Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty.

Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN v. MARIANO MEDINA

Facts:

On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, on its way to Pasay City, driven
by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. While the bus was running one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, while
the three passengers named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150.

Issue:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of
the torches which ignited the gasoline.

Ruling:

No.There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-
reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had
just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati,
not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights
allegedly suddenly failed. Thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters
away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street. He
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed
into the dump truck.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga claiming
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.

Issue:

Whether or not Dionisios negligence was an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the
accident and the injuries he sustained.

Ruling:

NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence was not an intervening,
efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios injuries was the
negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the dump truck. Petitioners are liable
for damages, but these damages must be mitigated because of Dionisios contributory
negligence. Decision modified whereby Dionisio will shoulder 20% of awarded damages.

[Resolution of factual issues]

The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a curfew pass. Since he was
without a curfew pass, he was hurrying home, driving at a fast speed in order to avoid the police.
Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving down that street in order to escape notice
from the nearby police station. However, the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor
he had did not show that he was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of
reckless imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the conclusion that Dionisio
was negligent on the night of the accident.

Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them

Petitioners urge that the Carbonels negligence was merelt a passive and static condition and
that Dionisios negligence was an efficient intervening cause, and that consequently Dionisios
negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the
earlier negligence of Carbonel.
However, the distinctions between cause and condition have been almost entirely
discredited.
The Court quotes significantly from Prosser and Keeton. The following parts were quoted with
emphasis:
Cause and condition So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible
to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the
case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the condition remains static will not necessarily affect
liability Cause and condition still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to
the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

distinction between cause and condition which is important, but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause.

Dionisios negligence is not an efficient intervening cause

Carbonels negligence is far from being a passive and static condition it was an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision would not have happened had the truck not been parked
askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the street and for having
so created this risk, Carbonel must be held responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created.
Dionisios negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident,
nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
The Court quoted parts of Prosser and Keeton. With emphasis were the following:
Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which is ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason
There is an intervening cause combining with the defendants conduct to produce result, and
the defendants negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk,
and hence of the defendants negligence.
Thus it has been held that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track
should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of
others. Xxx The standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life,
and therefore to be anticipated One who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it

Dionisio had contributory negligence

The court held that Dionisios negligence was only contributory, that the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury remained Carbonels lack of due care and that consequently
Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the court.
Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 20-80 ratio should be followed,
where 20% shall be borne by Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by petitioners.

Last Clear Chance cannot apply

Petitioners ask the application of the last clear chance doctrine. It cannot apply.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart
vs. Smith but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to mitigate the harshness of another
common law doctrine or rule contributory negligence. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided
that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court believes that there is no general concept of last clear chance that may be extracted
from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence the plaintiffs or the defendants was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.
That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. Chronology of
plaintiffs and defendants negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors that
may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its employees properly and
adequately

Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer
Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to
overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to
supervise the manner in which the dump truck if parked when away from company premises. It
is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

Facts:

On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Ave. a vehicular
accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation and
driven by Aquilino Larin and a Ford Expedition owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel.
A passenger of the sedan, (Estela) sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the
hospital for treatment.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his
opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is
the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when the accident happened,
Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.

Issue:

Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the accident is his
employee's negligence.

Rulings:

No. There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate causeof the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve into
it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event
that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have
suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO vs EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

Facts:

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom
teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell
on the classroom floor. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain
and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers
to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much work to
do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and
prematurely delivered a baby girl at home. Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery
her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery. A claim for death benefits was filed by her
husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational
disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of
her employment.

Issue:

Whether or not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not
compensable.

Ruling:

NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an
employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development.
The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a
result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the
premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on
theclassroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of
postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause that
set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.The right to compensation
extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting
from a compensable injury.

Where the primary injury isshown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flowsfrom the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of anindependent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or
misconduct. Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as aclassroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her
recurrentabdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and
deathare compensable.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

SOFIA FERNANDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO

Facts:

On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao. On November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other
companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr.
were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that
of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital
but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five
victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of
the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office
autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia"
caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions.

Issue:

Whether or not Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be
liable for damages.

Ruling:

NO.

Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the
Roman law.

Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover.

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less
a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.

Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers.

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of
service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his
men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.
Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI

Facts:

A storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan which started from 2pm and
lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm, the banana plants standing on
an elevated ground were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result the live wire was
cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under
the fallen banana plants. Barrio Captain Luciano Bueno warned the people in the place not to go
near the wire for they might get hurt. He saw Cipcriano Baldomero (a laborer of the Alcala
Electric Plant) and notified him of the broken line and asked him to fix it. The latter told him
that he could not do it but that he was going to look for a line man to fix it. Sometime after they
left, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel Saynes went to the area
where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. He was electrocuted and subsequently
died. After the electrocution of the child, the broken wire was fixed.

Issue:

Whether or not the electric company may be held liable.

Ruling:

Yes, the electric company is liable. A careful examination of the record convinces the court that a
series of negligence on the part of defendants employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in
the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were
big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident which were higher than the electric posts
supporting the electric line, yet the employees who, with ordinary foresight, could have seen that
even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger.
Second, even after the employees of Alcala Electric were already aware of the possible damage
the storm could have caused they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the
lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the
flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the
wires to see if they had been cut. And third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the
morning of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did
not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he
should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire;
instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of
the line, obviously fo rgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.

The court does not agree with the petitioners theory that the parents negligence constituted the
proximate cause. Even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to their
negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he
accidentally touched. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides that the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but
does not exempt him from liability. The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the
negligence of the employer.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907

M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY

Facts:

Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they
were working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars
(karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from
the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards
installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars
move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was
notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were
being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was
beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and
causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos
for damages ($2,500).

Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the
cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that
Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that
Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.

Issue:

Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was
another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of
caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On
the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was
on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of
damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to
2,500 pesos.

In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
a. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a
real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
b. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist
without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation
(contractual or culpa contractual).

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY

Facts:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David
Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation
engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.The
plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,15 years of
age. On the 30th of September , 1905 David together with his companion Manuel Claparols went
to the companys premises and found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on
the ground. They tried to break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one
of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it
with a match and explosion followed causing them more or less injuries and to the removal of
the right eye of David. So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether or not David is entitled to damages.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match
to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own
willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiffs own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury .We think it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the explosion ,the
accident which resulted in plaintiffs injury

,was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having contributed to
the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Twenty days
after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below,
without costs to either party in this instance, and 10 days thereafter let the record be returned to
the court wherein it originated, where judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the
costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. SO ORDERED. Judgment
reversed.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973

MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ

Facts:

At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus
materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store
and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted
'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of
the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the students,
who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi
Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the
street.
They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the
fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the instructresses, took to the microphone so as to
convey to the students the above admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three
students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near
the stairway, stood up and tried with outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and
pushing their way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with
the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students,
including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several
others injured on account of the stampede.
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the
upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures
in the second and third right ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was
"Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the
conjunctiva of both eyes."
Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. ... All buildings and separate sections
of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories, having
one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all public or
quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools,
reformatories, places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and
the like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter
and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided
when required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be placed as far apart as
possible.

Issue:

Whether or not the neglect of respondents to comply with the ordinance is the proximate or
remote cause of the incident and that the numerous events that occurred were sufficient
intervening causes to support the fact that the failure of respondents to comply with the
Ordinance was only the remote cause of the death/injuries of the students?

Ruling:

The failure of respondents to comply with the Ordiance is the proximate cause of the incident.

According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the
argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in
the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was
ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with
its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen
under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this
particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not
been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the
stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of
the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the
occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in
which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent."
To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray
the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at
the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to
prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:

It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between
Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh
McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kims babysitter,
Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a
Ford Escort.

Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben
Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward),
going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans
of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.

As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly
ran from the right side of the road into the Escorts lane. As the boys were going back and forth,
unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to
swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied his
brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane,
and collided with the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge.

The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her
babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli,
Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort, received physical injuries
from the collision.

An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and
achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for
Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second
one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other
children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang Galang
was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually
consolidated.

The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorneys
fees.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its
finding that it was Galangs inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and
upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Kohs car invaded the lane of the truck and the
collision occurred while still in Galangs lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was
negligent.

Issue:

Whether or not the herein truck driver can be held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance.

Ruling:

The court ruled that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid
the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. The court had the occasion
to apply the doctrine of the last clear chance which expound that the negligence of a claimant
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences
of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent negligence
of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the
more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable
to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages. The court herein also imposed liability on the private
respondents as employers of the truck driver under Article 2180 of the Civil Code are directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows
from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

G.R. No. 147791 September 8, 2006

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

REBECCA G. ESTRELLA

Facts:

On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.
Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never
reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of
CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their
knees to the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a
hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati
Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed their injuries. Thereafter, respondents filed a
Complaint for damages against CDCP.

Issue:

Whether or not BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages
sustained by respondents.

Ruling:

No. The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for
whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted
against the employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that the owner of the other vehicle which
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held,
thus:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus
on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver
of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were
jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this
allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from
contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict.
As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to
a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and
severally liable for damages. x x x
xxxx
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out
their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of
breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action
and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as private respondent
and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the

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Submitted by: Audrey Rose B. Gusi Submitted to: Atty. Dean Ace Pamaran

intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the
holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate
and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.

In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary"
or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is
so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,17we reiterated that joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo, we held
that:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis
of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort
feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable
with his tort feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons
injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of
the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that
others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others
of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.
Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is
ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the
body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr.,
are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent
Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.

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