CONSTI 2 Reviewer Midterms

[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - REVIEWER] [EDUARDO]
DUE PROCESS
Sec 1, Art. III: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of law.
Due process: furnishes a standard so that the deprivation of life, liberty, or property would be valid. The guaranty of due
process demands only that the law is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and the means shall have a real and
substantive relation to the subject sought to be attained.
Life: right to a good life; right of an individual to his body, in its completeness, free from dismemberment
Liberty: right to exist; right to be free from any arbitrary restraint
Property: anything that come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract
Factors to consider when previous judicial hearing may be omitted:

1. Nature of the property
2. Urgency of the need to protect the public welfare from a clear and present danger
Two kinds of due process:

1. Procedural due process: deals chiefly on the method or manner by which a law is enforced
2. Substantive due process: prohibition of the State against arbitrary laws
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Civil Proceedings: (IJOJ)

1. Impartial Court clothed with judicial power
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
Note: Notice is essential so that the Court may acquire jurisdiction
3. Defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard
Satisfied as long as the defendant is given the opportunity to be heard
Right to appeal is not a natural right
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing and must clearly explain its factual and legal bases
In Administrative Proceedings (Ang Tibay Rules) (NAPCTEST)

1. Notice - know what charge you are accused of
2. Answer in writing
3. Present evidence (both)
4. Cross-examine/challenge witnesses/evidence
5. Tribunal must consider evidence
6. Decision based on the evidence/law
7. Substantial evidence
8. Tribunal is impartial
In Criminal Proceedings
In Academic Disciplinary Proceedings: (IAEACP)

1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and the causes of any accusation against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
6. The penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
- Lawful purpose: interests of the public in general, as distinguished form those of a particular class, requires the
interference of the State
- Lawful means: means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the lawful purpose and not duly
oppressive
Requisites: Due process of law means simply that (LREA)

there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of Congress
reasonable in its operation
enforced according to the regular rules of procedure
applicable alike to all citizens or to all of a class
Expanded test of Substantive Due Process according to Ichiong v. Hernandez:

Is there public interest, public purpose, public welfare involved?
Is the act reasonably necessary for accomplishment of legislatures purpose, is it not unreasonable, arbitrary,
or oppressive?
Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the manner involved; or has there been capricious
use of legislative power?
Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely and unjustified interference?
Hierarchy of Rights:
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for
the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider (Ermita-Malate).
Vagueness and Uncertainty:

What makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application (Ermita-Malate).
A criminal statute is void for uncertainty when the language does not sufficiently convey definite warning at to
the proscribed conduct.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
1. Rational Basis Test: there is an evil at hand for correction and the particular legislatie measure was a rational way
to correct it.
economic, property, commercial legislation
Presumption: Constitutional -> Burden is on the one who challenges it
Requirements:
Is there a valid government purpose?
Is there a reasonable connection between the legislation and the legislative purpose?
2. Strictest Scrutiny: test is triggered when a fundamental constitutional right is limited by a law
Freedom of the mind, restriction on political process, fundamental rights (freedom of expression, speech,
suffrage)
Presumption: unconstitutional
Requirements:
Interest of the public generally, as opposed to a class
Means must be reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose and is not duly
oppressive of private rights
No other alternative less intrusive of private rights
Reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
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Cases under Due Process:
YNOT V. IAC (INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER):

It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by
those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. A
judgment based on less than this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted
with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Invalid exercise of the police power:
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers.
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these
minimum guarantees of due process: the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.
CORONA V. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process.
Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing.
The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process.
Their license, having been acquired through rigid series of examinations on the expectation that they will be able to
practice the profession until they will have retired should they pass the exams, makes it a vested right.
TAADA V. TUVERA
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. If the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence.
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The term "laws" refer not only to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank
Act; but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only
NUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows
that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private
citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal protection
clauses must give way to a specific provision.
Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to
the protection of his liberty? NO. This Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition
for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In that
sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence
required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied.
In criminal proceedings, due process is satisfied if the accused is informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after
full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of
course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction.
ANG TIBAY V. CIR: Cardinal Rules (supra)
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety
of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has
taken, which of course may take several years.
The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well
as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capital costs and operating expenses and to
increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort,
by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
NON V. DAMES
The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions.
This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school
officials to discipline them.
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there is such denial
when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and
peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of due
process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic
language against school authorities during a student rally.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts
to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not shed their
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constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the
authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as
to be violative of constitutional safeguards.
Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students Rights. The academic freedom enjoyed by
institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what
circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that
standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who
exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being
disregarded.
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection means that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike under the same circumstances and
conditions, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Requisites for valid classification:

It must rest on substantial distinctions which make real differences
It must be germane to the purpose of the law
It must not be limited to existing conditions only
It must apply equally to all members of the same class
In equal protection, valid classification depends on valid purpose -- the classification must be intimately related to the
purpose such that the latter cannot be achieved without the former.
The equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not unreasonable.
Analytical framework for equal protection: The Court has adopted three standards for government intervention under
the due process and the equal protection grounds:
Rational Basis is applied to legislative classifications in general. The classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose.
Indeterminate Scrutiny test is applied to classifications based on quasi-suspect classeslike gender or
legitimacy. The classification must be substantially related to an important legislative purpose.
Strictest Scrutiny test applies to classifications affecting fundamental rights or suspect classes. The burden is
upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Suspect classes: classification that violates a fundamental right, or prejudices a person accorded special
protection by the Constitution
Usually applied to cases involving classifications based on race, national origin, religion, alienage, denial
of the right to vote, migration, access to courts, and other rights recognized as fundamental.
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Cases under Equal Protection: (Not done, just know the requisites LOL)
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. BSP
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. VS. PRADO

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but
still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). What the clause
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the
national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed
legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Sec. 2, Art. III: The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects (PHPE) against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of any complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision includes the protection of:

The sanctity and privacy of a person himself
Inviolability of a persons home and his possessions
Nature: Personal
Can be invoked only by the person whose right was violated
Can be waived expressly or impliedly only by the person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly
authorized to effect such waiver
Purpose of search and seizure is to gather evidence (instruments, subject, proceeds) for a crime already committed.
Unreasonable if there is no valid search warrant or warrant of arrest authorizing it.
Search warrant defined: A search warrant is an order issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge, ordering a peace officer to search for personal property and bring it to court.
Rule 126, Sec. 4: A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Requisites of a Valid Warrant: (CaDetFaDe)

Probable Cause: such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
Personal Determination of a judge based on oath or affirmation of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce: But the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor
can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report
and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts they are testifying to.
Particular description of the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized
General rule: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority.
Must indicate the particular place to be searched and person or thing to be seized
EXCEPT: if the nature of the goods to be seized cannot be determined.
A John Doe search warrant is valid.
Search warrant is valid despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched.
What Can be Searched and Seized:

Subject of the offense
Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense
Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Valid Warrantless Search:

General rule: Probable cause is required.
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The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted. In these cases, probable cause (warrantless searches) must be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. (People v. Aruta)
Warrantless Searches Recognized by Jurisprudence:
1. Search incident to a lawful arrest: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. [Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of
Court]
As an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search
warrant.
Test for validity:
Item to be searched was within the arresters custody
Search was contemporaneous with the arrest
2. Plain view doctrine: Things seized are within plain view of the searching party
Requisites for validity:
The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area
The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent.
It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure.
Instances were Plain view apply:
A hot-pursuit
A search-incident
A valid arrest
A valid search
That the police officers were there for some other legitimate purpose and see the objects in plain-view.
IMPORTANT: it must be immediately apparent that the object is connected to the crime. Where the seized
object is inside a closed package, the object is not in plain view and, therefore, cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the content are in plain view, and may be seized.
3. Search of a moving vehicle: There must be a moving vehicle

Warrant cannot be secured immediately
Highly reasonable suspicion that the crime was ALREADY committed
Example: The accused was accosted on board a bus that was travelling from Sagada, Mt. Province. The search was
conducted without warrant but was validated by the court on two counts, first because it was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and second because of the circumstances of the search namely that the accused was on a moving vehicle
and there was no time to obtain a warrant despite the existence of probable cause [compare in the case of Aruta
where she had already alighted]
4. Consented search
There can be no implied acquiescence. Silence cannot be taken as consent to a search. Thus, in a situation where
an officer asked A if he could see the contents of the bag A was carrying, and the officer opened the bag after A gave
it to him, there is no consent. The mere fact that A gave the bag to the officer does not mean there was consent on
the part of A to the search. [People v. Aruta]
Note that the Court held in Roan v. Gonzales that though the petitioner signed a document stating his submission to
the search, the consent was vitiated by the presence of armed men during the prevailing martial law conditions.
Consent could not have been freely given in such a situation.
Requisites for valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently:
Must appear that right exists
Person involved had actual/ constructive knowledge of the existence of such right
Said person had an actual interest to relinquish the right
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Waiver is limited only to the arrest

Waiver does not extend to search made as an incident thereto, or to any subsequent seizure of evidence
found in the search.
5. Customs search: Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Customs laws
require warrants for searches of dwellings. Outside dwellings however, as long as there is probable cause to believe that
the place to be searched contains goods or items connected with offenses punished by Customs laws then a search of
that place is valid without warrant.
6. Stop and frisk: There should be a genuine reason to stop-and-frisk in the light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions to warrant a belief that the person detained has weapons concealed.
Test: WON a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety of that of
others was in danger [Terry Standards]
Requisites:
There must be specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.
The officer must identify himself and make reasonable inquiries
The frisk is permitted to search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason
to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of probable cause for a
crime.
The scope of the search is limited to the outer surface of the subjects clothing.
When valid: Authority is vested in the officer where has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual. Officer need not be absolutely certain the individual is armed. His suspicion, however, must
be reasonable.
Examples:
In Manalili v. CA, the Court upheld the validity of the stop and frisk of the petitioner. The officers stopped
Manalili based on his behavior and appearance, namely the way he wobbled while he walked and his
reddish eyes. After initially resisting the officers inquiry as to what Manalili had in his hands, he later
consented to the search of his wallet, where the officers found crushed Marijuana.
The Terry standards were also used in invalidating the search and subsequent arrest of the petitioner in
Malacat v. CA. In this case, the petitioner was merely standing in Plaza Miranda in Quiapo when he was
apprehended by a police officer. The officer subsequently found a grenade tucked in the front waistline of
the petitioner. The Terry standards were not met, since Malacats behavior (merely standing in the plaza)
could not have led the officer to believe that there was a reason to make the search. The grenade was
also tucked in an area which is beyond the permissible scope of the search and could not have been
possibly seen at a distance.
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

8. Visual search at checkpoints
The Court has ruled the establishment of checkpoints is a valid exercise of police power to ensure security and
safety. As long the inspection is limited to a visual search then the search is valid. A more extensive search of the
vehicle, or a body search of the occupants will only be valid if there is probable cause
Warrantless Arrest
Requisites for a Valid Arrest Warrant

Existence of probable cause
Personal determination of probable cause by a judge
Complainant and witnesses testify on facts personally known to them
Particular description of the person/s to be arrested and of the crime/s
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Requisites of a Valid Warrantless Arrest: [Rule 113, Sec. 5 Rules of Criminal Procedure]
1. In flagrante delicto
The person must be arrested after the offense has been committed and in the presence of the police officer.
Buy-bust: Valid in flagrante arrest. Subsequent search is also valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
NOT VALID when after the buy-bust, the police files a report and the arrest happens after the filing of the
report.
2. Hot Pursuit: When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
3. Escaped Prisoners
[OTHERS]
4. When the right is voluntarily waived
5. Violent insanity
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Cases under Search and Seizure:
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
Officers of certain corporations, from which documents, papers and things were seized by means of search
warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the seizures because said corporations have personalities
distinct and separate from those of said officers. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby. The objection to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties.
Only the corporation whose properties were seized can validly object to the use in evidence the seized
items.
Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of
certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit command of the
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of
eliminating general warrants.
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF

Use of some documents seized as evidence by person from same were seized, in the case filed against him, does
not estop him from questioning validity of their seizure. These documents lawfully belong to him and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal abounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and
cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Typographical error in specifying the address to be search not sufficient to invalidate a search warrant where the
address intended to be searched also appears on the face of the warrant.
Sec. 1, Rule 126 does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted
Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned
by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed
has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
PEOPLE V. MARTI
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones
person from interference by government; it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself
posed, as follows: First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
PEOPLE V. ARUTA
The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
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The exceptions to the search warrant requirement should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Validity of a moving vehicle search: In the case of Malmstedt, There was no reasonable time to obtain a search
warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the
agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second,
Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta, was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was
search aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the
other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
There should information received which would become the bases for conducting the warrantless
search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken
together with the information, constituted probable causes which would justify the warrantless
searches and seizures in each of the cases.
Validity of Plain view: The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the
NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Validity of Stop-and-Frisk: In People v. Solayao, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were
accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused
the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. She was merely
crossing the street when apprehended, never attempted to flee.
Validity of Exigent and Emergency Circumstances: In People v. De Gracia, there were intelligence reports that
the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a
group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite
repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts
were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime
was being committed.
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA (Validity of Checkpoint)

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal.
No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the
military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or
other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
A general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of
his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of right against unlawful search and seizure.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
At the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
ANIAG V. COMELEC
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles
and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we
declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long
PAGE 13 OF 34
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable
or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The action of
policemen who conducted a warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the petitioners privacy and the security of his property, and the firearms obtained thereby cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
CABALLES V. CA
The mere mobility of the vehicles does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. The
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police
checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. [either routine inspection or
extensive search]
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search:
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds
simply looks into a vehicle
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search
where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection
where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
Extensive search is permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant.
PAGE 14 OF 34
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
Sec. 3, Art. III:
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding
Cases:
GANAAN V. CA (Wiretapping)
Backdrop: Telephone conversation was private in the sense that the words uttered were made between one
person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one
of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the callers message with the use of an
extension telephone line.
The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose.
Device or arrangement in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
RAMIREZ V. CA
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
PAGE 15 OF 34
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Constitution does not have a specific provision protecting the right to privacy. It is a penumbral right formed
from the shadows created by several constitutional provisions. That is to say, the right to privacy is located within zones
created by various provisions of the Constitution and various statutes which protect aspects of privacy (Ople v. Torres)
Implied in right to liberty
Right to privacy = right to be left alone
BUT, this does not mean being a castaway
Right to privacy presupposes that you are in society but still maintain a private space and sphere of
protection from the State and others
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
A claim to the right of privacy is triggered by:

Reasonable expectation of privacy,
Intrusions via state action are invalid if there is no compelling state interest.
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (Ople v. Torres)

The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
1. Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy (Subjective expectation)
2. Whether this expectation is one that the society recognizes as reasonable (Objective expectation)
Note: The factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors,
such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation.
Diminished Expectation of Privacy (Ayer v. Capulong)

A limited intrusion into the right to privacy is permissible when:
1. The person is a public figure
2. The information sought constitutes matters of public concern
PAGE 16 OF 34
Cases under Right to Privacy:
OPLE V. TORRES
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
Said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does
not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of
abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave
the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the
authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests
and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.
The right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be
narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
AYER V. CAPULONG
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
The right of privacy or the right to be let alone, like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited
intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and
the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character.
Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of
public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
What is involved in the case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and
producing the entire proposed motion picture. Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior
restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of course,
mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional
freedoms.
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting
a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a public personage. He is, in other words. a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and
even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a
lodge.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right of privacy. The right of
privacy of a public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
PAGE 17 OF 34
To the extent that The Four Day Revolution limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public
facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondents privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private
respondent.
SJS V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

In upholding the validity of requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students as constitutional,
the Court notes that:
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and
may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discri-
minatory.
It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being
of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until
a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary
and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest.
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
VIVARES V. ST. THERESA COLLEGE

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.
The existence of a persons right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
The purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of
the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin
boards or walls, the contents of which are under the control of each and every user.
PAGE 18 OF 34
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user
manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the
users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web
page or the photograph itself.
PAGE 19 OF 34
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Sec. 4, Art. III: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec. 18(1), Art. III: No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It
protects speech, print, and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any
particular field of human interest (Chavez v. Gonzales).
At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages,
or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.
Protected Speech:
1. Free speech and free press
2. Freedom of assembly
3. Freedom of petition
4. Freedom of religion
5. Right of association or the right to form associations
6. Right to religious freedom
General forms of restraint on speech:

Prior restraint: official government restrictions of the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. It carries a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.
Subsequent restraint: Governmental laws that impose liability upon a conduct
Tests for Restraint on Freedom of Speech and Expression

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests:
Dangerous tendency doctrine: permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated
Balancing of interests test: used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation of type of situation
Clear and present danger rest: rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.
ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

GO-TO: (1) Determine whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-based. (2) If content-neutral, use
Intermediate Approach or the OBrien Test; If content-based, use Strictest Scrutiny. (3) Under strictest scrutiny,
the Court has held that at present, what is used is the Clear and Present Danger Test.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION
Regulations on the incidents of the speech - the place, time, and manner - under well-defined standards.
Test to be applied: OBRIEN TEST / Intermediate Approach (CFGI)
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
It is within the constitutional power
It furthers an important or substantial government interest
The government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
The incident restriction is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest
PAGE 20 OF 34
CONTENT-BASED REGULATION
Regulations based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. This kind of restriction is given the
strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact.
Test to be applied: CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST.
Under the Clear and Present Danger Test, the question in every case is whether the words used
in such circumstances are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality
Exceptions to Prior Restraint (Subjects where prior restraint is allowed):

Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young
who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.
Pornography
False or misleading commercial statement
Advocacy of imminent lawless action
Press statement made by persons, for and on behalf of the government, uttered while in the exercise of their
official functions
Danger to nation security (Chavez v. Gonzales)
Unprotected Speech (ODIFHSAS)

Obscenity
Defamation
Infringes upon right of privacy
Fighting words
Hate speech
Seditious speech
Advertising
Speech in special places
Test on Obscenity:
Prurient Interest Test (Roth v. US): The test for obscene material is whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest. This test provides safeguards adequate to withstand the constitutional infirmity. Obscenity is not within the area
of protected speech and press. Therefore obscenity is unprotected speech.
Miller Test (Miller v. California)

1. Whether the average person applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable law
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political or scientific values.
PAGE 21 OF 34
Cases under Freedom of Speech:
CHAVEZ V. GONZALES
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any
act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.
Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation
of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular
message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied
to content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the
validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant
governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome
the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-
based restraint will be struck down.
Press and Broadcast Media Dichotomy: While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of
freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media (Chavez v. Gonzales). But all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule
On whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC constitute a form of
content-based prior restraint: In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made
by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts
already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order
or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are
acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech
and press.
NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN

Backdrop: Sullivan sued the the New York Times Co. for printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement
in the south that defamed Sullivan. The advertisement charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had
been directed against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not mention Sullivan by name, he claimed that it referred
to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized
publication of the advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false.
Actual malice test is applicable to defamatory statements made with regard to public officials: Where an
article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant believes to be
truthful information concerning a candidate for public office and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their
ballot more intelligently, and the whole thing is done in good faith and without malice, the article is privileged,
although the principal matters contained in the article may be untrue in fact and derogatory to the character of the
plaintiff; and in such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of the article.
Prove (1) actual knowledge of falsity or (2) utter disregard of truth or falsity of the statement.
PAGE 22 OF 34
SOCIAL WEATHER STATION V. COMELEC (CONTENT-NEUTRAL)

Under the OBrien Test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if
the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
Fails criterion #3 because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes
such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the
integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a
particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results
Fails criterion #4 namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental
interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the
danger of such evils. COMELEC can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters.
GMA NETWORK INC. V. COMELEC

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And
where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination
becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and
to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with
substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts
the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. [F]reedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy. Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest.
The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. The
adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive
measure.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

In a democracy, the citizens right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-
making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-
building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas must
be given immediate protection by this court.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should be protected
and encouraged.
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue, fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation.
Commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.
PAGE 23 OF 34
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and
this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. In this case, there is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the
right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of noncandidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses
constitutional rights.
The size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of the
tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of
expression. The COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of
dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when
exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political
candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is
true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates real levels of
expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate
in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in
this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive
means to the fundamental freedom.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when
there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELECs infringement upon petitioners property rights as
in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through posts, comments, and other messages.
Since there are no standards, netizens are not given a fair warning as to what is criminal or lawful conduct.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets
another in destroying a forest, smuggling merchandise into the country, or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers, his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These
forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience. But, when it
comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of
aiding or abetting wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of
cyberspace use.
A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and
with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.
CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

Backdrop: Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "God-damned racketeer" and "a damned
fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace.
The court said that the constitutional right to freedom of speech is not absolute and that obscene, profane, libelous
and insulting words that by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,
came within the limited class of speech known as fighting words, and were a reasonable exception to the right to
freedom of speech. Such utterances are not an essential part of any exposition of ideas and are such of slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
PAGE 24 OF 34
TEST: What men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight.
MVRS PUBLICATION V. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a persons character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect,
good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute.
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere
words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute
a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression,
as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to anyone in
particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff
does not establish any personal reference to himself.
CAUSE OF ACTION: In order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that
the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made.
IF directed at a small, restricted group of persons: applies to any member of the group, and an
individual member could maintain an action for defamation.
IF used toward a small group or class, including every member: applies to each member so that each
could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses,
professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a society, a football team, a family,
small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a particular company.
IF used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by
proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no
member has a right of action for libel or slander.
PITA V. CA
If the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures
are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
There is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut
provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally
evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation. But neither should we say that obscenity is a bare matter of opinion.
Immoral lore or literature is still within the ambit of free expression, although not in its protection. Hence, the
presumption that such speech is protected may validly be said. The State/authorities have the burden to
demonstrate the existence of a clear and present danger to justify State Action to stop the speech. The authority
cant rely merely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare may require. Meanwhile, due process demands that
the Government must allow the speech to subsist.
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Backdrop: Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated adult material books which
consist primarily of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more
engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often predominantly displayed. This case thus involves the
application of a states criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust
by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients.
PAGE 25 OF 34
States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of
dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to
juveniles.
We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes
designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope
of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by
the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,
and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
NEW YORK V. FERBER

Backdrop: Use of children in pornographic materials has increased over the years causing the introduction of many
state laws prohibiting such activity. The Respondent was a storeowner who sold material showing children under the
age of 16 engaged in sexual activities.
The States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children.
It is evident that a State's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is
compelling."
The conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed. Here the nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense be limited to works that
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. The category of "sexual conduct" proscribed must
also be suitably limited and described.
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to
it for the purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: a trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual
conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be
considered as a whole.
As to overbreadth: The premise that a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial
number of impermissible applications is hardly novel. On most occasions involving facial invalidation, the Court has
stressed the embracing sweep of the statute over protected expression.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN RE: EMIL JURADO

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does
not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy alike immunity. The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection.
The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or halftruthsthis
would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may not be used to insult others, destroy their name or
reputation or bring them into disreputethis would not be to act with justice or give everyone his due.
In the present proceeding, there is also involved an acknowledged and important interest of individual persons: the
right to private reputation.
Judges, by becoming such, are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to
norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are
commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the
Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having thereby forfeited any right whatsoever to private
honor and reputation.The protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a matter
of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning
the exercise of press freedom and free speech.
The point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests [public interest and private
interest of judges] is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech,
publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise
bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish.
PAGE 26 OF 34
The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does
prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any
bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
REYES V. BAGATSING
Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of
a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta
has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
On the use of the US Embassy: The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
adopted in 1961, which provides that [t]he receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of
the mission or impairment of its dignity. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be
a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Students enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards.
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily,
their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded
the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must
be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the nonacademic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only
an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process.
A students rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of
PAGE 27 OF 34
others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behaviour materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical,
at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident
types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord
full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of
speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth.
BAYAN V. ERMITA
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settled principle that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights
of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P.
No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and
influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words
petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided.
Under B.P. 880, the permit for a public assembly in a public place can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the
extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There
is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
PAGE 28 OF 34
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Sec. 7, Art. III: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data shall be afforded the citizens, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28, Art. II: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Difference between Sec. 7, Art. III and Sec. 28, Art. II:
Art. II, Sec. 28 [full public disclosure] covers all transactions of public interest. This includes any information in
official communications and public documents of the government. The government has the duty to disclose the
information regardless of whether or not there is a demand for it, subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
The phrase subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law in Sec. 28, Art. II means that legislation is
required to regulate and control disclosure. This is to qualify what constitutes sufficient disclosure of
information. If there is an obligation to disclose, even if the information is not sought, the obligation to make
such information public still exists.
The right to access under Art III, Sec. 7 [access to information] covers matters of public concern. There must
first be a request in order to gain access to the information.
Scope: broader scope embracing not only transactions, but any matter contained in official
communication and public documents of the government agency, of public concern.
Public Interest
What constitutes as a matter of public interest has a broad scope. It refers to any matter contained in official
communications and public documents of a government agency. Information that is of public interest has to be
disclosed or made available to the public even without demand for it.
Example: In Chavez v. PCGG, the petitioner was demanding the disclosure of the terms of negotiations regarding
the settlement agreement between the government and the Marcos heirs regarding former president Marcos ill-
gotten wealth. This was prior to the consummation of such negotiations. The Court ruled that such information is of
public interest, and must therefore be disclosed subject to the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general [such as matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, etc].
Public Concern
Matters of public concern are subjects which the public may want to know either because these directly affect their
lives, or because they naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v CSC). This includes:
Official records
Documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions
Government research data
Legaspi v. CSC: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.
Remedy for Violation: As the duty to disclose cannot be discretionary on the part of the agency being asked of such
information, an action for mandamus is available to those denied of such access.
Limitations: In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court said:
national security matters and intelligence information: state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and
other national security concerns; inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements
PAGE 29 OF 34
But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, provided that they are examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection.
trade secrets and banking transactions: intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets, banking
transactions
criminal matters: relating to apprehension, prosecution, detention of criminals, prior to arrest, detention, and
prosecution
other confidential information: any confidential or classified information officially known by a public officer
by reason of their office and not made available to the public
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
The information and the transactions referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no
defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be
exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions:
National security matters and intelligence information: There is a governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But
where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents
and other information, provided that they are examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous
protection. (Chavez v. PCGG)
Informers privilege: Privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who
furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. (Akbayan v.
Aquino)
Trade Secrets and Banking transactions: trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property
Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act)
are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. (Chavez v. PCGG)
Criminal matters: those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals which
courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information
regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
Deliberative Process Privilege
Diplomatic Negotiations
Executive Privilege
Such privilege is only presumptive. As held in Senate v. Ermita, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the
claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status (Akbayan v Aquino)
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
US v Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests. In other words,
confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution.
A. PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE (NERI V. SENATE)

This privilege pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. It also applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As such,
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege
PRESUMPTION: Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. The presumption can be overcome
only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
RATIONALE: The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide
the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
PAGE 30 OF 34
B. DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (AKBAYAN V. AQUINO)

Deliberative Process Privilege covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged
status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the obvious realization that
officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front
page news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
TEST: The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of
need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis.
RATIONALE: A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first
impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that
treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable
terms in an area of greater national interest.
PAGE 31 OF 34
Cases under Right to Information:
LEGASPI V. CSC
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A
distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular
information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded.
The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6).
The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that
the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion.
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law. The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought:
being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and
not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
VALMONTE V. BELMONTE
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with
the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the right to privacy belongs to the
individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no
such ground for relief.
Requisites so mandamus can prosper when right to information is invoked: 1) Information sought is clearly a
matter of public interest and concern, and 2) the information sought must not be among those excluded by law
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that government owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special
legislation are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official
records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It
must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
PAGE 32 OF 34
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.
The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific.
Memas on Right to information:

The cornerstone of the republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to
the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a
public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is
not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application
by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes
hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
CHAVEZ V. PCGG
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must
be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is
aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of
the government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants.
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations
or proposals prior to the final agreement?
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to inter-agency
or intra-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
AKBAYAN V. AQUINO
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do
not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic
matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
In Chavez v. PCGG: information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.
In PMPF v. Manglapus: secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA
may not be kept perpetually confidentialsince there should be ample opportunity for discussion
before [a treaty] is approvedthe offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
PAGE 33 OF 34
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern
the same.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v.
Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
PAGE 34 OF 34

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[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - REVIEWER] [EDUARDO]

Factors to consider when previous judicial hearing may be omitted:

Two kinds of due process:

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

In Civil Proceedings: (IJOJ)

In Administrative Proceedings (Ang Tibay Rules) (NAPCTEST)

In Academic Disciplinary Proceedings: (IAEACP)

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Requisites: Due process of law means simply that (LREA)

Expanded test of Substantive Due Process according to Ichiong v. Hernandez:

Vagueness and Uncertainty:

JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW

Cases under Due Process:

YNOT V. IAC (INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER):

CORONA V. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS

ANG TIBAY V. CIR: Cardinal Rules (supra)

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA

Requisites for valid classification:

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. BSP

PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. VS. PRADO

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

This provision includes the protection of:

Requisites of a Valid Warrant: (CaDetFaDe)

What Can be Searched and Seized:

Valid Warrantless Search:

Warrantless Searches Recognized by Jurisprudence:

3. Search of a moving vehicle: There must be a moving vehicle

Waiver is limited only to the arrest

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

Requisites for a Valid Arrest Warrant

Cases under Search and Seizure:

BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF

VALMONTE V. DE VILLA (Validity of Checkpoint)

A claim to the right of privacy is triggered by:

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (Ople v. Torres)

Diminished Expectation of Privacy (Ayer v. Capulong)

Cases under Right to Privacy:

SJS V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

VIVARES V. ST. THERESA COLLEGE

General forms of restraint on speech:

Tests for Restraint on Freedom of Speech and Expression

ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

Exceptions to Prior Restraint (Subjects where prior restraint is allowed):

Unprotected Speech (ODIFHSAS)

Miller Test (Miller v. California)

Cases under Freedom of Speech:

NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN

SOCIAL WEATHER STATION V. COMELEC (CONTENT-NEUTRAL)

GMA NETWORK INC. V. COMELEC

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

MVRS PUBLICATION V. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL

NEW YORK V. FERBER

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

IN RE: EMIL JURADO

Limitations: In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court said:

A. PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE (NERI V. SENATE)

B. DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (AKBAYAN V. AQUINO)

Cases under Right to Information:

Memas on Right to information:

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