G.R. No.

96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity
as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the
relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by
a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief?
Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of
trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal
questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education.
The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance
with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order."
But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for
reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott
the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed
(unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the)
alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few
named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary
Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . .
(the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join
the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter,
considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this
matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was
submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the
case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service
of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to
any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16
and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges
against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered
to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other
words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by
their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been
passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law . 21 This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by
it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to
make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . .
act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case
of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil
or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the
mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on
and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have
been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether
or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon
and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment
on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary
to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter
to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and
the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial
repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group
of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES,
and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for
a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No.
90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer
of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days
(up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents
were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an
Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on
28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August
1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials
and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said
order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6

A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-
Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of
the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . .
and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon
grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to
be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and
political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. 13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political
rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored
and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in
which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance
and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its
own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent
Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21

The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission
is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24
the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions
that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's
investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of
the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society,
have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether
the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment,
and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable. 28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an
individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human
rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law
regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices,
aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties,
who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the
International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite
periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media
were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international
bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil
and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might
diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil
and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to
fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against
torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens
which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political
rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights
of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would
now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time
we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
 xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we
invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively : 1) protection of rights of political detainees;
2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more
effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the
term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in
the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not
have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention,"
rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us
which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in
the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without
prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado
as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by
this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes
involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee
on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil
and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize,
the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they
are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking up
without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the
military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs
this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to
land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring

 (t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment
for debt. 32

Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government. 34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking
into account its recommendation." 35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in
fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared
to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or
hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to
cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds
from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.
37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more
importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case
No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR
from precisely doing that. 39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case
No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation
to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status
quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving
a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by
the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count.
Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by
us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate
situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation
to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status
quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving
a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by
the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count.
Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by
us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate
situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export
Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery
Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission
from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who
accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a
joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an
investigation of the complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human
rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his
subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to
stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was
crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were
snatched from them by members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist
from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on
May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to
include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:

Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation
canals which prevent cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and
their possession and cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the
Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural "squatters", the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing the farmlands of
the complainants-farmers who have come to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from
further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the Commission.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways or his
representative is requested to appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction;
that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by this Court,
hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from
doing further acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not
limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;

c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection;

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45,
Rollo)

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground
that the Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for C ertiorari and Prohibition"
(p. 83, Rollo).

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and
desist from continuing the acts complained of?

In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor
even a quasi-judicial body.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law . This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on
the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a
strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and
the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication
(Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary
writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent
Commission on Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is
hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December
1991. In addition, it is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)

If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human
rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it
intends to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, which are
not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings (investigation).

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December
1991. In addition, it is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)

If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human
rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it
intends to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, which are
not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings (investigation).

G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) 1 dated 18 November 1991
and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought
in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner
to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO
No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.2

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a
house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have
been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed
that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in
Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who
rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a
mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent
of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money
because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 3

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379") 4 against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as
co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a
confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his
other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos." 5

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No.
1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended
that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated
from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978
only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital
documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as
having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for
leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the
amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had
been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses
or lack of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to
change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner
would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare
for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further
evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that
the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of
justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. 9 The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise
dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth
Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No.
1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan 10 and Republic v.
Migrino11 which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE,
HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
 1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by respondents with the
filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after commencement of the presentation of
the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan 13 and Republic v. Migrino.14

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and
Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. 15
The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP
personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos
because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly
from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing
that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO
No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith,
Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former President Marcos.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General 19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of
former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of
former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such
close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President
or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in
the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts
that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was
truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such
statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 20

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation
of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves
fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such
specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by
him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that
these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close
association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his
wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima
facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the
context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379
in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; 21 (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 22 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal
is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 24 14,25 14-A:26

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of
the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of
Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous
authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.
Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial
and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the
authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. 27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests
in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
1986.28

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate"
of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate
respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the
Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or
prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is
only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. 29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon
as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed
their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30
Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. 31

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still
conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. 33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint
on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this
sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even
before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 34 The motion sought
"to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the amended
complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the
delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly
upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has
been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as
those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month
pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as
mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this
request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result
of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the
presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x." 37 Still on the date set,
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint. 38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a
case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the
long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40
rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful
EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President
Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people." 40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary
government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines,
assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is,
after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the
interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno:42

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it"
or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In
Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a
new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people
tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or
effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the
people of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to
the existing constitution."
xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by
the Philippine Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 43 petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due
process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it
should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and
sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights.
Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On
the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga
spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the
results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand
the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let
us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the
constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time
ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights
for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new
government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and
they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch
Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the
search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your
private safe."

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation
will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new
Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without
the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with
the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional
Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26, 44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that
absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the
Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became
subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant
or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate
it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items
not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized
other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the
search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three
(3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out
that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money instead of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark
and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.

Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not include
that in the application for search warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.50

xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscals office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it
was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in attach cases. 1wphi1 These attach cases were
suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader
also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened. 51

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that
the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The
raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. 52 Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in
Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case
to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC,
GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented
by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would
undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile.
In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have
not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel
troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with
mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the
Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution
enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop
bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup
that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they
conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the
realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the
communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists
have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands.
There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of
propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left
the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating
the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political,
economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members
of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?

a. Is this a political question?

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the
interest of "national security, public safety or public health

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety or public health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds
upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present danger
to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his
family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any
act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners,
pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of
the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the
right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the
Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to
travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right
 to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence
will endanger national security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of
what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is
whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not
consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is
clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if
their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable
Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and
establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive
authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend
the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or
civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety
has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of
Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators
whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in
Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different
light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L
Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to
enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country,
including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or
morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not
determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation
to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a
two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's
to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara
v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and
"[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not
only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial
powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant
of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be
exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive
power which is vested in one official the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power
of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-
chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract
or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to
address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view
that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers,
and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument
brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable
leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the
swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is President." [At 30.]

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos
according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch,
said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its
impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his
personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to
the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of
presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers
under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution
attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments,
the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark
decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and
the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the
legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act
in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that
they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a
folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found
to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments,
were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential
functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for
the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door
the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in
absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It
also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [ see Hyman, The American President, where
the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return
to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising
respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in
his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted
or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set
aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the
guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all
actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established,
the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically
empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand
with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if
and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the
function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for
the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian
officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State
and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the
threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would
break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for
the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State,
acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived
as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the
people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country,
while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign
jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos
regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state
of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years
and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4253 October 31, 1951

CHARLES K. ANDREU, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.

Roberto Dollete for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Charles K. Andreu applies for a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner claims under oath that he is a stateless and was born in Latvia; that since 17 April 1940 he has resided in Manila, conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner, been engaged in the practice of his profession as architect and contractor, and has never been charged with and convicted of any
crime; that on 24 June 1946, he was arrested by the order of the Commissioner of Immigration; that without previous hearing he was ordered deported on
18 December 1946; that from 16 May to 2 June 1947 he was shipped to Shanghai but was refused admission there because he was not a Chinese citizen;
that upon his return to this country he was detained at the Immigrant Station; that on 9 December 1947, he was released provisionally by authority of the
Secretary of Justice and resumed the practice of his profession as architect and contractor; that on 20 March 1948, he was again apprehended and flown to
Cebu to be deported aboard any of the two Russian vessels lying at the anchor in Cebu but the masters of the Russian ships refused his being placed aboard
their ships; that since than he has been detained and confined; that he applied to this Court for a writ of habeas corpus (G.R. No. L-2838) but his petition
was denied on 16 September 1949; that from that date to the date of the filing of the petition he has been deprived of his liberty for 13 months and from
24 June 1946, for 46 months. Upon this claim he prays that the writ applied for issue and that after hearing the writ prayed for be granted.

The return of the writ denies that the petitioner is a stateless and was born in Latvia; that the Commissioner of Immigration seemingly will fail to carry out
the deportation of the petitioner, he not being a subject of any foreign power; that for that reason his detention will be endless and without due process of
law. The respondents deny any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief that the petitioner has resided in Manila, conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner, been engaged in the practice of his profession, and has never been charged with and convicted of any crime; that he was not
investigated nor he was informed of the charges against him; that after his release provisionally by the President he resumed the practice of his profession;
and that as a result of his confinement he lost all his property and has become destitute. They admit that on 24 June 1946 the petitioner was arrested; that
on 18 December 1946, a warrant of deportation as an undesirable alien was issued; that he was deported in Shanghai but refused admission not on the
ground that he was not a Chinese citizen but for lack of proper visa; that upon return to this country he was detained at the Immigrant Station; that he was
granted a provisional release not by the Secretary of Justice as claimed by him but by the President of the Philippines; that on 20 March 1948, he was again
arrested and flown to Cebu for the purpose of deporting him but the captains of the Russian steamers refused to allow him to board their ships not because
he was not a Russian citizen as claimed by him but for lack of permission of the Russian Government to take him aboard their ships; that since then he has
been detained; that he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied on 16 September 1949; that he has been detained for deportation for
13 months since denial of the first petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for 46 months since he was arrested on 24 June 1946.

It is further stated in the return that the petitioner was investigated upon charges that he was an undesirable alien having gained entry into the country by
fraudulent means, engaged in espionage and failed to register as such alien in violation of Com. Act No. 653; that he was a habitual drunkard, without
visible means of support and lawful employment; that after investigation the Deportation Board recommended his deportation to the President of the
Philippines "for being an undesirable alien whose conduct and mode of life render his presence in the Philippines inimical and dangerous to public interest;"
that the President finding the recommendation well founded ordered the deportation of the petitioner; that for the best interest of the country's national
security the petitioner's detention is advisable and necessary while arrangements for his deportation are being made; and that the question raised by the
petitioner has already been adjudged in the previous petitioner's application for the same writ.

We do not have before us the proceedings held in the Deportation Board to enable us to determine whether the espionage activities with which the
petitioner was charged fall under the terms of the Proclamation issued by the President on 22 October 1950 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Not having such proceedings before us, we may reasonably presume that such activities with which the petitioner was charged and upon
which, after hearing, the Deportation Board partly relied to make its recommendation to the President of the Philippines, do not come under the aforesaid
Proclamation, for if such activities fall under it, the Solicitor General would not have failed to allege such fact in the return he made to the writ, the petition
in this case having been filed on 30 October and the return of the writ by the Solicitor General on 14 November 1950, or subsequent to the issuance and
promulgation of the Proclamation.

Such being the case, we feel bound by the rule laid down in three similar cases, to wit: Mejoff vs. the Director of Prisons, supra, p. 70; Borovsky vs. The
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of Prisons, supra, p. 107; Chirskoff vs. Commissioner of Immigration and Director of Prisons, supra, p. 256.
It would serve no useful purpose to restate the reasons for the rule laid down in those cases which are incorporated herein. Adhering to our opinion in said
cases we order that the writ issues directing the respondents to release the petitioner from custody under the following terms and conditions: The petitioner
shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable a the question of reasonableness shall be
submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the
amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to require by Section 40 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613. No costs will be taxed.

G.R. No. L-3802 October 26, 1951

VADIM N. CHIRSKOFF, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Vadim N. Chirskoff, the first petition having been dismissed in an order promulgated on September 7, 1948, in
G.R. No. L-2838, entitled Vadim N. Chirskoff vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, et al., on the authority of Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration 1
(47 Off. Gaz., 136) and Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons 2 (47 Off. Gaz., 177).

The history of the prisoner's detention is thus set forth in the petition: Chirskoff entered the Philippines on June 19, 1946 with a passport duly visaed by the
United States Consul in Shanghai, for the purpose of making repairs on and taking delivery of certain vessels purchased by or in behalf of the Java China
Trading Co., Ltd. The vessels having been repaired and dispatched to Shanghai, the petitioner remained behind and stayed for the reason, according to him,
that he had "suffered an economic collapse and his return to Shanghai became impracticable."

In the meantime Chirskoff obtained employment in a lumber concern in Bataan and later in a similar concern in Floridablanca, Pampanga. It was while
working at the latter place that he was arrested by order of the Commissioner of Immigration on March 16, 1948, charged with aiding, helping and
promoting "the final objective of the Hukbalahaps to overthrow the Government." After that arrest, specifically on April 5, 1948, the Deportation Board
ordered the petitioner's deportation to Russia, not on the ground stated in the warrant of arrest but on the purported ground that he "violated condition of
the temporary stay given him by failing to depart from the Philippines upon its expiration, thus rendering himself subject to deportation under section 37(2)
(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended." No formal charges for giving aid to Hukbalahaps have ever been filed.

The immigration authorities were unable to carry out the deportation order, and it is alleged that because of that inability the petitioner repeatedly
expressed his desire to leave the country on his own account but that his request was not heeded. The petitioner says that he could easily have departed
from the Philippines without any expense on the part of the Government when, upon press authority of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, he
secured employment in the Swedish S.S. Axel Salem which was to sail from the Philippines in 1948, but, so he states, the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration for no valid and practical reason withdrew the said authority. Except as to the circumstances of the immigrants' entries into the Philippines, this
case and the cases of Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration and Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons referred to in the order dismissing the herein petitioner's
first application, are identical. Borovsky's and Mejoff's application had been denied because arrangements were being made to have the petitioners
deported. Like Chirskoff, Borovsky and Mejoff each later filed a second application for habeas corpus docketed as G.R. No. L-4352 and G.R. No. L-4254. Both
these applications have recently been granted for the reason that since the denial of the first a period of over two years had elapsed without the applicants
having been deported and the prospects of removing them were not in sight.

In the last mentioned cases we held that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention; that in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of
which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the theory
on which the court is given power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held
without any authority of law (U.S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp. 201); that the possibility that the petitioners might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at
large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in reasonable amount
with sufficient sureties.

Following our decisions in Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra, and Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, supra, it is ordered that the writ issue
commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court
of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or
sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

No costs will be charged.

G.R. No. L-2855 July 30, 1949

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces
during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested aa a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was
handed to the Commonwealth Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter the People's Court ordered his release.
But the deportation board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently refferd the matter
to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Board oF Commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had
entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, withoutinspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered
that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In
May, 1948, he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and in
August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his companions alleging lack of
authority to do so. In October, 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where
he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interest of the country to keep him
under detention while arrangements for his deportation are being made.

It is contended on behalf of petitioner that having been brought to the Philippines legally by the Japanese forces, he may not now be deported. It is enough
to say that the argument would deny to this Government the power and the authority to eject from the Islands any and all of that members of the
Nipponese Army of occupation who may still be found hiding in remote places. Which is absurd. Petitioner likewise contends that he may not be deported
because the statutory period to do that under the laws has long expired. The proposition has no basis. Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 any alien who enters this country "without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to
deportation within five years. In a recent decision of a similar litigation (Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration) we denied the request for habeas
corpus, saying:

"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time. However,
under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 1

"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transfortation, the
diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. 2 Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and
does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the
land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he
indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting
a chance for deportation3 or unless the Government admits that itcan not deport him 4 or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts
will not interfere.

"In the United States there were at least two instances in which courts fixed a time limit within which the imprisoned aliens should be deported 5 otherwise
their release would be ordered by writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, supposing such precedents apply in this jurisdiction, still we have no sufficient data
fairly to fix a definite deadline."

The difference between this and the Borovsky case lies in the fact that the record shows this petitioner has been detained since March, 1948. However,
considering that in the United States (where transportation facilities are much greater and diplomatic arrangements are easier to make) a delay of twenty
months in carrying out an order of deportation has not been held sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,6 this petition must be, and it
is hereby denied. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Padilla, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., I dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in case No. L-2852.
Feria, J., I dissent on the same ground stated in my dissent in case G. R. No. L-2852.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from
confinement. He has not been convicted for any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him no pretext to keep him
imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law has been
intended to protect all inhabitants or residents who may happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag.

Our vote is the same as one we cast when the case of Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-2852, was submitted for decision although, for some
misunderstanding, our vote was overlooked at the time of the decision was promulgated. Our vote is to grant the petition and to order the immediate
release of petitioner, without prejudice for the government to deport him as soon as the government could have the means to do so. In the meantime,
petitioner is entitled to live a normal life in a peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice.

G.R. No. L-3323 July 18, 1951

In the matter of the petition for naturalization of JACK J. BERMONT; JACK J. BERMONT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for oppositor and appellant.
Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel for petitioner and appellee.

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting Jack J. Bermont's petition for Philippine citizenship.

The trial court found and the finding is amply supported by evidence that petitioner was born in Nikolavesk, Amur, Siberia, on March 1, 1912; that during
the Russian revolution, when he was barely 6 years old, his parents, who were both White Russians, fled from Russia, taking him along with them, and
settled in Japan where they resided for more than 10 years; that in 1930 they moved to Shanghai and there he studied at St. Joseph's College of the
Christian Brothers and at the Shanghai American School; that his father died in Shanghai in July, 1948, but his mother was still living and was in Japan; that
petitioner came to the Philippines in January, 1935, with the intention of proceeding to Australia, but finding this country to his liking he obtained permission
to remain and had since then resided here continuously; that he never took oath of allegiance to the Soviet Government and considered himself stateless;
that he mingled with the Filipinos and married a Filipina and had a child by her (now two according to counsel's brief); that he had worked for Bobcock &
Co. and Heacock & Co. and in the lumber concession of Jose Cauwenbergh, and was at the time of the hearing a stockholder and director of the United
States Philippine Reconstruction Corporation with an emolument of P1,600 a month; that he could speak and write English and possessed a working
knowledge of Tagalog, Spanish, and Cuyonon, a dialect spoken in Palawan; that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution and was
opposed to communistic government; that he was of good repute and morally irreproachable, as certified to by Attys. Jesus T. Paredes and Arsenio S.
Lacson; that he was not opposed to organized government nor was he affiliated to any subversive organization; that during the last war he was an active
member of the guerrilla forces in Palawan under Major Pablo Muyco and was later attached to the Allied Intelligence Bureau (U. S. A. Task Force, Team No.
017) in Palawan, and that as a result of his activities in the underground movement he became entitled to two medals of honor and two unit citations, as
certified to by General Macario Peralta; that he had not been convicted of any crime and was not suffering from any contagious disease. It does not appear
that he has those shortcomings which would make a person unfit for Philippine citizenship, and he states under oath that if he is made a citizen of this
country, he will uphold and defend its Constitution and laws and take up arms, if necessary, in its defense, like he did in the last war.

The Solicitor General contends that the lower court erred in finding petitioner to be a stateless person and not a Russian citizen and in not finding that he
has failed to establish that in his country Filipinos are permitted to acquire Russian citizenship. The same contention was made in the case of Kremes
Kookooritchken vs. Republic of the Philippines* (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, 217, 225-227), in which the petitioner was also a White Russian, being one of the
1,200 Russian Refugees who, under the command of one Admiral Stark, fled from the Bolshevik regime and entered the Philippines in 1923. Overruling the
contention of the Solicitor General, this Court said in the case:

It is contended that petitioner failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia
grants to Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. The controversy centers on the question as to whether petitioner is
a Russian citizen or is stateless.

Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His testimony support the lower court's
pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless refugee in this country.

Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is citizen or subject of the Empire of Russia, but the Empire of
Russia has ceased to exist since the Czars overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet
Government established after the overthrow of the Czarist Government.

We do not believe that the lower court, erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported
by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorships has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or
displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort
to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to
foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that
group of stateless refugees.

Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know the history, nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the
greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless
than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist government and, because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia
to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a
Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his
 resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release
from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond
comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

The Solicitor General insists that in the present case the record does not support the claim that the petitioner is a stateless person. But there is no denying
the fact that, like Kremes Kookooritchken, herein petitioner is a White Russian refugee, who has permanently abandoned the land of his birth and adopted
the Philippines as his home and identified himself with its people. His alien certificate of registration describes him as a stateless Russian. If Kookooritchken
was held entitled to Philippine citizenship, it does not seem fair that the same consideration should not be extended to the present petitioner, who has
presented an even stronger case because he has by deeds shown his loyalty to this country and its ideals and his fitness to become one of its citizens.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 210412

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
KAMRAN F. KARBASI, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings. 1

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 29, 2013 Decision2 and the November 27, 20133
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 01126-MIN, which affirmed the January 17, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Dipolog City (RTC), in a naturalization case docketed as Naturalization Case No. 2866. The RTC order granted the petition for naturalization and, thus,
admitted Karman F. Karbasi as a citizen of the Philippines.

The Facts

On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi (Karbasi) filed a petition for naturalization with the RTC, where he alleged the following:

1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;

2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly issued
by the UNHCR;

3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has resided continuously in the
Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1)
year;

4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places of residence, prior to his present residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon
City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte;

5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his identity card which also serves as his birth certificate;

6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;

7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in Dipolog
City, as shown in

their certificate of marriage;

8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City;

9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila International Airport
on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per UNHCR certification containing reference to his Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;

10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten year requirement of
continuous residence;

11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;

12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average annual income of Php
80,000.00 more or less;

13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;

14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor
General of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;

15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of filing of this petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship;

16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C. Ratificar, of
legal age, Filipino, married and residing at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear
and testify as witnesses at the hearing thereof.

[Emphasis Supplied]

On July 2, 2002, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for hearing on October 21, 2002 and
ordering the publication thereof, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in
Zamboanga del Norte and in the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan. In the same Order, persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted and oppose the petition.

On July 22, 2002, the RTC amended its previous order and, with notice to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), reset the hearing on September 10,
2003 instead because the National Printing Office could no longer accommodate the publication requirement before the first hearing date.

On December 2, 9 and 16, 2002, copies of the amended order and Karbasis petition were published in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the same were
published in Press Freedom on January 27, February 3 and 10, 2003. The said copies were likewise posted on the bulletin boards of the RTC and the
Municipal Building of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte and Capitol Building, Dipolog City.
On September 10, 2003, Karbasi and his counsel appeared and presented proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. Nobody appeared to
interpose an objection to the petition. During the hearing on May 18, 2006, Alton C. Ratificar (Ratificar) and Dominador Natividad Tagulo (Tagulo) testified
as character witnesses.

Ratificar testified that in 1990, he was introduced to Karbasi whose house was located about 30 meters away from his; that he came to know him since
then; that when Karbasi got married, he was invited to the wedding ceremony where the then City Mayor of Dipolog was one of the wedding sponsors; that
he also attended the celebration; that he used to see Karbasi almost every day as he owned an electronics repair shop near his house; that Karbasi would
also allow neighbors, who did not own television sets at home, to watch shows at his repair shop; that he never heard of any complaint by the neighbors
against Karbasi, who went to church during Sundays and even on weekdays; that on several occasions, he was invited to Karbasis home, where he
observed his good relationship with his in-laws and his treatment of his wife and child which was in accordance with Filipino customs; and that Karbasi
talked to him in both Visayan and English.

For his part, witness Tagulo testified that he worked at the Andres Bonifacio College and had known Karbasi since July 1990 when the latter was then
enrolled in a vocational course; that Karbasi was very respectful to his instructors and that he had good grades; that he treated his schoolmates in
accordance with Filipino customs; that he never showed any inclination to violence; that when Karbasi transferred to Dumaguete City, he visited him there;
and that during this visits, Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially interacted and mingled with the rest of the community.

On August 10, 2006, the wife of Karbasi, Cliji G. Lim (Cliji), also took the witness stand. She testified that her father introduced her to Karbasi during her
graduation party; that a courtship followed thereafter for five months, during which Karbasi was well-behaved and acted like any other Filipino; that when
Karbasi proposed marriage to her, he was accompanied by his brother, Ali Karbasi; that Karbasis baptism as a Catholic coincided with her birthday; that
after their marriage, they begot two (2) children; that Karbasi continuously stayed with his family and never returned to Iran; that he was a good husband,
father and provider; that all his income from the repair shop was turned over to her for the budgeting of the familys expenses; and that he was then
earning a daily income of P1,000.00.

She added that Karbasi and his family regularly attended the Catholic mass and received communion; that they were active members of Couples for Christ
since 2003; that he actively participated in Catholic practices like the novena and vigil for her deceased grandfather; that Karbasi was not a polygamist and
that he did not flirt with other women; that she never heard her husband speak of any terrorist groups; and that he was never known to have an immoral
reputation.

On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi himself took the witness stand. As summarized by the RTC, the gist of his testimony is as follows:

He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran, Iran, and resided there since birth up to 1986. His father is Abdolhossein Karbasi, a doctor in Iran, and his
mother is Narjes Froghnia Karbasi, a retired teacher.

He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of the brood, Hamid Reza Karbasi, is in the United States of America and is now an American Citizen. The
second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi, admitted as Filipino citizen in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City, is in the Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his
sister. The fourth, his brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza Karbasi, graduated in India. The fifth, his sister, Kia Karbasi, is a nurse. The sixth, his brother Qolam Reza
Karbasi, is an engineer who graduated in France. His last four siblings are all in Iran.

He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as Roman Catholic. His former religion believes in the existence of a Supreme Being called God. It believes
in the existence of government and repudiates violence. His said religion is not within an organization of Al Qaeda, Jemayah Islamiya, or any terrorist group.
It also adheres to the principle of one man-one woman marital relation. He and his brother, Ali Reza Karbasi, left Iran in 1986 because of the war between
Iran and Iraq at that time. When the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, was overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in 1979, some Iranian nationals left Iran. He and Ali Reza,
who also condemns the act of overthrowing an existing government by force and violence, were among those who left. Since the government confiscated
his passport, they traveled by camel and passed by the desert during night time to reach Pakistan. He stayed there for almost three (3) years,

Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted themselves to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, they were not granted the status
of refugee right away since Pakistan is adjacent to Iran. They had to transfer to a third country not at war with Iran. Since his brother Ali Reza was already
studying in the Philippines, they decided to come here.

As it was difficult for him to get travel documents, petitioner procured a Pakistani passport under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July 11, 1990, he submitted himself to the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a
refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a refugee, he was granted by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and protection to some
extent.

After having been interviewed by the Solicitor General regarding his intention to become a Filipino citizen, he filed the corresponding Declaration of
Intention, dated March 28, 2001, on May 25, 2001.

Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his intention to become a Filipino citizen, was issued a certification captioned "UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Liaison Office for the Philippines," dated 25 June 2002, certifying that he has been recognized as a person of concern who arrived in the
Philippines on 11 July 1990 on board Philippine Airlines flight 731 under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).

At the time of the filing of the petition, he was already married and residing at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog City. However, upon arrival in the Philippines, he
first resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon City, where he stayed for almost six months. During those times, the United Nations provided him a monthly
allowance of P2,800.00, being a refugee. He then transferred to Burgos Street, Miputak, Dipolog City, where he stayed at the house of the fatherin- law of
his brother Ali Reza for a month.

He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at the house of his sister-in-law. It was during this time that he enrolled at Andres Bonifacio College where
he studied from 1990 to 1992. He finished a two-year vocational course in said school as evidenced by a Diploma issued by the Andres Bonifacio College,
Dipolog City. In Iran, he finished Bachelor of Science in Economics.

He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of Science in Industrial Technology Major in Electronics) at the Central Visayas Polytechnic College in
Dumaguete City. He resided in the Capitol Area of said city. He was already receiving a monthly allowance of P4,800.00 from the United Nations at that
time. He graduated from said institution as evidenced by a Diploma issued by said school. He also attended technical trainings conducted by Asian Durables
Manufacturing, Inc. as evidenced by a Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.

In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at Burgos Street where he opened his electronics repair shop (KX3 Electronics Repair Shop).

On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple transferred to the house of his parents-in-law after the marriage. When the grandfather of his wife got ill,
they were requested to take care of him. Thus, the couple transferred their residence to Dohinob, Roxas. However, they moved back to their house in
Burgos Street, Dipolog City, as it is nearer to a hospital. When his grandfather-in-law died, he participated in all the rites and ceremonies relative to his
wake and burial.

At present, his repair shops gross monthly income hovers between P20,000.00 to P25,000.00."4

Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had never been involved in any demonstration or mass action protesting any issuances, policies or acts of the
Philippine Government and its officials; that he had never made any rebellious or seditious utterances; that he believed in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution and he had even memorized the preamble; and that he can also sing the Philippine National Anthem and recite the Filipino Patriotic
Pledge, both of which he did in open court.

The following documents were proffered in Karbasis Formal Offer of Exhibits: 1] Identity Card issued by Iran to prove his Iranian citizenship; 2] Pakistani
passport with visa under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha; 3] Certifications and Identification Card issued by the UNHCR to prove his status as a
refugee and, later, as a "person of concern"; 4] Alien Certificate of Registration; 5] Certifications to prove Filipino nationality of Karbasis wife, Cliji G. Lim;
6] Certificate of Marriage between Karbasi and Cliji; 7] Certificates of Live Birth of his children Keenyji and Kerl Jasmen; 8] Karbasis Certificate of Baptism;
9] Affidavits of his character witnesses Alton C. Ratificar and Dominador Tagulo; 10] Police and NBI Clearances; 11] Certifications and Diploma to prove his
completion of vocational technology, BS Industrial Technology, and training seminars; 12] Alien Employment Permit for Refugees; 13] Business Permit,
Clearances and DTI Certificates of Accreditation to KX3 Repair Shop, Karbasis source of livelihood; 14] Income Tax Returns for the years 2001 to 2005; and
15] Contract of Service with Quality Circuits Services, Inc. and Kolins Philippines Intl. Inc., including a Summary of Accounts paid to KX3 Electronics Repair
Shop.5

On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasis evidence sufficient to support his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F. KARBASI to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines is hereby
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.6

Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on the
ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasis petition as he failed to comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on
character, income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization to
Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as required under the law; and 3] he is of good moral character as shown by his disregard of Philippine tax
laws when he had underdeclared his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for naturalization.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the grant of Filipino citizenship to Karbasi. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 in
Naturalization Case No. 2866 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasis ITRs was prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer needed to
include the income he received as payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines International,
Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld at source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove
reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian laws.

Hence, this petition.

Position of the OSG

The OSG asserts that the findings of the courts a quo are not in accord with law and jurisprudence because Karbasi failed to prove that he had a lucrative
income and an irreproachable character. It insists that Karbasi failed to establish his lucrative income considering that at the time of the filing of his petition
for naturalization in 2002, his gross income was P21,868.65. Per table of Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao, the average income for the
year 2000 was P86,135.00 and for 2003 was P93,000.00. This shows that Karbasis declared gross income was way below the average income and average
expenses in Western Mindanao, the region where Dipolog City, his residence, is located. The OSG argues that even if the subsequent years were to be
considered, Karbasis income was still insufficient as compared to the average income and expenditure in the area. Karbasis declared income for the years
2003, 2004 and 2005 were P31,613.00, P41,200.00 and P39,020.00, respectively. The same table presentation, however, provides that the average
expenditure for the year 2000 was P69,452.00, and for the year 2003 was P75,000.00. This shows that Karbasis declared gross income was not enough to
support his family within the contemplation of the law. Whether based on his testimony or on his ITRs, Karbasis gross income was not adequate, given the
high cost of living prevailing in the region. The OSG also mentions that Karbasis child had started formal schooling which would entail substantial income on
the part of Karbasi, so that he could meet his familys needs.

The OSG cites the discrepancy between his petition for naturalization and his ITRs as another reason to deny his application for Filipino citizenship. An
examination of the petition discloses that Karbasi claimed an annual income of P80,000.00. He had also declared in his testimony that he was earning
P20,000.00 to P25,000.00, monthly, from his electronic repair shop. His ITRs on the other hand, show his gross income as P14,870.00 in 2001; P21,868.65
in 2002; P31,613.00 in 2003; P41,200.00 in 2004; and P39,020.00 in 2005.

The OSG further argues that the "underdeclaration" of Karbasis income in his ITRs reflects his disregard of Philippine tax laws and, worse, its overstatement
in his petition indicates his intent to make it appear that there was compliance with the Naturalization Law, when there was actually none. According to the
OSG, this negates irreproachable behavior which required of every applicant for naturalization because the failure to enter the true income on the tax return
is indicative of dishonesty. The OSG cited the ruling in Republic v. Yao,8 where the Court ordered the cancellation of the naturalization certificate issued to
the applicant therein upon the discovery of his underdeclaration and underpayment of income tax. In the OSGs words, "[u]nderdeclaration of income is a
serious matter that it is used as a ground to cancel the certificate of naturalization. If the court can reverse the decision in an application for naturalization,
with more reason can underdeclaration be considered in denying an application," as in Karbasis case.9

Position of Karbasi

In the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court, Karbasi was required to file a comment on the petition in which he mainly argued that the petition did not raise
questions of law but questions of facts which were too unsubstantial to require consideration. He countered that while, admittedly, the "lucrative
trade/occupation" requirement under the law must be complied with, it has been emphasized in jurisprudence that, the objective of this economic
requirement is to ensure that the applicant should not become a public charge or an economic burden upon the society. 10 Karbasi claims that he had more
than satisfactorily established his lucrative trade or occupation, showing that he would become a citizen who could contribute to national progress. This has
been clearly and unanimously appreciated by the RTC and the CA.

Karbasi also avers that the analysis of the OSG with respect to the data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao is misplaced. Firstly, the
data presented were merely statistical and not actual, and did not reflect the circumstances relative to a specific subject or person. Hence, these are greatly
unreliable with respect to a specific person in a naturalization case. At best, it was only intended for the purpose it was made for planning and for policy
making of the government and not to determine whether a certain trade, occupation or income is lucrative or not.

Anent the allegation that the underdeclaration of his income projects was a flaw on his moral character, Karbasi point out that he had sincerely explained
that his failure to declare his correct annual income was in good faith not intended to commit fraud. He believed that the other sources of his income apart
from his repair shop had already been withheld by the companies for whom he had rendered services. For Karbasi, the meaning of "irreproachable" as
required by the law does not mean "perfectly faultless."

On September 18, 2014, Karbasi moved for leave of court to file a supplemental pleading, in which he insisted that pursuant to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines was a signatory, the country was
bound to safeguard the rights and well-being of the refugees and to ensure the facility of their local integration including naturalization. Karbasi reasoned
that this was precisely why Department Circular 58 Series of 2012 was issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Under the said circular, the Refugees and
Stateless Persons Unit was created not only to facilitate the identification and determination of refugees but also for the protection of these refugees.

Karbasi insisted that unlike any other alien applying for naturalization, he had to leave Iran out of fear of persecution without any mental and financial
preparation, and only with a view of finding safe refuge in the Philippines.

Reply of OSG

In its Reply, the OSG contended that Karbasi could not downplay the significance of the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao, as it
was an accurate illustration of the financial condition of a typical family in a particular region. The said table was prepared by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB), which strengthened the credibility of the report. The OSG explained that whether the data were statistical or actual, the
numbers still reflected the financial standing of Karbasi. It followed then that Karbasi could not claim good faith in failing to declare the income he gained
from his transactions with several companies. He even failed to present a certificate of tax withheld to show that these companies had actually remitted the
withholding taxes due to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even assuming that Karbasis declared income allegedly excluded the amount withheld by these
companies, the OSG claimed that his income would still be below the standard income and expenditure per the table.

The Courts Ruling

The Court is confronted with the issue of whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed the RTC decision granting Karbasis application for naturalization
despite the opposition posed by the OSG.

Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community
of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community.11 The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public
office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.12

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens.13 Among those listed are citizens by naturalization. Naturalization refers to the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be
judicial or administrative. Judicially, the Naturalization Law provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and the receipt of evidence showing that
the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper
naturalization certificate and its registration in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and
residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee,
which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization. 14 In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away.15 All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the
Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law. The reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves political status; hence,
every person must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor.16

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with the law. In other words, an applicant
must comply with the jurisdictional requirements; establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under
the law; and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations.17 Section 2 of the Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the
qualifications that must be possessed by any applicant, viz:

Section 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages;

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1
of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of
the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

[Emphasis supplied]

The contention in this case revolves around the following points:

1. the sufficiency of Karbasis income for purposes of naturalization;

2. the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the amounts of his gross income as declared in his ITRs, on one hand, and in his petition for naturalization on the
other; and

3. the necessity of proving reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization.

The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.

First. A reading of the OSGs pleadings discloses that its position arose out of a comparison made between Karbasis declared income and the amounts
reflected in the Data on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao issued by the NSCB. The OSG also invokes the past rulings of the Court where
the concept of "lucrative trade, trade, profession or lawful occupation" was explained in this wise:

It means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one
an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization.18

A long line of cases reveals that the Court did not hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a showing that the applicant had no lucrative income and
would, most likely, become a public charge. A summary of some of these notable cases is in order:

1. In the Matter of the Petition for Admission to Philippine Citizenship of Engracio Chan also known as Nicasio Lim. 19 The Court found that the
petitioner, who was a salesman at the Caniogan Sari-Sari and Grocery Store, then located in Pasig, Rizal, from which he received a monthly salary
of P200.00, with free board and lodging, had no lucrative income. Even if the petitioner was then an unmarried man without dependents, a
monthly income of P200.00 with free board and lodging, was not considered gainful employment. Further, there was no proof that he was legally
authorized to use an alias and his use thereof, being in violation of the Anti-Alias Law, was indicative of a reproachable conduct.
 2. In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines. 20 The Court found Antonio Po, then single and employed
as collector of the Surigao Chamber of Commerce as without lucrative income on the ground that his employment had so long depended upon the
selection of the succeeding presidents of the chamber and that he then got free board and lodging by living with his widowed mother. Simply put,
there was not enough stability in his claimed salary. His additional income gained from helping his mother to run a store was also insufficient to
satisfy the law, in the amount and in its steadiness. His free board and lodging pretense was also discerned as indicative of dependence upon his
mother for support.

3. In the Matter of the Petition of Tanpa Ong Alias Pedro Tan to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines. 21 The income of the applicant as
contemplated in the naturalization law was only P3,000.00 a year. Considering that he had a wife and seven children to support, this income was
held as insufficient to meet the high cost of living at that time.

4. Keng Giok v. Republic.22 The Court held that an income of P9,074.50 per annum was not sufficient for a married applicant with a wife and
five children to support.

5. Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic.23 The Court held that his income, derived from employment in a business enterprise of the petitioner's father, was
not sufficient to establish compliance with the statutory requirement of lucrative occupation or calling.

6. In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines by Pantaleon Sia alias Alfredo Sia.24 The Court ruled that the
determination of lucrative income or occupation should be reckoned as of the time of the filing of the petition. The Court decided against the
petitioner as his regular salary was not ample enough to defray his familys expenses. The excess amounts representing his bonuses and
commissions should not be considered in determining whether or not petitioner had a lucrative income or occupation.

With the pronouncements in these cases in mind, the comparison made by the OSG now begets another question: can the possession of an applicants
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation, for purposes of naturalization, be fairly determined through a simplistic read-through on government data?

The Court answers in the negative.

While it is true that a naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial contest to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, this does not accord infallibility on any and all of the OSGs assertions. If this were the case, the rules of evidence might as
well be brushed aside in order to accord conclusiveness to every opposition by the Republic. Needless to state, the Court still has the final authority and
duty to evaluate the records of proceedings a quo and decide on the issues with fair and sound judgment.

Here, it is clear that the circumstances prevailing in the above-cited cases are not at all attendant in Karbasis situation. There was neither a showing that
Karbasi was dependent on another person for support nor proof that his familys extraordinary expenses that would render his income as inadequate. As in
any other business venture, the risk of losses is a possibility for his repair shop but, still, this risk was not clearly established to render his livelihood as
unstable and volatile. In fact, the OSG does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been engaged by reputable companies for his services. Conversely, the
findings of the RTC would indicate that Karbasi had indeed exhibited industry and hard work in putting up his repair shop business and that his wife
considered him as a good provider, not to mention a vocational and college degree holder. Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an applicant for naturalization
are expected to be self-serving. Nevertheless, the Court finds it difficult to agree with the OSGs meager use of government data to prove that Karbasi
would become a burden to the Philippine society in the future. Except for its own citation of government data, nothing else was presented to establish that
Karbasi had indeed no lucrative income or trade to support himself and his family.

To accept the OSGs logic is a dangerous precedent that would peg the compliance to this requirement in the law to a comparison with the results of
research, the purpose of which is unclear. This is not to say that the data produced by government research are inappropriate, or much less irrelevant in
judicial proceedings. The plain reliance on this research information, however, may not be expected to produce the force of logic which the OSG wants to
attain in this case. Besides, had the law intended for government data on livelihood and income research to be used as a gauge for the "lucrative income"
requirement, it must have stated the same and foreclosed the Courts power to assess existing facts in any given case. Here, the Court opts to exercise this
power and delve into a judicious review of the findings of the RTC and the CA and, as explained, to rule that Karbasi, possesses a lucrative income and a
lawful occupation, as required by the Naturalization Law.1wphi1

At this point, it is worthy to note the Courts ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Chua25(Chua), where the Court assessed the prevailing
circumstances of an applicant for naturalization who was a medical student at the time of the filing of her petition. In Chua, the Court rejected the Republics
argument that the applicants status as a subsequent passer of the Board Examinations of 1985 for Doctors of Medicine could not by itself be equated with
"gainful employment or tangible receipts." The Court held that this interpretation of the income requirement in the law is "too literal and restrictive." It then
cited Uy v. Republic,26 where the Court laid down the public policy underlying the lucrative income requirement as follows:

[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable assurance not only that the applicant will not be a social burden or liability but that he is a potential
asset to the country he seeks to adopt for himself and quite literally, for his children and his children's children.

The Court, in Chua, continued:

The economic qualification for naturalization may be seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the petitioner would not become a public charge or an
economic burden upon society. The requirement relates, in other words, not simply to the time of execution of the petition for naturalization but also to the
probable future of the applicant for naturalization. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not dispute that respondent applicant, then a student, was
earning P2,000.00 a month, with free board and lodging, at the time she filed her Petition in August 1984. While this amount was not, even in 1984, exactly
a princely sum, she was not then a public charge and the respondent applicant having passed the qualifying medical board examinations, can scarcely be
regarded as likely to become a public charge in the future should she be admitted as a citizen of this Republic. Respondent is certainly in a position to earn
substantial income if allowed to exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of Medicine, she is also clearly a "potential asset to the country."27

As in Chuas case, it does not at all seem likely that Karbasi, in his current circumstances, will ever become a public charge. It bears emphasis to note that
from a refugee who had nothing when he came to the Philippines, Karbasi had indeed refused to be the object of charity by working hard to graduate from
college and to eventually engage in business to give his family support and comfort. The CA could not have explained this in better terms

Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee who was dependent on the UNCHR for support to a self-made entrepreneur who can ably support himself and
his family. As such, there is no showing that Karbasi may turn out to be a public charge and a burden to our countrys resources. The fact moreover that he
overcame this adversity through his education and skills shows that he is a potential asset of the country.

Second. The OSG raised the issue of Karbasis alleged underdeclaration of income in his ITRs. It contended that even if Karbasi had, indeed, a lucrative
means of earning, his failure to declare the income which he had earned from service contracts and to present any proof of the withholding of the taxes
thereon, would reflect adversely on his conduct, which under the statute must be "proper and irreproachable." The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v. Republic28 (Lim
Eng Yu), where the applicant later refuted the amounts reflected in his ITRs in order to prove that he had lucrative trade or occupation. The Court rebuffed
this "eleventh hour explanation" and concluded that the applicant had to conceal his true income for the purpose of evading payment of lawful taxes. The
Court found that Lim Eng Yu, at that time, had a wife and two children, so, at most, his total tax exemption then, was P5,000.00. Had he stated the net
incomes he claimed in his ITRs, he would have been required to pay income taxes, it appearing that the same exceeded his exemption under the law. Such
conduct showed that Lim Eng Yus moral character was not irreproachable, or as good as it should be, thus, disqualifying him for naturalization.

Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply the rigidity of the ruling in Lim Eng Yu to the present case. Unlike Lim Eng Yu, Karbasi did not deny the
charge of the OSG and instead admitted a procedural lapse on his part. Here, there is no showing that the income earned by Karbasi was undeclared in
order to benefit from statutory tax exemptions. To clarify, this does not intend to downplay the requirement of good moral character in naturalization cases.
It bears stressing that the granting of applications for naturalization still necessitates that only those who are deserving may be admitted as Filipino citizens.
The character of the applicant remains to be one of the significant measures to determine entitlement to Filipino citizenship. Nonetheless, the tenor of the
ground used for the denial of the application in Lim Eng Yu is not akin to what happened in this case.

Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner altogether intended to evade the payment of taxes by abusing the benefits granted by tax exemptions. 1wphi1 In this
case, Karbasi did not deny that he gained income through his transactions with Daewoo and Kolin. He even presented, as evidence, the contracts of service
he had entered into with the companies including a Summary of Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did not disclaim that he had rendered services to
these companies and that he had earned a considerable sum therefrom. Instead, he explained the cause of his lapse and acknowledged his mistaken belief
that his earnings from these transactions need not be declared in his ITRs as these were withheld already.

Again, it is not the objective of the Court to justify irregularities in ITRs by reason of a "mistaken belief." The Court, however, finds it difficult to equate
Karbasis lapse with a moral depravity that is fatal to his application for Filipino citizenship. This mistaken understanding of the proper way to declare income
is actually so common to individual taxpayers, including lawyers and other professionals. While this is not to be taken as an excuse for every irregularity in
ITRs, the Court is not prepared to consider this as an outright reflection of ones immoral inclinations. With due consideration to his character as established
by witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during the hearings, Karbasi should be deemed to have sufficiently explained his mistake.

In the case of Chua, the Court had even disregarded the OSGs argument that the applicants failure to execute her ITR "reflects adversely on her conduct."
Her explanation of non-filing as an "honest mistake" was accepted by the Court with due regard to the other circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the
Court also finds the same degree of sincerity in Karbasis case, for he was candid enough to elicit this conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion in the
records that Karbasi habitually excluded particular income in his ITRs. Echoing the findings in Chua, the Court does not believe that this one lapse should be
regarded as having so blackened Karbasis character as to disqualify him from naturalization as a Philippine citizen.

Third. Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does not need to belabor the last issue on reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine laws on
naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasis petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court,
however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the countrys obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit:

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and
conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee,
must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort
to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.

In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of
contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi' s status as a refugee has
to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the
Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and
stateless persons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191810 June 22, 2015

JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Petitioner,
vs.
BUREEAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION and its COMMISIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondents,

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeking to nullify the October 28, 2009 Decision 1 and March 22, 2010
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840, which affirmed as final and executor the April 17, 2002 Decision 3 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117.

In June 1999, the Concerned Employees of Noahs Arc Group of Companies filed a letter0complaint against petitioner Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano
(Go) and his father, Carlos Go, Sr. a.k.a. Go Kian Lu (Go, Sr.) It was claimed that Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien who later adopted the Filipino name
Carlos Go, Sr." Allegedly, Go. Sr. obtained for himself some basic education and married a Chinese woman name Rosario Tan. Their union produced ten (10)
children, one of whom is petitioner Go. On the premise that Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien, petitioner Go is also an alien, being a child of a Chinese
citizen.

A year after, in April 2000, a complaint-affidavit4 for deportation of petitioner Go was initiated, this time by Luis T. Ramos (Ramos), before the Bureau of
Immigration. Ramos alleged that while petitioner Go represents himself as a Filipino citizen, his personal circumstances and relevant records indicate that he
is a Chinese citizen born in the Philippines to Chinese parents, which is in violation of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. To prove his contention, Ramos presented the birth certificates of petitioner Go as well as that of his sister Juliet GO
(Juliet) and older brother Carlos Go, Jr. (Carlos, Jr.). The birth certificate indicates petitioner Go as "FChinese." The pertinent page from the Registry of
Births also states that the citizenship of Baby Jimmy Go is "Chinese." Further, the birth certificates of his siblings show that they were born of Chinese
parents.

Petitioner Go refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit. He alleged that his father, Go, Sr., who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother,
elected Philippine citizenship, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship on July 12, 1950. He added that Go, Sr. was a registered voter and actually voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. As regards the
entry in his siblings certificates of birth, petitioner Go averred that Juliet and Carlos, Jr., were born on June 3, 1946 and April 2, 1949, respectively, or prior
to their fathers election of Philippine citizenship. Finally, petitioner Go asserted that his birth certificate states that his fathers citizenship is "Filipino."

In October 2000, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forwarded to the BI a copy of its Investigation Report and probe on the investigation conducted
against petitioner Go and GO, Sr. pursuant to the letter complaint of the Concerned Employees of Noahs Arc Group of Companies. The finding of the Special
Investigator, which were affirmed by the Chief of the SLPS-NBI, stated that the election of Philippine citizenship of Go, Sr. was in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution and that the erasure on the original birth certificate of petitioner Go could not be attributed to him or Go, Sr. because
said document was on file with the local civil registrar of Iloilo City.

Finding the evidence and report of the NBA as conclusive of the citizenship of petitioner Go and Go, Sr., BI Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-
Hornilla subsequently rendered a Resolution dated February 14, 2001 that dismissed the complaint for deportation filed against petitioner Go.5

However, on March 8, 2001,6 the BI Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed the case dismissal, holding that the election of Philippine citizenship of Go,
Sr. was made out of time. The Board then directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against petitioner Go.
One July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet7 was filed against petitioner Go for violation of Section 37(a)(9), in relation to Section 45(e) of C.A. No.
613, as amended, committed as follows:

1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth certificate wherein his
citizenship was recorded a "Chinese";

2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship as
Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;] [and]

3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represents and introduces himself as a citizen of the Philippines,
for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

In November 2001, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001.9 Essentially, they challenged the jurisdiction
of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision dated April 17, 2002 in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go.
The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and
that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings
that are pending court or before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry
into the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.10

The Board gave weight to the documents submitted against petitioner Go, to wit:

1. The Certificate of Birth of petitioner Go, issued on November 23, 1999 by the local civil registrar of Iloilo City, which showed that Baby Jimmy
Go is "FChinese";

2. The Certificate of Live Birth of Juliet Go, which certified that her citizenship was Chinese. The same certificate also stated that Go, Sr. was a
"Chinese" and the mother "Rosario Tan" was also "Chinese"; and

3. The Certificate of Live Birth of Carlos Go, Jr., whose citizenship was also certified as "Chinese."

The Board held that all documents submitted were prima-facie evidence of the facts regarding the nationality of petitioner Go pursuant to Article 410 11 of
the Civil Code as they are considered public documents. Further, it was opined that petitioner Gos claim of being Filipino totally lacks merit since his fathers
election of Philippine citizenship was void for having been filed five (5) years after his attainment of the age of majority or when he was twenty-six (26)
years old. The Board also observed that the certified true copy of the Oath of Allegiance of Go, Sr. appears to have been subscribed and sworn to before the
Deputy Clerk of Court of Iloilo City on July 11,1950 while his Affidavit of Election was subscribed and sworn to before the same public officer a day after. The
Board considered this a irregular since Go, Sr. filed his Oath of Allegiance prior to his actual election of the Philippine citizenship contrary to Section 1 of C.A.
625, which provides:

Election of Philippine Citizenship must be expressed in a statement before any officer authorized to administer oaths and filed with the nearest civil registry
and accompanied by an Oath of Allegiance to the Philippine Constitution.

In view of the adverse judgment, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed before the Pasig RTC a supplemental petition to declare the nullity of the Boards April 17,
2002 Decision.12

The Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the BI from enforcing the April 17, 2002
Decision.13 Later, however, it dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 14 A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied in an Order issued on May 3, 2004.15

Petitioner Go and Go, Sr. then questioned before the CA the RTCs January 6, 2004 Decision and May 3, 2004 Order by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.16 The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration on October 25, 2004 and February 16, 2005, respectively. 17

Meantime, on November 16, 2004, the Board issued a warrant of deportation, which led to the apprehension and detention of petitioner Go pending his
deportation.18

Thereafter, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570, assailing the CA
decision and resolution CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.

Petitioner Go also appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which, on September 29, 2004, concurred with the findings of the Board. 19 The OP likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration on February 11, 2005.20 As a result, petitioner Go elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules.21

Meanwhile, the Court resolved G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 when Go, Sr. v. Ramos 22 was promulgated on September 4, 2009. The decision sustained the
October 25, 2004 Decision and February 16, 2005 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.

More than a month after, on October 28, 2009, the CA dismissed the Rule 43 petition, holding that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board which was the
subject of appeal to the OP, had already become final and executor. The CA denied petitioner Gos motion for reconsideration on March 22, 2010; hence, this
petition raising the issues as follows:

1. The Honorable Court erred in dismissing the instant petition;

2. The Honorable Court erred in declaring that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-
117 is final and executor; and

3. The Honorable Court erred in not ruling on the irregularity of the issuance of the Office of the President of its September 29, 2004 and February
11, 2005 Resolutions.23

We deny.

Petitioner Go presume that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not yet attained finality due to the pendency of his Motion for Leave to Admit
Attached Second (2nd) Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court allegedly failed to resolve. He is mistaken.
As a general rule, a second motion for reconsideration cannot be entertained. Section 2 or Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is unequivocal. 24 The Court
resolutely holds that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and after an express leave
has been first obtained may such motion be entertained.25 The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration is emphasized in A.M. No. 10-
4-20-SC, as amended (Internal Rules of the Supreme Court). Section 3, Rule 15 of which states:

SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be
granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the
higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

The Court has the power prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation of and when justice requires it. In the exercise of
sound discretion, we may determine issues which are of transcendental importance. This case is definitely not an exception.

Upon examination of the records of G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570, We found that on August 18, 2010 petitioners Motion for Leave to Attach a Second
Motion for Reconsideration and the Second Motion for Reconsideration were denies and noted without action, respectively. Thus, the CA is correct in ruling
that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board may no longer be reviewed as it already attained finality and should remain so. Based on the principle of
immutability of judgment, a decision must become final and executor at some point in time; all litigations must necessarily come to an end.

Xxx A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions
of a court much reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle our
justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
exercise the power adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers
had been conferred. Xxx26

Subject to certain recognized exceptions such a (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, which
are not present in this case, the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as nothing further can be done except to execute it.27

Notably, the subject matters of Go, Sr. and the present case are essentially the same as both involve identical facts and evidence. Necessarily, this case
should be disposed in the same way that G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 in Go, Sr. were resolved.

In Go, Sr. which was promulgated on September 4, 2009, the validity of the April 17, 2002 BI Decision that ordered the apprehension and deportation of
petitioner Go was already passed upon with finality. Therein, one of the issues presented for resolution was whether the evidence adduced by petitioner Go
and his father, Go, Sr., to prove their claim of Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the BI of its jurisdiction from continuing with the
deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage, While petitioner Go and Go, Sr. conceded that BI
has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insisted that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that claim is correct. They posited that the judicial intervention required is not merely a judicial
review of the proceedings below but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of evidence are strictly observed. The Court disagreed
and opined that the jurisdiction of the BI is not divested by mere claim of citizenship, it was held;

There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also
the question of citizenship raised by him. However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed
by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the
courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the
belief that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should
also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper
proceedings.1wphi1 After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and
not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. The decision of the
Board on the question is of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue
with the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificated of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go
and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was
offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow
immediate recourse to the regular court is a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts. None of the exceptions
in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented
once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.28

The Bureau of Immigration is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner Go violated certain provisions of C.A. No. 613, as amended. In this
jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.29 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not finality by the courts.30

Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues. The well-settled rule is that questions
of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of
the trial courts judgment or the appellate courts misapprehension of the adduced facts.31 None of the exceptions was convincingly shown to be present in
this case.

In addition, this Court cannot let it pass to declare that petitioner Go is guilty of forum-shopping

Forum shopping is defined as:

[w]hen a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court.

Forum shopping consists of the following elements:

a. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
 b. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

c. The identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the under consideration.32

In Go, Sr. petitioner Go and Go, Sr. challenged in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 the October 25, 2004 Decision and February 16, 2005 Resolution of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143, which affirmed the January 6, 2004 Decision and May 3, 2004 Order of the Pasig RTC in SCA No. 2218 that upheld the Charge
Sheet dated July 3, 2001 and the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board. We eventually affirmed the CA Decision and Resolution.

On the other hand, in this case petitioner Go seeks to nullify the October 28, 2009 Decision and March 22, 2010 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
88840 ruling that the April 17, 2002 Decision had already become final executor in view of Our Decision in Go, Sr. To note, after filing G.R. Nos. 167569 and
167570 before this Court, petitioner Go still appealed the same April 17, 2002 Board Decision to the Office of the President. Unfortunately for him, the OP
also denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. With the denial, he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA, which, as aforesaid,
sustained the BI Decision.

We have held in Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong33 that from the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the BI Board of Commissioners, the aggrieved
party has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OPs decision via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort certiorari before the CA
strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy."

Petitioner Go availed of remedies (b) and (c) above in his desire to obtain a favorable judgment. In Go, Sr., petitioner Go, together with his father, elevated
the case to the CA via Rule 65 petition. In this case, he immediately appealed to the OP, by-passing the Secretary of Justice.

Similar to Go, Sr., ruling on whether petitioner Go is a Filipino citizen is not what We are called upon to in this case.1wphi1 The Court does not even have
to rule once more on the issue of citizenship to determine whether the BI proceedings may be enjoined to give way to a judicial determination of the same
because the matter was already passed upon with finality in Go, Sr. At this moment, petitioners Philippine citizenship claim cannot be settled before Us.
There are factual issues that make his citizenship controversial; hence, must first be resolved before the BI and not before the Supreme Court, which is not
a trier of facts.34

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The October 28, 2009 Decision and March 22, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840, which affirmed as final the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Immigration, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARCOS BURIAL CASE GR 225973

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped
everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the
nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining
an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required
under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected
from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,
other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed
after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991,
order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of
all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from
enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided
over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by
the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to
dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing
or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of
this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying
its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the
same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals
within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from
exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and
(2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall
the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the
respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with
dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of
determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so
lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of
Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were
required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the
dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from
notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such
efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and
decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of
LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and
desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping
of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and
found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining
and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the
temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation
of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease
and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by
the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the
surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to
question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local
Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On
the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the
LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has
territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the
Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in
Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the
necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which
was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e),
(f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the
same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government
agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature
and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter
and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and
quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business
establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No.
192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious
effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within
the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-
complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite
project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d),
of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case
was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of
the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
"cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found
by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an
unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par.
(d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect
that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping
the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute
and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of
the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the
Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental
human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the
City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided
under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation
of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region,
whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might
possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from
the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the
Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and
expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CASE GR L-31195

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and
the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain
and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the
clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4
dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up
several businesses over the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3,
1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious
physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-668 9 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10
The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he
entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the
original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of
commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion
was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK],
against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence,
depicted the following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship. 20 When
their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. 21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking,
rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of
a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate
labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.24

She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred
residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly
and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On Wednesdays, she went to
Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her
well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her
panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31

In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial
problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x."
She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites
of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed
at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary
while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched
KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested
separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order:
"You transfer here [to] our bed."36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where
she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely
declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they
tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her
hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to
me because I'm not feeling well."42

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's
bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me," 44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to
their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is
crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family
trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again,
and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is
family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are
you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her
tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling
KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he
forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper.
The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children
proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the
beddings when the accused-appellant entered.

"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children. 54 He then scoffed: "Its
alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after
retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55

He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out
of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear
apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J
because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they
subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59

The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged,
"[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-
appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve
because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window,
inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed
with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again
forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought
food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.

Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually
acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks
that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63

The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On
October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to
attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan
de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the
accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the
accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then
instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around
4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7
and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00
p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18,
1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65

The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for
their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a
month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.67

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998
for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her
after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly
indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer
ask for his permission whenever she went out.68

Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually
intended for KKK.70

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or
the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player.
Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player,
spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter
followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had
somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the
separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-
appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a
Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the
spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money
squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting
declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant
the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.77

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned
with respect to the amended informations.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was
able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using
force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is
not necessary to prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse,
there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that
physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have
sexual intercourse with the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no
wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband
with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about
four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.79

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective
supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it
intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in
Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of
going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the
absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection

The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and
'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by
forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85

If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to become the property of her
husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
synonymous.88

From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power and status under the feudal
doctrine of coverture.89

A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.90

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no
right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will.91

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the
marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly
sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as
"the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty 95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with
all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his
wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.98

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be
equally protected under rape laws.99

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart
pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v.
Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital
exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent.
Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x
x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a
husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels
"aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful
self-help x x x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the
legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected
in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile,
the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep,
or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article
335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband
may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his
wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of
discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing
global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all
appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated
therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;

xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically
in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

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Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The
Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in
Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to
the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime
without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No.
6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus
of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it
is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I
believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even
jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the
definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for
sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing
so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief
of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that
will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not
marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our
understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the
husband? Is that correct?

MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is
no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because
all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to
death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years
imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape
actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does
not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess
that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all
it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have
sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're
[the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or
intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the,
yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.

xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an
instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F,
the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave
it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that
should be made clear. x x x.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have
sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand
that it is half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence.
x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter.
There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define
rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for
as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely
erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been
married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the
revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of
rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr.
Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of
sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to
live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence
accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight
percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two
incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim,
KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the
contrary is proved.

The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for
determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between
husband and wife.116

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles
on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The
Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is
needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to
every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was
Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in,
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property,
he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal 120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this
dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments
and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.

It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love,
that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens
the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious
urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies.
Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. 125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy
from her coercively or violently.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws 126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape
or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and
those raped by any other man alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from
married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A
marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her
own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for
the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.130

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court,
tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets
forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and
irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the
woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of
the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and
resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was

based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly
the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are,
nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing,
and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.131

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its
inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is
shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied,
the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each
witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK
never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep
beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he
insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn
demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She
reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped
her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.133

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the
previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room
and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got
angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do
whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK
into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts
and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the
room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual
congress.136

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the
offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of which were established
beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO:

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."

Q So, what did you do after that?

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

xx xx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

xxxx

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137

(Cross-Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.

Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A No, Sir.

Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?

A No, only on the breast level.138

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?

A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A It was tom.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in
order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus
revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter
coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact
that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she
consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the
conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to
take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person
from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is
soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an
invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught.
Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a
specific kind thereof.

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual
congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to
stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is
that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind 141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless
and hapless victim to bow into submission.142

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not
the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will or without her consent.145

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the
present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert
witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign
of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and
forthright.

The corroborative testimonies of

MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must
be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their
declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity
on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to
check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard
the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the
accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is
an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an
argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in
front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying
and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.

Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-
consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her
appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on
her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that
occurred were against her will.

Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK
belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.150

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only
found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate
charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.151

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is
understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social
humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is
in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is
often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had
the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents.

The victim -S testimony on the

witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the
witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony
given in court.152

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy
evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately
P3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not
account for the money deposited in the bank.153

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a
"happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness
to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did
he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that
an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-
appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely
made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus
incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual
intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus
be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or
rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical
distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the
facility of access between the two places.155

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of
commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by
about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must
give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful
declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO
and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-
appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in
relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than
the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape,
there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imperative.160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place,
age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her
time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an
affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of
marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or
withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force
or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It
entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent
husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape
complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other
laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.