial,
city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances,
but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
Resolution vs. Ordinance
RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a
temporary effect
ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or
things in general.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the
people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter
via an initiative.

Loss of confidence, a political question

- Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472

Bicameralism vs. Unicameralism

Senate (Composition; Qualifications; Term of office)

House of Representatives
Composition (District Representatives; Party-list Representatives)

Party-list Representatives
- Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:

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COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who
were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at
least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for
concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of
a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes
by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes
are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted
to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.

- Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

Apportionment of Legislative Districts

- Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186

- Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)

FACTS:

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1. Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.
2. GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation
to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.
b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
c. Section 52:
i. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
within three years following the return of every census
ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title
iii. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,000
3. GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:

a. D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries.
D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.

b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)
Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue.
Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.
This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis
legislative district.

D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to impede
legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of 250,000.

- Montejo v. Comelec, GR 118702, Mar. 19, 1995

Gerrymandering

Page 4 of 25
 Doctrine of Equal Representation

Qualifications
- Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300
- Aquino v. Comelec, Sept. 18, 1995

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

[G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN]

FACTS:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1st district of Leyte, filed a petition for
Petitioners disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for residency.
Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed ____ years and seven months.
Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood. This was not accepted for it was filed out
of time.
It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution:
1. Finding the private respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious
2. striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995
3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy
Even the MR to COMELEC was denied.
Petitioners reasons for the change:
o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos who was
then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband
throughout his political career.
o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace.
o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it
was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to
Leyte and settled there.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes.
Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.

HELD:

1. Qualification on 1 yr residency
No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes
of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile.
In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Courts concept of domicile is to mean an individuals permanent home.
She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she got married,
the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such
domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original
domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her
husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue.

2. Qualification on 1 yr residency
The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art.
VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution
Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute
had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.
Mandatory vs. Directory provision
o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law
o Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act.

Page 5 of 25
AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400)

FACTS:

Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10 months)
Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence
qualification.
COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify
Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.
On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes.
COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.

ISSUE:

WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position

WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional

HELD:

NO to both issues.

RATIO:

Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least
one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although
he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not
evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile.
Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority
is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people.

Natural-born
- Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he
enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none
of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.

Page 6 of 25
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

Term of office

Privileges
Freedom from Arrest
Parliamentary Immunity
- Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug. 25, 2009
- Eastland v. US Servicemen's Fund, 421 US 491
- Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 US 111

- Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 714

FACTS

Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang

- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not libelous since he was a
member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense

- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress was
presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.

- The open letter was an expos on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious plan or a
massive political build up of then Sec. of Natl Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a
way as to be prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II A coup detat;Plan III A modification of
Plan I)

- The letter also implicated that the planners have under their control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col.
Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna.......It is of course
possible that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge.

- Lower Court dismissed - Petitioners appealed

ISSUES

1. WON the publication is a privileged communication 2. (if not) WON it is libelous

HELD

1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the President published by the
defendant when the Congress was not in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House Committee.

- The phrase speech or debate therein as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to utterances made
by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
function as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

Page 7 of 25
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise added that it was possible that plaintiffs are
unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages.

Disqualifications and Inhibitions

Effect of Imprisonment
- People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sessions; Adjournment; Officers

- Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

FACTS

- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress.
Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of
Senate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected:
Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.

- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of
Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES

1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition

2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader

HELD

1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their
functions and prerogatives

- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.

- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation
or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this
scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in
nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies
or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution
now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:

- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.

- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that
Page 8 of 25
"each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its
own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of
the Senate.

3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader.

- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or
who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he
or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader.

- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a
caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.

Quorum
- Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17

RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC

FACTS

- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to look
into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own president

Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Taada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a
resolution enumerating charges30 against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and
called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United
States, all the Senators were present.31

- TAADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAADA from delivering his privilege
speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the
Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously
approved, among others, a resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating...
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the President of the Philippines recognized
CUENCO as acting Senate President.

- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO.

ISSUE

WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELD
Page 9 of 25
NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If the majority of
the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into
a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as
peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to
CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
Decision Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent]

- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session.

The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single
individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact
official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a
legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.

- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without
the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the
sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America, upon which ours is
patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision.

- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made
and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The circumstances lead us to the
conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the
purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of
his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group.

- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact business. The
Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business... [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987
Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate.
The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate
is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time
has one-half ever been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

FERIA [concur]

- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of
the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country of one senator, 12
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each
House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a
majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS

- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to the
session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them), reversed its original decision and now assumed
jurisdiction over the case

ISSUES

1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case

2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid

HELD

1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and]

Page 10 of 25
Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected
acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it
appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as Senate
President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done
enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial
justice and with the requirements of public interest.

Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and the
petition is dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION FERIA [concur]

I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the amendment of the quorum
provision from "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents,
and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members
to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.

PERFECTO [concur]

- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have
been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as
Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the
one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of
the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means
more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of
24 senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group
composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two
equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority
of the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the
Senate.

- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing
CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. The Constitution
provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum..., but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has to act collectively and cannot
act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among
their number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of
absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number"
may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who
will have to act until normalcy is restored.

- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position of
Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the
presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend the
sessions, notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should logically be
interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.

Rules of Proceedings
- Arroyo v. De Venecia (Sin-taxes case), GR 127255, Aug. 14, 1997

Discipline of members
Suspension vs. Preventive Suspension
- Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

Enrolled Bill Theory

- Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1
- Casco Chemical v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347
Legislative Journal vs. Enrolled Bill

Electoral Tribunals
Page 11 of 25
 Composition
- Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792
- Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651
Powers
- Aquino v. Comelec, Sept. 18, 1995
- Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807
Jurisdiction over Proclamation Controversy
- Caruncho v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135996, September 30, 1999

Commission on Appointments
Composition
- Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789
Powers
- Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Powers of Congress

General Legislative Power

Limitations
Substantive Limitations
Procedural Limitations
One Bill, one subject
- Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000
Sufficiency of Title
- Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, GR 105371, Nov. 11, 1993
- Chongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

Bills that must originate exclusively from the House

- Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, GR 115455, Aug. 25, 1994

FACTS

- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716. - RA 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code.

- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. These were
referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197.

- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted report
recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734
and H No 11197

- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.
- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended that HB in
consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.

- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to
President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen
circulation and it took effect on May 28.

- RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance
issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income from advertisements are still
subject to VAT.

- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation was stopped
by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:

Re: Art VI Sec 24

1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate
version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified by the word exclusively.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-
ratifying power.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate merely took H
No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630.

Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)

1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual

Page 12 of 25
condition in this country.
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197.

Re: BCC acted within its power

1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these were
surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind closed doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses.

3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didnt contain
detailed and explicit statement of changes 4. It is required that the Committees report undergo three rdgs in the two
houses.

- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)

1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this
was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title.

2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise
(24 of PD 1590).

- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:

Re: Art III Sec 1

1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goes
against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law.

Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:

2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:

3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.

- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4

1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although exemption was
subsequently restored, PPI says theres possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary
of Finance. Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on
advertisements.

2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment.

3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is discriminatory.

4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the
Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of thought/
conscience.

- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:

Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts

- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:

Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education

ISSUES

Procedural

1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps)
2. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days)

3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power

4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of
103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein Substantive:

Page 13 of 25
5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated
6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated

7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated

8. WON Art III 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science and tech) is violated

HELD

- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/
enforcement of Consti.

Procedural

Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill
is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is
absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than surreptitiously inserting provisions, SC declines going behind
enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of govt.

1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24

a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in
House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as
the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the
legislative power of the two houses.

b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on executive
power.
c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that its the initiative for filing the bill that
must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs.

Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by
Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it
began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.

2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)

a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate
days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity... qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has
passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved.
To construe that the except clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and would also negate the
necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210
then pending.

3. YES the BCC acted within its power

a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the
BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce.
The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3rd
version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all,
report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographers limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize
conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting. Also, SC is
not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the
compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house, not
the BCC report.

4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)

a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some
exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill
be a complete index of its content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for operation of
public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when common good requires.

Page 14 of 25
Substantive

- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in
Congress.

5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated

- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when property is imperiled,
lawmakers judgment prevails.

a. This is actually a policy argument. b. This is a mere allegation.

c. This is also short of evidence.

6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated

a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State.
b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. Also, the
law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute
applies to a wide range of goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press
alone but to all sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT
system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.

7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated

a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org.

8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated

a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into
contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.

9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher

income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted.
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we evolve a progressive taxation system.

10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious
org.
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17

a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.

Decision Petitions are dismissed.

Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross selling price

Narvasa, Separate Opinion Cruz, Separate Opinion Padilla, Separate Opinion Vitug, Separate Opinion Regalado,
Dissenting Opinion Davide, Dissenting Opinion Romero, Dissenting Opinion Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion Puno,
Dissenting Opinion

- Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, Oct. 30, 1995

Three readings on separate days

Bicameral Conference Committee

Legislative Process
Approval of Bills
Presidential veto
Pocket veto

Item veto
- Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133

BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:

Page 15 of 25
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under
RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized
the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually
issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was
restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers
gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in
1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law.
It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were
never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in
the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should
be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and
subsisting.

Legislative veto; One-House Veto

- Immigration Service v. Chadha, 462 US 919, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
- Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses
of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations
in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented
the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO.
7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated
pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds
in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No.
6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which
states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18
SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issue:

Page 16 of 25
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the
veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional

Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore,
sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof
to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing
Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to
use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A.
No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to
and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be
vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President
must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or
legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other
grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on
the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the
Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI
of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law
considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGUs to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether
they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary
and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent

SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur and dissent]

- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in
Gonzalez v. Macaraig
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the Executive.

VITUG [concur]

- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have the
best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
Page 17 of 25
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

Power of the Purse

Implied limitations on appropriation measure
- Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3 from the
General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the
Senate, question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by
Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.

- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided by Art.
7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void.

- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio after
President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation regarding
appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.

- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos, after
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated
that:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides
as follows

Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.

- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it enables
the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and
borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could
lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the
automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been
previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on
a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and nterest rate assumption's which
may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an
automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which
by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already
drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our
debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before
due dates. - Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the
person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is
foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos."

ISSUES

1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in violation of
Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.

The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.

2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative by automatic appropriation.

Page 18 of 25
HELD

1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other imperatives of
national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets
thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred
by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national
economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered
by this Court as unconstitutional.

2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes
that:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so
that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they
are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle
that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so
clearly stated.

3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the
amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it
when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises.
The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect
and maintain the credit standing of the country.

- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of
the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate
is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on
the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of
the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the
exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

Constitutional limitations and rules

Riders
Sub rosa appropriation
Prohibition against transfer of appropriation
- Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (see case above)

Power of Taxation
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat, 316)

Power of Legislative Investigation

- Senate v. Ermita (E.O.464), G.R. No. 169777

FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 46415
issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec.
16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A)
The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable
contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as
existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however,
did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have
already been completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept.
officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them;
their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several
cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing,
enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of
petitions for lack of merit.

ISSUES

Page 19 of 25
Primary Issue

1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:

a. Legal standing of petitioners:

G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)

b. Actual Case or Controversy

3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation.

HELD

Primary Issue

1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of
legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor.

- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why
the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons
therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means
by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid.

Reasoning

Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information of a
sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21 This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and
exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to
compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended to be distinguished
from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question
hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. -Sec.2(a)ofE.O.464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by the
executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as a
mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

-Sec.2(b)ofE.O.464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear
the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express
pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due
to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it.
Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
-Sec.3ofE.O.464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies
the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O.
464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating
its power of inquiry.

Secondary Issues

2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:

Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1. the

Page 20 of 25
character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3.
lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions raised.

The Senate of the Philippines

- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public decision- making
and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of
Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a
controversy.

Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)

- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their
constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)

- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and
personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)

- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the controversy
(the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP- Laban no standing.

b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)

- A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such results are
the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.

- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate hearings. It
would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, therefore, it
follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprives the
people of information.

4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Due process requires
that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented.

Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a)
are VALID.

- Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (November 20, 1991)

FACTS

- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan
the civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.

-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/
Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and
the Filipino People, among others:

-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc.
(corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the
veil of corporate identity, etc.

8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG
approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa Sen. Enrile called upon the
Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any
relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the
government

-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on what they know about the sale of the 36
Romualdez corporations
Page 21 of 25
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that
such testimonies would unduly prejudice the defendants of civil case no.0035

-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief,
claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose

-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of
legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec)

-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee

ISSUES

1.WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.

2.WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government.

3.WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.

HELD

1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation

- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez
corporationsthere was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v.
Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by
the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry
into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congressno inquiry is an end in itself. 2.
YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government

- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to
complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters
w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.

3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process

- It has been held that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action, including...the Bill of Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant be assumed that
legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v.
Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in
cases in w/c the witness is an accused.

Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it
because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.

SEPARATE OPINION GUTIERREZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.

-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual granteven so, it is expressly granted
by A6 S21.

Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power
of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to legislate on a particular subject
matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.

US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative purpose must
be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation is easier to establish here where Congress legislative field is
unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every question be material to the proposed legislation, but
directly related to the subject of the inquiry.

-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may investigate for its own purposes
even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under trial.

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-A6 S21 provides that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. However,
such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations where a violation of a basic right is
claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be respected.

Page 22 of 25
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are posed, but the witness may not
refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar, no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the
allegation of violation of rights is premature.

CRUZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it is
capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the contrary.

-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the
Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the legislature

Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation ...expressly state that the object of
the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation.

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand outright.

Power to Punish contempt

- Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29

FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had
an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic by
tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944
together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P
5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt was
unable to comply with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with
a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however
no other payment received from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its original
owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and
cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case
ordered the cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration.

- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate, it again
bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for
Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the
Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-in- fact. These two were represented in the
trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.

- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who
was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.

- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created
a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.

- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:

a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal

- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most
important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the transactions.

- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P
440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he
replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to
answer, he also said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate approved a
resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was
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committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to.
The Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.

- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release
cited the following grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the intended
legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already
approved bills related to the transactions.

b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating

- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either
house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the
Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact
that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices. The discussions
were as follows:

a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or exact
testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary
element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of
information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have them. At times,
the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain
such information.

b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.

ISSUES

WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

HELD

a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16
to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public
hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner
is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs
Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the
information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their
scope.

- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer
questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the
authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to
imprison him until he complies with said requirement.

b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative session. The
opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of
Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said
that, unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is only four
years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided
that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a
continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation
to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court.

c. Arnaults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court must be given
the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any
question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the
person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.

Decision Petition is denied

SEPARATE OPINION

TUASON [dissent]

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- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of the ends. The
power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where disagreement occur.

- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated
legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the question as to who received the money is
supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the
suspects, is the brother of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such vindication. The Senate
investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to prepare the way for court action since they could not expect
the Justice department to take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the
Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.

- The Committees report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were passed by the
Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the case there is no need to extract names. The importance of
names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution.

- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main objection lies
in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory of other braches of government
when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone
moot.

- Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358

Power to declare existence of state of war

- The Prize cases, 67 US 635, 17 L.Ed. 459
- Mora v. McNamara, 389 US 934, 19 L.Ed.2d 287

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