Haase 1

Donald Haase

Professor Daniel Alvarez

REL4461

28 November 2016

An Annotated Refutation of Idealism

Found below is an exegetical textual commentary on Kants Refutation of Idealism as found in the

Critique of Pure Reason B edition (CPR from here on). This is presented via a transcription of the text

as translated by Norman Kemp Smith, and annotations to that text. The primary concern here will be

within (various translations of) Kants works and those he references. The Refutation makes significant

use reference to Descartes and Berkeley to define idealism, and so their works are also of significance

here. Additionally some reference will be made to commentaries, but these will tertiary as the structure

of many commentaries dont interact well with exegesis.

Being a textual commentary, despite their importance, Kants various other refutations of idealism will

not be included here. Other formulations appear in the A edition of the CPR, in his Prolegomena, and in

other areas of the B edition of the CPR. These will be referenced as needed, but are not the focus of this

work. Of specific note is a footnote in the preface of the CPR B edition that requests a replacement of

some text in the Refutation of Idealism. Here I will present the updated text, but take the accompanying

explanation to be an entirely separate attempt to refute idealism (or perhaps a self-commentary on the

Refutation of Idealism) and will not be reproducing it in full.

 Haase 2

B274

Refutation of Idealism

Idealism meaning thereby material1 idealism2 is the theory which declares the existence of

objects in space outside us3 either to be merely doubtful45 and indemonstrable6 or to be false and

1 Having to do with matter. Sensation is called the material of sensible knowledge (A50/B74), and matter is defined in

the A version Paralogisms to be mere outer appearance, the substratum of which cannot be known through any

predicate that we can assign to it (A359). Matter should not be considered to refer to a thing in itself but merely

composites of outer experience.

2 In the preface to B Kant refers to this refutation as the new refutation of psychological idealism (B.xxxix).

3 There is a redundancy in objects in space outside me that is noteworthy. Based on Kants definitions of Space (See

A22/B37) or his descriptions of Space and Time in regards to sensibility and observation (See B146-148), there should

be no such thing as space inside me. This phrasing seems to be a holdover from the version A Paralogisms of Pure

Reason, in which he gives the title things which are to be found in space to empirically external objects (A373).

There, he does this due to the ambiguity he sees in the term outside us which could refer also to transcendental objects.

It would seem that in the reorganization, the statement of this distinction was lost.

4 Doubt is the core to Descartes Meditations, and the doubting of material things is laid out in the First Meditation which

is subtitled Of those things that may be called into doubt (Moriarty 13; Descartes 17 [First Meditation]).

5 Kant addresses in further detail the theory that the existence of all objects of the outer senses is doubtful (A367) in the

Fourth Paralogism (A366-380). The Refutation would seem to be in large part a refinement of the material in the Fourth

Paralogism, which was removed from the B edition.

6 For indemonstrable Pluhar gives unprovable. Reading in Moriartys translation of Descartes Meditations, we see that

that proof of anything but I am is indemonstrable: I have tried to put nothing in this treatise that I do not rigorously

demonstrate [emphasis mine]. (Moriarty 10; Descartes 13 [Synopsis of the Second Meditation]). Kant uses this again

in The Antimony of Pure Reason in saying that empirical idealism does not allow of any properly demonstrable

distinction between truth and dreams. (A491/B519). Unprovable, however, conforms to Kants lines further down

regarding Descartes idealism as pleading an incapacity to prove (B275). This should not be taken as a sort of
 Haase 3

impossible. The former is the problematic7 idealism of Descartes8, which holds that there is only one

empirical assertion9 that is indubitably certain, namely, that 'I am'10. The latter is the dogmatic11

idealism12 of Berkeley13. He maintains that space, with all the things of which it is the inseparable

condition14, is something which is in itself impossible; and he therefore regards the things in space as

merely imaginary entities15. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable, if space be interpreted as a property that

confusion of translation, but merely a note that the terms demonstrate and prove do not here hold special status that

distinguishes one from the other.

7 This terminology is the same as used in the Table of Judgments (A70/B95). Descartes judgment is one with a

Problematic modality.

8 Later in The Antimony of Pure Reason, Kant calls this same theory empirical idealism (A491/B519), and describes it

without significant differences to its description here. In the A edition, The Fourth Paralogism also referred to Descartes

idealism as sceptical (A377).

9 The use of assertion here is a flag to Kants dislike of this sort of idealism. In most uses of this term, he characterizes it

as something to be looked down upon. This can be seen in the Preface to A where when describing indifferentists he

says they always fall back on those very metaphysical assertions which they profess so greatly to despise (A.x). Also

in the Introduction when describing the flaws in assertions that [attach] to given concepts others completely foreign to

them, and moreover attaches them a priori (A6/B10). In places he provides the same with adjectives referring to

dogmatic or specious assertions (B23), groundless assertions (A13/B27), illusory assertions (A132/B171), and

surreptitious assertions (A149/B188). He even gives David Humes good sense as saving him from making an assertion

(B20). Kant seeks proofs, reasoning, and necessity, not assertions.

10 From the exploration given in the A version Paralogisms, one might see that here Kant is only willing to ground

Descartes in the ergo sum without the cogito. In the introduction to the Paralogisms, Kant separates the cogito, by

which he states it to admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding (A348/B406), and proceeds to

examine I think on its own merits. In the B version, the Paralogisms are vastly scaled down, and no longer reference

Descartes formulation explicitly (B407-432), but do instead rely on the refutation of problematic idealism being

already provided in the refutation (B418).

 Haase 4

must belong to things in themselves16. For in that case space, and everything to which it serves as

condition, is a non-entity17. The ground on which this idealism rests has already been undermined by us

B275in the Transcendental Aesthetic18. Problematic idealism, which makes no such assertion, but merely19

pleads incapacity to prove, through immediate experience20, any existence except our own, is, in so far

as it allows of no decisive judgment until sufficient proof has been found, reasonable and in accordance

11 Kant clearly defines Dogmatism in the preface to the B edition: the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without

previous criticism of its own powers. (B.xxxv). He uses the term primarily to describe points he is discrediting, similar

to his use of assertion (see footnote 9). In his allegory of Metaphysics as the Queen of Sciences in the Preface to A,

dogmatists are labeled as part of the failed government of the field (A.ix), dogmatism relies on magical devices

(A.xiii), and the dogmatism of metaphysics (B.xxx) leads to indulgence in easy speculation about things of which

[one] understand[s] nothing (B.xxxi).

12 Continuing the form beginning in footnote 7, dogmatic can be equivalent to assertoric, the second modality of

judgment from the Table of Judgments (A70/B95) by which something is asserted true or false (A75/B100). Its curious

here why Kant kept these as two distinct terms, as it undermines the structure of his refutation mirroring that of his

Judgments. It may very well be due to dogmatic being the more common term for such, whereas assertoric better

self-contains reliance on assertion. The first formulation of dogmatic idealism as the term can be seen in The Fourth

Paralogism (A377) and is moved to the Refutation of Idealism in B.

13 Colin M. Turbayne provides an excellent analysis of questions as to whether or not Kant had access to Berkeleys

philosophy which also cites commentaries that assert Kants lack of access (Turbayne 225-227). He further examines in

great detail the parallels between Berkelys writings and the refutations of idealism aside from the explicit Refutation

of Idealism (these include CPR As The Fourth Paralogism, sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and sections of

the Prolegomena) (227-244). The remainder of the Refutation does not require outside reference to Berkeleys

philosophy though, and as such, comparisons of Kants portrayal of Berkeley and Berkeleys own writings are a

tangential issue. For further information, see Turbayne.

14 This seems to be an avoidance of Kants preferred necessary, as to not indicate that it has the same elevated position.

The only other apparent use of this phrasing is in The Jsche Logic where it is used to connect the perfection of

cognition and truth (Kant and Young, Lectures on Logic 557; The Jsche Logic 49-50)
 Haase 5

with a thorough21 and philosophical mode of thought22. The required proof must, therefore, show that

we have experience, and not merely imagination23 of outer things24; and this, it would seem, cannot be

achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible

only on the assumption of outer experience.

15 In the B Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant describes Berkeley as ...degrading bodies to mere illusion..., so this usage of

imaginary should not necessarily hold any connection to Kants various definitions of imagination.

16 This statement is formulated to be a counterpart to one of Kants conclusions in the Transcendental Aesthetic Space

section: Space does not represent any property of things in themselves... (A26/B42) which is restated slightly later as

...space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property... (A30/B45). Thus Dogmatic idealism

is unavoidable if something is true Kant feels has already been shown false.

17 Here Kant is going further into the absurd results of this Dogmatic idealism. His term non-entity is the most empty of

his concepts of Nothing, namely nihil negativum (A292/B348). Pluhars translation draws attention to this by cross-

referencing the terms, where Kemp Smith unfortunately does note that the source German is the same (unding) but

places in nihil negativeum instead of non-entity. This term is also used in the time section of the Transcendental

Aesthetic to refer both to space and time (A39/B56) and to time in the B edition Transcendental Aesthetic when

discussing Berkeley specifically (B71, ...a non-entity, such as time...).

18 Footnotes 13-15 above refer to various instances where the Transcendental Aesthetic is being called back to.

19 As described in footnote 9, assertion is a decidedly negative term for Kant so Problematic idealism merely doing

something in place of asserting seems to hold even stronger disdain.

20 Kant keeps immediate experience as a term only to describe Descartes. It appears once more in the Architectonic of

Pure Reason, but is only used casually in reference to acquisition of historical knowledge (A836/B864). This could map

loosely to immediate intuition for Kant, as experience is not something immediate but mediated through a process of

representation (see A19/B33, A156/B195).

21 As Kant states later in The Discipline of Pure Reason: Philosophy therefore has no axioms, and may never prescribe its

a priori principles in any such absolute manner, but must resign itself to establishing its authority in their regard by a

thorough deduction. (A733-734/B761-762).

 Haase 6

THESIS25

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of

objects in space outside me.

Proof

22 This is likely intended to highlight Descartes later solutions to problematic idealism via psychologistic/physiological or

religious means. See Descartes Treatise of man and Meditations.

23 Kant ascribes to certain metaphysical students of nature (A40/B56) the view that time and space are merely

creatures of the imagination (A40/B57) and relies in his proof that neither outer things nor time and space are merely

imaginary.

24 It seems very much though that the merely here is a misstep. Based of Kants descriptions in the Transcendental

Deduction imagination is a faculty which represents objects that are not present (B151). This is further complicated if

we read this passage with Pluhar: The proof it demands must, therefore, establish that regarding external things we

have not merely imagination but also experience.. Pluhars translation would indicate that Kant will be proving both

imagination and experience of outer things. This seems to further invite the same issues seen above in footnote 3, in the

slight obscuring of the difference between objects and representations of objects.

25 This continues the Thesis/Proof structure used in is in the Principles of Pure Understanding This is likely a means by

which he is responding to others in a more rigorous philosophical (or rather mathematical) format. Pluhar translates this

as Theorem rather than Thesis. This would indicate that it is not be mirroring to the thesis/antithesis of the

Antimonies in terminology (though still in structure). With this translation though, the only matching in Pluhar would

be to mathematical or geometric theorems (A732/B760, A737/B765, and A855/B883).

 Haase 7

I am conscious26 of my own existence27 as determined in time28. All determination of time

presupposes something permanent in perception29. *But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me.

For all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in30 me are representations;

and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them31,32 in relation to which their

change, and so my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined.*33 Thus perception

26 It would seem that there is a qualifier here, stated in the thesis, but missing from this first premise that this is empirical

consciousness and not transcendental consciousness. Read out of context, the premise could be taken as either. This

distinction is described in both versions of the Transcendental Deduction (A106-108, B132).

27 In the B preface Kant provides ...[consciousness of my existence] is therefore experience not invention, sense not

imagination... (B.xl). In the Transcendental Deduction he names this consciousness of self to be inner sense,

empirical apperception (A107), or original apperception (A111).

28 This determined in time appears as well in the B edition Preface I should then have to know [objects with the

property of freedom] as determined in its existence, and yet as not determined in time which is impossible...

(B.xxviii). In the Schematism, determination in time is the key grounding by which the schemata act as a medium

between category and representation (A138/B177).

29 This statement recalls the schema of substance (A143/B183) as further proved via the First Analogy (A182/B224).

30 This anomaly can make the sentence even harder to parse. Pluhar reads here the much more fitting within. In fact

which are to be met with in me is read as that can be encountered within me. This same encountered is used to

describe the representation of space in the Transcendental Aesthetic This intuition [the representation of space] must,

however, be encountered in us a priori (B41, Pluhar). This same language is used in the Transcendental Deduction to

describe both space and time (B136, Pluhar).

31 This follows from the First Analogy of Experience, specifically the B version which expands this point (B224).

32 This comma appears to have no purpose and can mislead the reading of the structure of the sentence if paired to the

following comma, but is unpaired. This can be seen more clearly when the additional clause regarding my existence is

removed: and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change

may be determined.
 Haase 8

of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me34 and not through the mere representation

of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only

B276through the existence of actual35 things36 which I perceive outside me. Now consciousness [of my

existence] in time is necessarily bound up37 with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of

this time-determination; and it is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things outside

33 I have taken the liberty here of altering the text as requested by Kant in his preface (B.xxxix). The section of text

indicated by the characters * replaces the following sentence that was originally present: This permanent cannot,

however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be

determined. (B275). In the same footnote of his preface, Kant explains further this statement then re-argues much of

the refutation as provided here.

34 Referring to footnote 3, we see even further how nonsensical the in space is, in that it is omitted entirely here and the 4

other times that outside me is mentioned in the remained of the proof below. In fact, space plays no part here except in

Note 2.

35 The schema of actuality is existence in some determinate time. (A145/B184), which shows how this leads directly

from the first half of the sentence. The action here is is to traverse the schema.

36 It is worth noting that here we have shifted from a thing outside me to things (plural). The thesis dealt also with

objects (plural).

37 Bound up (which Pluhar gives as linked) is a relationship between things that seems to have no specific given

meaning. Its very much the bear minimum, simply stating that a relationship exists. The term is used sparingly

throughout the CPR only a little over 30 times with 7 being in the Refutation and the B Preface footnote described in

footnote 33. One instance gives that [G]eometric propositions are one and all apodeictic, that is, are bound up with the

consciousness of their necessity (B41). In another [t]he synthesis of apprehension is inseparably bound up with the

synthesis of reproduction (A102). It would seem from these that bound up with may be an indicator of bilateral

necessity, but if so, why not use necessity? In The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, Matter and Form underlie

all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with all employment of the understanding. (A266/B322), which

either indicates that bound up indicates this deeper underlying or possibly that it stands in for the interrelations being

multiple and complex. Turning to commentaries, Hannah equates this directly to must be which he also uses for
 Haase 9

me, as the condition of the time-determination. In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at

the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Note I38. It will be observed that in the foregoing proof the game played39 by idealism has been

turned against itself, and with greater justice. Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is

inner experience, and that from it we can only infer outer things and this, moreover, only in an

untrustworthy manner, as in all cases where we are inferring from given effects to determinate causes.40

In this particular case, the cause of the representations, which we ascribe, perhaps falsely, to outer

things, may lie in ourselves41. But in the above proof it has been shown that outer experience is really

B277immediate42, and that only by means of it is inner experience not indeed the consciousness of my own

existence, but the determination of it in time possible. Certainly, the representation 'I am'43, which

expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately includes in itself the

necessity (Hannah 61), but this doesnt seem to be a careful reading on his part.

38 The three Notes (called Comments by Pluhar) are primarily restatements of the proof above.

39 This same sort of language is used in the Principles of Pure Understanding when discussing the necessity for

representations to have some relation to objects if we are to have knowledge of objective reality: Otherwise the

concepts are empty; through them we have indeed thought, but in this thinking we have really known nothing; we have

merely played with representations (A155/B194). This relation to objects seems to have the same level of specificity as

the above bound up of footnote 37.

40 This differs from the description of the two idealisms at the start of the Refutation. In problematic idealism, the only

assertion is I am, but it did not assume that was the only immediate experience. In dogmatic idealism, all immediate

experience is taken as impossible. The untrustworthy manner seems to push this statement to refer to problematic

idealism, but it represents it differently from above.

41 This is Descartes world of illusions from his problematic idealism.

42 Footnote A, present in source text is replicated at the end of the document. Immediate is translated by Pluhar as direct.

Direct may be a more fitting translation for modern readers, as immediate here is intended to mean a more literal and

academic without an intervening medium. This is more clear when put against the uses of mediately.
 Haase 10

existence of a subject44; but it does not so include any knowledge45 of that subject, and therefore also no

empirical knowledge, that is, no experience of it46. For this we require, in addition to the thought of

something existing, also intuition, and in this case inner intuition, in respect of which, that is, of time,

the subject must be determined. But in order so to determine it, outer objects are quite indispensable;

and it therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer

experience.

Note 2. With this thesis47 all employment of our cognitive faculty in experience, in the

determination of time, entirely agrees. Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time

save through change in outer relations (motion) relatively to the permanent in space (for instance, the

B278motion of the sun relatively to objects on the earth)48, we have nothing permanent on which, as

43 Above this is named an empirical assertion, and not a representation. This may be a use of the problematic idealist

assertion to stand for consciousness of my own experience. This is called a representation though in the B version

Transcendental Deduction (B138).

44 This is explored further in the B version Paralogisms of Pure Reason, in which treating I as a subject is clearly a

proposition of identity and does not indicate substance or self-subsistent (B407).

45 In the B version Transcendental Deduction, knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to

an object (B137).

46 With the explanation in Footnote 3 of empirical experience, we can see claim here that the I is not given as the object

in space, and not sufficient for permanence. A long form of this is provided in the A version Paralogisms of Pure Reason

where I is called, among other things, a bare apperception (A400).

47 Footnote 25 goes to the usage of this term Thesis. Pluhars translation doesnt include thesis nor theorem here and

With this thesis is replaced merely with Now.

48 It is unclear what this note refers to, as there is no place where space and time determination are stated to be necessary

to each other. This may be referring only to non-philosophical time-determination, that is the building of clocks and

seeing time as the sun passing overhead, speaking of the common understanding of how we determine time.
 Haase 11

intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter49; and even this permanence is not

obtained from outer experience, but is presupposed a priori as a necessary condition of determination

of time, and therefore also as a determination of inner sense in respect of [the determination of] our

own existence through the existence of outer things. The consciousness of myself in the representation

I is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual50 representation of the spontaneity of a thinking

subject51. This I has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as permanent, might serve as

correlate for the determination of time in inner sense in the manner in which, for instance,

impenetrability52 serves in our empirical intuition of matter.

Note 3. From the fact that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a

determinate consciousness of the self, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer

things involves the existence of these things, for their representation can very well be the product

merely of the imagination (as in dreams and delusions53). Such representation is merely the

49 This comment, to this point has been a restatement of the proof. Here we see a distinct tie to the original description of

idealism as material idealism.

50 In both the Transcdendental Deduction (B148) and the Schematism (A138/B177), intellectual is given as the alternative

to sensible. Additionaly it used in the B version Transcendental Aesthetic to describe self-activity of the intuition (B68).

51 This thinking subject seems to be another result of the Refutation being a reworking of the Fourth Paralogism in A.

The term is not clearly defined when used here, and the next time it is mentioned it is as the object of psychology

(A334/B391). In the A version Paralogisms, this is more clearly the subject of Descartes I think, though the

distinction between thinking subject and thinking being is unclear (if any exists) (A348-350).

52 This is used throughout the Introduction (A2/B5, A8/B12) and in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A21/B35) to be a sense

characteristic of matter, literally the property that separates two solid objects from one another physically. With this it is

set alongside hardness, color, figure, shape, weight, and extension.

53 These are what Descartes believes all representations may be. This is the only use of the term Wahnsinn, which

Pluhar translates to madness not delusion. Additionally, dreams are only ever discussed prior to this in the A version

Transcendental Deduction: These perceptions would not then belong to any experience, consequently would be
 Haase 12

reproduction of previous outer perceptions54, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the

reality of outer objects55. All that we have here sought to prove is that inner experience in general is

B279possible only through outer experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be not

purely imaginary, must be ascertained from its special determinations56, and through its congruence

with the criteria57 of all real experience58.

without an object, merely a blind play of representations, less even than a dream (A112).

54 When describing the reproductive imagination in the Transcendental Deduction, this limit of only acting on previous

outer perceptions doesnt seem to exist(B141, B152). Additionally, the definition of the reproductive faculty is

alternatively merely empirical (A121), a transcendental act (A102), and within the domain, not of transcendental

philosophy but of psychology. (B152).

55 This appears to be a conceit to Descartes. Through the culmination of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Deduction we

arrive at merely that outer objects (or as above in footnote 36, possibly just one object) exists, but without a method to

bridge the gap between our experiences and those objects. This is more critically discussed in the A version Paralogisms

where the conclusion is given that this is a question which no human being can possibly answer. (A393).

56 Special determinations is an under-defined term. It is used only in the A version Transcendental Deduction to describe

how one ascertains objective rules from higher laws (A126), which is described (similarly to the application of

experiences to reality) as something not determinable through any process laid out in the CPR.

57 These criteria are never enumerated. When discussing the Table of Categories, it is stated that true consequences

following from concepts provide more criteria of its objective reality (B114).

58 This is given by Pluhar as actual experience, which reads as the same wirkliche Erfahrung that is used in the A

version Transcendental Deduction: Actual experience consists in apprehension of appearances, their association

(reproduction), and thirdly their recognition... (A123-125). This may point to the criteria for these experiences, but

does not illuminate the special determinations above.

 Haase 13

Footnote A: The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is, in the preceding

thesis59, not presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not.

The question as to its possibility would be this: whether we have an inner sense only, and no outer

sense, but merely an outer imagination60. It is clear, however, that in order even only to imagine

something as outer, that is, to present it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and

must thereby immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity

which characterises every act of imagination. For should we merely be imagining an outer sense, the

faculty of intuition, which is to be determined by the faculty of imagination, would itself be annulled.61

59 See Footnote 25 regarding the use of thesis and theorem. Here Pluhar gives theorem.

60 The latter would lead us back to a very Cartesian formulation of the outside world. Despite having proven the existence

of an outer object, we would have no means by which to know that any experience does correspond to such an object.

61 Here seems to be a loose proof for outer intuition (or refutation of mere outer imagination) on the basis of the existence

of the faculty of intuition. This is undermined by the loose definition of the faculty of imagination as described above in

footnote 54.
 Haase 14

Bibliography

Hanna, Robert. Kant, Science, and Human Nature. Oxford [u.a.: Clarendon Press, 2006. Internet

resource.

Kant, Immanuel, Gary Banham, and Norman Smith. Critique of Pure Reason. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2007. Print.

Kant, Immanuel, Werner S. Pluhar, and Patricia Kitcher. Critique of Pure Reason. Indianapolis, Ind:

Hackett Pub. Co, 1996. Print.

Kant, Immanuel, and J M. Young. Lectures on Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Print.

Turbayne, Colin M. Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-),

vol. 5, no. 20, 1955, pp. 225244. www.jstor.org/stable/2957436.