A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own.

I
n 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Laho
m commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred,
that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused t
o use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and acti
vities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into ef
fect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a de
cree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack
of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999
to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. Wh
en Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifical
ly R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wh
erein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disi
nherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Sectio
n 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or no
t the adopter s action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of t
he commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light o
f the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was mon
ths after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the de
cree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and
repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to re
scind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having bee
n initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursu
ed.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and th
at the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the laps
e of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a co
ndition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to pr
otection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a pres
ent interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The
concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and na
tural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has of
ten been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privil
ege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for
the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, includ
ing the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, a
re subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a stat
ute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can alway
s for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testamen
t, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of hi
s estate.