Syrias Chemical Weapons Kill Chain

Theres a long list of Syrian officials with blood on their hands --

but the culpability goes all the way to the top.

BY GREGORY KOBLENTZ-APRIL 7, 2017

For the first time since President Barack Obama declared in
August 2012 that the use of chemical weapons constituted a red
line, the United States has responded militarily to the Syrian
governments use of these weapons. On the night of April 6, the
U.S. military fired a salvo of 59 cruise missiles at Syrias Shayrat
air base, in response to a deadly chemical attack launched from
that base earlier in the week. The chemical attack on the
northwestern Syrian town of Khan Sheikhoun, according to first
responders on the scene, caused at least 84 deaths and injured
more than 500 more.

In announcing the strike, President Donald Trump said, It is in

this vital national security interest of the United States to prevent
and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.

While the strike on Khan Sheikhoun was the deadliest chemical

attack since the Syrian government launched rockets filled with
sarin nerve agent into the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August
2013 killing more than 1,400 men, women, and children it is
far from the first attack since that massacre. Since 2014, rebel-
held sections of Idlib, Hama, Aleppo, and elsewhere have been
subjected to at least 120 chemical attacks, mostly by helicopters
armed with barrel bombs filled with the toxic chemical chlorine.
While these attacks were terrifying for the local populace, they
rarely caused mass fatalities.

The attack on Khan Sheikhoun was significant not only for the
high number of deaths but also for its use of a far deadlier type of
chemical weapon. According to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
the United States has very high confidence that sarin was used
in the strike. Although this has not yet been independently
confirmed, the victims symptoms and autopsies are consistent
with poisoning by a nerve agent such as sarin.

If the chemical agent used in this attack was indeed sarin, it

would either confirm suspicions that the Syrian regime did not
destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile as promised when it
joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013 or that it
has resumed production of these weapons in violation of the
treaty. Either way, this latest attack vividly demonstrates that
Syria, despite being a member of the CWC, maintains a well-
organized capacity to conduct multiple types of chemical attacks
in support of the regimes tactical and strategic objectives.

While the U.S. cruise missile strike targeted one link in the Syrian
chemical weapons kill chain, it did not break the chain. National
Security Advisor H.R. McMaster recognized as much when
he told reporters in the aftermath of the strike: Obviously, the
regime will retain a certain capacity to commit mass murder with
chemical weapons beyond this airfield.

Syrias chemical weapons attacks are not the work of a mere

handful of people an entire political, military, and scientific
apparatus is responsible for orchestrating them. As Samantha
Power, Obamas ambassador to the United Nations, put it, While
their names may be unfamiliar, their brutality is infamous, so they
should be as well.

Based on information released by the U.N., the Organisation for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), nongovernmental
organizations, and the U.S. and European governments, it is
possible to construct a picture of the Syrian governments entire
chain of command involved in the research, production,
weaponization, planning, and delivery of chemical weapons. The
Syrian chain of command for chemical weapons is composed of
four tiers: the senior leadership, which is responsible for
authorizing the use of these weapons and providing strategic
guidance on their employment; the chemists, who produce,
transport, and prepare the chemical weapons for use; the
coordinators, who provide intelligence on targets and integrate
chemical weapons with conventional military operations; and the
triggermen, who deliver the weapons to their targets. Together,
these individuals and organizations form a chemical weapons kill
chain that has so far claimed roughly 1,500 lives and caused more
than 14,000 injuries.

The leadership

Given the sensitive nature of using illegal weapons while under

international scrutiny, decisions to use chemical weapons are
likely made at the highest levels of the Syrian government. At the
apex of Syrias chemical warfare chain of command is President
Bashar al-Assad, who has ruled Syria since the death of his father,
Hafez al-Assad, in 2000. The United States describes Assad as the
ultimate decision maker for the chemical weapons program.

According to French intelligence, only Assad and some of his

closest advisors are able to order the use of chemical weapons.
Maher al-Assad, Bashars younger brother, has likely been
granted that authority by dint of his close relationship with the
president, his prominent role in leading the crackdown on the
uprising, and his position as commander of the powerful 4th
Armored Division. There is also circumstantial evidence that
Maher was directly involved in the planning of the 2013 chemical
attack on Ghouta, as his forces spearheaded an assault on the
area shortly after the sarin attack, suggesting these attacks were
planned in conjunction. In addition, the 155th Missile Brigade,
which was responsible for launching the sarin-filled rockets used
in that attack, is subordinate to the 4th Armored Division and
reports directly to Maher.

The Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) created by the U.N.

Security Council to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in
Syria has reportedly included both Assad brothers on a list of
Syrian officials responsible for these attacks. A number of the
regimes most senior officials have also been implicated by
the United States and European governments in planning these
attacks. Given the insular nature of the Assad regime, it is
inconceivable that these officials were not acting with the
approval of the president.

Indeed, according to Western intelligence officials, President

Assad has delegated day-to-day decision-making on chemical
weapons use to his senior commanders. These officials include
Maj. Gen. Rafiq Shihadah, the former director of Military
Intelligence who still serves as an advisor to the president on
strategic affairs; Maj. Gen. Muhammad Mahmud Mahalla, the
current director of Military Intelligence; Maj. Gen. Jamil Hassan,
the director of Air Force Intelligence; and Maj. Gen. Muhammad
Khalid Rahmun, the head of the Political Security Directorate.
These officials are likely also members of the crisis cell
established by Assad at the outset of the uprising to coordinate
the regimes response.

Another notable high-ranking regime official linked to Syrias use

of chemical weapons is Brig. Gen. Bassam al-Hassan, a
commander in the Syrian Republican Guard and Assads advisor
for strategic affairs. In this latter capacity, Hassan acts as
the presidential representative to Syrias Scientific Studies and
Research Center (SSRC) the government agency responsible for
producing the countrys chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.
Thus, Hassan serves as a vital link to the next tier of Syrian
officials in the chemical weapons chain of command.

Workers in protective clothing unload a dummy grenade during a

press day at the GEKA facility that assisted with the disposal part
of Syria's chemical weapon arsenal on March 5, 2014 in Munster,
Germany. (Photo credit: NIGEL TREBLIN/Getty Images)

The chemists

The SSRC is the heart of the Syrian chemical weapons program.

The organization has its headquarters in the Barzeh neighborhood
of Damascus, another branch in Jamraya, and used to oversee a
network of chemical weapons production facilities until they
were dismantled under the OPCWs supervision. The SSRC
was responsible for the design and production of the short-range
improvised rockets, called Volcanoes, that were used in the sarin
attack on Ghouta. As the Syrian government agency responsible
for developing and producing nonconventional weapons and the
means to deliver them, the organization probably also developed
the chlorine-filled barrel bombs in use since 2014.

The director of SSRC is Amr Najib Armanazi, a computer scientist

by training. Among his duties was overseeing a facility that
produced sarin, the same chemical used in the attack on Ghouta.
Brig. Gen. Ghassan Abbas is the head of the SSRC branch near
Jamraya responsible for what the U.S. Treasury
Department terms chemical weapon logistics. This is probably a
veiled reference to Unit 450, an all-Alawite unit within the SSRC
that is responsible for guarding and transporting Syrias chemical
weapons and preparing them for use by military units.

The commander of Unit 450 receives orders to prepare and

deploy chemical weapons directly from the regimes senior
leadership. According to the European Union, Abbas has played a
key role in organizing the regimes chemical attacks, including the
one on Ghouta. The United States has sanctioned five more SSRC
officials Brig. Gen. Samir Dabul, Brig. Gen. Ali Wanus, Col. Firas
Ahmad, Col. Habib Hawrani, and Col. Zuhayr Haydar for
conducting research or providing logistics in support of the
regimes chemical attacks.

The United States, Britain, and the EU have also sanctioned more
than a half-dozen entities that serve as front companies for the
SSRC. These front companies play a vital role in helping the
center acquire foreign technology for its weapons programs in
spite of international sanctions or provide technical expertise to
the SSRC. For example, one of those front companies, Business
Lab, attempted in 2009 to purchase 500 liters of pinacolyl alcohol,
which can be used in the preparation of the nerve agent soman.
Although Syria initially denied working on soman, the OPCW found
traces of pinacolyl at a SSRC facility.

Civil defense rescue workers try to reduce the effects of chlorine

gas as they search for survivors after an attack by government
forces in Idlib, Syria, on April 4. (Photo credit: FIRAS
FARHAM/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
The coordinators

Several of the Syrian governments key military institutions serve

as liaisons between the SSRC, the individual units that conduct
the attack, and regime forces operating in areas where chemical
attacks are taking place. The Republican Guard, Military
Intelligence, and Air Force Intelligence have likely identified
promising targets and helped de-conflict the chemical attacks to
prevent friendly fire incidents. For example, the Assad regimes
chlorine barrel-bombing campaigns in northwestern Idlib province
in the spring and summer of 2014 and the spring of
2015 coincided with heavy fighting in that province between the
government and rebel groups.

Maj. Gen. Talal Shafiq Makhluf, the commander of the Republican

Guard, was sanctioned by the United States for his role in
coordinating military operations with chlorine barrel bomb strikes.
The Republican Guard is one of Assads elite military units, is
manned mostly by Alawite officers and soldiers, and has
been deployed to some of the most important battles of the civil
war.

Brig. Gen. Yasin Ahmad Dahi from Military Intelligence has also
been linked to the Syrian regimes use of chemical weapons. The
primary mission of Military Intelligence is to ensure the loyalty of
the military, but it also collects and analyzes intelligence and
conducts covert operations.

Two Air Force Intelligence officers have been identified as playing

key roles in carrying out the regimes chemical strikes. Col.
Muhammad Nafi Bilal was stationed at SSRC headquarters to
serve as a liaison between the center and Air Force Intelligence to
ensure proper coordination and was also involved in
the transport of chemical munitions. Col. Suhayl Hasan al-Hasan
is a pro-regime militia commander who coordinated military
operations in Idlib during a period when chlorine attacks were
occurring.

It is not surprising that Air Force Intelligence has been deeply

implicated in coordinating the regimes chemical attacks. The
organizations mandate extends far beyond matters related to the
Syrian Arab Air Force and has long been used by the Assad family
to conduct the regimes most sensitive and covert operations at
home and abroad. The Air Force Intelligence branch
in Harasta likely served as the staging area for the Volcano
rockets that rained sarin nerve agent on Ghouta in 2013.

A mother and father weep over their child's body who was killed
in a chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta
in Syria on Aug. 21, 2013. (Photo credit: NurPhoto/Corbis via Getty
Images)
The triggermen

At the end of the Syrian chemical weapons kill chain are two
military organizations in charge of delivering the weapons: the
Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate and the Syrian Arab Air
Force.
The Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate was responsible for
conducting the 2013 chemical strike on Ghouta.
That attack involved approximately eight to 12 Syrian-made 330
mm Volcano rockets, each carrying approximately 50 liters of
sarin nerve agent, and at least two Soviet-era M-14 140 mm
artillery rockets filled with sarin. The EU has sanctioned four
senior leaders in the Syrian missile force for their role in this
attack: Maj. Gen. Tahir Hamid Khalil, the commander of the unit;
Brig. Gen. Adnan Aboud Hilweh, a commander in the 155th and
157th Missile Brigades; Maj. Gen. Ghassan Ahmed Ghannan, the
commander of the 155th Missile Brigade; and Maj. Gen. Jawdat
Salbi Mawas, a senior-ranking officer in the missile force.
The 155th Missile Brigade, which is equipped with Scud
missiles and is based in the Qutayfa area outside of
Damascus, reports to Maher al-Assad through his role as
commander of the 4th Armored Division.

Syria is believed to have developed chemical warheads for

a range of missiles, including Scuds. The 155th Missile Brigades
experience operating Syrias chemical-armed missiles would have
been invaluable for deploying and launching the sarin-filled
rockets used in the Ghouta attack.

The Syrian Arab Air Force is the other key player in delivering
Assads chemical weapons. The air forces primary role has been
in using helicopters to conduct more than 100 chlorine barrel-
bomb attacks against rebel-held towns in 2014 and 2015, with
dozens more attacks occurring in 2016 and 2017. The JIM
definitively linked three of these attacks on towns in Idlib to
helicopters operating out of the Hama and Humaymim air bases,
which are home to the 253rd and 255th squadrons of the 63rd
Helicopter Brigade and the 618th naval helicopter squadron. All
three of these units are equipped with Mi-8 helicopters or related
models, which have played a well-documented role in conducting
conventional and chlorine barrel bomb attacks.

The United States has confirmed reports by local activists that the
April 4 attack on Khan Sheikhoun was conducted by an Su-22
aircraft based at Shayrat air base. This base is home to the 50th
Air Brigade, which contains two squadrons of Su-22s: the 677th
and 685th. Shayrat was also one of at least seven Syrian air bases
that had the capability to load sarin or its precursors into bombs
before these sites were dismantled by the OPCW. According
to French intelligence, Syria had a stockpile of aerial bombs
designed to deliver 100-300 liters of sarin. These bombs were
designed as binary chemical weapons that contain two separate
nontoxic precursor chemicals that could be mixed within the
bomb shortly before takeoff to produce sarin. Syria may
have retained as many as 2,000 of these munitions after joining
the CWC. The type of munition used in the attack on Khan
Sheikhoun has not yet been determined.

The United States and EU have imposed sanctions on the entire

chain of command of the Syrian Arab Air Force for their role in
chlorine barrel bomb attacks, including Maj. Gen. Ahmad Ballul,
the commander of the air force; Maj. Gen. Saji Jamil Darwish, who
oversaw air operations in northern Syria as commander of the
22nd Air Division; Brig. Gen. Badi Mualla, the commander of the
63rd Air Brigade, which was responsible for the helicopters based
at Hama air base; and Brig. Gen. Muhammad Ibrahim, the deputy
commander of the brigade. Since Shayrat air base is part of
the 22nd Air Division, Darwish would also have been involved in
planning the attack on Khan Sheikhoun.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley holds up

photos of Syrian victims of a chemical weapons attack during an
April 5 meeting of the Security Council at U.N. headquarters in
New York. (Photo credit: DREW ANGERER/Getty Images)

A path to justice?

This list of Syrian officials and entities that have played a role in
chemical attacks during the Syrian civil war is no doubt
incomplete. For example, the identities of the commanders of the
50th Air Brigade and subordinate squadrons that were involved in
the attack on Khan Sheikhoun are not publicly known.
Hopefully, further investigations by the United
Nations and nongovernmental groups into war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by the Syrian regime will bring to
light a fuller list of those who should be held accountable for using
chemical weapons. None of these individuals from the leader of
the country to the pilot who pulled the trigger should be
immune to the consequences of their actions.
Bringing these criminals to justice, however, will be a long, slow,
and difficult process. Many individuals who comprise Syrias
chemical weapons kill chain were listed in a U.N. Security
Council resolution that was vetoed by Russia and China on Feb.
28. Syrias lack of membership in the International Criminal Court,
and the veto by Russia and China of a Security Council resolution
to refer Syria to the court, means that this venue is likely off limits
for the foreseeable future.

So far, the only concrete steps to hold these individuals

accountable for their actions are financial sanctions and travel
bans imposed by the U.S. and European governments. Although
the sanctions themselves are largely symbolic, by identifying
these individuals and specifying their role in the chemical attacks,
the United States and its European allies are laying the
groundwork for future prosecutions once Assad is no longer in
power. In the case of Iraq, it took almost 20 years for Saddam
Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed Chemical Ali,
to stand trial for ordering the use of chemical weapons against
the Kurds in 1988.

Nonetheless, naming names, even when the ability of the

international community to punish these perpetrators in the near-
term is limited, has value. Identifying and punishing the
perpetrators of these heinous crimes is not only to right past
wrongs but to prevent future harms. As Nikki Haley, the U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., explained after the Russian veto of the
first sanctions resolution, None of us should hesitate to impose
consequences for these attacks. No one else should get the idea
that they can use chemical weapons.
Attribution is the first step to accountability, which forms the basis
for deterrence. But attribution without consequences will only
embolden the perpetrators, demonstrate to other dictators that
the use of chemical weapons is tolerable, and badly damage the
global norm against the use of these barbaric weapons. Hopefully,
the cruise missile strike on Shayrat air base will deter future
Syrian chemical attacks. At the same time, we should not confuse
limited military strikes on infrastructure that can be easily
repaired as having the same lasting value for deterrence and
justice as holding individual government officials and military
officers accountable.

In the aftermath of the attack on Ghouta, I co-wrote an

article arguing: [A]n effective effort to reduce the long-term risk
of chemical weapons must also include legal and economic
steps to deter further chemical attacks, including by holding
individual perpetrators accountable. In 2017, as in 2013, the use
of military force is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to
enhance deterrence, bring justice to the victims of chemical
attacks, and reinforce the norm against chemical weapons.

Top photo credit: Getty Images/Foreign Policy illustration

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