Downdraught

Runway 26
NAS Nowra

No blue text
links/URLs are
live in this PDF
4. AWIS AVBL 280.4 or phone 02 4424 2531. external lighting on receipt of CTAF call FM other ACFT.
+HOLSDG +
5. Non RDO equipped hang gliders OPR in VCY of Mount Cambewarra.
Charts Related to the Aerodrome +HOLSDG +
6. CA/GRS callsign Nowra Radio may be provided outside NW TWR HR on 118.85. HR
1. WAC 3456. +HOLSDG +
notified by NOTAM and/or NW ATIS. Procedures provided IAW CTAF and AIP/GPA (GEN
2. MIL Aerodrome Obstruction Chart Type A Chart: May 1997.
+HOLSDG +
3.4 sub-section 3.2) plus control of AD LGT, arrestor cables and call-out EMERG services. +HOLSDG +
3. Also refer to AIP Departure & Approach Procedures.
7. In the event of an EMERG, ACFT OPR at NW on an unattended airfield basis are to
+HOLSDG +
declare the EMERG on Melbourne Centre, FREQ 121.2. Additionally when WI 10NM of 5XQZD\  +HOLSDG +
Information is not for operational use

 IW &7$) 

NW, MIL ACFT are to advise details to either CA/GRS callsign Nowra Radio or to RFF

watch attendant callsign Base Fire on FREQ 118.85. &/1& '(/

Noise Abatement Procedures 5XQZD\  

*1' 
1. Noise sensitive area: ACFT are to avoid over flying an area 1 NM RAD centered on NWA

360/004 BLW 1,500FT.

 IW 7:5 
$33 
2. Fast jet/Turbo Prop departures RWY 21:
5XQZD\ 
For noise abatement climb to 1,300FT on RWY HDG before commencing a turn onto

track.  IW
Additional Information
1. SEV downdraft may be experienced WI 1NM on final RWY 26 during westerly wind ABV

7KT.

2. Model ACFT OPR SAT/SUN/PH HJ Taxiway Alpha up to 400 FT AGL. Will land on receipt

of CTAF(R) broadcast.

3. Model ACFT OPR HJ at race course, PSN 040/4.2NM up to 300FT AGL.

4. Rifle range APRX PSN 055/4.2NM. ACT is indicated by R flags.

5. 23M pistol firing range APRX PSN 329/1.4NM. ACT is indicated by R flags.

6. MIL ACFT may conduct OPS WI 50NM of YSNW using Light Enhancement devices and

may not display external lighting. SFC - 1,500FT AGL. Outside TWR HR ACFT will display
1$6
1RZUD
$LU
ILHOG
F







1RUWK
)HE  5:  &ORVHG WHPSRUDULO\
- +DQJDU &DU 3RUWV *RQH
1$6 1RZUD
1$6 1RZUD &RPSRVHG ZLWK /LHXWHQDQW 'HUHN 6WHYHQVRQ 51
E\ /LHXWHQDQW 'DYH :ULJKW 51 GLHG 

9HUVHV IURP 51 )OHHW $LU $UPV WUDGLWLRQDO VRQJ

, VDW RQ WKH ERRVWHU DZDLWLQJ WKH NLFN
$PXVLQJ P\VHOI E\ URWDWLQJ WKH VWLFN
'RZQ ZHQW WKH JUHHQ IODJ WKH HQJLQH ZHQW FRXJK
*DZG EOLPH\ VDLG :LQJV KH KDV WRVVHG KLPVHOI RII
&KRUXV &UDFNLQJ VKRZ ,P DOLYH EXW , VWLOO KDYH WR UHQGHU P\ $

7KH\ VD\ LQ WKH $LU )RUFH WKH ODQGLQJV 2.

,I WKH SLORW VSLQV LQ EXW FDQ VWLOO ZDON DZD\
%XW LQ WKH )OHHW $LU $UP WKH SURVSHFWV DUH GLP
,I WKH ODQGLQJV SLVV SRRU DQG WKH SLORW FDQW VZLP
&KRUXV &UDFNLQJ VKRZ ,P DOLYH EXW , VWLOO KDYH WR UHQGHU P\ $
$ LV DQ $FFLGHQW 5HSRUW :LQJV LV &PGU $LU DERDUG WKH &DUULHU RU &$* &PGU $LU *URXS
3RUWDEOH 0LUURU
/DQGLQJ 6\VWHP

D
E
E
P
-

G
U
L
L
Y
 6TXDGURQ
KWWSLSKRWREXFNHWFRPDOEXPVSDQG\GRSSHO6HD9HQRP'6&MSJ

% )OLJKW
3DLQW 6FKHPH
(DUO\ WR PLG V

1 := )$:    < &RGHG DV < &UDVKHG 
ZKHQ WKH DLUFUDIW XQGHUVKRW UXQZD\  DW 5$1$6 1RZUD FUDVKHG DQG EXUQHG 7KH FUHZ
RI /HXW 3 .QRZOLV 5$1 DQG /HXW 2 % 0F.HRQ 5$1 ZHUH LQMXUHG LQ WKH FUDVK EXW
VXUYLYHG $LUFUDIW ZULWWHQ RII +D]DUGV RI 'RZQ 'UDXJKW 5:  1$6 1RZUD

1 := )$:    < &UDVKHG  1RZUD 16: )ORZQ E\
/(87 3 5RZH 5$1 /(87 2 $/ (FFHOVWRQ 5$1 IURP  6TQ &UDVKHG RQ ILQDOV DW
5$1$6 1RZUD LQWR EXVK  \DUGV VKRUW RI UXQZD\  &UHZ VXUYLYHG VXIIHULQJ IURP
VKRFN DQG DEUDVLRQV $LUFUDIW ZULWWHQ RII  KWWSZZZDGIVHULDOVFRPDXQKWP
7KLV /LQH %RRN (QWU\ LV 127 6WURQJ :HVWHUO\
DERXW WKH )$7$/ $FFLGHQW 1RUWK:HVWHUO\
GHVFULEHG LQ IROORZLQJ SDJHV :LQG

'UDPDWLF GURS IURP

WKUHVKKROG LQWR D
JXOO\ MXVW EHIRUH
UHDFKLQJ 5: 

 6TXDGURQ /LQH %RRN IURP 6HD 9HQRP HUD RQ WKH KD]DUGV RI WKH
GRZQGUDIW RQ 5XQZD\  DW 1$6 1RZUD ZKHQ WKH VWURQJ :HVWHUO\ ZLQG ZDV EORZLQJ
 '((3 *8//< UXQQLQJ (DVW WR :HVW

7UXFN SDVVLQJ VRXWK RQ ROG URDG %(/2:

WKH 2/' 5:  FRQFUHWH UXQZD\ OLS
2/' 5XQZD\  FRQFUHWH WKUHVKROG

 )HE 

3+272 &$37,21 6HYHUH FROODSVH RI WKH FRFNSLW RQ LQLWLDO JURXQG LPSDFW OHG
WR VHSDUDWLRQ RI WKH FDQRS\ DQG LQDGYHUWDQW DFWLYDWLRQ RI ERWK HMHFWLRQ VHDWV
 )HE  6HD 9HQRP +0$6 $/%$75266 $6/7 3 )* +RGJVRQ 5$1
(0$ 0:+ROORZD\ 5$1 SDVVHQJHU &UDVKHG RQ UXQZD\  DW 1RZUD
ERWK GLHG LQ SRVW FUDVK ILUH
 'HF  6HD 9HQRP +0$6 $/%$75266 $6/7 3
*- *HHUOLQJV 5$1 &UDVKHG RQ UXQZD\  1$6 1RZUD
*XQ %XWWV )$7$/ 1RZUD +LOO
$Q H[DJJHUDWHG YHUWLFDO FRQWRXU YLHZ RI WKH JXOO\ DW WKH DSSURDFK WR 5XQZD\  DW 1$6 1RZUD

$SSURDFK
'LUHFWLRQ
9,(:

+LJK
5XQ
ZD\

$SSU
RDFK
+3$
6WDQ
GDUG
(OHYDWLRQ LV H[DJJHUDWHG E\ D IDFWRU RI  RU 
WR KLJKOLJKW WKH RWKHUZLVH EXPS\ UXQZD\V
 &RQWRXUV LQ WKLV VLPXODWLRQ DUH H[DJJHUDWHG GHOLEHUDWHO\ E\ D  WLPHV UDWLR

$SSURDFK *XOO\
836/23( ZLWK  'RZQGUDXJKW
5: VORSLQJ GRZQ

5:  WKUHVKROG 



&20%,1$7,21

RI ,//86,216

5:  VORSLQJ GRZQDUGV WKUHVKROG

KDV D GHHS JXOO\ WR WKH HDVW FDXVLQJ
D GRZQGUDXJKW LQ ZHVWHUO\ ZLQGV
 1$6
1RZUD

'HHS *XOO\ RII 5XQZD\ 

KWWSZZZGHIHQFHJRYDX
LGBDQHIDOEDWURVVSGI
 1RU:HVWHUO\ 'RZQ *XOO\ 5:  $SSURDFK

1$6 1RZUD
/RRNLQJ IURP
(DVW WR :HVW

3DFLILF +LJKZD\

1257+

Contents Issue 1 April 2004
MAGAZINE
Winter Westerlies KWWSZZZQDY\JRYDXVLWHVGHIDXOWILOHV
GRFXPHQWV7RXFKGRZQB$SULOBSGI
One of the most notable weather features at HMAS ALBATROSS is the
strong gusty westerly winds experienced
enced during the winter months of
every year.
BY LEUT B LANCE, RAN
METEOROLOGY OFFICER
NAS NOWRA
During the winter months the wind frequently
quently develops a mean strength of
greater than 20 knots, and at times greater than 30 knots, with gusts a further
10 to 20 knots above the mean. These winds occur due to the weather pattern at
that time of the year combined with local effects in the Nowra area.
Synoptic Situation
Towards the end of autumn the sub tropical ridge begins its seasonal progression
to the north, the ridge axis centred around 30 degrees south in winter. This
creates a predominately westerly wind flow across southern Australia, which
increases throughout winter peaking during August and September.
The anticyclones are interspersed with the passage of fronts, with associated
depressions.
The passage of these systems creates a tighter pressure gradient causing strong
to gale force winds to develop. During the winter and autumn months the area
around Tasmania is a favourable region for depressions to stall and/or develop
which in turn causes the strong winds to persist for several days.
Local Effects
The wind direction at ALBATROSS is greatly influenced by the topography of the
area. The Great Dividing Ranges and the Shoalhaven River Valley dictate the
wind direction at ALBATROSS. The range is orientated approximately 030/210
degrees and has elevations to just over 2000 feet in the vicinity of the Air
Station. The steep sided Shoalhaven River valley is oriented 300-120 degrees,ees,
with the Air Station lying in the axis of this valley.
In a westerly flow the wind (anything from 240 to 340 degrees)
is funnelled down the Shoalhaven Valley creating a freshening
of the wind by 5 to 10 knots. It also drives the direction of the
wind to be predominantly from the west to northwest.
Runway 26 is
most affected
by strong
westerly
winds
Hazards Associated with Strong Gusty Westerlies
The strong winds create a number of hazards but the one of most concern to
aviation and the most difficult to forecast is turbulence. The strong gusty winds
create turbulence in a number of ways, they are:
L Mountain Waves
L Wind Shear
L Low level turbulence due to interaction with the ground
d
Low level turbulence due to the gusts
L
Mountain Waves
Mountain waves occur when strong winds flow within 30 degrees of perpendicular
to a mountain range. These conditions are frequently created at ALBATROSS
during this winter period and the most common evidence of this are the cloud
formations. Lenticular cloud is commonly observed at the airfield and evidence Shoalhaven
can often be seen in the satellite picture.
River Valley
Wind Shear
Wind Shear creates turbulence due the vertical change in wind speed throughout
the atmosphere. If there is a significant difference between the wind speed at
different levels, eddies form creating the turbulence. This can occur at any level
in the atmosphere, however is most prominent in the boundary layer (the layer of
the atmosphere where surface heating and friction are an influence).
Low Level Turbulence
In the lower levels of the atmosphere turbulence can be caused by two
mechanisms, the wind shear in the boundary layer due the interaction with the
ground and the presence of wind gusts. The friction of the surface causes the
wind to slow (being zero at the very surface boundary) creating wind shear and
hence turbulence. The stronger winds above the surface also intermittently mix
down to the surface creating gusts at the surface, which causes turbulence.
Another source of wind shear, which is commonly observed is that caused by the 1$61RZUD
nocturnal inversion. Cooling of the ground over night causes the lowest few
hundred of feet of the atmosphere to cool, creating a temperature inversion near
the surface. This inversion causes the winds at the surface to decouple from the
winds above, creating large amounts of wind shear. This also creates a false
impression of the upper wind conditions due to light winds at the surface.
The presence of the nocturnal inversion often leads to the presence of a
Nocturnal Jet. During the daytime the airflow in the first few hundred feet of the
atmosphere is a balance between the pressure gradient force, Coriolis force and
the friction influence of the ground. When this frictional influence is lost in the air
above the nocturnal inversion winds freshen due to the change in the balance of
forces. This is frequently observed in the morning upper air sounding at
ALBATROSS with the 2000ft wind being 5 to 10 knots higher than the gradient
flow.
Conclusion
The strong gusty westerly winds are an annual feature in the Shoalhaven;
however, their intensity changes each year due to the differences that occur in
the synoptic patterns. The one definitive conclusion which can be drawn,
definitives being a rarity in meteorology, is that strong to gale force winds will be
experienced each Winter peaking in August and September.
 - +DQJDU
P DZD\
WR WKH QRUWK

KWWSZZZQDY\JRYDXVLWHVGHIDXOWILOHV
GRFXPHQWV1DY\B1HZV-XO\SGI

*URXQG FXW IRU VORSLQJ URDGZD\ IURP 1RUWK WR 6RXWK EHORZ UXQZD\
OHYHO 5RDGZD\ %(/2:
WKH VORSLQJ GRZQ ZHVW UXQZD\ FRQFUHWH OLS
6OLSVWUHDP 0DJD]LQH 
&$87,21 6HYHUH 'RZQGUDIWV ZLWKLQ .P RQ DSSURDFK
WR 5:<  ZKHQ ZLQG JUHDWHU WKDQ .W IURP WKH :HVW
8JOETIFBS
FGGFDU
"*3$3"'5
"*341&&%

.1)
FYQMBOBUJPO (306/%
41&&%

.1)

.1)
)&"%
8*/%

"1130"$)
4)&"3
-*/& 1"5)
KWWS
DXSUHVV
PD[ZHOO
DIPLO
"*3$3"'5 
.1)
5"*-8*/% %RRNV
"*341&&%

.1) %UXOOH
(306/%
41&&%

.1) %UXOOHSGI
(306/%
+VTU
CFGPSF
FODPVOUFSJOH
UIF
XJOE
TIJGU
UIF
BJSDSBGU
IBT
B
HSPVOE
TQFFE

PG

NQI

NQI
BJSTQFFE
NJOVT
UIF

NQI
IFBE
XJOE
+VTU
BGUFS


QBTTJOH
UISPVHI
UIF
XJOE
TIFBS
SFHJPO
UIF
BJSDSBGU
XPVME
TUJMM
IBWF
B


HSPVOE
TQFFE
PG

NQI
TJODF
UIF
NPNFOUVN
PG
UIF
BJSDSBGU
DBOOPU


CF
JOTUBOUBOFPVTMZ
DIBOHFE
5IVT
UIF
BJSTQFFE
XIJDI
XBT

NQI


TVEEFOMZ
ESPQT
UP

NQI
5IF
QJMPU
MPTU
UIF

NQI
IFBE
XJOE
BOE


OPX
IBT
B
UBJM
XJOE
PG

NQI

5IJT
ESPQ
JO
BJSTQFFE
DBO
TUBMM
UIF


BJSDSBGU
DBVTJOH
B
DSBTI
PS
JG
MVDLZ
DBVTF
JU
UP
MBOE
TIPSU
PG
UIF
SVOXBZ

$POWFSTFMZ
JG
GMZJOH
JO
B
UBJM
XJOE
BOE
UIFO
FODPVOUFSJOH
B
XJOE
TIFBS

TXJUDIJOH
UP
B
IFBE
XJOE
ZPV
XJMM
FYQFSJFODF
BO
JODSFBTF
JO
BJSTQFFE


UIBU
DBO
DBVTF
ZPV
UP
MBOE
MPOH
BOE
QFSIBQT
SVO
PGG
UIF
FOE
PG
UIF


SVOXBZ
'VSUIFS
BHHSBWBUJOH
UIF
TJUVBUJPO
JT
UIBU
UIF
SBQJE
XJOE



EJSFDUJPOBM
DIBOHFT
DBO
DSFBUF
MBSHF
EBNBHJOH
BJS
MPBET
VQPO
UIF



BJSDSBGU
TUSVDUVSF
**U
CSPVHIU
IPNF
UIF
BENPOJTINFOU
OFWFS
USZ
UP
MBOE

XIJMF
OFBS
B
UIVOEFSTUPSN

8JOETIFBS
FGGFDU
FYQMBOBUJPO
5:  1$6 1RZUD  3KRWR E\ :DO 1HORZNLQ
7KH%RQ]OH7HUUDLQVXPPDU\SURYLGHVDWRSRJUDSKLFSURILOHLQQRUWKVRXWKZHVWHDVWDQG1:6(SOXV1(6:GLDJRQDOVOLFHVFHQWHUHGDURXQG&RRUGV
Map of point 34 56.900' S 150 32.200' E near Nowra Weather Station
6OLFHGLVWDQFHIURPFHQWUHNP_NP_10km_NP_NP_NP_
34 56.900' S 150 32.200' E near Nowra Weather Station
KWWSPDSVERQ]OHFRP
North to South Terrain Slice FD"D S G WHU [ 
 \ 

1$6 1RZUD
West to East Terrain Slice VKRZQ RQ D
3/$7($8

Northwest to Southeast Terrain Slice

Northeast to Southwest Terrain Slice

7KH PRVW H[WUHPH 1$6 1RZUD WDNHRII ZDV ZLWK D 7$* ZLWK [
 SRXQG IXOO IXHO WDQNV FHQWUH EHLQJ EXGG\ WDQN GRLQJ WKH
VNL MXPS RQ  IRRW 5XQZD\  RQ D KRW ZLQGOHVV VXPPHU
GD\ FRQWHPSODWLQJ ZKHUH WKH DLUFUDIW VKRXOG EH SRLQWHG ,)
GXULQJ WKH LQWHUPLQDEOH WDNHRII UROO WKLQJV GLG QRW JR DV DG
YHUWLVHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH 7$* 1$7236 7DNH 2II 3HUIRUPDQFH
&KDUWV WKDQNIXOO\ MXVW PDNLQJ DOO WKH EHQFKPDUNV SHUIHFWO\ DV
LW WUXQGOHG GRZQ WRZDUGV WKDW PDJLF GURS RII LQWR WKH JXOO\ RII
WKH HQG RI 5:  EXW 127 %()25( ERXQFLQJ XS GRZQ RQ
WKDW ORQJ QRVH ROHR JRLQJ QRZKHUH SHUIRUPDQFHZLVH RQ
WKDW ODVW IHZ KXQGUHG IHHW XSKLOO WKH MXPSGHVNL HIIHFW
<HS YHHUWXUQ ULJKW HMHFW %XW WKHQ WKH ZKHHOV OHIW WKH
WDUPDF DLUFUDIW GURSSHG LQWR WKH JXOO\ VORZO\ DFFHOHUDWLQJ
GRZQKLOO 1R SHUIRUPDQFH LQ 7$* ZLWK WKDW OE H[WUD
ORDGGUDJ ZLWK IXOO LQWHUQDO IXHO RI OEV RQ WKDW KRW GD\
>$ ORQJ ILHOG DUUHVW ZDV SHUKDSV SRVVLEOH EXW QRW FHUWDLQ@
7KLV
FKDUW LV
IRU LOOXVW
UDWLRQ
RQO\ WKH
7$*
1$7236
ZLOO KDYH
PRUH
GHWDLO WR
VKRZ
 )
GHJUHH
GD\ IRU
H[DPSOH
DQG DOVR
UXQZD\
JUDGLHQW
Turbulence Explained a Simple
Guide to Understanding One of
Aviations BiggestJRYDXVLWHVGHIDXOWILOHVGRFXPHQWV
Hazards KWWSZZZQDY\
BY LEUT A BULTERS AND LEUT A DICKENSON, RAN
Turbulence is a term used
widely in the aviation and
meteorology world, but to
accurately explain the how and
why of turbulence is a much
more difcult task. This article
will seek to do this in a simple
manner, along with explaining
the more common types
of turbulence found in and
around the Nowra local area
and HMAS Albatross, where
the RAN Fleet Air Arm (FAA) is
located, and the basic rules
for forecasting turbulence in
Australia.
Simply put, turbulence
results when bodies of air
moving at different velocities
meet, resulting in an erratic
movement of parcels of air,
often without any visual
indications. When there is no
visual indication this is called
Clear Air turbulence (CAT). Due
AIRSPEED
INTENSITY FLUCTUATIONS
(KTS)
Light 5 14.9
Moderate 15 24.9
Severe >25
Extreme
FIG 2. Schematic of Mountain Waves and associated Lenticular Cloud and rotors
7RXFKGRZQB1RYHPEHUBSGI
If the wind exceeds 50kts, general rule, severe turbulence FIG 3.
to the lack of visual indicators waves are evidenced by cloud. Wind ow over a mountain then severe turbulence is will be forecast in Australia Satellite
CAT can be difcult to detect In particular, if the ow over range will not always result forecast out to 150 miles on when wind speed changes picture
the mountain range is moist in mountain waves. These showing
and it is hazardous for air the leeward side of the range. by more than 20kts over one
Mountain
navigation due to the sudden and the upward displacement waves will best be developed degree of latitude. Waves
movements of the aircraft on the lee side is such that if the mountain range is long Vertical Shear This results
as it crosses the boundary condensation occurs, then (if it is only a short mountain when the wind strength differs Thermal Turbulence As
between the air parcels lines of Lenticularis cloud range, the air stream will take vastly with altitude. This can the name suggests, this
moving at differing velocities (high level lens shaped cloud) the shortest route around the be evident in cloud formations turbulence results due to
parallel to the mountain range mountain, rather than over known as Kelvin-Helmholtz the ascension of warm
and/or directions. Turbulence
can occur on the leeward it), and if the wind is roughly instabilities (Fig 4) but can air, which is more buoyant
can also result in and around
side (Fig 2). An excellent and perpendicular to the mountain also be evident as CAT. As than the environment. As
cloud, however given the
very common example of ridge through a relatively a general rule throughout radiative heating occurs, air
visual indication of cloud this
this is Mt Fuji in Japan. The deep layer. In addition, if Australia, severe turbulence in contact with the surface
is easier to detect and avoid.
turbulence that occurs on the the mountain has a gentle will be forecast due to vertical is warmed and this results FIG 4.
Mountain Waves This lee side of this mountain is windward slope and a steep shear when the wind speed in warm air rising and Kelvin-
Helmholtz
mechanical turbulence results well documented, and can be leeward slope this will aid in changes by more than 10kts cooler air descending. This
turbulence can vary from
instabilities
when an airstream is forced so severe that it has resulted the generation of mountain over a 1000ft deviation in
to rise over mountains, forcing in the break-up of planes in waves. As a general rule, the altitude. gentle (thermals) through to
an excitation of internal wind speed should increase severe. If the air is moist, as it provides moisture for cloud of the most serious hazards
the past. When this cloud Horizontal Shear This is very
gravity waves. These gravity with height, and nally the rises condensation will occur formation in the atmosphere. to air navigation and safety.
occurs as lines it can often be similar to vertical shear, but it
wind speed must be above resulting in the formation At ALBATROSS the Nowra
waves result in unusually more easily seen on a Satellite occurs when on a horizontal Runway Turbulence The
a critical value. If the wind of Stratocumulus, Cumulus Weather and Oceanography
large upward and downward picture. Another visual plane, whereby the wind nal type of turbulence
is not above this value, than or Cumulonimbus cloud. As Centre (NWOC) incorporate
velocities and accelerations on indication is the presence of strength differs vastly over a discussed here is mechanical
it will simply be blocked by a general rule, moderate the likelihood and severity
the lee side of the mountain cloud with several wave like distance on that plane. This turbulence which is specic
the orography rather than turbulence is forecast of turbulence in routine
range, thus turbulence. In formations at the top surface occurs more in an anticyclonic to ALBATROSS. Due to the
surmounting it. This critical in and around Cumulus, forecasts issued twice daily in
some situations mountain of the cloud (Fig 3) ow as there is an imbalance sloping terrain to the east of
value varies from range to whereas severe turbulence conjunction with the Bureau
range. of the Coriolis force and the is forecast in and around Runway 08/26, when there of Meteorology Sydney
VERTICAL Pressure gradient forces, is a Westerly wind greater
G-LOAD AIRCRAFT REACTION INSIDE Cumulonimbus. This is due to Regional Forecasting Centre.
GUSTS Due to the location of which results in instability. than 7 knots, a moderate to
(G) REACTION AIRCRAFT the violent up and downdrafts Turbulence is at times a
(FT/MIN) ALBATROSS, mountain waves Due to the small scale that are associated with severe downdraft occurs at difcult parameter to forecast
Rhythmic bumpiness. are a common occurrence forecasting of the Nowra and the east end of this runway.
Momentary changes thunderstorms. because of its complex nature.
0.15 0.49 300 1199 Little effect on loose objects. over the aireld and local area. ALBATROSS local area, it is This turbulence presents The NWOC ofce is currently
in altitude and
attitude. The Cambewarra Mountain rare to forecast this particular Although cloud may not be a hazard to aircraft on compiling a turbulence
range lies to the north, and the type of turbulence. However, evident, thermal turbulence nal approach. As this is a database based on local
Rapid bumps or jolts.
Appreciable changes
Unsecured objects move. Turpentine Ranges lie to the horizontal shear can also may still be occurring. During promulgated aireld hazard, it reports and observations
0.50 0.99 1200 2099 Appreciable strain on south-west. Mountain waves occur with strong wind gusts, the summer months this
in altitude and
seatbelts/harness.
is never addressed in routine from aircraft operating in the
attitude. are most frequent during and as a result of Nowras turbulence will be more active, forecasts. local area. The objective of
Large abrupt changes Unsecured objects are tossed the winter and early spring orography, whereby the steep particularly in the afternoons this database is to be able to
in altitude and about. Passengers violently months when the synoptic ow sides of the Shoalhaven river with light winds, as a strong This completes the denitions
1.00 1.99 2100 2999 accurately forecast turbulence
attitude. Momentary forced against seatbelts/ is from the west. As a guide, valley forces funnelling of ow will break up the currents. of turbulence that are most
loss of control. harness. for given weather patterns.
if the wind exceeds 25kts the wind, making it much In the Nowra and ALBATROSS commonly expected over
Practically impossible
Unsecured objects are tossed perpendicular to the ridge at stronger than the surrounding local area, thermal turbulence the Nowra local area (and in All observations and reports
to control aircraft. the height of the ridge level, is usually coupled with general). The most important of turbulence can be
> 2.00 > 3000 about violently. May cause wind. This also occurs most
May cause structural
damage.
injury to passengers/aircrew. then moderate turbulence is frequently in winter and early cloud formation due to the thing to remember is that directed to the NWOC ofce
forecast out to 150 miles on spring months when strong proximity to the ocean and the turbulence is rarely visible, and they are contactable
FIG 1. Turbulence classication the leeward side of the range. and thus can present one on (02) 4424 1269.
Westerlies persist. As a afternoon sea breeze which

KWWSZZZDWVEJRYDXDYLDWLRQ
Mountain wave and associated turbulence
HGLWRULDOVPRXQWDLQZDYHVDVS[
In Australia, mountain waves are commonly experienced over and to the lee of mountain ranges in the
south-east of the continent. They often appear in the strong westerly wind flows on the east coast in
late winter and early spring.
Mountain waves are a different phenomena to the mechanical turbulence found in the lee of mountain
ranges, and can exist as a smooth undulating airflow or may contain clear air turbulence in the form of
breaking waves and 'rotors'. Mountain waves are defined as 'severe' when the associated downdrafts
exceed 600 ft/min and/or severe turbulence is observed or forecast.
'Breaking waves' and 'rotors' associated with mountain waves are among the more hazardous
phenomenon that pilots can experience. Understanding the dynamics of the wind is important in
improving aviation safety.
Glider pilots learn to use these mountain waves to their advantage; typically to gain altitude. However,
some aircraft have come to grief in those conditions. Encounters have been described as similar to
hitting a wall. In 1966, clear air turbulence associated with a mountain wave ripped apart a BOAC
Boeing 707 while it flew near Mt. Fuji in Japan. In 1968, a Fairchild F-27B lost parts of its wings and
empennage, and in 1992 a Douglas DC-8 lost an engine and wingtip in mountain wave encounters.
Mountain waves are the result of flowing air being forced to rise up the windward side of a mountain
barrier, then as a result of certain atmospheric conditions, sinking down the leeward side. This
perturbation develops into a series of standing waves downstream from the barrier, and may extend
for hundreds of kilometres over clear areas of land and open water.
Mountain waves are likely to form when the following atmospheric conditions are present:
the wind flow at around ridge height is nearly perpendicular to the ridge line and at least 25 kts
the wind speed increases with height
there is a stable layer at around ridge height.
If the wave amplitude is large enough, then the waves become unstable and break, similar to the
breaking waves seen in the surf. Within these 'breaking waves', the atmospheric flow becomes
turbulent.
The crests of the waves may be identified by the formation of lenticular clouds (lens-shaped), if the air
is sufficiently moist. Mountain waves may extend into the stratosphere and become more pronounced
as height increases. Some pilots have reported mountain waves at 60,000 feet. The vertical airflow
component of a standing wave may exceed 8,000 ft/min.
Rotors or eddies can also be found embedded in mountain waves. Formation of rotors can also occur
as a result of down slope winds. Their formation usually occurs where wind speeds change in a wave
or where friction slows the wind near to the ground. Often these rotors will be experienced as gusts or
windshear. Clouds may also form on the up-flow side of a rotor and dissipate on the down-flow side if
the air is sufficiently moist.
Many dangers lie in the effects of mountain waves and associated turbulence on aircraft performance
and control. In addition to generating turbulence that has demonstrated sufficient ferocity to
significantly damage aircraft or lead to loss of aircraft control, the more prevailing danger to aircraft in
the lower levels in Australia seems to be the effect on the climb rate of an aircraft. General aviation
aircraft rarely have performance capability sufficient to enable the pilot to overcome the effects of a
severe downdraft generated by a mountain wave or the turbulence or windshear generated by a rotor.
In 1996, three people were fatally injured when a Cessna 206 encountered lee (mountain) waves. The
investigation report concluded, "It is probable that the maximum climb performance of the aircraft was
not capable of overcoming the strong downdrafts in the area at the time".
Crossing a mountain barrier into wind also reduces the groundspeed of an aircraft and has the effect
of keeping the aircraft in the area of downdraft for longer, while an aircraft flying downwind on the
upwind side of a mountain range is likely to initially encounter updrafts as it approaches rising ground.
Rotors and turbulence may also affect low level flying operations near hills or trees. In 1999, a
Kawasaki KH-4 hit the surface of a lake during spraying operations at 30 feet. The lack of sufficient
height to overcome the effects of wind eddies and turbulence was a factor in the accident.
Research into 'braking waves' and 'rotors' or eddies continues but there is no doubt that pilots need to
be aware of the phenomenon and take appropriate precautions. Although mountain wave activity is
usually forecast reasonably well by the Bureau of Meteorology, many local factors may effect the
formation of 'breaking waves' and 'rotors'. When planning a flight a pilot should take note of the winds
and the terrain to assess the likelihood of waves and rotors. There may be telltale signs in flight,
including the disturbances on water or wheat fields and the formation of clouds, provided there is
sufficient moisture for cloud to form.
Prudent flight planning may include allowing for the possibility of significant variations in the aircrafts
altitude if updrafts and downdraughts are encountered. A margin of at least the height of the hill or
mountain from the surface should be allowed, and consideration given to the need to adopt a
manoeuvring airspeed appropriate to the circumstances. Ultimately, it may be preferable for pilots to
consider diverting or not flying, rather than risk flying near or over mountainous terrain in strong wind
conditions conducive to mountain waves containing 'breaking waves' and 'rotors'.
Mountain wave and associated turbulence
0D\  1$6 1RZUD 5XQZD\  51=$) 1R 6TGQ GHSDUW IRU 6LQJDSRUH 3KRWR E\ 'RQ 6LPPV
$$$$555****++++
air day
Nas
Nowra
2007

3&
5$$)
5RXOHWWHV

3KRWR E\
KWWSZZZP\DYLDWLRQQHWVHDUFKIXOOVFUHHQPDLQ"LG  :DO 1HORZNLQ
7KHUHV D IW GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH WKUHVKROG KHLJKWV RQ  WKH UXQZD\ $ \HDU  9LHZ RI 1RZUDV 5Z\  WDNHQ
LV 0 ORQJ )URP WKH $XVVLH (56$ WKH UXQZD\ VORSH LQ WKH  GLUHFWLRQ IURP &DQEHUUD $HUR &OXE &HVVQD 1 9+
08: RQ OLQHXS IRU GHSDUWXUH WR &DQEHUUD
6ORSH GRZQ  WR 1( WR 0 WKHQ GRZQ  WR 0 WKHQ XS  WR DIWHU WKH 1RZUD $LU 'D\ DW +0$6 $OEDWURVV
0 WKHQ XS  WR 0 WKHQ XS  WR 5:< HQG 7KLV 5XQZD\ DFWXDOO\ VORSHV GRZQKLOO
)RU D ELW RI D ZRUG SLFWXUH  WKUHVKROG DW IW WKHQ GRZQ WR  IW DW 0 ZLWK D VXEVWDQWLDO GLS LQ WKH PLGGOH VHFWLRQ
WKHQ GRZQ WR IW DW 0 WKHQ XS WR IW DW 0 WKHQ XS IW DW 0 RI 5XQZD\ 3LORWV FDQ HDVLO\ ODQG ORQJ DV
WKH UXQZD\ VXUIDFH GURSV DZD\ EHQHDWK
WKHQ XS WR IW DW UXQZD\ HQG $V \RX FDQ VHH WKHUH
V D KHLJKW FKDQJH RI IW WKHP +RZHYHU GRZQKLOO WDNHRIIV DUH
LQ 0 RI UXQZD\ DW LWV VWHHSHVW JUDGLHQW RI  %DUQVH\ >$. .DKX SLORW@ TXLFNHU :DO 1HORZNLQ

KWWSZZZP\DYLDWLRQQHWVHDUFKIXOOVFUHHQPDLQ"LG   3KRWR &RPPHQWV E\ :DO 1HORZNLQ

 Click here to go to Brian Dutch
and Sandy Sandberg accounts
of night Sea Venom ejection in
Photos from Michael Sandberg the circuit at NAS Nowra, 1960 Sandy Sandberg, Anzac Day, Canberra 2007
Sea Venom
WZ927 lost
that night

Photo via Michael Sandberg

Photo from Michael Sandberg Lcdr Ian Josslin, CO 805 Sqdn, an Army Major & Leut Sandy Sandberg
 Photo by Michael Sandberg

Sandy Sandberg FAAM 60th FAA Anniversary 2008

The Sea Venom FAW 53 had a Martin Baker MK-4A
seat for pilot & MK-4A1 for observer. The difference
was the "go foward" mechanism on the observers
seat gun to push the seat foward when the canopy
departed the airframe.

Page from Michael Sandberg

724
Sqdn
Line
Book
Page

First ADF
Night time
Ejection

See Next Page for Larger Pic

Sea Venom Sliced Tree
Canopy
Sea Venom F.A.W. Mk.53 Night 15th
June 1960
Returning from
Night Intercept
Exercise
First ADF
Nighttime
Ejection

Sea Venom F.A.W. Mk.53

Night 15th 2 x HS9 Photos by
Michael Sandberg
June 1960
This HS9
watch
survived
the First
ADF
Night
time
Ejection,
being
worn by
LEUT (O)
Sandy
Sandberg
in an Sea
Venom
F.A.W.
Mk.53 in
the night
circuit at
NAS
Nowra in
high wind
condit- Lemania
Information:
ions at http://forum.tz-uk.com/
very low showthread.php?
http://i78.photobucket.com/ 135461-Lemania-
altitude albums/j117/raskham/
Lemania-cal-2220.jpg Addition
via Michael Sandberg
 0N
Overview
The Martin-Baker Ejection Seat for both the RAN Sea Venom
FAW 53 & the RAN Macchi MB 326H (with some variations) 6HDUFK

With the advent of a new type of aircraft known as the "light fighter" it became increasingly
important to reduce the weight of the ejection seat. At the same time it was essential that the
reduction in weight should not impair the operation and efficiency of the seat in any way. The
construction of the Mk. 4 seat, although retaining the essential components of its predecessors,
was therefore considerably modified. The basic 80 feet per second ejection gun was retained,
having been proved to be sufficient for all current requirements, as was the Duplex Drogue
system deployed by the half second time-delay drogue gun, together with a 1 second time-
release unit.

The conventional type of guide rail was eliminated and superseded by channel members mounted
on the sides of the ejection gun. Steel slipper pads mounted on the seat beams located the seat
in position in the channels and guided it out of the aircraft on ejection. The seat structure
consisted of a framework of two side beams bridged by three cross members, this framework
supporting the seat pan and the drogue container; the drogue gun and the time-release unit being
mounted on the side beams. The top cross beam took the full thrust of the ejection gun and
contained the seat latch mechanism for locking the seat to the ejection gun. The centre cross
member served as the attachment point for the shoulder harness whilst the lower member
provided an anchorage for the seat height adjusting mechanism.

Although fitted primarily with the face screen firing control, an alternative firing handle was fitted in
the leading face of the seat pan. This enabled the occupant to eject when conditions of g
precluded the use of the face screen control. The comfort of the seat was considerably improved
by the design of the parachute pack and dinghy pack alongside that of the seat, instead of trying
to use the existing safety equipment. The parachute pack was a back-type, horseshoe in shape,
and mounted high up on the back of the seat in the best position for automatic deployment,
together with a high degree of comfort. The parachute harness was redesigned to combine with it
the safety harness all in one, with only one quick-release fitting which was fastened by the
occupant when strapping in the seat, and remained fastened throughout any subsequent ejection
until released by the occupant at the conclusion of the parachute descent.

This combined harness was attached to the seat by two locks in the rear of the seat pan and Specifications Mk 4 (Typical)

another lock in the back of the seat at shoulder height, the locks being released by a redesigned Operating ceiling 50000+ ft
time-release unit at the correct instant after ejection, through a linkage system installed in the Minimum height/speed
Crew boarding mass range
Zero/90 KIAS
70.4 to 101.7 kg
seat. The locks could also be operated manually in the event of failure of the time-release unit by Crew size range 5th to 95th percentile
a manual separation lever on the seat. This arrangement of the parachute and harness was also Maximum Speed for ejection
Parachute type
600+ KIAS
Irvin I 24
fitted to some of the later Mk. 3 seats. http://www.martin-baker.co.uk/getdoc/b0dc354a-ff3c-4447-a3ce-4b2db8bb50f9/Mk--4.aspx Parachute deployment Drogue assisted
Drogue parachute type Duplex drogues 22 in. and 5 ft
Drogue deployment Drogue gun. Cartidge generated gas. Initiatedd by
0.5 sec clockwork time-delay, tripped during
ejection sequence
Harness type Combined
Ejection seat operation type Ejection gun
Ejection gun 80 ft/sec One primary cartridge, two secondary
ary
cartridges, 72 in. stroke
Ejection initiation Face screen or seat pan firing
Barostatic time-release unit Yes, tripped during ejection sequence,
g-restrictor
Manual override handle Yes
Guillotine Yes
Timers Time-release unit for man/seat separation
Seat adjustment Up/down, manual operation
Arm restraints No
Leg restraints Yes, two garters
Oxygen supply Bottled oxygen
Personal survival pack Yes with liferaft
Aircrew services Personal equipment connector (PEC) provides es
connections for
- main oxygen
- emergency oxygen
- air ventilated suit
- anti-g suit
- mic/tel
Canopy jettison Yes, aircraft variant dependent

Retrospective fitting of a rocket pack to the Mk 4 converts the seat to a Mk 6

How it works

Face screen seat firing handle pulled

Canopy jettison initiated
Ejection gun fires, seat moves up guide rails, secondary cartridges fire
Emergency oxygen tripped
Aircrew services disconnect
Leg restraints operate
As seat rises, static line initiates time-delay which fires drogue gun after 0.5 sec
As seat rises, static line initiates time-release unit
22 in. dia then 5 ft dia drogues stabilise and slow seat
Above 10000 ft
- barostat prevents operation of time-release mechanism

High speed
- g-restrictor prevents operation of time-release mechanism The Sea Venom FAW 53 had a
Below 10000 ft, low speed
se unit
1.5 sec (3 sec on earlier Mk 4, 1.25 sec on later Mk 4) after initiation of time-release
Martin Baker MK-4A seat for
the plunger releases scissor shackle to pilot & MK-4A1 for observer.
- Transfer pull of drogue to lifting lines of parachute, releasing it from seat
- Release face blind The difference was the go
Harness and leg lines released from seat foward mechanism on the
Drogues deploy main parachute, aircrew separates from seat
Normal descent
Manual separation system available if necessary. Operation of manual separation handle andle
Jump observers seat gun to push
nkages
fires a cartridge that operates a guillotine, severing the parachute attachment line, linkages Back! the seat foward when the
function releasing parachute harness, negative-g strap, PEC and leg restraint cords..
Freeing parachute from seat. Aircrew can then use rip cord to operate parachute canopy departed the airframe
Twoo Martin n- 08 February 1957 Edition
Baaker Mk.4 4 Flight (see next page)
Lig
ghtweight
ejector seats in
their standard
Sea Veno om
F.A.W
W.21
installation.
The para-
chutes are in
horseshoe-
shaped con-
tainers at
shoulder-level,
wedge-s shaped
cushions sup-
porting the
small of the
back. Leg-
restraint
harness fitted.
The Observers
seat tilts for-
ward when the
hoood is opened

EXIT FROM THE SEA VENOM
0DUWLQ%DNHU0N6HDWVLQ6HUYLFH
$WWKH6%$&GLVSOD\ODVW\HDUDGH+DYLOODQG
6HD9HQRP)$:ZDVVKRZQIRUWKHUVW
WLPHZLWKLWVWZRHMHFWLRQVHDWVEXWGHWDLOV
RIWKHOD\RXWZHUHREVFXUHGE\DEODFNFORWK
FRYHU3KRWRJUDSKVRI6HD9HQRPVRSHUDWLQJ
IURPFDUULHUVGXULQJWKH3RUW6DLGRSHUDWLRQV
LQ1RYHPEHUVKRZHGWKDW0DUWLQ%DNHU0N
OLJKWZHLJKWHMHFWLRQVHDWVKDGUHDFKHGWKH
VTXDGURQVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKLVSDUWLFXODUO\
GLIFXOWLQVWDOODWLRQKDVQRZEHHQUHOHDVHG
7KHGHVLJQZRUNZDVXQGHUWDNHQMRLQWO\E\
WKHGH+DYLOODQGPLOLWDU\GHVLJQDQGGHYHORS
PHQWWHDPDW&KULVWFKXUFKDQGWKH0DUWLQ%DNHU
$LUFUDIW&RPSDQ\DW&KDOJURYHDQG'HQKDP
6LQFHSULRULW\ZDVJLYHQWR0NLQVWDOODWLRQVIRU
WUDQVVRQLFJKWHUVXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWWKH6HD
9HQRPDGDSWDWLRQZDVVWDUWHGVRPHWLPHDIWHU
WKH0NVHDWUVWEHFDPHDYDLODEOH
,WZDVFOHDUIURPWKHUVWWKDWIRUWKH6HD
9HQRPWKHZKROHFRFNSLWOD\RXWZRXOGKDYHWR
EHUHYLVHGDQGWKDWWKHHMHFWLRQVHDWLWVHOIKDG
WREHVSHFLDOO\DGDSWHG7ZRRIWKHODUJHU0N
VHDWVKDGWWHGTXLWHFRPIRUWDEO\LQWRWKHVLGH
E\VLGHFRFNSLWRIWKH9DPSLUHWUDLQHUEXWWKH
FRFNSLWRIWKH6HD9HQRPZDVLQQDUURZHUDQG
FRQWDLQHGPXFKUDGDUHTXLSPHQW,Q6HSWHPEHU
WKHSURMHFWZDVEHJXQDQGD0NZDV
RZQWR&KDOJURYH0DUWLQ%DNHUVDLUHOG$ ZHUHIRXQGWREHIUHHIURPVFUDWFKHVRUDEUD
VSDUHIXVHODJHZDVGHVSDWFKHGWRWKHIDFWRU\DW
'HQKDPIRUGHWDLOHGVWXG\
,WZDVIRXQGWKDWWKHOLJKWZHLJKWVHDWVFRXOG
EHDFFRPPRGDWHGLQWKH6HD9HQRPFRFNSLW
ZLWKRXWUHGHVLJQLQJWKHH[LVWLQJFDQRS\,Q
2FWREHUWKHUVW0DUWLQ%DNHUPRFNXS
ZDVUHDG\DQGWKHFRPSDQ\ZDVDVNHGWR
SURFHHGZLWKWKHGHVLJQ7KHDLUFUDIWDQG
IXVHODJHZHUHUHWXUQHGWR&KULVWFKXUFKDQGZRUN
EHJDQRQWKHUHSRVLWLRQLQJRIDOOWKHHTXLSPHQW
LQWKHFRFNSLW7KHRQO\LWHPVOHIWLQWKHLURULJLQDO
SRVLWLRQZHUHWKH\LQJDQGHQJLQHFRQWUROV
2QHRIWKHPRVWGLIFXOWSUREOHPVFRQFHUQHG
WKHREVHUYHUVSRVLWLRQZKLFKKDGWREHPRYHG
LQIXUWKHUIRUZDUGDQGVRDUUDQJHGWKDWWKH
EDFNRIWKHHMHFWLRQVHDWKLQJHGIRUZDUGIURPLWV
EDVHSULRUWRHMHFWLRQLQRUGHUWRJLYHDGHTXDWH
FOHDUDQFHEHWZHHQWKHEDFNRIWKHVHDWDQGWKH
UHDUFDQRS\DUFK
$ODUJHVSUHDGHUSODWHZDVDGGHGWRWKHRRU
WRDOORZIRUUHDFWLRQORDGVDQGVWURQJWWLQJV
ZHUHPRXQWHGRQ1REXONKHDGWRORFDWHWKH
VHDWVLQWKHIRUHDQGDIWGLUHFWLRQ&DUHZDV
WDNHQWRHQVXUHUHDVRQDEOHFOHDUDQFHEHWZHHQ
HTXLSPHQWIRUWKHVDNHRIVHUYLFLQJDQGD
QXPEHURIJHQHUDOPRGLFDWLRQVZHUHDOVR
LQFRUSRUDWHG:KHQWKHIXVHODJHKDGEHHQIXOO\
DGDSWHGVWUXFWXUDOWHVWVXQGHUHMHFWLRQORDGV
ZHUHFDUULHGRXW
$WDQDOPHHWLQJWKHFRFNSLWDQGVDIHW\
HTXLSPHQWZHUHDSSURYHGDQGWKHGHVLJQZDV
WHVWHGZKHQWZRGXPPLHVZHUHHMHFWHGIURPD
FRFNSLWULJRQWKHJURXQG7KHGXPPLHVZHUH
FRUUHFWO\VKDSHGDQGEDODQFHGDQGGUHVVHG
LQUXEEHUERRWVLPPHUVLRQVXLWVDQGIXOO\LQJ
HTXLSPHQW$IWHUEHLQJUHWULHYHGLQDQHWWKH\
VDFULFHIRUWKHDGGHGSHDFHRIPLQG7KHQHZ
VLRQVKRZLQJWKDWWKH\KDGPDGHVDIHFOHDQ
HMHFWLRQV
,WZDVXQGHVLUDEOHIRUWKHFUHZWRHMHFW
ZLWKRXWUVWMHWWLVRQLQJWKHFDQRS\DVLWKDVD
IRUHDQGDIWVWUXFWXUDOPHPEHU$QLQWHUORFN
EHWZHHQFDQRS\DQGVHDWZDVWKHUHIRUH
LQFRUSRUDWHG,WFRQVLVWVRIDVDIHW\SLQLQWKH
VHDWULQJPHFKDQLVPVRDUUDQJHGWKDWXQWLO
WKHFDQRS\SK\VLFDOO\OHDYHVWKHDLUFUDIWWKH
HMHFWLRQVHDWEOLQGFDQQRWEHSXOOHG7KLVLV
FRQVLGHUHGEHWWHUWKDQDWWDFKLQJWKHEOLQGGLUHFW
WRWKHFDQRS\ORFNLQJPHFKDQLVPZKLFKPLJKW
EHGDPDJHGE\HQHP\DFWLRQ7KHLQWHUORFNLV
DOVRDUUDQJHGWRRSHUDWHZKHQWKHFDQRS\LV
RSHQHGE\WKHQRUPDODFFHVVKDQGOHDSDU
WLFXODUO\QHFHVVDU\VDIHJXDUGVLQFHWKHFDQRS\
LVVSHFLFDOO\GHVLJQHGWRIDFLOLWDWHXQGHUZDWHU
HVFDSHLQFDVHRIDQXQVXFFHVVIXOFDWDSXOW
WDNHRII
,QDGGLWLRQWRUHOHDVLQJDVDIHW\SLQLQERWK
HMHFWLRQVHDWVWKHRSHQLQJRIWKHFDQRS\LVDOVR
VHWWRWULJJHUVSULQJVLQWZRWHOHVFRSLFWXEHVWR
PRYHWKHREVHUYHUVVHDWWRWKHIRUZDUGSRVLWLRQ
ZKHUHLWLVORFNHGE\DQRYHUFHQWUHOLQNDJH
7KH0NVHDWVQRZWWHGWRDOO6HD9HQRP
0NVWKHUVW6HUYLFHLQVWDOODWLRQFDQ
DFFRPPRGDWHWKHIWVHFORQJVWURNHHMHFWLRQ
JXQDQGWKHVSHFLDOWLPHGHOD\VZKLFKSHUPLW
ERWKUXQZD\OHYHODQGKLJKDOWLWXGHDXWRPDWLF
HMHFWLRQ$VLPLODULQVWDOODWLRQLVQRZUHDG\DQG
DYDLODEOHIRUWKH5$)V9HQRP1),QWKLV
FDVHVHDWVDQGVXSHUVWUXFWXUHDUHLGHQWLFDOZLWK
WKRVHGHVFULEHGDERYHEXWWKHFRFNSLWOD\RXWLV
GLIIHUHQW7KHZHLJKWSHQDOW\RIWKHWZRHMHFWLRQ
VHDWVLQWKH6HD9HQRP0NLVRQO\OE
ZKLFK1DYDODLUFUHZZLOOFRQVLGHUDZRUWKZKLOH
VHDWVDUHDOVRPRUHFRPIRUWDEOHWKDQWKHHDUOLHU
[HGW\SH
)HEUXDU\(GLWLRQRI)OLJKW
KWWSZZZLJKWJOREDOFRPSGIDUFKLYH
YLHZKWPO
 More 1st Person Accounts

IR NIC
An Account by SBLT Brian wind strengths this was within the was that the observer should eject the and landed just clear of the aircraft
Dutch of events of a Night crosswind limits of the Venom, at the heavy canopy and then immediately fire.
height of the gusts it exceeded limits. eject himself. The limitation of the As I landed in a small tree with my
Sea Venom ejection, from However, this was to become irrele- ejector seat, which was powered by 3 feet in a stream, I could hear shout-
the book HMAS Albatross vant by subsequent events! cartridges, was 200 knots of forward ing and thought that it was Sandy
A Collection of Memories As I turned the aircraft downwind speed and 200 feet of height. shouting for help. I methodically undid
During night flying on 15 June 1960 a and lowered the undercarriage, the I pulled up the nose of the aircraft my harness release and ran to assist
Sea Venom being flown by SBLT Brian aircraft rolled inverted in a gust of to about a 60 degree climb and put on Sandy. I got about 4 feet before I was
Dutch With LEUT Dave Sandberg as wind. As I was initially in a 60 degree full power to try to clear the ground. I jerked on to my back. I had forgotten
his observer malfunctioned and the banked turn and at 400 ft for the remember seeing the altitude indicator to undo my emergency oxygen tube!
crew carried out the first RAN night night circuit on those days, I immedi- showing a steep climb, the altimeter Flushing with embarrassment in the
ejection: ately applied full aileron and then full was rising and the air speed indicator darkness, I undid the tube and again
In June 1960 at the Naval Air Sta- rudder to roll the aircraft level. (ASI) falling rapidly! ran to assist Sandy. Bang! I ran into
tion, Nowra NSW, I was completing my We pilots all knew that the Venom The next 30 seconds or so seemed a fence. When I finally got to Sandy
night fighter phase of the Sea Venom did not roll around its longitudinal to take ages! In good drill fashion I said he was OK and said that he had been
(Operational Flying School) with 724 axis, due to its fuselage design, and it to Sandy EJECT, EJECT, EJECT No shouting at me as he could see me
Squadron. always dished or barrelled in the roll- reaction. I looked at Sandy who had not drifting into the fire and was trying to
There was some pressure to ing plane. Well, I had managed to get responded. The intercom had obviously warn me!
complete the course as we were due the aircraft back to about 30 degrees failed. My only option was to change We could hear the crash siren at
to embark on HMAS Melbourne, and to port heading the right way when my right hand from the control column the Air Station and sat in the dark-
after two day sorties, I had two sorties there was a violent crunch, the wind- and pull the canopy ejection myself to ness and waited for help. Sandy pulled
to complete that night. After the first screen shattered and became opaque get the message across to Sandy. out his cigarettes but he was shaking
night trip I was debriefed and it was and the whole aircraft began to shake. As the canopy exploded clear I with shock so I lit his cigarette for him.
decided that I needed one more night I assessed that, as I had no forward remember seeing Sandys eyes like Next a crash tender arrived and
sortie to consolidate. Lt E D (Sandy) visibility, the radome was probably saucers as he reached for the canopy I saw one of the tender crew walking
Sandberg, the Senior Observer, and shattered and the undercarriage was and ejected. With Sandy clear, I wait- gingerly around the crashed aircraft.
I climbed into another Sea Venom most likely damaged, we should eject! ed until the ASI was falling through In the light of the fire, I saw him trip
which was found to be unservice- Now at that stage the RN Sea about 110 knots and ejected myself. on the stump of a Black Boy palm
able after 20 minutes airborne. We Venoms had no ejection seat and the There was a surging acceleration (as we were allowed to call them in
re-turned to Naval Air Station and RAN Sea Venoms had been fitted with into the darkness, I felt the seat curv- those days). The man fell... I cannot
climbed into a third aircraft and took the Martin Baker Patent Ejector Seat ing backwards and then a jerk as the recall his name so I called out Are
off for the sortie. It was a cold win- MK 4A. As there had not been an ejec- canopy of the parachute deployed and you OK? He replied in a shaky voice
ters night with strong West to North tion, there were several myths and I was floating downwards. Almost im- Oh its you, sir. I thought that I had
West winds which had developed into rumours about the seat, particularly mediately the aircraft exploded on the tripped on your head!!
standing waves over the mountains to as the RAAF Sabre aircraft had an ground just below me and I realised Then the dear old Sycamore heli-
the West of Nowra. American seat and had had several that I was drifting towards the fire. copter arrived, flown by Lt Cal Payne
Well, Sandy and I completed the fatal low level ejection. Once again I recalled my drills and re- with Doctor Tommy Thompson aboard.
sortie and headed back to Nowra. On Our seats were canted towards membered our lectures on controlling Tommy was winched down to us to
join-ing the circuit for Runway 26 we one another at about 4 degrees which a parachute. I reached up and pulled check us out. This was the first night
were advised that the wind was up to meant that if both the pilot and ob- the right hand lines. Christ, Im winching with a Sycamore which was
35 degrees off the runway and gusting server ejected together the seats would drifting into the fire faster I thought, ill equipped for such work.
2550 knots. Although at the lower collide above the aircraft, so the drill as I quickly changed to the left lines We were whisked away to the sick-
 bay and although only shaken up, we
were detained for the night for obser-
vation. Subsequently it was found that
Sandy had injured his spine. He said
that he thought he would injure his
legs as he landed in the parachute, so
to avoid this he pulled up his legs and
thus landed on his bum!
A Board of Inquiry was convened
and headed up by Captain Ramsay
who was then Captain of HMAS Cre-
swell. In fatherly tones he said to me:
Tell us what happened in your own
words, son.
I proceeded to explain that I had
run upwind. Being a cautious man
he asked which way was that and I
pointed it out on the map. Go on he
said. I explained that I then broke
downwind (turned down wind). YOU
BROKE WHAT? said the Captain in
stentorious tones. Fortunately another
of the Board explained the jargon and
the saga of the Inquiry Board went
on to its conclusion. I resolved at that
stage that the Board should have only
consisted of aviation experts.
It is interesting that immediately
thereafter the circuit height for all
air sorties was raised from 400 ft to
1,000 ft. They had realised that the
terrain rose in the downwind position
and of course was covered with trees,
one of which I had hit. There had
never been a full 400ft of clearance.
Subsequently trees were lopped on
that side of the airfield.
Some time later Sandy and I
received a censure (in mild terms)
from the Naval Board. As an enthusi-
astic sub-Lieutenant who was known
as The Fanatic in those days, I was
bitterly disappointed and discussed it
with the Captain of NAS, Captain T K
(Tom) Morrison. With great wiseness
he said Dont worry about it, in time
the Board will always remember your
name and will not recall the details.
Therefore they will assume you did
well!
He was right. I went on to earn
a permanent commission and had a
wonderful career with many more ad-
ventures and experiences. I also found
that the ejection had proved to me
that in a life threatening situation I
would not freeze up and die, but that
I would act instinctively to save myself.
What wonderful years.
UP AND DOWN AN
UNIQUE EXPERIENCE
By: LCDR E.D. (Sandy) Sandberg
April 2001 From the RAN FAA Asso-
ciation Magazine Slipstream 2005
Sometime ago the Editor of SLIP-
STREAM asked me to write the story
of the first night ejection from an
aircraft in Australia. That incident
occurred on the 15th June 1960 at
RAN Air Station Nowra, NSW when a
Sea Venom FAW 53 of 724 Squadron
struck a tree on the downwind leg
of the landing pattern. The Pilot and
Observer ejected safely.
As this happened over 41 years
ago, I obtained a copy of the Board of
Inquiry report to refresh my memory.
I wrote Navy Office, but as the docu-
ments were over 30 years old, they
had sent them to the Australian Ar-
chives. I obtained a copy from there.
During this era Naval pilots
gained their wings with the RAAF and
completed OFS at NAS NOWRA in ei-
ther fighter or anti-submarine special-
isation. 724 Squadron was equipped
with Sea Venom & Vampire aircraft to
carry out night fighter pilot training.
The Sea Venom FAW 53 (FAW =
Fighter All Weather) was a side by
side two seater aircraft built by De
Havilland in the United Kingdom and
shipped to Australia in HMAS MEL-
BOURNE in 1956. The aircraft was
fitted with a Ghost 104 engine and
radar that enabled the observer to
locate a target passing in the front
sector of his aircraft. The observers
job was to verbally guide the pilot into
a position where the pilot could see
the target under all weather condi-
tions, day and night. Although, when
all went well, the radar was magic in
its day, I understand that it is pretty
basic compared to todays equipment
whereby pilots pop off a missile at a
blip. We only had 20mm cannon thus
the pilot had to actually see the target
before shooting. The Sea Venom was a
good aircraft.
The characters in the story are
mostly confined to Sub Lieutenant
Brian A. Dutch and Lieutenant E.D.
(Sandy) Sandberg because some of
the other players are no longer with
us. I would like to begin by thanking
all the old 724 Squadron ground crew,
the NAS Nowra Air Traffic Control
staff and particularly all the Armour-
ers and Safety Equipment Branch
sailors, without whose skills, this tale
would not be told by me.
Flying on the evening of 15th June
1960 began with a twilight takeoff for
Air Interception (AI) instruction. It
was the 20th time I had flown with
Brian, so we were pretty well used to
one another. I had a lot of confidence
in him and to my way of thinking in
those days, he was the better pilot on
his particular training course. As the
Senior Observer of the squadron, I
had the choice of pilots on a course
and checked all their logbooks before
selecting him. He was three years my
junior in age; he had been flying for
about 18 months and I for just on nine
years. I have flown with a lot of pilots,
in a lot of aircraft and I still rate Brian
as a good pilot.
This particular AI course was pro-
grammed to finish that night, so there
was pressure on us to get the appro-
priate number of exercises in
I dont recall how many, but some-
thing like three or four night intercep-
tions would satisfy the syllabus. In
fact we flew three sorties that night to
get the required runs in.
A Naval Board of Inquiry was con-
vened to determine the cause of the ac-
cident and several people on duty that
night gave their version of the event to
the Board but it was the pilot who nat-
urally underwent the most questioning
and his version is the best account of
what actually happened. He informed
the Board that on returning from the
first detail of the night the conditions in
the circuit were slightly turbulent but
didnt worry him at all. The detail as a
whole was successful and the landing
uneventful. After refueling we took off
for the second detail in the same air-
craft. But because the radar was un-
serviceable this time we returned to
change aircraft. We experienced very
severe wind gusts in the circuit area
this time. On one occasion the weather
sent us down 200 feet and then up 400
feet in a very short time. It was not a
very nice night.
Within half an hour we had
changed aircraft and were airborne
again. Shortly after take off Brian had
trouble with his oxygen equipment.
We stayed low until he sorted out the
problem. Fortunately this was not long
and we were soon chasing our target
(a Vampire flown by Lieutenant Rol-
ley Waddell-Wood) all over me sky for
a successful mission. Now it was time
to return to base and have a couple
of beers to celebrate the completion of
yet another night fighter course. Below
3,000 feet near NOWRA the turbu-
lence started again. In the circuit area
the pilot was doing those meaningful
little things that a pilot does when
coming into land. As I said earlier, I
had considerable confidence in Brians
ability as a pilot and I was not con-
cerned in the circuit after all, there
was nothing I could do; flying the
aircraft was his part of ship!
On the run upwind at 900 feet
the turbulence was again quite se-
vere. In fact we gained 100 feet on
the turn downwind and this was not
caused by bad flying. The airspeed
at this time was around 250 knots
decreasing to wheels down speed of
210 knots. I did my usual pre-landing
checks; there werent many but be-
cause of the turbulence my navigation
bag down by my right leg was bounc-
ing around. I bent down to secure it.
While I was doing that I felt the bang.
I bolted upright! The windscreen was
opaque. My radar was on my lap I
pushed it back. Fortunately it stuck in
its cradle otherwise it ejected with me
or I left my legs behind at the knee-
caps. I switched on my microphone
and shouted BIRDSTRIKE, EJECT,
EJECT!!
Naturally in a situation like this
nothing works as it should. Of course
the intercom was U/S. It says volumes
for my power of command that the
pilot heard me and responded in the
only way possible by ejecting the
canopy. Normally it was the Observ-
ers job to do that little chore but these
were not normal times. I dont know
where Brian got the extra hand from
to release the canopy but he did it. Af-
ter all at that time he had the control
column back in his stomach getting
height and the throttle full on getting
power. I suppose it comes back to that
old adage If you want something done
in a hurry ask a busy man. As
soon as the canopy went, I went! No
good hanging around at that time. In
its normal flying position the Observ-
ers ejection seat is tilted slightly to the
rear. When the canopy is ejected the
seat springs forward to arm the ejec-
tion rocket. To fire the gun it is neces-
sary to reach above the head and pull
down the D ring at the top of ne ejec-
tion seat. Attached to the D ring is a
felt and canvas hood that covers the
face to prevent injury to the head from
wind blast, flames or other nasties one
may meet on the way out.
I felt nothing of the bang one
would expect to feel in that portion
of the anatomy one would expect to
feel it. My first recollection was being
clear of the aircraft and a recognisable
moment when movement seemingly
stops. I was hanging in the air think-
ing Is this automatic thing going to
work auto-matically? Then the straps
holding me to the seat fell away. It felt
an eternity until that jolt that stopped
the fall and the parachute straps
uncomfortably tightened on my body. I
was hanging there. But I couldnt see
anything its all so black!
Most people that have been in a
life threatening situation will have
experienced the adrenaline that races
the mind. You think very fast indeed.
I was thinking very fast indeed as
I hung up there in the black but it
wasnt black for long. WHOOMPH!!!
The aircraft hits the ground, seeming-
ly in front of me and explodes. Flames
shoot into the air and again I realised
that I was still airborne but this time
without that comforting shell of the
aircraft around me.
Night become day below me but
in front things are still black. Hell Im
blind! I felt for my eyes and instead
feel my helmet or more correctly, I feel
the D ring from the ejection seat is
still over my head. I throw this off but
its still dark. The visor on my bone
dome is down and the cloth cover is
on it. I push this back and low and be-
hold there was light! Not any old light
though. Light that shows my partner
dangling like me but between me and
the flames from our downed aircraft.
Get out of there you bloody mug I yell
to him. I dont think he heard me but
right now I have more problems of my
own.
I realise I must be getting close to
the deck and I start to wonder about
landing. Like a flash those periods of
dummy parachute drill race out of my
mind. I cant think of a bleeding thing
to do. Do I put my feet to the left, to
the right cross them spread them or
what? I look down again and see Im
going to land in a gully. Whats more
that gully has steep sides and tree
stumps! Oh hell what the heck. Ill
withdraw my feet altogether and stick
them up around my neck somewhere
out of the way. Thus I landed on my
back somehow but at the time all I felt
was the exit of some wind (from the
mouth) and considerable jubilation at
still seemingly being in one piece.
Now to find that stupid pilot. Like
me he was approaching the deck fast
but his immediate concern was his
proximity to the burning aircraft. I
need not have worried because he
must have remembered his safety
equipment drills for he was not hurt
on landing. Before long we were re-
united and became very happy indeed.
We were alive! We would fly again!
Meanwhile, back at the station
all hell was breaking loose. The Air
Traffic Control Staff had watched the
whole event, saw us eject and sound-
ed the alarm. The Fire Tender boys
responded and raced to the scene. An
interesting side story here. I under-
stand one of the drivers thought he
was driving a tank and did all sorts
of wonderful things on the way to the
crash site but Ill leave that one to the zon; his bank and turn indicator. He indicate the aircraft was descending? OLDHAM) was not very amused and
crew to tell. We all know how dedicat- asked when he did this, when he did No Was the altimeter reading steady had a few harsh words to threaten our
ed these fellows were (and Ill bet, still that. He asked about his power setting or oscillating as the ASI was? It was future with, but DAWOT (Director of
are). The duty chopper was scrambled and his dive brakes. He was quizzed fairly steady. Was it steady during Air Warfare and Operational Training)
and the medics prepared for whatever on stalling speeds in certain configu- the turn Yes sir. Was the needle of in Navy Office had a more moderate
remains they got. Generally every- rations, what G did he pull, how he the VSI steady during the turn? No view and, fortunately for Brian and
thing worked as it should. As soon as was he flying at the time normal sir. Fluctuating quite a bit. Did you myself, his view prevailed. Naturally
the ambulance arrived they whipped or pulling the aircraft in the turn, read the fall of speed pretty accurately we both incurred the displeasure of
us back to the Sick Bay (instead of how the control surfaces were react- between 250 and 210 knots? It was the Naval Board.
the Wardroom!), checked we were still ing. Then came the point of impact impossible to get an accurate reading Brian was informed that his ac-
whole, put us in bed, shot us full of questioning. What was your speed as it was fluctuating over 20 knots. tions were below the qualities ex-
morphine and left. Meanwhile, up at the time the windshield shattered? It got to 210 and jumped to about pected and the Naval Board noted
in the Wardroom a party was build- Around 210 Knots. At that time
were 230 as I selected the undercarriage with concern the lack of knowledge in
ing up. We missed it but some kindly you turning or had you straightened lever. What was the altimeter read- elementary parachute drill displayed
soul did slip us a little, later on in the up? I was taking off bank, still turn- ing when you selected undercarriage by the observer. To that I say Amen.
evening. ing. You were straightening up? Yes. down? 1,000 feet. After the first I was required to carry out dog watch
I am sure the reader will appreci- Slightly port wing down, slightly nose impact you applied power. Did you get instruction in elementary parachute
ate that most of the trees around NAS down. The crunch questions. Could any response from the engine and did drill for one week.
NOWRA are not very big for obvi- you find the undercarriage lever with- your controls respond satisfactorily to We were informed of these find-
ous reasons. The one we lopped was out searching for it? Yes sir. You any movement? The sensation I had ings by a somewhat bemused Cap-
33 feet at our point of impact. Relax were on instruments all the way (in was of driving a car in mud and sud- tain of HMAS ALBATROSS, (Captain
Greenies, it was already dead before the turn)? Yes sir. But yet you saw denly coming out onto good road. The Tommy MORRISON.)
we hit it. no increase or loss of height either controls seemed to be operating cor- Hells Bells! We were alive and our
The Martin Baker ejection seats on the altimeter or the vertical speed rectly but I was getting a lot of control thanks still go to all those that made
fitted to the Sea Venom were the best indicator? asked Digger. To me, said changes as I was getting a lot of buf- that possible. Brian learnt to fly better
available at the time. The use-by label Brian, everything was in order as I fet. She was handling satisfactorily? and I had dog watch instruction in ele-
indicated that to work automatically selected undercarriage down and it Yes. I was getting into the climb with mentary parachute drill. Fortunately I
the seat needed to be 200 feet from was almost at the same instant that wings level. have not had to use those skills again.
the ground and have a forward motion we hit the gust and the windscreen The pressure eased the ques- What happened after a short spell of
of 200 knots. That they worked in our shattered. tions were answered satisfactorily and survivors leave? Well, it was back to
situation I thank Mr. Martin and Mr. The score at this point was slightly the crew are alive. How come? Was it flying. Brian and I finished the course
Baker and our squadron maintainers, in favour of the pilot. He had the an- an exemplary ejection because of the proper and we continued to fly togeth-
especially the Armourers and Safety swers. He answered truthfully. drill between pilot and observer? Was er until the end of that month. I was
Equipment lads. The questioning returned to the it because of briefings between the two posted (banished?) to 723 Squadron
Now comes the Board of Inquiry: instruments. Brian was asked about or was it squadron drills? and Sycamore helicopters on 25 July
Commander R.E. Digger BOURKE his instrument hours and then about The pilot answered. We carry out 1960 then back to Venoms in 1961
RAN being the specialist aged aviator, the instruments performance at the drills. On this occasion I couldnt con- while Brian went on to bigger and bet-
was the main inquisitor and a bloody time of the turn downwind. What tact my observer on the intercom so I ter things elsewhere.
thorough job he made of it too. He was your height at this point (again)? jettisoned the canopy to let him know But that, as they say, is another
threw questions at Brian at a great 900 feet Did see any alteration I had heard him shouting. So ended story for another day.
rate of knots. He asked about his air- of the altimeter reading during the the inquiry. Return to Cartoon Slipstream page
speed his altimeter, his artificial hori- turn? No. Did the artificial horizon Firstly FOICEA (RADM George E.D. (Sandy) Sandberg