G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION
represented by its manager and authorized representative
Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of
The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and
"PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed
Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated
and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private
parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-
2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to
the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its
General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario
S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No.
2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the
left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK
624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then
illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading
Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was
allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00.
The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee
of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager
Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in
their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper
Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto
Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly
removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with
Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed
parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such
clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the
clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its
owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00.
According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the
declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and
respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two
cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-
1996 and 2003-1997.
against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as
respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23,
2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging
Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S.
No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself
and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto
Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted
that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since
he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed
the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its
clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car.
He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he
intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario
Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of
Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the
case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez
stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two
(2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery,
specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent
in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the
crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents
in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars
involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed
fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No.
003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of
the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not
have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause
against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph
Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by
virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the
Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No.
003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding
informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003,
stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity
of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity
of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an
immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624
belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered
immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for
violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the
damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking
System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp
worth P26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of
July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused
through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004.
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal
of the two Informations on the following grounds:
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription;
failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense;
and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than
one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation
of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription
of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763,
provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two
months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged
in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can
be seen from the right hand corner of the Information,
the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on
October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the
alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence,
criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was
already extinguished by prescription when the
Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge
Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion
to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27,
2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue
among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed.
Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it
may be true that the Informations in these cases have been
filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well
within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and
petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16,
2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to
Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an
extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to
quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished
on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date
the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that
(Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En
Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the
special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65
with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was
raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that
the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the
prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private
respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-
Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other
chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of
the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and
the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the
criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided
in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal
information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point
in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases
had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure.
Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a
City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper
for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new
Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be
commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot
be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs.
Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this
case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal
ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed
directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on
Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and
as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the
offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the
respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They
held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides
that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the
proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in
Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two
months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed
with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva,
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court
held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be
commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month
prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against
the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld
the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court
in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the
offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense
in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply
because respondents were charged with the violation of a city
ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case,
assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two
months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in
Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent
Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for
dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the
facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents
were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that
petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since
Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the
assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling
in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private
complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal
offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, since the
Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The
Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not
specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed.
Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary
investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution
Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 and
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality,
since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may
file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the
substantive law and the procedural rules governing the
prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides
any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as
amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the
parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged,
the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive
period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without
question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed
by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period
of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was
discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases
falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint
or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan
Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of
cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component
or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and
corporate status of existing cities. Independent component
cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be
highly urbanized cities or component cities. An independent
component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as
defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as
United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the
validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of
1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only
the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where
the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent
judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v.
Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in
Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the
present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May
11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and
the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses
falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the
complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act
No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings.
His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between
the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as
the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter
must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive
right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information
in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription
period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated
that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws
are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld
this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan
pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information
contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the
Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the
petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor
of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to
run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to
file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by
filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The
conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the
ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the
petitioner only had two months from the discovery and
commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to
file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the
Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not
err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice
National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not
be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his
witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of
the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also
provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint
or information is sufficient if it states that the crime charged
was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place in which the crime was committed is an
essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for
violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes
the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is
necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in
the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and
Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the
court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try
the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the
filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at
the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the
complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of
Justices Prosecution Staff and established Regional State
Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices
were assigned centers for particular regions where the
Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of
responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando,
La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La
Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio,
Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned
prosecutor was designated to file the Information within the
two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as
amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information
is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against
the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia
is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also
upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order
to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the
effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime
may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too
late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of
the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a
rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SECOND DIVISION
x-----------------------------------------------
- - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for
certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and
setting aside of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the
Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal
Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.[3]
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant)
filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate
amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against private complainant before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a
Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC
of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private
complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 152662
PHILIPPINES,
Present:
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
MA. THERESA
PANGILINAN, June 13, 2012
Respondent.
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No.
423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-
complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases
were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the
motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of
appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon
City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the
MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were
filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court
although received by the Court itself only on 07
June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was
worded before the latest amendment. The criminal
action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22,
had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same
was filed with the court a quoconsidering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings
having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October
2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the
petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by
requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the
petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the
period of prescription for violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime
in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period
that the [respondent] was notified by the private
[complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject
checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by
law had elapsed. The private respondent then had,
pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four
years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file
her complaint or information against the petitioner
before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having
been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases
had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended,
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes [7] the Supreme Court
held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings,
which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court. Otherwise stated,
the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not
on any date before that, which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a
municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the
computation of the prescriptive period of both
ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise
applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.[9]
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for
review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763
dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions,
whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. [10] It
submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it
relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia
v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the
CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence
superseding the aforesaid ruling.
[13]
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court
ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with
the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the
allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases
for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that
the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a
certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the
complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense
charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied
upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised
Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime
imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made
between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as
in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to
attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the
12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service
is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached
to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA
decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the
proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the
CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An
Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,
as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the
law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4)
years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court
ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by
the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.
[17]
when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied
to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more
distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling
in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v.
[20] [21]
Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v.
[22]
Lim, cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,
[23]
the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
 In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the
latter part of 1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of
presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period
within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant
of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period
granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against
respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to
suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were
filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of
the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil
case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997
initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate
the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department
of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of
BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 135554-56 June 21, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO DELA CRUZ y CARIZZA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated
August 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 6, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and
15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza
guilty of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of
lasciviousness.
On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed
against accused-appellant in the RTC of Baguio City. The
informations alleged:
Criminal Case No. 15163-R -
That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter,
JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of
age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 15164-R -
That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
by means of force and intimidation, have carnal
knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA
CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against
accused-appellant charging him with violation of Republic Act
No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information
stated:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping
her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which
has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN
DELA CRUZ as a human being.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.3
This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the
consolidation of the three cases. When arraigned, accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges.
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-
legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Cordillera
Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother
of complainant and spouse of accused-appellant; and SPO2
Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police.
The prosecution established that accused-appellant married
Jean dela Cruz in civil rites on 14 April 1977 and again in
Catholic rites on 27 December 1978. They begot four children,
namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace,
Daniel Jay and Gerard Nio.4
Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco
Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. He transferred
to the Don Bosco Elementary School in Baguio City sometime
in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he
worked at the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City until his
dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-appellant again taught at
the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1993 until his
arrest in August 1997.5 While working there, he and his son
Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac on weekdays and went
home every 15 days or every payday. They would go home to
Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on Friday
evening and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.6
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz ("Jeannie Ann") testified that she was
born to accused-appellant and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April
18, 1979 in Tarlac, Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her family
transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2
Sumulong Street, Baguio City. Her family lived in an extension
of her grandmothers house which had a basement, a second
floor and an attic. The second floor had four rooms and a stairs
leading to the attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie
Anns parents and her two brothers, Daniel and Nio, stayed in
the basement while she and her sister, Divine stayed in the
second floor.7
Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting
her when she was seven years old. While he helped do her
homework at night, accused-appellant would on occasion
make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also
instances when he would put his penis inside her mouth and
withdraw the same when a white liquid came out. 8 Accused-
appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell her mother what he
was doing to her and told her that it was a normal thing
between father and daughter. He further warned Jeannie Ann
that her mother might kill them should she learn about the
things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant
and did not tell anyone about the sexual acts he performed on
her. As she was growing up, accused-appellant continued to
engage in the aforementioned sexual activities with her, and
continuously threatened to hurt her, her siblings or her mother
if she did not give in to his desires. Jeannie Ann still refrained
from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-
appellant that the sexual activities which he performed on her
were proper.9 She recounted before the trial court three
particular occasions when accused-appellant molested her.
Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was
sexually abused by accused-appellant in their house in No. 37
Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City. She was only 11 years old
then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said
house when her grandmothers house in Sumulong St. was
destroyed in the July 16, 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio
City.10 They occupied the basement of the house in Leonard
Wood Road. The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room
and a living room. Nobody stayed in the second floor thereof
but during the day they stayed in the main house. 11 Sometime
that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old brother Nio and
accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and
her sister Divine went to market. She was in the living room
with Nio when her father undressed her. Her father removed
his pants and she was made to lie down on a cushion. Her
father played with her genitalia and rubbed his penis against
her private part until a white liquid came out of his penis.
Jeannie Ann said that after said incident, she felt pain in her
vagina whenever she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not
resist because she thought that what her father was doing to
her was a normal act.12
Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her
one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old. She was
watching television with her siblings in the living room. At that
time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-
appellant called her three times but she refused to respond to
his call as she was watching television. Exasperated, accused-
appellant pulled her inside one of the bedrooms and asked her
to lie down on the bed saying, "This is only for a while."
Accused-appellant then undressed her, removed his pants and
underwear, inserted his finger inside her vagina, mashed her
breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant proceeded to
rub his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his
penis therein and kept it there until his semen started to come
out. Accused-appellant placed his penis on Jeannie Anns
stomach where he made his semen flow. While all this was
happening, Jeannie Ann could only cry, as she was afraid of
accused-appellant, because he threatened her that he would
kill her or her mother and siblings.13
The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their
house in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City on August 2,
1997. She was then 18 years old. When she came home at
around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis
University, she saw accused-appellant at the door. He told her
to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored him and went
directly to her room and started cleaning the same. While she
was cleaning the outer portion of her room, she saw accused-
appellant go up the attic. While he was there, he repeatedly
called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie Ann
remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean
the attic, she went up when she was done cleaning her room.14
Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann
swept the floor. When she was done, accused-appellant asked
her to join him on the bed. He went near her and again asked
her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call.
Accused-appellant whispered to her that he was running out of
time. He talked in whispers so that the other people in the
house at that time would not be able to hear what he said.
Sensing that accused-appellant would again molest her,
Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to cry. He told her to
stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do would
only take a while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Anns
t-shirt and brassier, mashed her breasts with his left hand and
inserted his right hand inside her pants. Jeannie Ann resisted,
but accused-appellant proceeded to insert a finger of his right
hand inside her vagina. While he performed the
aforementioned acts on his daughter, accused-appellant told
her, "I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only
one who will do this to you."15
Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he
heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He
immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved away from
her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down
and to keep quiet about the incident. When accused-appellant
noticed that Aileen had left because Jeannie Ann did not
respond to her, accused-appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and
said: "Please cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you
my life. Promise that I will be the only one who will touch you."
Accused-appellant began touching her again. He inserted his
fingers inside her vagina. As he touched her, he said, "Please
cooperate with me and trust me. This is for your own good and
for the good of our family. If you will not follow me, you might
regret it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish,
I can already die and you will no longer have any
problem."16 Although Aileen, Divine, Nio and Rogel, another
boarder in their house were also there at the time of the
incident, Jeannie Ann did not have the courage to call for help
because she was very much afraid of accused-appellant, and
she saw anger in his eyes.17
When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann
insisted on going down. She cried as she returned to her room
to fix herself. Thereafter, she went out of the house to deal with
what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward
the bridge, she saw a white L-300 van belonging to the police.
She flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police
officers riding therein, SPO2 Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what
accused-appellant had just done to her. The policemen
accompanied her back to their house where they met accused-
appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who had
raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the
policemen to the Baguio City Police Station.18
When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie
Ann narrated her experience to the police officer stationed at
the Womens Desk. In her statement, Jeannie Ann described
what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997.19
Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellants claim that she
had sexual relations with her boyfriend Charles, and that she
accused her father of rape to get back at him for causing her
breakup with Charles.20
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who
conducted a physical examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8,
1997, testified that he found two old healed lacerations at 5
o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Anns hymen. He
said that the lacerations could have been inflicted more than
three months prior to the date of the examination and
considering the proximity of their location, could have been
inflicted at the same time. A hard rigid instrument like an erect
male organ, a rigid wood or a finger could have caused these
lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of the
lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the victim had
sexual intercourse less than three months prior to his
examination of her, since intercourse would not create further
lacerations when done in the same position. He likewise noted
that the vaginal walls were lax and the vaginal rugosities were
slightly flattened and smoothed. The victim's hymenal orifice
admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill
said it was possible that penetration happened several times.
He further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or
other rigid object, with a diameter of more than an inch, could
cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal
walls.21
Jean dela Cruz ("Mrs. dela Cruz"), Jeannie Anns mother and
wife of accused-appellant, testified that she learned that
accused-appellant had sexually abused their daughter Jeannie
Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her
marketing chores. She was told by her daughter Divine that
accused-appellant was picked up by the police. Mrs. dela Cruz
followed accused-appellant to the police station and found
Jeanie Ann crying while the latter was reporting what had
happened to her at the Women's Desk. Upon seeing her
daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together.22
Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon
hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that
accused-appellant had been performing oral sex on their
daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as
it was the first time that she learned about it. In her anger, she
rushed to the other room where the accused-appellant was
being questioned and slapped him, kicked him and scratched
his face. She said accused-appellant denied all the
accusations against him. When accused-appellant was already
incarcerated, Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters23 from him
asking for forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann. 24 She
also informed the trial court that after accused-appellants
incarceration, she went to Tarlac to get her husband's things
since he usually stayed there on weekdays while he taught at
Don Bosco.25 She discovered several love letters by a certain
Emily addressed to accused-appellant,26 Emilys
27
photograph and accused-appellants draft love letters to
Emily, dated March 21, 1995, 28 September 4, 1995,29 and
March 7, 1996.30 Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter from a
certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a
chance of winning her heart,31 and a photograph of
Maureen.32She said that the tenor of the letters indicated that
accused-appellant was having relations with other
women.33 Mrs. dela Cruz also denied accused-appellants
claims that she had a paramour and that she helped Jeannie
Ann file the complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela
Cruz) wanted to get back at him for being unfaithful to her.34
SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio
City Mobile Group, also testified that on August 2, 1997,
between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon, while he and his
companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were
passing along Sumulong St., Baguio City, they saw Jeannie
Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them and
tearfully reported to them that her father had just sexually
molested her. They accompanied Jeannie Ann to her house
and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant as the person
who mashed her breasts and inserted his finger inside her
vagina. SPO2 Ong and his companion approached accused-
appellant, introduced themselves as policemen and invited him
to the police station. He said that accused-appellant readily
agreed to go with them to the police station.35
The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant,
Camilo Estepa, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost,
Baguio City, Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco
Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the
Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City.
Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don
Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In
1987, he transferred to Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City
and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught
also in Saint Louis School Center. In 1994, he went back to the
Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught
there until his incarceration in August 1997.36 On weekdays, he
and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they
would go home to their family in Baguio City every 15th and
30th of each month to give his salary to his wife. When these
dates fell on a weekday, they would go home to Baguio City
the following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.37
He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his
daughter Jeannie Ann.38 According to him, he tried to provide
for the needs of his family, especially his wife whom he loved
very much. He maintained that even when he was already in
jail, he asked his mother and his sister to support his
daughter's education.
He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the
evening of August 1, 1997, which he recalled was a Friday.
That night, his wife asked him to clean the attic the following
day as there was a dead rat therein.39
The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed
the decomposing body of the rat from the attic as requested by
his wife. He called his daughter Jeannie Ann who was cleaning
her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic
and help him. It took a while before Jeannie Ann heeded his
call. When she finally went up, she merely swept one third of
the floor area of the attic, away from where the dead rat was.
When she was done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant
asked her to come near him, as he wanted to apologize for
having scolded her earlier and to remind her that she should
not have ignored him when he commanded her to go up the
attic, or to at least tell him that she could not obey his
command immediately. While he was talking to her, they heard
someone calling her name. Jeannie Ann told accused-
appellant that that person was her classmate. She then went
down while accused-appellant stayed on to fix the things in the
attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him
that they had some visitors downstairs. On his way down from
the attic, he looked out of the window and saw Jeannie Ann
walking beyond the bridge.40
Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were
looking for Rogel, one of their boarders. After leading these
visitors to Rogel, two policemen arrived in their house with
Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as
SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo and SPO2 Melchor Ong. The
former asked for accused-appellants name and thereafter
invited him to the police station. He freely went with them,
without asking the purpose of the invitation.41
At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed
accused-appellant. The interview was reduced to writing and
he was asked to sign the same. He did not read the document,
as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first,
accused-appellant refused to sign the document without the
presence of his counsel. SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo,
however, told him that his refusal to sign the document may be
interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part. Accused-
appellant thereafter decided to sign the document.42
Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don
Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac because he was
dismissed from the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City. He
acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a
student named Freda Miguel filed a case43 against him
because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in
the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that he signed
an amicable settlement of the complaint. However, he denied
the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing
thereof was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis
Center.44
He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen
addressed to him were his but insisted that they were only his
friends, and that Emilys reference to him as her boyfriend in
one of her letters45 was only a joke.
Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann
conspired to file the cases against him because they had
resentments against him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed him for
having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His
wife, on the other hand, wanted him out of her life because she
had a paramour. According to him, his wife admitted to him that
she had an illicit relationship with a man named Alfredo dela
Cruz, a namesake of his brother. His wife had a second
relationship with a person named Alfredo Aquino against whom
he filed a case before the barangay.46
Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost,
Baguio City, told the trial court that sometime in 1993,
accused-appellant filed a case for malicious mischief against a
certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of
Mrs. Aqui, the mother of Mrs. dela Cruz. Accused-appellant
alleged that Aquino was courting his wife. However, the case
was settled amicably when Aquino agreed to leave the
boarding house of Mrs. Aqui.47
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical
Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to 1998, testified that he had
known accused-appellant since 1994 and was not aware of
any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that
accused-appellant and his son Daniel would go home to his
family in Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac
either on Sunday evening or Monday morning. He would come
to school on time and attended the flag ceremony regularly. Fr.
Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever complained
about accused-appellant.48
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary
School in Trancoville, Baguio City, testified that accused-
appellant was a very competent teacher in Science and had a
very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he
regretted that accused-appellant left his teaching job at the
Don Bosco Elementary School after only one year.49
On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the
accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape (committed
in September 1990) as charged in the Information
defined and penalized under paragraph No. 3 of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (Statutory
Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the offended party,
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as
Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention
prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the Court finds the
accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of incest rape
(committed in July 1995) as charged in the
Information defined and penalized under Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659 (Heinous Crime Law) which
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty
of Death to be implemented in accordance with law;
to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela
Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court finds the
accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Acts of
Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code instead of violation of
RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) as charged in the
Information and hereby sentences him, applying the
indeterminate sentence law, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from two (2) months and one
(1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two (2) years
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended
party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P5,000 as
Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention
prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law.
SO ORDERED.50
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court
erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jeannie Ann and in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Anns
testimony was fabricated and inconsistent.51
Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to
immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her
harrowing experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was
often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where
he worked on weekdays, and Jeannie Ann was with her mother
in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose the sexual
abuses which accused-appellant allegedly committed against
her.52 Moreover, he claims that considering Jeannie Anns
tender age at the time he allegedly raped her, she must have
suffered great pain and should have complained about it to her
mother or told the latter what accused-appellant had been
doing to her. Accused-appellant argues that the delay in the
reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his daughter is
not normal and is indicative of the untruthfulness of
complainants charges.53
The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping
his daughter Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime
of Rape prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997), and which is the applicable law for the
rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:
When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
xxx
In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following
guidelines it had previously formulated for the review of rape
cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but
it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.54
In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility
of the victims testimony. The trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of the victims statements is accorded great weight
because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses
testify and observing their deportment and manner of testifying.
The trial court judge is indisputably in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of the complainants testimony.
Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of
the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.55
The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a
woman who states under oath that she has been raped meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.56
In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Anns
testimony to be "natural, coherent and touching as she
recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of her
father,"57 as follows:
a He fingered my vagina and also mashed
mybreasts (sic). And with his tongue he licked my
vagina. After that he used his penis and rubbed it into
my vagina. And he played with my vagina.
q What did you do when your father was doing
that to you?
a I was just crying, sir.
q Did you not fight back?

xxx a No sir, because I was afraid of my father.

q Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, q Why are you afraid of your father?
Madame Witness, do you remember if there was
anything unusual which took place again in your
a Because when I was still young, one time he
house at Sumulong St., Baguio City?
told me that either I will be killed or our family will be
killed.
a There was, sir.

q On what occasion was that when your father

q What was that incident? old (sic) you that it is either you or the family that will
be killed?
[a] On that night I was watching TV with my
brothers and sisters. While I was watching TV my a I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I
father was calling me but I did not heed his call was still young.
because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he
called me and I know that he was already angry. Then
q Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your
he went near me and pulled me into the other room.
vagina, what else did your father do?
And in that other room, he did bad things that I cannot
imagine.
a When he was rubbing his penis against my
vagina there was a white liquid that came out. And
q Now, you said that you and your brothers and
when that white liquid came out he placed his penis
sisters were watching TV on that night of July, 1995.
on my stomach where the white liquid was placed.
Where was your mother at that time?

COURT: (to witness)

a She was not in the house at that time because
she attended a meeting in our church.
q Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing
his penis to your vagina? What was being done
COURT: (to witness)
actually?

q That is why we already excluded the public.

a I felt that half of the head of his penis was
Dont let the Court speculate. Will you tell us straight.
inside my vagina. That is what I felt. (At this point the
What did your father actually do which you said (sic)
witness again broke into tears)
he did things which you cannot imagine?

COURT:
a When we were in the room he let me sit on the
bed. And he asked me to lie down. And he said, "This
is only for a while". And after that he put down my Continue.
pants and my underwear. Then he undressed,
lowered his pants and removed his brief. Then he PROS. CENTENO:
started touching my vabina (sic).
q Now, when you felt that as you said half of the
COURT: penis of your father was inside your vagina, what did
you do?
Continue from there. Make it of record that at
this point the witness is crying. a None, sir.

PROS. CENTENO: q Why did you not do anything?

q Now after your father had removed your pants a Because I didnt know what to do, sir.
and your underwear as you said, and he also
removed his pants and his brief and started holding q Did you not try to fight your father?
your vagina, what else happened?
a No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father.
Because when he gets mad at my mother, my
brothers and sisters would be involved.
q Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness,
particularly in September of 1990, several months
after the earthquake of July 16, 1990, will you tell us
where you were residing?
a We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard
Wood Road, sir.
q How old were you?
a I was 11 years old.
xxx
q When you were staying at Leonard Wood
Road, Baguio City, together with your father, your
mother, your sister and your brothers in September of
1990, do you remember if there was any unusual
incident which happened to you?
a Yes, sir.
q What was that incident?
a I was with my father and brother Nio at the
sala. And at the sala he undressed me and did the
same. He removed his pants. Then he took a cushion
from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he
played with my vagina. Then he rubbed his penis
against my vagina. Nio was still a baby at that time.
q Where was your mother at that time?
a My mother was not in the house at that time.
What I know is that she went to the market.
q How about you sister Divine?
a She was with my mother, sir.
COURT: (to witness)
q Again, in this incident will you describe actually
to us the motions that took place with the rubbing of
his penis into your vagina?
a It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina
(witness showing her left hand, palms up) and this is
his penis (witness demonstrating with her right
forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on
my vagina.
PROS. CENTENO:
q What did you feel while your father was doing
that to you which you term as "rubbing his penis into
your vagina"?
a I felt pain, sir.
PROS. CENTENO:
May we put the word "mahapdi" which was
the term used by the witness, in the record.
(to witness)
q How long did your father rub his penis into your
vagina?
a It was for quite a long time until a white liquid
came out.
q Did you not fight back when your father did that
to you?
a No, sir.
q Why did you not fight back?
a Because I thought that what he was doing to
me was a normal act.
xxx58
The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the
anguish and the pain and the shame and the embarrassment
as she broke down and cried several times in the course of her
testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable
acts of her father."59
Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse,
allow an examination of her private parts and endure the
humiliation of a public trial where she would be forced to
recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not
really been raped. This is especially true in cases of incestuous
rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann accused her own
father of abusing her, since reverence and respect for ones
parents and other elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino
children.60
The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily
impair the credibility of the victim where the delay can be
attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily
harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral
ascendancy over the victim. It is not uncommon for a young girl
to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue because of
the rapists threat on her life, or on the life of the other
members of her family.61
In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that
accused-appellant threatened to hurt her, her mother or her
siblings if she did not give in to his desires. 62 Her fear of what
accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if
she revealed his evil deeds was what compelled her to suffer
in silence for a long time. In People v. Nicolas, 63 the Court
stated:
The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator
in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into
submission, is evident in virtually all cases that have
reached this Court. It is through this fear that the
perpetrator hopes to create a climax of extreme
psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his
 victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated
acts of rape over a period of time. The relationship of
the victim and the perpetrator magnifies this terror,
because the perpetrator is a person normally
expected to give solace and protection to the victim.64
On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to
be evasive in his narration of his story. All that he offered in his
defense were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is an
inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive
and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters.65
Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the
charges against him to get back at him for causing her breakup
with her boyfriend Charles is likewise unbelievable. It is not
likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story
of defloration against her own father and put to shame not only
herself but her whole family as well, unless it was the plain
truth and her motive was purely to obtain justice. 66 Neither
does the Court believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife
urged their daughter to file rape charges against him because
she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the way of her extra-
marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject
them to embarrassment and even stigma.67 No mother would
have the courage to expose an ignominious act of her husband
that could lead to a breakup of the family unless she was
prompted by a desire to obtain justice for her daughter.68
The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape he
committed in September 1990, since the offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the
Death Penalty Law).69
However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing
the supreme penalty of death upon him for the rape committed
in July 1995. R.A. No. 7659, which was already in force at that
time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender must concur for
the death penalty to be imposable. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx
The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of
minority and relationship are considered as special qualifying
circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of
rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
These circumstances must be alleged in the information and
established during trial for the court to be able to impose the
death penalty.70 It was, therefore, incumbent upon the
prosecution to satisfactorily prove both circumstances of
minority and relationship.
In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship
was alleged in the information and proven in the course of the
trial. However, Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise
alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that
was offered to establish her age was her bare testimony that
she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to
present her birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, other
documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate,
school records which would have aided the court in verifying
her claim that she was a minor when she was raped by
accused-appellant in July 1995.
In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the
penalty imposable for the offense in Criminal Case No. 15164-
R is reclusion perpetua.71
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be
convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the
information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness."72
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information
do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite
which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A.
No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.73 Moreover,
it does not state the acts and omissions constituting the
offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending
the same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure.
Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense. The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section
or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant
"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his
daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts
of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the
acts constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for
these are conclusions of law, not facts. 74 The information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative
of the accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.75
Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both
the trial court and this Court regarding the defects of the
information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court may motu
proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its
ruling in Suy Sui vs. People,76 because the information is a
patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and of the
basic principles of due process. Moreover, an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review,
and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as
might be found in the appealed decision, whether these errors
are assigned or not.
It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by
the trial court. The lower court in its decision ordered accused-
appellant to indemnify the complainant in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases,
representing moral damages. It failed to award the prescribed
amounts for civil indemnity, the award of which is mandatory
upon the finding of the fact of rape. 77 This civil liability ex
delicto is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law.78 It is not to be confused with moral damages, which is
awarded upon a showing that the victim endured physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation
and similar injury.79Under prevailing jurisprudence, when the
penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua, the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) should be
awarded as civil indemnity to the rape victim. 80 Thus, in
Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each
count of rape is proper.
In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically
granted to the victim in rape cases without need of proof for it
is assumed that the private complainant has sustained mental,
physical and psychological suffering.81The Court affirms the
award by the trial court of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and
15164-R, since said amounts are in accord with its current
rulings.82
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and
15164-R is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay the victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.
3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared
null and void for being violative of the accused-appellant's
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case
against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CASIANO
BUNTAG alias CIANO and DIEGO
BONGO, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729,
convicting the appellants Casiano Buntag alias Ciano and
Diego Bongo of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua, and directing them to jointly indemnify the heirs of
the victim Berno Georg Otte the sum of P50,000 as moral
damages.
The Indictment
The appellants were charged with murder in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1992, in the municipality of
Panglao, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill
and without any justifiable cause, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, with treachery by the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the acts, the victim who was unarmed being then
unaware thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the use of a bladed
instrument one Berno Georg Otte (a German national), hitting and
injuring the latter on his chest, thereby causing his immediate death;
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount
to be proved during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 in relation to
Art. 14 all of the Revised Penal Code as amended. [2]
The Case for the Prosecution
Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,[3] a German
national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach
Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma
Clarabal Bonga,[4] assigned Otte to Room No. 9[5] and gave the
latter his room key.
On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resorts
restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco which was
about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo
Chapel.[6]
At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where
she saw Otte seated at one of the tables. [7] She noticed that he
had some companions whom she failed to recognize.[8]
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno
Ninoy Guigue were also at the disco. At around 2:00 a.m. of
February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a
night and walked home, with their respective bicycles at their
sides.[9] At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man
lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past
the prostrate man. When they were about twenty-five
meters[10] away from the body by the road, they met Casiano
Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates. [11] Suddenly,
Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at
them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and
sought refuge in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo.
[12]
In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino
Bongo then accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they
left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their
bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.
At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police
station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about
a man, believed to be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad
near the Alona Beach.[13] PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos,
together with PO1 Mauro Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta,
[14]
proceeded to the crime scene. They were accompanied by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed
that the man died due to a stab wound.[15] The policemen found
a hunting knife about one meter away from the body.
[16]
Constancio Geoivencal took pictures of the
cadaver. Hormachuelos took custody of the knife.[17]
In the course of their investigation, the policemen learned
that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead body by the
road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their
houses and brought them to the road where the body of Otte
was found. Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the
body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as their encounter
with Bongo and Buntag.
At about 1:00 p.m. that day, Hormachuelos took appellant
Bongo to the police station and investigated him without the
assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Ottes key
to Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He then drew a
sketch showing the place where he hid the key, at the back of
their house. Bongo also admitted that he was with appellant
Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongos house and
recovered the key to Ottes room as indicated by Bongo in his
sketch.
At 2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and
gave his statement to Hormachuelos.[18] At 3:00 p.m.,
Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo Bonao.
[19]
Hormachuelos then took custody of Casiano Buntag and
brought him to the police station where he was asked about his
involvement in the killing of Otte without the assistance of
counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep silent. When apprised
that Diego Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this time with
the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, gave a
statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He
stated that at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was walking
back home from the disco place where he caught up with
Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw
Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box
Otte but he refused, and moved back about three
meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three times on the
face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the
chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran back home, but
Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the
incident to anybody or else he would be implicated. [20] Buntag
subscribed and swore to the truth of his statement on February
21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
In the meantime, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-
Cogo performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Otte and
submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the
following findings:
Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2
cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth of approx. 12 cms., directed
upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right,
involving a portion of the right lung and base of the heart.
Cause of death:
CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE,
SECONDARY TO STAB WOUND, ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT.[21]
On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was
filed against appellants Bongo and Buntag with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. Attached to the records was Buntags sworn
statement dated February 21, 1992. Only appellant Bongo
submitted his counter-affidavit on February 27, 1992,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Antonio Sarce, [22] where
he confirmed (a) Buntags account in his sworn statement
before Judge Sarce that they were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on
February 9, 1992 at the crossing towards Alona Beach Resort,
and (b) that he was armed with a hunting knife. He further
stated therein that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who
were both drunk, had an altercation and that he tried to pacify
them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongos)
hunting knife from his waist and stabbed Otte with it.[23]
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC
issued a resolution finding probable cause against the
appellants for murder and issued warrants for their arrest. The
court found Buntags sworn statement and Bongos counter-
affidavit self-serving.
On June 4, 1992, the day of the appellants arraignment in
the Regional Trial Court, appellant Buntag, through counsel,
Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, filed a Motion to Discharge (him) to be a
Witness for the Prosecution, alleging inter alia:
1) That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused
whose discharge is requested;
2) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused, as can be shown by the affidavit of said accused in relation
to theaffidavits or sworn statements of Ponciano Horcerada, Isidro
Mihangos, Benigno Guigue, Alfredo Guioguio, and PO1 Yolando [E.]
Hormachuelos;
3) That the testimony of herein accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
4) That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
5) That the said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude;
6) That herein accused-movant hereby expresses his consent to be a
witness for the government.[24]
However, the prosecution opposed the motion on the
ground that both accused were equally guilty. On June 8, 1992,
the court issued an Order denying the motion, and the
appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, entered
pleas of not guilty.[25]
During the trial, the prosecution presented Judge Antonio
G. Sarce who testified that he conducted the preliminary
examination of the case and identified both Buntags sworn
statement and Bongos counter-affidavit as subscribed and
sworn to before him (Judge Sarce) in his chambers.
After presenting all its witnesses, the prosecution offered
in evidence the hunting knife,[26] the key to room no. 9 of the
beach resort,[27] the sworn statement of Buntag,[28] and Bongos
counter-affidavit[29] to prove that both appellants conspired to
kill the victim and that they in fact killed the victim, and as part
of the testimony of Judge Sarce. Both appellants objected to
the admission of the said sworn statements and counter-
affidavit solely on the ground that the statements executed by
one accused was hearsay as to the other accused. [30] By way
of rejoinder, the prosecution alleged as follows:
1. That exhibits A, B, C, D, E and all its submarkings are all relevant,
pertinent and material evidence against the accused in the above-
entitled case, therefore, admissible in evidence;
2. That exhibits F and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not
violate the res inter alios acta rule because they are principally
offered against accused Casiano Buntag, the affiant. The sworn
statement of Casiano Buntag is offered mainly as admission of said
accused Casiano Buntag;
3. That exhibits G and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not
violate the res inter alios acta rule because they are principally
offered against accused Diego Bongo, the affiant. The counter-
affidavit of Diego Bongo is offered mainly as admission of said
accused Diego Bongo.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
to admit in evidence all the prosecutions exhibits formally offered,
for the purpose for which they are being offered. [31]
The court admitted the documentary and object evidence
of the prosecution. The appellants opted not to adduce any
evidence on their behalf. Instead, they filed, without leave of
court, a Motion to Acquit. On June 7, 1993, the court issued an
Order denying the motion.
On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment
finding both the appellants guilty of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Court renders judgment
finding the two (2) accused Casiano Buntag, alias Ciano, and Diego
Bongo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, an
act committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248, in relation to
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and does hereby
sentences each one of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
with all the accusatory penalties imposed by law.
There being no evidence disclosed as to the civil liability, this Court,
therefore, limits in providing that the accused shall pay jointly the
heirs of the deceased Berno Georg Otte the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), by way of moral damages, but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The trial court relied, inter alia, on the sworn statement of
Buntag dated February 21, 1992[33] and the counter-affidavit of
Bongo[34] in convicting them of the crime charged. Both the
appellants appealed the decision.
Although the appellants enumerated separate issues in
their briefs, the same may be synthesized into three issues,
namely: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim Otte and
that they, in fact, killed him; (b) whether or not the appellants
are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the appellants are
liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim. Appellant
Bongos contention that he was deprived of his right to due
process on his claim that the transcripts of the respective
testimonies of Dr. Julita Cogo, SPO1 Bonao and resort
manager Bonga were not transmitted to this Court is belied by
the records. In a Resolution dated September 11, 2000, the
Court declared that, based on the records, the transcripts of
stenographic notes in this case were already complete.[35]
The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to
adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that they
conspired to kill the victim, and that they, in fact, killed
him. They argue that although the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence consisting of the extrajudicial sworn
statement of appellant Buntag and the counter-affidavit of
appellant Bongo, such evidence is utterly insufficient to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, according to the appellants, the admissions
made by appellant Buntag in his sworn statement are binding
on him only. Being prejudicial to appellant Bongo, such
admissions are not inadmissible against the latter unless
repeated in open court by appellant Buntag, thus, affording
appellant Bongo the right to cross-examination. Likewise, the
admissions of appellant Bongo in his sworn statement are
inadmissible against appellant Buntag, unless the former
repeated his admissions during the trial, affording the latter an
opportunity to cross-examine the said appellant. The
appellants further aver that since they opted not to testify on
their respective statements, there was no opportunity for cross-
examination. Consequently, the admissions made by one
appellant in his sworn statement are hearsay evidence against
the other appellant, and vice versa. In fine, the appellants
contend that the trial court should have acquitted them of the
crime charged.
We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed
to adduce direct evidence that they conspired to kill Otte and
that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we
find and so hold, after an incisive review of the records, that
the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime
and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective
acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime.[36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by
acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests.[37] It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators
actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the
conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their participation because in contemplation of law,
the act of one conspirator is the act of all.[38]
 The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial
evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites are
established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[39]
In People v. Delim,[40] we held, thus:
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which
constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof
of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without
exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt
of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the
requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused
to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. [41]
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial
court relied not only on the counter-affidavit of appellant
Bongo[42] and appellant Buntags sworn statement,[43] but also
on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used in
killing the victim,[44] the key to Ottes room,[45] and the collective
testimonies of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admissible only against the said
accused but is inadmissible against the other accused.[46] The
same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one
accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession
during trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity
to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is
admissible against both accused.[47] The erstwhile extrajudicial
confession or admission when repeated during the trial is
transposed into judicial admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a
confession. It is but a statement of facts by the accused, direct
or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or
truths charged.[48] It is an acknowledgment of some facts or
circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts
of guilt.[49] A confession, on the other hand, is an
acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime
charged.[50]
In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial
admissions against his interest in his sworn statement, and not
a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-
affidavit. Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the
Municipal Trial Court in the course of its preliminary
investigation, are high quality evidence.[51] MCTC Judge
Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn statement and
counter-affidavit and was cross-examined.[52] Moreover, some
of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are
identical with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions
of the other, and vice versa. This corroborates and confirms
their veracity. Such admissions, made without collusion, are
akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the other
appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his
participation in the commission of the crime and as
corroborative evidence against him.[53] The Court rejects the
appellants contention that they were deprived of their right to
cross-examine the other on the latters admissions against the
other. Through their common counsel, they opted not to testify
and be cross-examined on their respective statements by the
prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides,
they had opportunity to cross-examine Judge Sarce before
whom they swore to the truthfulness of their statements.[54]
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following
circumstantial evidence which constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants, indeed, conspired to kill
and did kill the victim:
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement,
[55]
that, at about 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was in the
company of appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the
crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was armed
with a hunting knife. Appellant Buntag identified the victim
through the latters picture, as well as the hunting knife used in
the killing.[56]Appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, confirmed
the truth of appellant Buntags admissions and also admitted
that on the said date, time and place, he was with appellant
Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting
knife which was tucked on his waist.
2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements
that on the said occasion, Otte died from a stab wound caused
by a hunting knife.
3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that
he took the key to the victims room and hid it near their house
where the policemen found it.
4. While both appellants were within the periphery of
the situs criminis, Mihangos and Guigue sauntered by with
their bicycles at their sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly
and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos and
Guigue to believe that their lives were in peril, impelling them
to run for their lives and seek sanctuary in the house of
Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time Mihangos and
Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve their bicycles,
the appellants had already left.
5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that
after the victim was stabbed, he and appellant Bongo fled from
the situs criminis. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at the situs
criminis and their flight from the scene are strong indicia of
their participation in the commission of the crime and their
complicity therein.[57] Appellant Bongo opted not to testify or
adduce evidence to controvert the testimony of Mihangos and
the admissions of the appellant prejudicial to him.
6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used
to kill the victim was left at the scene of the crime where the
policemen recovered it shortly thereafter.
 7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn
statements that the victim was stabbed once with a hunting
knife. These admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita Cogos
finding that the victim was stabbed once on the anterior chest
area.[58] The doctor testified that the stab wound could have
been caused by a sharp-edged weapon.[59]
8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the
hospital for immediate medical attendance and operation.
9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the
assailant in their respective statements, neither of them
reported the stabbing to the police authorities and claimed that
the other killed the victim.
10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to
deny any involvement in the killing of the victim. The evidence
of the prosecution, thus, stands unrebutted.
The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of
their respective statements as basis for their acquittal of the
crime charged. In the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in his
sworn statement that he was ordered by appellant Bongo to
box the victim and when he refused, appellant Bongo himself
boxed and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife. When
appellant Buntag fled from the scene and went back home,
appellant Bongo followed and warned him not to divulge the
incident so that he would not be implicated. For his part,
appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and
claimed in his counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the
hunting knife from his waist and stabbed the victim in the heat
of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden, he insists,
that he was unable to stop appellant Buntag from stabbing the
victim.
We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for
the following reasons:
First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that
appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the necropsy report of Dr.
Cogo failed to show that the victims body sustained
hematoma, bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor
must prevail as against the bare statements of the appellants.
Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn
statement that before he and appellant Bongo could leave
the situs criminis after the victim was stabbed, Mihangos and
Guigue arrived.The appellants lunged jointly and
simultaneously at the two teenagers which so terrified the latter
that they fled for their lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he
had nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim, he should
have sought the help of the teenagers, brought the victim to
the hospital and reported to the police authorities that it was
appellant Bongo who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag
failed to do so. Neither did appellant Bongo seek the help of
the two teenagers and report the stabbing to the police
authorities. Both appellants unexplained omission is another
indication of their conspiracy and complicity in the crime
charged.
Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the
victim and hid it near their house where the policemen found
it. The appellant has not explained why he had the key to the
victims room and hid it near their house. He owned the hunting
knife used in stabbing the victim. He knew or should have
known that sooner or later, the policemen would trace the knife
to him; and yet, appellant Bongo failed to report the incident to
the police authorities and surrender the knife to them.
Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing
and pointed to appellant Buntag as the assailant only after the
latter had executed his own sworn statement pointing to
appellant Bongo as the victims assailant. We are convinced
that appellant Bongos denial of any involvement in the killing is
but a belated afterthought to escape criminal liability for the
victims death.
The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua. We note,
however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made no
finding on any attendant circumstance which would qualify the
killing to murder. It bears stressing that under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, any qualifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of a crime must be alleged in the Information
and proved by the prosecution, conformably to the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
of the charges against him.
In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was
attendant in the commission of the crime. The prosecution was
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the
crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
[60]
Treachery cannot be based on speculations and
surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the
malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution
affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate and, (b) the means, method or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.
On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn
statement, claimed that before the victim was stabbed,
appellant Bongo and the victim had an altercation; appellant
Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant
Buntag and the victim who had an altercation before the victim
was killed. There is no evidence that the appellants
deliberately or consciously adopted a method or means of
execution to insure the death of the victim.
In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide,
punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no
modifying circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period.
The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the
victim, although the prosecution failed to present any heir of
the victim as witness. The trial court, likewise, failed to award
civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. The decision
of the trial court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 7729 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS.Appellants Casiano Buntag alias Ciano and
Diego Bongo are found guilty, as principals, of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, each of the
appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The award of
moral damages is deleted. The said appellants are ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Berno Georg
Otte, P50,000 as civil indemnity, conformably to current
jurisprudence.[61] Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140406 April 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO DESUYO alias "TONY," accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger
sister Aisalyn one late night in September 1996 when she was
awakened by someone caressing her breasts. She opened her
eyes and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching
before her. He was naked except for his underpants to cover
his private parts. Instinctively, she begged her father not to
touch her, reminding him that she was his daughter. But he
paid no heed; instead, he removed her underwear while
threatening to kill her should she make any noise. He mounted
her, forced his penis into her vagina and gyrated his hips
against hers. She wept as she continued to beg him to desist
from his fiendish assault on her virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did
not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept the
ignominy and pain to herself.
Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town
and she did not want to give her any trouble. Neither did she
inform her relatives who lived nearby. She feared for her life as
her father had threatened to kill her should she speak to
anyone about what he had done to her.
The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel
almost everyday from September 1996 to August 1997. His
assaults on her virtue were always followed by threats on her
that she would be killed should she report these to her mother.
The sexual abuses of her father were so often that Maricel lost
count.
On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already
accustomed to, she would be roused from her sleep by her
father fondling her private parts. Again, he undressed her and
unleashed his lechery on her. It was meant to be the last. In
her young and impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that it
would not happen to her again.
On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to
relate her ordeal to a police officer who lived nearby. She
bravely narrated to Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his wife
Riza her sordid tale which was actually a confirmation of what
was already circulating around their neighborhood. She
admitted that her father had been sexually abusing her for
close to a year already. Emboldened by the encouragement
she received from sympathetic neighbors, she next confided to
Luisa Galit, Maricel's maternal aunt, who could only
commiserate with her.1wphi1.nt
Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who
upon examination found Maricel to have several old hymenal
lacerations in her vaginal area. Thereafter, they repaired to the
municipal hall where Maricel instituted a complaint against her
father, accused Antonio Desuyo, for having repeatedly raped
her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the
municipal trial court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked
forgiveness from his daughter and promised to leave her alone
should she withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel
vehemently refused as her father grovelled for forgiveness.1 As
a consequence, an Information was filed against the accused
Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old
daughter Maricel.
Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations.
According to her, ever since her mother worked in a faraway
town, her father was dauntless and unrelenting in sexually
abusing her night after night within the confines of their home.
She felt pain and cried everytime her father would forcibly
insert his penis into her vagina; however she kept her ordeal to
herself as she was afraid of him.
After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive
that she might get pregnant. Her father however was
unperturbed and simply dismissed her fears by telling her not
to worry. A year after the first forced coition, Maricel decided to
end her tribulation by unburdening her grief to neighbors who
readily sympathized with her. She felt relieved after seeing her
father locked up behind bars.2
The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed
however that he raised singlehandedly his two (2) daughters
Maricel and Aisalyn as his wife was serving another household
in a distant town. According to him, despite his guidance,
Maricel turned out to be a wayward daughter who entertained
suitors at an early age. Once, his daughter Aisalyn confided to
him that Maricel was corresponding with a boy from
another barrio. He immediately searched through her bag and
found a letter intended for a certain Jerry. Incensed by his
daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting that she would
atone for her mistakes. However, instead of mending her ways,
Maricel ran away from home and instituted this unfounded
charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence
Maricel's supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his
wife pledging her love and support. He averred that Maricel
was being inveigled by his sister-in-law Luisa and the latter's
boyfriend Boy into tormenting him for reasons which he could
not fathom.3
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the
accused. Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the court a
quo found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death, and to indemnify the offended
party P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.4
Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for
"multiple rape" essentially on two (2) grounds, namely, that the
Information is defective and that the court a quo erred in
imposing upon him the penalty of death despite the failure of
the prosecution to establish the age of Maricel with certainty.5
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed
against him is deficient since by merely stating that the sexual
assaults were repeated "within the month of September 1996
up to August 18, 1997,"6 it failed to state the exact dates when
the alleged rapes were committed. Quoting heavily from the
early case of US v. Diacho,7 accused asserts that unless he is
informed of the precise "day, or about the day, he may be, to
an extent deprived of the opportunity to defend himself."8
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against
an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the
offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of
particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for
a bill of particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.9
The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the
date when the alleged crime was committed or for the quashal
of the Information on the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form10 deprives him of the right
to object to evidence which could lawfully be introduced and
admitted under an information of more or less general terms
but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime.11 It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise
this issue because objections to matters of form or substance
in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission
of rape is not an essential element thereof and need not be
stated in the information.12 The Court has sustained the
following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient
for purposes of complying with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up to July 21,
1994,"13 "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions
prior and/or subsequent thereto,"14 "on or about and sometime
in the year 1988,"15 "sometime in the year 1987"16 and "before
and until October 15, 1994."17 In any event, a review of the
evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes
the guilt of the accused for the rape of his
daughter.1wphi1.nt
For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely
preposterous, that Maricel, a guileless barrio lass, would
concoct a story of rape against her very own father, taking into
mind the societal humiliation and personal devastation which
such a charge entails. More so, no serious motive, apart from
the beatings which she supposedly suffered in the hands of the
accused, was offered to satisfactorily explain why Maricel
would come out and undergo legal scrutiny of the unfortunate
encounters with her father. Thus, if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.
An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a
straightforward, spontaneous and consistent manner. Although
Maricel expounded only on the first and last instances of rape,
failing thus to give an accurate account of the other sexual
violations, her testimony in its entirety was forthright, clear and
free from any contradictions.
Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as
her relatives about her ordeal is consistent with reason. It must
be remembered that Maricel depended on the accused for
existence and protection as her mother lived far. As to her total
obedience to her father and the stoic silence she kept about
her sufferings, these were all brought about by her genuine
fear of a man who on account of his moral ascendancy needed
no weapon to instill such terror in her.18 Maricel was convinced
of a potential yet real danger posed by a beast masquerading
as the family's paladin.
Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before
the trial court that he wrote his parents-in-law sometime in
March 1998 to ask for their forgiveness. Antonio likewise
acknowledged when cross-examined that he begged for
Maricel's mercy before the municipal trial judge in the course of
the preliminary examination. No compelling reason was offered
by the defense to explain Antonio's incriminating declarations.
Verily, these are judicial admissions which no man in his right
mind would make unless they were true.
The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape"
without stating the counts of rape involved. The records
however show that the prosecution established beyond doubt
that accused was guilty of two (2) counts of rape. Although
Maricel insists that she had been raped almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to relate
with clarity two (2) of the rapes, the first forced coition
sometime in September 1996, and the last on 14 August 1997.
She positively narrated in detail the surrounding circumstances
of the sexual assaults committed against her on those two (2)
occasions. Indeed, her recollection of these two (2) rapes was
very vivid, leaving no doubt about its credibility and
truthfulness.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two
(2) counts of rape has been conclusively established; however,
the death penalty was erroneously imposed. Under Sec. 11 of
RA 7659, death shall be imposed if "the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent x x x of
the victim."
In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with
rape alleges that Maricel is the fourteen (14)-year old daughter
of the accused. However, it is significant to note that other than
the testimony of Maricel, no independent proof was presented
to show that she was a minor and that she was the daughter of
the accused. Although Maricel's relationship with the accused
was not contested, nor her age refuted, proof of age and
relationship is critical considering the gravity of the penalty to
be imposed upon the accused.19
It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation
to the accused when properly alleged in the information and
proved beyond reasonable doubt during trial elevate the crime
of simple rape to qualified rape and warrant the imposition of
the extreme penalty of death. As such, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which the accused is charged must be
established by the prosecution in order for the penalty of death
to be upheld. In fine, the minority of the victim as well as her
relationship with the accused must be proved with equal
certainty and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the failure of
the prosecution to sufficiently establish the victim's age and
relationship with the accused is fatal and consequently bars
conviction for qualified rape.20
Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by
the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be
modified and adjusted to P50,000.00 since the penalty is
likewise lowered to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence, accused Antonio Desuyo should also
be ordered to pay Maricel Desuyo P50,000.00 as moral
damages even if there was no proof presented as basis
therefor since the anguish and pain that complaining witness
endured are plainly evident.21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26,
San Jose, Southern Leyte, finding accused Antonio
Desuyo alias "Tony" guilty of "multiple rape" in its qualified form
and ordering him to pay complaining witness Maricel Peru
Desuyo P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, is MODIFIED. The
accused is instead found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape
and, accordingly, sentences him to reclusion perpetua for each
count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru Desuyo civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, instead of P75,000.00,
for each count of rape, accused is further ordered to pay moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 also for each count.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124036 October 23, 2001
FIDELINO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE RTC, GUMACA, QUEZON, BRANCH 62, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal by certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 22, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 13358. The
decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 in Criminal Case No. 2307-G,
finding petitioner Fidelino Garcia with his co-accused Leopoldo
Garcia and Wilfredo Garcia guilty of homicide.
In an Information dated December 13, 1983, Fidelino Garcia,
Leopoldo Garcia, and Wilfredo Garcia were charged with
murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of July 1983, at
Barangay II, in Poblacion, Municipality of Mulanay,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a knife, a piece of wood and a broken
bottle with intent to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and with treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit
with said piece of wood and stab with the said knife
and broken bottle one Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena,
thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries,
to wit:
"Wound lacerated mid parietal area 4cm with
linear fracture of underlying skull;
Wound lacerated 3 cm mid frontal area;
Wound lacerated T shape right frontal cm;
Abrasion right nasolridge;
Contusion with laceration nose;
Multiple contusion chest right #3 6cm deep
non-penetrating;
Wound lacerated left temporal 1 cm;
Wound stab left arm medial aspect 1 cm."
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.1
Petitioner and Wilfredo Garcia are brothers, while their co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, Leopoldo, is their first-
degree cousin.2
Earlier, a separate charge sheet docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2165-G had been filed against petitioner Fidelino Garcia,
charging him with direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. On March 8, 1984, he was arraigned in said case
and entered a plea of not guilty.
In 1985, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2307-G were
separately arraigned. All pleaded not guilty to the charge. As
Criminal Cases Nos. 2165-G and 2307-G arose from the same
incident, a joint trial ensued.
The facts, as established by the prosecution before the trial
court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
At around 2:30 P.M., July 30, 1983, P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera
was on his way to mail a letter. He was waiting at the crossing
near the police outpost in the town proper of Mulanay, Quezon,
when he saw petitioner, Wilfredo and Leopoldo, ganging up on
Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena.3 While Leopoldo held the victim,
petitioner hit him with an empty bottle. Wilfredo then stabbed
the victim once with a stainless steel fan knife (balisong). The
knife got stuck in Paulinos body. Paulino succeeded in
wrestling free from Leopoldos grasp and pulling out the knife
from his body. He used the knife to stab petitioner in the
stomach.
Rollera tried to stop the fight. He pulled out his service pistol
and fired three successive warning shots, calling upon the
combatants to stop their fight, but to no avail. Still holding
Wilfredos knife, the wounded Paulino beat a hasty retreat to
the store of one Manuel Roberto. Wilfredo pursued him. Inside
the store, Paulino stabbed Wilfredo twice in the neck and
stomach. Unable to stop the affray, Rollera then asked the
other people around to summon other policemen.
Paulino went back to the street. Seeing that Wilfredo was
about to hit him with a piece of wood, Rollera stepped in and
wrestled the stick away from Wilfredo. The latter, however,
managed to get hold of an empty bottle. Before Rollera could
react, petitioner approached him, holding a broken bottle.
Rollera moved back and Fidelino chased him around a parked
vehicle.
At this point, two other policemen arrived and pacified the
antagonists. A third responding policeman grabbed and caught
petitioner chasing Rollera around the parked vehicle.
Paulino Rodolfo subsequently died. The medico-legal
certificate issued by Dr. Mario A. Cuento of the Bondoc
Peninsula District Hospital at Catanauan, Quezon, revealed
that the cause of death was "cerebral hemorrhage."4
Predictably, the defense gave a slightly different version of the
incident. Wilfredo testified that between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. of
July 30, 1983, he was on his way to the tricycle parking space
in Nanadiego St., Mulanay, Quezon, with his two co-accused
following a short distance behind him. He met P/Cpl. Rollera
and Paulino, both of whom appeared to be intoxicated. Paulino
put an arm around Wilfredos shoulder and invited him to have
a drink. The latter removed Paulinos arm and refused,
explaining that he had to go to the barrio. Wilfredo was about
to leave, when Paulino suddenly collared him and poked
a balisong at his throat. Wilfredo stepped back, but Paulino
nonetheless succeeded in stabbing him in the neck, chest, and
stomach. He did not know what transpired next as he lost
consciousness as a result of his wounds, regaining it only next
morning when he found himself at the Quezon Memorial
Hospital where he was confined for four (4) days.
Although petitioner and he were closely following Wilfredo,
Leopoldo claimed that he did not actually see how Paulino
attacked Wilfredo. What he heard were the voices of persons
heatedly arguing. When he advanced to investigate, he saw
Wilfredo already wounded. Leopoldo ran towards the municipal
hall to get police assistance. On his way, he met police officers
Pobeda and Roadilla and he told them what happened. They
then proceeded to the scene of the incident where Leopoldo
allegedly saw Rollera chasing a wounded Fidelino around a
parked vehicle. Pobeda and Roadilla then pacified Rollera and
petitioner. Because Leopoldo and petitioner were both
wounded, the peace officers brought them to the Catanauan
Hospital. Leopoldo claimed that he never saw the victim at the
scene.
On February 14, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision and
disposed of the two cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, on ground of
reasonable doubt, accused Fidelino Garcia is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged under Criminal
Case No. 2165-G for Direct Assault Upon An Agent of
a Person in Authority.
In Criminal Case No. 2307-G, the judgment of
conviction is hereby entered. Accused FIDELINO,
WILFREDO and LEOPOLDO, all surnamed GARCIA
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of HOMICIDE, and this Court hereby sentences them,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Furthermore, all the accused are solidarily liable and
are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Paulino
Rodolfo y Olgena, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) plus the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as actual
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.5
The accused seasonably filed their respective notices of
appeal to the appellate court.6 The Court of Appeals, in a
resolution dated May 17, 1994 ordered Wilfredo Garcias
appeal deemed "abandoned and ordered dismissed for failure
to furnish the Court (with) his forwarding address."7 On
September 3, 1994, the resolution dismissing Wilfredos appeal
became final and executory. The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 13358, thus resolved only the appeals interposed by
Leopoldo and Fidelino Garcia.
On February 22, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the lower
courts decision finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the
indeterminate sentence should be from six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Although the three accused were represented by one counsel
before the trial court, said counsel filed an appellants brief only
for accused Leopoldo Garcia. Before us now is the separate
appeal of petitioner Fidelino Garcia filed by a court appointed
counsel de oficio from the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG).9 In his brief, petitioner Fidelino Garcia assigns the
following as errors committed by the appellate court:
First Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR CONSPIRACY WHEN IT
WAS NEVER ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION NOR
PROVEN DURING TRIAL.
Second Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
PETITIONERS CONVICTION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE FACT, MANNER AND CAUSE
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS DEATH.
Third Assigned Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING GREATER
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION AND
FINDING NO ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS.
Fourth Assigned Error
PETITIONER SHOULD BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH HIS CULPABILITY AS A
PRINCIPAL, CO-CONSPIRATOR OR ACCOMPLICE.10
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Whether the
appellate court erred in convicting petitioner as a conspirator in
the killing of Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena; and (2) Whether or not
there was sufficient evidence to establish petitioners guilt with
moral certainty.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that an accused cannot
be convicted of any offense not alleged in the information, as
he has the right to be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged before he is put on trial. He points out that
the Information in Criminal Case No. 2307-G did not allege that
he conspired, confederated, mutually helped, and/or acted in
concert and with consent in committing the offense charged.
He submits that an allegation of conspiracy cannot be
presumed or implied in an information. In finding him to be a
conspirator in the killing of the victim, appellant claims that his
rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; to a fair trial; to due process of law; and to equal
protection of law were violated by respondent appellate court.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that it is not essential that the allegation of
"conspiracy" be expressly stated in the indictment. It is enough
that the narration in the Information shows that the accused
acted in concert in the commission of the crime.
On this point, we are not in agreement with the OSG.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.11 The
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him
is explicit in Sec. 1(b) Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.12 To ensure that the due process rights of an
accused are observed, every indictment must embody the
essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable
particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place
of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.
One such particular circumstance is conspiracy where two or
more persons are charged in an information. Conspiracy
denotes an intentional participation in a criminal transaction,
with a view to the furtherance of a common design and
purpose. It imputes criminal liability to an accused for the acts
of another or others, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation. In a conspiracy, the act of one becomes the
act of all and the particular act of an accused becomes of
secondary relevance. Thus, it is essential that an accused
must know from the information whether he is criminally
accountable not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well.13 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient if:
(1) it follows the words of the statute creating the offense and
reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense
he is charged with conspiring to commit;14 or (2) following the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect
the object of the conspiracy;15 or (3) alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them.16
In the present case, the appellate court held that an allegation
of conspiracy is implied in, or may be inferred from, the
statement that "the said accused, armed with a knife, a piece
of wood and a broken bottle, with intent to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, hit
with said piece of wood and stab with the said knife and broken
bottle one Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena." But we agree with
appellant that here the information does not satisfy the
requirement that the conspiracy must be conveyed in
"appropriate language."17 The words "conspired,"
"confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in
conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in
the indictment.18 The language used by the prosecution in
charging the three accused contains no reference to
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in
the information. Absence of a particular statement in the
accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any
definitive act constituting conspiracy in Criminal Case No.
2307-G renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused
liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. An accused
must be furnished with a description of the charge against him
to enable him to make a proper defense and, later, to avail
himself properly of either a conviction or acquittal for his
protection against further prosecution for the same cause.19 In
our view, petitioner Fidelino Garcia cannot be convicted as a
conspirator in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo, for the simple
reason that the information against the accused contained no
clear and definite allegation of conspiracy.
It follows that in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, petitioner can only
be held responsible for an act as could be proved to have been
committed by him personally. Stated otherwise, his criminal
accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual
rather than on a collective basis. Responsibility for acts done
by his co-accused could not be heaped on the shoulders of
appellant unless it be shown that he participated directly and
personally in the commission of those acts.
Thus, anent the second issue, we find merit in petitioners
argument that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction for homicide. There appears no proof to
show the connection between the acts he allegedly committed
and the lethal injuries sustained by the victim. Petitioner points
out that the only act he allegedly did was that of hitting the
victim with an empty bottle while the latter was being held
down by Leopoldo Garcia and stabbed by Wilfredo Garcia. He
submits that there is no showing whatsoever that his blow
caused any injury to the victim, much less caused his death.
He stresses that the medico-legal certificate prepared by one
Dr. Mario Cuento, marked as the prosecutions Exhibit "B"
cannot even be found in the record, nor did the doctor take the
witness stand to identify it. The medical certificate in effect has
no probative value.
The OSG counters that while Exhibit "B" cannot be found in the
records, nonetheless, the fact stands that the number and
nature of the victims injuries are enumerated in the
Information, which the petitioner failed to rebut or object to
during the trial. Moreover, petitioner did not object when Exhibit
"B" was offered in evidence by the prosecutor before the trial
court to prove the victims injuries causing his death.
In general, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.20 The rule, however, does not apply in the present case.
For one, the judge who penned the trial courts judgment was
not the same one who heard the prosecution witnesses
testify.21 For another, our review of the records indicates that
both the trial court and the appellate court have overlooked
some material facts and circumstances of weight which could
materially affect the result of this case.
First, the Court of Appeals heavily relied on the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness, P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera. However,
we find his testimony riddled with inconsistencies, particularly
the exact role played by petitioner in the affray leading to
Paulino Rodolfos death. On direct examination, Cpl. Rollera
averred that petitioner struck the victim with a bottle while his
co-accused were ganging up on the latter, thus:
Q Now, you stated a while ago that the
accused in this case ganged up on the deceased
Rodolfo Olgena. Will you please tell before this
Honorable Court how the accused ganged up on him?
A While Leopoldo Garcia was holding Rodolfo
Olgena, Rodolfo Olgena was hit by a bottle by
Fidelino Garcia and Wilfredo Garcia stabbed him on
the lower groin with a stainless [f]an knife, sir. (Stress
supplied)22
The cross-examination of Rollera, however, reveals a
contradictory version in that apparently, petitioner Fidelino
Garcia was not the aggressor but the victim of stabbing by the
deceased Paulino Rodolfo. Thus, Cpl. Rollera testified on
cross:
Q According to you, the three were ganging up
on Rodolfo Olgena until Wilfredo Garcia stabbed him.
As the three were ganging up on Rodolfo Olgena,
where were Fedelino Garcia and Leopoldo Garcia
when Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by Wilfredo?
A Leopoldo was holding Olgena while Fedelino
was approaching Olgena when Wilfredo stabbed
Olgena, sir. When Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by
Wilfredo, as regards Fedelino, he was then also
approaching Rodolfo Olgena and that was the reason
why he was also stabbed by Olgena. Because when
Fedelino approached Rodolfo Olgena, the latter had
pulled the knife, so that when Olgena pulled out the
knife, he was able to stab Fedelino, sir.
ATTY. CERILLA:
Let us straighten this out. Correct me if I am
wrong. This, according to you, took place.
Q Rodolfo Olgena while being held by
Leopoldo Garcia was stabbed by Wilfredo Garcia, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q The weapon which was used by Wilfredo
Garcia got stuck in that portion of the body of Rodolfo
Olgena that was hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Rodolfo Olgena was able to pull out that
knife and while Fedelino Garcia was approaching he
stabbed the latter?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, are you telling us that although Rodolfo
Olgena was being held by Leopoldo Garcia he was
still able to pull the knife from his thigh and then used
it in stabbing Fedelino Garcia?
A Rodolfo Olgena was able to get loose from
the hold of Leopoldo that was why when Fedelino
approached Olgena the latter who had pulled out the
knife from his body was able to stab Fedelino, sir.
(Stress supplied).23
That petitioner Fidelino Garcia was stabbed by Paulino Rodolfo
is perfectly clear to us. What is doubtful is whether he had an
active, direct and personal role in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo.
On cross-examination, it appears petitioner was still
approaching the deceased when the latter was stabbed by co-
accused Wilfredo Garcia. Cpl. Rollera stated under direct
examination that Fidelino had hit Rodolfo with a bottle. But Cpl.
Rollera did not say where and when petitioner struck the victim
with a bottle, or if the blow was hard or not. Further, the
prosecutions evidence does not establish any direct link
between the petitioners act with the bottle and any injury
suffered by the deceased, much less the mortal wound which
caused his death. If we are to believe Cpl. Rolleras account,
petitioner was merely approaching the victim, who was then
trying to get loose from Leopoldos hold and ward off Wilfredos
attack. It appears unclear to us, however, whether petitioner
succeeded to hit the victim, Rodolfo, with a bottle. As it turned
out, it was petitioner who was stabbed by Rodolfo, using
Wilfredos balisong, with the result that petitioner was
hospitalized.
Second, the Court of Appeals likewise heavily relied upon
Exhibit "B" to establish the injuries suffered by Paulino Rodolfo.
As stated earlier, Exhibit "B" is nowhere in the records.24 The
only mention we find of it is in the transcript of stenographic
notes of November 19, 1987.
FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:
We will now be resting our case.
COURT:
Go ahead.
FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:
But before we do so, we would like to prove
the existence of the medico legal certificate
although it has been admitted by the defense
counsel and likewise the fact of death. We
would like to request the same to be marked
as Exhibit "B" in both cases and the findings
therein as stated as Exhibit "B-1" and the
signature of Dr. Mario Cuento as Exhibit "B-
 2." We are offering, Your Honor, Exhibit "A"
and "A-1" the affidavit of Francisco Llorera
[should read Rollera] as part of his testimony.
And we are likewise offering Exhibits "B", "B-
1", and "B-2" to show the fact of death and
the nature of the wounds sustained by the
victim.
COURT:
Is that all? Any objection to the annexes of
the exhibits?
ATTY. CERILLA:
No objection, Your Honor, except to the
affidavit of the policeman.
COURT:
The Court will admit all these exhibits in
evidence.25
Notwithstanding its absence from the records, the Court of
Appeals held that said Exhibit "B" "sufficiently indicates the
nature, number, location, and extent of the injuries sustained
by the victim. The cause of death stated therein is purportedly
cerebral hemorrhage."26 The appellate court likewise held that
"These were deemed admitted by the accused-appellants for
their failure to make a timely objection at the time the offer was
made."27 We find nothing in the record, however, to support the
prosecutions sweeping statement that the "existence of the
medico-legal certificate had been admitted by defense counsel
and likewise the fact of death." In fact, per the transcript quoted
above, Atty. Cerillas response has a reservation, "except to the
affidavit of the policeman," when asked about the annexes of
the exhibits. But we shall not belabor this point, for the decision
of the trial court is barren of any reference to admissions or
stipulations. On record now, the medico-legal report is missing.
And we find that the prosecutions evidence nowhere shows
that petitioner by his own act killed the victim or contributed
directly to his death.
To conclude, there is a dearth of evidence as to the specific
role played by petitioner Fidelino Garcia in the commission of
the crime charged. Petitioner enjoys the presumption of
innocence, which can only be overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere conjectures, no matter how strong,
can never substitute for this required quantum of
proof.28 Failing to meet the needed quantum of proof,
petitioners conviction as principal in the killing of Paulino
Rodolfo cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 22, 1996, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 13358, which had affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Branch 62, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to convict petitioner Fidelino Garcia beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless
held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126899. August 2, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On January 30, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City,
Branch 36, in Criminal Cases Nos. IR-3448, 3449, 3450 and 3451,
found accused-appellant Felicito Barbosa y Turallo guilty of four
counts of rape, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each
count.
The conviction of the appellant stemmed from four separate
informations all dated September 15, 1993, which read as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3450
That during the year 1988 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa who was then eleven
(11) years old, on nine (9) separate occasions, against her will and by
means of violence and intimidation, to the damage and prejudice of
said complainant in such amount as maybe proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3448
That in or about November 1992 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant
Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as may be proven
in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3449
That on or about February 6, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga
City, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as
may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3451
That on or about May 8, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused,
by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant
Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as may be proven
in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all
charges. Thereafter, the four cases were jointly heard. Subsequently,
the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused,
FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO
1. In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as
charged in the information and despite the presence of one (1)
aggravating circumstance, and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private
offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as
charged in the information, and despite the presence of one (1)
aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private
offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as
charged in the information and despite the presence of one (1)
aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private
offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages;
4. In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as
charged in the information and despite the presence of one (1)
aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the private
offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
In all the aforesaid cases, to reimburse Juana Malate of the sum of
P11,200.00 as attorneys fee and litigation expenses, and to pay the
cost of suit.
The accused, FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO shall serve the
foregoing four (4) prison terms successively or one after the other,
subject to the provisions of the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of
Article 70, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The accused shall be credited with the period of preventive
imprisonment that he may have undergone during the pendency of
these cases in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The facts in this case as presented by the prosecution are
summarized by the trial court as follows:
[P]rivate offended party, Analiza C. Barbosa, was born on February
6, 1978. Her father is Julio Abad and her mother is Juliana C.
Barbosa. Her parents were not married, so that she was registered in
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as Analiza Cornelio. When she
was already five (5) years old, her mother, Juliana Cornelio married
the accused, Felicito Barbosa. She continued using the surname
Cornelio until she reached Grade 2. Then her mother instructed her
to use the surname Barbosa, instead of Cornelio. Since then she has
been using the said surname Barbosa and she calls her stepfather,
Felicito Barbosa Papa. Sometime in 1988 (she cannot remember the
month) her mother went to Manila twice. The second time she went
to Manila, her mother stayed there for a month. It was already March
1988 when she returned. She, together with her half sister Analyn
who was then only one (1) year old, having been born on January 19,
1987, was left with her stepfather, the herein accused. They stayed at
the house of the parents of her stepfather situated at La Purisima,
Iriga City, because the latter were also in Manila at that time. The
three of them, (Analiza, Analyn and Felicito Barbosa) slept only in
one room and on one bed. On the third night after her mother left for
Manila and they were already sleeping, she woke up and noticed that
her short pants was already removed. Her stepfather was standing
beside the bed where she was sleeping. He was holding a Batangas
knife which was closed and which was poked at her side. When she
saw these things she cried but the accused told her not to make any
noise and not to tell her mother or he will kill her and he will not
send her to school anymore. She then stopped crying as she was
afraid of what the accused has said. The accused then told her to
remove her panty which she did. The accused removed his shorts,
reached for an oil from the kitchen which was adjacent to the
bedroom and after applying oil into her vagina, the accused laid on
top of her and inserted his organ into her organ. Analiza tried to
push the accused because she did not like what the accused was
doing as she felt pain. The accused, however, was too heavy for her
and she did not succeed in dislodging him from his position on top of
her. The accused stayed on top of her for about two (2) minutes. He
then went to the sala, on her part, she put on her panty and short
pants and kept on crying until she fell asleep. She further testified
that during that period of one (1) month, the accused repeatedly
abused her almost every night.
When her mother returned, Analiza Barbosa did not tell her about
the abuses committed by her stepfather because her stepfather
repeatedly warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise, he will kill
her. But in the middle of 1990 Analiza ran away and stayed with her
classmate, Quennie Sanglay. After one (1) week her mother and
stepfather went to the house of Sanglay to fetch her. She refused to go
with them. The following day her mother and grandmother went back
to fetch her. Her grandmother asked her why she refused to go with
her mother and stepfather. In answer, she told her grandmother of the
abuses she suffered from her stepfather. Her mother and
grandmother brought her to San Nicolas, Iriga City, where she
stayed with her aunt Evelyn Cornelio. After one week she was
brought to Manila to stay with her natural father, Julio Abad. She
stayed there up to October 1992 and then she returned to Iriga City
as her stepmother kept on scolding her. In Iriga City she again stayed
in the house of her aunt Evelyn Cornelio at San Nicolas, Iriga City.
After one week her mother got her again. Her mother told her that
her stepfather will no longer abuse her. However, as soon as she was
again with her mother and stepfather at their residence at La
Purisima, Iriga City the evidence show that, in more or less the same
pattern and circumstances and while her mother was out of town or
just outside their house, her stepfather continued abusing her.
In November 1992, Analizas mother again went to Manila. She
stayed there for about two (2) weeks. She returned before the
Barangay Fiesta of La Purisima on December 7. Her half sister,
Analyn, was with her mother. On the third night after her mother left,
Analiza was watching television at the sala of their house at La
Purisima, Iriga City at about 6:00 oclock in the evening and she fell
asleep. When she woke up she noticed that her shorts and panty were
already removed. Her stepfather, the herein accused, was standing
beside her. She asked him why he removed her shorts and panty. He
answered that he will repeat what he had done to her before, and
further told her to lie down and not to make any noise otherwise he
would kill her. She told him that she will not lie down for she did not
want to be repeatedly abused. The accused then got a knife from the
kitchen and showed it to her. She then laid down and the accused
placed himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her vagina.
He stayed on top of her for about three minutes. Then the accused
left.
February 6, 1993 was the 15th birthday of Analiza. The previous
month, January 1993, her mother together with Analyn, again went
to Manila to fetch Aljon, nephew of her stepfather. Upon her
suggestion, her mother invited Jonah Ocine, a girl of seven years old,
cousin of Analiza, to sleep in their house with her while her mother
was away. Jonah, however, stayed only for three days and she left.
And so, Analiza found herself alone again, with her stepfather, in
their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. On that day, February 6,
1993, while Analiza was sleeping in the only bedroom in their house,
at around midnight she noticed that her panty and shorts were
already removed and her stepfather was standing beside the bed
where she was sleeping. He was holding a knife which he poked at
her waist. He told her that he will do again what he did to her before.
He told her again not to tell her mother, otherwise, he would kill her.
He then removed his short pants and laid on top of her, Analiza tried
to push him but he told her if she will not stop pushing him, he will
kill her. He inserted his penis into the vagina of Analiza. Then he left
and went to the sala.
On May 8, 1993, complainant was at their house at La Purisima,
Iriga City. At about 8:00 oclock in the evening of that day she was
lying down on the sofa at the sala of their house. She was alone. Her
mother was at the house of her mother-in-law, helping in preparing
ibos (suman in Filipino) to be placed in the refrigerator and cooked
the following day. These ibos will be served during the baptism of the
nephew of her stepfather on the fiesta of San Nicolas, on May 10,
1993. Analyn was with her mother. The accused then arrived. He told
her to remove her shorts and panty as he again will do to her what he
did before. After some hesitation, Analiza obeyed as she was afraid
since appellant was again holding the balisong which the accused
used to poke at her side during the previous times he abused her. The
accused then laid on top of her on that sofa. He inserted his organ
into the organ of Analiza. He stayed on top of her for about two (2)
minutes and then left her, but he stayed in the house.
On May 10, 1993, complainant went to the house of her
grandmother, Juana Malate to attend the Barangay fiesta of San
Nicolas. After the fiesta she refused to go back to La Purisima, with
her mother and stepfather. She told her grandmother and her other
relatives that the accused continues to abuse her.[6]
On May 12, 1993, accompanied by her aunt Evelyn Cornelio,
complainant went to the Iriga City Police headquarters where she
revealed to the police officers the abuses committed by her stepfather
against her. She lodged complaints of four counts of rape against
appellant. Then she was taken by the police to the City Health Office.
Dr. Tita Lalaine Rito, a city government physician, examined
complainant. Dr. Rito later testified that she found old hymenal
lacerations at 10:00 and 6:00 oclock positions on the hymen of
complainant which appear to be months or even years back, and that
complainant was no longer a virgin.[7]
On October 5, 1993, appellant was apprehended and detained
in the city jail.[8]
As summarized by the trial court, appellants defense consisted
of the following versions of denial and alibi:
In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, the accused presented his wife,
Juliana C. Barbosa. She testified that the complainant, Analiza lied
when she said that she was raped by the accused in 1988 while she
(Juliana) was in Manila, because she did not go to Manila the whole
year of 1988. She was all the time in their house in La Purisima, Iriga
City. When accused testified, he denied that he raped Analiza in 1988
and corroborated his wifes testimony that she did not go to Manila in
1988.
In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, accused has similar defense. He and
his wife testified that the testimony of Analiza that she was raped by
the accused in November 1992 at their residence in La Purisima, Iriga
City, while Juliana Barbosa, her mother, was in Manila, was a lie,
because Juliana Barbosa did not leave for Manila in November 1992.
She was always in their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. Moreover,
the accused further argued in his memorandum that this rape (in
November 1992) could not have happened because at 6:00 oclock in
the afternoon, when the crime took place, people were still up and
around. The house where it happened is very near several houses. It
was by a pathway leading to the river. Analyn was just downstairs
and Analizas friend, Benelyn, just went to the house of the father of
his stepfather. She may return at any time. And yet, Analiza did not
cry out.
xxx
In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, the defense of the accused is to the
effect that he could not have raped Analiza on February 6, 1993, at
their house in La Purisima, Iriga City, as she claimed in her
testimony, because he went to Manila on February 1, 1993 and stayed
there until February 16, 1993. His alibi was corroborated by his wife
and his mother, Bibiana Barbosa.
In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, the defense put up was that the
accused could not have raped Analiza on May 8, 1993 at about 8:00
oclock in the evening because Analiza was at the church attending El
Shaddai prayer meeting. She was there from 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon to 10:00 oclock in the evening. The accused was in the
town of Bula, Camarines Sur, delivering candies. [H]e left about 8:00
oclock in the morning and returned to Iriga City at 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon. He was with his wife, Juliana, his cousin, Clemens
[Turallo] and Judith Ibarreta. This alibi of the accused was provided
by Joan Turallo, niece of the accused Juliana C. Barbosa, wife of the
accused Clemens Turallo, cousin of the accused and Bibiana Barbosa,
mother of the accused.[9]
 After trial, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting
on his innocence, appellant promptly filed his notice of appeal before
us. In his brief, appellant faults the trial court in:
I
BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF
APPELLANT IN ALL FOUR (4) CASES ON THE BASIS OF
ITS OBSERVATION ON THE MANNER AND DEMEANOR
OF THE COMPLAINANT WHILE TESTIFYING;
II
NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES;
III
RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
FOR THE PROSECUTION RATHER THAN ON WEIGHING
THE EVIDENCES DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLANT.[10]
At the heart of these assigned errors is the issue of the
credibility of the witnesses. It is doctrinally settled that such issue is
to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, its
findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected
the result of the case.
After trial, the court a quo gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of the complainant because it found her testimony positive,
straightforward, natural and sincere. It ruled that her testimony met
the test of credibility.[11] In contrast, appellant failed to overcome the
overwhelming force of complainants evidence against him. We shall
now consider the alleged errors of the trial court cited by appellant
and his arguments raised in support of his appeal.
In Criminal Case No. 3450, appellant seeks to discredit
complainants testimony by citing her inability to recall the date when
the sexual assaults were committed. He insists that complainant could
not have been threatened by a closed Batangas knife. According to
complainant, she was raped by appellant on the third night after her
mother left for Manila in 1988. She recalled that her mother stayed
there for about a month and returned only in March 1988.
But even if appellant could not recall the exact dates of the
rape, it appears that complainant was below twelve years old when
she was ravished in 1988 because she was born on February 6,
1978. Thus appellant would still be liable for statutory rape. Sexual
congress of a victim below twelve years is rape, as provided for in
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, R.A.
7659.)
Failure to recall the exact date of the crime is not an indication
of false testimony. Moreover, the precise date when the victim was
raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is
the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as
it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed an information is
sufficient. The allegations that rapes were committed before and until
October 15, 1994, sometime in the year1991 and the days
thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in the year
1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[12]
 Although evidence with respect to the employment of force or
intimidation upon complainant is mere surplusage in a charge of
statutory rape, the prosecution still established its case against
appellant by proving that the sexual assaults against complainant
were committed with the use of force and intimidation, alluding to
appellants use of a closed Batangas knife, and stressing that
intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces fear that
if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something dreadful would happen to her. Even the use of a weapon is
not necessary. Its use serves only to increase the penalty.[13]
Furthermore, the stepfather of the victim enjoyed moral and
physical ascendancy over complainant sufficient to cow her into
submission to his bestial desires.[14] Appellants moral influence over
the complainant substitutes for violence and intimidation.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 3450
charges appellant with nine counts of rape. This was objected to by
appellant because the information charges more than one offense
violating the proscription against duplicity of offenses in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, a complaint or information must charge but one offense
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses. The aim of the rule is to give the defendant the necessary
knowledge of the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. The
State should not heap upon defendant two or more charges which
may confuse him in his defense. The trial court is correct in
convicting appellant for only one count of rape under this particular
information.
In Criminal Case No. 3448, appellant avers that he could not
have raped complainant at around 6:00 P.M. sometime in November
1992 because his wife as always was at home after 5:00 P.M. and
Analyn, complainants younger sister, as always played downstairs.
Moreover, Benelyn, complainants friend, was just nearby and people
were then still awake. He insists that his wife did not leave for Manila
in November 1992, contrary to complainants claim.
In a number of cases, the Court has observed that fear of
discovery or the likely appearance of other people does not
necessarily deter the commission of rape. It is not impossible to
commit rape inside a house where there are several occupants and
even in the same room where other members of the family are
sleeping. Lust does not respect either time or place. [15] Appellants
assertion that his wife did not leave for Manila in November 1992 is
immaterial.
In Criminal Case No. 3449, appellant contends that the
identification of the perpetrator is uncertain because of the poor light.
He also claims the defense of alibi, in that he alleges he was in
Manila for medical treatment so he could not have committed the
crime.
It is undisputed that complainant not only knew appellant
personally; both she and appellant lived in the same house. At the
time of this offense, only the two of them were home. Also, there was
a vigil light in the altar which provided sufficient illumination in the
room to enable complainant to recognize her aggressor. A man and a
woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the
sexual act,[16] there is no doubt complainant had identified appellant
positively.
Concerning appellants alibi, it cannot prevail over the positive
identification and unequivocal declaration of complainant that
appellant was the author of the crime. What makes appellants alibi
weak is the fact that it is corroborated only by his wife and mother.
These testimonies of close kin are suspect and cannot prevail over
that of the complaining witness.[17]
In Criminal Case No. 3451, appellant asserts that complainant
was in fact attending the El Shaddai prayer meeting when the alleged
rape happened at about 8:00 P.M. As complainant explained during
her cross-examination, she did not know what time they left the
prayer meeting. But she declared that when she arrived home it was
not yet 9:00 P.M. Complainant might have failed to note the exact
time of her itinerary but these are minor details whose exactitude the
victim could not be expected to remember. Her inability to remember
these details even tend to buttress complainants credibility that her
testimony was not contrived.[18]
Appellant points out that while complainants rape allegedly
took place between 8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. of that day in their
residence, yet she admitted attending the prayer meeting at around
8:00 P.M. Appellant seeks to discredit complainants testimony
because of an obvious contradiction: she could not have been raped at
home while attending the prayer meeting at the same time elsewhere.
Appellants assertion can not stand scrutiny. Appellant admitted
that he returned home at about 5:00 P.M. while complainant arrived
home before 9:00 P.M. Complainant states she was raped between
8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. Clearly, it was not impossible for the offense
to have taken place in the indicated time frame, before 9 oclock that
evening. Further, considering the proximity of their residence and the
venue of prayer meeting, according to complainants testimony, it
could have taken just a few minutes for her to get home from the
meeting.
Appellant surmises that complainant filed the cases against him
to spite her mother who banged her head on a wall. According to
him, her grandmother, her auntie and she herself concocted said
cases. In brief, appellant attributes the rape charges to family feud,
resentment or vengeance. But, this attribution need not sway the
Court from lending full credence to the testimony of complainant
who remained steadfast throughout her testimony despite her
minority, as in this case. [19] Nothing on record shows plausibly that
complainant has any improper motive to frame-up appellant.
That complainant did not cry for help while being raped is not
too difficult to comprehend. Complainant explained that her uncles
are not her blood relations but relatives of appellant. She feared that
they might also do what appellant had done to her. Further, she was
cowed into submission by appellants continuous threat that he would
kill her, and that she would not be allowed to attend school anymore.
With regard to appellants claim that it was rather unusual for
him to have sexual congress with complainant without foreplay like
kissing or caressing her, hence the charges could not be true, suffice it
to say that it is too trivial a matter to merit further discussion.
More substantially, appellant argues that if indeed complainant
was raped continuously from 1988 until 1993, she should have not
kept her silence until she was fifteen years old, since she had all the
available remedies for redress as well as relatives who could help her.
But as observed by the Court on numerous occasions, delay in
reporting rape cases may be justified if there are strong reasons like
death threats against the victim. Worth stressing, complainant was a
girl of tender age who was completely under the moral ascendancy
and control of appellant. Fear alone of what appellant would do if she
exposed his evil deeds was reason enough for her to suffer in silence
for a long time. Then too her mothers apathy after she told her about
the abuses committed by appellant was another reason explaining
delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities. That she did
not file charges promptly against appellant could not diminish her
credibility,[20] given her tender age, the moral ascendancy of
appellant, and the continuous threat on her life.
Appellant claims there was no tenacious resistance shown on
complainants part. Physical resistance, however, need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim
and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace
because of fear for life and personal safety.[21]
Finally, appellant points out that the medical certificate,
Exhibit C, does not clearly show that complainant was raped. It is
settled that a medical report is not even necessary in a prosecution for
rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper.[22] In this case, the examining physician found
old lacerations on complainants hymen which appear to have been
caused months or even years back. While hymenal lacerations may
also be caused by other factors such as extraneous physical activities,
no evidence was adduced by the defense to support this possibility.
But note the complainant testified that appellant succeeded in
inserting his genital into her organ during the times she was raped.
Hence, the hymenal lacerations bolster complainants assertion that
appellant raped her on several occasions.
Under the penal law then prevailing, whenever the crime of
rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as the
knife used by appellant,[23] the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. In
this case, considering that there was neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
We note that the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages to complainant in each case. This however is
inadequate. In addition, complainant must also be awarded the
amount of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.[24]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal
Case Nos. IR-3450, IR-3448, IR-3449 and IR-3451 convicting
appellant FELICITO BARBOSA of four counts of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall also pay to the victim
for each count of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, P11,200.00 as attorneys
fees and litigation expenses, and the costs.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 132625-31. December 18, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL
SANDOVAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For ravishing his two (2) minor step-daughters, Noel
Sandoval was charged in seven (7) separate Informations with
seven (7) counts of Rape, five of which were committed
against Teresa Micu, then thirteen (13) years old, and two
counts of statutory rape committed against Victoria Rhea Micu,
then only eleven (11) years old as evidenced by her Birth
Certificate.[1] The Informations were filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch 42, and allege as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 97-01815-D
That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong,
municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01816-D
That on or about May 9, 1995 at barangay Casibong,
municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01817-D
That on or about April 24, 1995 at barangay Casibong,
municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D
That on or about April 18, 1995 at barangay Casibong,
municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01819-D
That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong,
municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01820-D
That sometime in April 2, 1997 in the evening thereof, at
barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
stepfather, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse in their conjugal house with VICTORIA RHEA F.
MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to R.A. 7659.
In Criminal Case No. 97-01821-D
That sometime in April 5, 1997 in the evening thereof, at
barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
stepfather, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse in their conjugal house with VICTORIA RHEA F.
MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to R.A. 7659.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 23, 1997 for the first
five (5) counts of rape, wherein he pleaded NOT GUILTY. The
following day, the Public Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend the five (5) criminal complaints to allege the
relationship of the victim and the accused. On July 31, 1997,
accused-appellant was scheduled to be arraigned for the other
two (2) counts of rape but he failed to appear because of lack
of notice on the Provincial Warden. At this point, the Public
Prosecutor called the attention of the Court to the Amended
Informations he filed in the first five (5) cases, to which
accused-appellant has already been arraigned and has
pleaded not guilty on July 23, 1997. Counsel for the defense
objected on the ground that the amendment would prejudice
the right of accused-appellant.
The court a quo ruled that since there was no evidence yet
presented, the matter of amendment should be brought at the
proper time after the prosecution has presented its
evidence.Thus, the resolution of the Motion to Amend
Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01815-D, 97-01816-D,
97-01817-D, 97-01818-D and 97-01819-D was held in
abeyance. Meanwhile, on August 7, 1997, accused-appellant
was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the two (2) counts
of statutory rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01820-D and 97-
01821-D. Thereafter, a joint trial of all the seven (7) cases was
conducted. The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses,
including the two (2) complainants while on the other hand, the
defense presented three (3) witnesses including the accused-
appellant.
On January 9, 1998, the court a quo rendered its decision,
[2]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused NOEL
SANDOVAL is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6)
counts of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01815-
D, 97-01816-D, 97-01817-D, 97-01819-D, 97-01820-D and 97-
01821-D and is hereby sentenced to suffer the mandatory
penalty of DEATH for each act of rape. In addition, he is
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages for each case or
a total of P300,000.00. Also for each count of rape, he is
further ordered to pay P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as
example for the public good or a total of P30,000.00. He is
however acquitted in Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the penalty imposed, the records were elevated
to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court.
Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction on
the following grounds:
I
The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime of Rape on the person of Teresa Micu and imposing
the death penalty upon him notwithstanding the fact that, at the
time of the alleged commission, he was not yet married to the
victims mother.
II
The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime of Rape over Rhea Micu, considering her lack of
credibility which finds support in the medical findings of the
physician who examined her.
III
The court a quo erred in awarding damages to the
complainants notwithstanding that the latter never testified to
establish the same and the only basis of such on record is the
testimony of their aunt, Perlita Fernandez, who is not their legal
guardian.
After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case at bar,
this Court finds that the trial court did not err in convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of rape on the person of Teresa
Micu. During her testimony, she clearly and convincingly
established before the court a quo the facts and circumstances
that transpired during the several occasions when accused-
appellant raped her.[3]
 The rule has always been that in the matter of credibility
of witnesses, factual findings of the trial court should be highly
respected. The trial judge is in a better position to pass
judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having had the
opportunity to personally hear them, observe their deportment
and manner of testifying and detect if they were telling the
truth.[4] We find no reason to depart from this rule in this
particular case. It should be remembered also that courts
usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim
of sexual assault because, ordinarily, no person would be
willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify
on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice.
[5]
However, we cannot agree with the trial courts imposition
of the death penalty on accused-appellant for the rape of
Teresa Micu. The pertinent law in effect at the time of
commission of the crimes in this case, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659,
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
xxxxxxxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x. (Underscoring ours)
The above-quoted provision states, inter alia, that where
the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. This is one of
the seven (7) modes enumerated in Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659 which are considered special circumstances specifically
applicable to the crime of rape. In the subsequent cases
of People v. Ilao[6] and People v. Medina,[7] it was ruled that the
seven new attendant circumstances in Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and not
merely aggravating circumstances, since said qualifying
circumstances are punishable by the single indivisible penalty
of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death. A qualifying
circumstance increases it to a higher penalty while an
aggravating circumstance affects only the period of the penalty
but does not increase it to a higher degree. Unlike a generic
aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not
alleged, a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be
proved as such unless alleged in the information.
A reading of the Information for the rape of Teresa Micu
filed against accused-appellant reveals that he was merely
charged with the crime of simple rape. The fact that accused-
appellant is the common-law spouse of the victims parent is
not alleged in the Information. What was stated therein was
only the minority of the victim. As we have emphasized, the
elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be both alleged.[8] As such, the special qualifying
circumstance stated in Section 11 of RA 7659 was not properly
pleaded in the Information. Thus, the penalty of death
prescribed in RA 7659 can not be imposed on accused-
appellant. Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process if he is charged with
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable
with death although the attendant circumstances qualifying the
offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged
in the indictment on which he was arraigned.[9]
The amendment sought by the prosecution of the five
informations, in order to allege the relationship of accused-
appellant to the victim, were clearly substantial in character as
they had the effect of changing the crime charged, thereby
exposing accused-appellant to a higher penalty. Such
amendment can no longer be done after accused-appellant
has pleaded to the Information for simple rape on July 23,
1997,[10] without violating his constitutional rights. Rule 110,
Section 14 of the Rules of Court, provides:
The information or complaint may be amended, in substance
or form, without leave of court, at anytime before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done, without prejudice to the rights of the
accused. x x x.
In sum, the failure of the prosecution to allege the
relationship of the accused to the victim has effectively
removed the crime from the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, which prescribes the death penalty when the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[11] In the recent
cases of People v. Calayca,[12] People v. Tabion[13] and People
v. Acala,[14] where the prosecution failed to allege the fact of
minority of the victim in the Informations, we reduced the
penalty imposed from death to reclusion perpetua.
Anent the second assigned error, accused-appellant
attempts to discredit Rhea Micu, the second victim, by invoking
the findings of the examining physician, Dr. Luisa Cayabyab, to
the effect that she could not tell whether force attended the
laceration of Rheas organ and that even the tip of her finger
could not reach the said complainants cervix when she
attempted to check the same.[15] According to accused-
appellant, this shows that the victim had never experienced
sexual intercourse.
Appellants claim is without merit.
A circumspect scrutiny of Dr. Cayabyabs testimonial
declarations discloses that they were not conclusive. As a
matter of fact, the medical examination, standing alone, is not
sufficient to prove nor disprove the fact of rape. On the
contrary, her testimony even tended to clarify the apparent
conflict pointed out by accused-appellant, viz:
Q Likewise one of your findings is that her vagina admits
one finger, in this finding of yours, it does not show
any force or can be interpreted that there was no
force of inserting something on the vagina of the
patient, is that right?
 A I cannot say directly that there was no force because the
vagina is so elastic like a rubber, sir.
Q And so you can conclude that there was really no force?
A I cannot say that there was no force because as I have
said the vaginal canal is so elastic, sir.
COURT
Q There may be force or no force?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Proceed,
ATTY. TAMINAYA
Q When you stated in your findings, admits one finger,
could you tell this Court that there was no penis yet or
any object that was inserted?
A As I have said, the vaginal canal is so elastic so I cannot
say if there was or there was no object that was
inserted, sir.
COURT
Q Was there something introduced into the vagina or
inserted inside?
A Maybe yes, maybe no, sir.
Q I think that the hymen can tell you that something was
inserted into the vagina because of the laceration?
A It is possible, sir.
Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA
Q In this case, there was no showing that the hymen was
lacerated?
A There was healed laceration, sir.
COURT
Q But whether or not the laceration was caused by force or
no force, you could not tell?
A Yes, Your Honor.[16]
In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the
complainants private part is not necessary. Neither is the
rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the
entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the
male organ into the labia majora of the victims genitalia and
not the full penetration of the complainants private part
consummates the crime.[17] More importantly, it has been ruled
in People v. San Juan[18] that in crimes against chastity, the
medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable
element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as her
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
thereof.
As found by the court a quo, Rheas testimonies were
overwhelmingly straightforward, logical and convincing as to be
worthy of belief and impervious to a mere denial by accused-
appellant Noel Sandoval, to wit:
Q Sometime in the evening of April 2, 1997, do you
remember where you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was in Brgy. Casibong, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, sir.
Q Where in Brgy. Casibong were you staying?
A In the house of my step-father, sir.
Q Your step-father, you are referring to the accused in this
case?
A Yes, sir.
Q While you were in the house of your step-father in the
evening of April 2, 1997, where were you in relation to
that house?
A I was inside the house, sir.
Q What were you doing at that precise time?
A I was tending the small child to sleep, sir.
Q What is the name of that small child?
A John, sir.
Q While you were tending the small child by the name of
John, what happened next after that?
A While tending, I was able to sleep, sir.
Q Were you awakened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you awakened, could you explain to the
Honorable Court?
A I was awaken because somebody went on top of me, sir.
Q When somebody went on top of you, who was that
person?
A Noel Sandoval, sir.
 Q When Noel Sandoval went on top of you, what happened
next after that?
A He removed my shortpant and my pantie, sir.
Q After Noel Salvador removed your shortpant and pantie,
what did Noel Sandoval do, if he did anything?
A After he removed my shortpant and my pantie, Noel
Sandoval also removed his pants and brief and
thereafter, he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q After Noel Sandoval inserted his penis to your vagina,
what did Noel Sandoval do, if he did anything?
A He kissed me, sir.
Q What part of your body did Noel Sandoval kiss you?
A My neck, sir.
Q What else?
A Only my neck, sir.
Q On April 5, 1997, do you remember where you were?
A I was also in the house of my step-father, sir.
Q What were you doing in that precise time of the day?
A I was already asleep then, sir.
Q Were you awakened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why? Could you explain before the Honorable Court why
you were awakened on the evening of April 5, 1997?
A I was awakened because I felt pain, sir.
Q Why did you feel pain.
A I felt pain inside my vagina, sir.
Q Why? Can you explain before the Honorable Court why
you felt pain in your vagina?
A Because my step-father inserted his penis inside my
vagina, sir.
Q What part of the house of your step-father did he insert
his penis?
A Inside the house, sir.[19]
It is a well-settled rule that an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[20]
We agree with the trial court that the evidence for the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Noel
Sandoval is guilty of the rape of Rhea Micu. However, as in the
other four cases, the death penalty can not be imposed on
him. The prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
was legally married to the victims mother, in order to
substantiate the allegation in the Amended Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01820-D and 01821-D that the accused-
appellant is the stepfather of the victim. In People v. Brigildo,
[21]
a stepdaughter was defined as the daughter of ones spouse
by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses
by a previous marriage. It is the burden of the prosecution to
prove with certainty the fact that the victim was the
stepdaughter of the accused-appellant to justify the imposition
of the death penalty. Corollarily, the prosecution must establish
that accused-appellant is legally married to the victims
mother. In order that the qualifying circumstances under
Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which raises the penalty of rape to
death, can be appreciated, the circumstances must be both
alleged and proved. Accordingly, the proper penalty for the two
counts of rape against Rhea Micu is reclusion perpetua.
Finally, we affirm the trial courts award of moral and
exemplary damages to the complainants notwithstanding that
the latter never testified to establish the same.
The award of moral damages for rape is proper as it is
provided in Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code. In accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence, accused-appellant should be
made to pay P50,000.00, especially considering that the
offended parties were of tender age at the time of the crime.
[22]
In People v. Prades,[23] it was ruled that the award of moral
damages to the victim is proper even if there was no proof
presented during the trial as basis therefor. The fact that the
complainant suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at
the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and
acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her
credibility.[24]
On the other hand, exemplary damages may also be
awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[25]Accused-appellant being the stepfather of the
victims, relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition to moral and exemplary damages, civil
indemnity must also be awarded to the victims since it is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[26] The recent
judicial prescription is that the indemnification for the victim
shall be in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape if
the death penalty is not imposed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch 42, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Noel Sandoval is
found guilty of four (4) counts of simple rape committed against
Teresa Micu and two (2) counts of simple rape committed
against Victoria Rhea Micu, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each of the six (6)
counts.
 Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00
for each of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of P300,000.00,
as moral damages; P10,000.00 for each of the six (6) counts of
rape, or a total of P60,000.00, as exemplary damages; and
P50,000.00 for each of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of
P300,000.00, as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134730. September 18, 2000]
FELIPE GARCIA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In two separate Informations filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, petitioner Felipe Garcia, Jr. was charged
with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 91-93374 and with
murder in Criminal Case 91-93375 committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 91-93374:
That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with two
others who[se] true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and treachery, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one REYNALDO
BERNARDO Y DEL ROSARIO @ BOY PANCHANG, by then and
there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the neck,
thereby inflicting upon the said REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @
BOY PANCHANG physical injuries which was necessarily fatal and
mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder, as a consequence but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said
REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @ BOY PANCHANG which
prevented his death.
Contrary to Law.[1]
xxx
Criminal Case No. 91-93375
That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
with two others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery attack, assault and use personal force upon one
FERNANDO B. LEAO Y BERNARDO @ BAGGING, by then and
there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the head,
thereby inflicting upon the said FERNANDO B. LEAO @
BAGGING gunshot wounds which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to Law.
x x x[2]
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly before
Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Upon arraignment on 24 May 1991, the petitioner,
assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of Not Guilty to
both charges.[3]
Trial on the merits then ensued. Based on the evidence
presented, the trial court summarized the events that led to the
killing of Fernando Leao and the near fatal injuries sustained
by Reynaldo Bernardo as follows:
On November 3, 1990, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Arnold
Corpuz and Fernando Leao, a 15-year old student, and their friends,
were conversing along Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila.
Fernando Leao was on the side of the street. Momentarily, a pedicab,
with Renato Garcia (Reneng Palayok), on board, passed by and, in
the process, the right wheel of the pedicab ran over the right foot of
Fernando Leao. The pedicab failed to stop and continued on its
way. Incensed, Fernando Leao ran after the pedicab. Arnold Corpuz
followed suit, at a distance of about three (3) meters away from
thepedicab. When Fernando Leao was about abreast with the pedicab,
he uttered invectives but Renato Garcia retaliated and
hurled invectives, too, at Fernando Leao, saying 'Putang ina
ninyo.' Fernando Leao was then ahead of the pedicab when he looked
back and saw, to his consternation, Renato Garcia placing his right
hand on the right side of his waistline and about to pull out his
gun. Afraid for his life, Fernando Leao sped away from the pedicab,
turned to an alley and ran to Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila,
direct to the house of his uncle, Reynaldo Bernardo, at No. 1281
Mataas na Lupa, Paco, Manila (Exhibit 'E-1'). The pedicab slowed
down a bit and then turned towards F. Muoz Street, Paco,
Manila. Arnold Corpuz followed Fernando Leao to the alley and,
when he saw him again, Fernando Leao was conversing with his
uncle, Reynaldo Bernardo, by the gate of the latter's house (Exhibit
'E-1'). Fernando Leao reported to his uncle that Renato Garcia earlier
uttered invectives at him and even tried to pull out his gun from the
back portion of his waistline. Reynaldo Bernardo decided to have the
incident reported to Police Station No. 5 of the Western Police
District. Reynaldo Bernardo changed clothes, put on his shoes and,
with Fernando Leao and Arnold Corpuz, proceeded to the house of
his mother, Esperanza del Rosario Bernardo (Exhibits 'E-2' and 'O-2')
to borrow the latter's jeep, parked near the basketball court, along
Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, which they will use in going to
the police station. The house of Reynaldo Bernardo was about twenty
(20) meters away from the house of his mother.
The three (3) then turned left along Mataas na Lupa Street, towards
the direction of the house of Esperanza del Rosario
Bernardo. However, before they could reach her house, they had to
pass by the intersection of F. Muoz Street and Mataas na Lupa Street,
Paco, Manila. The intersection was about twenty-five (25) meters
away from the house of the Accused and Renato Garcia and about
fifty (50) meters away from the house of Gerardo Lugos, which was
near the South Superhighway already.
When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and Arnold Corpuz were
near the corner of F. Muoz and Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila,
Reynaldo Bernardo saw the head of Gerardo Lugos who was peeping
on the side corner of the vacant store, at the said corner of the
street. However, Reynaldo Bernardo gave no significance to the
incident, there being no feud or misunderstanding between him and
Gerardo Lugos. When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and
Arnold Corpuz continued on their walk, Fernando Leao and
Reynaldo Bernardo were walking side by side, Fernando Leao on the
right side of his uncle, while Arnold Corpuz was three (3) meters
behind the two (2) but tried to overtake them. When the three (3)
passed by the first corner of F. Muoz Street, Paco, Manila and Mataas
na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, Arnold Corpuz saw three (3) male
persons, about seven (7) to ten (10) meters away on their left side,
walking along F. Muoz Street, Paco, Manila, going towards their
direction, but did not as yet recognize them at the time. However,
when the three (3) male persons were near the portion of the street
near the store, which was lighted by the lights emanating from the
Meralco post (Exhibit 'E'), Arnold Corpuz recognized the three (3)
male persons. The first was Renato (Reneng Palayok) Garcia, who
was then holding a .38 caliber revolver, with his two (2) hands raised
on the level of his abreast, aimed at them.Behind Renato Garcia,
towards his right side, was his younger brother, the Accused and
behind the Accused, to his right side, was Jerry Lugos. The Accused
and Jerry Lugos were armed with handguns, also aimed at Reynaldo
Bernardo. When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leao and Arnold
Corpuz were about two (2) to three (3) meters from the intersection
of F. Muoz and Mataas na Lupa Streets, Paco, Manila, Reynaldo
Bernardo turned, looked towards his left, and saw Renato Garcia, the
Accused and Jerry Lugos, all armed and their guns aimed at
him. Reynaldo Bernardo then started to sprint toward where Renato
Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos were but barely had Reynaldo
Bernardo taken off when Renato Garcia fired his gun, once, at
Reynaldo Bernardo and hit the latter on the left side of his neck
(Exhibit 'B').Renato Garcia was then only about two (2) meters way
from Reynaldo Bernardo. When Renato Garcia fired at Reynaldo
Bernardo, the Accused and Jerry Lugos looked around as if acting as
lookouts.Reynaldo Bernardo placed his left palm on the left side of
his neck which was hit, fell, at first, on a kneeling position and then,
on the ground, face down (Exhibits 'E-3' and 'O'). Instinctively, after
Reynaldo Bernardo was hit, he flung and swung his hand inward,
outward and sideward and, in the process, hit Arnold Corpuz who
was then about to give succor to Reynaldo Bernardo. Arnold Corpuz
then fell on the ground, on a sitting position. Arnold Corpuz then
stood up and then fell again on a kneeling position (Exhibit 'E-4'). In
the meantime, too, Fernando Leao rushed to his uncle and tried to lift
him (Exhibit 'E-5'). Fernando Leao was then on a kneeling
position. In the meantime, too, Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry
Lugos continued walking towards where Reynaldo Bernardo was
sprawled and Fernando Leao beside him and Arnold Corpus in front
of Fernando Leao. The body of Reynaldo Bernardo was between
them. Three (3) successive shots then ensued. Arnold Corpuz then
decided to lie down on the ground, face down, his face on the feet of
Reynaldo Bernardo, to avoid being hit with his two (2) hands under
his breast. Arnold Corpuz then raised his head a little and noticed that
the front portion of the head of Fernando Leao was bulging and
Fernando Leao falling down. It turned out that Fernando Leao was
felled (sic) by a gunshot wound at the back of his head. In the
process, Arnold Corpuz saw Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry
Lugos behind Fernando Leao, still holding their guns. Renato Garcia,
Dr. Marcial Cenido performed an autopsy on the cadaver
of Leao and prepared a report with the following Post Mortem
Findings:
EXTERNAL INJURIES AND EXTENSIONS INTERNALLY:
1. Gunshot wound, thru and thru with the following points of
entry and exit:
Point of Entry - right occipital region, head, 58.5 inches from
the heel, 3 cm. from the posterior midline, measuring 0.5 cm. x
0.3 cm. and with the contusion collar measures 1 cm. x 0.7 cm.
and
Point of Exit - right forehead, 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
58 inches from the heel, and measures 1.3 cm. x 0.5 cm.
Course: Forwards, very slightly upwards and very slightly
towards the lateral penetrating the cranial cavity and lacerating
the right occipital, parietal and frontal lobes of the brain.
2. Hematoma, below the right eyebrow.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Laceration of the right occipital, parietal and
frontal lobes of the brains and subrachnoid
hemorrhage, and generalized pallor of the
internal organs and tissues; and
2. Recovered from the stomach about a glassful of
dark liquid with some rice and vegetables and
without alcoholic odor.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Gunshot wound, right occipital region, head.[6]
On the other hand, Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Medical Center Manila, performed an operation
on and gave medical treatment to Reynaldo Bernardo. The
report he prepared showed the following findings:
Abrasion, 3 cm. x 2 cm. scalp, frontal region, left side; 3 cm. 3.5 cm
x 1cm. lateral aspect, frontal region, left side. Wound, gunshot,
circular in shape, 0.9 cm. in diameter, lateral aspect, neck left side,
indise anterior triangle, directed medially, downwards and slightly
backwards, penetrating soft tissues of the neck, involving external
jugular vein, then making wound exist at right paravertebral area that
the level of T3-T-4 and 3 cm. below the highest point of the shoulder.
[7]

the Accused and Jerry Lugos then fled from the scene
together. Arnold Corpuz also fled from the scene towards the house Based on the above established facts, the trial court
of Esperanza del Rosario Bernardo to plead for help. On the way, rendered judgment, the dispositive portion reading as follows:
Arnold Corpuz met Dominador Bernardo, Jr., the brother of Reynaldo
Bernardo who came from the basketball court. Dominador Bernardo,
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the
Jr. inquired why Arnold Corpuz was running and Arnold Corpuzz
following cases to wit:
(sic) replied, thus: Tinamaan si Kuya Boy at Ferdie.' (pp. 214-216,
id.)[4]
1. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal Case No. 91-
93374, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
The victims were taken to the Medical Center Manila at
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide
about 12:00 midnight. Subsequently, Leao was transferred to
and hereby sentences said Accused to an indeterminate penalty
the Orthopedic Hospital, where he died in the morning of
of from Four (4) Years and Two (2) months of Prision
November 4, 1990.[5]
 Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor, as Maximum, and to pay to Reynaldo
Bernardo the amount of P115,631.00 as actual damages and
P25,000.00 as moral damages;
2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case No. 91-
93375, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Homicide" and
hereby metes on him an indeterminate penalty of from Eight
(8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to
Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to pay to the heirs of
Fernando Leao the amount of P10,040.00 as actual damages
and P50,000.00 by way of indemnity.[8]
Petitioner elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
which on 21 May 1998, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.[9] Hence, the present case, petitioner raising the following
assignment of errors:
I accused. Reynaldo Bernardo, who sustained injuries from a
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN EVALUATING
EVIDENCE DIRECTED AGAINST SUSPECTS GERRY
LUGOS AND RENATO GARCIA - INFERENTIALLY
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELIPE GARCIA, JR.,
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSPIRACY SO-CALLED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
ESTABLISHED IN THE TRIAL AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR THEREOF, AND,
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY AS CO-PRINCIPAL IN
HOMICIDE AND FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE GROUNDED
ON CONSPIRACY WITH THIRD PERSONS (GERRY
LUGOS AND RENATO GARCIA) WHO ARE MERE
SUSPECTS AND STRANGERS IN THE TWO CASES AS
THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED THEREIN NOR
CHARGED AS JOHN AND RICARDO DOES IN EITHER
OR BOTH INFORMATIONS."[10]
Petitioner asserts that since he alone was named in the
information, "it would seem by implication from the narration in
the information that it was being made to appear that the
accused was in fact the gunman who acted in conspiracy with
unknown persons. The evidence later presented proved
otherwise and it turned out that it was Renato Garcia alone
who shot and wounded Reynaldo Bernardo and shot and killed
Fernando Leao. It was not, therefore, in keeping with the
evidence on record proper to convict the accused based
merely on the theory that there was conspiracy when no
sufficient evidence to support such fact exist."[11]
Contrary to petitioners argument, there is no irregularity in
the information to warrant a reversal of the conviction. All
material facts and essential elements of the crimes, for which
petitioner is charged, were alleged therein. Conspiracy was
alleged in the information. Thus, it is not necessary to allege
with exactitude the specific act of the accused, as it is a well-
settled doctrine that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all.[12]
Neither is the fact that the two others allegedly in
conspiracy with the petitioner were not named with
particularity, nor tried and convicted, of any moment. An
information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one
person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on
the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information.[13]
This Court does not doubt the guilt of the petitioner. The
findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve
great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an
appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial
evidence. Absent any showing that trial courts calibration of the
credibility was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.[14]
An examination of the records will reveal that the
prosecution witnesses positively identified the
gunshot wound, narrated the incident as follows:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Where were you when this Fernando Leao told you that a
gun was poked on (sic) him?
WITNESS:
I was in our house, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
Can you still recall that (sic) time it was when this Fernando
Leao told you that a gun was poked on (sic) him?
WITNESS:
I think about 11:30 oclock, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And did you come to know as to what time or that date was
that poking incident took place.
WITNESS:
On November 3, 1990, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
At what time was it, if you know?
WITNESS:
I was told at about 11:30 o'clock, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
You said that at around 11:40 o'clock in the evening at the
corner of Mataas na Lupa and F. Muoz street, you
 were with two (2) men, can you recall of any unusual FISCAL PERALTA:
incident that happened at that corner?
And what were these three (3) men actually doing at the
WITNESS: time that they shot you?

We were shot sir. "Pinagbabaril kami." WITNESS:

FISCAL PERALTA: They were armed with guns, sir.

Who shot you if you can still recall? FISCAL PERALTA:

WITNESS: Have you known this Rene Palayok even before November
3, 1990?
Reneng Palayok and his two (2) other companions by the
name of Peping Palayok and Jerry Lugos, sir. WITNESS:

FISCAL PERALTA: Yes, sir, since we were young.

How far were you in relation to the place where these men FISCAL PERALTA:
shot you?
What about this Peping Palayok, have you known also this
WITNESS: Peping Palayok?

About seven (7) meters away, sir, it is very near. WITNESS:

FISCAL PERALTA: Yes, sir, I have known him also since we were young.

Can you still recall the relative positions of these men FISCAL PERALTA:
whom you said shot you and your position at the time
that (sic) shots were fired? How about this Jerry Lugos?

ATTY. UY: WITNESS:

I object to the question, Your Honor, on the ground that the Yes, sir, he is my childhood mate.
same is very leading.
xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
COURT:
I will reform, Your Honor. You said that you were about
more or less seven (7) meters away from the Granted.
men. Now, my question to you is, were you hit?

FISCAL PERALTA:
WITNESS:

Now, Mr. Witness, after you were hit on the left side of your
Yes, sir. neck, what happened next?

FISCAL PERALTA: WITNESS:

And where were you hit? I fell down, sir, face down.

WITNESS: FISCAL PERALTA:

At my (sic) left side of my neck, sir. And when you fell down, face down, can you still recall
what happened next?
FISCAL PERALTA:
WITNESS:
And at the time that you were hit on the neck, where were
these three (3) men at that time? After that, sir, I heard shots.

WITNESS: FISCAL PERALTA:

They were on my left side, sir.

 Now, if you see again that Peping Palayok whom you said What is again the full name of this Rene(ng) Palayok, if you
was one of those who shot you, will you still be able to know?
recognize him?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Renato Garcia, sir.
Yes, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
FISCAL PERALTA:
What about this Peping?
Will you please look inside the Court and point to him?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Felipe Garcia, sir.[16]
That person, sir.
In the face of petitioner's positive identification, petitioners
INTERPRETER: defense of alibi cannot hold water. No jurisprudence in criminal
cases is more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of
Witness pointing to a person who, when asked, stated his all defenses, and the same should be rejected when the
name as Felipe Garcia, Jr.[15] identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively
established by eyewitnesses to the crime.[17]
One of Bernardos companion, prosecution witness Arnold
Corpuz, testified in this wise: The factual findings of the trial court that petitioner
participated in the perpetration of the crime, such being
FISCAL PERALTA: supported by evidence on record, will not be disturbed by this
Court. However, we are of the persuasion that the prosecution
failed to prove with positive and competent evidence the fact
Could you please tell to this Honorable Court why you were
that the act of the petitioner was direct or actually necessary to
not able to reach the house of Reynaldo Bernardo?
the commission of the crime.

WITNESS:
The existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. Similar
to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
Because there were three (3) male persons who were conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18] The
waiting nakaabang for us, sir. mere fact that the petitioner had prior knowledge of the criminal
design of the principal perpetrator and aided the latter in
FISCAL PERALTA: consummating the crime does not automatically make him a
co-conspirator. Both knowledge of and participation in the
Why did you say that these three (3) men were waiting or criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice. [19] In
nakaabang for you? his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Chief Justice
Ramon Aquino explains:
WITNESS:
The guilt of an accomplice should be predicated on an act that was
Because while we were walking, they were already there done in furtherance of the commission of the crime by the
holding guns, sir. principal. The accomplice must have known that the principal
intended to commit a particular crime. In other words, he should have
community purpose with the principal. xxx[20]
FISCAL PERALTA:

In the case of People vs. Tamayo,[21] citing the Supreme

Do you know these persons who were holding guns?
Court of Spain, this Court made the following exposition on the
characteristics of an accomplice:
WITNESS:

xxx It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not

Yes, sir.
only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice,
FISCAL PERALTA: but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying
And who were these persons whom you said were waiting material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
for you and holding guns? way.

WITNESS: In cases of doubt as to whether persons acted as

principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their
Reneng Palayok, Peping and Jerry Lugos, sir. favor and they should be held guilty as accomplices. [22] Such
principle was applied by this Court in the case of People v.
FISCAL PERALTA: Clemente:
In the case of appellants, Carlos and Pascual Clemente, while they WITNESS:
joined their brother in the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog, and in the
attack on him as he fell, yet the prosecution eyewitness was unable to Mang Rey or Rey Palayok, sir.
assert positively that the two managed to hit the fallen man. There
being no showing of conspiracy, and the extent of their participation FISCAL PERALTA:
in the homicide being uncertain, they should be given the benefit of
the doubt, and consequently they are declared to be mere accomplices
And you said that there were three (3) of them. What did
in the crime.[23]
these Peping and Jerry Lugos do when Rene Palayok
fired a gun that hit your Kuya Boy?
After a circumspect examination of the evidence, we find
that other than a showing that petitioner assisted Renato
WITNESS:
Garcia in the slaying of Fernando Leao and the infliction of
injuries upon Reynaldo Bernardo, the prosecution failed to
present other evidence which would positively establish the They were behind Mang Rene, sir.
existence of conspiracy. Thus, this Court is of the belief that
petitioner-accused should only be held liable as an FISCAL PERALTA:
accomplice. This seems to be the more reasonable and safer
course. You said that they were behind Rene Palayok. What did
they do afterwards after Rene fired a gun that hit your
Even if we were to agree with the trial court that Kuya Boy?
conspiracy existed between accused-petitioner and two other
malefactors, in particular Renato Garcia, who was positively ATTY. UY:
identified as the gunman, still this Court is of the conviction that
the petitioner should only be held liable as an Very leading, Your Honor.
accomplice. petitioners participation was hardly
indispensable. As the trial court pointed out, the petitioner COURT:
merely acted as a lookout. The testimony of Arnold Corpuz is
telling:
May answer.

FISCAL PERALTA:
WITNESS:

And what happened after you saw these three (3) men
They were looking around holding their guns as if they
waiting for you armed with guns?
were acting as look outs, sir.

WITNESS:
FISCAL PERALTA:

They fired a gun once and Kuya Boy was hit, sir.
After your Kuya Boy was hit on the neck, what happened
next?
FISCAL PERALTA:

WITNESS:
What part of the body of Boy was hit?

I saw Fernando went (sic) near his uncle so that he could

WITNESS: lift his uncle, sir.

Here, sir. FISCAL PERALTA:

INTERPRETER: Was he able to lift his uncle Reynaldo Bernardo?

Witness pointing to the left portion of his neck. WITNESS:

COURT: Not anymore, sir, because there were continuous firing of

guns about three (3) times.
I cannot understand that. You said that they fired
once. How many fired? FISCAL PERALTA:

WITNESS: What happened to Fernando Leao when there was a

continuous firing for at least three (3) times?
Only one, Your Honor.
ATTY. UY:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Leading, Your Honor.
Who was that person who fired the gun?
COURT:
 May answer.
WITNESS:
He was hit on the back of his head, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the right back portion of his head just
behind his right ear.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And do you know who shot this Fernando Leao?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. It was Mang Rene.
FISCAL PERALTA:
What did the companions of Rene Palayok do when Rene
Palayok shot Fernando Leao?
ATTY. UY:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
They were acting as aide and they were following Rene
Palayok, sir.[24]
As can be seen from the above testimony, petitioner's
participation was hardly indispensable. In the case of People v.
Nierra,[25] this Court made the following ruling:
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and
Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty
as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators
they should be punished as co-principals. However, since their
participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation
of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of
liability may be applied to them.
In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the
principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder
was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.
WHEREFORE, the herein questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby MODIFIED to wit:
1. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal
Case No. 91-93374, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the
crime of Frustrated Homicide and hereby
sentences said Accused to an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as
Minimum, to Four (4) years and One (1) Day
of Prision Correcional, as Maximum;
2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case
No. 91-93375, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the crime of
"Homicide and hereby metes on him an
indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years of Prision
Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Maximum.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131806 October 20, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO CABIGTING y SARMIENTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal filed by accused Liberato Cabigting y
Sarmiento from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan Branch 19, Malolos convicting him of rape, sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Sheryl M. de
Ocampo in the sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
moral damages and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages, and to pay costs of suit.1
On April 23, 1996, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, with the assistance
of her mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan,
Malolos, a criminal complaint alleging, to wit:
"That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1995, in the
municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd
designs have carnal knowledge of one Sheryl M. de Ocampo,
against her will and without her consent.
"Contrary to law."2
At the arraignment on February 25, 1997, accused Liberato S.
Cabigting pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.3Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Sheryl M. de Ocampo, eleven years old at the time of the
incident, was a Grade 4 student of accused Liberato S.
Cabigting in Tigbe Elementary School, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
In the morning of November 23, 1995, Sheryl, together with her
classmates, Janet C. Gojo Cruz and Zemonette4 C. Valenzuela
went to the house of their teacher, accused Liberato Cabigting,
to clean his house. Upon their arrival, the three children saw
accused Cabigting outside his house. They approached him
and asked what they were supposed to do. He instructed Janet
and Zemonette to clean the front yard of the house while
Sheryl would clean inside.
When Sheryl entered the house, accused Cabigting asked her
to go inside a room. Sheryl proceeded to a room on the ground
floor. The room was about 3 to 4 meters in length and 2 meters
in width. Accused Cabigting followed Sheryl and closed the
door and the window of the room. He took off her sando, t-
shirt, panty, and skirt. Sheryl did not move. Then, accused
Cabigting took off his polo shirt, shorts and brief. He told her to
kiss and hug him. She refused. He kissed and hugged her.
Then, he pushed her to a bed, spread her thighs and went on
top of her. She tried to kick him but he continued to stay on top
of her. Accused Cabigting held her two hands with his two
hands. Later, he held his penis and inserted it into her sex
organ. She felt pain in her sex organ.5
Suddenly, Janet and Zemonette knocked on the door. Accused
Cabigting got off Sheryl and dressed quickly. Sheryl also put on
her clothes. Accused Cabigting opened the door and led Sheryl
out of the room. They all went to school. Sheryl attended
morning and afternoon classes. She did not reveal to her
friends what had occurred that morning.6
Sheryl claimed that she found bloodstain on her panty after the
incident.7 She felt pain for about three days.
On November 27, 1995, five days after the incident, Sheryl
refused to go to school. Antonia de Ocampo, Sheryl's mother,
wrote the accused Cabigting to inform him that Sheryl had
LBM and would not be able to attend classes that day. Sheryl,
accompanied by her sister, Victoria de Ocampo went to Dr.
San Pedro at Sapang Palay Emergency Hospital for treatment
of the LBM. The doctor, after examination, advised Sheryl to go
to the National Bureau of Investigation to report the rape
incident.8
The following day, Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas, Jr., medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a
medico genital examination of Sheryl and issued an official
report, stating his conclusions as follows:
"1) No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries
noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
"2) Hymen intact and its orifice wall (2.0 cm. in
diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury."9
Dr. Vargas testified in court that "there was no destruction on
the hymen" and that there was "no laceration".10However, he
did not discount the possibility that there could have been inter-
labial insertion even if there was no full penetration of the
organ of the male.11 He noted that the examination took place
five days after the reported incident and that a contusion in the
vaginal canal heals after four days.12
Accused Liberato S. Cabigting13 denies ever asking Sheryl and
her two classmates, Janet and Zemonette, to clean his house
in the morning of November 23, 1995. He admits, however,
that his pupils normally come to his house, which is 100 yards
from the school, to watch television, to fetch him or to bring his
things to school.
Accused Cabigting alleged that at 7:00 in the morning of
November 23, 1995, he left his house to walk to school with his
daughter, who was also going to school. Ten minutes later, he
reached the school. He signed the attendance logbook at the
office of the Head Teacher and then prepared his lesson for the
day's classes. Later, he proceeded to the playground to attend
flag ceremony with his class, consisting of fifty students.
Afterwards, he returned to the classroom for morning classes.
Sheryl and the two other girls were present in school at that
time. Lunch break came at 11:45, then classes resumed at
1:00 in the afternoon. Sheryl and her two classmates also
attended the afternoon classes. Classes ended at 4:30 or 4:45
in the afternoon.
Accused Cabigting avers that he has been a teacher for 23
years in Malolos, Bulacan, and in Bayabas, Norzagaray,
Bulacan and that he has never been charged with any offense.
He does not know of any reason why his student, Sheryl M. de
Ocampo, would testify falsely and impute such a crime against
him.
Teresita Lo, head teacher of Tigbe Elementary School, testified
that accused Cabigting signed in the attendance logbook at
7:15 in the morning of November 23, 1995.14
Janette C. Gojo Cruz and Zemonette C. Valenzuela testified
that they went to the house of accused Cabigting at around
7:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995.15 Janet stated that
while she was cleaning the front yard of the house with
Zemonette, accused Cabigting was cleaning the pigpen.16
Michael Bayumbong, another student of accused Cabigting,
testified that he, together with Jonjon Hernandez and Ronald
Hernandez, accompanied Sheryl, Janet and Zemonette to the
house of accused Cabigting on November 23, 1995, at around
7:00 in the morning. The three boys stayed in the backyard
near the pigpen of the house to pick up dried leaves and
plastics. Thereafter, they left for school, leaving Sheryl, Janet
and Zemonette behind.17
On October 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision,18 the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, this Court
finds accused LIBERATO S. CABIGTING guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences
him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to indemnify the victim, Sheryl de Ocampo, in the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED.
"Malolos, Bulacan, 3 October 1997.
"RENATO C. FRANCISCO
Presiding Judge"19
Hence, this appeal.20
Accused-appellant Cabigting questions the credibility of Sheryl
M. de Ocampo, citing inconsistencies in her statements and
lack of evidence to support her assertions.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled doctrine that evaluation of testimonial evidence by
the trial court is accorded great respect by this Court because
the trial court is in the advantageous position of personally
observing the demeanor of witnesses. Absent any showing that
certain facts of substance and significance have been plainly
overlooked or that the trial court's findings are clearly arbitrary,
the conclusions reached by the trial court must be respected.21
Accused-appellant contends that Sheryl was inconsistent
regarding the actual time when the rape took place. According
to Sheryl, she went to the house of accused-appellant
Cabigting at around 8:00 in the morning of November 23,
1995. However, her classmates testified that they went there at
around 7:00 in the morning.
The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an
essential element of rape and it has no bearing on its
commission.22 The important thing is, it was established that
Sheryl went to the house of accused-appellant on the date
reported and this allegation was corroborated by the
classmates of Sheryl who went there with her.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim does not
necessarily render such testimony incredible. In fact, minor
inconsistencies strengthen the credibility of the witness and the
testimony, because of a showing that such charges are not
fabricated. What is decisive in a charge of rape is the
complainant's positive identification of the accused as the
malefactor.23
Accused-appellant likewise contends that the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the occurrence of
carnal knowledge of the victim. Medical findings were
inconclusive as to the finding of rape. No sign of violence or
any form of injury was detected on the body of the victim.
However, it is undisputed that the victim underwent medical
examination five days after the incident, by which time, any
form of slight contusion in the vaginal canal may have healed
already. The absence of any external sign or physical injury
does not necessarily negate the occurrence of rape, proof of
injury not being an essential element of that crime.24 Lack of
lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse.25 Even
the slightest touching of the female genitalia, or mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum
constitutes carnal knowledge.26
Moreover, when a woman, in this case a girl barely in her
teens, says she has been raped, she in effect says all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped, provided her
testimony is credible.27 It is highly inconceivable that a young
girl of eleven years would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her.28
Accused-appellant contends that any incident occurring within
the house would have been noticed by the classmates of the
victim, who were just outside the house at that time.
The fact that Sheryl's friends were outside the house and she
was inside the house does not remove the possibility for the
rape to occur. Rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and
even in the same room where other members of the family are
also sleeping, for lust is no respecter of time and place.29
At least four children, excluding Sheryl M. de Ocampo,
confirmed that accused-appellant was at home that morning of
November 23, 1993. Mere denial cannot overcome such
positive testimony.1wphi1
Although accused-appellant presented the head teacher in
charge of the attendance logbook to declare that she saw
accused-appellant signing in the logbook at 7:15 that morning,
said witness could not account for the time of accused-
appellant afterwards.
With the positive testimony of the victim, Sheryl M. de
Ocampo, accused-appellant is liable for rape under Article 335
(3) of the Revised Penal Code, in effect at the time the crime
was committed, for the carnal knowledge of a girl under twelve
years of age.
Regarding the amount of damages awarded by the trial court,
the Court notes that the trial court awarded moral damages in
favor of the victim and failed to award civil indemnity. Civil
indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without
need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the
offense and is separate and distinct from moral
damages.30 Hence, in addition to the fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) awarded as moral damages, accused-appellant
must be sentenced to pay an additional amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
The award for exemplary damages is deleted as no
aggravating circumstance has been proved to have attended
the commission of the crime.31 Exemplary damages, under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, may be imposed only when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.32
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, convicting
Liberato Cabigting y Sarmiento of rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, with the modification that he shall
indemnify the victim, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, in the amount of
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity, not as
exemplary damages, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
moral damages, and costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148144 April 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO CADAMPOG, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Malaybalay City, Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 7823-96,
finding the appellant Florencio Cadampog guilty of rape
committed against complainant Prudencia Lasara,2 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as
actual damages.
The Information filed against the appellant reads:
That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the
afternoon, at Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya,
Municipality of Maramag, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
prompted by lewd design entered the house of
Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, wrestle, kiss,
remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and
accused remove also his pants and have sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in
such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.3
Upon arraignment on April 10, 1996, the appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.4 Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution5
The spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara were farmers who
lived in Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of
Maramag, Bukidnon. Felipe was 41, while Prudencia was 33.
They had four children, namely, seven-year-old Jimmymar, six-
year-old Jaypee, five-year-old Gemma and one-year-old
Jovilyn.6
At about 12:30 p.m. on January 14, 1996, a Sunday, Felipe
with his brother-in-law Paul, and his friends Berting and Dodoy,
went to the neighboring Barangay Dagumbaan to attend the
festivities, as it was the eve of the fiesta.7Prudencia was left
alone in the house with her young children.
At around 2:30 p.m. of the same day, Prudencia heard the
voice of a man asking her two children, who were then playing
downstairs, where she was. The children replied that their
mother was upstairs. Momentarily, she heard footsteps going
up the house. Suddenly, the person, who turned out to be the
appellant Florencio Cadampog, their neighbor and her
husbands friend, rushed towards her.8 The appellant
immediately grabbed her by the arm and hooked his other arm
around her neck. She maneuvered to back away but the
appellant started kissing her. She wanted to shout, but relented
when she noticed that the appellant had a sheathed bolo
dangling at his waist. Nevertheless, she struggled and
vigorously resisted his advances, to no avail. The appellant
pushed her against a wall, stripped her of her panties, causing
her to be thrown off-balance. Prudencia fell on a bench, astride
and supinely flat on her back. The appellant then unzipped his
trousers, pulled out his erect penis and inserted it into her
vagina. He then made push-and-pull movements. Prudencia
continued resisting the bestial assault on her. The appellant
retaliated and scratched her face and neck.9 Prudencia
managed to push the appellant away, causing him to withdraw
his penis and ejaculate outside.10 The appellants lust deflated
when his semen splattered all over Prudencias upper
thigh.11 The appellant dressed himself and warned Prudencia
to keep the incident to herself, otherwise, he would kill
her.12 The appellant then left.
Prudencia immediately proceeded to the barangay secretary
and the barangay captain, Mrs. Raguro. She reported the
incident to them. The barangay captain told Prudencia that
there would be a settlement at 2:00 p.m, but the latter did not
agree. She then returned home.13 Back home, she hid her
husbands bolo in a safe place, and thereafter, patiently waited
for her husband to return.14
When Felipe arrived home at around 11:00 p.m., Prudencia
told him that the appellant had raped her.15 Felipe was so
enraged that his initial reaction was to look for and kill the
appellant, but he relented when he realized that he had no
right to take the law into his own hands.16
The following morning, January 15, 1996, Prudencia reported
the incident to the police17 and gave a sworn statement. Dr.
Venus Tagarda of the Maramag District Hospital examined her
and issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings:
PROGNOSIS/FINDINGS - Linear abrasions left
zygomatic
Multiple linear abrasion to
- upper part of anterior
chest and neck
OPERATION PERFORMED - Introitus-multiparous
REMARKS - Sperm identification:
Vagina smear done -
negative for spermatozoa
slide I, slide II18
Dr. Tagarda testified that there were no traces of semen found
in the offended partys vagina due to the intervening period
from the date of the rape and the physical examination. The
linear abrasion located at the complainants left cheekbone,
and the multiple abrasions on her chest and neck could have
been caused by sharp objects such as fingernails or other
sharp instruments.19
The Case for the Appellant20
The accused denied the charge. He interposed the defense of
alibi. He testified that he lived with his wife, Liza, and their four
children in Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya, Municipality of
Maramag, Bukidnon. They resided in a house built on a
farmland owned by Constancio Paragoso, roughly 500 meters
from where the spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara
lived.21 On January 14, 1996, the accused, along with his wife
and eldest daughter, Lady Rose, were at the farmlands
grassland all day long, cutting cogon grasses to be used for
Paragosos house roofing. They started working from 7:00 a.m.
until 5:00 p.m. without let up, except for a short lunch break.
He chopped firewood upon returning to the house.22 The
following day, at around 11:00 p.m., lawmen came to his house
and arrested him. He was brought to the municipal jail and
there he learned of the charge for the first time.23
The appellant claimed that the charge was merely Prudencias
concoction because he refused to be a witness against a
certain Romeo Alinas, against whom Prudencia had
contemplated filing a criminal charge for rape.24 The appellant
recalled having a meeting with the spouses Felipe and
Prudencia Lasara at their place days before January 14, 1994,
where Prudencia asked him to testify in her behalf. For his
refusal to do so, he ended up in jail.25
The appellants wife, Liza, corroborated his story, claiming that
her husband was with her and their daughter, Lady Rose,
cutting cogon grasses in Paragosos farmland the whole day of
January 14, 1996. Her husband never left the place.26 Liza
recalled that after the alleged rape, she went to Prudencia,
they being close friends, and requested her to withdraw the
case. Prudencia however, refused to agree unless
given P80,000.27
Constancio Paragoso, a septuagenarian farmer, also
corroborated the appellants alibi. He testified that he hired the
accused and his wife to cut cogon grasses for the roofing of his
house and paid them P1.00 per bundle. He claimed to be with
them. He also vouched for the appellant, claiming that the
latter was present at the cogonal area during the whole day of
January 14, 1996.28
On January 12, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty of rape. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this court, for the foregoing reasons,
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple rape as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
pursuant thereto is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together will all the accessory
penalties included thereunder and to pay the offended
party the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages and actual damages in the amount
of P10,000.00.
By virtue of this conviction and pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 114 of [the] 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
the accused shall continue to be under detention even
if the accused should appeal this decision to the
proper appellate court. However, the accused shall be
entitled to the full credit for the period he is detained
pursuant to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and
subject to the restriction and limitation therein
imposed.
SO ORDERED.29
The accused, now the appellant, contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED
THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHEN THE
INFORMATION WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE.30
The appellant asserts that the Information against him does not
charge him of rape because it does not allege one of its
elements, i.e, force or intimidation. He argues that the
Information is void. Even if the prosecution was able to prove
that he forced Prudencia to have sexual intercourse with him,
he cannot be convicted of the crime charged; otherwise, he
would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge
against him and to prepare for his defense.31
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that
the Information is not defective; neither is it void. It argues that
although the Information does not specifically allege that the
appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
victim with the use of force, threats or intimidation;
nonetheless, it alleges that the appellant succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with the victim after first wrestling with her
and against her will, viz:
Appellant argues that the information is defective
since it failed to allege that [the] appellant raped the
victim with the use of force and/or intimidation
(Appellants Brief, p. 4).
Appellants claim is bereft of merit.
Contrary to [the] appellants claim, a perusal of the information
shows that force was alleged therein.
As stated in the information "the above-named accused
prompted by lewd design entered the house of Prudencia
Lazara and once inside, did then and there, unlawfully and
criminally wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA
LAZARA and, accused remove also his pants and have sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will."
An information is sufficient where it clearly states the
designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. [Sta. Rita
vs. CA, 247 SCRA 484 (1995)].
In the case at bar, the failure of the information to state that
[the] appellant raped Prudencia "through force and
intimidation" was not a fatal omission nor did it make the
information defective since the word "wrestle" was used in lieu
of the word "force".
"Force" is defined as power, violence, or constraint exerted
upon or against a person. It is used to show that an unlawful or
wrongful action is meant (Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
West Publishing Co., Minnesota, 1979, page 644).
"Wrestle," on the other hand, is to engage in a violent or
determined purposive struggle to overcome an opposing force
(Webster[s] Third New International Dictionary,
Massachusetts, 1993, page 2640).
In the case at bar, although the word "force" was not used in
the information, the prosecution used the word "wrestle"
instead. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the word
"wrestle" synonymously connotes the use of force in the
commission of the offense.
Moreover, the use of the phrase "against her will" in the
information also implies that the rape was committed with
force.32
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure re-enacted Section
6, Rule 110 of the old Rules, thus:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of Information - A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a)
The Information need not use the language of the statute in
stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know the offense charged. Thus,
Rule 110, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
In the case at bar, the appellant is charged with rape through
force, threats or intimidation under Article 335, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will or without her
consent.33 We have reviewed the Information34 and found that it
contains all the elements of rape defined in Article 335,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
Information against the appellant is quoted, viz:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the
afternoon, at Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya,
Municipality of Maramag, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
prompted by lewd design entered the house of
Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, wrestle, kiss,
remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and
accused remove also his pants and have sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in
such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No.
7659.35
Although the Information does not allege that the appellant
used force, threat or intimidation in having sexual intercourse
with the victim, it alleges that the appellant "criminally wrestled"
with the private complainant and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will. The import of such
allegations is that the appellant used physical force and
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of her. To wrestle is to
contend by grappling with and striving to trip or throw down an
opponent; or to combat or overcome an opposing tendency or
force, or an antagonistic person or group; or to engage in or as
if in a violent or determined purposive struggle. It applies to a
struggling for mastery by the use, mainly or solely of dexterous
holds with the hands, arms or legs.36
The appellants submission that the Information does not
sufficiently charge him of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code or that the Information is defective
is but an afterthought. The appellant never filed a motion to
quash the Information or a motion for a bill of particulars under
Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of Court before his
arraignment. He was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and after
the Information was read and explained to him in a language or
dialect known to him, he entered a plea of not guilty. There was
no complaint from the appellant, before he entered his plea,
that the Information was defective and that he did not
understand the charge against him. The appellant is, thus,
deemed to have waived whatever objections as to form or
substance in the Information.37 As the Court ruled in People v.
Flores:38
If the complaint against the accused-appellant was
afflicted by the vice of vagueness, his remedy is to file
a motion for bill of particulars. The record reveals that
[the] accused-appellant did not ask for a bill of
particulars in accordance with section 10, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. The failure to move for
specifications or the quashal of the information on any
of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court
deprives [the] accused of the right to object to
evidence which could be lawfully introduced and
admitted under an information of more or less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with
a definite crime. It is too late in the day for [the]
accused-appellant to raise this issue now because
objections as to matters of form and substance in the
information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal.39
Although the appellant failed to raise, as an issue, the matter of
whether the prosecution was able to prove his guilt for the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, we reviewed the
records to ascertain whether or not the prosecution mustered
the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the crime charged
to avert a miscarriage of justice. It is a well-settled rule that an
appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
any errors as may be found in the appealed judgement,
whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of
errors.40 We are convinced that, indeed, the prosecution
discharged its burden.
The private complainant vividly recounted before the trial court
how the appellant bestially ravished her. She positively
identified the appellant as the rouge who raped her on January
14, 1996.41 She testified as follows:
...
PROS. CHING:
Q And then what did he do when he was inside your
house together with your infant baby (sic)?
A He immediately held me and embraced me.
Q And then when he embraced you what was your
position?
A He kept on kissing me.42
...
Q Then after the accused held your right arm and
encircled his right arm on the (sic) neck, what then did
he do to you? or what did he do with (sic) your face?
A He kept on kissing my face.43
...
Q Were you able to successfully resist?
A I kept on moving backward so that my face could
not touch his face.
Q Then because you were trying to avoid his Q What part of your body was scratched?
advances on kissing you, what then immediately
happened to you? What position did you have A Here.
because of the attack?
INTERPRETER:
A I was able to lean on the wall and bench.44
Witness pointed to the left side of her face, the neck
... and the chest.48

Q In that position, what then did he do to you? ...

A He removed my panty.45 PROS. CHING:

... Q In that position, when he inserted his penis into

your vagina, did you not resist him?
Q Now, when he removed your panty, did you not
resist? A I kept on resisting.

A I was afraid to resist because he was carrying with
him a bolo. He had a bolo.
Q Where was the bolo at that precise time?
A On the side of his body.
Q But he was able to penetrate your vagina?
A Yes.
Q And when his penis was already inserted into your
vagina, what then did he do?

Q Did it have a scabbard? A He made a push and pull movement of his buttocks.
He made a pumping motion of his buttocks.
A Yes.
COURT:
Q And you mean the bolo was strung around the
waist of the accused Florencio Cadampog? Q How about you, what was your reaction when he
kept on pumping?
A Yes.
A I was afraid.
Q Then you said your panty was removed, what then
did the accused do next? Q Did you come to like it?

A He unzipped the zipper of his pants and he pulled A No, Sir.

out his penis.
PROS. CHING:
Q When he pulled out his penis, what did you notice?
You are a married woman, you should know. Was it
erect or not? Q Now, when he had that pumping motion at that
time, the accused had sexual intercourse with you,
what then did you do?
A Yes, it was erect.
A I suddenly pushed him away.
Q And then after he opened his zipper and pulled out
his erect penis, what then did he do next?
Q And what happened after you pushed him away?
A He inserted his penis to my vagina.46
A He was pushed away from me.
COURT:
Q And what happened to his penis when you pushed
him?
...
A It was withdrawn from my vagina.
Q Did you resist his advances?
Q When it was withdrawn from your vagina, what
A I resisted, that is why he scratched my face.47 happened next?

... A He had an ejaculation.

PROS. CHING: Q How do you know that he had an ejaculation when

the penis was pulled out from your vagina?
Q You said that he scratched your face. Did you suffer
any injury on your face? A Because it spurted towards my upper thigh.

A Yes.
 Q Then when the penis was pulled out and the
accused had an ejaculation and spurted spermatozoa
(sic) in your thigh, what did he do next?
A He then left our own house.49
The linear abrasion on Prudencias left cheekbone, and the
multiple abrasions on her chest and neck were eloquent
testimonies of the force employed by the appellant. In rape
case, the physical evidence showing use of force speaks
louder than words.50 It bears stressing that when the testimony
of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings,
sufficient basis exist to warrant a conclusion that the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been established.51
It has been held that the conduct of the victim immediately
following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance as
tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of
rape.52 Thus, further strengthening this Courts conviction that
the appellant is guilty of raping Prudencia is the fact that she
wasted no time in reporting her ordeal to the authorities. As we
have held in the case of People v. Grefiel:53
[D]espite the outrage and shame, she lost no time
in reporting the incident to the barangay captain. In
less than twelve (12) hours from the commission of
the crime, she narrated the sordid details of her
horrifying and harrowing experience in a statement
given to the police authorities, submitted to a medical
examination and signed a criminal complaint for
forcible abduction with rape against the accused-
appellant. Not only did these acts demonstrate
courage of the highest order, they also enhance the
complainant's credibility. It has been repeatedly said
by this Court that when a woman admits that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been committed; if her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof ...54
Thus, the veracity of Prudencias testimony cannot be doubted.
In People v. Jaca,55 we said:
The credibility of the victim is further strengthened by
the spontaneity of her act immediately after the
incident. We note her courage in reporting the rape,
unmindful of what the incident could do on her
reputation in their barrio. We fully concur with the
opinion of the lower court, viz:
"The fact that, the offended party, after the
beastly attack, immediately left her house to
report the molestation against her honor, is a
clear manifestation that she was indeed
raped. ...
Her immediate response (reporting the incident)
carries the stamp of truth. This is a natural reaction of
a virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual
molestation against her will."56
The appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of the
private complainant is absurd. The appellant alleged that he
was charged with rape because of his refusal to testify in
Prudencias behalf against a certain Romeo Alinas, who is
Prudencias alleged real rapist. This reason posited by the
appellant is too chimerical. Prudencia does not need the
appellant, much less his testimony. She could have charged
Romeo Alinas of rape with dispatch if he, not the appellant,
was the culprit. She did not do so.
Anent the appellants assertion that Prudencia
demanded P80,000 from his wife in consideration of
Prudencias desistance from charging him with rape, the latter
offered no evidence to prove his allegation other than the bare
claim of his wife, Liza. Besides, the evidence shows that it was
Liza who approached Prudencia, not the other way around.
The Court does not see how Prudencia, a married woman, and
mother of four children, could demean her womanhood, risk
public censure, and expose herself to the rigors,
embarrassments and headaches of a public trial, if her motive
was other than to secure justice. As aptly pointed out in People
v. Dagami57
[A] married woman with a husband and three
daughters would not publicly admit that she had been
criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly,
it defies reason in this case why a mother of four
would concoct a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and publicly disclose
that she has been sexually abused if her motive were
other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice
the person who defiled her. Pertinently, it stands to
reason that Visitacion would not bring herself, her
family and her husband to embarrassment, to public
scrutiny and being the talk of the community unless
what she had testified that she was raped is true. It is
settled that where there is no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness would testify falsely against an accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony
is worthy of full faith and credit.58
It bears stressing that when it comes to the issue of credibility,
the trial court judge is in the best position to rule on the matter,
considering that he has the vantage point of observing first
hand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses. In the
absence of proof that the trial court had overlooked or
disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of
significance in the case, as in the case at bar, its appreciation
of the credibility of witnesses will not be altered on review.
The appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant
consideration, in view of Prudencias positive identification of
the appellant as the one who defiled her, coupled with Dr.
Tagardes testimony and medical findings.
The appellants denial of the charge against him is futile, in
light of Prudencias positive testimony that he raped her on
January 14, 1996. Denial is inherently a weak defense. It
cannot prevail over positive identification, unless buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability.59
The appellants defense of alibi must also fail. Well-settled is
the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
victim.60 Prudencia has positively identified the appellant as the
one responsible for the assault on her chastity.61 His alibi
cannot, thus, exculpate him from liability.
In addition to the positive identification made by Prudencia, the
appellants alibi placed him within the periphery of the locus
criminis. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the
offense was committed; it must, likewise, be demonstrated that
he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.62 In People v.
Bracamonte,63 we said
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission of
the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let
 there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common
notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But to be valid
for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge,
the defense of alibi must be such that it would have
been physically impossible for the person charged
with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of
its commission, the reason being that no person can
be in two places at the same time. The excuse must
be so airtight that it would admit of no exception.
Where there is the least possibility of accuseds
presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.64
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 765965 reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
The trial court is mandated to impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua regardless of any attendant generic aggravating
circumstance as provided for in Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Nevertheless, generic aggravating circumstances may be
appreciated as basis for an award of exemplary damages, in
line with prevailing case law.66 In this case, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling is attendant because the appellant
raped the victim in her house.67 Hence, the victim is entitled to
an award of exemplary damages.
While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of P50,000, it failed to award civil indemnity to the
victim. The award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000 to a
rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of rape.68 Civil
indemnity is distinct from and must not be denominated as
moral damages, which are based on different jural
foundations.69 The victim is entitled to P25,000 as exemplary
damages.70
The trial courts award of P10,000 as actual damages should
be deleted for lack of factual basis. To seek recovery of actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party.71 The Court can only grant such amount for
expenses if they are supported by receipts.72
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 9, convicting
appellant Florencio Cadampog guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant is
directed to pay the victim Prudencia Lasara the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages;
and, P25,000 as exemplary damages. The award of P10,000
as actual damages is deleted for lack of proof thereof.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142740. August 6, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated January 3, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 42,631-99. Appellant ROBERTO TAMPOS Y
AGUSTIN was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant was charged in an information [2] containing the
following allegations:
The undersigned, at the instance of the offended party HAPPYLEN
ORTEGA Y RIOS, whose affidavit hereto attached and form part of
this Information accuses the above-named accused of the crime of
STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to R.A. 7610 and R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a
heinous offense, committed as follows:
That on or about February 18, 1999, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the complainant HAPPYLEN ORTEGA Y RIOS,
who is six (6) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by counsel on arraignment, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented
five witnesses, namely private complainant Happylen Ortega,
her mother Lady Lewin Ortega, security guard George
Amigable, Ms. Benaranda V. Orosco, and Dr. Samuel Cruz.
Complainant HAPPYLEN[3] ORTEGA testified[4] that on
February 18, 1999, while on her way to the house of an Uncle
George, she noticed appellant Roberto Tampos staring at her.
She knew Tampos and even knew where he lived. [5] Appellant
suddenly pulled her by the right wrist and, using his two hands,
lifted and carried her. Appellant brought her to an unlighted
area at the back of Almendras Gym where a junked
ambulance[6] was parked. Appellant then forced complainant to
lie on the plywood flooring and proceeded to remove her short
pants. She was not wearing any panty at that time. Appellant
then removed his own short pants and brief. It was then that
she was raped.[7] While placing himself on top of Happylen,
appellants erect penis was placed in her vagina. Complainant
illustrated this by thrusting her right forefinger towards a circle
formed by the fingers of her other hand.[8]
According to Happylen, appellant covered her mouth to
prevent her from shouting. He warned her not to tell her
parents about what he did, otherwise, appellant would kill her.
[9]
Appellant then stood up to urinate and it was then that the
guard on duty at the Almendras gym apprehended him. At first,
Happylen did not tell her mother about what happened but
eventually had to since her Auntie Betty and two of the latters
children saw her and they had already related the incident to
her mother. Her mother accompanied her to the police where
she executed an affidavit detailing what had happened. They
also went to the doctor where Happylen submitted herself to a
medical examination.
During cross-examination, complainant testified that
appellants penis did not penetrate her organ.[10] On re-direct,
however, she said that there was actual contact of the penis
and her vagina.[11] When asked to point to the part of her body
that was touched by the penis, complainant pointed to a part a
little above the vagina.
home. When she returned to the gym, appellant was already
being held by the security guard and surrounded by many
people. It was only then that she saw Happylen.
Dr. SAMUEL CRUZ[30] testified that he conducted the
physical/medical examination of complainant on February 19,
1999 or a day after the incident. His findings were reduced to
writing as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette,
tense. Vestibule, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, thick, tall, intact. Hymenal
orifice, annular, 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities,
cant be reached by examining finger.

CONCLUSIONS:
On query by the court, however, Happylen clarified that
appellants organ did not pass her vagina but only its lower
1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body
portion. She stated that it was not on the middle but on the
of the subject at the time of examination.
lower portion or on the lower tip of the vagina.[12]

2.) Hymen, intact and its orifice, small as to preclude complete

GEORGE AMIGABLE[13] was the security guard on duty
at the Almendras Gym when the incident occurred. He testified
that on February 18, 1999, at past 7:00 p.m., while he was
roving around the compound of Almendras Gym, two women
reported to him that a child was being raped in the junked
ambulance. He rushed to said place and found appellant and
complainant both standing up. The witness saw appellant
putting his shirt on.[14] He then asked the appellant and the
child their names which they promptly gave him. The girl
appeared to be normal but then she cried when she told him
that appellant had raped her.[15] He held appellant at once, to
prevent him from running away. The other security guard on
duty assisted him. He turned over custody of appellant to PO3
Romeo Autor,[16] a policeman living nearby. Thereafter, the girls
parents arrived.
penetration by an average-sized male organ in erection without
causing hymenal injury.
REMARKS: Semenology: Positive for Spermatozoa[31]
According to Dr. Cruz, his findings indicated that no male
organ had penetrated the childs vagina, otherwise, hymenal
lacerations would have been present.[32] However, he stated
that this would not negate the possibility of partial penetration
or of contact between the penis and the vagina. Further, Dr.
Cruz testified that he took a sample from the opening of the
vagina by dabbing a cotton swab therein. Upon laboratory
examination[33] of the sample conducted by a medical
technologist, it was found to be positive for spermatozoa.

Complainants mother, LADY The lone testimony of the appellant was presented in his
LEWIN[17] ORTEGA[18] testified that her daughter was only six defense.
years and nine months at the time of the incident. She
presented Happylens Birth Certificate,[19] indicating that the
child was born on July 4, 1992. Mrs. Ortega knew appellant
because he had been a neighbor for three months. [20] The
children in the area were likewise familiar with appellant since
he used to hang out in the vicinity of the chapel where the
children usually played.[21]

A witness told Mrs. Ortega about the rape. Later on,

Happylen also told her about it.[22] The child was crying while
relating to her what she suffered at the hands of appellant.
[23]
Mrs. Ortega then assisted her daughter in filing a complaint
with the police and accompanied her to the doctor for physical
examination.

BENARANDA[24] V. OROSCO[25] also testified for the

prosecution. On the date and time in question, she was asked
by one Beatriz[26] Danuco to accompany the latter to the
Almendras Gym. Betty said her son Marvin told her there was
a little girl at the gym and a man was doing something bad to
her.[27] Upon reaching the back of the gym, and from a distance
of about 4-5 meters, they saw appellant Roberto Tampos. The
witness demonstrated how appellant was bending up and
down.[28] She did not actually see the child at that time because
it was dark.[29]Thereafter, a security guard arrived and she went
 ROBERTO TAMPOS[34] testified that he did not know
complainants name, but he recognized her only by face. He
admitted that he was with complainant at around 6:00 to 7:00
p.m. of February 18, 1999. [35] He saw her playing on the road
leading to the back of Almendras Gym at around 6:00 p.m.,
while he was on his way to the house of his foreman.[36] He
said he was a bit drunk at the time.[37] He brought her to the
back of Almendras
Gym, made her sit on a plywood near the junk vehicle and gav
e her P1.00.[38] People were passing by at the time. He placed
the girl on his lap and in the process touched her side. He
admitted that he intended to touch the girl and then
masturbate, which was what actually happened. He slipped his
penis out at the side of his brief and shorts. Appellant denied
removing Happylens shorts but said he only lowered them.
[39]
He then saw the girls vagina but denied that he ever
touched it. He did not place himself on top of the girl when he
masturbated. He only knelt beside her while Happylen lay on
the plywood. He touched the girls thigh but not her private
parts. As he was ejaculating, he actually touched Happylens
hips. He directed his semen above the hips of the girl.
[40]
Nothing more happened after that. He then left the girl
behind and went home. However, he was immediately
apprehended by the security guard of Almendras Gym, brought
to the guards office, and taken to the barangay captain.
After trial, the RTC rendered its assailed decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged, accused ROBERTO TAMPOS is sentenced to
suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to Lady Lewin
Ortega, another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity together
with all accessory penalties as provided for by law. (PP vs. Romeo
Ambray y Luterio GR 127177 promulgated on February 25, 1999; PP
vs. Melanio Bolatete y Melon GR 127570 promulgated on February
25, 1999).
SO ORDERED.[41]
Aggrieved, appellant interposed the present appeal, with
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TESTIMONY OF
THE CHILD HERSELF THAT THE ACCUSED
PENIS (sic) DID NOT GO INSIDE HER VAGINA
BUT MERELY ON HER NAVEL, ABOVE HER
VAGINA AND THE LOWER PORTION OF HER
VAGINA.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE MERELY
MASTURBATED AND THIS FACT IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE MEDICAL FINDINGS
ON THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
GIRL RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT AS WELL
AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION. [42]
More specifically, the issues are: (1) whether appellant
had carnal knowledge of complainant; and (2) whether the
penalty imposed on appellant is appropriate.
Appellant is charged of STATUTORY RAPE under
paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The two
elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12
years of age.[43] Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is now
in Article 266-A, par. 1-d, in view of the amendments
introduced by R.A. 8353. Statutory rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under par. d, when the
offended party is under 12 years of age.
In this case, the victims age is undisputed. She is below
12 years old. Her Birth Certificate shows that she was born on
July 4, 1992. Thus, on February 18, 1999, Happylen was
exactly six (6) years, seven (7) months and fourteen (14) days
old. Her mother confirmed this in open court. Hence, the issue
is whether there is sufficient evidence to prove carnal
knowledge between appellant and Happylen beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant submits that, assuming arguendo that
Happylens testimony were true, he could not be convicted of
rape but only acts of lasciviousness. He insists that there was
no penetration of the vagina. He points out that the medical
findings show that the hymen was intact and, had there been
penetration, hymenal lacerations would have been present.
Appellant contends that the acts described do not constitute
carnal knowledge as the essential element of rape. He sticks to
his claim that he merely masturbated. He adds that he only
held on to the hips of complainant at that time, without touching
her private parts.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
for the affirmation of the trial courts judgment finding appellant
guilty of rape. However, the OSG recommends that the penalty
of death be imposed on appellant instead of reclusion
perpetua only.
Considering the evidence on record, we are one with the
trial court in giving credence to the testimonies of the
complainant and the other prosecution witnesses. The trial
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
great respect on appeal, for it had the opportunity to closely
observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand.[44] The trial court found that the complainant
acted without malice in reporting the alleged abuses of
accused on her person. In contrast, according to the trial court,
appellants unsubstantiated and self-serving denial could not
hold up against the positive declaration and frank manner by
which the victim recounted her ordeal. [45] A careful scrutiny of
the records leads us to the same conclusion, that the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies are logical and
more credible than that of the defense. We have no hesitation
in rejecting the testimony of the appellant for being less than
candid and truthful.
Instructive is complainants testimony, which we find worth
excerpting, to detail what appellant did to her:
 DIRECT EXAMINATION
xxx
Q: Now, Hapilyn Ortega, tell the court, how did he
rape you?
A: He placed his organ to me. (witness
demonstrating her right forefinger thrusting it
towards the circle of her other finger as if
penetrating inside).
Q: What was the position of the accused when he
inserted his penis to your private part?
A: His penis erected.
Q: Precisely, was he on top of you at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Going back to the testimony, that his penis (sic)
the accused inserted his penis to your vagina,
in the course of sexual contact made to you by
the accused, what did you feel if any, coming
from the penis of the accused?
A: I cried.
Q: The question is what did you observe if any,
coming from the penis of the accused?
A: None.
xxx
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q: You testified that earlier, that you were raped by
the accused by placing his organ to your
organ, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was the penis of the accused able to penetrate
your organ?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, when he (sic) accused removed your
shortpants, what did the accused do with his
penis?
A: He let it out.
Q: Did he hold his penis? Did he push and pull it
with his hands?
A: No.
xxx
RE-DIRECT
Q: Hapilyn Ortega, you said the organ of the
accused did not penetrate your organ, do you
mean to say that there was an actual contact
of the penis in your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
RE-CROSS
Q: Can you point out to this court, what portion is
that which was touched by the penis of the
accused?
A: (witness pointing to her vagina).
xxx
COURT:
Q: Hapilyn Ortega, you testified before, you are
pointing in your finger like this, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are referring to the one of your finger like
this, as the organ of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the one you are forming in your finger a ring
symbolizes your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when the accused raped you, is it that his
organ passes to your vagina?
A: No.
Q: Where is that part in your vagina here in your
circle that the penis of the accused was
pointed?
A: To the lower portion.
Q: It did not go inside here?
A: Yes, not on the middle but on the lower portion.
Q: Where in this vagina where the penis of accused
penetrated?
A: Lower portion.
Q: Only on the lower tip of the vagina?
 A: Yes sir.[46]
From the foregoing, we resolve the crucial issue: Did the
acts described above constitute the essential requisite of
carnal knowledge in a case of rape?
In People v. Lerio,[47] we stated:
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge,
unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured (6 WORDS AND PHRASES 273 citing Walker v. State, 273
S.W. 2d 707, 711, 197 Tenn. 452). The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the labia or
lips of the female organ (People vs. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May
21, 1998) or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act.
(People v. De la Pea, 233 SCRA 573 cited in People v. Castromero,
280 SCRA 421.)
Appellants counsel, in his brief, admits that the foregoing
testimony of Happylen clearly demonstrated that appellants
penis, indeed, touched the victims vagina.[48] However, he
contends that, much like the case of People v. Campuhan,
[49]
the touching was merely an epidermal contact or a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victims vagina or the mons pubis. To bolster defense counsels
claim that there was no penetration, he cites the result of the
medical examination that shows no extragenital injury and no
hymenal lacerations.
Complainant herself testified that there was no
penetration of her organ. However, she indicated at least two
areas where the penis of the appellant touched her vagina: (1)
the one she pointed to above her vagina; and (2) the lower
portion or lower tip of the vagina. But even if we consider only
the second spot, the lower portion or tip of her vagina, which
she categorically indicated during counsels examination and
upon inquiry by the court, in our view, sexual contact has been
indubitably established. That appellants penis only touched the
lower tip of the victims vagina without any resulting external
genital injury or laceration of the hymen would not preclude a
finding of rape.
In several cases, we have held that rupture of the hymen
or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be
consummated.[50] An intact hymen does not negate a finding
that the victim was raped. To commit the crime of rape the
rupture of the hymen is not indispensable.[51]
Significantly, in a number of cases[52] we held that where
penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored
its conclusion that the rape was nevertheless committed on the
victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding
of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia
majora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags
were no longer visible.[53]
Thus, contrary to appellants assertion, we are convinced
that appellants penis came in contact with complainants vagina
in a way much more intense than mere epidermal contact or a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis which the defense wants
us to accept. The victim felt pain in her sexual organ; [54] the
doctor found both the labia majora and minora to be gaping.
[55]
These, in our view, are external indicia of carnal knowledge.
As we stated in People v. Ayo:[56]
While it may be granted that penetration may not have been
accomplished as the girls hymen was shown to have remained intact
and the orifice too small to preclude full penetration, jurisprudence
recognizes that slight penetration of the labia by the male organ still
constitutes rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male
organ within the labia of the pudendum. Absence of hymenal
laceration does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim
is of tender age. Mere touching, no matter how slight, of the labia or
lips of the female organ by the male genital, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is sufficient to consummate rape.
The presence of appellants spermatozoa in her genitalia,
established by medical evidence, adds to the credibility of the
prosecutions stance that carnal knowledge did take place.
Jurisprudence requires that, to be considered
consummated rape, an erect penis capable of
penetration[57] must have touched, at the very least, the area of
the labia of the pudendum. In the present case, Happylen
testified that contact was made on the lower tip of her vagina. A
six-year- old girl might have difficulty pinpointing which part of
her vagina was actually touched. But Happylen had no such
difficulty. Clearly, there was sexual contact, for spermatozoa
was found present in her vagina. The trial court is convinced as
we are that the lower tip of her vagina testified to by
complainant as the point touched by appellants organ is the
vaginal opening or the area between the labia through which
the semen (spermatozoa) traveled and therein found the
following day when the gynecological examination was
performed.
Now, as to the imposable penalty in this case. The OSG
contends that the trial court erred in imposing on appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The OSG argues that the
offense committed is the heinous offense of child-rape, where
the victim is less than seven years old. Hence, the OSG
recommends that the penalty should be death.
At the outset, we find that the appellant is being charged
of STATUTORY RAPE as defined in Art. 335, Paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This provision reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.[58]
The phrase under twelve years of age makes the offense
STATUTORY RAPE as well understood in our jurisdiction. It is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty,
under Art. 266-B, RPC, now. In our view, the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the charges against him
would be violated if, as the OSG argues, we should convict him
on the basis of a provision of law, R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which imposes death. True, the information
mentions confusedly Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to R.A. 7610, R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313, it being a
heinous offense. Note that the information does not mention
R.A. 8353. The visible emphasis of the present charge, clearly,
is on STATUTORY RAPE, which the Prosecutor spelled in
capital letters.
The Information first and foremost refers to the crime of
rape defined in Paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, now Article 266-A, where the woman is under twelve
years of age, which is statutory rape. It is this specific provision
of the Code, favorable in this context to the appellant that we
should apply. To convict an accused of a higher or more
serious offense than that specifically charged in the complaint
or information on which he is tried would be an outright
violation of his basic rights.[59] It is well settled that an accused
may only be convicted of a crime charged against him in the
information or those necessarily included therein. [60] The
information herein charging STATUTORY RAPE could not be
validly converted to a charge of CHILD-RAPE. The latter
charge constitutes a greater offense punishable by death, quite
distinct from statutory rape. Having been specifically arraigned
on the charge of STATUTORY RAPE, appellant could not after
trial be held to answer for child-rape. To do so would raise
infractions of due process and other guarantees in favor of
appellant, particularly his right to be informed, and not
misinformed, of the offense charged.
Moreover, the severity of death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the
decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.[61] The OSGs
prayer to increase appellants culpability to a capital offense
cannot, in our view, be granted now without also fracturing our
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. For now, in Rule
110 made effective on December 1, 2000,[62] we find strict
requirements for the State Prosecutor to observe faithfully,
thus:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The prosecution must avoid ambiguity, vagueness or
uncertainty as to what offense is being charged. The allegation
in the information states that the appellant is being charged
with the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of
the Revised Penal Code. Mention of its relation to R.A. 7610,
R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a heinous offense... need not
confuse us. It should not now appear that alternative offenses
are charged, which could void the information. To forestall that
eventuality, the charge should be read as referring to statutory
rape and no other kind. Given that charge, we agree with the
trial courts imposition of reclusion perpetua as the appropriate
penalty on appellant. Prudence counsels us to avoid
pronouncing a sentence of death where law and the evidence
do not clearly and indubitably call for it.
As to damages, civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 are also properly awarded
in favor of private complainant, on the ground that victims of
rape suffer psychological and moral injuries sufficient to justify
the award, without necessity of further proof.[63]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 17, is AFFIRMED. Appellant
ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN is declared GUILTY of
statutory rape, and he is sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all its accessory penalties. The appellant is
likewise ordered to pay private complainant, Happylen Ortega,
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity and another FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, together with the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127128. August 15, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROEL
MENDIGURIN Y CANLAS, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellant Roel Mendigurin challenges the decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 74,
convicting him of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay P30,000 as moral damages.
The information under which appellant was charged
states, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1992, in Navotas, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd design, have sexual intercourse with ELENA SEBASTIAN and
successfully did so by employing force, threat and intimidation on
her person.
Contrary to law.[2]
In his arraignment on March 1, 1993, appellant, assisted
by his counsel, pleaded not guilty[3] and trial thereafter ensued.
Appellants conviction was principally based on the
testimonies of complainant Elena Sebastian, her nephew Mark
Figueroa who allegedly witnessed the incident, and Dr. Louella
Nario of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Also
testifying for the prosecution on peripheral matters were the
elder sister of complainant, Edna Figueroa, and Dr. Remedios
Puentespina.
 Complainant Elena Sebastian, who was 19 years old on
the date of the alleged rape, is a native of Pampanga. After her
elementary education, she moved in with her elder sister Edna
Figueroa to the latters residence in 217 Gov. Pascual, Sipac,
Navotas, Metro Manila. Edna Figueroa is married to Salvador
Figueroa, who happens to be the brother of Daisy Mendigurin,
wife of appellant herein. Appellants house is adjacent to the
Figueroas. In fact the two houses are separated only by a
concrete wall.
In her testimony,[4] complainant narrated that on June 15,
1992, she woke up at 5:00 a.m. to prepare breakfast for her
brother-in-law and his two children, who were then sleeping
upstairs. As she unlocked the kitchen door leading outside to
throw out water from the rice pot, appellant suddenly pushed
the door and barged in. To her surprise, appellant locked the
door, and embraced and kissed her. Startled by appellants
sudden attack, she fell unconscious. When she regained
consciousness, she felt pain in her abdomen and noticed blood
in her private part. At that moment, she saw appellant putting
on his shorts with a smirk on his face. He threatened her not to
report the incident to anyone, or else he would kill her sister.
He then left and complainant was unable to do anything but
weep. She went to the bathroom with a knife and attempted to
commit suicide. Her fear, however, prevented her from doing
so.
Complainant kept the incident to herself until September
26, 1992, when she was rushed to the hospital for slashing her
wrist. It was then that she divulged to her relatives the ordeal
she suffered at the hands of appellant. On October 22, 1992,
she filed a complaint against appellant before the police
authorities of Navotas, where she gave a written
statement[5] relating the June 15, 1992 incident. She was
thereafter brought to the NBI for physical examination.
She further testified that due to her heart ailment, it was
usual for her to lose consciousness whenever she felt
frightened, as in the past when her elder sister scolded her. On
cross-examination, she said that at the time of the assault, she
was unable to cry for help to her relatives upstairs because she
was so surprised. She also stated that it took her a long time to
report the matter to the authorities because of appellants threat
to her and her fear that everybody would know about it.
To buttress complainants testimony, the prosecution also
presented the testimony[6] of Mark
Figueroa (Mark), complainants nephew who also happens to
be the godchild of appellant. He was then eleven years old at
the time of the incident. He declared that at around 5:30 a.m.
of June 15, 1992, while descending the stairs, he saw
appellant bare-buttocked on top of complainant on the kitchen
floor. Appellant immediately stood up, approached him and told
him not to tell anybody what he just witnessed. At that
instance, Mark also saw complainant get up to dress up. Out of
fear, he ran back upstairs and thereafter kept silent about the
incident. It was only after complainants confinement in the
hospital that he volunteered to take the witness stand because
he pitied his aunt. On cross-examination, he recounted that
before going down the stairs, he heard a soft outcry and an
angry voice, which prompted him to go down. He added that
his aunt, upon getting up, went into the bathroom where he
heard her crying.
Dr. Louella Nario, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who
examined complainant, confirmed in her testimony[7] her
findings as stated in Living Case Report No. MG-92-
858[8] which showed a healed deep laceration in complainants
hymen. She further opined that the laceration could have been
effected three to four months before October 4, 1992, the date
of the examination.
The prosecution also presented testimonial evidence to
support complainants claim that it was common for her to lose
consciousness whenever she feels afraid. Edna
Figueroa testified[9] that sometime in 1991, complainant fell
unconscious when she scolded the latter. In corroboration, Dr.
Remedios Puentespina testified[10] on the medical history of
complainant, who had consulted her on three occasions since
1991. She stated that complainants frequent complaint since
the first consultation was the latters tendency to lose
consciousness whenever she felt emotional stress. She
testified, however, that based on the results of the
examinations previously conducted on complainant, she found
nothing wrong with the latters heart.
Appellant Roel Mendigurin and his wife, Daisy
Mendigurin, testified for the defense.
Roel Mendigurin took the witness stand and admitted
engaging in sexual intercourse with complainant on June 15,
1992. He, however, denied the rape charge and interposed the
defense that he and complainant were lovers. In his testimony,
[11]
he stated that his work as a batilyo[12] required him to leave
the house before 7:00 p.m., and come home at past 3:00
a.m.He testified that from March until sometime in September,
1992, he secretly maintained a sexual affair with complainant,
who lived just next door. He recalled that his first sexual
intercourse with complainant was in the afternoon of March
1992 in the room of complainants elder sister. He testified that
it was on this occasion that he discovered that complainant
was no longer a virgin. They had their sexual escapades
usually in the mornings, either in his house or in complainants
house, whenever his wife was at work.
He narrated a different version of the incident. He stated
that in the early morning of June 15, 1992, he arrived home
from work and was allowed entry by complainant into her
sisters house. He walked into the kitchen, where they
voluntarily engaged in sex. Complainants nephew, Mark
Figueroa, later came down from upstairs and saw them in the
act of intercourse. At this instance, appellant and complainant
stood up. He went to the door, while complainant approached
her nephew. He, thereafter, went home. He said that contrary
to complainants claim, she never lost consciousness while they
were having sex. He also denied threatening Mark, asserting
instead that it was complainant who talked to the child.
To bolster his defense, he further testified that even after
the date of the alleged rape, he and complainant continued
with their illicit sexual affair. In fact he recounted that on June
28, 1992, they again engaged in sex in the house of
complainants parents in Apalit, Pampanga, where appellant
stayed overnight on the occasion of the town fiesta. He alleged
that complainants shame for having been caught by her
nephew, who later spread the word about their sexual
relations, must have moved her to accuse him of rape.
 Daisy Mendigurin also testified[13] in defense of her
husband, appellant herein. As a fish vendor, her usual routine
was to leave for work at 9:00 p.m., and to come home at 9:00
or 10:00 a.m. Most of the time, she was also away in the
afternoon to sell more fish in the market. Whenever she arrives
home from work, she would often see her husband and
complainant talking and teasing each other, which caused her
to suspect that they were having an affair. However, because
she treated complainant as her sister, she kept silent and
waited for proof to confirm her suspicion. Eventually, in
September, as complainant was rushed to the hospital for
having slashed her wrist, her husband talked to her and
admitted the affair. As a natural reaction, she got mad and lost
control of herself in rage.
In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled complainant to the
witness stand, and also presented a new witness,
complainants father, Federico Sebastian.
Complainant Elena Sebastian in her testimony[14] on
rebuttal denied appellants claim that she and appellant had an
affair and that what occurred on June 15, 1992 was
consensual. She admitted that on June 28, 1992, appellant did
stay overnight in her parents house in Pampanga, but denied
that they had any sexual contact. She clarified that although
they both slept on the same floor of the house, they were about
ten feet apart from each other, in different rooms. At the time,
she did not have the strength to report the rape incident to her
family because she was afraid of appellants threat.
Federico Sebastian testified[15] that on the night of June
28, 1992, while his daughter, his grandchildren and appellant
were asleep on the second floor of their house in Pampanga,
he went up to check on them and noticed nothing unusual.
The trial court lent credence to the prosecutions version
of the incident. Observing that complainant appeared to be the
Maria Clara type, it rejected appellants claim that the sexual
intercourse that occurred on June 15, 1992 was out of an illicit
affair. It concluded that the medico-legal finding that the
hymenal laceration of the complainant was about four months
old strongly negated appellants claim that they had had sexual
contact as early as March of 1992. It further found that
appellants act of sudden entry into the house and pushing the
victim to the door sufficed to be considered as an employment
of force, threat, and intimidation to consummate the rape.[16]
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleges the following errors:
I seeing appellant putting on his shorts. Of equal significance is
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ELENA SEBASTIAN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE.
III
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT
THAT ACCUSED WAS INDEED GUILTY, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BASED ON THE ALLEGATION
FOUND IN THE INFORMATION THAT RAPE
WAS COMMITTED BY MEANS OF FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION WHICH IS NOT FOUND
ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.[17]
It is constitutionally mandated that the accused be
accorded the presumption of innocence. The burden of proof
rests on the State to establish every circumstance which
proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[18] This exacting
standard of proof acquires more relevance in rape charges
which are easy to make but hard to prove and harder still to
defend by the party accused who may be innocent. [19] Thus, we
have exhorted courts to keep in mind settled principles in the
decision-making process: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy
but to disprove it is difficult although the accused may be
innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and that only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence of the defense.[20]
On the other hand, it is the general rule that factual
findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
alter the result of the case. [21]
In the present case, however, a careful review of the
evidence compels us to take exception to the aforesaid rule.
We have repeatedly stressed that the resolution of a rape
case often hinges on the credibility of the victim. If her
testimony does not meet the test of credibility, the acquittal of
the accused is inevitable.[22]
After thoroughly examining complainants testimony, along
with the other evidence at hand, we find glaring inconsistencies
therein which constrain us to entertain a reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of appellant. As principal evidence, the prosecution
proffered the testimony of complainant, who attested that she
was raped while she was unconscious and that the only thing
she could remember upon regaining consciousness was
Mark Figueroas testimony, which the prosecution presented as
an eyewitness account of the incident, and which, upon a
closer scrutiny, fails to corroborate complainants testimony.
Marks narration of what he saw that fateful morning of June 15,
1992 belies complainants claim that she was unconscious:
Q. You testified that sometime on June 15, 1992
between the hours of 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., when
you woke up and while descending the stairs
you saw your uncle, who happens to be your
godfather, on top of your Ate Lena is that
correct?
A. Yes sir. It is worth noting that Mark is related to both appellant and
complainant. Considering this and the fact that he was only
Q. Now, before you descended the stairs did you eleven years old at the time he witnessed the incident, we give
hear any outcry from downstairs coming from full weight to his testimony.
your Ate Lena?
Moreover, we cannot help but notice that complainants
A. Yes sir. testimony and affidavit failed to mention the presence of Mark
during the incident. When asked, she even denied knowledge
Q. You mean to say you heard your Ate Lena as to when her nephew woke up that morning.[25] In
making a loud outcry? comparison, except as to who approached and talked to the
child, appellants account on this point conforms with Marks
testimony.[26]
A. Little bit soft, sir.

In addition, complainants claim that she has a heart

Q. But why did you descend from your upper
ailment which caused her to faint under extreme emotional
house?
condition was unsupported by any medical finding. The
prosecution only presented the testimony of Dr. Puentespina,
A. Because it[]s as if I heard something, sir. who stated that the results of the two examinations conducted
on complainant both proved negative for any heart disorder.
Q. You heard murmur? She testified that she only prescribed medicines to calm her, as
she observed complainant to be frequently emotional each
A. No sir. time she consulted her.[27]

Q. You heard what, what more did you hear?
A. I heard an angry voice, sir.
Q. Do you hear the words being uttered by
someone whom you heard?
A. None sir.
Q. When you saw your uncle atop your Ate Lena,
did you hear any outcry from your Ate Lena?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Was the cry loud?
Complainants failure promptly to report her agonizing
experience to the authorities, or at the very least to her family,
despite all the opportunities to do so, also seriously affects the
veracity of her narration.[28] She stated that it took her four
months before divulging the incident because she feared
appellants threat to kill her elder sister.[29] However, she
admitted that she had many relatives living in the same
neighborhood where she resided.[30] She also admitted that just
a week after the date of the alleged rape, she spent one week
in her familys home in Pampanga, away from the watchful
eyes of appellant.[31] Considering that appellant was many
kilometers away in Manila and the protection afforded by her
household, her life cannot be said to have been in danger
then. Furthermore, she kept silent and did not protest when
appellant slept overnight in their house on the same floor
where she slept, while her parents slept downstairs.[32]

A. No sir. In view of the foregoing, we find the prosecutions

evidence insufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond
Q. And you testified that immediately your Ninong reasonable doubt.
stood up[,] is that correct?
And even assuming, for arguments sake, that the
A. Yes sir. evidence at hand suffices to prove the alleged rape, still,
conviction of appellant under the information filed herein
cannot stand.
Q. What if any did your Ate Lena do after your
Ninong stood up?
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the governing law
[23] in this case, provides that the crime of rape is committed by
A. She dressed up, sir.
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx

1. By using force or intimidation;

COURT:

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise

When you saw your godfather, the accused unconscious; and
herein, on top of your Ate Lena, will you please
tell the Honorable Court whether at that time
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
your Ate Lena was moving?
demented.

A. Yes sir.[24]
The information herein specifically alleged that appellant
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the complainant
by employing force, threat, and intimidation, thus invoking
paragraph 1 of Article 355. It was also on this ground that
appellant was convicted by the trial court. After painstakingly
searching through the records, however, we find no evidence
of force, threat, or intimidation used by appellant to
consummate the alleged rape. On the contrary, what we found
were complainants admissions that no such means attended
the sexual act:
Q. Now, it states here, that the accused did, then
and there will fully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design, have sexual intercourse with
Elena Sebastian and [successfully] did so by
employing force, threat and intimidation with
you, my question to you Miss Sebastian [is],
what kind of force was made to you by the
accused?
A. None, Sir, he only pushed the door.
Q. And what kind of threat [or] intimidation [was]
perpetrated or done to you by the accused?
A. After he raped me, [he] told me that he would kill
me if I complain to anybody.
Q. But that threat or intimidation happened,
according to you, after you have been abused
by the accused?
A. Yes, Sir.[33]
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also testified on rebuttal that what happened
to you on June 15, 1992 was no[t] voluntary
but by means of force and intimidation, my
question is, how were you forced and
intimidated by the accused?
A. He told me that if I tell what happened to
anybody, he will kill my sister, sir.
Q. Is it not a fact that [those] utterances, according
to you, [were] made by the accused after you
woke up and found yourself to have been
molested by the accused in this case?
A. Yes sir.
Q. So the intimidation happened after you found and
discovered yourself to have been abused by
the accused in this case?
A. Yes sir.[34]
As clearly shown from the foregoing, complainant herself
attested that no force was employed on her by appellant. The
threat and intimidation, on the other hand, were claimed to
have been used by appellant only after consummating the
sexual act. This is not what is contemplated by Article 355 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code. To convict under this mode, the
accused must have used force or intimidation to compel
complainant into having sexual relations with him.[35]
As the prosecution failed to present evidence to
substantiate the charge of rape through force, threat and
intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellants
innocence. It is an elementary rule in criminal procedure that
an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. [36] If the
prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by proving
that complainant was violated while in a state of
unconsciousness, as provided under the 2nd paragraph of
Article 355, the information should have stated so. We find,
however, that the element of unconsciousness was not alleged
much less specified in the information, which charged
appellant for rape under the first circumstance. Hence, it
cannot be made the basis of conviction without violating
appellants right to due process, in particular to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.[37] We have ruled that
this right is accorded by the Constitution so that the accused
can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against
him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is
concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would
plainly be unfair and underhanded.[38]
The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on
the praesumptio hominis that no young Filipina would cry rape
if it were not true. However, its decision totally disregarded the
paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is
deemed innocent until proven otherwise.[39] Where the
evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the
accused's innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that
which favors the accused should be properly considered.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 12501-MN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
appellant Roel Mendigurin y Canlas is hereby ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED
forthwith from confinement, unless held for another cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is further ordered to
report to us, within five days from notice, his compliance with
this decision.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137366 November 27, 2003
People of the Philippines, appellee,
vs.
Romeo Mole y Santos, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 143, finding appellant Romeo Mole y Santos guilty
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
The accusatory portion of the Information2 charged appellant
as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of
Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one EMERITA REYES Y
TAMAYO, against her will and consent.
On motion of the prosecution, the accusatory portion was later
amended to read:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of
Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one EMERITA REYES Y
TAMAYO, against her will and consent, while dizzy or
otherwise unconscious. (Emphasis supplied.)
Culled from the documentary and the testimonial evidence for
the prosecution consisting of the testimonies of the following
witnesses, to wit: private complainant Emerita Reyes
(Emerita); Aurea Villena, the Medico-Legal Officer from the
National Bureau of Investigation; SPO4 Lilia R. Hogar, the
police investigator; and Wildredo Reyes, the husband of
Emerita, are the following:
On April 11, 1997, the then 34-year old Emerita, her husband
Wilfredo and their three children consulted appellant, Romeo
Mole, an albularyo (quack doctor), in the latters house, they
having been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies.
Appellant, diagnosing the Reyeses to be victims of kulam
(witchcraft), asked for and was given P935.00 for the purchase
of 17 black candles which he needed to insulate them from the
spell. Appellant asked them to return the next day for
treatment.3
As advised, the Reyeses returned to appellants house the
next day, April 12, 1997. On appellants instructions, the
Reyeses removed their clothes upon which appellant
massaged their bodies one at a time with cotton dipped in oil.4
After the "treatment," the Reyeses repaired home,
accompanied by appellant who brought with him two black
candles. Upon reaching the Reyeses house, appellant lit the
candles and placed one at the main door and another near the
door of the kitchen. He then invited Emeritas husband Wilfredo
to drink gin while waiting for the candles to burn out. After three
shots, Wilfredo became dizzy and passed out. Appellant
thereupon brought Wilfredo to the only bedroom of the house
and blew something on his (Wilfredos) chest.5
At about 11:00 p.m., appellant left the Reyeses residence after
asking for and receiving the amount of P350.00 representing
payment for his services.6
Emerita then went to sleep. At about 12:00 midnight, however,
she heard someone knock at the main door. Clad in a duster,
she opened the door and saw appellant who was looking for
her youngest son, he saying that "the sorcerer will take and kill
him" and to save him (the son), appellant needed P2,500.00.
Panicky and crying, Emerita immediately gave the said amount
to appellant who thereafter went to the bedroom and sprinkled
a pungent liquid on Wilfredo and their three children. Appellant
also sprinkled the same liquid on Emerita, blew something on
her chest and, while looking at her eyes, mumbled as if in
prayer at which point Emerita instantly felt weak and dizzy.7
Appellant then dragged Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the
floor and removed her underwear. She felt appellant, who was
naked from the waist down, lie on top of her. While she wanted
to resist she was too weak and dizzy and eventually lost
consciousness.8
Before losing consciousness, however, Emerita felt something
heavy on her breast as appellant lay on top of her.9
When Emerita regained consciousness, appellant had left and
her entire body, including her vagina, was aching. She was
later to declare in the course of her testimony in court, when
asked why her vagina was aching, that appellant "raped" her.10
The next morning, or on April 13, 1997, Emerita, without the
knowledge of her husband, reported her experience to the
police.11 Her husband, however, was informed by a neighbor
that Emerita went to the police station, prompting him to follow
her. On arrival at the police station, he was unable to talk to his
wife, and it was only on her return home at around 3:00 or 4:00
p.m. of that day that Emerita related to him the incidents that
occurred the night before, albeit he could not remember if
Emerita ever mentioned to him that she became unconscious,
because there have been a lot of things which then occupied
his mind.12
On April 14, 1997, Emerita was physically examined by Dr.
Aurea Villena who found multiple lacerations on her hymen
which are secondary to child birth13 and noted the following:
1. No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body
of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen, reduced to myrtiformis.14
At the witness stand, the doctor disclosed that the seminology
examination conducted on Emerita yielded negative result, and
that there was no medical basis to conclude that she had been
subjected to sexual abuse.15
From the Final Investigation Report16 of SPO4 Lilia Hogar to
whom the case was referred for investigation, the following
datum appears:
xxx
07. Suspect ROMEO MOLE when apprised of his
constitutional rights admitted raping EMERITA and also told the
same admission to the PRESS people who interviewed him.
xxx
SPO4 Hogars testimony in court was dispensed with after the
prosecution stipulated that appellant was investigated and
"gave the statement to her."17
Appellant on the other hand denied the accusation. He claims
that it was his wife Adoracion Mole, not him, who treated
Emerita; that both Emerita and Wilfredo were awake when he
returned to their house on the night of April 13, 1997; that he
merely fell asleep on the Reyeses sofa in the living room; and
that when he awoke at around 8:00 the following morning,
Wilfredo even offered him breakfast which he turned down as it
was already late. He, however, admitted that there is no reason
why Emerita would file a complaint for rape against him.18
A Yes, sir.
Q Prior [to] you[r] los[s of] consciousness, what was the
accused doing [to] you that you could remember?
A I just felt that there was something heavy on my breast, sir.

Appellants testimony was corroborated by his wife Adoracion xxx

Mole.19

Q What was the condition of your body when you regained

Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on consciousness?
Romeos verbal admission to SPO4 Hogar of having raped the
victim, as reflected in the aforementioned datum in the Final
A I felt pain all over my body, sir.
Investigation Report, the trial court convicted appellant of rape
by the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Q What particular portion of your body was aching or suffering
from pain?
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Romeo Mole y Santos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Accordingly,
accused Romeo Mole y Santos is hereby sentenced to A My whole body and also my vagina, sir.
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to INDEMNIFY private
complainant Emerita Reyes y Tamayo in the amount of Q Do you know of any reason why your vagina is aching?
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.20
A Yes, sir.
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors to the trial
court: Q What was that?

1. . . . In deciding the case by mere confusion or A He raped me, sir.26 (Emphasis supplied)
supposition, and in failing to consider certain
unrebutted substantial matters of facts tending to On cross-examination, Emerita gave the following account:
show the non-occurrence or at least a doubtful
occurrence of rape.
ATTY. OLIVA

2. . . . In failing to apply the rule that in case of doubt,

Q You testified Madam Witness on direct examinatio[n] that the
the same must be resolved in favor of the accused.21
last time you were conscious that you felt that the accused was
on top of you, is that correct?
In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that
A Yes, sir.1wphi1
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.22
Q You also testified that you lost consciousness and that when
you regained consciousnes[s] the accused ha[d] left already,
And the credibility of the private complainant is of vital
am I right, Madam Witness?
importance for, in view of the peculiar nature of rape,
conviction or acquittal rests entirely upon her.23 It has thus
A Yes, sir.
become doctrine that the accused may be convicted even
solely on the basis of the victims testimony provided that the
testimony is clear, credible, convincing, unshaken by rigid Q Now, my question, Madam Witness, when did you lose your
cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or consciousness?
contradictions in its material points.24
A When he was halfway [with] what he was doing to me, Sir.
Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and
not disturbed on appeal,25 inconsistencies in the testimony of Q Are you referring to the . . .[m]ashing of your breast and
Emerita put serious doubts on her claim of rape, compelling kissing of your lips, Madam Witness?
this Court to reverse appellants conviction.
A Yes, Sir.
Thus, on direct examination, she related that appellant, who
was naked from waist down, lay on top of her after removing xxx
her underwear, whereupon she lost consciousness; and that
after she regained consciousness, her entire body, including Q Miss Witness, can you possibly tell the Honorabl[e] Court if
her vagina, was aching. She thus concluded that she was there was actual penetration of the sexual organ of the
raped: accused to you?

Q You mean Madam Witness that after your panty was WITNESS
removed and accused was able to l[ay] you down [o]n the floor
you lost consciousness and you dont remember anything?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Why do you know that there was [f]ull penetratio[n] Madam
Witness?
A Because Your Honor, when I regained consciousnes[s] and
he already left the house, I felt that my vagina was somewhat
forced and it was very painful, Sir.
xxx
Q Why do you know that he was able to have sexual
intercourse with you?
WITNESS
A Because my organ was wet, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
When, also on during cross-examination, she was questioned
by the trial court, she gave the following statement:
COURT
Q What was that thing that he did which you felt the accused
was doing to you?
WITNESS
A I felt that he put his sexual organ on top of my body, Sir.
COURT
Q On top of your body?
[Q] Where did the accused plac[e] his sexual organ, Madam
Witness?
[WITNESS]
[A] On my vagina, Sir.28 (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony of Emerita prompted the defense to
propound the following question which elicited the following
answer:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q Madam Witness, you made several inconsistent statements
during your direct examination that you lost consciousness and
that you learned that you were raped after you regained
consciousness. Likewise, when asked by this Honorable Court
when you came to know that you were raped, you also said
that you learned that you were raped because when you woke
up, your sexual organ was painful and when you were finally
asked when for the first time you c[a]me to know that you were
raped, you changed your testimony that you felt that the
accused inserted his sex organ into your vagina, which is
which now, Madam Witness?
A I lost consciousness after he was finished having sexual
intercourse with me, Sir.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
When asked to clarify her statements, Emerita did not give
categorical answers:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q When the accus[ed] was holding your breast and kissing
your lips, in the middle of that, you lost consciousness, Madam
Witness?
A I felt what he was doing to me but because my body was
very weak, I tried to move my head around so he could not kiss
me, Sir.30
xxx
COURT
Q When [did] you know that your organ was wet?
WITNESS
A When he was gone already, Sir.
COURT
Q In other words, you only came to know tha[t] there was
sexual intercourse after the accused has already left the
premises[,] is that correct?
WITNESS
A No, Your Honor, because when he dragged me, I already felt
weak and dizzy but I felt all those things that he did to
me.31 (Underscoring supplied)
Emeritas vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the
test of consistency. This Court is thus put on guard as to the
veracity of her claim. For while minor inconsistencies do not
detract from the actual fact of rape,32 those in Emeritas
testimony may not be considered minor for they relate to the
fact of commission of the offense charged.
A woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be
able to narrate her defloration during that state, and her
violation may be proved indirectly by other
evidence.33 Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of
rape need only testify in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in her
testimony to convict the accused.34
While this Court has held in numerous rape cases that no
person would subject herself to a rape trial given the attendant
embarrassment of a medical examination and the stigma of a
sexual assault unless the accusation be true,35 it is gathered
from those cases that the victim was able to clearly and
categorically impute the crime on the offender.
In the case at bar, save for Emeritas inconsistent testimonies
as noted above, there is no other evidence showing that
appellant did have carnal knowledge with her.
The testimony of Wilfredo merely dwelt on events that occurred
before and after the alleged rape, while the result of the
medical examination showed no physical manifestations of
sexual intercourse. While Dr. Villena did not rule out the
possibility of sexual intercourse, her testimony could hardly be
characterized as consistent and unwavering, having first ruled
out the possibility of sexual intercourse, only to later retract
upon being scrutinized by the trial court.36
As for the trial courts reliance on the investigative report-
Exhibit "E" of SPO4 Lilia Hogar in this wise:
Incidentally, the defense did not interpose any objection to the
admission of Exhibit "E", the Investigation report. SPO4 Lilia
Hogar, the Investigator-on-Case, stated in the said report that
ROMEO, when interviewed by the media people admitted
raping EMERITA,37
the same report showing that appellant admitted having raped
Emerita is inadmissible in evidence. The admission was not in
writing and there is no showing that appellant was assisted by
a competent and independent counsel of his choice when he
made such statement in accordance with Section 2 (d)38 of
Republic Act 743839 in relation to Section 12 (1) Article III of the
Constitution.40
The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Moles guilt
for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable for the
lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. The records clearly
show that appellant lay on top of the victim, mashed her
breasts and kissed her lips, acts from which appellants lewd
design was evident. Although the information filed was for the
crime of rape, appellant can be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in
rape.41
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
alleged in the information or proven during trial, the penalty
of prision correccional42 shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant must
suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the July 15, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Romeo
Mole y Santos is CONVICTED of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124342. December 8, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN
LADRILLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[1] The prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. Only when the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction exists that the liberty, or even the life, of an accused may
be declared forfeit. Correlatively, the judge must examine with
extreme caution the evidence for the state to determine its
sufficiency. If the evidence fails to live up to the moral conviction of
guilt the verdict must be one of acquittal, for in favor of the accused
stands the constitutional presumption of innocence; so it must be in
this prosecution for rape.
Jane Vasquez, the eight (8) year old complaining witness, could
not state the month and year she was supposedly abused by her
cousin Edwin Ladrillo. She could narrate however that one afternoon
she went to the house of accused-appellant in Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City, which was only five (5) meters away from where she
lived. There he asked her to pick lice off his head; she complied. But
later, he told her to lie down in bed as he stripped himself naked. He
removed her panty and placed himself on top of her. Then he inserted
his penis into her vagina. He covered her mouth with his hand to
prevent her from shouting as he started gyrating his buttocks. He
succeeded in raping her four (4) times on the same day as every time
his penis softened up after each intercourse he would make it hard
again and insert it back into her vagina. After successively satisfying
his lust accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo would threaten to "send her
to the police" if she would report the incident to anyone. [2]
Sometime in 1994 Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez, mother of Jane,
noticed that Jane had difficulty urinating and kept pressing her
abdomen and holding her private part. As she writhed in discomfort
she approached her mother and said, "Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa akin
na yung uten ni Kuya Edwin ipinasok sa kiki ko (Ma, you wont
believe that Kuya Edwin inserted his penis into my vagina).
[3]
Perturbed by her daughters revelation, Salvacion immediately
brought her to their church, the Iglesia ni Kristo, where she was
advised to report to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). At
the NBI Salvacion was referred to the Puerto Princesa Provincial
Hospital so that Jane could be physically examined.
Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the examining physician, reported in his
medico-legal certificate that Jane had a "non-intact hymen." [4] He
later testified that a "non-intact hymen" could mean either of two (2)
things: it could be congenital, i.e., the victim was born without a fully
developed hymen,[5] or it could be caused by a trauma, as when a
male organ penetrated the private organ of the victim. [6]
On 3 February 1995 Jane Vasquez with the assistance of her
mother Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez filed a criminal complaint against
accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo.
The defense is anchored on alibi and denial. Accused-appellant
claims that in 1992, the year he allegedly raped Jane as stated in the
Information, he was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City,
and did not even know Jane or her mother at that time. That it was
only in 1993, according to him, that he moved to Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City. To corroborate his testimony, the defense presented as
witnesses, Wilfredo Rojas and Teodoro Aguilar, both of whom were
neighbors of accused-appellant in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City. They
testified that in 1992 accused-appellant was still their neighbor in
Liberty and it was only in 1993 when accused-appellant and his
family moved to Abanico.[7]
 Edito Ladrillo, accused-appellants father, testified that his
family lived in Abanico for the first time only in 1993; that when he
and his sister Salvacion, mother of Jane, had a quarrel, he forbade his
son Edwin from attending church services with Salvacion at
the Iglesia ni Kristo, which caused his sister to be all the more angry
with him; and, the instant criminal case was a means employed by his
sister to exact revenge on him for their past disagreements. [8]
The trial court found accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo guilty
as charged, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
indemnify Jane Vasquez the amount of P100,000.00, and to pay the
costs.[9] Thus, the court rationalized -
The crux of accuseds defense is that he was not in the place of the
alleged rape in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City when this allegedly
happened. He denied committing the crime of rape against the young
girl, Jane Vasquez. After having carefully examined and calibrated
the evidence on record, the Court is convinced more than ever that
the accused Edwin Ladrillo indeed repeatedly raped or sexually
abused Jane Vasquez, a girl who was then only five (5) years
old. This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the testimony
of Jane Vasquez given the straightforward clarity and simplicity with
which it was made. It is highly improbable that a young, 8-year old
girl would falsely testify that her own cousin, the accused herein,
raped her. She told her mother: Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa akin na
ang utin ni Kuya Edwin ay ipinasok sa kiki ko. Jane also described
that after the intercourse and as the penis of the accused softened,
the latter would make it hard again and then inserted it again into
her vagina and this was made four (4) times. Janes testimony has all
the characteristics of truth and is entitled to great weight and
credence. The Court cannot believe that the very young victim is
capable of fabricating her story of defloration.
Accused-appellant contends in this appeal that the trial court
erred in: (a) not giving credence to his defense that at the supposed
time of the commission of the offense he was not yet residing in
Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and did not know the complainant nor
her family; (b) finding him guilty of rape considering that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (c) not
finding that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish with
particularity the date of commission of the offense; (d) giving great
weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant; and, (e)
failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of minority in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, assuming for the sake of
argument that indeed the crime of rape was committed. [10]
A careful study of the records sustains accused-appellants plea
that the verdict should have been one of acquittal.
Preliminarily, the crime was alleged in the Information to have
been committed "on or about the year 1992" thus -
That on or about the year 1992 at Abanico Road, Brgy. San Pedro,
Puerto Princesa City x x x x the said accused, with the use of force
and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned five (5)
years of age, minor, against her will and without her consent.
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly
violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the
time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the
actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More
importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[11]The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain
as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only
the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and
subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant
has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the
prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of
the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of
the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived
accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense
and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused-
appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year
indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he
supposedly committed the rape.
In United States v. Dichao,[12] decided by this Court as early as
1914, which may be applied by analogy in the instant case, the
Information alleged that the rape was committed "on or about and
during the interval between October 1910 and August 1912. This
Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on a demurrer filed by
the accused, holding that -
In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is
alleged to have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain that it
does not give the accused the information required by law. To allege
in an information that the accused committed rape on a certain girl
between October 1910 and August 1912, is too indefinite to give the
accused an opportunity to prepare for his defense, and that
indefiniteness is not cured by setting out the date when a child was
born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit
the allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to the
actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit,
and when that has been done any date may be proved which does not
surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It does not authorize
the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with
reference thereto as amounts to the same thing.
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining
witness testimony that militates heavily against its being accorded the
full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently,
the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of
conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to
the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they
exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed
judgment.
First, complainant had absolutely no recollection of the precise
date she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant. In her
testimony regarding the time of the commission of the offense she
declared -
Q: This sexual assault that you described when your Kuya Edwin
placed himself on top of you and had inserted his penis on
(sic) your private part, when if you could remember, was
(sic) this happened, that (sic) month?
A: I forgot, your Honor.
Q: Even the year you cannot remember?
A: I cannot recall.
 Q: But is there any incident that you can recall that may draw to a
conclusion that this happened in 1992 or thereafter?
A: None, your Honor.
Q: About the transfer of Edwin from Abanico to Wescom Road?
A: I dont know, your Honor (underscoring supplied).[13]
[14]
In People v. Clemente Ulpindo we rejected the complaining
witness testimony as inherently improbable for her failure to testify
on the date of the supposed rape which according to her she could not
remember, and acquitted the accused. We held in part -
While it may be conceded that a rape victim cannot be expected to
keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience, and while
Reginas answer that accused-appellant went on top of her, and that
she continuously shouted and cried for five (5) minutes may have
really meant that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her for
five (5) minutes despite her shouts and cries, what renders Reginas
story inherently improbable is that she could not remember the month
or year when the alleged rape occurred, and yet, she readily recalled
the incident when she was whipped by accused-appellant with a belt
that hit her vagina after she was caught stealing mangoes.
Certainly, time is not an essential ingredient or element of the
crime of rape. However, it assumes importance in the instant case
since it creates serious doubt on the commission of the rape or the
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The
Information states that the crime was committed "on or about the year
1992," and complainant testified during the trial that she was sexually
abused by accused-appellant in the latters house in Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City.[15] It appears however from the records that in 1992
accused-appellant was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, a
town different from Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and had never
been to Abanico at any time in 1992 nor was he familiar with the
complainant and her family. He only moved to Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City, in 1993.[16] It was therefore impossible for accused-
appellant to have committed the crime of rape in 1992 at his house in
Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, on the basis of the prosecution
evidence, as he was not yet residing in Abanico at that time and
neither did his family have a home there. The materiality of the date
cannot therefore be cursorily ignored since the accuracy and
truthfulness of complainants narration of events leading to the rape
practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.
The ruling of the trial court to the effect that it was not
physically impossible to be in Abanico from Liberty when the crime
charged against him was committed, is manifestly incongruous as it
is inapplicable. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that
Liberty and Abanico were not far from each other, both being within
the city limits of Puerto Princesa, and could be negotiated by tricycle
in less than thirty (30) minutes. [17] But whether or not it was
physically impossible for accused-appellant to travel all the way to
Abanico from Liberty to commit the crime is irrelevant under the
circumstances as narrated by complainant. Truly, it strains the
imagination how the crime could have been perpetrated in 1992 at the
Ladrillo residence in Abanico when, to repeat, accused-appellant did
not move to that place and take up residence there until 1993.
To complicate matters, we are even at a loss as to how the
prosecution came up with 1992 as the year of the commission of the
offense. It was never adequately explained nor the factual basis
thereofestablished. The prosecutor himself admitted in court that he
could not provide the specific date for the commission of the crime -
COURT: Wait a minute. (To witness) How many times did your
Kuya Edwin placed (sic) himself on top of you and inserted
(sic) his penis to (sic) your private organ?
A: Four (4) times, your Honor.
COURT: You demonstrate that with your fingers.
A: Like this, your Honor (witness raised her four (4) fingers).
COURT: Fiscal, did you charge the accused four (4) times?
PROS. FERNANDEZ: No, your Honor because we cannot
provide the dates (underscoring supplied).[18]
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in
the Information that accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992
manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as
alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a
conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of
evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place
indicated in the Information.
Second, neither did the testimony of Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the
medico-legal officer, help complainant's cause in any way. In his
medico-legal certificate, Dr. Aquino concluded on examination that
complaining witness' hymen was not intact. When asked by the trial
court what he meant by "non-intact hymen," Dr. Aquino explained
that it could be congenital, i.e., natural for a child to be born with a
"non-intact hymen."[19] However, he said, he could not distinguish
whether complainants "non-intact hymen" was congenital or the
result of a trauma.[20] When asked further by the public prosecutor
whether he noticed any healed wound or laceration in the hymen, Dr.
Aquino categorically answered: "I was not able to recognize (healed
wound), sir," and "I was not able to appreciate healed laceration,
sir."[21] The answers of Dr. Aquino to subsequent questions
propounded by the prosecutor were very uncertain and inconclusive.
To questions like, "Is she a virgin or not?" and "So you are now
saying that Jane Vasquez was actually raped?" the answers of Dr.
Aquino were, "I cannot tell for sure, your Honor." "That is a big
probability," and, "Very likely."
It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution likewise
failed to establish the medical basis for the alleged rape. The failure
of Dr. Aquino to make an unequivocal finding that complainant was
raped and that no healed wound or laceration was found on her
hymen seriously affects the veracity of the allegations of the
prosecution.
Third, from her testimony, complainant would have this Court
believe that while she was being raped accused-appellant was holding
her hand, covering her mouth and gripping his penis all at the same
time. Complainants narration is obviously untruthful. It defies the
ordinary experience of man. The rule is elementary that evidence to
be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself.
And fourth, complainant reported the alleged rape to her
mother only in 1994 or two (2) years after its occurrence. It hardly
conforms to human experience that a child like complainant could
actually keep to herself such a traumatic experience for a very long
time. Perhaps it would have been different if she were a little older
and already capable of exercising discretion, for then, concealment of
the rape committed against her would have been more readily
explained by the fact, as in this case, that she was probably trying to
avoid the embarrassment and disrepute to herself and her
family. Children, on the other hand, are naturally more spontaneous
and candid, and usually lack the same discretion and sensibility of
older victims of the same offense. Thus, the fact that complainant,
who was only five (5) years old when the supposed rape happened,
concealed her defilement to her mother for two (2) years seriously
impairs her credibility and the authenticity of her story.
We are not unmindful of the fact that a child of tender years,
like complaining witness herein, could be so timid and ignorant that
she could not narrate her ordeal accurately. But the mind cannot rest
easy if this case is resolved against accused-appellant on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution which, as already discussed, is
characterized by glaring inconsistencies, missing links and loose ends
that refuse to tie up. The rule that this Court should refrain from
disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, does not apply where, as in the instant case, the trial court
overlooked certain facts of substance or value which if considered
would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision
is based on misapprehension of facts.
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions
to it are categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for her
in publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without
those proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency
to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally
bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.[22]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of RTC-Br. 47, Palawan
and Puerto Princesa City, is REVERSED. Accused-appellant EDWIN
LADRILLO is ACQUITTED of rape based on insufficiency of
evidence and reasonable doubt. Consequently, his immediate release
from confinement is ORDERED unless he is otherwise detained for
any other lawful or valid cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once
look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused
may really have no other defenses but denial and alibi which, if
established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor,
especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak.

Let it be made clear, however, that this opinion does not

necessarily signify acceptance of accused-appellants version of the
incident. If complainant was indeed sexually abused, this view should
not be considered a condonation of what was done, as it was indeed
reprehensible. This only indicates that reasonable doubt has been
created as to accused-appellants guilt. Consequently, under the
prevailing judicial norm, accused-appellant is entitled to acquittal. To
reiterate, there is in his favor the constitutional presumption of
innocence, which has not been sufficiently dented.