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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CELESTINA B. CORPUZ Whether or not the losing party must first receive notice of the judgment
A.M. No. P-00-1418, 24 September 2003. before the court can execute it.

FACTS: HELD:
Francisco Lu (Lu) was the defendant in a civil case for ejectment with the YES. The Supreme Court, citing its ruling in Felongco v. Dictado and Dy v.
Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, City Pangasinan (MTC). The MTC rendered Court of Appeals held that the losing party must first receive notice of the judgment
judgment against Lu on 7 September 1995, a copy of which Lus counsel received on before the court or its personnel can execute the judgment. The reason being that if
13 September 1995. The judgment stated therein that: such judgment is immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party, then
such a party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support the judgment.

The Court further explained its ruling by stating that a court cannot direct the
In accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued. issuance of writ of execution motu proprio as provided in Section 8, Rule 70 (now
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 1) which stated that by perfecting an appeal
On 11 September 1995, Celestina B. Corpuz, respondent in this case (the and filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court, judgment may be stayed.2
respondent), in her capacity as Clerk of Court IV of the MTC issued a writ of Hence, the Supreme Court further held that as Lu immediately perfected his appeal
execution which was implemented by the Sheriff Domingo Lopez (Sheriff Lopez) with the RTC, the act of respondent of immediately issuing the writ of execution was
of the MTC on the same day. precipitate and against all sense of fair play.

Lu elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan,
Branch 47 (RTC) by filing his Notice of Appeal on 13 September 1995. The RTC
then issued a writ of preliminary injunction and declared as void the writ of execution
1 Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is
issued by respondent. On 5 February 1996, the RTC rendered a judgment which
deleted the portion of the MTC decision quoted above. Hence, Lu filed rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion
administrative complaints against Sheriff Lopez, and Judge Orlando F. Sapio of the unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
MTC. Respondent was not impleaded in the administrative case, hence the Supreme sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to institute the
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
appropriate administrative case against her.
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the
The OCA charged respondent with ignorance of the law, abuse of authority appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
and grave misconduct for issuing the writ of execution without a motion for under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
execution or a hearing prior to the issuance of the writ. In this case, respondent issued
Court.
the writ of execution at least two days before Lus counsel received a copy of the
MTCs decision.
2 Section 19 now requires that a motion must first be filed before execution of
ISSUE:
judgment.
2

Yes. The Supreme Court held that, in Batul v. Bayron (Batul case), through
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, it affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC First Division
directing the immediate execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
BALAJONDA v. COMELEC execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to
G.R. No. 166032, 28 February 2005 do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
FACTS: provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the
On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
as the duly elected Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay). Francisco duly filed a
petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation, Although Batul case is different from this case in that in Batul the decision
lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35. After subject of the order of immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the
trial, MeTC dismissed the protest. Francisco appealed the MeTC Decision to the exercise of its original jurisdiction while the decision in this case was promulgated in
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In its Resolution, the COMELEC First the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this
Division reversed the MeTC. The COMELEC First Division thus annulled the petition in a manner different from Batul. The public policy underlying the
proclamation of Balajonda, and declared Francisco as the duly elected Barangay suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to obviate a hollow victory for the duly
Chairman. elected candidate as determined by either the courts or the COMELEC. The Supreme
Court consistently employed liberal construction of procedural rules in election cases
Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
First Divisions Resolution. In the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution, defeated by mere technical objections.
praying for a writ of execution in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court [Sec. 2(a), Rule 39], which allows discretionary execution of
judgment upon good reasons to be stated in the order. Jalandoni vs. PNB
Balajonda duly opposed the Motion for Execution, arguing that under Sec. G.R. No. L-47579, 9 October 1981
2(a), Rule 39, only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of
discretionary execution pending appeal. However, in its Order, the COMELEC First
Division after due hearing granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of
Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as
Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco. FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not execution pending appeal issued by the COMELEC is valid.
On March 31, 1959 the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment ordering
HELD:
Eduardo Jalandoni to pay the Philippine National Bank the sum of P63,297.53,
together with daily interest. That judgment became final and executory.
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ten years had elapsed from the time the levy was made, no execution sale had been
held and, therefore, the levy had become inefficacious and was a cloud on his title.
On March 9, 1964 or Within five years from the entry of judgment in this
case, the sheriff of Silay City, Negros Occidental pursuant to an alias writ of
execution, levied upon Lot No. 657-C of the Silay cadastre, with an area of seventeen
hectares. The levy was annotated on Jalandoni's TCT in this manner: The bank holds the view that the execution sale can be made beyond the ten-
year period for enforcing the judgment as long as the levy was effected within five
years from the entry of judgment as in the instant case.

Notice of Embargo. ... issued by the City Sheriff


of Silay City subjecting the rights, interests
andparticipations of Eduardo Jalandoni over the lot ISSUE:
described in this title, to "levy on execution in
relation toCivil Case entitled Philippine National
Bank, Plaintiff vs. Eduardo Jalandoni,.
May the judgment debtor's land, which was levied upon within five years from the
entry of judgment, be sold at an execution sale after the expiration of the ten-year
period for enforcing the judgment?
No effort was made by the bank to have that land sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment against Jalandoni.

HELD:

On April 22, 1974, or more than ten years after the levy was made, Jalandoni
filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Silay City in the land No.
registration proceeding a petition for the cancellation of the levy on the ground of
prescription. The petition was opposed by the bank. It should be borne in mind that an action upon a judgment must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144, Civil Code). As
clarified in the Rules of Court, that prescriptive period means that "a judgment may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date
On May 20, 1975, Jalandoni filed in the same court an action to quiet title or it becomes final and executory" and "after the lapse of such time, and before it is
for the cancellation of the notice of embargo on the ground that, although more than barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action" (Sec. 6,
Rule 39).
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The employees of the bank were negligent. They did not require the sheriff to
sell Jalandoni's land at public auction. The bank is bound by its employees'
The Jalandoni heirs, in support of their contention that the levy cannot be negligence. This case should teach the responsible officers of the bank to be more
enforced after the expiration in 1969 of the ten-year period for enforcing the vigilant in exercising its rights and in supervising its employees. The law helps the
judgment, rely on the rule laid down in Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and Surety Co. of the diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
P.I., 88 Phil. 547, a 1951 case, that "properties levied upon by execution must be sold
in public auction within the period of ten years during which the judgment can be
enforced by action" The reason for that rule is that an execution is enforced (and
therefore accomplished) by levy and sale, not by levy alone. We find that the "notice of embargo" annotated in 1964 on Jalandoni's title is
no longer enforceable and has become a cloud upon his title. Following the rule in
the Ansaldo case, he and his heirs have a good cause of action under article 476 of
the Civil Code for the removal of that state encumbrance.
In the Ansaldo case, a writ of execution was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on April 11, 1933 and a notice of levy was annotated on April 17,
1933 on the Torrens titles covering the lots of the judgment debtor, Angel A. Ansaldo.
No other step was taken by the judgment creditor on the writ of execution and levy.

Fiestan v. CA
More than fourteen years later, or on July 30, 1947, Jose Ma. Ansaldo, the
heir of the judgment debtor, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila G.R. No. 81552, 28 May 1990
for the cancellation of the levy in view of the inaction of the judgment creditor. The
lower court granted it on the ground that the judgment creditor's right to enforce the
judgment by execution had prescribed This Court affirmed the lower court's order
cancelling the levy annotated on Ansaldo's titles. FACTS:

We hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint of Jalandoni Petitioners spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada were the owners
and in not applying the ruling in the Ansaldo case which is on all fours with this case. of a parcel of land situated in Ilocos Sur which they mortgaged to the DBP as security
for their P22,400.00 loan. For failure of petitioners to pay their mortgage
indebtedness, the lot was acquired by the DBP as the highest bidder at a public
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auction sale after it was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP. A certificate of sale
was subsequently issued by the Provincial Sheriff on the same day and the same
was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Earlier, petitioners executed a Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure sale null and void for lack of a valid
Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered. levy?

Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property within the one-year period, HELD:
petitioners TCT lot was cancelled by the Register of Deeds and in lieu thereof, it was
issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of consolidation of
ownership. The DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria and the same was registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds. Subsequently, the DBPs title over the lot was No. The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution
cancelled and in lieu thereof, the TCT was issued to Francisco Peria. Francisco Peria sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the
secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed
thereafter mortgaged to the PNB as security for his loan. property be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction should be made of the
three different kinds of sales under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a
judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, because a different set
of law applies to each class of sale mentioned. An ordinary execution sale is
Since petitioners were still in possession of the lot, the Provincial Sheriff governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the
ordered them to vacate the premises. On the other hand, petitioners filed on August Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. On the other hand, Act
23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the
certificates of title against the DBP, PNB, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
before the RTC. Petitioners seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the Mortgages" applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
mortgaged property on August 6, 1979 in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) on the ground that it was conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of
Ilocos Sur without first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at
the public auction sale. The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. Act No. 3135, as amended, being a special law governing extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, the same must govern as against the provisions on ordinary
execution sale under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
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Levy, as understood under Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in This is a complaint for misconduct and ignorance of the law filed by
relation to execution of money judgments, has been defined by this Court as the act Merlinda L. Dagooc of Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, against deputy sheriff
whereby a sheriff sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying the Roberto A. Erlina of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment-debtor's property.
Complainant alleged that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-695 before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The court
rendered judgment by compromise agreement which immediately became final and
executory. Complainant moved for the execution of the decision and, on February 28,
In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed 2002, a writ of execution was issued which was endorsed to respondent deputy
need not be identified or set apart by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of sheriff Erlina for execution. The defendants, however, could not pay the money
the mortgagor for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage indebtedness. For, judgment. Instead of levying on the properties of the defendants to satisfy the
the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been judgment, however, sheriff Erlina asked them to execute promissory notes in favor of
complainant which he asked the latter to collect from the defendants. Complainant
identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor
further alleged that respondent sheriff indicated in his return of service that
as security for the payment or fulfillment of the obligation to answer the amount defendants were insolvent. But upon verification with the assessors office of Tandag,
of indebtedness, in case of default of payment. By virtue of the special power Surigao del Sur, complainant discovered that defendants owned real properties, as
inserted or attached to the mortgage contract, the mortgagor has authorized the evidenced by the real property field appraisal and assessment sheet.
mortgagee-creditor or any other person authorized to act for him to sell said property
in accordance with the formalities required under Act No. 3135, as amended. ISSUE:
Whether or not the promissory note can be used to satisfy the execution of
money judgments.

HELD:
The Court finds that the formalities prescribed under Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Act No.
3135, as amended, were substantially complied with in the instant case. Records No. The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the
show that the notices of sale were posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and judgment debtor shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to the
the same were published in Ilocos Times, a newspaper of general circulation in the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter. Nowhere
province of Ilocos Sur, setting the date of the auction sale on August 6, 1979 at 10:00 does the law mention promissory notes as a form of payment. The only exception is
a.m. in the Office of the Sheriff, Vigan, Ilocos Sur. when such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was
obviously not acceptable to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case
against respondent sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of
DAGOOC v. ERLINA the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her favor.
A.M. No. P-04-1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P)
16 March 2005 If the judgment debtor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee,
FACTS:
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the money judgment shall be satisfied by levying on the properties of the judgment The decedent, claiming to be the owner of the subject properties by reason of
debtor. the previous sale to him by De Vera, filed an action to annul the levy and sale of the
subject properties in favor of petitioner. Petitioner argued therein that he is an
innocent purchaser for value and the previous sale to De Vera could not be preferred
But even assuming that the defendants/judgment debtors were insolvent, over the levy and sale at a public auction because it was never registered.
respondent sheriff should have garnished their salaries (being paid employees) to
enforce the judgment in the subject case as provided for in Section 9(c), Rule 39 of The lower court sustained the validity of the levy and sale, ruling that the sale
the Revised Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court found to the decedent could not bind third persons as it was never registered. The Court of
respondent sheriff ROBERTO A. ERLINA guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in Appeals however declared that the sale and levy of the subject properties are void
the performance of his official duties. because at the time of the execution sale, De Vera was no longer the owner thereof. It
further ruled that even if the sale to the decedent was never registered, the levy on
SOSTENES CAMPILLO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ZENAIDA execution does not take precedence over it because petitioner is not a third party
DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS within the meaning of the law and therefore could not be considered a purchaser for
G.R. No. L-56483, 29 May 1984. value in good faith.

ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the levy on execution in favor of petitioner is valid.
On 27 February 1961, Tomas de Vera and his wife (De Vera) sold two (2)
parcels of land (the subject properties) to Simplicio Santos (the decedent), now
deceased and is represented by his administratrix, Zenaida Diaz Vda. de Santos (the
private respondent). The sale however was never presented for registration in the
office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title of the property. HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that a sale of real estate, whether made as a
On 27 January 1962, petitioner Sostenes Campillo (the petitioner) obtained result of a private transaction or a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally
a judgment for a sum of money against de Vera in a civil case which became final effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Considering that
and executory. Hence, petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of the subject properties were attached and levied at a time when the subject properties
execution. The writ was issued on 4 April 1962 and pursuant thereto, the City Sheriff were still in the name of De Vera in the official records of the Registry of Deeds, the
levied on three (3) parcels of including the subject properties court held that the execution sale made in favor of petitioner transferred to him all the
rights, interest of De Vera over them.
On 25 July 1962, after publication of the notice of sale, the parcels of land
(including the subject properties) were sold at public auction in favor of petitioner The Court also held that, citing Leyson v. Tananda, while it may be true hat
who was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that the rule of caveat
City Sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over the three (3) emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property
parcels of land levied and sold on execution. On 4 February 1964, TCT No. 63559 sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him to place the purchaser in
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 73969 was issued by the Registry of possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered
Deeds of Manila in the name of petitioner. land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the
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property and he is merely charged with notice of the burdens on the property which the Ventanillas for which the MRCI, AUVCI, and Crisostomo were held solidarily
are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. liable.

Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the
registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificate On January 25, 1991, the spouses Ventanilla filed with the trial court a
of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 26411. The writ was
issued on May 3, 1991, and served upon MRCI on May 9, 1991.
The Manila Remnant Co., Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 107282, 16 March 1994


Petitioner contends that the subject properties could not be delivered to the
Ventanillas because they had already been sold to Samuel Marquez. Nevertheless,
FACTS: MRCI offered to reimburse the amount paid by the respondents, including legal
This case involved parcels of land in Quezon City which were owned by interest plus the aforestated damages. MRCI also prayed that its tender of payment be
petitioner Manila Remnant Co., Inc. (MRCI) and became the subject of its agreement accepted and all garnishments on their accounts lifted.The Ventanillas accepted the
with A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., (AUVCI) by virtue of which the latter was to act as amount of P210,000.00 as damages and attorney's fees but opposed the
the petitioner's agent in the development and sale of the property. reimbursement offered by MRCI in lieu of the execution of the absolute deed of sale.
Pursuant to the above agreement, AUVCI executed two contracts to sell
dated March 3, 1970, covering Lots 1 and 2, Block 17, in favor of spouses Oscar C.
Ventanilla and Carmen Gloria Diaz. Without the knowledge of the Ventanilla couple,
Valencia, as president of MRCI, resold the same parcels to Carlos Crisostomo.The On July 19, 1991, Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan issued the following order:
Ventanilla spouses, having learned of the supposed sale of their lots to Crisostomo,
commenced an action for specific performance, annulment of deeds, and damages
against MRCI, AUVCI and Carlos Crisostomo. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
26411 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch 7-B. To ensure that there is enough amount to cover the value of the lots
involved if transfer thereof to plaintiff may no longer be effected,
pending litigation of said issue, the garnishment made by the Sheriff
upon the bank account of Manila Remnant may be lifted only upon
On November 17, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the
the deposit to the Court of the amount of P500,000.00 in cash.
contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas valid and subsisting, and annulling the
contract to sell in favor of Crisostomo. It ordered the MRCI to execute an absolute
deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P210,000.00 were also awarded to
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The petitioner contends that the trial court may not enforce it garnishment A garnishment order shall be lifted if it established that:
order after the monetary judgment for damages had already been satisfied and the
amount for reimbursement had already been deposited with the sheriff. Garnishment (a) the party whose accounts have been garnished has posted a
as a remedy is intended to secure the payment of a judgment debt when a well- counterbond or has made the requisite cash deposit;
founded belief exists that the erring party will abscond or deliberately render the
execution of the judgment nugatory. As there is no such situation in this case, there is
no need for a garnishment order.

ISSUE: (b) the order was improperly or irregularly issued as where there is
no ground for garnishment or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor
Whether or not the order for garnishment is proper considering that MRCI are defective or insufficient;
has partially complied with the judgment and expressed willingness to reimburse the
Ventanillas in lieu of execution of the absolute deed of sale.

HELD:
(c) the property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt
from preliminary attachment or

Yes. The alternative judgment of reimbursement is applicable only if the


conveyance of the lots is not possible, but it has not been shown that there is an
obstacle to such conveyance. As the main obligation of the petitioner is to execute the (d) the judgment is rendered against the attaching or garnishing
absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, its unjustified refusal to do so creditor.
warranted the issuance of the garnishment order.

Partial execution of the judgment is not included in the above enumeration of


Garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the the legal grounds for the discharge of a garnishment order. Neither does the
judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. \ It is an petitioner's willingness to reimburse render the garnishment order unnecessary. As
attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of for the counterbond, the lower court did not err when it fixed the same at
the defendant in the hands of a third person or money owed by such third person or P500,000.00. As correctly pointed out by the respondent court, that amount
garnishee to the defendant. The rules on attachment also apply to garnishment corresponds to the current fair market value of the property in litigation and was a
proceedings. reasonable basis for determining the amount of the counterbond.
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Malonzo v. Mariano
The writ of possession issued on March 4, 1980 and on the strength thereof,
G.R. No. L-53998, 31 May 1989 the Sheriff of Manila attempted to evict the persons in occupancy of the property.
Three of the persons sought to be evicted, Enrico Malonzo, husband of Avelina
Malonzo, Barbara Brown, and Bonifacia Monzon, filed suit against Banco Filipino
FACTS:
and the City Sheriff in the same Court of First Instance of Manila seeking to
Universal Ventures, Inc. mortgaged its properties in favor of Banco Filipino perpetually restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession against them on the
Mortgage & Savings Bank, as security for the payment of a loan. The mortgage deed ground that there was no ejectment case filed against them and that they were not
authorized the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property in the event of default in the made a party to the Petition for Writ of Possession of Banco Filipino. Hence, they
repayment of the loan. were entitled to remain in possession of the properties and could not be ousted under
the writ of possession.

Universal Ventures, Inc. failed to repay the loan. Consequently, Banco


Filipino caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the property by the City Sheriff of ISSUE:
Manila. The foreclosure sale took place in due course; the mortgaged property was
struck off to the bank, as highest bidder, and the bank registered the sheriff's Whether or not a writ of possession issued by a Court of First Instance
certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila and on July 27, 1976 obtained (Regional Trial Court) in accordance with Act 3135, to give possession of property
a certificate of title in its name, numbered 122496, in lieu of that of the mortgagor, sold at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the purchaser thereof, may be enforced
against persons other than the mortgagor who are in occupancy of the foreclosed
which was accordingly cancelled.
property.

On the same day that title was issued to it, Banco Filipino filed a petition for HELD:
a writ of possession with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition recited
the foregoing facts and the additional circumstances that (1) the mortgagor, Universal Yes. Under section 6 of Act No. 3135 and Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, in case of an extra-judicial foreclosure of a
Ventures, Inc., had failed to redeem the property within the one-year period allowed
real estate mortgage, the possession of the property sold may be given to the
by law, and (2) the mortgagor was still in possession of the property, as well as purchaser by the sheriff after the period of redemption had expired, unless a third
certain other persons claiming rights under said mortgagor although said rights had person is actually holding the property adversely to the mortgagor. An ordinary
not been recorded in the Register of Deeds. Among the persons named in the petition action for the recovery of possession is not necessary. There is no law in this
as "claiming (rights) under" Universal Ventures, Inc., were petitioners Avelina jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of real property is obliged to
Malonzo, Barbara Brown, and Bonifacia Monzon. bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one year period for
redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final certificate of sale.
11

The same rule was followed in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage and in an execution of being notified of the application for a writ of possession and of being accorded an
sale. If the court can issue a writ of possession during the period of redemption there opportunity at a hearing to oppose the same, as by showing that they were "actually
is no reason why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of that holding the property adversely" to the mortgagor. That right was duly accorded to
period. them. They were served with copies of the motion or petition for issuance of the writ
of possession and had ample opportunity to oppose the same, to persuade the Court
The petitioners cannot be deemed third parties "actually holding the property that the writ should not issue or be executed against them. The proceedings showed
adversely" to the mortgagor. They derive their rights to the possession of the property that, by their own assertions, they were not holding the property adversely to the
exclusively from the mortgagor, in virtue of verbal agreements of lease. They were mortgagor, but were exercising rights under, derived from, said mortgagor, who was
lessees at the time that the property occupied by them was mortgaged by their lessor their lessor. Upon the cessation of their lessor's rights over the property, their own
to respondent Banco Filipino. And of that mortgage they were charged with also ceased. The writ of possession was therefore properly enforceable against them.
constructive knowledge upon its registration in the Registry of Property, if they did
not indeed, actually know of it. The right pertaining to them in this situation was that

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