Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System,"

in Party Politics and Pressure Groups

(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 23-32.

The Technical Factor: The Electoral System

To these socio-economic and historical factors a technical factor must be added: the
electoral system. I expressed its effects in 1946 in the formulation of three sociological
laws: (1) a majority vote on one ballot is conducive to a two-party system; (2)
proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty system; (3) a majority vote on
two ballots is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined toward forming coalitions.

The brutal finality of a majority vote on a single ballot forces parties with similar
tendencies to regroup their forces at the risk of being overwhelmingly defeated. Let us
assume an election district in which 100,000 voters with moderate views are opposed by
80,000 communist voters. If the moderates are divided into two parties, the communist
candidate may well win the election; should one of his opponents receive more than
20,000 votes, the other will be left with less than 80,000, thereby insuring the election of
the communist. In the following election, the two parties with moderate views will
naturally tend to unite. Should they fail to do so, the weaker party would gradually be
eliminated as a dual consequence of "under-representation" and "polarization." Under
representation is a mechanical phenomenon. Elections determined by a majority vote on
one ballot literally pulverize third parties (and would do worse to fourth or fifth parties, if
there were any; but none exist for this very reason). Even when a single ballot system
operates with only two parties, the one that wins is favored, and the other suffers. The
first one is over-represented--its proportion of seats is greater than its percentage of the
votes-while the party that finishes second is usually under-represented--its proportion of
seats is smaller than its percentage of the votes. The English, with their two-party system,
have expressed this phenomenon by the law of the cube: the relationship in the
percentage of seats held by the two parties would be equal to the relationship of the cubes
of the percentages of the votes received (if a and b are the percentages of the votes, and a'
and b' the percentages of the seats, then we find that a' / b' = a3 / b3).

[Janda's note: The cube law attempts to predict the percentage distribution of
seats won in parliament from the percentage distribution of the electoral vote in a
two-party system. If the parties divide the vote 50-50, each would win 50% of the
seats. But as a party's vote increases over 50%, the percentage of seats won is not
linear, but curvilinear. That is, each percentage point advantage in vote won
yields more than one percentage point increase in seats won. This curvilinear
relationship can formulated mathematically. The ratio of seats won equals the
ratio of the cubes of the votes won.]

When there is a third party, it is even more under-represented than the second. The gap is
generally quite large, with the proportion of seats far below the proportion of the votes
received. In 1964, the British Liberal party received 11.2 per cent of the votes cast, but
only 1.4 per cent of the parliamentary seats. This under-representation tends to eliminate
the effects of any votes cast for a third party. But voters are aware of this phenomenon.
They also know that a division of votes between two parties holding similar views favors
their common adversary. In the case mentioned before, the moderate voters would see
clearly that a split between the moderate candidates guarantees a Communist victory: in a
subsequent election they would drop the weaker of the two moderate candidates. Thus it
is that voters tend to abandon the third party in order to concentrate their votes on the two
strongest parties. This tendency toward polarization, a psychological phenomenon,
strengthens the mechanical factors conducive to a two-party system.

In a system of proportional representation, the situation is quite different. The very

principle of proportional representation explains the multiplicity of parties it produces.
Since every minority, no matter how weak it may be, is assured of representation in the
legislature, nothing prevents the formation of splinter parties, often separated only by
mere shades of opinion. If the conservative party has 6 million votes in the country,
corresponding to 300 seats in parliament, and if it splits into three groups about equal in
numbers, proportional representation will give each of these about a hundred deputies,
and the conservative family will have the same strength in parliament. In other respects,
this electoral system does not encourage parties to unite. A coalition is useless from an
electoral point of view since the entire system tends to permit everyone to take his
chances at the polls.,Hence the reciprocal independence of the political parties.

In a system in which elections arc decided by a majority vote on the second of two
ballots, political parties are numerous because the existence of a second ballot permits
each party to test its chances on the first one without risking irrevocable defeat through
the splintering of parties holding similar views; the regrouping occurs on the second
ballot through the game of "withdrawals." Let us again use the illustration of an election
district in which the conservatives have 100,000 voters and the communists, 80,000. If
the conservative electorate divides into two parties, with the first receiving 60,000 votes
and the second, 40,000, while the communists vote as a bloc on the first ballot, there will
still be a second ballot. For the second round, the weaker conservative candidate will
withdraw. His supporters will switch their votes to the stronger candidate, who will
normally be elected. New parties can thus multiply, but they are usually driven to form
alliances with one another to check their opponents by means of "retreats" and
"withdrawals." The second ballot is essentially a voting by coalitions, as was seen in
France during the Third Republic and in Imperial Germany, the two large countries that
have practiced this system.

Although the preceding laws have been much discussed, often in heated debate, they
have never been seriously challenged. The criticism directed against them has not
questioned the reality of the phenomenon they express, which is fairly obvious, as much
as the precise extent of its influence. It is clear that an electoral reform by itself will not
create new parties: parties are a reflection of social forces; they are not born of a simple
legislative decision. We can be sure that the relationship between electoral systems and
party systems is not something mechanical and automatic. A given electoral regime does
not necessarily produce a given party system; it simply exerts an influence in the
direction of a particular type of system; it is a force, acting in the midst of other forces,
some of which move in an opposite direction. It is also clear that the relationship between
electoral and party systems is not a one-way phenomenon; if a one-ballot vote tends
toward a two-party system, a two party system also favors the adoption of a single ballot
voting system.

The exact role of the electoral system seems, in the last analysis, to be that of an
accelerator or that of a brake. An election by a majority vote on a single ballot has a dual
effect: first, it poses an obstacle to the appearance of a new party, although this obstacle
is not insurmountable (the role of a brake); secondly, it tends to eliminate the weakest
party (or parties) if there are more than two (the role of an accelerator). The braking
effect was noticeable in Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, in the face of a
socialist drive, and again after World War 1, in the face of communist and fascist
movements. The accelerating effect was even more apparent in the case of the Liberal
party, which was practically eliminated in fifteen years (1920-35), although it retains a
certain number of supporters who are compelled by the electoral system to choose
between Conservatives and Labourites. Deciding by a majority vote on one ballot
accelerated in Great Britain the substitution of a two-party system for any other kind.

Proportional representation plays just the opposite role. It does not slow down the
development of new parties. It passively registers their appearance, sometimes
amplifying the vibrations they generate, like an echo chamber or a seismograph. (In order
to check this tendency, proportional representation is rarely applied in toto; it is modified
by such measures as permitting local districts to apportion residual votes and by
establishing rules regarding the percentage of votes required to gain representation in the
legislative assembly.) On the other hand, it retards the elimination of old parties which
would otherwise tend to disappear as the social and political scene changes. The
"salvaging" of the Belgian Liberal party through proportional representation, beginning
in 1900, is a typical example of this phenomenon. Instead of giving way to a twentieth-
century-style two-party system, the nineteenth-century system survived with the new
system superimposed on it, producing an essentially three-party system (this was also the
case in Germany and Austria), However, we must of course distinguish between old
movements, deeply rooted among a portion of the population, and superficial movements
reflecting temporary political moods or fashions. Proportional representation registers
just as clearly the appearance as it does the disappearance of parties of this latter type.
Typical examples were the case of "rexism" in Belgium, and, in France, the RPF
[Rassemblement du Peuple Francais] in 1951, and Poujadism in 1956.

The results of the two-ballot majority system are similar to those of proportional
representation, with a few differences. The two-ballot system seems to be more
discouraging to the formation of new parties than proportional representation (but it is far
less effective in this than the single-ballot majority vote). Perhaps it is also more helpful
to older parties, but it is difficult to formulate any definite conclusions in this matter.
Furthermore, it seems to present a certain barrier to brusque changes of political opinion,
to movements reflecting momentary moods or impulses, to political groups that are
"fashionable" but ephemeral (even though the example of the UNR [Union Nouvelle pour
la Republique, the Gaullist party] in 1958 proved to be of a different kind: but the
circumstances in this instance were very special). The sharpest difference with the system
of proportional representation concerns electoral alliances, A coalition system par
excellence, the two ballot regime can sometimes permit the formation of a dual system of
alliances, introducing a sort of two-party system in the midst of a multi-party situation.
This phenomenon was quite evident in France during the Third and the Fifth Republics,
and in Germany from 1870 to 1914.

Having said all this, the fact remains that a change in the electoral system does not
always have a decisive influence on the existing party system. However, it seems certain
that if proportional representation were to replace the majority vote in Great Britain, a
three-party system would appear before very long, making party splits within the ranks of
the Labourites and the Conservatives much more likely. The influence of a one-ballot
vote in maintaining an already established two-party system is beyond question. It is
much less certain that the adoption of such an electoral system would destroy an already
existing multiparty system and, for example, reduce to two the number of parties in
France or Italy. In any event, a reform of this nature is inconceivable, because an election
determined by a majority vote on a single ballot gives rise to unforeseen results when
more than two parties are involved. Yet in the German Federal Republic and in Austria,
such an electoral reform would very likely hasten the trend, already underway, toward a
two-party system. Above all, it would prevent any move in the opposite direction by
posing a serious obstacle to possible splits within the two major parties, and would also
discourage the revival of small political parties.