Topic: Administrative Due Process

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following

cardinal principles:

(1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones
case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration
of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted
the views of a subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.

Topic: Due Process in Disciplinary Actions Against Students

Guzman vs. NU (G.R. No. L-68288)

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of

respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were
denied due process due to the fact that they were active participants in peaceful mass
actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for
the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not
because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as
regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading
boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of
properties of respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and
are not of good scholastic standing.

Issue:

WON the petitioners were denied due process.

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is

the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether

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or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion
and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and
defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for
damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from
re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any
duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-
enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that no penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the manual and/or
in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due
investigation shall have been conducted.

There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE
PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS.

Topic: Res Ipsa Locquitor Doctrine

Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," a doctrine of law that one is presumed to be
negligent if he/she/it had exclusive control of whatever caused the injury even though
there is no specific evidence of an act of negligence, and without negligence the
accident would not have happened. Examples: a) a load of bricks on the roof of a
building being constructed by Highrise Construction Co. falls and injures Paul
Pedestrian below, and Highrise is liable for Pedestrian's injury even though no one saw
the load fall. b) While under anesthetic, Isabel Patient's nerve in her arm is damaged
although it was not part of the surgical procedure, and she is unaware of which of a
dozen medical people in the room caused the damage. Under res ipsa loquitur all
those connected with the operation are liable for negligence. Lawyers often shorten
the doctrine to "res ips," and find it a handy shorthand for a complex doctrine.

In re LAURETA

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IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-
ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL. (G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987)

Facts:

Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of
her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims
that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 st
Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial
ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case
is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press
conference.

Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first
division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty.
Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-
resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad
Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez
was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually
inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with
more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty
of justice.

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanod bayan,
charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap
and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in
rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He
circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court,
nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with
graft and corruption. The Tanod bayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is
charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication,
and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue:

WON privacy of communication was violated

Held:

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.

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There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the
premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.

We are not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor
with the complaint filed with the tanod bayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging
remarks such as undue influence, powerful influence in his pleadings. This was
bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the
newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the
radio.

Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.SC resolutions are

beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of
separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other
branches of government.

Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found
guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until
further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division,

speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of
the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government
are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

Topic: Due Process in Rule Making by Admin. Agencies

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education, Culture and

Sports (G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987)

Facts:

The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and
through respondent Secretary issued Dep Order No. 37, a modification of a previous
Department Order, authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner
opposed and alleged in a petition that said order was issued without any legal basis
arguing that authority of DECS to regulate school fees does not always include the
power to increase the same.

Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power
to regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70 of the same act grants the DECS the
power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties
under the law.
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The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees
is urgent and necessary.

Issue:

WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation
of legislative power.

Held:

Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system
includes the power to prescribe school fees. In the absence of a statue stating
otherwise, this power include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government
agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power
should be considered lodged with the DECS.

Topic: Due Process in the Dismissal of Employees

The procedural requirements, as summarized by the Supreme Court, are:

(A) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. Reasonable opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to
prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least
five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity
to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data
and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention
which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art.
282 is being charged against the employees.

(B) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a
hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1)
explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in
support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance
to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of
their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(C) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all

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circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and
(2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

MGG Marine Services vs NLRC

MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC tersely described the mechanics of what may be
considered a two-part due process requirement which includes the two-notice rule, x
x x one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein his acts or omissions complained
against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an opportunity to answer and
rebut the charges against him, in between such notices.

Topic: Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to a claim for violation of right to due
process

Topic: Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

Tatad vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with
the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of
Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of
the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then
Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet.

On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April
1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security
Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt
practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by
the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June
12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019
for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation
of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for
the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three
(3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar
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years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that
the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held:

YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling
out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-
day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him
from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed
by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar.

Topic: the equal protection clause

People vs Cayat

Facts:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by
the justice of the peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3)

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of
a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and
ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it
shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or
any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any
such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not
exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six
months, in the discretion of the court.

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At the trial, cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the
January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did receive,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A
gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of Act No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced
in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him,

The case was appealed and the accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on
the following ground:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

Issue:

WON the Act violates the equal protection of the laws

WON the Act violates due process of law

WON it is an invalid exercise of police power

Held:

The Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings
of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to
civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood
and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal

protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.

"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities."

The Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian
tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached

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a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to
the passage of this Act.

It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has
been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose,
that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government
to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or
other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any
prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-
Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. To
constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials
in applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the government (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation (3) that
it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed and (4)
that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. Thus, a
person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without
judicial hearing or property used in violation of law may be confiscated or when the
property constitutes corpus delicti.

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been
said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self protection
and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the
health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the
industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a
legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as
to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non
Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth
and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their
Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino
people with a view to a greater Philippines.

Judgment is affirmed.

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Topic: the search and seizure provision: section 2, Article III

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Topic: rational and essentials of a valid warrant / substantive and procedural

requirements

Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines et. al. vs judge maximiano

asuncion, et al

FACTS:

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating:

1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at

PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to
be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the premises described;

2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions
to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant.

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid
and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial
court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash
and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.

On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners
motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:

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The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is
invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and
the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for
the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were
not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was
not described with particularity.

20th century fox film corporate vs CA et al

FACTS

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy
campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of
PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the
video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired
search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video
outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.

Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the
seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?

RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and
resolution of the CA.]

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as
witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge
of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the
offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was

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also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the
confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from
master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring
that the testimony of petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the
effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial

similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere
allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.

Uy vs BIR

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy
Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned
cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal
Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search
warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was
issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated
Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A
third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied
by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search
was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the
warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The
CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD:

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The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized
items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant
issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform
strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions.
These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been
inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the
said warrants.

Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic
itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One
warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC
however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter
warrant as it has revoked the two others.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

Pendon vs CA

Facts:

Based on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued against
Siao and the same complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for the search warrant and the
joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the
Constitution on the ground that probable cause was not personally determined.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid.

Held:

Page 13
No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce before the issuance
of a search warrant.

Silva vs Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Negros Oriental

Judge Ontal of RTC Dumaguete City issued Seacrh Warrant no. 1, granting the
application for search warrant by the chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in the same
city.

Pursuant to the search warrant then issued, the presiding judge ordered the search of
Marlon Silvas room in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for an alleged violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

The warrant said that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of
Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be
committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's
Room, to be done at any time of the day.

They also seized money belonging to one ANtonieta Silva amounting to P1,231.40.

Petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant for a) it was issued on the sole
basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of
Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and b) the judge
failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions
and answers. Respondent judge denied their motion to quash.

Issue/s:

1. WON officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when
they seized the money of Antonieta Silva YES

2. WON the issuance complied with the requsites for the issuance of a search warrant -
NO

Ratio:

Search Warrant No. 1 nullified.

Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to
personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Said provision is against unlawful search and seizure, protecting the privacy and
security of the person and property. It also prevents unlawful invasion of sanctity of
the home by law officers.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant. Both the constitutional mandate and the staturory
provision provide that the judge must have determined whether there is

Page 14
probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses the
complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers. The
judge failed to do this, and in fact, asked just four questions which are merely
routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the
witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

Antonieta was not even name respondent, and the items specifically indicated to be
searched do not include money.

Search warrant was issued for seizure of personal effects of subject of the offense
and used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT
for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense.

Kho vs Makalintal (G.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999)

Facts:

Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects seized by
virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to
return immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and explosives,
radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles
and motorcycle.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and
investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the
application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in
the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating
the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

Issue:

Whether petitioners contention of the absence of probable cause in the given

situation is tenable.

Held:

Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted
the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being
carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare
parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he
personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990,
pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from
motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified
that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and
brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there
inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is

Page 15
therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was
based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.

In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the
question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be
determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v.
Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large
extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and
conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and
witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies
and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create
a probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants
and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and
their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they
conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that
respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal
examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting
the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

People vs CA 291 scra 400

FACTS

A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which
quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any
purpose the items seized under the warrant.

An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar
Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at
Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store
resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different
explosives and firearms.

ISSUE:

WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private
respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

HELD:

Page 16
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the
Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers'

own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution
which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place
to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself;
it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

Burgos vs Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984)

Facts:

Petitioners question the issuance of the two search warrants on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to have been used in
subversive activities.

It is contended by petitioners that the documents necessitating the issuance of the

subject warrants could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable
cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. x x x and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Page 17
Issue:

Whether the warrants were validly issued

Held:

No. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity
the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadillas
application that petitioner is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended x x x is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars
as would justify a rinding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are
continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.

In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be

determined by the judge, x x x after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance,
this Court ruled that the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. As couched,
the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets
the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.

Page 18
Topic: Probable cause

De los santos vs montesa

In the suit for desahucio initiated below by herein private respondent against
petitioners, the court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in question, to pay
P5,000.00 per year as reasonable rental from 1985 until possession is surrendered,
and to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit (pp. 37-38, Rollo).
Upon appeal, Branch XIX of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region
stationed in Malolos and presided over by herein respondent judge, granted private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal an account of petitioners' failure to
post a supersedeas bond(p. 21, Rollo). To set aside the proceedings below, the petition
at hand was instituted anchored on the supposition that petitioners were deprived of
their day in court. Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who
supposedly owns Lot 39 of the Cadastral survey of Bustos with an area of 5,358 square
meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7924 a portion of which petitioners
entered and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction.
Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was
unable to locate Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos,
Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer, judgment was
rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure (pp. 2-3, Decision; pp. 37-38,
Rollo). Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal
thesis that they were never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay
level, as well as the summons. They insist that private respondent was referring to a
different piece of realty because petitioners actually occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by
Nicolas delos Santos under Original Certificate of Title No. F-10418. Moreover,
petitioners advanced the proposition that Dolores' husband should have been
impleaded. All of these arguments were to no avail. As indicated earlier, execution
pending appeal was ordered due to petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond. To
stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on
April 28, 1986 directed against the reviewing authority and private respondent until
further orders (p. 52, Rollo). At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued
by petitioners could elicit a favorable response from us in as much as the proof of
service of the summons upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal
service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service. Even then, and
assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have
not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting
service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioner's counsel moved to re-
examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede
immediate execution (Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., 148 SCRA 541 [1987]; 1 Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed.,p. 136). Indeed, such demeanor is
tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the
purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of
appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons,
absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to
protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant (Carballo vs.
Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746

Page 19
[1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473; Sison, et al.
vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p.
467). Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the
unfavorable disposition as a special appearance founded on the sole challenge on
invalid service of summons since the application therefor raised another ground on
failure to state a cause of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level
were allegedly bypassed, nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G.
3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152). The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a
parcel of land other than the realty claimed by private respondent deserves scant
consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is proscribed by the
second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel
for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the
grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully on a question of law" (p. 32,
Rollo) is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the
truth or falsehood of such factual premise (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4,
Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). Petitioners argue next
that execution pending appeal was ordered without any prior notice to them (p.3,
Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of substance since it erroneously
suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the immediate
enforcement of the appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing party moving for
execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who
is obliged to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on the
face of the subject motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs.
Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1977 Ed., p.
288). In fine, petitioners may not press the idea that they were deprived of their day in
court amidst the implicit forms of waiver performed by their lawyer in submitting
every conceivable defense for petitioners via the two motions for reconsideration
below. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
restraining order issued on April 28, 1986 LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin,
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Lim vs Felix (G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991)

Facts:

At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another
security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although,
he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A.
Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest
of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.

Page 20
The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the
case. A petition to transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against
the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:

In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the
offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty
thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly
filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering
that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have
declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and
substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper
to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information xxx

Issue:

Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on
the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held:

No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires x
x x probable cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x, not by any other
officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all
the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The
Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of

Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by
the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he
had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the
petitioners motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists
is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Soliven vs Makasiar

Page 21
FACTS:

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his
contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts
jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering
the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.

HELD:

No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Topic: General or Roving warrants

Stonehill vs diokno

Facts:

Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners

personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including

Page 22
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and
other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were
constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted
the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus,
illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did
not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement
is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.

b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a

fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.

c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those
taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated
as personality different from that of the corporation.

Topic: scatter shot warrant

Topic: issuing court

Topic: implementation of warrant: witneses

Topic: warrantless search

Topic: warrantless search: motor vehicle

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221 , January 15, 2002)

FACTS:

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay
in Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle.
Page 23
With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police
Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in
the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and
the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

RULING:

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under
Section 2, Article III.

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is

not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.

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