The Bloomsbury Companion To Socrates-Bloomsbury Academic (2013)

The Bloomsbury
Companion to Socrates
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Other volumes in the series of Bloomsbury Companions:
Aesthetics, edited by Anna Christina Ribeiro

Continental Philosophy, edited by John Mullarkey and Beth Lord
Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison
Ethics, edited by Christian Miller
Existentialism, edited by Jack Reynolds, Felicity Joseph and Ashley Woodward
Hobbes, edited by S.A. Lloyd
Hume, edited by Alan Bailey and Dan OBrien
Kant, edited by Gary Banham, Dennis Schulting and Nigel Hems
Leibniz, edited by Brendan Look
Locke, edited by S.-J. Savonious-Wroth, Paul Schuurman and Jonathan Walmsley
Metaphysics, edited by Robert W. Barnard and Neil A. Manson
Philosophical Logic, edited by Leon Horston and Richard Pettigrew
Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Max Kolbel
Philosophy of Mind, edited by James Garvey
Philosophy of Science, edited by Steven French and Juha Saatsi
Plato, edited by Gerald A. Press
Pragmatism, edited by Sami Pihlstrm
Spinoza, edited by Wiep van Bunge
Forthcoming in Philosophy:
Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson

Aquinas, edited by John Haldane and John OCallaghan
Aristotle, edited by Claudia Baracchi
Berkeley, edited by Bertil Belfrage and Richard Brook
Hegel, edited by Allegra de Laurentiis and Jeffrey Edwards
Heidegger, edited by Francois Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson
Phenomenological Philosophy, edited by Burt C. Hopkins and Claudio Majolino
Political Philosophy, edited by Andrew Fiala and Matt Matravers
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THE BLOOMSBURY
COMPANION TO SOCRATES
EDITED BY
John Bussanich
and
Nicholas D. Smith
L ON DON N E W DE L H I N E W Y OR K SY DN EY
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Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square 175 Fifth Avenue

London New York
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UK USA
www.bloomsbury.com
First published 2013
John Bussanich, Nicholas D. Smith and Contributors, 2013
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or
retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
The authors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work.
No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on

or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication
can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
EISBN: 978-1-4411-5729-4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Bloomsbury companion to Socrates / edited by John Bussanich and Nicholas D. Smith.
p. cm. (Bloomsbury companions)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-1-4411-1284-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4411-5729-4 (ebook
(pdf) : alk. paper) 1. Socrates. I. Bussanich, John. II. Smith, Nicholas D., 1949-
B317.B56 2012
183.2dc23
2012025682
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India
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CONTENTS
Preface vi
List of Abbreviations vii
List of Contributors ix
1. THE QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES 1

2. SOCRATIC IRONY 20
3. SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHIZING 34
4. SOCRATIC METAPHYSICS 68
5. SOCRATIC IGNORANCE AND TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE 94
6. THE PRIORITY OF DEFINITION 136
7. SOCRATIC EUDAIMONISM 156
8. SOCRATIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 185
9. SOCRATES ON LOVE 210
10. SOCRATES POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 233
11. SOCRATIC THEOLOGY AND PIETY 257
12. SOCRATES RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 276
13. THE POLITICS OF IMPIETY: WHY WAS SOCRATES PROSECUTED
BY THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY? 301
Notes 328
Bibliography 379
Index 407
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PREFACE
In this volume, we have tried to assemble a comprehensive guide to the main issues engaged
in the philosophy of Socrates primarily as presented in the early dialogues of Plato but with
attention also to Socratic thought in the writings of other ancient sources. We invited chapters
from scholars whose work we know and admire, and instructed each author to include in his
or her chapter a presentation and evaluation of the competing interpretations advanced in
recent scholarship on that topic. If authors also wished to present their own views, we encour-
aged them to do so. The result, however, is that the editors do not always agree with the posi-
tive views put forward in these chapters.
Gareth B. Matthews agreed to contribute a chapter to this book, but died before he was
able to complete it. We dedicate this book to him.
The Editors
John Bussanich
Nicholas D. Smith
vi
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Ag. Agamemnon Hp. Ma. Hippias Major

Aj. Ajax Hp. Mi . Hippias Minor
Alc. I Alcibiades Il. Illuminati
Andr. Andromache La. Laches
Ap. Platos Apology Lg. Laws/Leges
Apol. Xenophons Apology Ly. Lysis
Arist. Aristotle Math. Adversus Mathematicos
Ath. Pol. Athenaion Politeia Mem. Memorabilia
Av. Aves Men. Meno
Bacch. Bacchae Menex. Menexenus
Beller. Bellerophon Mor. Moralia
Bus. Busiris Nem. Nemean Odes
Chrm. Charmides Od. Odyssey
Cho. Choephoroi Oec. Oeconomicus
Confess. Confessions Ol. Olympian Odes
Cri. Crito Op. Opera et Dies
De consensu evangelist De consensu Per. Pericles
evangelistarum Phd. Phaedo
De E De Exilio Phdr. Phaedrus
De vera relig. De vera religiones Phil. Philoctetes
D. L. Diogenes Laertius Phlb. Philebus
Ep. Epistles Pol. Politics
Eth. Nic. Nicomachean Ethics Prm. Parmenides
Erx. Eryxias Prot. Protrepticus
Euthd. Euthydemus Prt. Protagoras
Euthphr. Euthyphro Pyth. Pythagoras
Familiar. rer. Epistolae Familiares R. I Republic Book I
Grg. Gorgias Rhet. Rhetoric
HF Hercules Furens Sept. Septum contra Thebas
HN Historia Naturalis Sph. Sophist
vii
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SSR Socratis et Socraticorum Tht. Theaetetus

Reliquiae Thuc. Thucydides
Strom. Stromata Ti. Timaeus
Symp. Platos Symposium Trach. Trachiniae
Sym. Xenophons Symposium Tro. Troades
Them. Themistocles Xen. Mem. Xenophons Memorabilia
Thg. Theages Xen. Xenophon
viii
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Hugh H. Benson William J. Prior

Oklahoma University Santa Clara University
USA USA
Thomas C. Brickhouse Mark Ralkowski

Lynchburg College George Washington University
USA USA
John Bussanich Naomi Reshotko

University of New Mexico Denver University
USA USA
Curtis N. Johnson Nicholas D. Smith

Lewis & Clark College Lewis & Clark College
USA USA
Keith McPartland Iakovos Vasiliou

Williams College City University of New York
USA USA
Mark L. McPherran Robin Waterfield

Simon Fraser University Independent scholar and writer
Canada Greece
Suzanne Obdrzalek David Wolfsdorf

Claremont McKenna College Temple University
USA USA
ix
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1
THE QUEST FOR THE
HISTORICAL SOCRATES*
INTRODUCTION hope of recovering some traces of the his-

torical Socrates.4
The Socratic Problem, as it has come to be Socrates was famous within Athens in
called, is a problem of literary archaeology: his own lifetime,5 and after his death in
the attempt to excavate the historical Socrates 399 BCE he became famous throughout
from the soil of those who wrote about him. the Greek world. He died by drinking the
The problem would not exist, therefore, if poison hemlock in prison, having been
Socrates had left any written remains him- found guilty by his fellow Athenians of the
self, or had consigned his thoughts to writ- capital crime of impiety. Shortly after his
ing at all.1 His silence could be romanticized death, a sub-genre of prose-writing emerged,
as distrust of the written word,2 or even as dubbed Skratikoi logoi by Aristotle (Poetics
an aspect of his ironic elusiveness, but it is 1447b13, Rhetoric 1417a21), in which the
closer to the mark to recall that in Socrates authors, often men who had known Socrates
day, even in relatively cultured and literate personally and held him to be their men-
Athens, it was very unusual to write ones tor or guru, showed Socrates conversing
thoughts down, for publication (see e.g. and arguing with others. We hear or know
W. V. Harris 1989: ch. 4). of such works by Aeschines of Sphettus,
Clearly, this is a fundamental issue for Alaxamenus of Teus, Antisthenes, Aristippus,
the study of Socrates.3 If there is no solu- Bryson, Cebes, Criton, Eucleides of Megara,
tion to the Socratic Problem, Socrates Glaucon (Platos brother), Phaedon, Plato,
is bound to remain forever invisible, or Simmias, Simon the Cobbler, Stilpon and
surrounded by scare quotes as Platos Xenophon.6 Not all the works that circu-
Socrates, Xenophons Socrates and so on. lated under the names of these people were
In this chapter, I shall suggest that the liter- authentic,7 but they were available. In a piece
ary archaeologists have been digging in the written only 10 years after Socrates trial,
wrong place. I shall argue that no solution Isocrates already mentioned a tradition of
to the Socratic Problem is to be found in the eulogistic and hostile writing (Busiris 46);
pages of those who wrote about him, but this probably consisted mainly of pamphlets,
that we need not therefore quite give up all such as the one written by Polycrates ca. 392,
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QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES
purporting to be a speech delivered by one These are the literary sources that have been
of Socrates prosecutors, and the one writ- mined for information about the historical
ten by Lysias in response to Polycrates, about Socrates, with the addition of Aristotles ref-
which we know nothing (Lysias frr. 2723, erences to Socrates, if we assume that, as a
457 Carey).8 Then, in later centuries, for cer- resident scholar in Platos Academy, Aristotle
tain of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, had access to privileged information about
notably the Stoics and the Sceptics, Socrates Socrates, which he then reported in his
became the archetypal sage.9 Meanwhile, writings.13
others made up speeches that either Socrates But the puzzles begin immediately.
or his prosecutors might have delivered at Aristophanes gives us a Socrates who was a
the trial; this became a standard exercise for teacher of atheistic science and the new rhet-
students at the schools of rhetoric (see Trapp oric, teaching select students for money; the
2007c: 53; Vander Waerdt 1993: 1516). Socratics give us an upright and pious citizen,
None of these speeches survives except a who spoke openly to all who cared to listen,
defence speech by Libanius of Antioch, writ- and took no money for it. For Polycrates,
ten 750 years after the actual trial.10 At some however, Socrates was a dangerous dissident.
point in the fourth century a biographical There is equally little agreement among the
tradition started as well (see Trapp 2007c: Socratics and the Peripatetics. The ancients
545). In short, Socrates shortly became, as never quite asked which, if any, of these
he has remained, the most famous philoso- various portraits was true to the historical
pher in the Western world, and a figurehead Socrates, but even if, in this sense, the Socratic
for philosophy. He is still probably the only Problem is a modern concern, we can see that
Western philosopher who can safely be called its seeds lie in ancient uncertainty about the
a household name. nature of Socrates.
Very little of this long tradition of writ-
ing about Socrates is still available to us, so
we do the best that we can. Obviously, if we
are going to search for the historical Socrates QUOT HOMINES, TOT SENTENTIAE
in the literary remains, we need to rely on
authors with privileged access to authen- The Socratic Problem, it has been said, is one
tic Socratic material. Since Socrates himself of the most difficult, but also one of the most
wrote nothing, the only relevant privilege is important problems in the history of ancient
that the authors should have been contem- philosophy (Patzer 1987b: 4). Hence it has
poraries or close contemporaries of Socrates. generated an enormous amount of writing,
In these categories, there are few possibilities. some of which (even in modern times) is
We have the complete Skratikoi logoi of two altogether worthless, a lot of it repetitious.
of his followers, Plato and Xenophon, and Even in 1913, Maier found the literature
we have a few fragments of other Socratics, on the subject horrendously voluminous
mostly from Aeschines of Sphettus.11 We (Maier 1913: 2),14 and scholars continued to
have traces of Polycrates pamphlet, and worry away throughout the twentieth cen-
the complete text of one of the two comic tury. A swift survey is instructive, to show
plays produced in 423 which prominently what kinds of views have been canvassed by
featured Socrates, Aristophanes Clouds.12 reputable scholars over the past 200 years

or so.15 What follows in this section scarcely argued that he was writing fiction (and that
scrapes the surface of published work on the Plato was too), and he became discredited
Socratic Problem, and draws on the most (Maier 1913; Robin 1910). When von Arnim
influential work from the beginning of the tried to restore Xenophons credibility in
nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth 1923, he was already fighting a losing bat-
century.16 tle. An influential claim by those who dis-
puted Xenophons reliability as a source was
ARISTOPHANES that he did not know Socrates particularly
well: he did not study with him for long, did
Clouds was held to be a reliable, if comic, not understand what he was studying and
portrait of Socrates (Kierkegaard 1842; derived his ideas from Plato anyway (Burnet
Svern 1826), or at least to be a reliable 1911; A. E. Taylor 1911b).
portrait of Socrates at an early phase of his
intellectual career, when he was interested in PLATO
natural science (Bckh 1838; Burnet 1911;
Rck 1912;17 A. E. Taylor 1911b), or to be no Qua a genius, Plato has been held to be too
more than a caricature of the new education, precocious to report Socrates accurately (A.
without anything to tell us about Socrates Dring 1895; Grote 1849) and clever enough
in particular, at any phase of his life, except to report Socrates accurately (the domi-
perhaps a few personalia, such as his poverty nant view: Burnet 1911; Maier 1913, etc.).
(Grote 1849; Schanz 1893). Certain traits of However, everyone agrees that Plato also
the historical Socrates were perceived here used Socrates to express his own opinions.
and there in the play, such as traces of his dia- Hence the view arose that even if in other
lectical method (Philippson 1932) or of his dialogues we cannot tell where Socrates ends
midwifery (Burnet 1914). Havelock (1934) and Plato begins, nevertheless in Apology he
held that the basis for the solution to the is reporting Socrates own words (suppos-
Socratic Problem was Platos Apology and edly verified by the fact that he was at the
anything in Clouds that was not contradicted trial [Ap. 34a, 38b], and would not have
by Platos Apology; Kierkegaard (1842) reported a public event such as the trial inac-
preferred the eclectic triad of Aristophanes, curately), and so we can build up a picture
Plato and Xenophon; Gomperz (1924) set- of the historical Socrates by adding from
tled for a combination of the comic Socrates, Platos works whatever is consistent with
Antisthenes and Xenophon, with a smatter- Apology (Horneffer 1922; Natorp 1894;
ing of Plato. Schleiermacher 1818, etc.). This renders
Socratic a group of Platos early dialogues
XENOPHON (Hermann 1839). Others, however, denied
the historicity of Apology (Ast 1816; Schanz
Strange though it may seem today, and 1893). Since almost everything in Xenophon
despite the influence of Schleiermacher,18 for and Aristotle comes from Plato anyway, he is
much of the nineteenth century Xenophon our only reliable source (Burnet 1911, 1914;
was held to be the best source for Socrates A. E. Taylor 1911b). These two Scottish
(e.g. A. Dring 1895; Hermann 1839; scholars were principally responsible for end-
Labriola 1871).19 But then Joel 1893/1901 ing Xenophons reign as chief Socratic source

in the English-speaking world, just as Robin MODERN SCHOLARSHIP

1910 did for the French, and Joel 1893/1901
for the Germans. The notorious excess of the GIGON AND VLASTOS
BurnetTaylor view, that everything Plato
attributed to Socrates is historically reliable This brief and unnuanced survey takes us up
biography, soon became toned down (e.g. by to about the middle of the last century. It is
Ross 1933; Tovar 1947), as scholars distin- a quagmire of more or less complete lack of
guished the early dialogues, as Socratic, from consensus, in which every possible position
the later dialogues, as Platonic. Socrates was has been argued for and against with great
denied the theory of Forms and so on, and vigour, by reputable scholars. Since then, the
became the ethical thinker with whom we flurry has somewhat died down, with fewer
are familiar today. positions being argued for, so that there is
greater consensus. Two scholars above all
ARISTOTLE were responsible for this: Olof Gigon and
Gregory Vlastos.
Aristotle refers to Socrates about fifty times In various publications, Gigon argued
in the extant works. He was regarded by Joel forcefully for a highly sceptical position: that
(1893/1901)20 as the most reliable witness, the Skratikoi logoi of Aeschines, Plato and
but others argued that most, if not all of his Xenophon are fiction, not biography (follow-
evidence derives from the early dialogues of ing Joel 1893/1901), and that all of Aristotles
Plato (Natorp 1894). Generally, he serves relevant references to Socrates are depend-
as an umpire (A. M. Adam 1918: 122) in ent on Plato (following A. E. Taylor 1911b).
what I shall call the eclectic view, pioneered Duprel (1922) had been equally sceptical,
by Schleiermacher: where the evidence of 25 years earlier, but had attached his scep-
Plato and Xenophon coincides, we may ticism to eccentric theses, above all that the
confidently assume that we catch a glimpse so-called Socratics were not Socratics at all,
of the historical Socrates; where Aristotles and were trying to disguise the fact that they
testimony coincides with that of Plato and were followers of the sophists. Gigons work
Xenophon, that point of testimony may be has been more influential just because he was
taken to be confirmed (A. M. Adam 1918; more rigorous than Duprel.
Deman 1942; Zeller 1875, etc.).21 The diffi- Gigon more or less ignored Aristophanes,
culty has always been to distinguish where or rather he assumed that as a comic poet his
Aristotle is talking about the historical value as a historical source was negligible.
Socrates, drawing on privileged information The most common position nowadays is that
circulating in the Academy, and where he is Aristophanes has nothing to offer our picture
drawing on Platos dialogues. Some thought of the historical Socrates except some per-
they could pinpoint grammatical devices sonalia (Dover 1971; Konstan 2011). It has
that would enable us to make such a dis- also been argued, however, that Aristophanes
tinction (Fitzgerald 1853;22 Natorp 1894;23 took steps to distinguish the real Socrates
Stenzel 1927), but there were always coun- from the character appearing in the play, to
ter-examples cases where the chosen device separate comic exaggeration from reality, so
was used to exactly the opposite effect (A. E. that we can find distinct traces of the histori-
Taylor 1911b). cal Socrates in the play (Erbse 1954;24 Gelzer

1956). Otherwise, various modest claims are the point of convergence reached by tracing
put forward to find this or that doctrinal or back to their shared source the beams of light
methodological trait of the historical Socrates differently refracted to us by his different
adumbrated within the play: his daimonion memorialists (Trapp 2007b: xix).26
or little inner voice (Edmunds 1985), a form The most influential and sophisticated
of practical irony (Edmunds 2004), the response to Gigon came from Vlastos, who
Socratic idea of care for the soul (Havelock claimed to have good, objective grounds for
1972), a resurrection of Philippsons view thinking that in his early dialogues Plato
that there are traces of Socratic argumenta- gave us a true portrait of the thought and
tive methodology or teaching methods in the character of the historical Socrates. Against
play (Gelzer 1956; Nussbaum 1980; Schmid the background of the stylometric work of
1948), a resurrection of the TaylorBurnet scholars such as Lutosawski (1897), which
hypothesis that Aristophanes was referring appeared to offer statistical support for the
to the Presocratic phase of Socrates intel- idea that contradictions within Platos evi-
lectual development (Vander Waerdt 1994b), dence could be taken as signs of develop-
some traces of Socratic Pythagoreanism ment rather than inconsistency,27 Vlastos
(Rashed 2009). Others, on the contrary, have came up with his Ten Theses ten more
nibbled away at these traces: H. Tarrant or less radical inconsistencies between the
(1988) demolished any attempt to find traces Socrates of Platos early dialogues, and the
of midwifery (as e.g. Schmid 1948: 21920), views put into Socrates mouth in later dia-
while Nussbaum (1985) politely did the same logues (Vlastos 1988, 1991: ch. 2).28 He dis-
for Edmunds (1985) on the daimonion. The missed Aristophanes, citing Dover 1971, and
consensus position is that either there are largely dismissed Xenophon too,29 though he
no such traces, or they are so slight as to be was brought in to confirm some points.30 But
irrelevant, and certainly not enough to affect Vlastoss chief umpire was Aristotle, used to
Dovers overall scepticism. confirm the picture of the historical Socrates
Where Aristotle and the Socratics are con- that we could derive from Platos early dia-
cerned, Gigons scepticism has either been logues. Thus Vlastos offers us a Plato-heavy
accepted (Chroust 1952, 1957), or, more com- version of the eclectic position:31 Platos evi-
monly,25 has been replaced by the comfortable dence in the early dialogues is paramount,
reasonableness of the eclectic position: where supported by Aristotle, and once in a while
the evidence of the Socratics coincides, and by Xenophon.
especially where it is supported by Aristotle, Among those who care about such things,32
there it is reasonable to find the histori- this has become the dominant, almost the
cal Socrates (de Vogel 1962; Guthrie 1969; universal position in SocraticPlatonic schol-
Lacey 1971; Navia 1987, 1993; Pleger 1996; arship. In practice, scholars either just defer
Rogers 1971; Rutherford, 1995, etc.). This to Vlastoss authority (e.g. Kraut 1984: ch. 1,
is often combined with the idea that Platos n. 1; Benson 2000: 910), or argue for the
Apology offers us a secure starting-point for position (Irwin 1995; C. C. W. Taylor 1998),
building up a reliable picture of the historical and not always along Vlastosian lines.33 But
Socrates (e.g. K. Dring 1981, 1992, 1998; it is more often taken for granted: count-
Kahn 1996). On the eclectic view, the his- less books and articles simply assume this
torical Socrates is, as Trapp has nicely put it, mix of Plato, seasoned with Aristotle and a

sprinkling of Xenophon, when they write a second author into account, so that they
about Socrates. This is especially the case can study Plato alone, who is admittedly the
when they are writing not as historians, but more exciting and philosophically stimulat-
as philosophers (see e.g. Santas 1979: x). ing writer. For instance, as we have already
seen, it is commonly said that Xenophon did
CRITICISM OF VLASTOS not study long with Socrates.35 This, given
as a reason to ignore him, and to focus on
The critical weakness of Vlastoss position will Plato, is absurd, since we have absolutely no
be evident to any clear-thinking reader from way of knowing how long Plato studied with
my summary: even if we accept Vlastoss Ten Socrates either.36 It seems to be just another
Theses, we are left with no more than differ- way of saying that Xenophon did not under-
ences between two portraits of Socrates, one stand Socrates; but this too is sheer prejudice,
composed by early Plato and the other later; and begs the question. Xenophon is said not
we have no reason for going on to say that to understand Socrates because what he says
the earlier portrait is a likeness of the histori- about Socrates differs from what Plato says,
cal Socrates.34 Vlastos was aware of this cir- when the very issue we are trying to resolve
cularity: having dismissed Aristophanes and in the first place is which of them, if either,
Xenophon, he was forced to rely for suppos- is to be trusted as a source for Socrates.
edly objective support on Aristotle, but this Besides, recent scholarship has demonstrated
is precarious: as has been argued time and the Socratic nature of much of Xenophons
again (A. E. Taylor 1911b; Kahn 1996, etc.), work; he does not make as much of a splash
there are extremely few, if any, points in the with it as Plato does, but Socratic principles
Aristotelian corpus where it makes sense to inform a great deal of his writing.37
think of Aristotle as an independent witness. The charge that Xenophon was simply
Besides, the critical point seems to me to be too unintelligent to understand Socrates is as
this (see Beversluis 1993: 2068): if we sup- old as Schleiermacher (1818: 56). Bertrand
pose that Aristotle did have access to sources Russell described him as a military man, not
of information about Socrates that were inde- very liberally endowed with brains, and on
pendent of Platos and Xenophons writings, the whole conventional (Russell 1946: 102).
who or what were these sources? They must This charge is, I suspect, usually just another
have been other Socratics, but then this begs question-begging way to say that he differs
the whole question, since the problem in the from Plato, but even if it were true (and
first place is that the Socratics depictions of Xenophons record as a prolific writer, and
Socrates are not consistent with one another. an innovator in several genres, tells against
In short, there is no way to treat Aristotle as it), it could equally well be used to the oppo-
either a reliable or an independent witness. site effect: precisely because Plato was a gen-
This is also the time to respond to another ius, and geniuses are more likely to have their
issue that has bedevilled work on Socrates, own agenda, Plato is less to be trusted than
especially in recent years under the influence Xenophon. Is it plausible that Plato would
of Vlastos the common downgrading and have spent a dozen or so years of his life as
dismissal of Xenophon. This is invariably a writer doing no more than reproducing
mere prejudice, and a way for scholars to Socrates thought?38 Arguing about the reli-
feel able to ignore the complexities of taking ability of the sources based on their supposed

intelligence seems almost childish; in any midway between oligarchy and democracy.40
case, it cuts both ways, leaving us exactly What the comic poets were perhaps getting
where we were before. at is that, although Socrates inherited con-
siderable wealth from his father (who was
rich enough to have connections with one of
the most noble houses in Athens), he was not
SOURCE CRITICISM interested in money-making.41 More likely,
they made Socrates poor because poverty
CLEARING THE GROUND: ARISTOPHANES was part of the picture of the archetypal phi-
losopher, with his head in the clouds and no
Surely, Dovers scepticism is justified. Enough interest in earthly matters: compare Thales
Old Comedy survives for us to be certain in the story at Plato, Theaetetus 174a. Old
of the rules of the game, and they did not Comedy has to be treated with caution even
include historical truth. Aristophanes job on personalia.
was to raise laughter, and he used Socrates We have no reason to think that Socrates
as a comically exaggerated figurehead for the ever taught anyone the rhetorical techniques
new scientific teaching (especially atheism) associated with Protagoras and others. There
and rhetorical teaching (especially persua- is slightly more reason to think that he had
sion as an end in itself).39 At Birds 1553 ff., an interest in Presocratic science, with its
Aristophanes portrays Socrates as a necro- concomitant atheism. Plato ascribes just
mancer, but no scholar that I know of has such an interest to him at Phaedo 97b ff.
shown an inclination to believe that picture. But even if Plato is to be trusted on this, he
Why, then, believe the other? Just because is talking about something Socrates stud-
it is painted on a larger canvas a full play ied briefly in his youth, in the early 440s,
rather than a few lines? perhaps, and then gave up. Why ever would
The most usual way Socrates is depicted Aristophanes have bothered to portray
by the Old Comedians who were his con- Socrates as he had been 25 years earlier?
temporaries is as an unkempt and unwashed Where is the satire in that?
begging-priest, leader of a New Thought It is a far more economical hypothesis to
cabal and constantly in search of sustenance. think that Aristophanes is not giving us the
But there is good reason to think that even historical Socrates at all. As for any other
Socrates poverty, which has come to be Socratic traits, such as his teaching method,
almost universally associated with him, is a I doubt their existence in the play. Of course,
fiction. He served as a hoplite in the Athenian there needs to be a whiff of the original in a
armed forces on several occasions (Pl., Ap. satire, if it is to be satire and not farce, but
28e; see also Symp. 219e ff., La. 181b), and the original in the case of Clouds was an
hoplites were not poor: they were required already familiar type, not a particular person.
to supply their own equipment, and hop- Aristophanes Socrates, as the most recent
lite was a social as much as a military term, commentator has concluded, was a com-
meaning roughly middle-class, and cover- pound figure . . . a stand-in for new currents
ing much the same broad range of incomes of critical thought generally (Konstan 2011:
and attitudes. Hence at Politics 1265b289, 867). In any case, even if it were possible to
Aristotle spoke of a hoplite constitution, find some traces of the historical Socrates in

the play, they would be incidental and acci- differences between a Heraclitean position
dental, combined with so much other non- and that of Socrates in the early dialogues.
sense, as Brown says, that it is impossible Most importantly, in the early dialogues
to believe Aristophanes cared if the overall Socrates reliance on the craft analogy shows
impression he gave of Socrates was com- that he felt that more certainty was attain-
pletely false (Brown 2007: 3). able in the material world than a Heraclitean
could ever maintain.
CLEARING THE GROUND: ARISTOTLE Grahams second point has to do with
the characterization of Socrates in the early
I have already indicated my scepticism about dialogues. It is easy to dislike the Socrates
the value of Aristotle as an independent wit- of these dialogues:43 He at least appears
ness. He never met Socrates, who died 15 unscrupulous in argument and sometimes
years before he was born, and 32 years before insincere in his moral posture; he willingly
he arrived in Athens. Almost all his refer- puts himself in embarrassing social situa-
ences to Socrates can be traced to passages in tions, occasionally playing the buffoon; and
Plato, and usually to the dialogues we think he enters indiscriminately into conversations
of as early or Socratic, as if Aristotle him- with all classes, ages, and types of people,
self were struggling to distinguish in a devel- treating all alike with deference. Plato, how-
opmentalist fashion Platos various uses of ever, believed, according to Graham, that
Socrates throughout his writing career. And There is no sense in taking philosophy to
even if there are any passages which derive the masses, and would wince at unscrupu-
from alternative sources, there is no reason lous argument. This Socrates, then, is not a
why we should trust those sources either. projection of Platos values, social prejudices,
Aristotle is, in any case, a notoriously unre- or lifestyle (Graham 1992: 18990, in Prior
liable historian of others ideas (see, most 1996).44 In that case, he may just possibly in
recently, Kahn 1996: 7987). some respects be the historical Socrates.
A single item of Aristotles testimony has, I do not find this second point of Grahams,
however, been resurrected, in the context about the characterization of Socrates, at all
of the Socratic Problem, in an important convincing. Platos Socrates may well in cer-
1992 article by Graham. At Metaphysics tain respects be obnoxious, but it does not in
987a29-b7, during a review of earlier think- the slightest follow that we are faced with the
ers, Aristotle reports that Cratylus was historical Socrates. The underlying point of
Platos first teacher, and that from him Plato Socrates occasional obnoxiousness is that all
absorbed a Heraclitean mistrust of the world kinds of methods may be required to prick
of perception.42 Aristotle goes on to distin- an interlocutors bubble of conceit, to hum-
guish this metaphysical and epistemological ble him until he is prepared to change his life.
position from Socrates tight focus on ethical The historical Socrates may have been like
matters. Now, if Plato early in his life that is, that, but Plato may just have been wanting to
before writing any dialogues was influenced portray such a teacher for his own purposes
by Heracliteanism, Graham says, he withheld because, for instance, in some proleptic sense
admitting to that Heracliteanism while he (see Kahn 1996: 66), the early dialogues are
was writing the early dialogues. For, Graham meant to clear the ground to make way for
claims, there are a number of irreconcilable the higher education of the later dialogues.

As for Grahams emphasis on Platos whereas in mimes even the characters were
Heracliteanism, distinct from Socrates fictional.
exclusive concern with ethical matters, there In Xenophons case his fictionalizing is
are in fact notable Heraclitean traits in the shown above all, paradoxically, by his con-
early dialogues:45 several passages of Hippias stant asseverations to the contrary: he often
Major (289bd, 290cd, 292e293) make claims to have been present at some Socratic
it clear that for Platos Socrates, while the conversation or other when he demonstra-
things of this world are relatively fine, or are bly was not.48 He says as much at the begin-
determined as fine by their contexts, fine- ning of Symposium, for instance, when this
ness itself is not liable to this kind of quali- work purports to record a symposium that
fication. Euthyphro 7e8a does the same for took place in 422, when Xenophon was per-
piety. And, in general, the Platonic Socrates haps 6 years old. Or again, Memorabilia 2.2
call for universally applicable definitions is a records a very personal conversation between
call for definitions that can never be gainsaid, Socrates and his son; it is hardly likely that
precisely because they pick out a universal the conversation waited for Xenophon to
that is not liable to the (Heraclitean) uncer- turn up with his notebook. In Memorabilia
tainty of the material world (see Allen 1970; he often tells us that he was present on the
Fronterotta 2007; Prior 2004). Grahams occasion: 1.3, 1.4, 1.6.1114, 2.4, 2.5, 4.3.
approach does not afford us a way to read We do not have to believe him once. This is
the Socrates of Platos early dialogues as the a device, used by other fiction-writers too,49
historical Socrates. Even on this final point, to reassure readers of the veracity of the
Aristotles testimony remains suspect. account, and so, even more frequently, he
tells us: I know that Socrates had the fol-
CLEARING THE GROUND: THE SKRATIKOI lowing conversation with so-and-so. The
LOGOI device is not dissimilar to that used by any
modern fiction-writer who chooses to write
It was Aristotle who invented the term a first-person narrative rather than using the
Skratikoi logoi (Poetics 1447b13), and the third person. When Xenophon left Athens in
context in which he introduced it is reveal- 401, he had no idea that he was not going
ing. He described them as the prose equiva- to return for 35 years or so, and could not
lents of the verse form mime, in the sense have foreseen Socrates trial and death. He
that both use language unaccompanied by did not spend his last days in Athens running
music. He also described both mimes and around all of Socrates friends and recording
Skratikoi logoi as imitative, which is his their conversations with Socrates. When he
term for fictional.46 Grays 1998 mono- came to write the Memorabilia, many years
graph on Memorabilia bears this out in later, he drew on the work of other Socratic
the case of Xenophons Socratica: they are writers and on his memory, and made up the
driven by rhetorical theory, and designed conversations to suit his purposes.
to present Socrates as an exemplar of unat- It is in fact generally acknowledged that
tainable wisdom, not as he really was.47 the Skratikoi logoi are a species of fiction,50
The main difference between mimes and and that the differences between the views
Skratikoi logoi was that the latter showed of Socrates we find in the Socratics tell us
historical characters in fictional settings, more about the authors than they do about

the historical Socrates. Hence, for instance, are both good and bad pleasures good
the common complaint that Xenophons pleasures being those that accompany moral,
Socrates talks about hunting and other inter- self-disciplined activity, bad pleasures the
ests of Xenophons, and the rarer realization opposite. Hedonism is attributed to Socrates
that Platos Socrates discusses matters close to by PKln 205 (see note 10). In response to the
Platos heart.51 Wolfsdorf (2004c) has shown question why he did not defend himself at his
that the character Socrates is put to many trial, Socrates replies that any man of intelli-
uses just in Platos early dialogues. The contra- gence will think that death is no less pleasant
dictions between the many Socrateses we find than life, and, besides, no one can come to any
in the pages of the Socratic writers is due to harm in Hades. His interlocutor replies that
the fact that each of them used Socrates as an while this answer may satisfy people such as
ideal and a cipher, for his own purposes (see themselves who take pleasure to be the goal
Gomperz 1924). This clearly goes for Plato, of life, what will Socrates say to those who
Xenophon and, as far as we can tell, Aeschines; seek a more noble goal? And there the frag-
I have no doubt that it would also go for any ment ends, to our frustration but, unless
other writer of Skratikoi logoi, if his work the passage is ironic, it is already hard to see
had survived.52 There was no Socratic school: how the position attributed to Socrates by
every follower was free to develop his own the interlocutor quite squares with the moral
ideas and to use Socrates to express those hedonism attributed to him by Xenophon,
ideas. This is why his followers could contra- and, possibly, by Plato in Protagoras. It seems
dict one another on points of doctrine while, a more general kind of hedonism.
presumably, claiming to be true Socratics. Then, among Socrates followers,
Fortunately, we are in a position to confirm Antisthenes appears to have been vio-
these generalities. We happen to know the lently anti-hedonistic. He comes close to
philosophical positions attributed to Socrates Xenophons Socrates when he says (in Xen.,
by various Socratics on pleasure. In Protagoras Smp. 4.39) that his asceticism affords him
(351b357e) Plato makes Socrates out to be greater pleasure than indulgence, but then he
a hedonist. Wherever the word good is used adds that he could wish that this were not
with human reference, pleasant could be so, since so much pleasure cannot be good
substituted, and wherever bad is used, dis- for one. Later sources report Antisthenes
tressful could be substituted. This looks like as claiming that only the pleasures of hard
out-and-out hedonism, but a less indiscrimi- work are worthwhile, or even that he would
nate kind is not ruled out, if we attribute to rather go mad than feel pleasure (SSR V A
Socrates the belief that a thinking man will 114, 11722). Meanwhile, Aristippus seems
always find that his true long-term pleasure to have held that avoidance of trouble of any
(as opposed to the short-term satisfaction kind is pleasant and is the goal of life.54
of desire favoured by Callicles in Gorgias) It has been held (by Waterfield 2004:
coincides with the practice and performance 923) that, rather than privilege just one of
of virtue.53 Socrates position in Protagoras these views and attribute it to the histori-
would then coincide with the moral hedon- cal Socrates, it might be possible to uncover
ism attributed by Xenophon to Socrates at a common, underlying core to them, and
Memorabilia 1.3.57, 1.6.410, 2.1.2133 attribute that original position to the his-
and 4.5. Xenophons Socrates says that there torical Socrates. On pleasure, for instance,
10

perhaps Socrates claimed that pleasure or Socratics portraits of Socrates than there are
its lack is a natural guideline as to what is similarities,58 and there is no a priori reason
beneficial for a person. The trouble is that to focus on the similarities rather than the
we do not have much more to go on than differences. Second, as we have now seen,
pleasure.55 The only point I want to make Aristotles testimony is unlikely to be inde-
now is that there is no conclusive reason why pendent and likely to be tendentious; but
we should privilege one of our authors over without Aristotle as umpire, it becomes very
another, and there is no conclusive reason hard to assert the historical validity of any-
why we should think that any of them was thing we read in the Socratics. Third, since
writing anything close to what we under- the Socratics were writing fiction, when one
stand as history or biography. of them echoes the other (and, as far as we
The claim that any of the Skratikoi logoi can tell, Platos texts were generally primary),
are biographical, in our sense of the word, it is more appropriate to talk of intertextual-
would make them quite remarkably unique: ity than of historical veracity.59
Momigliano demonstrated 40 years ago56 that
all early approximations to biography were CLEARING THE GROUND: PLATOS APOLOGY
utterly different from what we might expect,
particularly in their ignoring canons of his- I need to devote a separate section to Platos
torical truth. The whole purpose of biogra- Apology because it has often been held not
phy in the fourth century was to praise your to be a Skratikos logos, even by those such
subject (e.g. Xen., Agesilaus and Mem.) or as Kahn (1996) who fully accept the fictional
condemn him (e.g. Aristoxenus biography nature of the Skratikoi logoi in general
of Socrates), with little regard for historical (Kahn 1996: 889).60 Linguistically speak-
truth. Since scholars unanimously agree not ing, there seems to be no good reason for
to use Aristoxenus biography as a source this distinction: Aristotles use of the term
for the historical Socrates (see note 13), they does not license the translation dialogues
should extend the same lack of courtesy to the for logoi, thus excluding the Apology as a
Skratikoi logoi. There must be traces of the forensic speech.61 Skratikoi logoi are prose
historical Socrates in them, otherwise Socrates works (logoi) whose protagonist is Socrates
would not have been chosen as their protago- (Havelock 1983: 1546). Besides, if Platos
nist, but we lack grounds for identifying such Apology is to be privileged, so presumably is
traces, and in any case any authentic, historical Xenophons. What, then, are we supposed to
data that they might preserve about Socrates make of the contradictions between the two
are only incidental (Dorion 2011: 8). Apologies? They cannot both be telling the
The eclectic view, however, claims that historical truth.
we can discern some genuine characteristics Anyway, as we have seen, it has long
and teachings. Where the evidence of the been held that Platos Apology is the best
Socratics coincides, and especially where it is starting-point for uncovering the historical
backed up by Aristotle, we can be reasonably Socrates.62 Plato says that he attended the
certain that we have traces of the histori- trial (34a, 38b), which seems to guarantee his
cal Socrates.57 We are now in a position to accuracy, and in any case, since the trial was
see that this view is overly optimistic. First, a public event, his immediate audience would
there are far more differences between the recognize any inaccuracies. The idea, then, is
11

that whatever occurs in any other source that or two would have been required (as Schanz
concurs with theses and attitudes in Apology 1893 pointed out). If, on the other hand,
may be taken to be historically reliable. Platos purpose was merely to present the gist
I believe none of this.63 First, if Plato goes of Socrates defence (Brickhouse and Smith
out of his way (Vlastos 1991: 49) to let us 1989: 9; Kahn 1996: 88; Vlastos 1971b: 3), or
know that he was present at the trial, that even to have Socrates say what he should have
proves nothing. As we have seen, Xenophon said (Patzer 1987c), we have already moved
goes out of his way to say that he was present some distance from historical truth.
at a number of the Socratic conversations he Fourth, I think we can demonstrate the
records, even when it is easily demonstrable falsehood of Platos Apology. One of the
that he was not. We are faced here again with most memorable stories it contains is that of
the device wielded by the Socratics to give Chaerephons question to the Delphic oracle:
their fictions an air of verisimilitude; the only Is there anyone wiser than Socrates? (20e
difference is that Plato wields the device less ff.) It is a central, foundational story because
crudely than Xenophon. It is ridiculous (and it is supposed to explain the start of Socrates
another sign of anti-Xenophontic prejudice) mission: he did not understand how Apollo
to take Xenophon to task for his claim, while could declare him to be the wisest, so he set
accepting Platos.64 out to question reputed experts, to test the
Second, there are a number of a priori rea- gods claim. His mission and his character
sons for thinking Platos Apology fictional. (in the Platonic dialogues) are prefaced by
Its gently ironical and elaborately rhetorical the story. And the story has been specifi-
nature is one.65 Then again, it is replete with cally picked on by a number of scholars as
philosophy, when it is far more likely that securely historical.68
on the day Socrates did what all Athenian The story has internal plausibility. It
defendants did, which is to defend their char- would indeed have been a life-changing event
acter and their behaviour, not state points of to have the oracle at the most important
abstruse philosophy. And as Platos Apology sacred site in Greece publicly declare that
stands (and the same goes for Xenophons), it Socrates was the wisest man alive. It would
is hard to read it as a serious defence: it is too have been somewhat like the Pope declaring
defiant and boastful for that.66 Then there one a candidate for future sainthood; it could
is also the matter of the third, post-verdict well have impelled Socrates on his mission of
speech, and the cross-examination of Meletus, questioning people. The trouble is that there
both inventions of Plato and unparalleled in are excellent reasons for doubting the truth
ancient oratory.67 of the story,69 and given the unlikelihood of
Third, we know from the beginning of our ever having objective grounds for prov-
Xenophons Apology that a number of ing the fictional nature of either or both of
Apologies had already been written by the Platos and Xenophons Apologies, it is sig-
time he put pen to paper. Platos is surely one nificant that we can easily create a plausible
of those he refers to (Vander Waerdt 1993: case for their fictional nature.
1415; contra e.g. von Arnim 1923: 1113). If The question we need to ask is this: why
the point of these Apologies was to record the should Chaerephon have approached the
words of Socrates on the day of his trial in 399, oracle with his question in the first place? In
why were there so many? No more than one order for it to make sense to ask whether there
12

was anyone wiser than Socrates, Socrates a position to recognize that Platos descrip-
must already have had a reputation for wis- tion of Socrates mission was actually a clever
dom. He was never famous for anything way of outlining and introducing Platos own
other than questioning people to find out if mission. So Xenophon did the same: he used
they could define the moral and other con- the same story for the same purpose, and
cepts they claimed to work with; this enter- merely tweaked it to suit his mission. The
prise had started around 440 BCE (Pl., La. chief difference between the oracle story in
187d188a; see Stokes 1997: 53), and had Plato and the version in Xenophon is that
brought him notoriety by the end of the dec- in Xenophon the oracle states that there is
ade. But this is precisely the kind of question- no one more free, upright and prudent than
ing that, according to Plato, was supposed to Socrates. Xenophons mission was to make
have been triggered by the oracle, rather than Socrates out to be a paragon of conventional
going on beforehand. Another good reason virtue (and to explore what inner condi-
for supposing the oracle a fiction is that there tions are required for such virtue), and so his
is no other reference to it by Plato, or by any Socrates is free, upright, and prudent, rather
of the other Socratics (who would certainly than wise. Xenophon avoids mentioning
have made hay with it), or anywhere else in wisdom because its corollary was Socratic
extant Greek literature, except a mention in ignorance: Platos Socrates was wiser than
Xenophons Apology (14), which now begins anyone else because he was the only one who
to look decidedly derivative. It surely would was aware of his ignorance. But ignorance is
have been a famous tale. Instead we are asked not one of the traits of Xenophons Socrates,
to believe that it was kept secret for 30 years who spends most of his time advising others
or more, until Socrates revealed it at his trial. what to do. What we have, then, is an exqui-
What Plato was doing with this story is site case of intertextuality between the two
rather subtle. Throughout his life Plato wanted authors. Plato used the oracle story to estab-
to establish philosophy, as he understood it, lish his mission in writing, and Xenophon,
as the one valid form of higher education, recognizing that this is what Plato had done,
and in order to do so he used his writings did the same for his own mission.
to puncture the claims of rivals educators, This is a good demonstration of how inter-
poets, statesmen, orators and other experts textuality rather than biographical veracity
(see, in general, Nightingale 1995). So this was the name of the game for the writers of
is what Plato has his character Socrates do Skratikoi logoi. And if such a central tale is
in the early dialogues: question such experts untrue, we cannot trust the rest of the Apology,
and find them lacking. This was Platos mis- a great deal of which hinges on this story.
sion, and his Socrates was his agent for this
mission. But this is precisely the mission sum-
marized in Platos Apology in the oracle story.
Plato made up the story, then, as a way of A NEW FOUNDATION
introducing his own mission, the mission he
would assign to the character Socrates who IS SCEPTICISM THE ONLY OPTION?
was to appear in his works.
Since Xenophon knew Socrates, he knew The ground has been cleared. There is no way
that Platos Socrates was fictional. He was in we can trust any of our witnesses to Socrates
13

life and work, either singly or in conjunction. we know that he fought for Athens on a
Others, on reaching this point of the investi- number of occasions, served on the Council
gation, gave up in despair. Maier described and possibly as a dikast.72 But most impor-
the problem as insoluble; Joel aptly remarked tantly, we know that he was put on trial, and
that Socrates admission that he knew noth- what he was put on trial for. The trial is the
ing could properly be applied to the Socratic most secure historical fact of Socrates life,
problem (Maier 1913: 1; Joel, 1921: 731). De and must provide the foundation for any
Maghales-Vilhena concluded that we could solution to the Socratic Problem. It is the
not hope to discover the historical Socrates single most important fact about Socrates
but only to study the socratisme of those who life, and should determine what we think of
wrote about him.70 Gigon concluded that all Socrates as a historical figure.
we could safely know about Socrates were a
few historical facts; to try to know more, he SOCRATES TRIAL
said, was a waste of time (Gigon 1947: 64).
Prior (2006a) believes (somewhat like Maier At his trial in 399, Socrates was accused of
1913) that all we can know is the impression impiety, asebeia, a prosecutable offence under
Socrates personality made on those who Athenian law, and of passing his impiety on
wrote about him, but nothing about his phil- to the young men who formed his circle.
osophical views. There are two possible approaches to these
I do not believe that the sceptical position charges, depending on whether or not one
for which I have been arguing necessarily takes them at face value. Both views have a
leaves us in the slough of such despond. We long history of scholarly advocacy.73 The
just have to look elsewhere. Gigon acknowl- face value view comes in two forms. Either
edged that we were left with a few histori- (Ia) Socrates was accused of impiety and was
cal facts, but made nothing of them. In my indeed guilty as charged, by Athenian stand-
opinion, however, they offer a way to learn ards,74 or (Ib) Socrates was accused of impi-
something about the historical Socrates, ety but was innocent.75 The alternative view
and enough to assign him some philosophi- reads the charges as a covert way of accus-
cal views. The Socratics works may be fic- ing Socrates of being no true friend of the
tional, but they are fictional accounts of a democracy.76
person they knew and loved, and they must The idea that Socrates was guilty as
have reflected some aspects of their men- charged (Ia) is in fact hard to sustain.77 Plato
tors appearance, characteristics and teach- and Xenophon coincide in attributing to
ings (see also e.g. Erler 2006). The historical Socrates the notion that the gods were only
Socrates is at least the focus of his followers ever good, and in claiming that this belief led
myth-making. But if we are to stand a hope him to criticize the traditional tales about
of uncovering these genuine traits, we need a the gods, which showed them often behav-
solid foundation from which to work. There ing immorally.78 But Socrates was far from
is nothing more solid than a historical fact.71 alone in tweaking traditional tales; every
We know that Socrates was famous enough tragic playwright tampered with myths and
as a thinker in Athens to have attracted the legends for the purposes of the play he was
attention of the comic poets and later of the composing, and Euripides has characters
legal system; we know that he had students; voice very similar ideas to those of Socrates
14

(e.g. Heracles 13416; Iphigeneia among the and private rituals that preserved the gods
Taurians 38591). No one got prosecuted for favour. Since it was the duty of the demo-
this alone. These stories were not gospel to cratic executive to make sure that the city
ancient Greeks, and there is no ancient evi- prospered in all respects, it was the peoples
dence for supposing that his contemporaries job to punish cases of impiety. Piety, then,
were troubled by Socrates alleged ethical was a political notion, using the term politi-
transformation of the gods (Brickhouse and cal in the capacious Greek sense, to refer
Smith 1994a: 183). Socrates was unorthodox to the entire public life of the community
(far more so in Plato than in Xenophon), but (Cartledge 2000).
not impious (Waterfield 2009: 424; see also This is borne out by what we know of
M. Morgan 1990). other impiety trials in classical Athens: A
The critical question then becomes: why surprisingly high proportion of known impi-
was he charged with impiety? Here the two ety trials reveal, on examination, a surpris-
remaining lines of interpretation, the reli- ingly strong political agenda (Todd 1993:
gious and the political, radically differ. In 308; see the classic study by Derenne 1930).
favour of the religious view, Brickhouse And this is further corroborated by the tri-
and Smith argue that the point of Platos als, or suspicion, of intellectuals both earlier
Apology is to mount a more or less successful and later than Socrates. If any intellectual got
defence against the charges by showing how into trouble, he was accused of impiety, but
the prejudice arose that Socrates was guilty that happened only if he had made himself
of impiety. It arose out of the confusion of politically undesirable on other grounds.80
the historical Socrates with the Socrates of To repeat: impiety was recognizably a politi-
popular prejudice, especially as formed by cal charge.81
Aristophanes Clouds. Socrates was not that Against this idea it has been urged that, if
kind of New Thinker, nor was he a teacher the trial was politically motivated, the pros-
(and so a fortiori he did not corrupt anyone), ecutors would have come up with a more
nor was he impious. Moreover, Brickhouse overtly political charge. There seems even
and Smith claim (1994a: 173) that neither to have been a law on the statute books (so
Plato nor Xenophon, in their accounts of the to speak) allowing prosecution for political
trial, give the slightest hint that it might have subversiveness.82 So why did Anytus and his
been politically motivated.79 team not base their prosecution on this law?
There may have been whitewashing rea- The question is too black-and-white. There
sons for this, but, less speculatively, the pro- is no reason why the Athenians should not
ponents of the political view maintain that have had several instruments with which
the very charge of impiety already indicates they could eliminate political undesirables.
the political nature of the trial. The reason And the instrument that was appropriate
that impiety was a punishable offence under for Socrates, as for all other philosophers,
Athenian law is telling. The gods permeated was impiety, for the reasons we have already
all aspects of Athenian life, private and pub- seen: because it was easy for the prosecutors
lic. The gods would not abandon the city as to arouse the dikasts prejudices against phi-
long as the citizens, collectively and individu- losophers, sophists and scientists by claim-
ally, did not abandon them, and so it was ing that they were impious. The trial was
ones duty as a citizen to perform the public not simply either religious or political: it
15

was both at once. It is misguided to think, at in 3.7.8); and Euthydemus political aspi-
like I. F. Stone and others (Stone 1988: 139, rations (4.2.1) are the context within which
212), that the religious charge was a screen Socrates offers himself to the young man, the
for a politically motivated trial; the religious lover of Critias, as his teacher. At Memorabilia
charge was itself political. 1.6.15, Xenophon has Socrates describe him-
There is further evidence in favour of self quite generally as a political teacher.
the political interpretation. Above all, we The Platonic evidence is, at first sight,
have a direct statement to that effect. In 345 less decisive. On the one hand, in both First
BCE, 54 years after Socrates trial, the ora- Alcibiades and Theages the young men are
tor Aeschines said that the Athenian people encouraged by Socrates to think of him as a
had condemned Socrates for having been teacher who can help them fulfil their politi-
the teacher of Critias (Aeschines 1 [Against cal aspirations (First Alcibiades, 105bd,
Timarchus], 173).83 Critias was one of the Theages, 122e127a). On the other hand,
leaders, possibly even the ideologue, of the oli- Theages is probably, and First Alcibiades
garchic junta of thirty which was imposed on possibly, inauthentic;87 and in any case by
the Athenians by the Peloponnesian League the end of First Alcibiades the goalposts have
in 404 after defeat in the Peloponnesian War, shifted, and Socrates says that Alcibiades
and which in the space of a few weeks mur- needs not power, but virtue (135b), and
dered 1,500 Athenian citizens and metics, that this is what he will learn from him.
and banished many more.84 If Aeschines is Nevertheless, even if these two dialogues
right, then, Socrates was on trial because he were not written by Plato, they are contem-
was thought to pass on to his students, or poraneous, and they support Xenophons
alleged students, views that were inimical to testimony by showing that Socrates was
the democracy.85 remembered in the fourth century as a politi-
It would fly in the face of everything we cal teacher. In any case, the final emphasis in
read about Socrates to think that he was a First Alcibiades on virtue rather than politi-
political oligarch (Brickhouse and Smith cal power is insignificant if, as Woodruff has
1994a: 15566; Waterfield 2009: 17881). remarked (1993: 58): The virtue that con-
No one suggests that Socrates was conspir- cerned Socrates was primarily the virtue that
ing with any of his undesirable associates86 to political leaders ought to have.
establish an oligarchy, and in so far as they Consider also Republic 494ce: Socrates
occur as interlocutors in Platos dialogues, it will be taken to court by people who want to
is fair to point out that Socrates purpose in prevent him training talented young men (no
those dialogues is generally to refute his inter- one doubts that Alcibiades is on Platos mind;
locutors, not to agree with them (Brickhouse see e.g. the note of J. Adam 1902 on 494c) to
and Smith 1994a: 1703). But refutation is become philosopher-rulers. All this is curious,
not the only position Socrates takes in the or at least it flies in the face of the orthodox
Skratikoi logoi in relation to political unde- picture of Socrates as no more than a teacher
sirables: in Xenophons Memorabilia (3.7) we of individual ethics.88 Why was Socrates also
find Socrates advising Charmides to improve remembered as a political teacher? Plato
Athenian politics by taking part in democratic more than once has Socrates describe him-
political debates, despite his lack of sympathy self as a true politikos,89 each time clearly
for the democracy (which is perhaps hinted because he is a true teacher of virtue. This is
16

not surprising: the very nature of moral phi- and tied them up in sophistic knots to their
losophy in those days was political. Morality embarrassment and to the amusement of his
was not, or not just, an individual quest, a followers; he was a clever arguer and taught
personal struggle against opposing desires young men to be clever arguers; he mocked
and temptations. In Socrates day, the polis the lottery and despised the common people;
was taken to be the correct and only envi- the result of his influence can be seen in the
ronment for human moral flourishing; a conduct of Alcibiades and Critias; his denial
good polis created goodness in its citizens. that he is a teacher is nonsense because eve-
Everyone else assumed it, and political think- ryone believes that teachers of opinions (as
ers argued for it. Plato occupied himself in opposed to teachers of facts) are the sources
Republic with imagining an ideal state in of the students views.
which all members of society would be good The difficulty with placing much weight on
to the best of their abilities. For Aristotle, this is that, as noted above, neither Plato nor
education in moral goodness was a prod- Xenophon give us, on the face of it, a politi-
uct of the right constitutional environment, cally motivated trial. It has been argued, then,
and thorough ethical enquiry entailed also that Polycrates was in all likelihood the pri-
describing the state that would best allow its mary source of all of the ancient evidence for
citizens to find and retain goodness: hence there having been a political motive behind
(1179b ff.) his Politics is expressly a continu- the prosecution of Socrates (Brickhouse and
ation of his Nicomachean Ethics. Moral and Smith 1994a: 174 n. 85, referring prima-
political philosophy were inseparable. So rily to Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 845).
there is good evidence that Socrates students In other words, when Aeschines mentioned
took him to be, at least in part, a political that Socrates was accused of having been the
thinker and teacher, even if he was not pre- teacher of Critias, his source for the idea was
cisely an oligarch or a democrat. Polycrates; and when Xenophon responded
to the political charges of the accuser in
POLYCRATES Memorabilia 1.2.961, he was responding
entirely to Polycrates, not to any aspect of
On the face of it, strong support for the the actual trial.
political interpretation is afforded by the It is impossible to disprove this thesis, but
existence of Polycrates pamphlet, written it is not bound by iron and adamant. It is
just a few years after the trial. In so far as hard to believe that Polycrates, whom no
we can reconstruct it,90 he brought a raft of one regards as a first-rate author and whose
political accusations against Socrates: he pamphlet met with responses from Lysias
induced his followers to despise the laws and Theodectes (Lysias frr. 272a273, 457
and generally to disregard Athenian moral Carey; on Theodectes, Arist., Rhet. 1399a8
norms; he undermined family ties by imply- 10), two of the leading lights of Athenian
ing that traditional Athenian values were intellectual life, so influenced the tradition
worthless; he argued that the only true friend about Socrates that everyone unquestion-
was one who did you good, and that he did ingly accepted his version. Yet the later tradi-
more good than parents; he cited elitist poets tion accepted not only that Critias had been
with approbation; he bred arrogant, anti- Socrates pupil,91 but that he had been his
democratic young men; he accosted people pupil in political matters (Maximus of Tyre,
17

Philosophical Orations 1.9, 18.6), and that Socrates accepting students so that he can
this had been held against him in his trial train them to be future leaders of Athens,
(Aelius Aristides, On Rhetoric 2.335, and In and Platos evidence is not incompatible
Defence of the Four 434; Libanius, Socrates with the same idea. Second, both Plato and
Defence Speech 136; Lactantius, Divine Xenophon attribute to Socrates a number of
Institutions 3.19.25). political ideas (see note 85), which happen to
It is still plausible, then, to suggest that be decidedly undemocratic, as if he wanted
Polycrates was not entirely misrepresent- to remodel Athens not as an oligarchy, as
ing the trial, and that there was a political normally understood, but certainly not as a
element to the prosecution speeches. In any democracy either. The evidence suggests that
case, since both prosecutors and defendants Socrates wanted to see Athens become a true
in Athenian courts routinely slandered their aristocracy, where the best men ruled. They
opponents by bringing up every personal were to be as close as possible to morally
feature that could be used against them perfect themselves, so that they would know
(see e.g. Lanni 2005), it is hardly likely that what goodness was and how to bring it about
Socrates prosecutors would have passed up in their community; then they could create a
the opportunity to allude to Socrates rela- political environment within which all could
tionships with political undesirables. And flourish to the best of their abilities.93 If this
we need also to bear in mind that two of is true, it is not just the case that Socrates
Socrates three prosecutors were prominent could be made out by his prosecutors to have
democratic politicians.92 an undemocratic political agenda, but that
he actually did.
A POLITICAL SOCRATES?
There is circumstantial evidence, then, to sug-

gest that Socrates trial may have been politi- CONCLUSION
cally motivated, and that politically loaded
charges were brought against Socrates by his What I hope to have done in this chap-
prosecutors. The bringing of such charges ter is problematize the Socratic Problem.
does not in itself, of course, establish Socrates Solutions are always sought within the
guilt on this score; the prosecutors may just pages of Aristophanes, the Socratic writers
have been trying to find ways to persuade the and Aristotle, but there is no solution to be
dikasts. But both Plato and Xenophon from found there, and they are not the only places
time to time bring out the political aspect of to look. Given their intrinsic unreliability, it
Socrates teaching, and this makes it difficult makes sense to rely on evidence external to
to dismiss the political interpretation. We can the Skratikoi logoi, and, as we have seen,
now accept this vein of evidence. The exter- that external evidence makes it impossi-
nal evidence has given us a perspective from ble to rule out the political interpretation.
which to judge the evidence of the Skratikoi Aristophanes gives us Socrates the buffoon;
logoi and independent grounds for assessing Xenophons Socrates is a blameless sage; the
its worth. Socrates of Plato and Aristotle is a tireless
First, then, as we have seen, Xenophon moral questioner. I have argued that these
and other fourth-century writers show characterizations are at least misleading and
18

may be more or less complete fabrications. historical Socrates can then begin on this new
Other evidence, which I have argued is more foundation, by taking the few facts of which
credible, suggests that we need also to revise we can be certain, and accepting or rejecting
our picture of Socrates to allow for the pos- the evidence of the Socratics depending on
sibility that he was more politically engaged whether it is consistent or inconsistent with
than Platos and Xenophons Apologies these facts.
reveal, and that this was, in whole or in part,
the motivation for his trial. The quest for the Robin Waterfield
19

2
SOCRATIC IRONY*
PLAY IN PLATOS DIALOGUES it is clear that he is not saying something that

in any straightforward way seems to be a
When Socrates says he is the gods gift to joke or something intended to elicit laughter.
Athens or when he proposes that he be given Nevertheless, the question is Socrates serious
free meals for life at the Athenian peoples when he says such and such? is frequently
expense as an alternative to death in a sys- intelligible and in some instances, like those
tem where the jurors must choose the pro- above, seems mandatory.
posed penalty either of the prosecution or of The presence of this play let us delay
the defendant does he really mean it? After for a moment the issue of whether it ought
a long conversation in which his interlocutor, to be called irony in the dialogues means
Euthyphro, has shown little understanding that even those scholars who believe that
of the issues at hand and even less flexibil- Socrates really means everything he says
ity in the face of rational argument, Socrates (e.g. that he actually does not have the
claims that Euthyphro has cast him down knowledge he seeks, that he does want to be
from a great hope (15e) that Socrates would, Euthyphros pupil, that he is seriously pro-
at 70 years old, finally learn what piety is; posing free meals as his punishment in the
is he serious? When Socrates disavows hav- Apology and so on)1 must argue that this is
ing knowledge of what virtue is, after show- the case against the manifest appearance that
ing himself in dialogue after dialogue to be something funny, playful, unserious or ironic
clearly more sophisticated and understand- is going on. Contrast this with most, but by
ing than his interlocutors on this topic, is no means all, other philosophical writing.
he joking? The fact that questions like these No one wonders whether Aristotle is serious
occur to readers of Platos dialogues, whether when he says that the function of a human
they are reading them for the first time or being is rational activity or whether Kant
the fiftieth, is what leads scholars and ordi- means it when he argues that space and time
nary readers alike to think about the cluster are forms of sensuous intuition. The possibil-
of issues that are usually labelled Socratic ity of wondering whether Aristotle or Kant
irony. Even inexperienced readers of the is serious does not arise; there is almost no
Socratic dialogues at certain points inevita- space for that question to be intelligible. To
bly smile at what Socrates says, even though make sense of it, one would have to believe
20

SOCRATIC IRONY
that Kants or Aristotles writing is some sort irony.2 In addition there are various moments
of hoax, and there is simply no reason to of ominous foreshadowing in the dialogues,
think such a thing. such as the young Charmides reference
But there is plenty of space for questions to using force at the end of the eponymous
about seriousness and about meaning what dialogue (176c) to get what he wants from
one says in the philosophical writing of Plato. Socrates, when Platos readers would know
The question of Socratic irony gets its foot- well that he will eventually be one of the
hold against this background of play in the Thirty involved in the violent overthrow of
dialogues. No matter what ones position on the Athenian democracy. Consider too the
Socratic irony, its nature and so on, discus- weight of Callicles warnings to Socrates in
sion of it begins from the fact that questions the Gorgias, which so explicitly foreshadow
about play inevitably arise in the dialogues. Socrates eventual fate: For as it is, suppose
someone arrested you, or some other one of
your type [i.e. philosophers], and put you in
jail, claiming you were doing wrong when
VARIETIES OF PLATONIC AND you were not [ . . . ] youd go into court to face
SOCRATIC IRONY some very base and vile accuser, and youd
be put to death if he wanted the death pen-
All of the irony, of whatever type, that we alty for you (486ab). So, similar to Greek
claim to find in the dialogues is in one sense tragedy in which the audience is only too
Platonic insofar as Plato is, of course, the aware of what will happen while the char-
author. One type of irony is dramatic irony, acters themselves are not, dramatic irony is
which stems from situational irony. In situa- clearly part of how Plato has constructed the
tional irony there is some incongruity between dialogues, when he decides not only what the
a persons beliefs, attitudes, or actions and characters will say, but who will be present,
how things actually are: a parent who leads what the setting is, what the dramatic date
a crusade against teenage drug use, criticiz- will be and so on. These instances of dra-
ing other parents, teenagers and so on, while matic irony are entirely outside the fictional
her own children in fact use drugs. Dramatic world of the drama; even Socrates could not
irony is situational irony depicted in drama; be in on the irony at work. Since the focus
ancient tragedy is replete with examples. in this essay, however, is on Socratic irony, I
Dramatic irony depends on knowledge the will set aside the issue of dramatic irony in
audience possesses, not available from within the dialogues, since there is no sense in which
the drama. Plato too no doubt employs this it is Socratic.3
sort of irony at various points. Mark Gifford, Leo Strauss presents another interpretation
for example, argues persuasively that the of irony, not clearly distinguished as Platonic
historical fate of the interlocutors in Book I or Socratic (Strauss 1964). Influential among
of the Republic, Cephalus and Polemarchus his followers, Strauss sees a serious political
(the latter was killed by the Thirty), which purpose to Socrates irony.4 Socrates as Plato
would be well known to Platos readers/hear- depicts him is under political necessity to
ers, would make their proposed account of speak to two different audiences. On the one
justice as benefitting ones friends and harm- hand, he speaks to the many, who do not catch
ing ones enemies a bitter case of dramatic his irony, while on the other he speaks to the
21

SOCRATIC IRONY
philosophical few. Irony is a necessary device historical figure is unknowable, it may well
that the character Socrates uses in order to be that whatever verbal trope or tropes we
hide his genuine views not only from the peo- identify as Socratic irony from the dialogues
ple Socrates is depicted as speaking to within in fact has its origin entirely in Plato, and so,
the dialogues, but also to those readers of from this perspective, would more appro-
Platos dialogues who miss the irony, and so priately be called Platonic irony. The verbal
miss the key to the real doctrines that Plato irony labelled Socratic is called such because
espouses. The persuasiveness of this reading it is generated by the character Socrates. The
of Socratic and Platonic irony hinges largely questions about play that opened this chap-
on the persuasiveness of a reading of Platos ter arise in response to things that the charac-
dialogues according to which he has two sets ter Socrates says. For the rest of this chapter,
of views: one, the apparent doctrines the dia- then, Socratic irony will refer to whatever
logues seem to present, and a second set of verbal irony there is in the words of the char-
esoteric views that are accessible to those acter Socrates in Platos dialogues, under-
who have the keys. If one is convinced that standing of course that all of these words are
Platos writing works in this way, then irony the work of Plato himself.
may be seen as device that facilitates the cov-
ert nature of Platos actual project (see e.g.
Bloom 1968).
Another type of irony is more appropri- SOCRATIC IRONY AND EIRNEIA
ately identified as Socratic, however. Lowell
Edmunds argues that there is good evidence Turning more specifically to Socratic irony,
from Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon two issues arise, which are not always ade-
that the historical Socrates engaged in what quately distinguished: the first is the larger,
Edmunds calls practical irony (Edmunds philosophical one we have started to broach
2004). Practical irony is a matter of ones and to which I shall return: is there a species
manner and style. Socrates general hubristic of verbal play at work in the dialogues that
attitude, Edmunds argues, is part of his prac- ought to be labelled Socratic irony? If so,
tical irony or imposture. This is on display what is it, how does it work, and does it have
in Socrates shunning of convention, going any philosophical importance? The second
barefoot and so on. While practical irony has issue is a narrower, philological one: what
a better, and perhaps historically speaking, does the word eirneia mean in Plato? The
the best claim to be genuinely Socratic irony, Greek word eirneia is cognate with the Latin
I shall focus my attention on what tradition- word ironia, which in turn is the etymologi-
ally has most prominently been considered cal root of the English word irony. In Greek
Socratic irony: verbal irony expressed in there is also a verb, eirneuomai, which
what the character Socrates says in Platos means to engage in eirneia. An obvious
dialogues. question is whether eirneia means the same
One might still wonder why irony in the thing as irony. At first glance the answer
speech of the character Socrates in Platos is simple: no. Eirneia at the time of Plato
dialogues should be called Socratic irony. means something like shamming or feign-
Insofar as the relationship between the ing and implies deceit. Verbal irony, by con-
character Socrates in the dialogues and the trast, roughly involves saying the opposite of
22

SOCRATIC IRONY
what one literally means with no intention of it may be the case that in some of these situ-
deceit on the part of the speaker (though of ations we would want to describe the type of
course the hearer may miss the irony and so play at work as irony. If this turns out to be
turn out to be deceived).5 So, for example, the case, then Socratic irony may not be the
one may exchange looks with someone on same thing as Socratic eirneia, and Socrates
a street corner in the midst of a cold, windy may turn out to engage in one, the other, nei-
rainstorm and, as ones umbrella turns inside ther, or both.6
out, say, what lovely weather were having. Socrates remarks typically treated as
Understood in this way, irony is rather simple potentially ironic cluster around two dis-
and not clearly distinguishable from sarcasm; tinct themes.7 The first includes remarks
it serves to distance one from emotions that that seem to praise or, indeed, over-praise
are perhaps more negative and destructive by Socrates interlocutor. The second group is
making a joke of sorts. It can also, like sar- quite different; in these Socrates speaks in a
casm, be mocking when turned against peo- way that hearers find difficult to take at face
ple rather than impersonal phenomena like value, such as when Socrates disavows hav-
the weather; think of mocking calls in sports, ing knowledge of virtue. In many dialogues
such as great shot after a terrible miss, and Socrates disavows the knowledge that his
so on. interlocutor claims to have (we consider an
There is, then, the philological question of example below). To the reader, however, it
the evolution, if any, in meaning of the word seems apparent that Socrates, even if he does
eirneia. Two factors prompt interest in this not explicitly have the knowledge in ques-
question: first, the etymological connection tion, is nevertheless in charge of the argu-
between eirneia and irony; second, in the ment and in a considerably superior position
dialogues Socrates is explicitly accused of compared with his interlocutor. It has
engaging in eirneia by some of his interlocu- tempted many readers, then, to conclude that
tors (and even tells his audience at one point Socrates is merely ironic in his disavowal.8
that they will think he is speaking eirniks). Connected, philosophically and thematically,
So what is it that his interlocutors are accus- with the disavowal of knowledge is Socrates
ing him of? One might think that whatever profession of ignorance and his disavowal
that is, it must be what Socratic irony is. But of teaching (if teaching is the passing on of
that is not so. For it may be the case that, knowledge, and Socrates has no knowledge,
if eirneia does not mean the same thing then Socrates cannot be a teacher).9
as irony, there is one phenomenon being Before we continue, we need to raise a
described in the dialogues when Socrates is general worry about irony and its attribu-
called eirn, or speaks in a way that would tion to Socrates. On any account, to call
be called speaking eirniks, while he also some remark or claim ironic is to say that
engages in a distinct verbal behaviour that it is a form of play, in the sense discussed
involves in some way not meaning what he above. While different interpretations of ver-
literally says, and so is properly called irony. bal irony explain the details differently, they
This connects with the broader philosophical inevitably include some sense in which the
issue of the nature of play in the dialogues. claim is not entirely serious, or not literally
There are many points at which the serious- meant, or not to be taken at face value and
ness of what Socrates says becomes an issue; so forth. The methodological worry here is
23

SOCRATIC IRONY
a form of a slippery slope argument: if one voice: over the phone to a friend one might
statement of philosophical significance for say, Were having beautiful weather here in,
example, Socrates disavowal of knowl- as we say, an ironic tone of voice. The incon-
edge might be ironic, and so in some sense gruity between what is said and the tone of
not what Socrates really means, what is to voice in which it is said indicates that what is
stop all such statements as being ironic? said is not literally meant.
How can one construct a rigorous, textually To bring the point back to Plato, in order
based interpretation of Socratic or Platonic to claim that Socrates disavowal of knowl-
philosophy if the value of any passage one edge is ironic or ironic in some sense one
cites as evidence for attributing a view to must find textual evidence that indicates that
Socrates or Plato can be undermined merely Socrates does in fact have or have in some
by claiming that it is ironic?10 Since, how- sense the knowledge that he disavows.
ever, the dialogues themselves manifestly One cannot responsibly just take something
contain play, they induce in the reader the Socrates says that, for example, doing injus-
question of whether Socrates can be serious tice is worse than suffering it and declare
when he says the things he says. Thus, we that Socrates is being ironic, and so does not
cannot get out of the problem for exegesis really mean it. Rather, to make such a claim
that the possibility of irony poses simply by one must find textual evidence from actions
dismissing it altogether; for even if we want depicted or described, manifest results of the
to claim that Socrates in fact always means dialogue or other things Socrates says that
all and only what he says, we have to argue shows that Socrates thinks in fact that suf-
for this as well. fering injustice is worse than doing it. Of
What is needed to prevent an anything course presence of conflict, incongruity or
goes application of irony is some criteria even inconsistency is not by itself sufficient
for when attributing irony is textually jus- for irony: a person might just be inconsist-
tifiable. Calling a remark ironic in a textu- ent, sloppy or stupid. One must also have
ally justifiable way must involve a conflict reason for judging that one of the two items
or incongruity of some sort between the in the conflict is the truth, is the way things
straightforward meaning of the statement actually are, and one must believe that the
and some other remarks or manifest features speaker of the irony understands that. When
of the situation in question. When someone we see Socrates call an interlocutor very wise,
says what beautiful weather, this state- in order for this to be ironic, we need some
ment can only be understood to be ironic in textual evidence from the dialogue that the
contrast with some circumstance such as interlocutor is actually not wise and we must
a terrible downpour. If there is no evidence think that Socrates thinks this as well.
available for such a contrast, then there is no These methodological restrictions on irony
warrant for calling it ironic. In an actual con- will not only be important for determin-
versation, this can be done in a number of ing whether some remark or set of remarks
ways: sometimes the conflict between what might justifiably be considered ironic, it will
is said and what is happening will be obvi- also show how the significant concept of play
ous because, say, speaker and hearer are both affects distinct questions about the concept of
in the downpour. On other occasions, the eirneia. In brief, even if there is no warrant
conflict may have to be conveyed by tone of for calling Socrates disavowal of knowledge
24

SOCRATIC IRONY
ironic, precisely because, according to the such things perfectly (5a). Socrates then
methodology just outlined, there is no (or responds, in a remark often taken ironically,
inadequate) textual evidence that Socrates that it is most important that I become your
has the knowledge he disavows, that does student (5a, 5c).
not mean that there is no play at work in the This is a perfect moment for our study
disavowal, play that has led many readers because it seems to be one remark that
(and interlocutors) to think incorrectly that straddles both groups of ironic statements:
Socrates is being ironic. it apparently falsely praises and compli-
ments Euthyphro by putting him in the posi-
tion of teacher and also apparently implies
that Socrates lacks the knowledge of piety
IRONY IN THE EUTHYPHRO Euthyphro claims to have. We should note
here that if one had read no other Platonic
I shall consider the example of the Euthyphro dialogues (cf. La. 186cd), there would be no
in some detail to illustrate some main types reason yet to regard this as ironic. For most
of irony.11 Platos Euthyphro takes place in of us, who have read this and other dialogues
front of the administrative building where many times, it is difficult to recall such a
Socrates is answering his indictment on the state of innocence. But, if this were the third
charges for which he will soon be tried, con- page of Plato one had ever read, and one
victed and put to death. The charges against did not have any background information
Socrates, not believing in the gods of the city about Socrates or Euthyphro, at this point
and corrupting the young, are, essentially, one would simply have Euthyphro declar-
charges of impiety. When Socrates meets ing that he knows what piety is and Socrates
Euthyphro at the opening of the dialogue, doing two things in his claim that he ought
Euthyphro is engaged in prosecuting his own to be Euthyphros pupil: first, being deferen-
father for murder and justifies his doing so tial and flattering of the wisdom Euthyphro
on the grounds that not to prosecute him claims to possess, and, second, implying that
would be impious. As is not infrequent in the he does not possess this knowledge and so
dialogues, Socrates makes an inference from would happily learn it from Euthyphro.
a persons action to an avowal of knowledge. Socrates confirms the same combination of
Since Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for claims a couple of pages later (9b): if you
wrongdoing, he must know that doing so is demonstrate this [that your action is not
right/pious; otherwise, the assumption is, he impious via your knowledge of what piety
would hesitate in his action.12 As Socrates is] adequately, I will never ever stop praising
says: It is not, I think, any random person your wisdom.
who could do this [prosecute ones father] According to the methodology sketched
correctly, but surely one who is already far above, in order to justifiably interpret these
progressed in wisdom. When Socrates hears claims as ironic, they first must conflict with
the details of the case, which are complex, some other evidence from the text. We need
he again asks Euthyphro whether he has no to find some texts that show that Euthyphro
fear of acting wrongly in pursuing this ethi- does not have the wisdom that he claims
cally questionable action. Euthyphro boldly to and that Socrates could be expected to
avows knowledge in his reply: I know all understand this; they are not hard to find.
25

SOCRATIC IRONY
Over the course of the dialogue, Euthyphro the character Socrates realistically and con-
and Socrates attempt five accounts or defi- sistently within and across the dialogues.14
nitions of piety, none of which succeeds. The opening of the dialogue makes it
After the third definition, Euthyphro con- clear that Socrates and Euthyphro already
fesses to being at a loss and not able to put know each other; this is not the first time
into words what I understand (ho no) they have met and so, one might reasonably
(11b). By the end of the dialogue, after the assume, Socrates knows what kind of per-
fifth failed definition, and with Socrates son Euthyphro is.15 Moreover, Socrates is 70
wishing to try yet again, Euthyphro departs years old in this dialogue. If one has read the
without ever conceding that perhaps he other dialogues, one learns that Socrates is
doesnt know what he claims to know never depicted as finding someone else who
after all. Socrates final speech says that knows what virtue is, although he encoun-
Euthyphro has cast him down from a great ters several people who claim to know. In
hope (15e) to discover what piety is and so fact, at Meno 71c, Socrates explicitly says
from the hope that he would be cured of his that not only does he not know what virtue
ignorance (16a). is, but also that he has never met anyone who
What are we to make of all this? Even on does. Thus the textual evidence overwhelm-
ones first reading of the dialogue, one can- ingly supports the idea that when Socrates
not help but laugh at Socrates one feels first praises Euthyphros wisdom and wishes
like saying ironic lament in the final lines. to become his pupil, he is being ironic in
The manifest result of the dialogue is that some way; that is, he does not believe that
Euthyphro obviously does not know what Euthyphro actually possesses the knowledge
piety is and that he is too stubborn or vain he claims and so he does not really wish to be
or thick even to admit it.13 When one then Euthyphros pupil after all.
reads the dialogue a second time, it becomes According to most readers, then, Socrates
almost impossible not to see the remarks praise of Euthyphro is mockingly ironic; it is
about Socrates becoming Euthyphros pupil false praise. In fact, Socrates means the oppo-
and extolling Euthyphros wisdom from the site.16 I believe, however, that the nature of
opening of the work as also ironic in the the irony in Socrates ironic praising is more
form of a mocking type of praise (we will complex, instances of what I call conditional
consider this further just below). But, one irony (Vasiliou 1999). Conditional irony
might object, perhaps Plato put these words operates most frequently in the context of
into Socrates mouth as a joke to the reader, the interlocutors conceit of knowledge. As
but there is no reason to think that the char- we have seen, Socrates attributes knowledge
acter Socrates is being ironic when he says to an interlocutor in two ways: (1) by taking
these things. Maybe Socrates does believe the interlocutor at his word when he claims
that Euthyphro will teach him what piety is. to know (e.g. Euthphr. 5a); or (2) by acting
Of course, this interpretation will not work in a way that implies having knowledge (e.g.
for the final lines of the dialogue, for by then Euthyphro prosecuting his father or Meno
Socrates is in on Euthyphros utter failure and giving speeches about virtue at Men. 80b).
stubbornness just as much as the reader. But The assumption is that one would not act
it will not work for Socrates earlier remarks if one did not know what one was doing; it
either, on the assumption that Plato depicts makes little sense to prosecute someone for
26

SOCRATIC IRONY
impiety if you do not know what impiety is. knowledge he claims he does, makes it clear
Once we appreciate this, we can understand that Socrates is also being ironic. Conditional
many of Socrates remarks in which some sort irony has the complexity that Socrates is
of irony seems to be involved as resting on a understood to mean straightforwardly the
conditional, the antecedent of which is since/ conditional as a whole; the irony arises from
if you know what F is, then . . . So, when the fact that we believe that Socrates does
Socrates says that he would love to become not really believe the antecedent, which typi-
Euthyphros pupil in one sense he means cally ascribes knowledge to the interlocutor
just that: if Euthyphro knows what piety is, (if you teach me what piety is, I shall never
he would love to become Euthyphros pupil, cease to extol your wisdom). Contrast this
on the assumption that he genuinely lacks with a simple case of irony, like the what
knowledge.17 The irony at work, however, lovely weather example, in which there is
is that given that Socrates knows Euthyphro no sense in which the speaker means that
and given the outcome of the dialogue, we the weather is lovely. Moreover, there is
(not first-time) readers strongly suspect that nothing other than his own conceit prevent-
Socrates does not believe the antecedent of ing an interlocutor from catching Socrates
the conditional; he does not believe that conditional irony, although none actually
Euthyphro has the knowledge he claims to does. Conditional irony, then, is to be appre-
have. Given this, we see irony in Socrates ciated primarily by readers/hearers of the
remark because we correspondingly deny dialogue.18
that Socrates genuinely wants to be his pupil. Conditional irony is a technique that dove-
Conditional irony has the logical form of a tails nicely with some traditionally identified
simple fallacy: if a, then b; not-a; therefore, aspects of Socratic thought. Many readers
not-b. But we should remember how con- have maintained that part of the point of
ditionals most often work in conversation: Platos dialogues and Socrates own method
if you give me five dollars, then I will mow is to leave an interlocutor (and the reader) to
your lawn. Of course it does not logically fol- think for him or herself about the problem in
low that if you do not give me five dollars, I question. Conditional irony, where Socrates
will not mow your lawn, but this is the con- says what he means in one sense, leaves the
versational implication of such claims. If you interlocutor to grasp his lack of knowledge
know, you should speak up, but if you do not for himself. Sometimes this is at least partly
know, you should keep quiet. successful (e.g. Laches; see La. 194ab);
Near the end of the Euthyphro, when sometimes it is not (e.g. Euthyphro). Without
Socrates says that Euthyphro has cast him conditional irony, Socrates would have a
down from a great hope, we readers chuckle. more difficult time speaking the truth with-
But, according to conditional irony and not out alienating his interlocutor; he would run
simple mocking irony, Socrates in one sense more of a risk of his interlocutor leaving him.
means this, given the standing assump- The false praise that Socrates is able to offer
tion that Euthyphro knows what piety is genuinely in its conditional form makes it
standing until and unless Euthyphro himself possible for him to flatter interlocutors like
retracts it. The fact that this assumption is Hippias and Euthyphro, while still in a sense
now ridiculous, just as thinking that Socrates meaning just what he says, and so keep them
still believes that Euthyphro may have the in the conversation longer.
27

SOCRATIC IRONY
IRONY AND THE DISAVOWAL OF us how little we understand.22 Nehamas

KNOWLEDGE believes that Socrates irony conceals rather
than reveals: [Socrates] simply does not let
We have seen how mocking irony works in Alcibiades see clearly what he means when
the Euthyphro. But can we not also justifiably he responds to his proposition; he at least
interpret Socrates claim that he is ignorant suggests that what he says may not be what
about the nature of piety (thus justifying his he means. It is no wonder that, alone in the
further ironic claim that he ought to become middle of the night, the boy, on hearing
Euthyphros pupil) as itself ironic? Almost all Socrates words, joins him on the couch.
contemporary scholars believe that Socrates Socrates has not lied to Alcibiades. But he
is sincere in his disavowal of knowledge of has suggested that he has not quite meant
virtue, at least in some sense. While Socrates what he said. By being ironic, he has left his
is overwhelmingly consistent in disavowing meaning and intention concealed (Nehamas
knowledge, in a couple of celebrated instances 1998: 61).
he appears also to avow moral knowledge An advantage of Vlastoss understanding
(e.g. Ap. 29b). These instances, however, are of irony, however, comes to the fore when
rare, and appear to most inadequate to sup- Vlastos introduces complex irony irony in
port in any simple way an ironic reading of which Socrates in one sense means what he
the very frequent and substantial disavow- says but in another sense means the oppo-
als. For the disavowal of knowledge, unlike site of what he says. Vlastos takes Socrates
Socrates mocking praise of Euthyphros disavowal of knowledge to be a paradigm of
wisdom, we do not have a contrast group of complex irony.23 According to Vlastos when
remarks or actions that conflict with the dis- Socrates says I do not have knowledge, in
avowal; rather, Socrates almost always acts one sense of knowledge he means it: he
and speaks in ways consistent with it.19 disavows what Vlastos calls knowledge-c
Gregory Vlastos, who is largely responsi- (certain knowledge). At the same time,
ble for generating interest in Socratic irony however, since he is being ironic, he means
among Anglophone scholars of ancient the opposite in that he does claim to have
philosophy over the last 25 years,20 distin- what Vlastos calls knowledge-e (elenctic
guishes what he calls simple from com- knowledge). The advantage for Vlastos is
plex irony. In simple irony, Vlastos adopts that he has a way of interpreting the anoma-
the traditional meaning of irony: saying the lous passages in which Socrates avows moral
opposite of what is meant, without an inten- knowledge consistently with the much more
tion to deceive. Vlastos seems to think that numerous passages in which he disavows
saying the opposite (or perhaps contrary) of moral knowledge. The solution is simply
what one means is relatively straightforward. that when Socrates avows moral knowl-
For example, when Socrates tells Alcibiades edge he avows elenctic knowledge, while
that it looks as if you are not stupid in the when he disavows knowledge he disavows
Symposium, Vlastos reads him as ironic and certain knowledge.24 The primary problem
so meaning the opposite: that Alcibiades is with Vlastoss account is that the distinction
stupid.21 According to Alexander Nehamas, between the two types of knowledge seems
by contrast, the irony runs considerably to many scholars to lack adequate basis in
deeper and our appreciation of it only shows the texts.25
28

SOCRATIC IRONY
Although I do not have space to go involved in eirneia is also complicated. If

through the arguments in any detail, the someone starts telling tales that are rather
consensus, then, is that Socrates disavowal preposterous (think of Bob Dylans responses
of knowledge is not an object of his irony, to interviewers in the 1960s), the hearer can
contrary to what Vlastos claims. But at the start to get the idea that while the person is
same time, there remains a lingering sense not telling the truth neither is he straight-
that if the disavowals are simply straightfor- forwardly lying because what is being said
wardly meant, and there is no irony or play at is becoming increasingly implausible. If one
work, why would anyone need to argue that were straightforwardly lying he would invent
Socrates means just what he says? Why does a falsehood that has less chance of being dis-
it so much as occur to both ordinary readers covered. The phrase putting one on captures
and distinguished scholars that something the humorous aspect that eirneia sometimes
funny is going on when Socrates professes has that is not present with outright lying; it
ignorance and disavows knowledge? I am also captures its mocking tone. One is play-
not satisfied with the idea that once you have ing with someone and taking a superior pos-
determined that Socrates is serious about the ture/attitude when one puts someone else on;
disavowal, as I certainly agree that he is, you putting someone on can be a kind of teasing
have adequately dispelled any whiff of irony. once the hearer suspects that the speaker is
I think it is important that the disavowal and not speaking the truth.
other claims that Socrates sincerely means At several points in the dialogues, interloc-
(such as, that it is better to suffer than to utors explicitly accuse Socrates of engaging
do injustice) provoke perplexity in readers in eirneia. I do not, however, in fact think
and in Socrates interlocutors. Moreover, that Socrates ever clearly engages in eirneia.
I shall argue that they provoke perplexity Rather, what happens with some frequency
precisely by appearing to be instances of is that Socrates speaks in a way that appears
Socrates speaking eironiks. Here we will see to his interlocutor to be a case of speaking
the importance of distinguishing speaking eirniks. In these cases, without exception,
eironiks from speaking ironically. Socrates is saying what he actually believes,
Vlastos defends the philological thesis that but it is something that his interlocutors can-
with Platos depiction of Socrates the Greek not believe that he believes and so they accuse
word eirneia begins to mean irony rather him of putting them on. The disavowal of
than its earlier meaning of feigning or sham- knowledge and profession of ignorance fall
ming or, in my translation, putting one on. squarely in this category.
I think, however, that eirneia continues to Consider too the Gorgias (480b ff.) when
have the meaning of putting one on in Plato Socrates tells Polus that if you really wanted
as well.26 What I call reverse irony is identi- to help your friends, you would make sure
fied in part via an account of the meaning of they were punished for their injustices,
eirneia (Vasiliou 2002). Eirneia, as opposed whereas if you really wanted to harm your
to irony and similar to lying, carries with it enemies you would, quite literally, help them
the implication of shamming or deception. get away with murder. Of course this sounds
But, as I have tried to indicate via the trans- preposterous, and Callicles says as much,
lation putting one on, it is less straightfor- asking whether Socrates is serious or just
ward than an out and out lie.27 The deception playing (481bc). If we think about Socratic
29

SOCRATIC IRONY
ethics, however, we understand that Socrates The philosophical value of reverse irony
denies that there can be any greater harm to consists in being able to produce aporia,
a person than his doing injustice. To harm without having to go through an elenchus.
ones character, ones soul, is the worst sort Socrates simply states what he actually
of harm there is. By helping someone to do believes but can be confident because of the
injustice and not have to pay a just penalty complexity and unconventional nature of his
for it, you would be helping them to harm ethical views, that it will provoke his hearer
themselves, in Socrates view. So, knowing and generate perplexity just as he provokes
some Socratic philosophy, we understand Callicles into conversation, his jurors at
that Socrates literally means what he says to his trial and we modern readers who work
Polus. But, speaking frankly in this way, we to explain how he can actually mean what
can be confident that Socrates is aware that he says when he professes ignorance about
he will be perceived as speaking eirniks. virtue, maintains that everyone pursues the
I call this trope, this form of play, reverse good or holds that doing injustice is worse
irony because at the very moment when than suffering it.
Socrates is speaking most honestly, his inter-
locutor will (mistakenly) understand him as
putting him on. To be more accurate, this
trope should be called reverse eirneia, AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
since, as we have seen eirneia does not IRONY?
mean irony.28 Reverse irony is a device used
to induce that most Socratic of states: apo- G. R. F. Ferrari has recently argued that reli-
ria. While Socrates usual method for bring- ance on what virtually all interpreters of
ing about aporia in his interlocutor is via the Socratic and Platonic irony consider the tra-
elenchus, with reverse irony, by saying what ditional understanding of irony is a mistake.
he literally means but what will be taken by Rather than think that irony involves saying
his audience to be an instance of eirneia, he something contrary to or other than what
can induce that state which he, and certainly one means, irony centres on the concept of
Plato, took to be the starting point of phi- pretence. Ferrari endorses the pretence the-
losophy. It is the fact that Socrates disavows ory of irony:
knowledge in the face of manifestly appear- In general, then, to communicate ironically is
ing superior to his interlocutors that makes us to engage in a pretence before an audience
perplexed as to how he could possibly mean with the intention of eliciting a response
what he says. The same is true when he pro- from that audience by means of their recog-
poses at his trial free meals at the Athenians nition of two things: one, that the pretence
expense as his penalty (Ap. 36de). Once we would be in some way inappropriate if it
understand Socrates ethical outlook, we can were actual rather than just a pretence; and
see that he is serious about this,29 although the other, that the ironist intended them to
(as he well knows) his claim will strike his recognize this fact (Ferrari 2008: 6).
hearers as such an extreme instance of speak- According to the pretence theory of irony
ing eirniks that it will not just perplex but you bring off an irony by maintaining a
antagonize, as no doubt Socrates proposal pretence while some feature of the situa-
actually does. tion permits the inference that you are only
30

SOCRATIC IRONY
pretending (Ferrari 2008: 9). What is crucial (properly). But how does Ferrari know this is
to Socratic irony on the pretence theory is a pretence?30 It must be based on his assump-
not whether the statements he makes are in tion that there is an incongruity or conflict
fact true or false; they may or may not be. of some sort between what Socrates is say-
Ferrari (2008: 1112) considers a number ing or doing and some other situation, state-
of claims Socrates makes from early in the ment, or action and this is very close to the
Laches (186b ff.): that he never had a teacher standard meaning of irony and the meth-
of virtue, though he longed for one; that he odology for identifying irony we employed
was unable to afford such a teacher; that he above. Socrates claim that he does not have
is unable to discover the art of taking care of money to pay the Sophists is ironic, although
the soul or virtue himself; that he would not true, because it is really an unexpressed set of
be surprised if Laches and Nicias, who are conditionals: if he had money, he could have
older and have money, have indeed discov- paid the Sophists and bought knowledge of
ered this art, and so on. All that constitutes virtue. The assumption, which Socrates does
Socrates irony here, according to Ferrari, is not believe and which generates the irony,
that Socrates pretends that Laches, Nicias is that the Sophists have knowledge of vir-
and the Sophists who purport to teach care tue. As we saw above, this is typical of con-
of the soul are his superiors when in fact he ditional irony. It is only on this assumption
believes that they are merely less self-critical that his lack of money would explain his fail-
than he (2008: 11). Some of the things that ure to acquire knowledge of virtue. So, there
Socrates says are true that he has no money is nothing ironic at work in Socrates true
to pay sophists and some we have reason claim I have no money, the irony only arises
to think Socrates believes are false that if he in the context of this being put forward as
had had money to pay the sophists, he would the explanation for his lack of knowledge of
then know what virtue is but, according to virtue.
Ferrari, both these statements are neverthe- I do not see, therefore, how the pretence
less ironic because they abet the pretence theory of irony escapes having to make a
(2008: 12). judgement about what Socrates believes to
On Ferraris account, then, each ironic be true or false in order to detect irony in the
statement is equally a pretence a matter of first place; and, further, I do not know how
Socrates pretending and so we cannot use to make a judgement about what Socrates
the ironies themselves as evidence of the truth believes true or false other than by compar-
or falsity of the claims by which Socrates per- ing beliefs/statements/actions in one context
petrates the irony (2008: 12). Ferraris idea with those in another and noticing an incon-
seems to be that Socrates is engaging in the gruity, and then deciding which he takes to
overall pretence that he is seeking advice, so be true (see Vasiliou 1999: 4612; Griswold
that all of the claims he makes, those we think 2002: 88). One must do this, just as Ferrari
he believes are true and those that we think does when he says that Socrates irony con-
he believes are false, as well as those about sists in his pretending that Laches, Nicias and
which we are unclear, fall under the scope of the Sophists are his superiors, when in fact he
that pretence. More precisely, Socrates pre- believes that they are merely less self-critical
tence is the pretence that he is seeking advice than he. To my mind, then, either we must
from people he believes unable to provide it take Socrates at his word31 or, as I prefer, we
31

SOCRATIC IRONY
need to see that verbal irony is based on there suggests, is rather the image we should stay
being some conflict among statements, situ- with according to Ferrari. Insofar as Socrates
ations or actions, one side of which is taken never explains his irony he is a man alone,
to be true or the case. And so, I am sceptical ironizing by himself for himself. This makes
that attributing the pretence theory of irony assessing him and his character difficult
to Socrates marks as substantial a departure and makes his irony a type of concealment.
from orthodoxy as Ferrari claims. Ferrari argues that we are not in a position
I am similarly sceptical about Ferraris to know whether Socrates irony is part of a
next major claim that Socrates practices genuine love and concern for the betterment
what Ferrari calls solipsistic irony. Ferrari of his fellow Athenians or part and parcel of
begins by emphasizing the fact that interlocu- his aloof contempt for them and their own
tors mostly do not catch Socrates irony, and conceit. Socrates, practicing solipsistic irony
so, as he puts it, while there are many vic- and not communicative irony, does not count
tims of Socrates irony, there is no audience on his audience understanding it. In Ferraris
for it. The problem, as Ferrari sees it, stems example, it is like someone being ironic with
from a puzzle raised by Charles Griswold his dog or with an infant or with a senile
(2002: 989). It is a common premise that adult that is, someone who does not, and
most instances of Socratic irony are missed indeed in these examples, cannot catch the
by Socrates hearers. So for whom is Socrates irony.32
being ironic? Most commentators say for Ferraris point is not, as it may some-
Platos readers (cf. Nightingale 1995: 115 times seem to be, that the act of irony does
n. 60), and Griswold agrees, but calls atten- not require at least an imagined audience.33
tion to the impossibility of this: how can a Rather he is making the interesting point of
fictional character be speaking as though the thinking about a character who is aware that
fictional character intends to communicate his irony will be lost on his hearers. This is the
directly to the reader? The character Socrates way Plato presents Socrates, in Ferraris view.
cannot, as it were, know he is a character But, as with the traditional account of irony,
in dialogues written by Plato. But Socrates there is more to the ordinary view that the
acts, impossibly, as though he were address- irony is (primarily) for the readers of the dia-
ing Platos readers; Plato, of course, never logues to catch. While Ferrari and Griswold
breaks in and directly addresses his readers. are correct that the character Socrates can-
The worry raised by Griswold, then, is that not speak to an audience that is not within
Socrates ironizes to no one for no one; for the fiction, it is equally correct that Plato can
unheard irony is simply misunderstanding at put things in the mouth of Socrates for the
best, and outright deceit at worst. sake of his readers, just as he puts in elements
Ferrari argues to the contrary that this is of dramatic irony that are above the heads
precisely part of the profundity of Socrates of all the characters, including Socrates. So,
own irony: its solipsism. While Ferrari cer- even if Ferraris characterization of Socrates
tainly agrees that Plato makes Socrates speak solipsism is correct, it seems to me equally
ironically for the benefit of his readers, within clear that Plato wishes to rescue Socrates
the dialogue Socrates speaks ironically to no from this, to give his irony a chance to be
audience. Ironizing by oneself on a mountain- heard, to supply, in Ferraris words, a prop-
top, far from being impossible, as Griswold erly self-aware person whom the character
32

SOCRATIC IRONY
Socrates never gets to meet within the dia- Ferrari, appreciation of the presence and roles
logues: namely, Platos readers.34 of conditional and reverse irony enhances
our understanding of Socrates and the dia-
logues. In identifying conditional or reverse
irony, I only mean to indicate that these are
CONCLUSION two forms of irony at work in the dialogues.
Agreeing that they are at work does not com-
Having play as an operative concept can mit one to denying that there are other, more
help us to avoid the thought that there must subtle and perhaps more problematic and
be some one proper account of Socratic or destabilizing forms of irony at work as well.
Platonic irony. While not as sophisticated as
the irony attributed by Vlastos, Nehamas or Iakovos Vasiliou
33

3
SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHIZING
INTRODUCTION Brickhouse and Smith (1984a, 1991, 2002b),

Polansky (1985), Benson (1987, 1990b,
By Socratic philosophizing I understand 1995, 2002), Adams (1998), Tarrant (2002),
the manner in which the character Socrates Carpenter and Polansky (2002), McPherran
in Platos early dialogues engages in philos- (2002b, 2007), Wolfsdorf (2003), Forster
ophia. (Hereafter, I will refer to the char- (2006), Santana (2007, 2009).
acter Socrates in Platos Socratic dialogues The conclusion to this chapter comments
simply as Socrates. I will refer to the histori- on the prospects for further study of Socrates
cal Socrates as the historical Socrates. By method.
Platos early dialogues I mean to include:
Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus,
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major,
Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Republic THE SOCRATIC ELENCHUS
1, Protagoras.) Philosophia is the Greek
ancestor of our philosophy. Socrates under- Elenchus is a Latinization of the Greek elen-
stands philosophia to be the pursuit of ethi- chos, which often in its original context and
cal knowledge. Socrates principally pursues usually in the recent literature on Socrates
ethical knowledge with others, his interlocu- method means refutation. (I will use the
tors, and principally by engaging them in Latin form throughout this discussion, except
arguments. For convenience, I will refer to when the Greek form occurs in the title of
the manner in which Socrates pursues philos- articles or chapters, and despite the fact that
ophia as Socrates method or the Socratic a number of the most recent contributions
method. prefer the Greek form.) Accordingly, the elen-
Mainstream Anglophone scholarship on chus is conceived as an adversarial approach
Socrates method over the past quarter cen- to claims or to people. Thus Vlastos under-
tury has been galvanized by Gregory Vlastoss stood the Socratic elenchus; the word adver-
1983a article The Socratic Elenchus. My sarial is his. A basic question is whether the
review of this literature begins with Vlastoss elenchus, whatever precisely it is and how-
article and includes the following contri- ever precisely it operates, exhausts Socrates
butions: Kraut (1983), Vlastos (1983b), method. Whereas Vlastos identifies Socrates
34

method with the elenchus, many others hold dissolve the problem of the elenchus. This
that the elenchus is just one, albeit salient, is true for Vlastos (1983a), Kraut (1983),
method or means of Socratic philosophiz- Brickhouse and Smith (1984a), Polansky
ing. In fact, Tarrant argues that Socrates (1985), Benson (1987, 1990b, 1995), Adams
method is best characterized not as elen- (1998) and Santana (2007, 2009). Moreover,
chus but exetasis; and Wolfsdorf argues Brickhouse and Smith (1990, 2002b), Benson
that Socrates pursuit of ethical knowledge, (2002), Wolfsdorf (2003) and Forster (2006)
specifically knowledge of ethical definitions, all treat the issue to some extent. This issue
is cooperative rather than adversarial. Even also enters McPherrans (2007) discussion,
so, most scholarship has focused on the elen- albeit as a secondary theme.
chus; that is, most scholarship has focused In short, the bulk of the discussion of
on the means by which Socrates refutes his Socrates method in the last quarter century
interlocutors or their claims. But even given has been devoted to the elenchus and to the
this focus, Carpenter and Polansky have sug- problem of the elenchus.
gested that Socrates employs various forms of
elenctic argumentation, and Forsters discus-
sion suggests that Socrates employs at least
two forms of refutation: by exposing a thesis ORGANIZATION OF THE DISCUSSION
as self-contradictory and by other means. In
short, it is questionable how heterogeneous My discussion of the interpretations of
Socrates method is and in particular to what Socrates method of philosophizing will pro-
extent Socrates method is elenctic. ceed chronologically, from Vlastos (1983a)
Whether or not the elenchus is a uniform to Santana (2009). In this respect, the organi-
method of refutation, it is questionable pre- zation of the discussion in this chapter differs
cisely what Socrates endeavours to refute from the topical organizations of the other
in general or in any given instance. Vlastos chapters in this companion. My justifica-
maintains that Socrates tries to refute a given tion for proceeding in chronological order is
moral thesis that his interlocutor asserts. In that this approach preserves the integrity of
contrast, Benson argues that Socrates imme- the contributions as well as illustrates their
diate aim is to refute his interlocutors claim to dialectical engagement within this vein of
possess ethical knowledge and that Socrates scholarship. However, for those who would
does this by exposing inconsistency among appreciate some topical mapping of the ter-
a set of his interlocutors ethical beliefs. rain, I offer here a topical overview of the
Bensons position is a response to Vlastoss contributions.
and arises from the view that the elenchus Does Socrates have a single, uniform
actually cannot refute a given ethical thesis, approach to philosophizing? Vlastos (1983a)
but only expose inconsistency among a set claims that Socrates does and, more pre-
of beliefs. Indeed, Vlastos himself centrally cisely, that this approach is the elenchus.
raises this problem: how can the elenchus Again, Vlastos construes the elenchus as an
refute a thesis? Vlastos calls this the problem adversarial method whereby Socrates targets
of the elenchus. Most scholarship of the last his interlocutors moral thesis for refutation
quarter century has been devoted to solving, and by means of a single argument claims to
dissolving or criticizing attempts to solve or prove this thesis to be false.
35

Not all papers discussed here weigh in from the fact that they have survived
on the question of whether Socrates has a repeated elenctic testing. Forster argues that
single, uniform approach to philosophiz- Socrates shows that his interlocutors thesis
ing. Rather, a number of contributions focus is self-contradictory. Santana argues that the
more narrowly on the problem of the elen- premise set has more evidential weight than
chus to which Vlastoss account of Socratic the refuted thesis because both Socrates and
elenchus gives rise. Once again, the prob- his interlocutor agree to it, whereas only the
lem of the elenchus is the problem of how interlocutor maintains the refuted thesis.
Socrates can claim to have refuted his inter- On the other hand, some scholars variously
locutors thesis when it appears that all he reject Vlastoss view that Socrates approach
has done is shown the interlocutors thesis is to target his interlocutors theses for refu-
to be inconsistent with a premise set. Vlastos tation. For example, Benson (1987, 1990b)
(1983a) argues that Socrates holds a number argues that Socrates primary aim is to expose
of meta-elenctic theses on the basis of which inconsistency among his interlocutors ethi-
he can deploy the elenchus effectively. None cal beliefs and, assuming knowledge entails
of the other contributors accepts Vlastoss a consistent, topically relevant belief set,
attribution of all of the meta-elenctic theses thereby to undermine his interlocutors con-
to Socrates. Several early contributions focus ceit of knowledge. Likewise, Tarrant (2002)
on arguing that Socrates does not or cannot maintains that Socrates aims to expose incon-
hold some of these theses (Brickhouse and sistency and thus lack of knowledge in his
Smith 1984a; Kraut 1983; Polansky 1985). interlocutor, but he emphasizes that Socrates
Indeed, in the wake of Krauts criticisms, intent is to aid and encourage his interlocu-
Vlastos (1983b) himself concedes that his tors pursuit of knowledge. Wolfsdorf (2003)
conception of the Socratic elenchus is only argues that Socrates views his engagement
true of one dialogue Gorgias. Consequently, with his interlocutors, specifically in the con-
Vlastos (1983b) rejects the view that text of the search for definitions, largely as
Socrates has a single, uniform approach to cooperative pursuits of truth.
philosophizing. As noted, Vlastos (1983b) abandons his
Granted this, a residual question from idea (from 1983a) that Socrates has a sin-
Vlastos (1983a) remains: Insofar as Socrates gle, uniform approach to philosophizing.
does attempt to refute his interlocutors A number of scholars emphasize this posi-
thesis, how can he do so? Many commen- tion. More precisely, they advocate one or
tators contribute to this question (Adams the other of the following two theses: the
1998; Brickhouse and Smith 1991; Forster elenchus is but one among several forms of
2006; Kraut 1983; McPherran 2002b, 2007; argument Socrates employs (Benson 1995,
Polansky 1985; Santana 2009). They vari- 2002; Carpenter and Polansky 2002); the
ously suggest that Socrates uses premises he elenchus itself is a broad kind of argument
thinks are true or at least more likely to be with various forms or various purposes
true than the refuted thesis with which they (Adams 1998; Brickhouse and Smith 1991;
are inconsistent. For example, Polansky sug- Forster 2006; McPherran 2002b, 2007). For
gests that Socrates uses endoxic premises. example, Benson (1995) claims that it is sim-
Brickhouse and Smith suggest that Socrates ply a dogma of Socratic studies that the elen-
confidence in the premises in part derives chus is Socrates only method of argument.
36

Brickhouse and Smith (2002b) go even fur- Regarding (1), note that Vlastos empha-
ther, denying that there is such thing as the sizes that the interlocutor must assert p as
elenchus. his own opinion. This is connected with the
existential dimension of Socratic elenchus:
elenchus has a double objective: to discover
how every human being ought to live and to
VLASTOS (1983A) test the single human being that is doing the
answering to find out if he is living as one
Gregory Vlastoss seminal paper The Socratic ought to live (37). Regarding (5), note that
Elenchus was published in the first volume the crucial text for Vlastos is Gorgias (479e):
of Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy in Has it not been proved (apodedeiktai) that
1983. (Vlastos criticizes some earlier views, what was asserted [by myself] is true? More
in particular: Grote, 1865; Zeller, 1922; generally, as we will see, the main evidence
Robinson, 1941[1953]. Other predecessors for Vlastoss thesis derives from Gorgias.
are cited in particular at n. 14.) A revised ver- For example, in Charmides, Charmides
sion of this essay was published in a posthu- claims (p) that sound-mindedness is restraint.
mous collection of essays Socratic Studies in Socrates targets (p) for refutation. Socrates
1994. secures Charmides agreement to the claims
Vlastos proposes that Socrates distinctive that (q) sound-mindedness is always a fine
method is the elenchus. Vlastos emphasizes thing and that (r) restraint is not always a
that while Socrates uses the word elenchus fine thing. The conjunction of q and r entails
and its cognates to refer to his philosophi- that sound-mindedness is not restraint
cal activity, he does not define what elenchus (not-p). Socrates and Charmides conclude
is. Vlastos himself defines Socratic elenchus not-p. (More precisely, Vlastos characterizes
as a search for moral truth by adversary this as standard elenchus. Cf. Vlastoss brief
argument in which a thesis is debated only discussion of indirect elenchus at 3940.)
if asserted as the answerers own belief and A problem with (5), as with Socrates
is regarded as refuted only if the negation of and Charmides conclusion that
his thesis is deduced from his own beliefs sound-mindedness is not restraint, is that it
(1983a: 30). More precisely, Vlastos charac- is possible for the discussants to reject some
terizes Socratic elenchus as follows: component of the premise set Q rather than
p. For example, Charmides could respond
(1) Socrates interlocutor asserts a thesis p, by suggesting that sound-mindedness is not
which Socrates considers false and tar- always a fine thing (not-q) or that restraint
gets for refutation. always is in fact a fine thing (not-r). Thus,
(2) Socrates secures the interlocutors agree-
what the exchange reveals is simply that Q
ment to a premise set Q that includes one
and p are inconsistent, not that p is false
or more premises q, r and so on, relevant
to p. rather than Q or some component of Q. The
(3) Argument is from Q not to it. [premise set Q] from which Socrates deduces
(4) Socrates argues and the interlocutor the negation of the opponents thesis are logi-
agrees that Q entails not-p. cally unsecured within the argument: no rea-
(5) Socrates claims that not-p has been son has been given to compel agreement to
proven true, and thus p false. (39) them (40).
37

Since, according to Vlastos, Socrates (C) provides the solution to the problem of
and his interlocutor inevitably conclude the elenchus. Since Socrates assents to the
not-p, Vlastos wonders what justifies this premise set Q from which not-p is deduced,
conclusion. He calls this the problem of Q must consist of true premises.
the elenchus. The problem of the Socratic Vlastos appends to his account of Socratic
elenchus: how is it that Socrates claims to elenchus a brief discussion of Socrates
have proved a thesis false when, in point of method in Euthydemus, Lysis and Hippias
logic, all he has proved in any given argu- Major, in which he argues that in these three
ment is that the thesis is inconsistent with dialogues, which fall late among the early
the conjunction of agreed upon premises Socratic dialogues, Socrates abandons adver-
for which no reason has been given in that sarial argumentation and thus the elenchus.
argument? (49). Vlastoss solution to the Instead, Socrates both proposes and criticizes
problem of the elenchus is this. If the inter- his own theses. Vlastos conjectures that at
locutor chose to reject Q or some compo- this point in his career Plato had lost faith in
nent of Q rather than p, Socrates would the elenchus.
have the resources to show his interlocutor
that p conflicts with some of the interlocu-
tors other beliefs. This is because Socrates
holds that: KRAUT (1983)
(A) Anyone who ever has a false moral The first response to Vlastos (1983a), by
belief will always have at the same time Richard Kraut, was published in the same
true beliefs entailing the negation of that volume of Oxford Studies in Ancient
false belief. (52) Philosophy. Kraut begins by praising Vlastoss
contribution as surpassing every other dis-
Vlastos emphasizes that, consistent with the cussion this topic has received (1983: 59).
lack of methodological discussion in the After this, Kraut criticizes Vlastoss account
Socratic dialogues, Socrates never argues for of the problem of the elenchus and his pro-
(A). Rather, Socrates reason for maintaining posed solution to it. Krauts criticism focuses
(A) is that (A) proves true in his own expe- on three main points:
rience (53). In other words, Socrates has
inductive evidence for (A). (1) The elenchus, as Vlastos describes it
Furthermore, Socrates has inductive evi- (1)(5) in the preceding section can
dence, based on the successes of his past provide proof without Socrates commit-
ment to (A) and (B).
experience in debate and discussion, that:
(2) Socrates does not rely on (A) and (B) to
reach the conclusion that all his moral
(B) Socrates set of moral beliefs is con- beliefs are true (C).
sistent. (55) (3) In fact, Socrates does not think that all
his moral beliefs are consistent (B). (59)
The conjunction of (A) and (B) entails that:
Regarding (1), Kraut emphasizes that any
(C) Socrates set of moral beliefs consists argument must contain premises for which
exclusively of true beliefs. (55) no argument is given. In that case, the reason
38

Socrates thinks his arguments are proofs that conflict with his own beliefs is due
is simply that he thinks his premises are to Socrates belief that there is a certain
true. Moreover, Socrates may not have rea- amount of psychological and moral fixity
sons for thinking that some of his premises in human beliefs. Socrates view of such fix-
are true: One cant always give a reason ity is based on his past experience in debate
for everything one believes, and this fact and discussion. But this is a different claim
doesnt deprive one of proof (62). Many of from the claim that whatever adjustment
the premises in Socrates arguments, Kraut Socrates interlocutor made to his belief-set,
claims, are simply plausible and compelling Socrates could always find the means to
at face value (63), for example, Socrates defeat his interlocutors position.
premise that doing well and doing badly are Finally, Kraut claims that (A) presupposes
opposites. Moreover, this fact is compatible that Socrates has sorted out true from false
with Socrates willingness to revise any of his moral beliefs. Thus, whatever confidence
beliefs. But apparently compelling beliefs will [Socrates] has in his ability to recognize which
only come to need justification if a good rea- beliefs are true [must be] independent of and
son for challenging them is disclosed (65). In prior to [a] belief in (A) (68). Accordingly,
short, Socrates argues for not-p on the basis Socrates does not derive the view that his
of Q, which is a belief-set that he holds; and true moral beliefs are true because of (A) and
the grounds of these beliefs may be nothing (B). Indeed, Kraut argues that Socrates does
more than that they appear compelling to not believe his moral beliefs are wholly con-
Socrates. sistent and true.
Regarding (2) and specifically Vlastoss Regarding (3) and specifically Vlastoss
claim that Socrates is committed to (A), Kraut claim that Socrates is committed to (B), Kraut
thinks that it would be astonishing and arro- argues that Socrates various professions of
gant for Socrates to believe that if his inter- perplexity and aporia regarding moral mat-
locutor rejected Q or some component of Q, ters are not, as many have claimed, ironic,
Socrates would always have the resources to but sincere. Thus, Socrates moral beliefs are
argue against that rejection. Socrates has only not wholly consistent. But such limitations
a finite number of arguments: therefore he to Socrates moral understanding do not,
cannot seriously believe that no matter how Kraut emphasizes, entail that Socrates lacks
often his interlocutor demands that he start proofs of some moral theses. Socrates, there-
all over again from new premises, he will be fore, does not need (A) and (B) to buttress
able to find a new argument (65). his confidence that some of his moral views
Furthermore, Kraut claims that there is are true: no argument loses its force merely
no good textual evidence for attributing because the speaker has, somewhere or other,
(A) to Socrates. Consider a Socratic claim inconsistent beliefs (70).
such as the following from Gorgias: But I In short, as Kraut sees it, there is no prob-
know how to produce one witness to my lem of the elenchus; thus, there is no need to
assertions: the man against whom I am think and indeed no compelling evidence
arguing (66). Kraut suggests that Socrates for thinking that Socrates has a commit-
confidence that he will always be able to ment to (A) and (B) and so (C) that resolves
contradict the beliefs of his interlocutors the problem.
39

VLASTOS (1983b) Meno provides a new means of justifying the

elenchus. Thus, in Meno, a dialogue transi-
In the same volume of Oxford Studies in tional between the early and middle periods,
Ancient Philosophy, Vlastos briefly replies to the elenchus returns.
Kraut and makes a major concession: outside of
Gorgias there is no evidence from the Socratic
dialogues for (A). Thus Vlastos maintains, con-
sistently with Kraut, that in all the Socratic BRICKHOUSE AND SMITH (1984a)
dialogues composed before Gorgias Socrates
argues for his views in much the same way as In the second volume of Oxford Studies in
other philosophers have done before or since Ancient Philosophy, Thomas Brickhouse
when trying to bring others around to their and Nicholas Smith criticize Vlastoss revised
own view: he picks premises which he consid- view that (A), (B) and (C) operate in Gorgias.
ers so eminently reasonable in themselves and Brickhouse and Smiths argument is brief, but
so well-entrenched in his interlocutorss system taut and subtle. I will run through it momen-
of belief, that when he faces them with the fact tarily. First, it may be helpful to offer a gen-
that these premises entail the negation of their eral description of their strategy. In Vlastoss
thesis he feels no serious risk that they will view, the problem of the elenchus is resolved
renege on the premises to save their thesis as by assuming (A) and (B), which yield (C). In
in fact, they never do (1983b: 73). particular, Socrates ability to prove not-p
In pre-Gorgias dialogues, then, Socrates rests on his asserting Q as a set of true moral
does not question, as an epistemologist propositions, which entails not-p. Insofar as
would, the justification of his elenchus. But Q consists of moral propositions, (C), which
in Gorgias, Platos own epistemological con- claims that Socrates moral belief-set consists
cerns lead him to question the justification of exclusively of true beliefs, ensures that the
Socrates elenctic method. Platos answer, (A), moral propositions of Q are true. Brickhouse
is his gift to Socrates; that is, Plato intro- and Smiths strategy is essentially to argue
duces (A) in defense of Socrates method. that Socrates has no means of assuring and
This solution is, however, short-lived, for no good reason to believe that his moral
Plato quickly comes to recognize how hope- belief-set is wholly true. Moreover, it is not
less it would be to justify [(A)] by the induc- merely moral propositions that serve in Q to
tive evidence, which is all Socrates could have entail not-p. But in that case the solution to
offered for it. [Consequently] . . . Plato loses the problem of the elenchus requires that all of
faith in the elenchus and proceeds to extri- Socrates beliefs, moral and non-moral, perti-
cate Socrates from it [in Euthd., Ly. and Hp. nent to not-p be consistent and true. But given
Ma.] (74). In short, (A) and (B) and so (C) that Socrates has no means of assuring and no
are one-off aberrations in Platos philosophi- good reason to believe that his moral belief-set
cal career albeit aberrations motivated by a is wholly true, a fortiori he has no means of
legitimate epistemological concern. assuring and no good reason to believe that
Vlastos concludes his reply with the sug- his set of moral and non-moral beliefs perti-
gestion that after abandoning the elenchus in nent to not-p is consistent and true.
Euthydemus, Lysis and Hippias Major, Platos Let us now turn to the details of Brickhouse
introduction of the theory of recollection in and Smiths argument, which focuses first on
40

(A) and subsequently on (B). Brickhouse and beliefs could be inconsistent with one of his
Smith first argue that Socrates could never moral beliefs. Vlastos has, then, given no rea-
justify (A) in the way that Vlastos claims, son to assume that Socrates moral belief-set
namely through induction in light of his includes beliefs entailing the negation of his
prior discussions and debates. (A) concerns hypothesized false moral belief. Given this,
true beliefs, but the elenchus can only reveal Brickhouse and Smith entertain the idea of
inconsistency. Thus, Socrates would have no amending (A) to:
means by which to infer whether any par-
ticular one of his interlocutors beliefs was (A1) Every persons belief-set always
true. Kraut (1983: n. 4) makes this point as includes a subset of true moral beliefs
well. Note also that Brickhouse and Smiths that entails the negation of that persons
discussion at this point (1984a: 18890) is false moral beliefs.
slightly confusing insofar as it also incorpo-
rates the claim that Socrates could have no The problem with (A1), they argue, is that it
justification for (B) as well as (A). Nothing is contradicted by textual evidence: Socrates
in their argument to this point tells against sometimes uses . . . non-moral propositions
(B). If the elenchus exposes inconsistency, . . . to gain his elenctic conclusions (191).
then the failure of inconsistency to appear in Consequently, Brickhouse and Smith enter-
Socrates moral belief-set in the wake of past tain the idea of amending (A) instead to:
discussions does support (B).
Second, Brickhouse and Smith argue that (A2) For any person who has a false
(A) cannot be used to justify (C) as Vlastos moral belief, that persons belief-set
claims. Assume that Socrates has a false includes a set of true moral beliefs that in
moral belief. (A) claims that anyone who conjunction with his relevant true non-
has a false moral belief will have true beliefs moral beliefs entails the negation of the
that entail the negation of that false moral false moral belief.
belief. Brickhouse and Smith astutely observe
that (A) does not imply that Socrates moral But Brickhouse and Smith argue that (A2)
belief-set includes beliefs that entail the nega- also cannot be used to justify (C). This is
tion of the hypothesized false moral belief. because it is possible for the subset of true
(A) merely states that if one has a false moral moral beliefs, which in conjunction with
belief, then one will also have true beliefs the relevant true non-moral beliefs entails
not necessarily moral ones that entail the the negation of the false moral belief, to be
negation of that false moral belief. Now, a consistent with the hypothesized false moral
belief-set can be consistent while containing belief. (Recall that a consistent belief-set can
some true and some false beliefs. Brickhouse contain some true and some false beliefs.) Ex
and Smith give the following example: hypothesi, the subset of true moral beliefs
{Socrates is married to Xanthippe, Socrates would only entail the negation of the false
can fly}. Therefore, Socrates could have a moral belief in conjunction with non-moral
consistent moral belief-set, one of whose beliefs. Finally, (A2) cannot be modified
members was false, while having an incon- except as (A1), to justify (C).
sistent moral plus non-moral belief-set. In Since emendations of (A) will not justify
other words, one of Socrates non-moral (C), Brickhouse and Smith now consider
41

whether (B) might be amended to justify (C). support, for where he does use non-moral
They entertain the idea of amending (B) to: premises they prove consistent with the
moral beliefs he utilizes as the other premises
(B1) All of Socrates beliefs not merely and those moral beliefs that are his conclu-
his moral beliefs are consistent. sions [1985: n. 13].) In short, Brickhouse
and Smith criticize Vlastoss position on logi-
But Brickhouse and Smith reject the attribu- cal and textual grounds.
tion of (B1) to Socrates on the grounds that Finally, while their discussion is almost
there is no reason to suppose that Socrates, wholly critical, Brickhouse and Smith con-
even on Vlastoss view, subjects all of his non- clude with one constructive suggestion: an
moral beliefs to the sort of rigorous scrutiny adequate account must allow us to make
to which he subjects his moral beliefs (192). sense of [the elenchus] as a method [of
Given this, they entertain a weaker version of moral inquiry that] Plato or Socrates would
(B1), namely: prescribe (194). On Vlastoss view, which
requires (C), the elenchus is in fact not a
(B2) Socrates moral beliefs, plus what- method that even Socrates can use.
ever non-moral beliefs he may ever use
in any elenctic argument (as per [A2]),
are all consistent.
POLANSKY (1985)
But Brickhouse and Smith find that textual
evidence for (B2) is lacking. In support of Polanskys discussion also criticizes Vlastoss
(B), Vlastos cites Gorgias (482a5b1), where solution to the problem of the elenchus.
Socrates claims to follow Philosophia and Polanskys criticism proceeds in two related
assert the things she says, which are always parts. First, Polansky refers to Vlastoss
the same. Brickhouse and Smith accept this rejection of the view that Q may consist
passage as evidence that at this stage in his of self-evident or endoxic premises. While
career Socrates always maintains the same Vlastos simply denies that Q may consist of
beliefs (193). But they argue that this does self-evident premises, he argues that Q does
not imply that Socrates elenctically relevant not consist of endoxic premises. Polansky
beliefs are all consistent. Socrates adherence suggests that none of Vlastoss [three] argu-
to Philosophia is an adherence to the pursuit ments aiming to prove that Socrates can-
of moral knowledge by means of rigorous not rely exclusively upon endoxic premises
elenctic inquiry, and Socrates current beliefs is effective (1985: 249). Second, Polansky
and assertions are the result of this inquiry. criticizes Vlastoss use of (A), (B) and (C) to
But, Brickhouse and Smith claim, it would resolve the problem of the elenchus. I will
be an extremely unrealistic overestimation discuss Polanskys criticisms in the order in
of the method to think that it would have which they are presented.
yielded a fully consistent elenctically relevant As evidence that Socrates arguments do
belief-set (193). (Note that Polansky is not not rely on endoxic premises, Vlastos first
persuaded by this: Socrates might hold that claims that Socrates never says that Q con-
his experience in elenctic encounters gives sists of endoxic premises. But Polansky argues
this modified version of (B) strong inductive that we should not expect to find Socrates
42

pointing out to the interlocutor that the pro- Socrates arguments are based on endoxa.
posed premises are generally accepted (249). At this point, Polansky turns to (A), (B) and
Since, as Vlastos claims, Socrates expects specifically (C) and proposes that this set of
the interlocutor to say what he believes, it assumptions has three serious problems.
would be counterproductive for Socrates The first problem is that (C), which con-
to proclaim that the premises are common cerns only Socrates moral beliefs, does not
beliefs (249). Moreover, it would be unnec- cover all of the premises Socrates uses in his
essary since the interlocutor rarely questions elenctic arguments: there are many cases in
the proposed premises. the dialogues in which Socrates appeals to
Vlastoss second argument that Socrates non-moral premises (256). Polansky empha-
does not employ endoxic premises relates sizes that this point differs from Brickhouse
to Socrates rejection of Polus view (at Grg. and Smiths more difficult point that (C)
472bc and 474ab) that everybody disbe- will not readily follow from (A) and (B):
lieves what Socrates is saying (that doing I am making the very straightforward point
wrong is worse than suffering it). But here, that (C) will not accomplish what Vlastos
Polansky notes, Polus is rejecting Socrates thinks it will, that is, guarantee for Socrates
conclusion, not his premises. the truth of his premises. So long as Socrates
Vlastoss third argument is that Socratic employs non-moral premises it will hardly be
doctrines are often contra-endoxic and adequate for him merely to have assurance
that Socrates could not have arrived at that all his moral beliefs are true (n. 14). But
contra-endoxic conclusions from endoxic given this, it is not readily open to Vlastos to
premises. Polansky rejects this claim: Quite expand (C) to include all of Socrates elencti-
unusual conclusions, surely, may derive from cally relevant beliefs. That is because Vlastos
most ordinary premises (251). Socrates refu- would then have to abandon his view that
tation of Polus is precisely one such example. Socrates is solely a moral philosopher. (Cf.
Furthermore, Polansky argues that Vlastos Vlastos, 1983a: 324, 56.)
has an impoverished conception of endoxic The second problem is that (C) already
views. Endoxic views are not equivalent to covers what is supposed to be shown. Vlastos
conventional views. Endoxic views are the claims that the elenchus is a method of
views of the wise and such views may be inquiry, that is, a method by which Socrates
resisted by the mass of men (252). Finally, may acquire new moral beliefs. But since
Polansky shows that the premises of an argu- Socrates believes Q and Q entails not-p,
ment in Republic (1, 335bc), which Vlastos what new positive moral belief is Socrates
takes to be non-endoxic, can be interpreted as acquiring? Rather, the elenchus seems to be a
endoxic. (Note that Polanskys position is pro- means . . . to convey the results of [Socrates
fessedly relevant to Xenophons understand- prior] research to his interlocutors (257). In
ing of Socratic method as involving endoxa: fact, in a footnote Polansky suggests that the
Whenever Socrates himself argued something early dialogues seem to show us a Socrates
out he proceeded from the most generally confirming his moral doctrines to others
accepted opinions, believing that security in rather than developing his moral doctrines
argument lies therein; Mem. 4.6.15.) for himself (257).
Polanskys refutation of Vlastoss argu- The third problem is that (C) has relatively
ments, thus, primes the possibility that little significance vis--vis Socrates elenctic
43

activity. Vlastoss account focuses on what a which Benson endorses, the elenchus demon-
single elenctic demonstration achieves. But, strates and persuades the interlocutor merely
Polansky argues, Socrates central moral ten- that Q and p are inconsistent. Against the
ets are never established by a single elenctic constructivist view, Benson argues that given
argument and could not be so established the formal structure of the elenchus plus two
(258). Among Socrates central moral tenets theoretical constraints that Socrates places
that Polansky lists are the importance of car- upon it, which Benson calls the availability
ing for the soul over the body, the identity of and doxastic constraints, the problem of the
virtue and knowledge and the view that the elenchus is insoluble. But since the solution
wisest man is one who is aware of his igno- of the problem of the elenchus is required for
rance. Insofar as we conceive of Socrates the elenchus to be constructive, the elenchus
central moral tenets as central to (C), cannot be constructive regardless of what
Socrates elenctic activity, precisely, single Socrates may think. The insolubility of the
elenctic demonstrations, has relatively little problem of the elenchus, thus, gives some
significance to (C). Above all, single elenctic reason for favouring a non-constructivist
demonstrations demonstrate not-p. Must interpretation of the elenchus.
we then hold, Polansky rhetorically ques- Bensons account of the formal structure of
tions, that Socrates . . . set of moral beliefs the elenchus is more complex than Vlastoss
prominently includes numerous [negative] (1987: 69). But I see no harm in simplifying
views . . . ? (258). Bensons account at this point and saying that
according to the formal structure of the elen-
chus, the conjunction of p and Q which I
will hereafter refer to as K is false. So both
BENSON (1987) the constructivist and non-constructivist hold
that K is false. But the constructivist addi-
In this paper, Benson draws a distinction tionally holds, while the non-constructivist
between two interpretations of Socratic elen- does not, that all but one of the elements of
chus: constructivist and non-constructivist. K namely p is either true or, as Benson
On the constructivist view, endorsed by puts it, has some other property that can
Vlastos, the elenchus demonstrates as well plausibly be seen to be associated with truth
as persuades the interlocutor that p is false. (69). Note that the constructivists reason for
(Note that the distinction between demon- holding that all but one of the elements of K
stration and persuasion is important for are plausibly truth-associated, if not true, is
Bensons discussion. It is, after all, possible that it allows Socrates to endorse elements
to demonstrate that p is false while failing of Q because they are, say, prima facie plau-
to persuade an interlocutor of the falsity of sible or endoxic (cf. 69). The constructivist
p by means of that demonstration. For exam- requires that all but one of the elements of
ple, although the premises that entail not-p K is either true or plausibly truth-associated
may be true, an interlocutor need not believe because that justifies Socrates conclusion
that they are. Benson characterizes the aim that p is false.
of demonstrating not-p as impersonal and Given this account of the constructivist
persuading an interlocutor that not-p as and non-constructivists disagreement over
personal.) On the non-constructivist view, the formal structure of the elenchus, the
44

remainder of Bensons discussion is devoted understand and endorse the soundness of

to showing that Socrates places availabil- the argument from Q to not-p, the elenchus
ity and doxastic constraints on the formal cannot persuade the interlocutor that p is
structure of the elenchus. The availability false. Instead, the elenchus can only persuade
constraint holds that the interlocutor must the interlocutor that he holds contradictory
understand the argument from Q to not-p. beliefs, p and not-p. Thus, the elenchus can
Benson argues that Socrates maintains the only be non-constructive.
availability constraint because the goal of
the elenchus is to persuade the interlocutor
of his ignorance as a necessary first step in
the attainment of knowledge (75). (Benson BENSON (1990B)
finds evidence for this view of the goal of the
elenchus at Men. 84a3c6, Sph. 230c3d4 In this piece, Benson develops his non-con-
and Grg. 471d3472c4.) Although the elen- structivist interpretation of the elenchus
chus might achieve this goal in various ways, vis--vis a problem known as the Socratic
an obvious way is to soundly argue that a Fallacy. The Socratic Fallacy, first articulated
proposition an interlocutor thought he knew, in 1966 by Peter Geach, claims that Socrates
namely p, is inconsistent with other premises cannot rationally pursue knowledge of defi-
to which the interlocutor is committed and nitions, given his commitment to the follow-
to argue in such a way that the soundness of ing two epistemological principles:
the argument is available to the interlocutor.
In short, Socrates will be justified in believ- (P) If one lacks knowledge of the defini-
ing that a particular elenchus has succeeded tion of F, then for some property P, one
in establishing the falsehood of a particular cannot know whether F has P;
conjunct, [namely K] insofar as Socrates is (D) If one lacks knowledge of the defini-
justified in believing that the argument [from tion of F, then for some particular x, one
Q to not-p] is sound and the interlocutor has cannot know whether x instantiates F.
access to its soundness (77).
According to the doxastic constraint, the (P) and (D) entail:
interlocutor must believe all the propositions
that constitute K, namely p and Q. For exam- (PD) If one lacks knowledge of the defi-
ple, in Crito (49d), when Socrates asks Crito nition of F, one cannot know anything
whether one ought ever to return a wrong or about F.
treat anyone badly, he reminds Crito to be
careful never to agree to anything contrary In other words, (PD) expresses what has
to his opinion (79). (The remaining evidence been called the epistemological priority of
Benson cites for the doxastic constraint can definitional knowledge. But given the episte-
be found at 7880.) mological priority of definitional knowledge,
But since the doxastic constraint requires how is one to rationally pursue definitional
that the interlocutor believe all the elements knowledge of F? One cannot use instances
of K which implies that the interlocutor of F since one cannot know what entities
believes the truth of p and the availabil- instantiate F, nor can one use properties of
ity constraint requires that the interlocutor F since one cannot know what properties
45

F has. Geach, thus, concludes that (PD) is immediate aim of the elenchus is to test the
fallacious. interlocutors claim to knowledge, the ulti-
A number of scholars respond to Geachs mate aim of the elenchus, Benson holds, is
charge by attempting to show that Socrates for its user, Socrates, to acquire knowledge,
is not committed to (PD), mainly because say, of the definition of F. Benson recognizes
he is not committed to (D). But Benson here that it is difficult to understand how Socrates
argues that Socrates is committed to (PD). hopes to acquire knowledge of the nature
Socrates commitment to (PD) compounds of F by [means of the elenchus], especially
the problem of the constructivist interpreta- since he has long ago come to the realization
tion of the elenchus. Assume that Socrates that he is not likely to come across anyone
asks his interlocutor to define some virtue who does know what they think they know
F. Not only is the elenchus unable to prove (63, Benson refers to Ap. 22a.). Even so,
false the interlocutors proposed definition of Benson digs in his heels: it is, nevertheless,
F, but Socrates commitment to (PD) makes the method that Socrates employs (63). He
the pursuit of definitional knowledge of F also mentions that Plato introduces the the-
impossible. ory of recollection at just the point at which
Bensons non-constructivist interpreta- the early dialogues had come to an end. The
tion of the elenchus can handle the Socratic theory is Platos answer to how to go on once
Fallacy somewhat more effectively. Benson conceit has been eliminated short of seeking
argues that the immediate aim of the elen- someone who knows (n. 85).
chus is to test the interlocutors knowledge.
Benson suggests that a necessary condition
of ones knowledge of F is that ones beliefs
about F are consistent. In this case, Socrates BRICKHOUSE AND SMITH (1991)
and the interlocutor can come to know that
the interlocutor fails to have the knowledge In this paper, Brickhouse and Smith articu-
that he thinks he has merely by determining late a more robust conception of the elen-
that the interlocutors beliefs concerning the chus, distinguish various of its functions and
relevant F are inconsistent (1990: 58). But to show how Socrates effectively deploys them.
determine this, neither Socrates nor his inter- Central to their account is the view that the
locutor needs to know what properties F has elenchus tests not merely propositions but
nor whether x instantiates F. Thus, Socrates human lives. Socrates sees himself as doing
can hold (PD) and think that his elenchus can something more than just attempting to dis-
succeed in testing the knowledge of his inter- play the falsehood of his interlocutors prop-
locutors without being confused (59). ositions . . . Through the elenchus Socrates
Thus, Bensons view of the immediate examines the manner in which his interlocu-
function of the elenchus enables his non-con- tors live (1991: 135). Moreover, Socrates is
structivist interpretation more effectively to interested in testing his own life as well as
handle the Socratic Fallacy than a constructiv- those of his interlocutors.
ist interpretation. But the non-constructivist Socrates tests lives by examining moral
interpretation cannot handle the Socratic propositions. Moral propositions and lives
Fallacy entirely effectively. Although the are connected in the elenchus for the following
46

two reasons. First, the elenchus requires that which beliefs to jettison and which to retain.
in an exchange the interlocutor say what he Rather, the interlocutor jettisons less firmly
believes: Only if the interlocutors answer his held moral beliefs.
questions with their sincerely held beliefs can In this respect, the elenchus could be dan-
Socrates be confident that he is really testing gerous; for example, if an interlocutors less
at least some aspect of how they think they deeply held moral beliefs were right, while
should live (137). Second, Socrates is com- his more deeply held moral beliefs were
mitted to intellectualism, according to which wrong, the elenchus would lead him to be
agents [never] act against what they believe more immoral. It must be a feature of the
is best for them, for . . . all people always examined life not just that we clarify what
desire what is best for them. [Thus], one will we really believe, but that in doing so we
always act in such a way as to follow ones invariably come to see that we believe what
beliefs about how it is best for one to live is right, and not what is wrong (144). But
(1401). Socrates holds that peoples most deeply held
Given the preceding, one function of moral beliefs are in fact right. Socrates evi-
Socrates elenchus is destructive: it is to dence for this view is based on his past elenc-
destroy an interlocutors false conceit of tic experience. Those who have attempted to
moral knowledge. Thus, if he is to make maintain moral beliefs contrary to Socrates
progress, Socrates must first attack the have, through elenctic testing, invariably
beliefs that hinder inquiry, thereby inducing yielded to Socrates beliefs. In other words,
in the interlocutor an openness to reconsid- past elenctic examinations have revealed
eration of what he thought he already knew that peoples basic moral beliefs tend to be
(140). The elenchus achieves this objective by the same. Moreover, to the extent that he has
exposing inconsistency in an interlocutors generated inductive evidence through previ-
moral belief-set. At the same time, Brickhouse ous elenctic examinations for the necessity
and Smith also emphasize a constructive of his own view concerning a coherent [life],
aspect to the destruction: exposure of incon- Socrates can claim to have established a truth
sistent moral beliefs shows the interlocutor applicable to all men (146). Socrates confi-
that his pursuit of the good life is likely to dence in the truth of his moral beliefs derives
be or has actually been in some substantial from their having survived elenctic testing,
way self-defeating (141). Thus, Socrates their consistency with the deeply held moral
exposures of inconsistency are lessons in and beliefs of others, their relative coherence
provocations toward self-knowledge. and the character and integrity of his life.
Through elenctic examination an inter- Additionally, Brickhouse and Smith empha-
locutor comes to see more clearly what size that Socrates derives support for the
he believes. But Brickhouse and Smith do truth of his moral beliefs from the Delphic
not think this is limited to the exposure of Oracle and Socrates own divine sign. Both
inconsistency in a moral belief-set. Instead, divine sources encourage Socrates percep-
the elenchus often reveals that some moral tion that he is a gift from god and thus that
beliefs are more deeply held than others. his mission is moral (144; here Brickhouse
Given this, an interlocutor does not merely and Smith cite Ap. 30e1). Consequently,
wind up in a state of perplexity, unsure of another use to which Socrates may put the
47

elenchus is to generate and to defend moral shame that one feels after the effects of the
propositions, for he has reason to think that elenchus provides a powerful incentive to
those he generates and defends in this way rectify the shameful condition. In short,
are of value to everyone (148). Socrates hopes to shame his interlocutors
The Delphic Oracle also stresses the limi- into positive action (153).
tations of Socrates wisdom, and the divine Brickhouse and Smiths final point picks up
sign often prohibits Socrates from some on the requirement for an adequate account
course of action. Thus, the divine sources of the elenchus that they express at the end of
also indicate that Socrates moral under- their critique of Vlastoss 1983a discussion
standing is imperfect. Brickhouse and Smith in their 1984 piece. Recall that an adequate
emphasize this point in discussing Socrates account must allow us to make sense of
pursuit of definitional knowledge. This arena [the elenchus] as a method [of moral inquiry
of moral inquiry illustrates the general point that] Plato or Socrates would prescribe.
that Socrates has, as they put it, good moral Accordingly, they argue here that Socrates
judgement, but not wisdom (151). Although elenctic practices are not unique to Socrates,
Brickhouse and Smith recognize that but available to others. Moreover, even those
Socrates is committed to the epistemological who lack the capability to perform elenctic
priority of definitional knowledge in some tests can benefit by subjecting themselves to
sense, they do not accept Bensons view that elenctic testing (159).
Socrates is strictly committed to (PD) (n. 25). In sum, Brickhouse and Smiths account of
In this paper, however, they do not examine Socrates elenctic mission is well encapsu-
the principle of the epistemological prior- lated in the following concluding passage:
ity of definitional knowledge. Accordingly,
as noted above, Socrates does not merely . . . On our account of the elenchus, moral
deploy elenctic testing on others, he contin- philosophy for Socrates is not a matter of
ues to subject himself to it. demonstrating which propositions in the
One final function that Brickhouse and moral sphere are true and which false.
Smith attribute to Socrates elenchus is Rather, it is a rich and complex enterprise
hortative: Socrates does not merely try to in which one must purge others of their
persuade people to believe certain things, pretence of wisdom, undertake to deter-
mine what kinds of things people must
he uses the elenchus to persuade people
believe about how to live if their lives are
to do the right thing (154). For exam-
to be happy, test and refine definitions of
ple, in Apology Socrates tries to get the the virtues, deliberate about right action,
jurors to acquit him; and in Euthyphro and when the nature of right and wrong
Socrates tries to get Euthyphro to desist action is clear enough, exhort others to
from his prosecution. It follows that the pursue what is right and shun what is
elenchus is a tool for normative persua- wrong. (159)
sion intended to make a real difference in
the actions people undertake . . . Thus, it is (Brickhouse and Smiths account of Socrates
not merely intended to further ones under- elenctic mission here is to be compared with
standing of moral concepts (156). In this their treatment in Brickhouse and Smith
context, shame can play a salient role. The 1994a: 329.)
48

BENSON (1995) Callicles, than like a defense of a Socratic the-

sis against the views of Polus and Callicles
This paper develops Bensons non-constructivist (101). (Recall that on Bensons view, the
view of Socrates elenchus. Benson observes immediate aim of the elenchus is to test the
that prior treatments of Socrates elenchus knowledge-claims of the interlocutor.) But,
have taken place at the level of generali- he argues, Socrates does not employ elenchi
ties or by focusing on one or two examples, in Gorgias to establish the falsity of his
supposed (with little argument) to be para- interlocutors moral beliefs. Rather Socrates
digmatic (1995: 48). Benson endeavours shows that Polus and Callicles central the-
to rectify this defect by examining in more ses are inconsistent with their other beliefs
detail the individual elenchi (plural of elen- (1009).
chus) that Socrates deploys in Euthyphro, Granting this, one may wonder about
Charmides and Laches. Benson takes these the source of the justification of the views
dialogues to be paradigmatic of the method Socrates defends in Gorgias. Benson offers
Socrates describes himself as practicing in three responses to this question in the short,
Apology, the dialogue which can be most penultimate section of his paper (10911).
confidently relied upon to represent the First, he suggests that it is simply a dogma
Socrates with whom he is concerned (49). On of Platonic or Socratic studies that the elen-
the basis of his examination of the elenchi chus is Socrates only method of argument
in these three dialogues, Benson concludes (109). Instead, Socrates may have arrived at
that Socrates shows his interlocutors beliefs his strong moral commitments as a result of
merely to be inconsistent. Thus, in conform- non-elenctic arguments (109). For example,
ity with the conclusions of his 1987 and 1990 Benson cites the following non-elenctic argu-
pieces, Benson maintains that Vlastoss prob- mentative passages among the early dialogues:
lem of the elenchus does not arise in these the argument of the Laws in Crito; much of
texts. I will not discuss further this aspect of Apology; the stretch of Gorgias following
Bensons paper, which is by far the bulk of his the refutation of Callicles. Second, Benson
discussion (50100). endorses the suggestion of Brickhouse and
Benson devotes the remainder of his paper Smiths 1991 paper that repeated [as opposed
to examining two potential sources of evi- to single] elenctic examinations [of a variety
dence that might undermine the preceding of interlocutors] can confirm the untenability
conclusions (10012). The first derives from of an opposed view, and thus give Socrates
passages in Gorgias. The second consists of grounds for claiming that leading the exam-
Socrates own moral views and the assump- ined life [i.e. pursuing the elenctic method]
tion that Socrates must derive these from the provides substantive and constructive doc-
elenchus. trinal consequences (111; the quotation
Regarding the Gorgias passages that is from Brickhouse and Smith 1991: 146,
seem to show Socrates proving moral tenets, with Bensons italics). Third, Benson stresses
Benson holds that Gorgias is not a paradig- that Socrates tends to emphasize his lack of
matic elenctic dialogue (101). The Gorgias moral knowledge. Thus, whatever method or
reads much less like an examination of the methods he uses to achieve his moral beliefs,
knowledge-claims of Gorgias, Polus, and Socrates does not take these beliefs to be
49

proven. (Bensons conclusion in this paper Adams defends an internal interpretation

and in those of 1987, 1990a, 1990b are to be of Socrates elenchus. As we will see, his
compared with Benson 2000). internal interpretation of Socrates elenchus
entails a complex view of whether Socrates
elenchus is hypothetical or categorical.
Adamss internal interpretation rests on
ADAMS (1998) what he calls Socratic evidentialism. He
never explicitly defines evidentialism, but
Adams begins by drawing two distinctions. claims that its spirit is captured in Humes
One is between hypothetical and categori- slogan: A wise man . . . proportions his belief
cal interpretations of Socrates elenchus. to the evidence (292, citing Hume, Enquiry,
According to the hypothetical interpretation, sect. 10 [part I 4]). In view of the broader
Socrates does not conclude not-p, but rather context of Adamss discussion, one can inter-
if Q, then not-p. Perhaps Socrates affirms pret this to imply that a belief-evidentialist
only the conditional claim, and does not holds those beliefs that the weight of the evi-
also affirm the antecedent of the conditional. dence available the believer favours. Adams
Perhaps Socrates is pointing out to Charmides also distinguishes action-evidentialism,
not that his definition is false, but only that which may be understood to entail that,
his admissions are inconsistent with his defini- in the appropriate circumstances, one acts
tion (1998: 288). According to the categorical on those practical beliefs that one holds as
interpretation, Socrates does conclude not-p. a belief-evidentialist. Adams argues that
Although Adams does not put the point this Socrates is a belief-evidentialist and an
way, hypothetical and categorical interpreta- action-evidentialist. Thus, for example,
tions of the elenchus clearly correlate with in Crito Socrates says: We must consider
non-constructivist and constructivist interpre- whether we ought to do what you suggest
tations of the elenchus la Benson. or not. For I have always been the sort [of
Adamss second distinction, which princi- person] who is persuaded by nothing other
pally pertains to a constructivist interpreta- than the argument which appears best upon
tion of the elenchus, is between internal and reflection (Cri. 46b, cited at 293).
external interpretations of the justificatory Adams argues, on the basis of Charmides,
strength of the elenchus. According to an Laches and Euthyphro, that the primary
internal interpretation, Socrates justification evidence upon which the conclusions of
for the conclusion of an elenctic argument Socrates elenchi depend is internal to the
derives primarily from information internal elenchi. For example, Socrates refutation
to the elenchus. According to an external of Charmides first definition of temper-
interpretation, Socrates justification for the ance as calmness depends upon numer-
conclusion of an elenctic argument derives ous examples of calmness not being finer
primarily from information external to the than vigour. (Adams discusses this at 294.
elenchus (290). For example, according to Note that earlier in the chapter I translated
Vlastoss original conception of the elenchus, hsychiots as restraint, my preference,
Socrates justification for not-p in a particu- but here following Adamss rendition.) In
lar elenchus depends upon (A) and (B), which short, Socrates draws his elenctic conclu-
are external to a particular elenchus. sions because they have more evidence
50

[drawn from the elenchus itself] in their Socrates disavowals of moral knowledge
support (295). and unquestioning confidence in his own
This would seem to suggest that Adams moral rectitude (297). I will not discuss this
favours a categorical interpretation of final section of Adamss paper here, beyond
the elenchus. But Adams emphasizes that saying that he resolves the appearances of
although Socrates may be resolute about conflict in these cases along the same lines as
the conclusions of elenctic arguments, he he resolves the apparent conflict between the
is not close-minded. He accepts that all hypothetical and categorical nature of the
the evidence does not infallibly prove that Socratic elenchus. That is to say, the appear-
his [conclusion] is right (294). Thus, for ances of conflict in these cases are explicable
instance, although he concludes his argu- according to Socrates evidentialism.
ment with Crito that he ought not to escape Finally, it must be mentioned that in a
from prison, he concludes by saying: Know footnote midway through the paper Adams
well that if you have anything to say against says: I am not arguing that the elenchus has
these arguments, you will speak in vain. only one purpose. I agree . . . that Socrates
Nevertheless, if you think you have some- uses the elenchus for many purposes. I am
thing more, speak (Cri. 54d, cited at 293). trying to identify what we would call one of
In short, Socrates always remains open to its epistemological uses (n. 13. Adams is here
the disclosure of further evidence that would agreeing with Woodruff 1987: 838, and
outweigh his present belief. Socrates is not Brickhouse and Smith 1991.) In that case,
nave about evidence; Socrates realizes that one must understand the scope of Adamss
it is always possible for an interlocutor to argument as limited to some, unclearly speci-
re-think the evidence upon which a particu- fied range of Socratic elenchi, but at least
lar refutation is based, and if he can make including some of the elenchi in Euthyphro,
the case that the evidence is spurious, then Charmides and Laches.
Socrates is willing to reconsider the claim he
tried to refute (296). This, Adams suggests,
explains why Socrates speaks of his conclu-
sions and beliefs sometimes in categorical and SCOTT (2002)
sometimes in hypothetical terms: evidential-
ism explains why the Socratic elenchus gives Scotts book is the first and to date sole assem-
the dual appearance of reaching conclusions blage of papers devoted to the subject of
which can appear simultaneously categorical Socrates method. The book divides into four
and hypothetical (296; cf. also the first two sections: Historical Origins of the Socratic
full paragraphs on 296 for a summary of this Method, Re-Examining Vlastoss Analysis
conclusion). of the Elenchus, Socratic Argumentation
Adams concludes his discussion by examin- and Interrogation in Specific Dialogues and
ing manifestations of Socrates evidentialism Four Interpretations of the Elenchus in the
beyond the elenchus, specifically in view of Charmides. Each section consists of four
Socrates apparently conflicting avowals and chapters. The fourth chapter in each sec-
disavowals of knowledge, Socrates appar- tion is a commentary on the preceding three
ently conflicting views about the priority of papers. The third paper in the section entitled
definitions and the apparent conflict between Historical Origins of the Socratic Method
51

is in fact an interpretation of the Socratic discovery of truth and falsehood; at best it

method and precisely an interpretation gives us an indication of those whose leader-
critical of Vlastoss view. So, in my view, it ship might ultimately help us to distinguish
belongs in the second section. I will discuss the one from the other (74). Apparently,
this piece and the four papers in the section then although he does not explicitly say
entitled Re-Examining Vlastoss Analysis of so Tarrant views Socrates characteristic
the Elenchus. activity as non-constructive la Benson,
yet, as Tarrant emphasizes, with a benefi-
cent intent.
Tarrant concludes with a discussion of
TARRANT (2002) Gorgias. He argues that insofar as the argu-
ments with Callicles [in Gorgias] imply
Tarrants chapter begins by arguing that something different and speak of a binding
Vlastoss description of Socrates method as process for propositions that can appar-
elenchus is inaccurate. Tarrant reviews all ently be valid [sic] without an interlocutors
instances of the word elenchus and its cog- nod, Plato has already moved away from his
nates in pre-Republic dialogues. On the basis Socratic heritage into a dialectical world that
of this, he concludes that elenchus refers to brings us logically to Aristotle (61). It is not
a competition among rivals and that Socrates clear to me what Tarrant intends by valid
rarely describes himself or is described as here. Arguments may be valid regardless of
engaging in elenctic activity. Thus, if elen- ones attitude toward them. Perhaps Tarrant
chus had been the term for Socrates activity, simply means that Socrates is less concerned
then both Socrates and Plato seem to have with his interlocutors attitude toward prop-
been curiously unaware of it (2002: 68). ositions and arguments in Gorgias, and this
In an effort to identify a more suitable distinguishes his activity in this dialogue
term to describe Socrates discursive activity, from his activity in other early dialogues.
Tarrant rejects Vlastoss focus on Gorgias on (It is worth noting that a short chapter by
the grounds that it is a late early dialogue and Young (2002) concludes the section entitled
that the concept of elenchus is specifically Historical Origins of the Socratic Method
suited to the sphere of rhetoric, a central topic and comments on Tarrants piece as well as
of this dialogue. Instead, Tarrant turns to the other two chapters in this section. Young
Apology and in view of Apology argues that is dubious of conclusions drawn from word
exetasis is the preferred term for Socratic counts or other stylistic features (85). But
interrogative activity for two reasons. First, granting Tarrants distinction between elen-
Socrates represents himself as the friend and chus and exetasis, Young takes it that the
benefactor of those being examined, not as only difference between these terms is that
their opponent. Second, exetasis is specially the former refers to interrogation directed
associated with the examination of the extent toward rivals. In that case, Young suggests
of somebodys knowledge (72). that Socrates merely uses exetasis out of
Tarrant emphasizes that both elenchus politeness or some equivalent when inter-
and exetasis primarily concern people rogating non-rivals. In that case, Young con-
rather than propositions. Thus, exetasis in cludes, there is little substantive distinction
particular does not appear to lead to the between elenchus and exetasis.
52

CARPENTER AND POLANSKY (2002) approaches to refutation (95). They argue

on the basis of four texts that Socrates has
Carpenter and Polansky argue that Socrates a variety of approaches to elenctic argumen-
has no single method of refutation or tation. First, they argue that in a passage in
cross-examination. He uses a variety of Alcibiades I Socrates refutes his interlocu-
approaches based on the needs of the partic- tors view not by showing it is false but only
ular interlocutor and conversational setting by showing that it has bad results (97).
(2002: 90) Moreover, Socrates does to some (Carpenter and Polansky acknowledge that
extent reflect on his method, yet his reflec- the authenticity of Alc. I is controversial.)
tion is not of a general nature; it tends to be Second, they argue that in Apology Socrates
restricted to the immediate context of the refutation of Meletus is intended to exemplify
argument (90). Thus, they argue that the aim to the jury the sorts of elenctic encounters
of determining a general theory of Socratic for which he is brought to trial (97). Third,
elenchus is misguided. they argue that in Republic 1 Socrates, while
Carpenter and Polanskys discussion explicitly dispensing with appeals to conven-
begins by indicating that Socrates must not tional belief, refutes Thrasymachus eccen-
be credited with originating refutative argu- tric view that injustice is profitable, fine and
mentation, and [that] he is not even the only strong. Finally, in his refutation of Polus in
one to practice elenchus in the dialogues Gorgias the fact that Socrates argument that
(91). Thus, they underscore that the elenchus doing injustice is worse than suffering injus-
is not per se a Socratic method. This point tice is deliberately fallacious, as Carpenter
is actually not directly relevant to their the- and Polansky hold, is supposed to illustrate
sis. But it is part of their general strategy of the very case he is making. Socrates does
exploding a narrow view of the scope, form injustice through arguing unfairly, and Polus
and function of elenctic argumentation in the is made to suffer injustice (99).
dialogues. Given this variety of approaches to refu-
Given this, they turn to consider the vari- tation and the variety of contexts in which
ety of contexts in which Socrates deploys refutation occurs, Carpenter and Polansky
the elenchus. They argue that Socrates some- conclude that the project of establishing
times refutes not only definitions, but also a general method or logic for the elenchus
responses to the request for definitions that is unlikely to succeed, and they encourage
are formally inadequate. They then argue expanding reflection upon Socrates meth-
that sometimes Socrates refutes his interlocu- ods beyond too narrow a view of the logic of
tors proposed procedures for deliberation. elenctic refutation (100).
Such argumentation about decision pro-
cedures seems rather unlike what is often
supposed the usual practice of Socrates, to
refute proposals of substantive beliefs (95). BENSON (2002)
In short, these elenctic contexts indicate that
Socrates elenchi do not simply target sub- Bensons paper begins with an elegant review
stantive moral theses. of Vlastoss conception of the problem of the
Finally, Carpenter and Polansky turn elenchus. Benson also briefly reiterates his
to more direct review of the variety of dissolution of the problem. In response to
53

those committed to a solution rather than a claims to have recognized someone who
dissolution of the problem of the elenchus, does know what he Socrates does not (111).
particularly on the grounds that Socrates Benson recognizes that Apology 22de is an
often speaks of aiming at the truth in his phil- exception to this claim, but he does not place
osophical inquiries, Benson also emphasizes much weight on this passage (n. 33). But this
that we should not suppose that whenever is limited solace since it remains fundamen-
Socrates behaves philosophically whenever tal to Socrates mission to pursue truth and
he engages in philosophical discourse he knowledge and thus to seek out those who
must be behaving elenctically (2002: 107). know.
In other words, Benson reiterates his view The second problem relates to Socrates
that the elenchus is not Socrates only philo- attempt to acquire knowledge in the com-
sophical method. pany of an interlocutor who, like himself,
Although this movement occupies about lacks knowledge. This problem emerges most
half of the chapter, Benson states at the explicitly and acutely with Menos paradox
outset that his objective here is to turn in Meno. Platos response to it is the theory
our attention away from [the problem of of recollection.
the elenchus] once and for all and instead Benson emphasizes that both problems are
to focus our attention on two other prob- independent of the elenchus. Finally, insofar
lems with the Socratic method that Socrates as Benson regards both problems as more
explicitly discusses in the early dialogues and general and fundamental to Socrates philo-
that [Benson thinks] are more fundamental sophical enterprise than Vlastoss problem of
to Socrates philosophical enterprise (101). the elenchus, it follows although Benson
These two problems derive from Socrates does not explicitly say this that Benson
goal of attaining truth and knowledge. In thinks that the Socratic elenchus plays a rela-
this short chapter, Benson merely introduces tively limited role in Socrates philosophical
the problems; he makes no attempt to solve mission.
them.
The first problem relates to Socrates
attempt to acquire knowledge from those
who possess it. Socrates holds, explicitly MCPHERRAN (2002B)
in Charmides, that in order to determine
whether someone possesses some expertise, McPherrans chapter focuses on Socrates
for example, that someone is a doctor and response to the Delphic Oracles pronounce-
thus possesses knowledge of health, one ment that he is the wisest Greek. McPherran
must oneself know what health is. Benson claims that Socrates reaction to the oracle,
does not claim here to fully understand why including his interpretation of it, is the most
Socrates so commits himself, but he suggests explicit instance in Platos dialogues of what
that Socrates conviction is related to his has been termed elenctic interpretation
commitment to the priority of definitional (2002b: 126). Consequently, McPherran pro-
knowledge (111). In some sense, this epis- poses that a close examination of Socrates
temological problem is mitigated by the fact reaction to the oracle will clarify more gen-
that Socrates nowhere in the early dialogues eral aspects of the elenchus (127).
54

The crux of Socrates initial puzzlement at oracle. Accordingly, Socrates interrogates his
the oracle is the conflict between the oracu- allegedly wise fellow citizens to determine
lar claim that Socrates is the wisest Greek whether they in fact possess moral wisdom.
and Socrates view of himself as not wise at The result of these interrogations, of course,
all. McPherran maintains that Socrates had is that Socrates comes to believe that his fel-
been practicing elenctic inquiry prior to the low citizens do not possess moral wisdom.
oracular pronouncement, on the grounds But since Socrates recognizes his own lack of
that it was Socrates intellectual capacities moral wisdom, he comes to the conclusion
that first incited Chaerephon to visit the that the wisdom that the oracle attributes to
Oracle (1202). Accordingly, McPherran him is precisely recognition of lack of moral
assumes that Socrates would not have wisdom. Accordingly, Socrates distinguishes
regarded himself as wise, on the grounds his human wisdom from his lack of divine
that he had failed to survive his own elenc- moral wisdom.
tic testing. However, Socrates had yet to hit At this point Socrates would seem to have
upon the idea that recognition of ignorance solved the puzzle of the oracle. Yet Socrates
could count as a form of wisdom (127). On interrogations of others do not cease.
this point, McPherran suggests that we can McPherran maintains that Socrates persists
hypothesize that he attempted (unsuccess- in testing others because he remains driven
fully) to define various virtue terms and then by a concern for piety and justice to con-
interrogated himself regarding the coherence firm to the highest degree of truth possible
of those definitions with his other beliefs his account of what the oracle [means], and
(1278). At the same time, Socrates piety from his perspective that [entails] piling up as
would have powerfully motivated him to much evidence as he [can] so as inductively
affirm the truth of the oracle. Consequently, to warrant [the oracles claim that Socrates is
for his method of discovery, of interpreta- the wisest Greek] (134). This does not, how-
tion, Socrates turns to his customary elenctic ever, merely mean testing one allegedly wise
method, attempting to refute, to show false, person after another to ensure that no undis-
the apparent meaning of the oracular pro- closed possessor of wisdom comes to light.
nouncement taken at face value, not . . . the At this point in his philosophical mission,
oracle or god (129). Specifically, Socrates McPherran hypothesizes, Socrates had also
attempts to uncover the gods meaning by come to distinguish between knowing that
trying to discover a counterexample to the something is true and understanding how it
[oracular claim that he is the wisest Greek] is true. Thus, even where Socrates might meet
(130). Thus, Socrates interrogates his alleg- someone who, like himself, admitted his lack
edly wise fellow citizens. of moral wisdom, Socrates would be wiser
At this stage in his interpretation of the than that person because he, Socrates, would
oracle, McPherran suggests, Socrates must not merely know that, but understand how,
have recognized that there were two senses this was true (135).
of wisdom, a familiar one that he himself Finally, McPherran argues, Socrates
associates with understanding of the great- continues to philosophize after nailing
est things cf. (2a) at 124 namely virtue, down the probable truth that he is the wis-
and the puzzling one attributed to him by the est [Greek] because he comes to the view
55

that he is probably being used by the god . . . cannot make his words stand still
as a paradigm to deliver the message that (2002: 144).
any person is wisest who, like Socrates, has
become cognizant that he is in truth worth
nothing in respect of wisdom (136). Thus,
whereas prior to the Oracles pronounce- BRICKHOUSE AND SMITH (2002B)
ment, Socrates would have had a secular
motivation to philosophize, namely because In this chapter Brickhouse and Smith com-
he would have viewed it as a common ment on the contributions of Carpenter and
good to rid his fellow citizens of hubristic Polansky, Benson and McPherran. Here I
false-conceit (cf. 1301), in the wake of his restrict myself to their central conclusion.
response to the oracle he comes to see that They begin with the claim that despite the
his elenctic activity is valued by god. intense and extensive attention the subject
McPherrans account of Socrates response has received . . . [they] find no general agree-
to and interpretation of the oracle occupies ment about precisely what the elenchus is
most of his chapter. In the last three and a half (2002b: 145). But Brickhouse and Smith do
pages he applies the results of this discussion not try to rectify this problem by clarifying
to consideration of Socrates elenchus gener- what the elenchus is. Instead, rather in the
ally. McPherrans conception of the elenchus spirit of Carpenter and Polansky, although
follows Vlastos. (Cf. claims (1)(4) at 142.) in a much more deflationary way, they
The central point McPherran here makes can maintain that there can be no solution to
be conceived as combining Adamss view of the problem of the elenchus and no sin-
Socrates belief evidentialism and Brickhouse gle analysis of elenctic arguments, for the
and Smiths view that Socrates beliefs are simple reason that there is no such thing as
secured through induction. (McPherran the Socratic elenchus (147). The very
cites Adams at n. 73.) Specifically, premise idea of the Socratic elenchus and thus
set Q, to which Socrates is committed and the notion that there is some very special
his interlocutor agrees has more evidential problem of the elenchus is an artifact of
weight than thesis p, which the interlocu- modern scholarship (147).
tor proposes and Socrates targets for refu- Brickhouse and Smith suggest that the first
tation. What are the evidential grounds of response to Vlastos, that of Kraut, was basi-
Q? Analogously to the way repeated elenc- cally correct: Socrates has no special method
tic testing justifies Socrates belief that he or means of arguing; he just does what we all
is the wisest Greek, the premises constitu- do when we try to argue well (156). In this
tive of Q have survived Socrates repeated respect Socrates is like us (157). Similarly,
elenctic testing. Those propositions that he the so-called problem of the elenchus is not
does assume, we are assured, are those that a problem unique or distinctive to the way
every prior attempt to overturn has resulted Socrates refutes his interlocutors theses; it
in self-contradiction, while every argument is just the basic epistemological problem of
where they serve as leading premises has what secures the premises that entail a given
either furthered inferences to similarly resist- conclusion. What distinguished Socrates
ant apparent truths or contributed to the from his contemporaries was his awareness
unmasking of a self-professed expert who of his ignorance. This did not yield a tool
56

or craft by which to advance ones cognitive F-conditions and even though all the defi-
condition (157), but, they emphasize, it did nitional pursuits ultimately end in aporia.
make Socrates outstandingly courageous. Furthermore, Wolfsdorf claims that the form
of Socrates pursuit of definitions is broadly
consistent through all the definitional dia-
logues. Thus, contra Vlastos, there is no
WOLFSDORF (2003) demise of the elenchus, that is, in this case,
no demise of Socrates manner of pursuing
Wolfsdorfs paper focuses on the manner definitions in Lysis and Hippias Major in
in which Socrates pursues definitions in the particular.
early definitional dialogues (Charmides, With respect to the cognitive status of
Laches, Lysis, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, F-conditions, Wolfsdorf claims that Socrates
Meno and Republic 1). As such, the discus- is committed to the truth of the F-conditions
sion intersects the . . . topic of Socrates on various grounds: self-evidence, their
method in the early dialogues (2003: 273). endoxic status, experience, deduction from
Wolfsdorf views Socrates pursuit of defini- premises to which he is committed on the
tions with his interlocutor as a cooperative basis of any of the previous three. As such,
pursuit of truth. Thus, Wolfsdorf rejects Wolfsdorfs position vis--vis the problem of
Bensons dissolution of the problem of the the elenchus is equivalent to Krauts: we must
elenchus. agree with Kraut . . . that when he develops
Wolfsdorf argues that Socrates pur- his arguments Socrates picks premises . . . he
sues true definitions by introducing what considers . . . eminently reasonable (293).
Wolfsdorf calls F-conditions. F-conditions But granting this, Wolfsdorf raises the ques-
are conditions for the identity of the definien- tion: If Socrates develops arguments using
dum F. More precisely, an F-condition is an premises that he considers eminently reason-
essential property of F that Socrates believes able, . . . why then does he so frequently disa-
a satisfactory definition of F must satisfy. vow ethical knowledge? (293). Observe that
For example, in Charmides Socrates sug- this question has a special force in the con-
gests that F is always fine. Proposed defini- text of an examination of Socrates pursuit
tions are, then, rejected insofar as they fail to of definitions as opposed to non-definitional
satisfy the given F-conditions Socrates intro- ethical propositions. Wolfsdorf maintains
duces. For example, the proposed definition with Benson that Socrates is committed to
of sound-mindedness as restraint is rejected (PD), the epistemological priority of defini-
insofar as restraint is not always fine. (Note tions. (Cf. also Wolfsdorf 2004b.) In that
that Wolfsdorf also argues, contra Brickhouse case, it is not open to Wolfsdorf to say
and Smith 1991, that Socrates is principally simply that Socrates holds that one cannot
concerned with investigating definitions or know some non-definitional ethical propo-
propositions rather than lives: 3058.) sition in the absence of relevant defini-
Wolfsdorf reviews all the F-conditions tional knowledge. The question is above all
introduced in the early definitional dia- why Socrates lacks definitional knowledge.
logues, and he claims that the pursuit of Wolfsdorfs response to the problem here is
definitions in individual dialogues progress general and to some extent vague. He main-
insofar as they successively satisfy successive tains that Socrates pursuit of definitions is
57

theoretically and methodologically nave in particular, properties of F that he employs

and that Socrates is in some sense sensitive in his pursuit. But, granted this, it seems that
to these limitations. It is such lack of knowl- Socrates pursuit of definitions can only rea-
edge that Socrates thinks an expert would sonably aspire to some sort of justified puta-
have and that he does not. Wolfsdorf appears tively true belief.
to be claiming that Socrates needs some sort (Wolfsdorfs 2003 discussion here should
of meta-ethical, specifically meta-definitional be compared with Wolfsdorf 2008: 12196.
theory. This appearance is supported by Another paper that advances a constructivist
Wolfsdorfs discussion of whether Socrates position with respect to Socrates pursuit of
has a theory of definition (3045). There he definitional knowledge is Hope May 1997.)
says: the [What is F?] question arises prior
to the conceptualization of metaphysics. But
methodologically the pursuit of the [What
is F?] question requires such conceptualiza- FORSTER (2006)
tion (305). As such, Wolfsdorf thinks that
such a meta-definitional theory would be a In his 1941 Platos Earlier Dialectic, Richard
metaphysical theory. (I still agree with this Robinson proposes that Socrates refutes his
view, particularly since I maintain, as most interlocutor by showing that his thesis p is
do, that Socrates pursues real definitions. self-contradictory (1953: 28, cited by Forster
However, I would add and stress that such a at 2006: n. 6). In his 1983a article Vlastos
theory must be semantic and epistemological mentions Robinsons position only to reject
as well as metaphysical.) it as an earlier misguided attempt to explain
Insofar as Socrates pursuit of defini- the Socratic elenchus (1983a: 29, cited by
tions is not based on a theory of definition, Forster at n. 7). In this 2006 piece, Forster
Wolfsdorf maintains that Socrates does not resurrects and defends Robinsons view.
have a method per se. On the other hand, Precisely, Forster argues for three related
since Socrates is committed to (PD) and pur- theses. First, at least sometimes [Socrates
sues definitions using F-conditions, Wolfsdorf understands] his refutations as attempts to
admits that Socrates has a manner of pur- reduce a thesis to a self-contradiction with-
suing definitions. Insofar as Socrates coop- out the aid of independent premises (9).
eratively pursues true definitions with his Second, Socrates conception of his refuta-
interlocutors, Wolfsdorf maintains that tions as such is reasonable [in a] significant
Socrates manner of pursuing definitions is number of cases (9). Third, it is not implau-
not elenctic, where elenctic saliently has the sible of [Socrates] to suppose that theses of
sense of adversarial or refutative. In short, the sort those refutations attack are in fact
Wolfsdorf thinks it is misguided to speak of self-contradictory (9).
Socrates elenctic method. Forster begins with what he calls a prima
Finally, Wolfsdorf considers whether, given facie case for Socrates understanding some
his commitment to (PD), Socrates pursuit of of his refutations as attempts to reduce a
definitions commits the Socratic fallacy la thesis to a self-contradiction without the
Geach. Wolfsdsorf claims that Socrates does aid of independent premises. Here he cites
not commit the Socratic fallacy because he evidence from Phaedo (101de), where
never claims to know the instances of F or, Socrates speaks of examining a hypothesis
58

to see if the propositions that rushed forth meaning of the logical as well as non-logical
from it agreed or disagreed with one vocabulary of the latter. For example,
another (10), and Euthyphro (11b), where from Jones is a bachelor, Jones is unmar-
Euthyphro complains that his theses wont ried is analytically implied. But Socratic
stand still, and Socrates compares them to sense-internality differs from analytic impli-
the self-moving statues of Daedalus. Forster cation. In particular, Socratic sense-internality
emphasizes that the analogy of statues mov- concerns the speaker-meaning of an
ing by themselves suggests that the theses are interlocutors claims, not the meaning-in-
self-contradictory (1011), and he appeals to the-language of the claim (52). It is for this
the fact that Zeno of Elea earlier presented reason that when an interlocutor proposes a
such self-contradictory refutations and sug- thesis p, Socrates sometimes asks what the
gests that in his youth the historical Socrates speaker means by p (1617). Forster cites as
was influenced by Zeno (1113). evidence Euthyphro (7a), and Hippias Minor
Forster then raises three problems (369d). Consequently, the sense of any given
for his position and spends most of the belief statement that someone utters is in part
paper answering them. (Problems one constituted by, and hence only determinable
and two are discussed at 1329; prob- by investigation, a network of related beliefs
lem three is discussed at 3054.) The first which he has . . . [And] cross-examinations
problem is that none of the elenchi in the of the sort Socrates performs have the
early dialogues works by exposing a the- function of uncovering this network (23).
sis as self-contradictory (15). A second, Moreover, this network of sense-internal
related problem is that Socrates refuta- beliefs . . . is quite broad (somewhat broader
tions employ a multiplicity of premises in than the semantic intuitions of most mod-
order to generate a logical difficulty (15) ern philosophers would be likely to allow)
and that Socrates is aware of this multi- (23). Accordingly, Forster argues, if Socrates
plicity. As evidence of this Forster cites sometimes understood all of the essential
Gorgias (498e499b), Protagoras (332d) assumptions employed in a refutation to be
and Charmides (164cd, 165ab). A third internal to the sense of the thesis, then both
problem is that the way that Socrates [of the first two] . . . problems would dis-
conceives of his refutations as exposing appear (16). That is, the refutations would
self-contradiction is implausible. Forsters expose the theses as self-contradictory, and
solution to the first two problems depends Socrates use of various premises to expose
upon certain implicit assumptions about the self-contradiction would be legitimate. An
meaning that Socrates makes and that are additional virtue of Forsters interpretation is
alien to us (14). Precisely, Forster proposes that it provides a solution to Vlastoss prob-
that in the case of the self-contradictory lem of the elenchus. Socrates is able to refute
elenchi, Socrates understands the premises his interlocutors theses precisely because
he generates to be internal to the sense of he exposes them as self-contradictory (29).
the thesis (16). Forsters introduction of the problem and
As an initial explication of sense-internality, rejection of, in particular, Bensons dissolu-
Forster refers to the concept of analytic impli- tion occurs at 259.
cation, according to which one proposition In an effort to resolve the third problem,
is derived from another on the basis of the that is, to defend Socrates conception of
59

sense-internality and thus the plausibility charge of fallacies of ambiguity is consider-

of Socrates view that he sometimes refutes ably more elaborate than I can or should
his interlocutors by exposing their theses as explain here. Forster begins with the argu-
self-contradictory, Forster takes a leaf from ment that Socrates is sensitive to ambiguity
the later Wittgenstein and from empirical and in particular to eristic uses of ambigu-
research of ordinary language use to sug- ity such as occur in Euthydemus (3847). He
gest that distinctions such as those between then discusses Socrates commitment to the
analyticity and syntheticity, meaningful- principle of univocity, according to which
ness and meaninglessness, synonymy and whenever a single general term is involved
non-synonymy are in fact more vague and there is just a single meaning involved as well
mutable than modern philosophers of lan- (48). But Forster recognizes that the univoc-
guage typically admit (32). Accordingly, ity principle and Socrates focus on speaker-
Forster suggests that Socrates draws the ana- meaning are at odds with one another, for
lytic/synthetic distinction in a different place the univocity principle entails uniformity in
from us (33). Moreover, Forster proposes the meaning attached to [a general term] by
that there is no good reason to assume in different individuals (54, with my italics).
advance that the modern distinction is more Finally, Forster suggests that it is not alto-
advantageous than Socrates (34). gether clear whether Platos Socrates per-
This is the gist of Forsters argument. In ceives this tension between or has a way of
addition, Forster argues that due to the reconciling these two opposing sides of his
highly unstable state of ethical thought in position (54).
fifth-century Athens (35), Socrates had good
reason to expect that his interlocutors ethi-
cal beliefs would be contradictory and thus,
given his conception of sense-internality, MCPHERRAN (2007)
self-contradictory. (Forster discusses this
topic at 357.) McPherrans important paper begins with
Finally, in the penultimate section of the Aristotles report in Metaphysics (1078b732)
paper, Forster considers a common objection that epagogic or inductive argumentation was
to Socrates elenchi, namely that they falla- one of two distinguishing features of Socratic
ciously turn on ambiguity and related linguis- philosophizing. Likewise, McPherran claims,
tic phenomena. This topic relates to Forsters Plato and Xenophon target epagg as an
conception of Socratic sense-internality inso- innovative, distinguishing mark of Socratic
far as appeal to Socratic sense-internality methodology (2007: 348). Several earlier
is crucial to Forsters defense of Socrates scholars, in particular Richard Robinson, dis-
against the charge. The gist of the defense on cuss Socratic epagg. (Cf. Robinson 1953:
this front is that although terms may appear 3348. McPherran also cites Gulley 1968;
ambiguous or in fact be ambiguous in the Santas 1979: 13655; Vlastos 1991: 2678,
language as a whole, an individual speaker is is a more recent, exceptional example.) Yet,
less likely to use a single expression in differ- McPherran suggests, their accounts of epa-
ent senses or to use two apparent synonyms gogic argumentation conflict. No article
in different senses [within a given argument] prior to McPherrans is devoted to the sub-
(52). Forsters defense of Socrates against the ject. Thus, McPherran offers a welcome and
60

much needed fresh, critical account (349) of (Note that McPherran uses the symbols (A),
the topic. (B) and (C). I have avoided these to avoid
Beyond the introduction, the paper divides confusion with the symbols Vlastos uses to
into two parts: epagg and induction and refer to Socrates meta-elenctic commitments.)
Socratic epagogic induction. The former Robinson has little to say about (i). He
occupies most of the paper and begins with claims that (d) is the most conspicuous form
Robinsons classification of three types of epagg in the dialogues (1941: 36, cited
of epagg in Platos dialogues. These are by McPherran at 351). And he claims that
arguments from a single proposition or set there is no clear case of (g) (1941: 37; cf.
of coordinate propositions that serve as McPherran 350 and n. 11). In contrast,
premises to: McPherran maintains that Robinson pro-
vides no convincing evidence that Socrates
1. Another proposition superordinate to the ever let alone frequently conducted
premise set (e.g. the opposite of beauty his elenchi according to (d) (2007: 351).
is only ugliness; the opposite of goodness Instead, McPherran argues that (g), some-
is only badness; therefore, every opposite what modified by (i), gives us the correct
has only one opposite. Prt. 332cd, cited account of one sort of Socratic epagg one
by McPherran at 349). that resembles what we would call induc-
2. Another coordinate proposition (e.g. tive generalization (350).
expert pilots have the best success at
Before turning to the defense of his posi-
sea-faring; therefore, expert builders have
tive view, McPherran devotes the remainder
the best success at building (Ap. 27b;
Hp. Ma. 284ab, cited by McPherran at of this section to consideration of Vlastoss
349). endorsement of a position akin to, but
3. Another proposition superordinate to the importantly distinct from, (i) as the most
premise set followed by an inference back characteristic form of Socratic epagg.
to a subordinate proposition (e.g. men are (Vlastos 1991: 267, cited by McPherran at
mortal; thus, human beings are mortal; 352.) Vlastos maintains that Socrates uses
thus, women are mortal (Euthphr. 10ad, epagg to communicate the meaning of
cited by McPherran at 349). rather than to provide empirical support for
some general claim. Accordingly, Socrates
Robinson suggests three conceptions of epa- epagogic method is not a method of infer-
gogic movement to a universal: ence, but rather amounts to what is some-
times called intuitive induction or what
(i) intuition of the universal through a sam- Vlastos calls explicative epagg (353; cf.
ple of coordinate cases (thus obtaining McPherrans remark at n. 22: Thus, the
certainty); term intuitive induction does not designate
(d) complete enumeration of a set of coordi-
what I . . . termed intuition of the universal
nate cases followed by trivial deductive
[(i)]). Consider the following abbreviated
inference to a universal;
(g) probable inductive generalization employ- argument from Ion (540bd):
ing a survey of coordinate cases that lead
to a probable generalization that may be (p) The pilot is one who knows best what
overturned by the discovery of a discon- should be said to the crew of a storm-
firming instance. tossed ship.
61

(q) The doctor is the one who knows best between persuasive epagogic argumentation
what should be said to the sick. and anti-constructivist interpretations of
(r) The master of a craft is the one who Socratic elenchus is a secondary concern of
knows best matters falling within its sub- McPherrans in this paper. Consider his con-
ject matter.
cluding sentence: I have indicated how advo-
cates of anti-constructivist interpretations of
(McPherran [352], following Vlastos [1991: the elenchus need to provide a better account
2678], presents the Ion argument more of the place of Socratic epagg in what they
fully.) allege to be Socrates single-minded use of
In this case, (r) is not being derived from the elenchus to pursue knowledge-testing of
(p) and (q) as an inductive generalization. knowledge-professing interlocutors (364).
Rather, (p) and (q) serve to explain the McPherran grants Vlastos that in some
meaning of (r). In other words, the argument cases, including Ion (540bd), Socrates
does not assume that (r) might be falsified employs intuitive induction. (McPherran
by some empirical evidence, say, encoun- discusses another instance from Grg. 460ae
tering someone who is not a master crafts- at 356, contra Santas 1979: 151.) However,
man yet who best knows matters falling he questions whether intuitive induction is
within a craft. That person would in fact be Socrates representative, let alone only, form
a master craftsman. (Cf. McPherrans dis- of epagg. Contra Vlastos, McPherran
cussion at 3523, with Vlastoss quotation argues that there is a considerable presence
at 1991: 268, cited by McPherran at 353.) of probabilistic, inductive, persuasive epagg
On Vlastoss view, then, we should think of in [Platos and Xenopons works] (359).
Socrates as always or almost always obtain- McPherrans presumptive argument for this
ing an interlocutors assent to the premises position occurs at 3579. The final section
of an elenchus not by persuasion but by of the paper (35964) elaborates. The pre-
mere explanation a form of explanation sumptive argument enlists Aristotles views
that helps the interlocutor to recall and state of epagg and their resemblance to certain
his or her actual beliefs, beliefs held prior to Platonic passages, in particular Euthydemus
his . . . encounter with Socrates (353; this (279d80b). The heart of McPherrans argu-
is McPherrans summary of Vlastoss view. ment occurs in the final section of the paper;
Observe that Vlastoss position here is signif- it is based on an argument from Charmides
icant for his view of Socratic elenchus, spe- (159b160d).
cifically for his view that argument is from McPherran argues that in the Charmides,
Q not to it [= (3]). In other words, Vlastoss Socrates infers, from a number of instances
view that Socrates employs intuitive induc- of agile and robust and slow and restrained
tion, rather than (i) or (g), is consistent with actions, the general claim that agile and
the view that Socrates never tries to persuade robust actions are finer than slow and
an interlocutor of the truth of a premise. restrained ones. More precisely, the gen-
Note that McPherran argues (at 3545) eral claim, that is, the universal, is inferred
that we can reject Vlastoss premise (3), probabilistically, not with certainty. Thus,
while still following Vlastoss defense of an McPherran maintains that in the Charmides
anti-constructivist interpretation of Socratic argument Socrates reasons epagogically in
elenchus. More generally, the relation accordance with (g), somewhat modified by
62

(i). That is to say, the Charmides argument In arguing that there are constructive
exemplifies probabilistically inductive gener- elenctic elements in early dialogues other
alization employing a survey of coordinate than the Gorgias (254), Santana specifies
cases (= [g]), from which the universal is three properties that an elenctic argument
intuited (= [i]), but not with certainty. may have, some combination of whose pres-
McPherran buttresses his interpretation ence would indicate that Socrates thinks his
of this Charmides argument, and concludes elenchus establishes the falsity of his interloc-
his discussion by considering a second utors thesis. These properties are as follows:
Charmides argument (167c168b) and an
argument from Memorabilia (1.2.9), in which (1) Before his elenctic argument, Socrates
he maintains that Socrates reasons by means makes statements indicating that he aims
of probable inductive generalization. to establish that the interlocutors thesis
is false.
(2) After his elenctic argument, Socrates
makes statements indicating that he has
established that the interlocutors thesis
SANTANA (2007) is false.
(3) Socrates expects his interlocutor to aban-
The aim of Santanas paper is rather modest: don his thesis and accept the conclusion
to vindicate a constructivist conception of of the elenchus (255. Santana emphasizes
the elenchus just to the extent of defending that of the three properties taken indi-
the constructivist assumption that: vidually, (3) has the strongest evidential
weight.).
(CA) Socrates thinks some of his elenctic
arguments prove that the interlocutors Given these properties, Santana discusses
thesis is false. (2007: 252) three elenchi: at Crito (44c48b), Republic 1
(335b336a) and Euthyphro (8be). Santana
I emphasize that Santana does not endeavour argues that the Crito elenchus has proper-
to solve Vlastoss problem of the elenchus, ties (1)(3) and that the Republic 1 and
merely to confirm, say, against Benson, that Euthyphro elenchi have properties (2)(3),
it is a genuine problem. Relatedly, Santana is thus vindicating (CA). (Santana summarizes
not concerned with whether Socrates is jus- these conclusions at 263.)
tified in thinking that certain of his elenchi In the remainder of the paper, Santana dis-
prove the falsity of the interlocutors thesis. cusses four possible objections that may be
Two further preliminary points deserve made to his preceding conclusions (2646).
mention. One is that in deriving evidence The first possible objection would be to
for his thesis, Santana deliberately ignores claim that Socrates has only argued that if
Gorgias. (Cf. 253) The other is that Santana the interlocutor accepts premise set Q, then
admits, with Carpenter and Polansky, that not-p follows. Santana maintains that the
Socrates elenctic arguments are to some presence of (3) in the elenchi undermines this
extent heterogeneous. Thus, Santana writes, possibility.
we can recognize a [constructivist] pattern in The second possible objection would be
a sub-set of elenchi without conceiving it to be that Socrates qualifies the conclusions of
the definitive account of the elenchus (254). some of his elenchi by claiming not to know
63

the conclusion for which he has argued. After presenting (EA), the paper discusses
Santana acknowledges that Socrates lacks two prior interpretations of (EA), those of
moral knowledge of the relevant claims, but Krauts 1983 response to Vlastos 1983a
responds that one can be a fallibilist yet still and Santas (unpublished manuscript), and
give proofs of which one is confident (265). how these interpretations are responsible
The third possible objection relates to for serious objections . . . to the legitimacy
Bensons doxastic constraint, namely that and scope of the problem [of the elenchus]
only the interlocutor must affirm Q; and in (42). Santana then argues that (EA), properly
that case, Socrates could only conclude that understood, avoids these objections and is in
the interlocutors thesis was inconsistent fact justified (42). Finally, given his interpre-
with Q. But Santana argues that given (3), tation of (EA), Santana briefly explains how
Socrates must himself affirm the truth of [Q] to solve the problem of the elenchus.
and therefore believe [Q] (265). In presenting (EA), Santana introduces a
Finally again with Benson in mind one distinction between two components of the
might object that Socrates must hold that the problem of the elenchus. The formal prob-
premises of Q have an epistemic property lem is that because agreement to Q is ad hoc,
more plausibly related to truth than the ini- which is to say, the premises of Q are logically
tial thesis. Santana simply acknowledges this unsecured, Socrates cannot validly conclude
as a problem that a defender of (CA) must not-p. This is because although the interlocu-
answer. He defers his own answer to another tor agrees to Q, he also believes p. The episte-
paper (Santana 2009). mological component of the problem of the
elenchus is that because Socrates secures only
the interlocutors agreement to the [premises
of Q], their epistemic status remains undis-
SANTANA (2009) closed (43). Thus, it is unclear how Socrates
and his interlocutor can validly conclude not-
Santanas 2009 paper picks up where his p from Q because it is unclear how Q has a
2007 paper leaves off, with the problem of weightier epistemic status than the interloc-
defending the view that premise set Q must utors original thesis p (43). This raises what
have an epistemic property more plausibly Santana regards as the central question of
related to truth than the interlocutors ini- the problem of the Socratic elenchus: How
tial thesis p: The purpose of this paper is to does Socrates think he and the interlocutor
address the . . . controversy [about whether are justified in thinking that [the premises
there is a genuine problem of the elenchus], constitutive of Q] in his elenctic arguments
part of which centers around an important are true? (44). Finally, the view that Socrates
but ambiguous assumption which seems to thinks that he and his interlocutor are so jus-
require that Socrates give or have particular tified, in other words, the view that there is a
epistemic reasons for the truth of the premises problem of the elenchus, assumes that:
he uses to refute the interlocutor (2009: 41).
The assumption to which Santana here refers (EA) Socrates must give or have epis-
he calls the epistemic assumption or (EA). temic reasons for how the interlocutor
(Santana gives, as I will shortly, a more pre- and he are justified in thinking that the
cise description of the contents of [EA].) premises of Q are true. (44)
64

Santana now turns to interpretations of (EA). Vlastoss assumptions (A) and (B)). Thus,
He notes that (EA) is ambiguous between: Santana interprets (EA) as:
(EA1) Socrates must give or have par- (EA3) Socrates must give or have general
ticular epistemic reasons for the truth of epistemic reasons for the truth of the
every premise of Q he uses in his elenctic premises of Q. (47)
arguments.
(EA2) Socrates must give or have par- Granting that (EA3) is the correct interpreta-
ticular epistemic reasons not for every tion of (EA), Santana now proposes the fol-
premise but for some of the premises lowing response to (EA) and thus solution
of Q, namely those that need such
to problem of the elenchus. Socrates gen-
reasons.
eral epistemic rationale for the truth of the
premises of Q, which lends them more evi-
If one interprets (EA) as (EA1), then, as dential weight than his interlocutors thesis
Kraut had argued, an infinite regress will p, is that Socrates and his interlocutor agree
follow, for every premise in an argument to Q, whereas only the interlocutor agrees to
will require reasons to support it. (Santana p. In short, the mutual agreement of Socrates
discusses this at 445.) Thus, (EA1) is unjus- and his interlocutor to Q corroborates the
tifiable; and, given the rejection of (EA1), truth of Q (50).
the problem of the elenchus is resolved. If, Santana appeals to this notion of justifi-
instead, one interprets (EA) as (EA2), then, cation by corroborative agreement (phrase
as Santas has argued, there are at least first used at 51) as a common one. For exam-
piecemeal solutions to the problem of the ple: if two people aim to identify a person at
elenchus. This is because Socrates at least a distance, the fact that each asserts that the
sometimes meets the requirement of (EA2). person is, say, Jones, gives the other more rea-
Precisely, arguments for at least some of the son to believe that it is Jones (52). But granted
premises needing epistemic reasons are scat- that epistemic justification by corroborative
tered among the early dialogues. So although agreement is common, it is important to note
in one elenchus Socrates may use a premise that in the course of arguing for this concep-
q without securing it, an argument for q may tion of epistemic justification, Santana distin-
be found elsewhere. (Santana discusses this guishes corroborative agreement within the
at 456.) context of an elenchus from mere agreement
Santana argues that both (EA1) and (EA2) in non-elenctic and specifically certain con-
are misinterpretations of (EA) and thus of ventional discursive contexts. In particular,
Vlastoss problem of the elenchus. Although the discursive contexts Santana has in mind
Socrates may have particular epistemic rea- include those whose methods are rhetorical
sons for particular premises constitutive of and whose aims are not the truth (51). The
Q, Vlastos construes the problem of the elen- importance of the distinction between such
chus as a general methodological problem mere agreement and corroborative agreement
that seeks to reveal Socrates background in an elenctic context is that Socrates himself
methodological assumptions regarding the dismisses the mere agreement of others as a
epistemic status of [the premises of Q], what- reason for thinking a claim is true. In other
ever these may be (47; recall the nature of words, Socrates dismisses the popularity of
65

a claim as a reason for thinking that claim is the interlocutors sole assertion, is open to
true. (This point is introduced and discussed debate. In short, Vlastoss problem remains
by Santana at 502.) Thus, corroborative alive and invites further reflection.
agreement in elenctic contexts has a special At the same time, as other scholars have
weight that tips the evidence in favour of Q suggested, we should broaden examination
and so not-p. of Socrates arguments beyond the elenchus
and the problem of the elenchus. Not all of
Socrates arguments aim at or achieve refuta-
tion. But even among those that do, not all
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER STUDY pursue or accomplish this objective in the
same way. For example, some arguments
A theory of Socrates method depends upon operate through some form of reductio;
the interpretation of arguments and as such some by analogy; some are epagogic; some
to some extent falls within the domain of use certain premises as dialectical expedi-
logic. But as we have seen, the interpretation ents; some are deliberately fallacious and
of Socratic arguments is not limited to their variously so. It may be useful to consider to
logical form; it also requires interpretation what extent Socratic arguments, both criti-
of the psychological attitudes of the par- cal and constructive, can be classified. Here
ticipants, in other words, the pragmatics of again, I recommend sensitivity to variation
argumentation. For example, we may need to across dialogues. For example, it may be
know Socrates or his interlocutors attitudes useful to consider whether some forms of
toward premises and conclusions. Likewise, argumentation are prominent in or unique to
we may need to know Socrates or his inter- some dialogues. In short, between Vlastoss
locutors attitude toward the development monolithic conception of the elenchus as
of or engagement in an argument or in argu- Socratic method and Krauts general claim
mentation itself. In that case, it is necessary to that Socrates argues by picking premises he
survey and clarify the evidence that informs considers eminently reasonable, a good deal
our knowledge of the relevant psychologi- of middle ground lies open for investigation
cal states of the characters. Some of this of details and specifics.
work has indeed been done. But it has not In considering Socratic arguments, it
been done so carefully or systematically as it may also be valuable to compare these
should be. In particular, one should be wary with the arguments and discursive man-
of generalizing within and across dialogues. ners of his interlocutors. Likewise, it may be
It is possible, for various reasons, that Plato valuable to compare the forms of Socratic
employs Socrates and his interlocutors vari- argumentation in Platonic dialogues with
ously in different argumentative contexts. those in non-Platonic Socratic texts such as
As far as the elenchus is concerned, Xenophons and in particular pseudo-Platonic
Bensons dissolution has not won much sup- dialogues such as Alcibiades II, Eryxias and
port. Indeed, the most recent contributions Axiochus. Sporadic and partial considera-
to the debate, Santanas, reaffirm that there tions of this kind occur among the second-
is a problem of the elenchus. Santanas pro- ary literature surveyed in this chapter, but a
posed solution, that corroborative agree- great deal of sustained and systematic work
ment carries greater evidential weight than remains to be done.
66

The primary data or domain of evidence on a uniform Socratic method. Why should we
the basis of which a theory of Socrates method presume that? Since questions of chronol-
is to be constructed is Platos early dialogues. ogy and authorship are extremely difficult to
But there are controversies surrounding settle, it may be prudent simply to examine
which Platonic dialogues are early and which Socrates method in a set of dialogues and
were composed by Plato. For example, many allow our results to encourage or discour-
scholars simply reject developmentalism. And age the view that the method is consistent or
some of those who accept developmentalism continuous among these texts. Finally, inso-
deny, for instance, that Euthydemus is an far as we are concerned with the method of
early dialogue. Similarly, some scholars deny the favoured character, if not the authorial
that Plato composed Hippias Major; and it mouthpiece, in a group of Platonic texts, why
is debatable whether, for instance, Theages should we speak of Socrates method rather
and Alcibiades I, which have tended not to than Platos?
be regarded as authentic, should be. Insofar Scholarship of the last quarter century on
as we are serious about studying Socrates the philosophical method or methods por-
method in the early dialogues of Plato, we trayed in a set of Platonic dialogues has been
must be prepared to defend the view that a an unprecedentedly vibrant period in the his-
certain set of dialogues is early and Platonic. tory of the subject. The foregoing survey of
To this it may be objected that it suffices to central contributions should help to advance
focus on a set of dialogues uncontroversially the discussion still further.
identifiable as Platonic and perhaps early. But
this would only be acceptable if there were David Wolfsdorf
67

4
SOCRATIC METAPHYSICS*
INTRODUCTION refer to the historical figure who is the source

for the Platonic portrait in the dialogues, or
Did Socrates have a metaphysics? The ques- to the Socrates of the Platonic portrait itself.
tion is complex. We might begin by ask- Of the authors I shall discuss, only Gregory
ing, what is a metaphysics? We might also Vlastos insists that he is seeking the histori-
ask, who we mean by Socrates? Let me deal cal Socrates. The rest are content to deal
with these questions in order. Metaphysics with the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues.
is concerned with what lies at the founda- This is, in my judgement, the only Socrates
tion of things, the principles underlying real- about whom we have information adequate
ity. In this essay, that will mean primarily an to provide an answer to the ontological ques-
ontology, a theory of what there is. Now tion. When this question is confined to the
one point on which the authors discussed in Socrates of the dialogues, the question then
this article agree, a point of departure that becomes, which dialogues? One possibility is
anchors their various views about Socratic that we should look at the views of the char-
metaphysics, is that Plato had a metaphysics: acter named Socrates in all the dialogues
as Gregory Vlastos puts it, a grandiose theory in which he appears. This approach is con-
of separately existing Forms (Vlastos 1991: nected with an interpretive strategy called
48).1 This ontology is found in the Phaedo, unitarianism. The unitarian treats the com-
Symposium and Republic. Our authors agree plete set of dialogues as a whole and does not
further that the Platonic Forms are universals, divide them into temporally distinct groups
causes, paradigms or standards, and in some with distinct doctrines. For the unitarian the
sense self-predicational (the Form of F itself is answer to the question whether the Socrates
F). Given this level of agreement on Platonic of the dialogues has an ontology is clear, for
metaphysics, we can ask three questions about there is no doubt that the character named
Socratic metaphysics: Did Socrates espouse Socrates in the Phaedo, Symposium and
Platonic metaphysics? Did he espouse some Republic espouses an ontology of Forms.
predecessor to Platonic metaphysics? Or was The unitarian approach has not been
Socrates innocent of metaphysics? dominant in the modern era, though it was
As to the identity of Socrates, there are widely accepted among Platos readers and
two possibilities. Socrates may be taken to interpreters in antiquity. The predominant
68

SOCRATIC METAPHYSICS
approach to the interpretation of the dia- say that godliness and ungodliness are,
logues in the twentieth century, however, is both as regards murder and other things;
what has been called developmentalism. or is the pious not the same and alike in
The developmentalist divides the dialogues every action, and the impious the opposite
into three groups: an early or Socratic group, of all that is pious and like itself, and eve-
which represents the thought of Socrates, a rything that is to be impious presents us
middle or Platonic group and a late group. with one form (idean, d4) or appearance
(Only the first two groups will be relevant in so far as it is impious?
to this essay.)2 The developmentalist rejects EUTHYPHRO: Most certainly, Socrates.
the solution to the problem of Socratic SOCRATES: Tell me then, what is the pious,
metaphysics offered by the unitarian, on and what the impious, do you say? (5cd,
the grounds that the ontology of the mid- trans. Grube)3
dle period dialogues is Platonic rather than
Socratic. For the developmentalist, the ques- And,
tion of Socratic metaphysics is confined to
the early dialogues. Only the Socrates of the (E2) SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I
early dialogues counts as representing the did not bid you tell me one or two of the
thought of Socrates. So the question of this many pious actions but that form (eidos,
essay becomes: Does the Socrates of the early d11) itself that makes all pious actions
Platonic dialogues possess an ontology, a pious, for you agreed that all impious
theory of what there is? actions are impious and all pious actions
Here controversy has swirled around sev- pious through one form (idea, e1), or dont
eral texts: Protagoras (330c331c), in which you remember?
Socrates gets Protagoras to admit that jus- EUTHYPHRO: I do.
tice is something that exists and is just, and SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form
likewise for piety; Meno (72a73a), in which (idean, e4) itself is, so that I may look upon
Socrates compares the nature of virtue to the it, and using it as a model (paradeigmati,
nature of a bee, and also to health, strength e6), say that any action of yours that is of
and size; Hippias Major (287be), in which that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is
justice, wisdom, goodness and beauty (the not. (6de)
fine, to kalon) are said to be that by which
things are just, wise, good and fine, by These two passages are centrally important,
being those respective properties; and, most the proof texts for those who would main-
importantly, Euthyphro (5cd and 6de). In tain the existence of an ontology, a version
these two passages, Socrates, in challenging of the theory of forms, in the early dialogues.
Euthyphro to define piety and in criticizing (All of the authors considered in this essay
his first attempt to define piety, puts forward regard the Euthyphro as an early dialogue.)
what has seemed to several scholars to be a For proponents of this view, Platos use of
theory of forms: eidos, idea and paradeigma to denominate
the entities mentioned in these passages pre-
(E1) SOCRATES: . . . So tell me now, by figures the full-blown theory of Forms in the
Zeus, what you just now maintained you middle dialogues. The claim that there is one
clearly knew: what kind of thing do you form for all the instances of piety, a One over
69

Many, marks piety as a universal, a common Socrates on matters of definition and their
property.4 The claim that it is through one metaphysical implications, and compares
form of piety that all pious things are pious them to those of Plato. Numerous questions
marks piety as a cause of pious actions. arise from these passages: Is the Socrates of
The statement that forms are paradeigmata, these texts the character of the dialogues or
paradigms or models, marks piety as a stand- the historical figure? Does Socrates have
ard for the application of the term pious. a metaphysical view? What does Aristotle
Paradeigmatism leads to self-predication, the mean by definitions? But the key claim of
assertion that the form of F is F. Socrates these passages is that Socrates did not sepa-
rejection of definition by distinguishing rate the forms, whereas Plato did. Aristotles
mark (Euthphro 9e11b) indicates that the claims have been subject to scrutiny; it has
definition of piety must describe its nature, or been questioned whether we ought to rely on
essence. This impressive looking set of claims them for our interpretation of Socrates. The
appears to constitute a metaphysical theory, authors I discuss take a number of different
one that strongly resembles the middle period views on this question. Most tend to accept
theory of Forms. How does it differ from that Aristotles testimony, but Allen is critical of
theory? Primarily on the issue of separation. Aristotle as a historian of philosophy.
The forms in the early period do not exist in They also take a variety of positions
separation from their participants; those in on the question of Socratic metaphys-
the middle period do.5 There is disagreement ics. Russell Dancy takes the most extreme,
among proponents of this distinction concern- anti-metaphysical view and draws the sharp-
ing the nature of separation and the amount est distinction between Socrates and Plato.
of difference it makes to the two theories. For For Dancy the early dialogues contain a
some interpreters (Allen and me, in particu- theory of definitions but no metaphysics;
lar), separation is a serious issue, marking a the metaphysics emerges in the middle dia-
large-scale difference between the theories logues and belongs not to Socrates but to
and requiring a difference in the kind of enti- Plato. Dancy relies on Aristotles testimony
ties forms can be said to be (unseparated to support his view. Gregory Vlastos holds
forms being properties, but separate Forms the view closest to Dancys. Like Dancy, he
being substances). For Fine, in contrast, the takes an anti-metaphysical line on the phi-
difference between the unseparated forms of losophy of Socrates. He makes the important
the early dialogues and the separated Forms concession that there is an ontology of forms
of the middle dialogues is much more mod- in the Euthyphro and other early dialogues,
est, with forms of both kinds being treated but he denies that it is a theory. For Vlastos,
as properties. For Francesco Fronterotta, the Socrates is exclusively a moral philosopher,
germ (at least) of separation, and thus of the for he never asks critical questions about the
middle period theory of Forms, is already ontology he holds.
present in the early theory. R. E. Allen, Gail Fine and I, in contrast,
The question of separation is connected hold that there is a metaphysical theory
with the testimony of Aristotle concerning present in the early dialogues, an early ver-
the metaphysical views of Socrates and Plato. sion of the theory of forms. I criticize Vlastos
In several places (notably, Metaphysics A.6, for denying that the metaphysics of the early
M.4 and M.9) Aristotle discusses the views of dialogues is a theory. I argue that it is a theory,
70

and following Allen, that it is similar, but not the question, Did Socrates have a metaphys-
identical to, the theory of the middle dia- ics? decisively shapes our understanding of
logues. It is Allen who labels this theory the the nature of Socrates philosophical inquiry,
earlier theory of Forms. If Gregory Vlastos which is central to everything we know
holds the majority opinion about Socratic about him, and thus our portrait of Socrates.
metaphysics, Allen is the leader of the minor- Socrates was one of the great philosophers
ity view. My agreement with Allen is nearly of the ancient world indeed, of the entire
complete; we hold the same view of Socratic history of Western thought and the ques-
metaphysics, but we have slightly different tion whether we should see him exclusively
views on separation. We also disagree about as a moral philosopher, as Vlastos claimed,
the testimony of Aristotle; like Fine, I take or as a philosopher with a metaphysics is of
Aristotles view of Socrates ontology to be fundamental importance to our understand-
reliable, whereas Allen is critical of it. Fine ing of him. That is the primary reason for us
takes it that there is a Socratic theory of forms to investigate this question.
and that it differs from the Platonic theory on
the question of separation, but is otherwise
the same. Fronterotta, finally, criticizes my
view (and that of other scholars mentioned THE ANTI-METAPHYSICAL
above) that there is development between the INTERPRETATION
ontology of the early and that of the middle
dialogues. Fronterotta is a unitarian, or, to DANCYS VIEW
use his term, an anti-developmentalist.
Why is this question important? It might The first view that I shall consider is that of
seem at first glance to be a question of a Russell Dancy. Dancy presents his interpre-
rather technical sort, based on disputed tation of Socrates view on metaphysics in
readings of isolated texts. Further reflection Platos Introduction of Forms (Dancy 2004)
reveals, however, that it is an interpretative and in Platonic Definitions and Forms
question of essential importance for our (Dancy 2006: 7084). Dancy is a develop-
understanding of Socrates. The metaphysical mentalist. (In this respect his view resem-
Socrates differs from the anti-metaphysical bles that of Vlastos, which we shall consider
Socrates in fundamental ways; ways that below.) He distinguishes a group of early dia-
affect our reading of all the early and mid- logues, including the Charmides, Euthyphro,
dle dialogues, and bring into play the general Hippias Major, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras,
interpretative strategies of unitarianism and and Book I of the Republic, from a middle
developmentalism. If SocratesE, as Gregory group, including the Phaedo, Symposium,
Vlastos called the Socrates of the early dia- and Republic; the Meno he takes to be tran-
logues, had a theory of forms, then he is much sitional (Dancy 2006: 70). He classifies the
closer to SocratesM, the Socrates of the mid- early, definitional dialogues as non-doctrinal
dle dialogues, than anti-metaphysical inter- and the Meno, Phaedo and Symposium as
preters such as Dancy and Vlastos can admit doctrinal (Dancy 2004: 46). Dancys inter-
(though exactly how close the two Socrateses pretation assumes a development over time
are to each other is a matter of controversy). from one group of dialogues to the other.
But more important, the answer we give to Specifically, the early dialogues are concerned
71

with a search for definitions, which is not Ordinary F things are also not-F (beautiful
metaphysical in character. The middle dia- things are also ugly).
logues, on the other hand, introduce the the- The form is never not-F (the Beautiful is
ory of Forms; this theory is said to be absent never ugly).
Therefore, the form of F is not the same as
before the Phaedo. The Meno is transitional
any ordinary F thing (the Beautiful is not
in that it introduces a philosophical doctrine,
the same as any ordinary beautiful thing).
the doctrine of Recollection, which goes
beyond anything in the Socratic dialogues. In
the Phaedo this doctrine is explicitly linked This argument does not appear in the
to the theory of Forms (Dancy 2004: 1011). Socratic dialogues, though it is anticipated in
Dancy writes, Socrates was concerned with the Hippias Major. It does, however, appear
definitions in the domain of ethical mat- in the middle dialogues (Dancy 2006: 71).
ters, while Platos adoption of Socrates Dancy believes that this argument is the
quest for definitions took a special turn: same as the Argument from Flux, which
Plato made the objects of definition, forms, Aristotle uses to distinguish the views of
distinct or separate from perceptible things. Socrates from those of Plato (Dancy 2004:
And we shall find this taking place not in the 1819). The Argument from Relativity/Flux
Socratic dialogues, but in the Phaedo and marks the onset of Platonic metaphysics, in
Republic (Dancy 2006: 70). Dancy denies particular the theory of Forms. What Dancy
the Allen/Fine/Prior view, discussed below, does is to construct a Theory of Definition
that the Euthyphro contains a Theory of for Socrates (Dancy 2006: 71). He admits
Forms (Dancy 2004: 11). that this theory is not Socrates or Platos,
Dancy accepts the testimony of Aristotle since there is no explicit theory of defini-
that Socrates did not make the universals tion in either the Socratic or the middle dia-
or the definitions exist apart (Metaphysics logues. It is, rather, elicited from remarks in
M.4, 1078b3031), which he reads as sup- the Socratic dialogues. This theory contains
porting his distinction between the early, three conditions of adequacy for defini-
non-doctrinal dialogues and the middle, doc- tions: the Substitutivity Requirement, the
trinal ones. He is also inclined to accept the Explanatory Requirement and the Paradigm
view that attributes the philosophical posi- Requirement. Though the latter two feed
tions of the Socrates of the early dialogues into the Theory of Forms, they do not
to the historical Socrates and the views of entail that theory; where Socrates is con-
the Socrates of the middle dialogues to Plato, cerned with definitions, he is not concerned
though he concedes that for purposes of dis- with metaphysics at all (Dancy 2006: 71).
cussion occurrences of the name Socrates Socrates wants definitions because he
need only be taken as referring to the charac- thinks they are essential to figuring out how
ter in Platos dialogues (Dancy 2006: 70). to live rightly (Dancy 2006: 72; cf. 2004:
For Dancy, a key to the distinction between 2635). Of the three requirements for a
the early and middle dialogues lies in the satisfactory definition, the Substitutivity
Argument from Relativity: Requirement is most straightforward and
seemingly free of ontological significance.
There exists a form of F (e.g. the It simply says that the definiens and the
Beautiful). definiendum must be substitutable salva
72

veritate; in other words, the definiens must Theory of Forms (Dancy 2006: 77). (He does
state a necessary and sufficient condition not consider, however, whether his whole
for satisfying the definiendum. This is just package the Explanation and Paradigm
a standard feature of definitions and con- Requirements, strengthened Self-Predication
tains nothing controversial. Not so with the and the Transmission Theory of Causation,
other two. The Paradigm Requirement states when connected with the One over Many
that the definiens must give a paradigm or principle, which he does not include in his
standard by comparison with which cases theory of definition do not amount to the
of its definiendum may be determined, and theory of Forms such as that presented in the
the Explanatory Requirement states that Phaedo.)
the definiens must explain the application Dancy concludes his treatment of the
of its definiendum (Dancy 2006: 73). The theory of definition in the Socratic dialogues
latter two requirements are clearly stated with a discussion of an argument in the
in (E2). The Paradigm Requirement is sup- Hippias Major that he admits comes very
ported by Platos common habit of referring close to the Argument from Relativity dis-
to what he wants to define using generically cussed above, an argument that he believes
abstract noun phrases such as the pious or marks the transition to the theory of Forms
the beautiful instead of the abstract nouns (Dancy 2006: 79). Hippias defines the beau-
piety or beauty. This makes the claim that tiful as a beautiful girl (Hp. Ma. 287e).
the beautiful is beautiful sound like a tautol- Socrates responds:
ogy and the claim that the beautiful is ugly a
contradiction (Dancy 2006: 77). Any beautiful girl is also ugly.
Plato accepts the schema, The F is F (SP, The beautiful itself cannot be ugly.
or Self-Predication), and a stronger version, Therefore, the beautiful is not the same as
The F is always F and never non-F (SPs, any beautiful girl (Dancy 2006: 79).
or strengthened Self-Predication). To say
that a definition of a term F must meet the Why is this not the Argument from
Paradigm Requirement is to say that it must Relativity? [T]hat requires a generaliza-
specify a standard that is in no way qualified tion Socrates does not give us in the Hippias
by the opposite of F; a self-predicating form Major, to the effect that . . . any beautiful
would meet that requirement. girl is ugly is not just true of girls, horses,
The Paradigm Requirement is connected or lyres, but of any mundane beautiful
to the Explanatory Requirement by means thing whatever(Dancy 2006: 79). And why
of what Dancy calls a Transmission Theory does this argument not establish a theory of
of Causality, according to which the cause Forms? Socrates says nothing whatever to
transmits to the effect a quality it possesses indicate that he has an overarching interest
itself. That is, the beautiful causes beauti- in the transcendental existence of the Form
ful things to be beautiful by transmitting to of the Beautiful (Dancy 2006: 79). (This
them a quality, beauty, which it possesses in remark indicates clearly that Dancy regards
supreme degree. Thus, the cause of some- only a theory of transcendental Forms as a
things being F is the perfect paradigm of metaphysical view.)
F-ness. Dancy calls the Transmission Theory A related issue is the question of exis-
a piece of metaphysics although not yet the tential import: to be defined, the subject of
73

definition must exist, must be something. Dancy concludes, it is best to leave meta-
Socrates inquires about the existence of his physics until it actually happens (Dancy
subjects in several places. In the Protagoras he 2004: 78). On the other hand, the Hippias
asks Protagoras whether justice and holiness Major adds something important to the
exist, and whether they are self-predicative discussion: the claim that it is by justice,
(330be), and Protagoras affirms that they wisdom and the like that things are made
are. Is this not ontology? Dancy argues that just, wise and so forth. This connects the
there is no reason to think that Protagoras question of existential import with the
commits himself to an ontology of abstract Explanatory Requirement of the Theory
entities (Dancy 2004: 70). Protagoras, an of Definition. It connects the existence of
intelligent interlocutor, must understand his the entities being defined with their role as
own view. When he accepts the existence causes.
of justice and piety he cannot be accepting In the Meno, Dancy writes, there is a
a theory of Forms, for he knows nothing massive shifting of gears (Dancy 2006: 79).
of Forms. Forms are irrelevant to the argu- The novelty begins with Menos Paradox:
ment (Dancy 2004: 71). When Socrates asks how can one search for a definition of
and Protagoras answers questions concern- something if one knows nothing about
ing the existence of holiness and justice, he is it? Socrates response is the Doctrine of
merely establishing the existence of topics of Recollection, which states that all knowledge
discussion, not abstract entities. is latent in the immortal soul. The Doctrine
Things are different in the Hippias Major of Recollection is associated with the theory
(287bd). Here Hippias accepts a number of Forms in the Phaedo (it is hinted at in
of existence claims, accompanied by causal 72ab), where Socrates uses the word form
claims: justice exists, and by justice things to indicate the object of his investigation.
are just; wisdom exists and by wisdom things [T]his is a far cry from an explicit Theory of
are wise; goodness exists, and by goodness Forms, Dancy writes (Dancy 2006: 80). But
things are good; beauty exists, and by beauty the Meno contains other novelties. It aban-
things are beautiful. Now it will not do to dons the Intellectualist Assumption (86c
claim that Hippias must understand what he e), often called the Priority of Definition
is agreeing to because for sheer density, there Principle or the Socratic Fallacy, which had
are few interlocutors in the dialogues to rival been a staple of the early dialogues search
Hippias (Dancy 2004: 77). So is it possible for definitions (Dancy 2004: 3564, 210,
that Hippias agrees to a theory of Forms that 2367; cf. 2006: 72). This leads to the intro-
he does not understand? duction of the Method of Hypothesis, which
allows him to reach the conclusion that vir-
Almost but not quite, and here close tue is knowledge. This conclusion is under-
doesnt count. So far we have only con- mined by the view that true belief is as good
ceded the existence of the beautiful, and
as knowledge for directing conduct. The
no one can suppose that this concession
dialogue ends in Socratic fashion, incon-
lets in the super-beautiful described in
the Symposium. All that Socrates needs clusively. The Doctrine of Recollection, the
is that there is something to be defined, retraction of the Intellectualist Assumption,
as subject for his what is it? question. and the Method of Hypothesis are hardly
(Dancy 2004: 78) Socratic. . . . [I]t looks very much as if, in the
74

Meno, we have Plato striking out on his own CRITIQUE OF DANCY

(Dancy 2006: 81).
The theory of Forms, at last, comes on stage Dancy provides an excellent account of
in the Phaedo, a stage that has been long pre- the theory of definition in the Socratic dia-
pared for it. The initial appearance of Forms logues, and of the development or unfolding
(at 65a66a) is augmented by the Argument of the theory of Forms in the Phaedo and
from Relativity, which is connected with the Symposium. A proponent of the Allen/Fine/
Doctrine of Recollection (at 72e78a). The Prior account of the development of Platos
Argument from Relativity (at 74ac) is pre- metaphysics (described below) can accept
sented using the Equal as an example: much of what he says. What Dancy does
not succeed in showing, however, is that the
There is such a thing as the Equal. account of definitions in the Socratic dia-
Any ordinary thing is also unequal. logues is not metaphysical. Of the views I
The Equal is never unequal. shall discuss in this article, Dancy holds the
Therefore, the Equal is not the same as purest version of the anti-metaphysical posi-
any ordinary equal thing.
tion. He shows that the theory of definition
is not equivalent to the theory of separately
This argument establishes the existence of existing Forms of the middle dialogues, but
a Form of Equality. The argument is further he does not show that it is not a precursor
generalized in the Symposium (210e211b) to that theory. Indeed, he insists that it is a
with respect to the Beautiful. As Dancy notes, precursor to it. He claims that it is a meta-
the account of the Beautiful in this passage physically innocent precursor, but he does
fits with two requirements of Socratic defi- not show that it is, for he does not offer an
nition: it covers all the cases, so satisfies the account of what makes a theory metaphysi-
Substitutivity Requirement, and it is a para- cally innocent. Dancy (like Vlastos) identifies
digmatically beautiful thing, satisfying the having a metaphysical view with having, in
Paradigm Requirement. The third requirement, Vlastoss words, a grandiose theory of sepa-
the Explanatory Requirement, is found in the rately existing Forms. Neither Dancy nor
Phaedo (at 100cd) where Socrates insists: Vlastos considers the more modest theory of
unseparated forms in the Socratic dialogues
[I]f there is anything else beautiful beside to be a metaphysical theory, even though it
the beautiful itself it is not beautiful seems to me to be the forerunner of Aristotles
because of any other [thing] than because ontology.
it partakes of that beautiful . . . nothing
But Dancy does not explain the basis for
else makes it beautiful other than the
his distinction between metaphysical and
presence or communion or however and
in whatever way it comes on that beau- non-metaphysical views. As Donald Zeyl
tiful . . . [it is] by the beautiful that all puts it:
beautiful [things are] beautiful. (100cd;
Dancy 2006: 83) I worry about the lack of attention given
to the question as to what counts as a
Dancy concludes that This is the Theory of metaphysical theory, and what distin-
Forms, and its heritage is pretty clearly Socrates guishes such a theory from one that isnt
quest for definitions (Dancy 2006: 83). metaphysical. That distinction is crucial
75

to Dancys overall argument, yet it seems many anticipations of the middle period
assumed without much support. (Zeyl theory in the Socratic dialogues. I would
2006) mention in particular the anticipation of the
Argument from Relativity in Hippias Major
Zeyl states that Dancy does not . . . explicitly (287e289d) discussed above. For Dancy this
identify and defend criteria that distinguish argument is one large step removed from the
non-metaphysical talk from metaphysics; he Argument from Relativity, in that its scope
appears to think that if a claim is intelligible is limited to the beauty of a maiden, and not
to philosophically nave interlocutors and generalized to all beautiful things. For me the
accepted by them as obviously true it is not step is a small one, and is almost inevitable
metaphysical (Zeyl 2006). However, as he when one realizes that there is nothing spe-
later adds, Why, one might wonder, should a cial about the example of a maiden, that she
philosophically nave interlocutor be incapa- simply typifies the entities in the phenom-
ble of understanding a metaphysical proposi- enal world. In general, I think the Socratic
tion? (Zeyl 2006). dialogues anticipate the Platonic theory of
If one rejects Dancys claim that the early Forms in many ways such as this.
theory of definition is not metaphysical, as
I believe one should, one can then see the VLASTOSS VIEW
beginning of Platonic metaphysics in what
Dancy calls the Paradigm Requirement and The most influential view on the topic of
the Explanation Requirement. These require- Socratic metaphysics is that of Gregory
ments have counterparts in Allens account Vlastos, which he set forth in a variety of
of Socratic definition, and Allen finds in them works, but primarily in a book, Socrates:
the basis of his theory of real definition and Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Vlastos
the early theory of Forms. It would seem that 1991), and a lecture, Socrates, which was
Dancy does not believe that the Socratic defi- presented to the British Academy (Vlastos
nitions he describes are real definitions. (A 1988).6 Vlastos set out to find the historical
real definition is one that primarily defines Socrates. Like most scholars, he attempted to
a thing, not a term; for more on real defi- find him primarily in the Platonic dialogues.
nitions, see the section on Allen.) If he held He divided the dialogues into three groups,
that they were, he would have to consider the the first two of which are of interest to us.
claim that there was a metaphysical view in
the Socratic dialogues. 1. The first group consisted of the early dia-
I agree with Dancy on his analysis of the logues, which he subdivided as follows:
definitions of the Socratic dialogues and on the elenctic dialogues, consisting of the
his analysis of the Argument from Relativity. Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro,
I agree also with his claim that the metaphys- Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches,
ics of the middle dialogues emerges from Protagoras and Republic I;
the theory of definitions in the Socratic dia- the transitional dialogues, consisting of
logues. As I hold that the theory of defini- the Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis,
tions is a metaphysical one, however, I do Menexenus and Meno.
not regard this emergence as the abrupt 2. The second group consisted of the mid-
matter that Dancy does. I think there are dle dialogues: the Cratylus, Phaedo,
76

Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, his case for this stark difference by stating
Parmenides and Theaetetus. that eidos and idea in the early dialogues do
3. The third, or late group, cited here for strictly definitional work (Vlastos 1991:
the sake of completeness, including the 53). He cites two principles for definitions,
Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus,
exemplified in the Euthyphro:
Critias and Laws. (Vlastos 1991: 467)
[1] The definiens must be true of all cases
Vlastos thought that the middle group fol- falling under the definiendum (cf. Dancys
lowed the early group in date of composi- Substitutivity Requirement), and
tion, but moreover he thought that the [2] the definiens must disclose the rea-
transitional dialogues of the early group son why anything is an instance of the
all post-dated the elenctic group. Thus he definiendum (cf. Dancys Explanatory
thought that there were four temporally Requirement). (Vlastos 1991: 567)8
distinct groups of dialogues: elenctic, transi-
tional, middle and late.7 There follows an extraordinary admission:
Next, Vlastos distinguished the Socrates
of the early dialogues, whom he called (V1) In assuming that these two con-
SocratesE, from the Socrates of the mid- ditions can be met SE is making a sub-
dle dialogues, whom he labelled SocratesM. stantial ontological commitment. He is
He identified SocratesE with the historical implying that what there is contains not
Socrates, and SocratesM with Plato. He made only spatio-temporal items, like indi-
a list of ten differences between the two viduals and events, but also entities of
Socrateses, the most important of which is another sort whose identity conditions
are strikingly different since they are the
item II:
same in persons and in actions which
are not the same: justice here and jus-
IIB. SocratesM had a grandiose meta-
tice there and again elsewhere, the same
physical theory of separately existing
in different individuals and occurrences,
Forms [. . .]
real in each of them, but real in a way
IIA. SocratesE has no such theory. that is different from that in which they
are real, its own reality evidenced just in
Vlastos thought that, because SocratesE lacks the fact that it can be instantiated self-
the metaphysical theory of SocratesM, he is identically in happenings scattered widely
no metaphysician. Rather, SocratesE is exclu- over space and time, so that if justice has
sively a moral philosopher (Vlastos 1991: been correctly defined for even a single
instance, the definiens will be true of
47). He describes thesis II as the most pow-
every instance of justice that ever was or
erful of the ten, and he states that the irrec-
ever will be anywhere. [ . . . ] That there
oncilable difference between SocratesE and are things which meet this strong condi-
SocratesM could have been established by this tion is a piece of ontology firmly fixed in
criterion even if it had stood alone (Vlastos SocratesEs speech and thought. He has
1991: 53). this ontology. (Vlastos 1991: 578)
Vlastos devotes his argument to showing
that SocratesE did not have the metaphysi- Though Vlastos does not use the term,
cal theory of SocratesM. He begins to make his description of these items in Socrates
77

ontology is virtually a textbook account of forms. It is also the spirit in which Protagoras
what is called a universal: an entity that can accepts them in Protagoras (330c): there is a
remain one and the same while being instan- sense of thing so innocuous that everyone
tiated in multiple items. By describing these who is willing to discuss justice, piety, and
universals as scattered throughout space and the rest can be expected to agree that they are
time, rather than as existing in the mind, things (Vlastos 1991: 62). The sense is not
Vlastos commits Socrates to the One over ontological, but linguistic, semantical and,
Many Principle (OM) and the doctrine of Vlastos adds, ethical. Brought up face to
metaphysical realism. To accept the existence face with the premier relativist of the day, the
of forms is to accept the existence of univer- chance to debate ontology virtually thrust on
sals, and that is to be a metaphysical realist. him, SocratesE turns it down (Vlastos 1991:
What more is required for Socrates to be a 63). (There are really two distinct questions
metaphysician? here: whether the talk of forms in the early
Though Vlastos does not shy away from dialogues constitutes a theory and whether
attributing this metaphysical view to Socrates, Socrates is a theorist for talking that way.)
he does not think that this invalidates his Consider now SocratesM. The existence of
claim that SocratesE is a moralist and noth- the F, which had been conceded as a matter
ing more no metaphysician, no ontologist of course by his interlocutors, now becomes
(Vlastos 1991: 58). He compares Socrates a matter of serious debate, highly contest-
acceptance of this ontology with the average able, a posit, a hypothesis, assent to which
New Yorkers acceptance of an ontology of cannot be expected from everyone (Vlastos
a world of material objects, independent of 1991: 634). In both the early and the middle
the mind. He asks: Cant one have a language dialogues Socrates is presented contra mun-
without being a linguist? What makes one dum. But in the early dialogues the opposi-
a linguist, and by parity of reasoning, what tion is exclusively ethical; his ontology is the
makes one an ontologist, is making their same as that of the many (Vlastos 1991: 65).
respective subjects object of reflective inves- In the middle dialogues that is all changed.
tigation. But this is what SE never does. He Now Socrates insists on asking his What is
never asks what sort of things forms must be it? question of the Forms. He posits four
. . . The search for those general properties categorical features of the Forms: they are
of forms which distinguish them systemati- inaccessible to the senses, absolutely change-
cally from non-forms is never on his elenc- less, incorporeal and they exist themselves
tic agenda. He asks, what is the form piety? by themselves, independent of their par-
What is the form beauty? And so forth. What ticipants (Vlastos 1991: 6673). SocratesE,
is form? He never asks (Vlastos 1991: 58). on the other hand, if asked where the forms
That is why it is gratuitous to credit him, existed, would have said, in bodies (Vlastos
as so often has been done in the scholarly lit- 1991: 74). Aristotle referred to the ontologi-
erature, with a theory of forms. . . . A belief cal independence of the Forms as separation
is not a theory if everyones agreement with (chorismos) (Vlastos 1991: 756). Vlastos
it can be presumed as a matter of course summarizes:
(Vlastos 1991: 59). This is the spirit in which
Socrates and his interlocutors Euthyphro, This is the heart of Platos metaphysics:
Laches, Hippias accept the existence of the postulation of an eternal self-existent
78

world, transcending everything in ours, metaphysician, with a grandiose theory

exempt from the vagaries and vicissitudes of separately existing Forms. These two
which afflict all creatures in the world of Socrateses were so different that they could
time, containing the Form of everything not have inhabited the same brain unless it
valuable or knowable, purged of all sen-
had been that of a schizophrenic (Vlastos
sory content. (Vlastos 1991: 76)
1991: 46). I argued against this view that
there was a metaphysical theory in the
The metaphysics of two worlds is completed Socratic dialogues, and that Vlastoss dichot-
by the theory of the immortal, transmigrating omy between the SocratesM who accepts the
soul and the doctrine of Recollection men- theory of separately existing Forms and the
tioned above. The result is a mystical vision of SocratesE who is purely a moral philoso-
reality: Platos Form-mysticism is profoundly pher is a false one. The question should not
other-worldly. The ontology of non-sensible, be, does SocratesE accept the grandiose
eternal, incorporeal, self-existent, contempla- theory of separately existing Forms, but is
ble Forms [ . . . ] has far-reaching implica- there a metaphysical theory in the Socratic
tions (Vlastos 1991: 79). dialogues?
Vlastos concludes: My own view is that there is, and that
Plato was not a schizophrenic for holding
One could hardly imagine a world-out- it. Vlastoss dichotomy led him to devote
look more foreign to that of Socrates. He himself to arguing that the Socrates of the
is unworldly: he cares little for money, early dialogues did not hold the ontology
reputation, security, life itself, in fact
of SocratesM. I concede at the outset that
for anything except virtue and moral
SocratesE did not accept the theory of sepa-
knowledge. But he is not otherworldly:
the eternal world with which Plato seeks rate Forms. Nevertheless, I argue that there
mystical union is unknown to him. For is a theory of forms in the early dialogues,
Socrates reality real knowledge, real and that it is basically the theory presented
virtue, real happiness is in the world in by R. E. Allen in 1970. This version of the
which he lives. The hereafter is for him a theory of forms does not contain the great
bonus and anyhow only a matter of faith contrasts of the middle period theory: Being
and hope. The passionate certainties of and Becoming, Appearance and Reality and
his life are in the here and now. (Vlastos the like. It is thus not a theory of separately
1991: 7980) existing Forms (Prior 2004: 34).9 What
remains when separation is removed? A
CRITIQUE OF VLASTOS theory of universals, of the sort Aristotle
accepted. When Aristotle says that Socrates
In 2004 I published Socrates Metaphysican, was seeking the universal or the essence of
a critique of Vlastoss claim that Socrates was things but did not make the universals or
purely a moral philosopher. As we have definitions exist apart, I interpret him to
seen, Vlastos had argued that there are in the mean that Socrates had a theory of univer-
Platonic dialogues two Socrateses: SocratesE, sals, but not the Platonic theory of separately
the Socrates of the early dialogues, who existing ones (Prior 2004: 4).
was exclusively a moral philosopher, and What textual evidence exists for the exist-
SocratesM, who was, among other things, a ence of a theory of unseparated forms in the
79

Socratic dialogues? Like Allen, I find this evi- to Meno what he wants by way of a defini-
dence primarily in E1 and E2 above, where tion, Socrates makes reference to the case of
Socrates describes holiness as an eidos, an bees: even if bees come in various kinds, still
idea and a paradeigma, all terms that prefig- there is a common form that they all possess,
ure the middle period theory of Forms. I also in virtue of which they are all bees. He goes
find support in the Protagoras and Meno. on to make the same point with health, size
In the Protagoras, as part of his argument and strength, making it clear that he thinks
with Protagoras as to whether virtue is a sin- of his ontology as extending beyond moral
gle thing, Socrates asks Protagoras whether matters to common terms generally (Prior
he takes piety and justice to be something 2004: 67).
(pragma ti), and Protagoras readily agrees. Now Vlastoss response to the claim that
Next he asks whether Protagoras thinks there is an ontology in the Socratic dialogues
that justice is just and piety pious, and again is remarkable: as we saw above, he admits
Protagoras agrees. He finally attempts to get that SocratesE has this ontology (V1).10 He
Protagoras to agree that justice is pious and goes on to argue that though he has an ontol-
piety just, but Protagoras balks and the argu- ogy, SocratesE is nonetheless still exclusively a
ment fails. This exchange is ontologically sig- moral philosopher. Before I go further, let me
nificant. The claims that justice and piety are note that from my perspective this conces-
pragmata, things, form the basis of an ontol- sion puts Vlastos in the camp of those who,
ogy. The claims that piety is pious and jus- like Allen, Fine and myself, attribute to the
tice is just are instances of self-predication, a Socrates of the early dialogues a metaphysi-
prominent feature of the middle-period the- cal view. Vlastos denies that it is a theory,
ory of Forms. There is no agreement on the on the grounds that it is readily accepted by
correct interpretation of sentences of this for- Socrates interlocutors,11 and he denies that
mula, but both existence and self-predication Socrates is a metaphysician, on the grounds
claims are features of the theory of separately that he never asks the what is F? question
existing Forms in the middle dialogues. This about Form.
passage anticipates that theory, and, I would My response to the first point is the fact
argue, what anticipates an ontological theory that, whether or not it counts as a theory,
must have ontological significance (Prior Socrates is ontologically committed to forms.
2004: 46). According to Quines criterion of ontologi-
It could be argued that though the cal commitment, Socrates is committed to
Euthyphro and Protagoras passages con- the existence of justice, piety and the like:
tain at least the makings of an ontology, he treats them as values of bound variables
they are limited to moral philosophy; thus, (Prior 2004: 78). My response to the sec-
SocratesE can still be understood as exclu- ond point is that it is too restrictive. True,
sively a moral philosopher. My response is Socrates does not ask What is Form? in
two-fold: first, an ontology limited to eth- the early or Socratic dialogues, but neither
ics is still an ontology; what Kant called a does he ask it in later dialogues, such as the
metaphysics of morals is still a metaphysics. Phaedo and Republic, which Vlastos admits
Second, the Meno indicates that the ontology are metaphysical. Not until the Parmenides
is not limited to moral matters. In explaining does Socrates ask, What is Form (Prior
80

2004: 8)? In fact, however, it is not necessary this metaphysical underpinning, Socratic
for someone to ask a second-order question moral enquiry cannot take place. (Prior
about the nature of Form for the existence of 2004: 10)
forms to be maintained in a serious, philo-
sophical manner. Not all philosophical ques- Perhaps the most serious objection Vlastos
tions are questions of definition, and Socrates made against the claim that Socrates was an
never says that only when he is engaging in ontologist was the assertion that the proposi-
definition is he engaging in serious philo- tions in question were too commonly held to
sophical thought. be considered an ontological theory. A belief
Suppose, however, that Socrates held is not a theory if everyones agreement with
Vlastoss view that only if Socrates asks the it can be presumed as a matter of course if
What is F? question is he engaged in seri- it is unproblematic for everyone, in need of
ous philosophical inquiry. Should we then explanation and justification for no one. This
deny that Socrates investigates forms seri- is the vein in which SE believes in the reality
ously in the Socratic dialogues? I do not of forms(Vlastos 1991: 59). I find this claim
think so. For Socrates asks the What is F? to be seriously misleading, in three respects.
question about virtue and the individual First, it is not clear to me that widespread or
virtues in these dialogues, and at least on even universal acceptance disqualifies some-
occasion states that he is looking for a form thing from being a theory. The heliocentric
(e.g. E1 and E2). Now the definitional state- theory of the solar system is a theory that is
ments Socrates is seeking are identity state- accepted by everyone in the civilized world.
ments, and it does not matter which side of Second, whether something is a theory
the identity sign the definiendum is on. So may depend not on the content of the view so
when Socrates says he is seeking the defini- much as the person who holds it. An ontol-
tion of piety, and piety is a particular form, ogy of physical objects existing in space may
when he is engaged in serious investigation not be a theory to the unreflective man in
into the nature of piety he is at the same the street, but it may be a theory nonethe-
time engaged in serious investigation into less to a philosopher. (One way of under-
the nature of a form. On the assumption standing the Socratic elenchus, a way that I
that the quest for the definition of a moral think is congenial to Vlastoss The Socratic
virtue is a quest for the nature of a particu- Elenchus [Vlastos 1983a: 2758], is an
lar form, moral inquiry and metaphysical attempt to make the interlocutors aware of
are inseparable (Prior 2004: 9). As Allen the theoretical, that is, philosophical, depth
puts the point, the definition sought in the and significance of the apparently ordinary,
elenctic dialogues is real definition, a defini- non-theoretical, non-philosophical state-
tion of things, not terms. ments they are inclined, unreflectively, to
make about moral matters [Prior 2014:
If SocratesE is a moral philosopher of the 11].) Even if we concede, however, that the
sort described in the elenctic dialogues,
ordinary man in the street does not have a
then, he cannot be exclusively a moral
theory of moral ontology or, for that matter,
philosopher, for his moral philosophy
presupposes a metaphysical theory, a of the ontology of physical objects, to what is
theory of common properties. Without this due? I argued that it was due to the fact
81

that he is not a philosopher. When a philoso- by Socrates interlocutors is unproblematic.

pher such as Socrates makes an ontological It might also be objected that, as the Meno
claim, however, it may be part of an onto- contains the doctrine of Recollection and as
logical theory. Whether or not a statement is the doctrine of Recollection is linked in the
part of an ontological theory, then, is not a Phaedo to the theory of separate Forms, the
matter of the statement itself but the way in common characters of the Meno must also be
which it is held and by whom it is held. so linked. My response is that the common
Third and most important, I believe that characters of the Meno are not separately
Vlastos seriously misrepresented the uncontro- existing Forms, but forms; there is no trace
versial nature of Socrates ontological theory. of separation in the Meno.
I note three features of Socratic dialectic. First, My conclusions are two:
Socrates is careful to get the explicit assent
from his interlocutors about his existence 1. The Socrates of the elenctic dialogues is
claims: he gets Protagoras assent that justice a moral philosopher. The form his moral
is something, and similarly with Hippias and philosophy took was that of enquiry
into the nature of the moral virtues. The
Euthyphro. Second, his interlocutors often
assumption underlying this enquiry is that
show that they do not really understand such
the virtues are characteristics, proper-
claims even when they have assented to them. ties, common to many individual persons
Hippias and Euthyphro find the idea of a and actions. Without this assumption it is
common character intellectually daunting, hard to see how moral enquiry could go
and it takes much subsequent discussion to forward. The assumption is ontological,
sort matters out. Third and most important, metaphysical in character. The fact that
not every character in the dialogues takes the it is held not casually, but in the face of
existence and definition of a common charac- philosophical objections, marks it as a
ter to be unproblematic. To be specific, Meno philosophical view. (Prior 2004: 1314)
does not. He explicitly rejects Socrates com- 2. Vlastos was incorrect in his claim that the
Socrates of the early dialogues was exclu-
parison between the definition of virtue and
sively a moral philosopher. I have argued,
the definition of a bee or health or strength.
following Allen, that the Socrates of these
Subsequent discussion not only fails to define dialogues is a metaphysician, an ontolo-
virtue but also leads to Menos famous scep- gist, as well as a moral philosopher. The
tical question, how is inquiry possible? The ontology of the elenctic dialogues differs
idea that virtue is a common character is from that of the middle dialogues only in
anything but unproblematic for Meno (Prior a single respect: separation. This is a huge
2004: 1213). difference and it is, strictly, an incompat-
It might be objected that the Meno is not ibility. Thus, the ontology of the elenctic
an early but a transitional dialogue. It is, dialogues is in this one respect incompat-
however, in its first third, an elenctic dialogue, ible with that of the middle dialogues.
In other respects, however, it is compat-
as Vlastos notes (Vlastos 1988: 144). The dis-
ible with that ontology and should be
cussion of the ontology of definition in the
seen as the precursor or first stage of that
Meno is germane to the ontology of the elenc- theory. In this regard, as I believe in oth-
tic dialogues. It cannot be said, based on the ers, SocratesE was much more closely con-
explicitness of that discussion, that the accept- nected to SocratesM than Vlastoss portrait
ance of the existence of common characters allows. (Prior 2004: 14)
82

THE METAPHYSICAL definitions concern essence, and the essence

INTERPRETATION of a thing is the nature of something which
is (Allen 1971: 328). These essences, forms,
ALLENS VIEW do not just sit there. They do honest work.
They affect the career of the world, being
As I stated in the introduction, one of the that by which things are what they are. [. . .]
main positions on the question of Socratic Beauty is not a word, not a thought, not a
metaphysics is that of R. E. Allen. Allens view concept. It is an existing thing (Allen 1971:
is described in two works: Platos Euthyphro 329). The fact that the forms Socrates seeks
and the Earlier Theory of Forms (Allen 1970) in the Euthyphro are universals, standards
and Platos Earlier Theory of Forms (Allen and essences implies that the kind of defini-
1971). Allen is the leading proponent of the tion he seeks is real definition; this in turn
view that the early Platonic dialogues con- entails that the search is a metaphysical one.
tain a theory of forms. His works remain, These facts imply something that is prop-
after four decades, the classic statement of erly called a theory of Forms (Allen 1971:
that view. Allen finds textual support for his 328). Allen rejects the view that there is no
claims primarily in two texts: E1 and E2. commitment to the existence of Forms in
As I noted in the introduction, for Allen, the the early dialogues, and that talk of them is
forms described in these passages are univer- merely a matter of language (Allen 1971:
sals, causes, self-predicating paradigms and 329). Though the Socratic theory of forms is
essences. The theory has both a logical and metaphysical, it is continuous with common
a metaphysical role to play in dialectic, sense (Allen 1971: 330). That is the reason
and the two roles are related. Logically, the why people like Euthyphro can accept it with-
forms play a regulative role in dialectic: they out question. What distinguishes Socrates
define the conditions for deciding when dia- inquiry from common sense is its precision:
lectic has succeeded, and when it has failed.
Metaphysically, Forms affect the career of the His question is hardly one which com-
world: they are the real natures of things, and mon sense, left to its own devices, will
the world is what it is because they are what ask. But is a question to which com-
they are (Allen 1970: 68). The logical and mon sense may certainly be led. . . . The
the metaphysical aspects of the theory come progress of dialectic involves passage
together in the concept of real definition: To from the nave existence claim that there
say that Forms exist is to say that real defini- is such a thing as holiness to the highly
sophisticated existence claim that there is
tion should be pursued; to say that real defi-
an essence of holiness, and that it can be
nition should be pursued is to say that Forms
defined. . . . [T]he commitment to essence
exist (Allen 1970: 68; cf. 1971: 334). is then latent in the common sense use of
Real definition is analysis of essence, words. The essence of holiness is what
rather than stipulation as to how words we mean by the word holiness when
are used or a report as to how they are in we fully understand our meaning. (Allen
fact used (Allen 1971: 327). Real defini- 1971: 331)
tion is not simply nominal definition plus
an existence claim; the existential import is It is in this sense that the theory of forms is
taken for granted in the early dialogues. Real a theory of meaning. Allen admits that the
83

theory of meaning is controversial and would ontologically prior to their instances (Allen
be rejected by anti-essentialist philosophers, 1970: 133), Allen insists that the forms of the
such as Wittgenstein (Allen 1971: 3312). early theory are just as separate as those of
The theory of meaning is a referential one: the later theory (Allen 1970: 136; cf. 147).
the meaning of a term is the characteristic Third, Allen rejects the view that the meta-
to which it refers, which is a Form (Allen physics of the early dialogues is the same as
1970: 125). Forms are causes: Forms . . . that of the middle dialogues, the view that
are causes in the sense that they are that by Platos thought is a unity in a very strong
which things are what they are. They there- sense. In both the early theory and the mid-
fore affect the career of the world, in that if dle theory of Forms, the Forms are separate,
they did not exist, the world would not be in the sense that the Forms are not identi-
what it is (Allen 1970: 125). cal with and are ontologically prior to their
Allen insists that the theory of forms in the instances,
early dialogues is a theory of Forms, not the But the middle dialogues expand this
theory of Forms: separation into a new view of the universe,
involving a doctrine of Two Worlds, sepa-
[T]hat theory of the choir of heaven rated by a gulf of deficiency and unreality.
and the furniture of earth found in the Associated with this is a religious attitude
Phaedo, Republic, and other middle dia- unlike anything the early dialogues can show
logues. . . . The philosophy of the mid-
(Allen 1970: 154).
dle dialogues is a nest of contrasts: Being
The difference between the theory of
and Becoming, Appearance and Reality,
Permanence and Flux, Reason and Sense, Forms in the early dialogues and those which
Body and Soul, Flesh and the Spirit. followed does not consist in the fact of sepa-
Those contrasts are rooted in an ontol- ration, but the way in which separation is
ogy of two Worlds, separated by a gulf conceived. The middle dialogues present a
of deficiency. (Allen 1971: 332) revised scheme of ontological status, an esti-
mate which turns on a theory of the way in
The key questions are what separation which Forms are (Allen 1970: 147).
means, and how the early dialogues are The Forms of the middle dialogues are
related to the middle dialogues on this ques- separate in a way that the forms of the early
tion. Allen rejects several answers to these dialogues are not. In the middle dialogues sen-
questions before stating his own. First, he sible instances of Forms are deficient resem-
rejects the view that the alleged presence of blances of Forms, and they are less real than
the theory of forms in the early dialogues is Forms. There is no trace of either of these
merely linguistic. This is incompatible with claims in the Euthyphro (Allen 1971: 332).
Socrates search for real definitions. Second, What motivated Plato to change his the-
he rejects the view of Aristotle that Socrates ory of forms into a theory of Forms? Why
did not separate the forms in the early dia- did he adopt an ontology of two worlds,
logues. On Aristotles own understanding of separated by a gulf of deficiency? Why did
separation, which requires that the Ideas he, in the middle dialogues, construe the
are numerically distinct from their instances, claim that forms are standards as the claim
exist independently of their instances, and are that they are perfect, fully real, exemplars of
84

qualities that their instances imperfectly imi- dialogues do not raise. (Allen 1971: 334;
tate? According to Allen: cf. 1970: 1634)
Platos account in the middle dialogues is ARISTOTLES TESTIMONY: FINES VIEW

conditioned by problems in epistemology
which the early dialogues had not faced. I now turn to the view of Gail Fine, as
Those problems arose over scepticism
expressed in her 1993 book On Ideas.12
and a priori knowledge. They arose not
This view differs from others in this essay in
in Socratic dialectic, but about it; specifi-
cally, they arose when Plato turned to deal that, though it discusses passages from the
with the question of how Socratic dialec- Platonic dialogues, it focuses on Aristotles
tic, as a search for Forms or essences, is treatment of Platos ontology, including
possible. (Allen 1970: 157) its Socratic version. Though Fines focus is
on Aristotles lost Peri Iden, for which we
These problems arise in the Meno, which have fragmentary textual evidence, she also
Allen describes as an early middle or deals with Aristotles discussion of Socrates
boundary dialogue, connecting the early and Platos ontology in three passages, all
dialogues with the middle, in particular the from the Metaphysics: A.6, 987a29b8;
Phaedo. The scepticism of Menos paradox M.4, 1078b1232; M.9, 1086a32b13
is answered by the doctrine of Recollection. (Fine 1993: 446; the following are all Fines
In the Phaedo, this doctrine is connected to translations).13
the theory of Forms. Sceptical doubts about
the possibility of Socratic inquiry thus led (F1) But Socrates was concerned with
moral questions, and not at all with
to a doctrine of the deficiency of sensibles
the whole of nature; he was seeking
to Forms, developed into a full-blown doc-
the universal (katholou) and was the
trine of Two Worlds, and a new concep- first to turn his thought to definitions.
tion of separation. This conception is not Plato agreed with him; but because of
found in the early dialogues because scepti- this (Heraclitean view) he supposed that
cism about Socratic inquiry is not present this (defining) applied to different things
there. What does this say about the relation (hetern) and not to sensibles for, he
between the ontology of the early dialogues thought, it is impossible for the common
and that of the middle dialogues? Allen definition to be any of the sensibles, since
concludes his article with an answer to this they are always changing (Metaphysics
question: A.6, 987b1b7)
(F2) Now Socrates was concerned with
The middle dialogues do not abandon the moral virtues, and he was the first to
the What is it? question. They pursue it seek universal definitions in connection
in the light of a new ontology. The theory with them. [ . . . ] It was reasonable for
of Forms in the middle dialogues, then, Socrates to try to find out what a thing
is neither the same theory as that of the is, because he was trying to argue deduc-
early dialogues, nor a different one. Not tively, and the starting point of deduc-
different because it contains the earlier tions is what a thing is. . . . For there are
theory as a part. Not the same because it just two things one might fairly ascribe
is directed towards issues which the early to Socrates inductive arguments and
85

universal definitions, both of which (Fine 1993: 50). Socrates has a realist concep-
are concerned with the starting point tion of universals: Socratic forms are proper-
of knowledge. But Socrates did not ties, not meanings.
make universals or definitions (horis- Fine discusses three more features of
mous) separate (chorista), but they (the
Socratic forms: their lack of separation from
Platonists) separated them. (Metaphysics
phenomena, their self-predication and the
M.4, 1078b1719, 235, 2731)
claim that they are paradigms. With regard
(F3) Socrates motivated this (view), as to separation, she notes that Socrates never
we were saying before, through defini-
states that the forms are separate, and that
tions; but he did not separate (universals)
other evidence pro or con is indeterminate.
from particulars. And he was right not
to separate them. This is clear from the On the question of self-predication, she
results. For it is not possible to acquire begins by claiming that the form of F cannot
knowledge without the universal; but be both F and not F. It might be so either
separating it is the cause of the difficul- by being neither, or by being simply F. The
ties arising about the ideas. (Metaphysics evidence indicates that Socrates took the lat-
M.9, 1086b27) ter option, and accepted the self-predication
of forms. It may be, however, that the form
It is with her interpretation of these passages is not F in the same way as its participants;
that I shall be concerned here. I shall deal it may be F in a sui generis way, simply in
with two questions: virtue of its explanatory role (Fine 1993:
523). Self-predication is connected with
1. What does Aristotles testimony tell us paradeigmatism.
about Socrates metaphysics?
2. What does it tell us about the relation When Socrates says that forms are
between that metaphysics and that of paradigms he seems to mean only that
Plato? they are standards, in the sense that in
order to know whether x is F, one must
know, and refer to, the form of F. . . . (So
Fines answer to my first question is clear:
paradigmatism and self-predication are
closely linked. The form of F is F because
Socrates believes that correct answers it explains the F-ness of things: forms are
to What is F? questions specify forms; also paradigms in virtue of their explan-
forms are the objects of definition where, atory role.) (Fine 1993: 53)
as we have seen, definitions are real defi-
nitions. The ontological correlates of real Socratic forms are thus real essences, uni-
definitions are real essences, non-linguis- versals, explanatory properties rather than
tic universals that explain why things are meanings, self-predicative paradigms. They
as they are. (Fine 1993: 49)14
are not separate from their participants.
I turn now to my question 2: what does
These forms are universals: Aristotle takes Aristotles testimony tell us about the rela-
Socratic forms to be universals not just in the tionship between the Socratic and the
sense that they are or can be in more than Platonic theory of forms? Here the answer is
one thing at a time but also in the sense that not so clear. Fine connects the Platonic the-
they are real essences, explanatory properties ory of forms with Platos Heracliteanism. As
86

traditionally interpreted, this is the view that say that Plato separated forms, though it
there is no knowledge of sensibles, as they is important to be clear that Plato never
are always changing. Fine distinguishes two argues, or even says, that forms are sepa-
versions of Heracliteanism: a radical ver- rate. (Fine 1993: 61)
sion, according to which objects change in
every respect at every time, and a moderate On the related questions of self-predication
version, according to which objects change and paradeigmatism, Fine holds that the
in some respect at every time. Change is forms of the middle dialogues are the same as
defined as the succession of opposites. To forms of the early dialogues: self-predicative
these two she adds a third kind of change: paradigms. She distinguishes two forms of
substantial change, the generation and cor- self-predication: narrow self-predication
ruption of things (Fine 1993: 54). Fine (NSP), according to which forms are F in
asserts, and I agree, that Plato never accepted the same way that their participants are,
extreme Heracliteanism (Fine 1993: 56). But and broad self-predication (BSP), accord-
what kind of Heracliteanism did he accept? ing to which forms are F in a different way
Here matters become complex. In addition than their participants. Forms are F because
to the succession of opposites, Fine adds to they explain the way in which F things are F.
the discussion the compresence of oppo- Socrates version of SP is BSP and, she claims,
sites. It is well known that Plato denied that so is Platos. It is often thought that forms in
phenomena could be objects of knowledge the middle dialogues are self-predicative in a
because they were at one and the same time different sense than this is because they are
both F and not-F. This is the compresence not properties, which Fine thinks they are,
of opposites, and it is a reason for Platos but perfect particulars. But it is sometimes
acceptance of forms (Phd. 74bc, Republic thought that forms are particulars because
479ad, 5235). Fine treats the compresence they are self-predicative, and an account of
of opposites as a form of Heracliteanism SP in terms of BSP removes one main reason
(Fine 1993: 567). for thinking of forms as particulars (Fine
But what of separation? The argument 1993: 623).
from compresence shows that forms are dif- On the question of paradeigmatism, Fine
ferent from both sensible particulars and thinks Plato goes beyond Socrates view
sensible properties. But it does not show while being basically consistent with it. Both
that forms are separate: that is, that they can agree that forms are paradigms in that they
exist whether or not the corresponding sen- are standards. The form of F is the property
sible particulars exist (Fine 1993: 60). Fine of F, and is therefore the ultimate explanation
remarks: of why Fs are F. . . . forms are self-predicative
paradigms in virtue of their explanatory
Nothing said in the middle dialogues role (Fine 1993: 63). Plato, unlike Socrates,
seems to me to involve clear commitment
holds that forms are perfect, and their par-
to separation. None the less, separation
ticipants are imperfectly F and derivatively F
fits well with the tenor of the middle dia-
logues, and the casual way in which sep- (derivatively from the form). Thus, whereas
aration emerges in the Timaeus perhaps Socrates accepts only weak paradigmatism,
suggests that Plato takes it for granted. Plato accepts perfect paradigmatism (Fine
So I shall assume that Aristotle is right to 1993: 63). Neither the fact that forms are
87

self-predicative nor the fact that they are par- the developmentalist interpretation of Platos
adigms jeopardizes their status as universals. thought in this respect incorrect. His aim is
On the contrary, the fact that forms are uni- to show that an anti-developmentalist thesis
versals and so are explanatory explains (like Allens or more radical) is wholly plausi-
the sense in which they are self-predicative, ble (Fronterotta 2007: 40; cf. 37 n. 1; 38).
perfect paradigms (Fine 1993: 64). Fronterotta focuses on four definitional
Fines conclusion is that Socratic and dialogues: the Charmides, Laches, Hippias
Platonic forms are more similar than has Major and Euthyphro. While all four of
often been believed. Both are universals or these dialogues fail to define the terms they
properties, introduced for metaphysical and seek, there is a progression from the first two
epistemological reasons; they are not per- to the second two. In the Charmides and
fect particulars or meanings. Both Socrates Laches the definitions fail because they are
and Plato accept SP, but their version of it is not appropriately universal: they give exam-
best construed as BSP (Fine 1993: 64). They ples rather than universal formulae.15 In the
disagree in that Plato says that forms are Hippias Major, however, the failure is of a
non-sensible, perfect and separate. But Plato different order. Socrates makes it clear that
is not trying to offer a theory of forms that is he is interested in what the beautiful or the
radically different from that of Socrates; beautiful itself is, not with what is beautiful.
The correct definition
Rather, he is offering what he takes to be
the most plausible defence of Socrates, must refer back to the proper nature of
or developing Socrates views in what the relevant object, that is, to that Form
he takes to be the most plausible way. or Idea that, when added . . . to any-
In particular, Platonic forms are not thing, makes it beautiful: this Form or
different entities from Socratic forms. Idea (eidos) is the beautiful itself (auto
Rather, Plato is attempting to offer what to kalon), and it is the cause (1) that pro-
he views as a better account of the same duces the beauty of/in all the beautiful
entities (Fine 1993: 64) things or (2) by which all other beauti-
ful things become beautiful. (Fronterotta
THE UNITARIAN INTERPRETATION: 2007: 42)
FRONTEROTTAS VIEW
Whereas in the Charmides and Laches the
The final view I shall discuss is that requirement for a correct definition can be
of Francesco Fronterotta, whose The stated in terms of extensional equivalence
Development of Platos Theory of Ideas and between definiens and definiendum, now it
the Socratic Question (Fronterotta 2007) must be stated in the form of a causal-onto-
was written in response to my 2004 article. logical universality.
Fronterotta agrees with Allen, Fine and me
that there exists a theory of forms in the An answer to the Socratic question what
is X? can now be given solely by indi-
early dialogues (Fronterotta 2007: 38), but
cating a unique and universal object
he argues that these forms are separate from
qualified by Plato as an Idea or Form
their participants, as are the Forms of the itself that is always unchangeable
middle dialogues. (In other words, the forms and identical to itself and yet present
of the early dialogues are Forms.) He finds in a multiplicity of particular things, to
88

which, by virtue of its presence, it con- in Platos early dialogues. (Fronterotta

fers that same property whose true nature 2007: 49)
it embodies. (Fronterotta 2007: 44)16
What Socrates is seeking is what Allen called
The Euthyphro accords with the causal- real definition, that is, one that shows the
ontological turn of the Hippias Major, add- very nature of the object to be defined, and
ing to it the idea of the form as paradeigma, not nominal definition (Fronterotta 2007:
or model (Fronterotta 2007: 45). Clearly, 52). This sort of definition is prior to the
Fronterotta finds in these two dialogues the logico-semantic and epistemological sorts
introduction of an ontology of Forms. of definition, and the Ideas, the objects
Fronterotta reaches the same conclusion so defined, are distinct, autonomous and
when viewing the subjects from the stand- prior to the multiplicity of particular things
point of agreement between definiens and of which they represent the proper being
definiendum. At the first level, the Charmides (Fronterotta 2007: 54).
and Laches seek only a logico-semantic Having defended the existence of Ideas
agreement. At a second level, epistemologi- in the early dialogues, Fronterotta turns to
cal agreement is sought, based on knowledge the development of Platos thought con-
of the definiendum. At the third level, agree- cerning them. Up to this point what he has
ment depends on the ontological status of the argued for has been compatible with the
definiendum: conception of forms described by Allen, Fine
and myself. From this point on, however,
The only true universal knowledge is Fronterotta offers a critique of the develop-
that which is directed to certain objects mentalist hypothesis shared by all three of
marked by a peculiar ontological sta- us. According to this hypothesis the theory of
tus, the unchangeable and ever identi-
forms in the early dialogues is different from
cal Ideas or Forms. Thus the possibility
that in the middle dialogues in that Plato
of knowledge and definition depends
on the ontological status of the objects describes the relation of participation in the
to be known and defined, and Socrates early dialogues in terms of immanence, while
interlocutors blatant inability to grasp he describes it in the middle dialogues in
this fundamental ontological dimension terms of transcendence. Fronterotta objects
is the ultimate reason why the enquiry that the forms are described in both ways in
carried out in the definitional dialogues each set of dialogues (Fronterotta 2007: 54).
fails. (Fronterotta 2007: 48) Fronterotta distinguishes two versions of
developmentalism. According to the first,
Thus: there is no theory of Ideas in the early dia-
logues. As we have seen, he rejects this view.17
The question raised in the definitional He then turns to the second version, which
dialogues, emphasizing the need for a he notes is defended by Allen, one of the rare
definition, leads to positing Ideas as the
scholars who has . . . recognized a true philo-
real beings one has to know beforehand
sophical meaning in the theory of Ideas in the
. . . in order to put forward an appro-
priate definition: on these terms, it definitional dialogues (Fronterotta 2007:
seems to me beyond doubt that one can 57). In opposition to Allens view, which
legitimately speak of a theory of Ideas denies separation between forms and their
89

participants in the early dialogues, only to the drawing of a sharp distinction between
posit a wide gap . . . between two absolutely the early and middle groups. Without this
different and rigorously separated worlds prejudice, we could see that Plato already
in the middle dialogues, Fronterotta argues inaugurates an original philosophical trend
that the difference between Ideas and sen- from the early dialogues, especially regard-
sible things, in the early dialogues, already ing the onto-epistemological framework of
consists in a real and concrete separation the theory of Ideas (Fronterotta 2007: 59).
between two kinds of beings (Fronterotta
2007: 57). He admits that this separation CRITIQUE OF FRONTEROTTA: THE PROBLEM OF
never takes on the mythical form of the jux- SEPARATION
taposition between two separated worlds,
but he claims that this represents a narra- Fronterotta describes his position as
tive change at most, an enlargement of anti-developmentalist (2007: 40, 60). He
Platos epistemological and ontological hier- does not use the term unitarian for his posi-
archy from a geographical point of view tion, but that is what a scholar who denied
(Fronterotta 2007: 57). In other words, from development in Platos thought, especially
Fronterottas perspective, the doctrine of two his ontology, would be called. If he sees
worlds is merely a metaphorical expression development in Platos thought, it occurs
of a pre-existing metaphysical doctrine of within the definitional dialogues, between
separation. For, if the object to be defined the Laches and Charmides, on the one hand,
and known must be universal, unchange- and the Hippias Major and Euthyphro, on
able, and stable, it obviously cannot belong the other. That is where the theory of Ideas
to the physical world (Fronterotta 2007: is introduced. Like Allen, Fine and myself,
57). He concludes, I tend to believe that this Fronterotta posits the existence of a theory
onto-epistemological principle, which plausi- of Forms or Ideas in these early, definitional
bly explains the introduction of Ideas, forcing dialogues. Once the Ideas are introduced, they
their status to be separated from the physical remain a constant feature of Platos thought.
world and justifying their set of functions, Naturally, I have no criticism of Fronterottas
is on no account subject to development in introduction of forms in the early dialogues,
Platos thought (Fronterotta 2007: 57). but are these forms Forms? Are they the
Fronterotta turns finally to the Socratic metaphysical entities of the middle dialogues?
question, and specifically to the attempt to The question turns on the meaning of separa-
find the historical Socrates in Platos early tion, and this is not as clear as it might be.
dialogues. This attempt, which falls apart In his book Allen defined separation in two
due to the argument that there is a theory ways: first, in terms of the independent exist-
of separate forms in the early dialogues, is ence of the forms, and second, in terms of the
based on an implicit exegetical prejudice . . . gulf of deficiency between Forms and their
consisting in the dogmatic assumption that phenomenal participants, and I focused on the
Platos early dialogues represent a faithful second sort of separation in my article. Let us
portrayal of Socrates philosophical activ- call the second sort of separation Two Worlds
ity (Fronterotta 2007: 58). This prejudice separation; Fronterotta tends to downplay
requires the elimination of all reference to the the significance of this kind of separation,
theory of forms from the early dialogues and referring to it as a mythological expression,
90

a geographical formulation of an ontological self-subsistent substances, though they gener-

point of view in short, a metaphor. I ques- ate properties of objects through participa-
tion this downplaying of the doctrine. tion. One may argue that Platonic Forms are
As Allen argued, the separation of the properties, as does Fine, but I think one can-
Forms in the middle dialogues is a response not eliminate the change in ontological status
to questions about Socratic dialectic that the between forms and Forms.
Socratic dialogues do not raise. These ques-
tions are epistemological in nature. They are
raised for the first time in the Meno, in Menos
paradox. The Meno offers a solution to the CONCLUSION
problem of Socratic dialectic in the doctrine
of Recollection; the Phaedo connects this In the preceding sections of this chapter, I
doctrine with the theory of Forms. It is in the have tried to present the positions of the vari-
Phaedo that Socratic forms become Forms, ous commentators on Socratic metaphysics
and the change is due to Platos consideration as accurately and objectively as possible. In
of these new questions about the possibility the course of doing so I have presented my
of inquiry. It is also due to Platonic medita- own view in the form of a critique of Vlastoss
tion on the imperfection of sensible objects, position. In this concluding section I would
the fact that for every example of F-ness one like to present my view in a more systematic
finds, there is some respect in which it is not- way than I have done so far and indicate my
F. The paradigm requirement of Socratic defi- agreement and disagreement with the views
nition, enunciated by Dancy and accepted by of others. I am well aware that those holding
Allen, among others, requires as a definition other views may find my position unpersua-
an object that is F in all respects. Believing sive. I hope, however, that some readers may
that such objects could not be found in the be convinced.
phenomenal world, Plato posited a sepa- I have so far identified seven features,
rate world in which they existed. This was found at various places in the Socratic dia-
a consequence of Dancys Argument from logues, that argue for the attribution to the
Relativity, introduced for the first time in Socrates of these dialogues of a metaphysical
the Phaedo, but adumbrated in the Hippias theory. These features include:
Major. Fronterotta could argue that this hint
(1) use of the language of the middle period
indicates that Platonic separation is present
(classic) theory of Forms: eidos, idea and
already in the Socratic dialogues, but the
paradeigma;
same cannot be said for the epistemological
considerations mentioned above. In brief, and the following claims:
it seems to me that Two Worlds separation
is not found in the Socratic dialogues, but (2) that things corresponding to abstract
terms such as justice exist (as in Prt.
marks a new development in the so-called
330cd and Hp. Ma. 287bd);
middle dialogues. With this development
(3) that these things are the objects of real
comes another, a change in ontological status definition, that they are things in the
of the Forms. Socratic forms are properties of world, not linguistic terms;
phenomenal objects, however independent of (4) that these abstract entities are ones over
those objects they may be; Platonic Forms are many, universals;
91

(5) that they are causes of some sort; not appear to be a version that gives rise (if
(6) that they are standards; any in fact does) to an infinite regress.
(7) that they are self-predicational. Why, then, do opponents of this view
(Dancy and Vlastos) refuse to accept it?
It is true that all of these claims are not found Perhaps because they hold the view I rejected
in a single text, but E1 and E2 come close to above, that only the inclusion of separate
a complete statement of the theory. Together existence among the premises of the theory
these seven features constitute a theory of of forms renders it metaphysically signifi-
forms, as Allen states. They constitute the cant. What Vlastos called Platos grandiose
basis of the theory of separately existing theory of separately existing Forms would
Forms in the middle Platonic dialogues. be a metaphysical theory; anything less gran-
Only the separate existence of the Forms, the diose would not be. Perhaps the question is
gulf of deficiency between Forms and phe- seen as a threshold problem: what does it
nomena, is not maintained. I do not find it take to make a theory cross the threshold
plausible to argue that this premise alone is from metaphysical innocence to metaphysi-
sufficient to turn a metaphysically innocent cal significance; their answer being, the doc-
set of claims into a metaphysical theory. trine of separate existence. As noted above,
I have a further argument in favour of the I find this implausible. I do not think this
metaphysical interpretation of the Socratic is a reasonable place to put the threshold.
dialogues. It ties together at least some of Exactly where the threshold of metaphysi-
these dialogues into a neat whole. The dia- cal significance lies is uncertain; if I had to
logues I have in mind are the dialogues of def- select a single principle that gave this theory
inition: the Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, metaphysical significance, it would be the
Hippias Major, Republic I, Lysis, Meno and one over many principle (4 above), which
(perhaps) Protagoras. These dialogues search introduces the idea of forms as universals. In
for a definition of a key term, but what is fact, however, I think the seven principles I
the nature of that search? According to the outlined above constitute a single theory that
account I adopt, it is a search for real beings, crosses the threshold of metaphysical signifi-
beings that possess certain characteristics, cance, wherever it lies, as a body.
enumerated above. If one rejects this account, I suspect that the real reason for reject-
it seems to me that one must say either that ing the metaphysical interpretation of the
the search is purely linguistic in character, Socratic dialogues is antecedent commitment
or refuse to provide an answer at all. The to the radical developmentalist framework
attempt to read out the ontological theory of interpretation, what Fronterotta calls an
from the dialogues one by one runs afoul of exegetical prejudice. The evidence in favour
E1 and E2; why not assume, therefore, that of an early theory of forms cannot be deci-
when Socrates is seeking definitions he is sive because we know, prior to inquiring,
seeking forms? This metaphysical theory is, that the Socrates of the early dialogues was
moreover, highly coherent. It posits the exist- exclusively a moral philosopher. This radi-
ence of the objects it seeks to define, assigns cal account of Platonic development may be
a causal role to them and assigns a role as attractive for reasons I have not explored
standards as well. The latter claim gives rise here. Vlastos thought it enabled him to solve
to a version of self-predication, but it does the Socratic problem. I do not imagine that
92

I, in this essay, have removed all the reasons forms as properties. I think that this is what
for regarding radical developmentalism as Aristotle meant when he said that Socrates
attractive. If the account I have defended did not make the universals or definitions
of an unseparated theory of forms in the exist apart: that he accepted universals, but
Socratic dialogues is correct, however, radi- not separately existing ones. I do not think,
cal developmentalism must be false and however, that Fine is right to claim that the
the relation between Vlastoss SocratesE separated Forms of the middle dialogues con-
and SocratesM must be closer than Vlastos tinue to be properties. I think that separation
thought. Though I do not think the relation transforms forms into Forms, properties into
is as close as Fronterotta claims, I think that substances. This leads to a new concept of
the development of SocratesM from SocratesE self-predication, according to which Forms
is a smooth movement in a single direction, become perfect instances of their relevant
rather than a radical shift of view. properties, and participation becomes resem-
I conclude with a remark about Aristotles blance to that instance. Aristotles interpreta-
testimony, as contained in F1F3 above. The tion of the Platonic version of Forms, with
interpretation of these passages is controver- all its complexities, is, however, beyond the
sial. I am in complete agreement with Fines scope of this chapter.
postulation of an early theory of forms, and
especially with her treatment of early Platonic William J. Prior
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5
SOCRATIC IGNORANCE AND
TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION own views to get the better of these argu-

ments. He also presents himself as a person
Platos Socrates repeatedly and emphatically guided by a divine voice that infallibly guides
denies that he is wise and denies that he has him to avoid actions that would bring him
the kind of knowledge of the nature of vir- harm. In other words, Socrates takes him-
tue and of the virtues that serves as the goal self to have true beliefs supported by strong
of his philosophical inquiries. Possessing evidence at times stunningly strong evi-
such knowledge would be of fundamental dence. Furthermore, on at least a few occa-
importance in living a truly virtuous life, and sions, Socrates is willing to ascribe ethical
Socrates laments both his own ignorance and knowledge to himself, and on other occa-
that of his fellow citizens. In the absence of sions makes claims that are naturally taken
such knowledge, Socrates doubts whether to imply that he takes himself to have such
anyone can have any ethical knowledge at knowledge.
all, and, in the absence of ethical knowledge, Many commentators have been struck by
Socrates doubts whether anyone counts as a tension that results when Socrates disa-
truly virtuous. Instead, when it comes to vir- vowals of knowledge are read alongside his
tue, Socrates claims that the best of his fellow claims to know various things. While there
citizens stand to the person with knowledge, has been widespread agreement that this
as the shades in Hades stand to living human tension can be resolved, there has been less
beings. agreement about exactly how the resolution
Socrates, however, is no sceptic and should precede.
expresses little uncertainty about how he One way to dissolve the tension, forcefully
ought to conduct his own life. He is com- presented in Wolfsdorf (2004c), reminds us
pletely confident that he must devote his to keep in mind that Platos Socrates is a
life to his philosophical mission and that literary character in a number of different
he must avoid vice at all costs. He defends dialogues. Rather than treating Socrates as a
his own ethical views and attacks those of philosopher in his own right whose views we
his opponents with carefully reasoned argu- find by examining a number of statements in
ments, and clearly indicates that he takes his the so-called early dialogues, we need to look
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
at the point that Plato is trying to make in position with respect to the philosophical
each particular work by having his charac- positions within this subset of dialogues. My
ter make certain utterances. Once we keep goal in this chapter is to find a solution to
in mind the fact that Plato can have a con- the problem of Socratic ignorance in keeping
sistent philosophical position without this with these assumptions.
characters utterances across different works In the section Two Questions, I distin-
being consistent, we can see that there is no guish two questions that we might be asking
mystery presented by Socrates inconsistent when we ask whether Socrates takes him-
utterances. self to have knowledge. We might be ask-
Another sort of solution, endorsed by ing whether Socrates takes himself to be in
Kraut (1984), is developmentalist about a condition that he uses, or would use, his
Socrates philosophy. The tension results own knowledge terminology to ascribe to
from the fact that Platos Socrates changes himself. Alternatively, we might be asking
his mind about whether knowledge of the whether Socrates takes himself to be in a
essential nature of virtue is required for all state that a contemporary reader could aptly
ethical knowledge. The passages in which call knowledge. This distinction will turn
Socrates claims to have ethical knowledge out to be crucial because there are a number
are from earlier Socratic dialogues in which of cases in which a contemporary reader will
Platos Socrates is not yet committed to the be willing to credit Socrates with knowledge
claim that definitional knowledge is required despite the fact that Socrates seems reluctant
for all ethical knowledge. However, in later to characterize his situation by using his own
Socratic dialogues, most notably the Meno, epistemic vocabulary.
Socrates accepts a principle of definitional In the section Socrates Disavowals, I
knowledge according to which all knowledge examine the textual basis for taking Socrates
requires knowledge of definitions. to disavow all ethical knowledge. At the
There is no doubt a good deal that can be heart of the evidence for total disavowal is
said for and against each of these attempts Socrates seeming commitment to the claim
to resolve the problem of Socratic ignorance. that all ethical knowledge requires knowl-
I will, however, say very little about either edge of the essential nature of the virtues,
sort of solution in this chapter. Instead, I will knowledge which Socrates emphatically
make two assumptions. First, this chapter denies having. In the following section,
is an exercise in Socratic Studies as under- Socratic Knowledge, I will examine evi-
stood and defended by Brickhouse and dence for the claim that Socrates takes him-
Smith (2010). I will assume that there are self to have some knowledge. I will look at
a series of philosophical positions espoused a few passages where Socrates makes an
by the character of Socrates in a subset of explicit knowledge claim, and will argue that
Platos dialogues, and that these positions other facts about Socrates seem to commit
differ in critical ways from positions that him, at the very least, to taking himself to be
we find outside these works. Furthermore, in a state that many people will be inclined to
I will assume that there is some intellectual count as possessing knowledge.
merit in attempting to discern and critically With these passages in hand, I present
evaluate these positions. Second, I will adopt a schematic version of the problem of
a unitarian rather than a developmentalist Socratic ignorance (hereafter (PSI)) in the
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
section titled Restatement of the Problem of himself to be in a state to which he would

Socratic Ignorance and a Survey of Proposed apply his own epistemic terminology. This
Solutions. I present an argument that com- question is complicated by the fact that the
mits Socrates to inconsistent beliefs. Past English word know and its cognates are
attempts to resolve (PSI) can be classified plausible translations of several different
according to which of the premises in this Greek terms. In the Apology alone, Socrates
argument they deny. I reject attempts to uses the verbs epaiein, suneidenai, eidenai,
resolve (PSI) by maintaining that Socrates epistamai and gignskein. Furthermore, he
disavowals of knowledge are ironic, and, uses the terms sophos (wise) and sophia
therefore, do not express his true commit- (wisdom) to talk about a state that is closely
ments. I then concentrate on interpretations related to possessing knowledge. He also uses
that take Socrates disavowals of knowledge the term phronsis in a way that seems syn-
and wisdom to be sincere. onymous with sophia, and talks about the
While there are a number of important possession of a techn (art or craft) as involv-
differences among the remaining attempts to ing the possession of knowledge and wisdom.
solve the problem of ignorance, they all share To complicate matters even further, Socrates
an important feature. In each case, resolution need not take all of these terms to have
of (PSI) depends on a distinction between dif- exactly the same sense and might take him-
ferent levels of cognitive achievement. On the self to be in a condition accurately described
one hand, Socrates allows that he has true by some of these terms but not others. In both
beliefs based on evidence that is sufficient for his avowals and disavowals, Socrates uses a
full rational commitment to what he believes. range of these terms. While a full discussion
On the other hand, Socrates takes himself to of the various shades of meaning of the terms
lack an explanatory account for the truth of in Socrates epistemic repertoire goes beyond
these beliefs that proceeds from a grasp of the scope of this chapter, I will often indicate
the essential nature of the virtues. Socrates the Greek terms that Socrates uses.
takes the possession of knowledge grounded In order to answer our first question, we
in such an explanatory account to be of need to look at two things. First, we need
paramount practical and theoretical impor- to look at how Socrates uses his epistemic
tance. I conclude this chapter by presenting vocabulary in talking about himself. Second,
an account of the two kinds of cognitive we need to look at Socrates commitments
achievement that Socrates distinguishes, and given his other statements about the phenom-
claim that we ought to read Socrates avow- ena that he uses his epistemic vocabulary to
als and disavowals in light of this account. talk about. When Socrates characterizes wis-
dom (sophia) and knowledge (epistm), he
indicates that he has in mind an extraordi-
narily high-level cognitive achievement. The
TWO QUESTIONS wise person or the person who has epistm
grasps the definitional nature of the subjects
When we ask whether Socrates takes himself she knows about, and possesses an explana-
to have any knowledge or wisdom, we should tory account of the truths she believes con-
be careful to distinguish two questions. First, cerning these subjects. The possession of
we might be asking whether Socrates takes epistm makes the wise person an expert,
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
and endows her with sophisticated recogni- that represents knowledgeW. The question that
tional and inferential capacities. A person I am interested in is the question of whether
with epistm concerning piety, for example, Socrates has a certain de re belief, whether
will never misclassify a non-pious action as tacit or explicit. Assume for a moment that
pious. Furthermore, her decisions about how Socrates has a true belief and that he really
best to pursue piety will invariably be cor- does have the evidence that he takes himself to
rect. The wise person will also be endowed have for his belief. Does he count as having a
with the ability to teach what she knows to true belief based on evidence sufficient for full
others. Finally, wisdom yields a remarkable rational commitment? In other words, does
degree of doxastic stability. The wise persons he have knowledgeW? With respect to this
beliefs are absolutely unshakeable and will second question, I think that it is reasonable
survive any attempt at refutation. to claim that Socrates does take himself to be
We might, however, ask another question. in such a state. Furthermore, in cases where
We can ask whether Socrates takes himself to Socrates does claim that he possesses ethical
be in a state that we would describe as knowing knowledge, it is likely that he has something
something. If we are asking whether Socrates like weak knowledge in mind, rather than the
has or commits himself to having what we kind of knowledge possible only for the wise
would call knowledge, a lot depends on our person whose knowledge proceeds from a
own theory of knowledge. The requirements grasp of ethical natures.
for knowledge, however, have been a matter of
controversy since at least the time of Socrates
and remain so even now. People who disagree
about what is needed for knowledge might SOCRATES DISAVOWALS
also disagree about whether the states that
Socrates takes himself to be in should count I turn now to some texts in which Socrates
as knowledge. I do not know what the proper claims that he lacks wisdom and knowledge. I
analysis of knowledge is, or even whether begin by examining evidence from the Apology
there is a proper analysis of knowledge. In in which Socrates disavowal of wisdom plays
what follows, therefore, I am going to make a particularly central role. Afterwards, I turn
a simplifying assumption. When I talk about to some other Socratic texts.
what we mean by knowledge, I intend some
sort of justified true belief account of knowl- DISAVOWAL IN THE APOLOGY
edge strengthened to deal with Gettier-style
counter-examples. On this sort of account, for In the course of his defense in the Apology,
a person to know something is for her to have Socrates disavowals of knowledge and wis-
a true belief that is based on undefeated evi- dom are at times quite sweeping. He claims
dence that is sufficient for full rational com- at the outset of his defense that he has been
mitment to that belief. In what follows, I will wrongly thought of as a natural philoso-
sometimes refer to this as weak knowledge pher, and recounts the charge against him as
or knowledgeW. In addition, I allow for the follows.
possibility that Socrates can take himself to
be in a state that counts as knowingW some- (AP1) It goes something like this:
thing, even if Socrates has no term or concept Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
he busies himself studying things in the Human wisdom (anthrpin sophia),

sky and below the earth; he makes the perhaps. It may be that I really possess
worse into the stronger argument, and he this, while those whom I mentioned just
teaches these same things to others. You now are wise with a wisdom more than
have seen this yourself in the comedy of human; else I cannot explain it, for I
Aristophanes, a Socrates swinging about certainly do not possess it, and whoever
there, saying he was walking on air and says I do is lying and speaks to slander
talking a lot of other nonsense about me. (Ap. 20d)
things of which I know (epai) nothing
at all. I do not speak in contempt of such
knowledge (epistm), if someone is wise We should note the tight connection between
(sophos) in these things lest Meletus wisdom (sophia) and knowledge (epistm)
bring more cases against me but, gen- suggested in (A1)(A3). It is precisely
tlemen, I have no part in it, and on this because Socrates thinks that he lacks knowl-
point I call upon the majority of you as edge (epistm) that he denies the posses-
witnesses. (Ap. 19bc1) sion of any wisdom beyond human wisdom
(anthrpin sophia). He allows that others
Socrates also claims that he has been incor- could have the knowledge of natural philos-
rectly lumped in with sophists such as ophy that he lacks, and allows that Evenus
Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and Evenus who might possess a greater than human wisdom,
claim to be able to teach young people to be provided the latter really does have the sort
excellent. These people pride themselves in of knowledge that he claims to have. The
having knowledge (epistm) of how to make wise person will possess knowledge, and the
young people excellent or virtuous (arte). person who possesses (at least some kinds of)
Evenus, for example, claims to be able to knowledge will count as wise.
teach young people to be excellent. Socrates goes on to explain what he means
in claiming to possess human wisdom while
(AP2) I thought Evenus a happy man, if denying any wisdom beyond human. He
he really possesses this art (techn), and begins by alluding to a striking pronounce-
teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly ment that the oracle of Delphi once made to
I would pride and preen myself if I his friend Chaerephon.
knew (epistamai) these things, but I do
not know (epistamai) them, gentlemen.
(AP4) He went to Delphi at one time
(Ap. 20c)
and ventured to ask the oracle as I say,
gentlemen, do not create a disturbance
While Socrates claims that his reputation as he asked if any man was wiser than I,
a teacher of virtue is misleading and unde- and the Pythian replied that no one was
served, he nevertheless claims that the source wiser. (Ap. 21a)
of this reputation is his possession of a kind
of wisdom. Socrates claims to have been shocked by the
oracles reply.
(AP3) What has caused my reputation is
none other than a certain kind of wis- (AP5) When I heard of this reply I asked
dom (sophia). What kind of wisdom? myself: Whatever does the god mean?
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
What is his riddle? I am very conscious fine, and agathos meaning good. This con-
that I am not wise at all; what then does junction can be used as an idiomatic formula
he mean by saying that I am the wisest? to describe anything taken to be valuable by
For surely he does not lie; it is not legiti- the speaker, and Grubes worthwhile cap-
mate for him to do so. (Ap. 21b)
tures this use of the phrase nicely. Socrates
disavowal of knowledge seems to have a
Notice that in (AP4) the Pythia claims only very wide scope on this construal of kalon
that no one is wiser than Socrates, which kagathon. Any knowledge that Socrates
strictly speaking does not imply that Socrates allows himself on this reading is knowledge
is wise. Socrates, however, takes the god to of something trivial or worthless.
have said through the Pythia that he is the However, a more inflationary reading of
wisest of men. Socrates disavowal of wis- kalon kagathon is also possible, according
dom in (AP5) is very general. In Grubes to which Socrates denies only that he knows
translation of the passage, Socrates says: I anything fine and good. To be fine and good,
am very conscious (sunoida) that I am not something might have to be of very high value.
wise at all. An alternative translation of this The more valuable a thing is said to be by use
sentence would be: I know (sunoida) myself of the phrase kalon kagathon, the narrower
to be wise (sophos) concerning neither great will be the range of knowledge Socrates disa-
nor small things.2 vows. He might know many things, just not
In response to the oracles statement, anything fine and good. The scope of the
Socrates begins to examine various peo- disavowal in (AP6), therefore, will depend
ple reputed to be wise. In each case where on how we take kalon kagathon. I incline
Socrates examines a person with a reputation towards a somewhat inflationary reading of
for wisdom, he soon learns that the person is the phrase. The elenctic investigations on the
not wise at all. Socrates reports his reaction basis of which Socrates comes to believe that
after such an examination. a person lacks knowledge focus on centrally
important subjects in ethics, and the peo-
(AP6) So I withdrew and thought to ple he investigates are shown not to know
myself: I am wiser (sophoteron) than what virtue or a particular virtue is. In addi-
this man; it is likely that neither of us tion, knowing something kalon kagathon is
knows (eidenai) anything worthwhile, both necessary and sufficient for possessing
but he thinks he knows something when greater than human wisdom. Even the crafts-
he does not, whereas when I do not people, to whom Socrates grants a sort of
know, neither do I think I know; so I am wisdom, do not seem to count as knowing
likely to be wiser than he to this small
anything kalon kagathon.
extent, that I do not think I know what I
From his continued examination of the
do not know.
politicians, poets and craftsmen in Athens,
Socrates claims that he came to the conclu-
What Socrates disavows in (AP6) is that he sion that those with the greatest reputation
knows (eidenai) anything kalon kagathon. were most lacking in wisdom, while those
The phrase kalon kagathon, translated by thought to be inferior were actually superior
Grube as worthwhile, is a conjunction of in wisdom (phronsis). Unlike the poets who
two terms kalos meaning beautiful, noble or create without wisdom, and the politicians
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
who do not have any knowledge on which things he claims that they are wiser than he
they base their political practice, Socrates is. Furthermore, Socrates never retracts either
takes craftsmen to have knowledge and to the claim that the craftsmen have knowledge
possess a kind of wisdom. The craftsmen, or the claim that this knowledge makes them
however, go wrong when they think them- wise in some sense. What he claims instead is
selves wise in matters that go beyond their that the wisdom that the craftsmen possess
crafts. with respect to their crafts is overshadowed
by the ignorance (amathia) that they have
(AP7) Finally I went to the craftsmen, for with respect to other greater matters.
I was conscious (suneidenai) of know- The word translated as ignorance in
ing (epistamai) practically nothing, and (AP7) is amathia. We must distinguish igno-
I knew (eidenai) that I would find that
rance as a mere lack of knowledge or true
they had knowledge (epistamenous) of
belief from amathia. The former might be a
many fine (kala) things. In this I was not
mistaken; they knew (epistamai) things wholly passive state, while the latter involves
I did not know (epistamai), and to that active epistemic overreach. The amaths per-
extent they were wiser (sophoteron) than son takes himself to know what he does not
I. But, men of Athens, the good crafts- know. Because of his own epistemic modesty,
men seemed to me to have the same fault Socrates takes himself to be better off than
as the poets: each of them, because of the craftsmen despite the fact that they pos-
his success at his craft (techn), thought sess some knowledge that he does not.
himself very wise (sophatatos) in other Socrates goes on to describe the most
most important pursuits, and this error blameworthy ignorance as taking oneself
of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they
to know what one does not. Once again,
had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of
he suggests that his avoidance of this sort
the oracle, whether I should prefer to
be as I am, with neither their wisdom of amathia concerning what happens after
(sophia) nor their ignorance (amathia), death distinguishes Socrates from many of
or to have both. The answer I gave his contemporaries.
myself and the oracle was that it was to
my advantage to be as I am. (Ap. 22de) (AP8) To fear death, gentlemen, is no
other than to think oneself wise when
Socrates disavowal of knowledge in (AP7) one is not, to think one knows (eidenai)
may have a somewhat narrower scope than what one does not know (oida). No one
his disavowal in (AP5), and he here claims knows whether death may not be the
that he is conscious or knows (suneidenai) greatest of all blessings for a man, yet
that he knows (epistamai) nothing so to men fear it as if they knew that it is the
greatest of evils. And surely it is the most
speak (ouden hs epos eipein) which may
blameworthy ignorance to believe that
suggest that he does not strictly speaking
one knows (eidenai) what one does not
know nothing. We once again see a tight know (oida). It is perhaps on this point
connection between knowledge (epistm) and in this respect, gentlemen, that I dif-
and wisdom (sophia). Possessing certain fer from the majority of men, and if I
kinds of knowledge suffices for wisdom, and were to claim that I am wiser than any-
because Socrates allows that the craftsmen one in anything, it would be in this, that,
have knowledge of many fine or noble (kala) as I have no adequate knowledge (eids
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
hikans) of things in the underworld, so small matters, and claims to be worth noth-
I do not think I have. (Ap. 29ab) ing with respect to wisdom. He claims to
have no knowledge of natural science, and
In (AP8) Socrates claims that fearing death to know (eidenai) nothing kalon kagathon.
implies taking oneself to know (eidenai) that However, Socrates also claims that he pos-
death is a great evil. Socrates claims that his sesses human wisdom and is wiser than the
superiority in wisdom is a result of his epis- politicians, poets and craftsmen that he has
temic modesty about what happens after examined. On a strong reading of 23b24,
death. Once again, he is wiser because he according to which the god is addressing all
does not think that he knows something that possible human beings, Socrates implies that
he does not know. his situation is pretty much as good as it gets
As a result of his failure to find anyone for human beings when it comes to wisdom.
wiser than himself in Athens, Socrates comes For versions of an interpretation that advo-
to understand the oracles statement to cates this strong reading and follows out
Chaerephon as a claim about the worthless- some of its consequences, see Vlastos (1985)
ness of human wisdom. and Yonezawa (2004). For a somewhat more
optimistic alternative about the possibility of
(AP9) What is probable, gentlemen, is human knowledge, see Benson (2000).
that in fact the god is wise and that his To avoid outright inconsistency, we need to
oracular response meant that human distinguish the wisdom that Socrates thinks
wisdom (anthrpin sophia) is worth
he has from the wisdom he thinks he lacks.
little or nothing, and that when he says
We have already seen that Socrates takes the
this man, Socrates, he is using my name
as an example, as if he said: This man possession of wisdom with respect to some-
among you, mortals, is wisest who, like thing to be strongly connected to the pos-
Socrates, understands (egnken) that his session of knowledge (epistm) about that
wisdom is worthless. (Ap. 23ab) thing. The wisdom that Socrates claims that
he lacks is the kind of greater than human
In (AP9) Socrates comes back to the human wisdom about important matters that would
wisdom (anthrpin sophia) he claimed to result from knowing something kalon kaga-
possess (at 20de). He contrasts being wise thon. This sort of wisdom would also make
in fact (t onti) with having human wisdom, a person truly worth something with respect
and claims that the latter is worth little or to wisdom. Neither Socrates nor anyone he
nothing. He goes on to strengthen the claim, has investigated turns out to have this kind
an alternative translation of which might be: of wisdom, which would involve a positive
The one among you, human beings, is wis- epistemic achievement that is perhaps possi-
est who like Socrates knows (egnken) that ble only for a god.
he is in truth worth nothing with respect to Socrates human wisdom, on the other
wisdom (23b34). hand, is primarily negative and consists in his
We have seen several texts in the Apology not taking himself to know what he does not
where Socrates disavows knowledge and know. For example, he does not take himself
wisdom. In some cases, these disavowals to know what things are like in the under-
are quite sweeping. Socrates claims that world. Human wisdom is not purely nega-
he is wise with respect to neither great nor tive. A dog does not think that it knows what
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
things are like in the underworld, but does ethical knowledge or ethical expertise. (For
not possess human wisdom. The key differ- further discussion of the relation between
ence between Socrates and the dog lies in the Socrates and scepticism, see Benson 2000;
latters awareness that he lacks a certain kind Brickhouse 1996; Brickhouse and Smith
of knowledge or wisdom. Socrates is able to 1994a, 2000; Wolfsdorf 2004a).
represent his lack of knowledge to himself in We can distinguish three sorts of ethi-
a way that the dog is not. Socrates not only cal knowledge that Socrates denies having.
does not take himself to know the things First, Socrates denies that he has definitional
that he does not know, but also takes him- knowledge. He claims not to know what vir-
self not to know the things that he does not tue itself is, and denies knowing the nature
know. In fact, Socrates is willing to use the of particular virtues such as piety, courage,
verb gignskein, which can be translated as justice and moderation. He claims that he
to know, to talk about his own condition. does not know the nature of the beautiful or
The god claims that Socrates is the wisest fine (in the Hippias Major), and that he does
person because he knows that he is, in truth, not know what a friend is (in the Lysis). In
worthless with respect to wisdom. Charity each of these cases Socrates denies that he
demands that we take Socrates to think that knows something that would count as kalon
knowing (gignskein) that he is worthless kagathon. Socrates recognition that neither
with respect to wisdom is a possible state. he nor his interlocutors possess definitional
Therefore, knowing (gignskein) something knowledge causes him to raise doubts about
should not imply that a person possesses whether they possess any ethical knowledge
genuine wisdom. at all, and leads to a second sort of disavowal
Socrates distinguishes the real wisdom of ethical knowledge. He worries that a per-
of the god from human wisdom possession son who does not know what a virtue is can
of which does not, in truth, make Socrates know neither what features that virtue pos-
worth anything with respect to wisdom. sesses nor whether or not that virtue properly
The term human in the phrase human wis- characterizes particular actions or sorts of
dom, therefore, seems to function as a priva- actions. Finally, Socrates denies that he pos-
tive adjective, like fake in fake diamond. sesses knowledge of how to make people bet-
Human wisdom turns out not to be genuine ter. Just as he does in the Apology, Socrates
wisdom at all. denies that he has the sort of expertise that
would qualify him as a teacher of virtue. It
DISAVOWALS IN OTHER WORKS will be helpful to look at a few examples of
each sort of denial.
I turn now to some disavowals of knowl- In the Euthyphro, Socrates offers to
edge outside the Apology. Socrates is con- become Euthyphros student in order to
cerned mainly to deny that he has knowledge learn what piety is. He claims that receiving
concerning ethical subjects. We do not see an account of the nature of piety will pro-
Socrates spending time thinking about prob- vide him with a model (paradeigma) that he
lems of natural philosophy, nor does he raise will be able to look at in deciding whether
sceptical problems about the reliability of his various actions are pious or impious. At the
senses, memory or other faculties. Instead, close of the dialogue, Socrates complains
Socrates typically denies that he possesses that Euthyphro is departing without having
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
taught him the nature of piety. While Socrates Socrates does not take himself to know the
interactions with Euthyphro are character- nature of sphrosun and to engage in elen-
ized by a good deal of irony, his claim not chus simply to trip others up. Rather he is
to know the nature of the pious and impious actively trying to figure out what sphrosun
and to lack wisdom about the divine are just is. Furthermore, Socrates does not seek to
what we would expect given his claims in refute his interlocutor merely out of competi-
the Apology. Socrates indicates that had he tive zeal.
received a proper account of the pious from
Euthyphro, he would have become wise as (CH2) Oh come, I said, how could
well as stopped making errors due to his own you possibly think that even if I were
lack of wisdom. to refute everything you say, I would be
doing it for any other reasons than the
(EU1) SOCRATES: What a thing to one I would give for a thorough inves-
do, my friend! By going you have cast tigation of my own statements the
me down from a great hope I had, that fear of unconsciously thinking I know
I would learn from you the nature of (eidenai) something when I do not know
the pious and the impious and so escape (eids) it. And this is what I claim to be
Meletus indictment by showing him doing now, examining the argument for
that I had acquired wisdom in divine my own sake primarily, but perhaps also
matters from Euthyphro, and my igno- for the sake of my friends. Or dont you
rance would no longer cause me to be believe it to be for the common good,
careless and inventive about such things, or for that of most men, that the state
and that I would be better for the rest of of each existing thing should become
my life. (15e16a) clear? (166cd)
In the Charmides, Critias defines sphrosun Socrates claims that his primary purpose in
(temperance or self-control) in terms of the refuting someone else is to avoid thinking
Delphic oracles command to know oneself. that he knows something when he does not.
He tells Socrates that he will elaborate on Elenchus thus serves as a way to avoid the
this proposed definition, if Socrates does not sort of blameworthy amathia that Socrates
agree that to be temperate is to know oneself. talks about in the Apology. In addition to
In response, Socrates claims that he cannot preserving our epistemic modesty, however,
simply choose to agree with Critias, because Socrates indicates that elenchus can serve
he does not know what sphrosun is. a positive role in making clear how each
thing is.
(CH1) Socrates: But Critias, I replied, At the outset of the Meno, in response
you are talking to me as though I pro- to Menos question about whether virtue
fessed to know (eidenai) the answers to
is teachable, Socrates denies that he knows
my own questions and as though I could
what virtue is and suggests that failure to
agree with you if I really wished. This
is not the case rather, because of my know what virtue is counts as an obstacle to
own ignorance (dia to m autos eide- knowing what sorts of features virtue pos-
nai), I am continually investigating in sesses. Furthermore, Socrates claims that he
your company whatever is put forward. has never met anyone who did know the
(165bc) nature of virtue.
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
(M1) Socrates: If then you want to ask (LY1) These people will go away saying
one of us [Athenians] that sort of ques- that we are friends of one another for
tion [whether virtue is teachable], every- I count myself in with you but what
one will laugh and say: Good stranger, a friend is we have not yet been able to
you must think me happy indeed if you discover. (Ly. 223b)
think I know (eidenai) whether virtue
(HM1) But when Im convinced by you
can be taught or how it comes to be; I
and say what you say, that its much the
am so far from knowing whether virtue
most excellent thing to be able to present
can be taught or not that I do not even
a speech well and finely, and get things
have any knowledge (eids) of what
done in court or any other gathering, I
virtue itself is. I myself, Meno, am as
hear every insult from that man (among
poor as my fellow citizens in this mat-
others around here) who has always
ter, and I blame myself for not knowing
been refuting me. He happens to be a
(eids) at all about virtue. If I do not
close relative of mine, and he lives in the
know what something is, how could I
same house. So when I go home to my
know what qualities it possesses? (Men.
own place and he hears me saying those
71ab)
things, he asks if Im not ashamed that I
dare discuss fine activities when Ive been
When Meno claims to have learned what vir- so plainly refuted about the fine, and its
tue is from Gorgias, Socrates begins to ques- clear I dont even know (oida) at all what
tion him about the nature of virtue. After that is itself! Look, hell say. How will
being examined Meno claims that he used to you know whose speech or any other
action is finely presented or not, when
know what virtue was but has now been led
you are ignorant of the fine? And when
into perplexity by Socrates who has the same
youre in a state like that, do you think
effect as the numbing torpedo fish. In his its any better for you to live than die?
response to Meno, Socrates again insists that (Hp. Ma. 304cd)
he is perplexed about the nature of virtue.
(R1) Before finding the answer to our first
(M2) Now if the torpedo fish is itself inquiry about what justice is, I let that go
numb and so makes others numb, then and turned to investigate whether it is a
I resemble it, but not otherwise, for I kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of
myself do not have the answer when I wisdom and virtue. Then an argument
perplex others, but I am more perplexed came up about injustice being more prof-
than anyone when I cause perplexity in itable than justice, and I couldnt refrain
others. So now I do not know (oida) from abandoning the previous one and
what virtue is; perhaps you knew before following up on that. Hence the result of
you contacted me, but now you are cer- the discussion, as far as Im concerned, is
tainly like one who does not know. (Men. that I know (eidenai) nothing, for when
80cd) I dont know (oida) what justice is, Ill
hardly know whether it is a kind of vir-
tue or not, or whether a person who has
Socrates similarly denies that he knows what
it is happy or unhappy. (R. I 354bc)
a friend is, what the beautiful is and what
justice is. The following passages occur at the
end of the Lysis, the Hippias Major and Book In each of these cases, Socrates makes a
I of the Republic: point of concluding his conversation with an
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
interlocutor by insisting that he lacks defini- Definitional Knowledge (PD) is more contro-
tional knowledge about the main topic of that versial.4 I here follow Bensons formulation
conversation. The inability of his interlocu- of the principle (Benson 2000: 11213).
tors to avoid falling into contradiction under
elenctic questioning has shown that they (PD) If A fails to know what F-ness is then
lack definitional knowledge, and Socrates A fails to know anything about F-ness.
claims that he too lacks the ability to give a
proper answer to his questions. Furthermore, As Benson notes, we can distinguish two
Socrates takes his lack of definitional knowl- theses within (PD). The first concerns the
edge to undermine other claims to knowl- dependence of particular knowledge on
edge that he might make. Just as his failure to knowledge of definitions.
know what virtue is undermines any claim to
know whether virtue is teachable (M1), his (P) If A fails to know what F-ness is, then
failure to know what justice is undermines A fails to know, for any x, whether x is F.
any claim to know whether the just person
is happy (R1) and his failure to know what The second principle involves the depend-
the fine is undermines any claim to know ence of knowledge about the features of
whether a particular speech or action is fine properties on definitional knowledge about
(H1).3 those properties.
In the Euthyphro, Socrates suggests that
knowledge of the definition of piety would (D) If A fails to know what F is, then A
allow a person to judge correctly whether any fails to know, for any G, whether F is G.5
given action is pious (Euthyhr. 6e), and chas-
tises Euthyphro for prosecuting his father in On the basis of the passages quoted above,
the absence of such knowledge. I am inclined to think that Socrates inclines
toward accepting something like (PD). In
(EU2) If you had no clear knowledge the absence of definitional knowledge con-
(oida) of piety and impiety you would cerning a property, Socrates seems strongly
never have ventured to prosecute your inclined to deny that he knows various facts
old father for murder on behalf of a
about the distribution and features of that
servant. For fear of the gods you would
property. Nevertheless, I do not think that
have been afraid to take the risk lest you
should not be acting rightly, and would the epistemic vocabulary Socrates ascribes to
have been ashamed before men, but now his own states or capacities can fully conform
I know well that you believe you have to (PD). In the Meno, for example, Socrates
clear knowledge of piety and impiety. takes himself to know that knowledge differs
(Euthphr. 15d) from right opinion while he denies knowl-
edge of precisely how knowledge differs from
Taken together, the foregoing passages sug- right opinion.
gest that Socrates takes the failure to have
definitional knowledge to imply a failure to (M3) SOCRATES: . . . That is why knowl-
possess at least some other sorts of knowledge is prized more highly than correct
edge. Whether Socrates accepts a full- opinion, and knowledge differs from cor-
fledged version of the Principle of Priority of rect opinion in being tied down.
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
MENO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it seems to be possible. If in the conversations we have

something like that. just had I had seemed to know (eids) and
SOCRATES: Indeed, I too speak as one who the other two not to know, then it would
does not have knowledge (hs ouk eids be right to issue a special invitation to me
leg) but is guessing. However, I certainly to perform this task; but as the matter
do not think I am guessing that right opin- stands, we were all in the same difficulty.
ion is a different thing from knowledge. Why then should anybody choose one of
If I claim to know anything else and I us in preference to another? What I think
would make that claim about few things is that he ought to choose none of us. But
I would put this down as one of the things as things are, see whether the suggestion I
I know (oida). (Men. 98b) am about to make may not be a good one:
what I say we ought to do, my friends
A completely universal application of (PD) since this is just between ourselves is
to all of Socrates uses of his own epistemic to join in searching for the best possible
terminology would render what he says here teacher. (La. 200d201a)
inconsistent.6 Furthermore, as we will see in
a moment, Socrates makes other knowledge Socrates takes his inability to teach others to
claims in cases where he lacks definitional be virtuous to follow from his own lack of
knowledge. Before turning to these passages, knowledge or wisdom. In the Meno, Socrates
however, it will be useful to look at a third insists that the inability to teach others to be
sort of knowledge that Socrates disavows. excellent shows that a person lacks knowl-
Socrates denies that he has knowledge edge or wisdom.
of the art of making people better and con-
nects this ignorance to his ignorance about (M4) SOCRATES: So it is not by some kind
the nature of virtue and the individual vir- of wisdom (sophia), or by being wise
tues. We have already seen that Socrates (sophos), that such men lead their cit-
denies having this sort of knowledge in the ies, those such as Themistocles and those
Apology, and he makes a similar denial in mentioned by Anytus just now? That is
the Laches where he denies knowing or ever the reason why they cannot make others
having learned the art of improving peoples be like themselves, because it is not knowl-
souls (La. 186c). Because Socrates takes him- edge (epistm) which makes them what
self to be as ignorant as his interlocutors, he they are. (Men. 99b)
denies that he has any special ability to help
them raise their sons. (M5) SOCRATES: Therefore, if it is not through
knowledge (epistm), the only alterna-
(La1) LYSIMACHUS: . . . What do you say, tive is that it is through right opinion that
Socrates? Will you comply with our statesmen follow the right course for their
request and take an active part with us in cities. As regards knowledge, they are no
helping the young men to become as good different from soothsayers and proph-
as possible? ets. They too say many true things when
SOCRATES: Well, it would be a terrible thing, inspired, but they have no knowledge of
Lysimachus, to be unwilling to join in what they are saying . . . And so, Meno,
assisting any man to become as good as is it right to call divine these men who,
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
without any understanding, are right in In order to possess knowledge that some-
much that is of importance in what they thing is the case, a person needs to grasp an
say and do? (Men. 99bc) account of why it is the case, and finding this
explanatory account will involve recollec-
If there are people who truly possess virtue tion. In the discussion of recollection earlier
but are unable to teach others to be virtu- in the Meno, Socrates suggested that recol-
ous, Socrates concludes that virtue is not lection was also the means by which a per-
knowledge, and Socrates allows that there son could find the answer to the question of
might be such people. Nevertheless, Socrates what virtue is. There is a strong suggestion,
holds that those who possess virtue without therefore, that what is needed for someone to
knowledge are markedly inferior to a virtu- have knowledge rather than true belief about
ous person with the ability to teach others. what is virtuous is an account of the nature
Such a person would be as Tiresias among of virtue. In the absence of such definitional
the dead and would be a true reality com- knowledge, the statesman with true beliefs
pared with shadows (Men. 100e). Socrates cannot teach others to be virtuous. The per-
counts himself among the inferior folk who son who possessed this sort of knowledge
are without understanding (aneu nou), when would be a person who knew something
it comes to virtue. kalon kagathon and would count as having
Since the inability to teach implies a lack significant worth with respect to wisdom.
of epistm, Socrates concludes that the suc- We have seen that Socrates disavows
cessful statesmen of the past possessed cor- three interrelated sorts of knowledge in the
rect or true opinion without knowledge. ethical sphere. He denies that he has defini-
Correct opinion in any individual case will tional knowledge. Because he lacks defini-
lead to the same sort of success as knowl- tional knowledge, he worries that he lacks
edge, but Socrates claims that knowledge has ethical knowledge altogether. Without defi-
the advantage of being secured by an explan- nitional knowledge of the nature of virtue,
atory account. Socrates fails to possess the explanatory
account that is required for knowledge rather
(M6) For true opinions (doxai altheis), than mere true belief about ethical matters.
as long as they remain, are a fine thing Finally, because Socrates lacks definitional
and all they do is good, but they are not knowledge about virtue, he is not in a posi-
willing to remain long, and they escape tion to teach others to be virtuous.
from a mans mind, so that they are not
worth much until one ties them down by
(giving) an account of the reason why
(aitias logism). And that, Meno, my SOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE
friend, is recollection, as we previously
agreed. After they are tied down, in the
SOME DIRECT AVOWALS OF KNOWLEDGE BY
first place they become knowledge, and
then they remain in place. That is why SOCRATES
knowledge is prized higher than correct
opinion, and knowledge differs from cor- Socrates disavowals of knowledge and wis-
rect opinion in being tied down. (Men. dom are widespread. Socrates consistently
97e98a) denies the kind of definitional knowledge that
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
would allow him to answer questions about at which point Euthydemus attempts to
the nature of various virtues. Furthermore, show that it is impossible to know any-
he seems to doubt that other kinds of ethical thing without knowing everything. For
knowledge are possible in the absence of def- our purposes, what is important in this
initional knowledge. Nevertheless, Socrates passage is the fact that Socrates readily
does sometimes claim to have knowledge admits that he knows some things. There
about particular actions. Furthermore, for a is no suggestion, however, that Socrates
person who takes himself to have no knowl- takes himself to possess the sort of defini-
edge, Socrates exhibits a surprising degree tional knowledge mentioned in (PD).
of confidence in his beliefs. In this section, I
begin by examining some of Socrates direct In the Euthyphro as well, Socrates distin-
avowals of knowledge. I then turn to some guishes questions that are easily settled from
indirect evidence that Socrates takes himself problematic ethical questions.
to possess something that we could justifi-
ably consider knowledge. (EU2) SOC: What are the subjects of differ-
In the Euthydemus, Socrates claims that ence that cause hatred and anger? Let us
he knows many trivial things but that he fails look at it this way. If you and I were to
to know other things. differ about numbers as to which is the
greater, would this difference make us ene-
(ED1) Then come answer me this, he mies and angry with each other, or would
[Euthydemus] said: Is there anything you we proceed to count and soon resolve our
know (epistasai)? difference about this?
Oh, yes, I [Socrates] said, many things, EUTH: We would certainly do so.
though trivial ones. SOC: Again, if we differed about the larger
That will serve the purpose, he said. Now do and the smaller, we would turn to meas-
you suppose it possible for any existing urement and soon cease to differ.
thing not to be what it is? EUTH: That is so.
Heavens no, not I. SOC: And about the heavier and the lighter,
And do you know something? he said. we would resort to weighing and be
Yes, I do. reconciled.
Then you are knowing, if you really know? EUTH: Of course. (Euthphr. 7bc)
Of course, as far as concerns that particular
thing. (EU2) suggests that it is possible to settle
That doesnt matter, because mustnt you ordinary empirical questions by observation
necessarily know everything, if you are and measurement. It is plausible to count
knowing? the answers to these questions as among the
How in heavens name can that be, said I, many trivial things that Socrates claims that
when there are many other things I dont he knows in (ED1). These easily settled ques-
know (epistamai)? (Euthd. 293bc) tions are contrasted with questions about the
This discussion occurs immediately after just and unjust, the beautiful and ugly and
Socrates raises some difficulties involved the good and bad (Euthphr. 7cd). Socrates
in discovering what sort of knowledge draws a distinction between ethical knowl-
makes human beings happy (Euthd. 292e), edge and knowledge of the ordinary empirical
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
features of things, and allows that the latter position to issue that command. In the
are fairly easy to acquire. Since Socrates dis- absence of definitional knowledge of wicked-
avowals of knowledge mainly concern ethi- ness, Socrates knowledge claim is inconsist-
cal matters, the kinds of knowledge that he ent with (PD).
implies he has in (EU2) and (ED1) need not However, in talking about someone who
worry us too much. is beltin Socrates might mean to indicate a
However, Socrates also claims to have some moral superior, in which case what he says
ethical knowledge. In the Apology, Socrates here does not amount to a very substan-
seeks to contrast his ignorance of what hap- tive ethical claim. He claims simply that it
pens after death with his knowledge that it would be vicious for him to disobey virtu-
would be wrong for him to disobey the god. ous demands, which we might take to be a
(AP8) quoted above is immediately followed simple truism.8 Even on this interpretation of
by this passage7: beltin, however, what Socrates says seems
to be incompatible with a fully universal
(AP10) It is perhaps on this point and application of (PD). Even if the general claim
in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ that injustice and disobedience to a moral
from the majority of men, and if I were superior is vicious borders on tautologous,
to claim that I am wiser than anyone in
Socrates needs to apply this knowledge to
anything, it would be in this, that, as I
particular situations. But this application
have no adequate knowledge (ouk eids
hikans) of things in the underworld, so seems to require the ability to recognize a
I do not think I have. I do know (oida), moral superior, and (PD) seems to rule out
however, that it is wicked and shameful this ability in the absence of definitional
to do wrong (adikein), to disobey ones moral knowledge.
superior, be he god or man. I shall never Later in the Apology, Socrates claims to
fear or avoid things of which I do not know that imprisonment or exile would
know, whether they may not be good be bad, and that it would be irrational to
rather than things that I know (oida) to choose these punishments in preference to
be bad. (Ap. 29bc) death since he does not know whether death
is good or bad.
Socrates here claims to know that it is wicked
and shameful to do wrong or to disobey his (AP11) I am convinced (pepeismai) that
superior. He goes on to note that for him to I never willingly wrong anyone, but I am
abandon his philosophical mission would not convincing you of this, for we have
amount to such disobedience. What does talked together but a short time. If it
Socrates mean when he talks about a supe- were the law with us, as it is elsewhere,
rior? If Socrates means to indicate someone that a trial for life should not last one
but many days, you would be convinced,
who has the right to give him an order, which
but now it is not easy to dispel great
is suggested by his example of obedience to
slanders in a short time. Since I am con-
a military commander (at 28de), then he vinced (pepeismenos) that I wrong no
is claiming knowledge of a substantive and one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to
controversial moral fact. He is claiming to say that I deserve some evil and to make
know that it is always wicked to disobey the some such assessment against myself.
command of someone who is in a legitimate What should I fear? That I should suffer
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
the penalty Meletus has assessed against (G1) SOCRATES: In that case I really am a
me, of which I say I do not know (ouk fool, Callicles, if I dont suppose that any-
eidenai) whether it is good or bad? Am thing might happen to anybody in this city.
I then to choose in preference to this But I know this well (eu oida): that if I do
something that I know very well (eu
come into court involved in one of those
oida) to be an evil and assess the penalty
perils which you mention, the man who
at that? (Ap. 37ab)
brings me in will be a wicked man for
no good man would bring in a man who
Socrates here makes another knowledge is not a wrongdoer and it wouldnt be
claim that is incompatible with (PD), on the at all strange if I were to be put to death.
assumption that he lacks definitional knowl- (Grg. 521cd)
edge about badness. Furthermore, at two
points in (AP11), Socrates claims to be con- In (G1) Socrates takes himself to know that
vinced (pepeismai) that he has never willingly anyone who attempts to prosecute him will
wronged anyone, and holds that given more be a wicked person. Furthermore, he claims
time he could convince the jurors of this fact to know this fact on the basis of an argu-
as well. Socrates seems to take his conviction ment. The argument contains as one premise
that he has never willingly wronged anyone a general moral claim that no good person
to be based on evidence and reasoned argu- prosecutes anyone who is not a wrong-
ment, and thinks that he could convince the doer. The argument also requires a particu-
jury by presenting his reasoning and evi- lar claim that Socrates has never wronged
dence. Assume for a moment that Socrates anyone. On the assumption that we cannot
has never willingly harmed anyone, and that know the conclusion of an argument on the
his evidence is strong enough to convince basis of that argument without also knowing
others of this fact. On these assumptions, the premises, Socrates takes himself to know
Socrates takes himself to have a true belief on that prosecution of innocent people is wrong
the basis of evidence sufficient for conviction. and that he is innocent. Once again, given his
Socrates, therefore, seems to take himself to avowed lack of definitional knowledge, what
satisfy the conditions for weak knowledge. Socrates commits himself to in (G1) cannot
We might claim, nevertheless, that Socrates be made consistent with (PD). There is some
takes himself to have a rationally grounded textual evidence, therefore, that Socrates
true belief that he has never willingly harmed takes himself to have some ethical knowl-
anyone, but deny he takes himself to know edge. From other things that Socrates says, I
that he has never done so. believe that there are indirect arguments that
Whatever we are inclined to say about he takes himself to be in a state or condition
(A11), however, Socrates makes an even that counts as weak knowledge of ethical
stronger claim that he knows that any- truths.
one who attempts to prosecute him will be
a wicked person in the Gorgias. When INDIRECT ARGUMENTS THAT SOCRATES TAKES
Callicles suggests that Socrates lives in dan- HIMSELF TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE
ger of being brought to court and deprived of
his property or life, Socrates acknowledges We have seen a few passages in which
this possibility. Socrates directly claims to know an ethical
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
truth, despite the fact that he does not think fail to believe. However, it is paradoxical
that he has the kind of definitional knowl- for a person to utter an instance of (MPB).
edge and grasp of explanations that he According to Moore, when I say, It is raining
requires for epistm in the Meno. Other outside, I do not assert but I do imply that I
things that Socrates says give us some indi- believe that it is raining outside. When I go on
rect indication that he takes himself to poss- to say, I do not believe that it is raining out-
ess true beliefs on the basis of a warrant side, I contradict what I implied in the first
sufficient for that belief. Socrates is will- clause of (MPB).9 Moore, along with many
ing to make various ethical assertions and subsequent philosophers, finds the follow-
expresses a good deal of confidence in his ing sentence problematic as well (for a dis-
ethical beliefs. In fact, he is confident enough cussion of Moores Paradox and its relation
in his ethical beliefs to die in their defense. to knowledge and assertion, see Williamson
Clearly a person can have a high degree of 1996, 2002: 24955):
confidence in a belief and can be willing to
assert the content of these beliefs without (MPK) It is raining outside, but I do not
having knowledge. Confidence and will- know that it is raining outside.10
ingness to assert do not entail knowledge.
However, I take the problem of Socratic While I am inclined to hear any utterance
ignorance to be a problem concerning the of (MPB) as completely inapt, my reaction
consistency of Socrates commitments. to (MPK) is somewhat more complicated.
While a person can assert and have confi- The complication is due to an unusual fea-
dence in things that she does not know, it is ture of the word know. Know is a perfectly
far from obvious that a person can consist- ordinary English word frequently used in
ently assert and confidently believe things non-philosophical contexts. However, know
that she does not take herself to know, or, is also a technical term, the analysis of which
worse, things that she takes herself not to has long been an object of dispute.
know. In being fully confident in his ethi- With respect to everyday non-philosophical
cal beliefs, and in being willing to make uses of know, I am strongly inclined to take
unhedged moral assertions, I suggest that an utterance of (MPK) to be inapt.11 When a
Socrates implies that he takes himself to person denies that he knows that it is rain-
have weak knowledge. ing outside, it is natural to take him to be
The problems at issue here are related to less than fully committed to the claim that
views about assertion, belief and knowledge it is raining outside. However, when a per-
that trace back to G. E. Moore (1962: 277). son makes the unhedged assertion that it
Moores Paradox is commonly stated in terms is raining outside, it is natural to take him
of belief: to be fully committed to the content of his
assertion. When a person utters (MPK) the
(MPB) It is raining outside, but I do not implications of the two clauses diverge, and
believe that it is raining outside. inconsistency ensues.
However, when we consider (MPK) with a
The proposition that is expressed by (MPB) philosophical theory of knowledge in mind,
is not contradictory. There are all sorts of our views about inaptness seem to depend on
things that are true about the world that I details about the theory of knowledge. For
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
example, any utterance of (MPK1) strikes me Socrates often avoids making unhedged
as inapt: assertions. In the ordinary case of elenchus,
Socrates asks questions of an interlocutor
(MPK1) It is raining but I do not have a rather than making assertions of his own.
true belief that it is raining based upon Sometimes what superficially seem to be
evidence sufficient to rule out alterna- assertions by Socrates are held up to an
tives to the claim that it is raining. interlocutor for assent or dissent, and need
not be taken to represent any commitment
(MPK1) seems especially inapt in contexts of Socrates. In other cases, what syntactically
where we are not considering various sorts seems to be an assertion is really a matter of
of sceptical scenarios to be relevant alter- drawing out the logical consequences of other
native possibilities. Even in contexts where things that an interlocutor has said, and not a
such scenarios are relevant, however, a per- view that Socrates endorses. Finally, Socrates
son who thinks that he has failed to rule often hedges his assertions by using locutions
out the sceptical possibilities should refrain like it seems (eikos). In none of these cases
from the unhedged assertion that it is rain- does it seem right to take Socrates to make
ing. Both being entitled to make an assertion an unhedged assertion expressing his own
and being sufficiently warranted in believ- commitment.
ing the content of that assertion might be In some cases, however, Socrates does
context-sensitive. If so, however, they are make unhedged assertions. Here are three
context-sensitive in the same way. In any examples taken from the Apology.
context, a person should not take herself to
be entitled to assert what she does not take (AP12) You are wrong, sir, if you think
herself to have sufficient warrant to believe. that a man who is any good at all should
On the other hand, consider: take into account the risk of life or death;
he should look to this only in his actions,
whether what he does is right or wrong,
(MPK2) It is raining, but I do not have whether he is acting like a good or a bad
an account of what rain is by reference man. (Ap. 28b)
to which I can give an account of the
cause of the fact that it is raining. (AP13) This is the truth of the matter,
men of Athens: wherever a man has taken
a position that he believes to be best, or
(MPK2) does not seem inapt. There are plenty
has been placed by his commander, there
of situations in which we take a person to he must I think remain and face danger,
be entitled to make an assertion despite the without a thought for death or anything
fact that she is fully aware that she lacks an else, rather than disgrace. (Ap. 28d)
explanatory account for the content of her
(AP14) Be sure (eu iste) that this is what
assertion. A person who accepts (MPK2)
the god orders me to do, and I think there
as capturing the content of (MPK) has an
is no greater blessing for the city than my
extraordinarily demanding conception of service to the god. For I go around doing
knowledge. In general, as our philosophi- nothing but persuading both young and
cal account of knowledge becomes more old among you not to care for your body
demanding we will tend to find an utterance or your wealth in preference to or as
of (MPK) less inapt. strongly as for the best possible state of
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
your soul, as I say to you: Wealth does takes himself to be in a state that we would
not bring about excellence, but excel- be willing to call knowledge.
lence makes wealth and everything else I suggested above that when Socrates talks
good for men, both individually and col- about having been convinced (pepeismai)
lectively.12 (Ap. 30ab)
in (AP11) he indicates that he comes to have
some of the beliefs that he does on the basis
In each of these cases it would be troubling of rational inquiry and argument. Socrates
for Socrates to claim that he lacks a true makes similar points in both the Crito and
belief based on evidence sufficient to rule out the Gorgias. In Crito (46bc), Socrates claims
the alternatives to what he asserts. Imagine that in deciding how to act he is always con-
Socrates making the following utterance: vinced (peithesthai) by the argument or rea-
son (logos) that seems best to him on rational
(S1) Excellence makes wealth good, but consideration (logizomenos). In the absence
I do not have evidence sufficient to rule of a compelling counter-argument, Socrates
out the possibility that it is not the case endorses and acts on what he rationally con-
that excellence makes wealth good. siders to be the best reasons.
In the Gorgias Socrates claims that the
An utterance of (S1) would exhibit the position that he has been maintaining against
problems that we see in other cases of Callicles that it is better to suffer injustice
Moores Paradox. In asserting the first con- than to commit it is well supported by
junct, Socrates recommends that his listener argument.
believe that excellence makes wealth good.
In the second conjunct, Socrates undermines (G2) These conclusions, at which we
his entitlement to make this recommenda- arrived earlier in our previous discus-
tion. If Socrates does not take himself to sions are, Id say, held down and bound
have a warrant to believe what he asserts by arguments of iron and adamant, even
that is strong enough to rule out alternatives, if its rather rude to say so. So it would
he should not make an unhedged assertion. seem, anyhow. And if you or someone
Insofar as he thinks that his evidence leaves more forceful than you wont undo
them, then anyone who says anything
open the possibility of his being mistaken,
other than what Im now saying cannot
Socrates ought to hedge his assertion some-
be speaking well. And yet for my part,
how. Socrates willingness to make these my account is ever the same: I dont
sorts of assertions is evidence, therefore, know how these things are, but no one
that he takes himself to have warrant for Ive ever met, as in this case, can say any-
the corresponding beliefs strong enough to thing else without being ridiculous. So
rule out contextually relevant alternatives. once more I set it down that these things
When Socrates makes an unhedged asser- are so. (Grg. 508e509b)
tion, we should hold that he takes himself
to have a sufficiently warranted true belief Socrates initial claim in (G2) is particularly
that what he asserts is the case. Insofar as emphatic. His belief is tied down by argu-
we are inclined to think that having a suf- ments of iron and adamant, and no one has
ficiently warranted true belief is enough for been able to maintain the opposite with-
knowledge, we should think that Socrates out being made to look foolish. Socrates
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
expresses no doubt that he has sufficient testimony from his daimonion. Socrates
warrant for his belief, and takes all the rea- claims initially that he does not fear death
sons he considers to provide overwhelming because he does not know sufficiently what
support his belief. Insofar as we are willing things are like in the underworld, or take
to count true beliefs with ironbound reasons himself to know what things are like in the
as knowledge, it seems that Socrates takes underworld. Later, however, Socrates com-
himself to be in state that we would count ments on the fact that his mantic sign did
as knowledge. However, in the midst of this not warn him not to act in a way that would
very passage, Socrates states that he does bring about his death. On the basis of his
not know how these things are (ego tauta belief that his daimonion always warns him
ouk oida hops echei), despite the fact that to avoid what is truly bad, Socrates concludes
he takes himself to have such strong warrant that death is not something bad.
for his belief. (G2) is an absolutely essential
passage in thinking through the problem of (AP14) At all previous times my familiar
Socratic ignorance, and we will see below prophetic power, my spiritual manifes-
how various commentators treat the passage. tation, frequently opposed me, even in
small matters, when I was about to do
For the time being, however, it is important
something wrong, but now that, as you
simply to note that Socrates uses his own
can see for yourselves, I was faced with
knowledge terminology in such a way that what one might think, and what is gener-
he does not seem to take the following state- ally thought to be, the worst of evils, my
ment to be inapt: divine sign has not opposed me, either
when I left home at dawn, or when I
(S2) It is better to suffer injustice than to came into court, or at any time that I
commit injustice, but I do not know how was about to say something during my
these things are. speech. Yet in other talks it often held me
back in the middle of my speaking, but
I have argued, however, that the following now it has opposed no word or deed of
mine. What do I think is the reason for
statement would be inapt:
this? I will tell you. What has happened
to me may well be a good thing, and
(S3) It is better to suffer injustice than to those of us who believe death to be an
commit injustice, but I do not have evi- evil are certainly mistaken. I have con-
dence sufficient to rule out the possibility vincing proof (mega tekmrion) of this,
that committing injustice is better than for it is impossible that my familiar sign
suffering it. did not oppose me if I was not about to
do what was right. (Ap. 40ac)
It follows that whatever Socrates claims
not to know how things are, he is not deny- In (AP14) Socrates claims that he has a great
ing that he has a true belief based on evi- proof or a sure sign (mega tekmrion) that
dence that warrants full commitment to his death is not an evil, and claims that it would
belief that suffering injustice is better than not be possible for his sign to fail to oppose
committing it. his actions unless he was about to do the right
It can also be instructive to look at the thing. Socrates claim would be inappropri-
beliefs that Socrates has on the basis of ate if he took his evidence to leave open the
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
possibility that death was something evil. So does not imply that Socrates has the explana-
he takes himself to have a true belief based tory account and definitional knowledge that
on evidence that rules out alternatives to that characterizes the knowledge and wisdom
belief. Socrates, therefore, takes himself to be that he claims he lacks. Furthermore, (G2)
in a condition that is plausibly taken to count gives us strong evidence that Socrates some-
as weak knowledge that facing death is better times uses his knowledge terms to indicate
than abandoning his philosophical mission. something that goes beyond true belief based
My claim here should be taken as a condi- on a sufficient warrant.
tionalized de re claim. Socrates takes himself, Socrates discussion of death in the
at least tacitly, to be in a state that would Apology provides further indirect evidence
count as an instance of knowledge were his that he takes himself to have some kind of
belief true and were he to have the reasons he knowledge. In (AP8) Socrates claims: To fear
takes himself to have. Assume that Socrates death, gentlemen, is no other than to think
belief that giving up his philosophical mission oneself wise when one is not, to think one
would be worse than death is true. Socrates knows what one does not know. On the face
has this belief in part on the basis of his belief of it, this claim is extremely problematic.
that he has received divine testimony. Even People often fear things without taking them-
if we do not grant that Socrates is receiv- selves to have knowledge about precisely
ing divine testimony and do not think that what those things are like. In fact, uncer-
he can have knowledge on the basis of his tainty about what happens after death seems
evidence, we should be willing to grant that to be part of the reason people are afraid of
divine testimony would count as very good death. Socrates intellectualist moral psycho-
evidence for a belief. logy can go some way towards explaining
Imagine Socrates making the following his claim about fear and knowledge. In what
utterance: follows, I will assume without argument that
Socrates takes a persons desiring that P to
(S4) Death is not something bad, but I entail that she believes that P is good, and
do not have definitional knowledge of that he takes a persons believing that P is
the nature of death and badness in terms good to entail that she believes that P con-
of which I can explain why death is not duces to her happiness. (For a more complete
bad. discussion of Socratic moral psychology, see
Brickhouse and Smith 2010 and Chapter 8
(S4) is not an instance of Moores Paradox. in this book.)
Socrates could be entitled to assert the first Parity of reasoning about aversion can get
conjunct even in the absence of definitional us to the claim that aversion is tightly con-
knowledge of badness. Similarly, Socrates nected to the belief that something is bad and
can have a warrant sufficient to assert that contrary to ones happiness. Since fear is one
death is something good on the basis of sort of aversive psychological state, if a per-
divine testimony without knowing precisely son fears something she believes that thing to
what happens after death. While Socrates be contrary to her happiness.13
confidence in his assertions suggests that he All that Socrates is entitled to so far, how-
takes himself to be in a state that is plausibly ever, is the claim that the person who fears
considered weak knowledge, this confidence death believes that death will detract from
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
her happiness. However, he claims that the takes herself to have a true and sufficiently
person who fears death takes herself to be warranted belief that the thing in question
wise and to know that what follows death is bad.
will be something bad. Unless Socrates This argument assumes, perhaps implausi-
thinks that there is something special going bly, that Socrates holds that it is not possible
on in the case of death, he is committed to for a rational person to form and maintain
claiming that whenever a person fears any- beliefs other than as a response to what she
thing, she takes herself to know that what counts as evidence. Notice that Socrates can
she fears is something bad. Similarly, when- still maintain that a person might count
ever somebody desires anything, she takes something as evidence when she is afraid
herself to know that the thing in question is that she would not count as evidence upon
something good. Since Socrates has various sufficient reflection. On the view that I am
aversions and desires, he will be committed suggesting, Socrates will hold that once a
to the claim that he takes himself to know person realizes that she lacks good evidence
that various things are good or bad. for believing that something is bad, she will
What sort of knowledge must some- stop having the belief and as a result will
one take himself to have when he fears or stop being afraid. On this line of reasoning,
desires something? Here is a sketch of how Socrates might maintain the position that
we might try to make Socrates claim about fear entails taking oneself to have knowledge
fear and knowledge somewhat more plau- in the sense of thinking that she has a suffi-
sible. According to the intellectualist, fear ciently warranted true belief. Socrates claim
and desire follow belief. What we need is about fear and knowledge could be taken as
a way to get taking oneself to know some- a claim that a person who fears death takes
thing to follow from believing that it is the herself to have weak knowledge that death is
case. Perhaps Socrates can claim that belief something bad. Socrates, on the other hand,
is essentially an attitude that is responsive takes himself to have weak knowledge on
to what a person takes to be her evidence. the basis of divine testimony that death is
In ordinary circumstances, a rational per- not bad, and that his death may turn out to
son who believes that something is bad be good.
rather than good will take herself to have
evidence that is strong enough to commit
to the claim that the thing in question is
bad rather than good. If she takes her evi- RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
dence to be insufficient to rule out the pos- OF SOCRATIC IGNORANCE AND A
sibility that the thing in question is good or SURVEY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
neutral, then she will not (and ought not)
fully commit to the belief that the thing in RESTATEMENT
question is bad. If fear requires fully com-
mitted belief, then the rational person who We have seen a number of passages in which
does not take herself to have sufficient evi- Socrates denies that he possesses wisdom.
dence in favour of the claim that something The strongest disavowals are extremely wide-
is bad will not fear that thing. It follows ranging. Socrates takes himself to be worth
that the person who does fear something nothing with respect to wisdom.
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
(1) Socrates believes that he is not wise with (6) Socrates believes that there are some ethi-
respect to any subject matter. cal propositions that he knows.
Socrates takes his lack of wisdom to follow The problem of Socratic ignorance stems from
from his failure to know (eidenai) anything the fact that, at least on the face of things,
kalon kagathon, and claims that he knows (5) and (6) commit Socrates to inconsistent
(epistasthai) practically nothing. It is tempt- beliefs. I am assuming that a resolution of the
ing, on the basis of passages in the Apology, problem should show that Socrates does not
to attribute to Socrates the belief that know- have inconsistent beliefs. An acceptable reso-
ing anything implies being wise with respect lution, therefore, must deny (5), deny (6), or
to some subject matter. show that, despite initial appearances, (5) and
(6) can be true without committing Socrates
(2) Socrates believes that any person who to inconsistent beliefs. In order to deny (5), a
knows anything possesses wisdom with solution must deny either (3) or (4).
respect to some subject matter. So, there are four basic strategies for
resolving the problem of Socratic ignorance,
However, as we saw in passage (ED1) above, as well as strategies that combine two or
Socrates is willing to claim that he knows more of these basic strategies. We can deny
(episthasthai) many trivial things. What (3), and hold that Socrates does take himself
Socrates is most concerned to deny is knowl- to be wise. We can deny (4), and hold that
edge or wisdom concerning ethical subjects. Socrates allows for the possibility of some
Restricting (1) and (2) to ethical subjects, ethical knowledge without wisdom. We can
and working with a very minimal notion of deny (6), and hold that Socrates does not
proposition, we get the following: take himself to have any ethical knowledge.
Finally, we can claim that know does not
(3) Socrates believes that he is not wise with occur univocally in (5) and (6), in which case
respect to any ethical subject matter. we need to distinguish what Socrates believes
(4) Socrates believes that anyone who pos- he lacks in (5) from what he believes he pos-
sesses knowledge of an ethical proposi-
sesses in (6).
tion is wise with respect to some ethical
subject matter.
SOLUTIONS THAT DENY (6)
On the assumption that Socrates believes, at Perhaps Socrates really takes himself to
least in this case, the obvious logical conse- lack knowledge of any ethical proposition.
quences of what he believes, we get: There are not many texts in which Socrates
directly claims to know any ethical proposi-
(5) Socrates believes that there are not any tion. If (6) causes us to attribute contradic-
ethical propositions that he knows. tory beliefs to Socrates, and we have only a
few texts in favour of (6), it might be best to
However, we have seen a number of cases bite the bullet and claim that those texts are
in which Socrates claims or implies that outliers or that despite appearances Socrates
he does take himself to have some ethical does not really claim to have knowledge
knowledge. in those texts. Terence Irwin, for example,
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
claims that Socrates does not take himself to accounts for the contents of his true ethical
have knowledge (Irwin 1979, 1995). Rather beliefs, and in virtue of which he can pro-
Socrates thinks that he has stable and ration- vide proper answers to definitional questions
ally defensible moral convictions that are (Benson 2000: 20515).
practically reliable and which merit great I argued above that Socrates confi-
confidence. Irwin is a constructivist about dence in his beliefs and his willingness to
elenchus and takes Socrates justification for make unhedged assertions should count
his beliefs to arise, at least in part, from his as evidence that he takes himself to have
elenctic practice. However, because Socrates sufficiently warranted true beliefs. I also sug-
holds (PD), he has the further belief that his gested that someone in this state is typically
moral convictions do not count as knowl- supposed to have at least weak knowledge.
edge (Irwin 1995: 29). As Wolfsdorf points However, it is clear that a person could take
out, Irwin must hold that Socrates some- herself to have a sufficiently warranted true
times uses knowledge words not to ascribe belief without taking herself to have the sort
knowledge to himself, but a different state of definitional knowledge and systematic
(Wolfsdorf 2004a: 114). Just as Socrates dis- understanding that Benson takes to be nec-
tinguishes the human wisdom that he pos- essary for Socratic knowledge. It is crucial
sesses from the true wisdom that he lacks, to notice that the kind of systematic under-
Irwin holds that Socrates distinguishes his standing that is necessary for knowledge on
elenctically justified ethical beliefs from true this account goes well beyond the possession
knowledge. of a sufficient warrant for a single ethical
Hugh Benson similarly claims that when belief, and requires a wide-ranging grasp of
Socrates uses knowledge terms to describe ethics as a whole. The sort of justification
his own condition, he does not mean to needed to have wisdom or to have epistm
claim that he possesses knowledge in the concerning a proposition will require a large
strict philosophical sense treated in the early system of beliefs that cohere with and mutu-
dialogues. Rather, Socrates is speaking with ally support one another. For more on the
the vulgar when he ascribes knowledge to holistic or coherentist aspects of Socratic and
himself (Benson 2000: 236). Unlike Irwin, Platonic epistemology, see Benson (2000)
Benson is a non-constructivist and denies and Fine (1979). Benson is even willing to
that Socrates uses the elenchus to estab- grant that there might be some lower-level
lish or justify any positive position (Benson epistemic state or power that Socrates some-
1995, 2000: chs 23). Like Irwin, however, times ascribes to himself or others by means
Benson grants that Socrates takes himself to of his knowledge terms, but he emphasizes
have some rational basis for the things that that Socrates nowhere provides a detailed
he claims to know when speaking with the account of this low-level knowledge (Benson
vulgar. Socrates commitment to (PD), how- 2000: 2368).
ever, rules out his taking himself to have As we will see below, interpretations that
knowledge. What Socrates lacks, and takes attempt to resolve the problem of Socratic
to be necessary for ethical knowledge, is a ignorance by holding that there are different
systematic understanding of ethical phenom- senses of know involved in (5) and (6) rely
ena and their connections to one another, in on a distinction between two sorts of knowl-
virtue of which he can provide explanatory edge that is quite similar to the distinction
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that Irwin and Benson want to draw between answering questions posed by others that
rationally supported true belief and knowl- he pretends to be ignorant when he does not
edge. In some ways, I suspect that the disa- really take himself to be ignorant.14
greement between solutions that deny (6) and Aristotle discusses irony in the course of
solutions that posit an ambiguity in the use his own discussion of the virtue of truthful-
of know in (5) and (6) will turn out to be ness, and points to Socrates as an example.
more terminological than substantial. There
is widespread agreement that Socrates takes Ironic people (hoi eirnes) by under-
himself to lack definitional knowledge and a estimating themselves in what they say
grasp of explanatory accounts, and that he appear more elegant in character. They
takes these to be of paramount importance in do not speak to gain profit but to avoid
many of his discussions of knowledge. There bombast. They especially deny what is
is also agreement that Socrates takes himself esteemed as, for example, Socrates used to
do. (Nicomachean Ethics 1127b2226)
to have reached the bar for a lower-level cog-
nitive achievement, and that he thinks that
his having done so does not constitute pos- The ironic person is given to self-deprecation.
session of the wisdom that he denies hav- When she takes herself to have the admira-
ing. There is disagreement about whether ble qualities that she denies having, she fails
Socrates takes philosophically strict uses of to be completely truthful. Furthermore, she
his knowledge words to properly character- runs the risk of falling into the vice of false
ize this lower-level cognitive achievement. modesty. If Socrates really does think that
With this in mind, I turn to solutions that he has the knowledge that he denies having,
deny (5) and solutions holding that know is then Thrasymachus charge is a just one.
used equivocally in (5) and (6). If Socrates is practicing false modesty and
merely pretending to be ignorant, why is he
SOLUTIONS THAT DENY (3) doing so? Socrates might feign ignorance
for pedagogical purposes because he thinks
One way to deny (5) is by denying (3). While that his interlocutor will best learn the truth
Socrates claims that he lacks wisdom and by working things out for himself. When
knowledge, Socrates is notoriously ironic. Socrates questions the slave boy in the Meno,
(For some interpretations denying that we see this sort of pedagogy in action. By
Socrates is sincere in his disavowals of knowl- asking the boy questions and showing where
edge, see Gulley 1968: 69ff.; Teloh 1981: his answers lead to absurdity, Socrates is able
614, 1986: 302; Versenyi 1963: 1204, to lead the boy towards an understanding of
1982: 312). In Book I of the Republic, how to double the square.
for example, Thrasymachus responds to Notice, however, that Socrates conver-
Socrates denial that he knows what jus- sations about ethical matters are unlike his
tice is by claiming that Socrates is using his conversation with the slave boy in important
customary irony (h eithumia eirneia) to respects. Socrates does not succeed in leading
avoid having to answer the questions of oth- his interlocutors to a positive grasp of ethical
ers. The word eirneia in Greek has the con- truths. At best, Socrates gets his interlocutors
notation of deception or pretense. According to realize that they do not have the knowl-
to Thrasymachus, Socrates is so averse to edge that they claimed to have. In many cases,
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
Socrates does not even succeed in getting the sincere, then (3) is true and we need to look
interlocutor to recognize his own ignorance. elsewhere for a solution to the problem of
We can understand the difference between Socratic ignorance.
what happens with the slave boy and what
happens with the ethical interlocutors, on the AMBIGUITY SOLUTIONS AND SOLUTIONS
assumption that Socrates claims to be igno- DENYING (4)
rant are sincere.
Socrates presumably does understand how In this section, I discuss a number of solutions
to double a square, and this understanding that deny (4). There are two sorts of solutions
guides him in his questioning of the slave to consider. First, we could take Socrates to
boy. Since Socrates knows where he wants use his knowledge terms univocally and take
the slave boy to end up, he is able to craft his him to deny (4) outright. According to this
questions to lead the slave boy to the right sort of solution, we need to be careful about
conclusion. If Socrates really does possess the the scope of Socrates disavowals of ethi-
ethical knowledge that he denies possessing, cal knowledge and wisdom. Socrates denies
he should be able to lead an interlocutor to that he knows general or fundamental truths
the right conclusion. But we do not see him about ethical matters, but still takes himself
lead his ethical interlocutors to the proper to know many ordinary and particular ethi-
conclusions. A plausible explanation for this cal truths. To deny (4), this sort of solution
failure is that Socrates really does lack and must deny (PD), especially (P). A second
really does take himself to lack the knowl- sort of solution holds that Socrates uses his
edge that he says he lacks. If Socrates igno- knowledge terms equivocally. He denies that
rance is a pretence for pedagogical purposes, he possesses a high-grade epistemic state that
it is surprising that we never see him succeed involves certainty, expertise or systematic
in bringing his interlocutor to the conclu- understanding, but does think that he has
sion that Socrates takes himself to know to another sort of knowledge. Furthermore,
be true. on this sort of view, (PD) is generally taken
Socrates disavowals of knowledge are so to govern the higher-grade but not the
frequent and so insistent that I find it hard to lower-grade kind of knowledge.
think that they are merely pretence. This does The most natural place to begin a discussion
not mean, however, that Socrates is not guilty of these sorts of solutions to the problem of
of false modesty of a type. In Euthyphro, Socratic ignorance is with Gregory Vlastoss
Meno and Republic I, Socrates does not paper Socrates Disavowal of Knowledge
merely claim that he lacks knowledge. He (Vlastos 1985; reprinted in Vlastos 1994a).
also rather elaborately suggests that his inter- Vlastos presents his solution as an attempt
locutors might be wiser than he is. When he to avoid both Irwins denial that Socrates
claims that he hopes to learn important ethi- takes himself to have any knowledge (Irwin
cal truths from Euthyphro or Thrasymachus, 1977a), and Gulleys claim that Socrates
it seems obvious that Socrates is not being disavowals of knowledge are ironic (Gulley
completely sincere. However, this false com- 1968: 6273). Vlastos proposes to solve the
parative modesty is compatible with Socrates problem of Socratic ignorance by distin-
being sincere when he denies that he pos- guishing a weak form of knowledge, which
sesses any genuine wisdom. If Socrates is he calls elenctic knowledge or knowledgeE,
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
which Socrates takes himself to possess from knowledge is elenctic knowledge or knowl-
a stronger form of knowledge requiring cer- edgeE, in which a persons evidence for her
tainty, knowledgeC, that Socrates denies belief is the result of her elenctic investiga-
having. tion. Socrates knowledgeE that an ethical
In order to have knowledgeC that P, a per- proposition is true is based on reasonable
son must have true belief that P on the basis evidence that fails to entail the truth of his
of evidence that entails that P is true (Vlastos belief. According to Vlastos, Socrates knowl-
1994: 55). Vlastos is working with an inter- edgeE that P is based on evidence given in the
nalist conception of evidence according to two-part schema Q (Vlastos 1994: 56):
which perfect intrinsic psychological dupli-
cates will possess exactly the same evidence. Q[a] P is entailed by beliefs held by any-
Since to see is factive, were my evidence one who denies P.
for a belief allowed to include the fact that I Q[b] not-P is not entailed by beliefs held
see something, my evidence would entail the by Socrates who affirms P.
truth of my perceptual beliefs. KnowledgeC
would then be too easy to come by to serve Vlastos takes knowledgeE to be insecure in
Vlastoss purposes. several ways. First of all, Vlastos denies that
Instead, my evidence can include only the the truth of Q would entail the truth of P, and
fact that I have a certain visual impression claims that the entailment condition would
as of P being the case. Since someone in a only be met were we to strengthen Q[a] to:
world where P is not the case could have this
visual impression, my evidence will not entail Q[A] P in entailed by the true beliefs of
the truth of my belief. A person will knowC anyone who denies P.
that P only if she can derive the truth of P
from the evidence that she shares with all Vlastos credits Brickhouse and Smith with
her internal psychological duplicates, and if the observation that if P is entailed by the true
all her internal psychological duplicates will beliefs of anyone who denies P, it will follow
have true beliefs on the basis of this evidence. that P is true. However, nothing as strong as
Furthermore, in order to knowC that P, a per- Q[A] is necessary for the entailment to hold.
son must possess knowledgeC of her evidence The following would be sufficient:
for believing that P. On Vlastoss view some
propositions are knownC through themselves Q[a*] P is entailed by the true beliefs of
and immediately, and all other knowledgeC at least one person who denies P.
involves deductive inference from the imme-
diately knownC propositions. The hallmark Whether Vlastos is right to claim that Q[a]
of knowledgeC is infallibility, and anything does not entail P depends on how liberal
which can be knownC cannot be otherwise we are in our treatment of anyone in Q[a].
(Vlastos 1994: 525). First of all, if a set of beliefs including the
KnowledgeC is to be contrasted with fal- belief that not-P entails P, then a subset of
lible knowledge, which a person has if she those beliefs not including the belief that
has a true belief on the basis of reasonable not-P will also entail P. Now, if we treat the
evidence that fails to entail the truth of her anyone in Q[a] as quantifying over actual
belief (Vlastos 1994: 51). One type of fallible and possible believers, then Q[a] would
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
seem to entail P. If every possible set of and Q[b] turns out to be inductive, his evi-
beliefs that a denier of P could have entailed dence does not entail the truth of Q. Since
P, then P would have to be a necessary truth. Socrates does not knowC that Q, he can have
Similarly, if even one possible set of true no knowledgeC on the basis of Q. Any knowl-
beliefs entails P then P is true. edgeE that Socrates has on the basis of Q will
Furthermore, I am not sure that entailment be fallible knowledge.
is going to do the work that Vlastos wants it We can restate both (4) and (6) in terms of
to do. The claim that some beliefs entail a knowledgeC or knowledgeE:
proposition is naturally taken as a claim that
it is impossible for those beliefs to be true (4C) Socrates believes that for any ethical
and that proposition to be false. However, proposition, P, if a person knowsC that
the truths of ethics that Socrates is searching P then she has wisdom with respect to
some ethical subject matter.
for would seem to be necessary truths for
example, if piety is a part of justice then it is (4E) Socrates believes that for any ethical
necessary that piety is a part of justice. On proposition, P, if a person knowsE that
a classical notion of entailment, necessary P then she has wisdom with respect to
truths will be entailed by any set of beliefs some ethical subject matter.
at all. Similarly, not-P will be impossible and,
on the assumption that Socrates beliefs are According to Vlastos, (4C) is true but (4E) is
formally consistent, Q[b] will be trivially sat- false. In order for Socrates to have knowl-
isfied for all ethical truths. In order for the edgeC of any ethical proposition, he would
entailment condition on knowledge to do need to be able to derive that proposition
any work then, Vlastos needs to have some from knownC ethical first principles. But
kind of non-classical consequence relation knowledgeC of these ethical first principles
with relevance constraints in mind. would count as the sort of wisdom that
The problem with Q[a] on Vlastoss view Socrates disavows. Nevertheless, Socrates
has to do with the grounds that someone can have knowledgeE of any number of
has for believing Q[a]. I cannot knowC that ethical facts without possessing this sort of
P on the basis of Q, unless I knowC that wisdom.
Q. According to Vlastos, however, Socrates We can also distinguish two different ways
can have only inductive evidence that Q[a] of taking (6):
is the case. The fact that every interlocutor
so far has been committed to P does not (6C) Socrates believes that there are some
suffice to show in the right way that every ethical propositions that he knowsC.
possible or even every actual interlocutor is (6E) Socrates believes that there are some
committed to P. ethical propositions that he knowsE.
Vlastos also denies that Socrates has
immediate access to all the entailments of According to Vlastos, (6E) is true while (6C)
his many beliefs. So his confidence that Q[b] is false. Socrates believes that he has fal-
holds that he is not committed to not-P lible knowledgeE, but denies that he has
can be based only on the fact that he has not knowledgeC. Furthermore, on Vlastoss view,
been shown to be committed to not-P thus Socrates takes knowledgeC, but not knowl-
far. Since Socrates evidence for both Q[a] edgeE, to be governed by (PD).
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Vlastos is most concerned to distinguish cases. In denying that he has wisdom or

knowledgeE from knowledgeC. KnowledgeE, knows anything kalon kagathon Socrates
however, is just one sort of fallible knowl- does not mean to suggest that he lacks
edge, and Vlastos does not spend much time knowledge of particular ethical propositions,
thinking about whether Socrates has fallible but only to deny that he possesses knowledge
knowledge on the basis of something other of the essence of virtue. Lesher writes:
than the elenchus. We might wonder whether
Socrates takes himself to have knowledge Further, lacking knowledge about the
on the basis of something weaker than [Q]. essence of virtue, [Socrates] would rea-
It seems possible for Socrates to satisfy the sonably claim not to know the truth of
various propositions about virtue (how
conditions on weak knowledge discussed
to acquire it, whether it is better to suffer
above without being in a position to be con-
injustice than to commit it, whether vir-
fident that [Q] is the case. A person could tue guarantees happiness) matters about
take himself to have a reason for his belief which he holds firm convictions, but not
strong enough to warrant full confidence in knowledge. (Lesher 1987: 284)
that belief, but not have any commitments at
all about whether every possible set of beliefs Lesher agrees that Socrates accepts princi-
entails his belief. There is also a problem ple (D) in (PD), but argues that Socrates can
posed by Socrates daimonion. I have argued recognize the ethical character of particu-
that Socrates takes himself to have weak lar actions without definitional knowledge.
knowledge on the basis of divine testimony, Socrates must then deny principle (P) in
but there is little reason to think that he will (PD). Lesher must interpret passages such as
have knowledgeE in such a case. (EU2) and (HM1) as allowing for knowledge
James Lesher worries that Vlastos ille- of the ethical character of particular actions
gitimately multiplies senses of knowledge in the absence of definitional knowledge.
(Lesher 1987). According to Lesher, Socrates Judgements about the plausibility of Leshers
endorses a position of semantic monism interpretation will depend on the depth of
according to which whenever we employ a ones commitment to (P).
word, there is a single quality designated by In addition, we might wonder on what
that term which, once properly identified, basis Socrates can legitimately claim to have
can serve as a distinguishing mark for all knowledge of the ethical character of a par-
the things designated by that term (Lesher ticular action without having knowledge
1987: 278). about the corresponding virtue. There is a
Leshers own solution to the problem of distinction between failing to have defini-
Socratic ignorance holds that there is a single tional knowledge concerning an ethical prop-
sense of knowledge that (4) is simply false erty, and lacking all general knowledge about
while (6) is true. Socrates thinks that it is that property. If Lesher means to deny that
possible to have knowledge of some ethical Socrates has any general knowledge about
propositions without being wise, although virtue or the virtues, it is difficult to see how
knowledge of some other ethical proposition Socrates has knowledge about the ethical
might require wisdom. On Leshers view, character of particulars. Lesher will not be
Socrates takes himself to have knowledge able to claim that Socrates has knowledge of
concerning the moral character of particular the ethical character of a particular action by
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
recognizing some feature of that action and Socrates does not claim to know merely that
inferring its ethical character from its pos- a particular disobedient action is wrong.
session of that feature and a general ethical Rather, Socrates makes a general claim that
truth. Since Socrates cannot know the general it is always wrong to disobey a superior, and
ethical truth, he cannot justify his belief about then applies this general ethical rule to his
the particular feature in terms of it. Perhaps own case. If Socrates knows that it is always
Lesher could argue that Socrates knowledge wrong to disobey a superior, then he would
of the particular truth is wholly based on seem to be in a position to know something
testimony from his daimonion or hold that about virtue and disobedience. It seems that
Socrates has some other capacity for coming Socrates will be able to have some general
to have knowledge about particulars in the knowledge even in the absence of defini-
absence of any general knowledge. tional knowledge.
Lesher does not tell us what Socratic For Vlastos, the wise person bears a dif-
knowledge consists in. He needs a single ferent epistemic relation to particular ethical
account of knowledge on which the firm propositions than does the person who lacks
convictions that Socrates has about general wisdom. On Leshers account, both the wise
ethical principles do not count as knowl- person and the non-wise person bear the very
edge, but the convictions that he has about same knowledge relation to a particular ethi-
particular actions do count as knowledge. cal proposition. The superiority of the wise
It is difficult to see how Lesher is entitled person consists in the fact that she has some-
to say that Socrates can know that certain thing in addition to knowledge that a par-
actions are virtuous but cannot have some ticular ethical proposition is true. However,
knowledge about virtue itself. Some claims on Leshers view, a person with knowledge
about virtue will be inconsistent with what of the essence of virtue will have evidence for
Socrates knows to be the case about par- her particular ethical beliefs that the person
ticular actions, and Socrates knows this to without wisdom is not in a position to have.
be the case. If I take myself to know that P While both the wise person and Socrates will
and to know that P is inconsistent with Q, know that a particular action is unjust, the
then I would seem rationally entitled to take wise person will be in a position to give as
myself to know that Q is not the case. Let P evidence of his belief the fact that the action
be the claim that a certain act of disobedi- conflicts with the definition of justice. We can
ence is vicious, and let Q be the claim that now define a relation, knowledge*, such that
virtue always requires disobedience to ones a person knows* that a particular action is
superiors. Socrates seems to be in as least just if and only if she knows, in Leshers sin-
good a position to know that not-Q as he is gle sense of know, that the action is just, she
to know P, since P is logically stronger than knows the essence of justice, and she knows
not-Q. Notice that Socrates would be in a that the particular action instantiates the
position to claim to know that not-Q even essential features of justice. Even on Leshers
if his knowledge that P was based purely on view, the wise person seems to be in a supe-
some kind of quasi-perceptual grasp of the rior epistemic position even with respect to
wrongness of the particular action or on a her beliefs about the ethical character of
warning from his daimonion, and he had no particular actions. Both Vlastos and Lesher
other general knowledge at all. Furthermore, are willing to hold that the person without
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
definitional knowledge can still have some possibility is that Socrates takes himself to
ethical knowledge, and both are willing to lack something that he would need to settle
hold that a grasp of definitions and explana- his questions once and for all. He has con-
tory accounts suffices for a superior level of fidence in his beliefs and no confidence in
epistemic achievement than is available to any alternative, and takes himself to have
the person without definitional knowledge. evidence sufficient to warrant his confidence.
Vlastos takes Socrates quest for defini- However, he also takes himself to be unable
tional knowledge to be driven by a quest to rule out the possibility that he has over-
for certainty. As long as Socrates lacks looked something in his investigations. The
definitional knowledge, the possibility search for definitions is essential on this view,
remains that his beliefs will turn out to be because it is only when he possesses knowl-
false. Furthermore, as long as this possibil- edgeC of the proper definitional facts that
ity remains, Socrates will not have reached Socrates will be in a position to end inquiry
the end of enquiry. It should be noted that with complete confidence. Only at this point
Socrates does express uncertainty about will Socrates be able to possess absolute and
his own views. When Socrates engages in unshakeable confidence in his beliefs.
elenchus with an interlocutor, he represents On Vlastoss view the quest for definitional
himself as open to the possibility that the knowledge seems to be motivated by some-
interlocutors belief will survive examina- thing like sceptical doubt. Socrates, however,
tion. Even in passage (G2), despite the great does not exhibit many of the concerns that
confidence that Socrates expresses in his we expect in a sceptical epistemologist. He
own view, there remains in the background does not express doubts about the reliability
a worry that some interlocutor might come of his perceptual or cognitive faculties, and
along with the ability to defend a position he seems quite willing to make the kinds of
contrary to Socrates own position. Were ordinary empirical knowledge claims that
there such an interlocutor, Socrates claim to sceptics often worry about. He shows no ten-
have iron-bound arguments would be under- dency at all to seek a higher degree of cer-
mined and his confidence in his own beliefs tainty about these ordinary matters. Socrates
could be shaken. also has great confidence in a cognitive
Socrates, therefore, finds himself in a tricky resource that he does not share with other
epistemic situation. He takes all the evidence people. He seems to have no doubt at all that
that he has to support his belief, and does not his daimonion is right in all its pronounce-
think that there is evidence in favour of the ments, and never worries that he might be
contrary belief of his interlocutor. However, hallucinating. On the internalist conception
he also thinks that further investigation is of evidence that Vlastos is working with,
warranted. If Socrates really thinks that the however, Socrates could have exactly the
questions he is investigating are settled, why same evidence in a world where his senses
does he continue his investigations? were faulty and where no daimonion exists.
One possibility is that Socrates is simply So Socrates evidence does not entail the truth
trying to teach others what he takes him- of his belief. If Socrates has general sceptical
self to know already, and that his represen- worries, it is somewhat surprising that they
tation of himself as open to the possibility do not extend to his senses and to the voice
that he is mistaken is simply a pose. A second in his head.
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If Socrates is not motivated to search Socrates inquiry into the nature of virtue
for definitions because of sceptical worries, begins from ordinary knowledge that some
then why does he continue to search for particular acts or types of acts are virtuous
definitions? One promising possibility is that and others are vicious. Socrates takes him-
Socrates is looking for explanatory under- self to have such ordinary knowledge, which
standing rather than certainty. Robert Bolton, I take to be equivalent to weak knowledge.
for example, draws a close parallel between Such knowledge can arise from a number of
Aristotles views in the Posterior Analytics different sources and does not require defini-
and Socrates understanding of epistm tional knowledge. The goal of the inquiry is
(Bolton 1993). Knowledge that something knowledge of the essential nature of virtue,
is the case needs to be distinguished from which will explain why such acts are virtu-
knowledge why it is the case. For Aristotle, ous or vicious. Socrates denies that he poss-
we do not possess epistm about some- esses this sort of knowledge.
thing unless we know why it is the case. In a A person who possesses an explanatory
similar way, as we saw above in the passages account of her ethical belief will be in posses-
from the Meno, Socrates denies that anyone sion of something beyond what is possessed
has epistm or sophia with respect to virtue by a person whose belief has survived a
without an explanatory account proceed- number of elenctic investigations. The person
ing from definitional knowledge about vir- who possesses definitional knowledge and an
tue. The person who possesses definitional explanatory account will have greater war-
knowledge is in a superior epistemic position rant to believe that her belief will survive any
to the person who lacks definitional knowl- attempt at refutation. Nonetheless, she might
edge, even if both of them know that some very well fail to possess knowledgeC. The sta-
ethical fact is the case. bilizing role of definitional knowledge can
On Boltons view, Socrates adopts a simi- be separated from the kind of self-evidence
lar view to Aristotle about the source of required for Vlastoss knowledgeC.15
ordinary knowledge that something is the The person who has definitional knowl-
case. Many of the things that Socrates takes edge on this view does not possess certainty,
himself and others to know are known as a but does possess understanding. Benson
result of ordinary and widely available expe- (2000) holds that the epistemic superiority of
rience of the world (Bolton 1993: 151). In the person with definitional knowledge con-
some cases, such as Crito (47de), Socrates sists not merely in her having a superior level
suggests that he has knowledge of contro- of justification to the person without defini-
versial claims as a result of arguments. Even tional knowledge, but in her having a kind
in these cases, however, the arguments rely of understanding of what she knows that the
on premises that are known as a matter of other person lacks (Benson 2000: 21221).16
ordinary experience. Bolton is a constructiv- While Benson denies that Socrates allows
ist about the elenchus, and holds that, inso- for knowledge in the strict philosophical
far as elenctic investigation is able to confirm sense in the absence of definitional knowl-
Socrates views or disconfirm the views of his edge, the point about epistemic superiority is
opponent, Socrates and his opponent must independent of whether there can be knowl-
possess some knowledge of ordinary facts edge without understanding. The person
based on experience (Bolton 1993: 147). who possesses sophia or epistm does not
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simply know isolated propositions, rather of the proper way to bring about the goals at
she possesses understanding. As Fine puts it, which his craft aims and can teach his craft
such understanding consists in a deep, syn- to others. We have seen texts from both the
optic, explanatory grasp of a domain (Fine Apology and the Meno in which Socrates con-
2008a: 70). Furthermore, a person can have nects wisdom and epistm about virtue with
a true belief that something is the case on the ability to teach others to be virtuous.
the basis of sufficient evidence even in the Woodruff also draws a distinction between
absence of this type of understanding. Bolton subordinate technai and technai in the strict
is inclined to take true belief on the basis of sense. Most of the examples of technai dis-
sufficient evidence to be a type of knowl- cussed by Socrates are subordinate technai.
edge, ordinary knowledge. Fine and Benson Possession of a subordinate techn requires
are not so inclined. Disagreements over how only that the technician can choose the cor-
to apply the term knowledge, however, are rect means to ends that are taken as given.
of less importance than the common recog- The ethical expert or master of the political
nition of the distinction between the person techn must possess a techn in the strict
with understanding and the person with a sense, which requires something beyond
well-grounded belief who lacks understand- instrumental proficiency. The strict techni-
ing. Furthermore, Socrates often takes himself cian must not only able to choose the right
to be in the latter condition but consistently means to reach a given end, but must have
denies that he is in the former. an understanding of why the ends of his craft
The wise person with ethical understand- count as genuine goods. This understand-
ing has an explanatory grasp of an entire ing of the goodness of the ends of his craft
domain of inquiry, not isolated knowledge requires the technician in the strict sense to
that a particular ethical fact obtains. She be able to give an appropriate account of the
is an ethical expert. Paul Woodruff distin- ends of his craft, from which he can dem-
guishes expert knowledge, which only the onstrate why these ends are genuinely good.
wise person has, from common knowledge. In order to accomplish this task, the genu-
Common knowledge is a common property ine technician must possess the sort of defi-
of ordinary people, rather than an excep- nitional knowledge that Socrates is seeking
tional cognitive achievement (Woodruff in the early dialogues. Anyone who proves
1990: 79). unable to produce a proper definition is not a
The ethical expert, on the other hand, has technician in the strict sense and lacks expert
the ability to give an account of the nature knowledge. (PD) then holds with respect to
of the various goods that he claims expertise expert knowledge, but does not hold with
about. As Socrates many examples of crafts- respect to common knowledge.
people reveal, the sort of ethical expertise On Woodruffs view, practicing the elen-
that he is trying to confirm or disconfirm by chus is not sufficient for arriving at expert
elenctic testing has much in common with knowledge. Furthermore, on Woodruffs
the craft-knowledge (techn) possessed by a view the purpose of the elenchus is not even
master craftsperson. A master of a craft is a to provide a kind of justification that grounds
reliable guide with respect to the quality of claims to common knowledge. Rather the
products of that craft. Furthermore, a master point of elenchus is to show a person that
craftsperson has a systematic understanding he does not really believe what he initially
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
claims to believe (Woodruff 1990: 7980). think that a belief has to be explicit or intro-
There is only apparent disagreement between spectively accessible for it to have psycho-
Socrates and his interlocutors, and the elen- logical reality. Nevertheless the belief should
chus reveals to a person what she actually play some role in what a subject thinks and
believes. According to Woodruff: how he acts. Even after the elenchus, let alone
before the elenchus, there is no evidence that
Socrates holds that, in the last analysis, Polus would choose to suffer injustice rather
you believe the consequences of what- than commit it. Furthermore, Polus does
ever views you are left with after elen- not even wholeheartedly assent to Socrates
chus has done its work. The elenchus claim after the elenchus. He claims that what
thus exposes what you believe in the Socrates says appears to be true, or that it is
last analysis, and simply treats this sort the case according to the argument.
of belief, without apology, as non-expert Socrates does reveal to Polus that his ini-
knowledge. (Woodruff 1990: 81)
tial claim is inconsistent with other positions
that he holds, but he does not show that the
In support of his view, Woodruff points to belief that committing injustice is worse had
the interchange between Socrates and Polus or even has any psychological reality for
at Gorgias (47481). In Gorgias (474b), Polus. I take knowledge, even weak knowl-
Socrates claims that Polus and everyone edge, to require psychologically real belief.
else holds or believes (hgeisthai) that doing Since elenchus does not show that a person
injustice is worse than suffering it. Polus has always had a psychologically real belief,
claims that no one, including Socrates, holds it does not show that a person always had
this position. Socrates begins an elenctic knowledge.
investigation of Polus, and Polus is forced A second problem with Woodruffs under-
to admit that Socrates has proven his point standing of common knowledge is that it
(479de). Woodruff suggests that Socrates threatens to erode any distinction between
takes himself to have shown Polus what he belief and non-expert knowledge. While I
really believed all along. Furthermore, while have some inclination to allow that fully
the elenchus plays a role in discovering what believing something and taking oneself to
he really believes, it cannot play a role in the have knowledge go hand in hand, it seems
justification of that belief. deeply problematic to hold that all belief
I think that there are problems with each counts as knowledge.
of Woodruffs claims. The claim that Polus Finally, Woodruff allows no justificatory
along with everyone else holds that com- role for the elenchus. Assume that as a result
mitting injustice is worse than suffering it is of my continued discussions with Socrates, I
ambiguous. Socrates might mean that Polus is do come to believe that it is better to suffer
committed to this claim by other things that injustice than to commit injustice. This belief
he believes, and that careful attention to the is psychologically real and I come to assent
implications of his various beliefs will reveal sincerely to the claim that committing injus-
this commitment. On the other hand, Socrates tice is worse and to deny the opposite claim.
might mean that the belief that committing I claim that I have changed my mind about
injustice is worse really already has some the relation between injustice and happiness.
kind of psychological reality in Polus. I do not When you ask me why I changed my mind, I
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
claim that Socrates convinced me through the knowledge is at stake, but to maintain (4)
elenchus that my former belief was incom- when expert knowledge is at stake. The pos-
patible with too many of my other beliefs. session of expert knowledge does imply wis-
When I give you this answer, I do not seem dom. When it comes to expert knowledge,
to be telling you something about a causal however, (6) will be false. Socrates does not
process by which I discovered what I already believe that he has expert knowledge con-
believed. Rather, I seem to be providing rea- cerning any ethical proposition. It is not
sons for my having changed my mind. In at clear to me whether Woodruff or Reeve
least some cases, it looks like the elenchus think that the distinction between expert and
can play a justificatory role. non-expert knowledge should be thought of
We can hold on to Woodruffs distinction as involving two different knowledge rela-
between expertise and common knowledge, tions, or whether both possess knowledge
as well as his observations about the relation but the expert possesses something in addi-
between expert knowledge and craft knowl- tion. For example, the expert might know
edge, while allowing some justificatory role that something is the case and know various
for the elenchus. C. D. C. Reeves solution to definitional facts in addition.17
the problem of Socratic ignorance, for exam- Brickhouse and Smith (1994a, 2000) also
ple, relies on a distinction between expert draw a distinction between the person who
and non-expert knowledge that is similar to possesses ethical expertise and the person
Woodruffs, but allows that the elenchus plays who has ordinary knowledge that a certain
a justificatory role with respect to non-expert ethical claim is true. In this way, their inter-
knowledge (Reeve 1989: 3762). The fact pretation is similar to that of Woodruff and
that a persons beliefs survive elenctic inves- Reeve. Socrates can freely allow that peo-
tigation, while those who maintain the oppo- ple possess weak knowledge sufficiently
site of her beliefs are refuted provides some warranted true beliefs about ethical mat-
evidence in favour of her beliefs. On the basis ters, but this sort of knowledge is not of
of this sort of evidence, and probably on the much interest to Socrates. Instead, when
basis of other sorts of evidence as well, she Socrates discusses knowledge and wis-
can possess non-expert knowledge. dom, he is interested in a kind of ethical
Nevertheless, this evidence cannot rise to expertise akin to the craft knowledge pos-
the level needed for expert knowledge. Expert sessed by master craftspeople. In addition
knowledge requires the knowledge of defini- to knowledge that an ethical proposition
tions and the possession of an explanatory is true, the expert knows why or how it is
account. Reeve sums up craft knowledge: the case that the proposition in question is
true. Like Bolton, Brickhouse and Smith
Expert knowledge seems to be craft- distinguish knowledge that P is true from
knowledge, then: that is to say, it is knowledge why P is true or knowledge of
explanatory, teachable, luck-independ- how it is the case that P is true (Brickhouse
ent, elenchus-proof, certain knowledge. and Smith 1994a: 39; Brickhouse and
(Reeve 1989: 45) Smith 2000: 1059). The latter sort of
knowledge requires a grasp of definitions
Like Vlastos, Woodruff and Reeve are in and explanatory accounts, and is what
a position to deny (4) when non-expert Socrates disavows.
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
Brickhouse and Smith pay special atten- something or other is true, for it plainly
tion to Gorgias (508e509b) ((G2) above). also has as one of its components that
After claiming that his conclusions are held the knower knows how to do something
down and bound with arguments of iron and or other. (Brickhouse and Smith 1994:
434)
adamant, Socrates says, I do not know how
these things are (ego tauta ouk oida hops
echei). What Socrates disavows, according Brickhouse and Smith distinguish knowl-
to Brickhouse and Smith, is not knowledge edge that something is the case not only from
that various ethical propositions are true. In knowledge why something is the case, but
fact, Brickhouse and Smith hold that what also from the sort of expertise that involves
Socrates says in (G2) is fully compatible with practical know-how. While the master crafts-
his taking himself to know that it is better person will possess explanatory knowledge
to suffer injustice than to commit injustice. and will, perhaps, be able to answer defini-
Rather, in claiming that he does not know tional questions concerning her craft, what
how these things are, Socrates is denying is even more important is the fact that she
ethical expertise. He is denying that he pos- will possess practical know-how. She will
sesses the kind of definitional knowledge be able to perform certain actions or make
which would allow him to explain why certain products. Propositional knowl-
suffering injustice is preferable to commit- edge is thought of as a cognitive state that
ting it (Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 389, consists in the knower standing in a rela-
2000: 1089). (For criticisms of Brickhouse tion to some proposition or some informa-
and Smiths reading of (G2), see Wolfsdorf tion (Brickhouse and Smith 2000: 105).
2004a: 10810.) Ordinary non-expert knowledge that some-
So far Brickhouse and Smiths inter- thing is the case is propositional knowledge.
pretation is quite similar to Boltons. Like Knowledge why something is the case can
Woodruff, however, Brickhouse and Smith also be analysed in terms of propositional
stress the central importance of craft knowl- knowledge, I know why the explanandum
edge (techn) and the practical abilities is the case if and only if I know that the
involved in exercising that craft knowledge explanans is the case and I know that the
to Socrates conception of expert knowledge. explanans provides the correct explanation
On Boltons view, the kind of ethical knowl- for the explanandum.
edge that Socrates is searching for looks a lot The person who counts as having sophia
like scientific or theoretical knowledge. On or epistm concerning virtue in the Meno
the other hand, Brickhouse and Smith write: has an explanatory account of her true beliefs
that proceeds from definitional knowledge.
We cannot stress enough how completely We can give a partial analysis of her state
Socrates epistemology is suffused with a
in terms of propositional knowledge that
concern for action, and how little con-
she possesses. We have already seen that in
cerned he is with pure theory . . . For
Socrates, because the only knowledge order to know why something is the case,
that concerns him is knowledge that has a person will have to possess a substantial
consequences for how we should live, understanding of a field of inquiry. This sort
his conception of knowledge cannot of understanding will involve a good deal
simply be understood as knowing that of propositional knowledge and a grasp of
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
the various explanatory relations between might be able to explain step by step how she
propositions. would go about playing a particular piece of
Brickhouse and Smith, however, deny music if she did not have arthritis. Such a per-
that the sort of expertise in which sophia or son might still possess expertise even though
epistm consists can be completely analysed she is no longer in a position to exercise her
in terms of propositional knowledge. In addi- expertise.
tion to the possession of a good deal of propo- Is there anything involved in knowing
sitional knowledge, the person with expertise how to play a piece of music, in the pos-
possesses various practical abilities. session of expertise, beyond knowing that
a certain sequence of actions constitutes
[W]e would expect any adequate analysis a way of playing? Imagine an expert jazz
to feature some conditions that required pianist who is playing an old standard with
the one with know-how to have the right a group of musicians she has never met. It
sorts of abilities or capacities to do and seems clear that an expert piano player has
to produce the right sorts of things. It is a number of perceptual and cognitive abili-
not clear that any sort of propositional ties in addition to propositional knowledge
knowledge would suffice to guarantee that a specific sequence of actions consti-
the satisfaction of such requirements.
tutes playing a piece of music. First of all,
For example, just because one knows
she has certain recognitional abilities that
that a certain tool is for cutting, it does
not follow that one knows how to cut a non-expert typically lacks. The expert
with the tool in question; just because attends to the epistemologically and practi-
one knows that a certain kind of wood cally relevant features of her environment.
is best for making chariot wheels, it does She is sensitive to these features and has a
not follow that one would know how stable disposition to form the proper beliefs
to make good chariot wheels from such in response to them. As a result of these
wood, and so on. (Brickhouse and Smith dispositions, the expert will often form dif-
2000: 1067) ferent beliefs about her environment than
the non-expert. She will recognize that the
Brickhouse and Smith identify know-how hammers on the piano are worn, or that
with the possession of certain practical or the drummer is playing a bit more slowly.
productive abilities. There is a good deal in Furthermore, the expert pianist has an abil-
Brickhouse and Smiths view that I agree ity to adjust her behaviour in accordance
with, and I want to develop the notion of with her beliefs about her situation. She is
expertise that is at work in their view in a disposed to make all kinds of correct practi-
bit more detail. First, I suggest that we fol- cal inferences. If the hammers in the piano
low Stanley and Williamson (2001) and are worn, she hits the keys harder to get the
draw a distinction between knowing how to proper sound. If the drummer is playing a
do something and having the ability to do it. bit slowly, she adjusts the tempo at which
For example, a former concert pianist with she plays, etc. Even bracketing the physical
advanced arthritis might no longer have the ability to play the piano, there seems to be
ability to play the piano. However, she might more involved in expertise than knowledge
still have all the knowledge that she used to that a certain sequence of actions is required
have concerning how to play the piano. She to accomplish a task. Expertise involves
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
perceptual sensitivities and a variety of cog- which her ends are to be pursued in whatever
nitive skills. situation she is in. At Euthydemus 280ab,
Presumably a good deal of the perception, Socrates insists that the possession of wisdom
inference and decision that goes on in piano renders any other good fortune otiose. In her
playing is not explicit. In fact, it is unclear decisions about how to pursue her ends, the
that any propositional attitudes need to be wise person is infallible (see Brickhouse and
involved in lots of cases of expert activity. Smith 2000: 107; Reeve 1989: 435). It is
In at least some cases, however, you would highly implausible to take the kind of infall-
need to be an expert to be able to give some ibility that characterizes the wise person as a
account of why she acted the way that she guarantee that her actions will always result
did, and her explanation will look like a in the desired outcome. However, the expert
bit of practical reasoning: I realized that will adjust her aims to fit the situation and
the drummer was playing a bit slow, and I will choose the best means to these ends. Her
wanted to stay in time with the drummer. So beliefs concerning the world and her reason-
I adjusted the tempo at which I was playing. ing about how best to respond to that world
Furthermore, Socrates requirement that a will be flawless even if her actions do not
person with wisdom be able to teach what always succeed.
she knows to others would seem to require Finally, Socrates thinks that the ethically
that the expert be able to make the reasons wise person will be able to give accounts of
for her beliefs and actions explicit to her stu- the reasons for her beliefs and actions, where
dents. Someone who possesses a great deal these accounts will proceed from a correct
of skill in performing an activity but who grasp of the essences of virtue and the vir-
is unable to give an account of what she is tues. The wise persons statements about
doing will not possess the sort of wisdom these essences, her statements of what virtue
that Socrates seeks. or the virtues are, will survive any attempt at
The person with sophia concerning ethics refutation. In short, wisdom or ethical exper-
attends to the correct features of her situa- tise is extremely hard to come by.
tion and is disposed to form the proper ethi- Given the abilities that expertise requires,
cal beliefs about that situation. For example, Brickhouse and Smith deny that expertise
the person who knows what piety is not can be identified with propositional knowl-
only has the ability to make true definitional edge. Like Woodruff, Brickhouse and Smith
statements about piety that are backed up attempt to resolve the problem of Socratic
by sufficient evidence. In addition, as we see ignorance by denying (4). We can possess
in the Euthyphro, she will be authoritative propositional knowledge concerning ethi-
about whether particular actions are pious or cal subjects even in the absence of wisdom
impious. In fact, Socrates seems to think that or ethical expertise. Brickhouse and Smith
the person with expertise will be infallible in take propositional knowledge to be suffi-
her judgements about particular cases (see ciently justified true belief (2000: 106). They
Brickhouse and Smith 2000: 10911; Reeve deny that the person with Socratic wisdom
1989: 435). has a different relation to a propositional
In addition to her ability to recognize content than the non-expert with proposi-
the ethical character of her situation, the tional knowledge.18 Both have propositional
wise person will correctly judge the way in knowledge with the same content, but the
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
expert has something in addition. The two (For other criticisms see Wolfsdorf 2004a:
things that distinguish the expert are the 10811.) First, Brickhouse and Smith draw
scope of her propositional knowledge and a contrast between having propositional
her possession of the right kinds of practi- knowledge and having expertise. Expertise
cal abilities. While a non-expert might have is not a propositional attitude term; it is
propositional knowledge of isolated facts, not the case that I have expertise that P.
the experts knowledge must range over her Expertise is a fine translation of sophia,
field of expertise and the expert has a type which is not generally used as a propositional
of understanding of that field that is not attitude term. Similarly, there are many uses
available to the non-expert. Similarly, the of epistm that do not take a propositional
non-expert might have propositional knowl- complement. There are, however, uses of
edge without the ability either to deploy this epistm with a propositional complement,
knowledge or to come to extend her knowl- which we would naturally translate as know-
edge in new cases. The expert, however, has ledge that such-and-such. Similarly, the verb
the further ability to deploy her knowledge epistasthai like to know can be used in a
in actions related to her field of expertise, variety of ways. On one way of using the
and has the sorts of epistemic sensitivities verb, however, it does take a propositional
and inferential skills needed to extend her complement, in which case we will generally
knowledge in her field of expertise. use as an English translation some form of
Possession of the sort of definitional ethi- to know plus a that-clause. Furthermore,
cal knowledge that Socrates seeks will suffice it is the use of the verb in a way that natu-
for ethical expertise. According to Brickhouse rally takes a propositional complement that
and Smith, were we to take definitional seems especially relevant in drawing the dis-
knowledge as propositional knowledge that tinction between epistm and true opinion
P, where P is to be replaced by a sentence that Socrates draws in Meno (97e98a). True
expressing an ethical definition, we would opinions seem to be propositional attitudes.
not be able to account for the fact that defini- They seem to be beliefs that various things
tional knowledge suffices for the sort of ethi- are the case. But Socrates claims that these
cal expertise that Socrates attributes to the true beliefs become instances of knowledge
wise person. They conclude that definitional (Socrates uses the plural epistmai, knowl-
ethical knowledge cannot be identified with edges) when tied down by an explanatory
propositional knowledge, and suggest that account. The instances of knowledge, there-
the kind of knowledge that Socrates seeks fore, do seem to be propositional attitudes.
should be identified with a kind of ethical However, we cannot possess this sort of
know-how. This ethical know-how, in turn, propositional knowledge until we have the
should be thought of as a power of the soul explanatory account. So there is a sort of
in virtue of which we possess the kinds of propositional knowledge that does require
practical abilities that characterize an expert. the possession of an explanatory account.
For a similar understanding of definitional Immediately after telling us that true
knowledge, see Bensons dynamic theory of beliefs become knowledge by the addition of
knowledge (Benson 2000: 193211). an explanatory account that we come to have
There are two worries about Brickhouse by recollection, Socrates tells us that he does
and Smiths view that merit some attention. not know that this is the precise difference
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
between knowledge and true belief. He Brickhouse and Smith might respond that
then denies that he is willing to claim that even someone with the same range of propo-
he knows many things, and asserts that he sitional knowledge as the expert could lack
does know that there is a difference between the sorts of practical abilities that charac-
knowledge and right opinion (Men. 98b). terize expertise. Imagine that the opponent
What is at issue in this passage certainly insists that anyone with sufficient justification
seems to be propositional knowledge, and for propositional knowledge must grasp the
Socrates denies that he knows many things. inferential connections between her beliefs.
Furthermore, Socrates seems to think that These inferential connections might already
he does know that right opinion and know- include connections to perceptual beliefs, as
ledge differ from one another, even while he well as connections to beliefs about what is
denies knowing many things. It is clear that required to achieve desired ends in particu-
Socrates does not have definitional know- lar situations. On a conception of knowledge
ledge concerning knowledge. So he should with very strong demands for sufficient justi-
not be claiming that he does have expert fication, a good deal of what the expert pos-
knowledge and that knowledge differs from sesses on Brickhouse and Smiths view will
right opinion. However, it is unclear why be necessary in order to possess any proposi-
Socrates denies that he knows many things, tional knowledge in the first place.
if the only sort of knowledge at issue in his Brickhouse and Smith might insist that
claim that he does possess knowledge is some expertise includes not only knowledge that
kind of readily available ordinary proposi- certain inferential connections hold, but also
tional knowledge. a stable disposition to make the right kinds
Another worry about Brickhouse and of inferences. The dispositions to form the
Smiths view is that they rely on a concep- right sorts of new beliefs in response to her
tion of justification that might be denied by environment and to adjust her actions in
someone wanting to claim that sophia and response to these beliefs could well outrun
epistm can be spelled out wholly in terms the information that the expert represents
of propositional knowledge. Part of what to herself in her propositional attitudes.
drives Brickhouse and Smiths argument is Consider an expert mechanic, for example.
the thought that a person could have a true She examines my car and hears a hissing
belief with the kind of justification needed noise coming from the engine. She asks me
for propositional knowledge without pos- a few questions and tells me that the cool-
sessing either the explanatory account or ing system needs to be repaired. Does the
the sorts of cognitive skills that character- mechanic possess a propositional attitude
ize expertise. It is possible, however, to deny towards a conditional before looking at my
this possibility as Irwin (1979, 1995) and car? Perhaps she already believes that if a
Fine (1979, 2008) do. Anyone who thinks car is hissing and the owner answers ques-
that a sufficient justification for propositions in a certain way, then it is likely that
tional knowledge must include a synoptic there is a problem with the cooling system.
grasp of a field of inquiry will hold that a She then comes to believe the antecedent of
person with any propositional knowledge at that conditional and infers the consequent.
all has all the propositional knowledge that It seems likely, however, that the mechanic
an expert has.19 is disposed to form a belief about my car
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SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
under certain circumstances without hav- field of inquiry, can agree that Socrates takes
ing any kind of prior conditional belief. At himself to meet the requirements for weak
the very least, it would seem that perceptual knowledge.
beliefs do not require antecedent conditional By this point, we can see a kind of con-
beliefs. Perhaps an expert is disposed to sensus between different attempts to resolve
form other kinds of beliefs as well without the problem of Socratic ignorance. Most
possessing antecedent conditional beliefs. parties can distinguish two sorts of cogni-
Expertise would then consist in something tive achievement. One sort of cognitive
more than possession of a body of proposi- achievement is relatively easy to attain and
tional knowledge. corresponds to weak knowledge true belief
In any case, however, the conditions on the with warrant sufficient for unhedged asser-
sort of justification needed for propositional tion and full confidence. I have argued that,
knowledge are extraordinarily demanding at the very least, Socrates takes himself to
on the view advocated by Fine and Irwin. (6) be in a state that satisfies these conditions.
is false, and almost no one will ever have any The second sort of cognitive achievement is
propositional knowledge at all. I contend, extremely hard to come by. The person who
however, that even someone who denies (6) manages such an achievement is an expert
should hold that Socrates takes himself to about a field of inquiry. She possesses defi-
have true beliefs based on a warrant suffi- nitional knowledge and has an explanatory
cient for unhedged assertion and full confi- account of what she knows. Her judgements
dence in his beliefs. In other words, we can in her field of expertise are authoritative and
agree that Socrates takes himself to possess inerrant, and she has the ability to teach her
something akin to weak knowledge. expertise to others. Socrates consistently
I have argued that Brickhouse and Smith denies that he has this kind of expertise.
need to recognize a type of propositional Socrates can be wholly consistent in taking
knowledge more demanding than the ordi- himself (either tacitly of explicitly) to have
nary propositional knowledge that they take reached the lower level of cognitive achieve-
to be quite common, and need to hold that ment even while denying that he has reached
Socrates denies that he possesses this sort of the higher level. While there remain differ-
propositional knowledge. They are free to ences over how best to interpret Socrates
maintain that this stronger sort of propo- epistemic vocabulary and over many other
sitional knowledge will only be found in issues in Socratic epistemology, we can see a
someone who possesses expertise even while kind of emerging consensus when it comes to
denying that expertise is identical to a body the question: Does Socrates take himself to
of propositional knowledge. On the other have any knowledge? The answer is a firm:
hand, the person who confines propositional In one way, yes. In another way, no.
knowledge to those who possess definitional
knowledge and the wide-ranging grasp of a Keith McPartland
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6
THE PRIORITY OF DEFINITION
ignorance should involve the reproach

INTRODUCTION of slavishness. (Mem. 1.1.16; Marchant
trans.)
One thing we seem to know about Socrates1
is that he was preoccupied with questions of And of course, the Socratic dialogues3 of
the form What is F-ness? 2Aristotle famously Plato abound in such questions. Socrates
tells us: and his interlocutor(s) focus on the ques-
tion: What is piety (or holiness)? in the
Socrates busied himself concerning the Euthyphro; What is temperance (or mod-
ethical virtues and was the first to seek eration)? in the Charmides; What is courage
to define them universally . . . He was (or bravery)? in the Laches; What is fineness
reasonable in seeking the what it is; for (or beauty)? in the Hippias Major; What is
he sought to syllogize, and the what it
a friend? in the Lysis;4 What is justice? in
is is the starting point of syllogisms . . .
Republic I; What is a sophist? in part of
For Socrates may be fairly attributed two
things, epagogic arguments and defining the Protagoras; What is rhetoric? in part of
the universal. (Metaphysics 1078b17 the Gorgias; and What is virtue? in the first
29, Ross trans.; see also Metaphysics third of the Meno.
987b14) Given this preoccupation, one is imme-
diately led to wonder what Socrates would
According to Xenophon: count as adequate answers to such ques-
tions. An immediate response is that
[Socrates] own conversation was ever Socrates is searching for definitions. Indeed,
of human things. The problems he dis- this preoccupation is often characterized as
cussed were, What is godly, what is a search for definitions, following Aristotle.
ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly;
But appealing to definitions here is problem-
what is just, what is unjust; what is pru-
atic for at least two reasons. First, pointing
dence, what is madness; what is courage,
what is cowardice; what is a state, what out that in asking these sorts of questions
is a statesman; what is government, and Socrates is looking for definitions of the rel-
what is a governor; these and others evant F-nesses (piety, courage, temperance,
like them, of which the knowledge made etc.) only pushes the question back. One
a gentleman, in his estimation, while wants to know what features are required for
136

definitions of the relevant F-nesses.5 Second, definition).9 I will then run through the
talk of definitions is potentially misleading primary evidence for and against attribut-
since it is likely to carry with it anachronistic ing such a principle to the Socrates of Platos
connotations concerning the nature of defi- Socratic dialogues. We will see that the evi-
nition. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Plato dence appears to cut both ways. I then con-
never uses Aristotles favoured term for clude the essay by rehearsing the various
definition (horismos), and rarely (at least in ways in which scholars have attempted to
the Socratic dialogues) uses Aristotles other resolve this interpretive tension. In the end,
technical terms (horos and horizein) in the I hope the reader will see that anything like
sense of definition.6 Nevertheless, Socrates a confident stance with respect to Socrates
concern to raise questions of the form What endorsement of the priority of definition
is F-ness? is clear whether or not providing principle will depend on ones interpretation
an answer to such questions amounts to proof many more features of Socratic philoso-
viding a definition. phy than we can consider here.
I propose to leave the question concern-
ing what amounts to adequate answers to
Socrates What is F-ness? questions to one
side, to the extent that I can.7 Instead I will THE PRINCIPLE
focus on another related question concern-
ing Socrates preoccupation with What is Let us begin by stating the principle in its
F-ness? questions: What motivates this pre- most general form.
occupation? What, that is, is so valuable about
the answers to these questions that Socrates (PD) If A fails to know what F-ness is,
is so devoted to asking them? I suspect that a then A fails to know anything about
number of considerations motivate his preoc- F-ness.
cupation, but a fairly traditional answer (and
one with which I am in general agreement) So stated, the principle requires a variety of
is that Socrates takes such answers to have a qualifications and comments.
special epistemic status.8 Knowledge of these First, I will simply stipulate that for
answers is in some way epistemically prior to Socrates to know what F-ness is is to know
other sorts of knowledge, and given Socrates the answer to his What is F-ness? question.
commitment to knowledge, it is natural for Of course, what it is to know the answer
and incumbent upon him to pursue what is to the What is F-ness? question cannot be
epistemically prior. It is the task of this essay fixed in light of my earlier decision to leave
to examine more closely this alleged motiva- unexplored the adequacy conditions of a suc-
tion for Socrates preoccupation with What cessful answer to the What is F-ness? ques-
is F-ness? questions. tion. But suffice it to say that to know the
I begin with a sketch of the nature of this answer to a What is F-ness? question is at
alleged motivation. The motivation depends least to be able to survive a Socratic exami-
on Socrates endorsement of an epistemic nation or elenchus. Again, what precisely is
priority principle, which I will call hence- required in order to survive a Socratic elen-
forth the priority of definition principle chus is a long and controversial story,10 but
(keeping in mind the flaws of using the word suffice it to say that surviving a Socratic
137

elenchus at least requires the ability to state (A) If A asserts something about F-ness,
an answer to the What is F-ness? question then A knows what A has asserted
that coheres with ones other F-ness related11
beliefs. Consequently, we need to distinguish Again such a principle may or may not
the priority of definition principle from two receive Socratic endorsement, but whether it
related but distinct principles concerning the does is not the focus of this essay. Our focus
nature of knowledge of what F-ness is, viz. is on (PD), the claim that knowledge of what
the verbalization requirement and the coher- F-ness is is prior to any other knowledge
ence requirement regarding F-ness.
Third, (PD) is a conjunction of two prin-
(V) If A fails to be able to state an answer ciples which have often been discussed sepa-
to the What is F-ness? question, then A rately in the literature. The first maintains
fails to know what F-ness is.12 that knowledge of what F-ness is is prior to
(C) If As F-ness related beliefs fail knowledge that anything is F. For example,
to cohere, then A fails to know what one cannot know that Socrates is virtuous, if
F-ness is. one fails to know what virtue is. The second
maintains that knowledge of what F-ness is
When these two principles are conjoined to is prior to knowledge of any of the proper-
(PD), we get the result that being unable to ties of F-ness. For example, one cannot know
coherently answer a What is F-ness? ques- that virtue is beneficial, if one fails to know
tion entails that one lacks any knowledge what virtue is. Put only a bit more formally,
of F-ness. Such a result may or may not (PD) is the conjunction of
receive Socratic endorsement, but its Socratic
endorsement is distinct from the Socratic (P) If A fails to know what F-ness is, then
endorsement of (PD). It is (PD) that is the A fails to know, for any x, that x is F,
focus of this essay.
Second, as the preceding discussion indi- and
cates, (PD) is a principle regarding the prior-
ity of knowledge. (PD) requires definitional (D) If A fails to know what F-ness is,
knowledge of F-ness (whatever that amounts then A fails to know, for any G, that
to) for any other knowledge regarding F-ness is G.
F-ness. It should not be confused with the
view that stating an answer to the What is Finally, (PD) should not be confused with
F-ness? question is prior to knowledge of what might be called the sufficiency of defi-
anything else about F-ness; that is the con- nition principle. As the name implies, the
junction of (PD) and (V). Nor should it be sufficiency principle maintains that knowl-
confused with the view that knowledge of edge of what F-ness is is sufficient for know-
what F-ness is is prior to the ability to state ing anything about F-ness. For example, if
or assert that something is F or that F-ness one knows what virtue is, then one knows
has some property or other. To arrive at that that Socrates is virtuous. Again, whether
sort of view from (PD) requires commitment Socrates would endorse such a principle (or
to something like the following assertability more plausible versions of it),13 this princi-
requirement: ple is distinct from (PD). (PD) maintains that
138

knowledge of what F-ness is is necessary for to the evidence that appears to argue against
any other knowledge involving F-ness, while this endorsement.
the sufficiency principle maintains that such
definitional knowledge is sufficient. EVIDENCE THAT SOCRATES ENDORSES (PD)
In conclusion, the priority of definition
principle (PD) is the conjunction of two The strongest evidence for Socrates endorse-
principles (P) and (D), each asserting the ment of (P), the principle that if one fails to
necessity of knowledge of what F-ness is know what F-ness is, then one fails to know
for knowledge of other things about F-ness. for any x that x is F, comes from two pas-
According to (P), knowledge of what F-ness sages in Platos Hippias Major.14 Early on
is is necessary for knowledge of which things in the dialogue Socrates relates an imagined
are F, and according to (D), knowledge of exchange he had with someone15 concerning
what F-ness is is necessary for knowledge of his critique of various parts of speeches he
which properties F-ness has. It is important had heard.
to note that (PD) on its own only asserts the
necessity of knowledge of what F-ness is for (a) Not long ago, someone caused me
knowledge of other things about F-ness. It to be at a loss when I was finding fault
is silent about whether such knowledge is with things in some speeches as being
necessary for belief, assertion, action, or foul and praising others as being fine; he
anything else. It is also important to note questioned me in the following very rude
that (PD) as here discussed is fully general. way. (b) How do you know what sort
of things are fine and foul? Come now,
According to (PD), knowledge of what any
can you say what the fine is? (c) I was at
F-ness is is necessary for anyone to know
a loss because of my worthlessness and
anything else about that F-ness. Certainly, if was not able to answer appropriately.
Socrates does endorse (PD) in the Socratic Going away from the gathering I was
dialogues we can understand why he is so angry at myself and reproached myself,
preoccupied with trying to acquire knowl- and resolved that the first time I met
edge of the answers to his What is F-ness? one of you wise men I would listen and
questions. The question, of course, is does he learn and study and then go back to the
endorse such a principle. questioner and fight the argument again.
(Hp. Ma. 286cd)16
And again at the conclusion of the dialogue,

SOCRATES ENDORSEMENT OF (PD)? Socrates reverts to the same theme, saying
Given this sketch of the priority of definition (a) He asks me if I am not ashamed daring
to talk about fine practices, when I have
principle, both what it is and what it is not,
clearly been refuted concerning the fine,
we need to examine the evidence concern-
to the effect that I do not know what the
ing Socrates endorsement of this principle. thing itself is. (b) And yet, he will say,
I will begin by looking at the evidence that how do you know whether someone has
appears to support Socrates endorsement, spoken finely or not, or done any other
first by looking at the evidence for (P) and thing whatsoever, when you do not know
then the evidence for (D). Then, I will turn the fine? (c) Being in such a state, do you
139

think it is better for you to be alive than knowledge of what fineness is if there are
dead? (Hp. Ma. 304de) other ways he might have known that some
speeches were fine. Rather the questions in
Between these two passages, Socrates pro- the (b) portions of these two passages from
fesses to want to learn from Hippias the the Hippias Major provide rather strong
knowledge of what fineness is (Hp. Ma. prima facie evidence that Socrates endorses
286de), which Hippias professes to have a substitution instance of (P).17
(Hp. Ma. 286e). Hippias proposes seven Socrates appears to endorse a similar sub-
different answers to the What is fineness? stitution instance near the beginning of the
question, all of which are found wanting by Euthyphro in the following passage.
Socrates in much the same way presumably
as Socrates own attempt to answer this ques- EUTH: (a) [My relatives say] that it is impi-
tion was found wanting by his imagined inter- ous for a son to prosecute his father for
locutor. The key for our purposes is noticing murder, knowing poorly, Socrates, how
that the (b) portion of both passages contains the gods view the pious and the impious.
a nearly identical question that has led many SOC: (b) Euthyphro, do you think that you
commentators to take Socrates to be com- have such accurate knowledge concerning
mitted to the view that Socrates (or anyone divine affairs, and concerning pious things
else) cannot know which speeches are fine, if and impious things that, the situation
he fails to know what fineness is. But such a being as you say, you do not fear that by
commitment is simply a substitution instance prosecuting your father you may be doing
of the more general principle (P) with fine- something impious?
ness substituted for F-ness and individual EUTH: (c) Socrates, I would be useless and
unnamed speeches substituted for x. no different than the average man, if I did
Of course, some commentators have not know accurately all such things.
focused on the fact that the (b) portions con- ...
tain questions, not assertions, and have sug- SOC: (d) Tell me, then, what you just now
gested that these questions are not meant to asserted you knew clearly, what sorts of
be rhetorical but are genuine (see e.g. Lesher things you say the pious and the impious
1987: 285). Socrates is not affirming that one are in the case of murder and all other
cannot know which speeches are fine without actions. (Euthphr. 4d5d)
knowing what fineness is. Rather Socrates
is genuinely wondering how it is possible In the (a) portion of this passage, Euthyphro
(assuming that it is possible) to know that a explains that his relatives think he is making
given speech is fine when one fails to know a mistake by prosecuting his father for mur-
what fineness is. But this is difficult to square der on the grounds that doing so is impious.
with the context. Socrates does not follow up In the (b) portion, Socrates is surprised that
the first question by looking for an alterna- Euthyphro is not afraid that perhaps his rela-
tive explanation for his knowledge of fine tives are right and supposes that Euthyphro
speeches, but with attempting to acquire the must think that he knows concerning
knowledge that the question in (b) indicates divine affairs, and concerning pious things
is necessary. In the second passage Socrates and impious things. Socrates suggests here
has no reason to be ashamed at lacking the that knowledge that prosecuting his father
140

is pious is required either for doing what dont because how would I know the
Euthyphro is doing or for not being afraid nature of a thing when neither you nor
that what he is doing is impious. In either Critias is able to discover it, as you say?
case, in (c) Euthyphro boasts that he has the (Chrm. 176ab)
requisite knowledge, leading Socrates in (d)
to ask Euthyphro to tell him what he had just Here Charmides explains that he fails to
claimed to know what piety and impiety know whether he is temperate because he
are. The movement in this passage goes from fails to know what temperance is, suggesting
not being afraid to prosecute ones father for another substitution instance of (P). It is true
murder to knowing that prosecuting ones that this is Charmides and not Socrates,19 but
father for murder is pious, to knowing con- the context of this passage provides no rea-
cerning divine affairs and concerning pious son to think that Socrates would not endorse
and impious things, to knowing what piety Charmides sentiment.
and impiety are. Whatever one thinks about Finally, again following a series of failed
the details of this movement, it appears to attempts to answer the What is a friend?
indicate a Socratic endorsement of the follow- question, Socrates concludes the Lysis as
ing substitution instance of (P): if Euthyphro follows:
knows that prosecuting his father for murder
is pious, then he knows what piety is. Lest We have been ridiculous . . . For the ones
we miss this endorsement Plato wraps up the going away will say that we think that
dialogue with Euthyphro as follows: we are friends with each other and yet
we have not been able to discover what a
For if you did not know clearly the holy friend is. (Ly. 223b)
and the unholy, it is not possible that you
would attempt to prosecute your aged Here Socrates finds fault with himself and his
father for murder on behalf of a hired
interlocutors, Lysis and Menexenus, for think-
labourer, but you would have feared the
ing they are friends when they fail to know what
gods, risking that you did not do this
correctly, and would have been ashamed friendship is. Of course, Socrates cannot mean
before men; now, I know well that you by this that it is impossible for Menexenus
think you know clearly the holy and the to think or believe that he is a friend to Lysis
not holy. (Euthphr. 15de)18 when he fails to know what a friend is (as he
does). Counter-examples to that sort of prin-
In addition to these passages, Socrates con- ciple are abundant.20 Indeed, Socrates, Lysis
cludes other dialogues with what appear to and Menexenus are counter-examples them-
be substitution instances of (P). Near the end selves.21 Instead, Socrates must have in mind
of the Charmides, following a series of failed something like his criticism of Euthyphro to
attempts to answer the What is temperance? the effect that the three friends are unjusti-
question, Socrates urges Charmides to see fied, unwarranted, unreliable, or in some other
whether he is temperate, and if he is to ignore way epistemically at fault in thinking they are
Socrates babbling. Charmides responds: friends. They fail to know that they are friends.
And the evidence for this is that they fail to
But good heavens, Socrates, I dont know what a friend is. But this indicates yet
know whether I have it or whether I another substitution instance of (P).
141

Similar evidence can be cited for (D).22 be, how would we become advisors to
Following Menos introduction of his epon- anyone regarding how it might best be
ymous dialogue by asking how virtue is attained? (La. 190bc)
acquired, Socrates responds as follows.
Here again, Socrates appears committed to
(a) Good stranger, you must think me the view that if one fails to know what virtue
happy indeed if you think I know whether is, then one fails to know how it is acquired.
virtue can be taught or how it comes to Of course, one might object that this passage
be; I am so far from knowing whether does not explicitly require knowledge of the
virtue can be taught or not that I do not nature of virtue for knowledge of how it is
know at all what virtue itself is. . . . (b)
to be acquired, but rather for becoming an
If I do not know what something is, how
(appropriate?) advisor for how it is acquired.
could I know what qualities it possesses?
(c) Or do you think that someone who And we might imagine that Socrates envisions
does not know at all who Meno is could the requirements for being a virtue-acquisi-
know whether he is good-looking or rich tion advisor to exceed the requirements for
or well-born, or the opposite of these? knowledge of how virtue is acquired. But in
Do you think that is possible? (Men. an earlier passage that serves as a sort of epa-
71ab; adapted from Grube trans.) gogic inference to 190bc, Socrates avers:
The (a) and (c) portions indicate substitution For if we happen to know concerning
instances of (D), that is, if Socrates fails to anything whatever that its being added
know what virtue is, then Socrates fails to to something makes that thing to which
it is added better and further we are able
know that virtue is teachable, and if Socrates
to cause that thing to be added to it, then
fails to know who Meno is, then Socrates
it is clear that we know that thing itself
fails to know that Meno is good-looking, or concerning which we advise how some-
that Meno is rich, or that Meno is well-born. one might best and most easily attain
But in between we find the most explicit evi- it . . . If we happen to know that sight
dence for the general principle that one could added to the eyes makes them better
plausibly expect: if someone fails to know and further we are able to cause it to be
what something (F-ness) is, then one fails to added to the eyes, then it is clear that we
know what qualities (G-nesses) it possesses.23 know what sight is concerning which we
Additional passages in the Meno suggest a advise how someone might best attain
similar commitment (see Meno 79c, 86de it. For if we did not know what sight is
or what hearing is, we would hardly be
and 100b), but none so explicitly as (b).
advisors or doctors worthy of attention
Socrates appears to endorse additional
concerning eyes and ears, how someone
substitution instances of (D) in the Laches. In might best attain hearing and sight. (La.
pursuing the same investigation as that posed 189e190b)
at the beginning of the Meno, Socrates says
in the Laches:
Two features about this passage are note-
Then isnt this necessary for us to begin, worthy. First, Socrates is explicit that knowl-
to know what virtue is? For if we do edge of the nature of F-ness is a requirement
not know at all what virtue happens to for knowledge of how F-ness is acquired,
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not simply advice concerning how F-ness If this were the end of the matter we
is acquired. Second, while the passage con- would have little reason to rest content
tinues to indicate a restriction to qualities with Robinsons vague impression that the
(G-nesses) associated with the acquisition Socrates of Platos Socratic dialogues is com-
of F-nesses, it testifies to a broader principle mitted to the priority of definition principle
than one restricted to virtue. Something like (PD).25 The evidence is considerably stronger
the following substitution instance of (D) is than a vague impression. While Socrates
indicated: If one fails to know what F-ness never explicitly states (PD) in its full gener-
is, then one fails to know that F-ness is G ality, he does appear to state (D) in its full
(for G-nesses associated with the manner in generality, as well as endorsing at least six
which F-ness is best acquired). different substitution instances. In the case
Two other dialogues testify to additional of (P), the general claim is never explicitly
substitution instances of (D). In the intro- stated, but the manner in which the substitu-
ductory dialogue between Socrates and tion instance of it is introduced in the Hippias
Hippocrates in the Protagoras, Socrates Major does not suggest any restrictions are
indicates that if Hippocrates fails to know in the offing, and again at least three more
what a sophist is, then he fails to know that substitution instances appear in surrounding
a sophist is good (Protagoras 312bc).24 And dialogues. When the passages on behalf of
Socrates concludes Book I of the Republic as (D) are combined with those on behalf of (P),
follows it is difficult to imagine that we have stronger
evidence for any other alleged Socratic the-
Hence the result of the discussion, as far sis than we have for his commitment to the
as Im concerned, is that I know nothing, priority of definition principle,26 if, as I say,
for when I dont know what justice is, Ill this were the end of the matter. But as the
hardly know whether it is a kind of vir- qualification suggests, this is not the end of
tue or not, or whether a person who has the matter. For in addition to the abundant
it is happy or unhappy. (R. I 354dc) evidence on behalf of Socrates endorsement
of (PD), there appear to be strong considera-
Once again, we appear to be presented with a tions that tell against his endorsement. Let us
substitution instance of (D) to the effect that turn to those considerations now.
failing to know what justice is entails failing
to know that justice is a virtue or that justice EVIDENCE THAT SOCRATES DOES NOT
is happiness-conducive. Indeed, Socrates ini- ENDORSE (PD)
tial suggestion that the result of the dialogue
so far is that he knows nothing may even be The considerations offered against Socrates
taken as indicating a more general principle endorsement of (PD) fall roughly into two
to the effect that failing to know what jus- categories: textual considerations and philo-
tice is entails failing to know anything about sophical considerations. The textual consid-
justice. Indeed, when this is conjoined with erations themselves follow three main lines
the second passage from the Laches, some- of argument. According to the first, it is
thing very close to the general statement in maintained that Socrates method of search-
the (b) portion of the passage from the Meno ing for knowledge is inconsistent with a com-
is indicated. mitment to (PD). This method of inquiry, it is
143

averred, depends on possessing knowledge of to Laches initial answer to the What is cour-
things that are F and of properties of F-ness age? question that courage is remaining in
in an attempt to come to know what F-ness the ranks and facing ones enemy by citing
is. As such Socrates method of inquiry pre- the courageous flight of the Scythian cavalry
supposes that Socrates does not endorse and of the Spartan hoplites at Plataea. In the
(PD), for it presupposes knowledge about Charmides, Socrates objects to the answer
F-ness (its instances and its properties) prior that temperance is quietness by appealing to
to knowledge of what F-ness is.27 various activities that are temperate but not
For example, in the Laches Socrates pro- quiet. And, in Republic I, Socrates famously
poses that Laches search out the answer to objects to Cephalus answer that justice is
the What is courage? question by searching giving to each his due by noting the injus-
for what various examples of courageous tice of returning a sword to a madman.
behaviour have in common (at 191ce).28 Once, again Socrates method indicates that
Similarly, in Euthyphro (6de), Socrates he thinks one can know that various things
appears to encourage Euthyphro to answer are F while failing to know what F-ness is,
the What is piety? question by examining contrary to (P). Moreover, on those occa-
a variety of pious actions and indicating the sions in which Socrates does not appeal to
form itself by virtue of which those pious a counter-example in opposition to a pro-
actions are pious. In the Charmides, after posed answer, he appeals to properties of the
Socrates rejects Charmides first answer to definiendum that the definiens fails to have
the What is temperance? question, Socrates or vice versa. For example, in opposition
encourages Charmides to re-examine him- to Charmides second answer to the What
self, an apparent example of a temperate is temperance? question that temperance is
individual, in order to try to answer again modesty, Socrates points out that while tem-
the What is temperance? question.29 These perance is always fine, modesty is not. Again,
and other examples, throughout the Socratic in opposition to Nicias answer that courage
dialogues, indicate that Socrates is commit- is the knowledge of fearful and daring things,
ted to the possibility that one can know that Socrates points out that while courage is a
particular actions or individuals are coura- part of virtue, knowledge of fearful and dar-
geous, pious or temperate while failing to ing things is the whole of virtue. These and
know the answer to the relevant What is numerous other examples30 indicate that
F-ness? question? But that provides rather Socrates thinks one can know a variety of
compelling evidence that Socrates would not properties of courage or temperance, for
endorse the view that one who fails to know example, while failing to know what courage
what F-ness is cannot know which actions or or temperance is. In these cases, we appear
individuals are F, viz. (P). to have rather straightforward evidence
According to a second line of argument that Socrates does not endorse (D), and
based on the text, Socrates tests proposed when these passages are combined with the
answers to his What is F-ness? questions counter-example passages, any suggestion
by appealing to examples and properties that Socrates endorses (PD) looks hopeless.
of the relevant F-ness. Indeed, Socrates fre- A third line of argument connected to the
quently objects to proposed answers by cit- text is independent of Socrates characteris-
ing counter-examples. Thus, Socrates objects tic method of searching for and examining
144

answers to his What is F-ness? questions. given Socrates professions of knowledge of

According to this line of argument, Socrates instances of badness and shamefulness and
frequently professes knowledge of various yet the strong presumption, if not explicit
things about F-nesses, while at the same time expression, of his ignorance of what badness
professing ignorance of what those F-nesses is and shamefulness is, we have good reason
are.31 The frequency of these Socratic profes- to conclude that Socrates does not endorse
sions of knowledge is a matter of some dis- (PD), or at least (P).35
pute,32 but not that Socrates does sometimes In addition to these textual considerations
profess to know things. Two such professions on behalf of denying Socrates endorsement
are well known from the Apology. of (PD), there is a philosophical considera-
tion. (PD) is simply too implausible to be
I do know, however, that it is bad and charitably attributed to anyone approach-
shameful to do wrong, to disobey ones ing Socrates philosophical acumen. What
superior, be he god or man. I shall never is philosophically implausible about (PD)
fear or avoid things of which I do not is perhaps best captured by Peter Geach,
know, whether they may not be good who following Wittgenstein, writes the fol-
rather than things that I know to be bad. lowing: We know heaps of things without
(Ap. 29b; adapted from Grube trans.)
being able to define the terms in which we
Am I then to choose in preference to this express our knowledge.36 Indeed, Geach
something that I know very well to be an finds this principle so implausible that, in
evil and assess the penalty at that? (Ap. perhaps a momentary lack of interpretive
37b)
generosity, he dubbed it the Socratic Fallacy
and blamed Socrates for a style of mistaken
In the first passage Socrates explicitly pro- thinking more damaging to the progress of
fesses to know that disobeying a superior is philosophy than Platos theory of Forms.37
bad and shameful, while in the second pas- Perhaps the obvious falsity of the principle
sage he professes to know that saying that would have led a more generous interpreter
he deserves some punishment other than to doubt Socrates commitment to (PD), as it
death would be among the bad things. If has a variety of scholars since Geachs influ-
Socrates endorses (PD), or more specifically ential paper. Indeed, I suspect that Geachs
(P), he should profess to know what bad- forceful repudiation of the principle was par-
ness is and what shamefulness is, since he tially responsible for rediscovering the texts
professes to know instances of badness and that argue against Socrates endorsement.
shamefulness. But while Socrates never to
my knowledge explicitly professes ignorance THE LANDSCAPE OF INTERPRETATIONS
of what badness or what goodness is in the
Socratic dialogues,33 it is difficult to believe Thus, we face an interpretive tension in
in light of his general professions of igno- the Socratic dialogues,38 not uncommon
rance that he would profess to know this. in the history of philosophy. On the one
Moreover, as we saw in the Hippias Major, hand, considerable evidence indicates that
Socrates does maintain his ignorance of what Socrates endorses the priority of definition
fineness is and so presumably his ignorance principle (PD). While precious little textual
of what shamefulness is.34 Consequently, evidence indicates the general principle,
145

numerous passages testify to a commitment be found in Russell Dancys recent book

to various substitution instances of (PD). If (2004).39 Dancy spends considerable time
there were not evidence to the contrary, we responding to those interpreters who attempt
would have rather compelling evidence for to explain away the passages which appear
Socrates endorsement of (PD). But, on the to testify to Socrates endorsement of (PD).40
other hand, there does appear to be consid- None of their attempts, Dancy maintains, are
erable evidence to the contrary. His method compelling. Nevertheless, Dancy does not
of searching for and testing answers to his deny that Socrates endorsement of (PD) is
What is F-ness? questions appears to pre- incompatible with his method of searching
suppose that Socrates does not accept (PD). for and examining purported answers to his
Moreover, various Socratic professions of What is F-ness? questions (see Dancy 2004:
ignorance and knowledge are contrary to an 3941). Indeed, he even agrees that the prin-
endorsement of (PD), and of course (PD) is ciple is false (Dancy 2004: 378). According
philosophically implausible. How then are to Dancy:
we to resolve this interpretive tension?
As one might expect there are three general Various attempts have been made to read
approaches to this tension in the literature. the dialogues in a way that gets around
Some interpreters simply accept the tension the apparent conflict between Socrates
claims and his practice. The way Im
and, la Geach, proclaim so much the worse
going to read them, the conflict is there,
for Socrates. I will call this the embrace
and is one of the driving forces tend-
the tension approach. Some interpreters ing towards the theory of recollection
re-examine the alleged textual evidence on we find in the Meno. Attempts to make
behalf of (PD) and explain it away. I will call Socrates come out smelling like roses
this the reject (PD) approach. Some inter- will be dealt with along the way. But a
preters re-examine the alleged textual evi- Socrates who is inconsistent on this score
dence against (PD), explain it away and offer strikes me as more interesting than these
a philosophically respectable understanding consistent ones. (Dancy 1999: 41)
of the principle. I will call this the embrace
(PD) approach. Let us look more closely at Notice that Dancys interpretation is moti-
each of these three general approaches. vated by two considerations. First, he rejects
a strong form of the principle of charity as a
EMBRACE THE TENSION guiding principle in interpreting philosophi-
cal texts.41 According to Dancy, we should
Geach may perhaps be the most famous not assume that philosophers, even great
representative of those interpreters who ones, fail to make mistakes, even big ones,
appear happy to embrace this tension in or are always consistent. Indeed, the reverse
Socratic thought. Indeed, Geach is so happy is more likely to be true. An interpretation
to attribute to Socrates a principle that according to which Socrates is mistaken and/
Geach considers obviously fallacious that or inconsistent is not only likely to be more
he never even considers the evidence to the plausible, but also, according to Dancy, more
effect that Socrates does not endorse (PD). philosophically interesting. Second, the the-
But another, perhaps more generous, repre- sis of Dancys book is to defend a develop-
sentative of this sort of interpretation can mental view [of Platos dialogues] with an
146

analytic emphasis (Dancy 2004: 1). Part of by two features. First, some of the pas-
his defence of this developmental interpreta- sages we cited above, for example, Hippias
tion is seeing Plato as attempting to resolve Major (286cd and 304de) for (P) and
this tension between Socrates commit- Meno (71ab) for (D), do indeed testify to
ment to (PD) and Socrates (or any reason- an endorsement of (PD). But they do not tes-
able) philosophical method. As Dancy sees tify to a Socratic endorsement. Rather they
it, at least by the time of the composition of testify to a Platonic endorsement. According
the Meno, Plato recognizes this tension in to Vlastos and Beversluis, the Hippias Major,
Socratic philosophy and resolves it by reject- Lysis, Euthydemus and Meno are transi-
ing (PD) by means of the theory of recollec- tional dialogues. They were composed by
tion.42 So, in the end, while Socrates may not Plato between the dialogues that represent
come out smelling like roses, Plato does, or the philosophy of Socrates and the middle
at least sort of.43 dialogues that represent a distinctly new
and different Platonic philosophy. As such
REJECT (PD) these transitional dialogues contain elements
of the older Socratic view (in particular its
By far the most popular approach in recent moral doctrines) and elements of the emerg-
years to the interpretive tension surrounding Platonic view (in particular a new emerg-
ing Socrates endorsement of (PD) involves ing methodology borrowed from Platos new
explaining away the alleged evidence offered interest in mathematics). Far from being at
on behalf of his endorsement. According to odds with the new emerging methodology of
this reject (PD) approach, the passages we these dialogues (as (PD) is with the method-
cited above on behalf Socrates endorsement ology of the earlier dialogues), (PD) is rather
of (PD) are understood in one of three ways. an essential component of the methodol-
(1) Either they fail to testify to any principle ogy of the middle dialogues. Consequently,
at all and are contextually explained away44; according to Vlastos and Beversluis, (PD) can
or (2) they testify to some other less general be found in the Hippias Major, Meno and
or weaker principle or principles which are Lysis passages,47 but these passages testify
compatible with his method of searching for to Platos endorsement of (PD) and not to
and testing answers to his What is F-ness? Socrates.
questions and his professions of knowl- Second, according to Vlastos and Beversluis,
edge and ignorance, and are philosophically the remaining passages that allegedly indi-
respectable (or at least more respectable than cate a Socratic endorsement of (PD) do not
(PD)); or (3) they fail to testify to Socratic, indicate anything as general (and hence as
as opposed to Platonic, views.45 Various com- implausible) as (PD). For example, while they
binations and applications of these three do not explicitly discuss Euthyphro (4d5d),
ways of dealing with the passages which sug- they evidently take it to indicate a commit-
gest Socratic endorsement of (PD) lead to ment to a more restricted and hence more
roughly four distinct versions of this general plausible principle roughly to the effect that if
approach. an individual fails to know what piety is (per-
The first version of the reject (PD) haps what any F-ness is), then that individual
approach is represented by Gregory Vlastos fails to know controversial and/or borderline
and John Beversluis.46 It is characterized instances of piety (like whether prosecuting
147

ones father for murdering a murderous slave know whether controversial and borderline
is pious).48 Since Socrates does not (and does cases of piety (like Euthyphros prosecution
not need to) appeal to controversial or bor- of his father for murdering a murderous
derline cases of F-ness in order to search slave) are pious unless one knows what piety
for and test answers to his What is F-ness? is (Nehamas 1987: 278). But, unlike Vlastos
questions, this more restricted principle is and Beversluis who take the Hippias Major
compatible with the method of the Socratic passages as evidence of Platos endorsement
dialogues and moreover is philosophically of (PD) in full generality, Nehamas maintains
plausible. Similarly, they take the Laches pas- that these passages testify to the principle
sages as testifying only to something like the that one cannot know in general which things
following principle: if one fails to know what are fine, if one fails to know what fine-ness
F-ness is, then one fails to know how F-ness is. Thus, the Hippias Major passages permit
is best acquired.49 Once again this principle knowledge of uncontroversial examples of
is not as general as (PD) (or even (D)) and so fine-ness, but not knowledge of fine things
does not rule out knowing various properties in general, when one fails to know what
of F-ness (other than how F-ness may best be fine-ness is (Nehamas 1987: 287).
acquired) prior to knowing what F-ness is. In the case of Meno (71ab), Nehamas
Knowledge that F-ness possesses these prop- maintains that, while the (b) portion of the
erties then can be appealed to in searching for passage does appear to be fully general, the
and testing answers to his What is F-ness? examples on either side importantly circum-
questions. Thus, according to Vlastos and scribe the principle. Nehamas points out that
Beversluis, we can avoid the interpretive ten- the properties of being good-looking, being
sion associated with (PD) by taking those rich and being well-born are thought (in the
passages which are most indicative of (PD) as culture at the time) to be essential properties
attributable to Plato and his new methodol- of an individual. So, in claiming that one can-
ogy, and the remaining passages as either not not know whether Meno is good-looking, rich
indicating any principle at all or as indicating or well-born, unless one knows who Meno
a variety of less general and so more plausible is, all that Socrates means to be endorsing is
principles and, moreover, ones perfectly com- that one cannot know essential properties of
patible with Socratic method and professions a thing, unless one knows what that thing is.
of knowledge.50 He is not maintaining that one cannot know
The second version of this general any of the properties of the thing. Similarly,
approach, represented by Alexander being teachable (or not) is plausibly thought
Nehamas, does not resort to the distinc- to be an essential property of virtue, and so in
tion between Socratic and transitional dia- maintaining that one cannot know whether
logues in order to address the interpretive virtue is teachable unless one knows what
tension. Rather, Nehamas takes all of the virtue is, Socrates is again only endorsing the
passages cited above to testify to Socratic restricted principle.
views, but he maintains that they testify to Nehamas deals with the concluding pas-
more restricted principles than (PD). Thus, sage of Republic I in a similar way. He
like Vlastos and Beversluis, Nehamas takes points out that being a virtue and being
Euthyphro (4d5d) to testify to Socrates happiness-conducive are plausibly thought
endorsement of the principle that one cannot to be essential properties of justice, and so in
148

maintaining that one cannot know whether to know, for any x, that x is F, and, for
justice possesses these properties unless any G, that F-ness is G.
one knows what justice is, Socrates is only
endorsing the restricted principle that if one While Nehamas leaves unrestricted the
fails to know what justice is, then one fails application of A (the principles Nehamas
to know whether justice is G (where G is a attributes to Socrates apply to everyone),
variable for essential or controversial proper- he takes Socrates to restrict the application
ties of justice).51 of F-ness to primarily the virtues, and the
Nehamas concludes his discussion of application of the x and G to controver-
the passages offered in support of Socrates sial or disputable instances and properties
endorsement of (PD) as follows: of F-ness or instances and properties in some
way connected to the essence of F-ness. I men-
Socrates insistence on the priority of tion this here because the third version of the
definition is therefore very narrowly reject (PD) approach has much in common
circumscribed. First, it seems to concern with Nehamas approach in that it does not
primarily the virtues and not every thing take any of the passages to require a Socratic
or every term, . . . Second, it seems to or Platonic endorsement of (PD) but only
apply only to specific issues, and not to of weaker and less general principles, but it
all the features of virtue, . . . Socrates does so, not by restricting the application of
seems to believe that we need to know
the variables but by distinguishing between
the definition of a virtue in order to
distinct types of knowledge.
decide whether certain disputable fea-
tures (either traditionally disputed, like Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith
teachability, or disputed on particular represent this third version of the reject (PD)
occasions, like its benefits in the case of approach (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a:
Thrasymachus) are or are not true of it. 4560).54 They are unique in addressing each
We also need to know it in order to dis- and every one of the passages cited above
course generally about it, that is, in order on behalf of Socrates endorsement of (PD).
to present ourselves, as Hippias does, in But they do not treat all these passages in the
the guise of experts in this regard. None same way. Rather they appear to see the pas-
of this amounts to a fallacy and none sages as falling roughly into three groups.
of it requires a broad methodological
They understand some of the passages as
response.52 (Nehamas 1987: 2901)
simply failing to testify to Socrates endorse-
ment of any very general substantive epis-
Notice that Nehamas version of the reject temic principle at all. This is, for example,
(PD) approach proceeds primarily53 by how I understand their reading of Lysis
restricting the application of the variables in (223b), Meno (71ab), Charmides (176ab)
(PD). Recall that (PD), as we introduced it at and Protagoras (312c). For example, after
the beginning of this essay, is a fully general considering a variety of ways of understand-
conjunction of (P) and (D) and so can be rep- ing Meno (71ab) that fall short of (PD) in
resented as follows: its full generality, they appear to settle on
the idea that the question in the (b) portion
(PD) For any A, and for any F-ness, if A is rhetorical and it is Meno who commits
fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to the impossibility of knowledge of what
149

properties F-ness has, when one is ignorant simply that something is the case. It is only
of what F-ness is (Brickhouse and Smith the former sort of knowledge that allows one
1994a: 52).55 Brickhouse and Smith take to know in general what things are F, and
Socrates to be maintaining in the Lysis simply the Laches, Euthyphro and Hippias Major
that Menexenus and Lysis look ridiculous in passages indicate that according to Socrates
failing to understand what they take them- knowing in general what things are F requires
selves so plainly to instantiate (Brickhouse knowledge of what F-ness is. Consequently,
and Smith 1994a: 51), that is, a friend. In they indicate a Socratic commitment to (BS).
the Protagoras, they take Socrates to indicate But given Brickhouse and Smiths distinction
only that one ordinarily does not go to a car- between two types of knowledge we should
penter [or any other expert] for some assist- not confuse (BS) with:
ance without some fairly clear idea of what
the carpenter is skilled at doing, unless, of (BW) If A fails to know what F-ness is,
course, one has some other, very exceptional then A fails to know in the ordinary way
ground for doing so (Brickhouse and Smith anything about F-ness.
1994a: 53). In none of these passages, then,
according to Brickhouse and Smith does Whatever plausibility that accrues to (BS)
Socrates endorse an exceptionless epistemic in virtue of the nature of clear knowledge is
principle on the order of (PD). absent from (BW).
A second group of passages, according to According to Brickhouse and Smith,
Brickhouse and Smith, testify to Socrates Socrates does not need to appeal to knowl-
endorsement of something like the following edge how or why specific actions are pious
principle: in order to search for an answer to his What
is piety? question. Nor does Socrates need
(BS) If A fails to know what F-ness is, to know why the Spartans were coura-
then A fails to know clearly anything geous at Plataea in order to accept it as a
about F-ness. counter-example to Laches answer that cour-
age is remaining in ones ranks. Moreover,
Thus, Brickhouse and Smith understand Socrates own professions of knowledge
Laches (189e190b) as well as the passages should not be understood as the sort of
from the Euthyphro and Hippias Major as knowledge that constitutes wisdom, that is,
testifying to Socrates endorsement of the as knowledge of how or why it is bad to dis-
view that failing to know what F-ness entails obey ones superior. On the contrary, given
failing to know in general what things are F. Socrates repeated expressions of his failure
According to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates to be wise, we should understand Socrates
distinguishes between two types of knowl- professions of knowledge to be knowledge
edge, a kind that is constitutive of wisdom of the ordinary sort. Finally, while it is phil-
(expert or clear knowledge) and a kind that osophically implausible to think one needs
is not (ordinary or unclear knowledge) (see to know what virtue is in order to know in
Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 3045). The an ordinary way that Meno is virtuous, it is
former kind of knowledge requires know- not so implausible to suppose that one might
ing how or why something is the case; the need this definitional knowledge in order
latter sort of knowledge requires knowing to know why Meno is virtuous. Thus, the
150

evidence against (PD) which we discussed for unclear knowledge concerning how vir-
above tells against (BW), but the Laches, tues come to be acquired, but because he
Euthyphro and Hippias Major passages only wants to encourage a kind of inquiry which
commit Socrates to (BS). has the potential to lead to the acquisition of
The final group of passages (La. 190bc, unclear knowledge over the long run. Even
Men. 100b and R. I 354dc), according to so, Brickhouse and Smith are quick to point
Brickhouse and Smith, fail to testify to an out, Socrates recognizes other methods of
epistemological principle at all. Rather, acquiring unclear knowledge besides search-
according to Brickhouse and Smith, they ing for answers to his What is F-ness? ques-
testify to a procedural priority principle. tions, through dreams, divinations or the
For example, when at the end of the Meno like.
Socrates says A fourth and final version of the reject
(PD) approach appears in a recent paper by
We shall have clear knowledge of this Michael Forster. Forster argues against what
when, before we investigate how it comes he maintains is the orthodox interpretation
to be present in men, we first try to find of Socratic definitions, which consists of the
out what virtue in itself is. (Men. 100b)
following three claims:
he is not simply testifying to his commitment First, Socrates motive in demanding

to (BS), the principle according to which ethical definitions was a desire to attain
clear knowledge of how virtue comes to be them in order to achieve ethical knowl-
edge in and through them. Second,
acquired requires knowledge of what vir-
Socrates expected these definitions to
tue is, he is also endorsing a particular pro-
provide substantive explanations of the
cedure which can lead to the acquisition of qualities referred to by the definienda,
unclear knowledge of how virtue comes to and accordingly to be scientifically
be acquired. The idea is that seeking to come abstruse and complex in character (not
to know what virtue is would enable one to the sort of definitions that it would be
acquire clear knowledge of how virtue comes reasonable to expect the ordinary man to
to be acquired, if ones inquiry were to suc- have at his fingertips). Third, and relat-
ceed in coming to know what virtue is.56 edly, Socrates expected these definitions
But proceeding to inquire what virtue is will to be more than mere statements of the
also enable one to acquire unclear knowl- meanings of the definienda, more than
mere statements of what anyone must
edge of how virtue comes to be acquired,
know in order to understand the defin-
without succeeding in knowing what virtue
ienda (in the everyday semantic sense of
is. Brickhouse and Smith maintain that one understand). (Forster 2006b: 3)
of the ways that one can acquire unclear
knowledge according to Socrates is by means
of repeated elenctic episodes devoted to an As part of his argument against the third
inquiry concerning what some F-ness is. claim that Socrates expected more than
Thus, when Socrates encourages an inquiry mere statements of meaning in response to
concerning what virtue is at the end of the his What is F-ness? questions, Forster cites
Meno, this is not because Socrates thinks what at first blush appears to be Socrates
knowledge of the nature of virtue is necessary endorsement of (PD), but more precisely,
151

turns out to be Socrates endorsement of for knowledge is at odds with Socrates view
a considerably weaker version of (PD).57 that knowledge is beyond a humans ken (see
According to Forster, we should understand Forster 2006b: 622). Consequently, Forster
the passages that have been cited as evidence rejects the evidence against Socrates endorse-
for (PD), instead as evidence for ment of (PD)/(MF) based on his method of
searching for and testing answers to his What
(MF) If A fails to understand the mean- is F-ness? questions. Since knowledge of such
ing that the word F-ness bears,58 then answers is beyond a humans ken, according
one fails to know anything else about to Forster, Socrates method should not be
F-ness.
seen as searching for such knowledge. Rather,
Socrates method is aimed simply at refuting
If we do, then we can understand why Socrates his interlocutors pretensions to wisdom, and
takes this principle to be so self-evident as not Socrates can accomplish this aim, without
to need argument, at least on a plausible con- professing to know examples and properties.
strual.59 For example, according to Forster, one This is because on Forsters account most of
cannot plausibly think one knows that Helen the interesting Socratic refutations are aimed
is beautiful (i.e. that Helen has beauty), if one at uncovering internal inconsistencies in the
fails to understand the meaning that the word interlocutors answers, while true belief con-
beauty bears. In this way, Forster avoids the cerning those examples and properties suf-
philosophical objection to Socrates commit- fices for the remaining refutations found in
ment to (PD). (MF), at least on one construal, the text (see Forster 2006a).61
is simply not philosophically implausible. Finally, Forster explains how (MF) fails
On the contrary, it is self-evidently true, at to conflict with Socrates alleged professions
least according to Forster. Consequently, all of knowledge of examples and properties of
of the passages that testify to (MF) testify F-ness whose definition he professes not to
to understanding Socrates as taking answers know. Forster simply denies that any such
to his What is F-ness? questions as merely Socratic professions of knowledge are to be
amounting to statements of meaning. For found in the text of the so-called Socratic
the best explanation of those passages is a dialogues. According to Forster, Socrates
Socratic endorsement of (MF), since an expla- and his interlocutors ethical insights (inso-
nation that commits Socrates to (PD) would far as they have them) are at bottom an
be uncharitable; and an endorsement of (MF) acceptance of [i.e. belief in] uncomprehended
indicates a commitment to taking answers to true sentences (Forster 2007: 18 n. 27; see
What is F-ness? questions as merely amount- also Forster 2006b: 1416). Forster appears
ing to statements of meaning. somewhat uncomfortable with this conse-
Unfortunately, Forster cites, but does not quence, but not enough apparently to over-
discuss, the passages that he takes as evidence throw the evidence on behalf of (MF).
for (MF) (see Forster 2006b: nn. 81 and 82).60
He does, however, have a way of countering EMBRACE (PD)
the textual evidence that has been cited against
Socrates commitment to (PD), now under- With Forsters interpretation we come
stood as (MF). Forster maintains that the exceptionally close to the third and final
view that Socrates has a method for searching general approach to the interpretive tension
152

surrounding Socrates endorsement of (PD). however, that (PD) does not prevent the pos-
According to this approach Socrates endorses sibility of true belief concerning the exam-
(PD), the passages allegedly in conflict with ples and properties of an F-ness when one
this endorsement can be explained away, and fails to know what F-ness is. Rather, (PD)
(PD) is not as philosophically implausible as only prohibits knowledge of those exam-
it has been supposed. ples and properties when one fails to know
Let us begin with the version of this what F-ness is. Consequently, the alleged tex-
approach which Vlastos proclaimed in 1985 tual tension disappears. (PD) only prohibits
to be now widely regarded to be the right knowledge of examples and properties prior
solution to the [tension] (Vlastos 1985: 23 to knowledge of what F-ness is. And the evi-
n. 52) and which he dubbed the sufficiency dence of the text only requires true belief of
of true belief interpretation, or STB for examples and properties prior to knowledge
short.62 As the name implies, the key to the of what F-ness is.
STB interpretation is that the evidence cited Unfortunately, advocates of the STB inter-
against Socrates endorsement of (PD) does pretation devote very little time responding
not require that individuals possess knowl- to the philosophical implausibility of (PD).
edge of instances and properties of F-ness Indeed, Irwin argues that Socrates must think
prior to knowledge of what F-ness is. Rather true belief of examples and properties is suf-
it only requires that individuals possess true ficient for inquiry into what F-ness is, since
belief of instances and properties of F-ness. such an inquiry would be impossible if he
For example, according to the STB inter- did not, given his endorsement of (PD). And,
pretation, it suffices to refute Laches defini- Irwin takes Socrates endorsement of (PD) as
tion that courage is remaining in the ranks the best philosophical explanation of Socrates
and facing ones enemies to believe cor- view that failure in an elenchus is evidence of
rectly that the Spartans were courageous in an interlocutors lack of knowledge (see e.g.
their retreat at Plataea. One does not need Irwin 1995: 201 and 279). Nevertheless,
to know that the Spartans were courageous. the alleged philosophical implausibility of
Again, one does not need to know whether supposing one can acquire knowledge of what
Charmides is an example of a temperate indi- F-ness is or reject answers to Socratic What
vidual to begin ones search for the nature is F-ness? questions on the basis of examples
of temperance by looking at him. Rather it and properties without knowledge of those
suffices to believe correctly that Charmides examples and properties is at least open to
is temperate. Nor does one need to know debate (see Fine 1992: 212, pace White 2008:
that temperance is fine and good to reject 434 n. 13). But Geachs charge that we know
Charmides definition that temperance is heaps of things without being able to define
modesty. And finally, those passages in which the terms in which we express our knowledge
Socrates expresses strong positive convictions goes explicitly unaddressed, at least as far as I
concerning various F-nesses, whose What is have been able to determine.
F-ness? questions he professes not to be able I have reserved to the end my own
to answer, should not be read as knowledge response to the interpretive tension sur-
claims, but rather professions of true belief rounding Socrates endorsement of (PD).63
(see Irwin 1995: 29 and Fine 2008a: 72 and Like the supporters of the STB interpretation,
n. 40). Those who endorse STB point out, I embrace Socrates commitment to (PD). I
153

take the evidence cited on behalf of Socrates test the knowledge claims of his interlocu-
endorsement as providing a compellingly tors. And that Socrates can and does do that
strong inference to the best explanation. by examining the coherence of his interlocu-
I concede that no single passage requires a tors F-ness related beliefs.65 But to examine
Socratic endorsement of (PD),64 but the vari- and test the coherence of his interlocutors
ety of passages which indicate substitution beliefs Socrates neither needs to know nor
instances of (PD) or something very much correctly believe that the examples and prop-
like it provides good reason to maintain that erties cited in the course of an elenchus are
the best explanation of all of those texts is examples and properties of F-ness.
Socrates endorsement of (PD). Of course, an In the case of the texts in which Socrates
inference to the best explanation is especially professes to know examples and properties of
susceptible to counter-evidence, and so just F-ness despite disavowing knowledge of the
as the defenders of STB needed to explain relevant F-ness, I am sympathetic to the STB
away the counter-evidence we rehearsed interpretation. I maintain that the alleged
above, so do I. Socratic professions of knowledge are much
Perhaps the most significant difference less frequent than they have sometimes been
between my version of the embrace (PD) taken to be, but that nevertheless a few such
approach and the STB version is the way I professions remain. In the cases that remain
respond to the first two textual considera- we should either understand Socrates to be
tions. Recall that the first two textual con- professing a weaker sort of knowledge than
siderations concerned Socrates method of the robust sort referred to in (PD), roughly
seeking to come to know answers to his along the lines of Brickhouse and Smiths
What is F-ness? questions and testing the distinction between ordinary knowledge and
answers offered by his various interlocutors. clear knowledge, or we should understand
It was maintained that Socrates sought and those Socratic professions as misstatements
tested those answers by appealing to exam- made in the heat of the moment or in the
ples and properties of F-ness. The defenders manner of the vulgar.66 Neither of these alter-
of the STB interpretation agree, but deny that natives are entirely satisfactory, but it is note-
doing so requires knowledge, as opposed to worthy that this difficulty is not unique to
true belief, of those examples and properties those who embrace Socrates endorsement of
of F-ness. I, however, maintain that suppos- (PD). Anyone who takes seriously Socrates
ing Socrates to be seeking to come to know professions of ignorance must opt for one or
answers to his What is F-ness? questions the other of these alternatives.67
and to be refuting (i.e. showing to be false) Finally, I want to turn to the philosophical
answers to his What is F-ness? questions implausibility of (PD), because I believe it is
is to misunderstand the nature of Socratic this objection that has driven the debate con-
method, or at least a unique and prevalent cerning Socrates endorsement of (PD) more
aspect of it the Socratic elenchus. I defend than any other. Indeed, I suspect that it was
an interpretation of the Socratic elenchus Geachs philosophical attack on Socrates that
according to which Socrates does not aim led many Socratic scholars to become uneasy
to come to know an answer to his What is with Robinsons vague impression that
F-ness? questions nor refute the answers that Socrates endorses (PD).68 This led them to
he has been offered. Rather Socrates aims to re-examine the text, perhaps more carefully,
154

and predictably texts were discovered that ones interpretation of Socrates endorsement
testified against Socrates endorsement.69 But of (PD) indicates Socrates endorsement
I wonder how genuinely implausible (PD) of such a robust understanding of knowl-
is. Consider, for example, Geachs assertion: edge.72 This latter evidence, however, serves
We know heaps of things without being able to reinforce the textual evidence on behalf of
to define the terms in which we express our Socrates endorsement of (PD).
knowledge. Would Socrates agree that we
know heaps of things about the good, virtue,
justice, piety, courage, temperance, friend-
ship, etc.? One fairly clear lesson Socrates CONCLUSION
learned from the Delphic oracle story in the
Apology is that most, if not all, of us (includ- In the end, I hope it is clear that the ques-
ing Geach presumably) think we know a tion of Socrates endorsement of some sort
great deal more than we do in fact know. of epistemic priority of answers to his What
So Socrates would not find the results of his is F-ness? questions remains open and hotly
commitment to (PD) to be as implausible disputed. The textual evidence appears to
as Geach (and apparently most contempo- cut in both directions as do the philosophi-
rary philosophers) would. But how are we cal considerations. Moreover, attempts to
to understand this difference? We can either address this interpretive tension involve a
think that Socrates is just mistaken in deny- variety of other (equally controversial) fea-
ing that we know the heaps of things that we tures of Socratic and Platonic philosophy,
think we know, or we can think that Socrates including, but not limited to, the composi-
has in mind a more robust sort of knowledge tional order of the dialogues, the nature (if
than the sort that Geach (and others) do. In any) of Platos philosophical development,
the latter case Socrates is not denying that we the nature of Socratic knowledge, the nature
know in the ordinary, justified true belief of Socrates professions of ignorance and
sense of knowledge the heaps of things that knowledge, the nature of Socrates distinc-
we think we do; rather he is denying that we tion between knowledge and true belief, the
know those things in a more robust way. If nature of Socratic definition, the nature of
this is so, then (PD) does not require knowl- the Socratic elenchus and, more generally,
edge of what F-ness is in order to know in the nature of Socrates philosophical mission
the ordinary, justified true belief way exam- and method. It also involves numerous philo-
ples and properties of F-ness. Rather it only sophical questions, ranging from the nature
requires knowledge of what F-ness is in order of knowledge to the nature of the philosophi-
to know in the robust way examples and cal method. This, of course, should not sur-
properties of F-ness. But understood in this prise us. It is not unique to the question of
latter way (PD) loses whatever implausibil- Socrates endorsement of (PD), but likely
ity it may have had understood in the former applies to every interesting question concern-
way.70 I maintain that it is not only the textual ing Socratic philosophy. Indeed, it testifies to
evidence on behalf of (PD) that indicates this the depth and fertility of Socrates philosophy
latter way of understanding (PD) (based on and the texts of his most famous student.
a moderate principle of charity),71 but also a
variety of other evidence independently of Hugh H. Benson
155

7
SOCRATIC EUDAIMONISM*
WHAT IS EUDAIMONIA? WHAT IS EUDAIMONISM?
Eudaimonia for Socrates is the natural Eudaimonisms of all stripes take eudaimonia
and inevitable goal of all human activity to be the central value and supreme goal of a
and, thus, the good for all human beings. human life. Philosophers other than Socrates
The English word happiness is often used have been described as eudaimonists and
to translate the Greek word eudaimonia. the term is probably most uncontroversially
However, the simple statement that eudai- associated with Aristotle, who begins his
monia is happiness raises the difficult ques- Nicomachean Ethics thus:
tion But what is happiness? Furthermore,
as is often the case with any translation, Every sort of expert knowledge and
let alone that of a term used in an ancient every inquiry, and similarly, every action
philosophical account, there is the suspicion and undertaking, seems to seek some
that there is no one-to-one mapping to be good. Because of that, people are right
done and that, while there might be some to affirm that the good is that which all
overlap between the territory that we cover things seek. (1094a13, trans. Rowe)
with happiness and that which Socrates
indicated with eudaimonia, it is likely that And goes on to separate good ends into
one is wider than the other or at least cov- those of subordinate or controlling prac-
ers some space that the other missed.1 I sus- tices, ultimately identifying the chief good
pect that Socrates thought true eudaimonia that is the end of this hierarchy of goods with
was a divine state towards which human eudaimonia (1095a1726).
beings strive in an effort to fulfil their divine Eudaimonism is also widely attributed to
nature.2 The most important thing to under- Plato due to the Republics sustained argu-
stand about eudaimonia, in order to under- ment that harmony of the three parts of the
stand Socratic thinking, however, is that it soul is the key to living the best life and that a
serves as a name for the goal that sets the person who experiences this harmony in fact
framework for human behaviour. It is that lives the best life even if it is unaccompanied
framework to which we refer when using the by any material or social blessings such as
term Socratic eudaimonism. health, wealth or the esteem of others. This
156

SOCRATIC EUDAIMONISM
harmony of the soul is taken to be Platos uses to denote human thriving), and the way
own understanding of the most desirable in which one comes to understand Socrates
human condition and therefore identified notion of eudaimonia will, in turn, dictate
with eudaimonia. Harmony of the soul, for the parameters for Socratic Eudaimonism.
Plato, is a condition where reason triumphs In order to outline the several relationships
over appetite and spirit, enabling a persons that have been diagnosed among eudaimonia
behaviour to be guided by knowledge of and aret, we must turn our attention first to
what is best. There is some controversy over aret itself.
whether Socrates even thought it possible for Aret is translated as both the English
a person to be guided by anything other than words excellence and virtue, and these
beliefs about what is best.3 But, even among two terms tend to be used in distinct, though
those diverse views on the subject of whether related, contexts. It is common, throughout
Socrates believed that ones desires could the dialogues (not only in Socratic ones), for
be out of harmony with ones knowledge Plato to discuss the excellence (aret) of a
of what is best, it is agreed that there is no tool or a craft. The excellence of a tool or
reason to attribute the parts-of-the-soul doc- craft is that which it does best, that which it
trine to Socrates. While some will note that is designed to do or that which only it can do
the Gorgias (493a34) does gesture towards (even if it does not do it so well). Aret can
treating appetite as a distinct psychological also designate its proper function (ergon):
mechanism, all agree that Socratic eudaimon- the excellence of a knife is to cut and the
ism is not grounded in a notion of harmony excellence of cobbling is to make shoes:
between appetite and intellect. Thus, there is the tool or craft becomes excellent when
no reason to think that references to eudai- it excels at its proper function. By exten-
monia, human flourishing or doing well in sion, the proper function of a human being,
any Socratic dialogue indicate anything which can in turn be honed and perfected,
about a harmony among parts of the soul. is that persons virtue (R. I 353a354a). So
virtue (aret) is that aspect of the human
being that can be honed in order to make
a human being excellent or virtuous. When
WHAT IS SOCRATIC EUDAIMONISM? we say that Socrates focuses on the rela-
tionship between eudaimonia and aret, we
While the question of whether Socrates was a understand that he wants to isolate the rela-
eudaimonist is not a matter of great debate, tionship between virtue understood as the
the question of what his eudaimonism con- excellence of the function that is particular
sists in is. Interpreters have taken widely to humans and flourishing. There is, to his
disparate views concerning the relationship mind, a very important connection between
Socrates established between eudaimonia being virtuous and flourishing or, if I may,
and aret (another Greek word that does not between being virtuous and being happy.
yield easily to translation and which I will dis- It is tempting to understand virtue as
cuss shortly). Their various interpretations of a moral term especially when we allow
this relationship have a determining effect on this burdened and storied Latinized word
their respective understandings of Socrates (from the Latin virtus) to stand in for the
notion of eudaimonia (or any other terms he Greek aret. It is not obvious, however,
157

that Socrates understood it to have a moral up, piecemeal, into propositions. As a result,
sense. It is widely agreed that Socrates he thinks knowing technical things is part
understood a persons virtue to consist only of knowing how to do what is best for one-
in that persons knowledge.4 While some self and others. Furthermore, the ability to
interpreters have assumed or argued that do what is best for oneself and others will
Socrates intended to single out a particular often necessitate exploring aspects of the
kind of knowledge that might be associ- world that would seem trivial if one were to
ated with consequent moral behaviour (see speculate about what is or isnt important
e.g. Tsouna 1997; Vlastos 1991), there is a in the abstract. Of course this does not keep
fair amount of textual evidence (to which Socrates from endorsing the reasonable per-
I will turn in the second half of this chap- sons practice of picking and choosing in
ter) to indicate that Socrates thought all light of his best guesses which things are
knowledge equally important and an equal more worth examining than others.
factor in virtue so that the completely and Understanding that Socrates takes virtue
truly virtuous person is the one who has to be knowledge, and that there is an impor-
all of every kind of knowledge. Attributing tant connection between knowledge and
this view to Socrates likely eliminates the eudaimonia, allows us to begin to sort out
possibility that he would think there are the different possible relationships that have
any truly and completely virtuous people. been proposed as Socrates delineation of the
Still (as I will also demonstrate later on), connection between virtue and (for want of a
Socrates thought there was a great deal to better term) happiness.
be gained from trying to become virtuous: Some authors have argued that the rela-
he thought we would benefit from increas- tionship between virtue and happiness is one
ing our knowledge as much and in as of identity (Annas 2002; Kraut 1984: 211 n.
many areas as possible. He thought that, 41; Rudebusch 1999: 1238;). They claim
the more knowledge we have in every con- that Socrates must think that virtue and hap-
ceivable area, the more likely we were to piness are simply two different names for the
thrive. This will strike many as odd; it may same thing. This is known as the identity the-
even seem odd for two reasons. First, even sis. Others have argued that, while virtue and
if learning how to fix a car is useful, might happiness are not identical, virtue is sufficient
we expect Socrates or any decent philoso- for happiness (Irwin 1995: 5860; Reeve
pher for that matter to place more empha- 1989: 137; Vlastos 1991: 22431). That is,
sis on our knowledge of how to treat other they think that Socrates held the view that
humans than on our knowledge of how to whoever is virtuous is happy.5 This is known
treat cars? Second, there have to be some as the sufficiency thesis.
things that are simply too trivial to be worth Many of the authors who adhere to one
spending time coming to know. Despite this of these two positions have used phrases like
apparent oddity, I will argue that Socrates intrinsically good and good in itself in
does not think that there is such a thing as order to characterize happiness as the ulti-
moral knowledge in addition to technical or mate human good (Kraut 1984: 211 n. 41;
scientific knowledge. Socrates conceived of Vlastos 1991: 229). Those who subscribe
knowledge as a unified whole he did not to the identity thesis call virtue intrinsically
think of it as something that can be broken good or good in itself as well.
158

A number of authors have said that, accord- necessity of virtue for happiness seems a key
ing to Socrates, virtue is the only good.6 One factor in touting Socratic eudaimonism as a
way to make sense of this is to attribute the moral theory. Second, Socratic eudaimonism
identity thesis to Socrates7 because Socrates, would be most convincing as a moral theory
like Aristotle, sees happiness as the chief good if it should turn out that it is actually virtue
to which all other goods are subordinated. itself that is the goal of human behaviour due
These authors then argue that it would be to its sufficiency for, or best of all identity
inconsistent for Socrates to assert that virtue with happiness; if, somehow (even if virtue
is the only good, while asserting that happi- looks like it serves happiness) the nature and
ness is also the ultimate human good, if vir- value of happiness actually redounds to the
tue and happiness are not identical. nature of virtue.
There is a rival view that Socrates held All of these views see Socrates as saying
only happiness to be the ultimate human that virtue is crucial to happiness. However,
good and saw virtue as an instrument for no matter which relationship we regard
achieving happiness (Irwin 1995: 678). Socrates as assigning to virtue and happi-
On such a view, only happiness is said to be ness, we can already better appreciate what it
intrinsically good, while virtue is good only means to say that eudaimonia is most impor-
in a lesser or subordinate sense (it is only tantly a goal and that eudaimonism is there-
good because it is a means to happiness). The fore a framework that describes purposeful
instrumental view, however, does not force behaviour in the context of the assumption
the claim that virtue is necessary for happi- of this goal. Eudaimonia is the ultimate and
ness, which is sometimes called the necessity inevitable goal for all human activity, and
thesis. Even if virtue is sufficient (as a means the attainment of knowledge (human aret)
or otherwise) for bringing happiness, one is crucial in some manner or other for
might think that there could be people who the attainment of that goal. This framework
even if the incidence is rare become happy analyzes all human behaviour as an effort
through other means. both to acquire knowledge, either because it
Socratic scholarship contains numerous is happiness or because it is a means towards
debates over the necessity and or sufficiency happiness, and to use that knowledge, either
of virtue for happiness. While I will argue that because the use of knowledge is that in which
such concerns are misguided, it is possible to happiness consists or is a means to happi-
diagnose two reasons for this interest: first, ness. We have now given a basic answer to
those who think of Socratic Eudaimonism the question of what Socratic eudaimon-
as a moral and prescriptive theory a the- ism is even if we have done so without
ory that tells us what to do in order to be answering the question What is (Socratic)
good people assume that Socrates must be, eudaimonia?
most of all, recommending virtue and virtu-
ous behaviour. If happiness is the ultimate
goal, and if it is not identified with virtue,
Socrates exhortations to be virtuous would SOME INTERPRETATIONS
seem unmotivated if it should turn out that
happiness is available without it. Thus, in We can now see why ones understand-
the absence of sufficiency or identity, the ing of the manner in which virtue is crucial
159

to eudaimonia, together with a few other seems to state that any person, if virtuous, is
assumptions that scholars are wont to make, also happy. Thus, even without saying that
will affect what Socrates is understood to knowledge is happiness, we are asserting
have said about the nature of eudaimonia that one cannot avoid being happy if one has
and therefore, some of the details that have knowledge. Now even if happiness is some-
led to the different varieties of Socratic eudai- thing more like a feeling or an activity that
monia. Note, for example, the effect that the is distinct from knowledge, the person who
identification of virtue and happiness can has knowledge also feels happy or is engaged
have on how each of them is characterized: in whatever activity happiness is, even while
as I already mentioned, the temptation to undergoing torture, etc. So, while sufficiency
engage the identity thesis is born of concern has the advantage of not limiting what hap-
that, even if virtue is necessary and sufficient piness can be by identifying it strictly with
for happiness, the pursuit of virtue will be knowledge, it still has the disadvantage of
false-hearted if the nature of virtue does not forcing a counter-intuitive appraisal of the
allow it to hold the same appeal for humans happiness of people who are in dire straits.
as happiness. People will be pursuing virtue Brickhouse and Smith voice concern that
only for the sake of becoming happy, and sufficiency will lead us to say that the vir-
that seems to put virtue in an unfortunate tuous person is happy while asleep or in a
moral light. Should not a moral theory cel- coma (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 118).
ebrate virtue for itself and not just as a means Thus they conclude that virtuous activity
towards happiness? The handy solution is to rather than virtue itself is what is sufficient
say that happiness simply is virtue. Of course, for happiness. Still, because they acknowl-
this will determine a certain understanding of edge that this does not solve the problem
what eudaimonia is. of the person who is virtuous but is forced
For those who have understood Socrates to undergo a horrible experience (like being
to say that virtue is simply knowledge, hap- tortured or watching her own child undergo
piness must turn out to be knowledge on this torture) as the virtuous person will actively
view as well. This certainly will be a deter- undergo this, they eventually adopt a nomo-
mining factor in how we can understand the logical view (Brickhouse and Smith 2010:
nature of happiness according to Socrates, 185 n. 24). The view is similar to that found
for it seems that people who have knowl- throughout Penner (2005: 172, 2010: 265)
edge (however it was gained) must be happy in which virtue guarantees the maximum
independent of their other circumstances and amount of happiness available to one given
perhaps independent of how they feel either ones circumstances (Penner has come to call
mentally or physically. It is easy to admit that this practicable happiness and earlier called
we dont know what happiness is, but to dis- it maxhap). The use of nomological here
cover that wise people are happy even when is consistent with my use (Reshotko 2006:
being tortured, or watching their children be 13555) and with the view I will describe
tortured, seems like a notion of happiness later in this chapter.9
that is counter-intuitive beyond plausibility.8 It should be noted that sufficiency is no
Notice that this problem is hard to avoid improvement upon identity in guaranteeing
even by denying the identity thesis and hold- that virtue is being focused upon for its own
ing sufficiency alone, because sufficiency still sake because sufficiency allows those who
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pursue and possess virtue to do so only in virtue), that persons knowledge is good for
order to become happy. While sufficiency that person without reference to any further
might better answer our intuitions concern- thing that person possesses. Socrates is argu-
ing happiness, in that it at least allows us to ing from the goodness of happiness to the
identify happiness with a psychological expe- goodness of the virtue (or virtuous activity)
rience, identity seems to better answer our that brings it about. He is saying that because
intuitive sense of what a moral commodity happiness is supremely and independently
such as virtue must be like. good, anything that always brings one closer
But even if sufficiency saves us from prob- to it will also be good. He is arguing that
lems associated with understanding happi- happiness causes knowledge to be good by
ness to simply be knowledge, it still leaves a association with it.
lot to be desired with respect to what it prede- Now, one can argue sensibly:
termines about the nature of happiness. One
vivid result of such failure in predetermina- P1. A is good
tion is the adaptive understanding of hap- P2. A = B
piness that some have assumed that Socrates C. B is good
must have held.10 On this view, virtue is suf-
ficient for happiness because the virtuous But one cannot coherently argue at the same
person is able to adjust her desires so that time that
she wants whatever her circumstances force
upon her. Then, on the assumption that hap- P1. A is good
piness is wish fulfilment, her desires achieve P2. B causes A
their objects and she becomes happy. So, the C. B is good
wise person who is in incredible pain simply
adjusts her desires to ones that are fulfilled because the identity between B and A
by that experience. While this is, perhaps, would seem to make the assertion that B
not an account of eudaimonism that appeals causes A false.11 However, the second argu-
to us, it is one that gets attributed to the ment is the one that Socrates is making in
Stoics, who might have taken themselves to the Euthydemus. So the argument in the
be following Socrates in developing it. So it Euthydemus is more comprehensible if iden-
has been deemed a credible account of what tity is not also assumed.
Socrates might have had in mind. Even if one could give convincing tex-
A further problem with identity is that tual evidence for sufficiency, or for the
it prevents us from making use of Socrates co-extension of virtue and happiness, the
discussions of why he considers knowledge Euthydemus seems to force virtue and hap-
to be good. For example, in the Euthydemus, piness to remain distinct. They are two
Socrates argues (280b282e) that nothing non-identical goods because one (happiness)
can make a person happy unless it is used is being credited with being the reason for the
and used with knowledge. Thus, he con- goodness of the other (knowledge/virtue).
cludes, while all of the other things that a Recognizing that virtue/knowledge can be
person might put to use in order to become crucial to happiness without being identical
happy (health, wealth, honour) are only to, necessary or sufficient for it is the first step
good relative to that persons knowledge (i.e. to making a new beginning that will clarify
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Socrates appraisal of both aret and eudai- who become principals with no additional
monia and their role in his eudaimonism. training and see how they compare to prin-
cipals who have never been teachers or who
do have extra training and decide whether
being a teacher is crucial to being a principal
A NOMOLOGICAL RATHER THAN (or at least to being a good principal). In this
LOGICAL APPROACH case, the researcher is little concerned with
the logical relationships among the concepts
When scholars see Socrates as saying that teacher and principal. She is seeking infor-
virtue is either identical to, necessary or suf- mation that could help her answer the ques-
ficient for happiness, they are attributing to tion: If Jodi wants to be a principal, should
him a purely theoretical claim. This attribu- I exhort her to first become a teacher? Also
tion assumes that Socrates thinks about the note that, if the researcher has noticed that in
nature of virtue and the nature of happi- 99 percent of all cases a background in teach-
ness or looks at the two concepts virtue ing is important to the success of a principal,
and happiness and diagnoses their logi- Jodi would still be wise to pursue teaching
cal relationship to one another the same first if she wants to be a good principal
way that we might look at the concepts of even though it is apparently not necessary. It
teacher and principal and, knowing only would be odd (perhaps even irrational) for
as much about them as is necessary to under- Jodi to count on lucking out and being in
stand the terms, try to figure out whether that 1 percent of principals who are effective
every principal is identical with at least one despite a lack of previous teaching experi-
teacher, whether it is necessary to be a teacher ence. Likewise, if teaching proves to be very
in order to be a principal and whether being helpful to becoming a principal, but evidence
a principal is sufficient for being a teacher. shows that it is still a good idea to take some
Notice, if we tried to answer these ques- classes in administration, Jodi would be no
tions in this way, we would be looking at the less encouraged by that evidence to become a
logical (you might say a priori) relationships teacher as a prerequisite to being a principal,
between the concepts of teacher and princi- even though it is not sufficient.
pal: is the principal teaching even if she does The main point to be made here is that,
not have direct contact with a class of stu- rather than assuming that we need to figure
dents?; are the skills of a teacher the same as, out the a priori relationships among concepts,
or at least among, the skills of a principal? it might be best to allow such concerns about
etc. If Socrates is diagnosing logical relation- logical relationships among those concepts
ships among virtue and happiness, then he to fall by the wayside. When we are consid-
is doing the same thing: he is looking at his ering real life questions about how we will
own conceptions of these things and seeing actually fare in our worldly lives, high cor-
how they overlap and are distinct in some a relations among the behaviours we consider
priori way. performing and the results we hope to obtain
A researcher in the field of education suffice to guide our activities.12 Realizing
might go about answering the question of that teaching experience supplemented with
how a teacher and principal are related in a some training in administration generally
very different way. She might look at teachers produces the best results is enough to guide
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Jodis actions. It is unnecessary for her to fig- Socrates is commenting on the necessity or
ure out the logical relationships between the sufficiency of knowledge for success. It is
concepts of teacher and principal in order less of a stretch to view him as pointing out
to make an informed decision. I would argue that knowledge is the only thing that allows
that Socrates is trying to look at real life con- a person to actively work towards her own
nections among knowledge and happiness success (regardless of whether it guarantees
and not doing an a priori examination of it and regardless of whether there is some
how he conceives of them. There are several small possibility that she could luck out and
reasons to think this is the case. First, espe- become successful without it). Thus, as long
cially in the Socratic dialogues, Socrates disa- as Socrates thinks that knowledge is crucial
vows having any knowledge of what aret is for happiness, there is nothing to be gained
and also never gives any clear definition of from noting any assertions that he may or
eudaimonia.13 Socrates seems very clear that may not have made about the necessity or
he has no concepts worthy of examination sufficiency of one for the other. Socrates sim-
and diagnosis; he is letting these words be ply finds that the pursuit of knowledge is
place holders for whatever he and his inter- the obvious precondition for any intentional
locutor might someday discover about these pursuit of happiness. So, anyone who wants
experiences from looking at people who have to be happy should pursue knowledge.
them or have experiences like them. Presumably, Plato and Socrates were cog-
Second, Socrates spends his time exam- nizant of our contemporary, logical notions
ining and talking about the experiences of of necessity and sufficiency. Many scholars
people who have skills or crafts that are find that Socrates made analytic-type argu-
presumably analogous to aret and the suc- ments in which he supported a conclusion by
cess that they experience as a result. In the finding necessary and sufficient criteria for
Euthydemus he talks about the success of it. Furthermore, in many of the dialogues,
more knowledgeable flutists, doctors, gen- Sophists such as Gorgias, Polus, Euthydemus
erals and navigators as compared to those and Dionysodorus use these necessary and
with less knowledge and seems to assume sufficient criteria to support their conclu-
that these peoples real life experience is rel- sions. However, despite the fact that Socrates
evant to a discussion of the relation between might have used phrases that contemporary
knowledge in general (the ultimate craft or logicians see as indicators of necessity and
skill) and happiness (the pinnacle of suc- sufficiency (x causes y, only x causes y, S
cess) (Euthd. 279e280a). It is unlikely that needs x for y), it seems reasonable to ques-
Socrates thought it important to worry about tion whether Socrates would have seen fit to
whether the perfectly knowledgeable gen- apply these technical and logical concepts to
eral would be guaranteed to win the war or descriptions of, and recommendations for,
perfectly knowledgeable navigators would human behaviour in the physical world.
be guaranteed to reach their destinations. Further, whatever technical and logi-
What is it to be perfectly knowledgeable cal concepts Socrates possessed, neither he
in these fields?14 Also, why think that even nor Plato were part of a long philosophical
the person who knows everything is able to tradition that provided textbook examples
control everything? It seems to import some- for how individual bits of logical reason-
thing irrelevant to the text to assume that ing should be verbalized, and how specific
163

verbal locutions should be interpreted logi- as knowledge) and happiness might we gain
cally. Plato scholars are, today, part of a from observations about this relationship?
community in which there is general agree-
ment that the verbal locutions X causes Y
and X makes Y happen are equivalent to
the logical claim that X is sufficient for Y. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
It would be unwise for a philosopher today EUDAIMONISM
to make statements like X causes Y or X
makes Y happen if she did not wish to be Let us understand eudaimonism as a moti-
interpreted in this way. However, there are vational framework that is delineated by
rigorous thinkers who are neither part of our the strong, law-like relationship between the
community nor steeped in our tradition, but pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of hap-
still do not adhere to this practice. piness. To understand how eudaimonia can
People in the medical profession are com- now ground this motivational framework,
fortable saying Smoking causes lung cancer, it must first be established that Socrates sees
Aspirin reduces fevers, Calcium increases eudaimonia whatever else it turns out to
bone density, and the like, even though be as an objective state that every human
they readily admit that these causes are nei- being inevitably strives to attain: all people
ther necessary nor sufficient for their effects. desire and seek their own good, and eudai-
Philosophers of science conclude that causes monia whatever else it turns out to be is
need not be necessary and sufficient for human good. This inevitable striving for an
their effects (see Salmon 1998: 145; Sober objective eudaimonia is paired by Socrates
1994: 198). The educated public does not with a notion of human psychology that
feel that a lack of specificity with respect to understands knowledge to be the determin-
such matters restricts the possibility of seri- ing factor in how successful one is at reach-
ous discourse. It seems entirely possible that ing that objective eudaimonic state. One is
Platos Socrates was inclined towards just trying to accomplish an objective task far
this type of discourse. By saying that virtue more complicated than, but not, in principle,
causes happiness, he could easily have meant unlike, climbing Mt Everest, and whether or
to indicate that he thought that there was an not one is successful is a consequence of the
overwhelmingly strong causal connection combination of ones resources, ones physi-
between the two, without imagining that he cal condition, ones skill, whom one chooses
might be interpreted as saying that virtue is (or is thrown together with) as colleagues in
sufficient for happiness. the effort and the external conditions one is
We can discern the elegance in Socrates subject to during the particular time during
eudaimonism if, rather than discussing a log- which one makes the attempt. The more com-
ical and a priori relationship between virtue prehensive ones knowledge, the more likely
and happiness, we take him to be discussing one is to succeed or approximate success.
a nomological relationship and investigating Knowledge is the most important resource as
the question: what do we note about the rela- it will enable one to discern that the project
tionship between knowledge and happiness is to work towards eudaimonia, and that
in practical experience and what insights this same knowledge is the key to embarking
into the true nature of virtue (understood upon that project, as knowledge will impact
164

how one deals with all of the conditions that a particular object, action, or psycho-
listed above. Deliberate actions are done for logical or physical activity is constitutive of
reasons and having a reason, according to happiness is also no guarantee that it does or
Socrates understanding of human psychol- is. It does not follow that eudaimonia is the
ogy, amounts to seeing an action as beneficial same for every person nor is that ruled out as
to oneself. Knowledge is what allows ones a possibility.15 It does follow that eudaimo-
deliberate action to actually be beneficial to nia consists in some specific and determinate
oneself. It allows the reasons for doing ones physical and or psychic activities and or cir-
actions to be good reasons. cumstances in each persons case.16
Socrates is not a eudaimonist because There is a risk in comparing the attain-
he thinks that eudaimonia motivates peo- ment of eudaimonia to climbing Mt Everest,
ple to seek and do what is good; rather, he as I did earlier. In light of such a compari-
uses eudaimonia to analyse human motiva- son, it may be assumed that the analogue for
tion towards anything whatsoever. He sees being eudaimonic is being at the peak of Mt
all purposeful, human activity as successful Everest. This assumption must be dispelled.
only insofar as it fulfils the motivation to do The point of using something like climbing
and seek what is actually good, where that Mt Everest as an analogue for the pursuit
good is understood to be our own personal and attainment of eudaimonia is that what it
good and that is understood to be our own is to climb Mt Everest is not determined by
personal eudaimonia. He analyses our fail- how one thinks or talks about what one is
ure to do and obtain the good as a break- doing. Rather, it is an objective task at which
down in our appreciation of what the good one can fail in a few relevant ways. One can
is and a breakdown in our understanding of fail by mistaking some other mountain Mt
the obstacles, over which we have little or Evans, perhaps for Mt Everest. If one man-
no control, that need to be overcome in the ages to get to the peak of Mt Evans, think-
process of becoming eudaimonic or at least ing that one has conquered Mt Everest, one
as eudaimonic as possible. has not accomplished anything with respect
to the task of climbing Mt Everest. The fact
that one might never find out that it was not
Mt Everest, or that no one else ever finds
EUDAIMONIA AS AN OBJECTIVE out, makes no difference. Climbing Mt Evans
GOAL FOR EACH HUMAN BEING is not climbing Mt Everest. Also, there are
many further ways in which Mt Everest
To say that, for Socrates, eudaimonia is the determinate and existent geographical
objective is to say that it is possible for each feature constrains ones interaction with
person to be mistaken about in what his or it and attempt to climb it. While one might
her own eudaimonia consists. It is possible need to be in the right state of mind in order
for each person to be wrong about whether to succeed, climbing or having climbed Mt
or not eudaimonia is what he or she is cur- Everest is not identical to being in a certain
rently experiencing because being happy is state of mind.
not the same thing as thinking that one is I want to convey that eudaimonia is an
happy. Furthermore, thinking that a particu- objective goal, but I do not want to convey
lar action or object will lead to happiness or that it is the same kind of goal as being at
165

the peak of Mt Everest. Socrates did not see that are designed to show that our pursuit of
eudaimonic experience as peak experience. both our own happiness and the happiness of
He saw it more along the lines of what we our children is premised on the assumption
might call optimal experience. The notion of that happiness is objective.
optimal experience is compatible with there It is common for a section of dialogue to
being a series of many peaks. The present heighten our awareness of the fact that just
moment is the peak that we are experiencing doing whatever it seems to one will make
right now and the next moment is the peak one happy wont make one happy. (Samples
for which all of our past moments, and the occur at Ly. 207d209c, Men. 88ac and
present one, have been a preparation. A wise Euthd. 279d280a.) In Lysis, the interchange
person who happens to be a person for whom between Socrates and Lysis underlines the
climbing Everest would enhance eudaimonia fact that because they want him to be happy,
experiences eudaimonia (or approximates it Lysis parents permit him to do what he
to a variety of degrees)17 while planning the wants only in areas where he has knowledge,
trip to Everest, while training, while accli- leaving him most often to be controlled by
mating in base camp and while deciding to a guardian or a teacher and leaving most of
stop short of the peak and turn back. There their own property to be controlled by slaves
is an objective shape that we strive to make who have knowledge concerning its proper
each moment of our experience embody, and use. Lysis is permitted to do whatever he
the human quest is to see that every moment wishes when it comes to the order in which
comes as close as possible to having that he writes letters and the tautness or slack-
shape.18 In our wisdom we might also calcu- ness with which he tunes the lyre, but that is
late that it is worth spending some moments because he knows something about how to
in rather suboptimal activities (recovering order letters and tune lyres in ways that are
from surgery or enduring chemotherapy) in objectively more beneficial than others.
the service of being able to spend more future In Meno and Euthydemus, it is pointed
moments more optimally.19 If eudaimonia is out that having resources at ones disposal
about the shape of each moment, and each does not lead to ones happiness; one must
moment involves planning and prepar- use them (Euthd. 280bd), but moreover,
ing for the eudaimonia of future moments, one must use them correctly (Men. 88ac,
then deliberating, reasoning, calculating, Euthd. 280e) with knowledge of how they
etc. must all be compatible with if not interact causally with other things. Using
also constituents of eudaimonia. It seems them incorrectly could lead to misery and
Socrates envisioned eudaimonia as compat- not to happiness (Euthd. 281de). In the
ible with, stemming from or conducive to Charmides, Socrates also makes it clear that,
well-informed, rational deliberation, or all the more scientifically knowledgeable one
three simultaneously. is, the happier one will become (174ab). In
Plato notoriously and frustratingly has fact, the most widely accepted claims about
Socrates tell us very little directly about the Socrates that he believed that virtue sim-
nature and identity of eudaimonia. While ply was knowledge and that virtue was the
Socrates never comes out and says what key to happiness necessitate the conclusion
eudaimonia is or that eudaimonia is objec- that happiness is something that one needs
tive, he makes arguments in several dialogues knowledge in order to recognize and acquire
166

and thus that happiness cant be identified one providing for the quality of ones future
with just anything a person happens to think playing and, therefore, ones future product.
that it is (see Gerson 1997: 5). If the activity of leading a eudaimonic life
Socrates also indicates, several times, that or doing well (as Socrates frequently calls
it takes an expert to evaluate a persons hap- it) is itself a skilful activity and has features
piness. Some people think they are happy that are analogous to other skilful activities,
and might even seem happy to others when, then it would be reasonable to assume that
in fact, they are not. Some examples are the Socrates is thinking that our momentary
jury in the hands of the Olympian victors efforts to produce current eudaimonia are
(Ap. 36e) and the Great King (Grg. 470e). the same efforts that will allow our future
If some people are better than others at rec- moments to either be or not be eudaimonic.
ognizing happiness, both in others and in Thus, our efforts to learn and our knowledge-
themselves, then happiness must be some able deliberations and calculations of what it
particular, determinate thing, concerning is best for us to do in the future both consti-
which it is possible for one person to have tute and are instrumental for the production
more scientific20 expertise than another. of both present and future eudaimonia.22
Throughout the dialogues, but particularly
in the Euthydemus (279e280a), Socrates
compares the project of becoming happy to
the development and use of a skilful activity EUDAIMONIA: THE INEVITABLE
like navigating, flute playing, practicing med- OBJECT OF OUR DESIRES AND
icine, writing, reading and military strategiz- PURSUITS
ing. Notable about skilful activities is that
they are productive in a twofold manner. In introducing the textual evidence for the
They are processes that lead to products that objectivity of eudaimonia, I showed Socrates
are distinct from themselves: flute-playing to be demonstrating our agreement with
produces music, medicine produces health. the claim that just doing whatever it seems
And they are processes that lead to their own to one will make one happy will not make
acquisition and improvement. The way to one happy. The phrase doing whatever
learn to play the flute is by playing the flute, it seems to one will make one happy is a
the way to improve ones flute-playing is non-technical way of expressing an important
through playing. Even those flute players who observation that Socrates makes. Socrates
have reached the pinnacle of virtuosity con- finds it necessary to allow for a degree of
tinue to practice and continue to improve. disconnection between what we actually do
The endeavour to maintain the quality of, in order to become happy and what we want
or to improve, ones future flute-playing is when we do what we actually do in order to
not distinct from ones current playing. It become happy. Socrates sees us as naturally
does not matter whether one is momentarily programmed to pursue whatever is our own
practicing or performing, the activity that good. As human beings, that good is eudai-
one is doing is not separate from the activity monia. But Socrates does not think that it
that affects ones future playing of the flute.21 is always clear to us that we seek our own
So, ones current playing is both an activity good and he certainly does not think that we
producing ones present product (music) and know what the good is that we seek. Thus,
167

Socrates recognizes that the processes of (1) what she would have seen herself as want-
actively seeking ones own good, (2) identi- ing had she first successfully figured out that
fying ones own good, (3) identifying what she wanted the good, then that her good
one is doing (that one is questing after ones was eudaimonia, then what her eudaimonia
own good) and (4) figuring out how one is to consisted in and then finally what actions on
seek ones own good, all overlap: they take her part would best lead to that eudaimonic
place simultaneously and are served (or at goal. Agents make errors in figuring out
least constituted and often not well-served) what they desire because they do not have
by the same behaviour. In order to account the requisite knowledge. Their desires always
for this Socrates must hold a complicated, aim at whatever is actually best for them,
even messy, theory of desire. But he has no but, in their ignorance, agents err appallingly
alternative. It would be lovely and simple if at interpreting both their own desire and its
we already knew that we were seeking our object. Thus, while everyone desires what is
own good before we had to figure out what actually good for them, they often do only
that good was, and if we already knew what what seems best to them rather than what
our own good was before we had to go about they wish to do.
finding it; if the success of each of these proc- The literature on Socratic ethics con-
esses did not rely on a product of at least one tains much disagreement about where and
of the others. If only all we had to do while with what consistency Socrates claims that
seeking the good was to seek the good, then all desire is for actual good rather than
seeking ones good could be a much simpler the apparent good. In the first book-length
process where one took ones attractions to treatment of Socratic philosophy, Santas
various things at face value and set out to fig- (1979: 1859) finds Socrates arguing that
ure out the best way to satisfy ones desires. people can want bad things provided they
But that is not the position that we are in on appear good to them (at Men. 77b78b).
Socrates account. This view was widely accepted for its seem-
Socrates realizes that the fact that we are ing adherence to common sense and for its
doing all of these sequentially interdepend- consistency with contemporary philosophi-
ent exercises at the same time, rather than cal understandings of what happens to the
sequentially, is a big problem. It impedes the objects of verbs like want. These verbs
success of our quest, but it also impedes our are purported to place their objects into an
ability to analyse that quest. Due to this real- intentional context.23 That is, when we try
ization concerning our human predicament, to understand the object of the verb, we must
Socrates attaches desire to the actual good understand it through the conceptions of the
as opposed to the merely apparent good. subject of that verb. I might want some food
What an agent actually desires need not be that is objectively bad for me (it will make
what she thinks she desires at all. Socrates me sick and being sick will actually be bad
takes every agent to desire whatever is actu- for me) because I want it under the descrip-
ally best for her, whatever will best advance tion delicious, which is how it appears to
her eudaimonia at the moment at which she me. Penner and Rowe (1994) objected to this
acts. One way to think of this is that Socrates interpretation of Socrates by showing that
takes each agent, in each situation, to want Gorgias 466a468e is inconsistent with such
168

a theory: there Socrates must be understood be disturbing to anyone who insists that we
as saying that, since desires are hierarchical, cannot be mistaken about what we want,
and most of the things we desire are desired when looked at in light of Socrates recogni-
as a means to some further goal, and since tion that we must do things without know-
the ultimate goal for which everything is ing whether or not they will turn out to be
desired is our own actual happiness, we only good for us, however, we see the sense of his
desire things that actually further our own approach within the framework set out by
actual happiness, things that are actually (not eudaimonism. As described in the Gorgias, a
just apparently) good for us. In fact, as they desire25 can make us do either what we want
demonstrate, Socrates coins a whole separate to do or what merely seems best to us. But
term to describe our attitude towards things even when the desire causes us to do what
that are actually bad for us but appear good only seems best to us, that same desire is for
to us: we do not desire (boulsis) them, but what is actually best for us. What becomes
they seem best to us (dokei beltiston). Penner clear through Socrates employment of the
and Rowe argue that the Meno passage in distinction between doing what we want and
question should also be read as endorsing doing what seems best to us is that Socrates
the claim that all desire is for the actual understands desires to be three-place rela-
good. They diagnose the analyses of their tions between an agent, the action that the
predecessors as succumbing to the hazard of agent actually performs and some further
importing contemporary philosophical scru- goal that the agent hopes to achieve by
ples (like the conviction that we have incor- performing that action. The further goal is
rigible knowledge of what we desire) into always connected to the goal of doing what
Platos text and also argue that the OCT is is actually good, namely whatever will bring
mis-punctuated, making the proper interpre- the best available outcome in the agents cur-
tation even more elusive (Penner and Rowe rent situation. But an agents ignorance or
1994: 1822). her false beliefs can create any number of
Penner and Rowes interpretation of mismatches between the action chosen and
the Meno passage has been challenged in the goal of doing whatever is actually best
two separate vigorous textual analyses in the current situation. This mismatch allows
(Anagnostopoulos 2003 and Wolfsdorf the desire for the actual good to direct the
2006a), but their interpretation of the agent towards some intermediate goal that is
Gorgias has not (see Anagnostopoulos 2003: not actually conducive to doing what is best.
18691; Santas 2003: 99; Wolfsdorf 2006a: For example, I might eat a chilli pepper that
79). Furthermore, these two critics find that is so hot that having it in my mouth causes
the notion of desire discussed in the Meno is severe pain. What I now want and what is
not embraced by Socrates.24 Thus, it seems now actually best for me is to reduce the pain
safe to stick with the notion of desire for the in my mouth. The pain is a burning sensation
actual good as analysed in the Gorgias when and often, when my mouth burns, a drink of
understanding the framework created by cold water helps to ease the pain. But, even
Socratic eudaimonism. though they feel the same in the mouth, burn-
The distinction between doing what we ing caused by food that is hot in temperature
want and doing what seems best to us will and burning caused by the chilli pepper have,
169

unbeknownst to me, very different physi- THE SOCRATIC DENIAL OF AKRASIA

cal properties and, therefore, very different
antidotes. I do not realize that the water will Platos partitioning of the soul in Republic
simply spread the oil from the pepper evenly IV in order to show how the appetites can
around my mouth and will not rinse it away. get the better of the rational part of the soul
Thus, the water will, if anything, increase the would seem to be an outright rejection of
pain in my mouth. Still, not having this infor- the denial that appetite can drag knowledge
mation, I think that drinking water is the around (at Prt. 351b357e). Some scholars
best thing I can do in this situation, so I go are more nuanced than others in their under-
ahead and do it. But, Socrates would say that standing of the relationship between appetite
drinking water, because it did not reduce the and knowledge for Socrates. For many years,
pain in my mouth, was not what I actually the dominant interpretation of the Socratic
wanted; it was only what in my ignorance denial of akrasia (Irwin 1977a, 1995; Vlastos
seemed best to me. Nonetheless, my desire 1969, 1991; Walsh 1963) depicted Socrates
for what is actually good (the reduction of as denying that people feel the urge to do
the pain in my mouth) still explains why I things other than what they believe to be
drank the water. For it was my goal of doing good for them. Penner challenges that tradi-
whatever was actually best for me, whatever tion (Penner 1990, 1996, 1997; also Penner
would reduce the pain that, combined with and Rowe 2005; Reshotko 2006; Rowe
my misapprehension about the oil in the 2007), finding that Socrates acknowledges
chilli pepper, caused me to drink the water. the experience of urges and desires that are
I had what we might think of as an incoher- not yet integrated with the desire for the
ent desire. It was for something other than good and, so, can be said to conflict with it.
drinking water (I am told that either milk or However, Penner then develops a theory of
beer works well), but, because it directed me how Socrates must think such desires inter-
towards the water, it looked as if it was a act with beliefs in order to form the execu-
desire for water. tive desires that result in the performance
So, we see that, just as Socrates finds of a specific voluntary action. It is Penners
eudaimonia to have objective identity con- claim that these executive desires are always
ditions, so also, desire has objective features for the good; non-executive desires are
according to him. A particular subject is not always trumped by ones knowledge and by
necessarily an expert on whether or not she is ones desire for what is actually good. Thus,
happy, nor does she necessarily have any spe- according to Penners interpretation, in the
cial expertise in determining what she wants. Protagoras Socrates explains away all cases
The action that is actually best for her in her of apparent akrasia as cases of diachronic
current situation (even though she likely does belief-akrasia (cases where ones beliefs
not know what it is) does, however, play a change to be in concert with ones actions
role in determining what she actually wants. at the moment when one performs an action
Another way of saying this is that the conse- even if they do not endorse that action as the
quences of the action she actually performs best before and after the action is performed)
are part of the identity of that action. So they and denies that anyone can act contrary to
play a role in determining whether or not it is what he or she believes at the moment (syn-
the action she actually wanted to perform.26 chronic belief-akrasia).27
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While Penner acknowledges the existence Brickhouse and Smith 2010). Devereux
of desires other than executive desires, he (1995) claims that Socrates endorses the
finds that, within the framework of Socratic existence of desires that, although they are
eudaimonism, only executive desires are ultimately subject to rational deliberation,
featured in explanations of behaviour. remain vibrant enough that an agent can
Socrates acknowledges and places no experience the agony of being forced by
importance upon non-rational urges except knowledge to act contrary to a felt desire
insofar as they have been integrated into even while doing what he knows to be best.
executive desires. I have argued (Reshotko Neither Penner nor I deny that an agent con-
2006: 835) that appetites and urges are tinues to feel an urge even while acting against
integrated into executive desires by pro- it in an effort to do what is best. What we
viding the agent with information about deny is that this urge can be a pull towards
what might be best for him in the present a specific instance of a thing. We argue that
circumstances and how to get it. My thirst any executive desire (any desire to do a spe-
informs me that drinking something in the cific action) will vanish if it is discovered
near future would be in my best interest, that doing what it directs is no longer the
but my beliefs about what kinds of drinks best course of action, but that does not mean
are available, how they taste, how much that the felt urges that informed it disappear.
they cost and how much effort it takes to It is entirely consistent with our notion of
obtain one of them will all be integrated Socratic desire that I can be on my way to
into my executive desire to grab four quar- the vending machine to satisfy my thirst at
ters and to walk to the vending machine the moment when the fire alarm goes off, an
on the west wall of the second floor lobby alarm so painful to the ears that it motivates
of Nagel Hall to buy a bottle of grapefruit one to form an executive desire to get out of
juice. If I am thirsty and also have to go that particular building to a particular place
to the bathroom, I might choose to go to a where it cannot be heard as efficiently as
vending machine in a different location a bit possible, and so have my executive desire to
farther away, but conveniently on the way go to that particular vending machine van-
back to my office from the ladies room. My ish. I will, of course, continue to feel thirsty
non-rational urges do effect my behaviour, as I run out of the building, but my thirst no
but they do not cause any behaviour all longer directs me towards a particular bottle
by themselves. They are always integrated of grapefruit juice.
with my beliefs by my desire to do whatever I reject the thesis that a person undergo-
is best for me right now. ing diachronic belief-akrasia experiences the
More recently, some interpreters have tension of being pulled in opposite direc-
argued that there is textual evidence that tions at the same time by a non-rational
Socrates emphasized these non-rational urges urge on the one hand and an executive
more than Penner and I have.28 Brickhouse desire on the other hand. A non-rational
and Smith believe that the Protagoras text urge cannot, according to Socrates, compete
is consistent with Socrates affirming that with an executive desire. Rather, the person
there are some appetites in some people that undergoing diachronic belief-akrasia will
remain active, even while the agent does alternate (perhaps very quickly) between
what he knows is best (this is the thesis of the pull of one executive desire and that of
171

another. The person who is choosing food to compete with executive desires on an
at a banquet and lingers over the chocolate equal footing. This is inconsistent with the
mousse before deciding not to have any was intellectualism that I am endorsing because
not feeling a pull towards chocolate and a it allows these non-rational desires to be
pull towards healthy eating simultaneously. oriented towards a specific object without
Neither was it the case that the pull towards any mediation by belief. Brickhouse and
healthy eating won because it was stronger. Smiths and Devereuxs non-rational desires
This person had formulated an executive motivate behaviour (even if not altogether
desire to select the foods from this banquet successfully) without being integrated with
that were low in calories and, upon seeing beliefs by the desire for the good. It is not
the chocolate, came to believe that the same at all clear that such a thing can happen or
ultimate goal that directed her forming the that action theories that contain desires that
first intention could be fulfilled by select- are featured in explanations of behaviour
ing chocolate in addition to, or instead of, without being related to beliefs are coher-
some of the other foods that were available. ent. This is because each person has many
Thus the person at least began to form an such non-rational desires and many beliefs
executive desire to take chocolate mousse in at the same time. I feel thirst, but I have
addition to, or instead of, some of the low many beliefs about how that thirst might
calorie foods. However, ultimately, the per- be satisfied: There is fruit juice in my refrig-
son was not able to justify the belief that the erator, water that comes from the faucet
chocolate mousse was an addition or substi- and beer at the convenience store a block
tute that would lead to her desired end. So, from my house. My thirst together with my
it is the executive desire to take only low beliefs cannot explain why I drink the fruit
calorie foods that ultimately directed her juice rather than the water or the beer. It is
behaviour. There is no reason to think that only when we put these desires and beliefs in
this switching back and forth cannot be very the context of my desire for the actual good
fast. Nor is there any reason to think that that we can explain why I made the particu-
because agents interpret their feeling as ones lar choice and conducted myself exactly as I
of constant tension that there are two exec- did. Thus, it is only a desire for drink that is
utive desires in constant tension.29 While I integrated with my beliefs about the world
agree with Brickhouse and Smith that such that can pull me towards any particular
non-executive desires can continue to be felt, instance of a thing. If it is integrated, then it
I disagree with the conclusion that Socrates has become part of an executive desire and
thinks their potential to persist produces I, ultimately, adjudicate among executive
psychological problems that can and should desires. The executive desire that actually
be mitigated by punishment. lines up with my beliefs about what is best
Devereux and Brickhouse and Smith for me in my present situation is the one
maintain that non-rational desires continue that will win. Thus, while I might continue
to be felt even after executive desires that are to feel the urges that led me to form com-
inconsistent with them have been formed. peting executive desires, I will not be pulled
This is not a problem for the Socratic intellec- towards any instances of commodities just
tualism that I am endorsing here. However, solely on the basis of their association with
they also maintain that such desires continue those urges.
172

KNOWLEDGE: THE DETERMINING It is in the Euthydemus and the Charmides

FACTOR IN EUDAIMONIA that Socrates makes it clearest that knowledge
is the key to happiness. In the Euthydemus,
Given Socrates theory of desire, it is easy to Socrates is asked to explain to Cleinias why
see why he thinks that it is knowledge (which one should endeavour to become as knowl-
he deems aret) and not desire or intention edgeable as possible (275a). The conclusion
that is the determining factor in the extent of the argument is that one is most likely to
to which a person becomes eudaimonic. fulfil ones wish to do well if one has knowl-
Everyone is the same when it comes to what edge (280b282e). Knowledge is the only way
they desire or intend to do: they all intend that a person can exert any control whatso-
to do whatever is actually best in their cur- ever over whether or not she becomes happy,
rent situation. In the Lysis passage cited ear- just as knowledge is the only way that a doc-
lier, it is a tacit assumption that, since Lysis tor can exert any control over the health of a
knows how to order letters in what has been patient and the only way that a navigator can
pre-established as a beneficial way, and how maintain any control over the success of a
to tune the lyre in a pre-established beneficial voyage (279e280a). This is the case because
way, he will endeavour to follow his knowl- objective criteria determine what constitutes
edge and not order the letters or tune the lyre each persons happiness, and only knowledge
haphazardly. The tacit assumption is that of our own natures and of what the world
once one knows what is beneficial one will within which we must pursue our happiness
seek to do it. One never seeks to do some- is like will allow us to discover that we are
thing that one does not consider to be the seeking happiness, what our happiness con-
most beneficial action overall. So knowledge sists in and how me might choreograph our
of what is beneficial is the key to doing and activities so that we might reach it.
getting what is beneficial. In the Charmides, Socrates investigates
We see this same sentiment in the Hippias whether there is any particular kind of knowl-
Minor where, once it has been determined edge that allows a person to become happy.
that a man who voluntarily does wrong He concludes that someone who is com-
must be wiser than he who only acciden- pletely scientific and is ignorant of nothing
tally does wrong, Socrates says that the (173e174a) would be the person most able
good man is the one who could voluntarily to arrive at happiness, but also notes that this
do wrong, if indeed any wise man would do person would not use all of her knowledge
such a thing (If there be such a man, 376b). equally: she would rely most on knowledge
The good man is the most capable of doing of past, present and future goods and bads.
wrong voluntarily and thus the most able to So Socrates thinks that while the knowledge
choose that which is disadvantageous from of good and bad is used the most in making
among the choices available, because that oneself happy, it would not be able to do so in
goes in hand with the ability to choose the the absence of complete scientific knowledge.
most advantageous alternative. Knowledge His reasons for thinking that knowledge of
enables one to calculate advantage and dis- good and bad will be most valuable in figur-
advantage equally well, but the result will ing out how to make ourselves happy in the
always be that the most advantageous alter- future become obvious when we think about
native is chosen. what he thinks good and bad are. Good is
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happiness or whatever is best able to further Eudaimonia is the goal that we are all
happiness (the current optimal experience, naturally and inevitably programmed to pur-
which is optimal partly because it leads to sue. It is the only such goal. Knowledge is not
the future optimal experience) and the bad pursued naturally and inevitably: it is pur-
is whatever detracts from happiness (both sued by those who have come to understand
this moments and that of future moments, that it is the only purposeful means towards
which is surely affected by what happens at increasing ones well-being. Eudaimonia is
this moment). So knowing past and present the only thing in Socrates schema that is
good and bad is understanding the causal non-relationally good; its goodness is due to
relationships between our former actions its own nature rather than its relationship to
and what has come to pass: understanding, anything else.
through careful and critical analysis, which Knowledge is also a special commodity,
actions have led to which consequences and but not because it is non-relationally good.
what results for our well-being have accrued Socrates has argued (at Rep. 333e334a
from them. People who observe and analyse and throughout the Hi. Mi. by claiming that
the data with which they are presented in Odysseus was more knowledgeable than
light of their knowledge of the fact that a Achilles as he erred voluntarily) that raw
determinately constituted state of well-being knowledge any individual skill or piece of
is what is best for them and that what is best information that is not considered in a con-
for them is what they are endeavouring to text is ambivalent. The same knowledge
pursue are those who come to know past and that allows someone to protect money in a
present good and bad. The extent to which bank allows that person to steal the money.
they know past and present good and bad is But, Socrates emphasizes that the fact that all
the extent to which they are reliable predic- desire is for the actual good dictates that any
tors of future good and bad. knowledge possessed by any human being
Unfortunately, as previously noted, we is possessed within the context of her desire
are in a dismal epistemological situation. for the actual good. No human being ever
Our eudaimonia depends on four pursuits possesses knowledge that functions outside
that ideally would be done sequentially but of a eudaimonic framework. So, given that
instead have to take place at once. Ideally we everyone wants what is actually best for
would come to know what happiness is and them whatever actually puts them on the
how to attain it first, so seeking knowledge road to genuine eudaimonia and given that
would be the first step to seeking happiness. knowledge is what allows us to discern what
Once we had such knowledge, we would is actually best for us, knowledge is always
just go about making our calculations and beneficial to a human being. So knowledge,
deliberations and putting it all together in as it is always combined with the desire
one lovely package. But we have to pursue for the good, is unconditionally good: it is
knowledge and happiness at the same time, good in all conditions and under every cir-
even though we must use one in the pursuit cumstance even though it is only relationally
of the other. Still, the pursuit of knowledge good. Knowledge is not good due to its own
is the first step indeed it is the only delib- nature, but rather because of the relationship
erate step we can take in the pursuit of that it has to human eudaimonia. Because
happiness.30 human desire inevitably sets eudaimonia
174

as its goal, and knowledge aids a human in The claim that knowledge always enhances
achieving whatever goal she has, knowledge happiness is the claim that the person who
will always be connected to eudaimonia and knows everything will always be better off
so the goodness of eudaimonia extends its than he would be if he didnt.33 There is no
glow down upon knowledge: knowledge reason to suppose that Socrates thought
always increases happiness. So happiness is knowledge, or even true belief, detrimental
the reason why knowledge is always good. outside of a eudaimonic framework. By this
Happiness is always and non-relationally I mean that having knowledge or true belief
good. Knowledge is also always good, but it that is not informing ones activities (which,
is good because human desire makes it have on the interpretation for which I am arguing,
this special law-like relationship with human are always actively in pursuit of the actual
happiness.31 good) cant harm one. When it does inform
The claim that knowledge is uncondition- ones activities, mere true belief can be det-
ally beneficial is not identical to the claim rimental within a eudaimonic framework
that all knowledge is beneficial. Justification because it is incomplete. Believing some
of the claim that virtue is knowledge and things that are true can really mess up my
knowledge is holistic, so that someone who pursuit of my own happiness if I have some
actually has knowledge knows everything false and some true information at the same
there is to know, requires that we examine time or if I have incomplete information.
two of Socrates claims: that knowledge Suppose I want to drive to Larissa and ask
is infallible, and that knowledge always a friendly local how to get there from here.
enhances happiness. I will examine these Suppose that this person points me to what
issues now, before contrasting the kind of is truly the road to Larissa and I, with a true
value that knowledge has with the kind that belief that this is the road to Larissa, proceed
eudaimonia has. down that road. While I have a true belief
The claim that knowledge always enhances that this is the road to Larissa, however, I
happiness entails that when we look at an might be ignorant of many things that will
individual person in a particular situation, make me wish I had never set out upon it:
that person will be happier to the extent that it might be hundreds of miles to Larissa, too
he is closer to having knowledge (what we many to drive on the gas I have left in my
might call more knowledgeable or more vir- tank and there might be no service stations
tuous).32 I am about to argue that knowledge on the way. It might be a road that one is
is holistic, but our ordinary knowledge-talk advised to travel only in four-wheel drive
makes this difficult. We are used to speaking vehicles. Larissa might be in the midst of
as if people can have some real knowledge civil unrest when I arrive. Clearly, if I have
without knowing everything and so accumu- only partial information, even if it is true, I
late more knowledge after they have some. In am very likely to make some mistakes and
order to understand Socrates view, we have get myself further from, rather than closer to,
to recognize that knowledge is something we eudaimonia.
pursue, approximate or get closer to but Socrates pronounces knowledge infallible
never acquire, since no one ever succeeds in (Euthphr. 280a, Chrm. 171d172a) and this
knowing everything. No one ever ends up is why we must understand him to say that
being omniscient. knowledge is holistic. Isolated propositions
175

or even small interrelated groups of proposi- knowing all of its other features. This is
tions might be all we have to go on and we because it is only if I do know all of the
might be able to make them work for us. other features that I will be able to discern
We are often far better off having them than what I can do to gain the best advantage in
not having them, but that they can get us in my particular situation. Of course, most of
trouble in the happiness seeking department these features will turn out to be trivial in
is one indication they do not rise to the level my particular situation, but I cannot know
of knowledge. in advance which features will be trivial
As we noted, the claim in the Gorgias without knowing exactly what my situation
that desire is always for what is actually is and exactly what the roads features are.
good, even if it leads to our doing what only If I happen to turn onto the road to Larissa
seems best recognizes that the things we pur- with a full tank of gas in my off-road vehicle,
sue are only good for us if they benefit us I may never even notice that the road had
as they really are (with all of their proper- no services and required four-wheel drive,
ties known and unknown). We do not desire but that certainly does not make those two
things that seem like they would benefit us features of the road absolutely trivial to
or that would benefit us under a description. human happiness.36 For any feature of the
If knowledge is going to guide desire, as it world, it is always possible to come up with
does in this framework, then just as objects some particular scenario in which it plays a
cannot be broken down into desirable pieces, non-trivial role in a knowledgeable persons
aspects or descriptions (Lois Lane cannot decision-making.37 Socrates did not expect
want to marry Superman without wanting to that any of us would come to know every-
marry Clark Kent because it is impossible to thing and there is every reason to think that
marry only the Superman aspect of him),34 he would have encouraged and expected us
they also cant break down into knowable to try to anticipate where it would be best to
pieces (Lois Lane cannot know that Clark focus our attention in pursuing information
Kent is a mild-mannered reporter and not about the world. So the claim that knowledge
also know that he is Superman, because she is holistic and that nothing is too trivial to
cant know this person by knowing only be worthy of inclusion is a highly theoretical
some aspects of this person). A propositional one. But, Socrates also expected us to make
theory of knowledge will not succeed in this a lot of mistakes and he expected those of
eudaimonistic framework; Socrates theory us who thought that we had knowledge, and
of desire and his claim that knowledge is consequently were not constantly on-guard
infallible indicate that he thinks that knowl- against unanticipated circumstances, to end
edge is of objects and is constituted by our up in worse shape than those who, no matter
understanding of the way the various things how learned they were, acknowledged that
in the world are connected to one another by they were far from having knowledge and
natural laws.35 needed to conduct a life-long and energetic
I might be able to believe, and believe pursuit of it. To say that knowledge is infal-
truly, that this is the road to Larissa with- lible is to say that it is holistic, to say knowl-
out believing that this road must be traversed edge is holistic is to set the bar for what
with a four-wheel drive vehicle, but I cannot counts as knowledge unattainably high. But
know that this is the road to Larissa without provided that one recognizes the advantages
176

of being closer to rather than farther from about moral good and bad into their descrip-
having knowledge, it lends a lot of clarity to tions of his views.38 But let us look further at
what is entailed by the pursuit of knowledge why it is not justified by the eudaimonistic
and has no disadvantages. framework that we have laid out.
Now let us take a look at the other The framework I am presenting claims
concern raised earlier. I am claiming that that, according to Socrates, there is one goal
Socrates thought that all knowledge was the that serves as the motivation for all human
same kind of knowledge, which means that behaviour: humans are naturally oriented
knowing how to treat others is not a cat- towards the goal of making themselves
egorically separate kind of knowledge that happy. All human activity is performed in
must be studied in a categorically different the pursuit of this one singular activity that
manner from ones empirical studies of the is engaged in for no reason beyond itself.
rest of the world. Many philosophers, most Socrates does not hold that humans strive to
notably Kant, have maintained that knowl- become happy because it has been decreed
edge of a moral good is independent from that they should, or because it is the mor-
empirical knowledge. Kant claimed that ally correct thing to do or even because they
moral laws, once constructed a priori, would believe that this pursuit will make them so;
guide our interpretation of our sense experi- humans strive to become happy because it is
ence and not the other way around. These simply impossible for them to do anything
sensibilities have found their way into the else. This is a fact of human existence. It
study and interpretation of Socratic ethics, might not be obvious to each person that her
perhaps most notably in the work of Vlastos, own happiness is the motivation that struc-
who developed a thesis known as the sover- tures all of her sub-motivations, but she is so
eignty of virtue (1991: 20924). Vlastos dis- motivated nonetheless.
tinguishes among goods as biological, social Socrates also believes that questions con-
and intellectual and moral (1991: 210). The cerning whether any particular individual is
sovereignty of virtue dictates that when moral happy are best answered by someone who
and non-moral goods compete, the percep- is an expert on the subject of happiness
tion that one of them is virtuous will all by rather than the person herself. The fact that
itself decide our choice. Vlastoss view also someone believes that she is happy does not
entails that two alternatives can be equally necessarily constitute evidence for her happi-
virtuous even though they will not make us ness, as far as Socrates is concerned. Socrates
equally happy and all that our desire for the thinks that we establish the fact that a per-
good forces us to worry about is which is son is happy with the same sort of eviden-
the more virtuous choice. The eudaimonistic tial criteria that we would use to justify our
framework we have already put into place belief that she is intoxicated, or a victim of
dictates that there is no such thing as compe- cancer. For Socrates, happiness is an objec-
tition between a moral and non-moral good. tive goal towards which human beings inevi-
The goodness of an action or possession is tably strive and it is, in principle, definable
decided only and completely by its compara- through scientific investigation, even if it has
tive contribution to our happiness. It would not yet been so defined.
be impossible to list all of the interpreters of As a result, Socrates thinks that what
Socrates who import this kind of sensibility we today call values are dictated by what
177

we today call facts. This is the opposite We can finally return to an examination
of what Kant hoped to accomplish when of the way in which the goodness of hap-
he sought to establish moral imperatives piness is distinct from the goodness of vir-
that were a priori and independent of our tue or knowledge. In the Euthydemus, we
empirical beliefs (Kant 1949). Hume (1888) see Socrates contention that happiness and
exhorted us to consider facts and values knowledge get their goodness in different
as two categorically different things, where ways (Euthd. 278e281e). The discussion
we need at least one from column B to com- between Socrates and his interlocutor is
bine with our ones from column A in order premised on the assumption that everyone
to establish the proper moral prescription in wishes to do well (278e). From there they
a given situation. This is antithetical to the move on to the presupposition that things
Socratic eudaimonistic framework that I benefit us (are good) when they make us
have established. happy (280b). Throughout the passage, the
Since each person is driven to pursue her criterion that a possession or an activity
own happiness, any individual who has an leads to our happiness is the litmus test that
understanding of what will actually make Socrates uses in determining whether or not
her happy and has access to all of the things that thing is good. Socrates states (at 280d)
that the world offers her as resources, will that a man who has all goods but makes no
do what she needs to do in order to become use of them would not be happy due to his
as happy as she can be. She does not need to possession of these goods. Socrates exam-
have some kind of separate and additional ines possession, use and virtuous use to see
moral knowledge of what she ought to do. whether each is beneficial, and in each case
An ought can always be established from the determining factor is whether that thing
an objective situation, if there is an objec- leads to happiness (280d, 280e, 282a). The
tive goal provided. If I set for myself the goal promotion of happiness is clearly the crite-
of making a chocolate cake, I am suddenly rion against which all potential goods are
confronted with many mandates that arise measured in the Euthydemus, and the win-
naturally from the way in which my goal ner by a long shot is knowledge because it
meshes with the laws of physics and chemis- is the only thing that always engenders hap-
try. I should use flour, chocolate, shortening piness and the thing that must be added to
and some sort of leavening agent. I should the others in order to make them more likely
avail myself of a pan, an oven and the proper to bring happiness about as well. Knowledge
utensils. Once the goal is set, prescriptive ele- has been measured in accordance with its
ments fall out of the state of my environment. ability to promote happiness, and that is why
The science of human happiness is no more it is deemed exceptional. Happiness makes
value laden than the science of cake baking. knowledge the fine thing that it is: it is always
If how we treat others is part of the science of good. However, unlike happiness (which is
human happiness, as I will argue below, then non-relationally good), knowledge is only
correct views about how to treat others will good due to its relationship to happiness.
inform my pursuit of my own happiness and Nothing else in the world other than hap-
need not be studied separately or in addition piness, no other object or human activity,
to my study of what my happiness is and is either non-relationally good or always
how I might bring it about. good. Eudaimonia stands out as the only
178

good that is both non-relationally good and appears to be practicing justice solely for the
always good. Aret stands out as the only benefit of others, the person in question is
good other than eudaimonia that is always actually doing so for monetary remuneration
good. All actions and objects are only con- or in order to avoid the worst punishment
ditionally good; the same object can be used of all, being ruled by one worse than one-
to benefit oneself or to harm oneself and the self. In the Protagoras (351b357e) Socrates
same activity can be a part of two different describes all deliberation concerning volun-
actions, one with good consequences and one tary action as a cost/benefit analysis concern-
with bad. When these activities or objects are ing which alternative is most beneficial for
done or used so as to make their agents bet- the agent. Throughout the Apology, Socrates
ter off, we call them good. Thus, in these cir- refers to his own benefit many times in
cumstances, they, too, become good due to explaining why he did what he did through-
their circumstantial relationship to eudaimo- out his life and also why he defends himself
nia. Eudaimonia casts its glow down upon as he does (22e, 31de); further, he assumes
them and they, by association with it, share, that the jury will make decisions according
however temporarily, in the non-relational to their own advantage (19a, 30c31a).
goodness that it alone possesses.
PURSUIT OF OUR OWN EUDAIMONIA

IT IS ALWAYS OUR OWN EUDAIMONIA NECESSITATES CONCERN FOR THE
THAT WE SEEK WELL-BEING OF OTHERS
Socrates sees every act we do, including those Having a theory which says that anything
that appear to be done for the benefit of other is valuable so long as it makes its possessor
people, as part of our own efforts to pursue or perpetrator happy seems to allow anyone
and maintain our own personal eudaimonia. to do whatever selfish, harmful and despica-
Socrates is what is today called a psychologi- ble acts they please so long as these acts will
cal egoist.39 bring them some benefit. Socrates argues that
No matter how we understand the argu- it is either very risky or impossible to pursue
ment that all desire is for the good in Meno eudaimonia by harming others. He believes
(77b78b), it requires us to equate good that we are all interconnected in such a way
with self-benefit and bad with self-harm.40 that it would be foolish to think that one is
In Gorgias (466a466e), Socrates entire likely to benefit herself by harming others. He
argument to the conclusion that tyrants maintains that when we think we can benefit
have the least power in the city is premised by harming another, we are probably wrong:
on the assumption that power is only power the act that we think will be beneficial to us
if it is self-beneficial. In that same dialogue will actually turn out to harm us in the long
Socrates also argues that justice benefits the run, or we are mistaking the benefit that will
self (474cd, 475bd) and that it is valu- accrue to another as the result of our action
able because it is better for the agent than its for harm. Some things might appear to be
alternative (470e). Socrates also suggests (R. harmful, especially at first, when they are
I 346a347c) that in cases where a person actually beneficial in the long run.
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When Socrates defends himself against to avoid, the more I need to separate myself
the charge that he has corrupted the youth from the society at large. This compromises
of Athens, he argues that he would never my potential happiness both because it is
have corrupted them purposefully because harder to live a happy life in isolation and
he knows that anyone who is harmed is also because any time I limit my activities
made worse by that harm and bad people through attempting to avoid particular peo-
are likely to bring harm to those who associ- ple or places I limit the choices that are avail-
ate with them (Ap. 25c). Similarly, Socrates able to me when I deliberate over which is
points out (R. I 335bc) that a just man the best possible action for me to perform in
would not harm another man because harm- my present circumstances.
ing anything or anyone makes them worse in In addition to thinking that we cannot
exactly those respects in which they would benefit by harming others, it seems likely
otherwise excel. The special virtue of human that Socrates would have acknowledged that
beings is justice, so harming a human being we benefit by caring about others, treating
would make the person harmed less just. them well and having the sorts of complex
Why would just people want to do anything loving relationships that Socrates is shown to
to make their fellow human beings less just? have had with some of his associates. Still,
Human beings are best served when they are this is not something that is emphasized in
surrounded by those who are just. Later, it the dialogues. Perhaps he emphasized that
is agreed that no person, group of people or we cannot benefit by harming others rather
city can accomplish any project that requires than that we do benefit by helping others
the cooperation of others unless they treat because he understood it to be the stronger,
those others well (R. I 351cd). Treating oth- but less intuitive, position. After all, even if
ers badly gives rise to factions and internal ones life is enhanced by having positive rela-
conflict and a group that is beset by these ills tionships with some people, she cannot have
will not be able to function. these kinds of relationships with everyone.
Of course, a person may amass wealth and However, Socrates thinks it is important to
power through harming others, but wealth our own happiness that we not harm any-
and power do not necessarily enhance eudai- one, not simply that we not harm the people
monia. In fact, the person who is wealthy and with whom we are able to have significant
powerful but nonetheless ignorant is likely to interactions.
suffer as a result (Euthd. 280e). One might Socrates gives additional reasons for think-
think that a person could benefit by harming that we cannot benefit by harming others.
ing another if he simply made sure never to In many places (Ap. 30ce, R. I 353d354a,
have further interactions with that person Cri. 48ad, Grg. 472c481b) he says that
after harming him. But this is easier said than when we harm others we harm our own
done. The person who has suffered harm is souls. This thesis has often been interpreted
also connected to others and may, due to his on what appear to be more complex, and
own increased unjustness, proceed to harm perhaps moralistic, grounds than the intel-
others. These others might be harder for the lectualism I am defending can condone. For
original perpetrator of harm to recognize and example, Brickhouse and Smith (2010: 92)
might be plentiful enough that they are hard say that the reason the tyrant discussed in the
for anyone to avoid. The more people I need Gorgias has the least power in the city is that
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he treats people unjustly and, in so doing, a thing works and will make us better off.
harms his own soul. They imply that this We allow ourselves to think that the things
harm is not only intellectual. It is not that the we can accomplish through harming oth-
tyrant acts on, develops and increases his own ers, for example, the accumulation of power
false appraisal of the way the world works; he and wealth, constitute eudaimonia. And if
feeds his appetite for power and, in so doing, Socrates is right about everything else, then
increases the likelihood that this appetite will that is the worst possible kind of ignorance
interfere with his beliefs about what is best to have and to feed.
for him. This contrasts with Penners (1991) Brickhouse and Smith have recently criti-
interpretation. Penner argues that the tyrant cized this view as incoherent (2010: 967 nn.
has the least power in the city because he 57). They say that, on this sort of intellectu-
assumes uncritically that the things he thinks alist view, only a soul that is already damaged
benefit him actually do benefit him; he does will lead a person to act wrongly. As a result,
nothing to try to learn about what the actual this view cannot account for how a soul got
consequences of the things that seem best to damaged in the first place. Furthermore, they
him will turn out to be. say there is no reason to think that a person
Penners intellectualist approach seems to who acts on misconceptions inevitably devel-
take Socrates psuch (the Greek word that ops further misconceptions as a result.
is commonly translated as soul) to be some- One can answer Brickhouse and Smith by
thing like the intellectual self. It has long been noting that Socrates thinks we are all born
argued that Socrates use of the term psuch ignorant and remain largely ignorant. Of
diverges from that of the Athenians of his course, this does not assume that we are born
time (Cornford 1932: 50). It, of course, also with a damaged or corrupted psych. It
diverges from the contemporary notion that just assumes that we are born with an intel-
has been processed through various mono- lectual self that is not capable of doing what
theisms subsequent to Socrates time. Platos it will someday be more capable of doing if
middle-period understanding of the soul is we nurture it carefully. We are born with a
arguably quite different from Socrates as far less than fully competent intellectual self
well. Plato, at least in some dialogues, sees and we want to improve rather than degrade
it as a supernatural and immortal entity that it. So there is no need on this version of intel-
is identified with our appetitive and spirited lectualism to come up with some explana-
capacities in addition to our intellectual ones. tion for why the soul starts out less than
Taking the soul simply to be the intellec- fully competent at getting us what we need
tual self allows us to interpret Socrates cau- in order to be happy. Neither does the nomo-
tions against harming it as follows: Socrates logical connection between knowledge and
thinks that what allows us to be happy is happiness require intellectualism to decree
our virtue and our knowledge. He could that harming others inevitably leads us to
think that, when we harm others in the belief become less competent at making ourselves
that we will benefit, and especially when we happier than we were before as Brickhouse
appear to succeed (at least in the short term), and Smith imply it does (2010: 96). Socrates
we corrupt our own understanding of human needs only to say that those who choose their
nature and the way the world is put together. actions sloppily and uncritically without an
We mislead ourselves into thinking that such eye towards understanding how the world
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really works are likely to have less and less admonition to care for the soul hard to inte-
of an idea of how the world really works and grate into ones motivational structure (espe-
to get themselves in more and more trouble cially if one is, for example, an atheist). But
in the happiness department. Penners intel- the intellectualist has no problem saying why
lectualism construes harm to the soul as the it is just as important to care for a soul that
increase and strengthening of false beliefs. will not survive ones body as it is to care for
Brickhouse and Smith understand Socrates an immortal one. The person who has only
to be saying that it consists in the strength- twenty-four hours left to live is as concerned
ening of appetites through a process that about his happiness over the remainder of his
is independent of belief. The view is intel- life as is the person who will live for another
lectualist, according to them, because these hundred years. Both are equally concerned to
stronger appetites further distort ones rea- put themselves in the best position for figur-
soning about what is best. However, as I have ing out how to make themselves as happy as
argued, it requires desires to be able to act possible in their remaining time and both will
independently of belief in pulling us towards be better served by using their knowledge to
various particular objects in the world, thus lead them rather than overriding it.41
there is an impurity to their intellectualism. Gerson argues that care for the soul can be
Not all desires require beliefs to guide them understood as an effort to remain a human
in producing behaviour on their account. being. To care for the soul is to be governed
Vlastos has asserted that Socrates admo- by reason, where abdication of such govern-
nition that we must ance is self-destruction (1997: 8). Brickhouse
and Smith (2010: 99100) respond that this
care for the soul can be understood no imports Platos later psychology into the
matter what kind of conception of the Socratic scheme. Socrates represents people
soul one has. The soul is as worth caring as incapable of being governed by anything
for if it were to last just 24 more hours, other than reason; it is Plato who develops
as if it were to outlast eternity. If you the notion that reason can be subordinated
have but one more day to live, and can to appetite. Brickhouse and Smith express the
expect nothing but a blank after that,
further concern that, on Gersons interpreta-
Socrates feels that you would still have
tion, one act of wrongdoing will be fatal to
all the reason you need for improving
your soul; you have yourself to live with the soul. Yet, the texts represent the ruin of the
that one day, so why live with a worse soul as a gradual process and harm to the soul
self, if you could live with a better one as an event from which it is usually possible to
instead. (Vlastos 1971a: 56) recover (Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 101).
Brickhouse and Smith appear to grant
Gerson (1997: 23) criticizes this account as that when people do wrong involuntarily,
inadequate to help us understand why car- their souls are harmed in the manner enter-
ing for ones soul is so important that one tained by the intellectualist account that they
would concentrate on it at the expense of themselves criticize.42 Further, they agree
everything else were one to have only one that in such cases damage to the soul can
day left to live. Stated in these moralistic be corrected by instruction.43 However, they
terms as if living with a better self has some think that Socrates admits to the existence of
sort of intrinsic value does make Socrates cases where damage to the soul is not wholly
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constituted by lack of knowledge and must punishment (Moss 2007: 232 n. 8; Reshotko
be corrected by punishment.44 1999: 410; Rowe 2007: 36).
Brickhouse and Smith support their view All of the scholars who understand Socrates
with a number of causal claims the mecha- to have acknowledged the existence of non-
nisms for which are not clear. They say that rational desires follow Penner in agreeing
strong passions and appetites make it difficult that there is no synchronic belief-akrasia.
for the agent to see reasons to resist them and However, as I have pointed out above, it is
that they thereby strengthen the agents incor- unclear that either Devereuxs or Brickhouse
rect beliefs (2010: 106). They maintain that and Smiths interpretation yields a fully coher-
their account remains intellectualist, since ent theory of Socratic desire. It is unclear how
they simply bring in non-epistemological bar- non-rational desires can continue to force an
riers to the accurate judgement of the agent agent to feel a pull towards an object that
concerning what is best (108), that is, barri- would satisfy a non-rational desire that has
ers that did not arise through misinformation been overridden by an executive desire on
and that cannot be removed via instruction. their account.45 Thus, they do not seem fully
On their account, it is the infiltration of these consistent with what I would posit is another
barriers into the judgement process that con- way of stating the framework that is Socratic
stitutes harm to the soul and their removal eudaimonism: all beliefs and desires that
can only be achieved through habituation figure into psychological explanations have
and conditioning with negative and unpleas- been subsumed under our inborn and inerad-
ant corporeal stimuli (2010: 11830). icable motivation towards eudaimonia.
Brickhouse and Smiths account is motivated
by several factors. First, they find (what they
call) the standard intellectualist approach
lacking in its failure to recognize the feelings CONCLUSION
associated with extra-rational appetites and
urges. Not only do they think there are such Socrates understands the relationship
extra-rational appetites, but they think that between aret and eudaimonia to be a nomo-
the appearances that they create will always logical one. This nomological relationship
create psychic dissonance with our desire for encloses a motivational frame within which
the actual good. Furthermore, they find a the- we can understand all purposeful human
ory of unruly desire and consequent punish- behaviour as motivated by eudaimonia.
ment at the end of the Gorgias and they are Eudaimonia is the ultimate and inevitable
committed to placing entire dialogues within human goal. Every purposeful behaviour
either the Socratic or Platonic realm (2010: is an effort to achieve eudaimonia either
24858). Many others have been content to because it is part of the process of figuring
see several dialogues as mostly Socratic but out that one wants eudaimonia, or the proc-
containing some Platonic features and inter- ess of figuring out that one needs knowledge
ludes (Benson 2000: 39; Kahn 1996: 3842; in order to get eudaimonia, or part of fig-
McPherran 1996: 264; Penner 2002; Rowe uring out how to get knowledge, or part of
2002, 2003; Vlastos 1991: 13). Still others using that knowledge to get eudaimonia or
do not think that the end of the Gorgias, to obtain a means to eudaimonia. Any good
even if Socratic, contains an endorsement of mountaineer knows that there is no action or
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decision that is negligible when one is nego- eudaimonia while embedded in the natural
tiating the mountain. Socratic eudaimonism world and in a human civilization that is not
has it that there is no action or decision that of her own making and over which she has
can be overlooked in negotiating the path to limited control.
ones own eudaimonia (even though there are Despite the fact that humans are motivated
many we wish we could overlook, discount to pursue their own personal eudaimonia,
or take back). The completely knowledgeable Socrates believes that the checks and balances
person comes as close to the achievement of in the natural and human-inhabited world
the inevitable human goal of eudaimonia as make it the case that it is at least foolhardy,
her external circumstances will permit. This if not impossible, to attempt to obtain ones
eudaimonia is not a peak experience that own eudaimonia at the expense of anothers.
occurs at the end of her life; it is something Thus Socrates eudaimonism is a theory of
that shapes each moment of her experience human motivation and purposeful behaviour
so that the cumulative effect is that she has at the same time as it is a theory concerning
lived as much of her life as possible as close to what prompts human beings to do what is
eudaimonia as possible. I specify as close as good for themselves and for others.
possible and as her external circumstances
will permit, because each person pursues Naomi Reshotko
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8
SOCRATIC MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM TWO RELEVANT PASSAGES
SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM DEFINED One of the main passages that has led scholars
to identify Socrates as a motivational intellec-
Socratic intellectualism is a term that is tualist is in the Gorgias, where Socrates gets a
used for two distinct, but related, features of reluctant Polus to admit that doing what one
Socratic philosophy. Socrates was a virtue thinks is best for one is not necessarily the same
intellectualist because he believed that all as doing what one wants (Grg. 467c468e).
virtue is in some sense constituted by knowl- Socrates accepts that people always do what
edge. This is an intellectualist view because they think is best for them; what he rejects is
it construes virtue cognitively, rather than in Poluss identification of doing what one thinks
terms of dispositions to behave or having the is best with doing what one wants:
right sorts of emotional or appetitive reac-
tions to things. Socrates was also a motiva- SOCRATES: Since were in agreement about
tional intellectualist because he believed that that then, if a person whos a tyrant or
all human actions are in some way the result an orator puts someone to death or exiles
of what the agents think is best for them him or confiscates his property because he
(among the available options recognized by supposes that doing so it better for himself
the agents) at the time of acting. This is an when actually its worse, this person, I take
intellectualist view because it entails that it, is doing what he sees fit, isnt he?
every case of ethical failure is a case of cog- POLUS: Yes.
nitive failure, because each ethical failure is SOCRATES: And is he also doing what he wants,
at least partly to be explicated in terms of if these things are actually bad? Why dont
some false belief about what the agents best you answer?
choice is among the available and recognized POLUS: All right, I dont think hes doing what
options. In this chapter, our focus will mainly he wants. (Grg. 468d)1
be on motivational intellectualism, but we
will close the chapter with a few remarks A similar argument is given in the Meno,
about how Socrates motivational intellectu- where Socrates gets Meno to admit that vir-
alism informed his virtue intellectualism. tue cannot be defined as desiring good things
185

and having the power to acquire them. The Now in the passage we are considering,
problem with this view, Socrates shows, is we can say that what Socrates is deny-
that no one desires bad things. ing is that bad things are the intended
objects of these peoples desires. For
his only basis in the passage for saying
SOCRATES: It is clear then that those who do
that the people in the hypothesis do not
not know things to be bad do not desire
desire bad things is the statement that
what is bad, but they desire those things these people do not know that the things,
that they believe to be good but that are which according to Meno they desire, are
in fact bad. It follows that those who have bad; and the only relevant statement that
no knowledge of these things and believe follows from this is that bad things are
them to be good clearly desire good things. not the intended objects of their desires.
Is that not so? Further, the only basis that Socrates has
MENO: It is likely. in this passage for saying that the peo-
SOCRATES: Well then, those who you say ple in the hypothesis really desire good
desire bad things, believing that bad things things is the statement that they thought
that the things, which according to Meno
harm their possessor, know that they will
they desire, were good things; and the
be harmed by them?
only relevant thing that can follow from
MENO: Necessarily. this is that good things are the intended
SOCRATES: And do they not think that those objects of their desires, (Santas 1979:
who are harmed are miserable to the 188; emphasis in original)
extent that they are harmed?
MENO: That too is inevitable. Santass view, however, would make the
SOCRATES: And those who are miserable are Meno inconsistent with the Gorgias, because
unhappy? it is clear in the latter dialogue that it is the
MENO: I think so. real and not just the intended good that we all
SOCRATES: Does anyone wish to be miserable desire.2 Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe,
and unhappy? however, argue that the two dialogues are
MENO: I do not think so, Socrates. consistent (Penner and Rowe 1994: 125).
SOCRATES: No one then wants what is bad, While not denying that the Meno could be
Meno, unless he wants to be such. For read in the way Santas supplies, Penner and
what else is being miserable but to desire Rowe contend, on the contrary, thus:
bad things and secure them?
MENO: You are probably right, Socrates, [T]he crucial passage 77D7E4 not
and no one wants what is bad. (Men. only need not be read in accordance
77d78b) with Santass reading, as speaking of
desire for things thought good (though
they are in fact bad), but can be read,
ARE THESE TWO PASSAGES CONSISTENT?
in some ways more plausibly, as deny-
ing that one can desire bad things, even
Scholars have debated, however, as to when one thinks them good. What one
whether these two passages really are con- desires is the benefits and the happiness
sistent. In his deservedly famous essay, The one wrongly thinks possession of the
Socratic Paradoxes, Gerasimos Santas bad things is a means to. This account
argued as follows: of the Meno is not after all inconsistent
186

with the account of desire for good in the In these concluding lines, there is no (remain-
Gorgias. (Penner and Rowe 1994: 23) ing?) trace of the idea that people actually
do sometimes want what is really bad. So if
Even more recently, however, Mariana Penner and Rowe are right to read the Meno
Anagnostopoulos (2003) has argued as they do, we can see the same view argued
against Penner and Rowes attempt to rec- in the Gorgias and Meno. We would claim
oncile the two dialogues.3 According to the very same view appears again in the
Anagnostopoulos, there are difficulties in the Euthydemus (at 278e279a).
Meno argument that are so great that they
cannot be solved in a way that at the same
time maintains consistency between the Meno
and the Gorgias, or even within the Meno SOCRATIC COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
itself (Anagnostopoulos 2003: 1734). Not
the least of these difficulties is that Socrates BEING OUT OF TUNE WITH ONESELF
says: (1) those who do not know things to be
bad do not desire what is bad, and also (2) Because everyone wants what is really best,
they desire those things that they believe to it follows that whenever anyone does what
be good but that are in fact bad. (1) seems is wrong, they have made a cognitive error
to assert what Penner and Rowe claim to of some sort. But do we actually know even
find in the Gorgias, namely that people do what we think is best for us? Or could it be
not desire what is (really) bad. But (2) seems that we have beliefs that we are not aware we
plainly to say that people actually do desire have? This question is one we must confront
what is bad, but only when they believe such in considering various things Socrates has to
things to be good. So (2) seems to be incon- say to both Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias.
sistent with (1). Anagnostopoulos reminds In the case of Polus, Socrates confounds the
us of Santass worry that Socrates seems to young man by claiming that he will call Polus
have contradicted himself within the space as a witness against Polus (Grg. 471e472c).
of three lines (Anagnostopoulos 2003: 175; On its face, Socrates claim is startling, for
quoting Santas 1979: 186). If, indeed, the what it implies is that Socrates can show
Meno is simply inconsistent on this issue, we Polus that the latter believes things he seems
can plainly make no firm conclusions about eager to disavow. But Socrates explicitly says
the Socratic view on the basis of this text. On that he thinks Polus is actually misrepresent-
the other hand, it is probably pertinent to ing what Polus himself actually believes. By
how we should interpret the Meno passage the end of the argument, Socrates prediction
to remind ourselves again of what conclusion has come true.
Socrates and Meno seem to agree is licensed:
SOCRATES: I was right, then, when I said that
SOCRATES: No one then wants what is bad, neither you nor I not any other person
Meno, unless he wants to be such. For would take doing whats unjust over suf-
what else is being miserable but to desire fering it, for it really is something worse.
bad things and secure them? POLUS: So it appears.
MENO: You are probably right, Socrates, and SOCRATES: So you see, Polus, that when one
no one wants what is bad. (Men. 78ab) refutation is compared with the other,
187

there is no resemblance at all. Whereas DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNTS

everyone but me agrees with you, you are
all I need, although youre just a party of One way to handle Socrates surprising
one, for your agreement and testimony. Its claims is to make them less surprising. So,
you alone whom I call on for a vote; the for example, Terence Irwin (1979, note on
others I disregard. (Grg. 475e476a) 473b10: 152) has argued that Socrates should
be taken to mean only that the Socratic elen-
And then, as soon as Callicles has joined the chus can induce belief in the interlocutor. Of
discussion, Socrates accuses him not only of course, we would hope and expect that any
saying inconsistent things, but also of hold- good example of reasoning can have this
ing inconsistent beliefs: effect, in which case Socrates is only claiming
to Polus and Callicles that when they reason
So, either [. . .] show that doing whats with him, they may find themselves believing
unjust without paying what is due for it something other than what they presently
is not the ultimate of all bad things, as I believe. The problem with this extremely
just now was saying it is, or else if you
deflationary reading of Socrates surprising
leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the
claims is that it simply ignores what is cen-
god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not
agree with you, Callicles, but will be dis- tral to the claims themselves the attribution
sonant with you all your life long. And to Polus and Callicles of the beliefs that, in
yet for my part, my good man, I think its this account, they do not yet have. In brief,
better to have my lyre or a chorus that this interpretation simply falsifies Socrates
I might lead out of tune and dissonant, claims about what his interlocutors believe.
and have the vast majority of men disa- Yet another deflationary account has been
gree with me and contradict me, than to given by Norman Gulley and more recently
be out of harmony with myself, to con- by C. D. C. Reeve. In this account, the way
tradict myself, though Im only one per- Socratic refutation works is by showing the
son. (Grg. 482bc)
interlocutor that the beliefs he expresses,
which Socrates targets for refutation, have
On the basis of what does Socrates make such entailments inconsistent with obvious truths
extraordinary claims? Callicles has given not (Reeve 1989: 165), or as Gulley put it,
the slightest indication that he both disa- Socrates tries to establish as the contradic-
grees and also agrees with Socrates on this tory of the respondents initial thesis a prop-
issue. All Callicles has said so far, having just osition presented as so obviously true that
begun his own portion of the debate, is that the respondent is driven to abandon his the-
what Socrates was saying would turn human sis (Gulley 1968: 434). As Gregory Vlastos
life upside down so that everything we do puts it so well, the problem with this version
would be the opposite of what we should do is as follows:
(481c). So where does Socrates perceive any
sign that Callicles is out of tune and disso- [I]n the G[orgias] in each of Socrates
nant because he also agrees with Socrates, arguments against Gorgias, Polus, and
even as he vehemently denies what Socrates Callicles, the contradictory of their the-
is saying? sis is a paradox not at all likely to
188

strike the sponsor of the refutand as claims to have shown them that they really
obviously true, no matter how it is pre- have agreed with him all along. No, they
sented to him. Thus in the second argu- might reasonably say, [w]e did not agree
ment against Polus the contradictory of with you all along, but you have shown us
Polus thesis is that it is better to suffer
why we should agree with you, and perhaps
injustice than to commit it and better to
even should have agreed with you before.
submit to deserved punishment than to
escape it; after Socrates has proved this Instead, when Socrates insists to Polus, I
(G. 479e8), its immediate consequences was right, then, when I said that neither you
continue to strike Polus as outrageous nor I not any other person would take doing
(480e1). (Vlastos 1994b: 1314 n. 39) whats unjust over suffering it, for it really
is something worse, Polus does not protest
Vlastoss own preference is to explain but actually concedes the point (Grg.475e,
Socrates claims by understanding them as quoted above). If Socrates is using a mar-
forecasting that he could show his interlocu- ginal sense of believe here, then it appears
tors that they themselves hold beliefs from Polus does, too.
which a belief contradictory to the one they
currently espouse can be derived: SHALLOW AND DEEP BELIEF
What in the world could Socrates mean If we compare what we find Socrates saying
by saying that Polus and the multitudes to Polus and Callicles with the account of
who agree with him believe the oppo- knowledge as recollection in the Meno, how-
site of what they assert? There is only
ever, we find an indication of an alternative
one way I see of making sense of that
explanation for Socrates odd attributions of
remark: we must understand Socrates to
be using believe in that marginal sense beliefs. According to the Meno, the man who
of the word in which we may be all said does not know has within himself true opin-
to believe innumerable things that have ions about the things that he does not know
never entered our heads but are none- (Men. 85c). There is no direct evidence, of
theless entailed by what we believe in course, in any of the dialogues earlier than
the common use of the word. (Vlastos the Meno, of the theory of recollection itself.
1994b: 23)4 But if Socrates did somehow think that eve-
ryone really already does have an indefinite
The problem with this interpretation, how- store of beliefs, whose acceptance he can
ever, is the same as the one we found with bring to his interlocutors attention as beliefs
Irwins deflationary account, for in Vlastoss they really do accept, then whatever role
view, it is still strictly true that Polus and these beliefs play in an ensuing argument will
Callicles do not yet believe what they claim actually count as what the interlocutor him-
to disbelieve, at the specific time when self (already) believes.5 When one becomes
Socrates seems to be telling them that they aware of contradictions between these
actually do believe what they claim to disbe- beliefs and others one may hold, rationality
lieve. It would be perfectly reasonable, then, requires one to jettison the other beliefs. The
for Polus or Callicles to correct Socrates, beliefs we all hold and will not abandon in
at the end of the conversation, when he the face of contradictory beliefs may thus be
189

characterized as deeper than the ones we are Penner (1990) makes several useful distinc-
willing to jettison when we become aware of tions. The first is between belief-akrasia and
conflicts in our beliefs. In this way, Socratic knowledge-akrasia.
philosophizing may be supposed to provide
a kind of cognitive psychotherapy, by which BELIEF-AKRASIA: acting contrary to what
we come to know ourselves better, while you believe to be the best option open to
also coming to have a more consistent set of you.
beliefs by which to lead our lives. KNOWLEDGE-AKRASIA: acting contrary
to what you know to be the best option
open to you. (Penner 1990: 45; emphasis
in original)
SOCRATIC MOTIVATIONAL
INTELLECTUALISM But Penner notes that this distinction is inad-
equate for specifying precisely what Socrates
THE DENIAL OF AKRASIA denies, and thus adds a further distinction:
The Socratic denial of akrasia was perplex- SYNCHRONIC BELIEF-AKRASIA: acting

ing even among the ancients. In Aristotles contrary to what you at the moment of
words: action believe to be the best option open
to you;
Some say that if he has knowledge of DIACHRONIC BELIEF-AKRASIA: acting
how to act rightly, he cannot be akratic; contrary to what you believe to be the best
for, as Socrates thought, it would be option open to you throughout most of
strange for a man to have knowledge and
the general context of the action includ-
yet allow something else to rule him and
ing, in particular (a) the period during
drag him about like a slave. For Socrates
was entirely opposed to this view and which you consider what to do, and (b)
held that there is no such thing as akra- the period during which you regret or
sia; for he thought that no one with the approve of what you have done. (Penner
right belief does what is contrary to the 1990: 47; emphasis in original)
best, but if a man does so, it is through
ignorance. Now this argument obviously If we return to Aristotles criticism of
disagrees with what appears to be the Socrates, we will see that it seems to rely on
case; and if a man acting by passion does the supposition that Socrates denied the pos-
so through ignorance, we should look sibility of diachronic belief-akrasia: Aristotle
into the manner in which this ignorance
calls our attention to the fact that an akratic
arises. For it is evident that an akratic
man, before getting into a state of passion,
man, before getting into a state of pas-
sion, does not think that he should do does not think that he should do what he
what he does when in passion. (Aristotle, does when in passion. The assessment of
Nicomachean Ethics VII.3.1145b2231; the akratic man about what he should do,
trans. Apostle and Gerson, modified) then, changes from the time before he acts
in passion and after he become impas-
But exactly what did Socrates deny? In a sioned. But Penner shows that this sort
very important article on this subject, Terry of case actually is possible for Socrates.
190

Socrates does allow an agent to change his make their first appearance in Platonic phi-
mind temporarily, and come to judge some- losophy in the Gorgias, which Irwin thus
thing he had judged as not his best option, counts as transitional between the early and
actually to be his best option at the time of middle periods of Platos work (Irwin 1977:
action, and then later, perhaps, to regret his 128; see also 1995: 756).6
action. In Penners view, which now seems to But others, while still advocating an
be generally accepted by scholars, Socrates understanding of Socratic motivational intel-
rejected the possibility of synchronic belief- lectualism in which all actions are explicable
akrasia, rejected also both synchronic and solely in terms of the agents beliefs about
diachronic knowledge-akrasia, but accepted what is best for them, do allow Socrates to
the possibility of diachronic belief-akrasia. recognize the existence of such things as
The only differences in scholarly opinion, at appetites and passions, even if these do not
this point, seem to be about the other aspect actually explain anything about how we act.
of Aristotles criticism, according to which So, for example, we find Penner describing
akrasia is to be explained in terms of some the Socratic theory as follows:
form of passion.
According to this theory, all desires to
GOOD-INDEPENDENT AND NON-RATIONAL do something are rational desires, in
DESIRES that they always automatically adjust
to the agents beliefs about what is the
Good independent desires = desires best means to their ultimate end. If in
that seek their objects in a way that is the particular circumstances I come to
independent of our universal desire for believe that eating this pastry is the best
what is really good for us (see the section means to my happiness in the circum-
Shallow and Deep Belief). stances, then in plugging this belief into
Non-rational desires = desires that seek the desire for whatever is best in these
their objects in a way that is independent circumstances, my (rational) desire for
of our reasoning or deliberation about whatever is best becomes the desire to
what is really good for us. eat this pastry. On the other hand, if I
come to believe that it would be better
Scholars have mostly tended to think that to abstain, then once again my desire
for what is best will become the desire
Socrates motivational intellectualism
to abstain. Rational desires adjust to the
shows that he provides no role whatso-
agents beliefs. In fact, on this view the
ever in the explanation of human action for only way to influence my conduct is to
good-independent or non-rational desires. change my opinion as to what is best.
In Terence Irwins view, Socratic motiva- (Penner 1992: 128; his italics)
tional intellectualism requires all desires
to be rational and good-dependent; if A But Penner does not take this view to elimi-
wants x, he wants it for its contribution nate the very existence of such things as
to some good y, and ultimately to the final appetites and passions. Instead, these may
good, and if he ceases to believe that x con- be thought of as mere hankerings, itches,
tributes to the final good, he will cease to or drives [that] cannot automatically result
want x (Irwin 1977: 78). Irwin claims that in action when put together with a belief
good-independent and non-rational desires (Penner 1991: 201 n. 45; see also 1990:
191

5960 and 1997: 124). A view similar to behaviour or in the analysis of virtue. Such
Penners may also be found explicated in passages include:
Naomi Reshotkos recent book (2006).
According to Reshotko, appetites and pas- Apology 21b23e, where Socrates seems
sions count as unintellectualized drives and clearly to say that peoples injured pride,
urges (Reshotko 2006: 86). Both Penner as a result of Socratic refutation, has led
and Reshotko contend, however, that these them to become angry at Socrates, and
phenomena play only an informational role thus to make various accusations against
in motivation. So Reshotko claims: him (Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 537).
Apology 29e30a, where Socrates con-
In my view, an appetite never plays a role trasts his own behaviour with that of oth-
that is more instrumental than any other ers by claiming that the threat of death
piece of information that the intellect will not dissuade him from his philosophi-
has used in order to determine what is cal mission out of fear, and also claims,
best to do as motivated by the desire for as part of that mission, to create shame in
the good. I hold that appetites are like his interlocutors (Brickhouse and Smith
sense impressions: they are phenomena 2010: 579; see also Sanderman 2004 and
that help us form judgments, but they Woodruff 2000).
do not interact with judgments that have Apology 32bd, where Socrates proudly
already been formed. (Reshotko 2006: claims not to have been led into doing any-
86; our italics) thing unjust, despite threats to his life in
dangerous political circumstances, out of
fear (Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 5960).
What seems still lacking here is an explana-
Apology. 34bd, where Socrates warns
tion of what is peculiar to the appetites and
his jurors against casting their votes in his
passions, namely that they are drives and case out of anger (Brickhouse and Smith
urges, as Reshotko seems to acknowledge, 2010: 601).
that is, that they actually do drive or urge Laches 191e, where Socrates says that
us towards and away from things, unlike pleasures, pains, appetites and fears all
sense impressions, which in themselves provide opportunities for people to dis-
do not. We find this account, accordingly, play courage (Devereux 1995: 388).
inadequate as an explanation of how appe- Charmides 155d, where Socrates describes
tites and passions do their work in us, and himself as struggling for self-control as he
we see no reason to saddle Socrates with suddenly burns with desire for the youth-
ful Charmides (Brickhouse and Smith
the inadequacy.
2010: 52).
Charmides 167e, where Socrates draws
APPETITES AND PASSIONS a distinction between appetite (epithu-
mia), which he says aims at pleasure, wish
Critics of the interpretations of Socratic (boulsis), which he says aims at what is
motivational intellectualism offered above good, and love (ers), which he says aims
have pointed to a number of passages in at beauty (Devereux 1995: 400).
several dialogues in which Socrates not only Protagoras 352bc, where Socrates claims
manages to identify various kinds of appe- that knowledge would prevent one from
tites and passions, but also seems to assign to being overcome by anger, fear or pleas-
them some roles in the explanation of human ure, because knowledge conquers pleasure
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and everything else (357c) (Devereux appetites and passions are assigned roles
1995: 388). within the explanation of human action. But
Lysis 220e221b, where Socrates explic- the question now is, how do we explain these
itly argues that the appetites, such as hun- roles in a way that is consistent with Socratic
ger and thirst, and also ers, can be both
motivational intellectualism?
good or bad, but the experiences of these
do not depend for their existence on both
good and bad existing (Brickhouse and DANIEL T. DEVEREUXS VIEW
Smith 2010: 52).
Gorgias 491de, where Socrates describes In his pathbreaking paper, Socrates Kantian
the temperate man as exercising rule over Conception of Motivation, Daniel T.
the pleasures and appetites within him Devereux was the first scholar directly to
(Devereux 1995: 404). challenge the view of Socratic intellectual-
Gorgias. 493a, where Socrates talks about ism in which the appetites and passions have
the part of the soul in which the appe- no explanatory role to play. According to
tites (epithumiai) happen to be (Devereux Devereux, for Socrates, virtue consists in a
1995: 404).
kind of knowledge that is simply so strong
Gorgias 500d, where Socrates distin-
that it can overpower even the strongest
guishes between pleasure and the good,
as well as the pursuits appropriate to each non-rational desires. This is why, as Socrates
(Moss 2006: 511 n. 17). puts it in the Protagoras, knowledge can never
Gorgias 505a, where Socrates reminds be dragged about like a slave (352c). But
Callicles that doctors often make their non-rational desires can drag opinion about
patients resist their appetites (Brickhouse like a slave, getting us to change our minds
and Smith 2010: 51). about what is best for us when we are pre-
Gorgias 507b, where Socrates says the sented with the objects of their desires within
temperate man must also be courageous easy reach. According to this view, knowledge
in order to pursue, avoid, resist and endure can always be relied upon to guarantee the
pleasures and pains (Devereux 1995: 388).
correct action in the situation. True or correct
Gorgias 521de, where Socrates distin-
belief, on the other hand, is unstable vulner-
guishes between what he does, which aims
at what is best, with what orators and able to temporary displacement or suppres-
rhetoricians do, which is to aim at grati- sion owing to the proximity of pleasure, pain,
fication and what is most pleasant (Moss or fear (Devereux 1995: 3934).
2007: 240). But Devereuxs interpretation faces a
Gorgias 525bc, in the Great Myth at the challenge in the Meno passage quoted ear-
end of the Gorgias, where Socrates explains lier in this chapter, because the non-rational
to Callicles that those who have curably desires on which his interpretation depends
damaged souls in the afterlife may benefit seem to show that people do, after all, desire
out of fear from seeing the incurable souls bad things precisely when the non-rational
tortured and also says that they may enjoy
desires target some aim other than what is
other benefits as a result of pain and suffer-
actually best for the agent. The Meno argu-
ing (Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 91).
ment, however, seemed to require that no one
actually does ever desire bad things.
In these and other passages in the early In response to this potential objection,
dialogues, we find clear examples in which Devereux notes Socrates shift from talking
193

about epithumia (appetite) to boulsis (will away from lack of disciple (akolasian) as
or wish) in the last few lines of the argument. quickly as his feet will carry him, and
Recalling the distinction Socrates makes in must above all make sure that he has no
the Charmides between types of desire (cited need of being disciplined, but if he does
have that need, either he himself or any-
above), Devereux argues that Socrates shift
one in his house, either a private citizen
from appetite to wish permits Socrates to
or a whole city, he must pay his due and
allow that people can have appetitive desire he disciplined (dikn epiteon kai kolas-
for what is bad, but will never have wish teon), if he is to be happy . . . he must
(which all agree is rational desire) for what is not allow his appetites (epithumiai) to be
bad. The conclusion drawn by Socrates and undisciplined or to undertake to fill them
Meno, that no one wishes for what is bad, up. (Grg. 507ce)
does not rule out other, non-rational forms
of desire in which one may well desire what If we are right about this, then it turns out
is bad. Accordingly: that having disciplined appetites and passions
will be a necessary precondition to being vir-
When he [Socrates] says that misery is tuous at all. In this way, then, on their view,
desiring evil things and attaining them, it is not that knowledge can simply conquer
using the verb epithumein, he is imply- the appetites and passions, as Devereux has
ing that we may speak of desiring what it, but that knowledge of the good and bad
is evil, but this is not the same as wanting (which Brickhouse takes to be Socrates
or wishing for what is evil. [. . .] Thus conception of virtue) will not be possible
Socrates claim is that no one wishes for unless and until the appetites and passion
what is evil or harmful to oneself; some
are already conquered, at least to the point of
people may be said to desire what is evil,
being in a well-disciplined condition.
and to the extent that they satisfy these
desires they make themselves miserable.
(Devereux 1995: 401)7 SOCRATES THE STOIC
Other scholars who wish to acknowledge a

Devereuxs view that knowledge can simply role for appetites and passions in Socratic
overpower even the strongest appetites and moral psychology have urged an interpreta-
passions has also more recently been criti- tion according to which Socrates was a kind
cized. In our recent book (Brickhouse and of proto-Stoic about the very nature of appe-
Smith 2010: 816), we point to a passage in tites and passions, counting them as exam-
the Gorgias as evidence for their own view ples of evaluative beliefs about their objects.8
that having well-disciplined, and thus weaker The way in which this view is compatible
and resistible, appetites is necessary for self- with motivational intellectualism is easy to
control: see: Anyone motivated to do anything on the
basis of an appetite or passion, in this view,
[Socrates speaking] So this is how I set would still be doing what they believed was
down the matter and say that it is true. best for them at the time of action, for the
And if it is true, then a person who wants obvious reason that such appetites and pas-
to be happy must evidently pursue and sions just are the sorts of beliefs that can
practice self-control. Each of us must flee motivate action. Synchronic belief-akrasia
194

would be impossible, in this account, because the earlier dialogues.10 In this account, Plato
ones actual action would indicate which never gave up on the Socratic denial of akra-
evaluative belief (or beliefs, if the motiva- sia, even in the Republics discussion of the
tion is complex) were strongest at the time of divided soul. This version seems to require a
any agents acting. Later remorse (as in dia- kind of Stoicizing of the Socratic view, which
chronic belief-akrasia) would simply signal a is then also found in the Republic, where we
shift in the agents relevant evaluative belief, find each part of the soul forming beliefs
perhaps because the applicable appetite or about what is best for the agent. As a result,
passion had dissipated or been (at least tem- whichever part of the soul may be responsi-
porarily) sated. One problem with this view, ble for the belief on the basis of which the
obviously, is that it rules out any possibility agent acts, every case of action will be a case
of having to struggle against an appetite or in which the agent acts in accordance with
passion, because the agent believed it would the agents present belief about what is best
be best to refrain from what the appetite or for him. Psychic conflict, insofar as it occurs,
passion inclined him or her to do. Or if there is just cognitive conflict in every instance.
could be such conflict, it could only be a case
of cognitive dissonance. THE POWER OF APPEARANCE IN THE
PROTAGORAS
UNITARIAN ACCOUNTS
One of the most important passages in the
Obviously, one way the problems involving study of Socratic motivational psychology
Socrates discussions of appetites and pas- appears in a famous passage in the Protagoras.
sions in these texts might be accounted for is Here, we are told that things can appear to be
simply to take his view as being at least more better or worse than they really are and the
or less the same as the view he expresses in . . . [power of appearance (dunamis tou phain-
Platos later dialogues, in which the soul omenou)] can often make us wander all over
is divided into parts and each part supplies the place in confusion, changing our minds
its own energies in motivation. There have about the same things and regretting our
been two general sorts of approaches that actions and choices . . . (356d). Knowledge,
fall under this general heading, though the however, Socrates says, is the metrtik
two have little in common other than their techn, the craft of measurement that can
Unitarianism. In one version, we should make the appearances lose their power by
interpret what Socrates says in the early dia- showing us the truth (356de). The danger
logues along the lines of the moral psychol- of the power of appearance is that it can lead
ogy of the Republic and other later dialogues. to misperception: pleasures can appear to be
Where differences from this point of view more pleasant than they actually are, if they
seem to appear in the earlier dialogues, we seem to be close to us (presumably, in time)11,
should seek other ways of explaining them.9 and pains can appear less painful than they
A very different sort of Unitarian account really are, if they are further away (again, in
has become increasingly popular in recent time). Hence, it is too easy to judge that our
years, however, in which we are invited to overall good (understood in hedonistic terms
understand Platos putatively later moral psy- in the Protagoras) will be advanced by pur-
chology as continuous with what we find in suing a given pleasure in spite of the pain it
195

will cause later, even if the pain will be much who take the hedonistic assumption of the
greater than the pleasure achieved, because Protagoras to represent Socrates actual con-
the pleasure will occur right here and now, ception of eudaimonia (e.g. Irwin 1977: 102
whereas the pain will occur later. 15 and 1995: 8192) will suppose that by its
But what gives items the power of appear- very nature, pleasure and only pleasure will
ance that can deceive us, unless, of course, we have the power to appear good to us. Others,
have the craft of measurement? Scholars have less inclined to accept that Socrates reduces
provided different answers to this question. eudaimonia to pleasure, provide a broader
Without recourse to considerations involv- list, arguing that a number of putative
ing the effects of appetites and passions, most goods, such as good looks, health, wealth
scholars have supposed that nothing can even and so forth have the power to appear good
so much as appear good to us unless we had (e.g. Boeri 2004: 120; Moss 2005). In this
already formed the judgement that it was interpretation, things we decide not to pur-
actually good. Recall Penners description sue might yet appear good, even as we resist
of his conception of Socratic intellectual- their pursuit. As Marcelo D. Boeri puts it:
ism, which holds that all desires are rational The person having the art of measurement
desires: Rational desires adjust to the agents cannot remove the appearance which does
beliefs (Penner 1992: 128). So, if someone not depend on him but he will not be ruled
who is thirsty sees a water fountain nearby, he by it insofar as he is able to assess it critically
will not approach the fountain to drink unless (Boeri 2004: 120).
and until he makes the executive decision that
drinking from that fountain right now would BRICKHOUSE AND SMITH ON THE POWER OF
be best for him. Were the person to suspect APPEARANCE
that the water from that fountain might be
tainted, he might decide that it would be best, In our recent book (Brickhouse and Smith
all things considered, to refrain from drink- 2010: 7981), we argue that the problem with
ing. But does the thirsty person who decides all such views is that they do not seem to handle
to refrain from drinking cease to feel thirsty? the actual phenomena any better than the view
One certainly can lose an appetite as a result that recognizes no explanatory role for appe-
of reassessing the value of something the tites and passions. For it does seem clear that
appetite had initially targeted for example, whatever power of appearance certain things
if we see what looks like a delicious choco- seem to have over us is dependent not so much
late cake, but then learn that it is an example on the things themselves, but on states internal
of shock art, made from faeces. But it seems to us. Consider the glutton eyeing yet another
implausible to say that every case of hunger chocolate tart. As he makes his decision to eat
or thirst or any of the other many appetites it or not, he is influenced not just by what the
and passions will simply vanish whenever tart itself looks like (or smells like, or tastes like,
the person decides not to pursue the nearby with all of which he is now intimately familiar,
apparent object of that appetite, for whatever having already eaten several of them), but also
reasons the agent may have to refrain. with his own feelings of satiety. If he is suffi-
Other scholars propose that there is sim- ciently full, such that his appetite for sweets is
ply something in the very nature of certain (temporarily) sated, the tart will not look good
sorts of things to appear good to us. Those to him except perhaps in some aesthetic sense.
196

He will not find in himself an occurrent desire and passions provide a very uncomplicated
to eat another one, and so whatever power of picture of Socrates views about how one can
appearance the tart had seems now to have get another to change his or her behaviour.
dissolved. The difference between the way the For example, we find Terry Penner putting it
tart looked to the glutton, before he was sated, this way:
and afterwards, is not a difference in the tart; it
is a difference in the state of the gluttons appe- There is in Platos early dialogues . . .
tite. On the other hand: a certain intellectualism that is quite
foreign to the middle and later dia-
The object of an appetite that an agent logues. . . . Indeed, that intellectualism,
has deliberately decided not to pursue with its implication that only philosophi-
may well continue to appear good to the cal dialogue can improve ones fellow
agent the chocolate tart will continue citizens, is decisively rejected by Plato
to look and smell good to the vigilant in the parts of the soul doctrine on the
but struggling dieter who resists eating Republic. [. . .] For Socrates, when peo-
it in spite of that desire. (Brickhouse and ple act badly or viciously or even just out
Smith 2010: 87 n.) of moral weakness, that will be merely
a result of intellectual mistake. (Penner
We argue, accordingly, that the power of 2000: 1645; his emphasis)
appearance that can lead us astray is a direct
result of the effects of non-rational desires on Other clear examples of this view include
our evaluations of things. Christopher Rowe, who characterizes the
Socratic position as one in which [n]othing
Something acquires the power of appear- apart from talking and reasoning with us will
ance when it becomes the object of a be necessary, because there is nothing apart
nonrational desire and so becomes rec- from what we think and believe that is even in
ognized by an agent as a way to satisfy
principle capable of causing us to go wrong
some appetite or passion for example,
(Rowe 2006: 166) and C. C. W. Taylor (1998:
as a pleasure or as a relief from some
pain. We can also see why Socrates refers 63), who claims that there is no possibility of
to the craft of measurement as our sav- interference by conflicting desires in Socrates
ior, for it allows its possessor to judge conception of motivation. Because nothing
correctly whether an apparent good is else can motivate behaviour, the only way
really worth the cost that must be paid in to induce change in behaviour is to induce a
terms of a subsequent evil. (Brickhouse change in belief. And the only way to change
and Smith 2010: 79) belief, in this view, is to provide the agent some
new information (or call his or her attention
to something he or she might be ignoring), for
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND example, via philosophical dialogue.
CHANGING BEHAVIOUR
THE ROLE OF SHAME
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION
But other scholars have noticed more going
Interpretations of Socratic moral psychology on in Socrates conversations than cool rati-
that recognize no operative role for appetites ocination. For example, Jessica Moss finds
197

something very important in the analogy Moss then considers whether non-philo-
between Socrates philosophical practices sophical rhetoric might not, after all, have
and those of medicine: a significant place in moral improvement,
by presenting virtue as pleasant, and vice as
This analogy between Socrates and the painful a way of using appetites as a tool of
doctor is far from innocuous. Looking at moral persuasion (Moss 2007: 246; emphasis
the dialogues characterization of medi- in original).12 But Moss does not agree with
cine, we will see that it serves two major
this, asserting instead that Socrates is clear in
purposes. First, it allows Plato to present
saying that such persuasion [ . . . ] will indulge
Socrates practice, and indeed philosophy
bin general, as beneficial as a valuable and thereby further strengthen unhealthy
and vital art that looks to the wellbe- appetites, the very appetites that soul-caring
ing of the soul. Second, it provides an needs to moderate (Moss 2007: 246).
account of why Socrates is often unsuc- Where, then, can a strategy other than
cessful in his efforts to persuade people pure reasoning, apply to the changing of
to value justice and philosophy. For there behaviours? In 2000, Paul Woodruff noted
are many people who find what Socrates that Socrates does not just engage his inter-
does unpleasant, and these people will locutors in ratiocination he also sometimes
refuse to submit to his arguments, just as seeks to shame them.13
some people refuse to submit to the doc-
tors painful cures. (Moss 2007: 231) And if any of you disputes me on this and
says he does care, I wont immediately
Examples of interlocutors becoming squirmy stop talking to him and go away, but Ill
question, examine, and try to refute him.
from the sting of Socrates, Athens gadfly
And if he doesnt appear to me to have
(see Ap. 30e), are common enough, for exam-
acquired virtue but says he has, Ill shame
ple, in the painful reactions of Callicles, who him because he attaches greater value to
Socrates explicitly says he is trying to dis- whats of less value and takes whats infe-
cipline (at Grg. 505c), and Thrasymachus, rior to be more important. (Ap. 29e30a,
who Socrates leaves in the rather humiliating trans. Brickhouse and Smith)
condition of blushing and secreting a quan-
tity of sweat that was a wonder to behold (R. In texts such as this and several others
I 350cd). Surgery, cauterization, and bitter Woodruff surveys, he finds shaming inter-
potions are painful; in this sense they are ene- locutors to be a highly significant aspect of
mies of the desire for pleasure (Moss 2007: Socratic philosophizing one that cannot be
238). So, too, Socrates compares his philos- explained in wholly rational terms.
ophizing with the doctor who cuts, burns,
confuses, starves, and stifles his patients, and Shame is a painful emotion one feels at
the thought of being exposed in weak-
gives them the bitterest potions and forces
ness, foolishness, nakedness, or perhaps
hunger and thirst on them (Grg. 521e522a).
even wickedness, to the view of a com-
So it is that Socratic refutation quite literally munity whose laughter would scald.
thwarts peoples appetites for certain kinds Shame is closely related to fear of exclu-
of pleasure, just as medically reinforced regi- sion from ones group, since derision
mens frustrate peoples appetite for unwhole- generally marks the exposed person as
some food and drink (Moss 2007: 240). an outsider. (Woodruff 2000: 133)14
198

One of the things Socrates does to heighten him in different directions when it comes to
his interlocutors sense of shame, accord- evaluating actions.
ing to one recent scholarly paper, is to mock
them. The point of this mocking form of On the account I have offered, Polus
irony, according to Sanderman (2004), is initially thought injustice good because
to motivate the interlocutor to change the he was attracted by its pleasures. Now,
Socrates hopes, he will realize that injus-
views that lead to his being mocked. This
tice is bad because he is repelled by its
actually works slightly differently from the
shamefulness. Responses to the pleasant
way Moss had indicated, however, for when and the painful on the one hand, and
Socrates mocks one of his interlocutors, the the kalon and the aischron on the other,
mockery may be set up with forms of flat- are two bases for non-rational, quasi-
tery that actually could serve to increase that perceptual value judgments. What one
persons experience of the pleasures of being takes pleasure in strikes one as good;
honoured by others. But this moment only what one feels shame at strikes one
makes Socrates later mockery all the more as bad. In proceeding as he does with
painful.15 Polus, Socrates is emphasizing that these
The role of shame in Socrates arguments two types of response tend to conflict:
many kalon things are painful, while
is also what Moss herself in her earlier
many pleasant things are aischron, and
(2005) paper identifies as the non-rational
thus our value-judgments are pulled in
element in Socratic persuasion. Recall that different directions. Moreover, Socrates
a rhetorical association of virtue with pleas- is making the point that pleasure pulls
ure is a technique Moss claims the texts rule us in the wrong direction, toward false
out, because it would have the tendency to value-judgments, while shame pulls us
reinforce (and thus increase) inappropri- in the right direction, toward the truth.
ate appetites for pleasure. But the same is (Moss 2005: 146)
not true for shame, for what shame does
is decrease those inappropriate appetites. Mosss explanation as to why shame pulls
Both Polus and Callicles accuse Socrates of us towards truth is that it pulls us towards
using appeals to shame to refute his inter- the deep beliefs we all share (see e.g. Grg.
locutors in the Gorgias. Moss is willing to 474b; cf. 475e), but which we may not be
have Socrates plead guilty to this charge, aware of unless and until challenged in
while also characterizing the way in which the way Socrates habitually challenges his
Socrates uses shame as blameless indeed, interlocutors.16
as morally useful. The Gorgias shows that Notice that if Moss, Woodruff and
appeals to a persons feelings of shame and Sanderman are right, the process to which
admiration may be able to succeed, when they call our attention goes the opposite way
rational arguments have failed, in bringing from what Penner had proposed (quoted ear-
him to see that a harmful pleasure is to be lier) in claiming that all desires to do some-
avoided, or that a beneficial pain is to be thing are rational desires, in that they always
pursued (Moss 2005: 140). automatically adjust to the agents beliefs
The way in which Socrates argues against about what is the best means to their ultimate
Polus allows Socrates to show his interlocu- end (Penner 1992: 128). Instead of desires
tor that two of his non-rational impulses lead adjusting to ones beliefs, Moss, Woodruff
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and Sanderman see Socrates as trying to get difficult to assess. On the one hand, Moss
beliefs to change on the basis of a desire to does not seem to be claiming that shame pro-
avoid or escape from a painful emotion. duces an all-things-considered judgement.
More recently, however, a detractor has Our own understanding of her view is that
argued against Moss (but not Woodruff or shame creates a sense of conflict between
Sanderman), claiming that she has misinter- what the interlocutor believes and what the
preted the evidence from the Gorgias. D. B. interlocutor believes about what he or she
Futter (2009) claims, contrary to Moss, both should believe, such that the conflict cannot
that Socrates does not win his arguments be resolved unless and until the interlocutor
against Polus or Callicles using shame, rather finds some way to be relieved of the shame,
than reason, by defending the actual argu- or else the interlocutor finds a way to change
ments Socrates provides. Futter also doubts what he or she believes. This seems to be the
Mosss contention (and thus also Woodruffs same mechanism at work in what is popu-
and Sandermans analyses) that shame can be larly called peer pressure, and so it seems to
an effective tool of moral persuasion, on the us to be right for Moss (and Woodruff and
ground that shame Sanderman) to point to shame as an effective
instrument of moral persuasion.
does not have the right kind of force, so
to speak, to produce an all-things-consid- SOCRATES ON THE USES OF PUNISHMENT
ered judgment that (e.g. doing wrong is
worse than suffering it). The basic reason
We have been discussing whether or not
for this is that shame is an emotion of
Socrates recognized a role for shame in per-
self-evaluation, whereas belief involves
taking something as true. Thinking one- suasion. But several passages suggest that
self contemptible for taking something something even stronger than shame may be
to be true does not entail or incline one needed for modifying human behaviour. In a
towards no longer taking it to be true. number of passages, Socrates seems to indi-
The shame judgment is reflexive, focused cate a willingness to recognize various forms
on the agent himself as one who holds a of punishment as appropriate responses to
particular belief, whereas belief-revision certain kinds of wrongdoing. So, for exam-
requires that he take the (moral) world ple, in the Apology, Socrates distinguishes
to be otherwise. (Futter 2009: 460) between an obviously intellectualist kind of
response to wrongdoing, and another that
Futters first objection to Moss has to be scholars have often denied to Socrates on
evaluated by an appeal to the quality of the ground that it seems incompatible with
Socrates actual arguments, but we are Socratic intellectualism. In his discussion of
inclined to think that at worst they show the accusation that he corrupts the youth,
only that Moss has perhaps overstated her Socrates responds:
view, for plainly one way in which Socrates
could induce shame in a proud interlocutor is If I corrupt them involuntarily, how-
by producing better arguments for a position ever, the law here isnt to bring people
the interlocutor denies than the interlocutor to trial for errors of this sort but to
can produce on behalf of the contrary posi- take them aside in private to teach and
tion. The second objection is perhaps more admonish them. For its clear that once
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I understand, Ill stop what Im doing become well, and it is necessary for him
involuntarily. But youve avoided asso- not to act cowardly but to shut his eyes
ciating with me and you didnt want to and be courageous, as if he were going
instruct me, and instead wanted to bring to a doctor for surgery or cautery, pur-
me here to trial where its the law to try suing the good and noble and taking no
those who need punishment, not instruc- account of the pain, and if his injustice is
tion. (Ap. 26a) worthy of a beating, he should put him-
self forward to be beaten, and if to be
imprisoned, he should do it, and if to pay
If, as Penner and others have claimed, only a fine, to pay it, and if to go into exile,
philosophical dialogue can improve ones to go, and if to be killed, he should be
fellow citizens (Penner 2000; his emphasis), killed. (Grg. 480ad; see also 478ce)
Socrates distinction here between educat-
ing and punishing wrongdoers would be In the other passage, in the eschatological
otiose.17 myth at the end of the dialogue, pain itself
When we actually look at the list of pun- seems to cure the soul of injustice.
ishments Socrates sometimes seems ready
to authorize, moreover, we find several It is fitting for everyone who deserves
examples that seem very poorly suited to punishment from another either to
the purely cognitive changes so many schol- become better and to profit from it or
to serve as an example to others in order
ars have claimed are all that Socrates could
that others, when they see the suffering
endorse. Such punishments include whipping
that they undergo will become better out
(Cri. 51b; Hp. Ma. 292b; Grg. 480cd and of fear. Those who become better and
perhaps 524c), imprisonment (Cri. 51b; Grg. pay the penalty inflicted on them by gods
480d), fines (Grg. 480d), banishment (Grg. and men are those who have committed
480d) and even death (Grg. 480d and prob- wrongs that are curable. Nonetheless,
ably Euthphr. 9a, 9c). What could the point the benefit comes to them there in Hades
of such treatments be, for Socrates? through pain and suffering. For it is not
In fact, Socrates directly addresses this possible to be rid of injustice in any other
problem in a couple of passages in the way. (Grg. 525bc)18
Gorgias. In the first, we learn that Socrates
believes that painful punishments can serve RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA OF SOCRATES
to cure the soul of the injustice that leads to ENDORSEMENT OF PUNISHMENT
wrongdoing:
Precisely because the sorts of punishments
If he or whomever else he may care Socrates seems to endorse in these passages
about commits wrongdoing, he should
operate through the use of pain as a moti-
voluntarily go to wherever he will pay
vational influence (rather than by direct
the penalty as soon as possible, to the
judge as if to the doctor, eager to take ratiocination), many scholars have found
care that the disease of wrongdoing not the conception of punishment introduced
become chronic and make his soul fester here incompatible with the moral psychol-
and become incurable. [ . . . ] He ought ogy of the (other) early dialogues of Plato.
not hide his injustice but bring it out in Some scholars have accordingly argued that
the open, so that he may pay his due and a new moral psychology is introduced in the
201

Gorgias during Socrates conversation with of painful punishments as a way to respond

Callicles.19 That Plato never calls explicit to wrongdoers. Instead, she regards Socrates
attention to such a shift in the moral psychol- apparent endorsement of various forms of
ogy on which the discussion is based, and that physical punishment as a perhaps deliber-
explicit references to painful punishments for ate oddity, and hypothesizes that the condi-
the treatment of wrongdoing also appear in tional nature of what Socrates says here in the
the earlier discussion with Polus (quoted just Gorgias (if his unjust acts merit whipping . . .
above) are, however, difficulties for this view. etc.) may only state a per impossibile condi-
Indeed, as we have seen, the Gorgias is also tion: Perhaps the conditional nature of the
not the only dialogue, among those generally claims about physical punishment at 480cd
regarded as early, in which Socrates seems to [. . .] indicates that Socrates is not committed
recognize a role for punishments other than to physical punishment ever being a genuine
purely rational admonishment. cure (Moss 2007: 232 n. 8).
Other scholars take an even more extreme Obviously, one way to deal with texts that
stand by simply denying that the text really plainly state a view that one does not wish to
means what it actually says. So, for example, attribute to the character actually stating that
quite recently Christopher Rowe has claimed view is to deny the authors or the charac-
that punishment, or kolazein, for Socrates, ters sincerity. But we might instead consider
is not a matter for the courts but for philo- if another, rather more charitable, approach
sophical dialectic (Rowe 2007: 34). Rowe is possible. We believe that the grounds for
earlier noticed that Socrates contrasts nou- such an approach may be found in the many
thetein (admonishment) with kolazein (pun- references to the appetites and passions and
ishment) in Apology (26a; quoted in the last to their keeping them in a disciplined condi-
section) (Rowe 2007: 32), but seems to think tion in the early dialogues. We have argued
that Socrates now assimilates the two. Thus, above that Socratic motivational intellectu-
Rowe finds himself able to reach his goal: alism requires only that every human action
My conclusion is that the Socrates of the reflect the agents cognitive state at the time
Gorgias does not endorse flogging, impris- of the action regarding which, of the present
onment, or any other vulgar kind of punish- options of which the agent is aware, are in
ment (Rowe 2007: 36). Socrates talked as if the agents best interest. But we have already
he endorsed such things only as a rhetorical found a role for shame in the way we might
strategy against Polus and Callicles: Socrates come to have a certain belief about what is
mounts his argument in the terms he does best for us at a given time. Could not pain,
[. . .] because they are the terms his oppo- also, play a similar role? We have now argued
nents, or interlocutors, can readily under- in several places (most recently in Brickhouse
stand (Rowe 2007, 34). That such a tactic and Smith 2010) that it can, indeed, play such
renders Socrates dishonest or misleading in a role, and that it can also have important
the way he undertakes his dialectical discus- effects in bringing undisciplined appetites
sions seems not to concern Rowe. and passions into a more disciplined condi-
Similarly, and despite her own view that tion, which would then allow the agent more
shame can play a role in Socratic moral psy- effectively to deliberate about the preferabil-
chology, Jessica Moss balks at the idea that ity of available options in a more sober and
Socrates could actually endorse the efficacy accurate way. Accordingly, we not only see
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no contradiction between the moral psychol- CRITO:Certainly not.

ogy given in the latter part of the Gorgias SOCRATES: It is, rather, to be respected more?
and what is in the rest of that work or in CRITO: Much more. (Cri. 47d48a; see
the other early dialogues, we also see no need also Grg. 478ce, 511c512b; R. I
to try to avoid the obvious sense of the text 353d354a)
when Plato has Socrates explicitly endorse
the uses of painful punishments, imprison- But what are we to make of this claim, and
ment or any other means by which a wrong- precisely what does Socrates have in mind
doers out-of-control appetites or passions as the condition of a soul that has been cor-
might be reined in and better controlled. rupted and mutilated? In Platos Republic,
Plato has Socrates agree to explain to Glaucon
and Adeimantus why justice is always prefer-
able to injustice. The way in which he does
WRONGDOING AND DAMAGE this is first to show that justice consists in
TO THE SOUL having the various parts of the soul in bal-
ance with each other, such that no part of the
SOUL-DAMAGE AND COGNITIVE PROCESSING soul is performing the function appropriate
to another part (443c444a). Injustice, then,
One of the many interesting features of the is a kind of civil war between the three parts,
moral psychology Plato gives to Socrates is a meddling and doing of anothers work, a
the claim, made in a number of places, that rebellion by some part against the whole soul
wrongdoing actually damages the soul. We in order to rule it inappropriately (444b).
have already seen how he makes this claim Now, in the Gorgias, Plato does have
in the Gorgias. Here is how he puts it in the Socrates refer to that in the soul in which
Crito: we have appetites (at 493a and 493b), and
his later characterization of keeping the soul
SOCRATES: Come then: If we ruin what in an orderly condition (see 504b505b,
becomes better by health and destroyed 506d507a, 507e508a) may also suggest
by disease when were persuaded by the that he regards the soul to be composed
opinion of those who lack expertise, is our of parts, but he nowhere in the early or
life worth living when this has been cor- Socratic dialogues explains what the vari-
rupted? This is, surely, the body, isnt it? ous parts may be, nor does he in any way
CRITO: Yes. argue or attempt to explain precisely why
SOCRATES: Therefore, is our life worth liv- the soul must have whatever parts it may
ing with a body in bad condition and have. But even if Socrates did think the soul
corrupted? had parts, the account of injustice Plato has
CRITO: Certainly not. Socrates provide in Republic IV does not
SOCRATES: But is our life worth living with appear to be one the Socrates of the earlier
this thing being corrupted that injustice dialogues could provide. Psychic injustice, in
mutilates and justice improves? Or, do the Republic, involves the suborning of the
we believe that what justice and injustice rational part by one of the lower parts of the
concern whatever it is of the things that soul.20 However, Socratic motivational intel-
make us up is inferior to the body? lectualism seems to rule out this possibility
203

altogether: in Socratic motivational psychol- if one has every kind of food and drink,
ogy, recall, every action reflects the agents lots of money, and every sort of power
judgement of what is in his or her best inter- to rule, life is thought to be not worth
est, among the available options, at the time living when ones bodys nature is ruined.
So even if someone can do whatever he
of action. In the characterization of psychic
wishes, except what will free him from
injustice in the Republic, on the contrary, the
vice and injustice and make him acquire
rational part of the soul may judge that one justice and virtue, how can it be worth
way of acting would be in ones best interest living when his soul the very thing by
and yet have that judgement simply swept which he lives is ruined and in turmoil?
aside by the usurping appetitive or spirited (R. I 445ab)
part of the soul.21 The case of Leontius and
the corpses, seems to provide a case in which The similarity of this passage to the one in the
such an overthrow actually occurs, even if Crito that we quoted at the beginning of this
only temporarily22: section is obvious. But, as we have also now
shown, the Socrates who spoke in the Crito
Leontius, son of Aglaion, was coming cannot have the same explanation for how
up from the Piraeus outside the North injustice damages the soul as the one that so
Wall when he saw some dead bodies impresses Glaucon in the Republic. What,
lying by the public executioner. At the then, can the Socrates of the early dialogues
same time, he had an appetite to look mean when he talks about the damage to the
and was also disgusted with himself and soul that wrongdoing causes, if it is not to be
made himself turn away. For a while,
understood in terms of a destructive civil war
he struggled and covered his face, but
between parts of the soul?
at length, overpowered by the appetite,
he opened his eyes wide, ran towards
the corpses, and exclaimed, Look, you HOW IS THE SOUL OF THE WRONGDOER
wretches! Fill yourselves with the beau- DAMAGED BY WRONGDOING?
tiful sight! (R. I 439e440a; see also
440ab) Those scholars who have tried to explain
Socratic motivational intellectualism without
Given the later conception of moral psychol- recognizing a role for appetites and passions
ogy, we can see easily enough what it might would presumably have to account for the
mean for Socrates to claim that injustice damage done to the soul by wrongdoing by
damages the soul. If injustice is, as he says in an appeal to some purely cognitive form of
the Republic, a kind of civil war in the soul, damage. An example of this sort of view has
we can well understand why Glaucon tells recently been argued, for example, by Naomi
Socrates that there is no reason to consider Reshotko: Socrates must think that harming
any further the question of whether justice is another increases the ignorance of the agent,
preferable to injustice: which Reshotko seeks to explain by contend-
ing that harming another in the belief that
[Glaucon speaking] But Socrates, this we will benefit by doing so predisposes us
inquiry looks ridiculous to me now that to have many ill-conceived notions about
justice and injustice have been shown how the world works. Reshotko offers no
to be as we have described. Even now, explanation, however, for how wrongdoing
204

would actually increase ones misconceptions as a result, end up with a net increase in false
about the world, or predispose us to even beliefs about what is best, it is hardly obvi-
greater ignorance than what led us to do ous that such will always be the case.
wrong in the first place. But this, after all, is Here again, however, we can find an easier
precisely the problem: wrongdoing must, in explanation for Socrates view if we acknowl-
the Socratic account, derive from some cog- edge the potential effects of the appetites
nitive failure. It also, he claims, damages the and passions in motivation. Recall that in
soul. The damage to the soul cannot be the the Gorgias, Socrates emphasizes keeping
cognitive failure that is antecedently required these non-rational factors in a disciplined
in order for the agent to do wrong; it must, condition:
therefore, be some further negative conse-
quence, in addition to the original cognitive And about the soul, oh best one, isnt
failure. it the same thing? As long as it is bad,
How can this story be told in such a way being foolish and out of control and
unjust and impious, it ought to be kept
as to make no reference to the effects of
from its appetites and not turn to any-
the appetites and passions? Presumably, the
thing other than what will be better for
account would require either that the wrong- it. Do you agree or not? I do. For isnt
doer acquire some new false belief or beliefs, it the case that the soul becomes better
in addition to the one(s) that led him or her in this way? Of course. Keeping it
to act badly in the first place. Here is how from its appetites is disciplining it?
Reshotko characterizes this position: Yes. (505b)
Of course, only someone who already In this view, plainly, the damage to the soul
has ill-conceived notions about how that results from wrongdoing is having
the world works will harm another in ones appetites and passions become less
the first place. Still, it would be reason- disciplined. The reason this happens is pre-
able for Socrates to think that harming sumably that the initial wrongdoing was
another will allow one to develop even the result of the pursuit of something, an
more false beliefs than one originally
appetite or passion, represented to the soul
had. One might, for example, begin to
as a benefit to be pursued, and the agent
believe that there is justification for the
harm that was done or that it would be failed to deliberate in such a way as to dis-
okay to harm further people in a similar cern the real benefit of some other available
fashion. (Reshotko 2006: 72 n. 31; our option, and was thus taken in by the power
emphasis) of appearance given by the appetites focus
on the apparent good of its own target. But
The weakness in such a view, however, is essential to Socrates position on disciplin-
already evident in Reshotkos characteri- ing the appetites is his view that acting in
zation of how such a result might occur. accordance with an appetite strengthens
Socrates view requires not just that damage that appetite whereas refraining from acting
might occur in the soul as a result of wrong- in accordance with the appetite weakens it.
doing, but instead that wrongdoing always By weakening the appetites, one makes one-
damages the soul. So even if we can imagine self better able to make the sober and clear-
that an agent acting badly might sometimes, headed judgements required for a successful
205

life; but by strengthening ones desires, one Damage to the soul occurs when the appe-
encounters the opposite effect. It is this tites or passions become strengthened, leav-
effect, we suggest, that Socrates would point ing the agent increasingly less able to make
to as the damage to the soul engendered by good choices between the options available
wrongdoing. at any given time. Instead, the agent becomes
increasingly disposed to select paths that
RUINED SOULS only serve to strengthen the undisciplined
appetites or passions even further. But how
As we have now seen, Socrates thinks there could this process get to the point where it
are some forms of wrongdoing for which only is no longer reversible, so that the very best
painful punishment can serve to return the such a person would have to offer would be
wrongdoers soul to a healthy condition. But to serve as an example to others, tormented
in the afterlife myth of the Gorgias, we hear endlessly in the afterlife?
about some wrongdoers who have gone past As far as we know, no scholar who fails to
the point of any chance of improvement: recognize the influence of the appetites and
passions in human motivational psychology
This is why [Rhadamanthus, the judge has even tried to provide an explanation of
who punishes unjust souls from Asia] what a ruined soul might be. If we did not
stops them, though he doesnt know believe that appetites and passions were at
whose soul it is, and gets hold of the
the heart of the process leading to this condi-
Great King or some other king or pow-
tion, however, we might seek to find some
erful person and sees nothing healthy in
the soul, but that it is has been whipped purely cognitive explanation for what a
and covered with scars, the result of ruined soul might be like. So, for example,
lying and injustice, which each of his we might imagine that a ruined soul was
actions has stamped on his soul and eve- one in which ones cognitive system reached
rything was crooked as a result of lying a kind of stable coherence, such that even
and boasting and nothing was left that is Socratic dialogue could no longer get the per-
straight because it has been brought up son to recognize anything wrong with any of
without truth. (524e525a) the beliefs that lead to wrongdoing. But this
approach seems to be made unavailable by
Souls in this condition, where nothing was Socratic cognitive psychology.
left that is straight in them, cannot even be
cured by the great judges (or gods) who rule POLUS: Dont you think youre completely
in the afterlife. Instead: refuted, Socrates, when you say such
things that no one would agree to? Just
[T]hose who have committed the greatest ask anyone whos here! . . .
injustices and who have become incur- SOCRATES: I think, indeed, that you and I and
able through these crimes will serve as other people believe that to commit injus-
examples, and they will no longer benefit
tice is worse than suffering it, and not to
in as much as they are incurable, but oth-
be punished is worse than to be punished.
ers will benefit by seeing them enduring
throughout eternity the most fearful suf- POLUS: Whereas I say that neither I nor any-
fering on account of their great crimes. one else believes that. But youd prefer suf-
(Grg. 525bc) fering injustice to doing it?
206

SOCRATES: Yes, and so would you and every- of the soul, to manage, rule, and deliberate,
one else. (Grg. 473e474b) and all other such things.
As discussed in the section Socratic Cognitive

Psychology above, Socrates thinks that eve-
ryone holds beliefs that can be shown to be VIRTUE INTELLECTUALISM
inconsistent with the sorts of beliefs that
would incline one to wrongdoing. IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN VIRTUE
In Republic I, we are told that the func- INTELLECTUALISM AND MOTIVATIONAL
tion of the soul is not just to live, but to INTELLECTUALISM?
manage, rule, and deliberate, and all other
such things (R. I 353d). So it would not be In this chapter, we have primarily focused
unreasonable for us to suppose that a ruined on motivational intellectualism because that
soul would be one that could no longer per- is the Socratic view of what has come to be
form its proper function. If the fault can- known as moral psychology. However, as
not be entirely a cognitive one, as we have we said at the outset, scholars have used the
suggested, we might accordingly look for term Socratic intellectualism to refer either
another source of the problem, and by now, to his motivational intellectualism (accord-
the culprit should be easy enough to spot: ing to which agents always act in accord
In a ruined soul, we propose, the appetites with what they think is best for them, of the
and passions have become so strong as never available options of which they are aware at
again to allow the agent to manage, rule, the time of action), or to his virtue intellec-
and deliberate, and all other such things. tualism (according to which virtue is a kind
Each time the soul becomes aware of some of knowledge). In our discussion of Socratic
pleasure or pain, some lure of renown or motivational intellectualism, we have tried
fearful risk, the agent finds no further delib- to show how that intellectualism is actually
eration about which course of action is possi- compatible with Socrates frequent refer-
ble he or she simply accepts automatically, ences to the effects the appetites and passions
as if there really are no other genuine can- can have on the way we act and thus, we
didates for action available, whatever target have moved away from those interpreta-
is represented to the soul by the strongest tions that supposed that Socratic intellectual-
appetite or passion at work at the time as ism required that the appetites and passions
the best course of action. Still consistent with could play no role in the explanation of
Socratic motivational intellectualism, such a human action. It remains, then, for us to
soul will always act in accordance with what consider whether Socrates believed, as most
the agent thinks is the best option available scholars have held, that virtue just is knowl-
at the time of action. But the reason why edge, or whether, now that we have identified
such an agent will think that a given course an explanatory role for appetites and pas-
of action is the best available will always be sions in motivation, whether we must also
that this is the course of action indicated as now identify a similar role for these things
best by the strongest appetite or passion the in the Socratic account of virtue and if so,
agent experiences at that time. As such, the whether this reveals Socrates not to be an
agent will simply fail to perform the function intellectualist about virtue after all.
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VIRTUE, KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-CONTROL beings would, accordingly, already have

an ordered soul. So although we do find that
In the Gorgias, Plato has Socrates explain that Socrates conception of virtue recognizes a
a self-controlled soul is a good one (507a), as need for control of the appetites and passions,
well as a just and happy one (504d, 508b). that need is a necessary and prior condition
So a good soul, for Socrates, is one that is of virtue; Socrates could identify knowledge
well-ordered (kosmios). Contrastingly, a with virtue precisely because he regarded such
disordered soul will be one that is uncon- knowledge as possible only with, and thus
trolled. By analogy with the physicians care- sufficient for, a soul that, because maintained
ful regime of management over what a sick in a disciplined condition, was immune to the
patient is allowed to eat or drink, Socrates ethically dangerous and cognitively distorting
describes similar treatment for psychic dis- effects of strong appetites or passions.
order the foolish, undisciplined, unjust,
and impious soul must keep away from its
appetites to become better, and this is said to
be disciplining it (Grg. 501b, quoted in the SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
section How Is the Soul of the Wrongdoer
Damaged by Wrongdoing?). In this chapter, we have reviewed the
As we showed in the section The Power most important and controversial issues
of Appearance in the Protagoras, Socrates in Socratic moral psychology, with spe-
thinks our lives would be saved by what he cial attention to what is called Socratic
calls the metrtik techn, the craft of meas- Intellectualism, by which scholars have
urement that can make the appearances lose meant either motivational or virtue intel-
their power by showing us the truth (Prt. lectualism. The main debates about Socratic
356de). One with such knowledge would motivational intellectualism have had to do
never err in judging what courses of action with whether or not appetites and passions
or objects in the world would most promote play any role in the way Socrates would
our interest in any given circumstance. But describe and explain human action. We
as we also argued in the section Daniel T. showed how, until recently, most interpret-
Devereuxs View, such knowledge does not ers thought that Socrates regarded human
simply overpower the urges of strong appe- agency to be entirely explicable in terms of
tites and passions; instead, as we argued there, cognitions. But we also argued that this view
having disciplined appetites and passions does not adequately explain Socrates many
will be a necessary precondition to being vir- references to the appetites and passions
tuous at all. Accordingly, having ones soul and the ways in which these can distort our
in a disciplined condition, where the non- judgements and damage our lives. We then
rational desires of the appetites and passions surveyed some of the various explanations
are prevented from distorting our judgements of how the appetites and passions operate,
about what is best for us, is a necessary (but rehearsing and exploring some of the subtle
not a sufficient) condition for possessing the differences between scholars who have found
craft of measurement at all. One who actu- a role for such non-rational desires to play
ally achieves such knowledge by which we in our ethical lives. Along the way, we found
can lead the best lives possible for human several general areas in which Socratic moral
208

psychology seems to be much more persua- virtue is knowledge of good and bad the
sive and nuanced than it appeared to be in knowledge of how best to live ones life.
earlier scholarly renderings of it. We then Scholarly debate about these subjects
concluded with a brief look at Socratic virtue obviously continues, and our own views on
intellectualism, and showed how Socrates these questions will probably require at least
view that virtue is a kind of knowledge reshaping and further clarification. In these
squares with his views of how non-rational pages, we have sought mainly to give read-
desires can influence our lives. ers a good sense of the current state of schol-
After considering the multitude of compet- arly opinion on Socratic moral psychology,
ing interpretations, however, the account we but also to show why it deserves the greatly
have presented preserves the view of Socrates increased attention it has recently achieved.
as both a motivational intellectualist and Socrates had much more interesting and
also a virtue intellectualist. He remains a perceptive views on this topic than have tra-
motivational intellectualist because although ditionally been recognized. In Brickhouse
he recognizes that appetites and passions can and Smith (2010, ch. 7), we compare and
influence the way we judge courses of action contrast the Socratic views with those of
and objects in the world, it remains true that Plato (in works later than those in which
human agents always act in accordance with the Socratic picture is drawn), Aristotle and
their present beliefs about what is best for the Stoics. Readers interested in determining
them among the options available to them of which of these important ancient accounts of
which they are aware. And Socrates is a vir- moral psychology is the most plausible and
tue intellectualist because although he thinks compelling may find our detailing of their
that one can never achieve the knowledge differences in that chapter useful.
that constitutes virtue unless and until one
attains orderly discipline over ones appetites Thomas C. Brickhouse and
and passions, he nonetheless also thinks that Nicholas D. Smith
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9
SOCRATES ON LOVE
INTRODUCTION: SOCRATES AS Protagoras, teased for hunting after the ripe

LOVER Alcibiades, Socrates defends himself, alluding
to Homers observation that young men are
In the famous Catalogue Aria of Don at their most seductive when their beards are
Giovanni, Leporello recounts how his mas- in first bloom (309ab). However, Alcibiades
ter seduced 2,065 ladies in France, Germany, was not the only youth to catch Socrates eye:
Italy, Turkey and Spain; reading Platos in the opening of the Charmides, Socrates
Socratic dialogues, one gets the sense that, famously describes himself as aflame with
while he may have had few actual conquests, passion when he catches a glimpse beneath
at least in terms of overall susceptibility to the boys cloak.3 This description is paral-
beauty, Socrates was not far behind.1 In the leled in Xenophons Symposium, where
Charmides, Socrates describes himself as a Socrates describes the effect of rubbing his
poor judge of youthful beauty because, like naked shoulder against Critobulos as the
a broken yardstick, he finds almost all young bite of a wild beast, which leaves a sting in
men appealing (154b). In the Symposium, his heart (4.278). This depiction of Socrates
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of being crazy is not confined to Plato and Xenophon;
about beautiful boys; he constantly follows Dover cites a remark by Aristoxenos, that
them around in a perpetual daze (216d).2 Socrates had strong heterosexual appetites,
Though Socrates is famous for professing which he indulged, though without injustice
ignorance, there is one area where he trum- (f. 55; Dover 1978: 153). Kahn alludes to a
pets his expertise: in the Symposium, he fragment from Phaedos Zophyrus, in which
declares that the only thing he understands is the physiognomist concludes on the basis of
ta ertika (matters of love, 177d); in the Lysis, Socrates bulging eyes that he is a woman-
he describes himself as mean and useless in izer; Socrates acknowledges this as his native
all else, but possessed of the god-given skill weakness, which he has mastered through
to recognize lovers and beloveds (204bc). rational training (1996: 1112).
Perhaps the most noteworthy of Socrates If we look more closely at these passages,
infatuations was with Alcibiades: in the something strange emerges. As the frag-
Gorgias, Socrates calls himself the dual lover ments from Phaedo and Aristoxenos already
of philosophy and of Alcibiades (481d). In the suggest, though Socrates may have had
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
unusually strong sensual appetites, he seems them a desire to imitate in their own lives
to have had them firmly under control. In the philosophical pursuit of aret which
the Symposium, after mockingly comparing they saw in his. (223)
Socrates to the debauched Silenus, Alcibiades
reveals that the boy-crazy exterior is just Supposing that Kahn is correct, that Socrates
a veneer (216de). Alcibiades goes on to flirtatious exterior is actually a means of
recount the humiliating story of his failed seducing promising youths to philosophy,
seduction of Socrates. In a striking inver- then we are left with a puzzle regarding
sion of pederastic convention,4 Alcibiades Socrates motivation. In classical Athens,
becomes so infatuated with Socrates wis- pederastic relations typically had a trans-
dom and virtue that he is transformed into actional nature: older male citizens offered
the lover, seeking to seduce Socrates, in order their beloveds moral and physical training
to trade physical for spiritual benefits. To in exchange for sexual favours. Yet in taking
this, Socrates replies: on the cast of lover in order to draw boys to
philosophy, Socrates philosophical seduc-
If I really have in me the power to make tion appears unmotivated. The evidence
you a better man, then you can see in me does not suggest that Socrates was hoping to
a beauty that is really beyond description exchange philosophical for sexual favours.5
and makes your own remarkable good
And, while Socrates typically flatters his
looks pale in comparison . . . You seem
interlocutors, claiming that he hopes to gain
to me to want more than your proper
share: you offer me the merest appear- wisdom from them, in the case of the very
ance of beauty, and in return you want young and inexperienced Lysis, Menexenus
the thing itself, gold in exchange for and Charmides come to mind it seems
bronze. (218de) unlikely that he could have believed that they
had much to teach him. Perhaps in engaging
This is echoed in Aeschines Alcibiades, philosophically with these boys, Socrates is
where Socrates rebukes Alcibiades for his acting out of disinterested beneficence. But
vanity, and Alcibiades, reduced to tears, begs what prompts this? Why, as Socrates puts it,
Socrates for help in becoming virtuous (cited trade gold for bronze?
in Kahn 1996: 1923). Socrates declares that This worry becomes acute if we consider
he had hoped that through keeping com- the theory of love and motivation that Vlastos
pany with Alcibiades, dia to eran (through and others locate in the Lysis. In his seminal
loving him), he might improve him. Kahn paper, The Individual as Object of Love in
speculates: Plato, Vlastos argues that Socrates theory of
love in the Lysis is a failure, since it is inca-
Perhaps [Aeschines] is saying in his sim- pable of accommodating disinterested con-
pler way . . . what Plato indicates more cern for the beloved. According to Vlastos,
explicitly in the Alcibiades speech: that Socrates argues that if A loves B, he does so
what looked to the world like Socrates
because of some benefit he needs from B and
flirtatious interest in handsome young
for the sake of just that benefit (8). We are
men was in fact his way of focusing upon
them the magnetic power of his own per- to love others only for the sake of our own
sonality and thus drawing them to him possession of happiness and never for their
through the power of love, instilling in own sakes. This leads us to be attracted to
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
others who are beautiful and useful solely for knowledge. But if Lysis is ignorant then,
insofar as they are such, and to potentially according to Socrates own theory, he has
abandon them should someone more beauti- nothing to offer Socrates, and we are left to
ful or useful come along. As a consequence, wonder what Socrates motives are in seek-
Plato is scarcely aware of kindness, tender- ing friendship with the boy and in benefiting
ness, compassion, concern for the freedom, him via the elenchus.6
respect for the integrity of the beloved, as In this chapter, I focus on what has come
essential ingredients in the highest type of to be called the Vlastos problem, the question
interpersonal love (30). of whether the theory of love that Socrates
We can see why the Lysis lends itself to advances in the Lysis can allow for love of
precisely this worry. In his opening elenchus other persons, and whether it can allow for
with Lysis, Socrates concludes that we are not a form of such love that is not problemati-
going to be loved by anyone insofar as we are cally egoistic. In the first part of this chapter,
useless (210c). In his subsequent discussion, I concentrate on the dialogue itself. I begin
Socrates rules out the possibility that good by offering a close examination of Socrates
could love good on the grounds that the good initial elenchus with Lysis, leading to the
are self-sufficient; he who is self-sufficient question of whether Lysis parents love him. I
needs nothing and therefore loves nothing then turn to Socrates positive account of the
(215ab). However, at the same time as the philos (lover, friend),7 agreeing with those
Lysis advances an egoistic analysis of love, interpreters who take Socrates to endorse
its dramatic frame problematizes this very the proposal that the neither-good-nor-bad
theory. The dialogue begins with Socrates (henceforth NGNB) is philos to the good.8
demonstrating to Hippothales how to seduce In the second part of this chapter, I address
a haughty boy, and he succeeds in eliciting critical responses to Socrates theory of love
Lysis and Menexenus friendship: the boy is in the Lysis. I divide these into four groups:
described as turning to Socrates paidiks kai (1) those that deny that the Lysis seeks to
philiks (in a playful and friendly manner, offer an account of the conscious motiva-
211a); Socrates addresses Menexenus as tions of the lover; (2) those that maintain
phile hetaire (dear friend, 213b); and the dia- that it allows for non-egoistic love between
logue concludes with Socrates describing him- persons; (3) those that concede that it treats
self, Lysis and Menexenus as friends (223b). all love as egoistic, but that attempt to recon-
Socrates method of seduction is to demon- cile this with contemporary intuitions regard-
strate to Lysis that he is ignorant and there- ing love as an other-regarding state; and (4)
fore needy; by humbling the boy, Socrates those that, like Vlastos, reject Socrates the-
makes him vulnerable to his advances. But ory as implausibly and repellently egoistic. I
this leads us to question Socrates motives. argue against the first group that the Lysis
On the one hand, if Lysis is knowledgeable, clearly seeks to offer an account of the lovers
then, in convincing him that he is ignorant, motives. I contend against the second group
Socrates advances his own interests, but also that the Lysis does contain an egoistic theory
emerges as a disturbingly manipulative char- of love, and against the third, that this theory
acter. On the other hand, if, as is more plau- cannot be reconciled easily with contem-
sible, Lysis is ignorant, then Socrates does porary intuitions. I conclude by suggesting,
him a service in revealing to him his need against the last group, that, while Socrates
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
theory may strike us as repellent, it is not cannot be serious. Price, for example, argues
without explanatory power. that, just as we are not to believe that the
Great King would entrust Lysis with his pos-
sessions, so we should not take seriously the
proposal that Lysis parents do not love him
DO LYSIS PARENTS LOVE HIM? (2004: 3); Robinson, similarly, suggests that
the passage is an exaggerated homily, which
The Lysis opens with Socrates questioning needs to be taken with a grain of salt (1986:
Lysis in order to demonstrate to Hippothales 69 n. 15).9 Vlastos is the notable exception
how to humble a boy, making him recep- to this trend. Vlastos observes that Socrates
tive to ones advances. Socrates begins by conclusion at 210cd, that no one will love
asking Lysis whether his parents love him, Lysis insofar as Lysis is useless, does not
and eliciting the admission that they do necessarily imply that Lysis must benefit his
love him and therefore want him to be as parents in order to be loved by them; it is pos-
happy as possible. Socrates then proposes sible that Socrates means that they wish him
that happiness is being free to do whatever to be wise in order that he may benefit him-
one pleases. However, Lysis parents do not self (1981a: 78). However, Vlastos argues
let him do as he pleases in most areas: they that (at 213e and 215bc) Socrates advances
trust their charioteer, not Lysis, with their a purely egoistic model of love, which makes
horses, their muleteer with their mules and no room for wishing Lysis well for his own
will not let him anywhere near his mothers sake. In that case, the conclusion stands that
loom. On the other hand, in areas where Lysis parents only love him insofar as he is
Lysis does have knowledge, such as reading, useful to them; since he is not yet wise, they
writing and playing the lyre, his parents give cannot love him very much.10
him free rein. Socrates extrapolates that if Before turning to arguments suggesting
Lysis possesses the relevant knowledge, his that Lysis parents do love him after all, it
neighbours will allow him to manage their is worth emphasizing that interpretive char-
estates and the Athenians their affairs. Even ity does not demand that we interpret the
the Great King will trust Lysis rather than his Lysis such that Socrates does not advance
own son to treat his sons eyes if Lysis has a utilitarian model of parental love. Plato
medical expertise. If Lysis becomes wise, eve- is a great philosopher, but as the Republic
ryone will be philos to him because he will be demonstrates, he has highly unconventional
useful and good; if he remains ignorant, then views regarding interpersonal and familial
Lysis will be no ones philos, and no one will relations. While these views might be unat-
love him, not even his parents. Socrates con- tractive to us, they do not mire him in the
cludes by observing that Lysis is in need of sort of conceptual or logical confusion that,
mental training; the implication is painfully as sympathetic interpreters, we should avoid
obvious: Lysis lacks knowledge, and so is not attributing to him.
loved, even by his parents. Nonetheless, it seems most likely to me
This conclusion has, nonetheless, been that Socrates does hold that Lysis parents
resisted by most interpreters, who find it love him. The reasons for this emerge if we
so morally repellent and psychologically look more closely at his elenchus with Lysis.
implausible that they conclude that Socrates First, consider the unfavourable comparison
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
of Lysis to his parents muleteer. If Socrates supreme regard for his son causes him to
is in fact endorsing a biconditional claim (at value other things derivatively for exam-
210d) that one is loved if and only if one has ple, he would value a cup if it contained an
knowledge, then it would emerge that Lysis antidote to some hemlock his son had drunk.
parents love their slaves more than Lysis, This passage calls to mind the example of the
given that the slaves have greater expertise. Great King and suggests that if Lysis medical
Given Athenian attitudes towards slaves, it knowledge makes the Great King value him,
seems unlikely that Socrates actually thinks this is only because he values his son even
that Lysis parents love their slaves more than more, despite his sons medical ignorance.11
Lysis; he thus cannot be serious when he con- Where does this leave us? Do Lysis par-
cludes: It seems, then, that [Lysis] parents ents love him or not? In assessing Socrates
think more even of a slave than their own initial elenchus with Lysis, we are left with
son (208b). Turn next to Socrates observa- the following interpretive options:
tion that Lysis parents do not let him rule
his own self (208c). What could their motive 1. Lysis parents do not love him.
be? They do not let him do as he wishes 2. Lysis parents do love him, but their love is
with his mothers loom for fear that he may not grounded in utility.
3. Lysis parents love him with a love grounded
damage it; by analogy, they do not let him
in utility; Lysis is useful to his parents in
govern himself for fear that he may harm
some way as yet to be determined.
himself. This makes sense only if they value 4. Socrates is in a state of aporia regarding
him highly. This, in turn, should cause us to the nature of Lysis parents love for him.
recognize that in the case of the horses and
mules, the most plausible reason why they
prevent Lysis from having his way with the I have raised considerations that cast doubt
animals is not that they fear he will damage on the first option. In order to decide between
the animals, but, rather, that they fear that the remaining three, we must first determine
the animals will damage him. Finally, when what, if any, positive account of love Socrates
Socrates observes that Lysis parents let him offers.
do as he wishes when it comes to reading and
playing the lyre, we have reason to question
whether his expertise in these areas can really
be the basis of their love for him; if this were SOCRATES POSITIVE PROPOSAL
so, they would have even more reason to love
a scribe or musician. As Santas observes, the Lysis is, formally at
Later in the dialogue, Socrates refers twice least, an aporetic dialogue: Socrates enter-
to cases of parental love that are in apparent tains, then attacks a number of hypotheses
tension with his initial exchange with Lysis. concerning who is the philos, and the best
At 212e3a, Socrates observes that newborn we can do as interpreters is to speak, specula-
infants are dearest of all things to their par- tively, of the favoured hypothesis (1988: 81).
ents. If Lysis is useless, how much more so Before considering what this may turn out to
a crying infant. And at 219d20a, Socrates be, it will be helpful to offer an overview of
describes a father who values his son more the remainder of the dialogue. After reveal-
highly than all his possessions; this fathers ing to Lysis that his ignorance renders him
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
unworthy of love, Socrates turns his atten- bad is a friend to the good. Just as a sick man
tion to Menexenus, asking him the question is friend of a doctor on account of sickness
that remains the focus for the remainder of and for the sake of health, so, more gener-
the dialogue who is the philos? Is it the one ally, the NGNB is a friend of the good on
loving, the one loved or both? Menexenus account of the presence of the bad and for
initially opts for both, so long as one of them the sake of the good. Socrates takes issue
loves the other. Socrates replies that if this is with this account for two reasons. First,
sufficient for both to be philoi (friends), then, according to this proposal, all friendships
absurdly, it will turn out that one can be phi- arise from some cause and exist for the sake
los to someone who hates him. Menexenus of some end. If this end, in turn, is the friend
therefore proposes that both are philoi, but of something else, then this would lead to an
only if they love one another. Socrates retorts infinite regress; Socrates therefore posits a
that this precludes the possibility of there terminus for this telic chain, a prton philon
being horse-lovers, quail-lovers and even (first friend, henceforth PP) for the sake of
philosophers, people who love objects that which all other friends are friends, but that
cannot possibly reciprocate their affection. is not, itself, the friend of anything further.
Menexenus third proposal is that what is In that case, all the dependent friends turn
loved is philos to that which loves; however, out to be false friends; only the PP is truly
since the beloved can hate the one loving, a friend. Second, this account assumes that
this returns us to the absurdities of his first all friendship occurs on account of the pres-
proposal. Finally, Menexenus suggests that ence of some bad. However, Socrates main-
a lover is a friend to the beloved; again, this tains that there would be friendship even if
leads to the possibility that one might be a there were no bad. In that case, there must be
philos to an enemy. some other cause of friendship. Socrates ends
Having reached aporia with Menexenus, the dialogue by proposing that desire is this
Socrates returns to questioning Lysis. cause. Since we all desire what we lack, that
Appealing to the poets, Socrates suggests is, what has been taken from us, the object
that like is friend to like. But if this is correct, of friendship is revealed to be the oikeion.12
then bad will be friend to bad; this is impos- Socrates concludes by observing that they
sible, since the bad do one another injustice. may have something useful to say about
Perhaps, then, only the good are friend to the friendship if there is a difference between
good. Socrates rejects this for two, related being oikeion and being alike. However, the
reasons. First, insofar as the good are alike, two boys miss this warning: when asked
they cannot benefit one another, and so can- whether the good is oikeion to everyone, or,
not be friends. Second, the good are, by defi- whether, rather, good is oikeion to good, bad
nition, self-sufficient; he who is self-sufficient to bad and NGNB to NGNB, they opt for the
lacks nothing and therefore loves nothing. latter; this mires them, again, in the incoher-
Socrates next considers the opposite possi- ence of good being friend to good etc. Since
bility, that unlikes are friends. This, however, they have eliminated all possible candidates
fails for the familiar reason that a friend will for the philos, the dialogue ends in aporia.
then be friend to an enemy. Most interpreters assume that Socrates
There is one possibility they have over- endorses some version of the thesis that the
looked: that that which is neither good nor NGNB is friend to the good. Before turning
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
to such interpretations, I will first consider Lysis is genuinely aporetic. Two prominent
a few alternate proposals. There are very proponents of this view are Robinson and
few interpreters who locate any other posi- Mackenzie. According to Robinson (1986),
tive analysis of friendship in the Lysis. One the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue stems
exception is Hoerber. In Platos Lysis, from Platos ignoring an ambiguity in the
Hoerber argues that according to the Lysis, sense of philos: one sense of the term applies
the highest form of friendship is mutual to those engaged in a reciprocal relationship
friendship between the good.13 The difficulty between humans, while another refers to what
with Hoerbers argument is that he can only makes some object valuable. Platos error is
adduce the most tenuous textual support. to analyse human friendship in terms of this
According to Hoerber, Platos ostensible second sense of philos, to assume that people
reason for rejecting the reciprocal analysis are valuable in the same way as objects; as a
of friendship is that it cannot account for result, he is unable to explain the reciprocal
usages such as quail-lover and philoso- aspect of friendship. While we can see why
pher, where the friendship is non-mutual.14 the NGNB should be friend to the good, it is
However, Hoerber maintains that Plato left unclear why the good should reciprocate
rejects Menexenus proposal that the lover is this affection. Robinsons argument assumes
the philos because this would allow for con- that human friendship is necessarily a mutual
texts where friendship is non-mutual; Plato relation and that Plato took it to be such, but
is thus indicating that friendship is necessar- neither claim is obvious.15 Robinson appeals
ily mutual, and we can therefore disregard to passages from Xenophon and Aristotle to
his argument against the reciprocal hypoth- establish that the Greeks took friendship to
esis (212). Against Hoerber, Platos issue be necessarily reciprocal (678); however,
with the proposal that the lover is the phi- Aristotles emphasis on reciprocity (at e.g. EN
los is not that this might lead to non-mutual 1155b6a) can be seen as a rebuttal of Platos
friendship, but, more problematically, that allowing for non-reciprocal cases of friend-
it might lead to friendship with an enemy. ship (at 212de). In fact, in the Laws, Plato
Furthermore, Hoerbers argument that we distinguishes two kinds of philia, between
should disregard Socrates argument oppos- equals and unequals, and specifies that the
ing reciprocal friendship cuts both ways; latter is rarely reciprocal (837ab): reciproc-
perhaps we can deploy the argument oppos- ity does not appear to be a requirement on
ing reciprocal friendship as evidence for dis- philia for Plato. To turn to the Lysis, Plato
regarding Socrates objections to one-way deliberately sets the dialogue in an erotic
friendship. Hoerber adds that, in listing the context, and depicts Hippothales ers for
views that have been refuted at the end of the Lysis as one-sided. Why, then, is it out of the
dialogue, Socrates ignores reciprocal friend- question that Plato should allow for cases of
ship. Against Hoerber, the very last substan- philia that are one-sided as well, particularly
tive philosophical point Socrates makes in since he emphasizes non-reciprocal cases of
the dialogue is that good cannot be friend to ers (at 212bc), and (at 221b) claims that
good (222d). ers entails philia?
A more plausible alternative to Hoerber In her ingenious paper, Impasse and
is the proposal is that, far from advanc- Explanation: from the Lysis to the Phaedo,
ing any positive account of friendship, the Mackenzie proposes that the dialogue
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
contains a complex structure of thesis and thesis, the thesis that the NGNB is philos to
counter-thesis, which end without resolution the good.16 There is, I believe, substantial evi-
and with no hint of a saving clause (31). In dence that Socrates subscribes to the NGNB
particular, the proposal that the NGNB is thesis. First, consider the manner in which it
friend of the good is undermined by the argu- is introduced (see Penner and Rowe 2005:
ment that there would be friendship even if 2434). The first phase of the investigation
there were no bad; the thesis that all friend- into what is the philos centres on Menexenus
ship is for the sake of some PP is attacked by replies to the alternatives Socrates poses to
the arguments that the good is loved for the him, and the second examines answers given
sake of the bad and that desire is the ultimate by the poets. But the third and final phase
cause of friendship; the claim that desire is of the dialogue, in which the NGNB thesis
what explains friendship is countered by the is introduced, begins in a striking manner. It
suggestion that friendship is explained by is Socrates who notes that they have over-
some feature in the beloved, which renders looked the possibility that NGNB is friend to
it oikeion; and, finally, the thesis that all the good. He then announces his intention to
friendship is directed at the oikeion is wax prophetic (apomanteuomenos) and asks
rejected because this amounts to the previ- Lysis to listen to his mantic sayings (ha de
ously rejected proposal that friendship is felt legn manteuomai). That Plato should place
by like for like. Against Mackenzie, not all of the NGNB thesis in the mouth of Socrates,
her counter-theses need be construed as such, and draw attention to it by comparing it to
and it is not clear that the dialogue ends with an oracular utterance demands explanation;
no hint of a saving clause. Socrates argu- the most plausible is that Plato is signalling
ment that friendship would persist in the that this is the hypothesis that Socrates treats
absence of the bad does nothing to under- most seriously.
mine his proposal that the NGNB is philos According to the NGNB thesis, friendship
to the good, only the additional clause, that aims at the good; the example of the sick
it is philos on account of the bad. The claim body suggests that it is directed towards ones
that all friendship originates in desire does own good. This conception of friendship as
not contradict the thesis that it is all directed grounded in utility is repeatedly endorsed
towards the PP. Similarly, the proposals earlier in the dialogue. In his elenchus with
that friendship is due to desire and that it is Lysis, Socrates concludes that we are loved if
directed towards the oikeion are not clearly and only if we are wise and hence useful to
incompatible. Finally, the collapse of the pro- others (210cd). In rejecting the proposal that
posal that philia is felt for the oikeion into good is friend to good, Socrates produces two
the previously rejected hypothesis that like arguments, both of which rely on the assump-
is friend to like is due to an argumentative tion that friendship aims at benefitting one-
error on the part of Lysis and Menexenus, an self: the argument that likes cannot be friends
error of which Socrates clearly warns them because, being alike, they cannot benefit one
(at 222b). While the dialogue may formally another; and the argument that the good can-
end in aporia, if anything, Plato implies (at not be friends because, being self-sufficient,
222b) that Socrates is far from stumped. they can be of no use to one another.
Most interpreters take Socrates to endorse Finally, at the conclusion of the dialogue,
some version of what I shall call the NGNB Socrates tells his friend, Wanting to review
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
the argument, I said, It seems to me, Lysis 1986: 75). As Rowe notes, on their own,
and Menexenus, that if there is some differ- these parallels perhaps do not offer decisive
ence between belonging and being like, then evidence for what, if any, positive proposals
we might have something to say about what a Socrates advances in the Lysis, but when con-
friend is (222b). This suggests that, so long joined with evidence internal to the dialogue,
as we do not commit Lysis and Menexenus they strongly suggest that the NGNB thesis is
error of identifying the oikeion with the Socrates own (2000: 21011).
homoion (like), on Socrates own telling,
we will have a plausible account of friend-
ship. Socrates goes on to list all the accounts
of friendship that have been rejected; as INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS FOR
Tessitore notes, the suggestion that the THE POSITIVE PROPOSAL
NGNB is friend to the good is conspicuously
absent from this list (1990: 128). Suppose we follow the majority of interpret-
Apart from evidence internal to the Lysis, ers in taking the NGNB thesis to be Socrates
there are suggestive parallels of the NGNB favoured proposal. This still leaves us with
thesis to claims that Plato appears to endorse a number of interpretive questions. Does
in other dialogues. Kahn (1996: 2667), Rowe Socrates hold that the NGNB loves the good
(2000: 20511) and Versenyi (1975: 194) all on account of the bad? What is the PP? Can
emphasize parallels to the Symposium. In there be more than one PP? And, finally, in
the Symposium, Plato makes the following what sense, if any, is the dialogue aporetic?
claims, all of which echo statements made in
the Lysis. (i) Love is directed at some object THE ROLE OF THE BAD
(Smp. 199d; cf. Ly. 221c). (2) This object is
something the lover lacks (Smp. 200ab; cf. When Socrates first introduces the NGNB
Ly. 221de). (3) This object is the beauti- thesis, his proposal is that the NGNB is friend
ful or the good (Smp. 201ac; cf. Ly. 216d). of the good on account of the presence of the
(4) Something can be neither good nor bad bad. Socrates goes on to reject this last clause
(Smp. 201e2b; cf. Ly. 217e). (5) That which for two reasons. First, Socrates argues that if
loves is neither good nor bad (Smp. 204ab; we identify the bad with the enemy, then we
cf. Ly. 216d). (6) There must be a terminus arrive at the paradoxical result that, whereas
to desire, which is not desired for the sake of all other friends are loved for the sake of a
anything else; this terminus is the good (Smp. friend, the good is loved for the sake of an
204d5a; cf. Ly. 219c20b). Conjoined, enemy. As many scholars note, this argument
these claims give us the view that that which is baffling: in it, Socrates slides from saying,
is neither good nor bad loves the good that unproblematically, that the good is loved on
it lacks, a good that is not desired for the account of (dia) the bad, to advancing the
sake of anything further. Though less strik- questionable claim that the good is loved for
ing, there are also parallels to the Gorgias, the sake of (heneka) the bad.
where Plato draws a distinction between the There have been several attempts to sal-
good, the bad and the NGNB (467e8a), and vage Socrates argument. Mackenzie pro-
maintains that people pursue the NGNB for poses that Socrates is driven to this position
the sake of the good (468ab; see Robinson because, as the end of a chain of consequential
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
goods, the good cannot be loved for the sake Santas concludes, on its basis, that philia is
of some further good; in that case, the only not reliant on the presence of the bad (1988:
possibility is that it is loved for the sake of 86).17 However, it is just as unsound as its
the bad. In advancing this paradoxical result, predecessor. Just because hunger is ben-
Socrates is implying that if we posit the PP eficial, it does not follow that we can feel
as what is lovable in itself, we fail to explain it in the absence of the bad. Even if hunger
its value (1988: 434). Though this proposal is, typically, the beneficial awareness of the
is intriguing, it is somewhat far-fetched. To bodys lack of food, it is still the awareness
object that the good is loved for the sake of of a bad state lacking food. More generally,
the bad would be a highly indirect way of given Socrates analysis of love and desire as
indicating the explanatory vacuity of positing grounded in lack, if we grant that lack is a
the PP; furthermore, this opens the question bad state, then it is hard to see how these
of why Socrates has no qualms about assign- could ever occur in the absence of the bad
ing the good the role of first principle in the (see Bolotin 1989: 225.). Socrates appears
Republic. Penner and Rowe have suggested quite sincere in rejecting the role of the bad
that when Socrates claims that the good is in his account: the objection is of his own
loved for the sake of the bad, what he really devising; is unrefuted; and is introduced in a
means is that it is loved for the sake of get- striking manner when (at 218cd) he shouts
ting rid of the bad (2005: 134). The difficulty out that his arguments are imposters. It thus
with this proposal is that it does not lend seems best to follow Versenyi in concluding
itself to the opposition between the PP and that Socrates rejection of the role of the bad
all the other friends that Socrates alludes to is an argumentative error, which he would
(at 220de), since all of the dependent friends have done well to avoid (1975: 196).
are also loved for the sake of getting rid of
the bad. While it is dissatisfying to attribute THE FIRST FRIEND
such an elementary error to Socrates, in the
absence of a better explanation, it is perhaps What is the first friend? Plato clearly gives us
best to side with interpreters such as Santas, a preliminary answer the good; however, it is
who accuse Socrates of confusing the dia and unclear whether he has any more substantive
heneka relations (1988: 86). account to offer. Some scholars propose that
Socrates second reason for rejecting the PP is the form of the good.18 They appeal
the role of the bad is his insistence that we to parallels between the status of the PP as the
would love the good even if there were no only thing that is truly a friend and the role
bad. Socrates imagines a world in which of the form of the good in the Republic as the
the bad did not exist; in such a world, we first principle. They take Platos discussion
would still experience desires such as hunger. of parousia (participation) at 217c18b to
Hunger is sometimes beneficial, sometimes offer further confirmation that the theory of
harmful; if the bad were abolished, bad hun- forms is operative in the dialogue. However,
ger would disappear with it, but beneficial as Mackenzie notes, the parousia relation
hunger would remain. Desire entails love; Socrates introduces in the Lysis is quite dif-
thus, if desire can occur in the absence of the ferent from that which is part of the theory
bad, the same follows for philia. This argu- of forms (1988: 323).19 Far from saying that
ment is taken more seriously by interpreters; only forms fully self-predicate, in the Lysis,
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
Socrates allows that particulars can partake that wisdom is a good, but it does not estab-
of whiteness either fully or apparently. lish that wisdom is the good, that is, the PP.
More persuasively, interpreters have sug- The passage occurs before Plato introduces
gested that the PP is happiness, virtue and/ the PP; as Penner and Rowe concede (274
or wisdom. All of these proposals are plau- 5), Plato also refers to the desire for health,
sible in light of evidence external to the but we are not to conclude on this basis that
Lysis; however, they are completely lacking health is the PP. Second, at the conclusion of
in direct textual support internal to the dia- the dialogue, Plato implicitly identifies the
logue. The suggestion that it is happiness, PP with the oikeion; Penner and Rowe treat
for example, advanced by Irwin (1977a: 52), this as a deliberate allusion to the opening
Vlastos (1981a: 1011), Wolfsdorf (2007b: of the dialogue, where Socrates concludes
2536) and others (see Versenyi 1975: 195), that wisdom makes all things hmetera
while attractive, has no support from within (our own). Against Penner and Rowe, in
the Lysis at most, we might take Socrates the conclusion of the dialogue, the philon is
claim that Lysis and Menexenus are happy not identified with that which makes things
since they have friends (212a) to imply that oikeia, but with the oikeion, simpliciter. By
friendship is desired for the sake of happi- contrast, in the opening discussion, wisdom
ness. Roth (1995: 1718) has argued that is what makes things useful and hmetera. If
the PP is virtue (see also Bolotin 1989: 193 wisdom is what makes things useful, then it
and Guthrie 1975: 145). According to Roth appears that it is a means to the PP rather
(at 218ab), Socrates states that wisdom is than the PP itself. Penner and Rowe con-
to ignorance and the soul as medicine is to cede this objection, but insist that wisdom
disease and the body. The PP stands in rela- can still be identified with the PP, since it is
tion to the soul as health stands in relation always a means to the PP (2756). However,
to the body; we can conclude, therefore, that nowhere in the dialogue does Plato draw a
the PP is virtue. Contra Roth, Plato does distinction between means that sometimes
not state (at 218ab) that wisdom is to the lead to the PP and means that always lead
soul as health is to the body; in this passage, to the PP. In sum, then, Socrates does not
Socrates only claims that the non-terminally appear to offer any positive account of the
ignorant desire wisdom. Furthermore (at PP in the Lysis, beyond identifying it with
219c), Socrates suggests that we value health the good.20
for the sake of something else; if virtue is
indeed analogous to health, then it, too, is MULTIPLE FIRST FRIENDS?
valued for the sake of some further good and
is not the PP. The question of what the PP is lends itself
Penner and Rowe argue at length for to a related concern, whether there can be
identifying the PP with wisdom, offering multiple PPs. This will be important later in
two passages as evidence for their position this chapter, when we turn to the question of
(2005: 14353, 2735; see also Tessitore whether people can function as PPs, and so
1990: 128). First (at 218ab), Plato gives be loved for their own sakes. Again, the text
philosophers as an example of those who gives us no clear answer. Many interpret-
love the good on account of the presence of ers, such as Annas (1977: 538)21 and Irwin
the bad. It is true that this passage implies (1977a: 512), accuse Socrates of committing
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
the error of concluding, on the basis of the fathers happiness, then the father would not,
fact that there cannot be an infinite chain of in fact, value his son above all else.
dependent friends, that there can be only one
PP. However, Plato nowhere states that there APORIA
can be only one PP; the best evidence for their
criticism is the fact that Plato always refers to As my discussion of the PP has suggested,
the PP in the singular. Those who hold that even if the Lysis contains a core positive
there can be multiple PPs can accommodate view, Socrates leaves much unresolved. This
this fact. Even if Plato refers to the PP in the enables us to offer a tentative answer to
singular and identifies it with the good, the our fourth question: in what sense, if any, is
good may have many constituents, each of the dialogue aporetic? I argued earlier that
which is a PP.22 the dialogue contains a positive proposal, the
Mackenzie has argued that when Plato NGNB thesis. Nonetheless, there are still
describes a father as valuing a cup full of strong indications that it is, in some way,
healing wine for the sake of his son, whom aporetic (see Mackenzie 1988: 15). Socrates
he values above all else, Plato is not merely begins by claiming that he is so far from pos-
providing an analogy, but is actually giving sessing a friend that he does not know how
an example of the relation of a dependent people become friends (212a), and concludes
philon to the PP (1988: 35). If the father by noting that, while he takes himself, Lysis
can have two sons, presumably he can have and Menexenus to be friends, he still does
two PPs; anything that one legitimately val- not know what a friend is (223b). It would
ues for its own sake will turn out to be a therefore be preferable to come up with some
PP (see Versenyi 1975: 1923). Against this deeper explanation of the aporetic conclusion
proposal, Penner and Rowe argue that the of the dialogue than the boys error. Plato has
son is an analogue to, and not an example them err for a reason, and to attribute this to
of, the PP (2005: 1412). They emphasize an attachment to the formal structure of the
that Plato only refers to the father as valuing aporetic dialogue is unsatisfying. The most
his son, and not to the son being a philos to persuasive explanation is that the dialogue
the father. However, as Mackenzie observes, is aporetic because Socrates has not yet dis-
Plato seems to hold that there is a close rela- covered what the PP is (see Bordt 2000: 171;
tion between valuing something and viewing Gonzalez 1995: 81; Mackenzie 1988: 367;
that thing as a philos (see e.g. 215a, 215bc, Penner and Rowe 2005: 1878; Rowe 2000:
215d). More persuasively, Penner and Rowe 215 and Tessitore 1990: 1245). Even if it is
note that (at 220a) Socrates asks, Isnt the the good, Socrates does not tell us what the
same account true of the friend? If the good is. Socrates maintains that dependent
son were truly a PP to his father, then this goods are imposters because they pretend to
phrasing would be odd; it would be more be valuable for their own sakes, while they
natural to say, Isnt the same account true are actually only valuable for the sake of the
of all friends? In defence of Mackenzie, it is PP (219d220b). If we do not know what the
implausible that the father should value his PP is, then we do not know what the depend-
son above all else, but that his son should ent goods are valuable for; in that case, we
fail to be a PP for the father; if the son is a will not know why they are valuable, and
dependent friend, loved for the sake of the they will remain phantom goods. However,
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
if this is the true source of Socrates aporia, along, we would be rationally obliged to
then we are left to wonder why Plato does trade up.
not have the dialogue founder on these Before I turn, in the next section, to
grounds, rather than on the conflation of the discussing various responses to Vlastoss
oikeion with the homoion. objection, I will spend the remainder of this
section attempting to throw light on what,
exactly, the objection amounts to. There is
a tendency to run together a number of dis-
THE VLASTOS OBJECTION tinct objections to utility-based love: that it is
egoistical, that it is not directed at the belov-
As I mentioned in the opening of this chap- eds true self, that it is potentially transient,
ter, Socrates theory of love has been subject that it does not involve a desire to benefit
to an influential line of attack by Vlastos the beloved for his own sake, etc. Carefully
(1981a); subsequent critical work on the dia- exploring and distinguishing these will help
logue is, in large part, a response to Vlastos.23 us to get a better sense of what, exactly, the
Vlastoss overall critique of the Socratic the- charges are against Socrates, whether these
ory is that it is problematically egoistic: we charges are legitimate, and whether he can
are to love others only insofar as they con- meet them.24
tribute to our own good, and not for their The broadest charge critics raise against
own sakes. Further difficulties emerge when Socrates is that of egoism (see Irwin 1977a:
Vlastos turns to Platos theory of love in the 99100). Consider two lovers call them
Symposium. On this theory, we love others Romeo and Juliet. According to this objec-
only insofar as they instantiate admirable tion, on the Socratic theory, Romeo loves
qualities, such as beauty and goodness, quali- Juliet only insofar as Juliet contributes to
ties that are only perfectly exemplified by Romeos own good. Penner and Rowe offer
forms. While I follow Vlastos in not finding a helpful refinement: the charge of egoism
the theory of forms in the Lysis, if we assume can be distinguished from that of selfishness
that in the Lysis people are to be loved for (2005: 28990).25 Socrates theory is selfish
their possession of useful qualities, then if, in addition to being egoistic, it claims that
many of the objections Vlastos raises against the good at which love aims is necessarily a
the Platonic theory in the Symposium apply state of the lover, such as pleasure; in that
to the Socratic theory of the Lysis as well. case, the good of Juliet can only ever play
According to Vlastos, if love is solely respon- an instrumental, but not a constitutive, role
sive to valuable qualities in the beloved, then in Romeos good. Thus, a theory could be
we fail to love him for his true self, for the egoistic but not selfish, if it allowed that the
uniqueness and integrity of his or her indi- well-being of Juliet is a constituent of Romeos
viduality (31). Furthermore, we fail to do good, independently of the contribution her
justice to his subjectivity; we treat him as we well-being makes to his psychological state.
might an object to love persons as objecti- What, exactly, is the problem with egoism?
fications of excellence is to fail to make the The worry might be that Romeo would not
thought of them as subjects central to what love Juliet if she did not contribute to his
is felt for them in love (32). Finally, should own good. Call this the charge of egoism
a person with more valuable qualities come proper. Alternately, the problem might be that
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
Romeo does not love Juliet for her own sake; refer to the second concern, that Socratic
call this worry instrumentalism.26 Though love fails to respond to the beloveds true self,
this might appear identical to the first con- objectification.
cern, in fact they are distinct. For example, it For Vlastos, part of what makes egoism
is possible that Romeo might not love Juliet worrisome is two potential consequences.
if she did not contribute to his good, but that The first is interchangeability: insofar as
the love generated by her contribution to his Romeo loves Juliet for certain qualities she
good causes him to love her for her own sake exemplifies, he has no more reason to love
as well as his own, with the proviso that, her than someone else who exemplifies these
should she cease to contribute to his good, qualities equally, and he ought, rationally, to
his other-directed concern would vanish. abandon her should a more attractive woman
Conversely, it is possible that Romeo might come along. As Kolodny observes, this is dis-
love Juliet whether or not she contributes to tinct from a second, related concern, transi-
his good, but that his love does not involve ence (2003: 1401). On transience, Romeo
valuing her for her own sake; self-destructive ought to cease loving Juliet should she cease
love often takes precisely this form. to possess the qualities that made her initially
The instrumentalism objection contains lovable. Two additional concerns are imper-
a core ambiguity: it is not obvious what, sonalism and non-reciprocity. According to
exactly, it means to love the beloved for his Vlastos, in the Lysis, Socrates claims that
own sake. Vlastos is inconsistent on this whatever we love for the sake of the PP is not
issue. In the opening of his paper, he suggests truly lovable. On the assumption that the PP
that to love the beloved for his own sake is is happiness or some other impersonal object,
to wish for his good independently of its con- then Socrates theory cannot accommodate
tribution to ones own good (46). However, other persons as objects of love. Relatedly,
Vlastos goes on to speak of the philosopher Robinson, among others, raises the concern
as loving the forms for their own sakes (34), that if we love something impersonal, or
and it is unclear how he could possibly hope another person who is perfectly good, then
to benefit them. Relatedly, Vlastos objects Socrates theory of love cannot do justice
that in loving the beloved as an instantia- to the fact that love is typically a reciprocal
tion of good qualities, we fail to value him relation (1986: 79). In the first case, reciproc-
for his own sake (314). This might suggest ity is a conceptual impossibility happiness,
that to love the beloved for his own sake is wisdom and virtue cannot love you back; in
to value him for those qualities that consti- the second case, it would be unmotivated
tute his true essence. These two issues are a perfectly good person needs nothing and,
frequently linked: often the reason we fail to given egoism, can love nothing.
wish for anothers good for his own sake is
because we fail to love him for those qualities METHODOLOGY
that really matter, as opposed to the quali-
ties that merely make him useful or pleas- Before turning to critical responses to
ant to us. Nonetheless, the two worries are Vlastoss challenge, it will be helpful to
distinct. Let us call the concern that Socratic emphasize certain methodological princi-
love does not involve wishing the beloved ples. Vlastoss attack on Socrates assumes
well for his own sake instrumentalism; I will that a correct theory of love will reveal it
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
to be a reciprocal, other-regarding rela- Socrates theory: Socrates is not attempting

tion between two persons, in which each to analyse the lovers motivations, and there-
desires the others good for his own sake; fore cannot be accused of offering an egoistic
call this the other-regarding theory of love. theory of love. The second group argue that
It is unclear what, exactly, the status of this Socrates theory is not necessarily egoistic; if
theory is. As a descriptive claim, it appears persons can serve as the PP, then they can be
false: most interpersonal love falls short of loved for their own sakes. In contrast to these
the other-regarding ideal, and some cases two approaches, other interpreters accept
of love are completely selfish. As a norma- Vlastoss reading of Socrates theory as ego-
tive claim, the other-regarding theory needs istic. However, of these, one group maintains
defence; however, this is typically not pro- that, though the theory is egoistic, it is not
vided, and the theory is taken to be obviously at odds with contemporary intuitions about
true. Thus, our first interpretive constraint in love. The second follow Vlastos in rejecting
assessing Socrates theory of love is to avoid Socrates theory as unacceptably egoistic.
baldly assuming that either the normative or
descriptive versions of the other-regarding Socrates Offers a Theory of Value, Not Love
theory is correct. Our second constraint is The most prominent proponent of this
not to force Socrates to conform to the other- approach is Glidden (1981). According to
regarding theory on the grounds that it is Glidden, the charge of egoism Vlastos raises
normatively or descriptively correct. Even against Socrates is misdirected. In the Lysis,
if the other-regarding theory is correct, this Socrates is not offering an account of the
approach risks being grossly anachronistic lovers subjective motivation; instead, he is
and doing violence to Socrates actual claims. advancing a general theory of value. As evi-
The Greeks had quite different approaches dence for his position, Glidden notes that
to love sexual and familial than we do, (at 214b and 215e) Socrates emphasizes
and even if they did not, Socrates appears the universal scope of his theory: he is not
to have had views radically at odds with his merely offering an account of interpersonal
communitys. We should not allow accord- relations, but of what feature in anything,
ing with contemporary intuitions let alone sentient or non-sentient, renders it philos.
a contemporary philosophers construal of Glidden also argues that Socrates claim, that
contemporary intuitions to constrain our anyone will turn himself over to Lysis if Lysis
interpretation of Plato, and we should be has knowledge (210ab), would be absurd if
open to the possibility that he has a position it concerned conscious intentions; Socrates
that may strike us as odd or even repellent. is discussing what is in peoples interests,
not what actually interests them. Insofar as
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF VLASTOSS POSITION Socrates offers a theory of desire, and not
just of value, he does not examine desire as
As I mentioned earlier, Vlastoss critique has a conscious state of the agent, but as a sub-
served as the foundation for virtually all subconscious psychological force; on Gliddens
sequent discussion of Socrates theory of love. reading, Socrates is a forerunner of psycho-
Some interpreters reject his critique on inter- analytic theory.
pretive grounds. Of these, one group argue Against Glidden, even if Socrates is offer-
that Vlastoss attack mistakes the purpose of ing a theory that applies to impersonal
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
objects, he is also proposing one that applies if Glidden is correct, and Socrates is not con-
to persons. There is no reason to suppose cerned with lovers conscious motives, the
that, as this theory applies to persons, it does theory would still be egoistic, since it claims
not concern their conscious motivations: one that love aims solely at the good of the lover.
key difference between persons and other Often the most egoistic are those who are
animals is that persons are capable of delib- unaware that they use others, but who are
erating about the good. The framing of the solely motivated by a (subconscious) desire
dialogue draws attention to the conscious for their own gain.
motives that drive lovers and beloveds:
Socrates is attempting to convince Lysis that Socrates Theory of Love Is Non-Egoistic
he needs knowledge, so that he will become Numerous interpreters find the egoistic
philos to Hippothales; on Gliddens theory, analysis of love so counter-intuitive that they
Lysis would need no convincing. In Socrates offer alternate interpretations of the Lysis, on
initial elenchus with Lysis, he proposes that which Socrates theory is non-egoistic. One
Lysis parents think more of (hgountai peri approach is to maintain that Socrates does
pleionos) a slave than their own son because in fact allow that love, or at least the best
they entrust their slave, and not Lysis, with form of love, is felt by the good for the good.
their livestock (208b): he is reading Lysis I have already discussed Hoerbers attempt
parents conscious attitude towards Lysis off to defend such a view. One of its earliest
their behaviour. At 209cd, Socrates states proponents is Von Arnim, who distinguishes
that Lysis neighbours will entrust them- philia from ers, and argues that philia is
selves and their goods to Lysis if they believe not occasioned by lack. Philia in its highest
(hgstai) that he has knowledge. Belief is form is felt by the good for the good for their
a conscious state, and Gliddens proposal, own sakes.27 More recently, Kahn argues
that Socrates claim is so preposterous that that Socrates is not serious in advancing a
it must be ironic, is dismissive of the tex- utility-based model of love and that he does,
tual evidence. In rejecting the possibility of in fact, allow that love can occur between
love between the good, Socrates states that the good (1996: 2824). Why should the
it is a requirement on love that the lover good feel love? Rudebusch proposes that the
think highly of (peri pollou poioumenoi) good love others because this enables them
his beloved (215bc); this claim clearly con- to act beneficently on their prudential wis-
cerns the lovers assessment of the beloveds dom and thereby achieve happiness (2009:
value, an assessment that serves as the moti- 1934). Bordt suggests that the good love
vation for love. Finally, in distinguishing the the form of the good and therefore desire to
NGNB from the bad, Socrates says that the realize it in themselves and others, an aim
ignorant do not love wisdom because they that is furthered through friendship (2000:
do not believe they are lacking (218ab). If 170). Against these proposals, Socrates
Socrates is not concerned with the conscious states quite clearly, on numerous occasions,
intentions of lovers, then there should be that the good cannot love the good (215ab,
no difference between the NGNB and the 222d). Furthermore, there is absolutely no
bad, since both are equally lacking; the gap evidence that Socrates gives up on the view
between them lies in the fact that the NGNB that love is occasioned by lack: it is present
believes that he is lacking. At any rate, even from his initial elenchus with Lysis, when he
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
proposes that Lysis will only be loved inso- the father who values his son above all else
far as he is useful (210d), through to the (219d220a). If, as Mackenzie maintains, the
conclusion of the dialogue, when he argues son is an example of, and not merely an ana-
that the cause of love is desire occasioned by logue to, the PP, then this would be a case of a
need (221de). person being valued for his own sake (1988:
Another approach is to propose that love 35). However, it is difficult to reconcile this
of the PP is, by its very nature, non-egoistic. proposal with Socrates need-based model of
Annas argues that Socrates account of love love, especially if we parse love of persons
in the Lysis only appears egoistic insofar as it along the lines of Kantian respect for their
seemingly maintains that all non-I-desires rational natures. On the need-based model,
desires whose propositional content does we only love others insofar as we are lacking
not make reference to I depend on and they are useful to us; this does not lend
I-desires (1977: 5378). However, Socrates itself easily to feeling respect for the rational
rejects this, since it would land him in an nature of the beloved.
infinite regress of teloi (ends). He therefore Even if we concede that Socrates allows
introduces the PP, which is not loved for the for other-regarding love in the Lysis, it also
sake of anything further. Where all other appears that he allows for egoistic love, and
desires make reference to the lover, love of this is sufficient to generate Vlastoss objec-
the PP does not derive from an I-desire (see tion (see e.g. Adams 1992: 3, 67). There
also Gadamer 1980: 1718). Against Annas, is much in the text to suggest that the ego-
it is unclear why an infinite regress of teloi istic model is at work. The analogy of love
can only be avoided if the terminal object of to sickness (217ab) suggests a need-based
desire makes no reference to the lover; why model, on which love aims at fulfilling a
can the PP not be, say, the lovers happiness? lack in the agent; this is confirmed at the
Socrates position will only be non-egoistic conclusion of the dialogue, when love is said
if the PP is not the lovers own good, but to aim at what we lack (221de). Socrates
there is nothing to suggest that this is the argues that good cannot love good because
case. Annas maintains that love of the PP is the good need nothing and thus love nothing
not grounded in lack; however, after intro- (215ab). But if love is, in fact, respect for
ducing the PP, Socrates proposes that love the inherent value of another person, then it
is caused by desire for what the agent lacks is hard to see why the good cannot feel love.
(221de). Finally, if we turn outside Plato, Xenophon
A final approach is to maintain that a provides further support that Socrates was
beloved person can serve as the PP. If a beloved thought to have advocated an egoistic theory
person is the PP, then we can avoid the objec- of love. According to Xenophon, Socrates
tion that I raised against Annas, that the PP gave a lecture in which he maintained that
is the lovers own good. On this proposal, friends are the most useful of all posses-
love might involve appreciating the worth of sions, more useful than even a horse or an ox
another person independently of his contri- (Mem. 2.45). A good friend must therefore
bution to ones own well-being and desiring be cultivated like fruit on a tree; conversely,
his good for its own sake. There is little to you should make yourself worth as much as
suggest such a model of love in the dialogue, possible to your friends, so that they will not
with the exception of Socrates reference to betray you.
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
Socrates Theory of Love Is Egoistic give rise to genuine, other-regarding concern

but not Selfish for the well-being of the beloved.29
Given that the text strongly suggests that an This proposal faces several difficulties.
egoistic theory of love is at work, some inter- First, it possesses many of the features that
preters seek to demonstrate that this is at least give rise to the Vlastosian objection: it is
partially compatible with the other-regarding guilty of selfishness, instrumentalism, objec-
model. Thus, Penner and Rowe propose that tification and replaceability. If what the lover
a theory of love can be egoistic without being loves is being in a relationship, then it seems
selfish if it holds that all love is motivated by that his love is directed at his own good,
concern for ones own happiness, but retains and that he is treating the beloved as a mere
an expansive conception of happiness, on means to that good. If asked why he loves
which the good of the beloved is closely the beloved, the lover would have to reply
linked to that of the lover. because he is lonely, or because he wishes to
There are two ways in which one could be in a relationship. But surely the beloved
defend an egoistic but unselfish theory of would be troubled to learn that he is merely a
love. The first would be to maintain that, means to keeping loneliness at bay; he might
while the lovers happiness is the PP, the feel that his lover does not really love him,
beloved is somehow part of the lovers hap- that any suitable companion would do the
piness. Lesses has argued, against Irwin trick. Second, it is doubtful that Socrates
(1977a: 85), that Socrates model of valu- would allow that loving relationships ought
ation does not rule out constituent means to function as constituents of the PP. Though
(1996: 3840). If a beloved person can serve Socrates does not specify in the Lysis what
as such a constituent means, then Socrates the PP is, if we look to other dialogues, he
theory can allow for valuing persons for their typically maintains that we ought to aim
own sakes, while still advancing an egoistic at happiness, where this is equivalent to or
analysis of love.28 Against this, it is unclear strongly dependent on virtue. Relationships
what it would mean for a person to be a with others are valuable insofar as they are
constituent of ones happiness: logically, only conducive to virtue particularly via joint
states of affairs can play this role. Perhaps, philosophical enquiry but are never pre-
then, it is the beloveds well-being, and not sented as constituents of happiness in them-
the beloved himself, that is a constituent of selves; I suspect that Socrates would insist
the lovers happiness. However, it is difficult that to pursue such relationships for their
to reconcile this with the need-based analy- own sakes and independently of their contri-
sis of love. These difficulties can be bypassed bution to virtue is irrational and even mor-
if we posit, instead, that it is being in a lov- ally irresponsible.
ing relationship that serves as a constituent Penner and Rowe have therefore offered
of the lovers good. This proposal is easy to an alternate account of how love might be
align with the need-based analysis. Humans egoistic yet unselfish (2005: 28091). On
are characteristically lonely creatures, who their model, the PP is happiness, where this
need loving relationships with others in is closely linked to wisdom. However, they
order to feel complete; forming such a rela- maintain that such a model of love can avoid
tionship would thus satisfy a genuine need in selfishness if the beloved person is treated as
the lover. Such a relationship could, in turn, a high-level means to the lovers happiness.
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
The beloved is a high-level means if he is means to wisdom if he is a philosophical dis-

rather a major premise in all calculations cussion-partner, and a very good one at that!
of [ones] good (270). Even if the beloved is This would render parental love, and many
merely a means, this is not problematic, since cases of friendship and romantic love, inex-
Penner and Rowe contend that there are no plicable, and even dispensable. Penner and
conceivable circumstances in which the lover Rowe might reply that my understanding of
could secure his own good in conflict with wisdom is too narrow: there are important
that of his beloved (288). life-lessons to be gained from, say, raising
Against Penner and Rowe, so long as the a child. But even if there is something to be
good of the beloved is valued as a means to learned, it is not clear that ones pursuit of
some state of the lover, the model of love is wisdom would not be better served by aban-
selfish. Suppose that some parent thought doning the child for the library, or at least a
that his happiness consisted in securing the philosophical discussion-group. Perhaps one
admiration of his peers, and concluded that who would abandon his child so callously
the only way to accomplish this was to pro- would reveal himself to be dangerously lack-
mote the flourishing of his children. This ing in moral wisdom. Granting that, if wis-
parents concern for the well-being of his dom is indeed the PP, then he is rationally
children would be objectionably selfish, since obliged to pursue whatever means will most
he would value it only for the sake of his own reliably and efficiently secure him wisdom,
good. Penner and Rowe might object that and it is at least conceivable that this may
what makes this example unattractive is not not be child-rearing. One difficulty raised by
that the good of the children is a mere means, these sorts of possibilities is transience and
but that the end in question is base. Perhaps replaceability: should the beloved cease to
if the end were something more admirable serve the pursuit of wisdom, or should a more
say, wisdom the love would no longer be efficient means be discovered, the lover ought,
objectionable. However, it seems that what- rationally, to abandon his beloved. Another
ever the end, so long as it is a state of the concern lies, not in the expendability of the
lover, the beloved has grounds for complaint. beloved, but in the motivation of the lover. So
Surely my beloved might be hurt if he learned long as the lovers motivation is centred on
that my primary reason for caring for him his own psychological state be it wisdom,
was that he is a mathematical genius with virtue or mere pleasure then his motivation
the ability to advance my understanding of is revealed to be not merely egoistic, but also
advanced algebra. selfish. And this is precisely what reveals the
Second, once the beloved is a means to Socratic theory of love to be deeply at odds
some other end, distinct from and independ- with the other-regarding model.30
ent of the good of the beloved, then the
good of the lover and that of his beloved can SOCRATES MODEL OF LOVE IS OBJECTIONABLY
always conflict. Suppose that, as Penner and EGOISTIC
Rowe maintain, the PP is wisdom. There are
surely many possible circumstances in which This is not to say that Penner and Rowes
the beloved might fail to be an optimal means treatment of Socratic love is incorrect on
to wisdom; in fact, according to Plato, the interpretive grounds. What Penner and
beloved will only succeed in being an efficient Rowe miss is that the theory that emerges
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
is selfish, and therefore sharply at odds satisfy the lovers desire to be in such a rela-
with the other-regarding ideal.31 I am there- tionship, even if the relationship in question
fore in agreement with interpreters such as is other-regarding.
Guthrie (1975: 1434) and Irwin (1977a: The second theory is advanced by Velleman
99100) who follow Vlastos in maintaining in Love as a Moral Emotion. According to
that Socratic love is utilitarian and egois- Velleman, love is a response to value; the
tic. Nonetheless, interpreters who side with value in question is not the beloveds beauty
Vlastos in criticizing the Socratic theory or intellect, but his Kantian rational nature.
typically do not do justice to its explanatory While all persons merit respect, love involves
strengths, nor do they recognize the weak- a heightened vulnerability in response to the
nesses of the other-regarding model. arresting awareness of the value of the belov-
These strengths can be clarified by con- eds rational nature. One attractive feature
trasting Socrates theory with two of the most of Vellemans model is that, like Frankfurts,
influential recent philosophical treatments of it avoids the problems of transience and
love. The first is advanced by Frankfurt in replaceability. The lover has no cause to
On Caring. According to Frankfurt, love abandon the beloved or trade up, since his
is disinterested concern for the well-being love is a response to a value that all persons
of the beloved. Being in such a disinterested have simply in virtue of being persons, a
relationship is one way in which we make value that, according to Velleman, prohib-
our lives meaningful. Love is not a response its comparison. However, just as Frankfurt
to value, but, rather, a creator of value; it is avoids transience by bypassing the person, so
not directed at any valuable qualities of the Velleman focuses on a feature of persons that
beloved, but, rather, at his concreteness. One gives us no more reason to love one person
considerable strength of Frankfurts analy- than another.32
sis is that it is not subject to transience and This examination of Frankfurt and
replaceability: if love is not a response to Velleman has brought to light a difficulty
value, then there is no worry that the beloved that confronts any attempt to explain love:
may cease to be valuable to the lover, nor that the demands that we place on an account of
he will be abandoned for someone with more love are in conflict. In assessing theories of
valuable qualities. This, however, reveals a love, we expect them to render love moti-
worry with Frankfurts model. If love is not vated, discriminating and non-transient.
a response to value, then it seems irrational. However, if love is responsive to qualities
Furthermore, if what is loved is the beloveds that are particular to the beloved, then it is
concreteness, rather than any of his qualities, transient; if not, then it is either unmotivated
then it seems that the beloved is not loved or undiscriminating. Socrates theory thus
at all; Frankfurt secures the permanence of fails in the first regard, Frankfurts in the
love at the expense of bypassing the per- second and Vellemans in the third. We can
son as object of love. Finally, if the beloved now also see that Socrates theory has a sig-
has value to the lover in virtue of serving as nificant strength: it offers a powerful account
the means for the lover to participate in an of motivation. It is intuitively plausible that,
other-regarding relationship then, as I sug- other things being equal, everyone desires his
gested earlier, the beloved has grounds to own happiness, and desires it as a final good;
complain that he is being used in order to the desire for happiness, as Plato notes in the
229

SOCRATES ON LOVE
Symposium, does not give rise to the further Frankfurt poses, on which we love the con-
question, Whats the point of wanting happi- creteness of the beloved, is even more guilty
ness? (204e205a). If love is a species of the of objectification than the Socratic approach:
desire for happiness, then we can see why it after all, persons, like objects, can be bearers
has such a hold on us.33 And if the beloved is of qualities, but it is the sorts of qualities per-
a means to happiness, then it is clear why he sons bear intelligence, wit, kindness that
should be lovable.34 make them potentially special.
This, in turn, suggests that some of the sup- Finally, let us examine egoism. The charge
posed strengths of the other-regarding model of of egoism claims that it is problematic to love
love may be merely apparent. While Socrates the beloved for the sake of ones own good;
theory may be guilty of most of the charges instead, the beloved ought to be loved for
Vlastos directs against it, we have reason to his own sake. However, it is unclear what it
question the cogency of some of these charges. even means to love someone for his own sake.
Consider transience. Transience is necessarily Perhaps the thought is that his good should be
a problem for any quality-based theory of valued independently of its relation to ones
love, so long as the qualities in question are own. But this raises a further question: what
not, as on Vellemans theory, possessed by eve- could motivate such love? Price observes that
ryone.35 If one is loved for his qualities, then if one requires that love aim solely at the good
there is always a risk that these qualities will of the beloved, and not that of the lover, then
change or that a better exemplar will come the thought expresses a moral obscurantism
along. In order to avoid transience, then, we and invents values in a vacuum created by the
must abandon the quality-based approach.36 expulsion of motivation (2004: 13; see also
But in giving up the quality-based approach, Penner and Rowe 2005: 2802). Philosophers
we give up a great deal: love becomes either fantasies aside, it seems that many people do
indiscriminate or irrational. Furthermore, think of their beloveds primarily in relation to
to be loved independently of ones qualities their own happiness, and that there is noth-
seems dehumanizing. Nor is it obvious that ing so bad about this. I suspect that what
transience is necessarily problematic. If the people worry about when they worry about
beloved ceases to promote ones happiness, egoism and transience is not that their lover
then perhaps one should not continue to love only loves them for the sake of his own happi-
him. We may think we want to be loved no ness and will abandon them should they cease
matter what but, in the end, this is absurd. to contribute to it, but that they will cease to
Perhaps it is commitment, rather than love, make such a contribution. This would spell
that demands permanence. the end of love, or at least any form of love
Next, turn to objectification. This charge, that falls short of self-destructive obsession or
as raised by Vlastos, is incoherent. As Kosman cold dutifulness.37
has persuasively argued, to love someone for
his valuable qualities is not to objectify him,
to bypass his true self (1976: 57). What else
could his true self consist in? To love him warts CONCLUSION
and all, for his bad breath and occasional cru-
elty, as well as his admirable qualities, seems In this chapter, I have argued that interpret-
both fetishistic and irrational. The alternative ers are correct to attribute the NGNB thesis
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SOCRATES ON LOVE
to Socrates. This model of love is of a piece and Socrates is genuinely puzzled by their
with Socrates egoism: love is a species of love. The first option, that their love is not
the desire for ones own good, the desire that grounded in utility, fits best with the pro-
motivates all intentional action. This appar- posal that I discussed earlier, that they love
ent egoism has sparked considerable debate him as a PP; this is supported by the exam-
among interpreters, since it conflicts with the ple of the father who values his son above
other-regarding model of love, on which love all else. However, it is unclear what it would
is a reciprocal relation between two individ- even mean for a person to be the PP; the PP
uals, each of whom desires the good of the seems to be the lovers good, and a person
other for his own sake. In the second part cannot be a constituent of that. Perhaps, then,
of this chapter, I turned to critical responses it is best to opt for the second proposal, that
to Socrates egoistic model of love, divid- Lysis is, after all, useful to his parents in some
ing interpreters into four groups: those who way.38 One possibility is that what Lysis par-
absolve Socrates model of love of egoism, ents value is their relationship with Lysis;
claiming that it does not seek to account for Lysis is a means for them to participate in a
the lovers conscious motivations; those who loving parentchild relationship. Alternately,
maintain that it is innocent of the charge of if we turn to the Symposium, Socrates, in
egoism because it allows for disinterested fact, explains the use children have to their
concern for the beloved; those who concede parents: they enable them to achieve a mor-
that it is egoistic but maintain that it is not tal form of immortality (207a8b). Neither
problematically selfish; and those who, like proposal paints a particularly attractive pic-
Vlastos, reject it as unacceptably egoistic. I ture of parental love, since according to both,
then argued that Socrates model of love is Lysis is merely a means. However, both are
indeed egoistic and therefore sharply at odds at least descriptively plausible: many peo-
with the other-regarding ideal. However, I ple do have children because they want the
also proposed that Socrates theory possesses experience of being a parent or because they
a core strength that the other-regarding feel that they will somehow live on through
model lacks: it renders love rational and their children; the second proposal has the
motivated. further advantage of actually being advanced
This leaves us with two questions, ques- by Socrates (albeit in a later dialogue). Even
tions with which I opened this chapter. First, if Socrates allows that Lysis parents do love
why does Socrates befriend ignorant youths him because he is useful to them, he might
such as Lysis and Menexenus, who do not still maintain that their love is grounded in
appear to be useful to Socrates in any way? a mistaken conception of their own good.
Second, if Lysis parents do love him, what can What they should value is wisdom and vir-
motivate their love, given his uselessness? tue, and they should only value Lysis inso-
To begin with the second of these ques- far as he contributes to these ends; perhaps
tions, earlier, I argued that it is unlikely when Socrates concludes that Lysis parents
that Socrates sincerely believes that Lysis do not love him very much, what he means is
parents do not love him, but I left open that they ought not to.
three other interpretive options: their love Let us now turn to the question of Socrates.
is not grounded in utility; he is useful to Why does he befriend beautiful boys and
them in some way as yet to be determined; lovingly introduce them to philosophy?
231

SOCRATES ON LOVE
Again, we can attribute utilitarian and Socrates offers in the Lysis: the lover loves
non-utilitarian motives to him. On the one the boy because the boy enables the lover
hand, he may act out of disinterested benefi- to achieve happiness, that is, philosophi-
cence; however, this would be completely cal understanding. It is worth emphasiz-
at odds with his professed egoism. The text ing that the theory of love at work in these
suggests that the NGNB thesis is Socrates later dialogues remains self-centred; in the
preferred analysis of love, and it rules out Symposium, for example, Plato refers to
selfless love. Furthermore, in advancing the beautiful boys as steps to be trodden on the
NGNB thesis, Socrates treats the love of wis- path to enlightenment (211c; see my 2010
dom as a paradigmatic desire of the NGNB and my forthcoming). Some interpreters
for the good (218ab); this suggests that argue that the theory of love in the Lysis is
Socrates should be viewed as the NGNB par deficient, corrected by the Symposium and
excellence. This, however, makes the motiva- Phaedrus.41 This is not at all my proposal.
tional problem acute: if Socrates subscribes What Plato explains in these later dialogues
to the NGNB-thesis and is, himself, NGNB, is why loving a beautiful boy should serve
then he has no reason to befriend Lysis and as a means to philosophy, but the general
Menexenus, who, at best, are on their way to analysis of love remains the same. The Lysis
becoming NGNB under Socrates tutelage.39 merits our philosophical attention because
My answer to this quandary is aporetic: I it offers Platos closest analysis of love as a
believe that Plato was genuinely puzzled by species of the egoistic desire for ones own
the tension between Socrates professed ego- good. This is a theory that is jarring and
ism and his selfless engagement with others, perhaps even repellent. Nonetheless, it may
and sought to highlight this tension in fram- be at least partially descriptively correct;
ing the Lysis in terms of Socrates philosophi- furthermore, it offers the prospect that love
cal seduction of Lysis and Menexenus.40 should be subject to rational assessment and
This tension is one to which Plato returns eventually directed to whatever is genuinely
in the Symposium and Phaedrus. In these good. In studying Socrates theory of love,
dialogues, Plato offers a fully developed the- we come to see the limitations of its rival,
ory of the way in which a loving relationship the other-regarding model; we also come to
with a beautiful boy can serve as a conduit recognize that perhaps no theory of love can
to philosophy: the beautiful boy power- do justice to all of our intuitions, and that
fully awakens the lovers desire for beauty love, like beauty, remains slippery (216cd).
and causes him to recollect the forms. This
fits neatly with the general analysis of love Suzanne Obdrzalek
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10
SOCRATES POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION Nevertheless an endeavour to discover

a Socratic political philosophy is entirely
Is it possible to attribute a political philoso- worthwhile, both for showing how Socrates
phy to Socrates? Whatever it might be, if it would and did answer questions that people
exists, will have to be assembled from several today would call political his ignorance
dialogues that purport to capture, more or was not total ignorance2 and more impor-
less, various conversations between the his- tantly, for bringing into clearer relief how
torical person Socrates and assorted people and why Socratic notions of virtue were
in and around Athens, as recorded mainly very much what he and his auditors would
by Plato.1 Complicating matters is that these understand as political ideas, however
conversations have little to do with politics much we have today drifted away from that
as it is generally conceived today. They have perspective.
rather to do typically with virtue (aret) The discussion that follows of Socrates
under its many aspects, and virtue is today political philosophy is presented in three
generally considered to belong to the disci- parts. The first part attempts to orient the
pline of ethics rather than political philoso- reader in a very general way to what might
phy. There is also the problem of Socrates plausibly be considered Socrates political
self-claimed ignorance about the most philosophy. The second part will review the
important things, particularly how virtue various controversies that have appeared in
is to be understood. How can someone who the recent scholarly literature about what
claims not to know about virtue (in the this philosophy might be in its details. Many
broad sense used here to encompass poli- lines of interpretation have been developed,
tics) be said to have a political philosophy? as one might expect. The hope is that most
Having a political philosophy would seem to of the key arguments have been captured
assume at least some knowledge about the and that references in the text will lead
political questions constitutive of it and some interested readers onto more detailed dis-
ability to say what it is. Socrates usually says cussions. In the final section an attempt is
he cannot give an account of virtue because undertaken to answer some still unresolved
he does not know what it is. questions.
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SOCRATES POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY political decision-making; or they taught

others with political ambitions how to do
SOCRATES AS POLITICAL PRACTITIONER so. Socrates regarded this entire line of work
with grave misgivings. As we know from his
Any account of Socrates political philoso- great speech against rhetoric earlier in the
phy must begin with an understanding of dialogue, rhetoricians, along with so-called
what Socrates took politics to mean. His politicians generally, are engaged in counter-
understanding was decidedly unconven- feit speech, that is, speech designed merely to
tional, even for the Athens of his day, and sway audiences by emotional appeals rather
more so for a modern audience. A useful than aimed at educating or enlightening them
guide is what he says to Callicles in Gorgias. by appeals to reason. Audiences under the
I think I am, Socrates claims, one of the sway of such people were not much better,
few, not to say the only one in Athens who wanting only to be pleased or entertained,
attempts the true art of politics and the only not educated.
man of the present time who engages in poli- The particulars of Socrates objections to
tics (Grg. 521d).3 This statement, like many this sort of speech activity come down to his
other Socratic utterances, appears absurd on basic conviction that rhetoricians aim not at
its face. Obviously many Athenians engaged what is just and good, but only at flattery.
in what they understood as political activity, In a nutshell, conventional politicians only
the activity appropriate to and defining of the try to please their audiences (and their audi-
polis particularly voting in the Assembly, ences care only to be pleased or entertained).
serving on the Council, filling political The true business of politics, Socrates is say-
offices and participating in judicial proceeding, is not to aim at what pleases but rather
ings (Arist., Pol. V.1315). Indeed, quite par- at what improves the city and its citizens. As
adoxically, Socrates in Apology notoriously true doctors aim only at the health of bodies,
claimed to avoid these activities as much as no matter how painful medical treatments
possible.4 How could the only one in Athens may be, so too true statesmen aim only at
who engages in genuine political activity also what is best for the citizens minds, even if
be one of the few people in Athens actively to what is best causes temporary psychic pain
avoid politics, while everyone else who did and it often will (Grg. 464b465c).5
engage in politics were found by Socrates
not really to do so at all? SOCRATES POLITICAL MISSION
The answer hinges on the qualification the
true art of politics as presented in Gorgias. In Socrates is the only one who attempts the
this dialogue Socrates is engaged in a discus- true art of politics because he does aim to
sion with Callicles, known by virtue of this improve the city and its citizens, and is,
dialogue as a champion of the speech-craft of as far as he knows, the only one to do so.
rhetoric. Rhetoricians as a group held signifi- Many others, including some of the great-
cant power in the ancient Greek city-states, est names in Athenian political history, may
including Athens. They appeared before have a reputation for improving the city, but
assemblies and other political bodies in order Socrates finds all of them democrats and
to effect persuasion to favour or oppose pro- oligarchs alike to have fallen far short of
posed legislation or other matters up for the mark of effecting genuine improvement.
234

As he explains to his jury, these benefactors wish to be made aware that their beliefs are
have only made the Athenians think they are self-contradictory (when they are) so that
well-off and happy, whereas Socrates has they may decide what to do about it. Of
brought to the Athenians real happiness course, many of Socrates companions in
(Ap. 36de), even if (again paradoxically) the speech were not particularly attentive, and
Athenians themselves do not know that they so missed what they should have heard, or
have been made happy by Socrates. were sufficiently pig-headed that they sim-
How Socrates improves the city and makes ply became annoyed or angry when Socrates
its citizens genuinely happy is a complicated produced his revelations about their mental
story, but essentially centres on his divine shortcomings. But these reactions do not in
mission. He explained to his jury that he the least detract from the service Socrates
had been ordered he by the god (i.e. Apollo) believed he performed for Athens and its citi-
to pursue philosophy. (The oracle in fact zens. How can one make moral progress if
had affirmed only that no one is wiser than one is stuck in a quagmire of contradictory
Socrates, but for whatever reason Socrates beliefs about the most important things?
took this as a divine command to himself to This brief excursus into the Socratic elen-
pursue philosophy, and believed the com- chus has been necessary to bring into focus
mand was reaffirmed in dreams and by other what Socrates understood politics to mean.
manifest signs: Ap. 33c.)6 But how does one It was not what most people then or now
pursue philosophy? Socrates decided, appar- think it is. It is not practiced in public spaces
ently on his own authority, that one pursues such as assemblies or law courts.8 It is not
philosophy by engaging other people in con- aimed at producing results, such as laws or
versations about their beliefs, especially their verdicts, that are merely pleasing or that sat-
beliefs about virtue. Such conversations gen- isfy temporary appetites. Its true practitioners
erally led to Socrates questioning people and are not those who win a sufficient number of
then subjecting their answers to merciless votes or who have been chosen by the lottery
scrutiny and usually destruction the notori- or who are sufficiently wealthy or prestigious
ous Socratic elenchus.7 to attain political office. Most people, in fact,
The result of these conversations, as would not recognize Socrates politics as
recorded mainly by Plato, were usually nega- politics at all. It really resembles much more
tive, in the sense of failing to yield positive what we today would call philosophy, or
discoveries about what virtue is or other perhaps better the craft of teaching philoso-
things about it, such as whether it can be phy, particularly ethics. But this statement
taught. Yet they did perform a valuable (or also needs to be qualified. Socrates insisted
harmful, depending on ones perspective) that he was not a teacher, and perhaps more
function for those who were involved in strongly, that virtue is something that cannot
them, either as participants or auditors: they be taught. Nevertheless, when we examine
showed that people hold, often unwittingly, how Socrates actually lived and what he did
beliefs that are in conflict with one another. with his life, it is hard to escape the conclu-
An attentive interlocutor or witness should sion that politics for him was nothing other
be grateful for such revelations, assuming than engaging himself and others through
that no one wishes to hold self-contradictory conversation in the pursuit of knowledge
beliefs. At a minimum most people should about virtue and about how one should live.
235

Politics for Socrates was philosophy, and phi- contrast, when the Thirty Tyrants were in
losophy was politics. To speak of Socrates power Socrates showed his lack of respect
political philosophy is thus at one and the for that government by flagrantly disobeying
same time to speak about his politics and his the only order they were ever known to have
philosophy, they are indistinguishable. issued directly and specifically to Socrates,
the order that he participate in the arrest
of Leon (Ap. 32c). Moreover, when Plato
has the personified Laws in Crito question
INTERPRETATIONS AND Socrates about whether he may rightfully
CONTROVERSIES escape, they remind him in the clearest pos-
sible terms that he has shown throughout
WAS SOCRATES A DEMOCRATIC OR his life his satisfaction with the city and
ANOLIGARCHIC THEORIST? its laws. So great, in fact, has been his sat-
isfaction that his decision to live in Athens
Viewed in this light, a Socratic political phi- rather than to go into exile in another city
losophy is unusually difficult to assimilate to may be construed as a sort of agreement on
modern conceptions, even when those con- Socrates part to abide by the citys laws and
ceptions are able to trace an ancestry back to other commands (Cri. 51e52d). Socrates
ancient Greek thought or practice. In brief, appears to agree with this entire line of rea-
the Socratic conception of political philoso- soning; certainly he does not protest any
phy, as characterized above, rules out several of it. Because Athens was a democracy for
candidates that have been brought forward nearly the entire time Socrates lived there, a
in recent and not-so-recent scholarship as conclusion might be drawn, and sometimes
describing what Socrates really believed as a is, that Socrates was philosophically a demo-
political philosophy. crat through and through.
Some scholars have found Socrates to be Against this view is the belief that Socrates
a champion of democratic political thought was really an oligarch, or at least more
(e.g. Burnet 1924: 173; Gulley 1968: 16879; sympathetic to oligarchic rule and ideology
Santas 1979: 38; a dissenting view is Kraut than to democratic practices and beliefs (e.g.
1984: 22 and ch. 7); or of democratic repub- Grote 1888, vol. 7: 1446; Guthrie 1971:
licanism (Arendt 1958: 2278; Villa 2001: 614; Stone 1988: 11739; Shorey 1933:
ch. 1). This belief centres mainly on Socrates 103; Vlastos 1983: 495516; Winspear and
loyalty to the Athenian laws and constitution Silverberg 1960: 84; Wood and Wood 1978:
when they were constituted as a democracy, 97; Ober 2011: 1423 is a critical examina-
that is, for most of his life (two short-lived tion of this view; cf. also the discussion of
oligarchic regimes in 411 and 404403 BCE this issue in the context of relevant ancient
being the only exceptions). He showed his texts in Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 15575,
loyalty in many ways, many of which are reprinted in Brickhouse and Smith 2002a:
recounted in Apology (cf. especially 28de, 190223). A stronger version of this thesis is
37ab), but no greater demonstration could that Socrates was in fact anti-democratic (this
be given than his willing submission to opinion is critically surveyed, with references
accept the unjust penalty of the Athenian to additional literature, in Ober 2011: 142,
jury that he be executed for his wrongs. By 163 and n. 48 and 1998: 159 and n. 9).
236

Several bases for the opinion that Socrates of government under which he lived. He
was an oligarchic sympathizer or even an demonstrates no principled approval or dis-
anti-democrat have been identified. Perhaps approval of any particular form of govern-
the most compelling is that Socrates most ment, whether democracy or oligarchy (he
famous friends and companions, includ- lived under regimes of both types in Athens
ing Plato himself, were oligarchs, and some, during his lifetime), or any other. As Kraut
such as Critias, Charmides and eventually (1984: ch. 7) points out, his allegiance to
Alcibiades were closely associated with the democratic Athens in Crito could just as
oligarchic faction in Athens, the former two well have been given to an oligarchy or even
having even been members of the Thirty. a monarchy; it is not based on Athens being
There is, secondly, Socrates apparent scorn a democracy.
for the views of the many, people who, Indeed, in Crito the Laws remind Socrates
Socrates is quite convinced, have never given that, while he has been satisfied with demo-
much careful thought to anything of real cratic Athens and how we conduct our trials
importance and whose views should be set and manage the city (Cri. 51e), he has also
aside by anyone who wishes to make correct often praised Crete and Sparta (both oligar-
decisions about how to live a virtuous life chies) as well-governed (Cri. 52e). Kraut
(e.g. Cri. 47a48c, Ap. 24e25c). This is not, plausibly suggests that his approval of all
we are told, an attitude that any democrat three governments had less to do with the
would hold. In addition, Socrates appears form of the constitution than with the fact
explicitly to reject some core elements of that all three cities took seriously the impor-
what is usually taken to be a democratic tant business of inculcating moral principles
ideology, especially the beliefs, conveyed into the young. Socrates conception of poli-
by Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his tics practicing the elenchus brought him
name, that virtue can be taught and that all around to the belief that conventional politi-
people have a share in the possession and cians of every stripe are among the least virtu-
teaching of virtue (Prt. 319a328d, cf. Men. ous and wise of all persons (Ap. 21c). Neither
92d94e).9 The assumption here is that any- wealth nor free birth (the defining marks of
one who is as contemptuous of democratic oligarchies and democracies, respectively)
ideals and democratic men as Socrates plainly bore any relation to ones ability to with-
is must therefore be friendly to the obvious stand a Socratic cross-examination, let alone
alternative, oligarchic ideals and men. to bring forward positive beliefs about virtue
Closer inspection reveals, however, that that Socrates could deem to be well-founded.
Socrates thought cannot be considered to A standard Socratic assumption is that some-
be simply democratic or simply oligar- one lacking knowledge of virtue, or at least
chic.10 There is no strongly positive evi- a commitment to discover what it is, is in no
dence in any of Platos Socratic dialogues for position to do well or to improve his city,
a Socratic preference for any sort of existing and is in fact much more likely to do it real
regime (Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 170 harm (Ap. 24e25c, Cri. 47c). Neither demo-
3). He did, it is true, have extraordinary crats nor oligarchs scored very well on the
(though not unbounded) respect for politi- standard of improving the city or its citi-
cal authority. But this respect did not derive zens, and on these grounds Socrates had little
from the character or the particular form sympathy for either side.
237

As for Socrates friends and associates, as possible. Civic engagement was quite a
just because Socrates may have conversed or different thing for Socrates than for what it
been on friendly terms with some oligarchs is to the republican tradition. Socrates posi-
does not mean that he embraced an oligar- tion does make allowance for, even requires,
chic political philosophy. For one thing, the discursive community and the ideal
oligarchs were more likely to have had the speech condition posited by theorists such as
leisure time necessary to engage in philo- Arendt and Habermas. But Socrates notion
sophic conversations. But also Socrates may of a discursive community is much more
have deliberately targeted oligarchs more private and intimate than the free-wheeling
often than democrats because he believed public arena of debate and discourse con-
they needed more help in the hard business templated by republicans (but see n. 5, infra).
of virtue than democrats (Brickhouse and Beyond that, Socrates ideal constitution can
Smith 2002a: 205). In any case, Socrates did no more be said to be a mixed or blended
not count only oligarchs among his compan- regime than it can be said to be a democracy
ions, and he makes perfectly clear in Apology or an oligarchy. In time, Plato appears to
that he wants to talk with all citizens, rich or have come to embrace the mixed regime as a
poor or whatever their station (Ap. 33ab). second best form of government, as spelled
The elenchus, and by extension Socrates him- out, for example, in the Statesman. But a
self, does not discriminate. defense of that particular form of constitu-
Finally we should consider briefly the tion eluded Socrates. If neither the many nor
argument that Socrates was a proponent of the few could be said reliably to care for the
democratic republicanism (Arendt 1958: most important things and to know how to
2278; Villa 2001: ch. 1). This is a complex enact the best policies, then no more could a
argument, much of which falls away for the mix between the two be hoped to do so.
same reasons that the argument for Socrates
the democrat fails. But the notion of repub- PROCEDURALISM
licanism brings in a dimension that is not
fully present in the democratic view, the sug- Some scholars have found in Socrates an
gestion that Socrates was a champion of pub- early proponent of the procedural state (cf.
lic virtue and civic engagement, and would Kraut 1984: 16671; Ober 2011: 1745).
therefore support a political philosophy that According to this conception, just decisions
gave a prominent place to the values of con- are contingent upon just procedures, some-
cern for the city over concern for oneself times referred to as due process considera-
and of active civic discourse, preferably in tions. Since Socrates was allowed a fair trial
an ideal speech setting, among all citizens. and because other relevant norms and laws
The republican position, moreover, generally were adhered to in his arrest, trial and execu-
favours a mixed or blended constitution to tion, a temptation may exist to find him to
ensure a role for the many as a counterpoint have obeyed the state in the matter of his
to the typical dominance within government execution because the proper procedures
by the few.11 were followed and because those procedures
The first and most apparent difficulty were fair. He was given due process of law,
with this view is that Socrates eschewed and accordingly believed himself bound to
politics (in the conventional sense) as much obey the state in the matter of his execution.
238

The evidence supporting this view is again the presence of these (or some other) proce-
to be found in Crito. The Laws point out to dures and that the obligation to obey would
Socrates that he had entered into just agree- be suspended if these procedures were lack-
ments with the city, and that the justice of ing. On the contrary, at his trial and again
these agreements is apparently contingent in prison Socrates consistently maintains that
upon the agreements having been neither he would be bound to obey any state com-
forced, nor tricked, nor rushed (Cri. 52e). mands no matter what its legal procedures
They also say on several occasions that may have been, except perhaps a command
Socrates must persuade us where justice that he commit injustice (further discussion
really lies, or obey its commands. One might below). Athens may have been a procedural-
infer from these statements that ones agree- ist polis, as Ober and others have recently
ments to obey ones city and its laws are argued (see n. 10, infra), but Crito does
qualified by the procedural requirement that not include a proceduralist justification for
the agreements are just, that is, not forced, obedience.
tricked or rushed, and that one be given the
right to persuade before one is obliged to LIBERALISM
obey (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 239).
Since Socrates could not claim any proce- A related idea that has appeared in the lit-
dural violation he found himself obliged to erature is that Socrates was an early liberal
obey. But had he discovered a procedural theorist. While liberal political philosophy
violation he may have justifiably escaped.12 has taken many forms it generally reduces to
Generally it is a mistake to find a doc- the notions that: (a) the relation between the
trine of rights or a foreshadowing of the citizen and the city is a social contract, in
procedural republic in the thought of which cities and citizens voluntarily exchange
either Socrates or Plato. (Discussions include rights and obligations for the sake of mutual
Brickhouse and Smith 2002a: 240; Johnson self-benefit13; (b) citizens are understood
1990: 730, 733 and n. 23; Kraut 1984: 90, to be morally autonomous and unencum-
1001; Strauss 1983: 623; Walzer 1970: ch. bered individuals who decide for themselves
4; Woozley 1979: 32 ff.; I postpone a fuller through acts of individual and independent
discussion of the so-called persuade-or-obey conscience that they wish to enter into the
doctrine to a later section of this chapter.) contract (the so-called consent condition);
The weakness in this line of reasoning lies in (c) the contract, to be sufficiently attractive
the assumption that had the procedures been for such morally autonomous citizens to con-
different and had Socrates found them to be sent to their obligations (including, above all,
unjust, he would no longer have believed the obligation to obey the government) must
himself to be obliged to obey. One is hard- include benefits granted by the state to its
pressed to find clear evidence in the dia- citizens (normally conceived as protection of
logues that would support that assumption. natural rights, but not always14); and finally
The Laws say only that Socrates had been (d) that if the state should fail in its side of
neither forced nor tricked nor rushed in his the contract (to provide benefits to the citi-
agreements to obey. They do not say what zens), the citizens may, as autonomous indi-
the procedural interpretation requires, that viduals, justifiably disobey the government
the justice of his agreements depends upon on the grounds that the state has broken the
239

contract (cf. Krauts illuminating discussion Athens, however, based solely on what the
in his 1984: ch. 6; also Brickhouse and Smith Laws say in Crito, cannot be considered a
2004: 21725; Ober 1998: 181, 184 and liberal state (but see Ober 2011: 150, 1567
Ober 2011: 1567).15 and Kim 2011: 10711). It did pride itself on
The belief that Socrates was an early pro- its generosity to its citizens: providing a sta-
ponent of this view stems in part from the ble framework of laws for marriage, nurture
speech of the Laws in Crito and in part from and education of children and a share of all
Socrates practices as described mainly in the good things we can [give] to its citizens
Apology. Many scholars have found the Laws (Crito 50a51d). What we do not find in the
to be proposing a social contract theory in speech of the Laws or in Socrates acquies-
Crito, based on their invocation of Socrates cence to it is any idea that Socrates (or the
just agreements to obey the city (most Laws) ties Socrates obligations to these ben-
recently Ober 2011: 156). The idea the Laws efits, or that Socrates believes he is absolved
want to present is that anyone who agrees of his obligation to obey if he thinks the city
justly to a citys government, seeing how it is has failed to comply with its side of the con-
run and having the opportunity to leave the tract. Conspicuously absent from the speech
city if he is not satisfied, thereby incurs an of the Laws is any notion that the city has
obligation to obey its laws, even if the citizen agreed to anything. We are not told that the
is required by those laws unjustly to go to his Laws think they are obliged to confer these
death. The city has conferred benefits on the benefits; the city and its Laws are simply gen-
citizen, the citizen has accepted those benefits erous, for which Socrates (and other citizens)
and so, on this reading, the contract is con- should be grateful.18 Much less are we told
summated and the citizen is obliged to obey. that Socrates has rights to these benefits.
One benefit that seems especially impor- Reading a liberal social contract philosophy
tant in the case of Athens is freedom of into Crito requires supplying one half of the
speech (parrhsia). Athens, unlike many contract idea that is simply not in the text
other ancient cities, allowed great latitude the half that imposes obligations on the city
to citizens to speak on all manner of sub- and gives rights and goods to the citizens
jects, almost without restraint. Citizens were that the city is obliged to supply.
allowed to propose laws, to express opinions The Laws, in fact, make the opposite case:
about proposed and actual laws, to vote in because of its generosity to its citizens the
assemblies and on juries, even to bring fellow city may rightfully assume that anyone who
citizens forward on criminal charges and to decides to remain in the city shows by his act
prosecute them before a jury of their peers.16 of remaining that he accepts state authority
It is sometimes argued that this enshrining of without condition (Cri. 51d). They explic-
free speech as among Athens most cherished itly point out the mistake in thinking that
values shows the signs of a nascent form of just because a city might decide to under-
liberalism (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 231; take to destroy you [the citizen], thinking it
Strauss 1983: 623; Weiss 1998: 23, 123 n. is just, the citizen gains a parallel freedom
88), in the sense that the citizen has the right to act in the same way in return, that is, to
to exercise a fundamental liberty, and the try to destroy the city by disobeying its com-
state has an obligation to protect him in that mands (Cri. 51a). There is, the Laws say, no
exercise, or at least not to interfere.17 equality between the city and the citizen
240

(cf. Ober 1998: 1812). Rather, the relation disobedience theory of political philosophy.
between city and citizen is better likened to A just citizen may or must disobey the com-
that between a master and slave or a parent mands of his city when those commands are
and child. Slaves, children and even more so unjust. One notes that a command may be
citizen-subjects owe obedience to their supe- unjust in two ways: a command may order
riors. This is a claim any city could make to a citizen to commit injustice or a command
its subjects, and is in fact the claim actual cit- may be unjust though without ordering a
ies, no matter how liberal (or tyrannical), do citizen to commit injustice. (An example of
often make. The fact that Socrates has been the second would be the jurys command that
unjustly convicted by the jury and unjustly Socrates be executed). As usually presented,
sentenced to death does not free Socrates the civil disobedience stance would allow or
of his obligation to obey. If liberalism is to require disobedience in both cases.20 But it is
be detected in the speech of the Laws, it is possible that Socrates accepted only the first
much closer to the authoritarian liberalism idea but not the second. Some scholars believe
of Thomas Hobbes than to the liberal liberal- he would refuse to carry out only commands
ism of John Locke or John Rawls. But even that he believed would require him to commit
that assimilation is quite misleading (Kim an injustice. Commands of this sort if any
2011: 67 n. 2). happened to come his way he would sim-
Socrates shows by his reaction to the ply disobey. But, on this reading, he would
speech of the Laws and his subsequent deci- (and did) carry out unjust commands of the
sion to remain in prison and accept execu- other sort, those that he regarded as unjust
tion that he essentially agrees with what the commands, such as the command that he
Laws have said.19 If the Laws are not liberal, die, but that did not require him to commit
neither is Socrates. He nowhere ties his loy- injustice.
alty to the Athenian state to its institutions In favour of the civil disobedience reading
guaranteeing free speech and universal (i.e. is Socrates strong support of the prohibition
adult Greek male) citizenship, and to the of injustice principle, according to which
other good things it provides. These institu- one ought never act unjustly, even to repay
tions may have helped satisfy Socrates that a wrong that has been done to oneself (Cri.
he should remain in Athens rather than go 49b). Since the principle explicitly allows
into voluntary exile to another city. But we of no exceptions, it appears that Socrates
do not find Socrates specifically praising would be civilly disobedient if the laws or
these institutions or, more importantly, hint- other state authorities ever ordered him to do
ing that he would somehow feel free of his something he believed to be unjust. Apology
obligation to obey the civic authorities were seems to furnish evidence that Socrates not
these institutions lacking. only would disobey such commands, as in
his promise to the jury that he would disobey
WAS SOCRATES A CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE a command that he cease practicing philoso-
THEORIST? phy, but that he in fact did disobey, as in his
refusal to obey the command of the Thirty
A claim in recent years about Socrates politi- that he arrest Leon.21
cal philosophy is that he was an early pro- Standing in the way of that conclusion,
ponent perhaps the very first of a civil however, is something else Socrates appears
241

to agree with in Crito, that one must always in the 1850s. On Grotes view, Plato, who
obey what the state commands, even, pre- was himself much more authoritarian in
sumably, if it commands one to do something outlook than Socrates, manufactured Crito
unjust (what Brickhouse and Smith call the as an imaginary dialogue that never really
strict compliance principle 2004: 220). To happened. Platos purpose, Grote urged,
make matters worse, Socrates seems to show was to sanitize the disobedient Socrates of
by his remaining in prison to accept execu- Apology for public consumption, in effect
tion that the strict compliance principle has to make him more obedient than he actu-
just as much hold on his loyalties as the pro- ally was and so more acceptable to Platos
hibition of injustice principle. From a first audience. On this reading Socrates is made
look at the conflicting evidence one might out to be a defender of disobedience (under
wish to conclude that Socrates did not hold a some specifiable conditions) by simply
consistent political philosophy. What he says dismissing Critos relevance for the ques-
in Crito appears to conflict with what he says tion at hand. Crito, on this reading, is not
in Apology (the Apology/Crito problem); an authentic representation of Socrates
and what he says in Crito appears to conflict thought. Unfortunately Grotes interpre-
with other things he says in Crito (the Crito tation, while convenient for removing the
problem). difficulty, has little else to recommend it,
other than Grotes acknowledged erudition
THE APOLOGY/CRITO PROBLEM in Platonic studies. That aside, we have no
reason at all for supposing Crito to be any
Broadly, two kinds of resolution to the less faithful to the historical Socrates than
Apology/Crito problem have been pro- any other Socratic dialogue, and many rea-
posed. One is to acknowledge inconsist- sons for believing it is fully as Socratic as
ency and then to give an explanation for it. Apology (see n. 1 infra).22
Some scholars declare either that Socrates is The other strategy for removing the dif-
simply inconsistent, a common human fail- ficulty is to deny inconsistency and then to
ing (as Socrates discovered was true of his explain how a proper interpretation allows
interlocutors in many of his conversations: this to be done. Usually this approach resolves
e.g. Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 224; Villa itself into the argument that Crito should be
2001: ch. 1); or claim that Socrates offered read as a genuinely Socratic defense of civil
the arguments of the Laws only to pacify disobedience, first impressions notwith-
Crito while not believing in those arguments standing. This strategy, it must be noted,
himself (which Brickhouse and Smith have seems indebted to modern civil disobedience
recently dubbed the separation view e.g. theory (rather than the other way round) and
Coliaco 2001: 199 ff.; Harte 1999: 11747; is usually predicated on the assumption that
Strauss 1983: 3866; Weiss 1998: 324; no man as wise or as good as Socrates could
see Brickhouse and Smith, forthcoming); possibly be a defender of unlimited state
or claim that what we have in the two dia- power and blind submission by subjects:
logues are the views of two different men, states sometimes command things of their
Socrates (in Apology) and Plato (in Crito). citizens or subjects that are just too wicked
This latter argument was first brought for- for someone like Socrates ever to be imag-
ward by the great Platonist George Grote ined to obey.
242

The civil disobedience reading of Crito the age of the child (is s/he an adult?), and in
generally proceeds along the following lines. part by the persuade-or-obey doctrine (obey
While the personified Laws seem to say the us, say the Laws, or persuade us where jus-
just citizen must always obey the state, what tice lies) (Allen 1980: 86, 10913; E. Barker
they really mean is that the just citizen must 1959: 123; Kim 2011: 67110; Kraut 1984:
obey commands of the state only under 90, 1001; Martin 1970; Murphy 1974:
well-defined conditions. The Laws inform 17; Santas 1979: 26; Strauss 1983: 623;
Socrates that he must obey (1) because diso- Vlastos 1974: 53034; Wade 1971: 324;
beying this law would be to destroy the city Walzer 1970: ch. 4; Woozley 1971: 3078,
for his part, and this one ought not to do 1979: 840;).
(the Argument from Injury); (2) because he Socrates does not escape. Assuming that
has agreed to obey this law (and other laws) the Laws do intend to suggest conditions
by manifest signs, and, his agreements being under which he might justifiably escape,
just, he is obliged to keep them (the Argument his failure to do so can only mean, on the
from Agreements); and (3) because he has above interpretation, that he believed the
been nurtured and raised by the laws, as by implied conditions for disobedience did not
his parents, and so owes them the same kind apply to his own case. For another man, or
of filial obedience he owes to his parents (the for the same man in another situation, the
Argument from Piety). It is then argued that conditions might apply, and when they do,
each of these reasons for obedience (or some escape becomes justified by reference to
of them, or at least one of them) may be read those conditions.
as tacitly specifying conditions for disobedi- The foregoing interpretation runs into a
ence under certain implied conditions. number of difficulties. First, much is being
What are the implied conditions? The con- inferred here from silence: why do not the
dition implied in the Argument from Injury Laws state a case for disobedience more
is that if disobedience to the laws or to a plainly and overtly? Second, if the Laws are
particular law would not destroy or contrib- making a case for disobedience, even if an
ute to the destruction of the city then diso- oblique one, their case is weak in a variety of
bedience would at least not be prohibited on ways; even the defenders of the disobedience
these grounds; if one had a good reason for interpretation acknowledge this. It takes a
disobeying a law, and no destructive conse- peculiar and strained form of reasoning to
quence would result from disobeying it, then get it to add up to an argument for obedi-
one might (or possibly must) disobey that law. ence in this case. Third, when disobedience
The condition implied in the Argument from is made to depend upon difficult judgements
Agreements is that if the agreements are not as to when it may lead to the destruction of
just, or if one has not had adequate oppor- the city, when it involves breaking just agree-
tunity to do otherwise than enter into them ments and when it is akin to dishonouring
(e.g. as one would not if one were forced or ones parents and when it is not these
tricked or rushed), then the agreements are things it opens up a great deal of leeway
not binding and one may legitimately diso- for disobedience on spurious grounds, par-
bey what one earlier had agreed to obey. ticularly to those less attentive than Socrates
The condition implied in the Argument from was to the finer points of logic and argu-
Piety is that obedience is limited in part by mentation. Indeed, one ventures to say that
243

almost anyone else besides Socrates when do so they bring forward several arguments
faced with his situation in prison would that, they believe, show the claim cannot be
jump at the opportunity to escape without sustained.
giving the matter much if any rational con- First, they argue, the jury could not legally
sideration at all. have offered Socrates the bargain that
In truth, Crito is more naturally read as a Socrates imagines them making. The jury
defense of almost unlimited obedience than simply lacked the authority to make such
as a manifesto of disobedience. In this dia- an offer, so Socrates statement to the jury
logue Socrates not only agrees that he must that he would refuse the offer is an empty
submit willingly to his unjustly ordered exe- gesture. Moreover, according to Brickhouse
cution, but also stands as a staunch defender and Smith, any law made by those who did
of Staatsrecht: whatever the state orders must have the authority to make a law prohibit-
be obeyed by the just citizen. Crito offers up ing Socrates from practicing philosophy (the
a powerful and almost unqualified version of Council and the Assembly) would have been
unlimited state power, and Socrates appears in conflict with the law proscribing impiety,
to endorse this theory (Brickhouse and Smith so that Socrates would be confronted with
2004: 234). But that interpretation, as we an impossible choice to commit impiety
have seen, brings Socrates up against the (by obeying the new law) or to commit impi-
charge of inconsistency vis--vis Apology. Is ety (by obeying the existing law proscribing
there rescue from the shoals? impiety). Such a new law, moreover, is sim-
Brickhouse and Smith (2004: 2305) bring ply inconceivable without self-contradiction
forward a resolution to the Apology/Crito in the Athens of Socrates day. But even if
problem they believe avoids the difficulties such a law were conceivable and were legally
of the earlier explanations. Instead of finding issued in an attempt to get Socrates to stop
a veiled defense of disobedience in Crito they philosophizing, Socrates would not necessar-
find a more obedient Socrates in Apology ily disobey that law. If he believed that the
than is often done, thus enabling them to law would make his continuation of practic-
assimilate the Socrates of Apology to the ing philosophy unjust, he would obey that
Socrates of Crito without resorting to overly law. And, they argue, he would presumably
strained interpretations of the latter dia- find the continuation of philosophy in light
logue. Their interpretation centres mainly on of such a (hypothetical) law to be unjust
the jurys hypothetical offer to free Socrates because the proscription came from a legally
if he would accept a command that he stop constituted authority and, as we know from
philosophizing. Socrates says, in effect, that Crito, his agreements with the city to obey
he would disobey such a command: I will its commands placed him under a moral
be persuaded by the god rather than you obligation to do whatever the city thought
(Ap. 29cd). Socrates foresees that to accept was right. The city and not Socrates, on their
release on the condition of giving up philoso- reading, is the final arbiter between it and
phy would necessarily cause him to become the citizen regarding what justice requires
a disobedient citizen (even if hypothetically). (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 234).
Brickhouse and Smith wish to avoid the con- Yet another strategy for removing the
clusion that Socrates would disobey a legal Apology/Crito problem is to have recourse
command of the state. In their endeavour to to what is often called the hierarchy of
244

authority view (Dybikowski 1974: 524; practice of philosophy would be in these cir-
Johnson 1990: 71940; Kraut 1984: 26 and cumstances unjust from the standpoint of
n. 2 and 1334; Martin 1970: 256; Santas the state, it would not be unjust in Socrates
1979: 37, 208; Vlastos 1974: 51734, 1991: eyes because he would still be obeying the
286; Woozley 1971: 315). On this view, god, and obeying the god is what the just
Socrates genuinely believes that he is obliged man must do.
to obey all legal commands of the state (the This does not make Socrates hypothetical
command of the Thirty does not qualify as disobedience to the state an easy decision!
legal). But because he is sometimes com- Indeed, his anticipation of the jurys hypo-
manded by different authorities to do differ- thetical command and how he would react to
ent things, he is sometimes forced to choose it saves him the trouble of having to disobey
to obey one authority at the expense of diso- the jury or the city. The offer from the jury is
beying another. For example, when Socrates never made, the command is never given and
in Apology tells the jury that he would diso- no law is ever passed prohibiting the practice
bey (or, more precisely, not be persuaded by) of philosophy. By answering the jurys ques-
an injunction to stop philosophizing, even if tion before the jurors even ask it cuts off at
he were given his freedom in exchange, and the pass the development of a situation that
even if the result of persisting in philosophi- Socrates would no doubt have found unpleas-
cal activity were that he die, he really means ant having to disobey the city. In effect he
that he would disobey (not be persuaded).23 says, dont bother to ask, and the jury does
He is easily understood as saying that even not. The trial proceeds to its conclusion with
if such an injunction were legal and conceiv- no further hint of a disobedient Socrates.
able he would disobey. His highest allegiance
is to the god (Ap. 29cd, 30b, 37e38a), and THE CRITO PROBLEM
that means to him that he must practice phi-
losophy because that is what he understood Nevertheless, as a theoretical matter, on the
the god to require of him: hierarchy view Socrates appears in Apology
to be able to imagine a situation in which
As long as I draw breath and am able I he would disobey the city. The concern is
shall not cease to practice philosophy . . . that this conclusion seems to create another
Be sure that this is what the god orders conflict, this one with views he expresses in
me to do, and I think there is no greater Crito through the speech of the Laws. On the
blessing to the city than my service to the one hand Socrates will never disobey the city
god. (Ap. 29d30a) on the other he will never knowingly commit
injustice. What, then, if he is ordered by the
In Apology Socrates appears to be speculat- city to commit injustice that is, something
ing about how he would decide if the state, that Socrates believes to be unjust?
in any of its voices, should command him Defenders of the hierarchy view claim
to cease and desist from his usual activities. that the concern is more imaginary than real
He replies to the imagined command that because the sort of situation imagined in
he would not desist. In the imagined case Apology does not ever come up for consid-
the god trumps the state, to use Vlastoss eration in Crito, viz. what are the obligations
expression. And even though the continued of a citizen when the city commands the
245

citizen to commit an injustice? Presumably for his freedom, he could not go along
the Laws think citizens must obey such com- because such an offer could not legally be
mands, but they do not say this. On that made by the jury, and so the offer was seen
particular question they are silent. Socrates by Socrates as illegitimate, that is, as coming
presumably thinks otherwise. Cities expect from an illegitimate authority.
obedience to all of their commands, no mat- Besides, they believe a better explanation
ter what citizens may think of them. This fact for how Socrates conceived the citizens
about cities helps to explain their hard-line obligations to state commands is available,
authoritarianism in Crito. The city and the one that, moreover, does not turn him into
Laws acknowledge that they might make a champion, even a cautious one, of disobe-
occasional moral mistakes, but they do not dience. They argue for a view that could be
acknowledge that citizens may decide to characterized as the instrument of the state
disobey such mistakes, even mistakes that view. On this reading, Socrates would (and
admittedly require citizens to commit injus- did) always obey his authentic commanders,
tice. Socrates, on the hierarchy reading, even when he believed he was being com-
refuses to go that far. He is obviously willing manded to commit an injustice. But, they
to suffer an injustice imposed by the city (e.g. say, such obedience did not result in Socrates
to be executed), but not to commit one. He violating his commitment to the prohibition
will not disobey the god, for example, even if of injustice principle. They offer, broadly,
ordered to do so by the city. We are thus war- two sorts of reasons. The first set concerns
ranted in believing, the argument goes, that certain procedural conditions that even the
Socrates and the Laws are simply in disagree- Laws believe must be in place for a citizen
ment on this point.24 In fact, when Socrates to have an obligation to obey: the citizen
spends time preparing Crito for the speech of must be free to leave the city if he does not
the Laws he makes it very clear that few peo- like its commands, the citizen must have an
ple, perhaps cities most of all, will accept opportunity to persuade the city where jus-
the premise that it is never just to commit tice really lies and the agreements between
injustice [knowingly]. the citizen and the city (that the citizen obey)
Brickhouse and Smith (2004: 2358) also must be just agreements. If these procedural
wish to preserve the authoritarian character conditions are not in place, a citizen is not
of Crito but they believe the hierarchy view obliged to obey the city when it issues unjust
is open to objection.25 They do not find hier- commands.
archy or trumping spelled out in the texts, The second set of reasons centres on a dis-
and believe moreover that Socrates behav- tinction between culpable and non-culpable
iour in those rare instances when he did diso- wrongdoing. Not all acts of obedience result-
bey a state command (e.g. his refusal to arrest ing in injustice are culpable. As an illustra-
Leon), is better explained by reference to the tion they cite the behaviour of the jailer who
notion of legitimate authority. The regime administered the fatal hemlock to Socrates.
of the Thirty was illegally constituted, and so Both men, Socrates and the jailer, believe the
any of its orders would be seen by Socrates to order that Socrates be executed was unjust,
be illegitimate. And when Socrates claimed yet both obeyed. Neither the jailer nor
he would disobey the (hypothetical) offer of Socrates in this circumstance is responsible
the jury to trade the practice of philosophy for the injustice. Only a moral fanatic, they
246

argue, would find either man culpable for The Brickhouse/Smith resolution to the
this acknowledged injustice. The culpabil- Crito problem is not friendly to the civil
ity resides instead with the authorities (the disobedience interpretation of Socratic
prosecutor and the jury) that asked for and political philosophy. By resorting to notions
ordered the execution. Culpability for injus- of responsibility and blame they are able
tice, then, is to be assigned only when one to portray Socrates as obedient to unjust
obeying an unjust command would make commands without finding him responsi-
the one obeying responsible for the injus- ble for the injustice himself. He is thus able
tice. In the case of non-culpable wrongdoing, to remain loyal to both the prohibition of
the actors who actually carry out the unjust injustice principle and the strict compliance
actions are merely instruments of the state. principle. That is not the civil obedience
How can we tell if the one obeying is stance as we usually encounter it. Civil diso-
responsible (i.e. culpable) for the injustice in bedience theory allows or requires departure
the relevant moral sense? To use Brickhouse from strict compliance when the latter col-
and Smiths example (2004: 23840), why lides with the prohibition of injustice. Their
should not the Nazi officers who carried argument may also be useful for removing
out orders to commit atrocities be allowed concerns some scholars have about Socrates
off the moral hook by claiming, as they did, participation in morally questionable mili-
that they were merely carrying out orders tary actions in the war (e.g. Anderson 2005:
of their superiors? Does this not make par- 826, who finds Socrates voluntarily obeying
ticipating non-culpably in injustice a bit too orders to participate in ethically questiona-
easy? Not necessarily. We are again reminded ble war campaigns, especially at Potidaia; cf.
of prior procedural requirements that must Balot, 2008; Woodruff, 2007).26
be in place that the citizen must have the In arguing that the jailer did not act
option to persuade before he acquires an unjustly in administering the hemlock, but
obligation to obey, and that if the citizen in fact did the just thing (obeyed his com-
is sufficiently dissatisfied with a particu- manders, the ones who ordered him to do
lar command, thinking it to be egregiously the administering), Brickhouse and Smith
unjust, or detects a pattern of injustice in appear to suggest (perhaps inadvertently) yet
the citys commands, he must be free to leave another resolution to the Crito problem. This
the city to avoid having to comply. The Nazi resolution requires thinking of Socrates (and
officers, at least ones lower down in the the jailers) understanding of what acting
chain of command, when ordered to commit justly means or at least requires as precisely
unjust acts should have tried to persuade or obeying authentic authority in every case.
left the city. Because they did not they are On this view it does not matter whether the
culpable of wrongdoing. Socrates too was command is just or unjust or more precisely
free to persuade or to leave, and he did not. the idea of unjust command by an authen-
Thus he signified by his decision to remain, tic authority is a contradiction. Authentic
and having been afforded the opportunity to commands that order citizens to do things
persuade, that he was morally obliged to cannot be unjust, and so Socrates is never
obey the decision that he be executed, or any confronted with the need to decide whether
other command the city may have imposed any particular command orders him to com-
upon him. mit injustice. At most he has to decide only
247

that the commanding authority is authentic, poison he was actively and knowingly par-
and whether what it has said to him to do ticipating in an act whose result would be
or refrain from doing is properly understood an injustice. But he did not see himself as
as a command. Once he is satisfied on both committing an injustice, and neither did
scores, he will obey, and he will accept full Socrates. Both men believed the jailer was
responsibility for whatever action is thereby acting justly: he was doing what he was
committed because he can be confident that commanded to do, and for both men, that is
what he is doing obeying is the morally exactly what justice in this unhappy circum-
just thing to do. stance required.
This interpretation is not free of difficulty, This interpretation also helps us to
for it seems to entail the following paradox- understand Socrates behaviour in the war
ical result: Socrates (on this reading) could campaigns at Potidaia, Amphipolis and
carry out commands that resulted in an Delium. Some scholars have questioned
injustice being committed, without himself Socrates morality in these campaigns, on
committing an injustice. (It is to be noted the grounds that atrocities and genocide
that the Brickhouse/Smith solution encoun- were committed in them, and Socrates was
ters the same paradox but resolves it differ- apparently a willing participant. Brickhouse
ently.) But the paradox may be removed by and Smith would evidently argue that
considering actual instances from Socrates Socrates could participate in such activities
life. His accepting the hemlock on this without committing injustice because he
reading is just such an instance. Why did was an instrument of the state, and so not
he take it? Because he was ordered to do culpable for wrongdoing. On the interpre-
so by a legitimate authority (the Athenian tation being considered here, by contrast,
jury). If justice includes obeying legitimate Socrates was doing the just thing in these
state authority, and if Socrates wished to campaigns by obeying his commanders. To
be just, he had to take the hemlock. At the his Athenian jurors, for example, he states
same time, the execution was unjust. This that he would have done a terrible thing if
episode shows how Socrates could carry out he had abandoned his post through fear or
a command that resulted in injustice with- for any other reason. When ones military
out himself having committed injustice. In commander (in this case, a legitimate state
fact, the episode shows more than that. Not authority) assigns one to a post with orders
only did he refuse to commit an injustice, to stay and fight, no matter how dangerous
he actually did the just thing. By accepting or difficult the situation may be, or even
his death penalty, even while believing the how morally questionable from our stand-
penalty was unjust, he showed that what he point, the just person remains and fights.
was doing was the just thing to do: to obey To be just again emerges as to obey the
the authority. authority.
Much the same reasoning applies to the Does this interpretation open any room
jailer who administered the hemlock to for civil disobedience? We shall discover an
Socrates. He believed, from what evidence affirmative answer to that question in a later
we have, that the execution was unjust (in the section of this chapter when we turn to con-
sense that Socrates was wrongly sentenced). sider one additional authority in Socrates
He also believed that by administering the life: logos or the argument.
248

PERSUADE OR OBEY activity (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 222;

Kim 2011: 8492). On this view, citizens
One aspect of the speech of the Laws in Crito may rightly appeal to the Assembly (the
that has generated a great deal of discussion main legislative body of Athens) to pass only
is the Laws statement to Socrates: laws that are just, or to rescind laws that they
deem to be unjust. If a citizen fails to per-
Is your wisdom such as not to realize suade the Assembly in either of these ways,
that your country is to be honored more he is obliged to obey even unjust laws when
than your mother, your father, and your they impinge upon his actions. Socrates, as
ancestors, that it is more to be revered we know, eschewed all conventional political
and more sacred, and that it counts
activity as much as possible, and therefore
for more among the gods and sensible
did not succeed in persuading the Assembly
men, that you must worship it, yield to
it, and placate its anger more than your to rescind its unjust laws or to refrain from
fathers? You must either persuade it, or passing other laws he may have believed to
obey its orders. One must obey the com- be unjust. In effect, he forfeited the oppor-
mands of ones city and country, or per- tunity to free himself of obligation to obey
suade it as to the nature of justice. (Cf. unjust laws because he: (a) did not exercise
Cri. 51a52a) his right to persuade; and (b) would have
presumably failed to persuade the city of the
The passage has an important bearing on the injustice of its laws even if he had exercised
question of the extent of Socrates obligation his right. Either way, having failed at persua-
to obey state authority. The clear import is sion, he was bound to obey (Brickhouse and
that Socrates obligation is not absolute: he Smith 2002a: 23542).
appears to have the right to attempt to per- Other scholars believe the attempted per-
suade the state that its commands are unjust, suasion is to come after one has been accused
and thus to cause the state to rescind such and/or convicted of a crime, and that its
commands (if the state is persuaded the com- purpose is to persuade the jury that one is
mands are unjust) before he incurs any obli- innocent (e.g. Johnson 1990: 733 and n. 23;
gation to obey them. It may be questioned Kraut 1984: ch. 3; Reeve 1989). An accused
whether the city is suggesting anything like citizen is to have his day in court. Here the
a right to persuade before one is obliged to question is not so much about the justice of
obey; Athens just happens to give its citizens the laws that one is commanded to obey as
this opportunity and, the Laws seem to be about the guilt or innocence of a citizen who
saying, Socrates should be grateful. However has been accused of violating such laws.27
that may be, the passages in which persuade On this reading all sides can agree about the
or obey appears still leave a number of ques- justice (or legality) of the states commands.
tions open for further interpretation. What is at issue, rather, is the factual ques-
First we should ask, when does the citi- tion of whether violations to those admit-
zen attempt to persuade, before or after tedly just laws have occurred. The Laws are
an unjust command has been given? Some thus to be read as making the uncomplicated
scholars believe the persuasion should come point that Socrates was allowed to address
before the command, at least before the the jury with his defense against the accusa-
command directly impinges upon a citizens tions, and failed to persuade it that he was
249

innocent (i.e. what we have ordered is not open up wide scope for disobedience (Kraut
right: Cri. 51e52a). His failure has the con- 1984: 111). Others argue that Socrates com-
sequence that he is obliged to abide by the mitments to the state, on a strict reading of
verdict that he remain in prison and die. persuade or obey, remove much room for
Two other questions raised by the per- disobedience, particularly if, for whatever
suade or obey passages are: (1) to whom is reason, the citizen should fail to persuade
the persuasion to be directed? and (2) is it the state that its commands are unjust. If he
enough to try to persuade or must one suc- fails to persuade the city that its commands
ceed in persuading, if persuasion is to have are unjust he must obey, no matter what
any impact on ones obligation to obey? Since (Brickhouse and Smith 2004: 22035). The
the Laws do not make their meaning clear on worry with that reading for some scholars is
either point, we are free to speculate. that it would make Socrates too authoritar-
Different scholars have offered different ian. But that concern may be prompted more
answers to the first question: the Assembly, by what thoughtful people today think than
the Laws or the jury or all three. An answer what is in the text. Based on textual consid-
to the first helps to answer the second. If erations alone, the verdict between an obe-
the Assembly is the intended audience for dient and a justifiably disobedient Socrates
persuasion, the usual argument is that since appears to go in favour of the former view.
Socrates did not ever try to persuade it When the Laws say that the citizen must per-
that its laws were unjust, he forfeited any suade or obey, that appears to be precisely
right to disobey that may have accrued what they mean and precisely what Socrates
from his attempt at persuasion (whether his agreeably takes them to mean (Allen 1980:
attempted persuasion had been successful 105; Brickhouse and Smith 2002a: 2369,
or not). If the Laws are the intended tar- 2004: 2201; Grote 1865, vol. 1: 303; Santas
get of persuasion, Socrates may be seen in 1979: 216; Woozley 1979: 6275; Young
Crito to attempt to persuade them about 1974: 1617, 212).
their injustice to him. Since he failed to No matter how one resolves the ques-
change their mind, and since he remained tions posed above, one can scarcely doubt
to accept his execution, this interpretation the importance of persuade or obey either
suggests that persuade or obey influences for the Laws, who make and repeat the point
ones obligation to obey only if one is suc- several times in Crito, or for Socrates, who
cessful. If the jury is the proper object of appears to agree with the Laws that per-
persuasion, then Socrates is again seen as suade or obey is an important consideration
having attempted to persuade (in this case, in assessing ones obligations to obey the
to persuade the jury that he was innocent city. Despite ambiguities and uncertainties,
of the charges), and that, having failed (and one may, I think, safely infer from the evi-
accepting his punishment), he shows again dence of Crito that the Laws believe giving
that he thinks persuasion must be success- citizens an opportunity to persuade was an
ful if it is to absolve one of ones obligations important factor in their believing that citi-
to the city. zens who, given the opportunity to persuade
Finally, we may ask, how much disobedi- but nevertheless fail, should be all the more
ence is justified under the persuade or obey willing to recognize that their obligation is
doctrine? Some scholars find the doctrine to to obey, without much further question. And,
250

Socrates appears to accept the Laws verdict not repay injustice with injustice does not
on that matter. get me very far when I do not know what
injustice is. What more can be said to fill in
the particulars of Socrates understanding of
what justice is, or what being just requires?28
POLITICS AND JUSTICE IN SOCRATES In view of Socrates admission at the end of
THOUGHT Republic Book I that he does not know what
it is (R. I 354c), how can one understand
SOCRATIC JUSTICE what it might have meant to him?
Despite Socrates profession of ignorance
In searching for a Socratic political philoso- about justice, his ignorance, no matter how
phy we have encountered numerous candi- genuine, was simply not total ignorance. In
dates, as many objections and few general both word and deed Socrates gives us many
agreements about much of anything. But one hints and clues about his view of justice, even
persistent theme does seem inescapable to if incomplete and imperfect ones. It is time to
virtually all interpretations: the centrality of weave the various strands into an approxi-
the particular virtue of justice and the signal mate fabric.
importance to Socrates of living a life of jus- The view proposed here, in a nutshell, is
tice as far as one is able. Most scholars agree that Socrates associated justice with obedi-
that Socrates would never knowingly commit ence to authority (this much is already gener-
injustice. Equally clear is the proposition that ally conceded in the literature), but that one
Socrates believed anyone, when confronted authority rises above state authority as deci-
with a moral choice about what to do or sive for giving him direction for living a just
how to live, would always prescribe, do life: logos or the argument:
or live justly, and above all never commit an
injustice. These precepts are foundational in I am not only now but always a man who
Socratic political philosophy, no matter what is persuaded by nothing but the argument
else one may say about it. (t log) that on reflection (logizomen)
However, we have not yet said enough seems to me best. (Cri. 46b)
about what justice is. Socrates understand-
ing of how to live, as it stands to this point, When it came to deciding what he should
would not be of much help in the practical do, or how he should live, Socrates would
decisions facing people in their everyday heed other authorities but ultimately put
lives, simply because it operates at a high logos in the commanding position. If that is
level of abstraction. I can know or believe true, worries that he was too libertarian or
that it is never good or honourable to com- too authoritarian are somewhat irrelevant
mit an injustice and still not know whether for assessing his political philosophy. He
the particular choice I am currently contem- was always attentive above all to what the
plating is an instance of injustice. I can know best argument tells him. He may well have
that it is unjust to disobey my superior, but believed the same should be true for every-
still be uncertain that this particular person one else the unexamined life is not worth
confronting me here and now with a com- living seems like an adage he intends univer-
mand is my superior. To know that I should sally but strictly speaking he claims logos
251

as the ultimate guide only for himself and his strongly still, that he is the only Athenian to
immediate interlocutor, not a general pre- practice this craft (Grg. 521d).30
cept for all people (see Brickhouse and Smith It is natural, then, to suppose that Socrates
forthcoming; Kim 2011: 96111; Weiss associated his own wisdom, human wis-
1998: introduction). dom, with his proficiency in the elenchus.
To make this case we should begin with It was, after all, through his practice of that
his most explicit statements about what jus- craft that he came to understand the nature
tice means. First is his statement in Gorgias of his own wisdom and how it differed from
that justice is a part of the craft (techn) of the false wisdom of others (Ap. 20d22e). If
politics. While it is hard to say what justice that is so, what may he have learned about
is, much can be said about what the craft of how to live or about what justice requires
politics is: of the just person from his practice of that
craft? Does his dedication to the elenchus
There are two different affairs to which enable him also to be able to arrive at proper
I assign two different crafts: the one beliefs or knowledge about what is required
which has to do with the soul I call to live justly or virtuously? Is the elenchus the
politics (politik); the other which con-
source of those positive moral convictions
cerns the body [has no single name but
that appear in Apology, Crito and Gorgias
can be designated] in two branches as
gymnastic and medicine. Under politics that doing injustice is the greatest of all evils
I set legislation in the place of gym- to the one committing it (Grg. 509b), that one
nastic and justice to match medicine. must never repay one injustice with another
[All of these] are noticed by the craft (Cri. 49b) and that it is evil and disgraceful to
of flattery which divides itself into four disobey ones superior, whether man or god
[corresponding] parts . . . [and each] (Ap. 29b)? These claims seem different from
pretends to be that [craft to which it claims Socrates might have made about his
corresponds]. Thus, cookery assumes understanding of proper speech. Thus, it is
the form of medicine . . ., self adorn- worth asking whether his warrant for believ-
ment personates gymnastic . . ., soph-
ing them is to be sought in what he learned
istry [imitates] legislation and rhetoric
from practicing the elenchus.
justice. (Grg. 464b465c)
Some scholars believe that Socrates
practice of the elenchus is the source of his
Socrates nowhere claims that he is a practi- positive moral convictions, in the sense that
tioner or a craftsman of justice,29 only that through repeated elenctic testing he was
he is just and that he knows how [rightly] able to learn some things about the virtues
to live (Johnson 2005: 1735; Johnson, (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 1029; Gulley
1985: 3750). But he does claim in Gorgias 1968; Kraut 1983: 5970; McPherran 1996:
to be a practitioner of politics (Grg. 521d). 5 n. 14 and 1789; Polanski 1985: 24760;
Because he is contrasting his craft with that Vlastos 1983a: 2758, 1983b: 714, 1994:
of the counterfeit practitioners of rhetoric 138). This view is usually known in the lit-
and sophistry, Socrates is claiming to practice erature as constructivism.31 While the con-
the craft of non-counterfeit speech. Proper structivist explanation has variant forms, the
speech is the one craft he practices in greater general idea is that beliefs that are success-
measure than any other Athenian, or more fully refuted provide important clues about
252

beliefs that may with warrant be regarded as any true moral beliefs may be derived from
true. If Socrates finds certain beliefs about them. Often a refutation succeeds in estab-
the virtues to be incapable of withstanding lishing nothing more than that one of two
his elenctic questioning of them, that find- (or several) moral principles must be aban-
ing is presumptive evidence that those beliefs doned, not which one. A refutation of this
are false, and that their contraries (or other sort may even yield the conclusion that many
beliefs logically entailed by their contraries) of an interlocutors beliefs are false without
are true. For instance, since Socrates found giving him a clue on that account of which
no interlocutor who was able to defend ones are false or which ones he may with
against the elenchus the view that it is bet- warrant believe instead. Merely to refute one
ter to commit than to suffer injustice (Grg. or several beliefs, even repeatedly, is often by
508e), he is or believes himself to be, on this itself not sufficient for establishing the truth
account, justified in taking as true that it is of any positive moral principles whatsoever.
better to suffer than to commit injustice, To use an example from Guthrie, to show
especially if that view is itself never refuted that something is not a circle is not to show
by similar elenctic examination. If certain that it is a square, or even that it is a figure
propositions are refuted again and again, at all (Guthrie 1975: 224). Socrates refuta-
or conversely if certain propositions always tions (when they are successful) are generally
succeed in overcoming elenctic challenges, useful only for showing an interlocutor that
this very track record furnishes sufficient something he believes should not be believed,
warrant for what Socrates should believe but not which of his beliefs he should believe
about virtue, about how to live, and about and which he should reject.
what he could, in some sense, justifiably The same is true of Socrates himself. In
claim to know (e.g. Brickhouse and Smith this respect he is no better off than his inter-
1989: 12931; McPherran 1996: 5 n. 14 locutors. Socrates may be the one to examine
and 1789; Polanski 1985: 24760; Vlastos the beliefs of others far more often than they
1983a, 1983b and 1994: ch. 1; Woodruff examine his beliefs. But in the practice of the
1986). elenchus it does not matter whose beliefs are
Other scholars believe this line of expla- under inspection, at least when it comes to
nation is defective. For one thing, construc- deciding which beliefs are worth keeping and
tivism, the strategy of discovering correct which ought to be rejected. Socrates repeat-
moral principles merely through the refuta- edly says that he examines others about the
tion of false moral principles does not work virtues because he wishes to know about
well at all in most of the Socratic dialogues these things himself. But what he can learn
(e.g. Benson 1987, 1990: 1009, 1995: 45 from a successful refutation is only what his
ff.; Guthrie 1975: 224; Johnson 2005: 245, interlocutor can learn, viz. that some beliefs
745 and 89 nn. 89; Kim 2011: 1015; May among a given set should be rejected so that
1997: 3750; McTighe 1984: 2208). Often the remaining ones harmonize.32 A successful
the refutations from which the alleged true refutation will not tell him, any more than
principles are supposed to derive are not suc- the person whose beliefs are under scrutiny,
cessful, contrary to the appearance that they which beliefs in the set are the defective ones,
are (Beversluis 2000: passim). But even when much less what beliefs should take their place
they are successful, it is often not the case that as positive moral convictions.
253

ARGUMENT (LOGOS) IN SOCRATIC POLITICAL appear only confirm him in his obligations to
PHILOSOPHY obey the state. But at least we now know that
Socrates will not blindly obey the state, its
If refutation of one belief does not auto- laws and its juries,34 even if he has attempted
matically point to the truth of another belief, (and failed) to persuade all of them where
how can Socrates learn anything of posi- justice truly lies.35 Instead, he will interro-
tive value from his practice of the elenchus? gate them, even while he is in prison, so that
One thing he seems to have learned from his they may have a like opportunity to persuade
cross-examinations is that it is always wrong him. Socrates will yield only to the argument,
to disobey ones superior, whether man or to what truth (altheia) itself would say. He
god, so much so that to be just encompasses is willing to be refuted by Crito (or anyone
obedience to these authorities. This is the else), but only if you can contradict (anti-
conclusion that appears too authoritarian lege) anything I say (Cri. 48d). But he is
to many readers and yet seems difficult to also willing to be persuaded by these others,
dispute. through rational argument. Logos, or at least
But the conclusion, while true as far as ones grasp of it, may change, and if it does
it goes, is fortunately incomplete. In Crito change, Socrates must follow wherever it
Socrates claims that he will always follow leads; but it does not change merely because
the best logos. It now appears that he will one is in prison and facing death. Ultimately
act in accordance with the commands of the argument, logos, must determine what
earthly and divine authorities, but he will Socrates will do; it is the final authority to
also be persuaded by the argument. Indeed, which Socrates appeals in Crito.36
the decision he reaches in Crito to remain in But it is far from clear that Socrates gains
prison and die is perfectly intelligible as an any real dispensation from any of his obliga-
instance of following the best arguments tions to civil authority (or any other legiti-
(which are brought forward by the Laws) mate authority) by virtue of his obligation to
just as much as an instance of obeying the follow the strongest logos. When he does
jurys verdict. In this case the two authori- examine the arguments in Crito he finds
ties logos and jury happen to command those in favour of escape (brought forward
the same thing. But the introduction of rea- by Crito) to be unpersuasive and those in
soned argument as a distinct authority mak- favour of remaining (brought forward by the
ing claims on Socrates obedience opens up Laws) to be decisive, even though the com-
a potential difficulty for deciding how to act manding authority (the city and the Laws in
justly. For it seems at least theoretically pos- this case) itself concedes that the command
sible for a reasoned argument to command of its agent the jury (that he die) is possibly
something contrary to what either the city or unjust (in the sense that Socrates was not
the gods command.33 By querying the Laws actually guilty of wrongdoing).37 Nor does
in his imagined debate with them in Crito it seem likely that he would have been per-
Socrates shows his receptivity to a possibly suaded by any arguments urging him to cease
disobedient course of action, should the right philosophizing or to ignore his daimonion.38
arguments appear. Logos, in the extant dialogues, does not turn
The right arguments (i.e. for escape) do him away from an obedient course of action
not appear in Crito. Arguments that do but rather confirms it as the correct choice.
254

But surely it is wrong to think that argu- authority in the conventional sense and are
ments always confirm, or at least must commanded by the authorities about what
confirm, what other authorities command. they must do. This includes more or less all
Socrates acknowledges this also: citizens in all cities. It encourages citizens to
examine reasons for obeying, finding good
Then we agree [he tells Crito] that the and strong reasons (whatever they may be)
question is whether it is right for me to and following them.
try to escape from here without the per- It is easier to say what Socrates does not
mission of the Athenians, or not right.
counsel than what he does. He does not
And if it appears to be right, let us try
counsel that we should prefer democracy to
it, and if not right, let us give it up. . . .
We, since our argument so constrains us, oligarchy or the other way around. His best
must consider only [this] question. . . . constitution, if one were to guess, would be
Let us, then, investigate in common, and similar to the kallipolis of Platos Republic,
if you can contradict anything I say, do but to make that guess goes beyond the
so, and I will yield to your arguments. evidence.39 Nor did Socrates espouse what
(Cri. 48be) would today be called liberalism or pro-
ceduralism. In that regard he was a person
This passage makes it clear that Socrates will of his time, supportive of the authority of
follow the best argument no matter what the state and its powers over the preroga-
it tells him to do. If an examination of the tives of its citizens and their putative rights.
arguments confirms one in ones duty to obey Equally doubtful is the proposition that he
other authorities, Socrates will obey them. was a forerunner of a civil disobedience
Following the best argument in this case is tradition of political philosophy. He was a
equivalent to obeying the other authorities staunch and unapologetic upholder of state
that give commands. But if Socrates were authority and the unlimited obligation of
to discover in his examination of the argu- citizens to obey that authority almost with-
ments strong and compelling reasons to out qualification.
disobey other authorities, and that argu- But the almost here is of vital importance.
ments of equal strength could not be found Socrates was above all one who asked ques-
on the other side, he would obey the stronger tions, and the harder the questions he asked,
arguments. the greater their significance. One of the
hardest questions to answer in the course of
a lifetime is how far one should be required
to go in his or her obligations to the state.
CONCLUSION States sometimes ask citizens to do things
that seem unreasonable, even unconscion-
In what sense, then, does Socrates have a able. An easy way around mental anguish
political philosophy? Whatever it is, it in such cases is simply to assume either: (a)
is unusual. It has little to do with conven- the state is right, and so ones duty is to obey
tional politics. But it does offer answers to or (b) the individual citizen is right (or some
those who ask themselves how they ought group to which he or she belongs or thinks
to live, even and perhaps especially those he or she belongs) is right, and so the citizen
who come into direct contact with political may justifiably disobey.
255

Socrates took neither of these easy reasons, if the reasons given cannot be well
ways out. Both are essentially unreflective defended, and stronger reasons for disobe-
responses, and that is the problem. What one dience can be brought forward, then obey
desires in citizenship, he insists, is precisely the stronger reasons. Ultimately that is what
reflection. Ask the state, he counsels, why justice requires: neither blind subjection nor
it commands one to do what it commands. knee-jerk dissidence. Socratic justice is noth-
Listen to the states reasons. Challenge those ing other than Socratic philosophy: leading
reasons. If they withstand the challenge, the examined life wherever it may lead.
if they should show themselves to be good
reasons, then obey the state. If they are bad Curtis N. Johnson
256

11
SOCRATIC THEOLOGY AND PIETY
Socrates is acknowledged to have been a illustrates the way that Socrates both chal-
moral philosopher of the first order and lenged and renewed the religious conceptions
the chief exponent of the Socratic Method, of his time.
the elenctic method of question-and-answer
cross-examination.1 It has also been, however,
common to underplay the idea that he was
very much a man of his own time in respect HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
of the supernatural, assuming in his speech
and thought the existence of gods vastly Although for most of our intellectual history
superior to ourselves in power and wisdom, the general postulate of a religious Socrates
and other such conventional Greek religious has been something of a commonplace, it has
commitments. Of course, Socrates trial and had its critics: first ancient, now modern. A
execution on a charge of impiety further rough historical sketch of its career goes as
indicates that he did not insulate his religious follows. The ancient critics of Socrates own
beliefs from those many other novel ones he era seemed to discern in his philosophical
had arrived at philosophically. Rather, our interests and his methodical interrogations
texts indicate that Socrates understood his of others the marks of an atheistic nature
religious commitments to be integral to his philosopher and the amoral argumentative
philosophical mission of moral examina- twistings of a professional teacher of rheto-
tion and rectification; conversely, he used ric: Not a religious Socrates, but an impious
the rationally derived convictions underlying critic of the gods and religious institutions
that mission to reshape the religious conven- of Athens (cf. Ap. 18a19d). In the Apology,
tions of his time in the service of establishing Socrates eloquently and vehemently denies
the new enterprise of philosophy. The direct the truth of these charges, and those deni-
legacy of that project is the rational theology als I shall be arguing are reinforced by the
of Plato, the Stoics and others. That, in any portraits of the other early dialogues. These
case, is the overarching thesis of this chapter. fictional recreations of Socrates are, among
My goal in what follows is to delineate and other things, so engaging and lifelike, that,
justify it by offering a sketch of the religious when taken in tandem with the corroborat-
dimension of Socratic philosophy: one that ing testimony of other Socratic apologists
257

(primarily Xenophon), they quite natu- religious sympathies. Thus, some rejected or
rally won the posthumous case of Socrates modified the myth of Socrates as a pious and
against his various accusers allegations of unjustly condemned servant of God, develop-
atheism.2 Indeed, on a straightforward reading in its stead the picture of a free-thinking
ing of those accounts, Socrates appears to Socrates, a subverter of traditional and civic
be in many ways the most pious Greek of religion.7 In tandem with this development,
his day. Having won that debate, however, the increasingly philosophical as opposed
these ancient defenders also inadvertently to theological interests of succeeding gen-
prepared a fertile ground for the subsequent erations of scholars led to a greater focus
heroization of Socrates by many of the early on Socrates contributions to the triumph
Christian apologists and Church Fathers.3 of rational, scientific culture, to the neglect
Platos and Xenophons emphatic por- of those traditional, religious elements he
traits of Socratic piety made it inevitable that retained within his own thinking.8 Thus
Christians would compare Socrates human began a process of secular canonization that,
wisdom with the divine wisdom of Christ, even now in some quarters, portrays Socrates
his unjust prosecution as an atheist with as a figure straight out of the Enlightenment.
theirs,4 Socrates proposed penalty at his This is the Socrates I and many others in
trial of thirty minae with Judas thirty pieces philosophy were introduced to in graduate
of silver, Socrates in his cell with Christ in school: A consummate intellectualist, wholly
the Garden of Gethsemane and the formers taken up in agonistic argument, whose para-
martyrdom by hemlock with the latters sac- doxical view that virtue is knowledge (e.g.
rifice on the cross. For many, that comparison Pr. 349e350d, 360d; Mem. 3.9.5) grounds a
revealed Socrates to be a proto-Christian and moral theory that takes discursive rationality
prophet of Christ, a valuable link between as our only trustworthy guide in life.
the virtues of intellectual paganism and the Thus, rather than arriving at a reasonably
revealed truths of Christianity.5 Hence, the accurate, or at least, a reasonably balanced,
tradition of an unjustly persecuted, religious assessment of Socrates and his views, one
Socrates became an inspirational fixture and biased reading of the materials, one mythi-
a subject of idealizing literature for think- cal personage, has sometimes been joined
ers up to and including Petrarch, Ficino and by another mythical extreme. Where before
Erasmus.6 Socrates had been a fifth century John the
The image of Saint Socrates, however, Baptist, today we can find others empha-
also began to unravel with the onset of the sizing the antithesis: A philosophical figure
Italian Renaissance. First, the very real inter- inextricably tied to our own contemporary
pretive problems involved in the use of the self-conceptions, cultural values and educa-
diverse accounts left by authors as different tional practices.9 This has given to popular
as Aristophanes and Plato began to be fully and scholarly culture a Socrates who is not
appreciated. This weakened previous confi- so much a man of his own time as a para-
dence in the received conception of Socrates digm of the modern rationally-examined
and thus gave to those battling for intellectual life, an early apostle of the liberal ideals of
liberty and religious tolerance new license to sincerity and self-realization.10
follow their interpretive imaginations in a This version of Socrates as opposed to
manner favourable to their own political and what I shall contend is the more accurate
258

(and more puzzling, more interesting) one evidence for a Socrates who was genuinely
has Socrates pursuing the fundamental ques- religious in the primary sense, a sense recog-
tions of human conduct and moral value by nized both then and now; namely possess-
essentially one method alone: The elenctic ing intellectual, heartfelt commitment to the
examination of belief consistency by the view that there exist divine, other-worldly
interrogation of an interlocutor.11 On the beings possessing intelligence and power,
standard secular portrait, this procedure that is, gods.
of dialogical belief-testing rigorously obeys
the canons of logic and constitutes Socrates
primary method of philosophical investiga-
tion, moral decision-making, and pedagogy. GREEK RELIGION
When Socrates claims that the unexamined
life is not worth living (Ap. 38a56), he is The distinct phenomena we designate by
thus to be understood as advising all human using terms such as religion and the sacred
beings to spend part of each day elencti- were, for Socrates and his contemporaries,
cally examining themselves and others in seamlessly integrated into everyday life.16
accordance with the rational principles of Moreover, no ancient text such as Homers
proper philosophical investigation.12 For this Iliad had the status of a Bible or Koran, and
Socrates, extra-rational religious experiences there was no organized church, trained clergy
do not themselves contribute to philosophys or systematic set of doctrines enforced by
proper methodology, but rather, are the very them. What marked out a fifth century BCE
sorts of things demanding our philosophical Greek city or individual as pious (hosios;
scrutiny. Hence, it is not surprising that advo- eusebs) that is, as being in accord with
cates of this portrait have sometimes under- the norms governing the relations of humans
stood Socrates to have been a kind of atheist and gods was therefore not primarily a
or agnostic, where his positive references to matter of belief, but rather, correct observ-
divine beings and signs are thus construed ance of ancestral tradition.17 The most cen-
as instances of his infamous alleged irony.13 tral of these activities consisted in the timely
He may talk as though he is the recipient of a performance of prayers and sacrifices.18 Such
divine voice (Ap. 31d1), but really goes this sacrifices ranged from an individuals liba-
line of thinking this is but a faon de parler: tion of wine at the start of a meal to the great
For by such phrases he is simply referring sur- civic sacrifices of cattle held on the occa-
reptitiously in the language of the many to sion of a religious festival, culminating in a
the divine inner promptings of his utterly communal banquet that renewed the ties
secular, human powers of ratiocination.14 of city-protecting deities with the citizenry
Once again, on this reading the Socrates of through the mechanism of the shared meal (a
the Apology stands guilty as charged.15 portion of meat being set aside as a burned
In my judgement, this portrait of Socrates offering for the gods; see e.g. Od. 3.418472).
is the result of slighting and misinterpreting Besides such activities designed to ensure the
the evidence of our texts (not to mention favour of a divinity, however, we must also
the cultural forces at work on Socrates from set those other rituals that aim to harm, not
birth). Proponents of this sort of view have help, others; in particular, curses (see e.g.
at least to come to terms with the compelling Pindar Ol. 1.75115; Il. 3.299301; Od.
259

2.134145; Sophocles Trach. 12381240).19 of this repertory that the elegiac, lyric, and
Whatever the ritual, the actions composing it tragic poets drew unstintingly while simul-
were typically aimed at a specific deity and taneously endowing the traditional myths
were tied to the community, ranging from with a new function and meaning.25 Thus,
households to more complex groupings such for example, the dramas of Aeschylus and
as the deme.20 The most obvious organizing Sophocles (e.g. Antigone) juxtapose some
principle, however, was the city and its reli- present situation against the events rep-
gious officials, who exercised final authority resented in Homers texts, extending that
over all religious functions and oversaw the mythology while also calling into critical
most prominent displays of public piety pro- question some facet of the human condition
vided by the citys numerous festivals.21 and contemporary societys response to it. By
It should be clear that ancient Greek the time of Socrates, some of this probing of
religion presupposed a notion of divin- the traditional stories was influenced by the
ity rather different from those central to speculations and scepticism of those thinkers
monotheistic traditions. Socrates and his working within the new intellectualist tradi-
peers were brought up on the portrait of tions of nature philosophy (e.g. Heraclitus)
the gods drawn in the works of Homer and and sophistry (e.g. Protagoras). As a result,
Hesiod, who did not create the cosmos or in the work of such authors such as Euripides
humankind but, rather, were themselves cre- and Thucydides even the fundamental tenets
ated. Their power was often gained through of popular religion concerning the efficacy of
duplicity and violence, they were neither everyday sacrifice and prayer became targets
omniscient nor omnipotent nor eternal, and of criticism.26 Although it is beyond the scope
it was assumed that they regularly intervene of this chapter to trace the influences of such
in human affairs for good or ill, inflicting, thinkers on Socrates, I will make brief allu-
for example, famine, war and plague.22 sions to some of them as we proceed.
Here on earth, then, there is no clear sepa-
ration of the religious from the secular (to
use anachronistic terminology), and thus
every human action, every facet of nature, THE PUZZLES OF SOCRATIC
had what we would call a religious dimen- RELIGION
sion. But although the ancient Greek world
is permeated by the divine, its most potent Socrates philosophical reputation rests on
expression is in beings distinctly different his adherence to the highest standards of
from perishable, mortal creatures: gods, rationality, one given its clearest expression
daimones and heroes.23 in the Crito:
Even though these ancient conceptions
of divinity were not elaborated or enforced T1 Rationality Principle: Not now for
by an official theological body, religious the first time, but always, I am the sort of
education was not left entirely to chance. man who is persuaded by nothing except
Both Homer and Hesiod were recognized the argument (t log) that seems best to
as having established for the Greeks a kind me when I reason (logizomen) about
of canonical repertory of stories about the the matter. (Cri. 46b46)
Powers of the Beyond.24 It was on the basis
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Socratic reasoning commonly employs the me . . . by the god through oracles and
Socratic Method, and we are encouraged to through dreams and by every other means
believe that for many years Socrates subjected in which a divinity has ever commanded
a wide variety of self-professed experts on the anyone to do anything. (Ap. 33c47; cf.
Ap. 30a, Cri. 43d44b, Phd. 60c61c)
topic of virtue to this form of examination (Ap.
20d23c). The result of this long effort, how-
ever, appears to be not a body of knowledge, In addition, Socrates tells the jurors at his
but the meagre payoff of moral scepticism: trial that he has been assisted in his philo-
sophical mission through the frequent warn-
T2 Ignorance Principle: I am aware of ings of his divine sign, the daimonion:
being wise in nothing, great or small . . .
(Ap. 21b45). . . . [except that] . . . I am T5 Daimonion: [A] sort of voice (phon)
wiser in that what I do not know, I do comes, which, whenever it does come,
not even suppose that I know. (21d68) always holds me back from what Im
about to do but never urges me forward.
(Ap. 31d24)
This would not be so surprising an out-
come were it not that Socrates represents
this awareness as resulting from a quest per- Our texts that depict Divine Mission (T3),
formed at the behest of Greeces pre-eminent Extra-Rational Information (T4) and
religious authority, the Delphic oracle. For Daimonion (T5) should now prompt us to
as Socrates sees it, the god Apollo, speak- ask how it is that Socrates can also subscribe
ing through the oracle, has stationed him in to his Ignorance Principle (T2): for, lacking
Athens as though he is a warrior, ordering wisdom, how can Socrates be confident that
him to philosophize by elenctically examin- gods such as Apollo even exist, let alone be
ing himself and others (28d29a, 30e31a). assured that Apollo always speaks the truth
As he summarizes the matter: (21b) and that his divine dreams and signs are
not mere delusions? Moreover, since he also
T3 Divine Mission: I . . . go around seeking endorses the Rationality Principle (T1), we
and investigating in accordance with the can expect him to justify the claims implied
god. . . . I come to the gods aid. . . . because by these texts; but it is hard to see how the
of my devotion to the god (21e523c1) Socratic Method could provide that sort of
. . . .the god stationed me . . . ordering warrant (since it appears to reveal only the
me to live philosophizing and examining inconsistency of interlocutors beliefs; hence,
myself and others. (28e429a2) their lack of expert knowledge).27 Texts such
as Extra-Rational Information (T4) and
Socrates also emphasizes that his interpreta- Daimonion (T5) also make Socrates appear
tion of the Delphic Apollos pronouncement to be far more superstitious than the aver-
that no one is wiser than he as constituting age Athenian: not the sort of behaviour we
an order to philosophize has been confirmed expect from the paradigm of the rationally
through other extra-rational sources: self-examined life. After all, if more sophis-
ticated contemporaries such as Thucydides
T4 Extra-Rational Information: To do this could stand aloof from comparable elements
[philosophizing] has been commanded of of popular religion, and if even traditionally
261

minded playwrights such as Aristophanes The preceding texts exemplify the way
could poke cruel fun at seers and oracle that Plato presents us with a puzzling, street-
mongers (e.g. Av. 521, 959991), how could preaching philosopher who is both rational
Socrates not do so as well? Worse yet, it is and religious, and whose relationship to eve-
hard to see how the Socrates who accepts the ryday Athenian piety is anything but clear.
Rationality Principle (T1), Divine Mission To begin to make sense of that relationship,
(T3) and Extra-Rational Information (T4) and thereby resolve the tensions between
texts as he investigates the religious claims of these and related texts, it is useful to exam-
his interlocutors can be self-consistent when ine Socrates own examination of a self-pro-
he goes on to criticize such interlocutors for fessed expert in Greek religion: Euthyphro.
acting on ungrounded religious judgements:
T6 Euthyphro Principle: . . . [I]f you

[Euthyphro] did not know clearly the SOCRATIC PIETY AND PHILOSOPHY
pious and the impious, there is no way
you would ever have attempted to prose-
The Euthyphros discussion of the virtue of
cute an elderly man, your father, for mur-
piety makes it a key text for determining the
der on behalf of a hired man. Rather, as
to the gods, you would have dreaded the religious dimension of Socratic philosophy.28
risk that you would not do it correctly, It also provides vivid examples of the Socratic
and as to human beings, you would have Method through its portrayal of Socrates
been ashamed. (Euthphr. 15d48) relentless interrogation of Euthyphros five
attempted definitions of piety.29 Definition
Here a rational principle of morality is (1) piety is proceeding against whomever
implied: actions that are morally ambigu- does injustice (5d6e) is quickly dispensed
ous ought not to be performed in the absence with because it is too narrow: Euthyphro
of a full understanding of the relevant con- holds there to be cases of pious action that do
cepts involved. So we are then left to wonder not involve proceeding against wrongdoers
how the epistemically modest Socrates of the (5de). Socrates also reminds Euthyphro that
Ignorance Principle (T2) would respond if he is seeking a complete account of the one
pressed to defend his risky conduct of chal- characteristic (eidos) of piety: that unique,
lenging the moral and religious views of his self-same, universal quality the possession
fellow Athenians. The mere citation of divine of which makes any pious action pious and
authority instanced by the Divine Mission which Euthyphro had earlier agreed was
(T3), Extra-Rational Information (T4) the object of their search (6de; cf. 5cd;
and Daimonion (T5) texts would appear Men. 72c). Definition (2) piety is what is
inadequate in view of the demands of the loved by the gods (6e7a) is next rejected
Rationality Principle (T1); such a citation on the grounds that since Euthyphros gods
would also open up to interlocutors such as quarrel about the rightness of actions, a
Euthyphro (a self-professed diviner) the pos- god-loved, hence pious, action could also
sibility of replying in kind that they too, like be a god-hated, hence impious, action; thus,
Socrates, have been commanded in divina- definition (2) fails to specify the real nature
tions and in dreams to contest conventional of pious actions (7a9d). Note, however, that
norms. by presupposing without restriction in his
262

definitional search that the definition of piety Socrates assists Euthyphro in produc-
must apply to every pious action, and given ing a fourth definition of piety by confront-
his apparent rejection of divine enmity and ing him with the question of pietys relation
violence (6ad, 7b9c), Socrates is committed to generic justice: Is all the just pious, or is
to the claims (i) that there is but one universal justice broader than piety such that piety is
moral canon for all beings, gods and humans then a part of justice? (11e12e). Subsequent
alike, and thus must reject the tradition of a to his adoption of the part-of-justice view,
divine double-standard of morality (cf. e.g. Euthyphro attempts to differentiate pious jus-
R. I 378b). Socrates examination also sug- tice from the remainder (human justice) by
gests that his gods (ii) are perfectly just and stipulating that piety involves the therapeutic
good and so (iii) experience no moral disa- service to the gods (therapeia then) (12e6
greements among themselves. 9).31 This differentia, however, is rejected by
Socrates rebuttal of Euthyphros third reference to a craft analogy comparing those
attempt at definition (3) piety is what who would tend the gods in this fashion to
is loved by all the gods (9e) constitutes those who tend horses, dogs and cattle (13a
the most logically complex section of the d). Such therapists possess the sort of expert
Euthyphro (9e11b).30 Socrates apparent knowledge that includes the capacity to ben-
rejection of this definition comes at the end efit their particular kind of subjects substan-
of a long and complex passage (10e11b) tially by restoring or maintaining their health,
where he first drives home his conclusion or by otherwise meeting their essential needs
that Euthyphros various concessions under- and improving the way in which they func-
cut this third definition of piety and then tion. Obviously, then, since mere mortals can-
explains the apparent source of Euthyphros not benefit gods in these ways the virtue of
confusion; namely given Euthyphros claim piety cannot be a form of therapy (13ce). By
that something is god-loved because it is contrast, skillful service (hupretik) along the
pious, his purported definition god-loved lines of assistants to craftspeople contributes
appears to designate only a non-essential to an acceptable differentia of generic justice;
property of piety (a pathos) rather than assistants to a shipwright, for example, serve
specifying pietys essential nature (its ousia). the shipwright by satisfying his or her desire
With this Socrates makes it evident that he is to receive assistance in building ships but do
no Divine Command Theorist: that is, unlike not restore or improve upon the shipwrights
gods modelled after Homeric royalty, his own nature or functioning. Socrates has thus
gods do not issue morality establishing com- brought Euthyphro to the point of agreeing
mands such that a pious action is pious sim- that:
ply because it is god-loved; rather, it seems,
his gods love things that are independently P Piety is that part of justice that is a
pious because they themselves are by nature service of humans to gods, assisting the
wise, virtue-loving beings. By tacitly allowing gods in their primary task to produce
that the gods are of one mind on the topic their most beautiful product (pagkalon
of virtue, Socrates here lays the groundwork ergon). (12e14a)
for the view that there is ultimately only one
divinity (see the section Socratic Theology Within the constraints of this account,
in this chapter). Euthyphro is then asked to specify precisely
263

the nature of that most beautiful product of kind: a gift for a gift, an evil for an evil (the lex
the gods chief work in whose production the talionis).34 Even among the gods the principle
gods might employ our assistance (13e14a). of lex talionis is assumed as basic (e.g. Zeus
Euthyphro, however, tenaciously avoids suggests that Hera might allow him to destroy
answering this question (13d14a), citing one of her favourite cities in return for aban-
instead a fifth definitional attempt: (5) piety doning Troy [Il. 4.3169]; cf. Sophocles Aj.
is knowledge of sacrificing and praying (14b 79).35 In terms of everyday practical religion,
15c). To this Socrates emphatically responds the charis relationship of the mutual exchange
that Euthyphro is abdicating their search just of pleasing favours assumed a similar rela-
at the point where a brief answer one anal- tionship.36 In respect of these venerable prin-
ogous to food, the product from the craft ciples, Socrates can be ranked a self-conscious
of farming (14a) might have finally given moral revolutionary (Cri. 49bd): as he sees it,
Socrates all the information that he really since we should never do injustice, we should
needed to have about piety (14bc). Many never do evil, and from that it follows that we
scholars have found this good evidence for should never do an evil in return for even an
ascribing something like P to Socrates.32 The evil done to us (Cri. 48b49d, 54c; cf. Grg.
question then becomes how Socrates would 468e474b, R. I 335ad). For Socrates, then,
have answered the question of the identity of not even Zeus (rather, least of all Zeus) can
the gods beautiful, chief product? return one injury for another.37 As for the
First, we can expect Socrates to main- return of pleasing favours: material goods are
tain that although we humans cannot have not to be expected from the gods for Socrates,
a complete account of the gods work, since but only wisdom at best.
the gods are wholly good, their chief project Next, the Socratic view that the only or
and product must be superlatively good. But most important good is virtue/wisdom (e.g.
what reasons, per the Rationality Principle Ap. 30ab, Cri. 47e48b, Grg. 512ab,
(T1), does Socrates have for holding that the Euthd. 281de) makes it likely that the only
gods are entirely good? His thinking would or most important component of the gods
seem to run roughly as follows. Since gods chief product is virtue/wisdom. But then,
are perfectly knowledgeable, they must be since piety as a virtue must be a craft knowl-
entirely wise (Ap. 23ab, Hp. Ma. 289b36); edge of how to produce goodness (e.g. La.
but because wisdom and virtue are mutually 194e196d, 199ce; Euthd. 280b281e),
entailing (and since there is but one moral our primary service to the gods the one we
realm), it would follow that a god must be are best suited to perform would appear
at least as good as a good person; but then to be to help the gods produce goodness in
since the latter can only do good, never evil the universe via the protection and improve-
(Cri. 49c, R. I 335ad), the same goes for the ment of the human mind/soul. Because philo-
former (cf. R. I 379a391e).33 sophical examination of oneself and others
Socrates moral reformation of the gods is for Socrates the key activity that helps
indicates that his gods cannot be fully identi- to achieve this goal via the improvement
fied with those of the literary tradition. For of moral-belief-consistency and the defla-
Greek popular thought assumed as a funda- tion of human presumptions to divine wis-
mental principle from Homer on that justice dom (e.g. Ap. 22d23b), philosophizing is a
consists in reciprocation, in repayment in pre-eminently pious activity.38
264

Finally, Socrates treatment of Euthyphros motives frequently underlying their observ-

fifth definition (5) piety is knowledge of ance. Xenophon, for example, portrays him
sacrificing and praying makes evident as the most visible of men in cult service to
that he rejects the idea that piety consists in the gods (Mem. 1.2.64) and has him testify
traditional prayer and sacrifice motivated that he often sacrificed at the public altars
by hopes of a material payoff of any kind (Ap. 1012; cf. Mem. 1.1.12, 4.8.11). It
(14c15c).39 In addition, Socrates view that seems unlikely that Xenophon would offer as
the only real good is virtue means that one a defense a portrait of Socrates that simply
ought not to pray for any particular mate- no Athenian could take seriously.43 There is,
rial payoff, since any such payoff could in in addition, some corroborating Platonic evi-
fact diminish ones happiness. Nevertheless, dence on this point.44 Although it would not
from his perspective the sacrificial gifts of seem that Socrates could consider prayers or
time, pride and conventional goods offered sacrifices alone to be essentially connected to
up in the pursuit of philosophical activity do the virtue of piety (since, independent of the
gratify the gods to a greater extent than any right intention, such actions in themselves do
burnt offering might (e.g. Ap. 23bc, 31bc, not necessarily serve the purpose of the gods
37e38a; Mem. 4.3.1718).40 per P), their performance is nonetheless com-
This appropriation and reconception patible with the demands of piety reconceived
of piety as demanding of us philosophi- as philosophizing. After all, since Socrates
cal self-examination would, however, seem embraces the positive side of the talio the
to be a direct threat to everyday piety. For return of one good for another we should
now it would appear that for Socrates time reciprocate as best we can the gods many
spent on prayer and sacrifice is simply time good gifts (see e.g. Euthphr. 14e15a) by
stolen from the more demanding, truly pious honouring the gods in fitting ways through
task of rational self-examination per the performing acts with the inner intention to
Rationality Principle (T1). More threaten- thank and honour them (Mem. 1.4.10, 18;
ing still, Socrates theology of entirely just, 4.3.17). While, again, serving the gods via
relentlessly beneficent gods in conjunction philosophical self-examination has pride of
with his moral theory would seem to make place in providing such honours, there is
sacrifice and prayer (and especially curses) no reason why such actions cannot include
entirely useless.41 For such practices appear prayers and sacrifices (cf. Mem. 4.3.13, 16).
to rest on the traditional and fundamental Socrates may well hold that prayers and sac-
assumption that justice consists in recip- rifices that aim to honour or thank the gods,
rocation, in repayment in kind (i.e. the lex or that request moral assistance from them,
talionis): a principle of returning evil for serve both ourselves and the gods: they help
evil that Socrates rejects (Cri. 49bd). The to induce our souls to follow the path of jus-
charis relationship likewise expects a return tice (thus producing god-desired good in the
of favours, one for the other. To what extent, universe) by habituating us to return good
then, is Socrates at odds with the ritual bed- for good. These actions also help to foster
rock of Greek religion?42 and maintain a general belief in the existence
I think it clear that Socrates does not of good and helpful gods and an awareness
reject conventional religious practices in of our inferior status in respect of wisdom
general but only the narrowly self-interested and power, something that Socrates is clearly
265

interested in promoting (see e.g. Mem. 1.4.1 and since the gods have no need of our sac-
19, 4.3.117; Ap. 21d23c). Of course, no rifices; see e.g. Socrates prayer at Phdr.
such action can be expected to establish a 279bc). This implication of Socrates moral
claim on any deity that would give us a right theory cuts straight at the root of everyday
to expect any specific or immediate return. self-interested motivations underlying many
Nevertheless, Socrates appears to think cult practices. But if Socrates rejected the effi-
that the gods aid those who do what is vir- cacy of improperly motivated requests, then
tuous. Xenophon, for example, represents he was a threat to popular piety, whether he
Socrates as accepting the traditional view was recognized as such by any of his jurors.
that he receives goods from the god(s) (e.g. After all, to many Athenians the assistance of
his daimonion) because, apparently, of the a Heracles would have meant, above all, help
piety of his mission to the Athenians (Mem. against the unseen, non-human forces bear-
1.1.9, 1.1.19, 1.3.3, 1.4.1519, 4.3.1617, ing down on one (e.g. plague), and for most
4.8.11; Smp. 4749). Hence, since petition- of them this meant material help against
ary prayers and sacrifices that offer honour oppressive other deities. By taking away the
to the gods are virtuous by attempting to enmity of the gods and conceiving of them
offer good for good, Socrates will expect that as fully beneficent, then, the need for and the
good things will be returned to us for such efficacy of this Heracles is also removed.
efforts in some fashion (Mem. 1.3.2; 2.1.28): It seems clear that those jurors able to
just as a master craftsman offers guidance, recognize the implications of Socrates views
nourishment and tools to his assistants when for sacrificial cult would have seen him as
they ask, Socrates would have thought, so the threatening the stability of the state: for if
gods may be expected to aid us in a similar you take away the conflicts of the deities
way. Again, however, although for Socrates and the expectations of particular material
the gods are always pleased in some sense by rewards and physical protections in cult, you
the honour such sincerely motivated prac- disconnect the religion of everyday life and
tices display towards them, they unlike the the state from its practical roots. To those
gods entertained by some Athenians are not not already centred on the development of
responsive to the material basis of the sacri- their inner lives, the substitute of the diffi-
fice or the specificities of the request (since cult, pain-producing activity of philosophical
any particular item requested might not be self-examination would seem to offer little
conducive to our real good; Mem. 1.3.2) solace in the face of lifes immediate, every-
(especially Socratically unjust petitions; e.g. day difficulties. Socrates, therefore, raised the
unjust curse-imprecations). stakes for living a life of piety considerably
It appears, then, that with the perfectly by making its final measure the state of ones
wise and just deities of Socrates we have philosophically purified soul.
few specific, materially rewarding impreca-
tions to make: beyond the sincere, general
prayer that one be aided in pursuing virtue,
there are few requests or sacrifices to which SOCRATIC REASON AND REVELATION
all-wise deities can be counted on to respond
(since in our ignorance, we can never know As our Divine Mission (T3), Extra-Rational
if any specific request would be virtue aiding, Information (T4) and Daimonion (T5) texts
266

demonstrate, Socrates is portrayed as a of virtues such as piety), and so given that

man who gives clear credence to the alleged it is not lawful (themis) for the god to speak
god-given messages and forecasts found in falsely (21b57) he was provoked to dis-
dreams, divinations, oracles and other such cover an interpretation that would preserve
traditionally accepted incursions by divin- Apollos veracity. He does this by going from
ity.45 But the degree of trust Socrates places in one self-professed expert to another in hopes
such sources appears to put him at odds with of finding someone wiser than himself so as
the Rationality and Ignorance Principles (T1 to refute the apparent meaning of the oracu-
and T2): what is the rational justification for lar pronouncement (and so uncover its real
heeding them, and in doing so, are they not meaning). After continually failing to find
regarded as sources of wisdom? The natu- such a person, Socrates concludes that what
ral response is, I think, to hold that while the god actually meant is that Socrates is wis-
Socrates accepts the everyday notion that the est by best grasping his own lack of real wis-
gods provide us with extra-rational signs and dom (this is human wisdom). This, in turn,
so does not pursue a form of the intellectual- is taken to mean that Apollo has stationed
ist rejection of divinations efficacy,46 he also Socrates in Athens ordering him to philoso-
does not take the operations of traditional phize and examine himself and others (28d
divinatory practices at face value. Rather, 29a). Thus, since one ought always to obey
he insists in accord with the Rationality the command of a god at all costs, Socrates
Principle (T1) that conventional methods is obliged to philosophize regardless of any
of oracular interpretation must give way to dangers (29d; cf. R. I 368bc). His jurors,
a rational method for evaluating such phe- therefore, should understand that the oracles
nomena. These extra-rational sources, how- pronouncement marked a turning point in his
ever, do not supply Socrates with general, life so profound that he now philosophizes
theoretical claims constitutive of the expert under a unique and divine mandate (Divine
moral knowledge he seeks and disavows Mission [T4] and 29c30b). Socrates also
having obtained per the Ignorance Principle continually interrogates others because he
(T2). Rather, they yield items of what we has come to believe that the god is using him
might call non-expert moral knowledge (e.g. as a paradigm to deliver the virtue-inducing
that his death is good; Ap. 40c41c).47 Let us message that that person is wisest, who, like
consider a few examples.48 Socrates, becomes most cognizant of how lit-
Early in his defense speech, Socrates tle real wisdom he/she possesses (23b).50
explains that his reputation for wisdom This account, despite its complexity, sug-
can be best understood by attending to the gests that Socrates takes it to be obligatory
testimony provided by the god who speaks to subject extra-rational signs to rational
through the Delphic oracle: Apollo (Ap. 20d interpretation and confirmation whenever
23b).49 As Socrates relates the tale, his friend possible, and especially if they urge him to
Chaerephon travelled to Delphi to ask the act in ways that appear to run counter to tra-
oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates, and dition or prudential considerations.51 That
the response was: No one is wiser (21a5 postulate dissolves two of our initial puz-
7). This report, however, was at odds with zles. First, the conflict between reason per
Socrates own conviction that he possessed the Rationality Principle (T1) and revelation
no real wisdom (namely full comprehension per the Divine Mission (T3), Extra-Rational
267

Information (T4) and Daimonion (T5) texts I 496c4; Mem. 1.1.35) and voice (phon;
is mitigated by noting how Socrates allows Ap. 31d1, Phdr. 242c2, Xen. Apol. 12.)
rationally interpreted and tested revela- caused to appear within the horizon of con-
tions to count as reasons in the sense of the sciousness by a god (probably Apollo).55 It
Rationality Principle (T1) (see below).52 The has occurred to few or none before Socrates
second tension between revelation and the (R. I 496c) and it has been his companion
Euthyphro Principle (T6) is dissolved as well: since childhood (Ap. 31d). The daimonions
this principle can be understood to claim intervention in his affairs is frequent and per-
that actions traditionally held to be unjust tains to matters both momentous and trivial
ought to be refrained from in the absence of (Ap. 40a). That Socrates receives and obeys
compelling rational or rationally interpreted these monitions is well known in Athens (Ap.
and tested divinatory evidence to the con- 31cd, Euthphr. 3b), and they are under-
trary. Euthyphro himself threatens with his stood to be apotreptic signs that warns him
suit traditional filial piety but cannot, under not to pursue a course of action that he is
examination, defend his conduct; and his in the process of initiating (Ap. 31d, Phdr.
purported mantic abilities manifestly fail to 242b3, Thg. 128131a).56 These interven-
give him any revelations whose meaning he tions are regarded as unfailingly correct in
could decipher or rationally justify. Socrates, whatever they indicate (Mem. 1.1.45), just
on the other hand, has engaged in few activi- as we would expect the gift of an unfailingly
ties that actually violate the traditional code, good divinity to be. The daimonions gen-
and has never violated the essential dictates erosity even extends to warning Socrates of
of traditional piety (especially once these are the inadvisability of the actions intended by
rightly understood). And although he has run others (Tht. 150c151b; cf. Thg. 128d131a,
some moral risk in pursuing his life of philo- Mem. 1.1.4, Apol. 13), but in no case does it
sophical examination, his belief in its over- provide him with general, theoretical claims
riding moral worth has survived a lifetime of constitutive of the expert moral knowledge
such testing. He has, in particular, laboured he seeks and disavows having obtained per
at great length to derive his understanding of the Ignorance Principle (T2). Neither does it
the Delphic oracles pronouncement and has provide him with readymade explanations of
received varied and consistent extra-rational its opposition. Rather, its occurrences yield
indications that back up his interpretation instances of non-expert moral knowledge
(that are, in turn, subject to philosophical of the inadvisability of pursuing particular
testing). Finally, Socrates has secular justifi- actions because those actions are disadvan-
cation and confirmation of this via his con- tageous to Socrates and others; for example,
ception of the virtues for believing that his the knowledge that it would not be beneficial
mission to the Athenians is a great good (Ap. to let a certain student resume study with him
30a, 30d31a).53 To confirm this account of (see e.g. Xen. Smp. 8.5, Tht. 150c151b, Alc.
Socrates treatment of extra-rational indica- 1 103a106a). Finally, these divine signs
tors, let us consider his reliance on his divine always target future unbeneficial outcomes,
sign, the daimonion.54 and especially those whose reasonable predic-
Socrates daimonion, we are told, is an tion lies beyond the power of human reason
internal, private admonitory sign (smeion; (Ap. 31d, Euthd. 272e273a, Mem. 1.1.69,
Ap. 40b1, c3; Euthd. 272e4; Phdr. 242b9; R. 4.3.12). It is, in short, a species of the faculty
268

of divination, true to Socrates description of from heeding it; that is, we should suppose
it as his customary divination (Ap. 40a4) that from an early age Socrates observed sub-
and himself as a seer (mantis) (Phd. 85b46; sequent to its warning that he would most
cf. Phdr. 242c4). likely have experienced a harm had he not
One important example that displays heeded its advice. Some sense of its level of
Socrates reliance upon and rational confir- activity can also be ascertained by attending
mation of a daemonic warning is found in to the end of the Apology (40ab).
Apology (31c32a), where Socrates notes Subsequent to his conviction and con-
his obedience to the daimonions resistance demnation in the Apology, Socrates closes
to his entering public partisan politics (cf. his defense speech with a friendly chat (39e
R. I 496bc) and then offers an explanation 40a) designed to console the jurors who
for its warnings; namely that such political voted for his acquittal by persuading them
activity would have brought him a prema- that his death will be a good thing. Socrates
ture death, thus curtailing his vastly ben- offers them two reasons for the truth of this
eficial mission to the Athenians (cf. Phdr. claim, the second of which is his famous
242b243a, Alc. 1 103a106a). This account argument for the goodness of death (40c
is introduced in the manner of one wholly 41d).57 This argument, however, is intended
convinced of not only that explanation, but to buttress his initial reason for taking this
also of the extra-rationally indicated truth stance, namely the fact that his daimonion
that prompted that explanation: namely that has never once interfered with his trial pro-
the daimonion opposes now, as it has in the ceedings (Ap. 40ac, 41d). Socrates repre-
past, his every attempt at going into politics. sents this failure as a great indication (mega
Another instance of daemonic activity is tekmrion: 40c2) of the goodness of both his
found in Euthydemus (272e273a). There we death and death in general. For this to be so,
find that Socrates had formed the intention to he must assume that the daimonion has gen-
leave his seat, but just as he was getting up the erally opposed him when he was about to do
daimonion opposed him, and so he remained. something unbeneficial and that it is the gift
In this case, Socrates exhibits no doubt that of a being who gives us nothing but good (cf.
its warning is utterly reliable; rather, Socrates Euthphr. 14e15a), who would never deceive
implicitly trusts the daimonion, although us (Ap. 21b, R. I 381e382a), and who is
how or why it is that the result of his obe- superlatively wise (Ap. 23a, Hp. Ma. 289b):
dience will be good-producing is opaque to in short, a divinity. But since Socrates trust
reasoned calculation (Tht. 150c151b; Mem. in the accuracy of the daimonion has been
4.3.12; 1.1.89). But this trust is in no way achieved inductively, the resulting beliefs that
irrational and so does not contradict the various intended plans of action are unben-
Rationality Principle (T1) for it may be eficial are not so secure that they amount
rationally confirmed in its wisdom and so to certain knowledge (thus, they do not
given credence on an inductive basis; since threaten the Ignorance Principle [T2]). That
(1) in Socrates long experience of the dai- would seem to be why he goes on to confirm
monion, it has never been shown not to be a his argument from daemonic silence with the
reliable warning system (Xen. Apol. 13, Ap. argument of 40c41c; even then, he takes
40ac), and (2) the reliability of its alarms has himself to have established only a rational
been confirmed by the good results that flow expectation that death is good.
269

Given the preceding, the daimonion of an orderly and beautiful universe, a deity
appears to be compatible with Socrates who also now governs it in a fashion analo-
profession of his Rationality and Ignorance gous to the way in which our minds govern
Principles (T1 and T2): if during or after a our bodies (1.4.119, 4.3.118; cf. Sextus
process of deliberation the daimonion should Empiricus Math. 9.9294).
oppose his action, then given the prior ration- The primary teleological argument con-
ally established reliability of the daimonion, tained in the Memorabilia holds that since
it would seem that an occurrence of the dai- individual beings in the universe are either
monion would count in a perfectly straight- the products of intelligent design (gnm) or
forward way as a reason for not performing mere dumb luck (tuch), and since human
that act. For if one had very frequently in beings are clearly products of intelligent
the past always obeyed the promptings of design, we then ought to be persuaded that
an internal warning that one has reason to there exists a vastly knowledgeable and pow-
believe come from all-wise gods, and this erful God, a God who is moreover a loving
had always been judged to have resulted in and wise Maker (dmiourgos) (1.4.27;
the best outcome, then one has good reason cf. 4.3.118). The argument with a bit of
for letting this internal warning trump ones interpretive polishing can be given this
merely human judgement, although this does formal structure:
not provide the sort of complete account
of the virtues that would contradict the (1) Everything that is clearly purpose-
Ignorance Principle (T2). ful (phelia; a beneficial adaptation of
means to ends) is the product of intelli-
gent design (gnm; that is, art, techn)
(and not mere dumb luck, tuch).
(2) Human beings (and other features of the
SOCRATIC THEOLOGY universe, living and non-Living: 1.4.8)
exhibit signs of forethought (1.4.6);
Socrates claims to receive guidance from for example, eyes have protective eyelids
the gods brings us to our last puzzle: how and lashes, teeth are adapted to cutting
can Socrates satisfy the rational demands of and the anus is far removed from the
the Rationality Principle (T1), the sceptical nostrils.
restraint marked by the Ignorance Principle (3) Things that exhibit signs of forethought
(T2), and yet affirm that gods exist and that are clearly purposeful.
they have characteristics such as wisdom (4) Thus, human beings are the product of
intelligent design.
(Ap. 41cd, Euthphr. 14e15a, Grg. 508a,
(5) The existence of products of intelligent
Hp. Ma. 289b, Mem. 4.4.25)? Unfortunately,
design implies the existence of an intel-
Platos texts show Socrates simply assum- ligent designer-creator (one possessing
ing and never proving the existence of gods, the intelligence and power necessary for
although Platos Socrates might perhaps take producing its products; cf. 1.4.24).
the daimonion as evidence that its god exists. (6) Thus, an intelligent designer-creator of
However, in Xenophon we are given an inno- the cosmos exists.
vative teleological cosmology and theodicy
grounded on an argument for the existence of This is a fairly impressive piece of philosophy
an omniscient, omnipresent God: the Maker to find in any section of fourth-century text,
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since the argument is no mere prototype but 1.4.10.19; cf. 4.3.214): we appear, says
close to being a full-fledged version of the Socrates, to have been not only designed
classic Argument From Design.58 Socrates, but also designed to the greatest advantage
then, conforms to his Rationality Principle in respect of other living creatures. First,
(T1) when he affirms the existence of god. It we exhibit a superior adaptation of means
also appears that because of the analogical to ends in our physical being; for example,
relationship Socrates postulates between this our versatile hands, our capacity for speech
Maker-god and the human soul (e.g. both and the fitness of our bodies for housing the
are invisible), his conception of this god is an kind of soul we have been given (1.4.1112,
extrapolation from his own understanding of 1314; cf. 4.3.11). In addition, the rest of
the human soul. This explains why he is con- the material Universe also exhibits a solici-
fident that the Maker-god has many human tous design insofar as it appears especially
mental characteristics raised to the level of constructed with the requirements of human
perfection. We are told, for example, that this happiness in mind, for it offers light, seasons
being has unlike the divinities of popular and food crops adapted to those seasons.
imagination complete knowledge of the Furthermore, when our reason is unable to
present, possessing an awareness of all things discern the future adequately, the gods send
at once by being present everywhere (Mem. portents to our aid (1.4.15, 18; cf. 4.3.12).
1.4.1719). The Deity also has knowledge So generous does Socrates theodicy become
of the past thanks to Its possession of an in the Memorabilias book four account
all-encompassing divine memory, and It has and so seemingly neglectful of earthquakes,
sufficient knowledge of the future to allow tyrants and plagues that he even claims that
It to send us reliable portents of the things everything in the Universe is fair and good
to come (cf. Smp. 4.4749). Vast power, as (4.3.13; cf. 1.4.13).60 This God is also capable
well, must be ascribed to this Being: Power of pleasure, since Socrates recommends that
sufficient to allow It to implement Its cosmic we honour and venerate It and other gods
plans (Smp. 4.48). Finally, as we saw earlier on the grounds of prudence given that these
in the section Puzzles of Socratic Thought, Deities confer benefits on those who please
the wisdom of this god ensures its complete them with obedience and honour (4.3.17).
goodness. The relation between this omniscient,
Given its extrapolated characterization, it omnipresent Deity and the other gods is
is not surprising to find that Socrates Maker left entirely obscure. Socrates speaks at one
has desires and affective states. Indeed, here moment of that singular Deity as responsi-
Socrates shows himself to be a bolder theo- ble for our creation and aid, and in the next
logian than many modern teleological phi- breath depicts the plural gods as doing the
losophers: the actual argument goes beyond same (e.g. 1.4.1011, 1314, 18). Next, he
conclusion (6)s mere assertion of existence distinguishes this one Deity from the other
by characterizing the Demiurge as loving gods by characterizing It as that particular
(Mem. 1.4.7).59 This appellation, naturally, god who coordinates and holds together
does not strictly follow from the argument, the entire cosmos (4.3.13) but also treats
but Socrates offers support for it later on that Deity as fulfilling all the functions of
when he responds to Aristodemus postu- the gods. To reconcile such oddities with
lation of an indifferent Demiurge (Mem. what evidence there is that Socrates would
271

affirm a belief in Delphic Apollo and plural allegations are especially dangerous because
Greek gods, we might credit him with being popular opinion holds that such intellectuals
a henotheist; that is, he may understand the do not recognize the gods [to exist] (18c2
Maker-god to be a supreme Deity oversee- 3). Later, when Socrates addresses the formal
ing a community of lesser deities in the man- accusations by interrogating Meletus as to
ner of Xenophanes greatest one god (DK the precise nature of charge I, atheism again
21 B23). Alternatively, it is also possible that becomes the chief allegation (26ae). But as
Socrates shared the not-uncommon view our Divine Mission (T3), Extra-Rational
which understood the gods to be manifesta- Information (T4) and Daimonion (T5) texts
tions of a singular supreme Spirit.61 In any and now the teleological argument of the
event, we may expect that Socrates holds Memorabilia (Socratic Theology) indicate,
that his reasons for affirming the existence Socrates is no atheist; moreover, Socrates has
and nature of his Maker-god do not consti- no trouble showing that Meletus allegation
tute the sort of complete and certain account II of introducing new divinities is inconsistent
that would give him the kind of theologi- with a charge of atheism (26a28a).
cal wisdom he disclaims with his Ignorance However, as discussed earlier in Puzzles of
Principle (T2). Socratic Thought, it would not seem possi-
ble to fully identify the gods of Socrates with
either the civic deities of Athens or those
of the poets. For example, in response to
SOCRATES ON TRIAL Euthyphros mention of the story that Zeus
bound his father Kronos for committing an
According to the report of Diogenes Laertius injustice, Socrates exclaims:
(D.L. 2.40) and Xenophon (Mem. 1.1.1), and
as Socrates himself recounts (at 24bc; cf. Is this, Euthyphro, why I am a defendant
Euthphr. 3bd), Socrates was prosecuted on a against the indictment: that whenever
charge of impiety that consisted of three dis- someone says such things about the gods
[e.g. that Zeus bound his own father,
tinct specifications: (I) Socrates does not rec-
that gods quarrel], I receive them with
ognize (nomizein) the gods recognized by the
annoyance? Because of this, as is likely,
state; (II) Socrates introduces new divinities someone will assert that I am a wrong-
(kaina daimonia); (III) Socrates corrupts the doer. (Euthphr. 6a; and see his similar
youth by teaching youths the notions speci- reaction to the myths of conflict at 6bd;
fied by the other two allegations.62 Socrates cf. 7a9b)
takes up these claims in reverse order, begin-
ning with III, but he first addresses the infor- This piece of pre-trial speculation, however,
mal concerns that he takes to motivate them: is not decisive, and later on Socrates affirms
these are the old rumours that Socrates his belief in the civic gods:
investigates natural phenomena in the style
of Anaxagoras and is a crafty practitioner . . . plainly, if I should persuade and force
of sophistical argument like Protagoras, you by begging, after you
and teaches others his results and methods have sworn an oath, I would be teaching
in these areas (18bc, 19bc, 23cd). These you not to hold that there are
272

gods, and in making my defense speech I of divine capriciousness, enmity, immorality

would simply be accusing myself and lack of response to sacrifice. They had
of not believing in gods. But that is far been exposed to such criticisms for years
from being so. For I do recognize by thinkers such as Solon, Xenophanes,
[nomiz] them [the civic gods] . . . as
Heraclitus and Euripides, none of whom
none of my accusers do. (Ap. 35cd;
appear to have suffered from religiously
my emphasis)
based persecution.66 Moreover, others such
as Pindar could speak plainly of Homers
Nevertheless, the evidence we saw regard- lies (Nem. 7.23) without incurring legal
ing Socratic theology in preceding sections sanctions, and we have no evidence of
argues that while Socrates is committed to anyone being prosecuted for disbelieving
the existence of gods, and is willing to rec- the stories of Homer or Hesiod.67 Hence,
ognize them both intellectually and through although there may be problematic impli-
traditional sacrificial practice under their cations for traditional religion in Socrates
civic names, they cannot be fully identi- conception of divinity, charge I does not
fied with the civic or poetic gods insofar as seem able to bear the entire explanatory
those gods are conceived of as being at vari- weight of Socrates conviction. Let us con-
ance with other gods, or given to retributive sider allegation II then.
justice, or as lacking in wisdom or power.63 So far as we know, Socrates was the first
Again, Socrates conception of the gods as person in the history of Athens to be for-
thoroughly good does appear to undermine mally accused of the crime specified by II,68
the everyday motivations underlying con- but despite the lack of precedent, there is
ventional conceptions of prayer and sacrifice. every reason to think that the allegation is
But if so, then Socrates would have been asso- legally permissible. The Athenian polis took
ciated with the sorts of criticisms of popular an active role in overseeing all religious activ-
religion found in Xenophanes, natural scien- ity; in particular, it had the power to exclude
tists and those of the Sophists who followed a or allow forms of worship, and those wish-
similar revisionary line.64 To what extent then ing to introduce new cults into Athens had
is Socrates actually guilty of non-recognition to seek official sanction.69 Since such rep-
of the civic gods (allegation I)? resentations to the polis implied privileged
Although his revisionary theology puts access to the divine, were in the last analysis
Socrates at variance with some of his fellow unverifiable, presented competition to the
Athenians, it does not seem by itself suffi- established cults and could easily be based on
ciently problematic to warrant a conviction self-interested or political motives, a signifi-
on charge I.65 After all, Socrates practical, cant burden of proof would have been borne
legal guilt before the court on this allegation by the petitioner. Even then, however, new
would be very much a matter of the mean- gods and their sponsors were by no means
ing each juror placed on the phrase gods of assured of a warm welcome when they peti-
the state: but for most Athenians of the end tioned for entry into a Greek community.70
of the fifth century, it would have been no What sorts of daimonia, then, did Socrates
great shock to hear expressions of doubt or and his jurors take the kaina daimonia
outright denial concerning the poets tales of allegation (2) to refer to? Although it
273

is possible that the term targets the mor- by adequate proof are all he has time to
ally purified gods of Socrates, there are a offer in response to suspicions that his voice
number of reasons for taking the view that offers evil counsel, for example, by noting
the daimonion was central to the allegation. that its content is always dissuasive, never
Primary among these is Euthyphros sug- proscriptive (31d). Moreover, once Meletus
gestion (to which Socrates does not object) opted for his allegation of complete atheism
that Socrates has been indicted because (26bc), Socrates was obliged to focus most
of his daimonion.71 It seems, then, that all of his defense against that claim, not all the
Socrates prosecution needed to do was sug- other suspicions that the jury might still be
gest to the jurors that the source of Socrates weighing against him. Thus, here in the sec-
daimonion has not been formally licensed ond specification I think we find one potent
by the state and thereby incite the natural source that Meletus might have called upon
suspicions Athenians had towards foreign in pressing an allegation of non-conformity
religious imports.72 There are, then, at least and one source for the jurys actual vote for
three areas of potential danger the prosecu- conviction: Meletus invocation of the dai-
tion might point to: (1) the source of the daimonion may well have inflamed the preju-
monion may be an unlicensed deity to whom dices of the jury, leading a good number of
Socrates pays unlicensed cult; (2) his char- them to vote for his conviction on the speci-
acterization of this sign puts him on special, fication of introducing kaina daimonia.74
private terms with a deity; and (3) this sign While certain jurors might have been dis-
and the deity behind it may be illusory or the cerning enough to see or intuit the danger
deity may have hostile intentions towards to traditionally motivated cult in Socrates
Athens.73 Although the first concern (1) is philosophical revisioning of the gods and
the explicitly actionable one, items (2) and the virtue of piety, the attention of the
(3) can also be understood to generate the jurors who voted for conviction was most
sort of ill will that Socrates cites as the true likely to have been drawn to his apparent
causes of his conviction (28a). Socrates must introduction of a new dispensation without
have only deepened such fears in some of his seeking the sanction of the polis: that will
jurors when he claimed that it was the dai- have seemed his most obvious and glaring
monion that kept him from entering public violation of accepted norms.75 Naturally,
politics (Ap. 31d32a), and then threatened given the over-determining constellation
to disobey any order they might concoct to of factors working against Socrates, jurors
discontinue his daimonion-assisted mission who believed him guilty of illegally intro-
on behalf of Apollo (29bd). ducing a new divinity may well have made
As Socrates surely realized, he was not further damning inferences concerning his
in an ideal position to soothe these sorts of teachings.
reactions to the daimonion. The time allotted We should not be surprised, then, that
for his defense speech was inadequate to the Socrates defense ultimately failed. In the
formidable task of removing by reason what end, the prejudices and allegations ranged
are very much emotional responses (cf. Ap. against Socrates proved so numerous and
18e19a). Socrates cannot deny that the dai- broad-ranging that he was in effect put
monion gives him a unique advantage in life, on trial for the conduct of his entire life.
and other sorts of denials unaccompanied His strange, provocative, street-preaching
274

conduct, purportedly commanded by a condemned (Ap. 19cd). It is, then, part of

divinity and exemplifying the new intellec- the drama and irony of Socrates martyrdom
tualist conception of piety that Socrates had that the sign of his god is also the sign of his
forged, proved all too prone to misrepresen- demise. But, on my account, it is also natural
tation before an undiscerning crowd. From that even with his last words Socrates gave
outside the circle of Socratic philosophy, thanks to a god for the extra-rational assist-
that revised piety looked all too similar to ance that gave him a life of extraordinary
the newfangled impiety Aristophanes had rationality.76
lampooned in his Clouds long before (423),
an impiety that Socrates himself would have Mark L. McPherran
275

12
SOCRATES RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES
INTRODUCTION be put into a certain condition (fr. 3 Rose).

This visceral contrast between thought and
Socrates atopia, his strangeness, confronts feeling (literally, what happens to someone),
modern readers most acutely in the religious is familiar enough. But consider the Phaedo:
attitudes and experiences we encounter in Plato has Socrates say that insofar as the soul
Platos dialogues, where Socrates is subject to remains in the same state when it touches
influences and forces less familiar to us than the forms, its experience (pathma) is called
they were to his contemporaries. All we have wisdom (phronsis) (79d). The different
in the case of Socrates, whatever his private slants in these two passages depend in part
experiences may have been, are representa- on the fact that Aristotle is speaking about
tions by writers, mainly Plato and Xenophon, initiation into the mysteries, whereas Plato
who shared his religious discourse but who identifies an experiential facet of understand-
also were motivated by their own agendas. ing truth. Modern philosophers of religion
Indeed, one critic is sceptical that it is pos- approach such statements, equipped with an
sible to speak confidently about Socratic reli- extensive conceptual toolkit. Schleiermacher
gion at all, if the developmentalist view of the in the early nineteenth century conceived of
Platonic dialogues is false, not to mention the religion as an internal, affective, intuitive
difficulties of inquiring into private religion experience to be distinguished from religion
in classical antiquity generally (Gocer 2000: as a rational system of doctrines and beliefs
1203). However, it is valuable to ascertain, or a moral code (Proudfoot 1985: 140).
as far as possible, how his experiences influ- Twentieth-century religious theorists such
enced his beliefs and arguments despite the as Rudolf Otto, G. van der Leeuw, Mircea
fact that religious experience is a modern Eliade and Ninian Smart define the essence
concept fraught with epistemic ambiguity of religion as unique forms of religious expe-
and indeterminacy (see Sharf 1998). rience of the sacred, of divine power or of the
I begin with two Greek attempts to dis- numinous. The idea of religious experience
tinguish experience from understanding. as sui generis and as self-authenticating and
Aristotle says that those who are being ini- as inaccessible to psychological, sociologi-
tiated are not to learn (mathein) anything cal, naturalistic and rationalistic explanation
but to experience (pathein) something and continues to be influential, though it has been
276

challenged on many fronts by philosophers taxonomy of the four types of madness in

of religion (Taves 2009). Many begin with the Phaedrus. While not exhaustive and
the holistic approach that all experience without presuming that Socrates experi-
including religious experience is mediated ences are forms of madness his words
by the nature of the mind, concepts, language and images can help to organize most of the
and cultural factors etc. From this perspec- experiences considered here. Asserting that
tive, there are no unmediated and uninter- the best things we have come from mad-
preted experiences (Katz 1978). ness (mania), when it is given as a gift from
Platos and Xenophons reports contain far god (Phdr. 244a), Socrates distinguishes
less phenomenological detail than modern four types of manic experience: (1) prophetic
first-person accounts of religious experiences. madness inspired by Apollo (244bd); (2) tel-
Perhaps Plato and Xenophon were baffled, as estic or ritual madness induced by Dionysus
one critic suggests (Nehamas 1998: 158). In (244d245a); (3) poetic madness inspired
any case, the accuracy of their third-person by the Muses (245a); and (4) erotic mad-
representations of the raw data of first-per- ness aroused by Eros and Aphrodite, which
son experience is almost impossible to gauge. is declared to be the best (249de, 265b).
Thus, the interpretations to be surveyed here Each of these extraordinary psychic states is
are inevitably caught in the tension between a type of possession caused by divinities that
naturalistic and reductionist approaches, on were considered external to the subject by
the one hand, and phenomenological and Plato and Greeks generally. As Socrates puts
culturally contextualizing approaches on the it, these states comprise a divinely inspired
other.1 An example of a theorist who tried release from normally accepted behavior
to steer a middle course between these two (265a). Remarkably, madness from a god
poles, while acknowledging the constructive is finer than self-control of human origin
role of the experiential subject, is William (244d) and produces fine achievements and
James, who defines religion as the feelings, good fortune (245b). Still, the erotic philos-
acts, and experiences of individual men in opher is rated best of all, higher than proph-
their solitude, so far as they apprehend them- ets and mystery-priests (fifth) and poets
selves to stand in relation to whatever they (sixth), below kings (second), statesmen or
may consider divine (James 1985: 34). Since merchants (third) and athletes or trainers
experience has a non-objective character, a (fourth) (248de).
completely unbiased inquiry is impossible, This four-fold scheme enables us to com-
but we can strive to be open-minded, self- pare Greek religious experiences with exam-
critical and historically well-informed about ples cited in various dialogues. (1) Prophetic
the concepts we apply to unfamiliar phenom- (mantik) ecstasy is associated first with
ena like divination and possession. the priestesses at the oracles of Delphi and
Dodona under the patronage of Apollo and
Zeus, respectively, but mediumistic trance
is also experienced by other oracular per-
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE sonnel, like the Sibyl, and freelance divin-
ers like Cassandra and Teiresias through the
In order to limit the distorting effect of agency of a god (usually Apollo), who pro-
modern categories, I shall begin with Platos vides knowledge of the future or of present
277

secrets (Phdr. 244b). Socrates contrasts such as the highest type will be examined in
inspired divination with technical or arti- the discussion of the Dionysian aspects of
ficial divination, based on the observation Socrates experience.
of birds and other signs by practitioners of
non-ecstatic divination who are in their right
minds (Phdr. 244d).2 Many Socratic religious
experiences are either caused by or involve SOCRATES, GREEK RELIGION AND
Apollo in some way: (a) the Delphic oracles APOLLO
pronouncement that no man was wiser than
Socrates (Ap. 21a); (b) the divine sign (dai- In ancient Greece, religion permeated all
monion) that spoke to him privately; and (c) spheres of life, without distinction of sacred
some of his dreams and prayers. Scholars dif- from profane. More public and communal
fer on whether these experiences are ecstatic than private and individual, correct prac-
or non-ecstatic. tice (orthopraxy) of cult, sacrifice and festi-
(2) Dionysian or telestic madness removes val came before maintaining correct beliefs
mental and emotional disturbances through (orthodoxy) (Bremmer 1994: 12; Connor
purificatory rituals, and can impart pro- 1988: 1824). Religions location at the centre
phetic vision (244d245a). The telestic mad- of polis life meant that its institutions medi-
ness associated with Dionysus also includes ated relations between divinities and humans
the Corybantic rites referred to in Crito, Ion, (Sourvinou-Inwood 2000), the potentially
Charmides and Euthydemus. In Symposium, volatile context that precipitated the con-
Socrates seems to wield a Dionysiac power frontation between Athens and Socrates.
to intoxicate and disorient. There is an addi- Both Xenophon (Ap. 1112) and Plato (Phd.
tional, esoteric facet of Dionysian experi- 61b, 118a, Smp. 176a, Euth. 302bd) attest
ence found among Orphic-Pythagoreans that that Socrates dutifully performed public
must be explored.3 (3) The poetic madness and private rituals, prayers and hymns in
inspired by the Muses is distinguished from accord with Athenian norms (Brickhouse
the uninspired state of poets who possess and Smith, henceforth B-S, 2000b: 756;
only technical skill. Socrates criticizes both Reeve 2000: 27).5 But his stance towards the
types of poetry in Apology (22bc) and Ion, mythic theology employed by poets, which
despite waxing poetic himself on a few occa- informed popular belief, was unorthodox.
sions.4 Yet the criticism of Muse-inspiration He famously moralized the gods, thinking
in the Ion offers vital information on the them wise, good (R. I 377e ff.) and in agree-
phenomenology of possession. The philoso- ment with one another (Euthphr. 6bc), but he
phers life, the highest of all, is imbued with also uncritically accepted many myths (Phdr.
an artistic flow (mousik) and eros (Phdr. 229e230a, Ti. 40de; cf. B-S 1994: 1889).
248d). Socrates himself is semi-possessed by Most Greeks did not consider the gods tran-
the nymphs (Phdr. 238c, 241e) and offers scendent (Bremmer 1994: 5). Representations
a prayer to Pan (Phdr. 279bc; cf. Connor of the gods differed considerably: poets and
1988: 15860.) While he waits in prison for artists pictured them as personal agents, phi-
his execution Socrates writes verse, prompted losophers refigured the divine in terms of
by a recurring dream (Phd. 60d61b). (4) The impersonal attributes, for example, divine
erotic madness of the philosopher celebrated power and wisdom; and tensions between
278

belief in gods as persons as opposed to pow- powers does Socrates appeal to? Perhaps his
ers continued to shape popular thinking Apollo is radically different from the tradi-
(Bremmer 1994: 223; Burkert 1985: 305 tional Apollo (Reeve 2000: 26). It should be
11). Which conception dominated Greek recalled, however, that this god, like the major
religious culture is disputed: some maintain Greek divinities, appears as an untidy bun-
it was more common to see the gods as per- dle of epithets, locations, and functions, with
sons (Burkert 1985: 1829), others give the difficulty given a veneer of unity by iconog-
nod to powers and functions (Vernant 2006: raphy and myth (Davies 2009: 58). From his
35996). Splitting the difference between bow and arrows flowed the power of spread-
person and function are the epithets charac- ing disease and of healing. With his lyre he
terizing how the gods informed festival and was the divine musician, leader of the Muses,
cult: [E]pithets show a spectrum of attributes of song, and of dance, which from archaic
or linkages so wide and heterogeneous as to times determined central social and political
illustrate by themselves the permeability of activities, for example, supervising adoles-
the boundaries between individual gods cent initiation rites and certifying laws. This
and thereby the difficulty of creating a logical power to renew manifested in ritual purifi-
articulation for any one deity within a poly- cation, which also explains his divinatory
theistic system (Davies 2009: 5). Keeping in function as god of seers and owner of the
mind the fluidity of divine identity and the Delphic oracle. For just as he separated the
ambiguous distribution of powers is essential pure from the impure, so he separated the
when we search for the sources of Socrates certain from the uncertain in the present,
experiences, especially the daimonion. It is past, and future (Bremmer 1994: 17).7 These
doubtful that his reticence to name gods or ordering activities8 were conducted, publicly,
to personalize divine activities amounts to through ecstatic divination in oracles and,
scepticism about their existence. Rather, he privately, through shamanism and freelance
appears to speak from epistemic modesty, divination (Graf 2009a: 4551; Johnston
as in the Cratylus when Socrates insists that 2008: 11925).9 Socrates Apollo shares
we know nothing about the gods themselves many if not all of these traditional functions,
or about the names they call themselves albeit with certain modifications.
(400d79). Sourvinou-Inwood attributes
to Greeks the awareness of the severe limi-
tations of human access to the divine, and
of the ultimate unknowability of the divine SOCRATES TRIAL AND THE DELPHIC
world, and the uncertain nature of human ORACLE
relationships to it (2000: 20). In contrast,
Mikalson (2010: 210) emphasizes the know- Aspects of the traditional Apollo, with
ability of the gods: Xenophon and Plato (in Socratic refinements, figure in Platos
Laws) believe that the gods are invisible, but Apology and in Socratic dialogues like the
claim that we know them through their deeds Charmides. The many references to the god
and in their statues. at Delphi (Ap. 20e) leave little doubt that
If Apollo, in some sense, plays a central it is Apollo whom Socrates claims to serve
role in Socratic religion and philosophy,6 (Ap. 20e23c) and that the daimonion, the
which of the gods traditional features and voice that speaks to him (Ap. 31cd, 40ab),
279

is somehow connected with Apollo.10 His distinct from the Delphic theology accord-
condemnation hinges in part on the jurors ing to which the gods are distant and pow-
uncertainty whether the rigorously moral erful, men frail and endangered and a great
divinity to which Platos Socrates keeps refer- gulf separates the divine and human realms.
ring is the old Apollo he has known since Some think Socrates assimilates this divide
childhood or a newly made god of Socrates between gods and humans exemplified
own (Burnyeat 1988: 18). In Charmides in Herodotus, Xenophon and the tragedi-
(164d165a) Critias asserts that the Delphic ans to his conception of divinity as wise,
maxims Know oneself and nothing too good and as unanimously promoting human
much, inscribed on the temple of Delphi, morality.14 An alternative view claims that
allude to moderation (sphrosun), an Socrates intimacy with the gods involved
essential virtue for Socrates and Greeks gen- the practice of a salvation-oriented piety that
erally. Scholars disagree on how much sub- shared the mystery religions goal of divin-
stance Delphic morality possessed: Through izing the immortal soul as far as possible,
the cultic prescriptions emanating from while substituting ethical reflection and dia-
Delphi, the outlines of a universal moral- lectical activity for ritual practice (Morgan
ity overriding tradition and group interests 1990: 1519).
may be discerned for the first time among Interpretations of the accounts of the
the Greeks (Burkert 1985: 148). Others are Delphic oracle and of Socrates reactions to
more cautious (Davies 2009: 548; Parker it in Platos and Xenophons Apologies vary
1983: 13843).11 Socrates does make a con- greatly. Among those who accept the histo-
nection when he construes the Delphic ora- ricity of the oracle story, some argue that it
cles response that no man is wiser to mean inspired Socrates mission to philosophize,
it is really the god who is wise, and in his but others raise doubts that he could derive
oracle he is saying that human wisdom is such an imperative from the Pythias bare
worth little or nothing (Ap. 23a). He strives statement (in Platos version) that no man is
to remove blameworthy, prideful ignorance wiser.15 According to Xenophon, Socrates
(Ap. 25d26a, 29b) from himself and from philosophical activity began long before the
his interlocutors via the elenchus as service oracle (Ap. 1417). Some interpreters believe
to the god of purity.12 Plato fabricated the oracle story which in
Both the originality of Socrates moraliza- turn influenced Xenophons later account
tion of the gods and whether it provoked the in order to construct a divine justification for
charges against him and his ultimate condem- Socrates public philosophical activity (Stokes
nation are disputed. Especially influential 1997: 5567, 11516; Waterfield 2009: 11;
has been Vlastoss view that Socratic theo- Hackforth 1933: 1014; Montuori 1981a:
logical ethics constitute a radical departure 57146). Historicity aside, the Pythias utter-
from traditional religion by rejecting the lex ance was considered true because she was
talionis (the doctrine of retaliation, returning possessed by the god. Socrates response
wrong for wrong), ascribing only goodness to the oracle is an indirect type of reli-
to the gods but never wrongdoing, and in gious experience that should be examined
rejecting the do ut des (offering goods to the in relation to the role of the Delphic ora-
gods for goods in return) foundation of ritual cle in Greek society. It provides the context
sacrifice.13 These moralizing innovations are necessary for understanding Socrates own
280

divinatory experiences, particularly the dai- Pythias statement about him. As the inter-
monion. For example, Xenophons Socrates preter of what the oracle means for him, he
likens himself to the Pythia when he asks configures his religious experience in relation
what about the priestess herself who sits on to the practice of the elenchus. And in the
the tripod at Pytho? Doesnt she too use a case of the daimonion he may be in a sense
voice to relay the messages from god? (Ap. both seer and interpreter.
12, trans. MacCleod, adapted). Moreover, The debate about the inspired Pythias
modern scholars approaches to the Pythias demeanour is instructive. In the first half
state of mind parallel in many respects the of the twentieth century many scholars
various explanations of Socrates religious imagined that ecstatic seers appeared fren-
experiences. zied and disturbed, exhibiting uncontrolled
As a Panhellenic sanctuary of great antiq- movements and emotional agitation. This
uity, the oracle at Delphi had wide influence image depends largely on Plutarchs (1993:
and great religious authority.16 Plato too had 556) one report of disturbed behaviour
great respect for its authority in establishing in the case of a failed divination, and also
and guiding religious institutions.17 Scholars on comparative data concerning states of
disagree about the oracular procedure, the spirit possession.19 Earlier historians of
form of the Pythias utterances, the nature and Greek religion also muddied the waters. The
causes of her psychological state, her exter- nineteenth-century classicist Erwin Rohde,
nal behaviour and how Delphic oracles were relying on his friend Nietzsches opposition
received. Until recently, many marginalized between rational Apollonian religion and
the Pythian priestess role in the ritual pro- irrational Dionysian ecstasy, claimed that
cedure, assuming that because of her peasant Dionysus must have brought ecstatic pos-
origins, illiteracy and altered mental state she session to Delphi and thus that the Pythia
must have been incapable of uttering coher- behaved like the raving Maenads, the female
ent statements, let alone producing oracles in devotees of Dionysus. Dodds refuted this
verse.18 This distorted representation of the tendentious reconstruction and thereby
Pythia depends in part on a misapplication proved that Platos distinction between pro-
of Platos distinction between seer (mantis) phetic and telestic ecstasy corresponded to
and proclaimer or interpreter (propht): classical Greek realities (1951: 6872). He
it is customary to appoint interpreters also advanced the idea that possession by
(prophtai) as judges of inspired divinations Apollo was ecstatic too, though it produced
(entheos manteia). Some persons call them calmness (cf. Kingsley 1999: 74108, 1334,
seers (manteis), being entirely ignorant of the 157; Latte 1940). Images on Greek painted
fact that they [i.e. prophtai] are expositors pottery support the distinction, with the
of utterances or visions expressed in riddles Bacchants depicted as whirling and dancing
(ainigmata), and are not to be called seers at wildly, while the Pythia appears calm as she
all, but most precisely declarers (prophtai) sits atop the tripod in the fifth-century Vulci
of what the seers say (Ti. 72ab; cf. Nagy cup (Ustinova 2009: 126).
1990: 62). However, the distinction between Of course, a calm demeanour can be con-
the seers altered psychological state and strued in different ways. In his minimalist,
the interpreters normal or rational state rationalizing interpretation of the Pythias
can be applied to Socrates response to the psychological state, Fontenrose argues that
281

the speaking of oracles was above all a exercised from outside, it becomes part of
dramatic ritual . . . The Pythia experienced the Pythias inside but is influenced by her
enthusiasm, but not an uncontrolled and own inertia. We deal, so to speak, with a
irrational frenzy. Confusion arises from sophisticated Platonic transformation of the
translating mania as madness or insan- Body Snatcher template (2009: 595; for a
ity . . . [y]et mania, especially as Plato and similar view see Dodds 1951: 71). Yet, in Ion
Plutarch use the word, means a high state of (533e) Socrates uses entheos and katochos
emotion and comprehends all kinds of trans- as equivalents to describe the inspired state
port, enthusiasm, and inspiration (1978: of epic poets. Moreover, the precise mean-
21112).20 Though he wrote centuries after ing of within and externally in the case of
Socrates, Plutarchs informed reports depict both prophetic and poetic possession is dif-
the Pythia as unfrenzied and fluent when ficult to determine. We do know that ancient
possessed. Acknowledging a passage that commentators, including Plato, assumed that
imputes mental volatility to Pythian priest- a god had penetrated the seers psyche. It is
esses (Plutarch 1993: 74), Graf thinks reasonable to assume that the self of a diviner
that the Pythias demeanour nevertheless is highly permeable.
remained serene and composed (2009a: 592 Unwilling to accept a divine source for
5).21 Graf and Maurizio make a convincing the Pythias inspiration, some scholars pre-
case for approaching possession as part of fer naturalistic explanations, as did one of
a cultural system that represented contact Plutarchs characters, who wonders whether
with the divine in multifarious ways, in con- the Pythias inspiration was the result of
trast to Fontenrose, who psychologizes the breathing the exhalations and vapours from
Pythia, attributing her altered states not to the chasm below the sanctuary (Plutarch
the presence of the god within her, the mean- 1993: 51). In the early twentieth century
ing of enthousiasmos, but to autosuggestion some were convinced that the temple was sit-
through the performance of ritual. These lat- uated at an opening in the earth from which
ter factors are certainly important, but they gases rose, but geological surveys at the time
may underdetermine the phenomenon. found no local faults. However, recent sur-
There is the additional issue that the con- veys have confirmed the sanctuarys location
cept of possession is itself ambiguous. Graf directly over the intersection of several faults,
distinguishes two types of Greek spirit pos- increasing the likelihood of periodic seismic
session: (1) the Control Template, in which activity, which would produce gas emissions.
the person is held (katochos) by a divinity The ancient accounts of intoxicated goats
or divine force, but whose normal appear- and of visitors to Delphi, the scent of the
ance has not altered, for example, when gas present there and the recent geological
Socrates ironically says hes almost seized by surveys are discussed by Graf (2009a) and
the nymphs (nympholptos Phdr. 238d). (2) Green (2009). One ancient source, nicely
The Body Snatcher Template, that is, having blurring the distinction between physical
a god inside (entheos), the state in which a substance and spiritual force, reported that
superhuman entity (a god or daimn) has from a fissure in the rock arose inspirational
entered mind and body. Plutarch employs pneuma (wind or spirit). Green supports
both the former model22 and at other times the recent hypothesis of geologists that the
the latter.23 For Graf, Apollos control is not gas may be ethylene (2009: 3641), noting
282

that its sweet odour and symptoms of mild accurate divinations is, then, a divine gift
euphoria, reduced inhibition, hallucinations (theia moira, c1) and divine power (theia
and quick recovery roughly match ancient dunamis, c6): thats why the god takes their
reports.24 Even if a psychotropic gas like eth- intellect away from them when he uses them
ylene made the Pythia susceptible to altered as his servants, as he does prophets and godly
states and it should be recalled that most diviners . . . the god himself is the one who
ancient oracles are not associated with gase- speaks, and he gives voice through them to
ous emissions the priestess ascetic regimen, us (c7d4). Socrates specifies further (c15)
virginity, isolation, ritual purity and mediu- that the products of inspired states will vary
mistic receptivity were probably more signifi- depending on the Muse or divinity who pos-
cant factors (Green 2009: 436).25 Moreover, sesses the poet or prophet. Socrates expands
one wonders whether the emissions would on this point in the Phaedrus (244ac),
have been regular enough to sustain the discussed above. In cases of possession, he
Pythias ecstasties. Finally, that the Pythia praises the benefits that come from being
and many freelance diviners were female may out of ones mind (ekphrn), but he criticizes
be important.26 Is it coincidental that Platos the resulting inability to explain the mean-
Socrates receives guidance from the Pythia ing of inspired utterances. His grounds are
and from the priestess Diotima of Mantinea the traditional, sober Apollonian virtue of
(a likely pun on manteia, divination)?27 knowing that we are all worth nothing with
What does Platos Socrates think of respect to wisdom (Ap. 23b) (McPherran
Apollonian ecstasy in the early dialogues? 1996: 118). But if the Pythia says many fine
And can what he says guide our approach things while she is possessed by Apollo but
to his own religious experiences? In Platos she has no knowledge, where do Socrates
Apology he lumps together poets with seers own divinations, that is, his Apollonian
and prophets: I soon realized that poets do ecstasies, stand in relation to Apollonian
not compose their poems with knowledge sobriety?
(sophia), but by some inborn talent and by
inspiration, like seers and prophets who also
say many fine things without any under-
standing of what they say (22bc).28 The INTERPRETING THE ORACLE
Ions commentary on inspired states pro-
vides more detail. Epic poets produce beau- Critical opinion varies on the reasons why the
tiful poems, Socrates insists, not from skill oracle declared that no one was wiser than
(techn), rather they are inspired (entheoi) Socrates.29 Some argue that the oracle, aware
and possessed (katechomenoi) (533e). So too of Socrates philosophical activity, intended
are the lyric poets when they compose beau- to endorse his deflationary view of human
tiful songs like the Corybantes who are not wisdom (B-S 1989: 945; McPherran 1996:
in their right minds when they dance and 21420; Reeve 1989: 2832).30 Others see the
possessed by Bacchic frenzy (533e534a). oracle more cynically as telling questioners
Thus, as long as a human being has his intel- what they wanted to hear (Fontenrose 1978:
lect in his possession he will always lack the 78, 1157) or that the Pythias priestly inter-
power to make poetry or sing prophecy preters shaped her utterances in order to pro-
(534b). The source of beautiful poetry and mote their own interests (Parke and Wormell
283

1956: I.3041). Still others believe that the 223; Reeve 1989: 626). In response to the
entire oracle story is a Platonic fiction (see oracle Socrates may have felt a greater obli-
above at note 16). If the oracle story is his- gation to serve the god because he then more
torically accurate, it is reasonable to suppose clearly recognized the moral ignorance of his
that reports about Socrates reached even fellow Athenians and that the god approved
remote Delphi. His reaction and response to his efforts to make each one of them aware
the oracle are fascinating and, of course, con- of their ignorance (B-S 1989: 979, 2000a:
troversial. Literally puzzled by the Pythias 2424; McPherran 1996: 227). The value of
declaration, which he takes to be a riddle his elenctic service to the god is confirmed
(ainigma), Socrates questions others in order retrospectively in the words: To do this has,
to prove that someone is wiser than he (Ap. as I say, been enjoined on me by the god, by
21bc). Some maintain that Socrates tries to means of oracles and dreams, and in every
expose the god or its oracle as liars (Burnet other way that a divine manifestation (theia
1924: 92, 172; Hackforth 1933: 88104; moira) has ordered a man to do anything
West 1979: 106; see B-S 1989: 889). More (Ap. 33c, cf. 28e29a). In Ion (534c) theia
common is the opinion that Socrates does moira divine gift explains how poets become
not doubt the gods veracity (Guthrie 1969: possessed. Whether or not the plural oracles
407; Stokes 1997: 347, 117). Convinced also includes the daimonion, this passage
that the god cannot lie (Ap. 21b), Socrates exposes Socrates permeable self as open to a
aims to refute the apparent meaning of the broad spectrum of divine interventions.
oracle in order to grasp its underlying mean-
ing (B-S 1989: 96; McPherran 1996: 2235).31
However, there is nothing extraordinary or
impious in Socrates effort to ascertain the THE DAIMONION
oracles meaning through reasoning since
oracles were considered riddles that required Without doubt the most enigmatic of
interpretation (Burkert 2005; Nock 1972: Socrates religious experiences is the daimo-
53640).32 nion, which Vlastos described as that unpre-
Is Socrates effort to decipher the oracle dictable little beast (1995: 29). It appears
the origin of his mission to philosophize? in both authentic and spurious Platonic dia-
After all, it is likely that he had practised logues and in Xenophon. Difficulties in com-
the elenchus long before he heard the ora- prehending this phenomenon are exacerbated
cle (McPherran 1996: 215). As the Apology by the semantic ambiguity of the words and
does not address the question directly, some phrases that refer to it, by how it appears to
argue that his public philosophical activity Socrates, and by questions about its sources.
after the oracle harks back to earlier testing Socrates introduces it in these words: a thing
of interlocutors beliefs, which depend on divine or spiritual (theion ti kai daimonion)
his beliefs about piety in the second half of happens to me, which Meletus has ridiculed
the Euthyphro (11e14c). On this account in his deposition. This began when I was a
Socrates holds that piety involves service to child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it
the gods, which assists them in their work turns me away from something I am about
of producing morally beneficial effects (B-S to do, but it never encourages me to do
1989: 925; McPherran 1996: 4759, 218, anything (Ap. 31d, Grube trans., adapted).
284

First, the semantic ambiguity of daimonion, was faced with what one might think . . .
an adjective that assumes substantive mean- the worst of evils, my divine sign has not
ing. In addition to being something divine opposed me, either when I left home at
or spiritual, it is often a sign (smeion): the dawn, or when I came into court, or at
any time that I was about to say some-
sign of the god (40b), the customary sign
thing during my speech. Yet in other talks
(40c) or simply the sign (41d), the spir-
it often held me back in the middle of
itual sign (daimonion smeion, R. I 496c) my speaking, but now it has opposed no
and both the daimonion and its customary word or deed of mine. What do I think is
sign (Phdr. 242b). How the sign appears is the reason for this? I will tell you. What
indicated by the verb it happens or occurs has happened to me may well be a good
(gignesthai) or being about to do (mellein), thing, and those of us who believe death
which fits well the fact that it intervenes when to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I
Socrates is deliberating about or is about to have convincing proof of this, for it is
initiate an action. When Xenophon refers to impossible that my familiar sign did not
the daimonion (Mem. 1.1.2, 4, Ap. 4, 13) he oppose me if I was not about to do what
was right. (40ac)
employs the verb to indicate (smainein)
instead of the noun sign (smeion) with a
verb. With the same verb Apollo gives a sign Before treating how Socrates rationally
in Heraclitus (fr. 93). Sometimes the daimo- assessed these interventions and silences, for
nion presents itself as a voice (Ap. 31d, Phdr. the moment observe how insistently he seems
242c, Xen. Ap. 12).33 to feel its presence from moment to moment,
How the daimonion intervenes differs throughout his life, from the time he was a
between Plato and Xenophon according to child! Such attentiveness helps to explain
most scholars. Appearing to Socrates fre- why, when the sign remains silent in the face
quently (Euth. 272e, Phdr. 242b), the sign of an impending death-sentence, Socrates
was familiar to his fellow Athenians (Ap. deems that proof of a good outcome, a judge-
31c, Euthphr. 3b), which led his accusers to ment he reaffirms shortly thereafter (41d).36
charge him with introducing new gods (Mem. The daimonions gatekeeper function
1.1.2).34 In Plato it warns Socrates not to do for students is represented variously in the
an act that would be either imprudent or Theaetetus, in the disputed Alcibiades I
unethical (Ap. 40ab, Phdr. 242b, Hp. Ma. and in the probably spurious Theages. The
304bc, Alc. I 103a, Thg. 128a131a), but in midwife passage in Theaetetus provides the
Xenophon it gives both negative and positive most detailed account of this activity in the
advice to Socrates and to others (Mem. 1.1.4; undisputed dialogues. On the other hand, it
4.3.1213; 4.8.1, 5; Ap. 4, 1213).35 In the features the notion of association or being
most informative passage about the divine with (sunousia and variants) that is preva-
sign he asserts: lent elsewhere only in the two disputed dia-
logues. However, the notion is prominent in
[M]y customary prophetic power the famous passage in the Seventh Letter:
(mantik) from the daimonion frequently having insisted that the highest knowledge
opposed me even in small matters, when cannot be put into words, the text says that
I was about to do something wrong, but it is born in the soul after long-continued
now that, as you can see for yourselves, I intercourse (sunousia) between teacher and
285

pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject (341c disguise the remarkable protreptic function
d).37 At the beginning of the midwife pas- of theos suggested in Theaetetus (150ce,
sage, Socrates observes that because of his quoted above). Struck by the uniqueness of
ignorance and inability to create wisdom in this divine intervention in undisputed dia-
others god (theos) compels me to attend the logues and by its similiarity to the extraor-
travail of others . . . At first some of them dinary activity of the daimonion in Theages,
may give the impression of being ignorant H. Tarrant thinks this section of the text is
and stupid; but as time goes on and our an interpolation (2005: 148). In yet another
association continues, all whom god permits twist, in Theages by divine dispensation
are seen to make progress . . . it is I, with (theia moira, see Ap. 33c) the daimonion
Gods help, who deliver them of this off- only turns away and never prescribes, but,
spring (150ce, adapted; see Thg. 130a). He unlike the Apology, it also instructs Socrates
then recounts how sometimes a pupil leaves friends (128d), resulting in the admission
before he should, mixes with bad company that this spiritual thing has absolute power
but then wishes to return: in some cases, in my dealings with those who associate with
the divine sign that visits me forbids me to me (129e).
associate with them; in others, it permits me In Xenophon both the daimonion and
and they begin again to make progress (Tht. theos offer positive advice. His Socrates
151a; see Thg. 129e). In Alcibiades I a prohi- often warned his associates to do this
bition in similar circumstances is issued first or not to do that, at the prompting of the
by the daimonion (103a) and later by the divine (daimonion), and those who took
god (theos) (105d106a). Only in Theages his advice benefited from it, while those
does the daimonion determine a students who did not were sorry for it afterwards
progress. Should we distinguish between (Mem. 1.2.4, trans. Macleod). Likewise, I
theos and the daimonion in these passages? have often told friends what God (theos) has
Friedlnder argues that no sharp distinction advised and I have never been found to be
should be made because we are dealing with wrong (Ap. 13). This picture of the divine
active powers, not names (1958: 35). Joyals sign offering positive and negative advice
contention that the two divine activities both to Socrates and to his companions has
should be kept distinct is supported by their convinced most scholars that Xenophon is
respective involvement in what he discerns unreliable and that both Alcibiades I and
as two successive stages of Socratic educa- Theages are not by Plato. Although Theages
tion (2000: 84). In the first, the god initiates is probably spurious, its author was clearly
contact and determines whether success will familiar with Platos writings, as verbal and
be achieved; only in the second phase, when thematic borrowings from the Apology and
the association has failed and the student Theaetetus attest. Also valuable is its inde-
wishes to resume contact does the daimo- pendent corroboration of the nature of
nion intervene negatively as in other genuine Socratic pedagogy, much of which coheres
dialogues.38 with Platos erotic Socrates (see Guthrie
The Theaetetus, therefore, makes some sort 1969: 399). And because it probably was
of distinction between theos and daimonion, written in the mid-fourth century (see Joyal
while Alcibiades I assimilates them. Simply 2000: 13555),39 its more active daimonion
distinguishing the terms, however, cannot enhances our understanding of the religious
286

milieu within which variant traditions about through dreams, divinations and the daimo-
a daimonic Socrates circulated.40 nion? Unlike the modern, unitary, individual
The prevailing attitude towards the dai- self, which is the metaphysical basis for the
monion in Theages and Xenophon, espe- principle of autonomy,43 Socrates permeable
cially among Anglo-American scholars, is self is constituted through interactions with
best captured by Vlastos who sees it as an divine forces and through regular dialectical
occult prognosticator, never encountered in activity.44 One might also consider the pos-
Plato (1991: 281). He thinks the conclusion sibility that Plato had good reasons to leave
of Theages reveals its magical character as the details of divine guidance unclear.
a divinity in its own right. If the daimonion Aristides remarkable claim that he
does not allow Socrates and himself to asso- derived the most benefit when he touched
ciate, Theages urges that they propitiate the Socrates (Thg. 130e) is often contrasted with
divine thing that comes to you with prayers the playful interchange between Socrates and
and sacrifices and any other way the diviners Agathon in Symposium (175cd): Socrates,
might suggest (131a). This attitude Vlastos come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I
deplores as credulity on the part of Socrates touch you, I may catch a bit of the wisdom
superstitious admirers (1991: 282).41 What (sophon) that came to you under my neigh-
has also troubled commentators is that in bors porch. Its clear youve seen the light.
this short dialogue the learning on the part If you hadnt, youd still be standing there.
of Socrates interlocutor Aristides is not said (The episode on the porch will be addressed
to occur through dialectical examination by below.) Socrates says how wonderful it
Socrates, but rather through physical prox- would be if wisdom could flow from the wise
imity and spending time together (sunou- to the foolish, as water flows from a full cup
sia) with him, even more when the student into an empty one when we connect them
gazes at the master and most of all through with a piece of yarn (175d). More in the
physical touching (130ce).42 It is to be noted spirit of the Theages passage is Alcibiades
first that philosophical progress is measured speech later in Symposium, when he testi-
in terms of argumentative skill (130c) and fies to Socrates electric charisma, his amaz-
moral improvement (128c). H. Tarrant and ing power (dunamis, 216c), confessing that
Joyal emphasize the absence of dialecti- when hes absent from Socrates he returns to
cal learning in Theages, but fail to explain his evil ways (Smp. 216b). Alcibiades attempt
Socrates remark in Theaetetus (150d) that to seduce Socrates (217a219d), throw-
associates make progress if the god permits ing his arms around this truly superhuman
but that this is not due to anything they (daimonios) and amazing man (219c, trans.
have learned from me. McPherran argues Rowe), implies that Socrates body exerted a
that the gods provide less-than-clear pro- magnetic force, even though he doesnt claim
treptic messages for pedagogical considera- that he hoped to acquire wisdom simply by
tions, because frequent advice would violate touching Socrates as did Aristides.
an individuals autonomy and discourage Intimate associations with young men are
self-examination (2005: 2930). This cogent cultivated by daimonic Socrates through the
insight prompts the question: How impor- erotic skill he learned from Diotima. Erotics
tant is individual autonomy for a philoso- (ertika) is the only thing he says he under-
pher who regularly receives divine guidance stands (Pl. Smp. 177e; cf. Phdr. 257a, techn
287

ertike, Ly. 204c, Thg. 128b; Xen. Mem. than Platos, or at least more hubristic, with-
4.1.2). Just as Socrates erotic knowledge out being the brilliant philosopher we meet
was given to him by the priestess and diviner in the dialogues.
Diotima (Smp. 201d, 207a), so too is the suc-
cess of the maieutic art he practises depend-
ent on the god (Tht. 149a, 150b, 150c, 184b,
210c). The intertwining of daimonic activity THE IDENTITY OF THE DAIMONION
and educative eros goes deep.45
The interchangeability of theos and dai- The third type of ambiguity concerns the
monion in both Xenophon and in Alc. I,46 nature of the daimonion, which is a deriva-
the daimonions intervention in the affairs tive of the common word daimn. Daimonia
of Socrates companions in Xenophon and meant supernatural powers generally. It was
Theages and the gods in Theaetetus has not in itself an unambiguously negative term,
stimulated much debate on the daimonions though the diminutive -ion termination was
role in Plato.47 Recently, Droge has suggested probably meant to imply a lower grade of
that Platos insistence that it serves Socrates divinity than daimn, while daimn was
alone and then only as a deterrent, and often itself of a lower status than theos (Cartledge
in quite trivial contexts, all imply a concern 2009: 87). The term designates anonymous
to treat the daimonion with considerable cir- divine agents or forces that can have positive
cumspection, unlike Xenophons Socrates, or negative effects, as when even the rational-
who dispenses oracular pronouncements ist Pericles referred to the Athenian plague of
among a wide circle of friends, prophecies 429 as daimonion, that is, sent by the divine
that are received directly from his personal (Thucydides 2.64.3). Burkert states that
divinity without the need for interpreta- daimn does not designate a specific class of
tion (2007: 65, authors emphasis; cf. divine beings, but a peculiar mode of activ-
McPherran 2005: 29 n. 42).48 The behav- ity . . . Daimn is occult power, a force that
iour of Xenophons Socrates, he argues, bet- drives man forward where no agent can be
ter explains the lethal antipathy he aroused. named . . . Every god can act as daimn; not
This offers an interesting challenge to ortho- every act of his reveals the god. Daimn is the
dox opinion that Xenophon, motivated by veiled countenance of divine activity. There is
his pedestrian piety and aiming to disarm no image of a daimn, and there is no cult
criticisms of his hero, presents Socrates with (1985: 180).49 Though scholars give good
a conventional religious persona that could reasons for not identifying the daimonion as
not have aroused popular enmity had it a daimn, as we shall see shortly, Socrates
been true (Joyal 2000: 70 ff.; Vlastos 1971: divine sign evidently shares many features of
3, 1991: 161, 290). Xenophons apologetic daimones (cf. Ap. 27d). Generally, then, the
aims and commonplace moralizing notwith- impersonality of daimonic activity supports
standing, it was revolutionary to claim that the idea that his deliberate vagueness about
the gods spoke directly to him and told him the source and nature of the daimonion sug-
what was right, as this implies that Socrates gests that Socrates did not suppose he knew
has a closer relationship to god than any- anything very clearly about the daimonion,
one (Lefkowitz 1989: 239, 245). In some other than that it had some divine source
respects, Xenophons Socrates is stranger (B-S 2000: 262 n. 5).
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By the second century CE later Platonists, Socrates vagueness about the nature and
beginning with Plutarch, identified Socrates sources of the daimonion has prompted
daimonion as a daimn.50 This is not sur- widely divergent explanations of the sig-
prising since later Platonic demonology is nificance the phenomenon had for Socrates.
rooted in the famous passage where, having Some interpreters nervously begin their
identified eros as a great spirit (daimn) inquiries with the worry that because he
that operates in the space between god and heard voices Socrates supposedly the
man (Smp. 202d), Diotima teaches that they epitome of rationality might have been
are messengers who shuttle back and forth superstitious (B-S 1994: 190; McPherran
between the two, conveying prayer and sac- 2005: 14 and 2011: 115) or that the daimo-
rifice from men to gods, while to men they nion contributed to the general sense of his
bring commands from the gods and gifts in being weird (Long 2006: 63). Each student
return sacrifices. Being in the middle of the of Socrates must decide for herself whether
two, they round out the whole and bind fast invoking highly charged, condescending
the all to all. Through them all divination terms like these advances inquiry into phe-
(mantik) passes, through them the art of nomena like Socrates daimonion, his dreams
priests in sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, and altered states of consciousess. The his-
prophecy (manteia) and sorcery (goteia). torical genesis of terms and concepts has a
Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and bearing on their hermeneutic value and the
converse with us through spirits instead, etiology of superstitious is epistemically
whether we are awake or asleep. He who is suspect. In antiquity deisidaimonia, which
wise in any of these ways is a man of the is usually rendered in English as supersti-
spirit (daimonios anr) (Smp. 202e203a). tion, signified a negative, excessive piety in
Socrates daimonic experiences are shaped the form of inordinate fear of being harmed
by this realm, even if the daimonion is not by gods or daimones (Martin 2004: 1819,
a daimn (the view of Joyal 2001b: 351).51 925). Applying such a dubious adjective to
Hence, Plato possibly maintained a distinc- Socrates religious sensibility may be confus-
tion between daimones and the daimonion, ing since it has become a term of reproach
since Socrates says it is a very rare phenom- through its use in the history of Christianity.
enon or unique to him (R. I 496c), whereas Obviously, Socrates did not think the gods
each soul has an indwelling personal daimn were harmful, on the contrary. Beginning in
(Ti. 90a ff.) that also guides it through the classical antiquity and continuing through
afterlife (R. I 620d ff., Phd. 107d).52 The the Christian critique of paganism in late
conception of the daimn as the highest antiquity, superstition acquired the meaning
part of the soul identifies it with reason and roughly similar to that of cult nowadays,
understanding, whose attributes are good- that is to say, a bad form of religion. In the
ness and wisdom. Since the daimonion is medieval West, the critique of demons and
a sign from the god (Ap. 40b), the god is witchcraft continued the trend, culminating
good and wise, and the best part of a human in the rationalist Enlightenment reduction of
being, reason, is daimonic, the emphasis on a any form of religion to superstition.
precise distinction between daimn and the Scholarly opinion on the nature of the
daimonion by scholars may have gone fur- daimonion divides on the question whether
ther than Plato intended.53 or not the sign comes from a supernatural
289

source distinct from Socrates.54 The first and that the god is superfluous because it is a
larger group begins with the idea that the voice inspired by Socrates thinking and
daimonion is an internal, private admoni- intuition (2005: 845, 89).58 Vlastos also
tory sign and voice caused to appear within sometimes construes its alarms in Theaetetus
the horizon of consciousness by a god or a (151a), Euthydemus (272e) and Phaedrus
divine daimn (McPherran 1996: 185). Still, (242bc) as hunches or forms of rational
some critics who hold this view are uncer- intuition (1991: 2823, cf. the critique in B-S
tain whether the sign spoke in an audible 2005: 449), a characterization that would
voice (B-S 2005: 61; Joyal 2005: 1067). seem to eliminate any divine component. It
Long recommends that we credit Socrates is important to emphasize that these ration-
with experiences that were not dream-like alizing interpretations unlike the accounts
but palpable, vivid, and endowed with suf- of the epistemic status of the daimonions
ficient semantic content to be understood . . . alarms that I shall address shortly rather
in ordinary language (2006: 65). Many take straightforwardly relabel as intra-psychic
Socrates statements in Plato and Xenophon phenomena that the ancient texts specify as
literally and conclude that Socrates did hear extra-psychic divine entities or phenomena.
a voice (see McPherran 1996: 2034; Rist Others reject such reductionism by stressing
1963: 21; Vlastos 1991: 281, 2000: 185). the divine source of human rationality, but
His claim that the voice began when he was also insist that the daimonion has an iden-
a child (Ap. 31d, Thg. 128d) supports this tity separate from Socrates himself rather
view. Opinion in this group also varies as to then being located within him (Long 2003:
whether the daimonion is a sign from Apollo 126, 136, 2006: 67; Reeve 2000: 325).
(Joyal 2005: 109; McPherran 1996: 137, Differences between these rationalizing inter-
2005: 16, 2011: 125; Reeve 2000: 256) or pretations are motivated by different concep-
from the divine in an unspecified sense (B-S tions of Socratic rationality.
2004: 142; Burnyeat 2002: 136).55 As dis-
cussed above, Socrates moralized theology,
with all the gods in agreement, seems to tend
towards an impersonal concept of divinity SOCRATES AND PROPHECY
or even henotheism, according to which all
gods and spirits are manifestations of a sin- That the daimonions interventions are lim-
gular principle (Guthrie 1969: 45560). ited to prohibitions (in Plato) may explain
Those who deny the supernatural origin of why Socrates speaks of it modestly: I am a
the daimonion propose various rationalizing seer (mantis), and though I am not particu-
and psychologizing explanations. Van Riel larly good at it, still . . . I am good enough for
sees it as a purely human phenomenon that my own purposes (Phdr. 242c).59 Yet some-
arises within the personality (2005: 345).56 times Socrates issues bold prophetic state-
Nussbaum holds that the daimonion is called ments that reflect the presence of a power
daimonion, a divine thing, because human more nuanced than the signs simple no.60
reason is a divine thing. It is an ironic way Apology (33c) cites dreams and divinations
of alluding to the supreme authority of dis- not including the daimonion that order him
suasive reason and elenctic argument (1985: to philosophize, and Xenophon represents its
2345).57 On the same line, Weiss believes regular intervention in Socrates life as a mark
290

of divine friendship (philia, Mem. 4.3.12) and of essays are excellent guides to the ongoing
the Delphic oracle as honouring him (Ap. debates (Destre and Smith 2005; Smith and
14). His Socrates boasts that his divinations Woodruff 2000). The former contains a selec-
possess greater truth and piety than those tion from the lively correspondence among
who divine through birds (Ap. 13). He also Vlastos, B-S and McPherran in the 1980s on
speaks with a forceful prophetic voice both the source and nature of the daimonion and
in the Apology and in the Phaedo. He says its relation to rationality.
to the jurors who voted against him I am at Vlastos stipulates that all manifestations
the point when men prophesy most, when of the divine sign require unlimited scope
they are about to die, predicting that others for the deployment of critical reason (1991:
younger and more insistent than himself will 170). The critical point of dispute between
test and trouble them after he is dead (Ap. Vlastos and his critics concerns whether
39cd). The Apollonian source of this power or not the divine sign challenges or con-
is revealed in the Phaedo, when Socrates lik- strains Socrates rational thought. B-S and
ens himself to swans, who sing most beau- McPherran maintain that the daimonions
tifully when facing death: as they belong to alarms are not fallible though they are unin-
Apollo, they are prophetic (mantikoi), have formative in the sense that it offers no general
knowledge of the future and sing of the bless- explanations (B-S 1994: 39, 194; McPherran
ings of the underworld . . . As I believe myself 2011: 125). Socrates accepts without deliber-
to be a fellow servant with the swans and ation the signs prohibitions of actions he has
dedicated to the same god, and have received reasons to pursue. Thus, given the wisdom of
from my master a gift of prophecy not infe- the gods (B-S 2000a: 252) it is reasonable for
rior to theirs, I am no more despondent than Socrates to think that the divine sign would
they on leaving life (Phd. 85b). Prophetic oppose him if he was about to do something
singing is an extension of Socrates writing wrong (B-S 2004: 142). Vlastos takes exactly
hymns to Apollo, which he was instructed to the opposite tack: if Socrates knew that X
do in the dream mentioned earlier (60c61b). is a command from the infinitely wise god
Evident here is a deep continuity of experi- this would trump any rational scruples he
ence in the form of dreams and divinations might have had about it. But that is precisely
conveyed by Asclepius and Apollo, from what he does not know. All he has is subjec-
the Apology and into the Phaedo, both of tive states of mind, putatively caused by the
which depict Socrates as optimistic and con- god, whose import remains to be determined
fident as he prepares to enter the afterlife (see by himself (1991: 285, authors empha-
McPherran 2003a: 7880). sis). When Socrates abstains from politics
owing to the signs opposition (Ap. 31cd),
Vlastos contends that the sign and reason
are in complete accord: there is no trump-
THE DAIMONION AND REASON ing (1991: 286), whereas B-S argue that
Socrates had reasons for engaging in politi-
Vlastoss explorations of the philosophy of cal activity before the daimonion intervened
Socrates in the 1980s and 1990s inspired and hence it does trump his reasoning (2005:
many scholars to scrutinize the epistemic sta- 523, 1994: 192). Similarly, when Socrates
tus of the daimonion. Two recent collections points to the silence of the divine voice as
291

his speech nears its end (Ap. 40ac) as proof to a belief, attitude and even to a myth.61
that his impending death will be a good Socrates acceptance of the Gorgias myth as
thing, Vlastos argues that Socrates belief is a true logos constitutes a reason for him to
rationally grounded prior to and independ- believe certain things about the afterlife, but
ent of the divine sign (1991: 284, also Weiss the content of a myth is not empirically veri-
2005: 913). B-S respond that Socrates gives fiable nor testable by the elenchus.
no argument for this belief anywhere in the Another example of the rationalizing
Apology, but trusts the benefits listening to approach is Reeves. Stating as a general prin-
the daimonion has brought him (2005: 534; ciple that [t]he primary source of knowledge
see McPherran 1996: 189). about the gods for Socrates . . . is elenctic
Vlastos argues that there is no conflict argument, he contends that Socrates obeys
between reason and the daimonion (and divine commands simply on the basis of the
other extra-rational experiences) because it elenctically established goodness of the gods.
is subordinate to reason. His conception of He does not need to justify each particular
Socratic reason is based on this brief passage command and prohibition independently of
in the Crito: Not now for the first time, but the fact that he believes it to have a divine
always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded source (1989: 63, 70).62 This reading faces
by nothing except the argument (logos) that the difficulty that Socrates experienced the
seems best to me when I reason (logizomenos) daimonion from his childhood (Ap. 31d),
about the matter (46b; Vlastos 1991: 157). presumably before he became an elenctic
McPherran formulates this passage as the expert (B-S 2005: 57). In the face of this
Rationality Principle, which constrains impasse an alternative thesis has been for-
Socrates thoughts and feelings (2011: 114; mulated on which Socrates experience of
cf. Reeve 1989: 713). Burnet contends that repeated episodes of the phenomenon proved
logos does not and cannot mean reason to be reliable (B-S 2005: 57; cf. McPherran
here but instead indicates a practical rule of 1996: 756, 208; 2005: 1718). B-S defend
conduct that results from reasoning (1924: this reliabilist form of justification (in 2005:
268). B-S reject Grubes translation of logos 5861), concluding that Socrates need not
as argument and Vlastoss as proposition understand fully the entire process by which
and substitute reason (B-S 2000a: 263 n. he experiences his daimonion in order for his
16) on the grounds that these renderings reliance on it to be reasonable (60).63
beg the question as to what comprises a rea- If in fact Socrates secured inductive sup-
son. They respond to Vlastos that logos is port for accepting the signs interventions,
not opposed to Socrates divinatory experi- what can be said about his epistemic state?
ences, but rather to the opinions of the many, Vlastos suggests that what Socrates possesses
which are subjected to elenctic examination when pursuing actions enjoined by the dai-
in the first part of the dialogue (B-S 2000a: monion is practical certainty not epistemic
247). For them the sign is a reason, but it is certainty (Vlastos in Woodruff and Smith
not critically analysed each time it appears. 2000: 184, 190; Vlastos 1991: 26971).
Much depends on what one takes Socratic The distinction has been questioned as
reasoning to be: one or more types of elenc- more sophisticated than anything found
tic reasoning, practical reasoning or reflec- in the texts (Smith in Woodruff and Smith
tion. It should be noted that logos can refer 2000: 189). Vlastos also remarks that the
292

daimonion gives Socrates subjective reas- if riddling, truth (Desjardins 1981: 110). As
surance: it makes him feel good about not the Crito begins (44ab), Socrates, await-
performing an action (Vlastos in Woodruff ing the return of the Athenian ship that has
and Smith 2000: 196). On a more plausible been gone for a month on an Apolline reli-
version of this idea, Socrates lacks theoretical gious mission to the island of Delos, awak-
and explanatory knowledge, but is provided ens from a prophetic dream: I thought that
by the daimonion with instances of non- a beautiful and comely woman dressed in
expert moral knowledge (McPherran 1996: white approached me. She called me and
18691, 2011: 126) or with what Vlastos said: Socrates, may you arrive at fertile
termed elenctically justifable true belief or Phthia on the third day (Il. 9.363). Crito
elenctic knowledge (1994: 4658).64 remarks that the dream is strange (atopon),
but Socrates says: It seems clear enough to
me.65 Clarity was often ascribed to dreams in
order to convey their vividness (Dodds 1951:
OTHER APOLLONIAN RELIGIOUS 109; van Lieshout 1980: 1819); and the
EXPERIENCES epiphanic type of dream often features quo-
tation of an authoritative text and a beauti-
In justifying his divine mission Socrates ful dream-figure (van Lieshout 1980: 1819,
invokes oracles and dreams and other divine 106). McPherran (2003a: 823) interprets
manifestations (theia moira) that order him this as a prescriptive dream that reaffirms
to philosophize (Ap. 33c). Scholars disagree Socrates conviction at the end of Apology
whether or not this passage includes the dai- that he should stay in Athens and die.
monion, but it hardly matters. What deserve But who is the mysterious lady in white?
further scrutiny are other types of religious McPherrans intriguing proposal is that she
experience alluded to in this passage. I shall is Persephone, the queen of the underworld,
first examine what scholars have said about whose divinities are contacted in dream incu-
Socrates dreams. In Timaeus (71d72a) bation through the auspices of Asclepius, the
Plato likens dreams to inspired states that son of Apollo (2003: 82 n. 33).66 Ahbel-Rappe
require interpretation: a person must be thinks it more likely that she is the spiritual
in his right mind to construe what is stated consort who appears occasionally when
by those who are awake or asleep, whether Socrates is being summoned for a heroic task
they are in states of divination or possession. and must bring the aid of the divine to his
Information obtained in dreams is usually community.67
ranked low in epistemic value (Ly. 218c, R. This dream episode is a framing device
I 476c, 520c, Ti. 52bc, Tht. 158b, 190b). along with the conclusion of the dialogue
On the other hand, dreams sent by the gods where Socrates follows the way the god is
are reliable (R. I 383a, Smp. 203a). Besides leading (54e, similarly Phd. 80d). The god
Apology (33c) Socrates own dreams confirm may be Asclepius, who also sends him the
the judgement that Platos deliberate intro- recurring, prescriptive dream in Phaedo
duction of material as being the content of 60e61b to cultivate the arts and to whom
a dream is invariably significant . . . a dream Socrates with his last words asks Crito to
represents a kind of divine or oracular state- sacrifice a cock in repayment for the gift of
ment which . . . is the vehicle of important, didactic dreams (118a; McPherran 2003a:
293

823). In Crito the gods way leads Socrates of rational intuition that does not depend on
to the laws of Hades (54c), whose pro- deliberation or justification.
nouncements drown out Critos arguments In the Crito what do the opening dream
in the way the Bacchic Corybantes become and the concluding sound of the laws of
absorbed in deafening flute and drum Hades tell us about Socrates attitude towards
music that removes fear and anxiety (54d). immortality and the afterlife? That these
Weiss (1998: 136) believes that the laws are heavenly laws will not receive kindly those
responding to Critos arguments and that who have returned wrongs for wrongs implies
their statements calm his anxieties about the existence of moralized afterlife punish-
Socrates impending death and thus are not ments. Long ago Burnet traced these intima-
directed to Socrates, who is calm in the face tions of immortality to Orphic-Pythagoreans
of death. In contrast, Adam contends that (1924: 258, 291; cf. Taylor 1911b: 31). As
the pleading of the Laws coincided with the Phthia is literally Achilles home, so Socrates
voice of the divine sign (1927: 80). Weiss journey to Hades is envisioned as a home-
interprets the final words the god leads the coming.69 While Socrates does not claim to
way as a reference to philosophical reason- know whether the soul survives death and
ing (1445) not to any divinity, just as she what its experiences in the afterlife might
reduces the daimonion to rational intuition be, some claim that he had religious beliefs
in her 2005. about these matters. The ending of the Crito
It is striking that the Crito begins with this and the Gorgias myth (523a527e) express
epiphanic dream and ends with Socrates in Socrates belief in an afterlife with rewards
an altered state of mind, listening to divine and punishments, though he provides no
messages from another world.68 In his analy- arguments to support it (B-S 1994: 20112;
sis of the Crito and Phaedo dreams, Vlastos Vlastos 1991: 55). Relying on the authority of
highlights the texts use of the verbs of seem- the Apology, McPherran argues that Socrates
ing and supposing to support the claim that was not committed to the souls immortality
Socrates does not make knowledge-claims (1996: 25271). Although Socrates is agnos-
and that their interpretation depends on his tic whether death amounts to unending sleep
reasoning (1991: 1678; similarly McPherran or everlasting dialogues with the illustrious
1996: 1945). However, Socrates does not dead (Ap. 40c41b), he also expresses good
deliberate at all after the Crito dream and hope (elpis) that death is a blessing (40c)
only minimally after the Phaedo dream, and he tells the jurors you too must be of
which he takes as instructing him to compose good hope (euelpidas) as regards death . . .
a prayer and poetry to Apollo and Asclepius, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good
respectively (Phd. 61ab). Though it appears man cannot be harmed either in life or in
in the later Republic, an account of cognitive death, and that his affairs are not neglected
activity during states of sleep and dreaming by the gods (41cd).
should prompt reflection on the significance It has been argued that Socrates accepts
of Socrates dreams. Socrates says that traditional accounts of the afterlife trans-
while a person sleeps, if the two lower parts mitted by the poets even though he provides
of the soul are calm, the rational part sees no good reasons for his beliefs (B-S 2000a:
true visions of past, present and future (R. I 2529). This proposal faces two difficul-
572a). Here reason seems to represent a kind ties. First, Socratic eschatology (in Crito and
294

Gorgias) differs sharply from conventional (Dodds 1959: 376, 1973: 121; Gocer 1995:
Greek belief both in being thoroughly moral- 710).71 It is beyond the scope of this essay
ized and by its esoteric content. The Gorgias to debate the question whether Socrates was
myth, which Socrates calls a true account, committed to such indemonstrable truths
does not reflect popular eschatology but and whether they would be consistent with
rather Orphic-Pythagorean ideas. In the soul- his disavowal of knowledge and admission
as-sieve preamble to the myth (Grg. 493ac), of ignorance. A goad to further reflection
the sources of what Socrates has heard are on this issue is Kahns statement: Socrates
Orphic-Pythagoreans not popular poets.70 betrays no need for the wisdom he does not
Second, Socrates profession of good hope possess (1996: 97).
(Ap. 40c) has been characterized as hope-
ful understanding (B-S 2000a: 259) and
rational expectation (McPherran 2005: 20)
that death is a good thing for a good man. DIONYSIAN EXPERIENCES
Certainly, Socrates can be said to give rational
assent in some sense to beliefs in an afterlife, The second type of madness in the Phaedrus
but he has experienced also divine guidance taxonomy is Dionysian or telestic mad-
directly through dreams and divination. The ness, which removes mental and emotional
term elpis expresses eschatological hope in disturbances through purificatory rituals
Greek mystery religions (Kerenyi 1967: 15, (244d245a). Though Socrates religious
95, 123), which is echoed in the first section experiences seem affiliated more with Apollo
of the Phaedo where the noun and its ver- than with Dionysus and other ecstatic cults,
bal form appear seven times in the context some dialogues depict Socrates as being
of his elucidation of mystery doctrines about endowed with the powers of an ecstatic divine
immortality and divinization (Phd. 63c, 64a, man or sorcerer (gos). Sorcery (goteia), we
67b, 67c, 68a; cf. Phd. 114c, R. I 496e, 517b, recall, is said to be transmitted to humans
Lg. 732cd). Also widely used in mystery tra- through daimones along with divination
ditions and by Plato (Grg. 493cd) are the (mantik), charms (epoid) and prophecy
related terms persuasion (peith) and faith (manteia) (Smp. 202e203a). Yet, Plato con-
or conviction (pistis). The verb peithein is demns magicians and certain magical prac-
used four times to refer to Socrates convic- tices in the Republic (364b) and Laws (909b).
tion about the details of the true earth in the He attacks, through the counter-magic of
Phaedo myth (108c, 108d, 109a, 109e). He philosophy, the magical enchantment in the
also embraces the Orphic-Pythagorean doc- metaphorical sense produced by the soph-
trine of immortality, recollection and rebirth ists (Sph. 234c, 235a, 241b) and the poets
with the words: I trust that this is true (Men. (R. I 598d, 602d, 607c) deceptive language
81e). On the use of pistis and peithein in the and by the magical seductions of physical
mysteries and in Plato see Detienne (1996: pleasure (Phd. 81b, R. I 584a, Phlb. 44c;
758), Vernant (2006: 1478) and Kingsley see Belfiore 1980: 12831 and Graf 1997:
(2003: 5079). Of course, the Phaedo is not 246.). What are we to make, then, of epi-
a Socratic dialogue, but the term seems to sodes in the Euthyphro and Meno, where
be used here and in the Apology to express Socrates is accused of magical deception
faith in indemonstrable religious truths and coercion for reducing his interlocutors
295

to perplexity (aporia)? Meno complains charms are not Socrates elenctic arguments,
that Socrates has bewitched (goteueis) which can only work as purgatives to remove
and drugged him and put him under a spell false beliefs and instil awareness of ones
(Men. 80a, see Euthphr. 11bc).72 Is Menos ignorance, as in the Sophist (229b230e;
perplexity induced solely by elenctic exami- McPherran 2004: 236).73 After elenctic
nation? It is reasonable to think so, but examination Charmides is found to lack tem-
Socrates immediately confronts him with the perance, so Socrates never sings his charms,
mystery doctrines of immortality and rebirth though he characterizes extra-rational truths
imported from the Orphic-Pythagoreans, as charms in later dialogues like the Phaedo
masters of extra-rational practices for and Laws.74 Thus, the Charmides and per-
transforming the self and attaining wisdom haps the Meno also allude to an emotional
(Morgan 1990: 3743). Vlastos assigns these means of persuasion with distinct emotional
doctrines, along with the Gorgias myth, to effects. The curative rites of the Corybantes,
Platos middle period, in an effort to build which were similar to the Dionysiac, aimed
a firewall between them and the historical to cure fears and anxiety through music
Socrates (Vlastos 1991: 535). and dance (Lg. 790e). Dodds thinks the
In Charmides and Euthydemus, Socrates is Euthydemus (277d) is evidence that Socrates
portrayed as familiar with the ritual practices was an initiate (1951: 79; also Morgan 1990:
and ecstatic states of shamans and he seems 267).
to share their charismatic, healing powers. Does Socratic contact with shamans and
In Charmides, Socrates has just returned to seers (iatromanteis) contribute to understand-
Athens from military duty at Potidaea in 432 ing his religious experiences? Shamans such as
430 (Chrm. 153a, Ap. 28e, Smp. 219e220e), Zalmoxis, Abaris, Hermotimus, Epimenides
close to Thrace, the home of Dionysus and and Pythagoras could access altered states
Zalmoxis, whose doctors instructed him of consciousness in which the soul, freed
in the use of charms (epoid) for healing. from the physical body, journeyed to other
Whether Zalmoxis was god, daimn or sha- worlds, acquired divine healing-powers and
man is difficult to determine, but he was wor- experienced ecstatic union with a divinity.75
shipped by the Thracian Getae, who believed Through contact with such figures Socrates
in the souls immortality ( Dodds 1951: 140 may have learned about the ideas of the soul
ff., 1656; Morgan 1990: 236). Zalmoxis as an entity capable of acting separately
was also linked with Pythagoras and north- from the body and as immortal and also
ern shamanic healers and miracle work- about techniques of detaching conscious-
ers such as Abaris (Chrm. 158b), Aristeas ness from the physical world (Morgan 1990:
and Epimenides (Burkert 1972: 14759). 2831). In this vein it has been suggested
Socrates offers to cure Charmides head- that Socrates was the last shaman and the
ache, but informs him that the body cannot first philosopher (Joly 1974: 69).76 Some
be cured apart from the soul: herbs must be have also seen Socrates as an adherent of
accompanied by incantations (epdai) that Pythagorean doctrines, like the immortality
heal the soul, that is, make it temperate, by and rebirth of the soul, and as an initiate of
means of beautiful words (Chrm. 157a). the Pythagorean way of life with its ascetic
McPherran argues that these kaloi logoi or regimen and meditative practices.77 Features
296

of the sorcerer (gos) are ascribed to Socrates agitated than the Corybantes (215e) (cf.
in Aristophanes Clouds (Bowie 1996: 112 Morgan 1990: 959).78 He admits to feeling
24; Festugire 1975: 701). But, as a phi- shame and anger at himself for his inability
losopher, Socrates must be distinguished in to live virtuously as his beloved Socrates
essential respects from shamans and seers exhorts him to do (216ab). I refuse to listen
because he criticizes inspired poets and pos- to him; I stop my ears and tear myself away
sessed diviners, as we have seen, and applies from him, for, like the Sirens, he could make
the elenchus to himself and others publicly. me stay by his side till I die . . . he makes
Perhaps his private practice owed something me feel ashamed . . . yet, the moment I leave
to these divine men from a different milieu. his side, I go back to my old ways (216a
Detienne and Vernant highlight what they b). This sense of shame is not an untypical
see as evidence for breathing exercises, medi- response to elenctic examination (Belfiore
tative withdrawal and self-concentration, 1980: 134), but besides his emotional agita-
particularly in the Phaedo (64e, 65c, 66a, tion Alcibiades describes being possessed and
66e, 67d, 79d, 81bc), which are indebted to intoxicated, states of mind that result from
Empedocles and other Orphic-Pythagoreans the madness and frenzy of the philosopher
(Detienne 1963: 7181; Vernant 2006: (218b), whose words are truly divine (221a).
1269, 1448). Whether such practices can He uses the same vocabulary of possession
be attributed to the Socrates of the early dia- (218d) we found in the Ions description
logues is, of course, speculative, but it will be of poets possessed by the Muses (534be).
difficult to settle the issue simply by relying The decisive difference in the Symposium is
on the putative chronology of the dialogues. that it is Socrates who causes these dramatic
It is in Alcibiades gripping account in the effects, not a supernatural force. This power
Symposium of his relationship with Socrates animates Socrates erotic nature, which
that the effect of his cathartic spells is most expresses itself as both lover and beloved. In
powerfully expressed. Here I shall summarize the Euthyphro he says: the lover of inquiry
only the main points of this much-discussed must follow his beloved wherever it may
passage. Socrates is depicted as an incarna- lead him (14c). Xenophon and Aeschines
tion of the daimn eros (daimonios anr) and also attest to Socrates love for Alcibiades
as a charismatic, Dionysiac intoxicator of his and his other companions.79 His erotic peda-
devotee Alcibiades. Before he arrives at the gogy, with its disruptive but curative power,
banquet, Socrates stands alone, apparently shares therapeutic features with the telestic
in a trance on a neighbours porch (Smp. madness of the Bacchic mysteries as distinct
175de), which anticipates Alcibiades men- from the prophetic skill derived from Apollo
tion of a similar episode when they were on and the Pythagoreans (Morgan 1990: 95).80
campaign in Potidaea (220cd). Comparing The possession-trance Socrates induces in
Socrates to the satyr Marsyas, a compan- Alcibiades and the less intense state expe-
ion of Dionysus, Alcibiades describes how rienced by Meno exemplify the Dionysiac
Socrates words (without aulos of Marsyas) method of imposing madness or bewilder-
cast a spell on him and made him possessed ment as a cure for the patients fears. In
(215bd) so that he felt drunk and, with Socrates cultivated version of the method, he
his pounding heart and tears flowing, more aims to remove false beliefs in part through
297

confusion and shame. But while Socrates Scholars disagree about his state of mind
may not have been an active participant in while he stood motionless for twenty-four
communal Bacchic cult, with its reliance on hours. Some accept a rationalizing expla-
intoxicating substances, dance and music, he nation, focusing on the verbs employed in
may have practiced the true Bacchic myster- Alcibiades account. Vlastos contends that
ies alluded to in the Phaedo (67cd), which Plato represents Socrates as thinking, investi-
aimed to effect a radical transformation of gating, searching (sunnosas, skopn, ztn),
the personality by means of the private, eso- not contemplating (1981: 97 n. 51; similarly
teric practices of Orphic-Pythagoreans in Dover 1980: 173).81 The last two verbs com-
southern Italy and exemplified in the mys- monly denote considering or inquiring, but
tic Gold Plates (Dodds 1951: 14756; Graf the first can mean more than thought in some
and Johnston 2007; Kingsley 1995: 256 contexts.82 I take it to mean concentrated
72, 30814; Morgan 1990: 957). These awareness. In any case, Socrates demean-
quasi-shamanic practices involved the dis- our during this long period of time suggests
memberment of the initiands old self and the to many scholars that he was absorbed in a
reconstitution of a new, transformed self (see trance state ( Ahbel-Rappe 2009: 13; Burnet
Seaford 2006: 10514). Students of Socrates 1911: xlvii, 38; Bussanich 2006: 210; Greene
must judge whether the religious experiences 1944: 274; Guthrie 1969: 4045; Hegel
and beliefs of Socrates in Crito, Charmides 2006: 128; Morgan 1990: 978; Prior 2006:
and Gorgias flow in the same stream as those 144). The episode occurred when Socrates
in the Alcibiades episode and portions of the was in the far north, just before he returned
Phaedo that allude to ecstatic transforma- to Athens and mentions the Corybantes at
tion of the self or whether the latter represent the beginning of Charmides. The prayer to
Platonic embellishments. the sun is also noteworthy. Socrates says he
The last examples of Socratic religious believes the sun and moon are gods (Ap.
experience to consider are the episodes men- 26d), but possibly relevant is the identifica-
tioned at the beginning and towards the end tion of the sun-god Helios with Apollo by
of the Symposium. On his way to the party the Pythagoreans (Burkert 1972: 14950,
Socrates falls behind, standing motionless 1987: 701), Parmenides and Empedocles
in a porch (175b). After Socrates arrives, (DK 28A20, 31A23) and Plato (Lg. 946bc,
Agathon refers to the wisdom Socrates may 947a; on Plato see Dodds 1951: 221, 232 n.
have acquired during the episode (175cd). 70; Morrow 1960: 447). In Aeschylus lost
Socrates playfully rebuffs the request, but Bassarai, Orpheus descends to the dark-
what is significant about the report is that ness of Hades and, seeing a bright light (a
these episodes appear to be regular occur- mythic image of initiation into the myster-
rences for Socrates, which his companions ies), returns to worship the sun as Apollo.83
think is a source of his wisdom (sophia). Orphic-Pythagorean sun-worship in the con-
Later, Alcibiades recounts how Socrates text of mystic initiation is a possible back-
astonished his fellow soldiers at Potidaea by drop for a devotee of Apollo who has just
standing in the same spot from sunrise to emerged from a long trance.
sunrise. On the second morning he said his I find no analogies in classical antiquity to
prayers to the sun and went away (220d). Socrates standing motionless for twenty-four
298

hours. For examples of such behaviour one examples of the latter, the Corybantic agi-
can cite South and East Asian religious virtu- tation and telestic madness mentioned by
osos, as did Pliny in his description of Indian Plato as well as similar phenomena in other
yogis: Their philosophers, who are called cultures (1978).85 If in fact Socrates expe-
Gymnosophists, remain in one posture, with rienced some sort of ecstasy or trance, it
their eyes immovably fixed upon the sun, would be of the quiet or inward-turning kind
from its rising to its setting, and, during the evidenced in the Symposium, in the medita-
whole of the day, they are accustomed to tive states alluded to in the Phaedo and the
stand in the burning sands on one foot, first internal quietening described in Republic
one and then the other (Pliny HN 7.2.38, (571).86 Plutarch (1993: 104) claimed that
trans. Bostock). Many accounts of yogis and his calmness enabled him to apprehend the
Zen masters standing or sitting motionless for daimonion.
long periods of time while absorbed in con- Parallel to the recent naturalistic explana-
centration (samdhi) are readily available.84 tions of the causes of the Pythias trances,
In referring to what appear to be Socrates some scholars maintain that Socrates
altered states of consciousness, I have abnormal behaviour and altered states
employed, without prejudice, the terms for example, hearing voices, withdrawn
trance and ecstasy as do classical scholars self-absorption display the symptoms of
and anthropologists generally. It is beyond non-convulsive (i.e. mild) Temporal Lobe
the scope of this essay to dig deeply into the Epilepsy (Muramoto and Englert 2006).87
meanings of these terms, but a few points are This idea deserves further study. At the
worth noting for those wishing to pursue the same time, neuropathological explanations
matter further. Ecstasy is, of course, a Greek of religious phenomena have been critiqued
word that means being outside of oneself or as reductionist by William James and oth-
outside ones normal state of mind (Burkert ers (see Taves 1999: 274).88 Even if Socrates
1985: 110; Dodds 1951: 77). Among anthro- were epileptic, knowing this would add little
pologists and classical scholars alike ecstasy to our understanding of the life he lived and
is often used interchangeably with trance, his responses to the experiences he had and
which can be confusing (Rouget 1985: the manner in which Plato represented them.
329). Though it may not apply to the phe- Less speculative than this medical diagnosis
nomenology of Socrates experiences or to and possibly more cogent is testimony about
the Phaedrus taxonomy of mania with which the physical regimen Socrates lived by and
we began, this distinction may be helpful in his detachment from pleasure and pain. Plato
thinking about both. Rouget contrasts the emphasizes this facet of Socrates personality
two terms, applying ecstasy to altered states less than Xenophon, but it surely raises the
attained in silence, immobility, and soli- question whether his yogic behaviour con-
tude, and restricting trance to those that ditioned some of his experiences or, indeed,
are attained by means of noise, agitation, whether his detachment might be seen as a
and in the presence of others (1985: 7). As side effect of ecstatic experience. Alcibiades
examples of the former he cites the mysti- reports Socrates preternatural calmness on
cal experiences of St. Teresa of Avila, South the battlefield at Delium (Smp. 221b; cf.
Asian yogis and Sufi mystics (79), and, as Arist. Clouds 3623) and how impervious he
299

was to temperature extremes (219b220b), of Socrates left to us by the ancient sources

even to the extent of walking barefoot present him as the relentless analyser of his
through ice and snow. Xenophon testified own and his interlocutors beliefs one of
to his self-sufficiency and freedom from Western philosophys rational heroes and
desire (Mem. 1.2, 56, 2.1.1), asserting that also as a servant of the gods and a barefoot
self-control (enkrateia) was the foundation visionary. In the end, he remains an enigma.
of virtue (1.5.5) and necessary for achieving
wisdom (4.5.6, 7, 9).89 The diverse images John Bussanich
300

13
THE POLITICS OF IMPIETY:
WHY WAS SOCRATES PROSECUTED
BY THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY?
Socrates wanted to die: not Athens, but 6). Even his divinity wanted to protect him
he himself chose the hemlock; he forced from that (Ap. 5).3
Athens to sentence him. Socrates is no Waterfield (2009: 2034) recently offered a
physician, he said softly to himself; here new interpretation of Socrates dying words.
death alone is the physician. Socrates
Playing on the close link between pharma-
himself has only been sick a long time.
kos and pharmakon, scapegoat and cure,
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 1977 Socrates saw himself as healing the citys ills
by his voluntary death. The city needed
to make amends with the gods, whom the
INTRODUCTION Athenians believed they had offended. How
else could they make sense of their crushing
Nietzsche thought Socrates wanted to die. loss to the Spartans, the loss of their proud
That is what his last words Crito, we owe empire and navy, the horrors of the Great
a cock to Asclepius (Pl. Phd. 118a) imply. Plague and ongoing civil war and social cri-
Only a nihilist, only someone unhealthy, sis? There was something rotten in Athens, a
tottery, decadent, late, could equate death sort of pernicious vapor that could spread
with healing and life with sickness. Even from one individual and infect the entire
Socrates was tired of [life] (Nietzsche community.4 The execution of Socrates,
1977: 473).1 Nietzsche probably got this who had come to embody everything that
idea from reading Xenophon, who tells was wrong in Athenian culture natural
us that Socrates was boastful during his philosophy, sophistry, moral relativism and
defense speech because he preferred death questionable politics gave the Athenians
to extending [his] life for a life worse than an opportunity to purify their community:
death (Ap. 9). He was trying to entice the all of the citys evils could be loaded onto
jury to convict him.2 The alternative was old Socrates the scapegoat and sent away, curing
age, which just meant the general decline Athens of all its ills. Socrates understood and
of his capacities and enjoyment of life (Ap. accepted this role (Waterfield 2009: 203). He
301

THE POLITICS OF IMPIETY
was a sort of pre-Christian saviour who lived THE STANDARD POSITIONS AND
according to his principles and voluntarily THE DIFFICULTY
died for Athens sins. Asclepius deserved a
sacrifice as thanks in advance for restoring Scholars typically take one of two gen-
the city to health. eral approaches in answering this motiva-
These are fascinating and provocative tion question. Some argue that the formal
ideas. But even if one of them were true, we charges are all we need to make sense of why
would not have a complete answer to the Socrates was brought to trial and convicted.
question about why Socrates was tried and Political considerations may have been rel-
convicted, which asks about how Socrates evant we have no way of knowing for sure,
was perceived, what he believed and what especially as we examine the evidence but
could have motivated his jurors and accus- they are superfluous. We can account for
ers.5 These are historical questions about the trial without speculating about political
Athenian culture and religion, and philo- grievances. These scholars, those who favour
sophical questions about Socrates religious the religious interpretation, divide into two
and political values. Even if Socrates wanted groups: those who think Socrates was guilty
to die, either to cure Athens or to escape of impiety (see Burnyeat 2002; Connor 1991;
from this world to a more perfect one, we McPherran 2002b), and those who think he
would still want to know how to account for was innocent.9 The main point of conten-
his trial why the accusers and jurors felt it tion between these rival positions is whether
important to execute an elderly man which Socrates religious views and practices were
remains a mystery for many reasons. unconventional enough to warrant a trial
In 399 BCE Socrates was brought to trial and conviction for impiety (Brickhouse and
for impiety. Meletus, the accuser who wrote Smith 2002: 8). The alternative approach
the indictment, clarified this charge with to answering the motivation question, that
three specifications: Socrates was guilty taken by those who favour the political
of failing to recognize the citys gods; he interpretation, denies that the impiety charge
invented new spiritual beings and he cor- was the real reason for Socrates trial, and
rupted the youth.6 All three of these claims argues that Socrates was prosecuted because
were part of the impiety charge, which was he was, or was perceived to be, a threat to the
the punishable offense under Athenian law.7 democracy.10
At the conclusion of the trial, during which The problem here is vexed, and not merely
Socrates may or may not have defended because it involves questions about the irre-
himself,8 the jury convicted Socrates and coverable psychological states of Socrates
sentenced him to death. Today scholars con- prosecutors (about whom we know very
tinue to disagree about the motivations of little)11 and jurors (about whom we know
the jury and the prosecution. Did they mean almost nothing).12 In a sense, this question
what they said when they charged Socrates encapsulates the entirety of the Socratic
with impiety, and did they have impiety in Problem. We cannot know whether Socrates
mind when they charged him with corrupt- was on trial for subversion13 or for some
ing the youth? Or were there political rea- other political reason, if we do not know
sons for the trial that arent reflected in the what his politics were or how they were
formal charges? perceived. And we cannot know whether
302

the impiety charge was justified, or whether and convicted. If this is right, Socrates accus-
it is sufficient for making sense of Socrates ers were not allowed to charge him with
trial, without knowing what his religious political crimes alleged to have occurred prior
beliefs were. The motivation question, in to the Amnesty, but they were free to bring
other words, has both historical and philo- up their allegations as often as they wished
sophical aspects. On the one hand, there are once the trial was underway (Brickhouse and
perhaps unanswerable historical questions Smith 1994a: 174).16 There are two kinds
about what Socrates believed and how he of evidence for this position: (i) the details
was perceived by his countrymen. And on the of the Amnesty, which are inconclusive, and
other hand, there are philosophical questions (ii) the speeches associated with other trials
about how we ought to understand Socrates from the same time period, which strongly
philosophy as it is reported in the writings of suggest that prosecutors could speak freely
Plato and Xenophon, assuming it is reported about political grievances once a trial began.
there at all. The reconciliation agreement of 403 made
it illegal to charge people with political crimes
(other than murder by ones own hands,
which remained prosecutable under the
THE AMNESTY Amnesty agreement) committed before17 or
during the reign of the Thirty, or for violating
Many scholars have dismissed the political any of the laws that the Amnesty nullified.18
interpretation out of hand because they have It had two important provisions. The first
considered it incompatible with the Amnesty was a matter of distributive justice, which
that was passed in 403,14 just after the fall of guaranteed that everyone who lost his prop-
the Thirty and the end of the brutal civil war erty under the Thirty got it back or received
in Athens.15 Some proponents of the political something of comparable value. The second
interpretation have even thought the provi- was a rule against reprisals, which governed
sions of the Amnesty made it illegal just to the trials the oligarchs had to submit to as a
mention political grievances during post-war precondition for staying in Athens: the ver-
trials for example, this is how one might dicts of those trials were final there could
explain why Socrates does not discuss poli- be no reprisals.
tics in either Platos or Xenophons account The no reprisals provision is the part of
of the trial. the reconciliation agreement that many schol-
However, if Brickhouse and Smith are cor- ars have interpreted as a blanket Amnesty,
rect, under Athenian law at the time there and some of the ancient evidence appears
was a recognized difference between (a) what to support their interpretation. As Aristotle
you could charge a person with, and (b) what says in his Athenian Constitution, there was
you could say during his trial (Brickhouse a universal Amnesty for past events, cover-
and Smith 1989: 734). The Amnesty was ing everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the
not a complete forgiveness of crimes, and (so Eleven, and those that have been governors
far as we know) it did not explicitly restrict of Peiraeus, and that these also be covered
what people said during the prosecution of by the Amnesty if they render account (Ath.
defendants like Socrates. It only restricted the Pol. 39.6). Likewise, Andocides speaks very
grounds on which people could be charged generally of the Amnestys application: the
303

returning democrats, he says, decided to that Socrates accusers faced as they con-
let go of the past, and counted the safety of structed and presented their case. These are
the city as more important than personal logically independent points. As Brickhouse
grievances, and so decreed not to recall past and Smith (1989: 74) have argued, there
misdeeds committed by either side (On the was no provision in the Amnesty that would
Mysteries 1.81). These comments give us prevent Meletus et al. from making unmis-
some reason to think the Amnesty estab- takable references to Socrates associations
lished a very general rule against stirring up with Alcibiades or Critias, through obvi-
political controversies of any kind, not just ous insinuation, or even quite explicitly, by
a legal restriction on the drafting of formal way of character assassination. Juries were
charges. supposed to make their judgements on legal
However, if Carawan (2002) and grounds alone, but it appears that there were
Waterfield (2009) are correct, it is a mistake no rules governing what people did or did
to consider these statements as evidence of not say during post-war trials only a rule
a blanket Amnesty, because the no repris- that restricted how one framed the legal mat-
als rule applied only to the two provisions ters in an indictment.
in the reconciliation agreement: the term There is some reason to think the Amnesty
used [m mnsikakein] is common in ancient was more restrictive than Brickhouse and
Athenian contract law and it always refers Smith suggest, and that it would have pre-
to the specific terms of a specific agreement vented Socrates accusers from mention-
(Waterfield 2009: 134). As Carawan (2002: ing his relationships with the Thirty at all.
5) develops this point, in treaties of recon- According to Aristotle, Archinus who dili-
ciliation the pledge m mnsikakein is not gently supported the Amnesty and even cre-
in itself a bar against prosecuting partisan ated the procedure of paragraph to protect
crimes in the first instance, but a rule against against unfair trials persuaded the Council
further retribution in matters that have of 500 citizens to execute someone for violat-
been settled once and for all. The Amnesty ing the Amnesty: When somebody began to
guarded against reprisals on post-war prop- stir up grudges against the returned citizens,
erty agreements and the verdicts handed he arraigned him before the Council and per-
down during the post-war trials of the Thirty suaded it to execute him without trial, saying
and their henchmen (Ostwald 1986: 5012). that this was the moment for them to show if
But that was the extent of the Amnestys for- they wished to save the democracy and keep
giveness. It did not protect Socrates or any- their oaths (Ath. Pol. 40.2). This sounds like
one else against having his relationships with evidence against the Brickhouse and Smith
members of the Thirty discussed during his position, but in fact it does not settle the mat-
trial. His accusers were free to use this infor- ter. Archinus and the Council may have been
mation however they wished in their efforts punishing someone for crafting a political
to persuade the jury. indictment, or they may have been respond-
We should note that Waterfield and ing to someone who acted inappropriately
Carawan could be mistaken about the appli- simply by making politics relevant, through
cation of the no reprisals provision in the rec- rhetoric instead of the law, during a post-war
onciliation agreement without other scholars trial (or even outside of the courts). Aristotle
being mistaken about the legal restrictions does not tell us enough to know either way.19
304

On the other hand, there is independent him with a political crime, but not from slan-
evidence for thinking the Amnesty did not dering his character or eliciting an emotional
restrict Socrates accusers from expressing response from his jury in order to convict
political grievances. Several speeches asso- him. His accusers, as we have seen, were
ciated with and probably delivered at other legally permitted to talk about Critias and
trials from the same time period suggest that Alcibiades, as well as Socrates many other
litigants enjoyed a great deal of rhetorical relationships with oligarchs.
freedom. This is clearest in Lysias speeches
(and at least one of Isocrates), many of
which would have violated the Amnesty if
it had prohibited all references to political ANCIENT TESTIMONY
grievances during post-war trials.20 Lysias
Against Eratosthenes, for example, attacks a It is one thing to say the political interpre-
member of the Thirty for being part of the tation cannot be ruled out, and another to
tyranny and for abusing his power to murder make a positive case for it. What evidence do
the accusers brother. His Against Agoratus we have that there was a political dimension
accuses Agoratus of crimes he committed to Socrates trial? Unfortunately, in addi-
before and during the reign of the Thirty, tion to our various other challenges, we have
and it refers to another case that did so as a source problem. In fact, the lions share
well. His Defense against the Charge of of confusion on this topic is caused by the
Subverting the Democracy defends a man inconsistent testimony found in our origi-
for serving the Thirty as a knight. Defense nal sources. The most important and earli-
of Mantitheus does the same for Mantitheus. est accounts of the trial, Platos Apology and
His In Defense of Eryximachus, Who Xenophons Apology, focus almost exclu-
Remained in the City defends Eryximachus sively on the charge of impiety, which was
against the general resentment of men who the lynchpin of the formal charges brought
stayed in Athens while the democrats were in against Socrates.
exile. Isocrates Against Euthynus accuses a This is significant for our assessment of
man of crimes he committed during the reign the political interpretations plausibility,
of the Thirty, and there may have been sev- because if there had been a political motive
eral more speeches that made similar accu- for the trial, neither Platos nor Xenophons
sations.21 Either we have misunderstood the Socrates spends much time responding to it
meaning of the reconciliation agreement, or directly. We can squeeze political significance
if the Amnesty really was supposed to protect out of Socrates remarks in both documents,
oligarchs from having political grievances but it would be an exaggeration to say that
raised during their trials, it was not effective Socrates concentrates on political issues in
in the least. either one of them (Brickhouse and Smith
The political interpretation, then, cannot 2002: 7). These considerations seem to cast
be ruled out because of the Amnesty. Some doubt on the political interpretation. If it
scholars have thought otherwise, but only is true that Socrates trial was politically
because they have exaggerated the signifi- charged, Plato and Xenophon either obscure
cance of the reconciliation agreement, which the most important issues present at the trial
prevented Socrates accusers from charging (assuming their purposes were historical and
305

not philosophical or political or something It is said that, seeing Anytus pass by, Socrates
else that might explain the omission), or they said, This man is proud, as if he had
show that Socrates avoided them (Brickhouse accomplished something great and honor-
and Smith 2002: 7). But neither of those pos- able by killing me. Because seeing that he
was thought by the city to be worthy of
sibilities seems likely, given the extent to
great things, I said that he should not edu-
which both Plato and Xenophon present us
cate his son in the ox-hide trade . . . I was
with a Socrates who was often critical of the in the company of Anytus son for a short
Athenian democracy, its institutions and its time, and he does not seem to me to have
people.22 a weak soul, so I say he will not remain in
On the other hand, however, many the servile occupation that his father has
ancient sources Isocrates, Aeschines prepared for him. But, on account of not
Rhetor, Aeschines of Sphettus, Libanius and having any serious guardian, he will fall
Xenophon in his Memorabilia tell us the into some shameful desire and advance
prosecution was primarily or partly moti- further into wickedness. (Ap. 29)23
vated by political reasons, not religious ones.
The relevant testimony from these sources Aeschines Rhetor (390320 BCE):
that survives is rather thin, but the most
important passages, quoted below, provide us Men of Athens, then you killed Socrates,
with a very different perception of Socrates because it appeared that he educated
trial. Critias, one of the Thirty who destroyed
the democracy. (Oratio 1)
Xenophon (430356 BCE):
Aeschines of Sphettus (ca. 425350 BCE):
But, by god, the accuser said, he made his
companions despise the established laws, I wonder how one ought to deal with the
saying that it was foolish to establish the fact that Alcibiades and Critias were the
rulers of the city by lot, and that no one associates of Socrates, against whom the
would want to make use of a captain chosen many and the upper classes made such
by lot, or a builder, or a flute-player, or any strong accusations. It is hard to imagine
other arts, any of which do far less damage a more pernicious person than Critias,
when their practitioners make a mistake who stood out among the Thirty, the most
than do those who make a mistake about wicked of the Greeks. People say that
affairs of the city. And such arguments, the these men ought not be used as evidence
accuser said, raised up young men to look that Socrates corrupted the youth, nor
down on the established constitution, and should their sins be used in any way what-
made them violent. (Mem. 1.2.9) soever with respect to Socrates, who does
But, the accuser added,Critias and Alcibiades not deny carrying on conversations with
became intimates of Socrates, and the two the young. (Fragment 1K)24
of them did the city the most grievous
wrongs. Critias became the biggest thief
Isocrates (436338 BCE):
and the most violent and murderous of all
those in the Oligarchy, while Alcibiades
became, for his part, the most irresponsible So, when you were accusing Socrates, as if
and high-handed and violent of all those in you were trying to praise him, you gave
the democracy. (Mem. 1.2.12) him Alcibiades as a pupil, and although no
306

one saw him being educated by [Socrates], THE EXTREME POLITICAL

all would agree that he was better by INTERPRETATION
far than the others [who were around
Socrates]. (Bus. 5) The extreme political interpretation is the
idea that Socrates was prosecuted and con-
Libanius (314393 CE): victed because he was perceived to be,
and in fact was, a corrupting influence on
In accusing Socrates of being someone who Alcibiades and prominent members of the
teaches others how to do evil and saying Thirty, the oligarchic government that Sparta
that he corrupts your young, Anytus can- installed in Athens after the Peloponnesian
not recall any examples except Alcibiades
War. On this view, Socrates was opposed to
and Critias. (Ap. 13641)
democracy in theory and in practice, and he
advocated or favoured oligarchy. We know
Each of these authors suggests, in one way or this from his political teachings and from
another, that Socrates evil associates, Athens his actions, especially his failure to leave the
most hated criminals, were connected in a city and join the democrats in exile after the
meaningful way to Socrates trial. At the Peloponnesian War. The trial of Socrates,
very least, they were part of the discussion, then, was an effort by the Athenians to rid
part of peoples deliberations. Xenophon and the city of a dangerous internal enemy, some-
Aeschines Rhetor make the strongest claims, one who threatened the democracy by trying
suggesting that the Athenians executed to undermine it from within. He had influ-
Socrates because of his pedagogical rela- enced one generation of young Athenians to
tionships with Critias and Alcibiades. The despise the democracy and replace it with an
first passage from Xenophons Memorabilia oligarchy. Best to purge the city of the poison
is probably the strongest of all, and poten- before it struck again. This is the case for the
tially the most revealing. It suggests, with- prosecution that some have put together to
out any qualifications, that Socrates was make sense of how the trial of Socrates could
perceived to be an enemy of the city who happen in so free a society (Stone 1988: xi).
corrupted the youth by influencing them to The most well-known defense of the
despise and undermine the democracy. This extreme political interpretation is I. F. Stones
is not Xenophons personal opinion, but The Trial of Socrates, which argues for two
rather that of the accuser, whose identity is separate theses. The first relates to the indict-
undisclosed. ment against Socrates, and in particular the
Looking at the same testimony and the charge of impiety, which Stone dismisses as a
same historical evidence, different scholars mere disguise for the real motivation. It was
have arrived at very different conclusions. the political, not the philosophical or theo-
Even scholars who share the same gen- logical, views of Socrates which finally got
eral interpretive approach to the trial will him in trouble. The discussion of his religious
sometimes disagree about how to weigh the views diverts attention from the real issues
various pieces of evidence. This is certainly (Stone 1988: 1389). Stones second thesis
true among those who defend the political is about Socratic politics: he was opposed
interpretation, which has both extreme and to democracy in theory and in practice, as
moderate variants. we can tell from his political teachings and
307

from the fact that he stayed in Athens dur- Plato, the two innovators that Stone men-
ing the bloody dictatorship of the Thirty tions. Greece was full of famous and influen-
between 404 and 403 BCE, and he taught his tial atheists and agnostics. Protagoras was a
subversive ideas to anti-democratic fanatics sceptic. Prodicus of Ceos reduced the gods to
(Stone 1988: 174). Both of these claims are natural phenomena or people. Democritus of
controversial, and neither is supported with Abdera denied that the gods were immortal
a compelling argument. The first depends and argued that religion was rooted in fear.
on inconclusive evidence, and the second Thrasymachus of Chalcedon argued from
depends on a problematic interpretation of injustice to the conclusion that the gods do
Socrates politics. These points are worth not look after us. Diagoras was famous for
developing in detail because they are rel- his atheism, as was Euripides, who suggested
evant to our assessment of every position in that religion was merely a tool of social and
this debate. political control. As Waterfield says: Almost
all of the most potent arguments against
BAD REASONS TO REJECT THE RELIGIOUS the existence of a divinity or the validity of
INTERPRETATION worship were deployed by Socrates contem-
poraries, and this fact exacerbates the puz-
Stone begins by rejecting the religious inter- zle of Socrates trial. Because the Athenians
pretation for two reasons. First, Athenians tolerated impiety in so many other con-
typically did not persecute people for hold- texts, it seems that we must look elsewhere
ing or expressing unorthodox beliefs (Stone to understand why Socrates was taken to
1988: 138). Second, Aristophanes Clouds court (Waterfield 2009: 378). On this point
must have been unimportant because Athens Waterfield follows Stone, but it is this infer-
did not condemn Socrates immediately after ence that does not follow automatically from
the play first showed. And, besides, it was the fact that the persecution of Socrates was
a comedy intended to be entertaining, not exceptional. As I discuss below, there proba-
a piece of political propaganda intended to bly was something uniquely damaging about
destroy Socrates character. Only a humour- Socrates alleged impiety, either in terms of
less scholar would think that a few jokes led his specific beliefs or because it coincided
to Socrates trial. To blame Socrates fate on with events (such as failure in war, plague,
the comic poets is like blaming a politicians and cultural crises) that spooked Athenians
defeat today on the way he has been misrep- and made them unusually sensitive to this
resented by newspaper cartoonists (Stone man who persistently questioned the beliefs
1988: 136). and values of their society.25
Stones first point is fair enough. Socrates Stones second point is also weak. Political
condemnation on religious grounds alone comedy can be extremely damaging, even
is hard to understand in light of what we when it is not intended to be.26 Aristophanes
know about the tolerance of religious inno- play presents Socrates as a sophist who made
vation and scepticism in Athenian culture bad arguments seem like good ones, and an
(see Garland 1992). If impiety had been suf- atheist who questioned the value of conven-
ficient to bring someone to trial, there would tional religious practices, such as the efficacy
have been many other trials for impiety in of prayer and sacrifice. This representation
Athens, and not just of Xenophanes and of Socrates was probably unforgettable for
308

many Athenians, who had long memories psychological environment, full of bitter-
and effective gossip networks (Cartledge ness and resentment and a desperate desire
2009: 86): forgivable as long as things were for a scapegoat (Waterfield 2009: 13972).
good in Athens, but dangerous and unac- Aristophanes image of Socrates as a spiritual
ceptable when things were bad. In fact, by pariah, who dishonoured the gods by ques-
399 the Athenians, who Pericles had proudly tioning the value of prayer and denying the
described as free and tolerant of one anoth- gods capacity to intervene in human affairs,
ers private lives (Thuc. 2.37), were act- must have weighed heavily on the minds of
ing more like the stereotypical traditional many jurors (McPherran 2000: 92). Some
Mediterranean villagers suspicious, con- undoubtedly worried that Socrates had pro-
servative, superstitious, irrational (Cartledge voked the gods to punish them, and might
2009: 84). continue to do so unless he was exiled or
The bigger problem here is that Stone eliminated.
never explains why Plato would make an A final problem with Stones dismissal
issue of Aristophanes if his play had been of the religious interpretation is that it may
unimportant. As Irwin points out, the assume too little of the average Athenians
charges in the indictment were so close ability to think logically. Stone focuses
to Aristophanes caricature of Socrates in on Socrates relationships with men like
the Clouds that it would have been fool- Critias and Alcibiades, as if he was simply
ish for Socrates to remind Athenians that tarred with a kind of guilt by association:
the very same charges had been brought they were anti-democratic; Socrates was
against him years ago, before anyone knew their teacher; therefore, Socrates made them
how Critias and Alcibiades would turn out anti-democratic. The problem with this, how-
(Irwin 1989: 189). If the Apology is not a ever, is that it rules out the possibility that
historical document, and instead is better Socrates was held responsible for corrupting
thought of as a piece of Platonic philosoph- the youth making them worse by making
ical propaganda, Irwins point still applies: them into sceptics and atheists. Some of the
in that case it would have been amazingly characters in the Clouds, and perhaps Critias
foolish for Plato to remind his audience of himself in his play Sisyphus, suggest that the
Aristophanes old play. gods were invented to give people a reason to
The opening pages of Platos Apology, dur- be just even when they do not have to worry
ing which Socrates singles out Aristophanes about getting caught by human authorities.
as his most damaging first accuser, Athens suffered profoundly during and after
make much more sense if we assume that the war because of unrestrained self-interest.
Aristophanes had been effective in poisoning It is possible that some of Socrates jurors
the well against Socrates. This was a time of worried that Socratic philosophy had con-
social and spiritual crisis (Cartledge 2009: vinced criminals like Critias that the old
812). Most Athenians worried that they values did not matter, that they were free to
had somehow lost the favour of the gods, do as they pleased as long as they could get
that they had done something to enrage away with it.
them. Their empire was gone. Their navy had In other words, Socrates jurors may have
been destroyed. They had lived through the had his associates in mind as evidence that
Plague and multiple civil wars. It was a toxic his impiety was a dangerously corrupting
309

force in the minds of young men, not as evi- Xenophon reports that Socrates was charged
dence of anti-democratic political values. If by his accuser with influencing his students
so, Stone and others could be correct that to despise the established constitution. Stone
Alcibiades and Critias were relevant during quotes this passage from the Memorabilia as
the trial, and wrong that this was for politi- saying that Socrates taught his companions
cal reasons. to look down on the laws of Athens (Stone
1988: 29). If this testimony were reliable, and
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY if Stone had translated it accurately, it would
serve as solid evidence for his first thesis. But
The strongest evidence for Stones view would there are two problems here. The first is that
seem to be in the testimony from Aeschines Stones translation of Xenophon is mislead-
Rhetor and Xenophons Memorabilia, both ing, because the Memorabilia does not say
quoted above and both relied on in The Trial anything about teaching in this passage. The
of Socrates. Aeschines, as we saw, does not text actually says that Socrates epoiei (tended
mince words. He claims straightforwardly to make) his companions despise the estab-
that the Athenians executed Socrates because lished laws, and that his arguments epairein
he was Critias teacher. The passage dates (provoked) them to despise the established
from 345 and it is part of a speech that constitution and poiein (made) them vio-
Aeschines used to encourage an Athenian lent. As Irwin says, the difference between
jury to punish Demosthenes, who was an Xenophons verbs and Stones taught is not
opponent of democracy. Stone finds this pas- trivial (Irwin 1989: 193). Xenophons word
sage very revealing. The speech of Aeschines choice suggests an effect that Socrates alleg-
shows that half a century after the trial of edly had on his students (an effect that they
Socrates the popular view was that the old might have experienced simply as a conse-
sophist got what he deserved because he quence of learning to do philosophy); Stone
was the teacher of the hated Critias (Stone suggests that Socrates intended for his stu-
1988: 178). Stone may be right that this was dents to reach a particular conclusion thanks
the popular view 50 years after the trial, but to his teaching. This is a difference that
even if it was it does not follow that it was matters, because we want to know whether
the popular view in 399 (Burnyeat 1988: 12; Socrates accusers believed he had taught his
Irwin 1989: 186). Fifty years is a long time, students to adopt anti-democratic political
even by our own standards it certainly is ideology.
enough time for the facts to be distorted with As we try to answer the motivation ques-
respect to issues as controversial as these. As tion, we must be very careful with the limited
Burnyeat asks: how much accurate knowl- evidence available to us. And since the accuser
edge would a present-day jury have about a only talks about the effect that Socrates had
famous trial in the Thirties? (Burnyeat 1988: on his companions, Stone overstates his case,
13). How much accurate information do we and even begs the question, with his transla-
have (ready in our minds) about the assas- tion. It is possible that Socrates was critical
sination of JFK, or even the impeachment of of democracy in theory without opposing
Bill Clinton? the specific democracy in Athens, and cer-
The other passage that Stone relies on tainly without encouraging his companions
is the one from the Memorabilia in which to reject it or replace it with an oligarchy.
310

And it is possible that Socrates was feared or Xenophon to tell us the whole truth about
or despised as a threat to the state because Socrates is as dangerous as trusting Oliver
he corrupted, or was thought to have cor- Stone to tell us the whole truth about JFK.
rupted, his students with philosophy in gen- Because Polycrates speech has been lost, we
eral. He did not have to impart dangerous do not even know what it said, and we must
political doctrines to be a corruptor of the rely on references to it as we reconstruct its
youth. His examined life may have seemed contents.28 Nevertheless, some scholars have
bad enough. In the minds of many Athenians, followed Chroust in arguing that the charges
Socratic philosophy, which subjected every- made by Polycrates (i) were not based on the
thing to rational analysis, appeared mostly actual speeches of the trial, and (ii) were not
to make bad arguments seem like good ones, part of the official indictment and proceed-
and as a matter of fact may have caused its ings (Chroust 1957: 135).29
practitioners, including the young men in the There are two arguments for think-
Socratic circle, to reject the moral and politi- ing this. The first is that Isocrates Busiris,
cal values on which they had been raised, which contains the first known reference to
as Plato himself suggests is a real possibility Polycrates pamphlet, seems to imply that
when one starts to philosophize (R. I 539a Polycrates invented the idea that Socrates
c). Philosophy, after all, as an argumentative was condemned because of his relationship
technique and not only as a doctrinal system, with Alcibiades. He even denies (or seems to
often has the effect of waking people up and deny) that Socrates was Alcibiades teacher.
setting them free from what Bertrand Russell As he says in his Busiris, Polycrates gave
liked to call the tyranny of custom (Russell [Socrates] Alcibiades as a pupil in spite of
1999: 98). the fact that no one saw Alcibiades being
educated by Socrates. Irwin thinks Isocrates
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY: POLYCRATES criticism of Polycrates is carping and over-
stated. And that seems fair enough, especially
Some scholars have suggested that there is a in light of Xenophons Memorabilia and
second problem with relying on the passage Platos Symposium, Gorgias, Protagoras and
in Xenophons Memorabilia. They argue that Alcibiades I, all of which confirm a close ped-
it is almost certainly a response to Polycrates agogical relationship between Socrates and
Accusation of Socrates, a pamphlet written Alcibiades.30 However, Isocrates complaint
and published within a decade of Socrates would not make much sense, and in fact
trial and execution; it is not, as it seems, a would seem rather obtuse and out of touch,
response to the trial itself.27 If this is right, if Socrates relationship with Alcibiades had
we run the risk of letting a troublemaking, been widely regarded as a primary reason for
second-rate sophist determine our perception the prosecution of Socrates. It would not make
of what was said during the trial. Surely we any sense to deny the existence of a relation-
are better off trusting Plato and Xenophon. ship that was well known and widely thought
What should we think of this? The truth to be incriminating (Irwin 1989: 193).
is, nobody knows whether Polycrates pam- The second argument for thinking
phlet records a speech that Meletus, Anytus Xenophons accuser refers to Polycrates is
or anyone else actually delivered at the trial, that neither Plato nor Xenophon gives us
just as nobody knows whether trusting Plato reason to believe the trial had a political
311

motive or was politically charged. If politics 1989: 84). They favour (b): Polycrates simply
had been relevant to the trial, we would have made it up!
heard about it from one or both of them. There are two problems with this view,
Xenophon, of course, responds to Socrates however. First, there is a third possibility that
accuser in his Memorabilia, but he seems to Brickhouse and Smith do not consider, and it
make a meaningful distinction between the is compatible with Socrates having a peda-
accuser (katgoros) (Mem. 1.2.12, 26, 49, 51, gogical relationship with Alcibiades: Isocrates
56, 58) and the ones who wrote the indict- may mean that Alcibiades never learned any-
ment (grapsamenos) (1.2.64). As Brickhouse thing from Socrates because he was a failed
and Smith have argued, this could be a dis- student, just as many of todays Catholics can
tinction between Polycrates on the one hand, learn all about the sinfulness of contracep-
and Meletus, Anytus and Lycon on the other tion without making any meaningful changes
(see Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 174 n. in their lives. Isocrates could be saying sim-
85). The idea here is that all the instances ply that Alcibiades was Socrates student, but
in which Socrates responsibility for the youd never know it from his behaviour. The
acts of Critias and Alcibiades is reported or second problem is that it seems implausible
refuted by ancient authors are compatible on its face that Polycrates would have been
with its invention as an issue by Polycrates capable of creating a myth powerful enough
(Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 84). to pull the wool over everyones eyes, includ-
In other words, when Xenophon and ing Platos, regarding the nature of Socrates
Isocrates responded to Polycrates, they either relationships with Alcibiades and Critias.32
joined or started a debate that other writers, More importantly, it does not square well
such as Aeschines, carried on in the decades with Libanius Apology our primary source
and centuries that followed. Chroust (1957: for reconstructing Polycrates pamphlet
71) argues that Polycrates pamphlet was a which says Anytus made Socrates relation-
literary sensation that inspired a flurry of ship with Critias a material issue during the
Socratic apologies, all of which took issue trial (Apology of Socrates 136 ff.). It is pos-
with Polycrates rather than the events that sible that Libanius confused the details here,
occurred during the official trial. Brickhouse but it is also possible that he learned from
and Smith accept Chrousts view but go even Polycrates that Anytus made Socrates asso-
further. They suggest that all of the evidence ciates an issue during the trial. If that is right,
for a political motivation (Brickhouse and those who think that Polycrates invented the
Smith 2002: 7, emphasis added) must be political interpretation owe us an explana-
attributed to Polycrates, and that Polycrates tion of how we can know that Libanius was
may be credited with inventing the idea out mistaken or that Polycrates was not telling
of whole cloth.31 They quote the relevant the truth about Anytus.
passage from Isocrates Busiris, and they Some scholars have thought Polycrates
suggest that it can be interpreted to mean pamphlet cannot be, or even be like, any
either (a) that nobody at the trial had any of the prosecutions speeches, because too
evidence that Alcibiades had been Socrates much of its content has seemed to violate the
student, or (b) that no one until Polycrates terms of the Amnesty (Irwin 1989: 187 n. 5;
had ever perceived Alcibiades as having been Strycker and Slings 1994: 5). This position
a student of Socrates (Brickhouse and Smith is unconvincing, however, when we consider
312

it in light of more recent discussions of the we can accept the epideictic interpretation of
Amnestys legal significance (Brickhouse Polycrates, therefore, we need an account of
and Smith 1994a; Carawan 2002, 2004 and why the pamphlets thesis would have been
2006; Waterfield 2009). If it is true, as many counter-intuitive to its audience. After all, it
scholars now believe, that the prosecution is just as likely that the pamphlet was pro-
was free to slander Socrates as much as they vocative because the trial was controversial
wished, and constrained only in how they (D. L. 2.43) and it was the first time many
framed their charges in the indictment, we Athenians encountered the details of Anytus
have to reconsider the possibility that the prosecution speech.33
contents of Polycrates pamphlet accurately The biggest problem with assessing the
reflect what the prosecution said at the trial. significance and historical reliability of
This is much easier said than done, however, Polycrates pamphlet is that the original
because we cannot be certain about what document has been lost and so we must rely
Polycrates pamphlet said, and we cannot be on Xenophons Memorabilia and Libanius
certain about Polycrates rhetorical aims in Apology of Socrates, both of which seem
writing and publishing it. to contain responses to Polycrates, as we
Some scholars have thought Polycrates reconstruct its primary claims.34 On the
wrote his pamphlet as an epideixis, a rhe- basis of these two sources, Chroust (1957:
torical display intended to showcase his rhe- ch. 4, especially 99100) and Waterfield
torical skills, not to preserve historical truth (2009: 196200) suggest that the political
(Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 712). There is contents of Polycrates pamphlet looked
some commonsense plausibility to this idea, something like this: Anytus argued that
since we know the pamphlet was exception- Socrates caused his students to despise
ally provocative. The problem with this view, Athenian laws and disregard Athenian val-
however, is that Xenophon took the politi- ues; he was anti-family and undermined the
cal charges seriously enough to refute them authority of fathers, claiming to be a bet-
in his Memorabilia. Brickhouse and Smith ter friend than any parent; he quoted elitist
can answer that Xenophon responded to poets to support his anti-democratic politi-
Polycrates because he wrote such a provoca- cal teachings; he produced students who
tive epideixis. But it is not clear how the sub- opposed the democracy in principle and in
ject of Socrates politics could have served practice; he used linguistic sorcery to embar-
epideictic rhetorical purposes. If (i) we can rass his intellectual and political opponents
assume that Polycrates pamphlet was an in public; he was a sophist and he taught
epideixis, as Brickhouse and Smith (1989: his students to be clever with rhetoric as
72) do, and (ii) the point of an epideixis they sought their own interests; he criticized
was to argue persuasively for positions that sortition and popular election; he dispar-
most people would consider impossible to aged the demos; the fruits of his teaching
defend, as Gorgias does in Nothing Exists, are evident in the characters of Critias and
Polycrates chose extremely low-hanging Alcibiades; and he cannot be trusted when
fruit: given Socrates evil associates and he denies being a teacher because he clearly
publicly stated political views, it would not influenced the opinions of his pupils, and
have been difficult to defend the thesis that there is no more profound or more danger-
Socrates was politically subversive. Before ous kind of teaching than that.
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If, indeed, Socrates accusers could employ own political values.37 Xenophon himself
some incriminating evidence from Socrates was an oligarch. That alone is not sufficient
personal relationships, it seems plausible to reason for dismissing his representation of
suppose they would not hesitate to do so. It Socratic politics, but it certainly is a reason
is, therefore, hard to doubt that the names to be cautious. We face a different problem
Critias and Alcibiades, and the word [miso- as we look through Platos dialogues for evi-
demos] hater of the people was spoken at dence namely he seems to provide us with
the trial (Parker 1996b: 150). Socrates guilt more than one Socrates, and no key for dis-
by association was overwhelming: he taught tinguishing between them although he also
Alcibiades and Charmides, Critias and was no friend of democracy, and so for simi-
Euthydemus, Aristotle of Thorae (a member lar reasons (as well as others, such as the fact
of the Thirty) and Cleitophon (who helped that he was a philosopher with an ambitious
engineer the oligarchic coup in 411), as well literary, philosophical and political agenda
as many other lesser-known oligarchs who of his own) may be an unreliable reporter of
were involved in subversive activities dur- Socratic politics.
ing and after the war (Nails 2002: 18). In Proponents of the political interpretation
addition to having relationships with these rely on these sources, despite the many rea-
enemies of the democracy, Socrates may sons to be sceptical, because the Socrates of
have held and taught and been famous Platos early dialogues is not obviously an
for holding and teaching a variety of anti- enemy of democracy. In fact, some have even
democratic political doctrines. If so, and if it found him to be a sympathetic democrat.38
is true that Socrates accusers were not pro- Without the evidence from Xenophons writ-
hibited by the Amnesty from making poli- ings and Platos middle dialogues, in other
tics an issue as they made their case to the words, it is much harder to accept the idea
jury, the probability that they did not, and that Socrates accusers were motivated by
that they focused exclusively on the religious political grievances. And it is virtually impos-
charges expressed in the indictment, quickly sible to believe that Socrates was tried and
approaches zero.35 convicted because he was or was perceived
to be an oligarch or sympathetic to oligar-
chy.39 Some might think that the interpretive
method used by proponents of the politi-
THE MODERATE POLITICAL cal interpretation therefore begs the ques-
INTERPRETATION tion. But maybe that puts the cart before
the horse. Maybe we should count the fact
Political interpretations of the trial, whether of Socrates trial as evidence in favour of an
extreme or moderate, depend on evidence anti-democratic Socrates, and even evidence
derived from (i) Platos middle dialogues, the against the view that Platos dialogues fit
contents of which are widely, though not uni- cleanly into Socratic and Platonic categories.
versally, taken to be representative of Platos Who says Plato had to shift gears once and for
thought, not Socrates,36 and (ii) Xenophons all after writing the Gorgias? Why could he
Memorabilia and Apology, which are often not have used the Republic to blend Socratic
thought to be philosophically obtuse and, politics with his own ideas about psychology,
in some cases, obscured by Xenophons metaphysics and epistemology?40
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Due to limitations of space and the focus to benefit the citizen body by providing them
of this chapter, I cannot enter the debate with a high standard of living, freedom and
over the historical Socrates here. Instead, for concord, and the excellence is knowledge, the
simplicitys sake, and to make the best possi- possession of which enables a ruler to per-
ble case for the political interpretation, I will form his function well (Pl. Euthd. 292bc).
assume that Socrates political views show The true statesman is someone who knows
up wherever Platos and Xenophons repre- how to rule, not someone who can win an
sentations of those views converge.41 This election, get appointed by lot or take power
interpretive method produces a Socrates by force or by fraud (Xen. Mem. 3.9.10).
who opposed democracy and oligarchy In fact, without knowledge of the states
equally: he favoured rule by experts, not rule affairs regarding the budget, agricultural
by the wealthy or the masses, since neither capacity, war needs and available natural
wealth nor citizenship were sufficient con- resources, etc. a ruler can neither benefit
ditions for having the knowledge necessary his city nor do anything of credit to himself
for governing. It does not give us a Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3.67). Indeed, as long as one is
who would have favoured the Thirty over ignorant, it is much easier to cause oneself,
Athenian democracy. And it certainly does or those in ones care, lasting harm (Pl. Cri.
not give us a Socrates who would have sup- 47ab, Ap. 25a). Insofar as democracy con-
ported Critias or any of the other tyrants flicted with this necessary condition for good
who murdered Athenian democrats in the government (expertise held by ones rulers),
name of moral reform after the war. Socrates it was unjustifiable.44
was an intellectual and moral reformer, and Socrates thought a true statesman relates
he was a critic of democracy. But he was not to his people the way a doctor relates to
a political revolutionary who would have his patients, and that a citizen body relates
advocated the use of Critias bully-boys to a true ruler the way patients relate to a
(Stone 1988: 144) to terrorize the people of doctor: they see that their best interests are
Athens. served by obeying his commands, and they
This is another way of saying that the do not think they know more than he does
extreme political interpretation is unsupport- about such matters. They are happy to obey,
able. We can reconstruct Socratic politics to because they realize that he knows better.45
make sense of why the historical Socrates This is not the only undemocratic analogy in
was misperceived as an enemy of the democ- Socrates political thought. He also compared
racy, but there is no evidence that he was an the ruler of a state to a shepherd looking after
oligarch, sympathetic to oligarchy or inter- a flock of sheep (Pl. R. I 342ce; Xen. Mem.
ested in political revolution. This will become 1.2.32, 3.2). Successful Athenian democrats
clearer as we look more closely at the most like Pericles enjoyed king-like power over the
political Socrates we can construct on the Athenian demos because of their excellence
basis of the available evidence.42 What, then, and popularity (Thuc. 2.65.9), but none of
were Socrates political views? them actually held absolute power over the
If Socrates had a political philosophy, its city the way a shepherd does over his flock.
first principle was that experts should rule.43 Even Pericles, who held power in Athens for
Governing is a craft, and as such it has a spe- more than 30 years, was driven out of office,
cific function and excellence. The function is put on trial for embezzlement, convicted
315

and punished with a heavy fine when the Socrates may have even considered sorti-
Athenians were frustrated with his war pol- tion impious, because it was equivalent to
icy and looking for a scapegoat. Pericles had praying for knowledge that we can discover
many enemies and rivals in Athens. Many of by learning. We cannot know whether the
them were able to use the democratic checks consequences of our actions will be good or
and balances such as the rules governing bad (Xen. Mem.1.1.8) only the gods can
the reelection of generals and free speech in know this, and so we must pray to them for
the assembly and agora to stir up public assistance and success in our endeavours
resentment against Pericles, who in fact was (Xen. Mem. 1.1.9) but otherwise we can
most resistant to bribery and correct about make reliable judgements about matters
the war (Thuc. 2.65.2). Socrates no doubt within the control of human reason. For
objected to these safeguards for the same rea- example, we can know without consulting
sons he objected to the lottery: they put too the gods that we are better off with a cap-
much power in this case the power to influ- tain who has knowledge of navigation than
ence policy in the hands of people who did we would be with one who lacks it, and that
not know what was best for them personally it is better to assess quantity by weighing,
or for the city as a whole.46 measuring and counting than by prophecy or
Socrates was also famous for arguing any other non-rational means. According to
against sortition, the selection of decision Xenophon, Socrates thought that those who
makers by lottery, which was common prac- asked such questions of the gods were acting
tice in the Athenian democracy. He thought impiously. For, he said, what the gods have
it made more sense to directly appoint rulers given us to know by learning, we should
who had the relevant expertise, since the lot- learn; but what is unclear to humans, we
tery was too unlikely to make the right selec- should attempt to find out from the gods by
tions (Xen. Mem. 1.2.9, 3.1.4; Arist. Rhet. means of prophecy (Mem. 1.1.9). The lot-
1393b). Anyone can be appointed by lot, but tery might appear to be pious, because it puts
most people arent fit to govern because they the selection of rulers in the gods hands (Pl.
are ignorant (Pl. Ap. 25b, Cri. 47cd, Hp. Lg. 757b), but Socrates considered it impious
Ma. 284e, La. 184e; Xen. Mem. 3.7.57). because it requires abandoning the capacity
Expecting sortition reliably to select quali- with which the gods endowed us to make
fied rulers, therefore, is like expecting it reli- leadership decisions for ourselves.
ably to select the best athletes or doctors Meetings of the assembly were not much
from among the masses (Arist., Rhet. 1393b; better, because the masses are ignorant (Pl.
Pl. Grg. 455bc and Prt. 319bd). Why not Ap. 25b, Cri. 47cd, Hp. Ma. 284e, La.
just identify the ones who really have the 184e; Xen. Mem. 3.7.57) and corrupt or
relevant capacities and select them on that misguided, especially in large gatherings
basis? If merit-based selections make sense (Pl. Ap. 29d, 31c32a, Cri. 48c and 49cd,
in the other crafts, Socrates argued, such as R. I 492bc), where orators use flattery to
in athletics or medicine or navigation, surely trick them into believing that what is good
they make sense in politics, where the craft for the orators (or those who pay the ora-
is more challenging and the consequences of tors) is good for the city (Pl. Grg. 502e).47
making a mistake are so much more costly Against this kind of sophisticated trickery,
(Xen. Mem. 1.2.9). the demos did not stand a chance, Socrates
316

thought, because they do not know the dif- of them achieved the revaluation of Athenian
ference between rhetoric and dialectic (Pl. values that Socrates considered central to his
Grg. 471e472d). Most of them had been own god-appointed mission (Pl. Ap. 29e
impaired by a life devoted to manual labour 30b), which he identified with the true craft
and consequently lacked the self-knowledge of politics (Pl. Grg. 521d).
and other virtues necessary for good judge- All of these arguments and analogies
ment (Pl. Alc. I 131ab; Xen. Oec. 4.2.3, imply that Socrates was, at a minimum, a
6.49).48 They needed benevolent statesmen fierce critic of democracy. Having compared
to use persuasion for the sake of redirect- the demos to subhuman sheep in need of a
ing the citys appetites and making its citi- shepherd a ruler so different from them, in
zens better (Pl. Grg. 517b, Ap. 29d30b). cognitive capacity and self-knowledge, that
But instead, the democracy proved most he can only be represented metaphorically
effective at serving the city by satisfying its by a different species Socrates could hardly
appetites and thereby making it worse (Pl. have been surprised when he we was thought
Grg. 517bc). to believe and teach anti-democratic ideas.
It is no wonder, then, that Socrates admired But do we have any evidence that he was
the Spartan and Cretan governments (Pl. Cri. an oligarch?51 Some have thought it reveal-
52e) for their hierarchy and structure. Both ing that Socrates stayed in Athens during the
states enjoyed political harmony because rule of the Thirty while the democrats went
every Spartan and Cretan knew his proper into exile.
place and function in his city, whereas Athens
suffered from self-undermining disharmony Socrates did not like his accuser,
thanks to its aimless freedoms, which served Anytus leave the city and join the exiles
only to make Athenians wilder rather than who were already planning the over-
more self-controlled (Pl. Grg. 516c, 513e).49 throw of the dictators. He would have
been a welcome and inspiring recruit. He
If the objective of the statesman is to care for
simply went home. Was that fulfilling
the city and make the citizens as good as pos-
his civic duty against injustice? Or was
sible, as Socrates believed (Pl. Grg. 515cd), he merely avoiding personal complicity
then Pericles was not good at politics (Pl. and, as he expressed it, saving his soul?
Grg. 516d), and neither were the other (Stone 1988: 114)52
political heroes whom the masses adored for
making them wealthy and for bringing glory Is this evidence, as some have argued, that
and power to the city: Themistocles, Cimon Socrates was part of a conspiracy against the
and Miltiades. These men left the polis and democratic constitution of Athens (Winspear
its people more disordered than they found and Silverberg 1939: 84) and trying to replace
them, filling the city with harbors and dock- the democracy with the rule of an aristocratic
yards, walls, and tribute payments and such oligarchic elite (Wood and Wood 1978: 97)?
trash as that, but did so without justice and Not in its own right. As Irwin points out,
self-control (Pl. Grg. 519a). And so, by unless we somehow knew that Athens was
Socratic political standards, the heroes of deserted by everyone except a hard core of
the masses were failed statesmen: we do not collaborators with the Thirty, we could not
know any man who has proved to be good use Socrates failure to leave as a reason for
at politics in this city (Pl. Grg. 517a).50 None special animosity against him, or as reason
317

for thinking he favored the Thirty and did not with men like Alcibiades whose rise to
prefer democracy (Irwin 1989: 199).53 power, let us recall, was fuelled by his close
Socrates argued that, in order for the aims association with the most democratic of fac-
of politics truly to be served, statesmen must tions in Athens, namely those associated with
be knowledgeable, not wealthy and privileged Pericles and Critias, which we can explain
by birth the defining characteristics of oli- in terms of Socrates moral mission in Athens
garchic leaders in the ancient world. Because (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 1703), we do
the wealthy were more likely to acquire the not have any positive evidence that he iden-
knowledge necessary for ruling, thanks to the tified with anti-democratic politicians and
leisure their wealth afforded them, Socrates political values: there is not a single passage
was more inclined toward the aristocratic in Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle or Aristophanes
youth than he was toward anyone else in in which Socrates praises oligarchy or exist-
his search for future statesmen.54 Moreover, ing oligarchic politicians. He never couples
because he believed knowledge was possessed his criticisms of democracy with favourable
by a very select few, if at all, his own politi- assessments of oligarchy, whether in principle
cal values more closely resembled oligarchy or in practice (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a:
(Waterfield 2009: 181), which distributed 160). He singles out specific democrats for
power selectively, than democracy, which criticism, but he never singles out specific
distributed power equally. But the existing oligarchs for praise. Oligarchs are never said
oligarchies at the time certainly would not to have more knowledge or virtue, or to be
have appealed to him (Brickhouse and Smith better educators of their sons, and Socrates
1994a: 166). They allocated power no more never claims that Athens would have been
rationally than democracies, since wealth, better off if the oligarchs had been in power
like citizenship, is not a sufficient condi- instead of Pericles. Those scholars who have
tion for having political expertise. Socrates identified Socrates with the oligarchic faction
was not interested in wealth, high birth or in Athens seem to assume that Socrates was
amoral political oratory. His ideal was a gov- either a democrat or an oligarch, since those
ernment by experts who had theoretical and were the actual options in Athens. But this
practical knowledge of the good (Waterfield is a false dichotomy (Brickhouse and Smith
2009: 181). Existing democracies and oligar- 1994a: 1601). Socrates was an idealist, not
chies were equally offensive to these political a democrat or an oligarch, and as such he was
values, because neither one valued political mostly critical of all existing governments.
expertise and both failed to achieve the aims He was a devoted servant of the democ-
of true statesmanship, which were to make racy and its laws. In Platos Crito Socrates
the city and its inhabitants as good as pos- says it is impious to use violence against the
sible. Socrates equal dissatisfaction with state, just as it is impious for a child to use
oligarchy and democracy is probably clear- violence against a parent (Cri. 51bc). In
est in his willingness to criticize past political Platos Apology, Socrates proudly tells his
leaders from both factions (Brickhouse and jury that he disobeyed the democracy and
Smith 1994a: 161). the Thirty in the name of justice (Ap. 32ae).
There is an additional problem with think- And in both cases, he acted as he did because
ing that Socrates was an oligarch. Apart from he refused to do anything unjust or impious
his personal and pedagogical relationships (Ap. 32d). He fought for the democracy at
318

Potidaea (alongside Alcibiades), Amphipolis Athenian democracy. It certainly is possible

and Delium (Ap. 28e) and he was willing that Socrates was well known for expressing
to die in prison for the sake of preserving and teaching these ideas. If so, it is easy to
the democratic laws of Athens. When the imagine how Socrates might have been mis-
laws say that Socrates life the overwhelm- perceived as a teacher who taught all of his
ing majority of which he spent inside the students, including monsters like Critias and
city walls, leaving only to fulfil his military Charmides, to despise and replace the demo-
duties, showing little or no interest in other cratic constitution in Athens.
cities or other laws was itself evidence of Is this enough to establish the truth of
his satisfaction with Athens, he agrees that the moderate political interpretation of the
what they have said is true (Cri. 52bd). trial? Probably not. We cannot rule it out,
These are not the ideas or the actions that we but if it is possible, as other scholars believe,
would expect from someone who was willing to account for the trial without appealing
to replace the democracy with an oligarchy to political factors, which do not show up
by means of a violent revolution (Brickhouse in our most important sources on the trial
and Smith 1994a: 163). If Socrates was an Platos and Xenophons accounts of Socrates
oligarch who advocated violence against defense speech the political interpretation
the democracy and its supporters, Plato has is unnecessary.
thoroughly deceived us.
The point of this reconstruction of Socratic
politics is not to answer the vexed question
of what the historical Socrates believed about THE RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION
politics. We will never answer that question
once and for all. Instead, my aim was to see As we have seen, many scholars have argued
what the most political Socrates would have that the corruption charge was politically
believed and then reflect on how, if at all, loaded. They have argued that the Athenians
that affects our assessment of the motivation believed Socrates was at least sympathetic to
question. oligarchy and that he shared the amoral and
There simply is no evidence for the revolutionary conclusions that some of his
extreme political interpretation of the trial: students reached by practicing Socratic phi-
Socrates was not an oligarch, and he was losophy. But if we empathize with Socrates
not sympathetic to oligarchy; he did not countrymen, remembering their time and
favour revolution, and he would not have place, it seems just as likely that the corruption
favoured replacing the Athenian democracy charge was closely related to the complaint
with an oligarchy, let alone a murderous tyr- against his impiety: Socrates could have been
anny. He was fiercely critical of democracy, considered a corruptor of the youth because
however, because he (i) rejected the notion his philosophical life had the effect of under-
of mass wisdom, (ii) condemned the results mining traditional beliefs in the gods, as well
and practices of mass deliberation, (iii) could as traditional beliefs about the value of living
not accept sortition as a means for selecting a just life. Athenians could have considered
political officers and (iv) felt that the aims Socrates a threat to the democracy without
of true statesmanship were incompatible attributing any positive political beliefs to
with the reckless and aimless freedoms of him. If so, it was his philosophical life, not
319

his political ideology, that they could not doing anything bad, and in Platos Euthyphro
tolerate. Plato went out of his way to distin- (6a) Socrates says he cannot believe the tra-
guish the Socratic philosophical life from the ditional myths about the gods, which show
trickery of sophistic oratory and eristic (Pl. them lying, committing adultery, murdering,
Grg. 457cd, Men. 75cd, Euthd. 306ad), castrating their fathers, etc.
but his distinctions were undoubtedly lost Some scholars have thought that this
on most uneducated Athenians, just as most ethical transformation of the gods is the
Americans could never distinguish between, best way to understand the formal charges
say, Paul Krugman and Sean Hannity. Maybe (Connor 1991: 56; Vlastos 1991: 166).
Stone and others are right that the corrup- However, this position has been decisively
tion charge was politically loaded. It is pos- rejected (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 182
sible. But, on the basis of the testimony from 7): numerous thinkers in the ancient world
Xenophon and Aeschines alone, we lack revised the myths and rationalized belief in
sufficient evidence for rejecting the simplest the gods, and there is no ancient evidence that
explanation of Socrates indictment, which is these were the grounds on which Socrates
that the corruption charge was rooted in the enemies found him impious (Brickhouse and
charge of impiety. Smith 1994a: 182). Aristophanes represents
Socrates was charged with (i) failing to Socrates as a natural philosopher, and thus
believe in the citys gods, (ii) introducing new as an atheist by implication, not as a reli-
divinities and (iii) corrupting the youth (Pl. gious reformer. The same is true of Socrates
Ap. 24bc; Xen. Mem. 1.1.1; D. L. 2.40). first accusers in Platos Apology, as well as
Proponents of the religious interpretation his later accusers who brought the formal
argue that these charges, whether fair or not, charges against him. Not even Polycrates
are enough to explain Socrates trial and con- found fault with Socrates moral purification
demnation. Are they? of the gods (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a:
The topic of Socratic theology is even 183). It is equally important to point out
more complicated than the topic of his politi- that Socrates was not the only thinker to
cal beliefs, and it is the focus of a separate revise the traditional myths. He had plenty
chapter in this volume. Instead of providing of company on that score: Xenophanes,
a complete reconstruction of Socratic the- Heraclitus, Solon, Pericles, Pindar, Euripides
ology, then, I intend to make a case for the and Prodicus each of these men engaged
religious interpretation by discussing some in rational revisions of traditional religious
but not all of Socrates religious beliefs and beliefs, and none of them was tried for impi-
practices, namely those features of Socratic ety (Waterfield 2009: 40). Indeed, with these
theology that are relevant to the motivation men in mind, it is difficult to support the
question. claim that Socrates was prosecuted for insist-
The first principle of Socrates religious ing that the gods are good and wise, respon-
beliefs is that the gods are completely wise sible for everything good that befalls humans
(Pl. Ap. 23a; Xen. Mem. 1.1.19) and given (Pl. Euthphr. 15a), and not at all responsible
Socrates identification of virtue with wis- for their suffering of evils (Pl. R. I 379b).
dom completely good. In Platos Republic It is true, as Burnyeat points out, that
(379c) Socrates argues that the essential Socrates never addresses the charge that he
goodness of the god makes him incapable of failed to believe in the citys gods. Yet that
320

was the central charge of the indictment, the Athena, Zeus, Heracles, Ares and Theseus
part on which the rest depends (Burnyeat were raised to sudden prominence because
2002: 136). One explanation for Socrates they were held responsible for the Athenian
silence on this matter is that his moral puri- victory over the Persians. In addition to these
fication of the gods made it impossible for innovations, many foreign gods were intro-
him honestly to say that, yes, he did believe duced to the city, sometimes under the super-
in the citys gods. That would mean believing vision of the city and sometimes not: Pan (an
that Apollo brought plague to the city, that Arcadian deity), Asclepius (the Epidaurian
Poseidon caused earthquakes, etc. But he did god of healing), Bendis (a Thracian god-
not believe these things, and so he faced a dess) and Sabazius and Cybele (both from
genuine dilemma: (i) he could not say that the Near East) all of these innovations
he believed in the citys gods without tell- were tolerated in Athens as part and parcel
ing the whole truth (namely that he believed of life in a cosmopolitan city. Even instances
in a morally purified version of them), but of recognized impiety rarely moved the city
there was no time for that during his short to action (Parker 1996b: 152). What had
trial. And (ii) he could not lie and say that he Socrates done that was uniquely criminal?
did believe in the citys gods without violat- Platos character Euthyphro thought
ing his own commitment to only speak the Socrates was on trial because of his pri-
truth (Pl. Ap. 18a, 20d, 22b, 28a, 32a, 33c). vate divine sign (Euthphr. 3b), his claim to
Instead, he traps Meletus in a contradiction direct contact with the divine, not because
(Pl. Ap. 27a), getting him to claim both that of his ethically purified conception of the
Socrates believes in gods and that he does gods.55 Plato and Xenophon agree on this
not. This makes Meletus look bad, but it point. Both suggest that Socrates divine sign
does not answer the question put before the accounts for the charge of religious innova-
jury: whether Socrates is an atheist or a spir- tion (Pl. Ap. 31c, Euthphr. 3b; Xen. Mem.
itual innovator. Socrates dialectical abuse 1.1.2, Ap. 12). In Platos Apology, Socrates
of Meletus leaves the jury with that choice, says Meletus ridiculed it in his deposition,
and in either case he would be guilty of not and he suggests that it is something his jurors
believing in the citys gods. are familiar with: they have heard him cite
But was it a crime in Athens not to believe it as a reason for not engaging in politics on
in the citys gods? Was it a crime to introduce many occasions (Ap. 31c). In Xenophons
new gods? Waterfield (2009: 436) makes Apology, Socrates asks rhetorically how his
the case that the first charge is strange since divine sign, the voice of a god that tells him
the city was home to thousands of cults, what it is necessary to do (Ap. 12), consti-
more than any individual could follow, and tutes the introduction of new gods. Having
the second charge is just as strange because (i) ruled out the possibility that Socrates was
the introduction of new gods was common on trial for his unconventional conception
practice, and in many cases sanctioned by the of the divine as absolutely good and wise,
state (see also Parker 1996a: ch. 9). There was (ii) rejected the political interpretation and
no specific set of gods that every Athenian (iii) finding a unified voice between Plato
was required to recognize or worship, and and Xenophon on the motivation ques-
the introduction of new cults into Athens tion, Brickhouse and Smith conclude that
during the fifth century was very common: Euthyphro is right: Socrates was on trial
321

because his prosecutors and his jurors con- from Salamis (Pl. Ap. 32c). As Kraut (2000:
sidered his divine sign an unacceptable form 16) asks, why was Socrates divine sign not
of religious innovation, regardless of what just brushed off as a harmless eccentricity?
Socrates might have thought about it. Where This is the lacuna in the religious interpreta-
the ancients agree, we see no reason not to tion that points us back in the direction of
believe them (Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: politics. As Parker observes, it may be that
183; see also Kraut 2000: 15; Reeve 1989: an accusation of impiety was almost never
97107; Waterfield 2009: 46). brought before an Athenian court without
Still, questions linger here. Xenophon political anxiety or hatred being present in
and Plato mention the divine sign as the the background (Parker 1996b: 147).
issue that got Socrates in trouble with his Xenophon has Socrates describe his divine
countrymen, but neither answers the ques- sign as though it is no different from other
tion that Xenophon has Socrates ask in his forms of divination (Ap. 12), and Plato has
version of the defense speech: how did the him describe it in equally harmless terms: it
Athenians turn a form of divination into an opposed him whenever he was about to do
instance of religious innovation and grounds something wrong (Ap. 40a and 40c). This
for prosecution? Atheism was common- seems innocuous enough, but there were still
place in ancient Greece familiar enough, problems with having such a friendly private
in fact, that it was a regular feature of deity: it seemed to privilege Socrates (and by
popular culture. Aristophanes jokes in his extension his friends and followers) and to
Thesmophoriazusae (4501) that Euripides exclude others in a most undemocratic fash-
was so effective at making the case for athe- ion (Waterfield 2009: 46).56 A character in
ism, via his characters, that a garland seller Aristophanes Frogs (88891) condemns the
went out of business when people no longer gods of the scientists as kaina daimonia,
wanted to buy her garlands for religious cer- newfangled spiritual beings, the same words
emonies. Moreover, there was no religious used in the charges brought against Socrates,
uniformity across the thousands of cults in and complains that they are private and inac-
Athens, and the city regularly introduced cessible to the people of Athens.57
new gods, often times from distant cities The Athenians were democratic through
and cultures. Why would the Athenians care and through, and their religion was part and
if an elderly man claimed to be able to talk parcel of their lives as citizens of a democ-
directly to the gods? What made it a matter racy.58 There was nothing about Socrates
of enough significance to the city to warrant well-known divine sign that was problem-
a trial and, in the end, the death penalty? atic or illegal in principle, but it gave his
Yes, it was an unprecedented phenom- prosecutors rhetorical leverage. They could
enon, but surely its novelty was not enough use it to stir up common prejudices against
to make people feel threatened again, they natural philosophers and political grievances
welcomed new and foreign gods into the city held against enemies of the democracy. There
regularly. Furthermore, it is not as if Socrates was something subversive about Socrates
did radical things on account of its guidance private deity, something undemocratic, if not
in fact, it may have even had some part in his anti-democratic about it (Cartledge 2009:
refusal to obey the Thirty when they ordered 88). Meletus, Anytus and Lycon could have
him to take part in the execution of Leon used it to position Socrates as an outsider
322

who felt he was free from, and stood above, way of life if (i) the entire city were to live
the religious norms of Athens, all of which as Socrates did and (ii) replace their religious
were governed and carefully protected by sacrifices, festivals and processions with
the Assembly (Kraut 2000: 16). It allowed moral philosophy, what would they think?
his accusers to argue that he was the fol- I submit that our jurors are bound in good
lower of a god not recognized by the state, conscience to say to themselves: Socrates has
and this would have found traction with a religion, but it is not ours. This is not the
his jury because it made him seem undemo- religion of Athenians (Burnyeat 2002: 138).60
cratic. Plato has Euthyphro superciliously At this point we have to ask, do these argu-
sympathize with Socrates: Such things [his ments sound like strictly religious considera-
divine sign] are easily misrepresented to the tions? Does the impiety charge really matter
masses (Waterfield 2009: 47). outside of a social and political context?
Socrates loyalty to his divine sign was,
in a sense, a rejection of the city and espe-
cially its traditions. It suggested that he felt
superior to everyone, including the citys THE MIXED MOTIVATIONS THEORY
religious institutions, and that he had privi-
leged access to what the gods wanted from Some of the most recent scholarship on the
and for Athens. When we look at the divine trial of Socrates has argued for a mixture of
sign in this light, it no longer seems like a religious and political elements in accounting
harmless eccentricity; it sounds more like a for the trial (hereafter the mixed motivation
claim to special authority (Kraut 2000: 17). theory).61 The crux of these arguments is
It begins to look like the rejection of tradi- that, in Socrates Athens, religion and politics
tional religious institutions and the claim of were so interrelated and inseparable in the
superiority by one individual over the politi- lives of most Athenians that it is anachronis-
cal decisions of the whole city . . . it is not tic and misleading to distinguish a political
the sign itself that alarmed Athenians, but the from a religious charge (Cartledge 2009:
disloyalty and antitraditionalism implied by 77).62 On this view, we have already missed
it (Kraut 2000: 17).59 the point if we ask, as many scholars have,
This may be why Socrates defends himself whether political motivations trumped reli-
in terms of his service to the city. He felt he gious concerns (or vice-versa) in the minds
needed to justify a broader pattern of activi- of Socrates accusers and jurors. In Athens,
ties that appeared hubristic, undemocratic impiety was always political, because it
and even subversive. But in defending him- always ran the risk of endangering the city as
self by justifying his philosophical life as a a whole (Strauss 1987: 95; see also Cartledge
new form of piety, a kind of service to the 2009: 79). Religion was not a separate
god in which he is a gadfly god-sent to sting sphere in society. If Socrates rejects the citys
the Athenians into caring about virtue above religion, he attacks the city. Conversely, if he
all else (Burnyeat 2002: 137), Socrates rein- says the city has got its public and private life
forces his position as an outsider and as a all wrong, he attacks its religion; for its life
threat to the status quo. If Socrates jurors and its religion are inseparable (Burnyeat
were to ask themselves what would be left 2002: 138). Atheism, or any other form of
of their religion and the traditional Athenian impiety, was a public concern because both
323

had the potential to anger the gods and turn but without sufficient evidence that Socrates
them against the city (Waterfield 2009: 164). was condemned because he was perceived as
Waterfields point is very important because a crypto-oligarch or Spartan sympathizer.
it helps appreciate that, for the Athenians, Perception alone, and in this case a mis-
piety and impiety were matters of the deepest perception, was sufficient to turn Athenian
existential significance an impious citizen democrats against Socrates (Vlastos 1983:
could endanger the entire city. 495516). Still other scholars have argued
Other scholars, therefore, have been wrong that, regardless of Socrates political beliefs
to think that the impiety charge was unre- and associations, the most plausible con-
lated to politics,63 and to ask why Socrates clusion from our available evidence is that
was charged with a religious crime, rather Socrates trial had no political dimension
than a political crime (Brickhouse and Smith (Irwin 2005: 142; cf. Brickhouse and Smith
2002: 8). Athenian society was so thoroughly 1994a: 1735, 1989: 6987). Meletus and
permeated and cemented by religious sen- his supporters meant what they said when
sibilities that a catastrophe like the loss to they charged Socrates with impiety, and they
Sparta, or a public health crisis as devastat- had impiety in mind when they accused him
ing as the Great Plague of 430, which killed of corrupting the young men of Athens.
one-third of the Athenian population, could The mixed motivations theory avoids
only be understood as a sign of the gods dis- this hornets nest of irresolvable disagree-
approval of Athens (Waterfield 2009: 202). ments by grounding the political motiva-
From the perspective of the average Athenian, tions for Socrates trial in Athenian religious
the outcome of the war, like the social, eco- beliefs. Socrates was not the only atheist in
nomic, ideological and health crises that pre- Athens, but he was the only atheist who had
ceded it, meant the gods were punishing the become a figurehead and symbol of Athenian
city. Even Pericles, who famously rationalized decline. He was not an oligarch, but because
religious beliefs, referred to the Great Plague of his connections to the oligarchic circles in
as daimonion (Thuc. 2.64.3), as heaven-sent Athens, he had been living on borrowed time
or supernatural (Cartledge 2009: 82). In the since the Thirtys defeat in 403 (Waterfield
extraordinarily awe-ful circumstances of 2009: 193). As a representative of all that
399, ordinary pious Athenians were prac- had gone wrong in Athens, Socrates was no
tically bound to ask themselves whether longer welcome in a city still reeling from the
the gods had deserted Athens or had the humiliation of what Thucydides called her
Athenians deserted the gods? (Cartledge moment of total destruction. She had been
2009: 83). defeated in every respect . . . army, navy, and
The mixed motivation theory has sev- everything else was lost (Thuc. 7.87). In
eral advantages over the standard positions. the wake of so much devastation, Athenian
Some scholars have argued implausibly that religious beliefs produced a political impera-
Socrates was condemned because he was an tive to make amends with the gods by clean-
oligarch or had oligarchic sympathies and ing house, and Socrates was the poison that
favoured overthrowing the Athenian democ- needed to be purged.
racy (Stone 1988). This position is not sup- The mixed motivations theory has the
portable for several reasons, as we have seen. added advantage of being compatible with
Other scholars have suggested more plausibly (i) the formal charges taken at face value
324

(rather than as a cover for hidden political evidence. We do not know what the historical
grievances), and (ii) Platos account of why Socrates believed about religion or politics,65
Socrates was on trial (Brickhouse and Smith and we have even less evidence about the
1994a: 187). As Socrates says in the Apology beliefs and motivations of Socrates accusers
(20c ff.), he infuriated the wrong people with and jurors. We certainly do not know enough
his gadfly questioning, and this made him to attribute a single mindset to all of them
both unpopular and open to the misrepre- in fact, it is not clear what that sort of evi-
sentation that he was sophist who made the dence could be: is it ever possible to recover
weaker argument the stronger, and an athe- the psychological states of a jury or prosecu-
ist who did not believe in any gods, let alone tion team on any evidence? Perhaps there is
the gods of the city. Over time these preju- something fundamentally misguided about
dices against Socrates became embedded the way the standard positions account for
in Athenian commonsense, which enabled Socrates trial.
Socrates accusers to craft their indictment Moreover, we have a source problem and
broadly, so as to trigger as many Athenian so do not know what Socrates said in his
prejudices as possible while also insulating defense speech (or even whether he spoke
itself from Socratic refutation. Given the at all!), or what his prosecutors said in their
troubled times, and the brevity of the trial, speeches. It is tempting to trust Plato and
which prevented Socrates from adequately Xenophon more than other sources, but
defending himself, these prejudices were (i) we do not know where to distinguish
easy to develop into the idea that Socrates between fact and fiction in their writings,
was a danger to the city. For some jurors, and (ii) we have to work awfully hard on
religious considerations probably weighed the basis of very weak evidence to limit our-
most heavily; for others, political grievances selves to Xenophons Apology, where politics
were probably more pressing; still others are not mentioned, and not his Memorabilia,
may have simply wanted revenge for hav- where they are a central issue. Without reli-
ing been embarrassed in public the broadly able evidence about these matters we cannot
construed indictment was able to exploit all say with certainty what Socrates believed,
of these resentments.64 What someone like how he was perceived or what was or was
Cartledge (2009) or Waterfield (2009) can not said during his trial. Even Xenophon
add to this story is an account of the cultural confesses that he often wondered what the
factors that helped warrant a trial in 399. arguments could have been by which the
prosecutors persuaded the Athenians that
Socrates was worthy of death as far as the
city was concerned (Mem. 1.1.1). If he could
CONCLUSIONS not figure it out, it is not clear how we can,
especially when he is a primary source!
When we weigh our evidence and assess the The second problem with the stand-
quality of the arguments for the various posi- ard positions is that neither one of them is
tions in this debate, it is clear that the mixed necessary and sufficient for answering the
motivation theory is the most reasonable. motivation question. The moderate politi-
There are several problems with the standard cal interpretation, while impossible to rule
positions. The first is a matter of insufficient out, is not necessary, since we can account
325

for the trial without appealing to a political understood in terms of Socrates divine sign,
subtext involving Socrates political ideology. as both Plato and Xenophon understood it,
Even if we knew for certain that the maxi- only carries weight when it is connected to
mally political Socrates that I reconstruct the citys democratic politics: it was a private
above were a correct representation of the deity and so unavailable to other Athenians
historical Socrates, it still would not follow to worship, and it positioned Socrates as an
that he was on trial for political reasons. His extreme outsider who questioned the author-
accusers and his jurors might have found his ity of traditional religious institutions and
philosophical life in general to be intoler- thus the authority of the Assembly.
able because it, and not any of his particular The mixed motivations theory has several
beliefs, was the real corrupting influence on advantages over these positions: (i) it can
the youth. Anytus and Meletus could have float free from the unanswerable questions
argued that philosophical analysis caused about the historical Socrates, since it does
young Athenians to question the value of not depend on any particular views about
Athenian values, and so freed them in a Socrates politics or religion; (ii) it does not
way that was dangerous and even harmful depend on any of our inconsistent sources,
to the state. They could have had Alcibiades and it does not require us to speculate about
and Critias in mind as evidence of Socrates whether Xenophon responded to Polycrates
social toxicity without attributing any politi- or the speeches actually delivered at Socrates
cal beliefs to him. trial; (iii) it can accept the sincerity of the
The religious interpretation is not much charges that were brought against Socrates,
stronger, because it is not sufficient for because it is sensitive to their unspoken but
answering the motivation question, and it (to Athenians) obvious political significance;
rests on an anachronistic assumption about and (iv) it is compatible with much more
the separability of religion and politics in the probable hypotheses about what Socrates
civic life of ancient Athenians. The crucial accusers said during their speeches, given
point here is that apart from political con- the freedom to slander and engage in char-
cerns about the welfare of the city, the impi- acter assassination afforded by the Amnesty,
ety charge would not have mattered to the which restricted what they could put in their
city the Athenians would not have gone out indictment but not what they could say as
of their way to execute an elderly man if his they spoke to the jury.
impiety was not a matter of social and politi- The mixed motivations theory depends
cal concern. Athens was full of atheists and on two things: the formal charges and some
sceptics, many of whom (including Pericles background knowledge about the insepa-
and Euripides) rationalized traditional reli- rability of politics and religion in ancient
gious beliefs and/or revised traditional myths; Athens. These two things cannot give us
there was no law requiring every Athenian to answers to questions we have a natural pro-
believe in one god or set of gods or to fol- pensity to ask, such as questions about what
low one cult or to perform certain sacrifices; Socrates did and did not believe, how he was
religious innovation was something the city and was not perceived, etc. But perhaps that
sponsored; and there was nothing crimi- is for the best, since those questions only
nal or impious in principle about Socrates lead to irresolvable disagreements. Instead
divine sign. In fact, the impiety charge, of leading us further down that path, the
326

mixed motivations theory points us in a invites us to reverse this train of thought so

new direction, and it is a promising one: we that we reason from facts about the trial
should focus primarily on reconstructing to conclusions about our sources, and then
the political culture of Socrates trial, not back again. In the end, we are still left with
Socrates irrecoverable beliefs, which, after lacunae in our understanding of what hap-
all, probably were not known or under- pened to Socrates in 399. But perhaps we
stood by anyone on his jury, and may not can make progress in putting together a
have been reported by Xenophon or Plato. more complete picture of who Socrates was
When we study the trial and think about by looking more closely at his trial as his
the motivation question we typically reason truest available reflection.
from facts about our sources to conclusions
about the trial. The mixed motivation theory Mark Ralkowski
327

NOTES
CHAPTER 1 he was accurately reporting the views of the

historical person in question. By this criterion,
*
I am extremely grateful to the editors for the for instance, he concluded that the theory of
invitation to write this chapter and especially recollection found in Platos Phd. was truly
to Nick Smith for working with me to improve Socratic, a view with which few would agree
the final sections. I also thank Louis-Andr nowadays.
5
Dorion for comments both critical and encour- Witness how often he figured in the comic
aging on the final draft, and Barbara Taverna playwrights, from the late 430s up until his
for help with some tortuous German. death. Apart from incidental references, he
1
At Phd. 60cd, Plato has Socrates whiling was one of the chief protagonists in two
away some time in prison, shortly before his plays produced in 423 alone: Aristophanes
death, by turning some of Aesops fables into Clouds and Ameipsias Connus. The relevant
verse, and writing a hymn to Apollo. But comic fragments constitute SSR I A. He was
nothing remains of these verses, if they are not also famous enough to earn a mention by an
fictional in the first place. admired contemporary writer, Ion of Chios (fr.
2
The temptation is increased by Platos Socrates 9 Jacoby).
6
voicing such doubts at Phdr. 274e275b. SSR IIVI lists about seventy Socratics,
3
It will dog your steps, barking at you, forc- including these writers. Clay 1994 and K.
ing you to turn and face it in self-defense Dring 2011 survey their literary activity.
7
(Vlastos 1991: 45). It is so fundamental that The authenticity of almost all of them was
in what follows I shall ignore its ramifica- already being questioned in the second century
tions, and shall refer plentifully to others BCE by Panaetius of Rhodes (fr. 16 van
work, rather than turning a short chapter Straaten = Diogenes Laertius 2.64).
8
into a book-length study by going into all the On Polycrates pamphlet, see Chroust (1957:
relevant details. ch. 4); Waterfield (2009: 195200).
9
4
The parallel question, whether Platos and See Long (1988, 1993, 2011), and essays in
Xenophons reports of other historical people Vander Waerdt (1994a: Part II).
10
are accurate, is asked surprisingly rarely, The great orator of the late second and early
except perhaps in the case of Protagoras in third centuries CE, Maximus of Tyre, alludes
Platos Prt. and Tht. But what about Zeno in to the tradition of writing both prosecution
Prm.? Is Xenophons portrait of Antisthenes in and defence speeches for Socrates trial, and
his Smp. accurate? It is usually assumed to be explains it, partly, by reference to the rumour,
so (and will be so assumed here). And so on. which started perhaps late in the fourth
A notable exception to the scholarly silence century, that Socrates himself said nothing at
is Capizzi 1969, but he relied far too heavily his trial, but just stood there mute and defiant
on what he took to be verbal cues by Plato (Oration 3 in Trapp 1997). Did this tradition
that were supposed to indicate whether or not begin with a misreading of Plato Grg. 521e,
328
9781441112842_Notes_Final_txt_print.indd 328 10/17/2012 10:02:44 AM

NOTES
where Plato has Socrates say that he would Theodectes wrote a defence of Socrates (Arist.,
be tongue-tied in court? Otherwise, we would Rhetoric 1399a810), but we know noth-
not know about the rumour of Socrates ing of the work. With the next generation of
silence, were it not for the chance preserva- Peripatetics, such as Demetrius of Phalerum,
tion of a papyrus fragment containing part who wrote a defence of Socrates (frr. 102,
of a fourth-century BCE Socratic dialogue, in 1045, 1089 Stork, van Ophuijsen, Dorandi),
which Socrates is asked why he did not mount the trail is getting cold. On Demetrius defence,
a defence. The fragment is PKln 205 in M. see OSullivan 2008.
14
Gronewald, Klner Papyri, vol. 5 (Opladen: Writing on the Socratic Problem stretches
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985): 3353. It is sum- back over centuries and a lot of it is no longer
marized by J. Barnes in Phronesis 32 (1987): worth reading, or never was. I have read at
3656; see also Spinelli 1992. least some of this work, and have simply
11
The fragments of the minor Socratics are eliminated it from the bibliography; other
generally so slight that they have often been omissions are due to the quantity of such work
ignored altogether. Brandis drew attention to and the limits of my intentions in this essay (to
them in 1827, but they add little to the debate. present representative positions on the Socratic
If only we had more. But their works tended Problem, not all positions). Some of the best
to be very short of the length, perhaps, of or most useful work has been anthologized in
Platos Ion (cf. D. L. 2.124 [Simmias]). D. Montuori (1992), Patzer 1987a or Prior 1996,
Tarrant (1938) brought the pseudepigraphical vol. 1. Montuori contains numerous short
Socratic works of Plato into the debate on the extracts, a few pages rather than complete
Socratic Problem, but admitted that they add works; Patzers and Priors collections are more
little or nothing to what we can learn from useful.
15
genuine works. Longer such surveys: Capizzi 1969: 940; Dis
12
In fact, we do not have the text of the play 1926b; Gomperz 1924: 37791; Montuori
that was produced in 423, but of the second 1981a: 4253 and 1988: 2538; Patzer 1987b:
edition (ca. 415). It is not clear how much 140 (by far the most useful). The survey by
difference, if any, there was in the portrait of Stavru and Rossetti 2010 is rather cursory;
Socrates offered by the two editions. Wildberg Dorion 2011 is excellent, but focuses on just a
(2006) and a few others (see his bibliography) few of the most important scholars.
16
have claimed to find similarities and echoes As Patzer remarks (1987b: 56), there was
between certain statements in Euripides plays scarcely any good work on the Socratic
and those attributed to Socrates by Plato. And Problem before the beginning of the nineteenth
Aristophanes and other comic poets associated century.
17.
the two of them (SSR I A 1, 3). Is Euripides Rck 1912 went so far as to allow no value to
then a second contemporary witness? The the testimony of Aristotle, Plato or Xenophon.
18
evidence allows us only to conclude that the See Dorion 2001, 2011 on Schleiermachers
common thread is the New Thought of the downgrading of Xenophon, and its subsequent
period; they were associated in peoples minds influence; see also Montuori 1981b.
19
because they were both prime exemplars of the This was perhaps due to the influence of
New Thought, not because they were exchang- Hegel, who in his Vorlesungen ber Geschichte
ing ideas. der Philosophie (1833) drew his account of
13.
From roughly the same generation as Aristotle, Socrates almost entirely from Xenophon.
we also have a few fragments of the biog- But he in turn was probably under the spell
raphy of Socrates written by Aristoxenus of of J. Bruckers 17424 Historia Critica
Tarentum (SSR I B 4151). These display such Philosophiae, on which see Patzer 1987b: 67
vituperative hostility towards Socrates that and Gomperz 1924: 379. The rise and fall of
they are generally discounted as evidence. Xenophon as a star witness is well mapped by
More to the point, they focus on trivial aspects Spinelli 2008.
20
of his alleged personality: he was sex-mad, See his conclusion, vol. 1 (1893): 203. I have
avaricious and grumpy. We also know that not gone into the idea, which persisted for
329

NOTES
29
decades (thanks above all to Joels influence), On the old BurnetTaylor ground, that
that Socrates in many of the Socratic writings Xenophon hardly knew Socrates, but also on
was Antisthenes in disguise. I take it that the the old Schleiermacher ground, that Xenophon
view is discredited by the paucity of evidence. was too dim to understand Socrates, and that
21
Naturally, different scholars assessed the Xenophons Socrates was too bland to have
value of the three sources differently: attracted bright students or to have been con-
Schleiermachers star witness was Plato, for sidered a threat to the Athenian state.
30
instance, while Zellers was Xenophon. On this inconsistency, see Beversluis 1993:
22
Fitzgeralds Canon (that Aristotle puts 20811 in Prior 1996.
31
a definite article in front of proper names As distinct from de Maghales-Vilhena 1952,
when he means the character in a Platonic or whose response to Gigon was to accept his
Xenophontic work; when the name lacks a scepticism where Xenophon and Aristotle were
definite article, he is referring to the historical concerned, but to insist that Plato gives us, at
person) was resurrected by Ross (1924, xxxiii least in outline, an accurate portrait. Jaeger
xlv) despite the fact that A. E. Taylor 1911b 1915 prefigured Vlastoss position.
32.
had proved it not to be invariable. The device Chiefly the Oxford analytic approach to Plato;
used on Fitzgeralds Canon for the historical other schools care less about chronology,
Socrates, for instance, occurs at Pol. 1264b24 repudiate the mouthpiece theory and so on.
in a reference to Platos Lg. a work in which See essays in Smith (1998, vol. 1).
33
Socrates does not even appear. Penner 1992 comes up with a list of twelve dif-
23
In a review of A. E. Taylor 1911a in Deutsche ferences between the early and later dialogues
Literaturzeitung cited by A. M. Adam 1918: of Plato that hardly overlap with Vlastoss Ten
129. I have not seen any response to his sug- Theses, and in his 2002 article he distances
gestion that Aristotle used different tenses of himself expressly from Vlastos. But his method
verbs of speaking, depending on whether he is essentially the same: to use Aristotle to
was referring to the historical Socrates (imper- confirm differences between the early and later
fect or aorist) or the literary Socrates (present dialogues, and to infer that this allows us to
or perfect). A survey suggests that it is defensi- distinguish the earlier writings as reflections of
ble but, as will emerge shortly, all this proves the historical Socrates.
34
is that Aristotle thought he was referring to the This is far from being the only problem
historical Socrates, not that he actually was, as with Vlastoss position, but it is enough
a result of access to privileged information. for present purposes enough, that is, to
24
Corrected by Erbse 2002. demolish Vlastoss position. For this accusa-
25
Commonly enough to be called the commu- tion of circularity, and for further criticism,
nis opinio of the twentieth century: Patzer see Beversluis 1993; Graham 1992; Kahn
1987b: 11. 1992; Nails 1993; Prior 1997; Vander Waerdt
26
One of the results of Gigons scepticism about 1993; and Kahn 2002. By 2002, Annas and
Aristotle, Plato and Xenophon was that schol- Rowe were acknowledging the breakdown
ars cast their net wider and included the minor of the Vlastosian paradigm (ix). See also the
Socratics and later testimony in the eclectic remarks of Cooper 1997: xiixviii.
35
picture; see e.g. Humbert 1967; Rossetti 1971, See Vlastos 1988: 92. This proposition has met
1977; K. Dring 1984. But the results were with an extended response by Dorion 2000:
always inconclusive. xxxxxii. See also Vander Waerdt 1993: 8.
27 36
Hermann 1839 was the original Plato was too ill to be able to attend Socrates
developmentalist, Schleiermacher 1818 the last day in prison (Phd. 59b). This implies that
original unitarian. he was a member of the inner circle only if
28
The idea that the early dialogues repre- we assume that all those present then were
sented the historical Socrates is as old as such members. There is no reason for such an
Schleiermacher and Hermann, but stylometric assumption, nor for making any such case on
studies enabled Vlastos to put it on a more the basis of his presence at Socrates trial (Ap.
scientific basis. 34a, 38b). In any case, in both these instances
330

NOTES
46
we are up against the problem that they A. E. Taylor 1911b made far too much of the
were written by Plato: they represent what term mimsis. He took it to mean that the
Plato wants us to believe, and are therefore Skratikoi logoi were imitative in the sense
unreliable. Securer evidence is supplied by that they preserved the authentic Socrates.
47
Xenophons mention of Plato at Mem. 3.6.1, See also Gray 1989 on Xenophons Ap.
48
which seems to imply intimacy with Socrates, It is remarkable that even as able a scholar as
but still says nothing about how long they Ross accepted the honesty of these claims by
knew each other. Xenophon. Ross used the tired, old argument,
37
Charlton 1991; Cooper 1999b; Dorion 2000, often trotted out in this or similar contexts:
2003, 2004, 2008; Luccioni 1953; Mazzara fictitious conversations would not have served
2007; McPherran 1994; Morrison 1987, 1994, his purpose of defending Socrates memory,
1995; Narcy and Tordesillas 2008; Natali since they could easily have been denounced
2006; OConnor 1994, 2011; Patzer 1999; by those he names as taking part in them
Powers 2009; Seel 2006; Stevens 1994; Vander (1933: 29, in Prior 1996). This assumes that
Waerdt 1993; Waterfield 2004. Xenophons audience would have been expect-
38
Vlastos 1991 is careful to insist that Platos ing truth from him.
49
purpose is more creative than mere reproduc- See J. Morgan 1985 for later writers.
tion of his masters voice; but see Beversluis Xenophon (Mem. 4.3.2) implies that other
1993 for Vlastoss inability to maintain both Socratics used the same device.
50
this thesis and the historical reliability of the Their fictionality was perhaps recognized in
early dialogues. later antiquity too: see D. L. 3.35 on Platos
39
There were two, good, comic reasons for Ly., and other texts summarized by Dorion
choosing Socrates as a figurehead: first, he 2011: 13.
51
was a native Athenian (as very few of the According to Rowe (2006: 161), it is a natural
new intellectuals were), and already well response to regard Socrates as an invention
known in Athens (where Clouds was to be of Platos, but if so it is a response that modern
shown for its one-off performance in 423) scholars have resisted more often than not. On
as an eccentric, a guru of aristocratic young the various Socratics different intentions or
men and a brave soldier; second, he was so missions, see Waterfield 2004.
52
ugly that his face already looked like a comic Kahn (1996: ch. 1) examines the remains
actors mask. of the Socratic writers other than Plato and
40
Pol. 1297b12 ff. also shows that Aristotle demonstrates the imaginative and essentially
meant middle-class by the term; see the fictional nature of Socratic literature (2).
distinction the hoplites or the people at Rossetti 1977 is a more thorough reconstruc-
1305b33, to describe the social ranks below tion of some lost Socratic work, with tentative
the aristocracy. conclusions about their bearing on the histori-
41
However, his marriage late in life (ca. 420) to cal Socrates.
53
Xanthippe, whose name indicates that she was For debate on this issue, see Gosling and Taylor
from a noble house, would have brought him a 1982, Berman 1991 and Rudebusch 1999.
54
dowry. See Waterfield 2009: 54, 578. Xen. Mem. 2.1 = SSR IV A 163; see also
42
Lacey 1971: 45 also drew attention to this pas- 76, 165, 172, for Aristippus as a moderate
sage of Aristotle. hedonist. The difficulty is separating his views
43
See also e.g. Beversluis 2000: passim; Vlastos from those of later hedonists who claimed his
1956: xxivxxv. authority.
44 55
De Strycker (1950: 2267) had already pro- Possibly ers too (Kahn 1996: ch. 1), and good
moted the same methodology. fortune (Waterfield 2004: 901).
45 56
The early dialogues focus more on what The 1993 second edition of his book is sub-
Irwin 1977b called a-change (things having stantially the same as the first edition in 1971.
57
compresent opposite properties) rather than More, as Navia 1987 points out, for some
s-change (things changing over time and areas of Socrates life and thought than for
space). others.
331

NOTES
58
Dorion (2006: 946) lists the major differences story, and to offer to produce witnesses to its
between Plato and Xenophon. truth . . . unless the thing had really happened
59
I have developed this view at greater length (A. E. Taylor 1932: 78, Doubleday paperback).
in Waterfield 2004, but I will shortly provide This, of course, perfectly begs the question:
a corroborative test case. In the meantime, why should we assume that Platos audience
a thought experiment: there are well-known would have expected him to be telling the
similarities between Platos Smp. and that of truth? See also de Strycker 1975, and for a
Xenophon. Does it make sense to think that list of other scholars who share this view,
the similarities reveal details of a prototype Montuori 1988: 36 n. 25. Rudebusch (2009:
Smp., rather than being mere intertextuality? 43) even goes so far as to date Chaerephons
60
Platos Ap. is a particularly important plank visit to Delphi, to the summer of 432.
69
for Kahn, since he dismisses both Xenophons Its veracity was doubted in ancient times
and Aristotles evidence as historically of no (Colotes ap. Plut., Against Colotes 1116ef;
value at all, being filtered in both cases through Athenaeus, The Learned Dinner 5.60). It has
Platos work anyway (87). been doubted in modern times too: in addition
61
See e.g. Joel 1893/1901: 480, but especially to Waterfield 2004, see Robin 1910; Joel 1921;
Morrison 2000. Xenophons Mem. has also Gigon 1947; Montuori 1981a: 57143, 1988:
been excluded e.g. by Ross 1933. 537; Stokes 1992 and 1997; Danzig 2010:
62
A list of sixteen eminent scholars who believe 4953 (though he seems to accept Xenophons
in the historicity of Platos Ap. is provided by version of the story); Leibowitz 2010: 636;
Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 3 n. 9. They could Dorion forthcoming.
70
have added more. Vlastos once summarized Calder agrees: The search for the historical
the importance of Ap. by describing it as a Socrates . . . is . . . of less utility and value
touchstone of the veracity of the thought and than the exploration of the ideas of Socrates
character of Socrates depicted in Platos other (2002: x). See also Gigon 1947: 314: Socratic
early dialogues (1971b: 4). Some scholars literature is the presentation by the Socratics of
(e.g. Maier 1913; Popper 1945, 30613) add their own philosophical ideas.
71
Cri. as well, on the grounds that it is equally The point was stressed also by de Strycker
personal about Socrates. (1950), but the objective facts he chose
63
I cannot here encompass all possible objec- (Socrates advice to Xenophon at Anabasis
tions: see also Morrison 2000 and Prior 2001. 3.1.57; his conduct during the Arginusae trial
64
Chroust 1945 does so explicitly; most scholars [Xen., Hellenica 1.7.15]; and his refusal to
do so implicitly. help kill Leon of Salamis [Pl. Ep. VII 324d ff.])
65
Stressed by Morrison 2000: 1045; see also give us little to go on. In the end de Strycker
e.g. Stokes 1997: 98. effectively advocates an eclectic view, consist-
66
I am aware that this goes against the curing of early Plato and Aristotle.
72
rent orthodoxy, represented by Brickhouse This last point is an uncertain inference from
and Smith 1989 and Reeve 1989; but see Plato, Ap. 35a: I personally have often seen . . .
73
Waterfield 2012. For more sustained discussion, see Chapter 13
67
See Dorion 1990; Danzig 2010: 40; de in this volume.
74
Strycker and Slings 1994: 2014. Danzigs The chief advocates of this view are Vlastos
general thesis is that Plato (and Xenophon) 1989, Connor 1991, McPherran 1996, 2011
were responding to the debate about the trial and Burnyeat 1997. McPherran believes that
that arose afterwards, not writing accounts of Socrates was not unambiguously guilty of not
the historical defence. If this thesis is true, the worshipping the gods of the city, but that his
defence speeches cannot be factual. See also daimonion was the problem.
75
Samaras 2007, who limits the intended audi- The chief advocates of this view are
ence of the work to the post-trial culturally Brickhouse and Smith 1989 and Reeve 1989;
and intellectually privileged. see also Irwin 1989 and Kraut 2000.
68 76
In his biography of Socrates, Taylor opined The chief recent advocates of this view are
that it would have been insane to tell such a Cartledge 2009: 7690 and Waterfield 2009.
332

NOTES
83
For a list of earlier advocates, see Brickhouse Naturally, none of the Socratics showed their
and Smith 1994a: 173 n. 82. mentor advising the future mass murderer,
77
See Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 1819, though he appears in two of Platos dialogues,
Gocer 2000 and Waterfield 2009: 3847. For Chrm. and Prt. (and in the pseudepigraphical
the religious background see Boedecker 2007, Erx.).
84
Parker 1996a and Sourvinou-Inwood 1990. The history of the Thirty is most easily avail-
78
God is only ever good: Xen. Mem. 1.4 able in Krentz 1982; a brief survey, bringing
(pace 1.4.16), 4.3.7; Pl. Euthphr. 15a. Some out Critias role, may be found in Waterfield
traditional tales are therefore misguided: 2009: 12232.
85
Pl. Euthphr. 6ac, and see, in summary, R. I Such as that experts should rule (Pl. Euthyd.
379bc. 292bc; Xen. Mem. 3.9.10); that the demo-
79
We need to scotch from the start the idea, often cratic lottery is a nonsense (Xen. Mem. 1.2.9,
floated by proponents of the political inter- 3.14; Arist. Rhet. 1393b); and that mass
pretation of the trial, that the amnesty of 403 wisdom is an oxymoron (Pl. Hp. Ma. 284e,
prevented Socrates prosecutors from arraigning La. 184e, Ap. 25b, 29d, 31c32a, Cri. 47cd,
him on explicitly political charges. Even if there 48d; Xen. Mem. 3.7.57). It should be clear
was a blanket amnesty, we have to understand that I disagree with the thesis of Vlastos 1983c
it as prohibiting the use of alleged pre-amnesty and Kraut 1984 that Socrates was tepidly in
crimes in the formal indictment presented to the favour of the Athenian democracy; see also
King Archon, not as prohibiting any mention at the response to Vlastoss paper by Wood and
all of alleged pre-amnesty crimes (Brickhouse Wood 1986. Ober 2011 explores the extent to
and Smith 1989: 734; 1994a: 174; Waterfield which Socrates, as a philosopher, felt comfort-
2012: 2814). For countless trials in the first able in Athens, but avoids clear statements
decades of the fourth century referred copiously about Socrates approval or disapproval of
to crimes committed before and during the the democracy. Griswold 2011 argues for the
regime of the Thirty: see e.g. Lysias 13 (Against impracticality of Socratic politics, a position
Agoratus), 16 (For Mantitheus), 25 (Against with which I am in broad agreement.
86
the Charge of Subverting the Democracy), 26 Critias, Alcibiades, Xenophon, Charmides,
(Against Evandros), and 30.1112 (Against Euthydemus, Aristotle of Thorae, Cleitophon,
Nicomachus); also Isocrates 21 (Against Patrocles (almost certainly Socrates
Euthynus). half-brother), seven of those who fled into
80
On fifth-century attacks on intellectuals, see exile as a result of the scandals and failed oli-
Wallace 1994, a far more balanced piece of garchic coup of 415: see Nails 2002. Socrates
work than the overly sceptical Dover 1976; on was close to Pythagoreans, with their elitist
fourth-century attacks, see OSullivan 1997. politics (Walbank 1957: 223), and he and his
81
The Athenian legal system allowed and even circle had long been suspected of favouring a
encouraged subtexts in trials on social charges Spartan-style society over Athenian democ-
such as impiety: see Waterfield 2009: 2731, racy (Cartledge 1999), which was especially
drawing on a large body of recent work (such significant since the Thirty seem to have
as that of E. Harris 2000) that has convinc- wanted to remodel Athens along Spartan lines
ingly demonstrated the open texture of the (Whitehead 19823). Nevertheless, Socrates
system and its tendency to allow the dikasts to also had friends who were democrats, most
judge whether or not the defendant was a good famously Chaerephon.
87
citizen, as much as whether or not he was On the authenticity of Alc. I, see most recently
guilty of the particular crime. Denyer 2001: 1426 (for), and Smith 2004
82
Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 175, referring to (against); on Thg., see Joyal 2000: 12134.
88
Andocides 1 (On the Mysteries), 967. See also That Socrates was a teacher of ethics is corrob-
Lysias 25 (Against the Charge of Subverting orated by a piece of evidence external to the
the Democracy). The first speech definitely Skratikoi logoi. Socrates student Aeschines of
dates from 399 BCE, the same year as Sphettus got into trouble over non-repayment
Socrates trial, and the second probably does. of a debt, and in the ensuing court case, his
333

NOTES
opponent remarked that he never expected Euthphr. (5c) that he wants to be Euthyphros
any such dishonesty from a pupil of Socrates pupil.
2
(Lysias fr. 1.2 Carey). Gifford 2001. Blondell 2002: 323 refers
89
Grg. 521d, Men. 99e100a (on which see to dramatic irony as historical irony. See
C.C.W. Taylor 1998: 52). Consider also Halperin 1992 for dramatic irony in the Smp. .
3
Ap. 30a: since the basic duty of a politikos was Contrast Ferrari 2008: 224, who claims that
to do good to the city, Socrates is there claim- Socrates himself engages in a type of dramatic
ing to be the best politikos. irony. See Nehamas 1998 for a discussion of
90
See especially Chroust 1957: ch. 4, basing his Platonic irony that is not merely dramatic irony.
4
reconstruction primarily on Xen. Mem. 1.2.961 For a succinct, but thorough, criticism of
and on Libanius Apology of Socrates. Strausss approach, see Burnyeat 1985.
91 5
Already in the undatable comic fragment Ill discuss a few types of irony below, but
printed by Giannantoni as SSR I A 16, and what complicates any question about whether
then see e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, eirneia means the same thing as irony is that
On Thucydides 51; Plut., On the Fortune of one must say what irony means in English,
Alexander the Great 328bc; Philoponus, which is itself complex. For some discussion,
Commentary on Aristotles De Anima, 89.8; see Booth 1974; Ferrari 2008, with further
Libanius, Socrates Defence Speech 59, 142, references, Nehamas 1998; Vlastos 1991b.
6
148; On the Silence of Socrates 16. Griswold 2002, perhaps because he agrees with
92
We know little else about Lycon other than Vlastoss claim that eirneia comes (often) to
this fact; Anytus political career is scarcely mean irony in Plato, simply equates eirneia
more transparent, but he ended up, after start- with Socratic irony (see especially, 89 ff.).
7
ing as a moderate oligarch, by becoming a hero Clearly recognized by Brickhouse and Smith
of the revolution against the Thirty, and one of 2000a: 5968. In addition to mocking irony,
the most prominent figures in the post-Thirty they identify (668) what they call tragic
democracy. See Nails 2002: 378 (Anytus); irony, in which one means what one says,
1889 (Lycon). but there is something tragic about its truth.
93
If what I have just said smacks of Platos Examples they cite include the Oracles claim
Republic, that is because The whole intellec- that no one is wiser than Socrates. Although
tual project of Republic is a Socratic project Socrates comes to understand that this is true,
an attempt to think through how Socrates since it refers to Socrates human wisdom
might have conceived of an ideal political namely, his awareness of his own ignorance
system (Schofield 2006: 31516). See also and since this wisdom is worthless, it is a
Kraut 1984: 10: The Republic describes the tragic fact: the irony is in the very tragic way
sort of state he [Socrates] would have infinitely that the oracles claim is true. The judgment of
preferred to all others; and Ober 1998: 10: the tragic element here hangs strongly on the
in Republic, Plato sought to establish a city idea that Socratic wisdom is worthless (Ap.
in which Socratic politics might flourish. 23b); it is worthless relative to the sought-after
And from there it is only a short step to argue, wisdom, which is knowledge of virtue, but
as Rowe 2007b has done, that Platos entire I do not think that Socrates thinks that it is
political project, right up to his latest works, is worthless to be aware of ones own ignorance.
Socratic in inspiration. In the Ap. itself not to be so aware is the
most blameworthy ignorance (29b), and the
Socratic dialogues show and refer again and
again to people who, lacking Socratic wisdom,
CHAPTER 2 did (or would do) terrible actions in the belief
that they knew what was right and wrong (cf.
*
I thank the editors for their helpful comments. Euthyphro, Charmides, Critias, Nicias and
1
See e.g. Wolfsdorf 2007a who goes so far as perhaps Alcibiades). See Vasiliou 2010: c. 4.3.
8
to argue that we ought not to see any irony See e.g. Gulley (1968: 634), who concurs
or play in Socrates claim at the start of the with Robinson 1953, that Socrates profession
334

NOTES
of ignorance and his claim that he is simply is merely a matter of mocking others in order
following the argument wherever it leads are to elevate oneself, and so a form of invective.
ironic. She argues, however, that while this fits some
9
This raises complex issues about, among imitators of Socrates (e.g. Apollodorus in the
other things, whether this is the only way to Smp.), Socrates own use of ironic praise is dif-
be a teacher. Another sense of being a teacher ferent. It is not invective because he does not
or master or, as people often put it today, a try to claim that he is wise, while his interlocu-
role model is by providing an example for tor is ignorant; rather, he uses his ironic praise
others to follow. It seems clear that Socrates to combat his interlocutors conceit of knowl-
is a role model for some others (not to edge. It is a rhetorical device that clamors for
mention Plato himself!); see Ap. 23c, and a cooperative dialectical quest (119). Blondell
the characters Chaerephon in the Grg. and 2002: 11920 recognizes a similar value to
Apollodorus in the Smp., among others. Of Socrates ironic praise of his interlocutors wis-
course there should be no assumption that dom. Lane 2006 and 2011, citing Dickey 1996,
avowed imitators of Socrates are actually emphasizes that Socrates terms of address
understanding him. such as O marvelous one, etc. should not be
10
Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 32 raise precisely considered part of ironic praise.
17
this slippery slope argument. They remain I shall consider the possibility that the profes-
rightfully concerned not to have an any- sion of ignorance is itself ironic below.
18
thing goes approach to irony, although they Catching conditional irony may thus contrib-
acknowledge the presence and importance ute to readers feeling superior to Socrates
of mocking as well as tragic irony. They poor interlocutors. Nehamas 1998: 41 thinks
argue, however, that the presence of these that this is part of the deeper Platonic irony:
types of irony does not support the idea that the dialogues lull you into a complacent
the profession of ignorance is meant ironically sense that you are better off than, say, poor
(Brickhouse and Smith 2000: 66). See too Euthyphro, but you yourself close the book
Vasiliou 1999: 4568. and do not submit to honestly answering the
11
I focus on the Euthphr. in part because it has questions. Thus, the reader too is left with a
seemed to most readers that Socratic irony conceit not dissimilar to Euthyphros own,
must be present there, at least in some form; thinking that he knows what he does not.
Wolfsdorf 2007a denies it, however. Ferrari 2008: 278 disputes this.
12 19
Indeed the Euthphr. comes first in the The literature on Socrates disavowal is enor-
Thrasyllan ordering of the corpus. mous, and beyond the scope of this essay. Like
13
Contrast Euthyphro with Laches in the epony- most scholars, see e.g. Brickhouse and Smith
mous dialogue, who begins with the confidence 1994a and 2000, I take the disavowal to be
that he knows what virtue and courage is sincere.
20
(190a, 190e), but then admits, after a discus- See Vlastos 1991. He also, importantly, begins
sion with Socrates, that he doesnt know after a discussion about Socratic irony that is
all and seeks aid in finding out (193e194b). detached from Kierkegaardian roots.
14 21
Wolfsdorf 2007a denies this. See too Halperin 1992 and Nightingale 1995.
15
This is further confirmed by remarks Socrates One might worry that Vlastos frequently
makes about the Athenians and Euthyphro, appeals to dialogues, e.g. the Smp. and Phdr.,
cf. 5c. as illustrations of Socratic irony despite the
16
See Brickhouse and Smith 2000a: 645 for fact that they do not belong among Socratic or
mocking irony. Nightingale 1995: 11419 early dialogues as Vlastos himself lists them
focuses on Socrates mode of ironic praising (cf. 1991: ch. 2). Vlastoss division of Platos
(she does not discuss Socratic irony in general) dialogues, however, primarily depends on ques-
and illuminatingly sees this as part of a larger tions of doctrine and method, such as the pres-
Platonic critique of encomiastic (praise) ence or absence of transcendent forms, serious
discourse in general. It is tempting to think concern with mathematics, Socrates disavowal
that this sort of ironic praise on Socrates part of knowledge and the elenchus. It is consistent
335

NOTES
with this that Plato depicts a consistent type the meaning of eirneia; it continues through-
or types of irony in his character Socrates, out Plato to mean putting someone on. Lane
even in dialogues where he has moved beyond 2006 argues for a similar conclusion about
the philosophical views of his Socratic period. eirneia, although she claims that eirneia
Nevertheless, it is striking how few examples means concealing by feigning. Building con-
of Socratic irony from the canonical Socratic cealment into the meaning of eirneia seems
dialogues are discussed at all in Vlastoss essay. unwarranted; see Ferrari 2008: 17 n. 20. Lane
22
Nehamas 1998: 55 argues that saying the also claims (50 n. 4) that I argue that feigning
opposite of what one means does not capture be limited to modesty and that in Vasiliou
irony; one needs merely to indicate that one 1999 I stipulate that [eirneia] must involve
means something different from what one modesty. I never, however, stipulate that
literally says. Nehamas thus broadens the eirneia must involve false modesty. In 1999:
definition, but also purposefully makes it 461, I argue rather that pretending or putting
vaguer. Ferrari 2008: 34 n. 3 thinks Nehamas someone on is typical of eirneia. I do say,
account is too broad. Griswold 2002: 88 also arguing against Vlastos, that eirneia through-
denies that irony involves saying the opposite out Plato and Aristotle means shamming or
of what one means, but claims that in Plato at false modesty, but I do not intend the or as
least irony may be a way of revealing as much epexegetic; and it is true that eirneia means
as it is of concealing. Contrast Lane 2006 and one or the other in the instances it appears in
2011. these authors. Further, false modesty is one
23
Here Vlastos adds complexity to earlier species of shamming or feigning that Socrates
accounts of Socratic irony, such as Gulley often at least seems to his interlocutors to
1968, which only conceived of irony as engage in. See Harris 2009: esp. 16889, who
simple. follows the translation of eirneia as putting
24
There is a larger issue here about Vlastoss one on.
27
interpretation of Socrates that I cannot Ferrari 2008: 17 n. 20 offers a translation of
explore. It can seem that Vlastoss independ- eirneia as putting on an act, quite close to
ent argument for a distinction between my putting one on.
28
knowledge-c and knowledge-e is what drives Lane 2006: 50 n. 4 says that I use the term
his attribution of irony to Socrates disavowal eirneia to explain contexts where it does not
in the first place. It does seem clear, in any case, appear. One does not need the presence of
that Vlastos does not have some independ- a term, however, for there to be an instance
ent reason for thinking I am aware that I of the phenomenon referred to by it. Neither
know nothing is ironic. And so he does not Socrates nor his interlocutor needs to use any
argue from the irony of that statement to the word cognate with eirneia for the trope to
conclusion that Socrates must mean that he occur.
29
does know something. One might suspect that See Vasiliou 2002: 95 and 2010: 34. In brief,
Vlastos is trading on the notion of play I intro- if Socrates is seriously committed to never
duced at the beginning. It is obvious that when doing wrong, which I believe he is, he will not
Socrates says he does not know anything, he do himself a wrong by saying he deserves a
seems both to readers and to his interlocutors penalty when he does not. What he genuinely
to be in some way putting us on. I elaborate believes he deserves is state support, although
on this below. he knows that saying so will appear to his
25
See Brickhouse and Smith 1993 and 1994a for hearers as ludicrous.
30
criticism of Vlastoss view. For further refer- Wolfsdorf 2007a represents a view dia-
ences and a different interpretation of how to metrically opposed to Ferraris in some ways
understand Socrates disavowals and his much (neither piece refers to the other; they were
rarer avowals of moral knowledge consistently, published in consecutive years). At 1834
see Vasiliou 2010: ch. 1. Wolfsdorf denies that there is, from an unprej-
26
In Vasiliou 1999 I argue, against Vlastos udiced point of view, any verbal irony at work
1991b, that there is no evidence for a shift in at all in some of Socrates most notorious
336

NOTES
cases, e.g. denying that there is any irony at this essay and it is the basis for several of the
work when Socrates says he hopes to become essays I shall discuss. I therefore follow the
Euthyphros pupil. Wolfsdorf argues that convention of referring to early or Socratic
Socrates emerges, on his reading, as an unreal- and middle dialogues in this essay.
3
istically nave individual, but takes this to be All translations of Plato in this chapter are
part of Platos art rather than a point against from Cooper 1997 unless otherwise noted.
4
his own interpretation. He also requires (184) The One over Many Principle (OM) is a key
that the interlocutor recognize that verbal feature of Platonic metaphysics. We find it
irony is occurring. We shall see that Ferrari applied to piety in these passages in the form
interprets Socrates irony as occurring in fact of a question at Euthphr. 5d and again in the
without any audience, calling it solipsistic. form of a statement at 6de. It does not seem
31
As Wolfsdorf 2007a does, conceding that it possible to find a statement of the OM in its
makes Socrates unrealistically nave. full generality, as generating Forms of every
32
I am not sure why Ferrari needs these more plurality, before R. X 596a.
5
elaborate examples. Surely one can be ironic As will be made clear below, at least some
by oneself, just as one can encourage oneself of the arguments for the forms of the early
by speaking about oneself in the second-person dialogues differ from those of the middle
or third-person. dialogues. Most notable is the Argument from
33
I think that this is probably what Griswold Relativity or Flux, originally noted by Aristotle
had in mind when he called Socrates speaking (Metaphysics A.6, 987a32987b14; M.4,
ironically by himself impossible. Griswold is 1078b1332). This argument is discussed by
right that one must speak ironically as though Dancy and Fine below.
6
there was someone to hear just as one says Vlastoss view is influential in two ways. First, it
to oneself you can do it as though one were gives definitive form to a view of Platos devel-
another person. opment that Fronterotta (2007: 37) refers to
34
In contrast to Griswold 2002, Ferrari confines as a quasi unanimity among English-speaking
himself to aporetic dialogues; one might well Plato scholars. Second, it provides the point
think that Socrates meets more capable inter- of departure for scholars, such as Allen and
locutors (e.g. Parmenides) in so-called later myself, who dissent from that quasi unanimity.
7
dialogues. But it is striking too that Socrates Note that the Euthphr., which will be a primary
irony seems to be absent there. focus of debate, is in the earliest of Vlastoss
groups.
8
Vlastos does not state Dancys Paradigm
Requirement, which in my view marks an
CHAPTER 4 important link between the early and middle
theory of Forms.
*
I thank the editors of this volume for their 9
Allen argues elsewhere (1970: 1306), however,
comments on various drafts of this essay. I that the forms are as separate as those of the
also thank my assistant Jesse Wackerbarth for middle dialogues.
his editorial assistance in writing this essay. 10
In this respect he disagrees with, and is less
1
In this essay I follow the convention of Russell radical than, Dancy.
Dancy in referring to the separately existing 11
Dancy seems to follow Vlastos on this point;
Forms of the Phd., Smp. and R. as Forms see the critique of Zeyl above.
and the unseparated forms of the Euthphr. 12
I am grateful to Debra Nails for pointing out
and other Socratic dialogues as forms. When to me the relevance of this text to my project.
authors discussed in the essay use a different 13
I quote below only those portions of these pas-
convention, however, I follow that convention sages that directly concern Socrates.
in discussing their views. 14
The relation to Allens view is clear.
2
I am suspicious of the chronological basis for 15
This standard for correct definition is reminis-
the division of the first two groups of dialogues, cent of Dancys substitutivity requirement.
but it is necessary to generate the problem of
337

NOTES
16
The causal requirement seems to be equivalent ought to believe that there is a cat on the mat.
to Dancys explanatory requirement. On the assumption that there really is a cat on
17
For Fronterottas specific arguments against the mat, she has a true belief that there is a cat
this view of Platos development, see on the mat justified by her perception of the cat
Fronterotta 2007: 556. on the mat. By making an unhedged assertion
that she sees something on the basis of her
current experience, she indicates that she takes
CHAPTER 5 her experience as sufficient warrant for full
commitment to the belief that there is a cat on
I wish to thank the editors for their helpful com- the mat. If she did not think that she had suffi-
ments and for all the work that they have put cient warrant for full commitment to the belief
into this volume. that there was a cat on the mat, she ought not
to have asserted that she sees a cat on the mat.
1
All translations, unless otherwise noted, are Rather, she ought to have hedged the assertion
those given in Cooper 1997. somehow. Compare the following sentences:
2
As Fine (2008a) points out, we should be
careful about taking this passage to com- (i) I see the cat on the mat, but I do not
mit Socrates to the paradoxical claim that he know whether there is a cat on the mat.
knows that he knows that he knows nothing. (ii) It looks as if there is a cat on the mat,
While Socrates takes the possession of epistm but I do not know whether there is a cat
to imply wisdom, we need not think that on the mat.
knowing (suneidenai) something is sufficient I am inclined to think that there is something
for having epistm of that thing. It is possible, seriously wrong with an utterance of (i), while
therefore, that a person is aware (suneidenai) (ii) seems fine.
of something without being wise. We might, A similar argument would show that
nevertheless, ask whether Socrates commits Socrates is entitled to assert that he is aware
himself to a kind of knowledge in asserting that that he lacks wisdom, only if he thinks that his
he is aware of something. On the assumption evidence for the claim that he lacks wisdom is
that Socrates takes suneidenai to be factive, strong enough to warrant full commitment to
he does seem to be committed to the claim the claim that he lacks wisdom. So, insofar as
that he has weak knowledge of the fact that he he takes awareness to be factive, Socrates does
fails to possess wisdom. His assertion commits imply that he takes himself to be in a situation
Socrates to the truth of the claim that he lacks that would count as weak knowledge of the
wisdom, and to his believing that he lacks fact that he lacks wisdom. To be fully consist-
wisdom. Furthermore, his willingness to make ent then, Socrates would need to deny that hav-
an unhedged assertion using the factive verb ing weak knowledge of something is sufficient
suneidenai indicates that he takes himself to for being wise about anything great or small.
have sufficient warrant to commit to the truth 3
Gareth Matthews (2006: 10711) suggests
of the claim that he lacks wisdom. Compare that we can take Socrates question at (H1)
Socrates case with the case of a person who to be a genuine expression of perplexity. On
utters, I see the cat on the mat. It is entirely Matthewss view, Socrates does not mean to
possible for a person to see something without commit himself to the claim that one cannot
having knowledge or even belief that the know that a speech is finely done without
proposition corresponding to the perception knowing the nature of the fine. Rather,
is true. However, it is unclear that a person Socrates takes knowledge of the nature of the
can consistently make an unhedged assertion fine to provide one way in which knowledge of
that she sees something without taking herself the fineness of a particular action is possible,
to have the corresponding knowledge. On the and wonders whether there are other ways of
assumption that the speaker knows that to knowing available as well. Matthews reading
see is factive, her assertion commits her to of (H1) strikes me as possible. However, (R1)
the belief that she sees a cat on the mat, which does not seem open to the same kind of apo-
implies that there is a cat on the mat. So she retic reading. In that passage, Socrates denies
338

NOTES
that he will be able to know whether the just not know the precise nature of the difference
person is happy without first knowing what between knowledge and true opinion, he does
justice is. The Meno is somewhat compli- not have definitional knowledge about knowl-
cated. In (M1) and the passages immediately edge. Nevertheless, he claims that he does
around it, Socrates indicates that his failure know that knowledge and true opinion are
to know what virtue is renders him unable to distinct. It seems that Socrates cannot accept
answer Menos question. Later in the dialogue both (PD) and (SD), and claim to know that
(Men. 86d87c), however, Socrates indicates knowledge and true opinion differ, unless he is
a hypothetical method for trying to deter- using his knowledge vocabulary equivocally.I
mine whether or not virtue is teachable. This would like to say that Socrates only commits
method does not seem to require knowledge himself to weak knowledge of the distinction.
of the nature of virtue. However, it is unclear However, this passage presents a difficulty for
whether the results of the hypothetical method my interpretation. Socrates goes out of his way
truly count as knowing whether or not virtue to emphasize that he takes himself to know
is teachable. On my view, Socrates does think (eidenai) few things. His claim that there is a
that definitional knowledge is necessary for distinction between knowledge and true belief,
the possession of epistm concerning ethical therefore, seems to be something that he takes
subjects. However, a person might count as to meet a pretty high epistemic standard, a
having the sort of warranted true belief needed standard that might go beyond that required
for knowledgeW in the absence of definitional for knowledgeW.
7
knowledge. My discussion of Socrates avowals of
4
For more on this topic, see Chapter 6 in this knowledge in this section owes a great deal to
book. Wolfsdorf (2004), which contains a thorough
5
We might wonder what precisely counts as discussion of several other passages in which
knowing something about F-ness in (PD). Does Socrates seemingly claims to have knowledge.
knowing that there is such a thing as justice Wolfsdorfs arguments against taking many
count as knowing something about justice? other passages in which Socrates uses knowl-
Does knowing that justice is identical to itself edge words as direct avowals of knowledge
or distinct from injustice count as knowing strike me as pretty compelling, and I direct the
something about justice? What about know- reader to his paper.
8
ing that if there are such things as justice and Vasiliou (2008) takes beltin to indicate
injustice, then these are each self-identical and a moral superior, and denies that Socrates
distinct from one another? If we take the x in claims any substantive moral knowledge in
(P) to range over properties as well as individu- this passage. According to Vasiliou, Socrates
als and are liberal about what substitution allows that he has knowledge of the answers
instances of F-ness and G-ness are admis- to aiming questions he knows that it is best
sible, then (P) and (D) will yield a very strong for a person to pursue virtue and to avoid vice.
version of (PD). For example, without know- What Socrates lacks are answers to determin-
ing what justice is, a person will be unable to ing questions, questions about what virtue or
know whether justice exists or that if there is individual virtues consist in. I cannot do justice
justice then it is some one thing in each of its to Vasilious subtle and nuanced interpreta-
instances. On this construal of (PD) Socrates tion in this chapter, but want to make two
will fail to know (in the relevant sense of quick points.First of all, having an answer
know) even truths about justice that seem to to an aiming question will not be enough to
follow from logic alone. motivate Socrates to act one way or the other
6
Presumably if Socrates did have definitional in any situation. Given the fact that Socrates
knowledge concerning knowledge, he would knows that he should not disobey an order by
know the precise way in which knowledge a moral superior, he still needs to be able to
differs from true opinion. As Benson (2000: recognize who counts as his moral superior
14256) puts it, Socrates subscribes to some to apply this knowledge in a given case. He
version of a principle of the sufficiency of defi- must then be able to recognize who counts as
nitional knowledge (SD). Since Socrates does virtuous, but on a strong reading of (PD) he
339

NOTES
would need to know what it is to be virtuous accepted and applied in interpreting Socrates.
in order to do so. Second, Socrates seems to (KNA) requires that a person with a well-
raise worries of the kind associated with (PD) justified false belief is not entitled to assert the
even about aiming questions. In Republic I content of that belief. For my purposes here,
(see (R1) above) Socrates holds that he cannot only a weaker norm is needed. I have some
even know whether being just is virtuous or inclination to accept:
more conducive to happiness than being unjust
without knowing what justice is, but this sort (WNA) A speaker is entitled to assert that P
of knowledge seems to involve the answer to only if she takes herself to know that P.
an aiming question. We might worry, however, about possible cases
9
If (a) assertion implies belief, (b) the asser- in which a person has knowledge but does not
tion of a conjunction implies the assertion of have beliefs about her knowledge, in which
each conjunct and (c) belief is transparent, case she is not entitled to assert what she
we can get to a formal contradiction from knows according to (WNA). In what follows,
an utterance of (MPB) in short order. In this I will assume that, at least in the cases under
context, to claim that belief is transparent is discussion, whenever Socrates knows some-
to claim that a person does believe whatever thing he, at least tacitly, believes that he knows
she believes that she believes, and that she does it. With this proviso in mind, I will argue that
not believe whatever she believes that she does (WNA) is true concerning weak knowledge.
not believe. Where R stands for the proposi- When Socrates makes an unhedged assertion
tion that it is raining, B(R) abbreviates The that P, he (at least tacitly) takes himself to be in
speaker believes that it is raining, and A(R) a state where he has a true belief that P on the
abbreviates The speaker asserts that it is rain- basis of a warrant sufficient for fully believing
ing, we can derive a contradiction. See Adler that P. When he makes an unhedged assertion,
and Armour-Garb (2007: 1479) for a fuller Socrates takes himself to be in a state that
discussion of arguments of the following type: would count as weak knowledge under the
(i) A(R & ~ Believe(R)) [premise] right conditions. If fact, I think that an even
(ii) A(R) & A(~B(R)) [(i), (b)] weaker norm than (WNA) will generate a
(iii) B(R) [(ii), (a)] problem concerning Socrates commitments:
(iv) B(~B(R)) [(ii), (a)]
(WNA*) If a person believes that she does
(v) ~B(R) [(iv), (c)]
not know that P, then she is not entitled to
10
Williamson (2000: 2523) points out that in assert that P.
response to an assertion, we often ask someone
Socrates violates (WNA*) if he asserts some-
how he knows what he has asserted.
thing that he takes himself not to know. As
A: Its raining outside. long as we are talking about weak knowledge,
B: How do you know that its raining (WNA*) seems acceptable as a minimal norm
outside? governing assertion.
A: I dont know that its raining. 12
We might translate the eu iste . . . , which
In response to As denying knowledge, I am Socrates uses on other occasions as well, as
torn between two reactions. The first reaction know well that . . . . Wolfsdorf is right that
is to think that A should not have asserted that his uses of eu iste need not be taken to be
it is raining. The second is to think that A is cases of Socrates ascribing knowledge to
using know for a more high-grade epistemic himself. However, they do seem to be cases of
state than usual. In the latter case, I might emphatic unhedged assertion.
13
expect to hear some indication in As tone of As this story stands right now, Socrates brand
voice. of intellectualism does not seem particularly
11
Fine (2008a) briefly considers whether plausible. Desire or aversion on this story
Williamsons knowledge norm of assertion requires that I have an all things considered
(KNA) a speaker is entitled to assert that P belief about whether the thing will promote or
if and only if she knows that P should be detract from my happiness. In many situations,
340

NOTES
however, we will not be in a position to have excuse for not answering questions about the
such an all things considered belief. We are nature of justice, while (N1) does not. Socrates
often in a position akin to decision under risk, does seem to have pretty firm convictions
and see that there is some chance that a thing about the nature of justice, however. So (N1)
will promote our happiness and some chance seems like a more likely thesis to attribute to
that that very same thing might detract from Socrates. However, if Socrates does have con-
our happiness. Perhaps a suitable version of victions about the nature of justice, his attempt
Socratic intellectualism can deal with this to get out of answering questions by disavow-
problem by appeal to something akin to a ing knowledge seems somewhat fishy.
15
principle of expected utility. If so, I do not We might deny that Socrates has a foundation-
always desire what I believe will make a posi- alist epistemology on which definitional claims
tive contribution to my happiness. Rather, I are self-evident, and hold that even defini-
desire what I take to have the highest expected tional beliefs are justified by their evidentiary
contribution to my happiness. I might not only and inferential relations to other beliefs. One
fail to believe that a desired course of action advocate of this sort of coherentist picture of
will make a contribution to my happiness, Socratic and Platonic epistemology is Gail Fine
but also believe that it is quite likely that that (see Fine 1979, 2003: Introduction). The fact
course of action will not make any positive that certain evidentiary and inferential rela-
contribution to my happiness. I desire that tions hold between beliefs does not entail that
course of action, nonetheless, because the any of those beliefs are true. So our definitional
expected eudaimonistic payoff of this action knowledge, on this kind of view, will not count
is higher than any of the alternatives. I ignore as knowledgeC in Vlastoss sense. Nevertheless,
these complications about Socratic intellectual- such definitional knowledge can play a crucial
ism in the body of the essay, since I am most justificatory and explanatory role for the
concerned with Socrates claim that fear of person who has it. Fine (2008a) is inclined
death entails that a person takes herself to to deny that anyone who lacks definitional
have knowledge. knowledge counts as having any knowledge at
14
When Socrates claims that he cannot answer all, and would attempt to solve the problem
questions about justice because he does not of Socratic ignorance by denying (6). Socrates
know what it is, how is his lack of knowledge takes himself to have rationally justified true
supposed to get him off the hook? If Socrates belief without taking himself to have knowl-
thinks that he has beliefs about virtue that edge. Notice than we can follow Fines lead in
somehow fall short of knowledge, why cant denying that definitional knowledge satisfies
he answer the questions of others by saying the entailment conditions for certainty without
what he believes? Socrates refusal to answer denying that Socrates takes himself to have
questions would make sense, if he doesnt even some kind of knowledge even in the absence of
have beliefs about the correct answers to such definitional knowledge. Furthermore, we can
questions. A related point is made by Nozick grant that a person with definitional knowl-
(1995), who distinguishes two ways that we edge is in an epistemically superior position to
might take Socrates denial to know what a person that has knowledge of some ethical
justice is: fact without definitional knowledge.
16
Other commentators who emphasize the
(N1) I do not know the truth about the
role of understanding in Socratic knowledge
nature of justice.
include Moravcsik 1978, Fine 1979, 2008a,
(N2) I do not know the truth about the
Prior 1998 and Wolfsdorf 2004.
nature of justice. 17
It is useful to keep in mind some wayw in
(N1) is compatible with Socrates taking which the Greek uses of the verbs eidenai and
himself to have true beliefs about the nature epistasthai the nouns sophia and epistm
of justice, while (N2) implies that the speaker are coordinate with English uses of to know,
does not even take himself to have true beliefs wisdom, and knowledge. The verbs can
about justice. (N2) seems to give someone an accept a propositional complement, a person
341

NOTES
can know, (epistathai) that something is the Socratic dialogues. I begin with Aristotle and
case. On the other hand neither wisdom nor Xenophon, however, to indicate the likelihood
sophia naturally take such a complement. I do that the features of Socratic dialogues (and
not have wisdom (sophia) that something is the indeed of the Platonic dialogues as a whole)
case. I can have wisdom (sophia) and knowl- concerned with What is F-ness? questions
edge (epistm) concerning a subject matter, may have been features of the historical
which will consist at least in part in knowing Socrates philosophical perspective. By the
(epistasthai) that various things are the case. Socratic dialogues I mean (in alphabetical
18
Reeve distinguishes ordinary knowledge, order) Ap., Chrm., Cri., Euthyd., Euthphr.,
which is something like justified true belief, Grg., Hi. Ma., Hi. Mi., Ion, La., Ly., Men., Prt.
from expertise. The latter state is infallible, and R. I. As we will see below, the scholarly
elenchus-proof and requires knowledge debate concerning Socrates preoccupation
of definitions, while the former is fallible, with the What is F-ness? involves among
elenchus-resistant and does not require knowl- other things which of these dialogues should
edge of definitions. Wolfsdorf (2004: 11112) be included in this list. I begin, however, by
claims that Reeve must think that Socrates being inclusive. Those who are less inclusive
uses knowledge words equivocally using the will be discussed below.
2
term for expert knowledge in his disavowals My reasons for using the inelegant F-ness can
and for ordinary knowledge in his avowals. be found in Benson (1990a: 125 n. 2).
3
It might be possible, however, for Reeve to See note. 1 above.
4
hold that Socrates accepts only a single type See Sedley 1989 for a different understanding
of knowledge. I will have ordinary knowledge of the Ly.
5
that P, if and only if I know that P. I will have It is at this point that the debate concern-
expert knowledge that P if and only if I know ing whether Socrates is pursuing nominal or
that P, and my justification for believing that real definitions arises; see e.g. Locke Essay,
P renders me infallible, immune to elenchus, III 3.1317, Vlastos 1965: 156 n. 26, Penner
etc. It will still turn out that Socrates uses his 1992: 1414, Fine 1992: 202, Irwin 1995:
knowledge terms equivocally sometimes 256, Fine 2004: 54 n. 36 and 62 n. 58 and
he denies ordinary knowledge + high-grade Forster 2006b: 2533.
6
justification, sometimes he claims that he has See Dancy 2004: 234 who points out that
ordinary knowledge. only one of the six occurrences of horos (R. I
19
For example, if Socrates has a coherence 331d), and only two of the fifteen occurrences
theory of knowledge he will insist that only of horizein (Chrm. 173a and La. 194c) in the
someone with a large set of inferentially con- Socratic dialogues are best translated as defini-
nected beliefs (perhaps a set that must include tion. In Benson 2011 I mistakenly claimed
definitional beliefs) is capable of any propo- that Socrates does sometimes use horismos
sitional knowledge at all. (See Benson, 2000: in the Socratic dialogues. To the best of my
1623, 1912 for a discussion of coherentism knowledge he does not.
7
and Socratic epistemology.) The person with For important discussions see e.g. Nehamas
any propositional knowledge at all will then 1975, Vlastos 1981, Woodruff 1982: ch. 4,
have knowledge with the same scope as the Benson 1990a, Wolfsdorf 2003, Forster 2006b,
expert. The alternative to Brickhouse and Charles 2006 and Fine 2010.
8
Smith that I develop here is an attempt to See e.g. Ross 1951: 16. See Forster 2006b:
develop the sort of line that I think underlies 359 for a different but related, motivation.
9
Irwin (1995) and Fine (2008a). The principle has gone by a number of names,
perhaps most famously by the Socratic
fallacy. Dancy 2004: 3564 calls it the
CHAPTER 6 Intellectualist Assumption (AI). (See Nehamas
1987: 2757 who takes Socrates alleged com-
1 mitment to this principle as a component of
My concern in this essay will be primarily
Socratic intellectualism.) I prefer the priority
with the character Socrates in Platos so-called
342

NOTES
of definitional knowledge, but I will not ride Grg. passages may be more suggestive of a pro-
my hobby horse here. cedural priority principle. For the procedural
10
See Chapter 3 above and, esp., Vlastos 1983c, principle see also Men. 86de and my discus-
Kraut 1983, Brickhouse and Smith 1984a, sion of Brickhouse and Smith 1994a below.
25
Polansky 1985, Benson 1987, Brickhouse See Robinson 1953: 51, who was taken to task
and Smith 1994a: ch. 1, Benson 1995, Adams by Beversluis 1987: 211 for resting content
1998), the essays in Scott 2002, Forster 2006a, with a vague impression.
26
Young 2006, White 2008 and Benson 2011. In addition to this textual evidence, Irwin
11
For the notion of F-ness related beliefs see my (1995: 278) offers an argument that Socrates
brief remarks concerning appropriate related must have been committed to (PD) in order
beliefs at Benson 2000: 1612. For the notion to plausibly take failure in an elenchus as
of doxastic coherence as opposed to consistent evidence for an individuals general lack of
beliefs see Benson 2011. knowledge.
12 27
See e.g. Irwin 1995: 27 and Dancy 2004: 378 In addition to Beversluis 1987 and Vlastos
for this requirement. 1990 who cite specific instances of this ten-
13
See Benson 2000: 14260 for a defense of a sion, see Santas 1979: 116, Brickhouse and
Socratic endorsement of a more plausible ver- Smith 1984b: 128, Nehamas 1987: 292 and
sion of the sufficiency principle. Woodruff 1988: 22, who make the point
14
Concerning the Platos authorship of the Hp. somewhat more generally. To describe this
Ma., see Woodruff 1982 and Kahn 1985. Its and the following consideration as textual
relative compositional date will be an issue considerations is a bit imprecise. The claim
below. that Socrates employs a method of inquiry
15
By the end of the dialogue it has become fairly and of testing answers to his What is F-ness?
clear that this is Socrates alter ego. questions that depends on examining examples
16
All translations are my own unless otherwise and properties of F-ness is a textual considera-
noted in which case they are found in Cooper tion. The further claim that such a method of
1997. inquiry and of testing depends on knowledge
17
For a longer discussion of this passage along of those examples and properties of F-ness is a
roughly the same lines see Wolfsdorf 2004b: philosophical consideration, one which, as we
425. will see below, is denied by those who defend
18
For a longer discussion of the first Euthphr. the sufficiency of true belief interpretation. See
passage along similar lines see Dancy 2004: p. 153 below.
28
417. Cited by Beversluis 1987: 212 and Vlastos
19
See Santas 1972: 138 who takes this to be 1990: 6 as evidence against Socrates commit-
the most explicit text for (P), but denies that ment to (PD). See also Socrates example of
Socrates is committed to it since it is put in the how to answer the What is swiftness? ques-
mouth of Charmides. tion at La. 192ab.
20 29
Nearly every interlocutor in the Socratic Beversluis 1987: 21213 cites the examples
dialogues professes to believe something about from the Euthphr. and Chrm.
30
a relevant F-ness whose ignorance of which is See Beversluis 1987: 222 n. 17 who cites in
subsequently revealed in the same dialogue. addition the following passages against (D):
21
See Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 51 for this Chrm. 160e and La. 192c and 192d. He also
general line of criticism. cites the following passages against both (P)
22
Lesher 1987 takes the evidence for (D) to be and (D); Cri. 54d, Grg. 474b, Prt. 329e333b
persuasive, but not the evidence for (P). and Grg. 470d. But, in fact, the number of pas-
23
To be fair the (b) portion of this passage sages in which Socrates appeals to a property
restricts the principle to Socrates, but the (c) of the definiendum in the course of examining
portion makes clear that this is not philosophi- an interlocutors answer are nearly too numer-
cally salient. ous to list.
24 31
See also Grg. 462cd and 463c for a similar For perhaps the clearest statement of this line of
suggestion concerning rhetoric, although the argument see Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 45.
343

NOTES
32
For more detailed accounts of Socrates vari- Dancys defense of Socrates endorsement of
ous knowledge avowals and disavowals see (PD) with which I am in substantial agreement
Vlastos 1985; Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: see Dancy 2004: 4264; see also Wolfsdorf
3072; Benson 2000: 22338; Forster 2007; 2004b: 4055.
41
Wolfsdorf 2004a; Fine 2008a; and Wolfsdorf Dancy is not rejecting the principle of charity
2008: 13145. completely. He would endorse the principle
33
He does, of course, profess ignorance of the that one should not understand a philosopher
form of the good at R. I 506bc. in such a way that he or she is inconsistent
34
It is noteworthy that the Hp. Ma. passage if there are viable alternatives. The trouble,
appears to indicate that knowledge of what according to Dancy, is that here no alterna-
fineness is is necessary not only for knowledge tives seem to me really viable Dancy 2004: 41.
42
that something is fine, but also that something That Plato abandoned (PD) in the so-called
is shameful. This may be connected to the middle and late dialogues is a matter of some
general Greek commitment to knowledge of dispute. For some passages, which might be
opposites. See e.g. Phd. 97cd. cited for his continued commitment, see R.
35
Arguably less explicit professions of knowl- I 336c, 354bc, 402bc, 462c, 505a506a;
edge together with corresponding professions Smp. 199cd; Tht. 147b, 196de, 210a; Sph.
of ignorance of answers to What is F-ness? 260d261a; and Phlb. 12cd. Of course, each
questions provide similar evidence against of these passages needs individual examina-
Socrates commitment to (D), as well as (P). tion and can be interpreted otherwise, just as
See e.g. Prt. 357de, R. I 351a and Euthyd. in the Socratic dialogues. It is interesting to
296e297a. note that the Vlastos-Beversluis interpretation
36
Geach 1966: 371. Geach follows this by discussed below takes the opposite approach.
indicating the philosophical implausibility of It denies that Socrates endorsed (PD) in the
successful inquiry given a commitment to (PD). Socratic dialogues, but concedes that Plato
See White 2008: 33 and note 31 above. But it endorsed it in the post-Socratic dialogues.
seems clear that Geachs main objection is the See also Kahn (1996: esp. 163), who, though
one quoted above. rejecting Dancys developmentalism, agrees
37
See Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 51 n. 34 that the tension can be found in dialogues like
who suggest that I am alone in attempting to the Laches and resolved in dialogues like the
deny (PD)s implausibility. For some potential Phd. in virtue of the introduction of the theory
fellow travelers see Penner 1992: 168 n. 78 of recollection and theory of forms. But Kahn
and Prior 1998. does not think that Plato abandons (PD).
38 43
The taxonomy of interpretations is an impre- I doubt that Dancy thinks the theory of recol-
cise and subjective business, and nothing of lection smells like roses.
44
philosophical importance hangs on the way I This is how e.g. Vlastos understands Chrm.
have chosen to carve up the interpretations. 176ab and how Brickhouse and Smith under-
My hope is simply that it may help the reader stand Ly. 223b.
45
see the various options for responding to the For perhaps the earliest version of this general
interpretive tension. See note 57 below. approach in the recent literature, see Santas
39
Other scholars who might be placed in this 1972.
46
general category of interpreters include Charles The interpretation is presented in the follow-
2006: 125 and Wolfsdorf 2004b: esp. 67. But ing essays: Vlastos 1985, Beversluis 1987 and
neither of them is as explicit as Dancy nor do Vlastos 1990. The dependence on each other
they maintain a longer-term resolution of the is clear from the notes (see esp. Beversluis
tension as Dancy does. To this extent Charles 1987: 223 n. 29 and Vlastos 1990: 13 n. 1),
and Wolfsdorf may be closer to Geach. See although the direction of influence is more
also Irwin 1995: 358 n. 32, who concedes this difficult to determine. Such differences as
possibility. there are between these two scholars on this
40
Dancy dubs this principle the Intellectualist issue will be for the most part set aside for our
Assumption Dancy 2004: 36 n. 40. For purposes.
344

NOTES
47
They consider R. I to be a Socratic dialogue, distinction between expert and non-expert or
but they take the concluding passage of this ordinary knowledge, as opposed to Brickhouse
book, which contains the evidence for (PD), to and Smiths distinction between clear and
be tacked on to facilitate the books new role unclear knowledge or knowledge how (or
as the introduction to Platos magnum opus. why) and knowledge that; see Woodruff 1988:
See e.g. Vlastos 1990: 15 n. 31. 80, 85, and 92 and McPherran 1988:esp. 126
48
See Beversluis 1987: 214. Somewhat surpris- who prefers Brickhouse and Smiths version
ingly neither Vlastos nor Beversluis discuss of this resolution to Woodruffs. At other
Euthphr. 4d5d. They do, however, rightly times Woodruffs view resembles Nehamass
point out that Euthphr. 6de, cited by Geach approach; see Woodruff 1988: 104 n. 38.
on behalf of (P), testifies not to the necessity Brickhouse and Smiths discussion is more
of definitional knowledge, but rather to its extensive and so I will focus on their account.
sufficiency. (See also Santas 1972: 136.) They See also Brickhouse and Smith 1984b for an
maintain that Euthphr. 15de is a spin-off of earlier version of their resolution.
55
6de (Vlastos 1985: 23 n. 54 and Beversluis Similarly, they appear to maintain that it is
1987: 215). But reading Euthphr. 15de in Charmides, not Socrates, who endorses (P) at
this way is difficult to understand; see Dancy Chrm. 176ab; Brickhouse and Smith 1994a:
(2004: 47 n. 68). 59 n. 40.
49 56
Beversluis 1987: 215 only cites La. 190b-c and According to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates
takes it to testify to the view that if you do not takes such knowledge to be impossible for
know the nature of virtue, you cannot usefully mere humans to acquire.
57
advise anyone about how best to achieve it, but It is, of course, somewhat arbitrary whether
as we saw above La. 189e190b requires some- we consider Forster as maintaining a reject
thing more. Vlastos 1985: 23 n. 54, who does (PD) view or as an embrace (PD) view. I have
cite La. 189e190b only says that it does not located Forsters view in the former because
assert (PD) in full generality. Vlastos says the he denies that Socrates endorses (PD) under
same thing about Chrm. 176ab, and neither of the orthodox construal of Socratic definition.
them says anything about the Prt. passage. Nevertheless, the view that I endorse below
50
See Vlastos 1985 for how Socrates professions also attempts to explain away the evidence
of knowledge are to be understood in this against (PD) in part by recommending a
approach. non-orthodox understanding of (PD), and yet I
51
Nehamas 1987: 290. The connection between categorize it as an embrace (PD) view. Indeed,
a property being essential (or nearly so: see one might take Forsters view to be an attempt
Nehamas 1987: 2845) and being controver- to explain away the evidence against (PD) by
sial is brought out by Nehamas suggestion endorsing a weakened version of (PD), while
that the essential properties of F-ness are in as I attempt to explain away the same evidence
much dispute as the nature of F-ness itself. See by endorsing a strengthened version of (PD).
Nehamas 1987: 284 and 292. Understood in this way, one would assume
52
Nehamas 1987: 2901. Nehamas does not that Forsters and my approach ought to fall
explicitly discuss Euthphr. 15de, Chrm. 176a within the same taxonomical genus. What this
b, La. 189e190b, or Prt. 312bc, but one shows, of course, is simply that taxonomies
suspects he would deal with them similarly. of interpretations are arbitrary and typically
53
I say primarily because Nehamas talk of reflect the taxonomists interests and preju-
discoursing generally may have inspired dices. Nothing of philosophical importance
Brickhouse and Smiths distinction between hangs on whether Forsters view should be
expert and ordinary knowledge below. See seen as rejecting Socrates endorsement of
Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 60 n. 41, where (PD) or my view should be seen as embracing
they explicitly acknowledge the influence of Socrates endorsement of (PD). See note 38
Nehamas 1987. above.
54 58
See also Woodruff 1988 who at times appears Forster 2006b: 345: though not necessar-
to offer a similar resolution based on a ily that the word [F-ness] bears it, since,
345

NOTES
for instance, you might happen not to know be noted, however, that she does not offer a
English . . . detailed review of the evidence that creates the
59
Unfortunately, according to Forster, the plau- tension we have been trying to resolve.
63
sible construal is not Socrates. Forster main- See Benson 1990b, 2000: ch. 6, and most
tains that according to Socrates, in order to recently 2011. See also Prior 1998 and per-
understand the meaning that the word F-ness haps Scott 2006: 8690 and n. 25, although
bears one must be able to give an informative since Scott is only concerned with the views
synonym of that word (see Forster 2006b: 27). endorsed in the Men. he does not respond to
But such an assumption is false and has very the contrary evidence in the Socratic dialogues.
damaging consequences for Socrates project Scott does appear to endorse something like
(Forster 2006b: 456). For the inability of my response to the philosophical objection.
64
Socrates interlocutors to give an informative Although Men. 71b comes very close to requir-
synonym does not show that they lack an ing a Socratic endorsement of (D), at least in
understanding of the meaning that the word my view.
65
F-ness bears and so does not show that they See Benson 1987, 1995, 2000: chs 24, and
fail to know anything else about F-ness. Thus, most recently 2011. I do not, however, deny
in the end, Forster agrees with Geach and that Socrates seeks to come to know answers
Dancy that Socrates position is fatally flawed to his What is F-ness? questions in the elenc-
(Forster 2007: 323), but it is not because of tic dialogues. I simply deny that he does so by
Socrates commitment to (MF), but because employing his elenchus, at least in the way it is
of Socrates commitment to a particular ver- typically understood. Rather, he seeks to come
sion of the verbalization requirement. See (V) to know answers to his What is F-ness? ques-
above. tions by finding someone who knows what
60
Forster generously cites Benson 1990b as F-ness is and learning from him or her. See e.g.
having convincingly refuted those who would Hp. Mi. 369de. I hint at this view in Benson
reject Socrates commitment to a (PD). I fear, (2003: 9 and n. 12). I develop this view at
however, Forsters generosity considerably length in Benson (2002). Thus, unlike Forster
overestimates the results of my essay. who would agree that, at least in the interest-
61
For the claim that true belief suffices for the ing cases, Socrates elenctic method aims at
remaining refutations see Forster 2006a: 19 n. uncovering an incoherence in the interlocu-
25. tors beliefs, I concede that Socrates is seeking
62
To my knowledge there is no sustained defense knowledge of answers to his What is F-ness?
of this approach in the literature. Various questions. Rather, I deny that the method by
scholars appear to endorse it, but with varying which he seeks this knowledge as well as the
degrees of enthusiasm. Woodruff 1982: 140 method by which he tests others purported
appeared to endorse, but then appears to aban- knowledge of these answers requires that
don it in Woodruff 1988. STB is not the main Socrates know (or even truly believe) examples
focus of Burnyeat 1977, although he appears and properties of F-ness whose nature he fails
to endorse it, and Irwin 1977: 401 only to know, at least according to Socrates own
devotes a couple of pages to the issue. See also lights.
66
Irwin 1995: 278 and Santas 1979: 11526. See Benson 2000: 22338 for longer discus-
Perhaps the most sustained defense is provided sion of these passages. See also Irwin 1995: 29,
by Gail Fine, given her defense of a suffi- Fine (2008a: 72 and n. 40) and Forster 2006b:
ciency of true belief interpretation of Menos 1416 cited above.
67
paradox. Since she thinks Socrates endorses This is true even if one does not take Socrates
(PD), which she labels [PKW] (Fine 2004: to be professing universal ignorance, as I do
57, 75), and she thinks the paradox depends not. At Ap. 23b Socrates professes ignorance
upon (PD) (Fine 1992: 2014), her defense of important things, and it is difficult not to
of her interpretation of how Plato/Socrates take the knowledge professions made at Ap.
avoids the paradox amounts to a defense of 29b and 37b to be about important things. See
Socrates/Platos endorsement of (PD). It should Benson 2000: 2313 for why I do not think
346

NOTES
6
Vlastoss distinction between elenctic and Annas 1993: 54, 2002; Alcinous, Handbook
certain knowledge can resolve this difficulty. on Platonism (ch. 27), Kraut 1984: 211 n.
68
See note 26 above. 41, Irwin 1986: 202, 204, Rudebusch 1999:
69
I do not mean in any way to be critical here. 5, Reeve 1989: 137, Santas 1993: 43, Benson
This is how the history of philosophy makes 2000: 150 n. 31, Kahn 1998: 226.
7
progress. See Vlastos 1983c: 467 for the idea This appears to be the strategy employed
of discovering a text one has read numerous by Alcinous, Annas 1991, Kraut 1984 and
times before. Rudebusch 1999.
70 8
See Brickhouse and Smiths (BS) above. Rudebusch (1999) identifies happiness with
71
See note 41 above. virtuous activity, which he in turn identifies
72
See e.g. Benson 2000: ch. 9, Fine 2008a and with non-sensate (modal) pleasure. But this
Wolfsdorf 2008: ch. 3. either forces every occasion of skilful activ-
ity to be an experience of happiness, which
might seem to cast the happiness (and virtue)
umbrella too broadly especially for anyone
CHAPTER 7 concerned to isolate virtue as a moral trait.
Rudebusch appears to deal with this by using
*
I am grateful to Jeffrey Ogle and to the editors some other (unspecified) criteria to isolate a
of this volume for helpful comments on an subset of skilled activities as the virtuous ones
earlier draft of this chapter. (see my discussion in Reshotko 2006: 17985).
1
The etymology of the English word happiness 9
Strikingly, the same footnote in Brickhouse
carries the implication that it is a happenstance and Smith 2010 mentioned above indicates
rather than an achievement, something which that I (Reshotko) dissent from this nomo-
Greek philosophical accounts of eudaimonia logical view, an editing error that Nick Smith
will largely reject (even though it might be graciously called to my attention, assured me
equally implied by the Greek etymology of was involuntary and asked me to correct in
being possessed by an eu daimn, a good spirit). this article (as I know he and his co-author
2
But I do not plan to go into this view in detail are virtuous, I needed no assurance that it
here. See note 17, below. was involuntary). This error was corrected
3
I will discuss this controversy over Socrates in the subsequent paperbound edition. While
denial of akrasia a bit later. Brickhouse and Smith have challenged the
4
Ferejohn summarizes the textual evidence for sufficiency thesis for many years, I believe that
the equivalence between virtue and knowledge they intended to acknowledge that the newest
neatly (1984: 107): (1) The only thing which iteration of their view is consistent with what
always benefits us is wisdom (Euthd. 281e, I developed and labelled the nomological
Men. 87d, 88cd); (2) virtue always benefits account in Reshotko 2006.
us (Men. 87e); (3) therefore, virtue is wisdom 10
The term comes from Irwin who also
(Men. 88cd). In recent times this view has articulates the clearest such interpretation and
acquired a few dissenters from among those then goes on to voice his regrets at having
same interpreters who have added nuance to to assume that Socrates held such a theory
the Socratic relationship between appetite and (1986). Annas 2002 and Russell 2005: 3243
desire (Brickhouse and Smith 2010; Devereux also appear to support the Stoic interpretation
1995). I will discuss these views in the section of Socrates on the relationship between virtue
on the denial of akrasia, below. and happiness.
5
Of course the identity thesis also asserts that 11
Someone who wanted to make both arguments
whoever is virtuous is happy; the difference is would have to embrace a notion of causality
that identity proponents also think that a per- upon which cause and effect can be identical.
son, if happy, is virtuous. Furthermore, identity 12
Skyrms (1999: 134) has argued that when it
theorists have taken a metaphysical stance: comes to strong, but probabilistic, relation-
virtue and happiness refer to one and the same ships we cannot even distinguish between
thing. necessity and sufficiency
347

NOTES
13
Or any of its cognates, like eu prattein (to do assumption that it is out there as an objective
well). goal is important. Just as when oncologists
14
I would argue that the perfectly knowledge- try to both research and treat cancer without
able navigator (or practitioner of any science) really knowing what it is, they must investigate
knows everything, especially if knowledge it under the assumption that it fulfils objective
guarantees success. For how could a navigator criteria and can be defined.
19
who does not know meteorology, geography, Thus, while I do not commit Socrates to the
psychology (in order to infallibly interact with view criticized by Aristotle (E.N. 1153b17
subordinates), etc. be guaranteed success? Of 21) and adopted by the Stoics that the
course this does not address the two objec- virtuous person is happy even while enduring
tions mentioned above: that there is more to horrible torture and misfortune, I do think that
virtue than scientific knowledge and that some Socrates thought that the virtuous person was
knowledge is too trivial to be worth knowing more able to handle these experiences than his
as it wont figure into anything of consequence. less virtuous counterpart and that the virtuous
These objections are still to be addressed. person would bounce back to a higher degree
15
There is no reason to take a stand on this. For of eudaimonia than his counterpart would,
those who find it implausible that eudaimonia were he to survive misfortune.
20
should be the same thing for each person, there Scientific in the Socratic context has a
is no need to assume Socrates thought it was. I broader range than in English where we might
think that Socrates thought that while people distinguish it from the technical or artistic. For
are eudaimonic under different circumstances Socrates, science covers any area where a per-
and while performing different activities, son needs to take the truth about the way the
eudaimonia has some universal qualities. See world is (rather than the way it appears) into
my 2009 for more on this topic. account in order to become more successful.
16
This is compatible with, but not sufficient At Grg. 465a, Socrates distinguishes knacks
to dictate, the view that happiness is a kind and flatteries, which guess at what is pleasant
of pleasure. While I think that it can be with no consideration for what is best, have
argued that Socrates thought eudaimonia no account of the nature of the things [they
was a species of non-sensate pleasure (see apply] and [are] unable to state the cause of
Reshotko 2006: 17983 where I argue for a each thing from crafts and sciences. Crafts and
very specific subset of what Rudebusch argues sciences are areas in which one can become
for in his 1999: 8196 and 1238), the thesis more expert by accumulating knowledge,
that eudaimonia is pleasure is not essential to developing skills and understanding the rela-
the claim that it is objective (pace Wolfsdorf tionships (and discrepancies) between the way
2006b: 4). What is required for eudaimonia things appear and the way they are.
21
to be objective is that goods are commensu- Even if the effect it has is to make ones future
rable (see my 2006: 1856 for arguments to playing worse (because one develops bad
this effect), and that eudaimonia is the sort of habits or plays in such a way as to compromise
thing that Aristotle (E.N., X.iv, 1174a14b9, ones future embouchure).
22
Met. 1048b1834) would have called an I believe that Socrates conceives of both virtue
activity (energeia) rather than a movement and happiness as maximal states a person
(kinsis). experiencing either one of them is experienc-
17
It is my view that Socrates thought no human ing a state that cannot be improved. Still, since
being actually experiences eudaimonia but Socrates thinks that both states can only be
rather a facsimile of it that can be thought of approximated and not attained, it makes sense
as a non-sensate pleasure (this is a thesis of that he speaks of them using scalar language
my 2009 as well). But for the purposes of this at times. See Bobonich 2002: 21013 for a
chapter, I will simply be content to imply that discussion of conceptions of eudaimonia as
the facsimile is eudaimonia. scalar versus maximal and his own argu-
18
Even though we dont know and might never ment that Platos use of scalar language need
have a clear idea of what that shape is. The not count as evidence against his holding an
348

NOTES
understanding that eudaimonia is, in theory, a claim. For a rehearsal of the reasons why
maximal experience. logic and philology are laden with metaphysi-
23
See Frege 1892 for the origin of this theory cal and epistemological baggage see Penner
and Penner 2005 for a review of the contem- (2007: 1719). For an argument that Plato
porary literature on this subject as it pertains would have found them to have this baggage
to Socrates use of verbs of desire. see Penner (1987: 28799).
24 27
Wolfsdorf thinks that Socrates is show- Unfortunately, in their 2010, Brickhouse and
ing the failure of Menos subjectivist claims Smith do not note the departure of the Penner
about desire (Wolfsdorf 2006a: 912), camp from its predecessors on the distinc-
Anagnostopoulos thinks that Plato, if not tion between executive desires and other
Socrates, is acknowledging some of the extra-rational urges. Although they applaud
limitations of the account endorsed elsewhere the clarity of Penners presentation and his
(Anagnostopoulos 2003: 1901). distinction between synchronic and diachronic
25
It is important to understand the kind of desire belief-akrasia, they lump him together with
in question as a desire that causes a specific his predecessors and refer to the entire lot as
action to happen; my more general desire to the standard interpretation. This leads them
write an article functions in such a way that to make objections to the Penner camp that
it, together with my beliefs and other desires, miss the mark as they only point out that
results in the desire to type a particular letter. people feel urges and non-executive desires to
It is the desire to type that particular letter do things that are not necessarily in their own
what Penner and Rowe (2005: 218) call an best interest and that Socrates acknowledges
executive desire that Socrates is interested these feelings (see e.g. Brickhouse and Smith
in when he claims that desire is for the actual 2010: 5062, 725). Singpurwalla (2006) also
good. This will be discussed further in the misses the departure of Penner and his follow-
section on Socrates denial of akrasia. ers from their predecessors on this point. To
26
In his defence of the subjectivity of the illustrate this misinterpretation: Brickhouse
notion of desire found in the Meno, Wolfsdorf and Smith (2010: 50) quote a paragraph that
(2006a) has the originator of the views in that Penner begins . . . all desires to do something
dialogue (be it Socrates or Plato) embrace a are rational desires in that they automatically
subjective notion of desire (79) at the same adjust to the agents beliefs about what is
time and in the same dialogue as he embraces the best means to their ultimate end (1992:
an objective notion of happiness (However, 128 italics mine). Brickhouse and Smith then
this is compatible with the view that hap- summarize Penners view: (1) There are no
piness consists of having truly good things, desires other than rational desires; (2) A
89.) Thus, Wolfsdorfs Socrates (or Plato) rational desire is one that always adjusts
considers psychological activities piecemeal: to the agents beliefs about what is best for
either neglecting to relate desire and happi- him or her, leaving out the qualification to
ness as instances of a general phenomenon do something (which I italicized above). But,
about which it might behove one to have desires to do something are executive desires.
some sort of a consistent theory or decid- Penner is not, here, talking about the urges and
ing against it. Wolfsdorf likely does not find non-rational desires that are integrated into
it legitimate to take this sort of thing into executive desires. So Brickhouse and Smith
consideration, as he would claim it imports are wrong to say that he endorses (1) and (2)
unwarranted epistemological assumptions as blanket statements concerning all desires
(2006b: 45). Surprisingly, Wolfsdorf thinks including extra-rational ones.
28
his own primarily philological and historical Because, as stated above (note 27), none of
approach makes no such assumptions and these interpreters has recognized the degree to
is a completely neutral tool for uncovering which we do acknowledge them, they group us
genuine historicity (5). That any interpretive with Vlastos and Irwin.
29
tool is devoid of bold metaphysical and epis- See my arguments against Devereux in
temological assumptions would seem a naive Reshotko (2006: 858).
349

NOTES
30
Of course, as has hopefully already become that he thinks such things as the science of
clear, for the person who has come to realize medicine are similar, but larger, more detailed
the relationship between the pursuit of knowl- and more complicated clouds.
36
edge and the pursuit of happiness, the pursuit In the case where I do this, I have used luck
of knowledge is just as inevitable as the pursuit where others might need to use knowledge
of happiness. It is not voluntary in the sense (or at least true belief). I believe that this is
of could have done otherwise. See Penner an important part of the play on words that
2005 for a fuller discussion of Socrates com- Socrates makes at Euthd. 279d when he says
mitment to determinism. knowledge is good-luck. His nomological
31
For an extended argument concerning the view has the consequence that knowledge and
difference between eudaimonias good and good luck have a reciprocal relationship, the
virtues, see my 2001: 225. extent to which one falls short of knowledge is
32
In other words, the knowledgeable person on the extent to which one must rely on random
the rack is better off than the ignorant person good luck (pace Brickhouse and Smith 2010:
on the rack. Comparisons of a knowledgeable 169 n. 13, who say that luck has nothing to
person who is on the rack with an ignorant do with what Socrates is saying at Euthd.
person who is not are irrelevant to the claim. 278e281e).
33 37
Contrary to objections made by Brickhouse To take an example entertained in fun in
and Smith (2010: 1689), this is not the Aristophanes Clouds, it is quite likely that
assumption that he who is omniscient is also understanding the mechanism by which gnats
omnipotent. Of course it is not the case that buzz would be useful to someone trying to pre-
he who knows everything can control every- vent the spread of a disease that they harbour,
thing. It is simply that he who knows every- especially if it is spread by either the proboscis
thing will have the most resources available to or the anus. (I suspect that, contrary to the
him and thus the most capacity to manipulate assumptions in Aristophanes question, it is
his circumstances so that they are better than something about their movement that makes
they would have been otherwise. I am not them buzz. This is something that people who
claiming that the omniscient person is happy are trying to make tiny, silent, spy drones
(my nomological conception of the relation- might need to study.)
38
ship between knowledge and happiness should A few examples are Annas (1999: 3151), who
have already made that clear). Interestingly, finds Socrates position against immorality
Kant rejects eudaimonism because he thinks to be deontological; Rudebusch (2003), who
it would require omniscience, in brief, he thinks there is something obviously wrong
is not able on any principle to determine with pursuing virtue with an impure heart,
with complete certainty what will make him that is, only in order to become happy; Weiss
truly happy, because to do so would require (2006), who thinks that Socrates chief concern
omniscience (Critique of Practical Reason, is justice and not happiness.
39
Book II, ch. ii). This term is appropriate because Socrates
34
See my 1996 and 2010 for Socratic arguments thinks people cannot be motivated by any-
to this effect. thing other than their own benefit. However,
35
I choose the example of the road to Larissa in Socrates also thinks that we cannot benefit
order to draw attention to the claim at Men. while harming others. So, practically speak-
97a98a that true belief about the road to ing, his theory dictates that people will care
Larissa can be as useful as knowledge of it is. I for others as much as they care for themselves.
hope my example helps to illustrate that, even Thus, some consider the term misleading in
here, Plato cannot be thinking that an isolated its application to Socratic ethics (Brickhouse
true belief like this is the road to Larissa is and Smith 2010: 44 n. 1). I think it clarifies
as useful as knowledge. He must be think- Socrates theory of motivation and is consist-
ing of true belief as a cloud of interconnected ent with the practical motivation to care for
but limited beliefs that inform us about many others (see Reshotko 2006: 5773 for fuller
dimensions of some feature of reality. I assume arguments to this effect).
350

NOTES
40
Or at least apparent self-benefit and apparent these are the Athenians beliefs and practices
self-harm. does nothing to override the argument that he
41
I am fond of the story of the Buddhist has just made in his own person that no one
priest who finds himself caught between a falls into this category.
45
thousand-foot cliff and a ferocious lion with See Penner 1990, Berman 2003 and Reshotko
no escape. The story goes that he, calmly and 2006: 613 for further discussion of why
deliberately, seizes a nearby cherry blossom, belief-independent desires, despite the fact that
puts it to his nose and takes a deep inhale. I they do exist, cannot pull a person towards an
think Socrates would appreciate the manner in individual instance of a thing.
which he is using his noggin and caring for his
soul.
42
It is entirely possible that some cases of
wrongdoing actually are simply the result of CHAPTER 8
ordinary ignorance or straightforward miscal-
1
culation (2010: 103). All translations included herein, unless oth-
43
This is odd since they earlier argued that the erwise noted, are those provided in Cooper
notion that damage to the soul could occur 1997.
2
in this way was incoherent (2010: 967, nn. Santass interpretation is applied in Vlastos
57). Of course, that Socrates thinks that most 1991: 1514, as also the correct interpretation
souls are curable (as distinct from those few of the Grg. Still more recently, Santass view
that are labelled incurable at Grg. 525bc) has been endorsed by Dominic Scott (2006:
indicates he holds the standard intellectualist 49). But see Smith 2009 for criticism. Another
account regarding the damage and repair of who reports the Grg. as claiming that we
most souls. So Brickhouse and Smith are just desire what we think is good is Moss 2006.
3
as committed to finding a way to make the Anagnostopoulos is careful not to endorse
intellectualist account where the only dam- Santass reading, either (see Anagnostopoulos
age is cognitive work as anyone else is. 2003: 1901).
4
44
Brickhouse and Smith find evidence for A recent endorsement of Vlastoss interpreta-
Socrates support of punishment for incur- tion appears in Futter 2009: 4601.
5
able souls in both the Ap. and the Grg. The Vlastos himself suggests a version of such
evidence in the Grg. must be interpreted in a view in claiming that the elenchus works
the context of the highly complicated issue of in virtue of a principle, according to which:
Platos development and the chronology of the Whoever has a false moral belief will always
dialogues. I will discuss this briefly below. I have at the same time true beliefs entailing the
think, however, that the textual evidence they negation of that false belief (Vlastos 1994b:
glean from Ap. 26a is misinterpreted. There, 25). Vlastos does not take the extra step,
after making an argument that it is ridiculous required by the interpretation we are now con-
to think that he corrupted the youth voluntar- sidering, where the negation of the false moral
ily, Socrates says that, since he has corrupted belief is already one of the beliefs an interlocu-
the youth involuntarily, it is unnecessary to tor accepts. Versions of this interpretation
bring him to court where it is the law to try may be found in Brickhouse and Smith 1992,
those who need punishment. Brickhouse revised in their 1994a: 7385, 1012, and in
and Smith take this as evidence that Socrates Moss 2005: 152. As we will see below, Moss
believed that there were people who do wrong thinks that our sense of shame helps to reveal
voluntarily and that these people should be to us what our deepest beliefs really are. In the
taken to court and need punishment. But account we offer here, shame is not required;
all that the text reveals is that the Athenians rather, our choices as to which of two incon-
believe that people can do wrong voluntar- sistent beliefs we find ourselves holding at a
ily and that they made laws that require such given time should be abandoned will reveal the
people to be brought to court and punished if one retained as the deeper belief.
proven guilty. Socrates acknowledgement that
351

NOTES
6 12
See also Cooper 1999b, Frede 1992: xxixxxx, Moss cites Weiss 2003 and Stauffer 2006 as
Kahn 1996: 227, McTighe 1984, Nehamas arguing for such a view.
13
1999: 2758, Reeve 1988: 1345, Rowe 2003, An important earlier study of Socrates use of
2006 and 2007, Santas 1979: 18394, Taylor shame appeared in McKim 1988.
14
1998: 623 and Wolfsdorf 2008: 3359. Another who sees a role for shame in Socratic
Jessica Moss sometimes talks as if she accepts philosophizing is Charles Kahn, who sees it at
this view (e.g. in Moss 2006: 504, where she work in Socrates discussion with Callicles (see
states: In the early dialogues, Plato argues that Kahn 1983: 1067).
15
all desires (including the desire for pleasure) Moss herself seems to identify just such
are rational desires for the good. On this view a case, when she notes that Socrates first
of desire, vice is merely a matter of ignorance praises Callicles for his manliness or bravery
about good and bad: once we learn which (andreia at 494d4), only later to compare
things are really good and bad, we can rely on him to a furiously scratching catamite (at
our desires to lead us to virtue. On the other 494e35) see Moss 2005: 150.
16
hand, she also holds in the same paper that in For evaluation and discussion of this claim,
the Prt. Socrates argues that when we pursue see Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 7387. Moss
harmful or vicious pleasures instead of doing does not cite this earlier argument, which
what is good, we do so because we have been anticipates hers on this issue.
17
deceived by illusions generated by pleasant and In Chapter 7 in this book, Reshotko argues
painful things (Moss 2006: 505). If our desire that we have misinterpreted this passage. We
for pleasure is to be counted as a rational note that in her view, Socrates actually believes
desire for the good, it would seem we ought to that Athenian law is simply mistaken on there
be able to rely on [it] to lead us to virtue. The being a place for punishment in criminal jus-
first to have attributed such a view to Socrates tice, and that the kind of punishment Socrates
may have been Aristotle: According to him has in mind here is pointless in every case, and
[Socrates], all the virtues are to be found in the not just in cases such as Socrates. We do not
rational part of the soul. The result is that in find her reading especially plausible, but we
making the virtues sciences, he does away with also note that Reshotko never addresses the
the irrational part of the soul, and thereby other texts we cite in support of a Socratic
also does away with both passion and moral recognition for the uses of punishment.
18
character: Magna Moralia I.1.7.1182a1823. As Reshotko reminds us in Chapter 7 in this
7
More recent arguments for this reading of the book: Still others do not think that the end of
Men. may be found in Brickhouse and Smith the Grg., even if Socratic, contains an endorse-
2010: 6570 and Weiss 2001: 36. An earlier ment of punishment (Reshotko 1999: 410;
version appeared in Croiset and Bodin 1923: Rowe 2007: 36; Moss 2007: 232 n. 8). We
III.2456. invite our readers to assess the plausibility of
8
For examples of this line of interpretation, see: this understanding in the light of what Socrates
Carone 2004, Segvic 2000 and Singpurwalla quite explicitly says in this text.
19
2006. See e.g. Cornford 1933: 3067, Irwin 1979:
9
For an example of this approach, see Kahn note on 507b, 222, and 1977: 1234, Vlastos
1996: esp. 22657. Another version, where 1994b: 13, Kahn 1996: 3842, McPherran
apparent differences in the earlier dialogues 1996: 264, Penner 2002, Rowe 2002, 2003.
are simply not recognized at all, may be found A rather different version of the same view,
in Gerson 1997. For criticisms of this view, see according to which the new moral psychol-
Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 97102. ogy is introduced by Callicles, rather than by
10
For examples of this form of Unitarian Socrates, is given in Cooper 1999b.
20
account, see Carone 2001. For criticisms of In fact, the way in which Plato has Socrates
this view, see Brickhouse and Smith 2010: characterize injustice seems to indicate that it
2069. would be the overthrow of the rational part
11
See Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 758, for by the appetitive part of the soul. However,
discussion. surely Plato would also acknowledge that an
352

NOTES
overthrow of the rational part by the spirited Ly.; for a summary of the nineteenth-century
part is possible (indeed, the risk of such seems debate concerning its authenticity, see Robin
to be indicated in the case Plato has Socrates 1964: 44 n. 1.
2
recall, where Odysseus needs to speak to his Cf. Xen. Smp. 8.2.
3
heart to avoid doing something in a fit of pas- See also Pl. Men. 76ac and Phdr. 227cd for
sion that would not be rationally defensible further depictions of Socrates flirtatiousness.
4
(see R. I 441bc). Platos dialogues suggest that pederastic
21
The same sort of case is obviously imaginable relationships were prevalent in Socrates circle.
in the mythical representation of the psyche as Such relationships were characteristically
a charioteer and his two horses, in the Phdr. asymmetrical: the man was in love with the
It seems plainly to be a risk, in that myth, that boy, while the boy, at most, felt affection for
the charioteer could find himself unable to the man; the man ideally served as a mentor to
control the wilder (appetitive) horse, in which the boy, imparting philosophical, political or
case the whole soul could be led to act in ways athletic skills, while the boy offered the man
contrary to what the charioteer judged best. sexual favours in return. For further discus-
See especially Phdr. 253e254b. sion of this important topic, see Dovers classic
22
Gabriela Carone has recently argued that 1978, as well as Halperins more recent 1990.
5
this passage actually does not recognize a Though Lucian takes a sceptical view of
case of akrasia (Carone 2001). We disagree Alcibiades depiction of Socrates chastity
with Carone in Brickhouse and Smith 2010: (Philosophies for Sale 15, cited in Dover 1978:
2069. 156).
6
Vlastos notes this tension, but explains it by
positing that a man can be better than his
theory (1981a: 9 n. 21).
CHAPTER 9 7
The translation of philein and its cognates,
philein, philoumenos and philia, is notori-
1
In this chapter, I discuss the views on love ously difficult. The term, philein, has a wider
advanced by the character Socrates who sense than either to love or to be the friend of;
appears in Platos dialogues, particularly those at its broadest, it means to value, and it can
assigned to Platos early period. Though I occa- be directed at both personal and impersonal
sionally appeal to non-Platonic sources, such objects. (It should be noted that in Attic Greek,
as Xenophon, to corroborate my interpreta- philein is often used in opposition to eran, to
tion, I do not make any claims as to whether denote non-sexual or familial love. In the Ly.,
the views of the character Socrates were shared however, Plato is concerned to treat philein as
by the historical Socrates. I focus on Platos a catch-all for all forms of valuation, includ-
Ly., since this dialogue offers the most sus- ing sexual ones; he therefore claims at 221b
tained discussion of love among the early dia- that eran entails philein.) Thus, interpersonal
logues. I thus subscribe to the commonly held relationships count as one species of philia,
assumption that the Ly. precedes the Symp. and both lovers and friends turn out to philein
and Phdr. and belongs to Platos early period. their objects, since both are attracted to or
For defence of this assumption, see Brandwood value their objects. I attempt to capture this
2000: 112; though at 115, Brandwood offers ambiguity by alternating between translating
some considerations which suggest that the Ly. philia as love and as friendship as the context
and Symp. belong to the same group, Guthrie demands; similarly, I translate philos as both
1975: 1345, Kraut 1992: 45 (Guthrie and lover and friend. Since there are no suitable
Kraut identify the dialogue as early-middle, English expressions related to friend, I solely
but take it to precede the Symp.), Levin 1971: translate philoumenos as beloved, and philein
2367, Robin 1964: 446 and Robinson as to love. For a very helpful discussion of
1986: 63; for a summary of contrary views, the senses of these terms, see Robinson 1986:
see Robin 446 and Guthrie 1345. No recent 658, though I do not agree with Robinsons
interpreters contest the authenticity of the claim that philia between humans is necessarily
353

NOTES
a reciprocal relationship (see my comments claim in the Ly. that the good are self-sufficient
below).One frequent response to the Ly. is (1646).
14
to suppose that Socrates erroneously applies Adams 1992: 9 proposes that this passage
his general analysis of valuing relationships is, in fact, compatible with Socrates taking
to interpersonal relationships. This may be reciprocity to be a requirement on friendship:
correct. However, as I argue below, Socrates quails and horses can be friends to us because
reasons for doing so are deeply rooted in his we can benefit them. Adams adds: This theory
moral psychology. For Socrates, all valuing also makes sense of the fact that Socrates never
relationships are grounded in the agents desire mentions the possibility of being a friend to an
for his own good; whether one loves wine or inanimate object (9). This is puzzling since, in
another human, this love is aimed at the good the passage under consideration, Socrates goes
of the agent. on to refer to those who are friends of wine,
8
Strictly speaking, the Ly. is concerned with the exercise and wisdom.
15
question of who is the philos, and not what is Note that if Robinson were to claim, instead,
philia. However, in his attempt to identify the that Plato mistakenly thought that philia
philos, Socrates commits himself to a broader between humans need not be reciprocal, then
theory of philia, of the nature of the relation the dialogue would yield a false conclusion,
that makes one count as a philos. Sedley 1989 but would not be aporetic.
16
notably argues that the Ly. is not concerned See Gonzalez 1995: 823, Rudebusch 2009:
with defining philia; for a contrary view, see 191, Santas 1988: 845, Versenyi 1975: 188
e.g. Adams 1992: 16 n. 7 and Bordt 1998: 157. and Wolfsdorf 2007b: 24850. Robin 1964:
9
See also Bordt 2000: 1601, though Bordts 3940 concurs that according to the Ly., the
rejection of the utilitarian analysis of friend- NGNB is the philos, but is agnostic as to
ship is at odds with his concession that utility the object of philia. Rowe argues that Plato
is a necessary condition for friendship (162); endorses the NGNB proposal, though he raises
and Penner and Rowe 2005: 2334. Penner doubts concerning whether the philon is neces-
and Rowe suggest, plausibly, that the absurd sarily oikeion 2000: 21113; these doubts are
conclusion, that Lysis parents do not love not shared by Penner and Rowe 2005: 1745.
17
him, is a reductio of the childish conception of See also Bolotin 1989: 1789, Gadamer 1980:
happiness as doing whatever one thinks one 1718, Guthrie 1975: 148 and Robin 1964: 39.
18
wants. Glaser, cited in Glidden 1981: 39 n. 4, and,
10
Rider 2011 argues that Socrates aim in more recently, Bordt 2000 and Levin 1971:
reaching this counter-intuitive conclusion is 2478.
19
protreptic, to spur Lysis (and the audience) See also Glidden 1981: 43 n. 37 and Vlastos
to engage in further philosophical investiga- 1981a: 357 for further arguments that the
tion. This suggestion is plausible; however, it Ly. does not make reference to the theory of
does not resolve the issue of whether Socrates forms.
20
himself endorses the conclusion (as Rider notes See Rowe 2000: 210, 21415. While it is
at note 36). important to emphasize that Socrates does not
11
The significance of these passages is noted by offer a positive account of the good in the Ly.,
Penner and Rowe 2005: 33 and Price 2004: 3. the evidence in other dialogues that he takes
12
I do not translate oikeion, since no English happiness to constitute ones good is very
word captures its sense; its core meaning is strong; in what follows, I therefore occasion-
what pertains to ones household, but it can ally appeal to the proposal that the PP is
mean what is proper to or akin to oneself. happiness.
13 21
Bordt 2000 advances a similar interpretation, Annas qualifies this claim at 538.
22
on which philia is only felt between the good Irwin concedes this 1977: 53; see also Lesses
on account of their love of the Good. Like 1996:n. 6 and Versenyi 1975: 194.
23
Hoerber, Bordts proposal lacks direct textual See also Irwin 1977: 85, 99100, who argues
support; Bordt is forced to appeal to signifi- persuasively that Socrates egoistic theory of
cantly later dialogues, and to ignore Platos love in the Ly. stems from his commitment to
354

NOTES
LG, the principle that if x and y are goods and it is conceivable that someone elses empirical
x contributes to y, then x is not good in itself. persona could reveal his rational nature in a
According to Irwin, in the Ly., Socrates sug- more loveable form; on the other hand, if what
gests that we only love others for the sake of is loved is simply the rational nature, then it is
our own happiness; LG therefore entails that hard to see why the empirical persona should
we can never love them for their own sakes. be what prompts love.
24 33
See also Kosmans 1976: 546 and Kolodnys As I note above, Socrates does not explicitly
2003: 13942 helpful discussions. identify the PP with happiness in the Ly.; how-
25
See also Irwin 1977: 54, though Irwin refers to ever, the evidence from other dialogues for this
selfishness as egoism. identification is quite strong. At any rate, even
26
An alternate version of instrumentalism might if we can only identify the PP with ones own
claim that it is not sufficient for Romeo to good, my claim that Socrates has a powerful
love Juliet for her own sake; he must also account of motivation will still hold.
34
never treat her as a means. In its raw form, Note that the beloved will only be loved as
this is implausible: surely it is acceptable that a means; strictly speaking, then, he will not
he should, say, value Juliet as a dance partner, be truly lovable (219d). However, at the
so long as he primarily loves her for her own conclusion of the dialogue, Plato deploys a
sake. Perhaps this version of instrumentalism looser vocabulary, on which persons can still
should be modified such that Romeo must be called lovable (221e2a, 222a, 223b), even
never treat Juliet merely as a means, or that his though they are not the PP.
35
love must never be conditional on her serving One might avoid replaceability if the list of
as a means to some other end. qualities which one values in the beloved were
27
See Bolotins 1989: 20125 summary of Von so extensive and unusual that no other person
Arnim. could possibly replicate these. However, as
28
Note that Lesses does not argue that persons Velleman notes, such love would cease to be
can serve as constituent means. rational (1999: 36870); furthermore, such
29
This model of love bears some resemblance to love could not accommodate changes in the
what Frankfurt 1999 proposes, which I discuss beloved and would therefore be particularly
in the following section. susceptible to transience.
30 36
Roth claims that it is not egoistic to prioritize Kolodny (2003) has suggested a third alterna-
ones own virtue over friendship where these tive: we can love others for their relational
conflict 1995: 1819; against him, while this qualities e.g. for their being ones child or
may be righteous, it still seems egoistic. wife. Kolodnys theory strikes me as the most
31
Penner and Rowe acknowledge that the ego- persuasive among recent proposals; it offers a
istic theory of love they attribute to Socrates particularly powerful account of familial love.
is somewhat at odds with the other-regarding I take it that Socrates would reject Kolodnys
ideal: e.g. it does not demand that the theory on the grounds that unless relational
beloveds good be valued independently of its qualities are conducive to ones own good, the
contribution to that of the lover. Nonetheless, love is irrational. Cf. Symp. 205e206a.
37
they minimize the degree to which the theory Our intuitions about love appear strik-
is selfish, to which it may prescribe that the ingly inconsistent in this area. On the one
lover pursue his own good even when it runs hand, were I to learn that I no longer make
contrary to the good of the beloved or the any contribution to my lovers happiness, I
commitments implicit in the love relationship. would conclude that he no longer loves me;
32
Velleman attempts to circumvent this by pro- in this case, I would be assuming that love is
posing that love is prompted by the beloveds egoistic. On the other hand, were my lover
empirical persona as this reveals his rational to tell me that he only loves me insofar as I
nature 1999: 3702. This is unsatisfactory: if contribute to his happiness, I might object
what we really love is the rational nature as that he is using me and does not really love
revealed by the empirical persona, then we me; in this case, I would be supposing that
do have to worry about replaceability, since love is necessarily non-egoistic. Some of these
355

NOTES
inconsistencies depend on the conception This stratum includes the dialogues on which I
of happiness at work: is it being in a giving chiefly rely: Ap., Cri., Grg. and R. Book I. But
relationship with the beloved or, say, using see Chapter 1, in this book, for further discus-
him for sexual or even intellectual purposes? sion of the Socrates problem.
2
Others derive from the perspective assumed in See Chapter 5 in this book.
3
the thought-experiment: do I imagine myself to Irwin 1979: 240 takes Socrates to mean that
be the lover or the beloved; the beloved being he only attempts (epicheirein at Grg. 521d7)
wooed or the beloved being scorned? the political craft, not that he has reached it,
38
One concern about this strategy is that, as so that this remark need not conflict with his
Rider notes, Socrates appears to argue at 210d previous disavowal of knowledge (similar is
for the claim that Lysis is ignorant and hence Kraut 1984: 227 and Griswold 2011: 340).
useless (2011: 55 n. 30). Perhaps this can be But in the same sentence Socrates says he does
resolved along the lines I sketch out below, practice politics, indeed that he is the only one
that, while Lysis parents ought only to love of the present time who does so. This seems
him insofar as he is wise, in fact they love him strong evidence that he believes he actually
because they take him to be useful in other does practice the craft of politics, not only
dimensions. that he attempts it. More will be said below
39
A further tension is that if Socrates is really on what Socrates took this craft to be. Cf. also
NGNB, then it seems that he should be lacking Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 8.
4
in wisdom and so be ignorant of the NGNB Socrates says to the judges at his trial in
thesis; perhaps this can be resolved by insisting Platos Ap. that he never engages in politics
that Socrates ignorance lies solely in his lack- (Ap. 31cd); and to Polus in the Grg. that I
ing a full account of the good. am not one of the political men (Grg. 473e).
40
A possibility I do not pursue is that Socrates How, then, can he claim in Grg. to be the only
sole motive for engaging philosophically with practitioner of politics? The answer is that he
others is that he was ordered to do so by the intends two different senses of politics in these
gods. See Rudebusch 2009: 197. two passages. The context at Grg. 473e makes
41
See e.g. Guthrie 1975: 143, Levin 1971: 246, clear that his disclaimers apply to conventional
Robin 1964: 40, Santas 1988: 88. For a con- politics; cf. Dodds 1959: 247, 276; but at
trary view, see Gonzalez 1995: 889, Penner 369, Dodds (without any compelling reasons)
and Rowe 2005: 2989 and Versenyi 1975: doubts whether the historical Socrates would
1856. have made any such claim, and credits Plato
with the discovery of this new political ideal.
I argue that the claim is Socratic, and displays
continuity (along with other positive moral
CHAPTER 10 convictions expressed by him in Grg.) with
Cri. and Ap.
1
A question that goes beyond the scope of this 5
Recent scholarship has homed in on the
chapter is whether Platos dialogues cap- question of Socrates motives for avoiding
ture authentically the views of a historical conventional politics, or even whether he is
man named Socrates, or whether they only sincere in claiming that he did. Ober 1998
approximate such a persons views, or whether thinks Socrates knew more about the courts,
they are more or less Platos fabrications/ide- the assembly, the agora and the speech conven-
alizations of such a persons views. Without tions of those places than he let on in Ap. (cit-
argument I shall adopt the opinion, shared ing evidence from Grg.). Both Woodruff 2007
by many others, that Platos dialogues may and Balot 2008 think he did avoid conven-
be sorted out into strata, in which the early tional politics (establishing a model for Platos
stratum does in fact try to preserve the actual Socratic philosopher at Tht. 172c176b),
thoughts and arguments of an Athenian man but they have different reasons for supposing
whose name was Socrates. Perhaps it is best so. Woodruff argues that Socrates could not
to think of this person as Platos Socrates. have engaged in conventional politics without
356

NOTES
ceasing to be a philosopher; whereas Balot democratic Socrates, and provides citations to

believes Socrates could not have entered the other scholars who share this opinion.
11
public arena of Athenian politics without See Obers 1998: 67 paean to republican free-
having been destroyed by the demos. Such dom, defined as the condition of not being
accounts bear on another question (also under, directly subject to the will of, other
treated by Anderson 2005): if Socrates was a human beings. In democratic Athens this free-
moral saint (as Balot puts it), why did he not dom did not rule out a political role for the
speak out against moral atrocities committed elite few in governing the city, but did ensure
by Athenians during the war, and why did he an even greater political role for the masses.
not speak out against Athenian imperialism Kim 2011: 10110 emphasizes the freedom of
more generally? More on this below. the autonomous will of interlocutors who are
6
Griswold 2011: 3423 argues that Socrates engaged in Socratic conversations, even if the
argument to the jury that he was commanded outcome of a conversation is uncertainty, as it
by Apollo to pursue philosophy is uncon- often is.
12
vincing. Ober 1998: 1723 and nn. 325 Ober 1998: 1837 and n. 56 believes that
calls Socrates interpretation of the oracles Socrates acceptance of the jurys verdict that
statement a tenuous thread for justifying his he suffer the death penalty owed much to his
philosophical activity because statements by conviction that Athens had fair procedures,
oracles were notoriously open to competing that these were followed in the case of his trial
and conflicting interpretations. Socrates does, and that a just person must obey judgements
however, attempt to justify his own peculiar thus rendered. Obers case is bolstered by his
interpretation (Ap. 21bc). Ober acknowledges sensitivity to Athenian political culture at the
Socrates additional testimony at Ap. 33c. time of Socrates trial, wherein he shows a
7
See Chapter 3 in this book. general concern on the part of Athenian citi-
8
Ober 1998: 197206 opines that the Socrates zens with procedural requirements, especially
of Grg. was in fact much more familiar with regarding the role of juries in defining what
public places (e.g. the agora) and its practices acts constituted crimes and what punishments
than was even Callicles. His activity in speech to mete out to those convicted. I depart from
was not the activity of the Assembly or the Obers view only insofar as I find no proce-
courts (although he knew about the speech duralist arguments being offered in Cri. by
activities of these places), but neither was it either Socrates or the Laws, except perhaps
confined to the quiet and removed private inferentially.
13
places of Athens, despite his suggestion in Ap. The term employed in Cri. that is often taken
that it was. as rendering the idea of a contract is agree-
9
Socrates may be thought to be defending ment (homologekenai: e.g. 51e2). The Laws
democratic ideology in Grg. when he argues, tell Socrates he has agreed to obey by various
against Callicles bermensch philosophy, that manifest signs, and so, having agreed, he now
natural justice really means everyone should finds he must do so. Weiss 1998: 746 argues
get an equal share, on Callicles own premises. that Socrates agreement to do things he has
But, like Kraut, I take this argument to be agreed to do (in this case, to obey the citys
inserted only to give Callicles trouble by show- command) derives from his pledge to his jury
ing that Callicles beliefs lead him to conclu- to abide by my penalty (Ap. 39b); but see the
sions he cannot accept. The argument reveals following notes.
14
nothing about Socrates beliefs. Ober 2011: 15863 believes the goods
10
Ober 2011: 164 n. 49 notes that Socrates was received by Socrates that lead to his obliga-
a critic, hence neither for nor against democ- tion to obey the city are birth, upbringing, and
racy or oligarchy. A different view is Stone education, but he does not claim that these are
1988, for whom Socrates was fundamentally natural rights, only that they are goods that
anti-oligarchic as shown in his response to create an obligation.
15
the Thirty that he arrest Leon by going away. As one might expect, different liberal theorists
Griswold 2011: 349 and n. 30 leans towards a endorse or differentially weigh different parts
357

NOTES
of the liberal formula. Kraut e.g. defends happier to obey the Laws of the city because,
what he calls a liberal reading of Cri., but he compared to other places, Athens Laws are
does not endorse the view that this dialogue fairly generous. The city gives Socrates a gift,
includes a defense of all of the elements of not a quid pro quo.
19
liberalism I have indentified here. In particular, Weiss 1998: passim argues that Socrates does
while he places great weight on the argu- not agree with the Laws in Cri., at least with
ment from just agreements as underwriting their arguments about his obligations to obey
Socrates obligations to obey, he rightly does the city. Socrates fabricates a speech for the
not construe that argument is a Lockean social Laws that is designed to satisfy Cri., not to
contract argument; and he rightly finds no reflect his own private views.
20
defense of a doctrine of natural rights in the Later disobedience thinkers such as Henry
dialogue, which is, he thinks, its greatest defect. David Thoreau and M. L. King Jr. usually do
Villa 2001: ch. 1 and Kim 2011: 95ff. find an not discriminate between these two. Their con-
attractive exemplar of the moral autonomy of cern, rather, is with the injustice of the state,
the individual in Socrates, but neither place no matter what form it takes (Johnson 1990:
any weight on the idea of the procedural 71940). Socrates appears to have been chiefly
republic in Socrates. Kim 2011: 678 and n. 2 concerned with not committing injustice, even
gives a useful account of some vital differences when commanded to. Weiss 1998: 715 thinks
between modern social contract theory and Socrates would always refuse to obey unjust
the theory of obligation set out by the personi- commands, where an unjust command is one
fied Laws in Cri. that his own rational and reflective thought
16
Kraut 1984: 21828 ties Socrates strong pref- found to be unjust. His greatest loyalty was to
erence for Athens over other well-governed being just as determined by a suitably reflective
cities like Sparta and Crete to the existence rational agent. Anderson 2005 finds Socrates (in
in Athens of a wide scope for free and open his military activities during the Peloponnesian
discussion. This is what enabled him to pursue War) to be a man who was generally willing,
his philosophical mission for so many years. even eager, to obey civic and military orders
Kraut does not, however, find in the Athenian even when such orders may have required him
constitution anything remotely resembling the to commit actions that would today be regarded
First Amendment of the United States constitu- by many authorities as atrocities.
21
tion or an ideology of natural rights. Socrates also reminded the jury in Platos Ap.
17
Cf. Stone 1988, who finds Ap. to be intensely that he refused to go along with the decision
anti-liberal in this sense; Weiss 1998: 123 n. 88 of the Council when he was a member to try
acknowledges Athens toleration of free speech the ten admirals of Arginusae as a group, on
but believes that this tolerance did not extend the grounds that he believed Athenian law
to Socrates method of doing philosophy. prohibited capital trials of several individuals
18
Ober 2011: 156 acknowledges in his social at once. Whether his refusal can be construed
contract reading of Cri. that the contract is as disobedience has been disputed, but at
unequal. Socrates is obliged to give more the very least it shows that he did not regard
(complete obedience to the Laws) than the himself as bound to agree with every decision
Laws are obliged to give him (birth, nurture of state authority (Weiss 1998: 1314 assumes
and education; Ober does not mention the that Socrates behaviour in the case of the ten
additional unspecified goods that the Laws admirals was an example of disobedience).
22
claim to provide). But for Ober it is still a con- Discussions include Grote 1875 vol. I: 3024,
tract. I depart from this view insofar as I see Adkins 1960: 2634, A. Barker 1977: 1328,
no evidence at all that the Laws believed they Dybikowski 1974: 51935, Friedlander 1964
were obliged to give Socrates, or citizens more vol. 2: 176, Greenberg 1965: 4582, Maier
generally, anything at all except perhaps a 1913: 409, Martin 1970: 2138 and Young
city to live in. The notion of a citys obligations 1974: 24 n. 18.
23
to citizens is not in the text. The point of the More generally, the hierarchy view holds that
Laws, rather, is that Socrates should be even one may trace Socrates decision to disobey
358

NOTES
27
state authority to an underlying conviction Modern jurisprudence recognizes two different
about ones duty to obey a higher authority, ways in which states may err in condemning
in each case the highest authority that speaks persons accused of wrongdoing: (1) in wrongly
on the issue, whether human or divine. Vlastos, thinking the laws that have supposedly been
a champion of this view, introduced the help- broken are good or right laws (in modern
ful expression that higher authorities could parlance, constitutional laws); and (2) in
trump lower ones whenever Socrates was wrongly believing defendants have broken
confronted with competing commands. such laws. Neither the Laws of Crito nor
24
To be clear, the argument presented here is Socrates himself quarrel with the rightness of
not the same as what Brickhouse and Smith the law prohibiting impiety. Both are focused
forthcoming have dubbed the separation on whether Socrates disobeyed that law. The
view, according to which Socrates is present- distinction would help remove some of the
ing arguments through the mouthpiece of the difficulty in understanding just what the Laws
imagined Laws just to mollify Crito but that were telling Socrates he should do when they
he does not believe himself. The idea here, presented persuade or obey. Ober 2011: 140
rather, is that Socrates and the Laws simply is one of the few modern scholars to discuss
do not raise or examine (let alone agree on) the fact/law distinction in Athenian legal
a critical question about obedience; but see practice.
28
Weiss 1998: 324, for whom Socrates does A related question, whose resolution cannot
not agree with the Laws about much of be undertaken here, is why anyone would even
anything but only invents their speech to mol- want to be just, even assuming one knows
lify a distraught and unphilosophical friend what justice is. Justice is an admittedly difficult
Crito; cf. also V. Harte 1999: 117 ff., Coliaco virtue to acquire or practice, on nearly every-
2001: 199ff.; a rejoinder to the separation ones view. It also appears on almost any view
view is provided in Brickhouse and Smith to require quite a bit of self-sacrifice. It is thus
forthcoming. not hard to understand why critics of justice
25
Brickhouse and Smith (forthcoming) reject the like Thrasymachus and Callicles urge every
appellation authoritarian for their under- right-minded person to avoid it and to pursue
standing of the doctrine of the Laws in Cri. injustice instead (Johnson 2005: passim).
29
Rather, they argue, the position they [viz. the Socrates often refers to the several virtues in
Laws] articulate is one that must be accepted terms appropriate to other crafts like shoe-
in any philosophy that recognizes the possibil- making and medicine, e.g. Chrm. 165c166b;
ity of legitimacy for any civil authority. Euthd. 288d292e; the particular virtue of jus-
26
The concept of an instrument of the state, tice seems to be (though is not called) a craft at
relying as it does on the concepts of respon- Grg. 464b3465c5. At R. I 332d an imaginary
sibility and blame, is of such large philo- questioner asks Simonides about the craft
sophical consequence that I would like to see of justice. Socrates does not claim the craft of
it spelled out somewhere in the dialogues, justice as his own in the either of these pas-
but I do not find it. I do note, however, that sages, but seems to allow that justice might be
Ober 1998: 210 also renders the Greek aitios considered a craft insofar as it exhibits itself
(= cause) as responsible for in reference to in certain kinds of practices. When justice is
Socrates criticism of Athens past leaders (at a state of soul (Grg. 504d) the craftsman is
Grg. 518e519c). They were the cause of the one who brings such a soul into existence
current problems; in other words (on this (503e), but justice itself (as the proper order
translation), responsible for them. This is the of the soul) is not itself a craft. Philosophy
very word used by the jailer to explain who (under that term) is a craft only at R. I 495d,
was the real cause of the execution not he but the appellation craft is given to what
himself but the jury. Sorabji 1980: 24951 Socrates does when he practices philosophy
also finds the idea of responsibility in ancient at Grg. 465a and 521d, where it is differently
texts, particularly Aristotle. The term is his called the techn logn and the politik techn.
translation (in suitable contexts!) of aitios. Discussions of the craft analogy of virtue and
359

NOTES
other ways of thinking about Socrates as a McPherran pits reason against authority as
craftsman include: Reeve 1989: 12444, Irwin the bedrock of the virtuous life (1996: 47),
1977: 713, 935, 1279, Klosko 1981: 95 whereas for Socrates reason seems to be cast as
ff., Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 610, Parry yet an additional authority, albeit of a unique
1996: 4760, Tiles 1984: 4966, Lesses 1982: kind. McPherran 1996: 2027 (arguing mainly
93 ff., Roochnik 1992: 18597 and Johnson against Vlastos 1991: 22932) thinks that
2005: 21, 38, 99, 21113. between reason and daimonic revelation (in
30
It is by no means universally accepted that cases of conflict) Socrates would always obey
Socrates possessed a craft or even believed the latter, but in cases of other sorts of divine
he did (e.g. Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: command that conflicted either with tradi-
610; Irwin 1979: 240; Kraut 1984: 233). His tional norms or with rational determination he
explicit statements at Grg. 465a and especially would first subject such commands to elenctic
521d, however, are strong testimony that he testing before obeying them; but this latter
did believe he possessed at least the craft of claim would be true only if these other divine
true speech. commands became intelligible as commands
31
See Chapter 3 in this book. as a consequence of Socrates subjecting them
32
This will be true unless all the beliefs in the to elenctic tests. Once Socrates understood the
belief set but one are already known to be true; statement of any god to be a command, either
in that case a refutation will establish the false- to do or refrain from doing, he would certainly
hood of the remaining belief. Something like obey it. See Chapter 13 in this book for further
this assumption guided Vlastoss solution to discussion.
34
the problem of the elenchus (in 1983a: 2758, Kim 2011 makes the interesting argument
revised but not significantly with respect to this that the obedience Socrates is thinking about
point in 1994b: 139). But Vlastoss solution here is actually obedience to oneself that is,
has been frequently criticized, and seems dif- ones own rational thinking, a sort of Kantian
ficult to substantiate for any dialogue in view personal autonomy utterly lacking in the coer-
of Socrates agnosticism on so many matters. cive aspects of normal obedience to external
33
Bostock 1989: 121, who reads Cri. as strictly authority.
35
authoritarian (i.e. the just man must always Persuade or obey is itself a discovery arrived
obey every law), overlooks entirely the signifi- at through reasoned discourse. The Laws
cant role of logos here. Vlastos 1991: 1701, bring it forward as another reason Socrates is
while acknowledging the crucial role of logos, obliged to obey. But it is not the only reason or
seems to brush aside even the theoretical pos- even necessarily the decisive reason; the Laws
sibility of a conflict between it and at least one advance several others. What if Socrates had
other authority in Socrates life, viz. commands discovered even stronger reasons supporting
of divine origin, on the grounds that the latter escape, reasons, lets say, that overrode all of
always required Socrates rational interpre- the Laws reasons for remaining? Presumably,
tation of them in order to be understood; given his allegiance to the best logos, he would
but Vlastos does not provide the evidence have escaped.
36
that would assure us that in every case the Colson 1989: 27 ff. rightly emphasizes the
divine monitions required interpretation (cf. centrality of the examined life to Socrates
McPherran 1996: 178208 for a useful cri- conduct in both Ap. and Cri., suggesting (on
tique, although he too does seem to allow, 201 the basis of Ap. 21c) that even the god must
n. 57, some room for Socrates interpretation pass the test [and] measure up to Socrates
of the daimonion; cf. Reeve 1989: 69, and n. investigative standard (Colson 1989: 489;
17 above; Nussbaum 1985: 2345 argues that for a similar view cf. Vlastos 1991: ch. 6). This
the daimonion is Socrates own critical ration- last statement seems to me to go beyond the
ality). In any event, even if the gods could evidence, for Socrates nowhere indicates that
never be interdicted by Socrates logos, it still he would disobey the god under any circum-
seems more than probable that the commands stances. If we can imagine the god failing the
of earthly authorities could be. Like Vlastos, test (whatever that might mean), we must
360

NOTES
suppose that Socrates would conclude that he, (e.g. Aristotle). These portraits constitute a
not the god, was in error. mosaic of the characteristics, methods, views
37
Does Socrates violate his own proscription and activities of a Socrates who manifests
against committing injustice by agreeing to distinctly different philosophical attitudes
take the hemlock? Most scholars find this to be from those expressed by the Socrates of Platos
an instance of the acceptable act of suffering Republic and other such constructive and,
injustice (e.g. Kraut 1984: 378), perhaps less arguably, later dialogues. This qualification
desirable than neither doing nor suffering, but permits me to avoid the difficult issue of how
more desirable than doing it. Cf. Reeve 1989: we might accurately arrive at the views of the
1201 and n. 18 (and citations). Colsons actual teacher of Plato, yet still allows us to
1989: 345 argument that Socrates is doing confront many of the most interesting ques-
injustice to himself by taking the hemlock has tions Platos works provoke. There is not suf-
found few adherents. ficient space here to address the complex issue
38
Ap. 29bd. The hypothetical offer which of whether and how we might legitimately use
Socrates imagines the jury making to him may the testimony of Aristotle in conjunction with
not quite resemble an argument, but it is com- that of Platos dialogues and Xenophons work
parable to the arguments brought forward by to triangulate to the views of the historical
Crito to induce him to escape. Both have the Socrates in the manner of Gregory Vlastos
form, doing x would be advantageous to 1991: chs 2 and 3; but see e.g. McPherran
sustaining your physical existence; therefore 1996: ch. 1.2.
2
you should do (or might want to consider The theistic Stoics e.g. claimed to be follow-
doing) x. Cf. Colson 1989: 27 ff. The ing in Socratess footsteps, and assigned the
authority of the daimonion is not presented as origins of their main proof of Gods existence
overruling or interdicting the logos, it is true. to him; cf. Sextus Empiricus Math. 9.88104,
But Socrates does say it often prevented me esp. 9.101, DeFilippo and Mitsis, Long and
from doing something I was about to do, and McPherran 1996: ch. 5.2. Sextus also finds it
since he always led the examined life as much natural to lump Socrates in with Pythagoras
as possible, one must assume that what I was and Plato as one of the leading ancient theists
about to do was itself at least sometimes the (Math. 9.64).
3
determination of a process of rational reflec- And many Muslim thinkers as well; see Alon,
tion. On the other hand, Socrates would no who notes Next to Aristotle and Plato . . .
doubt have wished to investigate the reason Socrates . . . was the most mentioned philoso-
for daimonic intervention after the fact of its pher in Arabic literature (1991: 12).
4
occurrence (cf. McPherran 1996: 157 ff.). In the first centuries of Christianity Christians
39
Nevertheless, the opinion is not uncommon: were liable for prosecution as atheists in the
Schofield 2006: 31516, Kraut 1984: 10 same way a theistic Socrates could be thought
and Ober 1998: 10. It may be the case that atheistic: By not recognizing the gods of the
Socrates would find the kallipolis too oligar- state but new (unlicensed) divinities instead;
chic, given his evident concern for the health Athenagoras Presb. Chris. 4.
5
of the souls of all citizens in his native Athens. Justinus the Martyr appears to have been the
first to make the parallel (cf. Justin I Apol. V,
34, II; Apol. X, 48) and was followed in his
admiration by Clement, Origen, Lactantius
CHAPTER 11 and St Augustine; Clement Strom. I, XIV 63,
3; V, XIV 99, 3; I, XIX 92, 3; Prot. VI, 71, 1
1
See chapter 3 on Socratic Method. This essay ff.; Origen Adv. Cels. III 66, 67; IV 89; VII
does not attempt to identify the views of the 56; Augustine De vera relig. c. 39 n. 72; II, 1;
historical Socrates, but rather, those of the Confess. I, II; De consensu evangelist. I.12,
cross-dialogue, literary figure that emerges 18. Not all the Fathers were so impressed,
from the Socratic dialogues of Plato in concert however. Tertullian, for one, accused Socrates
with the recollections of Xenophon and others of being an immoralist (Apology 39, 12) whose
361

NOTES
attention to a familiar voice (Socrates little philosophy to be free of class and gender
divine voice, the daimonion) shows him to distinctions, open even to slaves, foreigners
be acting in the service of a disreputable dae- and young and old alike; Ap. 30a; Men. 85c,
monic power (Apol. 46; On the Soul 1, 26). 73bc; Xen. Sym. 2.10; and McPherran 1996:
There was a similar reaction in the Islamic ch. 4.2.
13
world: While many thinkers saw important For discussions of Socratic irony see Chapter
parallels between Socrates and Muhammad, a 2, in this book.
minority saw otherwise; e.g. al-Ghazl attacks 14
Nussbaum 1985: 234.
15
Socrates as a non-believer; Alon 1991: 11, For an example of this line of interpretation,
345, 41100. see Versenyi 1982. Also note, in particular,
6
Cf. Petrarch, Familiar. rer. I.9; rer. VIII.4; the attempts of Nussbaum 1985: 2345
Seniles XI.14; D. Erasmus, Colloquia, Ulmae and Nehamas 1987: 3056 to explain away
1712, Convivium Religiosum, 175; and his Socrates trust in various forms of divina-
letter to John Colet. See Montuori 1981a: tion. Vlastos 1996: ch. 6 and 1989 also finds
612. For Ficino, see FitzPatrick 1992: 165. Socrates guilty of disbelieving in the gods of
The temptation to compare and contrast the the Athenian state, but allows that he was
secular philosopher with the sacred saviour, nonetheless religious in some sense.
16
often to the detriment of both, still proves Note e.g. that there is no Greek term for reli-
irresistible; see e.g. Davar 1972, Deman 1944, gion (the root religio is Latin).
17
Kaufmann 1951, Toynbee 1954 and Wenley See Mikalson 2010: 69, ch. 4, and ch. 5 on
1889. the subtle differences between eusebs proper
7
For example, Marechal and Voltaire; see also respect and hosios religious correctness.
18
Montuori 1981a: 1225. For examples of prayer, see Il. 1.44658;
8
The popular 1749 biography of Socrates by Hesiod Op. 7246, 4658; and Aeschylus Sept.
Cooper is in this line, where Socrates fate is 25260.
19
taken to show how false religion can under- See e.g. Watson 1991: ch. 1.
20
mine true morality and rational understanding. See Parker 1998 on the nature of the reciproc-
9
As Burnet 1916: 236 observes: ity of sacrificial gift-giving. On his account,
prayer and sacrifice occur in the context of
The most diverse philosophies have sought a charis relationship, where charis is delight,
to father themselves upon him, and each favour, gratitude and kindness; the mutual
new account of him tends to reflect the exchange of pleasing favours in reciprocal
fashions and prejudices of the hour. At one relations between gods and humans; see also
time he is an enlightened deist, at another a Mikalson 2010: 14, 39.
radical atheist. 21
For discussion, see Burkert 1985: chs 2 and
For further and more detailed discussion of 5, Cartledge 1985 and Zaidman and Pantel
Socratic historiography, see Montuori 1981a 1992: part 2. I should note that public and
and FitzPatrick. private cult do not represent the entirety of
10
Nussbaum 1980: 44; and see also her n. 5. classical Greek religion: the Eleusinian myster-
11
On the Socratic elenchus see Chapter 3, in this ies and Orphic/Bacchic cults operated with
book. rather different presuppositions, on which see
12
Cf. Brickhouse and Smith 1991, 1994a: ch. 1 Chapter 12, in this book.
22
and Vlastos 1994b on Socrates use of the elen- See e.g. Zaidman and Pantel 1992: ch. 13.
23
chus. Why think, though, that Socrates would Daimones were sometimes thought of as
allow all human beings to engage in philoso- intermediary powers. However, every god
phy? First, notice that although we never see can act as daimon, and so the term is better
Socrates engaged in the elenctic examination of understood as referring to the veiled counte-
women, he does foresee the possibility of inter- nance of divine activity, (Burkert 1985: 180).
rogating both men and women in the afterlife A hero was a long-dead individual, about
(Ap. 41c). We also see testimony that he holds whom epic adventures might be told, usually
virtue and the means to it the practice of tied to a specific locale, such as Theseus at
362

NOTES
Athens; although some, like Heracles, were It should be noted that although Socrates
widely worshipped. As much as any god, a takes himself to have established that D3 is
hero had attained the status of divinity, and inconsistent with Euthyphros other com-
thus could respond to prayers and sacrifices by mitments (to e.g. [1a]), he need not be taken
providing protection, retribution and so forth. to also conclude that D3 is false; see Benson
On daimones, see Burkert 1985: ch. 3.3.5; on 2000: 5961.
31
heroes, see Burkert 1985: ch. 4 and Zaidman See Mikalson 1991: 3342 on service to the
and Pantel 1992: ch. 13. gods.
24 32
Vernant 1980: 193. Among those constructivists willing to do
25
Zaidman and Pantel 1992: 144. so are Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: ch. 6.1,
26
For Euripides, see e.g. Bacch. 21620, Burnet 1924: 1367, Rabinowitz 1958, Reeve
Tro.106080, Andr. 11615. See Thuc. 2.8.2. 1989: ch. 1.10, Taylor 1982 and Vlastos 1991:
27
For a recent discussion of whether the elenchus ch. 6. Those who do not think a Socratic
can also be used to establish positive conclu- account of piety is implied by the text (anti-
sions (e.g. that an interlocutors definition is constructivists) include Allen 1970: 69, 67
actually false), see Chapter 3, in this book, and and Grote 1865: 43757. Beckman 1979: ch.
Scott 2002. 2.1; Calef 1995 and Versnyi 1982 are quali-
28
Not everyone agrees with this assessment: fied anticonstructivists, since they argue that
whether the Euthyphro is a source of positive no definition of piety involving reference to the
Socratic doctrine or merely an aporetic inquiry gods may be culled from the dialogues explicit
is a much debated issue. statements, and that in fact, the notion of piety
29
For a more complete account of Socrates towards which Socrates directs Euthyphro is a
examination, see Geach 1966, Heidel 1900 secular one that identifies it with the whole of
and McPherran 1996: ch. 2. virtue (Reeve 1989: 646, seems to head in this
30
For analysis of this argument see Cohen direction as well). For additional references,
1971 and Benson 2000: 5962. McPherran see McPherran 1985: nn. 2 and 3 and 1996:
1996: 43 n. 43 provides a bare-bones version: 30 nn. 4 and 5.
33
Euthyphro agrees that (1a) the pious is loved For further discussion, see McPherran 1996:
by the gods because it is pious and that (1b) chs 2.2.26, 3.2 and Vlastos 1991: 1625.
34
its not that the pious is pious because it is Cf. e.g. Aeschylus Cho. 30614, Ag. 15606;
loved by the gods (b). He also agrees that as Arist. Eth. Nic. 1132b211133a6; Hesiod
with the examples of seer and seen thing, car- fr. 174 Rzach; Pindar Pyth. 2.835; and Pl.
rier and carried thing, lover and loved thing Men. 71e.
35
(2) a god-loved thing is god-loved because Yunis 1988: chs 1 and 3.
36
the gods love it, and (3) its not that the gods On the complexity of the charis relation see
love a god-loved thing because it is god-loved. Mikalson 2010: chs. 12.
37
But if D3 [his third definition: piety is what Cf. Xenophanes, who testifies that Homer and
is loved by all the gods] were true (viz., that Hesiod have attributed to the gods every-
the pious = the god-loved), then by substitu- thing that is a shame and reproach among
tion from D3 into (1a), it would be true that humans, stealing and committing adultery and
(4) the god-loved is loved by the gods because deceiving each other (Sextus Empiricus Math.
it is god-loved, and by substitution from D3 11.193).For another view of the lex talionis
into (2) it would be true that (5) a pious thing and its relation to religious practice plus
is pious because the gods love it. However, a reply to my line of argument see Gocer
(4) contradicts (3), and (5) contradicts (1b). 2000: 11529. For a critique of the claim that
Thus, (1a), (1b), (2), and (3) cannot be jointly Socrates is a moral revolutionary see Chapter
affirmed while also affirming D3 (resulting in 12, note 13, in this book.
38
D3s rejection). To conclude, the god-loved For further discussion see McPherran 1996:
is not the pious . . . nor is the pious the god chs 2.2 and 4.2.
39
loved, as you say, but the one is different from For a detailed treatment of Socrates examina-
the other (10d1214; cf. 10e211a6). tion of this definition, see McPherran 2003b.
363

NOTES
For a critique of Vlastoss and McPherrans and Smith 1994a: ch. 2, Vlastos 1994a and
mercenary interpretation of the do ut des Chapter 5, in this book.
48
principle cf. Lnnstrm 2011 and Furley 2007: For a comprehensive discussion of Socrates
125. relation to the extra-rational, see McPherran
40
See e.g. McPherran 1996: chs 2.2 and 4.2. 1991 and 1996: ch. 4. For critiques see
41
Vlastos 1989: 235. Hutchinson 1999 and Gocer 2000.
42 49
See McPherran 2000 and for a range of views On the Oracle and its functions see Fontenrose
see Chapter 12, Socrates, Greek Religion and 1978 and Parke and Wormell 1956. For more
Apollo, in this book. recent discussions see Chapter 12, Socrates
43
Some modern critics dismiss Xenophons Trial and the Delphic Oracle, in this book.
50
categorical affirmations of Socratic piety as For discussion of the problem of how Socrates
instances of telltale overkill. For example, is able to derive a prescriptive claim that he
Vlastos 1971a: 3 argues that Xenophons ought to philosophize from the merely descrip-
account of Socratic piety refutes itself, since tive claim of the Pythia that he is the wisest,
had the facts been as he tells them, the indict- see Brickhouse and Smith 1983, McPherran
ment would not have been made in the first 2002b, Stokes 1992: 2933, Vlastos 1989:
place. 22930 and 1991: 16673.
44 51
For example, Plato is willing to put twelve See McPherran 1996: ch. 4.2.
52
prayers into the mouth of his Socrates; see See Vlastos 1989 and 1991: ch. 6 who opposes
Jackson 1971; Euthd. 275d; Phd. 117c; Symp. this view, and is replied to by Brickhouse and
220d; Phdr. 237ab, 257ab, 278b, 279bc; Smith 1994a: ch. 6 and McPherran 1991, and
R. I 327ab, 432c, 545de; Phlb. 25b, 61bc. 1996: ch. 4. For discussion of a wide range of
Euthd. 302c303a, Menex. 243e244b and views on this issue see Chapter 12.
53
Phdr. 229e testify to Socrates orthopraxy, See McPherran 1996: ch. 4.2.
54
and note the stage-setting of the start of the For comprehensive discussion of the daimo-
Republic (I 327a), where Socrates has travelled nion see Chapter 12.
55
down to the Piraeus in order to pray to the See Ap. 40b1 together with 26b228a1.
goddess Bendis and observe her festival. See also Ap. 31c8d4, 40a46, 40c23,
45
During Socrates lifetime, divination 41d6; Euthphr. 3b57; Tht. 151a25; Thg.
() was widely employed by both 128d1131a7; Xen. Mem. 1.1.24, 4.8.1;
states and individuals, and appeared in Apol. 45, 8, 1213; Smp. 8.5. What evidence
roughly three forms (in order of prestige): there is (see esp. Ap. 27c1028a1) suggests
(1) divination by lots; (2) interpretation of that Socrates is uncertain as to the nature and
signs such as thunder, the direction of flights identity of the divinity behind his sign, but
of birds, dreams and the reading of sacrificial Apollo is surely a prime candidate since it is
entrails; and (3) the production and interpre- Apollo who has charged him with his philo-
tation of oral oracles by a seer (mantis) (with sophical mission to the Athenians, one that
these being recorded, collected and inter- exposes him to the sort of danger that would
preted by oracle-mongers. See e.g. Zaidman warrant a gods help. On the identity of the
and Pantel 1992: 1218. daimonion see Chapter 12, The Identity of the
46
For example, in the manner of the characters Daimonion.
56
of Euripides, who challenge both the abili- Although in Xenophon (e.g. Mem. 1.1.4;
ties and honesty of traditional seers (e.g. Phil. 4.3.12; 4.8.1; Apol. 12) the daimonion offers
fr. 795) and the existence of the gods who positive advice.
57
allegedly provide foreknowledge (Beller. fr. I argue in McPherran 1996: ch. 5.1 that we
286; Tro. 8847; fr. 480; Sextus Empiricus have reason to believe that Socrates holds the
Math. 9.54). See Ostwald 1986: 27990, for alternatives of his first premise that death
discussion. is either nothingness or migration to another
47
For discussion of how Socrates can endorse place where he can philosophize to be
the Ignorance Principle (T2) but also know equally probable; hence, that he is an agnostic
(or justifiably believe) things, see Brickhouse on the topic of the souls immortality. For a
364

NOTES
critical response, see Brickhouse and Smith that the motivation for Socrates prosecution
1994a: ch. 6.5. is primarily political and not religious, see
58
This inference was adopted by the Stoics Chapters 1 and 13, in this book.
63
as their main theological proof and made a Plato makes the same point, in a clear refer-
crucial contribution to their thinking about ence to the Euthyphro (R. I 377e378e; cf.
natural law; see e.g. DeFilippo and Mitsis Laws 886cd). Note too that even a critic of
1994, Long 1996 and Sedley 2002. For further the new intellectualism like Aristophanes sees
discussion and the argument that Xenophons this same problem, but foists it onto the intel-
testimony ought to be accepted, see McPherran lectuals, not the traditionalists (correctly so,
1996: ch. 5.2.For a good discussion of this since it is these who are responsible for advo-
argument and ancient design arguments in gen- cating a unitary conception of justice); e.g. in
eral, see Sedley 2007. the Clouds he has Wrong Argument advocate
59
The attribute of loving marks a somewhat using the example of Zeus to excuse ones own
non-traditional development, for part of adulteries (107984; cf. 904).
64
the traditional attitude held that being a For example, Democritus, a probable contem-
human-lover is beneath the dignity of Zeus; porary of Socrates, declared that the gods are
Burkert 1985: 274. On the other hand, some the source of all good and that man is respon-
gods in Homer do display affection for some sible for the evils that he suffers (DK B175);
mortals: see Parker 1998: 123. while the speaker of the Sisyphus fragment
60
Although we never see Socrates grapple (probably by Euripides) held the gods and
directly with the problem of reconciling the their justice to be the false invention of certain
existence of good and wise god(s) with the shrewd and clever-minded man (DK 88 B25).
65
existence of natural disasters and moral evil, For the argument that Socrates was found
his view that piety involves serving the gods guilty on the basis of charge (I), see Burnyeat
by improving our souls via philosophical 1997.
66
examination, and his seeming view that we See e.g. Euripides HF 13406.
67
are, qua human beings, constrained from fully Lloyd-Jones 1971: 134, Burnet 1924: 114,
possessing the knowledge of virtue constitu- Dodds 1951: 1413, Yunis 1988: 39.
68
tive of divine wisdom (Ap. 20de, 23a) suggest Garland 1992: 136, 146 and Versnel 1981: 127.
69
that he might have held something akin to For detailed discussion of this procedure, see
a traditional soul-building response to the e.g. Parker 1996a: chs 910, Garland 1992:
problem. On this sort of account, there really esp. 1422, 137, 149. Cf. Laws 738b739a.
are no natural evils: ocean storms, diseases As the influx of foreign deities such as Bendis
and death itself are not in themselves evil, but into Athens increased during and after the life
assume value only in relation to the moral of Socrates, there even seem to have been a
development of a persons soul (see e.g. Euthd. number of prosecutions for failure to meet the
277d282e; Grg. 511c512e). Moral evils, requirements for proper religious innovation; see
on the other hand, are a consequence of our Garland 1992: ch. 7 and Parker 1996a: chs 910.
70
having imperfect human souls, an imperfec- Garland 1992: 146. Versnel 1981: 121
tion that is a necessary condition of non-divine writes: . . . the very nature of the notion
human beings having been created in the first foreign [e.g. god] evoked various unpleasant
place, a creation that is, all things considered, a associations . . . .
71
good thing. Euthphr. 3b59; cf. 5a78. Xenophon also
61
Guthrie 1971: 156 and Zaidman and Pantel: claims that the second count derives from
176: As the Greeks saw it, the divine simply Socrates talk of the daimonion (Mem.
manifested itself in multiply diverse aspects. 1.1.23; Apol. 12), and the Socrates of Platos
62
Ap. 26b7; a reduction paralleled at Euthphr. Apology reports that Meletus wrote about it
3b4e; Reeve 1989: 756. For the argument [the daimonion] in the indictment (31d12).
that the specifications are historically accurate Add to this the fact that Xenophon feels
and authentic, see Brickhouse and Smith 1989: the need to defend Socrates against this sort
30, Versnel 1981: 124 n. 122.For arguments of understanding of the second allegation
365

NOTES
(Mem. 1.1.34; Apol. 1214; cf. Mem. CHAPTER 12

4.3.1213) and we have solid grounds for sup-
posing that Socrates daimonion was indeed 1
For a theoretically sophisticated analysis of
its primary target. Cf. Burkert 1985: 317 and reductionist paradigms in the interpretation
Garland 1992: 149. of possession, trance and ecstasy see Smith
72
Versnel 1981: 1212 notes that foreign cults 2006: 3956. Though the focus of his study
tended to be associated with private rituals, is on South Asian religious phenomena,
which in turn fostered all sorts of suspicions. the methods he discusses are also deployed
He also persuasively shows through a survey widely in accounts of Socrates experiences.
of cult-introduction in Athens (10231) that (1) Approaches based on theological ortho-
in addition to the negative connotations of doxy that classifies certain phenomena as
foreign cults . . . there is also a marked resist- superstitious. (2) Psychoanalytic approaches,
ance to the novelty of non-traditional gods and e.g. Freudian and diassociation theory, that
cults (130): a resistance to religious change interpret subjective experiences as caused
that extends back to Hesiod (fr. 322) and intra-psychically. (3) Various naturalistic
which shows up in Xenophons advice from schemes, e.g. the biomedical approach, which
Delphi to follow established custom (Mem. relies on psycho-physical mechanisms as
4.3.16). Thus, the daimonion could represent primary causal factors and excludes the pos-
to some Athenians the worst possible religious sibility of non-sensory forces influencing an
threat: not only a foreign import but a new individuals consciousness.
one as well. 2
See Flower (2008: 8490) for a lucid exposi-
73
McPherran 1996: 135; cf. Kraut 2000: 17. tion of Platos typology of divination, which
74
Cf. Garland 1992: ch. 7 and Kraut 2000. does not reflect actual Greek experience.
75
Although Socrates himself never names the Platos overly schematic distinction influenced
daimonion as a source of the first accusations Cicero, who distinguished between natural and
that led to the formal specifications, it may be artificial divination, the former involving spirit
alluded to when he speaks at Apology 23a of possession, the latter rational and technical
unspecified slanders connected with the allega- readings of bird flight and animal entrails: On
tions that he possesses wisdom and when he Divination I.6.1112, I.18.34.
notes at 23de the allegation that he teaches 3
Burkert 1977 points out that in the early
about the things aloft. In fact, since it is clear fourth century no clear boundaries sepa-
that the daimonion was the source for the rate Orphic, Eleusinian, Pythagorean and
formulation of one of the formal specifications, Corybantic rites and teachings.
it seems likely that Meletus would try to use 4
Nagy 1990 traces the interconnections
a formulation that does pick up a pre-existing between mantic and poetic inspiration.
prejudice and that the daimonion as the 5
For a detailed introduction to Socratic piety
source for the second specifications formu- in relation to classical Greek religion see
lation (II) was, then, a source of pre-trial McPherran, Chapter 11, in this book. Here I
prejudice. shall only highlight a few aspects of this theme
76
Namely: Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius: that have a bearing on Socrates religious
please pay the debt and do not forget (Phd. experiences.
118a78). In McPherran 2003a, I argue 6
Schefer 2000 argues that Platos Apollonian
that we should understand Socrates here as faith remained constant throughout his writ-
instructing Crito to repay their mutual debt ings, despite significant development in his
for (1) the philosophy-encouraging dreams metaphysical and ethical ideas.
Socrates has received from Asclepius (e.g. Ap. 7
For a detailed portrait of Apollo see Graf
33c, 43d44b; Phd. 60c61c); and (2) for 2009a.
Asclepius having saved both Crito and himself 8
See Davies 2009: 514. In R. I 427bc
from death during the plague of 430420, Socrates validates Apollos unique legisla-
and thus, having saved them for a life of tive authority. See Mikalson 2010: 1319 on
philosophizing. Platos accounts in R. and Lg. of how the
366

NOTES
gods, and particularly Apollo, through the 1960: 40111. In both works Plato approves
Delphic oracle, established sacrificial cults, the traditional conduct of sacrifice, cult, prayer
religious laws (e.g. on pollution), civic laws and hymns.
18
and institutions, song and dance honouring See Maurizios 1995 critique of received opin-
the gods, funerary practices, etc. ion, e.g. Parke and Wormell 1956:I.379, who
9
See Graf 2009a: 4551, who links the ecstatic claim that, owing to her being in a hypnotic
side of Apollos character to travel and wisdom trance, the Pythias babble had to be revised
acquired from abroad, in these respects like or shaped into publishable form by the male
Dionysus. attendants (prophts, one who proclaims
10
See Reeve 2000: 249 for discussion of the publicly) at the Delphic sanctuary. In his
twenty-three references to Apollo in Platos authoritative study Burkert 1985: 116 also
Ap. Schefer 2000: 97 notes fifty references to endorses this dubious position.
19
Apollo with theos in the dialogues, compared On comparative anthropological data see
to ten for Zeus and Poseidon. Maurizio 1995: 726 and Arnott 1989, which
11
On the Delphic background to the Socratic compares the Delphic oracle with contempo-
paradoxes see OBrien 1967. rary Tibetan oracles. On the anthropology of
12
Cf. Sph. 230bd on the purificatory effect of possession see Smith 2006 and Bourguignon
the elenchus. 1976.
13 20
See McPherran, Chapter 11, in this book, and One of Plutarchs characters says that the god
1996: 2982. Vlastos 1991: 15799 champi- initiates the movement, and each of the proph-
ons Socrates as a moral revolutionary whose etesses is moved according to her nature . . .
untraditional theology led to his execution. B-S Voice and sound, diction and meter, belong not
2000a: 236 reject this claim; see also Parker to the god but to the woman. He merely puts
1996a: 2023, who points out that criticism the concepts into her mind, and gives her soul
of myths, which Socrates conducts in Euthphr. light to view the future; that is what possession
6a and elsewhere was common and not (enthousiasmos) means (1993: 62).
21
considered impious. For a critique of Vlastos Graf 2009b: 5968, Maurizio 1995: 856 and
and McPherran on the do ut des principle cf. Maurizio 2001: 504 discuss the interpreta-
Lnnstrm 2011. tive challenges posed by the frenzied behav-
14
Reeve 2000: 2930. McPherran 1996: 218 iour of prophetesses portrayed in literature,
stresses the great epistemological and meta- like Cassandra. Dodds 1951: 87 n. 41 also
physical chasm separating humanity from objects to early-twentieth-century characteriza-
the gods . . . Socrates would have us labor to tions of the Pythias inspiration as hysterical
perfect ourselves, but with no hope . . . of our excitement.
22
ever crossing this divide (authors emphasis); Graf 2009a: 5935 discusses Plutarchs use
see also McPherran 1996: 291302. of the Control template in Mor. 414de.
15
On the oracle as the inspiration for Socrates Comparing the case to ventriloquists, he says
mission see McPherran 1996: 20846, B-S that it is foolish to believe that god himself
1989: 8799. . . . enters into prophets bodies and uses their
16
On the prestige of the oracle see Dodds 1951: mouths and voices as his instruments (Plut.
745, Green 1989: 92, Green 2009: 30. See 1993: 21).
23
Mikalson 2005: 99111 and Graf 2009a Graf 2009a: 5945: divine and human natures
6471 for an overview of the oracle as a reli- mix and are attuned, or not, depending on a
gious institution in classical times. Broad 2006 seers state of mind and body: the force of the
is an engaging popular history. Fontenrose spirit does not affect everyone in the same way,
1978 is a comprehensive survey that is still nor the same person in the same way at all
valuable, though outdated in some respects. times (Plut. 1993: 556).
17 24
In both the ideal state of the R. and the Cretan Greens analysis (1989: 91111) exposes the
city of the Lg., Delphic Apollo governs reli- hermeneutic limitations of recent rational-
gious laws and institutions: R. I 427abc, 461e, ist historians like Fontenrose, who, urging
540bc, Lg. 738bd, 759ae, 828a. See Morrow that the Delphic oracle be seen as part of a
367

NOTES
political con-game, dismiss out of hand strong natural to see and hear daimones; see Aristotle
empirical evidence of gaseous intoxication. For frr. 193, 196 Rose with Burkert 1972: 73.
34
additional arguments complementing Green For the daimonion as a target of the impiety
see Graf 2009a: 598602 and Maurizio 1997. charges see McPherran 1996: ch. 3, 2005,
25
Graf stresses these sociocultural and psycho- Mikalson 1983: 66, Parker 1996a: 203.
logical factors (2009a: 601). On the regimen Cartledge 2009: 889 and Garland 1992:
of priestesses see also Connelly 2007. Dietrich 146 argue that although new gods were often
1978: 56 emphasizes that the Delphic oracle assimilated into Athenian civic cult witness
as well as other oracles had chthonic associa- the festival of Bendis in the opening frame of
tions. The Pythias isolation, sensory depriva- the Republic because it communicated with
tion and mantic inspiration is paralleled by the only one person and showed no interest in
ascetic regimen and inspired states cultivated public welfare, the daimonion could not have
through the practice of incubation in caves been approved as an object of public cult.
35
by many religious virtuosos in the archaic Most scholars, accepting the daimonions
and classical periods. See Kingsley 1999 pas- apotreptic character in Plato, dismiss
sim. Ustinova 2009: 12555 details chthonic Xenophons account as a sign of his conven-
aspects of Delphic cult and incubation gener- tional piety. Representative of this view is
ally, but is uncertain whether trances were Vlastos 1991: 1817. Waterfield 2004: 1001
induced by either gases or religious practices minimizes the differences between the two
or both. Graf 2009b: 523 traces the links accounts on the grounds that an alarm not
between Apollo the healer and incubation. to perform a certain action amounts to an
26
See Maurizio 1995: 71, 75, who discusses endorsement of the opposite action. He also
Apollos sexual penetration of the Pythia. See points out that the daimonions giving advice
Flower on women as seers (2008: 21139) and to Socrates friends suits Xenophons ideal of
on Diotima in Platos Symp. as an example of the gentleman as someone who benefits his
the wandering type of seer (29, 21213). friends.
27 36
On Socrates receiving instruction from Vlastos 1991: 283 n. 147, 284 contests
female but not male figures see Blair 1996. translating tekmrion as proof. He argues
28
For Platos critique of divination see B-S 2007. instead that Socrates is convinced that death is
29
In Xenophons version Socrates is said to be not an evil on rational grounds not because of
more free, just and prudent (Ap. 14). That the silence of the daimonion. For a critique of
wisdom is omitted proves for Waterfield 2009: Vlastos on this point see B-S 2005: 534.
37
1011 that Xenophons mission was to make H. Tarrant 2005: 138 discusses the extensive
Socrates out to be a paragon of conventional use of variants of sunousia in Xenophons
virtue. On Xenophons oracle story see Mem., which in his view links it thematically
OConnor 2011: 657. with Thg. and Tht. He also notes (2005: 150)
30
McPherran 1996: 21415 surveys opinion five instances of sunousia in Ep. VII, which he
on the range of philosophical issues Socrates also considers inauthentic and assigns to the
may have debated. For the idea that Socrates Academy after Plato. Many scholars challenge
engaged in cosmological speculation before the Ep. VIIs authenticity, but it is considered
the oracle see Vander Waerdt 1994 and Janko genuine by a greater number of scholars than
2003 and 2006. those who consider the Alc. I and Thg. to be
31
Nehamas 1986: 3056 thinks that Socrates by Plato.
38
tests the oracle in the same way he tests his See the meticulous discussion of the inter-
interlocutors. textuality of passages in Tht., Thg. and Alc.
32
McPherran sharply contrasts conventional I with discussion of opposing views in Joyal
methods of oracular interpretation with 2000: 829. Joyal 2005: 10810 interprets
Socrates rational method (2011: 123). the assimilation of theos and daimonion as
33
To Partridge 2008: 2868 voice comprises an evidence of its inauthenticity. However, he fails
auditory event without verbal content. Aristotle to address the meaning and identity of theos in
recounts that for the Pythagoreans it was either dialogue, being content to characterize it
368

NOTES
48
as indeterminate (110). Most scholarship on Friedlnder 1964: 328 n. 14 defends the
this point is remarkably incurious about the authenticity of Thg. and argues that Plato cir-
implications of protreptic divine activity. cumscribed in other dialogues the wider scope
39
H. Tarrant 2005: 1415, 1535 prefers of the daimonions operation in this dialogue.
the first decades of the third century in the While the authenticity of Thg. was undisputed
Academy under the direction of Polemo. He in antiquity, its depiction of the daimonion
also discusses various scenarios for how Tht. provoked comment. See Opsomer 1997 on
influenced the authors of Alc. I and Thg. Plutarchs defence of the dialogues portrayal
40
Hutchinson 1999: 6056 thinks these of the daimonion against criticisms.
49
non-Platonic texts supply valuable evidence On ancient demonology from Homer through
about Socrates religiosity. late antiquity see Luck 2006: 20784, which
41
Shorey 1933: 429 and Rist 1963: 19 also includes a generous selection of primary texts.
criticize Thg. for it superstitious treatment of On the emergence of evil daimones in the
the daimonion. Cobb defends the dialogues Hellenistic period see Martin 2004: 93108.
50
authenticity. He suggests that the credulous On demonology in later Platonists see Plutarch
attitude in the passage belongs to Theages not 2010, Joyal 1995, Droge 2005: 65 ff., Long
Socrates and that Plato may have intended to 2006: 6972 and, in late antiquity in general,
criticize it (1992: 2778). Dodds 1965: 3768.
42 51
For recent discussions of this section of Thg. Joyal contends that in Thg. the daimonions
see Droge 2005: 728, Joyal 2000: 939 and active assistance in the learning process falsely
H. Tarrant 2005: 1415. For D. Tarrant 1958: characterizes it as an agent, like the mediating
98, touching implies miraculous powers. The daimn of Smp. 203a (2000: 92 ff.).
52
idea is problematic for two reasons. First, the For illuminating discussion of the differences
evidence she cites is from the New Testament, between the two entities see Long 2003:
which is the product of a totally different 1346. Destre 2005: 75 distinguishes the
religious milieu. Second, while Jesus sometimes daimonion and daimones, but thinks that the
heals through touch (but more often through daimonion is common to all humans. Rist
other means like language), he is the instiga- 1963: 16 speculates that the daimonion might
tor. In the dialogue, it is Theages who tries to be a manifestation that Socrates was guided
touch Socrates as do Agathon and Alcibiades by something superior to the daimones of
in Symp. Cobb 1992: 283 sees nothing magical other men.
53
in the passage, but rather evidence of charisma. Reeve 2000: 26 thinks that the daimonion is
43
See Taylors analogous distinction between the voice of a daimn.
54
the porous pre-modern self, which is open to Though he is included in this group, Vlastos
forces and interventions outside its perme- 1991: 159 argues that gods and daimones are
able boundaries, and the buffered modern, natural not supernatural, because they dont
post-Enlightenment self 2007. transcend nature.
44 55
For a critique of employing the individualized, Zellers is one of the earliest statements of
subjective concept of the self in Descartes and this idea: By the daimonion in the sense of
Kant to analysis of the ancient Greek model Socrates, no genius, no separate or distinct per-
of the self, see Gill 1996: 115. See also his sonality can be understood, but only vaguely
critique of relying on the Kantian notion of some heavenly voice or divine revelation
autonomy for interpreting Greek ethical reflec- (1885: 856, quoted in Reeve 1989: 68 n. 81).
56
tion (1996: 2941). Hans 2006: 839 also internalizes the daimo-
45
On educative ers see Friedlnder 1964: 152. nion, but does so along Heideggerian lines.
46 57
Annas 1985 argues for authenticity, N. D. Cf. McPherrans critique of this view 1996:
Smith 2004 against. Joyal 2000: 1289 sharply 2056 n. 65. He cites her statement (from
contrasts Tht. with Thg. and Alc. I. correspondence) that Socrates understands his
47
For an open-minded approach to Thg. and citations of the daimonion to be surreptitious
Alc. I see Friedlnder 1958: 345. references to his own secular powers of reason
dolled-up in the language of the superstitious
369

NOTES
many: Reason, that is, understood as a form of Ahbel-Rappe points out that the action of the
intuition a hunch produced by unconscious Prt. (310b) also begins with Socrates awak-
inference. ened from sleep and that he enters a kind of
58
Other recent rationalizing readings of the underworld he quotes from Od. 11.601
daimonion include Versenyi 1963, 1982, where Odysseus reports what he saw in the
Nehamas 1987: 3056. underworld when he perceives the great
59
Rowe 1986: 1656 interprets the sign in the sophists seated around Protagoras, enchanted
Phdr. as a literary device. as if listening to Orpheus (315be).
60 68
See the beginning of Tht. where Eucleides The Phd. also exhibits ring-composition, albeit
remarks that Socrates spoke prophetically in a more complex fashion, with Socrates
(mantiks) about the promise of the young dream near the beginning and the imagina-
Theaetetus. On Socrates prophetic insight see tive journey to the otherworld at the end. See
Desjardins 2004: 1535. McPherran 2003a: 80.
61 69
Socrates introduces the myth of the afterlife Phthia itself may be a Pythagorean pun on
at the end of the Grg. (523a) as a true logos. Hades (Phthia for Phthies, that is, land of the
On the ambiguity between logos and muthos dead) and death for Pythagoreans was the
see Kingsley 1995: 801, Gocer 1995: 7 and beginning of a voyage (Detienne 1962: 4950).
70
Buxton 1994: 1114. Note also Socrates state- Dodds 1959: 2967, 1951: 225, Kingsley
ment that we are not servants of logoi but vice 1995: 1045, 1659, Burkert 1972: 248 n.
versa (Tht. 173c). 48, Morgan 1990: 725. B-S do not find
62
Reeve also argues that Socrates mission origi- Orphic-Pythagorean content in the Grg. myth,
nated from elenctically based ethical reason which supports their grouping it with the
(1989: 66). It has been objected that he uses conclusions of the Ap. and of the Cri. and con-
reason to understand the oracle, but he accepts trasting them all with myths in Platos middle
it as true before he proceeds to examine his dialogues (2010: 2567).
71
fellow citizens (B-S 2005: 57). That Socrates does not argue for his meta-
63
The genesis of this view may be seen in the physical beliefs is also maintained by B-S 2010:
stimulating debate between Vlastos and Smith 2556.
72
in Smith and Woodruff 2000: 194, where See Dickie 2001: 1845 on the ambiguity
Smith suggests that Socrates trust in his dai- of the term magic in classical Greece. He
monion is akin to the trust we put in ordinary demonstrates that Plato has no clear concept
experience. of magic. On Socrates and magic see Rinella
64
On the daimonion and rationality see also 2010: 18495
73
Reeve 1989: 4561, B-S 2000a: 24752, See Belfiore 1980: 134 who claims that the
Partridge 2008. epoid has an emotional appeal unlike the
65
Vlastos 1991: 168 n. 50 stresses that the dream elenchus. Lan Entralgo offers a rationalizing
only seems clear to Socrates, in support of his view 1970: 11427.
74
claim that this and the Phd. dream possess low Phd. 107c115a, Lg. 653b, 656b, 659d. See
epistemic value. Belfiore 1980: 1335, McPherran 2004: 269
66
Adam 1927: 27 thinks she is a figure for fate, and Gellrich 1994. Lan Entralgo 1970: ch. 2
as in Socrates reference to his fated day at maintains that Platos use of charms and songs
the end of Phd. (115a). In Kingsley 1999 the is metaphorical.
75
goddess who welcomes Parmenides to Hades For criticism of the interpretation of these fig-
and reveals truths to him is Persephone. ures as shamans see Bremmer (2002: 2740).
67 76
Sara Ahbel-Rappe, unpublished talk Socrates See also Vernant 2006: 3817 and Dodds
Dreams. Her other example of a spiritual 1951: 21718. Hadot argues against taking
consort is Diotima who reveals to Socrates Socrates as a shaman in any sense (2002:
truths about daimones and the realm of forms. 1823). Following Dodds 1951: 20910,
On Socrates female guides see also Blair Morgan 1990: 99 and passim argues that the
1996. Kingsley 2003: 153 argues that Socrates philosopher displaces the ecstatic shaman and
received guidance mostly through dreams. seer and practices a rational ecstatic rite. The
370

NOTES
idea that the practice of dialectic exhibits ritu- the association of Dionysus with mystic light
alistic features is cogent, but his study leaves in the Bacchae and his identification with the
unclear in what sense dialectic is ecstatic. sun in late Orphic texts. He speculates that the
77
Taylor 1911b: 139, 12977. For a critique of mystic ritual may be in part a dramatization of
Taylors thesis see B-S 1989: 20, 35. near-death experiences (2005: 605).
78 84
On Platos critique of the popular aulos The sixteenth-century Chinese Chan Master
and how it was employed to induce trance Han Shan recounts several such episodes from
in cult see Rouget 1985: 21419. Plato his own experience in Lu 1971: 812, 85.
85
favoured Apollos lyre as opposed to Marsyas Rougets study is a rich resource for the com-
emotion-inducing aulos. parative study of ecstasy, trance and possession
79
Xenophon discusses Socrates love-potions and in classical antiquity and in other cultures. His
spells in association with Antisthenes (Mem. distinction is analogous to Webers distinction
3.11.1617). On Socrates eros for Alcibiades between apathetic and agitated ecstatic states
in Aeschines see Kahn 1996: 217, Vlastos (Weber 1958: 149). Rouget believes that Plato
1991: 247. On Xenophons Socrates erotic held Bacchic trance in relatively low regard
intensity and self-sufficiency see OConnor (1985: 200) in contrast to Linforth 1950: 171.
86
2011: 605 1994. On Socratic eros gener- The internal quietness Plato endorses in
ally see Chapter 9, in this book, Hadot 1995: the middle dialogues is explored in Gocer
15870, Friedlnder 1958: 3258. 1999. Kingsley 1999: 162, 180 ff. discusses
80
A passage in Plutarch offers one way of imag- Parmenides practice of silence and stillness as
ining the paradoxical combination of both an Orphic-Pythagorean healer-seer (iatroman-
Apollonian and Dionysian traits in Socrates: It tis). Dionysiac possession also produces calm-
seems that our beloved Apollo finds a remedy ness in the end (Seaford 2006: 106).
87
and a solution for the perplexities connected On the neuropathology of altered states,
with our life by the oracular responses he including epilepsy, in shamans and other reli-
gives to those who consult him; but as for gious virtuosos see Winkelman 2000: 11390.
88
the perplexities connected with our power to For a philosophically sophisticated discus-
reason, it seems that it is rather he himself who sion of trance and ecstasy with respect to the
implants and propounds these to him who is contemporary phenomenon of split personality
by nature inclined to the love of knowledge, see Hacking 1995: 14258.
89
thus creating in the soul a craving that leads For Anthisthenes praise of these features of
on to the truth (Plut. De E 384, trans. Babbitt Socrates see Kahn 1996: 78, 301. OConnor
modified). 1994 highlights the self-sufficiency of
81
Remarkably, Lear 2011: 334, 845 contends Xenophons Socrates.
that Socrates simply does not know what his
next step should be. Lears Socrates is not
thinking about an intellectual problem at all.
82
In Ti. 71e the verb sunnoein designates the CHAPTER 13
cognitive state of a rational man who reflects
1
on what is said by those who are in a state Nehamas 1998: 153 challenges Nietzsches
of divination or possession. In R. I 571de, assessment of Socrates health, pointing out
quoted above, the noun sunnoia designates the that Nietzsche was sick most of his life, while
cognitive state of the person who has calmed Socrates was an embodiment of health and
the two lower parts of the soul, himself hav- vigour; Nietzsche was always bundled up
ing reached understanding (or awareness) of/ against the cold, while Socrates wore the same
with himself. This is analogous to the phrase tunic winter and summer, and walked around
used in the porch-episode: he applied his mind barefoot; Nietzsche could not tolerate any
(nous) to himself (174d). alcohol, while Socrates could drink prodi-
83
See Seaford 2005 who discusses the symbol giously without getting drunk; Nietzsche spent
of the light appearing in the darkness in his life writing in private, completely alone and
Orphic-Pythagorean mysticism. He also traces withdrawn from the world, while Socrates was
371

NOTES
a street philosopher, always in public, always criminals and traitors issues during the trial.
talking to people. When we compare Socrates The Amnesty merely prevented these relation-
and Nietzsche in these respects, the question, ships from being part of the formal charges.
8
Nehamas says, who is decadent and who is Some writers in later antiquity suggested that
healthy begins to appear perfectly senseless. Socrates refused to defend himself and instead
2
For an argument in favour of Socratic sincerity, chose to remain silent. See e.g. Maximus of
according to which Socrates was committed to Tyre (late second century CE) who in Oration
telling the truth and could not possibly have III addresses the question of whether Socrates
been enticing his jury to convict him unjustly, did the right thing when he did not defend
see Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 3747. himself. Most scholars reject these stories
3
We might complain that Nietzsche has turned because Plato and Xenophon, both of whom
Socrates narrow claim about the value of old knew Socrates personally, present us with a
age into a broad assessment of the value of life Socrates who had plenty to say during his trial.
in general, but Nietzsches point is that death Brickhouse and Smith 2002: 117 speculate that
can only appear to be a benefit if you believe the story of Socrates court-day silence derives
that this life and this world are inferior to the from a distortion of the tradition of apolo-
ones that are to come. Since Nietzsche was an gists trying to explain why Socrates, although
atheist whose central value was life, this logical a brilliant thinker and speaker, was not able to
consequence of two-world metaphysical beliefs persuade his jurors to release him.
9
seemed unhealthy and particularly deplorable. See Brickhouse and Smith 1989 and 1994a for
4
On this point, see Cartledge 2009: 89, who the most systematic development of this view.
suggests that the trial of Socrates would have See also Reeve 1989, Irwin 1989, Kraut 2000
performed something like the collective civic and Cartledge 2009.
10
rite of purification . . . purifying the citizen Many scholars have argued along these lines.
body by purging it of a cancerous irreligious See Barker 1951, Bonfante and Radista 1978,
traitor. Burnet 1924, Bury 1926, Cartledge 2009,
5
I discuss Waterfields complete answer to these Chroust 1957, Dover 1976, Finley 1977,
questions throughout this chapter. Nietzsche Guthrie 1971, Hansen 1980, Lofberg 1928,
does not seem to have any opinions about MacDowell 1978, Montouri 1981, Roberts
them. 1984, Seeskin 1987, Stone 1988, Strauss 1987,
6
Plato (Ap. 24bc), Xenophon (Mem. 1.1.1) Taylor 1956, Vlastos 1983, Waterfield 2009,
and Diogenes Laertius (2.40) preserve essen- Winspear and Silverberg 1960 and Zeller
tially the same indictment. There are slight 1963. See Irwin 1989 and Burnyeat 1988 for
variations in the wording, but the charges line-by-line refutations of Stone 1988. For
are the same. For a detailed discussion of the further responses to Stone, see Sobran 1988,
precise meaning of each formal charge, see Annas 1988, Leonard 1988, Bowersock 1988,
Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 306. Griffin 1988, Kagan 1988 and Davis 1988.
7
Some scholars have seen a political motive See Ralkowski 2011 for a critical review of
underlying the corruption charge, and there Waterfield 2009, and see Brickhouse and Smith
may have been one, just as there may have 1989, Cohen 1988, Finley 1968 and Hackforth
been a political motive underlying the jurys 1933 for general arguments against the politi-
decision to convict. But that does not mean cal interpretation. Cartledge and Waterfield,
there was a political meaning intended in the but especially Cartledge, are difficult to classify
indictment. There could not have been, as a using these categories, which may be anach-
matter of legal fact. The Amnesty prohibited ronistic. Waterfield clearly identifies more
it. The Amnesty passed under the archonship strongly with the political interpretation, as
of Eucleides in 403 made it illegal to charge we will see below. But Cartledge (2009: 77)
Socrates with crimes he committed before or argues that the Athenian jury was indeed
during the reign of the Thirty. As I will discuss, right to convict Socrates. More especially, I
however, the Amnesty did not prevent Socrates shall argue that they did so on the basis of
accusers from making his relationships with the main charge, that of impiety. He rejects
372

NOTES
the straightforward political interpretation. I principle: during the war, he resorted to brib-
argue against that view, he says. But he also ery to get himself acquitted from a trial for
argues that it is anachronistic and misleading incompetence, and at the end of the war, he
to distinguish the political from the religious initially supported the Thirty. It was not until
charge, because impiety was always political. he fled into exile that he joined the resistance
For agreement on this important point, see movement with Thrasybulus and eventually
also Waterfield 2009: 193, Irwin 1989: 190, became a prominent democratic leader in
Strauss 1986: 946, Burnyeat 1988 and 2002: Athens. Maybe his role as a prosecutor in
138, Kraut 1999: 1318 and Parker 1996b. Socrates trial was a calculated political step
11
As we will see, scholars usually debate the taken to solidify his credentials as a trustwor-
prosecutions motivations in terms of what thy protector of the Athenian democracy. As
they were legally permitted to do, given the Strauss says, the prosecution of Socrates four
Amnesty, what the indictment explicitly said years after the fall of the oligarchy gave him
and how Socrates defended himself according an opportunity to focus the ever-smouldering
to Plato and Xenophon. But why should we anger of the demos against a symbol of their
limit ourselves to these factors when were enemies, as well as a chance to build up
trying to unearth the psychology of three his own reputation as a popular champion
men? Why not ask what Socrates accusers (Strauss 1986: 95). Anytus was also known
had to gain from persecuting and silencing to be a suitor of Alcibiades (Plut. Alc. 4.46),
Socrates? What did they most want, and how and a bitter father who blamed Socrates for
is that related to Socrates execution? For ruining his son (Xen. Apol. 2931). For all
example, the Thirty killed Lycons son. That we know, Anytus may have wanted revenge
seems extremely relevant to his participa- against Socrates for stealing his man (since
tion in the trial as one of the two promi- Alcibiades loved Socrates, and not Anytus)
nent democrats on the prosecution team. If or harming his family. If we could develop a
Socrates could be linked in any way to the more comprehensive understanding of these
Thirty, it is hard to imagine how Lycon would issues, we would be well on our way to a
not want revenge against him for his son. But clearer picture of what happened to Socrates.
we rarely include ordinary human elements But alas, such a clearer understanding is prob-
like this in our discussions about Socrates ably impossible.
12
last days. Maybe, as a consequence, we have Arguably the most sensible thing ever said
missed the forest for the trees. Anytus might about this issue is Burnyeats observation that
have been driven by something as basic as Socrates jurors will not have all voted Guilty
self-aggrandizement. Smith and Woodruff for the same reasons (2002: 135).
13
2000: 4 think this would implicate Anytus In fact, Socrates could have been charged
in an improbable hypocrisy, because he with sedition or subversion, but he was not.
had been an architect of the Reconciliation For an example of an Athenian law against
Agreement. But this assumes that Brickhouse subversion, see Andocides On the Mysteries
and Smith 1989 and 1994a are wrong about 1.9697, and see MacDowell (1978) for a gen-
the legal significance of the Amnesty. Like eral discussion of the law in classical Athens.
several other scholars, Brickhouse and Smith Socrates was charged with impiety. Nobody
argue for the view that the Amnesty prevented seriously disputes this. Our question is whether
prosecutors from including political griev- the formal charge of impiety was used to
ances in their indictments, but it did not pre- disguise political motivations for Socrates
vent them from speaking freely about politics trial, or whether there were political grievances
once a trial got started. If that is right, Anytus operative in the decision-making of Socrates
could have supported the Amnesty vigorously jury. And when scholars attempt to answer
and made politics relevant during Socrates these questions, they are not merely interested
trial. Besides, how probable is it to expect in knowing how Socrates was perceived.
a politician to be constrained by hypocrisy? Typically there is a desire to understand what
We know Anytus was not exactly a man of Socrates politics were in fact.
373

NOTES
14
Our ancient evidence for the Amnesty is in Lysias Against Agoratus, Against Evandros
Aristotles Ath. Pol. 3839, especially 39.16, and Against Alcibiades 1. Lintott 1982: 176
and Andocides On the Mysteries 1.8187. mentions twelve such speeches by Lysias, and
15
See e.g. Allen 1975: 12, Burnet 1924: 101, three by Isocrates.
22
Bury 1940: 393, Davies 1983: 187, Navia At the very least Socrates was critical of sorti-
1984: 14 and 39n2, Reeve 1990: 99 and tion and popular election, and he rejected
Roberts 1984: 245. Each of these scholars the idea of mass wisdom. He also may have
thinks the Amnesty would have made it illegal favoured rule by experts, and he was fiercely
for the prosecutors to use Socrates relation- critical of Athens most famous democratic
ships with Critias and Alcibiades, or anyone statesmen, including Pericles. For important
else affiliated with crimes against the democ- and representative passages, see Pl. La. 184e,
racy, as part of their case against him. Grg. 519a, Prt. 319b320b, Ap. 24e25c, 29d,
16
For an additional discussion of this point, see 31c32a, Cri. 47cd, 47a48d, Hp. Ma. 284e,
Loening 1981: 203. Men. 93e94e2, Euthd. 292bc; and Xen.
17
Joyce 2008: 514 argues that the Amnesty only Mem. 1.2.9, 3.14, 3.7.57, and 3.9.10.
23
applied to the time period in which the Thirty Xenophons implication here seems to be
held power, and that the point of the reconcili- that Anytus participated in the prosecution
ation was merely to settle grievances that their because he was angry with Socrates for sug-
dictatorship had produced throughout the city. gesting that he had raised his son badly. Plato
18
Hansen 1996 makes the important point that also hints at personal grievances between
Socrates prosecutors would have been free to Anytus and Socrates. At Men. 91c92b and
discuss politics as much as they wanted, even if 93a94b, Anytus expresses hostility towards
the Amnesty did offer a blanket forgiveness for the sophists, with whom he probably identified
crimes committed before or during the reign Socrates, and he specifically warns Socrates to
of the Thirty, provided the issues they raised watch what he says about Athenian politicians.
24
related entirely to things Socrates did and According to Plato, Aeschines of Sphettus was
said between 403 and 399. However, if that present at Socrates trial (Ap. 33e) and death
had been the prosecutions focus, and if the (Phd. 59b).
25
prosecutors had been limited in this way, they See Irwin 1989: 18990. To be fair to
would not have been able to discuss Alcibiades Waterfield, this seems to be his point as well,
or Critias, both of whom were dead by 403. only he puts the emphasis on the political
19
However, it does seem fair to say that Socrates dimension of impiety, not the religious one, as
accusers would have been careful not to be I discuss below. On this point, Cartledge 2009:
perceived as violating the Amnesty, and so may 7691 and Strauss 1986: 946 are also helpful.
26
have constructed and presented their case in Newspaper cartoons may not change many
a way that steered clear of politics as much minds, but Stones analogy is a poor one. Jon
as possible. The success of their case, as well Stewarts Daily Show is a much more apt
as their lives, may have depended on it. See analogue to the plays of Aristophanes. Stewart
Rhodes 1981: 473, Harrison 1971: 106 and often says he does not have a political agenda.
Krentz 182: 11518. For a general discussion But who honestly thinks that he and his col-
of the Amnesty, see Ostwald 1986: 497509. leagues do not shape opinions and impact
Rhodes points out that defendants could American politics? See Cost 2009 for a discus-
appeal for acquittal at a preliminary hearing if sion of recent studies of Stewarts influence.
27
they could prove they were being prosecuted in See Chroust 1957: ch. 4 for a detailed discus-
violation of the Amnesty. sion of the arguments relevant to dating
20
See Parker 1996b: 150 for a discussion of Polycrates pamphlet.
28
Lysias speeches and what they mean for our Chroust 1957: ch. 4 and Waterfield 2009:
understanding of the Amnesty. 197200 both try to reconstruct the content of
21
For additional examples of post-war trials that Polycrates speech. Irwin 1989: 193 n. 19 calls
made open references to crimes committed Chrousts reconstruction of Polycrates pam-
before and during the reign of the Thirty, see phlet overconfident. This is a fair criticism,
374

NOTES
since Chroust relies so much on Libanius upon hearing the news about Socrates (D. L.
Apology and we cannot know how faithful 2.43) or they stoned him to death (Plut. Them.
Libanius paraphrase of Polycrates is. 20.239c). See Nails 2002: 38.
29 34
For developments of Chrousts position, see We also have to find a way to explain why
Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 1994a and 2002. Plato never mentions the political issues that
30
Assuming his dialogues are informative about Polycrates suggests were central to the pros-
history, Plato confirms a whole host of other ecutions case against Socrates.
35
potentially damaging relationships between Brickhouse and Smith would object to this
Socrates and many of Athens worst enemies conclusion because it contradicts Platos and
of the state. Alcibiades, Charmides and Critias Xenophons accounts of the trial, neither of
are all present in the Protagoras. The Chrm. which show Socrates responding directly to
says outright that Socrates and Critias have political charges (Brickhouse and Smith 2002:
known each other for more than a decade, 7). This is an important argument, but it
and it presents Socrates as Charmides teacher. depends on the assumption that Xenophons
The Symp. and Grg. both present Socrates as and Platos apologies were intended to be
Alcibiades lover, and the Symp. and Chrm. straightforward (i.e. not rhetorical) and
both tell us that Socrates was attracted to exhaustive (i.e. complete) historical reports.
Charmides. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether this
31
For a more detailed development of this argu- assumption is true, although one might find
ment, see Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 845. it unlikely simply on the grounds that Plato,
32
Plutarch says that after Alcibiades speech for one, was a philosopher and not a biogra-
to the assembly in favour of the Sicilian pher or historiographer (Kahn 1988: 35). The
Expedition, the young were soon elevated with question, therefore, is what should weigh more
these hopes, and listened gladly to those of heavily in our speculations: (i) the evidence
riper years, who talked wonders of the coun- of absence (i.e. what Plato and Xenophon did
tries they were going to; so that you might see not write) or (ii) the probability that Socrates
a great number sitting in the wrestling grounds accusers would have exploited their audiences
and public places, drawing on the ground the post-war resentments and bitterness to convict
figure of the island and the situation of Libya Socrates? Brickhouse and Smith favour (i). I
and Carthage. Socrates the philosopher and favour (ii).
36
Meton the astrologer are said, however, never For a classic account of the distinction between
to have hoped for any good to the common- the Socratic and Platonic dialogues, see
wealth from this war (Plut. Alc. 17.3).Plato Guthrie 1971: 2935.
37
was probably twelve or thirteen the year There is an exception to this rule, as we will
that Alcibiades made his case for the Sicilian see in the penultimate section of this essay. It is
Expedition. And he was a wrestler. How can possible to attribute a political significance to
we not imagine Plato at the wrestling grounds the trial without taking a position on Socrates
described by Plutarch, either involved in this political teachings. See Cartledge 2009.
38
excitement or watching it disapprovingly from On this view, the anti-democratic ideas in the
a distance? But if Plato was acutely aware of dialogues are Platos innovations and therefore
Alcibiades and his role in the Sicilian disaster, tell us nothing about the historical Socrates or
how could he have muddled the details of the motivations for his trial. For some classic
Alcibiades pedagogical relationship with and representative examples, see Popper 1966,
Socrates? Anything is possible, but this seems Vlastos 1983, Kraut 1984 and Irwin 1986.
particularly unlikely. All he had to do was ask Each of these scholars, with the exception of
Socrates. Vlastos, argues that Socrates was not opposed
33
According to Diogenes Laertius, the Athenians to democracy in theory or practice, and they
were so repentant after the trial that they exe- attribute the anti-democratic ideas of the mid-
cuted Meletus and banished the others. When dle dialogues to Plato alone.
39
Anytus reached Heraclea Pontica as a fugitive, Several scholars have argued that Socrates was
the citizens there exiled Anytus immediately part of the oligarchic faction, and perhaps even
375

NOTES
43
part of a conspiracy against the democratic Socrates emphasizes the importance of experts
constitution. See Grote 1888 vol. 7: 1446, in several of Platos early dialogues. See Ap.
Guthrie 1971: 614, Stone 1988: 11739, 24e25c, Cri. 47a48c and La. 184ce.
44
Shorey 1933: 103, Vlastos 1983: 495516, Socrates arguments against democracy were
Winspear and Silverberg 1960: 84 and Wood not unique to him. Some of his contempo-
and Wood 1978: 97. raries made the same or similar points. See
40
For discussions of the relationship between Bultrighini 2005.
45
Platos political theory in the Republic and This analogy is ubiquitous in Xenophon. See
Socrates political thought, see Kraut 1984: 10, Gray 2007 for a discussion. Stone thought
Ober 1998: 10, Schofield 2006: 31516 and Socrates challenges to the possibility of
Rowe 2007. knowledge undermined the polis (Stone 1988:
41
Vlastos 1983 argues that the incompat- 81), but only because he was committed to
ibilities between Plato and Xenophon are too contradictory positions. He argues both (i) that
significant for this to be a plausible interpre- Socrates denied the possibility of knowledge
tive method. For a response to him on this and (ii) that only someone with knowledge
point, however, see Wood and Wood 1986 and should rule, which produces the conclusion
Schofield 2000. Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: that nobody is qualified to rule. See Irwin 1989
157 agree with Vlastos on this point. They for a discussion of Stones absurdly incoher-
make the case that the Socrates of Platos early ent position on this issue. Socrates scepticism
dialogues cannot be reconciled with the one we is probably clearest in his distinction between
find in Platos middle dialogues or with the one divine and human wisdom (Ap. 20c23b).
we find in Xenophons writings. But his scepticism may have been restricted to
42
My own view is that we cannot know what the knowledge of the consequences of our actions,
historical Socrates believed about anything. It which is unattainable at best, we must pray
seems plausible that the historical Socrates is to the gods that our actions will have desirable
correctly represented some places in Plato and consequences (Mem.1.1.79). The topic of
Xenophon, but we lack the objective standard Socrates disavowal of knowledge is complex
necessary for distinguishing fact from fiction. and too much to discuss in detail in this chap-
I do not see any way around this problem, ter. For a few classic discussions, see Burnyeat
short of discovering a time machine. And 1977, Irwin 1977, Kraut 1984 and Vlastos
even then we would have to find our way past 1985.
46
Socrates various ironic facades, assuming he Socrates mentions the trial of Pericles as an
really was a master of irony. The point of this instance of the demos not taking responsibility
subsection is to present a maximally political for its own failings, and evidence of Pericles
Socrates so that we can bring such a Socrates failed leadership (Grg. 516ad). Socrates and
views to bear on the debate about the trials Pericles appear to have been well acquainted,
motivations. although Socrates may have preferred
It is worth noting that some scholars, e.g. Aspasias company to Pericles (Plut. Per. 24.3).
47
Penner 2000, think Socrates was completely On this point he disagrees with Platos
apolitical, cynical about the possibility of Protagoras (Prt. 319a328d), who argues that
producing or discovering political experts and everyone can learn civic virtue, albeit at differ-
interested only in a kind of ground-up reform, ent ability levels, and so is capable of develop-
that is, via discussions with interlocutors ing a worthwhile opinion of what is just and
aimed at changing them as individuals. Horn lawful.
48
2008 also denies that Socrates had political Brickhouse and Smith 1994a: 164 argue that
ambitions to change Athenians by changing Socrates had a favourable opinion of the
the polis. Woodruff 1993 acknowledges that craftsmen. Their evidence of this is Socrates
Socrates was often focused on the kind of claim in Platos Ap. (22d) that, unlike the
virtue that political leaders should have, sug- politicians who know nothing, the crafts-
gesting that the moral reform of individuals men know many fine things they have
was inseparable from politics. craft knowledge. This point is overstated,
376

NOTES
55
however. Socrates criticism of the craftsmens On Socrates divine sign, see Chapter 12, in
bloated self-assessment they believed they this book.
56
had knowledge about everything because of Parker 1996b: 155 offers this solution to our
their craft knowledge is compatible with the paradox: the city could introduce new gods
oligarchic dismissal of the craftsmen as being (e.g. Pan and Bendis), provided the introduc-
unable to deliberate properly about moral and tions were done formally, publicly and with
political matters: if their craft knowledge made approval from the assembly. All religious prac-
them hubristic and closed-minded, that sounds tice undertaken on Attic soil occurs therefore
like an instance of impaired judgement. by gracious permission of the assembly. For
49
In Platos Ap. (31e32a), Socrates suggests that additional discussion of these practices, see
the Athenian people are so wild, so far gone Garland 1992.
57
from the path to virtue, that they cannot even Parker 1996b: 149 makes a similar point about
tolerate an activist who is devoted to justice. Aristophanes Clouds: admission to [Socrates]
The democracy, he said, was a with us or school is portrayed as a form of initiation
against us institution. into Mysteries (255 ff.), but the effect is much
50
Socrates makes a similar point in Platos Men. less to present Socrates as a man of strong if
(92d94e), where he angers Anytus, one of misguided piety than to stress the secret, elitist,
Socrates accusers, by suggesting that none of anti-social character of his teaching.
58
the Athenian statesmen had succeeded in giv- For example, they began their meetings of the
ing his children a proper education in virtue. Assembly with the ritual slaughter of piglets.
Later in Platos Grg., Socrates offers high Their blood was used to ceremonially purify
praise to Aristeides, who, despite failing to the meeting place on the Pnyx hill: religion
teaching his sons virtue (Men. 92d94e), was therefore was implicated with everything,
admirable for remaining uncorrupted by his and everything was imbricated with religion
power (Grg. 526a). (Cartledge 2009: 78).
51 59
Several scholars have argued that Socrates Burnyeat 2002: 1378 makes a simi-
criticism of democracy was theoretical, lar point. He argues that Socrates
not practical (Vlastos 1983; Kraut 1984; self-description in Platos Ap. is both one
Irwin 1989; Ober 2011). These positions long counter-indictment of Athens, charging
are worth considering very closely, since it Athenians with rampant injustice, and a revi-
is one thing to be a critic of democracy, and sion of traditional Athenian religious beliefs.
another to support the alternative faction. For It is a counter-indictment of Athens because it
counter-arguments to these positions, however, implies that Athenian values must be revised.
see Waterfield 2009. And it is a revision of traditional religious
52
Burnyeat 1988 suggests that Stone may not beliefs because it implies what divinity minds
have correctly understood Socrates, but he about, in Socrates view, is two things: (1) that
may nevertheless have provided us with a people should try to be virtuous, (2) that they
sympathetic understanding of the ordinary, should realize they do not yet know, but have
politically involved Athenian citizens reaction to find out, what it is to be virtuous . . . And in
to Socrates. making this counter-indictment Socrates claims
53
On the other hand, some of Lysias speeches to be speaking on behalf of divinity. See also
give us reason to believe there was a prejudice Parker 1996b: 156.
60
against those who stayed in the city dur- Parker 1996b: 153 thinks the important
ing the reign of the Thirty. For example, one connection, made by many Athenians, was
was titled, In Defense of Eryximachus, Who between atheism and relativism.
61
Remained in the City. See Waterfield 2009 and Cartledge 2009:
54
These men were also the most likely to be 7690. For older and much less developed
blinded by self-satisfaction and pretensions to statements of the same basic idea, see Irwin
wisdom, and so most in need of being stung 1989: 190, Strauss 1986: 946, Burnyeat 1988
by Socrates, the gadfly (Brickhouse and Smith and 2002: 138, Kraut 1999: 1318 and Parker
1994a: 171) 1996b.
377

NOTES
62
For details on the inseparability of religion and because they wanted revenge for having been
civic life in ancient Athens, see Parke (1977) humiliated in public has an equally serious
and Parker 1996a. difficulty accounting for why it took 24 years
63
See especially Brickhouse and Smith (1994a: for the prejudice against Socrates to become
175): Those who find a political motive actionable. However, if we combine (i) their
lurking behind the prosecution simply cannot prejudice interpretation of the prosecutions
explain why Meletus and his supporters would motives for crafting a one-size-fits-all indictment
choose such an unrelated indictment. with (ii) the historians analyses of the troubled
64
Brickhouse and Smith (1994a and 1989) argue times in Athens (Cartledge 2009; Waterfield
for this version of the mixed motivations 2009), we get what I think is the fullest and
theory, but they couple it with an absolute most accurate account of why Socrates was on
rejection of the political interpretation. We trial and ultimately condemned.
65
should point out, however, that their prejudice This matters a great deal. If Socrates political
interpretation is separable from their rejection views are reflected only in Platos Socratic
of Polycrates pamphlet as a source, just as it is dialogues, one can make the case that he was
separable from their more general case against a proponent of democracy, as some scholars
the political interpretation. They are right that have argued. On the other hand, if we couple
it is a problem for the political interpretation, Platos Socratic dialogues with Xenophons
whether extreme or moderate, that Platos and Socrates and a few passages from Platos
Xenophons apologies do not give us evidence middle dialogues, it is clear that Socrates was
of a political trial. But their own position the a theoretical opponent of democracy and
idea that Athenian hotshots went after Socrates favoured rule by experts.
378

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INDEX
Academy (Platos) 2, 4, 368, 369 Anytus 15, 106, 306, 307, 311, 312, 313,
Adam, A. 4, 294, 330, 370 317, 322, 326, 334, 373, 374, 375, 377
Adam, J. 16 Apollo 12, 235, 261, 267, 268, 272, 274,
Adams, D. 34, 35, 36, 501, 56, 226, 27783, 285, 290, 291, 293, 294, 295,
343, 354 297, 298, 321, 328, 357, 364, 3667,
Adeimantus 203 368, 371
Aelius Aristides 18 Apollodorus 335
Aeschines of Sphettus 1, 2, 4, 10, 16, 17, Apology of Socrates (Libaniuss) 312, 313,
211, 297, 306, 333, 374 334, 375
Aeschines Rhetor 306, 307, 310, 312, 320 Apology of Socrates (Platos) 3, 5, 7, 1113,
afterlife see death 15, 20, 28, 34, 48, 49, 52, 53, 76, 96,
Ahbel-Rappe, S. 293, 298, 370 97102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 11213,
Alaxamenus of Teus 1 114, 115, 117, 127, 145, 155, 167, 179,
Alcibiades 16, 17, 28, 21011, 237, 287, 180, 192, 198, 200, 201, 202, 234, 235,
2978, 299, 304, 305, 3067, 30914, 236, 237, 238, 240, 2425, 252, 257,
318, 319, 326, 333, 334, 353, 369, 371, 259, 269, 274, 278, 27984, 285, 286,
373, 374, 375 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295,
Alcibiades (Plutarchs) 375 298, 301, 305, 307, 309, 315, 316, 317,
Alcibiades I (Platos?) 53, 268, 269, 285, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325, 330, 332,
288, 317, 333, 368, 369 333, 334, 342, 346, 351, 356, 358, 360,
Allen, R. 9, 701, 72, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 365, 366, 367, 368, 370, 376, 377
835, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 243, 250, 337, Apology of Socrates (Xenophons) 11, 12,
363, 374 13, 278, 305, 314, 321, 325
amnesty (of 403) 3035, 31213, 314, 326, aporia (perplexity) 30, 39, 47, 57, 104, 214,
333, 372, 373, 374 215, 216, 217, 218, 2212, 232, 296,
Anabasis (Xenophons) 332 337, 338, 354, 363
Anagnostopoulos, M. 169, 187, 349, 351 appearance 14, 29, 30, 50, 51, 69, 1689,
Anderson, M. 247, 357, 358 179, 183, 190, 1957, 205, 208, 211,
Andocides 303, 333, 373, 374 255, 348
andreia see courage (andreia) appetite 157, 1701, 1813, 185209,
Annas, J. 158, 220, 226, 330, 347, 350, 21011, 235, 317, 347 see also desire
354, 369, 372 Arendt, H. 236, 238
Antisthenes 1, 3, 10, 328, 330, 371 aret see virtue (aret)
407
9781441112842_Index_Final_txt_print.indd 407 10/17/2012 8:44:57 AM

INDEX
Aristippus 1, 10, 331 Blair, E. 368, 370

Aristophanes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 78, 15, 18, 22, Blondell, R. 334, 335
98, 258, 262, 275, 297, 3089, 318, Bloom, A. 22
320, 322, 328, 329, 350, 365, 374, 377 Bobonich, C. 348
Aristotle 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 89, 11, 17, 18, Bckh, A. 3
20, 21, 52, 60, 62, 70, 71, 72, 75, 78, Boedecker, D. 333
79, 84, 858, 93, 119, 126, 136, 137, Boeri, M. 196
156, 159, 1901, 209, 216, 276, 303, Bolotin, D. 219, 220, 354, 355
304, 314, 318, 329, 330, 331, 332, 336, Bolton, R. 1267, 129, 130
337, 342, 348, 352, 359, 361, 368, 374 Bonfante, L. and Raditsa, L. 372
Aristotle of Thorae 333 Booth, W. 334
Aristoxenus 11, 210, 329 Bordt, M. 221, 225, 354
Arnim, H. von 3, 12, 225, 355 boulsis see desire
Arnott, W. 367 Bourguignon, E. 367
Asclepius 291, 293, 294, 301, 302, Bowersock, G. 372
321, 366 Bowie, A. 297
asebeia see impiety Brandis, C. 329
Ast, F. 3 Brandwood, L. 353
atheism 2, 7, 182, 257, 258, 259, 272, 274, bravery see courage (andreia)
308, 309, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, Bremmer, J. 278, 279, 370
326, 361, 362, 372, 377 Brickhouse, T. 102 see also Brickhouse and
Augustine 361 Smith
Brickhouse, T. and Smith, N. 12, 15, 16,
Bacchants/bacchic religion 281, 283, 294, 17, 34, 35, 36, 37, 402, 43, 468, 49,
297, 298, 362, 371 see also Dionysus 51, 567, 95, 102, 115, 121, 12935,
bad see good(s) (agathon) and bad(s) 14951, 154, 160, 171, 172, 180,
(kakon) 1813, 185209, 236, 237, 238, 239,
Balot, R. 247, 356, 357 240, 242, 244, 2468, 249, 250, 252,
Barker, A. 358 253, 278, 283, 284, 288, 289, 290,
Barker, E. 243, 372 291, 292, 294, 295, 302, 303, 304,
beauty (fine, finenesskalon) 9, 37, 50, 53, 305, 306, 312, 313, 318, 319, 320,
57, 61, 62, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 83, 321, 322, 324, 325, 332, 333, 334,
88, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 335, 336, 342, 343, 344, 345, 347,
108, 117, 123, 136, 139, 140, 144, 145, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 356, 359,
148, 152, 153, 178, 192, 199, 210, 211, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368,
212, 218, 222, 229, 231, 232, 263, 264, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 377,
270, 277, 283, 291, 293, 296 378
Beckman, J. 363 Broad, W. 367
Belfiore, E. 295, 297, 370 Brown, P. 8
Benson, H. 5, 34, 35, 36, 446, 48, 4950, Bryson 1
52, 534, 56, 57, 59, 63, 64, 66, 101, Burkert, W. 279, 280, 284, 288, 296, 298,
102, 105, 11819, 126, 127, 133, 299, 362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 370
13655, 183, 253, 339, 342, 343, 344, Burnet, J. 3, 4, 5, 236, 284, 292, 294, 298,
346, 347, 363 330, 362, 363, 365, 372, 374
Berman, S. 331, 351 Burnyeat, M. 280, 290, 302, 310, 320, 321,
Beversluis, J. 6, 1478, 253, 330, 331, 343, 323, 332, 334, 346, 365, 372, 373,
344, 345 376, 377
408

INDEX
Bury, J. 372, 374 Cooper, J. M. 330, 331, 337, 338, 343, 351,
Bussanich, J. 276300 352
Buxton, R. 370 Cornford, F. 181, 352
Corybantes 278, 283, 294, 296, 297, 298,
Calder, W. 332 299, 366
Calef, S. 363 courage (andreia) 57, 102, 136, 144, 150,
Callicles 10, 21, 29, 30, 49, 52, 110, 113, 153, 155, 192, 193, 201, 331, 335, 352
1879, 193, 198, 199, 200, 202, 234, craft (techn) 8, 12, 13, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61,
352, 357, 359 62, 96, 98100, 101, 102, 120, 12735,
Capizzi, A. 328, 329 14950, 156, 157, 158, 162, 163, 164,
Carawan, E. 304, 313 167, 170, 174, 177, 1957, 203, 208,
Carone, G. 352, 353 210, 213, 214, 234, 235, 252, 261, 262,
Carpenter, M. and Polansky, R. 34, 35, 36, 2634, 266, 267, 268, 270, 278, 283,
53, 56, 63 2878, 293, 297, 315, 316, 317, 318,
Cartledge, P. 15, 288, 309, 322, 323, 324, 333, 342, 345, 347, 348, 356, 35960,
325, 332, 333, 362, 368, 372, 374, 375, 366, 374, 3767, 378
377, 378 Cratylus 8
Cebes 1 Cratylus (Platos) 76, 279
Cephalus 21, 144 Critias 16, 17, 103, 141, 237, 280, 3047,
Chaerephon 12, 55, 98, 101, 267, 332, 30910, 312, 31314, 315, 318, 319,
333, 335 326, 333, 334, 374, 375
Charles, D. 342, 344 Crito (Platos) 34, 49, 63, 76, 113, 180,
Charlton, W. 331 201, 203, 204, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241,
Charmides 16, 21, 37, 50, 141, 144, 153, 24251, 252, 254, 255, 260, 264, 265,
192, 211, 237, 296, 314, 319, 333, 334, 278, 292, 293, 294, 298, 315, 316, 317,
343, 345, 375 318, 319, 332, 333, 342, 343, 356, 357,
Charmides (Platos) 34, 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 358, 359, 360, 370
57, 623, 71, 76, 88, 89, 90, 92, 103, Crito(n) 1, 45, 51, 203, 242, 254, 255, 293,
136, 141, 144, 166, 173, 175, 192, 194, 294, 301, 359, 361, 366
210, 278, 279, 280, 296, 298, 333, 342, Critobulos 210
343, 344, 345, 375 Croiset, A. and Bodin, L. 352
Christ see Jesus
Chroust, A.-H. 5, 311, 312, 313, 328, 332, daimonion (Socrates divine sign or
334, 372, 374, 375 voice) 4, 5, 47, 48, 94, 114, 123, 124,
Clay, D. 328 125, 254, 259, 2612, 266, 26870,
Clement 361 272, 274, 278, 279, 281, 28493, 294,
Cobb, W. 369 299, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 332, 360,
Cohen, S. 363 3612, 364, 3656, 368, 36970, 377
Coliaco, J. 242, 359 damage see harm
Colson, D. 360, 361 Dancy, R. 70, 716, 77, 91, 92, 1467, 337,
Connelly, J. 368 338, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346
Connor, W. 278, 302, 320, 332 Danzig, G. 332
constructivism (and non-constructivism, or Davar, F. 362
anti-constructivism) 447, 49, 50, 52, Davies, J. 279, 280, 366, 374
58, 62, 634, 66, 118, 126, 252, 253, de Maghales-Vilhena, V. 14, 330
361, 363 de Strycker, E. 331, 332 see also de Strycker
Cooper, J. G. 362 and Slings
409

INDEX
de Strycker, E. and Slings, S. 312, 332 143, 144, 145, 1467, 148, 152, 155,
de Vogel, C. 5 157, 163, 166, 167, 180, 181, 183, 189,
death 1, 9, 10, 20, 21, 25, 1001, 10910, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 201, 202, 203,
112, 11416, 145, 185, 192, 201, 240, 204, 206, 210, 227, 231, 232, 233, 237,
241, 248, 254, 267, 269, 285, 291, 292, 239, 242, 253, 254, 257, 276, 277, 279,
2945, 301, 302, 322, 325, 328, 341, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288, 294, 295, 296,
357, 364, 365, 366, 368, 370, 371, 372, 297, 314, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335,
374, 375 336, 337, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 351,
DeFilippo, J. and Mitsis, P. 361, 365 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 359, 360,
definition(s) (Socrates search for) 9, 26, 35, 361, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 375,
36, 45, 46, 48, 50, 53, 55, 578, 706, 376, 378 see also developmentalism;
77, 79, 816, 8891, 92, 93, 95, 96, unitarianism
10211, 115, 11819, 1237, 12930, Dickey, E. 335
132, 1334, 2625 Dickie, M. 370
priority of 456, 48, 51, 54, 578, 74, Dis, A. 329
94155, 33940, 343, 344, 345, 346 Dietrich, B. 368
see also knowledge Dionysodorus 163
Delphi (oracle) 12, 47, 48, 546, 98, 101, Dionysus 277, 278, 281, 2957, 367, 371
103, 155, 261, 267, 268, 272, 277, 278, Dionysus of Halicarnassus 334
27984, 291, 332, 364, 366, 3678 disobedience see obedience (to law or
Deman, T. 4, 362 superior)
democracy (Athenian) 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, divination 151, 262, 267, 268, 269, 277,
18, 21, 234, 2368, 255, 30127, 333, 278, 279, 281, 283, 287, 289, 290, 291,
334, 357, 373, 374, 3756, 377, 378 292, 293, 295, 322, 362, 364, 366, 368,
see also oligarchy 371 see also daimonion (Socrates divine
Democritus of Abdera 308, 365 sign or voice); Delphi (oracle); dream(s)
Denyer, N. 333 divine see god(s)
Derenne, E. 15 Dodds, E. 281, 282, 293, 295, 296, 298,
desire 10, 17, 47, 116, 132, 134, 156 299, 356, 365, 367, 369, 370
232, 263, 265, 271, 300, 306, 309, Dring, A. 3
3401, 347, 349, 351, 352, 354 Dring, K. 5, 328, 330
see also appetite; love Dorion, L.-A. 11, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332
Desjardins, R. 293, 370 Dover, K. 4, 5, 7, 210, 298, 333, 353, 372
Destre, P. 369 doxastic (constraint in Socratic
Destre, P. and Smith, N. 291 argumentation) 44, 45, 64
Detienne, M. 295, 297, 370 dream(s) 151, 235, 261, 262, 267, 278, 284,
developmentalism 8, 67, 69, 71, 88, 89, 287, 289, 290, 291, 2935, 364, 366, 370
90, 923, 95, 1467, 276, 330, 344 Droge, A. 288, 369
see also unitarianism Duprel, E. 4
Devereux, D. 171, 172, 183, 192, 1934, Dybikowski, J. 245, 358
208, 347, 349
dialectic see elenchus; method (Socratic) Edmunds, L. 5, 22
dialogues (Platos/early-middle) vi, 3, 4, 5, egoism 179, 212, 213, 22232, 354, 355
89, 10, 1113, 16, 207, 29, 32, 33, eidos see forms, Platonic
34, 38, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 53, 54, 57, eironeia see irony
59, 61, 63, 65, 667, 6885, 87, 8893, elenchus 28, 30, 3467, 767, 78, 81, 82,
945, 118, 127, 136, 137, 139, 141, 99, 103, 105, 112, 118, 120, 121, 123,
410

INDEX
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 138, 295, 296, 297, 320, 321, 333, 334, 335,
151, 153, 154, 155, 188, 212, 213, 214, 337, 342, 343, 345, 363, 365
217, 225, 235, 237, 238, 2523, 254, Evenus 98
257, 259, 261, 280, 281, 284, 290, evil see good(s) (agathon) and bad(s) (kakon)
292, 293, 296, 297, 335, 342, 343, excellence see virtue
346, 347, 351, 360, 362, 363, 367, 370 expert/expertise see craft
see also method (Socratic)
Eleusinian mysteries 362, 366 fallacy (Socratic) 456, 58, 74, 145, 149,
emotion(s) see desire 342
endoxa (common opinion) 36, 423, 44, 57 fear 25, 1001, 103, 105, 109, 114,
epagg (argument from examples) 603, 11516, 140, 141, 144, 145, 192, 193,
66, 136, 142 see also induction 198, 201, 206, 207, 214, 248, 274, 289,
epistm see knowledge 294, 296, 297, 308, 311, 341
epistemology (Socratic) 45, 56, 85, 90, Ferejohn, M. 347
94135, 341, 342 Ferrari, G. 303, 334, 335, 336, 337
epithumia see appetite Festugire, A. 297
equality (and inequality) 75, 216, 240, 318, fine see beauty (fine, finenesskalon);
357, 358 punishment
Erbse, H. 4, 330 Fine, G. 701, 72, 75, 80, 858, 89, 90, 91,
eristic 60, 320 93, 118, 127, 134, 135, 153, 337, 338,
Erler, M. 14 340, 341, 342, 344, 346, 347
Eryxias (Ps.-Platos) 333 Finley, M. 372
esotericism (Platos) 22 Fitzgerald, W. 4, 330
Eucleides of Megara 1, 370 FitzPatrick, P. 362
eudaimonia (happiness) 48, 79, 98, 104, Flower, M. 366, 368
105, 108, 115, 116, 123, 128, 142, Fontenrose, J. 281, 282, 283, 364, 367
143, 148, 15684, 186, 191, 194, 196, forms, Platonic 4, 6893, 144, 145, 219,
208, 211, 213, 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 222, 223, 225, 232, 276, 335, 337, 344,
22730, 232, 235, 265, 271, 339, 340, 354, 370
341, 347, 348, 349, 350, 354, Forster, M. 34, 35, 36, 5860, 1512, 342,
355, 356 343, 344, 345, 346
Euripides 14, 260, 273, 308, 320, 322, 326, Frankfurt, W. 229, 230, 355
329, 363, 364, 365 Frede, M. 352
Euthydemus 16, 108, 163, 314, 333 Frege, G. 349
Euthydemus (Platos) 34, 38, 40, 60, 67, 76, Friedlnder, P. 286, 358, 369, 371
108, 147, 161, 163, 166, 167, 173, 178, friend/friendship 9, 14, 17, 21, 24, 29, 52,
180, 187, 269, 278, 290, 296, 315, 320, 98, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 136, 141,
347, 350, 364 150, 155, 20832, 237, 238, 267, 269,
Euthyphro 20, 258, 48, 59, 69, 78, 82, 83, 286, 288, 291, 313, 314, 322, 333, 353,
102, 103, 105, 120, 1401, 144, 148, 354, 355, 368
262, 263, 264, 265, 268, 272, 274, 321, Fronterotta, F. 9, 701, 8890, 91, 92, 93,
323, 334, 335, 337, 363 337, 338
Euthyphro (Platos) 20, 258, 34, 48, 49, Furley, W. 364
50, 51, 57, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 80, Futter, D. 200, 351
835, 88, 89, 90, 92, 1023, 105, 108,
120, 132, 136, 1401, 150, 151, 175, Gadamer, W. 226, 354
201, 2625, 268, 269, 272, 274, 285, Garland, R. 308, 365, 366, 368, 377
411

INDEX
Geach, P. 456, 58, 145, 146, 153, 154, 351, 352, 356, 357, 359, 360, 370,
155, 344, 345, 346, 363 375, 377
Gellrich, M. 370 Gosling, J. and Taylor, C. C. W. 331
Gelzer, T 4, 5 Graf, F. 279, 282, 295, 298, 366, 367, 368
Gerson, L. 167, 182, 352 Graham, D. 89, 330
Gettier, E. 97 Gray, V. 9, 331, 376
Giannantoni, G. 334 Green, P. 282, 283, 367, 368
Gifford, M. 21, 334 Greenberg, N. 358
Gigon, O. 4, 5, 14, 330, 332 Greene, W. 298
Gill, C. 369 Griswold, C. 31, 32, 333, 334, 336, 337,
Glaucon 1, 203, 204 356, 357
Glidden, D. 2245, 354 Grote, G. 3, 37, 236, 242, 250, 358,
Gocer, A. 276, 295, 333, 363, 364, 370, 371 363, 376
god(s) 12, 14, 15, 20, 25, 47, 55, 56, 98, Grube, G. 69, 99, 142, 145, 284, 292
99, 101, 102, 105, 109, 112, 140, 141, Gulley, N. 60, 119, 120, 188, 236, 252,
145, 188, 201, 206, 210, 235, 244, 334, 336
245, 246, 249, 252, 254, 257300, Guthrie, W. 5, 220, 229, 236, 253, 284,
301, 302, 308, 309, 316, 317, 31927, 286, 290, 298, 353, 354, 356, 365, 372,
332, 333, 356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 375, 376
364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370,
376, 377 see also Apollo Hackforth, R. 280, 284, 372
godliness see piety (holiness) Hacking, I. 371
Gomperz, H. 3, 10, 329 Hadot, P. 370, 371
Gonzalez, F. 221, 354, 356 Halperin, D. 334, 335, 353
good(s) (agathon) and bad(s) (kakon) 10, 14, Hans, J. 369
17, 18, 30, 39, 45, 47, 56, 61, 69, 74, 99, Hansen, M. 372, 374
103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, happiness see eudaimonia (happiness)
114, 115, 116, 127, 131, 132, 142, 143, harm 10, 21, 29, 30, 94, 110, 175, 179,
145, 148, 150, 153, 155, 15684, 185, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 199, 2047,
186, 187, 188, 1912, 193, 194, 1957, 214, 219, 235, 237, 259, 269, 289,
199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 294, 315, 326, 350, 351, 352, 373
21032, 234, 240, 241, 242, 251, 260, see also good(s) (agathon) and bad(s)
2636, 268, 269, 271, 273, 277, 278, (kakon); wrongdoing
280, 285, 289, 292, 294, 295, 309, 311, Harris, E. 333
316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 331, 333, 334, Harris, J. 336
344, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 354, 355, Harris, W. 1
356, 357, 358, 359, 365, 374, 375 Harrison, A. 374
Gorgias 98, 104, 163, 188, 313 Harte, V. 242, 359
Gorgias (Platos) 10, 21, 2930, 34, 36, 37, Havelock, E. 3, 5, 11
39, 40, 43, 45, 49, 52, 53, 63, 76, 104, hedonism 10, 195, 196, 331
110, 113, 136, 167, 169, 176, 180, 183, see also pleasure
185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 193, Hegel, G. 298, 329
194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, Heidel, W. 363
2067, 208, 210, 218, 234, 252, 253, Hellenica (Xenophons) 332
292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 311, 314, 316, Hellenistic schools of
317, 320, 328, 334, 335, 342, 343, 348, philosophy see Sceptics; Stoics
412

INDEX
hemlock 1, 214, 246, 247, 248, 258, immortality 74, 79, 181, 182, 231, 280,
301, 361 294, 295, 296, 308, 364 see also death;
Heraclitus 8, 9, 85, 86, 87, 260, 273, soul
285, 320 impiety 1, 14, 15, 25, 27, 69, 102, 103,
Hermann, K. 3, 330 105, 132, 1401, 205, 208, 244, 257,
Hesiod 260, 273, 362, 363, 366 262, 272, 275, 284, 30127, 333, 359,
Hippias 27, 73, 74, 78, 82, 98, 140, 149 367, 368, 3723, 374 see also piety
Hippias Major (Platos) 9, 34, 38, 40, 57, (holiness)
59, 61, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 88, induction 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 55, 56, 603,
89, 90, 91, 92, 102, 104, 136, 139, 140, 85, 122, 269, 292 see also epagg
143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 201, 264, (argument from examples)
269, 270, 285, 316, 333, 343, 344 injustice see justice
Hippias Minor (Platos) 34, 173, 346 intellectualism 47, 74, 115, 116, 172, 180,
Hippocrates 143 1813, 185209, 258, 260, 267, 275,
Hippothales 212, 213, 216, 225 340, 341, 342, 344, 351, 365
historical Socrates 119, 22, 34, 59, 68, 70, irony 1, 5, 10, 12, 2033, 39, 96, 103, 119,
72, 76, 77, 90, 233, 242, 257, 280, 284, 120, 225, 259, 275, 282, 290, 334, 335,
296, 303, 313, 315, 319, 325, 326, 330, 336, 337, 376
331, 332, 342, 353, 356, 361, 365, 375, complex 28
376 conditional 267, 33
Hoerber, R. 216, 225, 354 dramatic 21
holiness see piety (holiness) mocking 27, 28, 199
Homer 210, 259, 260, 263, 264, 273, 363, Platonic 21
365, 369 pretence 303
Horn, C. 376 reverse 30, 33
Horneffer, E. 3 simple 28
Humbert, J. 330 solipsistic 32
Hume, D. 50, 178 Irwin, T. 5, 11718, 119, 120, 134, 135,
Hutchinson, D. 364, 369 153, 158, 159, 170, 188, 189, 191, 196,
hypothesis (method of) 58, 74, 78, 214, 220, 222, 227, 229, 309, 310, 311, 312,
216, 217, 339 see also method 317, 318, 324, 331, 332, 342, 343, 344,
(Socratic) 346, 347, 349, 352, 354, 355, 356, 360,
372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377
idea see forms, Platonic Isocrates 1, 305, 306, 311, 312, 333, 374
identity thesis (virtue = happiness) 1589,
160, 162, 347 Jackson, B. 364
ignorance 13, 22, 23, 25, 26, 2830, 44, Jaeger, W. 330
45, 51, 55, 56, 58, 64, 94135, 145, James, W. 277, 299
146, 147, 150, 154, 155, 168, 169, 170, Janko, R. 368
173, 175, 180, 181, 190, 204, 205, 210, Jesus 258, 369
212, 213, 214, 220, 225, 231, 233, 251, Joel, K. 3, 4, 14, 330, 332
261, 262, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, Johnson, C. 23356, 358, 359, 360
280, 281, 284, 286, 295, 296, 315, Johnston, S. 279, 298
316, 3345, 341, 343, 344, 346, 350, Joyal, M. 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 333,
351, 352, 356, 374 see also knowledge; 368, 369
wisdom Joyce, C. 374
413

INDEX
justice 21, 24, 29, 30, 53, 55, 69, 74, 77, Kraut, R. 5, 34, 35, 36, 3840, 41, 56, 57,
78, 80, 82, 91, 102, 104, 105, 108, 64, 65, 66, 95, 158, 236, 237, 238, 239,
109, 113, 114, 119, 122, 123, 124, 240, 243, 245, 249, 250, 252, 322, 323,
128, 130, 136, 143, 144, 1489, 155, 332, 333, 334, 343, 347, 353, 356, 357,
179, 180, 181, 187, 188, 189, 192, 358, 360, 361, 366, 372, 373, 375, 376,
198, 199, 201, 202, 2037, 208, 210, 377
215, 23355, 258, 262, 263, 264, 265, Krentz, P. 333, 374
266, 268, 272, 273, 303, 308, 309,
317, 318, 319, 3389, 340, 341, 350, Labriola, A. 3
352, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 365, Lacey, A. 5, 331
368, 372, 376, 377 Laches 27, 31, 78, 153, 335
Justinus the Martyr 361 Laches (Platos) 7, 13, 25, 27, 31, 34, 49,
50, 51, 57, 71, 76, 88, 89, 90, 92, 106,
Kahn, C. 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 183, 210, 211, 136, 142, 143, 144, 148, 150, 151, 192,
218, 225, 295, 330, 331, 332, 343, 344, 316, 333, 342, 343, 344, 345
347, 352, 371, 375 Lactantius 18, 361
kalon see beauty (fine, finenesskalon) Lain Entralgo, P. 370
Kant, I. 20, 21, 80, 177, 178, 226, 229, Lane, M. 335, 336
350, 360, 369 Lanni, A. 18
Katz, S. 277 Lnnstrm, A. 364, 367
Kaufmann, W. 362 Latte, K. 281
Kerenyi, K. 295 law(s) (Athenian) 14, 15, 17, 49, 109,
Kierkegaard, S. 3, 335 2001, 23356, 279, 294, 302, 303,
Kim, A. 240, 241, 243, 249, 252, 253, 357, 304, 306, 310, 313, 318, 319, 326, 351,
358, 360 352, 357, 358, 359, 360, 367, 373, 376
Kingsley, P. 281, 295, 298, 268, 370, 371 Laws (Platos) 77, 216, 279, 295, 296, 316,
Klosko, G. 360 330, 365, 366, 367, 370
knowledge 20, 2330, 31, 34, 35, 36, 39, Lear, J. 371
42, 44, 456, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, Lefkowitz, M. 288
55, 57, 58, 612, 634, 74, 79, 85, 86, Leibowitz, D. 332
87, 89, 90, 94135, 13655, 15684, Leon of Salamis 236, 241, 246, 322, 332,
185, 186, 187, 18991, 192, 1934, 357
195, 2078, 209, 212, 213, 214, 221, Leontius 204
224, 225, 233, 235, 237, 238, 245, Lesher, J. 1234, 140, 343
246, 248, 251, 252, 253, 258, 261, Lesses, G. 227, 354, 355, 360
262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, Levin, D. 353, 354, 356
269, 270, 271, 277, 279, 280, 283, Libanius of Antioch 2, 18, 306, 307, 312,
285, 287, 288, 291, 2923, 294, 295, 313, 334, 375 see also Apology of
315, 316, 317, 318, 334, 335, 336, Socrates (Libaniuss)
33840, 3412, 343, 344, 345, 3467, Linforth, I. 371
348, 350, 356, 359, 360, 364, 365, Lintott, A. 374
371, 3767 see also epistemology Lloyd-Jones, H. 365
(Socratic); ignorance; intellectualism; Loening, T. 374
virtue; wisdom Lofberg, J. 372
Kolodny, N. 223, 355 Long, A. 289, 290, 294, 328, 361, 365, 369
Konstan, D. 4, 7 love see friend/friendship
Kosman, L. 230, 355 Lu, K. 371
414

INDEX
Luccioni, J. 331 Meno 26, 54, 74, 80, 82, 85, 91, 104, 106,
Lucian 353 107, 142, 148, 149, 185, 186, 187, 194,
Luck, G. 369 296, 297, 339, 346, 349
Lutoslawski, W. 5 Meno (Platos) 26, 40, 45, 54, 57, 69, 71,
Lycon 312, 322, 334, 373 72, 74, 75, 76, 80, 82, 85, 91, 92, 95,
Lysias 2, 17, 305, 333, 334, 374, 377 103, 104, 1056, 107, 111, 119, 120,
Lysis 141, 150, 166, 173, 21032, 126, 127, 130, 133, 134, 136, 142,
354, 356 143, 146, 147, 148, 151, 166, 168,
Lysis (Platos) 34, 38, 40, 57, 71, 76, 92, 169, 179, 185, 186, 187, 189, 193,
102, 104, 136, 141, 147, 149, 150, 166, 237, 295, 296, 320, 334, 339, 342,
173, 193, 21032, 331, 342, 344, 353, 343, 346, 347, 349, 350, 352, 362,
354, 355 374, 377
metaphysics 8, 58, 6893, 287, 314, 337,
MacDowell, D. 372, 373 347, 349, 366, 367, 370, 372
Mackenzie, M. 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, method (Socratic) 3, 5, 7, 8, 30, 3467,
226 81, 82, 83, 91, 143, 144, 146, 147,
madness 136, 277, 278, 282, 295, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 257,
297, 299 259, 261, 262, 297, 335, 343, 346,
Maier, H. 2, 3, 14, 332, 358 358, 361 see also elenchus; midwifery
maieusis see midwifery (Socratic) (Socratic); teaching
mania see madness midwifery (Socratic) 3, 5, 285, 286, 288
Martin, D. 289, 369 see also elenchus; method (Socratic);
Martin, R. 243, 245, 358 teaching
Matthews, G. 338 Mikalson, J. 279, 362, 363, 366, 367, 368
Maurizio, L. 282, 367, 368 mission (Socrates) 12, 13, 47, 48, 54, 55,
Maximus of Tyre 17, 328, 372 94, 109, 115, 155, 192, 234, 235, 257,
May, H. 58 261, 262, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272, 274,
McKim, R. 352 280, 284, 293, 317, 318, 331, 358, 364,
McPartland, K. 94135 367, 370
McPherran, M. 34, 35, 36, 546, 603, moderation see temperance (sphrsun)
183, 252, 253, 25575, 283, 284, 287, Momigliano, A. 11
288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, money 2, 7, 31, 79, 174, 204
296, 302, 309, 331, 332, 345, 352, 360, see also poverty (Socrates); wealth
361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, Montuori, M. 280, 329, 332, 362
369, 370 Moore, G. 111, 113, 115
McTighe, K. 253, 352 Morgan, J. 331
Meletus 12, 53, 98, 103, 110, 272, 274, Morgan, M. 15, 280, 296, 297,
284, 302, 304, 311, 312, 321, 322, 324, 298, 370
326, 365, 366, 375, 378 Morrison, D. 331, 332
Memorabilia (Xenophons) 9, 10, 11, 16, Morrow, G. 298, 367
17, 63, 136, 226, 265, 266, 270, 271, Moss, J. 183, 193, 196, 197200, 202,
272, 286, 306, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 351, 352
314, 315, 316, 320, 325, 331, 332, Muramoto, O. and Englert, W. 299
333, 334 Murphy, J. 243
Menexenus 141, 150, 21032 myth 14, 90, 201, 206, 258, 260, 272, 278,
Menexenus (Platos) 76, 364 279, 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 312, 320,
326, 353, 367, 370
415

INDEX
Nagy, G. 281, 366 Parke, H. and Wormell, D. 283, 364, 367

Nails, D. 314, 330, 333, 334, 337, 375 Parker, R. 280, 314, 321, 322, 333, 362,
Natali, C. 331 365, 367, 368, 373, 374, 377, 378
Natorp, P. 3, 4 Parmenides 298, 337, 370, 371
natural philosophy see science (natural) Parmenides (Platos) 77, 80, 337
Navia, L. 5, 331, 374 Parry, R. 360
necessity thesis (virtue is necessary for Partridge, J. 368, 370
happiness) 159, 163, 164, 347 passion(s) see desire
Nehamas, A. 28, 33, 1489, 277, 334, 335, 336, Patzer, A. 2, 12, 329, 330, 331
342, 345, 352, 362, 368, 370, 371, 372 pedagogy see teaching
Nicias 31, 144, 334 Peloponnesian War 16, 307, 358
Nietzsche, F. 281, 301, 3712 Penner, T. 160, 1701, 181, 182, 183,
Nightingale, A. 13, 32, 335 1902, 196, 197, 199, 201, 330,
Nock, A. 284 342, 344, 349, 350, 351, 352, 376
Nussbaum, M. 5, 290, 360, 362 see also Penner and Rowe
Penner, T. and Rowe, C. 1689, 170, 1867,
OBrien, M. 367 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 2278, 230,
OConnor, D. 331, 368, 371 349, 354, 355, 356
OSullivan, L. 329, 333 Pericles 288, 309, 31516, 317, 318, 320,
Obdrzalek, S. 20132 324, 326, 374, 376
obedience (to law or superior) 109, 124, Peripatetics 2, 329
145, 150, 23356, 267, 268, 269, 270, perplexity see aporia (perplexity)
271, 274, 292, 315, 318, 322, 339, 357, Phaedo (Platos) 7, 58, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74,
358, 359, 360 75, 76, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 91, 216, 276,
Ober, J. 333, 334, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 278, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298,
376, 377 299, 301, 328, 330, 337, 344, 370
Oeconomicus (Xenophons) 317 Phaedo(n) 1, 210
oligarchy 7, 16, 17, 18, 234, 2368, 255, Philippson, R. 3, 5
303, 305, 306, 307, 310, 314, 315, phronsis see wisdom
31719, 324, 333, 334, 357, 361, piety (holiness) 9, 15, 20, 257, 28, 55, 69,
373, 375, 377 see also democracy 70, 74, 78, 80, 81, 83, 97, 102, 103,
(Athenian); Thirty(tyrants) 105, 122, 132, 136, 141, 144, 147, 148,
omen see divination 150, 155, 243, 25775, 280, 284, 288,
Opsomer, J. 369 289, 291, 323, 324, 337, 363, 364, 365,
oracle see Delphi (oracle); divination 366, 368, 377
orators/oratory 12, 13, 16, 185, 193, 316, Plato vi, 119, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32,
318, 320, 328 see also rhetoric 33, 38, 40, 42, 46, 48, 49, 52, 54, 60,
Origen 361 61, 62, 66, 67, 6893, 94, 95, 118, 137,
Orpheus 298, 370 see also Orphic 141, 145, 147, 148, 149, 155, 156, 157,
Orphic 278, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 362, 163, 164, 166, 169, 170, 181, 182, 183,
366, 370, 371 see also Orpheus 191, 195, 198, 202, 203, 208, 209, 210,
Ostwald, M. 304, 364, 374 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220,
221, 222, 224, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233,
pain 161, 169, 170, 171, 1923, 1957, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 255, 257,
198, 199, 200, 2013, 206, 207, 234, 258, 262, 265, 270, 276, 277, 278, 279,
299, 352 see also pleasure 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287,
paradeigma see forms, Platonic 288, 289, 290, 293, 295, 296, 298, 299,
416

INDEX
303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 311, 312, 314, Pythagoreanism 5, 278, 294, 295, 296, 297,
315, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325, 298, 333, 361, 366, 368, 370, 371
326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, Pythia see Delphi (oracle)
334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 341, 344, 345,
346, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, Quine, W. 80
355, 356, 361, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368,
369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, Rabinowitz, W. 363
378 Ralkowski, M 30127, 372
Platonists (later) 289 Rashed, M. 5
pleasure 1011, 1923, 1957, 198, 199, recollection 40, 46, 54, 72, 74, 75, 79, 82,
207, 222, 228, 271, 295, 299, 347, 348, 85, 91, 107, 133, 146, 147, 189, 232,
352 see also hedonism; pain 295, 328, 344
Pleger, W. 5 Reeve, C. 129, 132, 158, 188, 249, 278,
Plutarch 281, 282, 289, 299, 367, 369, 371, 279, 283, 284, 290, 292, 322, 332, 342,
375 347, 352, 360, 361, 363, 365, 367, 369,
poison see hemlock 370, 372, 374
Polansky, R. 34, 35, 36, 424, 343 refutation see elenchus; method (Socratic)
see also Carpenter and Polansky religion 15, 25775, 276300, 30127,
Polemarchus 21 333, 362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368,
politics 1519, 23356, 269, 274, 291, 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 377, 378
30127, 333, 334, 356, 357, 373, 374, see also atheism; daimonion (Socrates
376 divine sign or voice); Delphi (oracle);
Polus 29, 30, 43, 49, 53, 128, 163, 185, god(s); impiety; piety (holiness)
1879, 199, 200, 202, 206, 356 Republic (Platos) 16, 17, 21, 34, 43, 52, 53,
Polycrates 1, 2, 1718, 31114, 320, 326, 57, 63, 68, 71, 72, 76, 77, 80, 84, 87,
328, 374, 375, 378 92, 104, 119, 120, 136, 143, 144, 148,
Popper, K. 332, 375 151, 156, 157, 170, 179, 180, 195, 197,
Potidaia 2478, 296, 297, 298, 319 198, 2034, 207, 213, 219, 251, 255,
poverty (Socrates) 3, 7 see also wealth 269, 285, 289, 294, 295, 299, 311, 314,
Powers, N. 331 315, 316, 320, 333, 334, 337, 340, 342,
predication see forms, Platonic 344, 345, 353, 356, 361, 364, 366, 367,
pretence see irony 368, 376
Price, A. 213, 230, 354 Reshotko, N. 15684, 192, 2045, 347,
Prior, W. 8, 9, 14, 6893, 298, 329, 330, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352
331, 332, 341, 344, 346 rhetoric 2, 7, 9, 12, 52, 65, 136, 193, 198,
Prodicus of Ceos 98, 308, 320 199, 234, 252, 257, 304, 305, 313, 317,
Protagoras 7, 69, 74, 78, 80, 82, 237, 260, 335, 343, 375 see also orators/oratory;
272, 308, 328, 370, 375, 376 Sophists
Protagoras (Platos) 10, 34, 59, 69, 71, 74, Rhodes, P. 374
76, 78, 80, 91, 92, 136, 143, 149, 150, Rider, B. 354, 356
170, 171, 179, 192, 193, 1957, 208, Rinella, M. 370
210, 237, 311, 328, 333, 342, 343, 344, Rist, J. 290, 369
345, 352, 370, 376 Roberts, J. 372, 374
Proudfoot, W. 276 Robin, L. 3, 4, 332, 353, 354, 356
punishment 15, 20, 29, 109, 145, 172, 179, Robinson, D. 213, 216, 218, 223, 353, 354
183, 189, 2003, 206, 250, 294, 302, Robinson, R. 37, 58, 601, 143, 154,
304, 309, 310, 316, 324, 351, 352, 357 334, 343
417

INDEX
Rck, H. 3 Sharf, R. 276

Rogers, A. 5 Shorey, P. 369
Rohde, E. 281 sign (Socrates divine) see daimonion
Ross, W. 4, 136, 330, 331, 332, 342 (Socrates divine sign or voice)
Rossetti, L. 329, 330, 331 Simmias 1, 329
Roth, M. 220, 355 Simon the Cobbler 1
Rouget, G. 299, 371 Simonides 359
Rowe, C. 156, 170, 183, 197, 202, 218, Singpurwalla, R. 349, 352
221, 287, 330, 331, 334, 352, 354, 370, skill see craft (techn)
376 see also Penner and Rowe Smith, F. 366, 367
Rudebusch, G. 158, 225, 331, 332, 347, Smith, N. 292, 328, 330, 333, 347, 351,
348, 350, 354, 356 369, 370 see also Brickhouse and
Russell, B. 6, 311 Smith; Destre and Smith; Smith and
Russell, D. 347 Woodruff
Rutherford, R. 5 Smith, N. and Woodruff, P. 291, 292, 293,
370, 373
Samaras, T. 332 Sobran, J. 372
Sanderman, D. 192, 199200 Socratic problem 119
Santana, A. 34, 35, 36, 636 Socratic works (Skratikoi logoi) 1, 2, 4,
Santas, G. 6, 60, 62, 64, 65, 168, 169, 911, 13, 16, 18, 329, 331, 333
1867, 214, 219, 236, 243, 245, 250, sophia see wisdom
343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 351, 352, Sophists 4, 15, 31, 98, 136, 143, 163, 252,
354, 356 260, 272, 273, 295, 301, 308, 310, 311,
Sceptics (ancient) 2 313, 316, 320, 325, 370, 374
Schanz, M. 3, 12 sphrsun see temperance (sphrsun)
Schleiermacher, F. 3, 4, 6, 276, 329, 330 soul 5, 30, 31, 44, 74, 79, 84, 106, 113,
Schmid, W. 5 133, 156, 157, 170, 180, 1813, 193,
Schofield, M. 334, 361, 376 195, 197, 198, 201, 2037, 208, 220,
science (natural) 2, 3, 7, 15, 97, 98, 101, 252, 264, 265, 266, 271, 276, 280, 285,
102, 158, 166, 167, 173, 176, 177, 178, 289, 294, 295, 296, 306, 317, 351, 352,
258, 272, 273, 276, 277, 282, 301, 308, 353, 359, 361, 364, 365, 367, 371
320, 322, 348, 350 Sourvinou-Inwood, C. 278, 279, 333
Scott, D. 346, 351 Spinelli, E. 329
Scott, G. 512, 343, 363 Stauffer, D. 352
Seaford, R. 298, 371 Stavru, A. and Rosetti, L. 329
Sedley, D. 342, 354, 365 Stenzel, J. 4
Seel, G. 331 Stevens, J. 331
Seeskin, K. 372 Stilpon 1
Segvic, H. 352 Stoics 2, 161, 194, 195, 209, 257, 347, 348,
self-control see temperance (sphrsun) 361, 365
self-predication see forms, Platonic Stokes, M. 13, 280, 284, 332, 364
separation see forms, Platonic Stone, I. 16, 236, 30710, 311, 315, 317,
Sextus Empiricus 270, 361, 363, 364 320, 324, 357, 358, 372, 374, 375,
shame 48, 104, 105, 109, 139, 140, 141, 376, 377
145, 192, 197200, 202, 262, 297, 298, Strauss, B. 323, 372, 373, 374, 377
306, 344, 351, 352, 363 Strauss, L. 21, 239, 240, 242, 243, 334
418

INDEX
stylometry 5, 330 Thirty (tyrants) 16, 21, 2367, 241, 245,

sufficiency thesis (virtue is sufficient for 246, 3035, 306, 307, 308, 314, 315,
happiness) 158, 159, 1601, 162, 317, 318, 322, 324, 333, 334, 357, 372,
163, 164 373, 374, 377
Svern, J. 3 Thrasybulus 373
Symposium (Platos) 7, 28, 68, 71, 74, 75, Thrasyllus 335
77, 210, 211, 218, 222, 230, 231, 232, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon 53, 119, 120,
278, 287, 297, 298, 299, 311, 353, 355, 149, 198, 308, 359
364, 368, 375 Thucydides 260, 261, 288, 309, 315, 316,
Symposium (Xenophons) 9, 210, 268, 332, 324, 363
353, 362 Tiles, J. 360
Tiresias 107, 277
Tarrant, D. 329, 368 Todd, S. 15
Tarrant, H. 5, 34, 35, 36, 52, 286, 287, Tovar, A. 4
368, 369 Toynbee, A. 362
Taves, A. 277, 299 Trapp, M. 2, 5, 328
Taylor, A. 3, 4, 5, 6, 236, 294, 330, 331, trial (Socrates) 119, 30, 53, 109, 2001,
332, 334, 352, 363, 371, 372, 376 237, 238, 239, 245, 257, 258, 261, 269,
Taylor, C. 369 2725, 279, 30127, 328, 330, 332,
Taylor, C. C. W. 5, 197 see also Gosling and 333, 356, 357, 358, 366, 372, 373, 374,
Taylor 375, 376, 378
teaching 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 1517, 18, Tsouna, V. 158
22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 31, 97, 98, 102,
1037, 119, 120, 125, 127, 129, 132, unitarianism 68, 69, 71, 8890, 95, 195,
135, 142, 148, 149, 166, 200, 211, 330, 352 see also developmentalism
235, 237, 257, 259, 272, 274, 285, Ustinova, Y. 281, 368
286, 287, 289, 297, 307, 309, 310,
311, 312, 31314, 317, 318, 319, van Lieshout 293
333, 335, 339, 361, 366, 375, 377 van Riel, G. 290
see also method (Socratic) Vander Waerdt, P. 2, 5, 12, 328, 330, 331,
techn see craft (techn) 368
technique see craft (techn) Vasiliou, I. 2033, 334, 335, 336, 339
Teloh, H. 119 Velleman, J. 22930, 355
temperance (sphrsun) 50, 102, 103, 136, Vernant, J.-P. 279, 295, 297, 363, 370
141, 144, 153, 155, 193, 296 Versenyi, L 119, 218, 219, 220, 221, 354,
Tertullian 361 356, 362, 363, 370
Tessitore, A. 218, 220, 221 Versnel, H. 365, 366
Thales 7 Villa, D. 236, 238, 242, 358
Theages 369 virtue (aret) 10, 13, 16, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30,
Theages (Ps.-Platos) 16, 67, 285, 286, 287, 31, 44, 46, 48, 55, 69, 74, 79, 80, 81,
288, 333, 368, 369 82, 85, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103,
themis (lawful) 267 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 118,
Themistocles 106, 317 119, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 132, 136,
Theodectes 17, 329 138, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150,
theology 25775, 278, 280, 290, 307, 320, 151, 155, 15684, 185, 192, 1934,
365, 366, 367 see also god(s) 198, 199, 204, 2079, 211, 220, 222,
419

INDEX
223, 227, 228, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, Winspear, A. and Silverberg, T. 236, 317,
238, 251, 252, 253, 258, 261, 2626, 372, 376
267, 268, 270, 274, 280, 283, 297, 300, wisdom 9, 12, 13, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 43,
315, 317, 318, 320, 323, 334, 335, 44, 48, 50, 54, 556, 69, 74, 94135,
33940, 341, 345, 347, 348, 350, 352, 139, 150, 152, 160, 161, 162, 166,
355, 359, 360, 362, 363, 365, 368, 376, 173, 211, 213, 217, 220, 223, 225,
377 see also courage (andreia); justice; 227, 228, 231, 232, 235, 237, 242,
knowledge; piety (holiness); temperance 249, 252, 257, 258, 261, 263, 264,
(sphrsun); wisdom 265, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272,
Vlastos, G. 4, 5, 6, 12, 289, 33, 3444, 48, 273, 276, 278, 280, 283, 284, 286,
49, 50, 512, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 287, 289, 291, 295, 296, 298, 300,
60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 701, 75, 319, 320, 321, 333, 334, 335, 338,
7682, 91, 92, 93, 101, 1206, 129, 3412, 354, 356, 364, 365, 366, 367,
1478, 153, 158, 170, 177, 182, 183, 368, 374, 376, 377 see also ignorance;
1889, 211, 212, 213, 220, 2224, 226, knowledge; virtue
227, 229, 230, 231, 236, 243, 245, 252, Wittgenstein, L. 60, 84, 145
253, 280, 284, 287, 288, 290, 2913, Wolfsdorf, D. 10, 3467, 94, 102, 118, 130,
294, 296, 298, 320, 324, 328, 330, 331, 133, 169, 220, 334, 335, 336, 337, 339,
332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 341, 342, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 349,
343, 344, 345, 347, 349, 351, 352, 353, 352, 354
354, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 367, Wood, E. and Wood, N. 236, 317, 333, 376
368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 375, 376, 377 Woodruff, P. 16, 51, 1279, 130, 132, 192,
voice (Socrates divine) see daimonion 198, 199, 200, 247, 253, 342, 343,
(Socrates divine sign or voice) 345, 346, 356, 376 see also Smith and
Woodruff
Wade, F. 243 Woozley, A. 239, 243, 245, 250
Walbank, F. 333 wrongdoing 21, 25, 43, 45, 47, 48,
Wallace, R. 333 97, 109, 110, 112, 114, 124, 145,
Walsh, J. 170 173, 181, 182, 187, 197, 2007,
Waterfield, R. 119, 280, 301, 304, 308, 236, 241, 246, 247, 248, 254, 262,
309, 313, 318, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 272, 280, 285, 291, 294, 306, 322,
325 334, 336, 351, 359 see also good(s)
Watson, L. 362 (agathon) and bad(s) (kakon); harm;
wealth 7, 11213, 156, 161, 180, 181, 196, punishment
235, 237, 315, 317, 318
Weber, M. 371 Xenophanes 272, 273, 308, 320, 363
Weiss, R. 240, 242, 252, 290, 292, 294, Xenophon 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
350, 352, 357, 358, 359 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 43, 60, 62,
Wenley, R. 362 66, 136, 210, 216, 226, 258, 265, 266,
West, T. 284 268, 269, 270, 272, 276, 277, 278, 279,
White, N. 153, 343, 344 280, 281, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290,
Whitehead, D. 333 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 305, 306, 307,
Wildberg, C. 329 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317,
Winkelman, M. 371 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325, 326, 327,
420

INDEX
328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 342, Yunis, H. 363, 365
353, 361, 362, 364, 365, 366, 368, 371,
372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 378 Zaidman, L. and Pantel, P. 362, 363, 364,
365
Yonezawa, S. 101 Zeller, E. 4, 37, 330, 369, 372
Young, C. 52, 343 Zeno of Elea 59, 328
Young, G. 250, 358 Zeyl, D. 756, 337
421


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1. THE QUEST FOR THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES 1

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Ag. Agamemnon Hp. Ma. Hippias Major

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SSR Socratis et Socraticorum Tht. Theaetetus

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Hugh H. Benson William J. Prior

Thomas C. Brickhouse Mark Ralkowski

John Bussanich Naomi Reshotko

Curtis N. Johnson Nicholas D. Smith

Keith McPartland Iakovos Vasiliou

Mark L. McPherran Robin Waterfield

Suzanne Obdrzalek David Wolfsdorf

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INTRODUCTION hope of recovering some traces of the his-

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in the English-speaking world, just as Robin MODERN SCHOLARSHIP

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There is circumstantial evidence, then, to sug-

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PLAY IN PLATOS DIALOGUES it is clear that he is not saying something that

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IRONY AND THE DISAVOWAL OF us how little we understand.22 Nehamas

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