Descartes on Persons

Daniel Holbrook

Descartes has a two-fold answer to the question, 'What is aperson?' The main point
is that being a thinking thing is both necessary and sufficient for personhood. But most,
if not al1, of the persons welrnow are embodied. Descartes's account of persons-in-the-
world (as I shall ca11 them) is that a person is a union of two distinct substances: one that
thinks (mind), and one that takes up space (body). Personal identity, in his view, is
essentially tied to the mind and only accidentally related to the body.
The order of Descartes's argument is that first the mind and body are shown to be
distinct and separate substances. Later, he explains how they are joined and interact. He
uses a thought experiment to demonstrate that mind and body are separate substances.
Each can be conceived clearly and distinctly as being complete entities capable ofexisting
independently of one another. I can imagine my mind thinking on its own and I can
imagine my body existing without amind. How can mind and body, two wholly different
kinds ofthings, interact in such an orderly manner? It is like fire and water. Descartes relies
upon theology to answer this question. Beyond creating mental substance and physica1
substance, there is a third kind ~f creation. According to Descartes, God creates a union
between these substances; a union that describes persons-in-the-world.
Descartes offers the Argument from Doubt for the conclusion that he is essentially a
thinking thing. Given any other candidate for being essential to hirn except thinking, he
can doubt that it makes up his essence. Essence is not grounded in the body because I can
imagine that I exist without my body; but is inconceivable that lexist without being a
thinking thing, since being a thinking thing is prerequisite to the possibility of doubting
itself. 1 The psychological fact that doubting occurs guarantees that some thinking thing
exists that is doing the doubting, undoubtedly ~.
According to an interpretation offered by Anthony Kenny, the Argument from Doubt
relies upon the principle of the indiscernability ofidentica1s applied in a modal context.
Descartes is not his body because he can doubt whether his body exists, but he cannot
doubt whether he exists. Hence, he and his body differ in that he lacks the capacity of
dubitablity and his body has that property. Therefore, by Leibniz's Law, he must not be
identica1 to his body. Kenny compares Descartes's argument to something like this: 2
PI: I can doubt if the King ofNaples exists
P2: I cannot doubt if I exist
C: I am not the King ofNaples,
which is clearly an invalid argument form, for it might have true premises and a false
conclusion. You might have inherited the tide without knowing it. Michael Hooker offers
an amended version ofKenny's interpretation such that Descartes's error is seen as being

9
10 Daniel Holbrook

founded on a confusion of de dicto and de remodalities. What can (or cannot) be doubted
is held by Hooker to be irrelevant to what really does (or does not) exist. He compares
Descartes's argument to something like this: 3
PI: I can doubt iflohn is a father
P2: I cannot doubt ifTom's father is a father
C: lohn is not Tom's father,
which is another invalid argument form.
It is interesting to see if the Argument from Doubt can stand on its own without
refe rence to questionable metaphysical principles for, ifsuccessful, the argument is sound
whether or not the principles are welI-founded. However, Kenny and Hooker show us
that, in its barest form, the Argument from Doubt is invalid. The argument for thinking
being the essence ofthe person is not merely an instance ofthe more general indiscernability
of identicals schema; nor is it the work of a philosopher unaware of the de dictolde re
distinction. There is no assumed premise containing the principle of the indiscernability
ofidenticals in the argument in the Second Meditation because, as I will show, Descartes
relies on deeper metaphysical assumptions. There is no dedictolde redistinction of the kind
Hooker employs in Descartes's philosophy. If God is a perfect being, then anything
represented by a well-formed thought that occurs to hirn can also be created by hirn.
Assuming that our thinking is alike, if we can entertain a well-formed thotight that
represents something, then God could also think that thought, and thus that thing might
possiblyexist. 4
Notice how inappropriate are the counterpart premises chosen by Kenny and Hooker.
In the case ofKenny, the doubting ifI am a body is replaced with the doubting ifI am the
King ofNaples. First, the point ofDescartes's argument is to uncover what is essentially
true about hirnself. The conclusion is not that he is without the attribute ofhaving a body.
In fact he does have a body, as I williater discuss. The relevant conclusion is that his body
is not his essential identifying characteristic. Therefore, Kenny's conclusion should read:
'I am not essentially the KingofNaples,' which suddenly renders the interpretation useless
to his purpose. Descartes never suggests that it follows from the fact that he gn doubt that
he is without a body that he is without a body. Rather, he claims that it follows from the
fact that he 9!l!1Q! doubt that he is not a mind to the conclusion that being a thinking thing
is an essential characteristic. Equally inappropriate is Hooker's counterpart premise, 'I
cannot doubt ifTom's father is afather' which is also disanalogous to Descartes's "I cannot
doubt if lexist." Hooker's premise is analytic and trivial. Descartes's is synthetic and
important. Also, the important point ofknowing that the subject ideas are well-formed,
clear and distinct is missing. I can doubt that]ohn is a father only ifI am unaware of the
relationship between lohn and Tom. It is only from the ignorance of the situation that the
parallel argument gains its force. In Descartes's argument, all the relevant facts are in focus.
Still, the Argument from Doubt, interpreted independent from underlying metaphysical
assumptions is invalid.
The cogito is supposed to be the proposition known to be true with the greatest
certainty, and yet, I find that to generate a valid argumentwith the cogitoas its conclusion,
Descartes must rely on two (what I find to be questionable) metaphysical assumptions.
 Descartes on Persons 11

I will call them the Substance-Attribute principle and the Unique Defining Attribute
principle.
Substance-Attribyte (S-A) principle; Ifthere exits x such that x=an attribute then there
exists S such that S=a substance in which x is grounded.
UniQue Defining Attribute (UPA) principle; If there exists S such that S=a substance
then there exists U such that U and only U uniquely defines the essence of S.
A problem for Descartes is that the veracity of these two principles can be doubted
through the evil genius argument. Every other basic metaphysica1 assumption that is based
on reason (even basic mathematical truths) is called into question by this argument, so it
seems that skepticism ought to apply equally to these two principles. I shall argue that the
validity of the cogito as the least dubitable proposition is undermined by the skepticism
generated by the evil genius, and thus, the role of the cogito as the most foundational
proposition is not as solid as Descartes would have us believe.
The Argument from Doubt begins with a commitment to phenomenal realism.
During the course of his philosophica1 doubts, Descartes doubts many things, but he
cannot come to doubt the reality ofhis own psychologica1 states. Whether or not the world
exists, or God exists, Descartes is certain thati.t~ that he sees colors and shapes floating
about in a world before him. s From this phenomenal realism, when coupled with the S-
A principle, the cogito soon follows. Psychologica1 states include modes; colors, shapes,
loud and soft noises, for example. Their existence implies the existence of a substance in
which they inhere, given the S-A principle. 6 Descartes finds his personal identity as being
the thinking substance in whjch these psychological states inhere. He thinks and,
therefore, he exists.
Since Descartes defines substance as being that which has the capacity to exist
independently ofany other thing and since he envisions God as being the creator ofall the
world, then, strictly speaking, on this view, only God exists as substance. He alone is an
uncreated and independently existing infinite thinking substance. Within the world, there
are two fundamental kinds of"created" substances that only need God's concurrence to
exist; minds (finite thinking substances) and the physical world (finite bodies that, taken
together, are infinite)? Apart from minds, being the substance in which thinking inheres,
and bodies, which are extended (takes up space), all else exists as attributes of these two
kinds of substances. The only exception to this rule is the union of mind and body that
describes persons-in-the-world and explains mind-body interaction. In this philosophy,
allother properties exist as properties 2fsome substance. The property ofbeing cubic only
exists as the shape of some finite particular corporeal substance. The property of loving
only exists as the psychological state of some thinking substance. Descartes offers no
argument for this ontology ofsubstance and attribute other than 'it is very manifest by the
natural light which is in our souls. '8
Another basic assumption is that each substance has a unique defining attribute that
determines its essence and that no other substance shares this attribute as its unique
defining attribute. With thinking substance, the unique defining attribute is thought and
with corporeal substance the unique defining attribute is extension. 9 Descartes defines
essence as 'nothingwithoutwhich a thing can still exist... '.lO and to take away my existence
12 Daniel Holbrook

as a thinking thing is to cause me to cease to exist. The nature ofthe psychological states
of a person is essential to the identity of that person, because ifseparated from the person,
the identity of the person is also destroyed. ll I can focus on the idea I have of myself and
one-by-one separate the various attributes that are constituents ofthat idea. It is still 1when
my arm, even my head, is separated from my idea of myself. I can separate a particular
action from all the other actions I have done. I can separate calling my mother on her
birthday from my other actions. It is still 1 that remains. But ifl separate my existence as
the subject of my psychological states, then my personal identity is destroyed. In
Descartes's philosophy, if I lose my mind and become an automaton, a machine of flesh
and blood, then that body walking about would not be~. Thus, Descartes concludes
that, essentially, he is a thinking thing, and that no other attribute (having a body, for
example) contributes to his essence.
With reference to these underlying metaphysical assumptions, Descartes's argument
becomes valid:
(1) My thinking (rn) exists (phenomenal realism assumption).
(2) t m is an attribute (assumption).
(3) If there exists x such that x=an attribute then there exists S such that S=a substance
in which x is grounded (S-A principle).
(4) There exists SI such that SI is a substance in which rrn is grounded (from (2) & (3.
(5) lama substance, not an attribute or combination of attributes (assumption).
(6) If there exists S such that S=a substance then there exists U such that U and only U
uniquely defines the essence of S (UDA principle).
(7) t m and only rn is essential to my personal identity (established through the thought
experiment discussed in the preceding paragraph).
(8) t m is the UDA ofS I (6 & 7).
(9)1 am SI.
In Objection 11, Father Mersenne grants that Descartes knows that he is a being that
thinks, but asks how does Descart~ know it is not his body doing the thinking?12 In Reply
11, Descartes again reiterates the argument given in the Second Meditation. It is not just
that it is inconceivable that existence goes on without one's mind, while it is conceivable
that existence goes on without one's body. The key point is that this distinction is based
on a clear and distinct conception of mind and body.13 Central to the thesis that the mind
is known to be distinct from the body is the notion ofcompleteness as applied to our ideas
of mind and body when conceived clearly and distincdy. When Descartes focuses upon
the idea ofhis mind and the idea ofhis body, it is necessary that each idea be complete in
order to justify the conclusion that they are separate}4 If the ideas ofour mind and body
are incomplete, then we are ignorant of that area ofincompleteness. Ignorance allows the
possibility of there being common features ofour ideas of mind and body ofwhich we are
unaware. The completeness of our conception of mind and body ensures the mutual
exclusivi ty ofmind and matter. Descartes claims that his idea ofhis own mind and his idea
of his body are complete in the relevant sense. Not that he needs to know of every detail
of their complex natures, but he knows enough of them that he sees that each fills their
appropriate and independent conceptual space. Figuratively, there is no room for other
 Descartes on Persons 13

minds or bodies within the conceptual space occupied by my mind. The possibilities for
its thoughts spread infinitely in every direction. Likewise, there is no room for other
systems ofextension within the physical world. It is a complete system, and so my idea of
my body is complete because that idea is of a body in that complete system.
Secondly, as shown in the above argument schema, my thinking (and only my
thinking) is essential to my personal identity, and my personal identity must be grounded
in some substance or the other. Descartes has already determined that extension is the
UDA ofphysical substances like my body. By the UDA principle, my body can only have
one attribute that defines its essence, and therefore, my thinking cannot be defining the
essence of my body, and therefore, this thinking must be an attribute of some other
substance.
In Descartes's philosophy there is a distinction to be made between the essential quality
of personal identity (the thinking substance of the person) and the nature of humans as
persons-in-the-world. A person-in-the-world, on this view, is Il2I simply a particular
thinking substance, although this is the essential feature ofone's personal identity, but as
we know them here on Earth, each person is a union of mind and body.
If mind and body are distinct substances then we might assume that persons-in-the-
world consist of the unhappy marriage of one mind and one body (they say opposites
attract one another). But that is not Descartes's philosophy. He emphasizes persons-in-
the-world as being the.wllim. ofthese two substances. 15 The union ofmind and body is not
a mere collection ofone mind and one body. T ogether, the mind and body form a synthesis
that is different from mind and,body disjoined. Persons-in-the-world are not analyzable
into the two potential components, mind and body. Its logical behavior is not replaceable
with the logical conjunction (mind, body). Persons as this metaphysical union is a
primitive notion; other primitive notions mentioned by Descartes are being, number,
duration, extension, and thought. 16 Mind, body, and persons-in-the-world are three
different kinds of primitive notions. Mind is the kind that can be known completely by
pure intellect. Body is best known by the intellect aided by imagination. The cogito is
known by the pure intellect. Knowledge ofextension is gained through analytic geometry
which aids the pure intellect to understand abstract truths with the aid ofimagination. The
union ofbody and soul is of a third kind of primitive notion. It is the kind of thing that
can be known through sensation. Body can only be obscurely understood by the pure
intellect, and in a like manner the union ofbody and soul can only be obscurely known
by either the pure intellector imagination. 17 The union ofbody and soul is known through
sensation. His is not a 'ghost in a machine' theory of persons. Our everyday experience
shows us that mind and body are integrated in a thoroughgoing manner.
Going a little deeper, in the DiscourseQ!! Method, Descartes reveals a commitment to
our ability to know basic truths as long as we carefully attend to the limits ofour faculties. 18
We can know ourselves. Through reflection, Descartes finds that his thinking is the unique
attribute that defines his essence. One is not able to discover and clearly understand one's
genetic code, one's project, or even one's physical presence as defined by the continuity
principle (nearest resemblance to myself in the previous moment) over time and change.
If we share in Descartes's optimism, then we have established a basic criterion for
14 Daniel Holbrook

personhood - one's existence as a thinking thing. Ifwe disregard the UDA principle then
we have established ~ necessary condition for personhood. It seems that other condi-
tions must also be met. Mary Anne Warren writes that other trairs that are central to the
concept of personhood are self-motivated activity and the capacity to communicate. 19
With Descartes's single criterion, there might be possible worlds in which mental
substances exist and contemplate, but feel nothing, do nothing, and are unable to
communicate with one another. I would hesitate to say that such entities were persons.

Washington State University

Notes

Med. 11, HR I, pp. 152 and Med. VI, H& I, pp. 190, All references to Descanes's writings will be either~
Philosophical Works ofDescanes (in (Wo volumes), trans. Haldane and Ross (Cambridge University Press,
1931), abbreviated as HR, or Descanes Philosophical Letters, translated by Anthony Kenny (Clarendon
Press, Oxford; 1970), abbreviated as ~.

Descanes, by Anthony Kenny (Random House: New York; 1968); 79-80.

'Descanes's Denial ofMind-Body Iden tity' , by Michael Hooker in Descanes, ed. by Hooker Ooh ns Hopkins
University Press; 1978); 171-174.

Med. VI, H.R I, pp. 190.

Med. 11, HR I 150-153.

For a discussion of Descarres' substance-mode ontology see From Descarres to Hume. by Louis Loeb
(Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 90-91 (abbreviated as~. Donald Sieven concurs that the validity
of the cogito argument depends on the assumption that a substance ex.ists in which thoughts inhere. See his
"Sellars and Descanes on the Fundamental Form of the Mental" in Philosophical Studies 37 (1980) 251-
257.

Principles ofPhilosophy I, LI-LN, HR I 239-241 and L2.cl2 pp. 95-97.

Principles of Philosophy I, XI, HR 1, pp. 223.

Principles of Philosophy I, LIII, H I, pp. 240.

10 Reply IV, HR 11, pp. 97.

11 Med. 11, HR I, pp.151-152.

12 Objection 11, HE II, pp. 25.

13 HR 11, p. 32.

14 Reply IV, HE. 11, pp. 97-99.

15 Reply IV, H II, p. 102, Loeb, pp. 139-140.

16 ~pp.138.

17 Letters, pp. 140-141.

18 Discourse on the Method, H I, pp. 81-81.

19 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abonion', in ~M211ill. Vol57 (1973), reprinted in IlKR.igluIhing
!Q QQ, ]ames Rachels, ed. (Random House, New York; 1989); 123-132.