CASE 1

G.R. No. 178911 September 17, 2014

EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D.

MONSANTO, JR.,Petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Regional Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), through a letter,
requested the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto of the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar to
nullify the results of the auction sale conducted on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG claimed that the
winning bid of Leoncio was grossly disadvantageous to the government because the
outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto, was more than the bid
amount. Executive Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter because Eduardo is his
relative.He re-assigned the same to Judge Usman. However, Judge Usman noted that no
complaint was actually filed which presents a judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of
partake of administrative matter.Judge Usman referred the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). Subsequently, Pascual, who appeared for Eduardo,filed with the OCA a
Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate. OCA directed Judge Usman take action on
Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate and the letter of Home Development
Mutual Fund. The trial court denied the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate.
Petitioners thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No.Records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The case was
supposedly "commenced" through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive
Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman.
However, said letter could not in any way be considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court defines pleadings as "written statements of the respective claims and defenses
of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment." To stress, Pag-IBIGs letter could
not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were not
identified pursuant to Section 1,Rule 3 and Section 1,Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or
cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not
even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly identified;the allegations were not
properly set forth; no particular relief issought; in fact, only the intervention of Executive Judge
Monsanto is requested; it was notsigned by a counsel; and most of all, there is no verification or
certification.The Court noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court.

CASE 5
G.R. No. 185969 November 19, 2014
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed its Quarterly VAT Returns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the
taxable year period covering 1 January - 31 December 2003.Petitioner filed on 13 April 2005
with the BIR an application for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilized VAT input taxes for the
aforesaid taxable period.However, there being no action on said administrative claim, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review before the CTA in Division on 20 April 2005 (or exactly seven [7] days
from the time it filed its administrative claim) in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive
period provided under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997.

The CTA in Division rendered a Decision dated 12 December 2007 10 dismissing petitioners
claim for the refund or issuance of a TCC. On 12 March 2008, the CTA in Division denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.Petitioner filed a Petition for Review
before the CTA En Banc, which affirmed both the Decision and Resolution rendered by the CTA
in Division in CTA. Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereof, it filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA properly acquired jurisdiction over petitioners claim covering the four
(4) quarters of taxable year 2003 taking into consideration the timeliness of the filing of the
administrative and judicial claims.

RULING:
Clearly, the CTA had no jurisdiction to rule on petitioners refund claim covering the First Quarter
of taxable year 2003 since its administrative claim was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive
periodas mandated by law, or exactly fourteen (14) days after the last day to file the same.
On the other hand, as to petitioners claims covering the remaining quarters of taxable year
2003, the Court finds that petitioner has indeed properly filed its judicial claim beforethe CTA,
even without waiting for the expiration of the one hundred twenty (120)-day period, since at the
time petitioner filed its petition, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 issued on 10 December 2003 was
already in effect.
As a general rule, a taxpayer-claimant needs to wait for the expiration of the one hundred
twenty(120)-day period before it may be considered as "inaction" on the partof the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). Thereafter, the taxpayer-claimant is given only a
limited period of thirty (30) days from said expiration tofile its corresponding judicial claim with
the CTA. However, with the exception of claims made during the effectivity of BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 (from 10 December 2003 to 5 October 2010), 34 petitioner has indeed properly and
timely filed its judicial claim covering the Second, Third, and Fourth Quarters of taxable year
2003, within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence.