Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience

Author(s): Zoltan Barany

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Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1997), pp. 21-43
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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 Democratic Consolidation and the Military
The EastEuropeanExperience

Zoltan Barany

The literatureon easternEurope'spostcommunisttransitionis alreadyvoluminous,

but the role of the armedforces in democratizationprocesses is one of the few areas
that seems to have escaped the attentionof political scientists and area specialists.'
This omission is striking since the military is potentially one of the most conse-
quentialinstitutionalactorsin postauthoritarian transitionsand the success or failure
of these processes to a large extent hinges on its political behavior. Although the
East Europeanarmieshave seldom played a decisive political role in the post-World
WarII era- certainlynot one comparableto the militaryregimes of LatinAmerica
and Iberia- they were one of the institutionaldefenders and beneficiaries of the
Communistsystem. Thus, it is importantto examine the behaviorof these militaries
duringthe 1989 transfersof power and in the consolidationphase thereafter.
This essay surveys the evolution of civil-militaryrelations in the East European
states of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (for the purposes of this essay, defined as
Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania)duringthreestages of political transformation:the late Communistperiod
(1980s), the transitionfrom Communism (1989), and the period of consolidation
(from 1990).2 I consider all of these cases but concentrateon Hungaryand Romania
because they appearto have had the most dissimilarpatternsof civil-militaryrela-
tions in easternEurope.Their experiences place them at the two opposing poles in
the spectrumof civil-militaryrelations. In most respects other East Europeanstates
fall somewherebetween them.
I make four arguments. First, notwithstandingsome fundamentalsimilarities,
civil-military relations, like political regimes, varied considerably among East
EuropeanCommuniststates, and their differenceshave tendedto persist in the three
stages of political transformation.I identify two basic types of civil-military rela-
tions in the late communistera:the "professionalized"patternin states like Hungary
and Poland, where the military's professionalizationsupersededpolitical indoctri-
nation, and the "politicized" type in states like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and Romania, where the stress on the armed forces' politicization
remainedparamount.
Second, the differences between these two types help explain the variation
between the role of the armed forces during the transferof power in 1989 and the
extent of the military's democratizationin the consolidationperiod. Specifically, in

21
ComparativePolitics October 1997

contrastwith the "politicized"patternof civil-military relations, the "professional-

ized" type correlatedpositively with the absence of militaryinterferencein the trans-
fer of power and the rapidinternaldemocratizationof the armedforces.
Third, the strategic institutional choices of the transition and consolidation
periods have strongly affected civil-militaryrelationsunderthe new regimes. More
precisely, parliamentarysystems (Hungary,Czech Republic, Slovakia) have been
more successful in developing stable and balanced civilian control over the armed
forces than presidentialones (Romania,Poland).
Finally, the more gradualthe transferof power is, the less likely the militarywill
interferepolitically. The contextual evidence of the East Europeantransitionssug-
gests that relatively liberal Communistregimes (Hungaryand Poland) maintained
"professionalized"civil-militaryrelations,gave up power graduallythroughnegoti-
ations with the opposition, and experiencedno military interferencein the transfer
of power. Conversely, the more conservative Communist states developed more
"politicized"civil-militaryrelations,their rule collapsed faster, and the militarywas
more likely to intrudein some form in their transition.
The article first explains the variation among civil-military relations in
CommunisteasternEuropeand demonstrateshow these disparitiesled to the differ-
ent roles the armedforces could play in the transfersof power. Second, it deals with
comparativeissues of democratizingcivil-militaryrelations, especially how a new
democraticregime might establish control over and democratizethe armed forces.
Third, it explains the type of civil-military relations that have evolved in eastern
Europeduringthe consolidationphase.

Types of Civil-Military Relations in East European Communist States

The profounddifferences in the relationsbetween states and armedforces have not

allowed the evolution of a single overarchingtheory of civil-military relations. In
fact, the theoreticalcomponentof the field may be best summed up as a numberof
competing assumptionsabout the dynamics that govern the relations between sol-
diers and the state.3The three principalviews on the party-armyrelationshipin the
Soviet Union suggested that it was determined by either institutional conflict
(Kolkowicz), institutional congruence (Odom), or institutional interpenetration
(Colton).4If the theoreticalwork on civil-military relations in Communisteastern
Europe is less controversial,it is also more fraughtwith problems.5Its major defi-
ciencies are an inabilityto suggest explanationsfor the breakdownof civil-military
relationsin some East Europeanstates duringpolitical crises and the revolutionsof
1989 and a general failureto provide worthwhiletestable generalizationsfor highly
disparatecases.6
Notwithstandingsome fundamentalsimilarities,such as the party's controlmech-

22
 Zoltan Barany

anisms over the armed forces and the cooptation of selected high-rankingmilitary
personnel into the state and party hierarchies,there was also a numberof key dif-
ferences in the patternof civil-militaryrelationsbetween the Soviet Union and east-
ern Europe.7In the USSR the army played a far more consequentialpolitical role,
and the military-industrialelites were considerablymore powerful than in eastern
Europe. Most important,while civil-military relations in the Soviet Union were
determinedby two institutions(the party and the armed forces), in eastern Europe
they were complementedby an externalactor, the Soviet Union and its occupation
forces. Moreover, it may be argued that this external force and not the indigenous
militarieswas the ultimateguarantorof the East EuropeanCommunistregimes' sur-
vival, as was shown in Hungaryin 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Differences in Party-Army Relations A careful analysis of civil-military rela-

tions in eastern Europereveals only a few other attributescommon to all of them.
These attributesinclude the pervasive influence of Moscow, which graduallyweak-
ened after the mid 1950s but was reinforced directly or indirectly in crises; the
Communists'suspicions of the armedforces inheritedfrom the pre-1945 era, which
manifestedthemselves in recurringpurges; the numerouspolitical control mechan-
isms intended to ensure the armed forces' reliability; the high Communist Party
membershiprates among professional militarypersonnel;and the party's mainten-
ance of special securityforces and militias, its last line of domestic defense afterthe
questionablepolitical reliabilityof the regulararmedforces.'
More germaneto the argumentof this paperare the differencesin party-armyrela-
tions among the East Europeanstates. The most importantdimensions along which
civil-militaryrelationsin the region variedwere the following (for the sake of brevi-
ty only the states occupying the extremeends of the spectrumin each case are iden-
tified): (1) participationof the armed forces in policymaking: importantin Poland,
particularly following the declaration of martial law in 1981, insignificant in
Hungary;(2) the party's cooptationof militarypersonnel into the various levels of
political administration:prevalent in East Germany,negligible in Czechoslovakia;
(3) Soviet influence on military policy and the socialization of military cadres (an
issue especially pertinentto affinities towardthe Warsaw Pact): critical in the East
Germancase, inconsequentialin post-1965 Romania;and (4) the impact of profes-
sionalization on the officer corps as a factor adversely affecting the party's control
over the armedforces: significant in Poland, far more subtle in East Germany.
In no two East Europeanstates did civil-militaryrelationsdiverge more in the last
Communist period than in Hungaryand Romania. In Hungary "professionalized"
civil-military relations evolved; the military's political influence was minimal as
reflected by the fact that no militaryofficer occupied a Politburoseat after the late
1950s. In Romania,however, Nicolae Ceausescu, an increasinglydistrustfuldicta-
tor, periodicallyrotatedthe top officials of key ministriesand in the militaryestab-

23
ComparativePolitics October 1997

lishment to prevent them from building their own power bases. "Politicized"civil-
military relations prevailed in Romania. Party control over the armed forces was
more extensive and intensive, and, in starkcontrastto its Hungariancounterpart,the
Romanianmilitaryhad an institutionalrival, the security police (Securitate),which
received prioritytreatmentfrom the Bucharestleadership.9
Startingin the 1970s militaryreformswere introducedin Hungary,signaling the
political elite's intent to improve the conditions of professional and conscripted
soldiers. In Romaniaan opposite trendresultedin the growing alienationof the mil-
itary from the regime.'0The professional standardsof Hungarianofficers benefited
from the country'ssolid membershipin the WarsawPact (for example, throughpar-
ticipation in multinationalexercises and opportunitiesfor advancedstudy in Soviet
academies), while those of their Romanian peers suffered as a consequence of
Bucharest's reluctant and limited involvement in the Pact." In sum, Hungarian
officers received less political indoctrination,were more professionalized,and were
betterprovidedfor than their Romaniancolleagues.
The other three East European regimes' relations to their armed forces fell
between Hungary and Romania.'2In the northerntier states of the Warsaw Pact
(Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland), befitting their strategic importance,the
militarywas relatively well providedfor with equipment,benefits, and above aver-
age living standards.Still, therewere importantdifferencesin termsof the military's
political control. Fromthe 1960s on, Polish militarypersonnelwas subjectedto less
political indoctrinationand had become a more professional corporateentity ("pro-
fessionalized"type) thantheircounterpartsin Czechoslovakiaand East Germany.In
the latter("politicized"pattern),political indoctrinationcontinuedto outweigh pro-
fessional trainingon all levels of the militaryeducationsystem, and the party's con-
trol remainedfar more extensive and intensive than in Hungaryand Poland.'3The
evolution of Bulgaria's civil-militaryrelations largely followed the Czechoslovak-
East Germanpatternwith one importantdifference:afterthe economic slowdown of
the early 1980s the militarycould no longer count on the regime's generous equip-
ment procurementprogramsor maintainits living standards.Thus, the most telling
variationin East Europeancivil-militaryrelationswas the contrastbetween profes-
sional competence in Hungaryand Poland and political reliability in the other four
states as the most importantcriterionfor professionaladvancement.
To understandthe anomalous case of Poland it is importantto recognize that,
when GeneralWojciech Jaruzelskibecame the Polish United Workers'Party'slead-
er in 1980, he acted during a severe institutionalcrisis to preserve the Communist
party and regime and to save the countryfrom a potential Soviet invasion. In other
words, he acted as a Communist leader rather than as, an officer, as, in Amos
Perlmutter'swords, "the party in uniform."In the 1980s the party's rule was never
challenged by the militaryas an institution,although some governmentaland party
leaders had careersin the armedforces.14

24
 Zoltan Barany

The Reasons Why What factors account for the variety in the civil-military
relationsamong such seemingly similar East Europeanstates. There are two impor-
tant explanatoryvariables:the political orientationsof the East Europeanregimes,
and Soviet policy towardthem. Although Stalinistrule createdsimilarpolitical and
socioeconomic conditionsacross the region, the authorityof domestic elites expand-
ed after the mid 1950s when Moscow loosened its control. Thus, more reform-
friendly regimes were willing to probe the patience of the Kremlin by introducing
relatively liberal policies with more (Hungary and, periodically, Poland) or less
(Czechoslovakiain 1967-68) success, while conservative elites sought to maintain
and strengthentheir control over state and society (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,East
Germany,Romania).As for Soviet policy, the USSR allowed Hungarianelites more
domestic freedom because of the bloody and, from Moscow's perspective, embar-
rassing 1956 revolution,its confidence in the local leadership'sability to controlthe
population,and Hungary'slesser strategicimportancecomparedto the states of the
northerntier. In a like vein, one might argue that Romaniaand Bulgaria- both of
relatively minor military-strategicsignificance as indicated by the absence (in
Romania after 1958) of Soviet occupation troops - could have enjoyed a liberal-
ization trend similar to Hungary'shad their elites been favorablydisposed to it. In
contrast,the northerntier states were strategicallyfar too importantfor Moscow to
jeopardize its control over them by letting them experiment with Hungarian-type
liberal policies. Poland experiencedrelatively liberal periods (for example, most of
the 1970s) only because domestic elites were unable to prevent domestic crises (in
1956, 1970, 1976, 1980-81) and unwilling to repressentiresocial strataandbecause
the Soviet Union calculatedthata heavy-handedrepressionof Polandalong the lines
of Hungaryin 1956 might result in serious armedconflict.
The Hungarianand Romanian regimes suggest the two polar cases. Although
Hungary's political system was not democratic, by the mid 1960s it was quite
liberal compared to other East Europeanstates."5In contrast, soon after Nicolae
Ceausescu came to power in 1965, Romania became one of the most repressive
states in the region.'6While Hungarianpolitical elites startedexperimentingwith
economic reforms in the 1960s and pursued a policy of liberalization, their
Romanianpeers continued "to apply the classical Stalinist frameworkof military
mobilization"until December 1989.'7

The Military and the Transfer of Power in 1989 Ultimately, these differences
between regimes in their relations to their military establishmentstranslatedinto
sharp contrastsin the behavior of the armed forces during the transferof power.'8
The armed forces played the least active role in the transition in Hungary and
Poland, where the liberalizationprocess was gradual,civil-military relations were
"professionalized," and Communist elites gave up power voluntarily. The
Hungarianmilitaryremainedneutralthroughoutthe transferof power, and its lead-

25
ComparativePolitics October 1997

ers repeatedlystressedthatthey had no desire to interferein politics. Throughoutthe

transitionin Poland, startingduringthe summerof 1988, the army did not involve
itself in the political struggle that culminatedin the Polish United Workers' Party's
partialsurrenderof power to the Solidarity-ledgovernmentin August 1989.19
In contrast, the armed forces played an active role in the transition in
Czechoslovakia,Bulgaria,and Romania,where conservativeCommunistelites were
unpreparedfor the revolutionaryuproarof citizens and the "politicized"type of civil-
militaryrelationsprevailed.In Czechoslovakiathe partyresortedto the use of secu-
rity troopsagainstdemonstratorsin November 1989, while in Bulgariadefense min-
ister Dobri Dzhurovwas an importantparticipantin the cabal thatunseatedthe party
leader.20 The fall of the ancien regime was most sudden in Romania, where
the armedforces actually decided the fate of the revolution.Between December 17
and 21, 1989, the armycarriedout the militaryelite's ordersto fire on demonstrators
in Timisoara.After December 21, following a few days of vacillation among the
army's leadership,the Romanianarmedforces clearly sided with the populationand
fought successfully againstpro-CeausescuSecuritateunits until the end of the year.21
The East Europeantransfers of power suggest that the armed forces played a
smallerrole in the more gradualand the more carefullypreparedtransitions.In con-
trast to the more orthodox Communist states, the two relatively liberal regimes
maintained "professionalized"civil-military relations, tolerated the evolution of
some political opposition, and were willing to give up their rule. Although sudden
revolutions and "politicized" civil-military relations are not necessarily accom-
panied by militaryinterference,such conditionsoffer the armedforces betteroppor-
tunities to play an active role.

Democratizing Civil-Military Relations: Theoretical and Practical

Considerations

In order to understandthe reasons behind the different types of civil-military rela-

tions that have evolved in the East Europeanstates in the consolidationperiod, we
need to examine the imperativesand choices facing postcommunistelites in their
efforts to democratize civil-military relations and to explore the consequences of
these strategic options. The Iberianand Latin American states provide recent ex-
amples of postauthoritarian democratization.Still, I argue thatthe tasks confronting
East Europeanreformersin this respect are different.The main reason for this diver-
gence lies in the fundamentaldisparityin the political role the armedforces played
between Communistsystems, on the one hand, and praetorian(military-dominated)
polities on the other. Second, I contend that the establishment of parliamentary
(ratherthan presidential)regimes correlatespositively with the evolution of demo-
cratic civil-military relations. This argumentis groundedin what I consider to be

26
 Zoltan Barany

parliamentarysystems' more balancedpower-sharingarrangementamong the exec-

utive, the legislature,and top militaryauthorities.

Problems of Cross-Regional Comparison Notwithstanding some insightful

cross-regional comparative studies, disparities in socioeconomic and industrial
development, ethnic complexity, civil society, the internationalenvironment,and
other factors caution against hasty comparisons.22What are the fundamental
commonalities and disparities between civil-military relations in praetorianand
Communist systems? In both system types the military's institutional support is
indispensablefor the stability of the state. In orderto ensure armedforces' loyalty
the state rewardsprofessionalmilitarypersonnelwith privileges and above average
living standards,attemptsto elevate its social prestige,and, as a generalrule, invests
heavily in arms and defense-relatedprojects.
When comparing the militaries as political institutions, the most conspicuous
attributeof the armed forces in Iberia and Latin America has been their long-
standing political and socioeconomic involvement. In the praetoriansystems of
these regions militaryelites functionedalso as political elites: generals and colonels
served as state and government leaders whose political power was seldom chal-
lenged. Moreover, in many of these states the armed forces acquired controlling
positions over significantportionsof the economy, the media, the educationsystem,
and other social institutions. In contrast, while East EuropeanCommunist elites
customarilycoopted some high-rankingmilitaryofficers into state and partybureau-
cracies, the political role they were allowed to play was generally superficial and
episodic. Although a few members of the military elite were awarded important
political positions by the Communist Party leadership,these occurrences were in
nearly every instance extraordinary.In the unlikely event that a general gained
actualpolitical decision-makingpower (Polish partychief WojciechJaruzelskiis the
best example), he acted as a Communistleaderratherthan as an officer. In sum, the
party's role as the monopolist of political power was, for the most part, unques-
tioned.
These disparitiesin civil-militaryrelationsbetween Iberiaand Latin America, on
the one hand, and eastern Europe (and by extension Communiststates elsewhere),
on the other,suggest differencesin theirdemocratizationprocesses as well. In Iberia
and Latin America two distinct patterns have emerged: qualified military with-
drawalsfrom politics (for example, Argentina,Brazil, and Chile) and demilitarized
civilian regimes (for example, Colombia, Portugal,and Spain).23In sum, the main
task of Iberianand Latin American democratizershas been the demilitarizationof
politics along with the economy and social affairs,while in easternEuropethe chief
objective has been the depoliticizationof the military.Thus, the few examples of the
armed forces' successful democratizationin Iberiaand Latin America (Spain being
the most impressive) have only limited utility in easternEurope.24

27
ComparativePolitics October 1997

Consequently,the practical"guidelines"distilled from the experience of earlier

democratizationprocesses seldom provide much help to postcommunistleaders.25
Some of these guidelines (clarifying chains of command, reducing the size of the
armed forces, identifying and flattering the military) are eminently sensible, yet
othersclearly do not have much currencyin the East Europeancontext. For instance,
raising salaries and "giving toys" to armed forces personnel not only would not be
economically feasible but would entail unacceptablepolitical and social costs in
easternEurope. Similarly, reducingthe numberof soldiers in or aroundthe capital
cities and moving them "to the frontiers or other relatively distant and under-
populatedplaces"may be sound advice for reformersin postpraetorianstates but are
neither feasible nor practicalin easternEurope.26These recommendationsare based
on the experiences of countries emerging from military rule; most importantthey
suppose that militarycoups are likely to occur. These assumptionsare untenablein
the case of postcommuniststates.

Democratizing the Military: Objectives and Options The most important

Communistlegacies in the area of civil-military relations are not militaryrule and
recurringcoups but armed forces that were subordinatedto the Communist Party,
professional militarypersonnelheavily indoctrinatedwith Marxist-Leninistdogma,
and vaguely defined external and internal institutional functions for the armed
forces. Thus, the depoliticizationof the military requiredthe obliterationof party
mechanismsin the armedforces, the terminationof the main political administration
and abolitionof political officer positions, the eliminationof political indoctrination
from the curricula of military colleges, and the inculcation of armed forces
personnel with a democraticvalue system. Although at the time the ancien regime
collapsed the position of the armed forces in these states varied, the main tasks
everywherehave been to abolish and preventpartisanpolitical control of the armed
forces by legal-constitutionalmeans and to undertakethe military's internaldemoc-
ratization.
Successful democraticconsolidation has several military components. First, the
military must be placed under the authorityand supervision of the elected govern-
ment. Second, the chains of commandand areasof responsibilityof state institutions
and the militaryestablishmentover the armed forces must be unambiguouslycodi-
fied in the constitution. Third, the activities of political parties within the armed
forces must be terminatedand prohibited,and partisanpolitical activities by active
military personnel must be effectively proscribed.Fourth,the government's fiscal
responsibilityover defense expendituresand the executive branch's accountability
to the legislatureover militarymattersmust be established.Fifth, the militaryestab-
lishment itself must be democratized,with special attentionto inculcatingmilitary
personnelwith fundamentaldemocraticvalues. Finally, a pool of independentcivil-
ian experts should be createdto advise politicians on militaryand security issues.

28
 Zoltan Barany

Scores of other less critical albeit importantobjectives, such as the elaborationof

new defensive militarydoctrines,reformingof militaryeducationand training,and
enhancing of the prestige of the military profession, should also be attained.In an
ideal scenario these tasks would be accomplished while maintaining the armed
forces' defensive capabilities,avoiding the demoralizationof the officer corps and
the troops, and enlisting the supportof both the militaryand the electorate.
These goals can be accomplishedthroughdifferentmeans which affect the type
of postcommunistcivil-militaryrelationsthat are eventually instituted.The starting
point is the dichotomy of "objective"and "subjective"civilian control over the
military as outlined by Huntington.27 Objective civilian control is suitable only for
well-established democraticsystems where civilians can afford to minimize inter-
ference in the military's internalaffairs, thus recognizing a highly professionalized
and politically neutralinstitution.Due to politicians' reluctanceto accept the impar-
tiality of the officer corps as a given, objective control has seldom been established
even in western democracies.28Subjective control, on the other hand, signifies the
maximization of civilian influence and the reduction of the officers' sphere of
autonomousdecision making. In postcommunistsocieties where the militaryelite's
political neutralityis rarely beyond suspicion and the financial prerequisitesof the
armed forces' professionalizationare absent, institutingthis type of control is the
clear choice.
Still, advocacy of subjective control in East Europe settles little, for in the pre-
ceding era the rulers' objective was also maximization of civilian (Communist
Party)dominationover the military.The principaltask of postcommuniststates is to
remove the partyfrom the equationand substitutefor it the constitutionallyoutlined
authorityof the freely elected president, legislature, and government. A weighty
issue to consider, then, is what form of constitutionalframeworkis more favorable
to stable civilian control in particularand to democraticconsolidationin general.
The question whether a presidential or parliamentarysystem holds the most
promise for successful democraticconsolidation has become the focus of a lively
debate among students of democratization.29 Although there is considerable dis-
agreementconcerning the benefits and drawbacks of these constitutionalarrange-
ments, the majorityof scholarsagrees thata parliamentarysystem is betterequipped
to tackle the obstacles of democratic consolidation. In a recent study Stepan and
Skach argue that parliamentarysystems appearto foster democratizationmore than
presidentialones owing to the higher likelihood of majoritygovernments, greater
ability to rule, and lower tolerance for authoritarianpresidentialbehavior.30 In the
same vein, while civilian control over the military can be exerted in both a presi-
dentialand a parliamentarysystem, the latteris more likely to preventthe utilization
of the armedforces for the purposesof any one political actor.
An importantdecision facing democratizers,which is directly affected by the
presidential/parliamentary dilemma, is the manner in which political institutions

29
ComparativePolitics October 1997

exert their control over the military. Dividing civilian oversight responsibility
among president,government,and legislature(throughits specialized committees)
strengthensthe prospects of effective civilian control and reduces the likelihood of
abuses of power (thatis, utilizing the armedforces for partisanpurposes)by any one
of these institutions. In pure parliamentarysystems the president is generally
commander-in-chiefand has broadpowers in times of nationalemergency but does
not interferewith the day-to-dayrunningof the armedforces. The latterfunction is
executed by the defense minister, who is responsible to the government,which in
turn is accountableto parliament.In democracies, then, parliamentaryregimes are
essentially systems of mutualdependence,while presidentialregimes are systems of
mutual independence.3" Such independencedenotes expandedelbow room for both
the chief executive and the legislatureand may translateinto increasedopportunities
for authoritarianbehaviorfor both, but particularlyfor the president.
A similarly consequentialand related question is how the areas of authorityare
apportionedbetween the chief executive and the ministry of defense, on the one
hand,and between the defense ministerand the highest-rankingofficer, on the other.
Huntington'sstill useful typology distinguishesbetween threetypes: balanced,coor-
dinate, and vertical.3 In the balanced type the executive (president and/or
government)enjoys purely political functions, maintainingonly a general overview
of the military.Below the executive is the defense minister,a political figure respon-
sible for supervisingthe entire defense establishment.The highest-rankingofficer is
the top militaryadvisorto the minister.This type of institutionalarrangementis con-
ducive to the military's professionalizationand to civilian control. The coordinate
patternis characterizedby a division of militaryand administrativefunctionsimme-
diately below the executive level. This scheme tends to underminecivilian control
because the highest-rankingofficer has direct access to the executive and can easily
get involved in political issues. Finally, in the vertical design the civilian defense
minister and the highest-rankingofficer have the same duties, but administrative
personnel are responsible to the officer. In practice, the latter oversees the entire
defense establishmentbut is formally subordinatedto the defense minister and has
no direct access to the executive. This patternis also inconsistentwith stable civil-
ian control because of the immense authorityin the hands of the highest-ranking
officer. Anotherpossibility is what one might call the "modifiedvertical"scheme in
which the positions of defense ministerand highest-rankingofficer are filled by the
same person.This arrangementis even less conducive to civilian controlbecause of
his direct access to the executive and thus increasedpotentialto influence political
decisions.
Anotherless tangiblebut equally importanttask is the internaldemocratizationof
the armedforces. It is critical that the heavy doses of Communistpolitical indoctri-
nation that took up a significant part of military education in the old regime be
replacednot only with higher caliberprofessionaltraining,but also with instruction

30
 Zoltan Barany

for officers and soldiers in basic democraticvalues, on the assumption that, as in

stable democracies,the successful inculcationof militarypersonnelwith the funda-
mentals of a democraticvalue system will promotethe maintenanceof stable civil-
militaryrelationsand solid civilian control.33Just as important,the internaldemoc-
ratizationof the militarywill foster the developmentof democraticpractices in the
intrainstitutionalcontext and therebyboost the armed forces' morale, prestige, and
recruitmentprospects.
The relationship between the armed forces and society also needs to be
reassessed. With the exception of Polandand Romania,the militarylost much of its
formerprestige as an occupationin CommunisteasternEuropeas officers were gen-
erally despised as the servants of foreign (Soviet) and ideological (Communist)
ratherthannationalinterests.34The Polish and Romanianarmedforces were not per-
ceived as highly dependenton the Soviet Union. The traditionalanti-Russianstance
of and public respect for the militaryin Poland and Romania'snationalistdeviation
and perfunctorymembershipin the Warsaw Pact allowed them to maintain their
nationalistcredentials."3 In Romaniathe military'snationalcharactercame into play
duringthe revolution.Since 1989 all of these armedforces have become institution-
al trustees of national interests.Raising the profession's prestige, however, is con-
tingent upon attractingtop quality personnelto the militaryand realizing a number
of subjective conditions (for example, reputable instructors)as well as objective
ones (for example, financial resources).

The Military and Politics in the Consolidation Period

Since the transfersof power in 1989-1990, civil-military relations have followed

differentpathsof developmentin easternEuropeanstates. Clearly,a numberof vari-
ables (budgetary constraints,the military's weight on the government's political
agenda)has affected the natureof theirrelationswith the armedforces andthe extent
of the military's internaldemocratization.The most importantof these factors have
been the disposition of late Communist polities and their relations to the armed
forces and the strategicdecisions taken by the new regimes. More specifically, the
evidence gained from the experiencesof East Europeanstates supportsthe claim that
strong presidencies correlate negatively with stable and balanced civilian control
over the armedforces.
Althoughtherewere profounddifferencesbetween the East Europeanstatesunder
Communist rule, since the transition these polities have become even more dis-
similar.Disparitiesare particularlyapparentin their choices of constitutionalframe-
work.36 In Hungaryand Czechoslovakia(and following the break-upof the federa-
tion in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) pure parliamentarysystems were estab-
lished; the president retained largely symbolic powers."37In Bulgaria a parliamen-

31
ComparativePolitics October 1997

tary-presidentialframeworkhas emerged; it has broaderpresidentialpower than in

the parliamentarystates but relatively effective legislative constraintson presiden-
tial decision making. In Poland and Romania, however, presidentialsystems have
evolved, and the office of the chief executive has become powerful. These differ-
ences in presidentialpower have strongly affected civil-militaryrelations.
The individual states' choices of constitutional framework are explained by a
numberof primarilycountry-specificvariables. Perhapsthe most importantfactor
that contributedto the evolution of differentpolitical systems and, by extension, to
disparatepostcommunistcivil-military relations was the configurationof political
elites at the time of the transition.In Hungary several distinct factions within the
HungarianSocialist Workers'Partydivided over their differentvisions of the coun-
try's political future.38Furthermore, the democratic opposition succeeded in
organizinga numberof active groups which graduallyenteredthe political stage in
the late 1980s. During the roundtabletalks (June-September1989) and especially
following the 1990 elections these groups, together with the reform Communists,
succeeded in laying the foundationsof a political-institutionalstructurefavoring a
strong parliamentarysystem. While the transfer of power was concomitant with
roundtablenegotiations in both Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the political balance
between the participants,and thus the outcome, was different.In Czechoslovakiathe
emergingpolitical elites who determinedthe institutionalframework,dominatedby
the activists of several dissident groups, were similar to those in Hungary.At the
time of the transition the Bulgarian democratic opposition was relatively weak,
while the former Communistsmaintainedtheir strength.Bulgaria thus opted for a
compromiseparliamentary-presidential system.
In Romania, in contrast,Ceausescu's dictatorialrule preventedthe formationof
factions in the Romanian Communist Party, and extensive police terrormade the
development of any organized opposition to the regime all but impossible. In the
aftermathof the revolution,withouta credibleopposition,the membersof the "new"
political elite (nearlyall of whom enjoyed privileged positions at some point during
Ceausescu's reign) could develop a presidentialsystem favorableto themselves.39
Poland, too, developed a presidentialsystem, but for different reasons. It had by
far the strongest democraticopposition in the region. Poland's transitionpreceded
those of the other East Europeanstates by nearly a year, and Solidarityrepresenta-
tives had to make a numberof painful compromisesconcerningthe first multiparty
elections and presidential prerogatives in order to emerge from underground.
According to the 1989 agreement,Jaruzelskiwas to remain president with broad
powers. Although he resigned the next year, his successor, Lech Walesa, did not
give up these powers, and Polish legislators have not adopteda new constitutionto
define the extent of presidentialpowers and eliminate ambiguities.
These differences between the constitutional arrangementsof East European
states are also manifested in their relations with their armed forces. Hungary and

32
 Zoltan Barany

Romaniaagain appearto be the most disparatecases in the region. In orderto appre-

ciate the disparities in postcommunist civil-military relations between these two
states, let us consider three crucial aspects of this issue: civilian control, depoliti-
cization and democratization,and the armedforces' domestic political role.

Civilian Oversight Authority The Hungarianconstitutionwas amendedin 1990

to subordinatethe military to the constitution and the president. The president
became the commander-in-chiefof the armedforces, althoughhe is not to exercise
this prerogativein peacetime.The militaryis responsible,in descendingorder,to the
president, legislature, government, and minister of defense.40 The legislature,
through its defense committee, enjoys the most extensive control over the armed
forces. This committeedecides militarydoctrine,the place of the militarywithin the
frameworkof security policy, and the size and budget of the armed forces. The
government, as the superior policymaking body, transmits its decisions to the
ministryof defense and indirectlyto the armedforces.
In addition,a new defense council was created.Its activities are overseen by four
individuals:the president,the prime minister,the chairmanof the parliament,and
the head of the supremecourt. The Defense Law of 1993 drasticallyimprovedcon-
ditions for civilian controlby creatingthe structuralconditionsfor a "balanced"type
of civil-military relations.41 The law subordinates the highest-ranking military
officer directly to the minister of defense and clarifies other questions left open for
interpretation.The minister, who remains accountable to the government and its
head, oversees and has authorityover three state secretarieswithin the ministry of
defense who are responsiblefor political, administrative,and operationalfunctions.
(The state secretary for military operations is the commander of the Hungarian
army.)The 1993 law also eliminatesthe duplicationof functionsand clearly defines
areas of authorityand accountability.
Civilian control over the Romanian armed forces is quite different. As in
Hungary, the commander-in-chiefof the Romanian army is the president, who
chairs the supremenationaldefense council, whose membersinclude leaders of the
pertinentministriesand governmentalagencies but which has no legal-constitution-
al authority.42The legislature maintains four committees charged with defense
issues: one defense committeein each of the two chambersandjoint committees for
NATO and internalaffairs.Accordingto the Defense Law of January1991, the min-
istry of defense is the centralexecutive organ for defense. The minister is account-
able to the governmentfor all of the ministry's activities and, as a member of the
government,is also accountableto parliament.43
Ion Iliescu has used presidentialpower in a concerted effort to vest in himself
increasing authorityover defense issues and to obstructattemptsby parliamentary
committees to establish control over the military and the police.44PresidentIliescu
has tried to ensure that, as in the Communistperiod, the army's top priority will

33
ComparativePolitics October 1997

remain the protectionof the regime from its internalopponents. In fact, one of the
explicit objectives of the supreme national defense council when it was created in
December 1990 was to establish"cooperationbetween the defense and interiormin-
istries" for the "maintenanceand restoration of legal order."45 Furthermore,as
critics have charged,the council is a faithful continuationof the political executive
committeeof the RomanianCommunistParty's centralcommittee and directly con-
tradictsthe principleof separationof powers. As the chair of the council, the presi-
dent directly calls to order and controls governmentmembers who belong to it.46
Moreover,Iliescu has attemptedto establishhis own power base in the highest ech-
elons of the armedforces by directly interferingwith personnel mattersin the pro-
motion and retirementof generals.47It appearsthat many Romanianpoliticians steer
clear of the militarydue to theirfear of opposing Iliescu and otherswho alreadyhave
wrested control over it; no political party was preparedto supportanyone but an
active militaryofficer as defense ministerin orderto avoid political debates.48
Still, in March 1994 defense ministerGeneralNicolae Spiroiuwas replacedby a
civilian, Gheorghe Tinca, who had held a number of high-level positions in
Ceausescu's regime and was said to enjoy the full supportof PresidentIliescu. The
shuffle was explained by the need to satisfy "accepted internationalstandards,"
althoughopposition politicians have contendedthat it was the result of differences
of opinion between the presidentand General Spiroiuand have called for an inves-
tigation of Tinca's alleged ties to the Securitate.49In contrast to Hungary, the
Romanianlegislature'scontrolover the armedforces is clearly limited. Even though
deputies have the right of interpellation,the defense ministermay and occasionally
does refuse to answer their questions.50
The source of majordifferencesbetween the Hungarianand Romanianpracticeof
civilian control, then, may be found in the basic attributesof their systems." In
Hungarythe presidentenjoys only nominal powers over the military in peacetime,
while in Romania the chief executive is endowed with broad decision-making
powers. In contrast to Hungary's "balanced"pattern of civil-military relations,
Romaniahas implementeda "modifiedvertical"scheme.

Depoliticization and Democratization of the Armed Forces One of the most

urgent tasks of democratizing regimes is to depoliticize the armed forces. In
Hungarythis process was largely completed- the main political administrationand
Communist Party organizationswere disbanded, and political officers were dis-
missed or retrained- before Jozsef Antall's first postcommunistgovernmenttook
office in May 1990. For a numberof reasons, such as low social prestige and the
stigma of being associated with Communistpower, the overwhelming majority of
the armed forces welcomed the collapse of Communismand the military's subse-
quent depoliticization.52 Political activity may not be conductedin the armedforces,
and Hungarianmilitarypersonnelare not permittedto join parties.

34
 Zoltan Barany

Although defense minister Colonel General Victor Stanculescuannouncedfour

months after the revolution that the army's depoliticization was completed, the
Romaniansituationappearsto be markedlydifferent.53To be sure, on paperand on
the institutionallevel the Romanianarmyseems to supportStanculescu'sclaims. The
higher political council (the Romanianequivalent of the main political administra-
tion) and miliary party organizationswere abolished; political officers were dis-
missed, retired,or retrained;and the militarywas forbiddento develop links to any
political party.Actual practice,however, is quite anothermatter.Since 1989 the mil-
itaryhas at times played an importantand independentpolitical role, and significant
problemsarose duringits depoliticization.For several reasons,this process has been
resisted by a numberof political actors. In the Romaniancase the usual sources of
resentmentto depoliticization- generals,colonels, the corps of political officers-
are complementedby the continuedambiguityof the military'srole in the revolution
and the success of the political elite in stonewallingefforts to clearup the situation.
In Hungary the armed forces' intrainstitutionaldemocratizationcommenced in
1989. The most importantaspects of democratizationhave been the substantialrevi-
sion of the curriculaof militarycolleges and high schools and the opportunityfor an
increasingnumberof officers to attendwestern service academiesand universities.54
The objective of these changes in military education has been to inculcate profes-
sional personnel with western democraticvalues, more specifically, to familiarize
them with the armed forces' role in democraticsystems. In addition, a numberof
interestrepresentationorganizationscame to life within the armed forces (for con-
scripted and professional soldiers alike) whose legitimacy has been fully accepted
by the state.
The democratizationprocess in the Romanian armed forces has been less con-
vincing.55Although some officers have been able to take advantageof the opportu-
nities offered by traininginstitutionsabroad,the revision of curriculahas been more
sluggish. Furthermore,after a promising start the intramilitaryinterest representa-
tion organizations have been repressed. The most important was the Action
Committee for the Democratizationof the Army (CADA), an intramilitaryorgani-
zation formedby disenchantedofficers in February1990 and disbandedby the pres-
ident the following year.56Although CADA had several achievementsto its credit,
including the dismissal of defense minister General Nicolae Militaru in 1990, it
could not reach one of its major goals, a full-scale inquiry into the military's role
during the revolution. Junior officers have constituted the most vocal support for
depoliticizationand internaldemocratizationand have demandedan investigationof
their commanders,in some cases raising fears of insubordinationand institutional
paralysis."5The major obstacle to the efforts of both CADA and the large pool of
younger officers has been the uncooperative military and political elites. Their
demands have not materializedin large part because President Iliescu considered
them an "illegitimateand provocativechallenge."'8

35
ComparativePolitics October 1997

What factorsaccount for these disparities?First of all, due to the Romanianpres-

ident's influential position over the military he has been able to manipulate the
depoliticizationprocess primarilythroughdecisions affecting personnel and there-
fore the political allegiancesof the armedforces leadership.Second, the political and
militaryelites' refusalto investigatethe role of dozens of militaryleadersduringthe
revolution continues to sow seeds of distrust between junior and senior military
cadres, on the one hand, and between the military and the state, on the other. In
Hungary,in contrast,the balanced scheme of power sharingover the military does
not permit such interventions,and there are no unresolved issues from the past to
divide the armedforces.

The Military's Domestic Role In the postcommunistera the domestic functionof

the armed forces had to be redefined. In Hungary this issue was settled by the
Defense Law which prohibitedany role for the armedforces in domestic contingen-
cies with the exception of certainunits thatmight be utilized for the defense of build-
ings housing public offices such as parliamentand ministries.The use of the mili-
tary even in this case is strictly limited to instanceswhen these edifices are attacked
by armed force.59In contrast, the Romanian military has been utilized on several
occasions in domestic situationssince 1989. While the civilian leadershiphas been
quite willing to call on the armedforces to interferein domestic confrontations,the
entiremilitaryseems to be disinclinedto heed such calls. Still, the Romanianleader-
ship has sought "to include defense of the social order and the political leadership
against domestic challengers"as one of the army's legitimate tasks.60
With the decreasingpower of the security apparatusafter 1989 Romanianpoliti-
cal elites realized that the coercive authorityof the state had declined. To alter this
situation,the presidentintendedto rely on the militaryby assigning it the domestic
functionof defendingnot the constitutionalorder,but his regime. The armyhas thus
been used in a numberof domestic contingencies, albeit never violently. In March
1990, for instance, military units were deployed alongside the police in the
Transylvanian city of Tirgu Mures when violence broke out between ethnic
Romanians and Hungarians.Army troops controlled Victory Square in front of
government headquartersin central Bucharest during the two days of riots in
September1991 thatbroughtdown Petre Roman's government.61
Just as important,however, the military was not used in a large number of dis-
ruptivestrikes and instancesof civil unrestsince the revolution,probablydue to the
political leadership's fears that soldiers would have refused to actively interferein
these conflicts. Popularopinion has clearly come down on the side of the army's
political neutrality,and in a recentpoll only 19 percentof the respondentsapproved
the government's handling of public order.62At the same time, on a number of
occasions defense officials were forced to deny persistentbut unsubstantiatedalle-
gations about impending military coups and increasing military activism in poli-

36
 ZoltanBarany

tics.63Whateverthe meritsof these conjecturesand refutations,the Romanianarmed

forces are clearly in the strongestposition vis-A-vis the political leadershipin east-
ern Europe.64A recent article, entitled "The Army Is Intoxicated with Politics,"
quoted the declarationof the controversialmayor of Cluj, GheorgheFunar,that "the
army is ready to take power in case of political disorder."65
The Hungarianand Romanian cases demonstratethat, to a large extent, civil-
military relations in the democratizingEast Europeanstates depend on the party-
army nexus and the extent of political liberalizationin the late Communistera, as
well as on the choice of constitutionalframeworkand the division of civilian over-
sight authorityin the consolidationperiod.

The Regional Context A brief survey of civil-militaryrelations in the other East

Europeanstates supportsthe contention that Hungary and Romania representthe
polar cases during the consolidationprocess.66All of these countries, with the ex-
ception of Poland,have opted for some type of balanceddivision of civilian control
over the armed forces. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria presidents
enjoy only nominalpower over the armedforces in peacetime, althoughthey are the
commanders-in-chiefof their respective military establishments.67In these states
the presidents,governments,defense ministers,and highest-rankingmilitaryofficers
hold different,clearly delineatedresponsibilitiesthat preclude any one from taking
chargeof the armedforces.68In Poland,however, effective civilian oversightauthor-
ity has not been establishedthus far; in fact, the Polish and Romanianinstitutional
arrangementsof civilian control are quite similar.
Presidentialauthorityover the armed forces has not been clearly demarcatedin
Poland. According to the "little constitution,"passed by the legislaturein 1992, the
presidentis the head of the armedforces and is obliged to appointa supremecom-
manderin wartime.69The presidentalso has the power to dismiss the chief of the
general staff "in consultation"with the defense minister and to choose the deputy
chiefs of staff and othertop militaryofficials accordingto the "recommendation"of
the prime minister.In addition,the prime ministermust solicit the president'sopin-
ion before appointinga new defense minister(as well as the ministersof interiorand
foreign affairs).70A furtherweakness of this arrangementwas revealedin November
1995 when all threeministers- who indirectlyowed theirpositions to the president
- resigned following Lech Walesa's defeat in the presidential elections.7'These
ambiguitiesand faults in the constitutionalframeworkallowed PresidentWalesa to
exercise a great deal of influence over the military.In October 1994, for instance,he
asked defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk to step down, but the ministerrefused.
Walesa's actions encouragedwidespreadspeculation that he wanted to gain direct
control over the armed forces by concentratingpower in the hands of the general
staff, whose leadershe appointedand who were thus dependenton him.72
Depoliticization and democratizationhave progressed swiftly in all of the East-

37
ComparativePolitics October 1997

CentralEuropeanarmedforces. The institutionalizedties between the partiesand the

armies were dismantledby 1990 everywhere in the region although, not unexpect-
edly, senior officers were frequently critical of the consolidation process and
especially of efforts to depoliticize the armed forces. Officers who were unable to
commit themselves to the democraticpolitical orderwere dismissed. Nowhere has
the political cleansing gone fartherthan in the Czech Republic, where thousandsof
former officers suspected of procommunist leanings were discharged.73In the
Balkans,however, many militaryleadersactively opposed the depoliticizationof the
armed forces, especially in Bulgariawhere some of them insisted that Communist
dominationof the armedforces was the consequence"of a long historicalprocess."74
Although the democratizationof the Bulgarianmilitaryhas advancedconsiderably,
some credit is due to the Georgi Stoikov Rakovski Legion, an organization not
unlike CADA in Romania,whose predominantlyjunior officer membershave con-
sistently pressed the army leadershipfor professionalizationand for "overcoming
the legacy of politicization."I7
It is noteworthy that, aside from the Romanian military, none of the East
Europeanarmedforces have been called upon to act in domesticpolitical crises. One
componentfor the effective civilian controlof the armedforces that is still absent in
the region, however, is a corps of politically neutraland objective civilian expertsto
advise presidents, legislatures, and governmentson defense matters. Such special-
ists are in short supply because either military affairs and related subjects were not
taughtor only trustedmilitarycadres were allowed to study them. Since the transi-
tion hundredsof East Europeanofficers and a smallernumberof civilians have stud-
ied the military's role in democracies in the West, thereby fostering the armed
forces' democratizationand alleviating the dearthof civilian experts.76

Conclusion

This essay has argued,based on the East Europeanstates' experiences, that a grad-
ual, preparedtransitionallows for less political interferenceby the armedforces than
a suddencollapse of the ancien regime. Civil-militaryrelations,just like the regimes
themselves, varied in Communisteastern Europe, and their differences, along with
the strategicdecisions taken in the consolidationperiod, strongly affected the types
of civil-militaryrelationsthat have emerged in the period of democraticconsolida-
tion. Finally, the findings of this study supportthe argumentthat, at least in the con-
text of East Europeancivil-militaryrelations,parliamentarysystems are more con-
ducive to democraticconsolidationthanpresidentialones.
In spite of the substantialdifferencesbetween the types of civil-militaryrelations
that have evolved in eastern Europe a serious danger of praetorianismalong Latin
American-Iberianlines is absent from the region.77To be sure, particularlyin the

38
 Zoltan Barany

Balkans several social and political conditions that have customarily encouraged
praetorianismare present:low degree of social cohesion, a nonconsolidatedmiddle
class, low level of political institutionalization,weak political parties.78Still, not
only do most of these armies lack cohesion and a corporateidentity,but theirpoten-
tial interferencein politics would enjoy little popularsupport.
It might be instructiveto put the East Europeantransitionsin the broaderper-
spective of otherdemocratizingsystems when contemplatingtheir accomplishments
and shortcomings.After all, in all of Latin America only Mexico has thus far been
entirely successful in transformingthe relations between the state and the armed
forces.79In Iberia,too, Spain's successful postauthoritariantransitionto stable civil-
ian control over the military in a limited period of time must be contrastedwith
Portugal'sdelayed albeit no less convincing record.8" The time and difficulty it took
to establish stable democracies elsewhere put eastern Europe in a more favorable
light and underscorethe achievements of the region's states in transformingtheir
relationswith their militaryestablishments.

NOTES

I am gratefulto Gary P. Freeman,whose insightfulcomments and criticisms of the manuscriptat sev-

eral stages of its evolution have improvedit considerably,to the anonymouseditorand reviewers for their
thoughtfulsuggestions, and to LawrenceS. Grahamand LarryL. Watts for helping with the interviews.
1. For an exception, see Nancy Bermeo,"Surprise,Surprise:Lessons from 1989 and 1991,"in Nancy
Bermeo, ed., Liberalizationand Democratizationin the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 198-99.
2. AlthoughAlbaniais not consideredhere, it, too, was a Pactmemberfrom 1955 to 1968. 1 also will
not deal with postcommunist East Germany, whose army was absorbed into the West German
Bundeswehrfollowing reunificationin 1990.
3. See TimothyJ. Colton, "Perspectiveson Civil-MilitaryRelationsin the Soviet Union,"in Timothy
J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from
Brezhnevto Gorbachev(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990), p. 6.
4. See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the CommunistParty (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967); William E. Odom, "The Party-MilitaryConnection: A Critique,"in Dale R.
Herspringand Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-MilitaryRelations in CommunistSystems (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1978), pp. 27-52; and Timothy J. Colton, Commissarsand Commanders.:The Structureof Soviet
MilitaryPolitics (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1979).
5. See, for instance, Dale R. Herspringand Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political
Socialization in EasternEurope,"ArmedForces and Society, 3 (Winter 1977), 249-69; and JonathanR.
Adelman, ed., CommunistArmies in Politics (Boulder:Westview Press, 1982).
6. This point is developed in more detail in Zoltan Barany,Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe,
1945-90 (London:Macmillan, 1993), pp. 113-75.
7. For theoreticalanalyses of Communistcivil-militaryrelations, see Amos Perlmutterand William
M. LeoGrande,"The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist
Political Systems,"AmericanPolitical Science Review,76 (December 1982), 778-89; andZoltan Barany,
"Civil-MilitaryRelations in CommunistSystems: Western Models Revisited,"Journal of Political and
Military Sociology, 19 (Summer 1991), 75-100.

39
ComparativePolitics October 1997

8. See Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier
(Durham:Duke UniversityPress, 1982); and Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The WarsawPact and
the Issue of Reliability (Boulder:Westview Press, 1984).
9. See, for instance, William Crowther," 'Ceausescuism' and Civil-MilitaryRelations in Romania,"
ArmedForces and Society, 15 (Winter 1989), 207-25.
10. See, for instance, "Hadsereg es rendszervaltas"[Military and Transition] Mozgo Vilag, 19
(December 1993), 17-30.
11. See Zoltan Barany, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact," paper presented at the U.S. Air Force
IntelligenceConferenceon Soviet Affairs, Arlington,Virginia,October 19-22, 1988; and Zoltan Barany,
"MilitaryHigherEducationin Hungary,"ArmedForces and Society, 15 (Spring 1989), 371-89.
12. See Zoltan Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and
SoutheasternEurope,"Political Studies, 41 (December 1993), 594-610.
13. Thomas S. Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee,East European Military Reformafter the Cold War
(Santa Monica: Rand, 1995), pp. 8-10.
14. See Andrew A. Michta, Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Stanford:Hoover
InstitutionPress, 1990), chs. 6-9.
15. See an elegant definitionof the two concepts in Alfred Stepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 6. For an excellent study of
postrevolution Hungary, see Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform,
Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996).
16. For useful studies of Communist Romania, see Vlad Georgescu, ed., Romania: Forty Years
(1944-1984) (New York:Praeger,1984); and Daniel N. Nelson, RomanianPolitics in the CeausescuEra
(New York: GordonBreach, 1989).
17. Andrew C. Janos, "Social Science, Communism, and the Dynamics of Political Change," in
Bermeo, ed., Liberalizationand Democratization,p. 102.
18. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armies in the Transitions and Beyond," East European
Quarterly,26 (Spring 1992), 1-30.
19. See Jerzy Wiatr,Four Essays on East European Democratic Transformation(Warsaw: Scholar
Agency, 1992), pp. 65-66.
20. See Jan Obrman,"ChangingConditionsfor the Army and the Police," Report on Eastern Europe,
1 (January26, 1990), 14; and Bradley R. Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe
(New York: GreenwoodPress, 1992), p. 149.
21. For a detailed description, see Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (Westport:
Praeger, 1991).
22. See SarahMeiklejohnTerry,"ThinkingaboutPost-CommunistTransitions:How ComparableAre
They?," Slavic Review, 52 (Summer 1993), 333-37; Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be
Grounded?,"Slavic Review, 54 (Spring 1995), 111-27; and Valerie Bunce, "ComparingEast and South,"
Journal of Democracy, 6 (July 1995), 87-100.
23. See Alain Rouqui6, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987); and Jorge Zaverucha,"The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the
Spanish,Argentineand BrazilianTransitions,"Journal of Latin AmericanStudies, 25 (1993), 283-99.
24. See, for instance, Jose Antonio Olmeda, Las fuerzas armadas en el estado franquista (Madrid:
Ediciones El Arquero,1988); and Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Civilians,and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain
in ComparativePerspective (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
25. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late TwentiethCentury
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 251-53; and Augusto Varas, "Civil-Military
Relations in a DemocraticFramework,"in Louis W. Goodman,JoannaS. R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial,
eds., TheMilitaryand Democracy: TheFuture of Civil-MilitaryRelations in LatinAmerica (Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 199-218.

40
 Zoltan Barany

26. Huntington,The ThirdWave,p. 252.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1957), pp. 80-97.
28. Ibid., p. 85.
29. See, for instance, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992); Scott Mainwaring,"Presidentialism,Multipartism,and
Democracy," Comparative Political Studies, 26 (1993), 198-228; and Juan J. Linz and Arturo
Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: ComparativePerspectives (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
30. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "ConstitutionalFrameworksand Democratic Consolidation:
Parliamentarismversus Presidentialism,"WorldPolitics, 46 (October 1993), pp. 1-22.
31. Ibid.,p. 3.
32. Huntington,TheSoldier and the State, pp. 186-89.
33. Captain Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "When East Meets West: Fostering Democracy in
PostcommunistStates,"AirpowerJournal, 9 (special Edition 1995), 4-16.
34. See, for instance, Jerzy Wiatr, The Soldier and the Nation: The Role of the Military in Polish
Politics, 1918-1985 (Boulder:Westview Press, 1988).
35. See ibid.; and Alexander Alexiev, "Party-MilitaryRelations in Eastern Europe: The Case of
Romania,"in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats:
Civil-MilitaryRelations in Communistand Modernizing Societies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982),
pp. 199-231.
36. See A. E. Dick Howard, ed., ConstitutionMaking in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993).
37. See Stepanand Skach, "ConstitutionalFrameworks,"p. 4.
38. See George Schopflin, Rudolf L. Tokes, and Ivan Volgyes, "LeadershipChange and Crisis in
Hungary,"Problems of Communism,37 (September-October1988), 27-40.
39. On these issues, see J. F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism
(Durham:Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 94-105.
40. Magyar Hirlap (Budapest),May 12, 1993.
41. See A honvedelem negy eve, 1990-1994 [Four Years of National Defense] (Budapest: Zrinyi,
1994), pp. 38-47.
42. "New Law on SupremeDefense Council,"MonitorulOficial (Bucharest),Dec. 13, 1990, pp. 2-3,
translatedin Foreign Broadcast InformationService-EasternEurope (hereafterFBIS-EEU), Feb. 15,
1991, p. 44.
43. "Law on Ministryof National Defense," Viitorul(Bucharest),Jan. 19, 1991, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU,
Feb. 1, 1991, p. 43.
44. One case in point has been the repeatedrefusal of the head of police to appearbefore the parlia-
mentarycommittee on internalaffairs. Interviewwith Ina Bardan,Helsinki Watch/GrupulPentruDialog
Social, Bucharest,May 13, 1993.
45. MonitorulOficial al Romanei,Dec. 13, 1990, cited in LarryL. Watts,"TheRomanianArmy in the
December Revolution and Beyond," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Romania after Tyranny (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1992), p. 111.
46. See Victor Ianu, "The SupremeCouncil for the Country'sDefense," Dreptatea (Bucharest),Oct.
24, 1991, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU,Nov. 4, 1993, p. 23.
47. In May 1992, for instance, Iliescu assigned eleven generals to the reserves and promoted six
colonels to generals. See "Iliescu PromotesLoyal MilitaryOfficers,"RomaniaLibera (Bucharest),May
27, 1992, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU,June 1, 1992, p. 33.
48. Interviewwith LarryL. Watts, Projecton Ethnic Relations, Bucharest,May 31, 1993.
49. Reuterdispatch(Bucharest),Mar. 17, 1994.

41
ComparativePolitics October 1997

50. For instance,when Valentin Gabrielescu,secretarygeneral of the National PeasantPartyand vice

chairof the senate defense committeeasked Spiroiuabouthis ministry's intentionsconcerningequipment
modernizationin June 1993, he was told that "whatwe are doing is our business; it is a secret insofar as
parliamentis concerned."Interviewwith Gabrielescu,Bucharest,June 2, 1993.
51. For furtherempirical supportconcerning civilian control over the armed forces, consult the data
pertainingto changes in manpower,defense expenditure,and arsenalin TheMilitary Balance (London:
InternationalInstitutefor StrategicStudies, annual).
52. See Barany,Soldiers and Politics, pp. 119-22.
53. Rompres (Bucharest),0937 GMT, April 27, 1990. Two years later, defense minister Lieutenant
General Nicolae Spiroiu was forced to deny persistent rumors about the repoliticizationof the armed
forces. See Azi (Bucharest),May 7, 1992.
54. See Janos Szabo, "Hadsereges civil ellenorzes" [Army and Civilian Supervision], Tarsadalmi
Szemle, 50 (April 1995), 68-76.
55. See StephaneLefebvre,"Changesin the RomanianArmed Forces,"Jane 's Intelligence Review, 7
(January1995), 8-11.
56. See Watts, "The RomanianArmy,"pp. 99-105; and Baricada (Bucharest),Jan. 26, 1993, p. 26.
57. Watts, "The RomanianArmy,"p. 103.
58. Ibid., p. 105.
59. See Nepszabadsag (Budapest), Oct. 29, 1990; Magyar Nemzet (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1990; and
EndreSik, "The Vulture and the Calamity (Or, Why Were HungarianTax Drivers Able to Rebel?),"in
Janos Matyas Kovacs, ed., Transitionto Capitalism? The CommunistLegacy in Eastern Europe (New
Brunswick:Transaction,1994), pp. 275-89.
60. Watts, "The RomanianArmy,"p. 108.
61. See The Guardian, Sept. 27, 1991; and the articles from the Romanianpress translatedin FBIS-
EEU, Sept. 22, 1991, p. 33, Sept. 30, 1991, p. 24, and Oct. 9, 1991, p. 27.
62. Azi (Bucharest),Mar. 16, 1994.
63. See, for instance, CurierulNational (Bucharest),Sept. 19, 1991, in FBIS-EEU, Sept. 24, 1991, p.
22; Dreptatea (Bucharest),Sept. 2, 1992, in FBIS-EEU,Sept. 9, 1992, p. 24; Dimineata (Bucharest),Oct.
24-25, 1992, in FBIS-EEU,Nov. 4, 1992, p. 23; and Dan Ionescu, "The President,the Journalists,and
the KGB," Transition,1 (September8, 1995), 36, 39.
64. The same conclusion is reached by Dale R. Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations on Post-
CommunistEasternEurope:The Potential for Praetorianism,"Studies in ComparativeCommunism,25
(June 1992), 119.
65. Tineretulliber (Bucharest),Apr. 22, 1994.
66. For a comparativestudy, see Jeffrey Simon, CentralEuropeanCivil-MilitaryRelations and NATO
Expansion (Washington,D.C.: National Defense University, April 1995).
67. See, for instance, Valentin Alexandrow, "Entsowjetisierungund nationale Traditionen: Die
Militirreform in Bulgarien," Europdische Sicherheit (January 1993), 32-6; "Reformprozesse und
Demokratisierungsbestrebungen in der bulgarischenArmee,"Osteuropa,43 (April 1993), A213-24; and
Miroslav Purkrabek,"Social Problemsof the DemocraticTransformationof the HumanPotential in the
Czechoslovak Army,"Journal of Slavic MilitaryStudies, 6 (June 1993), 221-33.
68. A slight problem occurred in Slovakia where, following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the
Slovak armycommandwas set up before the new ministryof defense in Bratislava,therebycausing some
tension between the army and the ministry.Pravda (Bratislava),Apr. 2, 1994, p. 2, translatedin FBIS-
EEU, Apr. 8, 1994, p. 8.
69. AndrzejKorbonski,"ThePolish Militaryat a Time of Change,"RFE/RLResearch Report,3 (July
29, 1994) 18.
70. Ibid.
71. OMRI Daily Digest, no. 226, Nov. 20, 1995.

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72. "Militaryand SecurityNotes," Societies in Transition,15 (November 1994), 49. See also Jaroslaw
Drozd and Lech Kosciuk, "Die polnische Sicherheitspolitikzwischen Ost und West," in Hans-Joachim
Giessman and FrankS. Roediger, eds., MilitarischeNeuordnungin Mittel-Ost-Europa(Bremen:Edition
Temmen, 1994), pp. 60-72.
73. See Jan Obrman,"MilitaryReform in the Czech Republic,"RFE/RLResearch Report,2 (October
15, 1993), 37-38.
74. NarodnaArmiva(Sofia), Dec. 12, 1989.
75. Gitz, ArmedForces and Political Power, p. 150.
76. Ulrich, "WhenEast Meets West," pp 10-13.
77. Herspring,"Civil-MilitaryRelations,"pp. 121-22.
78. See Amos Perlmutter,"The PraetorianState and the PraetorianArmy: Toward a Taxonomy of
Civil-MilitaryRelations in Developing Polities," ComparativePolitics, 1 (April 1969), 385-91.
79. See Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
80. See, for instance, Lawrence S. Graham, The Portuguese Military and the State: Rethinking
Transitionsin Europe and Latin America (Boulder:Westview Press, 1993).

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