4/12/2017 G.R. No.

L-32951-2

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.Nos.L329512September17,1971

RICARDODELACAMARA,petitioner,
vs.
HON.MANUELLOPEZENAGE,PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofAgusandelNorteand
ButuanCity(BranchII),respondents.

DemosthenesMediante,PuroVelez,FranciscoFabe,FedericodelPuertoandPelaez,Jalandoni&Jamirfor
petitioner.

Hon.ManuelLopezEnageinhisownbehalf.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO,J.:

AnorderofrespondentJudgeManuelLopezEnage,fixingthebailofpetitioner,RicardodelaCamara,inthesumof
P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting
excessivebail.1Themeritofthepetitiononitsfaceisthusapparent.Nonetheless,reliefsoughtsettingasidetheabove
orderbyreducingtheamountofbailtoP40,000.00cannotbegranted,asinthemeanwhile,petitionerhadescapedfromthe
provincialjail,thusrenderingthiscasemootandacademic.Itisdeemedadvisable,however,fortheguidanceoflowercourt
judges,tosetforthanewthecontrollingandauthoritativedoctrinesthatshouldbeobservedinfixingtheamountofthebail
soughtinorderthatfullrespectbeaccordedtosuchaconstitutionalright.

Thefactsarenotindispute.Petitioner,Ricardo,delaCamara,MunicipalMayorofMagsaysay,MisamisOriental,
wasarrestedonNovember7,1968anddetainedattheProvincialJailofAgusan,forhisallegedparticipationinthe
killingoffourteenandthewoundingoftwelveotherlaborersoftheTiradorLoggingCo.,atNato,Esperanza,Agusan
delSur,onAugust21,1968.Thereafter,onNovember25,1968,theProvincialFiscalofAgusanfiledwiththeCourt
of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co
accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969,
cameanapplicationforbailfiledbypetitionerwiththelowercourt,premisedontheassertionthattherewasnoevidenceto
linkhimwithsuchfatalincidentofAugust21,1968.Helikewisemantainedhisinnocence.RespondentJudgestartedthetrial
ofpetitioneronFebruary24,1969,theprosecutionrestingitscaseonJuly10,1969.Asofthetimeofthefilingofthepetition,
thedefensehadnotpresenteditsevidence.

Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that
there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the
opportunity,butfixedtheamountofthebailbondattheexcessiveamountofP1,195,200.00,thesumofP840,000.00
for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then
cametheallegationthatonAugust12,1970,theSecretaryofJustice,VicenteAbadSantos,uponbeinginformedof
suchorder,sentatelegramtorespondentJudgestatingthatthebondrequired"isexcessive"andsuggestingthata
P40,000.00bond,eitherincashorproperty,wouldbereasonable.Therewaslikewiseamotionforreconsideration
toreducetheamount.RespondentJudgehoweverremainedadamant.Hencethispetition.

TheanswerfiledbyrespondentJudgeonMarch5,1971setforththecircumstancesconcerningtheissuanceofthe
aboveorderandtheotherincidentsofthecase,which,tohismindwoulddisproveanychargethathewasguiltyof
grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challengedorder would find support in circulars of the
DepartmentofJusticegivensanctionbythisCourt.Hesoughtthedismissalofthepetitionforlackofmerit.
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InthehearingofthecasesetforMarch31,1971,therewasnoappearanceforboththepetitionerandrespondents
withtheformer,uponwrittenmotion,beinggiventhirtydayswithinwhichtosubmitamemoranduminlieuoforal
argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a
memorandumasdulysubmittedbypetitioneronApril6,1971.

Insteadofareply,respondentJudgesubmitted,onMay26,1971,asupplementalanswerwhereinheallegedthat
petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained at large. There was a
reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated
June7,1971,andfiledwiththisCourtthenextdaywiththisplea:"Theundersignedcounsel,therefore,vehemently
interposeopposition,onbehalfofpetitioner,torespondent'sprayerfordismissalofthepresentpetitionforlackof
merit.For,theissueinthiscaseisnotalonethefateofpetitionerRicardodelaCamara.Theissueinthepresent
petitionthatcallsfortheresolutionofthisHonorableTribunalisthefateofcountlessotherRicardodelaCamaras
whomaybeawaitingtheclearcutdefinitionanddeclarationofthepoweroftrialcourtsinregardtothefixingofbail."
4

Whileunderthecircumstancesarulingonthemeritsofthepetitionforcertiorariisnotwarranted,still,assetforthat
the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude thisTribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocalcommandoftheConstitutionthatexcessivebailshallnotberequired.

1.Beforeconviction,everypersonisbailableexceptifchargedwithcapitaloffenseswhentheevidenceofguiltis
strong.5Sucharightflowsfromthepresumptionofinnocenceinfavorofeveryaccusedwhoshouldnotbesubjectedtothe
lossoffreedomasthereafterhewouldbeentitledtoacquittal,unlesshisguiltbeprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt.Thereby
aregimeoflibertyishonoredintheobservanceandnotinthebreach.Itisnotbeyondtherealmofprobability,however,thata
person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarceand thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the
accused"forthesubsequenttrial.6Noristhere,anythingunreasonableindenyingthisrighttoonechargedwithacapital
offensewhenevidenceofguiltisstrong,asthelikelihoodis,ratherthanawaittheoutcomeoftheproceedingagainsthim
withadeathsentence,aneverpresentthreat,temptationtofleethejurisdictionwouldbetoogreattoberesisted.

2.Where,however,therighttobailexists,itshouldnotberenderednugatorybyrequiringasumthatisexcessive.
SotheConstitutioncommands.Itisunderstandablewhy.Iftherewerenosuchprohibition,therighttobailbecomes
meaningless.Itwouldhavebeenmoreforthrightifnomentionofsuchaguaranteewerefoundinthefundamental
law.ItisnottobelostsightofthattheUnitedStatesConstitutionlimitsitselftoaprohibitionagainstexcessivebail.7
As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's
presenceattrial,anddeclaredthat"bailsetatahigherfigurethananamountreasonablycalculatedtofulfillthuspurposeis
"excessive"undertheEighthAmendment."8

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00asthebailthatshouldbepostedbypetitioner,thesumofP840,000.00fortheinformationcharging
multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated
murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there
being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in
thiscasethattheDepartmentofJusticedidrecomendthetotalsumofP40,000.00forthetwooffenses.

3.ThereisanattemptonthepartofrespondentJudgetojustifywhat,onitsface,appearstobeindefensiblebythe
alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abano.9The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail (2) nature of the offense (3) penalty for the offense
charged(4)characterandreputationoftheaccused(5)healthoftheaccused(6)characterandstrengthoftheevidence
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial (8) forfeiture of other bonds (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from
justicewhenarrestedand(10)iftheaccusedisunderbondforappearanceattrialinothercases." 10RespondentJudge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the
courtcalledupontoruleonthequestionofbail.Wemuststress,however,thatwhereconditionsimposeduponadefendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to
exerciseoursupervisorypowerstoprovidetherequiredremedy."11

Noattemptatrationalizationcanthereforegiveacolorofvaliditytothechallengedorder.Thereisgrimironyinan
accusedbeingtoldthathehasarighttobailbutatthesametimebeingrequiredtopostsuchanexorbitantsum.
What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the
fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a
purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a
stateof desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required

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could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were
informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have beenno disappointment of
expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the
hope,ateasingillusionlikeamunificentbequestinapauper'swill."12Itisnowonderthattheresultingfrustrationleft
resentmentandbitternessinitswake.Petitioner'ssubsequentescapecannotbecondoned.Thatiswhyheisnotentitledto
thereliefprayedfor.WhatrespondentJudgedid,however,doescallforrepudiationfromthisCourt.

Noristhereanyjustificationthenforimputinghisinabilitytofixalesseramountbyvirtueofanallegedrelianceona
decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that
there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement
may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order
complainedofabsolutelybereftofsupportinlaw,butitfliesinthefaceofcommonsense.Itisnottoomuchtosay
thatitisatwarwiththecommandofreason.

With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the
aboveorder.

WHEREFORE,thiscaseisdismissedforbeingmootandacademic.Withoutpronouncementastocosts.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Teehankee,BarredoandVillamor,JJ.,concur.

Castro,J.,concursintheresult.

Makasiar,J.,tooknopart.

Footnotes

1TheConstitutionprovides:"Allpersonsshallbeforeconvictionbebailablebysufficientsureties,
exceptthosechargedwithcapitaloffenseswhenevidenceofguiltisstrong.Excessivebailshallnotbe
required."Art.III,Sec.1,par.16.

2CriminalCaseNo.3563.

3CriminalCaseNo.3564.

4Reply,par.III,pp.34.

5Art.III,Sec.1,par.16,Constitution.

6AccordingtoCooley:"Iftherewereanymodeshortofconfinementwhichwould,withreasonable
certainty,insuretheattendanceoftheaccusedtoanswertheaccusation,itwouldnotbejustifiableto
inflictuponhimthatindignity,whentheeffectistosubjecthim,inagreaterorlessdegree,tothe
punishmentofaguiltyperson,whileasyetitisnotdeterminedthathehascommittedanycrime.Ifthe
punishmentonconvictioncannotexceedinseveritytheforfeitureofalargesumofmoney,thenitis
reasonabletosupposethatsuchasumofmoney,oranagreementbyresponsiblepartiestopayitto
thegovernmentincasetheaccusedshouldfailtoappear,wouldbesufficientsecurityforhis
attendanceandtherefore,atthecommonlaw,itwascustomarytotakesecurityofthischaracterinall
casesofmisdemeanoroneormorefriendsoftheaccusedundertakingforhisappearancefortrial,and
agreeingthatacertainsumofmoneyshouldbeleviedoftheirgoodsandchattels,landsand
tenements,ifhemadedefault.Butinthecaseoffelonies,theprivilegeofgivingbailbeforetrialwasnot
amatterofrightandinthiscountry,althoughthecriminalcodeismuchmoremercifulthanit
formerlywasinEngland,andinsomecasestheallowanceofbailisalmostamatterofcourse,there
areothersinwhichitisdiscretionarywiththemagistratetoallowitornotandwhereitwillsometimes
berefusediftheevidenceofguiltisstrongorthepresumptiongreat.Capitaloffensesarenotgenerally
regarded,asbailableatleast,afterindictment,orwhenthepartyischargedbythefindingofa
coroner'sjuryandthisuponthesuppositionthatonewhomaybesubjectedtotheterriblepunishment
thatwouldfollowaconviction,wouldnotforanymerepecuniaryconsiderationsremaintoabidethe
judgment.Andwherethedeathpenaltyisabolishedandimprisonmentforlifesubstituted,itisbelieved
thattherulewouldbethesamenotwithstandingthischange,thebailwouldstillbedeniedinthecaseof
thehighestoffenses,exceptunderverypeculiarcircumstances.Inthecaseofotherfeloniesitisnot
usualtorefusebail,andinsomeoftheStateconstitutionsithasbeendeemedimportanttomakeita
matterofrightinallcasesexceptoncapitalcharges"whentheproofisevidentorthepresumption
great.""ICooley,ATreatiseontheConstitutionalLimitations,643644(1927).

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7AccordingtotheUnitedStatesConstitution:"Excessiveshallnotberequired,norexcessivefines
imposed,norcruelandunusalpunishmentsinflicted."EighthAmendment.

8Stackv.Boyle,342US1,5(1951)..

9L23599,September29,1967,21SCRA312.

10Ibid,p.317.

11Ibid,p.321..

12Jackson,J.,con.,Edwardsv.California,314US160,186(1941).

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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