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Review Essay
The Philological Present:
Reading the Arabic Nineteenth Century
Review Essay of Four Books
Jeffrey Sacks
University of California, Riverside
jeffrey.sacks@ucr.edu
restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, mak-
ing it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the tradi-
tional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.1
Calling upon the poetic word when Orientalism presses his handMarx cites
Goethes verses, should this torture then torment us / since it brings us greater
pleasure?he proposes that the losses, and the force of social violence, are
absorbed into the promise of revolution. Marx: The question is, can mankind
fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?2
Reading Marxs The British Rule in India (1853), Said underlines the language
to which Marx was constrained in order to write of India, the very vocabu-
lary he found himself forced to employ.3 The lexical dimension of this force is
underlined in Saids reading:
In part, of course, Marx was concerned with vindicating his own the-
ses on socio-economic revolution; but in part he seems to have had
easy resource to a massed body of writing, both internally consolidated
by Orientalism and put forward by it beyond the field, that controlled any
statement made about the Orient.4
The controlling field of these statements is, Said writes, philological. Marx
wrote after the philological revolution of the early nineteenth century, and
in its wake, where language is suddenly read as historical, in what Said called
the new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness, where philology, as
a historical discipline for the comprehension of language, is a reconstituted
theology of a culturally particular kindwhat Said has taught us to read as
a secular-Enlightenment myth whose outlines are unmistakably Christian.5
That language, in relation to the relatively earthbound experiences of
war, colonialism, imperialism, economic oppression, love, death, and cultural
exchange, forms a constraint in relation to writing and thought, is a principal
thesis of the critical writing of Said, in Orientalism and elsewhere.6 In Said one is
never simply free, and one does not write freely, in whatever language, because
one already does so in relation to more than one past and present, more than
one event of colonial violence, and more than one institutional and lexical
inheritancenone of which will simply have been overcome, transcended, or
left behind. This is as true of the European texts Said reads in Orientalism as it
is of those non-European texts and contexts of which the Orientalists wrote
and of which they continue to write. And Orientalism, then, is not simply an
act of misrepresentation, however forceful such acts will have been, and what-
ever their effects, but a pervasive form of linguistic and social violence. Put dif-
ferently, Orientalism is a name for the institution of philological categories in
the colonies, and in more than one colonial language and literary institution.
One locus of such violence is the Arabic nineteenth century, where, through
an iterated and differentiating practice of translation, between and within
languages, the terms for doing language are transformed. In the nineteenth
century, all of sudden, to write is to write historically, and it is to understand
oneself and ones language in historical terms, as in, for example, Rifah Rfi
al-ahws Takhl al-ibrz f talkh Brz (Cairo, 1834), Burus al-Bustns
Khubah fi db al-arab (1859), and, differently, Amad Fris al-Shidyqs
al-Sq al al-sq (1855). In this philological-historical reorganization of lan-
guage, the immediate, if also distant, past appears as a moribund time of death
and loss. It is a time of decadence and decline, of stasis and non-generative
repetition.7 This understanding, I wish to underline, is at once Orientalist and
historical: it installs divisions between temporal periods and it understands
language in terms of succession and persistence, life and death, movement and
stasis, belonging and rupture. Here, language grows and changes, as if it were
a natural-historical object, even as language belongs, throughout, and most
essentially, to itself: it never stops being what it is. And this understanding
is equally, Said has taught us, philological: Orientalism is, among other things,
the philological institution of historical categories. Philology in the colonies,
then, as Said gives us to read it, is the institutionalization of the terms for the
formation of national-historical, which is also to say Orientalist, literary insti-
tutions. The work under review here contributes to a critique of such institu-
tions, and it does so in a way which compels the attention of scholars in more
than one field of literary and historical studies, and in more than one national-
colonial language.
7 A most illuminating critique of this understanding, and its effects in literary and historical
interpretation, is presented in Muhsin J. al-Musawi, The Medieval Islamic Republic of Letters:
Arabic Knowledge Construction (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015).
Indeed, it is only today (in the present of philology) that we can conceive of
the loss of the gods.8 This reminder from Marc Nichanian, in his powerful
intervention Mourning Philology, recalls for us the forceful philological effects
of auto-ethnography. And it is from this work that I draw the title of the pres-
ent essay, in the present of philology.9 Philology in the colonies imparts the
loss of a pastif also of a language and of our tonguethat will already have
been lost, and which is to be restored through philological practice, a past that
is already mediated in philological terms.
And since in foreign lands, as Hlderlin would say, we have almost lost
our tonguelost the language of the godswe need philologists, obvi-
ously, in order to restore it to us. The philologists will give language back
to us. No doubt about it: the mythological gods are philological gods.
But to restore a language philologically is, for us, who have arrived late, to
establish and confirm the loss of it.10
8 Marc Nichanian, Mourning Philology: Art and Religion at the Margins of the Ottoman
Empire, trans. G. M. Goshgarian and Jeff Fort (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 3.
9 Ibid., 6.
10 Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid., 75, 76.
12 See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New
York: Vintage, 1970), 293: Empiricityand this is equally true of natural individuals and
of the words by which they can be namedis henceforth traversed by History, through
the whole density of its being. And consider also the discussion of Nichanian (and
Foucault, among others), in relation to philology and history, pursued by Gil Anidjar in
Against History, in Marc Nichanian, The Historiographic Perversion, trans. with an after-
word by Gil Anidjar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 125-159.
He spoke, and reveals himself to us, in his own voice, in a book that he freely
authored of his own will and in his own way (4), Dana Sajdi writes of Shihb
al-Dn Amad Ibn Budayr, the eighteenth-century Levantine barber whose
chronicle is the object of her study. The six chapters of this study elaborate
this claim in detail, and yet the book equally points elsewhere, to the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries (122), and to the nineteenth century and the nahah.
A reading of the latter is presumed throughout, and is directly addressed when
the chronicle, in Ibn Budayr, becomes a platform of interrogation:
Yet Ibn Budayrs text, one is given to read, was not singular, but rather a symp-
tom of a phenomenon (5): it points to other historical writing in the eighteenth
century. He was joined by other authors whose social backgrounds were quite
unusual for the genre of the chronicle: a couple of Sh farmers from southern
Lebanon, a Samaritan scribe from Nablus, a Sunni court clerk from im, a
Greek Orthodox priest from Damascus, and two soldiers also from Damascus
(6). The new form of language practiced in this writing, which Sajdi names
13 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1839 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983 [1962]); Ibrahim Abu Lughod, The Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A
Study in Cultural Encounters (London: Saqi, 2011 [1963]).
14 Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998 [1979]);
Nelly Hanna, In Praise of Books: A Cultural History of Cairos Middle Class, Sixteenth to the
Eighteenth Century (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003).
15 The full passage reads: The history of the contemporary chronicle is therefore about the
transformation of a literary-historiographical genre and of the rules of scholarship as well
16 Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 [1988]);
Stephen Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2004); Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007); Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial
and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Kamran Rastegar,
And yet the recognition of the time of the present as a time of freedom
(no research or scholarship of past authorities was necessary; nor did the
author have to link his work to that of a learned predecessorthe author of
the contemporary chronicle wrote on the authority of his own I. Neither did
the authors literacy have to extend to a command of classical Arabic; the con-
temporary chronicle freed itself [my emphasis] of the obligations of correct
Arabic and could acceptably be written in whatever degree of colloquial the
author chose [140]) temporally translates a series of categories. If the freedom
of the author and his literacy mirrors that of the eighteenth century, a century
which, we are told more than once, broke with the past (with the breaking of
the ulam monopoly over the production of the contemporary chronicle, the
Literary Modernity between the Middle East and Europe: Textual Transactions in Nineteenth
Century Arabic, English, and Persian Literatures (New York: Routledge, 2007); Elliott
Colla, Conflicted Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian Antiquity (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2007); Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working Out Egypt:
Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2011); Shaden Tageldin, Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions
of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and Ziad Fahmy,
Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2011).
17 Stephen Sheehi, Towards a Critical Theory of al-Nahah: Epistemology, Ideology and
Capital, Journal of Arabic Literature 43 (2012), 269-298.
language of the chronicle is liberated from the literary convention set up by the
ulam themselves [111]), and, as Sajdi underlines in relation to the authors
of the commoner chronicles she discussesthey managed to break the
hegemony of the Muslim learned elite (36), then the reading of language
mirrors the reading of history itself. The presenthere, the eighteenth cen-
turybreaks with the past to be what it is, and it is through this rupture that
language is compelled to become both legible and temporally recognizable.
And yet The Barber of Damascus also suggests that language may be read dif-
ferentlyas something other than an instrument or an end: This is what our
nouveau literates did: they used language as an instrument, and not an end in
itself (112). Sajdi shows that the form of the chronicle gave to Ibn Budayr the
I and its possibility, if not also its freedom and liberation. If the popular epic
gave Ibn Budayr a model after which to frame the events of history, the con-
temporary chronicle gave [my emphasis] him the room to be. The chronicle
gave [my emphasis] Ibn Budayr the possibility of the I, the authority to speak
in his own voice (158). This authority, and its possibility, then, is not simply his
own. It is an authorityand an authorial comportment and practicethat
will never simply have closed itself off from the language practices upon which
it draws in order to be what it is. This is a point on which, as I read The Barber
of Damascus, with and against the grain of its language, Sajdi is quite clear.
As for the question of what the chronicle did for Ibn Budayr: with its authorial
I, the chronicle allowed him to speak [my emphasis] (173). Yet how does one
read, in a text which privileges authorship and authorityand in a text which
privileges freedom, autonomy, and liberationthe non-authority and non-
autonomy, in relation to language, which Sajdi recalls, a certain non-belonging
of a self to itself or its time? To install authorship, language had to draw on a
past, or, differently, it had to break itself off from a pasta break which, Sajdi
shows, language is not able to stop repeating. If historiography has to privilege
sharp breaksin, for example, a discussion of the new order of the eighteenth
century (59)one may ask whether history may be read differently, and one
may ask whether such a reading would still be historical. It is not that historical
reading would give voice to or represent voices which had remained silent or
which have been silenced (thus far, I have posited the chronicles of the non-
ulam as an effect of changed social positions, a change that prompted these
previously silent individuals to negotiate in or for new positions, whether anx-
iously or complacently, through their authorship of chronicles [103-104]), but
that it would refuse to decide on the timehistorical or otherof its objects.
If Ibn Budayrs chronicle points to a disturbanceHis book, which repre-
sents the new voice of the commoner in the field of historiography, was itself
a disturbance in the literary order (20)it is perhaps in its non-absorption or
its non-domestication into the time of its writing, that it becomes a literary
disruption (34)an event of language that neither represents nor privileges
a bold subjective I (164), but that gives us, its readers, to read language, and
perhaps also the act or event that reading is, differently.
18 See Paul de Man, Conclusions: Walter Benjamins The Task of the Translator, in The
Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 82.
where reading does not come later to Darwin but is already implicated in
what Darwin, and his writing, between languages, is and does. In short, this
approach to reading Darwin is one that views him not as the template against
which to measure subsequent readings but rather as part of an extended sys-
tem of meanings, references, and significations. Tracing the web of meaning
produced by these readings is central to what this book sets out to do (6).
The readings Elshakry pursues open by discreetly indexing a social and polit-
ical valance with which they are engaged, and which the reading of Darwin
in Arabic mediated. Both men [Faris Nimr and Andrew Dickson White] saw
understanding the laws of nature as compatible with religious belief and nec-
essary for the formation of an educated society whose citizens could question
authority when needed and yet still accept the rationale and rule of law (2-4).
Yet if producing political and social docility forms a backdrop to reading Darwin
in Arabic, what one might call a scientific political theologyDarwins early
Arabic readers were often conscious of their public audience: they were pub-
lic men of science, supporting public measures, safeguarding the public good,
and so forth. Yet they were always part and parcel of a generation of literary
elite who spoke in the name of their masses while still considering themselves
a class apart (23)the texts Elshakry considers impart a historical reading
of language and practices of knowledge, which newly alter what it means to
know in Arabic. Responding to an article by Shaykh Ysuf al-Dijw on the rela-
tion between science and religion, and in the fallout of Isml Mahars 1928
Arabic translation of Darwins The Origin of the Species, Mahar underlined
that al-Dijw had misunderstoodor perhaps just missedwhat he took to be
clear distinctions: It seems the good Shaykh al-Dijwi, retorted Mazhar in an
article entitled Faith in God, does not know the difference between science,
knowledge, and ethics [al-ilm, al-maarifa wa al-adab]pointing out the pro-
found reorientations that the concept of ilm and allied forms of knowledge
had long been undergoing (297).19 Through close readings of figures in Arabic
letters who mediated and carried out the reading of Darwin in Arabicfrom
Fris Nimr and Yaqb arrf, the editors of the journal al-Muqtaaf, which was
founded in Beirut in 1876 and which later moved to Cairo (While in Egypt,
they also continued to engage in the sweeping reformulation and conceptual
transformation of the notion of ilm, Elshakry underlines [73]), to Jaml
al-Dn al-Afghn, Muammad Abduh, Shibl Shumayyil, usayn al-Jisr,
They also held that the process of evolution was itself evidence of design
in nature, and they clung tenaciously to a faith in the unity of nature,
natural laws, and scientific method. If one held that nature was a unified
system of being, operating under fixed laws and investigated by scientific
proofs, and under the providence of divine benevolence, then there was
no reason, they believed, for religion and science to come into conflict.
Wherever possible, the two authors stressed the harmony of the laws of
nature with Gods laws. (43)
separate and divide knowledge from religion, religion from literature, litera-
ture from language, and language from science are redrawn.
Elshakry stages her discussion of reading in relation to rising international
literacy rates and the subsequent expansion of a global print culture (7), and
this expansion is enacted, in linguistic details, through the journals and books
she studies. Reading is considered in relation to a series of transformations in
the Arabic nineteenth century.
The rise of an Arabic press in the late nineteenth century similarly created
new relations. These new reading networks were both cross-confessional
and transregional. They brought the Muqtataf group together with Jamal
al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. American and British mission-
aries had viewed the press as a potent tool of civilization and a powerful
means of conversion, while Muslim scholars saw it as an effective agent
of transregional Muslim reform. Shattering former conventions of read-
ing, transcribing, and collecting texts (above all, in a society dedicated
until then to chirography and the palimpsestic codex), the print press
forged novel literary and material networks, circulating ideas much fur-
ther afield than just the Arab worldnow linking Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli,
and Istanbul with London, Paris, New York, and Buenos Aires. (22)
how, through and with translation, language does something other than that
at which it aims (Their aim was to introduce, A newspaper should be writ-
ten, We shall endeavor to write it). Rather than merely simplifying things, to
give place to a reader who would understand himself or herself by recognizing
himself or herself as a reader of languageI read it, and when I understood
it, I felt a great joy, Jurj Zaydn wrote of reading Al-Muqtaaf (32)what hap-
pens in translation is a repeated and pervasive, if also unruly, transformation
in categories. And this translation leaves neither the original nor the transla-
tionnor the presumed simplicity of the readerintact.
One dimension of this transformation is indexed through the writings on
materialism of Shibl Shumayyil and Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn, where the dis-
tinction between science and knowledge, which had earlier been privileged
by Edwin Lewis at the Syrian Protestant College, becomes a locus of inter-
pretive difference. Lewis, a Harvard graduate and professor of geology and
chemistry at the college (65), divided knowledge, marifah, from science,
ilm, installing a distinction that came to be proliferated in the Arabic lan-
guage. Lewis delivered the commencement address at the College in 1882, and
the address, given in Arabic under the title Al-ilm, al-marifa wa al-hikma
(Science, knowledge, and wisdom), was essentially a reflection on the nature
(and limits) of science. In that respect it could be seen as a typical mission-
ary translation projectturning ilm, the broadest word in Arabic for knowl-
edgeinto science. Knowledge (marifah) announced Lewis, is not science
(ilm), for while the former involved the patient and thorough accumulation
of observations or facts, the latter was a superior epistemological system of
inquiry since it involved both the gathering of facts and, through induction,
the formulation of causal theories (65). And this divisionbetween ilm and
marifahwas supplemented by a second, between ilm and ikmah (wisdom),
by which he meant divinely ordained truth (66). Through Lewis a distinc-
tion between knowledge of things human and knowledge of things divine
(66) is installed both through and in relation to the other differences Elshakry
reads, and this cluster of distinctions is read, differently, in Shumayyil and
al-Afghn. For Shumayyil, who was shaped by American missionary culture
and its educational outlook, the universe was not governed by intelligence,
purpose, or final causes but only by natural law (103, 108). And this understand-
ing is attributed by Shumayyil, and through his translations of Ludwig Buchners
lectures on Darwin, to Darwin. Shumayyil praised Darwin in particular for his
scientific approach to the problem of life and foras he saw itputting aside
ideas of final causes (108). It is in relation to this question that al-Afghns
al-Radd al al-dahriyyn (Refutation of the Materialists) is published in an
Lacking the proper training, thought Shumayyil, men like Afghani could
raise objections but could not provide adequate scientific proofs. For
Shumayyil, Afghani was the real imitator, merely following conventional
opinion. In short, Afghanis conception of science (ilm) was at odds with
the one promoted by men like Shumayyil. For Afghani, science (ilm) was
a corpus of knowledge that made reference to a tradition of texts, proce-
dures, arguments, and practices that aimed to incorporate rather than
repudiate the past. For Shumayyil, by contrast, it was a system of inves-
tigation, experimentation, and discovery that implied a de facto break
with, and hence a repudiation of, the past. (123)
through a series of close readings, how an older series of terms and catego-
ries come to be rearticulated and differently restaged through the debates that
opened in the reading of Darwin in Arabic.
This restaging is read, in Elshakry, as an incorporation (Yet what is striking
from our perspective is to see how easily he [al-Jisr] could incorporate con-
temporary evolutionary thought within this broader discursive framework and
how smoothly Darwins own ideas could be fitted and assessed within it [140])
and a fusion (140). Yet this fusion is also a harsh event relocation, where a
series of older Arabic terms are called upon to become recognizable in rela-
tion to a series of new debates in a colonial context. Yet the Risala, Elshakry
writes of the text of al-Jisrs she is reading, formed part of the new theology
in another and more specific sense: for as the bulk of the work shows, it was
in fact intended to meet the challenges to faith posed by the modern sciences
(156). And in relation to these challenges, al-Jisr sought, above all, to empha-
size the rationality of Islam and highlighted its demand for evidentiary cer-
tainty in matters bearing on scriptural interpretation (153). Elshakry gestures,
in reading al-Jisr on this point, to other Muslim thinkersSayyid Ahmad Khan
and Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn, but also Shibli Numani and Muhammad Iqbal
in India and the Ottoman Izmirli Ismail Hakki (156)and she shows not only
that al-Jisr elaborates older Arabic terms in a new way, but that his writing also
appropriates these terms into a new kind of historical reflection and mode of
reading. For the names and texts to which he gestures, and which his own text
mimesfor example, al-Ghazls Tahfut al-falsifahare now summoned
to be understood in a new historical, philological sense: they belong to a past
and form a civilizational resource upon which one is able to draw in order to
write of and in the present. It is not only that al-Jisr participates in a tradition,
but that his writing alters the terms of what it means to speak of tradition at
all, because it renders tradition in relation to, and through, the historicizing
practice compelled in reading Darwin in Arabic. In al-Jisr, and also elsewhere,
what appears as tradition becomes something that is only accessible through
the reconfiguration of terms Elshakry elaborates.21 If al-Jisr, was, then, anti-
evolutionary (Again, however, he stressed that at each point they were cre-
atedin the sense of being guided by a divine handand not evolved [154])
and antimaterialist (In the opening pages, we hear echoes of what would
later prove to be the thrust of al-Jisrs antimaterialism [149]), his text scripts a
relation to time, and historicity, in which readers of his textand of the texts
of al-Afghn, Shumayyil, Abduh, and othersare schooled.
For Abduh, modern science and Islam were essentially moving along the
same path, that of the advance of civilization (165), Elshakry writes as she
addresses the work of this towering figure, who was among the first of the
ulama to advocate a reconciliation of modern scientific knowledge with reli-
gious texts (165). Abduh, like al-Jisr, privileged a conception of natural law in
relation to an understanding of the world and causality. Elshakry writes that
Abduh defined sunna in terms of what we might now call natural law.
The universe has laws (sunan), evidences of which are to be found every-
where in nature, from the composition of precious stones and other
rocks and the development of plants and animals to the composition
and disposition of natural bodies. Quoting other verses from the Quran
on creationsuch as God created the sun and the moon to lighten our
paths and organized their cycles so we could count the years, and this he
did for those who desire to learn and follow the path of truthAbduh
concluded that he who has knowledge of the order (nizam) of creation
and of existence (wujud) knows the truth (in other words, the divine
truth) of the laws of life. (173)
22 Elshakry notes: As this brief sketch suggests, Abduhs career developed in large part
thanks to the rise of new media and organizations, such as newspapers, publishing
houses, and modern libraries and schools as well as salons and associations. Abduhs own
ideas took shape in these forums, and they affected his writing: for instance, he repeatedly
mentions the need for an easy, didactic style that can override the narrow scholastic and
classical lexical concerns of contemporary theologians (171-172).
He believed that the current state of Europe showed that the excessive
pursuit of science alone, while ignoring the necessary role of religion in
society, led to civilizational malaise. The search for an authentic knowl-
edge tradition and its attendant sociomoral order thus formed the back-
drop to the modern interest in the Muslim classical past and played a
significant role in discussions of the Arab Renaissance (Nahda) of the
time. (185)
The time span harked back to might fluctuate, at its most inclusive
tracing a millennium from the founding of the city to late antiquity, and
the terms usedPtolemaic, Hellenistic, Graeco-Romanvary depend-
ing on the constituency giving voice to the narrative and the additional
cultural inflections it introduces; but all accounts overlap in the inclu-
sion of the Ptolemaic period. In its barest form, that account is instantly
recognizable by the blanking out of the Arabo-Islamic period, coded as a
moment of decline, a millennial rupture. (20)
And this blanking out, Halim underlines, is repeated through another histo-
riographical sleight of handwhere the decline of the past is interpretively
reproduced through a particular reading of post-independence Egypt, where
Alexandria appears as a city in decline, in this case fallen victim to nation-
alism, the members of foreign colonies having departed, thus depleting that
space of its cosmopolitanism (22). Halims reading becomes, differently, a
reading of cosmopolitanism through the archive she assemblesan approach
mirrored, in particular ways, in Sajdis reading of literacy in the eighteenth-
century Levant and in Elshakrys reading of the transformation of the category
ilm through reading Darwin in Arabic. In each, a privileging of Europe as
a site of origination and as a locus for interpretive and theoretical insight is
placed in question, even as that placing in question is read and pursued dif-
ferently, and to different effect. Halim renders a critique of this privileging
through the notion of the archive: I do not propose or espouse a rigid defini-
tion of cosmopolitanism in this book: instead, I have chosen to elicit it from the
archive I deal with, proceeding from the premise of a given tradition, national
included, against but also through which cosmopolitanism is defined (9). The
archive does not become a locus for temporal or historical-philological legiti-
currents of European art; and also to convey to the European nations what
specific contribution Arab writers in Egypt have to offer to these trends, by
means of translation (but translation done most carefully), perhaps an Arab
contributiona contemporary Arab perspectivemight be translated into
foreign works and somehow naturally transformed in a way that the condi-
tions of adaptation demand, thus becoming valuable outside the boundaries
of Egypt and beyond the borders of the Arab world (116). This need points to
a preponderance of anticolonial perspectives and instantiations of affin-
ity with Egypt in his later texts (119) as it sits adjacent to a persistence of
Orientalism in his writing, an adjacency which allows Halim to underline the
paradoxical quality of Cavafys text in relation to a more cosmopolitan attun-
ement to otherness and other textualities (119). Receiving and giving more
than one legacy, Beyond authorial intentionality, Cavafy was heir to a catho-
licity of intellectual traditions, sometimes mutually reinforcing, at other times
antagonistic (119), where a corpus of writing teaches, both with and against it
all, a repetition of Orientalism in poetic statement.
This repetition is construed, differently, in Forster (in chapter 2) and Durrell
(in chapter 3). If, in Forster, there is a privileging of the historiographical para-
digm around the discourse on Alexandrian cosmopolitanism Halim has taught
us to read, in Durrell there is an iteration of a domesticating, neocolonial
Levantinism. To extrapolate from Cromers account, the distinction between
the Levantines and the Syrians rests on the perception that the former are
self-serving whereas the latter can be induced to act in the service of British
colonial authority, and Durrell, as I see it, would take this colonial geneal-
ogy of Levantine and give it a new, neocolonial lease on life, extending it into
the postindependence period in which the Quartet was published (202). In
Forster, Halim points to the narratological undergrid of his account [in his
Alexandria: A History and a Guide] and its sources both spiritual and cultural
(123), to offer a close, intricate readingas in her discussion of Durrell
of Forsters account of the spiritual in relation to the standard paradigm of
arching over from a Hellenistic golden age of Alexandria to a modern city con-
structed in Hellenized terms while bracketing out the Arabo-Islamic period
(123), and of his consonance with readings of the cosmopolitan as post-
ethnic and post-national. If Forsters words have a contemporary ring that
resonates with recent scholarship about cosmopolitanism, this is because
in his construction of Alexandrias heritage the city epitomizes a valorized
hybridity, specifically here racial (bastardy and miscegenation), as an anti-
dote to nationalisms based on the ethnocentrism that have spawned ethnic
cleansing (127). Separating Alexandria from EgyptForster writes that it is a
situation unique in Egypt, and the Alexandrians have never been truly Egyptian
The point I wish to make is not solely that whatever signs of impend-
ing decolonization the Quartet bears are refracted back onto the Egypt
of the mid-1930s and 1940s from the late 1950s time of writing when the
country had gained its independence, and that representing intimations
of the end-of-empire per se does not warrant a novels designation as
25 See also Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), upon
which Halim draws in this passage.
26 I point here to Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage, 1979).
The relations between Copts and Muslims (52) are discussed as relations of
commonality and forms of interaction, suggesting a form of non-cosmopol-
itan cosmopolitanism, a cosmopolitanism given through local acts of writ-
ing, and practices of being with otherspractices that take on a political
valance in al-Kharrs Girls of Alexandria (53). Al-Kharr, Starr writes, links
Jerusalem and Ramallah and Nazareth and al-Khalil to state and colonial,
racialized violence in Palestine, Egypt, France, South Africa, and the United
States (54). She cites al-Kharr:
Their small yellow tanks knew what they had to do; they shot bullets
from their old-fashioned long cannons and hundreds fell in the great
square outside the Winter Palace; the sirens of their black cars wailed as
they were barricaded in front of the Sorbonne; they dragged trained and
vicious dogs by their leather leads to maul black legs in Johannesburg or
by the Mississippi. (55)
Giving to us this prescient citation, and translating it for us, Starr reads these
pages in Edwr al-Kharr in relation to universalist, transnational political
affiliation, and revolutionary activity (54).
Staged over and against the literary city of E. M. Forster, C. P. Cavafy, and
Lawrence Durrell (33) and the myth of cosmopolitan Alexandria perpetu-
ated by literature in Western languages from Plutarch to Lawrence Durrell
(35), readings of Edwr al-Kharr, Ibrhm Abd al-Magd (whose Ambergris
Birds stages a small act of resistance to repressing the memory of Alexandrias
cosmopolitan history [69]), and Youssef Chahine, suggest an imbrication
of the legacies of colonial practices with the reorganization of identities and
the relations between languages. The richness of unexpected juxtapositions,
self-referentiality, and playful blurring of boundaries define Chahines art-
istry, and destabilize rigid notions of identity and place in his work (78),
where Alexandria is, Starr writes, a locus for a nostalgic desire for recovery:
Alexandria is the repository of nostalgia, the lost irrecoverable cosmopoli-
tan space (82). This nostalgia is read, in Starr, in relation to what she calls a
non-essentializing politics.27 Abdel Meguids and al-Kharrs novels, Starr
elaborates, attempt to reclaim the cosmopolitan moment within the context
of Egyptian cultural memory, and, as I argue, offer an authentic and locally
specific alternative to parochial ethno-linguistic nationalism (76), a post-
colonial Egyptian pluralism to supplant colonial cosmopolitanism (100)a
reading which, if however salient, redoubles the categories Starr seems to
wish to place in question. Opposing ethno-linguistic nationalism to the
27 Referencing al-Kharr and Abd al-Magd, Starr writes that Their work reformulates the
characterizations of Alexandrian cosmopolitanism perpetuated by Lawerence Durrell,
and, to a lesser extant by E. M. Forster and other writers of European languages. Their
response is a non-essentializing, local and particular re-formulation of the cosmopolitan
myth. Their writing, although nostalgic for elements of coexistence and tolerance, is also
critical of the colonial system in which cosmopolitanism thrived in Egypt (76).
28 The Jewish characters in the novel, including the narrator, Starr writes, fundamentally
see themselves as European, and display a deep internalization of Orientalist attitudes
toward native Egyptians (124-125).
reconjure and rewrite a Levantinism through its colonial inscription and its
relation to languagesand through the divisions between and within the
languages it perpetuatesMatalon, and also Gormezano Goren, point to a
complicity in relation to the political and social orders to which readers of
Remembering Cosmopolitan Egypt are recalled. To read this complicity would
be to read the ways in which languageand languagesare imbricated in
relation to colonial force. If this force compels, in one of its vectors, a histo-
ricizing reflectiona reflection on language that privileges the historical as
a category, where the past disappears and draws away, to become, simply,
the pastthen the reflection on the relation between older and later writ-
ing claims the attention of scholars in the disciplines of literature studies. If
one must speak of the past in such termsIn the years following the 1956
Suez conflict, foreign minorities began leaving Egypt in large numbers. The
cosmopolitan society immortalized by Western literature disappeared (40)
it would be only in order to insist on the non-stable, dissonant time of lan-
guage, and of writingan instability and a dissonance one is also given to
read through the texts considered here, and through Starrs consideration of
them. To write of the past, and to write of languageas in Sajdis The Barber
of Damascus, Elshakrys Reading Darwin in Arabic, and Halims Alexandrian
Cosmopolitanismwould be to do so in relation to a knowledge that the past
does not simply draw away, but that it persistently interrupts the time of the
present. To learn to read language differently, in relation to this interruption,
has been one of the lessons offered by the texts under review here. Lingering
with it gives to us a reading that remains with the historicity of language, while
not appropriating language as a legible object. To think this interruption in
relation to the formation of objects of study in the disciplines of Arabic studies,
and in the fields of literature studies more broadly, remains the greatest chal-
lenge and provocation of the work reviewed here, where these objects decline
to be what they arewhere objects fail to domesticate themselves within a
temporal horizon, and where this failure is neither a loss to be mourned nor
a privation to be corrected, but a divided and dividing event. Sajdi, Elshakry,
Halim, and Starr suggest, differently, that rather than having left the past safely
behind, the time of the writing they considerand if also our own time
remains that of the philological present. It is not a present of tranquil self-
understanding, but one whereby time is already problematic. Interrupting
historical-philological domestication, and refusing the stately time of readerly
legitimation, writing, in the broadest sense, and in the texts considered in the
work reviewed here, refuses the closure of languageand of collective social
and political struggle, and social and political formin the domesticating and