Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12003214
David R. Shanks
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London,
London WC1H 0AP, United Kingdom
d.shanks@ucl.ac.uk
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/psychlangsci/research/CPB/people/cpb-staff/
d_shanks
Abstract: To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a
wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and
behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories
assigning causally effective roles to unconscious inuences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and
reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment,
deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role
of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review
highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of landmark results, and a
tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that t with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious inuences being ascribed
inated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future
research should focus on tasks in which participants attention is diverted away from the experimenters hypothesis, rather than the
highly reective tasks that are currently often employed.
Keywords: awareness; conscious; decision making; deliberation; intuition; judgment; perceptual-motor skills; unconscious
1. Introduction
BEN R. NEWELL is an associate professor of Cognitive
Psychology is concerned with understanding how the mind Psychology at the University of New South Wales in
controls and determines behavior. Fundamental to this Sydney. He has published more than 60 journal articles
goal is whether unconscious inuences play a signicant on several aspects of higher-level cognition including
role in the generation of decisions and the causation of be- heuristic judgment, decisions under risk and uncer-
havior generally. Everyday notions such as gut instinct tainty, categorization, learning, memory, and induction.
and intuition capture the idea that subtle inuences He has an enduring interest in the roles played by
falling outside awareness can bias behavior. Claims that implicit and explicit processes in all of these areas. In
2012 he was awarded an Australian Research Council
People possess a powerful, sophisticated, adaptive uncon- Future Fellowship.
scious that is crucial for survival in the world (Wilson 2002,
p. vii) and that we should think less rather than more about DAVID R. SHANKS is a professor of Psychology at
complex decisions (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006b) have a strong University College London and head of the Division
grip on both theoretical perspectives and the public imagin- of Psychology and Language Sciences. He is the
ation (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007; Gladwell 2005; Lehrer 2009). author of more than 100 publications in human cogni-
This article evaluates a wide range of research ndings from tive and experimental psychology, including research
the past 20 or so years that have contributed to the devel- on learning and memory, causal inference, and judg-
opment of this perspective. ment and decision making, and has authored or edited
The unconscious has of course played a major role in the seven books, including Straight Choices: The Psychol-
ogy of Decision Making (with Ben Newell and David
history of psychology, certainly predating Freuds comprehen- Lagnado). Development and testing of computational
sive development of the concept. But in the past few years it models is a major theme throughout his research. In
has been the focus of extensive research in mainstream exper- 2011 he was awarded the Experimental Psychology
imental psychology, including cognition, perception, and social Society Mid-Career Award.
behavior, as well as in cognitive neuroscience, behavioral
Figure 1. A lens model framework illustrating possible loci of unconscious inuences on decision making.
who uses the right of peremptory challenge against a poten- measurement, one being some behavioral index of per-
tial juror, based on an unconscious judgment or stereotyp- formance and the other being an awareness assessment
ing of the juror as racially biased. based on the individuals report, verbal or otherwise. An
Our use of the lens model as a framework is illustrative, unconscious inuence on decision making is inferred if
and there are other formal frameworks such as signal detec- performance is affected by some cue or factor that is not
tion theory and sequential analysis (see Gold & Shadlen reected in awareness. Underlying theoretical constructs
2007) for conceptualizing the elements of decision are not the same as the measurements that we take of
making.2 Nonetheless, it affords some structure for evaluat- them, and this is as true of awareness as it is of any other
ing the major areas of our review. Before turning to these psychological construct. It is therefore essential to recog-
areas, however, in the next section we outline a set of cri- nize that an assessment of awareness will only be informa-
teria that further help to evaluate possible unconscious tive if it is relatively free from bias and error.
inuences on decision making. The criteria that need to be met by adequate awareness
measures have been the subject of extensive previous
discussion (e.g., Dawson & Reardon 1973; Ericsson &
1.2 Criteria for the assessment of awareness
Simon 1980; Lovibond & Shanks 2002; Shanks & St.
Research on the role of awareness in decision making typi- John 1994). In brief, the more reliable, relevant, immedi-
cally (but not invariably) seeks to contrast two types of ate, and sensitive an awareness assessment is, the less
demonstrations under (a) above fail to meet our criteria mental states, and the verbal reporting of these states
regarding adequate assessments of awareness (see conveys privileged information about the causes of our
Table 1). Consider an experiment in which participants behavior.
chose between (and justied their choice from) four consu- Having provided a framework for thinking about how
mer products that were in reality identical. Nisbett and unconscious processes might inuence decisions, and
Wilson (1977; more details of the original experiments having articulated some of the requirements for an ade-
are given in Wilson & Nisbett 1978) found that participants quate test of awareness, we now turn to three major
tended to select the right-most of four alternatives (e.g., areas in which unconscious factors have played a prominent
pairs of stockings) but did not mention position when justi- role.
fying their choice, or atly denied being inuenced by pos-
ition when asked directly (this would be an example of
unawareness located at Point C in the lens model of 2. Unconscious inuences in multiple-cue
Fig. 1). Instead, participants mentioned attributes such as judgment
the quality of the stockings. The problem with this
nding is that asking participants about position fails the Research into multiple-cue judgment focuses on situations
relevance criterion, as position is almost certainly not a in which people attempt to predict an environmental cri-
proximal cause of choice (this argument was originally terion on the basis of imperfect probabilistic indicators
made by Smith & Miller 1978). It is at best a distal cause just as a doctor might try to diagnose a disease on the
whose inuence is mediated via the participants true basis of symptoms, medical history, and results of diagnos-
decision rule. tic tests. A long-standing question in this eld is the extent
In such sequential choice situations, people tend to study to which such judgments are based on explicitly available
the options one at a time, usually (but depending on knowledge. This question is of psychological importance
culture) from left to right (Wilson & Nisbett [1978] con- because if experts lack self-insight into the processes
rmed that this was the case in the experiment). Suppose underlying these judgments, they may be unconsciously
that the decision rule is that if the current item is no biased (Evans et al. 2003, p. 608). This section investigates
worse in terms of quality than the previous item, then this claim rst by reviewing evidence relating to the devel-
prefer the current item. After the initial item, each sub- opment of self-insight in novices learning experimental
sequent one is mentally compared with its predecessor multicue judgment tasks, and second by examining the lit-
(Li & Epley 2009; Mantonakis et al. 2009), and because erature on the self-insight of experts performing real-world
the items are identical, the resulting nal choice is the multiple-cue judgments.
right-most pair of stockings. Even though the rule may Following the pioneering work of Hammond and col-
lead (wrongly) to the belief that one item is superior to leagues (see Hammond & Stewart 2001), many studies in
the others, the choice is in no sense determined by this area have employed the lens model framework of
spatial position. Spatial position only has an inuence Figure 1 to examine judgment. In a standard study partici-
insofar as it affects how the items are sequentially pants make judgments about a series of cases (e.g.,
sampled. Indeed, under such circumstances it is perfectly patients) for which information is available from a set of
correct for participants to report quality as the basis of cues. Multiple linear regressions are then performed
their decision, as their decision rule incorporates judg- from the judgments to the cues to measure the policies
ments of quality, and to deny being inuenced by position. that judges adopt. The beta weights obtained from these
To establish that the choice is being driven by unconscious regressions give an indication of the cues that inuenced
inuences, it would be necessary to show that participants the judge, as well as the relative extent of this inuence.
deny employing a sequential comparison process, but this is These beta weights are described as the implicit or tacit
not what Nisbett and Wilson (1977) asked their partici- policy underlying judgment (indicated on Fig. 1, Point D,
pants. Claiming that their participants were unconsciously as cue utilizations).
inuenced by position is like claiming that an individual To examine the extent of insight into judgments, these
who chooses the apartment she saw on Thursday, after implicit policies are then compared with self-assessments
seeing others on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, is of the importance of cues for determining judgments.
unconsciously inuenced in her choice by the day of the Importance can be assessed in a variety of ways, such as
week.4 asking judges to divide 100 points between the cues, with
The second way in which subsequent research chal- higher numbers indicating greater reliance on a cue. The
lenges Nisbett and Wilsons (1977) position is equally strength of the correlation between these ratings of impor-
damaging. It appears far too strong to claim that individ- tance and the beta weights derived from multiple
uals responses can be predicted just as well by observers, regression is taken as indicating the extent of insight. A
who have access to nothing more than the public features widely accepted consensus from this research is that
of the stimuli and context, as they can be by the individuals there is often a lack of correlation between the two
own verbal reports on their mental processes. Apart from measures of the usage of cues, reecting judges poor
raising a number of serious methodological problems insight (Arkes 1981; Evans et al. 2003; Slovic & Lichten-
with Nisbett and Wilsons original studies (e.g., Guerin & stein 1971).
Innes 1981; Smith & Miller 1978; White 1980), later
research has clearly shown predictive advantages for
2.1 Examining insight in novice judges
actors over observers (Gavanski & Hoffman 1987; White
1989; Wright & Rip 1981). It is apparent that in many According to some researchers, the reason for this poor
of the sorts of situations cited by Nisbett and Wilson, we insight is that judges learn how to make their judgments
do in fact have introspective access to our conscious in an implicit manner (e.g., Evans et al. 2003), and these
correlation of only 0.34 between the implicit and explicit 0.50 for explicit policy recognition. This level of perform-
weights of 13 professional stockbrokers performing a ance is clearly far from perfect but it is considerably
stock selection task. The low correlation was attributed to better than the 0.25 hit rate expected by chance. This repli-
the variance of explicit weights across the individuals: cation is important because it not only demonstrates
Each of the eight predictor variables was rated as most self-insight in genuine domain experts (instead of under-
important by at least one judge, and some variables were graduate students), but also rules out one possible expla-
rated subjectively more important than the regression nation for Reilly and Dohertys ndings. In their study
analysis warranted. some participants mentioned selecting explicit policies on
The serious discrepancies identied by Slovic et al. the basis of explicit memory for the particular numbers of
(1972) and many others (e.g., Balzer et al. 1983; Phelps points they had distributed to individual cues (e.g., I
& Shanteau 1978) seem problematic for the view that we know I used 2.5 for one attribute). Such memory for spe-
have access to the information inuencing our behavior. cics, rather than insight into the actual policy, is less likely
These results would seem to suggest that there are to have been a contributing factor in the Harries et al.
indeed unconscious inuences on the process of weighting (2000) study, given that policy recognition was conducted
and integrating cue information (see Fig. 1, Point D). 10 months after the judgment task and importance
However, the strength with which such conclusions can ratings were represented as bar charts. Note that although
be drawn depends crucially on the methods used to elicit the test used in these studies does not meet the immediacy
the importance ratings. It is quite possible that judges criterion for awareness assessment (see Table 1), the use of
have good insight, but that experimenters have not pro- recognition rather than free recall makes it a more sensitive
vided them with sufcient opportunities to report the and arguably relevant test of insight.
knowledge that they possess. It is also possible that The recognition measures used in the Reilly and
judges confuse questions about the importance of cues Doherty studies revealed an astonishing degree of
for the task environment (i.e., ecological validities; see insight (Reilly & Doherty 1989, p. 125), but the standard
Fig. 1, Point B) with their importance for their own judg- measures (e.g., correlations between implicit and explicit
ment process (i.e., cue utilizations; see Fig. 1, Point D) (cf. policy weights) showed the same poor to moderate levels
Lagnado et al. 2006; Speekenbrink & Shanks 2010; Surber as seen in many previous experiments. Furthermore, in
1985). As we shall see, there is considerable justication for both studies predictions on hold-out samples of judgments
these concerns. (i.e., cross-validation) demonstrated that models using
implicit weights were superior to those using explicit
weights in almost 100% of cases. Thus there appears to
2.3 Insight through policy recognition
be something else captured in the implicit policies that
In an inuential brace of articles, Reilly and Doherty (1989; participants are unable to communicate in their explicit
1992) examined an alternative way of assessing insight and policies.
drew signicantly more optimistic conclusions about However, the lower predictive accuracy of explicit
experts knowledge of their judgment policies. Their weights and the tendency for people to state that they
novel procedure used a policy selection or recognition have relied on more cues than are apparent from their
test that involved identifying ones own policy (described judgments (e.g., Slovic et al. 1972) might also be partially
by normalized cue utilization indices) from an array of poss- artifactual. Harries et al. (2000) pointed out that explicit
ible policies. In both articles, across a variety of hypotheti- weight estimates are based on a sample size of one that
cal judgment tasks, this policy recognition method of is, they are made once, at the end of a series of (often)
assessing insight revealed much higher levels of self- hundreds of judgments. As such they fail the immediacy,
insight into implicit and explicit policy proles than indi- sensitivity, and reliability criteria for awareness outlined
cated in previous research. in Table 1. In contrast, the implicit weights are calculated
Harries et al. (2000) extended the policy recognition from all trials and are thus more likely to capture patterns
approach by assessing self-insight in medical general prac- of cue use. Thus the low correlation between the two types
titioners. The doctors had taken part in a policy-capturing may be due to the weakness of the cue importance
study 10 months prior to the insight assessment. They measure.
had been asked to make prescription decisions (e.g., The mismatch between stated and actual cue use could
whether to prescribe lipid-lowering drugs) for 130 hypothe- also be attributable to another aspect of typical experimen-
tical patients, each described by 13 cues (e.g., hyperten- tal designs: the use of orthogonal cue sets (cf., Harries et al.
sion, cholesterol level, age), and to rate the importance of 2000; Reilly & Doherty 1992). Policy-capturing studies aim
each cue for their judgments. In the follow-up, the to discover reliance on particular cues; this is very difcult
doctors were presented with two arrays each containing to do if a stimulus set contains highly intercorrelated cues,
12 bar charts. The rst array displayed implicit policy pro- and so experimenters take pains to develop orthogonal cue
les (regression weights), and the second explicit proles sets. However, this can lead to problems if a judge uses
(importance ratings) both on standard bar charts. The 12 cues inconsistently across cases.
charts included the participants own policy and 11 others Harries et al. (2000) cited the example of a doctor using
randomly selected from the total pool of 32 participants. overweight or blood pressure interchangeably in making a
Their task was to rank the three policies in each set that decision about hypertension (because the two cues are
they thought were closest to their own. highly correlated in reality). If the doctor was then pre-
Consistent with Reilly and Doherty (1989; 1992), the sented with hypothetical cases in which these cues were
doctors were signicantly above chance at picking both orthogonal, he or she might still switch between them in
types of policies. The average hit rate (having ones own his or her judgments but rate them both highly important
policy in the three selected) was 0.48 for implicit and at the end of the task. The regression analysis would then
deliberation, and immediate processing. None of these theoretical and empirical grounds (for a wide-ranging
experiments satised the two criteria outlined above. critique of the capacity principle of UTT, see, e.g.,
Moreover there were troubling (and unexplained) patterns Gonzlez-Vallejo et al. 2008). With regard to superior
in the data. For example, in Experiments 1 and 3 signicant weighting of information, the experimental evidence is
differences between some conditions were only found for equivocal at best. In the standard paradigm described
males who constituted the clear minority in the sample. above, participants own subjective attribute weightings
Thus even in this foundational study the evidence for are ignored because the importance of attributes is prede-
unconscious inuences was rather imsy. It appears that ned by the experimenter (e.g., Nordgren et al. 2011).
when it comes to the role of unconscious processes, once Often this is done in an implausible manner. For example,
an (intuitive) idea has taken hold, a momentum appears in Dijksterhuis et al.s (2006b) study the number of cup
to build that is belied by the strength of the existing data. holders in a car was deemed as important as the fuel
But despite this rocky start, it is now clear that there are economy (obviously cup holders are far more important):
several demonstrations of the effect both in terms of Both were given the same single-unit weight in the calcu-
improvements relative to conscious thought and immediate lation of the best and worst cars. With these exper-
thought (see Strick et al. 2011, for a meta-analysis), imenter-dened weighting schemes, it is impossible to
although experiments in which all three conditions are know whether the best choice is indeed the one favored
tested and signicant differences are found between each by all participants.
are still the exception rather than the rule (e.g., Dijkster- Newell et al. (2009) examined this issue by asking partici-
huis et al. [2009] and Lerouge [2009] but see Gonzlez- pants, after choices had been made, for importance ratings
Vallejo & Phillips [2010] for a re-evaluation of the former). for each attribute (e.g., How important are cup holders?).
These positive ndings are, however, tempered by In so doing, Newell et al. were able to determine, retro-
several studies that have compared all three thought con- spectively, the best option for each participant and then
ditions in a single experiment and failed to demonstrate see how often participants chose the option predicted by
any advantage of unconscious thought over conscious their idiosyncratic weights. The results were clear: Regard-
and/or immediate decisions (Acker 2008; Calvillo & Pena- less of the condition (conscious, unconscious, or immedi-
loza 2009; Huizenga et al. 2012; Mamede et al. 2010; ate), the majority of participants chose the option
Newell et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2008; Rey et al. 2009; Thor- predicted by their own idiosyncratic weights. In a similar
steinson & Withrow 2009; Waroquier et al. 2010). The vein, Dijksterhuis (2004) reported that conscious and
reliability of the effect is also questioned by an earlier unconscious thinkers did not differ signicantly in terms
meta-analysis of the unconscious-thought literature. of the correlations between their idiosyncratic attribute
Acker (2008) found that across 17 data sets there was weightings and attitudes toward options.
little evidence (p. 292) for an advantage of unconscious This last nding was echoed in a recent study by Bos
thought. He also found that the largest unconscious et al. (2011), who demonstrated that participants in both
thought effects were in the studies with the smallest an immediate and an unconscious-thought condition were
sample sizes. Note that this is exactly the pattern predicted able to differentiate between cars that had a high number
if one adopts exploratory rather than conrmatory research of important positive attributes (quality cars) from
practices (Simmons et al. 2011; Wagenmakers et al. 2011) those that had several unimportant positive attributes
and is also consistent with a publication bias operating ( frequency cars) (a conscious thought condition was not
(i.e., preferential publication of statistically signicant included). While unconscious thinkers were signicantly
effects Renkewitz et al. 2011).5 In line with these con- better at this differentiation (their difference scores were
clusions, Newell and Rakow (2011) presented a Bayesian larger), there was no signicant difference in the extent
analysis of 16 unconscious-thought experiments from to which participants obeyed their own weighting
their laboratories (including both published and unpub- schemes. Moreover, because a conscious thought compari-
lished studies) and found overwhelming evidence in son group was not run, we do not know if it was the oper-
support of the null hypothesis of no difference between ation of some active unconscious process that improved
conscious and unconscious thought. weighting or simply the additional time between presen-
A charitable interpretation is that it is too early to draw tation of the alternatives and the elicitation of the decision.
strong conclusions about the robustness of the effect (cf. A study by Usher et al. (2011) sheds further light on the
Hogarth 2010). Vagaries of procedures, experimental weighting issue. They asked participants to rate the set of
instructions, differences in population samples, and differ- attributes from which the objects were composed before
ences in stimulus materials are all likely to contribute noise the decision task. A unique set of objects was then
and hamper interpretation. But what about those cases created, via computer software, to ensure that one object
where an effect is found? Do such results necessitate the was the best for each individual participant, one the
involvement of an intelligent unconscious? worst, and two others in-between. The standard decision
task was then conducted with conscious- and uncon-
scious-thought groups (no immediate group was included).
3.2 Explanations of the deliberation-without-attention
Almost 70% of the distracted participants chose the best
effect
option, while fewer than 30% of those asked to think care-
Proponents of the unconscious-thought theory (UTT) fully did so. This is a compelling result suggesting more
argue that deliberation without attention works because optimal weighting in unconscious than conscious thought,
of the increased capacity and superior information-weight- but without the immediate group for comparison, the
ing ability of unconscious relative to conscious thought Usher et al. results (on their own) do not satisfy our
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren 2006). However, substantiating earlier criteria: The added value of unconscious processing,
these claims has proved somewhat problematic on both relative to an immediate judgment, cannot be assessed.
penalty, but nothing is known at the outset about the distri- In view of the enormous amount written about the IGT
bution of these outcomes. Someone playing this game has and this pioneering study, it is remarkable to note that the
the opportunity to learn that the long-run payoffs of the key behavioral observation with regard to normal partici-
decks differ and hence can adapt their sampling of pants more selections from good than bad decks in the
the decks to reect the payoffs. This essential structure prehunch period was not in fact statistically signicant
describes the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), devised by in the Bechara et al. (1997) study. Preference for cards
Bechara et al. (1994). In the years since it was rst from the good decks was signicant in the hunch and con-
described and studied, a vast literature has grown up ceptual periods, but by that stage, of course, the partici-
around this simple choice task (see Dunn et al. 2006). pants possessed some conscious knowledge that could be
The conventional structure of the task employs four card guiding their choices. And the failure of this preference
decks and 100 card selections. Two of the decks yield posi- for the good decks in the prehunch period to reach signi-
tive payoffs of $100 for each card, and the remaining two cance is unlikely to be due simply to low power, because in
decks yield payoffs of $50. However, some of the cards two direct replications, with the same assessment of aware-
yield simultaneous losses. These are programmed to be ness, Maia and McClelland (2004) and Wagar and Dixon
more substantial on the decks that yield $100 payoffs (2006) did not even observe a numerical preference for
such that in the long run these decks are disadvantageous the good decks in the prehunch period.
and yield average net losses (equal to $25), while the In addition to their replication of the original study, Maia
decks with $50 payoffs are advantageous and yield positive and McClelland (2004) tested another group of participants
average net payoffs (equal to +$25). Within each pair of but employed a much more careful assessment of their
decks, one has larger but less frequent punishments, but awareness of the nature of the task at regular intervals.
the average payoff is equal. Thus in the long run the best This careful assessment satised the criteria listed in
strategy is to select cards from one or both of the advan- Table 1. Rather than simply recording responses to open-
tageous decks and avoid the disadvantageous ones. ended questions regarding what they thought and felt
In addition to assessing choice behavior in this task, about the task, Maia and McClelland required their partici-
Bechara et al. (1997) probed participants awareness of pants to rate each deck on a numerical scale, to explain
the task structure. After the rst 20 trials and then after their numerical ratings, to report in detail what they
every additional 10 trials, participants were asked to thought the average net winnings or losses would be if 10
describe what they knew and felt about the task. The cards were selected from each deck, and to state which
majority of participants eventually reached a conceptual deck they would choose if they could only select from
period in which they were able to describe with condence one deck for the remainder of the game. Answers to
which were the good and bad decks, and in this period they these questions provided a range of assessments of aware-
unsurprisingly selected from the good decks on the ness against which actual card selections could be com-
majority of trials. Prior to the conceptual period was a pared. In addition, Maia and McClelland ensured that
hunch period, described by Bechara et al. (1997) as invol- the classication of decks as good or bad was based on
ving a reported liking for the good over the bad decks, but the actual payoffs experienced by the individual participant
with low condence and reports of guessing. In the phase to that point. Bechara et al. (1997) xed the sequence of
before this (the prehunch phase) participants professed payoffs from each deck in the same way for each participant
no notion of what was happening in the game (Bechara and scheduled very few penalties on the bad decks across
et al. 1997, p. 1294). Crucially, then, the question is the early trials. Thus a participant selecting early on from
whether awareness correlated with card selections or the bad decks might actually be making good choices,
whether, in contrast, participants selected from the good because the penalties that ultimately make such decks
decks in the prehunch phase before being aware of the bad have not yet been experienced. Plainly, it is crucial to
differences between the decks in terms of their average classify selections as good or bad in relation to what the par-
payoff. It is this latter outcome that Bechara et al. (1997) ticipant has actually experienced, not in relation to the long-
claimed to observe in their data, concluding that normals term but unknown average.
began to choose advantageously before they realized When card selections were compared with reported
which strategy worked best and that in normal individ- awareness under Maia and McClellands (2004) improved
uals, nonconscious biases guide behavior before conscious method, it was apparent that awareness if anything was
knowledge does (p. 1293). Elsewhere, it has been more nely tuned to the payoffs than the overt selections
claimed that this biasing effect occurs even before the were. Far from observing selections from the good decks
subject becomes aware of the goodness or badness of the in participants who could not report which were the good
choice s/he is about to make (Bechara et al. 2000, p. 301). decks, Maia and McClelland found that conscious reports
Studies employing the IGT have a very natural about the decks were more reliable than overt behavior.
interpretation within the lens model framework of This might indicate that participants were still exploring
Fig. 1. The decks can be conceived of as the cues, and the task and acquiring further information about the
their relationships to reward and punishment (the cri- decks, but it clearly provides no support for the claim
terion) are captured by their ecological validities. The par- that nonconscious biases occur before individuals have rel-
ticipants goal is to judge the likely payoff for choosing evant conscious knowledge. Maia and McClellands results
each deck and to make a decision accordingly. If partici- were replicated by Wagar and Dixon (2006), and similar
pants indeed learn to make advantageous deck selections, outcomes were obtained by Evans et al. (2005), Bowman
then their utilizations are appropriately tuned to the val- et al. (2005), and Cella et al. (2007), who in three separate
idities, yielding high achievement. Inability to report experiments found that preferential awareness ratings for
which are the good or bad decks is unawareness located the good over the bad decks emerged before the point
at Point B in Fig. 1. at which preferential card selections favored the good
were selected from good than from bad decks in the hunch to a variety of awareness assessments and a range of behav-
period, anticipatory SCRs measured during that period ioral indices, such as card choices and SCRs. While ques-
were not signicantly different for good versus bad decks. tions remain about important issues such as the suitability
As Gutbrod et al. noted, this early development of a behav- of using wagering as a means of gauging awareness, the evi-
ioral preference for the good decks cannot have been dence (particularly from Maia & McClellands [2004] major
driven by the somatic markers measured in anticipatory study) is clear in showing that participants acquire detailed
SCRs. It could, on the other hand, have been driven by conscious knowledge about the payoff structure at an early
differential awareness which, as discussed above, emerges point during the task. This awareness emerges at least as
very early in the task. This temporal sequence awareness early as behavioral differentiation itself, and there is little
differential choice differential SCRs seems to t the convincing evidence that decision making in the IGT is dis-
data across these experiments well, with awareness being sociable from awareness.
evident by around trial 20, advantageous card selections
by trial 40, and differential anticipatory SCRs by around
trial 80. 5. Primes and primes-to-behavior
The only recent study to provide support for the possi-
bility that anticipatory SCRs precede the development of In the present section we provide a highly abbreviated
card selections is that of Wagar and Dixon (2006). These assessment of research using a range of priming techniques
authors obtained the typical nding of advantageous card to inuence behavior. In some research elds it has
selections emerging at around trial 40, but in their data become widely accepted that priming can inuence behav-
differential SCRs were evident by around trial 30. Although ior unconsciously.
these results suggest that more work is needed before we
fully understand the relative timing of and causal relation-
5.1 Subliminal perception
ship between anticipatory SCRs and card selections, even
Wagar and Dixon themselves did not take any of their Subliminal perception is the controversial phenomenon
results as evidence of unconscious inuences on decision whereby invisible stimuli may inuence some aspect of
making. Their participants showed awareness at least as behavior (see Fig. 1, Point C). It is intriguing that in the
early as they showed a preference for the good decks. wake of a comprehensive methodological debate about 25
Moreover, there is a major concern surrounding the years ago (see Holender 1986), subliminal processing was
interpretation of somatic markers. On Bechara et al.s afforded a rather modest role in most theoretical debates
(1997) interpretation, they provide anticipatory infor- about the causation of behavior. Yet in recent years there
mation about the value of a particular choice option, has been a wealth of claims, based on subliminal perception
especially for negative outcomes. Specically, they are experiments, concerning the importance of the unconscious
assumed to encode information about the negative in behavior including some striking reports of subliminal
emotions that were previously triggered by a stimulus or priming on decision making (e.g., Winkielman et al.
choice outcome, and then covertly guide subsequent 2005). Here we do not attempt to review this extensive lit-
decisions. On this account, whatever the individuals erature. We do, however, briey comment on the pervasive
report may state, his or her decision is actually driven at methodological problems that plague interpretation of
least in part by an emotional marker of the valence of the results in this eld (Dixon 1971; Holender 1986; Miller
choice outcome, a marker that is related to previous 2000; Pratte & Rouder 2009), and we illustrate these pro-
(especially negative) experiences independently of subjec- blems with reference to a prominent and typical recent
tive belief. In contrast to this account, recent ndings claim about subliminal inuences on decision making.
suggest that SCRs code the uncertainty associated with In a striking illustration, Hassin et al. (2007) primed their
the participants decision, not the outcome (Davis et al. participants with a brief (16-ms) masked presentation of
2009; Tomb et al. 2002). For example, Tomb et al. either the Israeli ag or a scrambled version of the ag,
showed that when the IGT was modied so that it was prior to each of several questions about political attitudes
the good rather than the bad decks that were associated (e.g., Do you support the formation of a Palestinian
with large payoffs and losses, SCRs tended to precede state?) and voting intentions. Not only did the subliminal
selections from the good decks. This strongly challenges primes inuence responses to these questions, but they
the claim of the somatic marker hypothesis that such also affected subsequent voting decisions in the Israeli
markers provide biasing signals for choice, because SCRs general elections. Key evidence that the primes were invis-
precede those choices (of bad decks) that are eventually ible came from a test in which participants were shown the
eliminated in the standard IGT and precede those (of masked images and asked directly to indicate for each
good decks) that eventually dominate in Tomb et al.s whether it was a ag or scrambled ag, which revealed
modied version. Although it is possible that there are chance-level performance.
psychologically distinct somatic markers of positive and There are substantial problems with this kind of inference.
negative outcomes, it is plain that they cannot be distin- For instance, the form of awareness check employed by
guished by conventional SCR measurement. Hassin et al. (2007) is susceptible to bias if the participants
condence about seeing the ag is low. On some occasions
on which they actually see the ag, they may nonetheless
4.3 Summary and conclusions
respond scrambled ag because their judgment is uncer-
Of all the experimental methods used in recent years to tain and they adopt a conservative decision criterion.
study the role of awareness in decision making, the IGT Worse still, Pratte and Rouder (2009) have shown that
and its variants have probably been studied more inten- typical tests used to measure awareness in subliminal per-
sively than any others. The task lends itself quite naturally ception experiments (such as that used by Hassin et al.
eld yields remarkably few effects that convincingly assessment may not have adequately met the criteria in
demonstrate unconscious inuences. The claim that Table 1. Uhlmann et al. proposed a range of other ndings,
briey presented primes fall outside consciousness is dif- such as the absence of actorobserver differences, which
cult to establish without extremely rigorous methods, but may avoid these difculties (though, as previously dis-
such methods are employed insufciently often. The cussed, these ndings have not been obtained under
primes-to-behavior literature has also largely employed more careful assessments).
weak methods to assess awareness, there are question
marks over the replicability of some of its most prominent
ndings, and selective publication bias and le drawer 6.1 Brief comments on other research areas
effects (Renkewitz et al. 2011) may be clouding the We noted in the Introduction that our focus is on those
overall picture. research areas that are most relevant to our overall question
about the extent to which the mental processing that leads
to the selection of one among several actions can be con-
6. Discussion sidered unconscious. To talk of brain systems making
decisions is to use the notion of a decision very differently,
We have articulated some of the conditions necessary to and it is not clear what it would mean to ask whether the
establish inuences of unconscious mental states on visual systems computation of size and distance, for
decision making and have reviewed a considerable body example, is or is not conscious. Even with regard to the
of evidence in relation to multiple-cue judgment, delibera- main areas reviewed in Sections 24, we have of necessity
tion without attention, decisions under uncertainty, and been selective in the studies we have reviewed, and we
priming. From the perspective of our lens model frame- recognize that our critical viewpoint leaves us at risk of
work, many of the claims for unconscious inuences the objection that if we had considered areas X or Y, we
focus on Points B (unawareness of cuecriterion relations), would have found more compelling evidence. We maintain
C (unawareness of cues), and D (unawareness of cue utiliz- that the areas we have selected have been highly inuential
ation) (Fig. 1). However, when paradigm demonstrations in bolstering claims for unconscious decision making, so it
are scrutinized, explanations that invoke unconscious pro- would be very surprising if the evidence is markedly
cesses appear unnecessary. Performance in tasks such as weaker in these domains than elsewhere. Nevertheless,
the IGT which is routinely cited as providing evidence for we briey comment here on some other well-known
unawareness (at Point B) can be readily explained as areas. Our hope is that we can convey at least a avor of
mediated by conscious acquisition of deck knowledge why the common claims from these elds may be open to
(Maia & McClelland 2004); subliminal priming exper- challenge.
iments that might be considered optimal for demonstrating
unawareness at Point C reveal awareness of primes (Pratte 6.1.1 Automaticity. When we look at the individuals use of
& Rouder 2009); and studies of multiple-cue judgment low-level brain decisions, do we see clear evidence of
suggest that people do possess knowledge of cue utilization unconscious processing? This is far from obvious. Evidence
(Point D; Reilly & Doherty 1992). Moreover, manipula- that such decisions are cognitively impenetrable (in other
tions designed to impact this utilization process uncon- words, immune from top-down attentional control and con-
sciously have limited and potentially artifactual effects scious knowledge) is very controversial. It is now known, for
(Newell et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2008). In summary, instance, that even something as low level and apparently
these research areas have so far failed to yield clear, replic- automatic as motion processing in area V5 is dramatically
able, and unequivocal demonstrations of unconscious inu- attenuated in conditions of high cognitive load (Rees
ences. On the contrary, many careful experiments have et al. 1997). Similarly, visuo-motor adaptation is inuenced
documented consistently high levels of conscious access by conscious expectancies (Benson et al. 2011).
in peoples causal reports on their behavior. Supposedly automatic processes like word reading and
A surprising outcome of the review is that debates and visual adaptation are frequently cited as examples of uncon-
disagreements about the meaning of the terms conscious- scious processing. The use of unconscious (meaning
ness and awareness have (with a few exceptions) played a uncontrollable inuences/processes) in this context is
remarkably minor role in recent research. Whereas issues rather distinct, however, from what we have been con-
about how to dene and measure awareness were once cerned with in this article (unreportable inuences or pro-
highly prominent and controversial (e.g., Campion et al. cesses). The evidence suggests that very few inuences or
1983; Reingold & Merikle 1988), it now seems to be gener- processes are truly uncontrollable. For example, it is well-
ally accepted that awareness should be operationally known that Stroop interference which apparently
dened as reportable knowledge, and that such knowledge reveals the automaticity of word reading can be diluted
can only be evaluated by careful and thorough probing. by a range of manipulations of top-down control (Logan
Thus an encouraging conclusion is that the eld seems to & Zbrodoff 1979). Thus these examples have little
have generally taken heed of detailed recommendations bearing on the main question addressed in the present
(e.g., Ericsson & Simon 1980) about suitable methodology article.
in the assessment of awareness, including the requirements
noted in Table 1 that awareness assessment must be 6.1.2 Neural precursors of motor responses. Famously,
reliable, relevant, immediate, and sensitive. We concur Libet and colleagues (Libet 1985; Libet et al. 1983)
with Uhlmann et al. (2008) that claims of unconscious inu- reported experiments in which electroencephalographic
ences should ideally depend on more than simply conrm- activity was monitored while participants freely chose
ing the null hypothesis (that evidence of awareness is not when to make a voluntary movement and reported the
obtained). Null results are always ambiguous because the time point at which they felt the intention to move (Point
is a ction or that perception is generally illusory. Rather, are observed between awareness and discrimination accu-
we conclude that there are real causal connections in the racy than is the case when awareness is measured with
world but that our knowledge of them is indirect and binary responses. As with other examples from neuropsy-
largely inferential (e.g., Harr & Madden 1975). In con- chology, much of the evidence can be plausibly explained
trast, on the basis of illusions of agency and will, without recourse to unconscious inuences.
Wegners conclusion is that free will and the conscious cau-
sation of behavior are illusions. The illusions per se cannot
prove this. They merely show that we lack direct access to 6.2 The seduction of the unconscious
linkages between thought and action. Given these conclusions, it is surprising (to us) that there
remains a pervasive view in the literature that unconscious
6.1.4 Blindsight. Individuals with the condition known as processes serve an important explanatory function in the-
blindsight report being experientially blind in a part of ories of decision making. This prominence is most
their visual eld (scotoma) yet are able to make a variety obvious in theories that contrast deliberative with intuitive
of discriminations about stimuli presented in that part of decision making (see Evans 2008; Kahneman 2011; Keren
the eld. Blindsight results from damage to primary & Schul 2009). A recent version of this general view advo-
visual cortex, and because external space is represented cates two interacting systems with the following qualities:
retinotopically in primary visual cortex, there is a tight System-1 (intuition) is parallel, extracts gist (holistic), and
coupling between the location of the cortical damage and results in affective states, which are open to phenomenological
the location of the scotoma. Successful discrimination of awareness (Block 2007) in their end result but not in their oper-
location, movement, form, color, and so on, as well as ation (or stages). While, in contrast, system-2 (deliberation) is
overt actions such as pointing, have been reported in blind- sequential, rule-based (e.g., lexicographic), and has access to
sight (Weiskrantz 1986), and it has been proposed that the stages of processing. (Usher et al. 2011, p. 10, emphasis
these behaviors must be based on unconscious represen- added)
tations, as blindsight patients deny visual consciousness Our added emphasis highlights that Usher et al. (2011)
regarding stimuli falling within their scotomata. In terms operationalized the two systems, in large part, via access
of the lens model, the decit is located at Point C in to phenomenological awareness. In essence, Usher et al.s
Figure 1. interpretation suggests that a decision maker relying
For almost as long as blindsight has been investigated, purely on system-1 would have awareness only at Point E
the possibility that the condition is simply degraded in Figure 1 (the end result), whereas one relying solely
(near-threshold) normal vision has been hotly debated on system-2 would be aware at all points (AE inclusive).
(see Campion et al. 1983; Weiskrantz 2009). It is possible Usher et al. emphasized, however, that many decisions
that residual visual discriminations with near-threshold will be a product of these two systems interacting. For
stimuli are accompanied by weak, but reliable, levels of example, in a multi-attribute judgment task, system-2 is
visual awareness. In fact, individuals with blindsight often responsible for sequentially inspecting attributes and
report forms of visual experience (Overgaard 2011). alternatives (e.g., Does this car have cup holders?), while
Cowey (2010) recently noted in regard of D.B., the system-1 generates an affective integration of the values
patient whose performance led to the coining of the term (p. 10). This approach is similar to that proposed by Glck-
blindsight, that there is still no explanation for the rev- ner and Betsch (2008) in their parallel-constraint satisfac-
elation nearly 30 years after his operation, that he experi- tion model of multi-attribute judgment and choice (see
ences visual after-images when a visual stimulus is turned also Glckner & Witteman 2010). Our review suggests,
off. How ironic if the discovery of blindsight proves to however, that when participants are given adequate oppor-
be based on a patient who does not possess it! (p. 7). tunities to report the knowledge underlying their behavior,
Weiskrantz (2009) and others have argued against the there is little, if any, explanatory role played by a phenom-
degraded normal vision hypothesis by pointing out enologically inaccessible affective integration process.
(among other things) that individuals with blindsight While knowledge underlying behavior might not always
behave qualitatively differently from normal individuals. be comprehensive, it is often sufcient to explain observed
Signal detection theory can be used to show, for instance, performance.
that forced-choice guessing in blindsight about which inter- Why, then, do explanations that invoke unconscious
val contained a stimulus yields a higher discrimination mental states remain so popular? A supercial answer is
measure than yes/no responses about whether a stimulus that they make good stories that have clear appeal to a
was presented, while in normal individuals measured dis- wide audience, especially when they involve expert decision
crimination is identical in the two conditions (Azzopardi making (e.g., Gladwell 2005; Lehrer 2009). A more con-
& Cowey 1997). sidered answer acknowledges that as a eld of study, the
Overgaard and colleagues (Overgaard 2011; Overgaard issue of unconscious inuences is a challenging one to
et al. 2008; Ramsy & Overgaard 2004) have argued, look at impartially because we all have such strong ex
however, that dichotomous measures that ask the individ- ante beliefs about the causation of our behavior and the cir-
ual to report (yes/no) whether a stimulus is visible system- cumstances in which we are unaware of its determinants.
atically underestimate the extent of visual awareness Consider the following illustration of the grip that our intui-
(regardless of response bias). These authors have provided tions about the limits of conscious deliberation can hold. In
evidence that when participants (both normal and blind- a multiple-choice test, is it wise to change your answer on
sight) are given the opportunity to report the clarity of subsequent reection? Suppose that you have been asked
their perceptual experience using a range of categories which city is more populous, Stockholm or Munich? You
such as no experience, brief glimpse, almost clear intuitively choose Stockholm, but then ponder your
experience, and clear experience, stronger correlations decision further. Perhaps you retrieve relevant information
be inuenced by relating the choice to eye movements. are unable to control the inuence of Afrocentric features on
Participants in their study considered questions such as their judgments (Blair et al. 2004b).
Is murder sometimes justiable? and their gaze was mon- 5. A more recent and much larger meta-analysis of the uncon-
itored as they looked at on-screen yes and no buttons. They scious-thought literature by Strick et al. (2011) does not discuss
the relationship between N and effect size.
were required to choose as soon as the buttons disap-
6. Some of these effects have been interpreted as arising from
peared. Richardson et al. arranged for the buttons to disap- direct perceptionaction links, and if that indeed is their basis,
pear when the participants gaze had rested on one of them then the involvement of decision making processes would be
for 500 ms and found that yes responses were about 10% minimal. However, it has become clear that these effects are
more likely when gaze had been on the yes than the no highly inferential and almost certainly do recruit aspects of
button. This and many other such subtle priming effects central decision processes (see Loersch & Payne 2011). For
offer considerable promise for future exploration of example, primes sometimes produce assimilative effects and
insight, awareness, and decision making. sometimes contrast effects.
7. In a similar vein, Albert Einstein once noted that intuition
is nothing but the outcome of earlier intellectual experience (In a
6.4 Conclusion letter to Dr. H. L. Gordon on March 5, 1949; Albert Einstein
Archives 58217, as cited in Isaacson 2007.)
In summary, evidence for the existence of robust uncon-
scious inuences on decision making and related behaviors
is weak, and many of the key research ndings either
demonstrate directly that behavior is under conscious
control or can be plausibly explained without recourse to
unconscious inuences. Few topics in the behavioral
sciences are as fundamental as this or run across as many
subdisciplines of experimental psychology. Future research Open Peer Commentary
must take seriously the experimental and theoretical chal-
lenges that our critical review has highlighted.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The support of the Australian Research Council (DP Degraded conditions: Confounds in the study
0877510; DP 110100797; FT110100151) to Ben of decision making
R. Newell is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Magda
Osman, David Lagnado, Peter Lovibond, Adam Harris, doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000629
and Jon Baron for insightful discussions and comments
on an earlier draft of the manuscript. We also thank the Louise Antony
University of New South Wales students who participated Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003-
9269.
in the 2010 and 2011 Unconscious Inuences on Decision
lantony@philos.umass.edu louise.antony@gmail.com
Making seminar course.
Abstract: I raise a consideration complementary to those raised in the
NOTES target article. Many of the most widely cited studies on decision making
1. We use the terms decision making and judgment throughout involve introspection in degraded conditions, namely, conditions in
which agents have no reason for the decisions they reach. But the fact
the article. A decision can be conceptualized as guided by the that confabulation occurs in degraded conditions does not impugn the
judgment process, which in turn refers to the evaluation of evi- reliability of introspection in non-degraded conditions, that is, in cases in
dence pertaining to different options (see Baron 2008). which a subject actually does make a choice for a reason.
2. Our illustrative use of the lens model departs somewhat
from traditional Brunswikian perspectives (e.g., Dhami et al. An ongoing debate in philosophy of mind concerns the status of
2004). For example, in our conceptualization the criterion our everyday, folk psychological explanations of human actions
(Point A) can exert a causal inuence on judgment. explanations that advert to the agents intentions or goals. It is
3. The terms proximal and distal here refer to temporal part of this folk picture that in cases where people do act for
characteristics of the cues and should not be confused with the some particular reason, they know what that reason is. But the
use of the same terms in the traditional lens model framework. work surveyed by Newell & Shanks (N&S) suggests that this
4. Because this point is so crucial we provide another illus- assumption is false. Indeed, some of it suggests not only that we
tration of our alternative approach to explaining cases where indi- may be frequently wrong about what our reasons are, but also
viduals appear unaware of an inuence on their behavior. In that we may be wrong about having reasons at all. To be a
striking research on racial stereotypes in criminal sentencing, reason for performing an action, a mental state must have seman-
Blair et al. (2004a) found that both black and white prison tic content, and that content must bear a rational relation to the
inmates with more Afrocentric features (e.g., darker skin, wide agents conception of the action to be performed. Thus, a judg-
nose, full lips) received harsher sentences than those with fewer ment that stocking sample D is superior to the other samples
such features, and suggested that this form of stereotyping is would rationalize choosing sample D. But if the factor that in
outside peoples awareness and control. But Blair et al. (2004a) fact determines this choice is the spatial position of sample D,
provided no evidence that number of Afrocentric features was there is no rationalizing. Even if I were aware of a rightward
the proximal cause of behavior, and it is easy to imagine that bias, the thought that sample D is the rightmost sample would
some other feature was instead. For instance, suppose that not give me a reason for choosing sample D. If such a factor
number of Afrocentric features in faces is correlated, in the were in play at all, it would likely be as a mere physical cause:
minds of judges, with some other attribute such as hostility or The perceived position of the sample would immediately deter-
low intelligence. Use of this correlated attribute might be entirely mine the choice, without any cognitive mediation at all. Unsur-
conscious (though of course deeply unjust). Moreover, it would prisingly, then, reductivist and eliminativist critics of folk
not be surprising on this alternative hypothesis that participants psychology point to work like that of Nisbett and Wilson to
How necessary is the unconscious as a the judgment process explicit, in the sense of revealing which cues
predictive, explanatory, or prescriptive were most inuential. The impetus behind this was not rooted in dis-
covering unconscious processes, but simply in the realization that
construct? judgments had not been systematically studied and were impacting
doi:10.1017/S0140525X1300071X lives in important domains (e.g., clinical judgments). Because most
psychological and physical processes are not easy to verbalize,
Claudia Gonzlez-Vallejo,a Thomas R. Stewart,b modern psychological research shifted from relying on verbal
G. Daniel Lassiter,a Justin M. Weindhardta reports to using psychometric techniques, and this ensued in judg-
a ment research as well. The focus on self-insight evolved from con-
Psychology Department, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701; bCenter for
Policy Research and Department of Public Administration and Policy,
trasting statistically estimated cue weights with the verbal
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York descriptions of what was important. As N&S show, that agreement
at Albany, Albany, NY 12222. is variable, but the goal of the approach was not about understanding
gonzalez@ohio.edu t.stewart@albany.edu unconscious processes but rather about employing statistics to help
danlassiter@mac.com jw225207@gmail.com individuals communicate the basis for their judgments (Hammond
http://www.ohioupsychology.com/ & Adelman 1976). More generally, mathematical models of cogni-
http://www.albany.edu/cpr/ tion are ubiquitous and use many function forms. The view that indi-
viduals may be able to verbalize model parameters, thus showing
Abstract: We elucidate the epistemological futility of using concepts such self-insight, is an interesting but not very useful proposition.
as unconscious thinking in research. Focusing on Newell & Shanks Indeed, even if we think mathematical models are about the uncon-
(N&Ss) use of the lens model as a framework, we clarify issues with scious, a notion like self-awareness would be unnecessary. We do
regard to unconscious-thought theory (UTT) and self-insight studies. agree with N&S that the validities of measures of self-insight are
We examine these key points: Brunswikian psychology is absent in UTT; questionable, but we add the caveat that both subjective assessments
research on self-insight did not emerge to explore the unconscious; the
accuracy of judgments does not necessitate the unconscious; and the
and statistical estimates of parameters depend on a model, so neither
prescriptive claim of UTT is unfounded. has priority over the process they are measuring.
From another perspective, lens model research has yielded a
Daryl Bem (1972) foresaw a slippery slope in resorting to uncon- rich body of work (Karelaia & Hogarth 2008). The main results
scious processes as explanatory variables. The point was not to are (a) linear models capture similar and relatively high pro-
deny that mental activity could occur outside of awareness, but to portions of variance in environmental outcomes and in human
warn researchers about abandoning sound epistemological practices judgments, and (b) judges reach high levels of accuracy when pre-
when explaining phenomena. We add to this a concern about deriv- dicting criteria in many domains. Factors that affect accuracy can
ing prescriptions from theories that have not been extensively be safely classied as task/environmental characteristics (see also
tested; from studies that have not been widely replicated; and Stewart et al. 1997). Therefore, on logical grounds, there is little
from the usage of terms, such as unconscious, that have not been need to resort to unconscious thinking as an explanatory variable
consistently dened. In this light, we commend Newell & Shanks of judgments, or as a mechanism for improving accuracy.
(N&S) for their critical review of unconscious inuences on decision Because of Hammonds central role in lens model research, we
making and agree with their conclusions. However, we identify areas feel his views on intuition must be mentioned. Cognitive continuum
needing clarication following their use of the lens model (Brunswik theory (CCT; Hammond 1986; 1996; Hammond et al. 1997) states
1952; Hammond & Stewart 2001) as an interpretive framework. that both tasks and cognitive processes are located on an intuitive-
Greenwald (1992, p. 775) concluded that unconscious cognition to-analytic continuum. According to Hammond, most judgment is
occurs rapidly and is severely limited in its analytic capability. In quasi-rational, involving a combination of intuition and analysis
contrast, unconscious-thought theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & Nordg- (Hammond 1996), thus contrasting with dual-process conceptions
ren 2006) assumes a deliberative and temporally extended uncon- (Epstein 1994; 2003; Kahneman 2011) and with UTTs rst principle
scious that can sift through vast amounts of information to arrive of two modes of thought. (We refer the reader to our analysis of this
at optimal decisions. UTT experiments, as described by N&S, use principle in Gonzlez-Vallejo et al. 2008.) In short, Hammonds
a unique multi-attribute evaluation task that presents participants notion of quasi-rationality is similar to modern conceptions of cogni-
with cue values, sequentially and randomly. We agree with N&S tion. In particular, with the emergence of parallel processing models
that the evidence supporting the benets of unconscious thinking (e.g., Rumelhart et al. 1986) and more generally connectionist models
is weak. The application of the lens model to research based on (Phaf & Wolters 1997), psychologists favor the view that responses
UTT, however, is not self-evident. First, N&S identify points reect a mixture of unconscious and conscious contributions.
within the lens model where lack of awareness could take place; We end by revisiting the prescription that complex decisions
however, lack of awareness and UTTs unconscious processing do should be left to unconscious thinking. Many years of research
not equate. Second, it is worth adding that UTT is not Brunswikian converge on the conclusion that selecting important predictors
in spirit. Representative design is absent; most UTT studies use a is best done by experts, but the combination of cues is best left
small set of objects with attributes and their values selected by to a statistical tool (Bishop & Trout 2005; Dawes 1979).
the experimenters. The cue values are presented in random Imagine a psychiatrist judging the likelihood that a patient will
order across cases in UTT studies, whereas in most judgment situ- commit suicide; the prescription that she or he should let the
ations the unit of information acquisition is organized rst by case/ unconscious decide is not only wrong, it is also unethical.
object. And in terms of accuracy, UTT uses agreement between
judgments and the experimentally dened best option rather
than by correspondence of judgments with agreed-upon environ-
mental criteria. N&S note that within the lens model, a source of Do implicit evaluations reect unconscious
lack of awareness may occur at the weighting of cues stage. We attitudes?
add that this relates to UTTs Principle 4, which claims that uncon-
scious weights the relative importance of attributes in an efcient doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000721
manner; but the evidence supporting this principle is missing (see
Gonzlez-Vallejo et al. 2008). Adam Hahn and Bertram Gawronski
From a historical perspective, we note that multiple-cue judg- Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario, Social Science
ment research did not directly attempt to study unconscious pro- Centre, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada.
cesses, even when considering the topic of self-insight. Hammond adam.hahn@uwo.ca bgawrons@uwo.ca
(1955) advocated for the use of a quantitative technique to make http://publish.uwo.ca/~bgawrons/people.htm
The target article recommends that future research on subcon- Self-insight research as (double) model
scious processing should focus on tasks in which participants recovery
attention is diverted away from the experimenters hypothesis,
rather than the highly reective tasks that are currently often doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000824
employed (Abstract). The authors also suggest that: subtle
priming effects offer considerable promise for future exploration Tim Rakow
of insight, awareness, and decision making (sect. 6.3) and outline Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United
four criteria for a measure of awareness: reliability, relevance, Kingdom.
immediacy, and sensitivity. The binary exclusion task meets timrakow@essex.ac.uk
both of these recommendations and fullls the four criteria for http://www.essex.ac.uk/psychology/department/people/rakow.html
a measure of awareness, but it is not mentioned in the target
article. Abstract: Self-insight assessment compares outcomes from two model-
In each trial of the binary exclusion task one of two known recovery exercises: a statistical exercise to infer a judges (implicit) policy
stimuli appears. Participants are required to respond with and an elicitation exercise whereby the judge describes his or her
the stimulus that was not shown (Debner & Jacoby 1994). If the (explicit) policy. When these policies are mismatched, limited self-
stimulus is presented for long enough, participants are aware of insight is not necessarily implied: Shortcomings in either exercise could
be implicated, whereby Newell & Shanks (N&Ss) relevance or
which one was shown and respond correctly with the other one. sensitivity criteria for assessing awareness may not be met. Appropriate
But at brief stimulus durations, participants are more likely than self-insight assessment requires that both exercises allow the original
chance to respond incorrectly, with the stimulus that was shown processes to be captured.
(Persaud & McLeod 2007). The briey presented stimulus must
have been processed because it affected the decision about Slovic and Lichtensteins (1971) extensive review of research on
which response to make. But if it had been available to conscious policy capturing for multiple-cue judgment (see Newell &
processes, the participant would have responded correctly with Shanks [N&S], sect. 2.2) was one of the rst papers that I read
the other stimulus. Thus the binary exclusion task with briey pre- on human judgment; so one of the rst things I learned about
sented stimuli demonstrates unconscious processing inuencing human judgment was that people exhibit poor insight into their
decision making. cue use, overestimating the number of cues used and misestimat-
The assessment of awareness in the binary exclusion task meets ing the relative weights applied to different cues. N&S have use-
all four of the criteria outlined in the target article. Since the fully reminded us that this conclusion is dependent upon a
response used to assess awareness is the same as the behavioral particular choice of methods, and that the picture changes if
response, the assessment of awareness is reliable, relevant, and alternative methods for investigating self-insight are employed
immediate. Using the denition of sensitivity in the target (e.g., Reilly & Doherty 1989; 1992). When considering methods
article (same cues are provided for measuring awareness as for for assessing self-insight for multiple-cue judgment, it is worth
eliciting behavior in Table 1), the binary exclusion task is also sen- noting that such investigations are an exercise in model recovery.
sitive because only one cue is presented. In fact, two model recoveries are required: (1) statistical tech-
Persaud and Cowey (2008) used a binary exclusion task to niques (typically regression) are used in an attempt to recover
compare the processing in the blind and sighted elds of the the judges policy for making the original case judgments (the
blindsight patient, GY. A square wave grating was presented to implicit policy); and (2) the judge is also asked to recover his or
either the upper or lower quadrant of his blind or sighted eld. her strategy for making the original judgments (the explicit
Figure 1 (Steingroever & Wagenmakers). Choice behavior of healthy participants in Fridberg et al. (2010), once for the good and bad
decks (left panel) and once for each deck separately (right panel). Each block contains 20 trials, except the last block (15 trials).
The rst pitfall is that the traditional way of analyzing IGT suggest that neither participants behavioral preference for the
data is incomplete and potentially misleading because it collapses good decks nor their conscious preference for the good decks is
choice behavior over the two good decks and over the two bad substantial. Cella et al. (2007) reported similar ndings.
decks. This procedure hides the impact of the frequency of Next to the above mentioned pitfalls, several behavioral nd-
losses (bad deck B and good deck D yield rare losses, whereas ings contradict the conclusion from N&S. First, a detailed re-
bad deck A and good deck C yield frequent losses) and poten- analysis of eight data sets showed that healthy participants learn
tially obscures diagnostic information. For example, consider to prefer the good decks in only one data set (see Steingroever
the data of Fridberg et al.s (2010) healthy participants. Fridberg et al. 2013, and references therein). In the remaining seven data
et al. plot the mean proportion of choices from the good and bad sets, participants either only learn to avoid bad deck A (frequent
decks as a function of trial number, replotted here in the left losses) or prefer the decks with infrequent losses (decks B & D).
panel of Figure 1. This panel suggests that participants learn Such a preference for the decks with infrequent losses the
to prefer the good decks. However, Fridberg et al. also plot frequency-of-losses effect has been reported by many studies.
the mean proportion of choices from each deck separately, The empirical evidence for the frequency-of-losses effect contra-
replotted here in the right panel of Figure 1. This panel shows dicts the assumption that healthy participants learn to prefer the
that, across all trials, participants prefer the decks with infre- good decks.
quent losses (B & D). Second, Steingroever et al. (2013) showed that participants
A similar problem is evident in work that assesses conscious have a tendency to switch frequently throughout the entire task.
knowledge about the IGT either with subjective experience This is counterintuitive because one expects a strong decrease
ratings (C+D) (A+B) (Bowman et al. 2005; Cella et al. 2007), in the mean number of switches once participants learned to
or by determining whether participants have conscious knowledge prefer the good decks. The frequent switches suggest that partici-
that would encourage them to choose one of the two best decks pants do not learn to systematically differentiate between the good
(Maia & McClelland 2004). However, participants who consider and bad decks, a suggestion that is illustrated by deck selection
one of the best decks as the best deck do not necessarily under- proles of 394 participants (Steingroever et al. 2013; see https://
stand that there are two best decks and that both bad decks should dl.dropbox.com/u/12798592/DeckSelectionProles.zip for the
be avoided. To investigate whether participants understand that deck selection proles); each participant has a highly idiosyncratic
there are two good decks, participants should identify the best choice pattern, and for most participants it is impossible to ident-
and second-best deck on each trial. ify a point where they realized that the good decks should be
The nal pitfall concerns the way in which IGT studies typically preferred.
assess the learning process, namely by applying an analysis of var- In sum, detailed analyses of IGT data have shown that even
iance to assess whether participants preference for the good healthy participants are unable to discriminate the good decks
decks (i.e., (C+D) (A+B)) increases over blocks of trials (main from the bad decks, a nding that suggests a lack of both conscious
effect of block). A signicant effect of block is typically taken as and unconscious knowledge in this task.
evidence that participants learned to discriminate between the
good and bad decks. However, when the main effect of block is
signicant, this does not imply it is also substantial. For
example, consider the data of Bowman et al. (2005), who tested The problem of the null in the verication of
three groups of healthy participants that differed in whether
they obtained a manual or computerized IGT combined with or unconscious cognition
without a 6-second delay. The only signicant effect was a main
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000873
effect of block. However, even in the last block (i.e., the nal 20
trials), the three groups showed at most a weak preference for Eric Luis Uhlmann
the good decks, as (C+D) (A+B) ranged from about 3 to about
HEC Paris School of Management, Management and Human Resources
6.5. A value of 3 corresponds to an average of 11.5 out of 20 Department, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France.
choices from the good decks, and a value of 6.5 corresponds to eric.luis.uhlmann@gmail.com
an average of 13.25 out of 20 choices from the good decks.
Similar unconvincing results were evident from subjective Abstract: Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue that when awareness measures
ratings of how positive each deck was experienced. These ndings are more reliable and valid, greater evidence of awareness of supposedly
assessments probe post facto knowledge that may have believe that a prominent place in the human cognitive
been constructed after the decision itself, and (b) even architecture needs to be assigned to mental states that
for knowledge assessed contiguously with a decision, it is may (or may not) become the object of other, metacogni-
a challenge to establish that such knowledge was causal in tive, states. Instead, we believe that awareness and report-
relation to the decision. One general strategy is to ask ability are intrinsic properties of many mental states. States
whether verbal reports correlate better with choices than become reportable not because other states pick them up
do affective reactions or somatic markers; Gutbrod et al.s and move them to the consciousness box, but because
(2006) data suggest this is highly likely, though more reportability is part of (or an affordance of) what they are
research is needed on this issue. To that extent, it is plaus- as states in the rst place. How much hinges on this con-
ible to attribute a causal role to conscious knowledge. ceptual disagreement we leave for others to judge. Our
Several commentators (Bernacer, Balderas, Marti- principal claim is an empirical one, namely, that the coup-
nez-Valbuena, Pastor, & Murillo [Bernacer et al.]; ling between cognition and metacognition, if that is how
Hogarth; Srinivasan & Mukherjee) raise the issues of one wishes to frame it, is far tighter than many have
attention, automaticity, and habitual behavior. We agree assumed, although we certainly do not deny the theoretical
that attention is distinct from awareness and that attention possibility that they can be dissociated. Sher & Winkielman
is required for virtually all decisions. Hogarth expresses sur- offer the distinction between procedural and declarative
prise that we did not explore the topic of automatic pro- knowledge as an empirical example, the former being the
cesses in more detail. We do not dispute that the cognitive part and the latter the metacognitive part.
acquisition of many physical or perceptual-motor skills We have analyzed this distinction in considerable depth
involves a period in which people are acutely aware of elsewhere (Berry et al. 2012) and maintain that the evi-
their movements, and that when such skills are mastered, dence does not support the view that people can only
they are executed with very shallow phenomenological declare a subset of their procedural knowledge. Last,
experience. However, just because we allocate very little we agree wholeheartedly with the point Sher & Winkiel-
attention to and engage in minimal monitoring of the man make about the incentives in place that might
mental operations involved in performing perceptual- induce researchers to make Type I errors in their obser-
motor skills, it does not follow that such skills are controlled vations of the behavior of interest but Type II errors con-
and executed unconsciously. A relevant example comes cerning their observations about participants reports
from studies of ball catching. Although this ability is often about those behaviors.
highlighted as a paradigmatic case of a skill outside con- Ingram & Prochownik quote from Haidt (2007) con-
scious control, detailed analyses of what people know cerning fast and automatic moral intuitions in which an
about the cues they use to decide whether to advance or evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike appears
retreat to intercept and catch a ball reveal surprisingly in consciousness without any awareness of having gone
rich and accurate information (e.g., Reed et al. 2010). through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a
Thus while we agree with Hogarth that it can be difcult conclusion, to which we reply, whats the evidence that
to prove or disprove the role of unconscious inuences in these intuitive responses went through such steps?
such skills, those studies that have tried to do so provide Perhaps they were based on one-reason decision making?
evidence that falls far short of demonstrating independence We also suggest that Ingram & Prochownik are muddled
from conscious control. in two further respects. First, we certainly do not (as they
Bernacer et al. suggest that habits are a distinct form of imply) confuse awareness of stimuli with awareness of
behavior characterized by unconscious triggering alongside their inuence: The lens model framework incorporates
conscious monitoring. Thus consciousness can reclaim this distinction very clearly. Second, they misinterpret the
control of behavior when a difculty arises. We are not con- proximaldistal distinction so as to effectively equate a for-
vinced that it is meaningful to say that habits involve any gotten or neglected distal cue with an unconscious inu-
decisions at all. A pianist is not deciding to play each ence. These are quite different things. Our argument is
note, and as evidence for this we would point to the fact that forgotten distal cues (e.g., Mother always told me
that true habits run on independently of their conse- that spinach was good for me) are irrelevant to understand-
quences: They are pushed by the eliciting cues rather ing decision making if they causally triggered a chain of
than pulled toward a goal. Dickinson (1985) has shown events that eventuates in a reportable proximal cue (the
that habitual responses (such a lever pressing by a hungry current belief that spinach is healthy).
rat) continue even if their outcomes (food pellets) have Velmans asks us to consider distinct ways in which a
been devalued (e.g., by being paired with poison). A den- process might be conscious and suggests that adopting a
ing characteristic of a decision is that it involves the weigh- broader perspective leads to the conclusion that evidence
ing of different outcomes, which is precisely what is absent for unconscious mental processes is ubiquitous. To illus-
in habitual behavior. trate his point, Velmans considers the phenomenological
In the target article we employed a lens model analysis to experience of reading the sentence: If we dont increase
explicate the ways in which unconscious inuences on be- the dustmens wages, they will refuse to take the refuse.
havior might be realized. An elegant redescription of the He argues that the syntactic and semantic processing
issue is provided by Sher & Winkielman, who frame it required to assess meaning and assign appropriate stress
in terms of the relationship between cognition and meta- to refuse in the two instances in which it appears must
cognition. We would certainly not want to take up the chal- occur outside awareness. This conclusion, however,
lenge they put to us of proposing a cognitive architecture in appears to be at odds with our (and others, based on an
which cognition and metacognition are inseparable. informal survey) phenomenological experience: Encoun-
However, we stress that their cognition/metacognition tering the second instance of refuse provokes hesitation
view does not align with our own conception. We do not in readers precisely because there is an awareness of the
slight (and statistically nonsignicant) tendency for partici- participants learn a great deal about the decks albeit
pants in an unconscious thought condition to use a com- about their associated loss frequencies rather than long-
pensatory equal-weights strategy (EQW) more than those run payoffs. In principle, this loss-frequency learning
in a conscious thought condition, but nd no difference could be unconscious.
in the use of a weighted-additive strategy (WADD) across Second, while we agree with them that participants in
conditions. This latter nding is clearly contrary to the the IGT often show a prominent frequency-of-losses
weighting principle of UTT (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren effect (a result we ourselves have obtained), this does not
2006), which states that unconscious thought leads to mean that they fail to show discrimination between good
more efcient and accurate weighting of attribute values. and bad decks. In our own studies (Konstantinidis &
On a related point, we were also somewhat surprised by Shanks 2013), such discrimination has invariably been stat-
Dijksterhuis et al.s statement that Obviously, partici- istically signicant. We suspect that one or more methodo-
pants are capable of generating post hoc weights that logical factors to do with the payoff schedule or the level of
justify their previous choice. While we agree, we thought performance-related reward or indeed the inclusion of
the key claim was that choices following unconscious awareness measures may account for this difference,
thought would be more consistent with these weights though clearly more work on this issue is called for. But
than those following conscious and immediate thought we reiterate that whether or not participants can discrimi-
(e.g., Dijksterhuis 2004). In line with the conclusions of nate good from bad decks in the IGT, Steingroever &
Gonzlez-Vallejo et al., we see little evidence in the lit- Wagenmakers agree with us that the IGT provides
erature to support this claim. minimal evidence for unconscious inuences.
In a somewhat related vein, Uhlmann questions our In a related comment, McLaren et al. suggest that
interpretation of research on reasons analyses, arguing some studies on the IGT (and variants thereof) that we
that such effects are consistent with people lacking con- omitted from our review do show evidence for unconscious
scious introspective access into the true bases for their inuences. However, McLaren et al. themselves note that
attitudes and subsequent choices (e.g., Wilson & Schooler one of these studies (Guillaume et al. 2009) adopted a
1991). The key feature of these studies is that participants less than ideal method for indexing awareness. We share
who are invited to provide reasons to support their choices this reservation. Guillaume et al. found that explicit knowl-
end up making objectively poorer decisions, and sometimes edge and differential skin conductance response (SCR)
exhibit greater post-choice regret, than those who make magnitude can be uncorrelated. These researchers pre-
unexamined choices. While such studies support the sented their participants with a standard 100-trial IGT,
idea that preferences are constructed, labile, and inu- measuring SCRs concurrently with card selections. Aware-
enced (sometimes detrimentally) by deliberation, we fail ness was only assessed at the end of the task, and Guillaume
to see why they force the conclusion that some inuences et al. used responses to the awareness questions to classify
on choice lie outside awareness. Both sorts of choice participants as having no awareness, partial awareness (con-
those made intuitively and ones accompanied by an analysis scious knowledge of which decks were good or bad), or
of reasons are, we contend, accompanied by awareness of complete awareness (knowledge of the relative payoffs of
the proximal basis for that choice. The fact that this proxi- the decks). Whereas participants classied as having no
mal basis might not be the same in the two cases does not awareness performed at chance on the task, higher levels
imply that the unexamined choice was mediated via an of awareness were associated with increasing proportions
unconscious process. of selections from the good decks. Thus awareness corre-
lated with card selections. Likewise, Guillaume et al.
found that the extent to which SCRs differed in antici-
R4. Iowa Gambling Task: Challenges and pation of bad versus good deck selections correlated with
extensions choice behavior. Yet awareness was not correlated with
differential anticipatory SCRs.
We argued that participants are able to learn to make While Guillaume et al. (2009) speculated that such a
advantageous choices in the IGT but concurrently nding is consistent with awareness and somatic markers
acquire considerable levels of awareness and insight into having independent inuences on decision making, they
the payoff structure of the decks and of the optimal also acknowledged that the nonsignicant correlation
decision-making strategy. Steingroever & Wagenmakers (reported as reaching p = 0.1) could simply be the result
argue that in one important respect our conclusion is incor- of low statistical power. We would add to this that their
rect: Participants do not learn to discriminate the good awareness classication was less than ideal as it was pre-
from the bad decks at all (Huizenga et al. make a sented only once at the end of the task (raising problems
similar point). It must be emphasized, however, that of lack of immediacy) and did not include any questions
although Steingroever & Wagenmakers dispute our analy- requiring numerical estimates. Instead, the questions
sis, their viewpoint does not challenge our general con- required very coarse-grained responses (e.g., suppose
clusion about the role of awareness in decision making: you select 10 new cards from the deck, will you on
If, as they claim, there is minimal discrimination in the average win or lose money?). Since other studies show
IGT, then it also provides no evidence of unconscious inu- a gradual development of differential anticipatory SCRs
ences on decision making. (Gutbrod et al. 2006) and a gradual development of differ-
It is important to note that the conclusions of Steingro- ential awareness (Bowman et al. 2005; Cella et al. 2007;
ever & Wagenmakers may be overly strong, in two Evans et al. 2005), it seems likely that a positive relation-
respects. First, their statement that there is a lack of ship between awareness and SCR differentiation would be
both conscious and unconscious knowledge in this task is observed if the former were measured more sensitively
contradicted by their own results, which show that and immediately.
We acknowledge the elegant simplicity of this demon- to refute. In the target article we reviewed Overgaards
stration and urge researchers to explore it further (see (2011) ndings that when individuals with blindsight are
Table R1). Other studies using this basic task have not asked to report whether they have no experience, a
obtained the same result (Fisk & Haase 2006; 2007), so brief glimpse, or an almost clear experience of a stimu-
its basis and boundary conditions require further explora- lus, correlations are observed between awareness and dis-
tion. We also note the peculiarly contradictory position crimination accuracy. Brogaard, Marlow, & Rice
that Persaud & McLeod inevitably nd themselves in (Brogaard et al.) object that such correlations do not
regarding their denition of unconscious perception. In prove that the reports are indicative of visual awareness,
their studies, they found that at very short presentation dur- and could instead reect awareness associated with the
ations participants could not make the correct exclusion higher-order predictive act, that is, awareness of being
response, and instead reported the identity of the pre- able to make a judgment. We do not see the force of this
sented letter. Persaud & McLeod take this to be an uncon- objection. Whichever construal is correct, it would
scious effect. At the same presentation duration, however, remain the case that in the absence of awareness (either
participants successfully reported the identity of the pre- visual or judgmental), discrimination would be at chance.
sented letter when explicitly instructed to do so (inclusion Dijksterhuis et al. found it mystifying that we did not
instructions i.e., report b when b is present). The discuss a study by Soon et al. (2008). In a modern neuroi-
latter would, of course, normally be taken as direct evi- maging adaptation of the Libet task, Soon et al. presented
dence of conscious, not unconscious, processing. their participants with a stream of letters (1 every 500 ms)
Taking a similar line, Uhlmann cites studies in which and asked them to make a left or right button-press at a
priming effects from unobtrusive stimuli attenuate or freely chosen time point. Participants then reported the
even reverse when participants become aware of the stimu- letter that had been on the display at the moment they
lus. But there are many reasons why a change in cognitive felt they formed their conscious choice. Using advanced
state might modulate priming, even for conscious primes methods for decoding neural activity, Soon et al. found
(Higham & Vokey 2000). From the fact that altered that several seconds before the choice was made, and
levels of awareness (e.g., from weak to strong) may long before it was conscious, two brain regions (frontopolar
reduce priming effects, it does not follow that priming and precuneus/posterior cingulate) contained information
can occur unconsciously. that predicted that choice.
The data surrounding blindsight are extensive and Soon et al. (2008) concluded from these ndings that
complex, but the idea that blindsight is little more than there is a signicant contribution of unconscious processes
degraded conscious vision has proven extremely difcult to decision making. But this conclusion rests on adopting
the assumption that participants go instantaneously from
a state of no bias (i.e., 50:50 right/left) to a state in which
they have sufcient bias to commit to a response. It is
Table R1. Suggested studies where further research could address surely the case that the process of forming a decision
major outstanding questions. takes time. Suppose that a threshold degree of bias or pre-
ference (100:0) is required before a participant makes a
Primary citation Issue to be addressed voluntary movement of the left or right hand. Then the
accumulation of bias prior to reaching this threshold
Dunn et al. (2011) Measuring awareness, bodily could be entirely conscious and neurally measurable for
differentiation (somatic tens or hundreds of milliseconds, even before it compels
markers), sensitivity to bodily the button-press. When individuals report the time at
signals, and payoff knowledge which they consciously made their decision, perhaps they
within subjects in variants of (perfectly reasonably) report the point at which their bias
the IGT reached, say, 70:30, rather than the point it rst drifted
Finkbeiner (2011) Subliminal priming applied to away from 50:50. The key point is that the threshold for
more typical decision-making detecting neural activity does not have to be the same as
tasks and over longer time the threshold for reporting a state of awareness.
intervals The notion of information accumulation is more than
Huizenga et al. Strategy classication in the just a vague possibility. Numerous theories of decision
UTT paradigm to identify if/ making have developed precise formalizations of the
how decisions change accumulation idea. For example, random walk models con-
following distraction ceive of decision making in terms of time-steps during
McLaren et al. Peak-shift and verbalizable which evidence moves in one direction or another by
rules employing online small amounts. When the total evidence reaches a
awareness assessments threshold, a choice is made. Although they have not
Overgaard et al. (2008) Use of a new awareness usually considered whether accumulated information is
instrument in blindsight and conscious or unconscious, these models have been very
normal vision successful in explaining response time distributions and
Persaud & McLeod (2007) Binary exclusion task other aspects of choice (e.g., Newell & Lee 2011). Soon
Richardson et al. (2009) Unobtrusive priming et al.s (2008) ndings provide important evidence about
techniques such as using eye- the high-level brain structures involved in the development
tracking to prompt of decisions, but they seem entirely consistent with the idea
decisions that consciousness is a necessary component of, and pre-
cursor to, our choices.
(conscious reports) yields stronger correlations with actual weighting principle of unconscious thought theory. Frontiers in Psychology
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