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SUPREME COURT summarized by the CA, are as follows: The late Beatriz S.
Manila Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She
was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio,
FIRST DIVISION Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S.
Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014 S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner, 2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by
vs. SILVERIO, SR.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS,
INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different
INC., Respondents. petitions and appeal challenging several orders ofthe
intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme
DECISION Court. To better understand the myriad of factual and
procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: case, this court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the The Petitions
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and
122024 are concerned, and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013 The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-
denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S.
CA nullified the preliminary injunction issued by the SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate intestate court dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO
court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the
said court's Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the sales estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
and derivative titles over two properties subject of intestate
proceedings as null and void.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR.
EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a issued an Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding
Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and
heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as removed SILVERIO SR., ad administrator for gross
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81
intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was of the Rules of Court.
appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active
exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above
administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a
SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed
administrator is summarized below: as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the
removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR. Order reads:
was designated as the new administrator. A motion for
reconsideration was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and "WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of
Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming administration to and the taking of an oath of administration
among others, the Order of 3 January 2005. Inthe same by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio,
SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as administrator effective are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard
filed by SILVERIO SR. to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting
letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO SR. as administrator. Then again, the intestate
court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore
the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 challenging
the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and
February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a resolution LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO,
reversible error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the JR. based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the
exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction. written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE
Acting on SILVERIO JR.s motion for reconsideration, the GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case considering
Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings;
finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011. (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in
favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the
court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYAs Petition
the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support has
the now challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the
portion of the Order reads: heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
xxxx
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition.
MILLION PESOS, the same to be approved by this Court, The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the
the Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio instant petition.
and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his
duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the xxxx
said position. xxx."
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October
xxxx 2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S.
pertinent to the present petition reads: SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy.
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of
Whether the authority to sell the properties in question discretion on the part of the intestate court when it ordered
granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as
nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. NULL and VOID citing as justification the decision of the
SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No.
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made
reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was
good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads: declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus
Order that upheld the grant of letters of administrationby
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administrator and nothing else.
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration
by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, in its Order dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by
are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it
injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was directed
said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz preliminary injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR.,
Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents. their agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any person
from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late the heirs represented by their respective counsels interposed
Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of no objection to the same.
Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any giving due course to While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as
whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in
involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, Silverio-Dee), weagree with the CA that the permanent
waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated
any entity the above-enumerated properties belonging to the in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31,
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
records show that when the preliminary injunction was administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have
properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7(Emphasis supplied.) Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover,
the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011
We affirm the CA. when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio,
Jr.s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending 185619).1wphi1
motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr.,
father and son, respectively, who are the central figures in The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18,
the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the
the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued
appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine
respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping
more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having
suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with
Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order
settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity came when
dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting
insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
SO ORDERED.
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
Republic of the Philippines Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
SUPREME COURT Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Manila
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
THIRD DIVISION Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
vs. Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. predeceased Felicisimo.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re- disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel. denied. 28
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the which states:
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
to the trial court for further proceedings. 29 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee,
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, marriage.
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration
was properly filed in Makati City. Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, x x 33
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued Appeals.
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As
a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
respondent. Thus manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
of administration. the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
subject petition for letters of administration. physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
The petition lacks merit. personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
petition for letters of administration of the estate of that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the particular length of time of residence is required though;
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the
however, the residence must be more than General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied) indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are Laguna."
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
his residence in one place and domicile in another. the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
In the instant case, while petitioners established that over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Court of Makati City.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is former marriage."
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the property. 53
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court
the divorce. Thus: ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private her marital duties and obligations. It held:
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case
own country if the ends of justice are to be in relation to Article 26. 61
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay- background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit Brief Historical Background
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56 "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
in effect. and 38.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary amended, it now provides:
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly law already established through judicial
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her precedent.1awphi1.net
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
xxxx productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
Legislative Intent some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations possibly be productive of any good to the society where one
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, is considered released from the marital bond while the other
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien Filipino spouse, as in this case.
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts
to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
added) results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of
of the legislature, is to render justice. the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar with the legal personality to file the present petition as
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
to the literal command without regard to its cause and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
them." officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
xxxx accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly An "interested person" has been defined as one who would
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As contingent. 75
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
Felicisimo. prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has provision governs the property relations between parties who
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
provides in part: been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A the contrary is proven. 77
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
petitioner: x x x. the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would
be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
property relations of couples living together as husband and the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
property regime under this provision as follows: administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
shares shall be presumed to be equal. for further proceedings.
xxxx SO ORDERED.
NACHURA, J.:
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she G.R. No. 177099
died in 1984, her inheritance shall be
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF
TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER
ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
JOAQUIN AGTARAP PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH
OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN
IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR
PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS
PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY
PROCEEDINGS. UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE
MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW
II. ITSELF.[14]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia
instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9,
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT
the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal
is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el
estate of Joaquin. presente certificado de titulo, tal como
aparece, tanchando las palabras con Lucia
Garcia Mendiet[t]a y poniendo en su lugar, thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
palabras en segundas nupcias con Caridad partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
Garcia, en complimiento de un orden de proceedings of either.Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to
fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to
Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of
Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a
cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the
1368; copia de cual orden has sido same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings
presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, of Joaquin, being Lucias spouse. [24] Accordingly, the CA
Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the
32184. properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of
this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and
Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show
the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out that the owners of the properties covered therein were
and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name
referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia,
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a
Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession
already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a
TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the holders true ownership of property.[25] A certificate of title
said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot
certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.
[26]
Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the
the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose. sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of
that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily
husband or the wife, the community property shall be prove that the realties are their conjugal properties. [28]
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have obligations within such time as the court
already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the directs.
inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance
tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs
provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court only after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral
SECTION 1. When order for charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
distribution of residue made. -- When the and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of that these were complied with in 1965.
administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of
estate in accordance with law, have been Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the
paid, the court, on the application of the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The
executor or administrator, or of a person RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and
interested in the estate, and after hearing convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative
estate to the persons entitled to the same, allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and
naming them and the proportions, or parts, Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by
to which each is entitled, and such persons Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this
may demand and recover their respective in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the
shares from the executor or administrator, or August 21, 1995 hearing.[29]Furthermore, the CA affirmed
any other person having the same in his this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision. [30]
possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter
the deceased person or as to the distributive de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be
share to which each person is entitled under sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the
the law, the controversy shall be heard and RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4,
decided as in ordinary cases. 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by
her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with
No distribution shall be allowed Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC
until the payment of the obligations above likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo
mentioned has been made or provided for, Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in
conditioned for the payment of said intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby
admitting his answer on October 18, 1995. [31] The CA also necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate,
noted that, during the hearing of the motion to intervene on they being his legal heirs.
October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose
any objection when the intervention was submitted to the However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred
RTC for resolution.[32] in distributing Joaquins estate pertinent to the share allotted
in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will
appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts erred allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch
in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo 108, Pasay City.[34] While there has been no showing that the
Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from
incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been
refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa probated and approved, prudence dictates that this Court
were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and
Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January
so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had 15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death. [35] He is survived by
the right to participate in the estate in representation of the his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children
Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma.
respectively.[33] Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November
that the CA erred in settling, together with Joaquins estate, 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the
the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the
Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the
would readily show that the disposition of the properties final determination of the probate of her purported will, and
related only to the settlement of the estate of that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192
jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
as well as their respective shares after the payment of the 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision
obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in
favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the
final determination of the probate of her will, and that
petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on
January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita
B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and
Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 183053 -------x
INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CRISTINA AGUINALDO- Present:
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY DECISION
III, CARPIO, J.,
Petitioner, Chairperson, NACHURA, J.:
NACHURA,
PERALTA, Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse
ABAD, and between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the
- versus - PEREZ,* JJ. exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New
World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with
Promulgated: the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, June 16, 2010
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Respondent
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949, [4] reversing the
.
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M- with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately
95.[5] from their father and paternal grandparents.
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico
filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren:
respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo- Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of
died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including unwanted visits of her grandparents.
herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse,
Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. [7]
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein
respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two containing the following allegations:
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo
(Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and [A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she]
Isabel Santos, respectively. was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was [decedent] left an estate of real and personal
reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by properties, with a probable gross value
the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and
natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural residences of the surviving heirs of the
child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89
Federico and Cristina. years old, surviving spouse and a resident of
x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years
As previously adverted to, the marriage between old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident
Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently, of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay,
respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco- Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to
Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
and a resident of x x x; and that as far as Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on
debts or obligation at the time of her death.[8] his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with
a better right to the letters of administration.
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild,
respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs
December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that: Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the
outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his
is capable of administering her estate and he grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
should be the one appointed as its stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administrator; that as part owner of the mass administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that:
must be accorded legal preference in the [he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was
administration thereof; that Isabel and her trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving
family had been alienated from their him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; which was established in 1979 in memory of her
that the enumeration of heirs in the petition grandmothers father; the significant work experiences
was incomplete as it did not mention the outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae;
other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E.
situated to protect the integrity of the estate Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]
of Cristina as even before the death of his
wife[,] he was already the one who managed In the course of the proceedings, on November 13,
their conjugal properties; that the probable 2000, Federico died.
value of the estate as stated in the petition
was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were
allegation that some of the properties are in heard and evidence on their respective allegations were
the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9] adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9,
2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
GRANTED. and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M.
Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator WHEREFORE, in view of all the
of the estate of the decedent Cristina foregoing, the assailed decision dated
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional
execution of his trust upon the filing of a Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No.
bond in the amount of P200,000.00, 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
conditioned as follows: ASIDE and the letters of administration
issued by the said court to Emilio A.M.
(1) To make and return Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked.
within three (3) months, a true and complete Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
inventory; hereby appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
(2) To administer the estate Let letters of administration be issued in her
and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, favor upon her filing of a bond in the
and charge on the same, or dividends amount of Two Hundred Thousand
thereon; (P200,000.00) Pesos.
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their administration granted. If no executor is
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their named in the will, or the executor or
marriage; executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are intestate, administration shall be granted:
still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because
her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, such surviving husband or wife, or next of
entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply and willing to serve;
representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA case may be, or next of kin, or the person
erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the selected by them, be incompetent or
decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that after the death of the person to apply for
the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being administration or to request that
the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession administration be granted to some other
over a portion of the exclusive property of the person, it may be granted to one or more of
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal the principal creditors, if competent and
partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a willing to serve;
strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject
to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason (c) If there is no such creditor competent and
of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar. willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administration of the subject estate.
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.
[20]
In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
estate. decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared
between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that: administration.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID
REVERSIBLE ERROR: ORDERS OF THE INTESTATE COURT
ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND THAT
A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS THE ORDERS WERE FINAL AND
PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DENYING EXECUTORY WITH REGARD TO
THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE LATTER
THAT THE APPELLATE COURTS
WERE NEVER NOTIFIED OF THE AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE
PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER OF SETTLED LAW AND
CANCELING ITS OWNERSHIP; JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR
HAS THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE
C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECEDENTS PROPERTY EVEN IF
INTESTATE COURT COMMITTED THE SAME IS UNDER
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ADMINISTRATION PURSUANT TO
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF CIVIL CODE PROVISION THAT
JURISDICTION (1) WHEN IT ISSUED POSSESSION OF HEREDITARY
THE OMNIBUS ORDER NULLIFYING PROPERTY IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
THE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER HEIR THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF
FLAG OVER SHARES OF STOCK THE DECEDENT (ACEDEBO VS.
WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO BE PART ABESAMIS, 217 SCRA 194);
OF THE ESTATE AND (2) WHEN IT
ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL
EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
FLAG AS PRESENT OWNER TO IN G.R. NO. 128525 DATED
IMPLEMENT MERELY PROVISIONAL DECEMBER 17, 1999 INVOLVING
ORDERS, THEREBY VIOLATING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
FLAGS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT PARTIES, TO WIT, PETITIONERS JOSE
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO WERE
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS; RESPONDENTS IN THAT CASE
WHILE RESPONDENT MA. DIVINA
D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND ENDERES WAS THE PETITIONER
VOID THE ORDERS OF THE THEREIN. THAT DECISION, WHICH
INTESTATE COURT WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED LAW OF THE
NULLIFIED THE SALE OF SHARES CASE, RULED THAT PETITIONERS
OF STOCK BETWEEN THE CANNOT BE ENJOINED BY
LEGITIMATE HEIR JOSE S. ORTAEZ RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM
EXERCISING THEIR POWER AS January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was no compelling
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF reason to reconsider said denial. [18] Our decision became
PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT THE final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in
INTESTATE COURT IN CHARGE OF the book of entry of judgments. For all intents and purposes
THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of
CANNOT ADJUDICATE TITLE TO stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez in favor of
PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PART petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said
OF THE ESTATE AND WHICH ARE issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide open
EQUALLY CLAIMED BY PETITIONER for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no
FLAG.[17] end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient
administration of justice.
The petition has no merit.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing SP No. 46342 affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose
Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not only the validity Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez of the Philinterlife
of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated shares of stock read:
July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997
order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Petitioners asseverations relative to said [memorandum]
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose agreement were scuttled during the hearing before this Court
Ortaez, in their personal capacities and without court thus:
approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of
nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their Counsel for petitioner, when the
favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Memorandum of Agreement was executed,
Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA- did the children of Juliana Salgado know
G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by already that there was a claim for share in the
us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. inheritance of the children of Novicio?
135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality
and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your proceedings without the approval of the court.
Honor, it is already known to them. That is basic unless you can present
justification on that. In fact, there are two
JUSTICE AQUINO: steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the
document and then ask for approval of the
What can be your legal justification for document executed. Now, is there any legal
extrajudicial settlement of a property subject justification to exclude this particular
of intestate proceedings when there is an transaction from those steps?
adverse claim of another set of heirs, alleged
heirs? What would be the legal justification ATTY. CALIMAG:
for extra-judicially settling a property under
administration without the approval of the None, Your Honor.
intestate court?
ATTY BUYCO:
ATTY. CALIMAG:
With that admission that there is no
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra- legal justification, Your Honor, we rest the
judicial settlement there is an approval of the case for the private respondent. How can the
honorable court as to the propertys partition x lower court be accused of abusing its
x x. There were as mentioned by the discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of January 29,
respondents counsel, Your Honor. 1998).
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(fishpond) were included in the inventory of properties of the (149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale of an immovable
estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special
Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private respondent was proceedings, needs court approval. . . This pronouncement
appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs.
lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that
questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the
between petitioner and private respondent without notice and sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
approval of the probate court. Even after the sale, heirs before final adjudication. x x x
administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three
fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her It being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of,
any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has
null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to
an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement
not pass to the purchaser. is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
null and void the disposition of the property under adjudication.
administration, made by private respondent, the same having
been effected without authority from said court. It is the Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or nullifying the sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the
approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23,
fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for 1998 and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the decision
terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that the probate of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of
court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed
vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours) by the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG,
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate however, contend that the probate court could not issue a
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized because said order was merely provisional:
disposition.
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court determine provisionally whether said shares are included or
execute its order nullifying the invalid sale? excluded in the inventory In ordering the execution of the
orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners
and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that that the determination of the intestate court was merely
the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate
a property is included or excluded in the inventory of the proceeding is incorrect.
estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of
execution.[24] (emphasis ours) The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next
contend that the writ of execution should not be executed
Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question, against them because they were not notified, nor they were
based on the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of
stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the stock.
very start as in fact these shares were included in the
inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like
Ortaez after he and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate
special administrators by the intestate court. [25] court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation.
This is the logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in
The controversy here actually started when, during the several subsequent cases. [26] The sale of any property of the
pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his estate by an administrator or prospective heir without
wife Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes
stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of the no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon.
intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the remaining Melencio Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we
1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer certificate of
approval of the intestate court. title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator
after finding that the sale of real property under probate
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or proceedings was made without the prior approval of the
exclusion of properties in the inventory of the estate because court. The dispositive portion of our decision read:
there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of assailed Order dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent
the sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Judge approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is
Jose Ortaez, without the required approval of the declared NULL and VOID and hereby SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and knew of the pending settlement proceedings and that the
by the latter to William Go is likewise declared NULL and shares they bought were under the administration by the
VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is intestate court because private respondent Ma. Divina
hereby ordered cancelled. Ortaez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a
case against them at the Securities and Exchange
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes Commission on November 7, 1994, docketed as SEC No.
authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of stock,
non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of
it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its controlling subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting,
interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio. inspection of corporate books and records and damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due restraining order.[27] In said case, Enderes and her mother
process. questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to
petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution
We do not think so. dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
to them, did not appeal the decision of the intestate court
nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr.
vendor, Jose Ortaez, appealed the case. A careful review of Juvencio Ortaez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate
the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of which is presently the subject matter of an intestate
the estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private proceeding of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85.
respondent Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the
of the Philinterlife shares of stock. documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of
stocks were allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special Ortaez who allegedly assigned the same to the other private
Administratrix Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC respondents, approval of the Court was not presented. Thus,
of Quezon City, Branch 85) a Motion to Declare Void Ab the assignments to the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.]
Initio Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife Shares of Stock on of the subject shares of stocks are void.
March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already
xxxxxxxxx the deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the
conjugal properties; that in the said Memorandum of
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the Agreement, Jose S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate
shares of stock owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we the 1,329 shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4,
rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the 1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of
regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions
pending.[28] of petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee,
Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the
early as March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of
intestate court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial his shares of stock to private respondents; and that the right
partition of the estate of Dr. Ortaez and the subsequent sale of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement
by the heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is
stock to petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were barred by prescription.[29]
not aware of the intestate proceedings?
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Futhermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing Enderes offered additional proof of actual knowledge of the
officer reached the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. settlement proceedings by petitioners which petitioners
128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein never denied: (1) that petitioners were represented by Atty.
filed their answer which contained statements showing that Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother of private
they knew of the pending intestate proceedings: respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose
Lee and Alma Aggaboa for the nullification of the sale of the
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the shares of stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-
jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; around and appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and
Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be (2) that the deeds of sale executed between petitioners and
the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late the heirs of the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortaez) were acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who,
Ortaez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, during the pendency of the settlement proceedings, filed a
executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons motion for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of
Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of
stock to the Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc. title to a certain property for the purpose of determining
(which motion was, however, later abandoned). [30] All this whether the same should or should not be included in the
sufficiently proves that petitioners, through their counsels, inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is
knew of the pending settlement proceedings. subject to final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as
libel (Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No.
(Criminal Case No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No. 128525. The issue therein was whether the Court of Appeals
Q-96-67919) against private respondents mother Ligaya erred in affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes et
Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife, [31] all of which al. were not entitled to the issuance of the writ of
criminal cases were related to the questionable sale to preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals
petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of stock. was correct in affirming the resolution of the SEC denying
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept injunction is not designed to protect contingent rights. Said
petitioners claim of denial of due process. The essence of case did not rule on the issue of the validity of the sale of
due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where shares of stock belonging to the decedents estate without
the opportunity to be heard has been accorded, there is no court approval nor of the validity of the writ of execution
denial of due process.[32] In this case, petitioners knew of the issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly
pending instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. involved a different issue and it does not therefore apply to
Juvencio Ortaezs estate but for reasons they alone knew, the present case.
they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of
the sale, they did not bother to appeal. And when they were Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them
notified of the motion for execution of the Orders of the are hereby warned not to further delay the execution of the
intestate court, they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
alone should bear the blame. 1997.
Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
in G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs. decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736
Court of Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition
allegedly ruled that the intestate court may not pass upon the for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial
court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August
11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SYLLABUS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN Henedino M. Brondial for petitioner.
OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID BEFORE
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. The estate tax is De Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
one of those obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in SECOND DIVISION
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The probate of
a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND
validity and settles only the question of whether the RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division),
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE the named executor, did not take any action for the probate
RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE of his fathers holographic will.
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it
156, respondents. was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
DECISION petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
PUNO, J.: Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and
set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the
resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045. IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4 - was leased out by
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
1
Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his
only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private On January 19, 1993, the probate court
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the
personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent
executor of his estate.2 after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate.5
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately
thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of
among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties
with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he
the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes motion
court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and for release of rent payments which opposition the court
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous
to Edmondconditioned upon the filing of a bond in the motion for release of funds.
amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued
on June 23, 1993. On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle
Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.Respondent Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on
Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria of the testators three granddaughters subject to collation and
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the
notice to creditors.8 The Court stated thus:
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied
petitioners motion for release of funds but granted xxx xxx xxx
respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of
opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the
the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the parties, the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond
delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn
Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
subject to collation and deductible from the share in the COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
or rents pertaining to them. JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING
THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER
Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
Creditors. THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION
OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE
ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO
for administration including provisions for the support Of CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND
Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE
Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9 VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE
THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition The issue for resolution is whether the probate court,
and sustained the probate courts order in a decision after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant
dated January 5, 1995.11 an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the
Hence, this petition. titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all
properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Petitioner claims that:
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
Revised Rules of Court provides: provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren,
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error,
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the
widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the respondents six months after the date of first publication of
testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully which is allowed only under the following conditions:
employed. In addition, the provision expressly states
children of the deceased which excludes the latters Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. -
grandchildren. Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 13 of the affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among
Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
the time of the testators death, provides that during the set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil And Rule 90 provides that:
status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the estate. 14 The law is rooted on Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15 the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
persons may demand and recover their respective shares the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
from the executor or administrator, or any other person directs, or when provision is made to meet those
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy obligations.19
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of
six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors,
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
payment of said obligations within such time as the court one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution
directs.18 of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet
the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after admitting the
will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its
due execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. - An executor
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 23 debts and expenses for administration.28
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was When petitioner moved for further release of the funds
controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously
Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and
1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as moved again for the release of additional funds for the same
his fathers will included the estate of his mother and reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to expenses for administration before releasing any further
who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their money in his favor.
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall
proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. 26 It was relevantly noted by the probate court that
petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner
assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the
all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As
administration,27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds
of Court explicitly provides: of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess
all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of
the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.32
DECISION
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner
sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to should have been filed with the probate court before which
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending,
pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States agreement was void, considering that it had not been
and there was no information on his address or the date of approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court
was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola. further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the
now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
filed her Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement
and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held
the joint agreement. that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-
raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63. The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and
[14]
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the
was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the following as errors of the trial court:
complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision reads:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola
THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should
A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE have been presented before the probate court. [17]
PROBATE COURT.
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its
THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED. partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no
valid partition may be had until after the will has been
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent
PROCEEDING.[16] Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver.
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation
of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision
heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been SO ORDERED.[18]
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no
longer necessary to present the same before the probate court In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was following errors to the CA:
not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by
the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, I.
particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present
ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate
the claim in the estate proceedings.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN
FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT. THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS
II. BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION
THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE BANK.[19]
HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED. The petitioner claims that the obligations of the
deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article
III. 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate
court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she
PROCEEDING. is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto.
The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
IV. deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action
DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER- to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint
APPELLANT UNION BANK. agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
V. heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA
the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void.
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore,
Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her
December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or
made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are claim that she is in estoppel.
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the
express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she
the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was
latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. there any document presented as evidence to show that she
Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late
claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses father.
that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased. The petition is bereft of merit.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a)
Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by
of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of
claim should have been filed with the probate court. She the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings deceased.
of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a
claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
said agreement. deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
[21]
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
partition among the heirs until after the will has been three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
probated: involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence,
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
authentication of a will decides no other question than such already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them
with those requirements or solemnities which the law in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount
prescribes for the validity of a will.[22] to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
[23]
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus,
holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the
which reads as follows: nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar,
court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. [28] In the
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the
joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim
the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
(3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If
against the estate of the deceased. not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
The question that now comes to fore is whether the whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
and use the above-described chattel and each of them to counterclaims in any action that the executor or
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside executor or administrator commences an action, or
Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
take possession and use of their respective share under the has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness claims may be set off against each other in such action; and
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
effect. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
in the probate court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31] in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to
which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed
of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the documentary
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the
heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found.
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[32] presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not
the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file
the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish
its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration
SUPREME COURT of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
Manila respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
SECOND DIVISION Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No.
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City,
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos
not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied
estate. by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August
2009.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting The Issues
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of
the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE,
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED
the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA- jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
MARRIAGE; AND in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED supplied).
THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12 as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
The Courts Ruling elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
We find the petition bereft of merit. application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where
for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
decedent resides at the time of his death: sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words,
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and and her children. It disproves rather than supports
consistency.19 petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding
RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo upon this Court.21
was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
laid in the said city. marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It must
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after
1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action voidable marriages, to wit:
for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
interested party may attack a void marriage. 24 signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of from the National Archive that no information relative to the
rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus,
marriage.25 the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners
spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of Petition for Letters of Administration.
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down
does not extinguish such cause of action. the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
bigamous. executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be interested person and must show, so far as known to the
granted: petitioner:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case (a) The jurisdictional facts;
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have the names and residences of the creditors, of the
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; decedent;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case (c) The probable value and character of the property
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by of the estate;
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days (d) The name of the person for whom letters of
after the death of the person to apply for administration are prayed.
administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent letters of administration.
and willing to serve;
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
to serve, it may be granted to such other person as has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
the court may select. estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus: In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to
be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the
debts of the estate are satisfied. 29Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law. THIRD DIVISION
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson,
- versus-
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
CALLEJO, SR., and
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA Complaint for partition, annulment, and
BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., recovery of possession filed by the heirs
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES, hereby DISMISSED.
FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents. On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration[3] of the
foregoing Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of
the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs
Promulgated: of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006,
petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs
of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an
Opposition to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, [4] to
February 5, 2007
which the respondents filed a Rejoinder [5] on 23 May
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the
- - - - - - - - - -x Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel for the respondents.[6] Atty. Brioso then
filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006, respectively, a
Reply[7] and Supplemental Reply[8] to the petitioners
Opposition to respondents Motion for
RESOLUTION
Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder [9] to
the respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2006.
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its
[1]
Decision in the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, [10] are as
petitioners. The dispositive portion[2] reads as follows:
follows
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
Petitioners are the heirs of the
the assailed Decision of the Court of
late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31
consisting of her surviving
August 2001, affirming the Decision of
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Riza
the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-
linas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and
5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby
the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away. Respondents, on the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof,
other hand, are the heirs of the received new TCTs, covering the said
late Maximino Briones (Maximino), properties, now in her name.
composed of his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in Donata died on 1 November
representation of the deceased siblings 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces,
of Maximino. instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate
xxxx of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
Maximino was married administrators of Donatas intestate
to Donata but their union did not produce estate. Controversy arose
any children. When Maximino died on 1 among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate exclusive ownership of three parcels of land,
proceedings to settle her husbands estate covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and
with the CebuCity Court of First Instance 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation,
(CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July executed in her favor by her
1952, the CFI issued Letters of aunt Donata. The other heirs
Administration appointing Donata as of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She Court, however, was no longer informed of
submitted an Inventory the subsequent development in the intestate
of Maximinos properties, which included, proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as
among other things, the following parcels of far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs
land x x x. of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be
on the same side.
xxxx
On 21 January
The CFI would subsequently issue 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew
an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC
ownership of the aforementioned real for Letters of Administration for the
properties to Donata. On 27 June intestate estate of Maximino, which was
1960, Donata had the said CFI Order initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals
from Maximinos properties. But then, x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set of Maximino were entitled to of the real
Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, properties covered by TCTs No. 21542,
claiming that the said properties were 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It
already under his and his wifes also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs
administration as part of the intestate estate of Maximino the said properties and to
of Donata. Silverios Letters of render an accounting of the fruits thereof.
Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino was subsequently set aside by The heirs of Donata appealed the
the RTC. RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in
On 3 March 1987, the heirs its Decision, promulgated on 31 August
of Maximino filed a Complaint with the 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
RTC against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of xxxx
possession of real property, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted
an Amended Complaint, on 11 December Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs
1992. They alleged that Donata, of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.
as administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge
of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in
her name the real properties belonging to the In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this
intestate estate of Maximino.
Court found the Petition meritorious and,
xxxx reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the
After trial in due course, the RTC Complaint for partition, annulment, and
rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in recovery of possession of real property filed by
favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x. the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794. This Court summed up its findings,[11] thus
xxxx
In summary, the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
of Maximino failed to prove by 5794, the same should have been
clear and convincing evidence dismissed.
that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino, registered in her Respondents move for the
name. In the absence of fraud, no reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
implied trust was established raising still the arguments
between Donata and the heirs that Donata committed fraud in securing the
of Maximino under Article 1456 of Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October
the New Civil Code. Donata was 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her
able to register the real properties deceased husband Maximino and authorized her
in her name, not through fraud or to have Maximinos properties registered
mistake, but pursuant to an Order, exclusively in her name; that respondents right
dated 2 October 1952, issued by to succession to the disputed properties was
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. transmitted or vested from the moment
928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to of Maximinos death and which they could no
be fairly and regularly issued, longer be deprived of; that Donata merely
declared Donata as the sole, possessed and held the properties in trust for
absolute, and exclusive heir her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this
of Maximino; hence, Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad[12] and Sevilla,
making Donata the singular owner et al. v. De Los Angeles,[13] respondents action to
of the entire estate of Maximino, recover title to and possession of their shares
including the real properties, and in Maximinos estate, held in trust for their
not merely a co-owner with the benefit by Donata, and eventually, by
other heirs of her deceased petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest,
husband. There being no basis for is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a
the Complaint of the heirs fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, being based on the fraudulent As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any
misrepresentation of Donata that she trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall be
was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order, examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code,
which produced no legal effect. Lastly, which provides that, [i]f property is acquired through
respondents asseverate that, by relying on mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
certain procedural presumptions in its Decision, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed person from whom the property comes. Hence, the foremost
their substantive right to succession, thus, question to be answered is still whether an implied trust
making justice subservient to the dictates of under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been
mere procedural fiats.[14] sufficiently established in the present case.
xxxx xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for
the foregoing pronouncements. First of all,
(m) That official the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of
duty has been regularly Administration in Special Proceedings No.
performed; 928-R before the CFI was not even referred
to nor presented during the course of the
trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the
RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals
(n) That a court, or make a finding that Donata willfully
judge acting as such, excluded from the said Petition the names,
whether in ages, and residences of the other heirs
the Philippines or of Maximino? Second, there was also no
elsewhere, was acting in the evidence showing that the CFI actually
lawful exercise of failed to send notices of Special Proceedings
jurisdiction. No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that
it did not require presentation of proof of
By reason of the foregoing service of such notices. It should be
provisions, this Court must presume, in the remembered that there stands a presumption
absence of any clear and convincing proof to
that the CFI Judge had regularly performed
the contrary, that the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
the subject matter and the parties, and to which included sending out of notices and
have rendered a judgment valid in every requiring the presentation of proof of service
respect; and it could not give credence to the of such notices; and, the heirs
following statements made by the Court of of Maximino did not propound sufficient
Appeals in its Decision. evidence to debunk such presumption. They
only made a general denial of knowledge of
xxxx
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until
1985. There was no testimony or document
presented in which the heirs
of Maximino categorically denied receipt of merely claimed to have been fortunate enough to obtain a
notice from the CFI of the pendency of copy thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.[16]
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only
evidence on record in reference to the
Respondents should be taken to task for
absence of notice of such proceedings was
springing new evidence so late into the
the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia),
proceedings of this case. Parties should present
one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
all their available evidence at the courts below
so as to give the opposing party the opportunity
to scrutinize and challenge such evidence
xxxx during the course of the trial. However, given
that the existence of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and
was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit the copy submitted is a certified true copy of
considering that she was not testifying on the said Order; and that the said Order may
matters within her personal knowledge. The provide new information vital to a just resolution
phrase I dont think is a clear indication that of the present case, this Court is compelled to
she is merely voicing out her opinion on
consider the same as part of the evidence on
how she believed her uncles and aunts
would have acted had they received notice record.
of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, The CFI Order[17] in question reads in full as
the Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence
on record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI ORDER
Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only This is with reference to the Motion
submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960,
annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners that she be declared the sole heir of her
opposition to their motion for reconsideration of this Courts deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones,
Decision.Respondents did not offer any explanation as to the latter having died without any legitimate
why they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but
ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
brother or sister, nephews or nieces. that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court
was not able to order that these siblings be given personal
At the hearing of this incident today, notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in
nobody appeared to resist the motion, and mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or
based on the uncontradicted testimony intestate, is a proceeding in rem,[19] and that the publication
of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
surviving relative of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed
deceased Maximino Suico Brionesat the by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
time of the latters death, and pursuant to the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of
of the Philippines, the Court hereby the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased
sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
estate of the especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in
deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of voluntarily or involuntarily made.
this estate after paying all the obligations
thereof, which properties are those contained This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order
in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952. was the result of the intestate proceedings instituted
by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in
Cebu City, January 15, 1960. its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge
conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order
Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A
on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete
in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in
by Donata as administratrix of Maximinos intestate estate, newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to
which was dated 2 October 1952.[18] Other than such require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither
observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which can this Court find any reason or explanation as to
could change its original position in the Decision under why Maximinos siblings could have missed the published
consideration. notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of presented by respondents failed to overcome the given
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, presumptions.
dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for
respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of Although Donata may have alleged before
respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere the CFI that she was her husbands sole heir, it
procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the establishment of was not established that she did so knowingly,
rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court
in De Dios v. Court of Appeals[20] maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court
to conclude that she indeed committed
Procedural rules are designed to fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the
insure the orderly and expeditious delay by which respondents filed the present
administration of justice by providing for a case, when the principal actors involved,
practical system by which the parties to a particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings,
litigation may be accorded a full and fair
have already passed away and their lips forever
opportunity to present their respective
positions and refute each other's submissions sealed as to what truly transpired between
under the prescribed requirements, them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings
conditions and limitations. Adjective law is No. 928-R took place when all these principal
not the counterfoil of substantive law. In actors were still alive and each would have been
fact, there is a symbiotic relationship capable to act to protect his or her own right
between them. By complying faithfully with
to Maximinos estate. Letters of Administration
the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are
better able to discuss, analyze and of Maximinos estate were issued in favor
understand substantive rights and duties and of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI
consequently to more effectively protect and Order in question was issued only on 15 January
enforce them. The other alternative is 1960. The intestate proceedings for the
judicial anarchy. settlement of Maximinos estate were thus
pending for almost eight years, and it is the
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general
rule, and abandonment thereof should only be done in the burden of the respondents to establish that their
most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied parents or grandparents, Maximinos surviving
upon by this Court in the instant case are disputable siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the
presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or
said proceedings all these years. As established to answer for themselves, it would be the
in Ramos v. Ramos ,[21] the degree of proof to height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
establish fraud in a case where the principal their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud be
actors to the transaction have already passed
clear, beyond a reasonable
away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.],
481, 498).
Moreover, even though respondents Complaint This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its
before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for Decision the basis for barring respondents action for
partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This
action to enforce their right to the said Court pointed out therein[31] that
properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action
for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as In further support of their contention
the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as of fraud by Donata, the heirs
provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears of Maximino even emphasized
to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents
that Donata lived along the same street as
as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.
[28]
Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet,
928-R that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily she failed to inform them of the CFI Order,
excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in properties, in exclusion of all others, which
her name of new TCTs covering the real must have already put the heirs
properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino on guard if they truly believed
of Maximino. This Court, however, that they still had rights thereto.
appreciates such information differently. It
actually works against the heirs
of Maximino. Since they only lived
nearby, Maximinos siblings had ample The heirs of Maximino knew he
opportunity to inquire or discuss died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his
with Donata the status of the estate of their wake. They did not offer any explanation as
to why they had waited 33 years
deceased brother. Some of the real
from Maximinos death before one of
properties, which belonged to the estate them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
of Maximino, were also located within the Administration for the intestate estate
same area as their residences in Cebu City, of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After
and Maximinossiblings could have regularly learning that the intestate estate
observed the actions and behavior of Maximino was already settled in Special
of Donata with regard to the said real Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another
two years, before instituting, on 3 March
properties. It is uncontested that from the
1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
time of Maximinos death on 1 May Complaint for partition, annulment and
1952, Donata had possession of the real recovery of the real property belonging to
properties. She managed the real properties the estate of Maximino. x x x
and even collected rental fees on some of
them until her own death on 1 November
1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took
possession of the real properties, and
continued to manage the same and collect Considering the circumstances in the
the rental fees thereon. Donata and, afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously respondents conduct before this Court,
exercising rights of ownership over the real particularly the belated submission of evidence
and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances which are not
action, without any proffered reason or present in the case at bar.
justification for such delay.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the 5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then
Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued on March 3, an ordinary housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who
1998 by the probate court in favor of respondent and against never received any formal education, and did not
all adverse occupants of Lot 11.7 even know how to read and write. When Trinidad
Claverio Sabidong, together with her children and
the complainant in this case, tried to negotiate with 8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the
the Estate for the sale of the subject property, they family of the complainant and negotiated for the sale
were informed that all papers for transaction must of the property and transfer of the title in favor of the
pass through the respondent in this case, Nicolasito latter. Respondent made the complainant and his
Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries and family believed that he is the representative of the
they learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then the estate and that he needed a downpayment right
Clerk of Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court away. All the while, the Sabidong family (who were
in Cities, Iloilo City and presently, the City Sheriff carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who
of Iloilo City; belong to the underprivileged) relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason
Court III, MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by that respondent represented himself as the City
reason of his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate Sheriff;
was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x Taking
advantage of this inside information that the land 9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the
subject of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial complainant who was fortunate to have worked
Court in Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a abroad, sent the amount of Ten Thousand
Clerk of Court III, the respondent surreptitiously (P10,000.00) Pesos to complainants mother, to be
offered to buy the said lot in litigation. x x x given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After
receiving the money, respondent assured the
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did Sabidong family that they will not be ejected from
not know that as early as 1984, the respondent had the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take care of
offered to purchase the subject lot from the estate x x everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of
x. After receiving the notice of denial of his offer to Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any
purchase, dated January 7, 1986, respondent made a receipt;
second offer to purchase the subject property the
following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well 10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it
that the subject property was being occupied. x x x took the respondent some time to see them again and
demanded additional payment. In the meanwhile, the
complainant waited for the papers of the supposed earned monies purportedly for the sale of the subject
sale and transfer of title, which respondent had property, respondent was also exercising acts of
promised after receiving the downpayment ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant
of P10,000.00; and his family;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again 15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be
received from the mother of complainant the amount an embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent
of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for acted with malice, with grave abuse of confidence
the expenses of the documentation of sale and and deceit when he represented that he can facilitate
transfer of title, and again respondent promised that the sale and titling of the subject property in favor of
the Sabidong family will not be ejected; the complainant and his family;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant 16. That when several thousands of pesos were
and his family, respondent was able to secure an given to the respondent as payment for the same and
order for the approval of his offer to purchase x x x incidental expenses relative thereto, he was able to
in Special Proceedings No. 1672 x x x; cause the transfer of the title in his favor. x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a 17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x
Writ of Possession in his favor, which the probate x x the respondent received from the complainant
court acted favorably x x x. A writ of possession was the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos x x
issued on June 27, 1989 x x x; x When a receipt was demanded, respondent refused
to issue one, and instead promised and assured the
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and complainant that they will not be ejected;
confidence which the Sabidong family has shown,
considering that respondent was an officer of the xxxx
court and a City Sheriff at that. The complainant and
his family thought that respondent, being a City 19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law,
Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to the
their favor. Never had they ever imagined that while respondent the amount of Three Thousand
respondent had been receiving from them hard- (P3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the subdivision of
the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally
subdivision and after the same was approved, the filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely
complainant did not know that two (2) titles were and voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to
issued in the name of the respondent. x x x; the respondent, thinking that respondent was helping
in the fast and easy release of the loan. While the
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to said documents were in the possession of the
Sell, for the complainant and his neighbor Norberto respondent, he never made any transaction with the
Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant to their HDMF, worse, when complainant tried to secure a
previous agreement for the buyers to avail of a copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not
housing loan with the Home Development Mutual signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the
seminar of the HDMF for seven (7) times, in his 22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that
desire to consummate the sale. However, when the respondent had canceled the sale and that respondent
complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he refused to return the documents required by the
was surprised that the owner of the subject property HDMF. Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he can
was the respondent. When complainant raised a cause the demolition of the house of the complainant
question about this, respondent assured complainant and of his family. Respondent threatened the
that everything was alright and that sooner complainant and he is capable of pursuing a
complainant will be the owner of the property. demolition order and serve the same with the
Complainant and his family, all these years, had assistance of the military. x x x;
believed and continued to believe that the owner was
the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only 23. After learning of the demolition order,
the representative of the estate; complainant attempted to settle the matter with the
respondent, however, the same proved futile as
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been respondent boasted that the property would now cost
notarized on June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof at Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos;
was given to the complainant by the respondent.
Respondent then, took the papers and documents 24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly,
required by the HDMF to be completed, from the complainant and his family were duped by the
respondent and are helpless victims of an officer of
the court who took advantage of their good faith and Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court
trust. Complainant later was informed that the officers of property and rights in litigation within their
subject property was awarded to the respondent as jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended
his Sheriffs Fees, considering that respondent that:
executed the decisions in ejectment cases filed by
the Hodges estate against the adverse occupants of 1. this administrative complaint be treated as an
its vast properties; administrative matter;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the 2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV,
respondent over the subject property is pending OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the
and a criminal complaint for Estafa is also pending same offense in the future will be dealt with more
preliminary investigation before the Office of the severely;
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No.
1559-99, both filed [by] the complainant against the 3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the
respondent.8 delivery of substantial amounts which complainant
alleged and which defendant denied, this issue
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. should be investigated and the Executive Judge of
Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should be
requiring respondent to file his comment on the Complaint designated to hear the evidence and to make a report
dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999, respondent and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
submitted his Comment.10 receipt.14
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted
Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against the recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the
respondent for insufficiency of evidence. present administrative action as a regular administrative
matter and to designate the Executive Judge of the RTC of
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the parties.
issued an Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding
respondent guilty of violating Article 149113 of the Civil
The Court, however, noted without action the Court In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his
Administrators recommendation to suspend respondent for purchase of the subject land is not covered by the prohibition
six months. in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed
out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after the MTCC of
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila
Elepao forwarded the records of this case to Executive Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He
Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a insisted that public trust was observed when complainant
Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the Court referred this case was accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of Lot
to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that
investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent cited the
from notice. By Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and
Judge Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence. damages which complainant filed against him.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired
the case for annulment of title, damages and injunction from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy
against respondent for lack of merit.19 Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, requesting for the
release of his retirement benefits pending resolution of the
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to administrative cases against him. 24 In a Memorandum25 dated
reassign the instant administrative case to Executive Judge September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report and Elepao made the following recommendations:
recommendation within 60 days from notice. In a
Letter21dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk
informed the Court that per the records, the parties have of Court, MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his
presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before retirement benefits be GRANTED; and
retired Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required Management Office, Office of the Court
the parties to file their respective memoranda within 60 days Administrator be DIRECTED to (1) WITHHOLD
from notice, upon submission of which the case shall be the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
deemed submitted for resolution.22 (P200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of
Nicolasito S. Solas to answer for any administrative In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted
liability that the Court may find against him in A.M. Judge Patricios Investigation Report and referred the same
No. P-01-1448 (Formerly Administrative Matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99-659-P; evaluation, report and recommendation.
OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P;
and (2) RELEASE the balance of his retirement Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
benefits.26
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for
the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and
investigation, report and recommendation. recommended the forfeiture of respondents salary for six
months, which shall be deducted from his retirement
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report benefits.
and Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Based on the extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts
evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded that he received from complainant and Saplagio without due
respondent misappropriated the money which he received for notice, respondent failed to act with justice and equity. He
the filing of complainants loan application. Such money found respondents denial to be anchored merely on the fact
could not have been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280- that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his
D-4-11 since the same was already subdivided into Lots 11- admission that he had asked money for the expenses of
A and 11-B when respondent presented the Contract to Sell partitioning Lot 11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since
to complainant. And despite respondents promise to keep their PAG-IBIG loan applications did not materialize,
complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the complainant should have returned the amounts given to him
subject property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of by complainant and Saplagio.
demolition against them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended
the forfeiture of respondents salary for six months to be On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a
deducted from his retirement benefits. Resolution30 requiring the parties to manifest whether they
are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings and records already filed with the Court. However,
the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 which x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the
postal carriers notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public
Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
his willingness to submit the case for decision and prayed for relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and
an early resolution of the case. confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these
persons.32 "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud,
Our Ruling or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud,
which is what can and must be done."33
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court
officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of property must take place during the pendency of the
their courts. Said provision reads: litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. 35
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another: In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
xxxx which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property is
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings
connected with the administration of justice, the property (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of judge.36 A property forming part of the estate under judicial
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
profession. probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long relation to and be connected with the performance of the
as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been public officers official duties amounting either to
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction discharge the duties of the office.39
of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud
entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness
27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the and straightforwardness."40
execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the
Civil Code. Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of such power to
intercede for overstaying occupants of the estates properties
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court officer,
of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to a City Sheriff at that, complainants family completely relied
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying
he was Clerk of Court. was for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through
respondent, complainants family readily gave the amounts
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for he demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the
dishonesty and grave misconduct. requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the
while and unknown to complainants family, respondent was
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and actually working to acquire Lot 11 for himself.
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
as well as gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, Estate for the sale of the property to him, he collected as
serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The down payment P5,000 from complainants family in July
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere 1986. Four months later, on November 18, 1986, the probate
error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct court approved respondents offer to purchase Lot 11. The
latter received further down payment from complainant in Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of P2,000
the amount of P10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the to defray the expenses for documentation and transfer of title
Deed of Sale with Mortgage41dated November 21, 1994 in complainants name. In the latter instance, while it may be
could be executed in respondents favor. argued that respondent already had the capacity to sell the
subject property, the sum of all the circumstances belie an
Thereafter, respondent demanded P3,000 from complainant honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to
supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter complainant. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-
and the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained 1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent
title over said lot that the same was subdivided into Lots 11- executed a Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the
A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that the issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered
Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the owner."44 Soon after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A
Land Management Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into and TCT No. T-11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in
sublots 11-A and 11-B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997 the name of respondent on February 28, 1997 only eight
two years after TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was months after he executed the Contract to Sell47 in favor of
issued in respondents name on December 5, 1994. complainant on June 3, 1996.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the
estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had left no approval of the inventory.7cralawred
real properties but only personal properties worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir the inventory.
Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.2 With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined
regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas motion through the Ruling of the RTC
order of January 8, 1993.
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding
order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrixs
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders
par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock the said administratrix to redo the inventory of properties
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her
mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May
(60) days from notice of this order. 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of III
discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in
ordering her as administrator to include real properties that THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that
WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO early as February 17, 1989 for the purpose of saving, as in
MERCADO.12 avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7)
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for parcels of land were included; that as to the January 10,
certiorari, disposing as follows:13 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been even at
the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12,
this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders 1989, were again given monetary consideration through
dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed shares of stock; that even if the assignment had been based
and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various about the estate planning scheme; that the RTC, as an
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and
dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised determine the issue of title to property registered in the name
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by
and affirmed in all other respects. the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
SO ORDERED. presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that
petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC
pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the issue of which properties should be included in the
the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the inventory.
vendee upon its actual and constructive delivery, and to
Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale The CA further opined as follows:
made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it
ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what
properties are to be included in or excluded from the Issue
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed
dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in
jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares
considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the Ruling of the Court
administratrixs motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a The appeal is meritorious.
third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
corporation, which under the law possessed a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the I
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Was certiorari the proper recourse
Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed. to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends
had no authority to determine the applicability of the that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co
public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited respondents was not proper.
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless
failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have Thelmas contention cannot be sustained.
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a
a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed. 14 were final or interlocutory in nature. In PahilaGarrido v.
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished appeal of the judgment itself.
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas
to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional
otherwise, it is final. and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that
of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an the order of the intestate court excluding certain real
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion
the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily was not a final but an interlocutory order in the sense that it
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur Village lots. The Court observed there that:
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose
as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued whether a certain property should or should not be included
by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the appealable may be the subject of an appeal in due course.
parties (3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
Edition, pages 4489 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L42257, (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or
June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
supplied) rendered) is expressly made nonappealable.
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a
the Court declared that a probate court, whether in a testate practical recognition of the possibility that material issues
or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title may be finally determined at various stages of the special
provisionally, and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of
Appeals, that the patent reason is the probate courts limited Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
action. Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of taken. An interested person may appeal in special
Appeals,20 the Court pointed out: proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties where such order or judgment:
is determine whether they should or should not be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by (a) Allows or disallows a will;
the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership,
then the opposing parties and the administrator have to (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court person is entitled;
cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against
orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first it;
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also
governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee
the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of or guardian;
law that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
administrator; and court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing
to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and
it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate,
for reconsideration. and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, months from the issuance of letters of administration
did not come under any of the instances in which multiple pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
appeals are permitted.
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within
three months. Within three (3) months after his
II appointment every executor or administrator shall return to
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
in directing the inclusion of the properties personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
in the estate of the decedent? possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such
estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers to give his or their assistance.
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
in the inventory notwithstanding their having been inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is
and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession
name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
Was the CA correct in its conclusion? exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the possession of another person or entity.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
estate.23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
the question of what properties should be included in the cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
from the inventory in the absence of positive abuse of his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
discretion, for in the administration of the estates of properties is to determine whether or not they should be
deceased persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
shown that there has been a positive abuse of and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
discretion.25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of determination of the conflicting claims of title.
the regular performance of its judicial duty.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as justified by expediency and convenience.
an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the without prejudice to final determination of ownership in
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26 parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio
determination of the status of each heir and whether the Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her
property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank
bold emphasis supplied) account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one
half thereof should be included in the inventory of the
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual properties constituting as estate of her husband.
bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in
question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz: In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing
in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls657D located in
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as
that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is
listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
Special Proceedings No. 306R which are supposed to be When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB12690
divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of
being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner
that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in
Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina Mercado Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu
should be included in the inventory of properties required to should be included in the inventory in this case.
be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the
include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit
Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was
her from money derived from the taxicab business which she a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days
and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in
As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that
character, onehalf thereof or of the value thereof should be the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a
testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). specific property acquired during that property regime did
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the
provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive
determined by including the value at the time of his death of ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of
death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to
still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, were,31and which of the properties should form part of the
the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of
the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the
Cebu City Assessors Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already
O).28 registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made
findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of 12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was
The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to still in Emigdios name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order
include the properties in question in the inventory rested on of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353
good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
arbitrary, or capricious.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio Case No. CEB12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case
from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory No. CEB12692 was susceptible of various interpretations,
because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could
shares being inherited by Emigdio. have already threshed out their differences with the
assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita
their property regime was the conjugal partnership of herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty
gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdios estate, it appeared to be a family corporation.
was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the
conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view
instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale the deed of assignment. This is because:
only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands;
legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of
Appeals:33 proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to
vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and certificate at the time of registration or that may arise
make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
intention of the parties still and always is the primary inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
consideration in determining the true nature of a presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 35
contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should
of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by
Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The
was a circumstance that should put any interested party on limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was have constricted the determination of the rights to the
a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent
pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the
correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with
established in court. special and limited jurisdiction, was still deemed to have all
the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens effective.37
titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
prepared and submitted for the important purpose of discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
herself, to bring into the mass of the estate any property or refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
right which he (or she) may have received from the contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers acted in a
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, of jurisdiction.39
and in the account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by In light of the foregoing, the CAs conclusion of grave abuse
the decedent on the legitime of an heir may be heard and of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate erroneous.
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
decedent.38 3094CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio
Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
The determination of which properties should be excluded and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
from or included in the inventory of estate properties was suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted SO ORDERED.
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of
the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As
long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Republic of the Philippines On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate,
SUPREME COURT leaving several heirs, including his_ children with his first
Manila wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as
well as several properties including a resort covered by
THIRD DIVISION Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No.
51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015 home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos.
40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR.
RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with
by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated
vs. September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedros
ALARAS, Respondents. second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria
and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the
by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge complaint on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and
and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further
she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, contended that what they purchased was only the
which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from a Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale
bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
Silangan of the amount of P87, 352.62 releasing her and her sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma.
late husbands indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,
has no record of any transaction involving the subject 000.00. 11
properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to
the same. When respondents went to the subject properties, On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of
they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due
been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by
the premises were padlocked. petitioners .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the
execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not
notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late duly commissioned as such on the date it was
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the
this, They caused the annotation of their adverse claims over acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten
the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed
for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject that both documents were Never presented to the Office of
properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued the Register of Deeds for registration and That the titles to
pursuant thereto. 8 the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and
His second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries
and buyers of the Subject properties were not even presented
as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and 5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons,
execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis whose Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4)
thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its parcels of land described in Par. 4-c above is derived from
Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide: the rights and interest of defendant Villafria, to vacate its
premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf
Hereby rendered as follows: of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the
settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in parties. 42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
the resolution of an action for partition, as held in definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a
Municipality of Bifzanv. Garcia: 40 partition of an estate. 43
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial
up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of
in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of
exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Since the action herein was not merely for partition and
recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and xxxx
documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
the instant petition for annulment of judgment must parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of
necessarily fail. the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
the determination of the status and rights of the respondents evil case - subject of the present case, could and had already
as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the fact in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue during pre-trial.
of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court
explained: In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly to administration proceedings since a determination of
that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it pre-trial, x x x. 48
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the
causes of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the
trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more
than ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner executed by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the
cannot now be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt
because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to
repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition and a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate courts
recovery of possession in the same proceeding does not strip observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the
the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were
of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the
in an action for partition. properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the
impression 'that they bought both the resort and the family
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they
considered valid as to the heirs who assented to the only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they
conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this presented the subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other document
the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by which w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration
both courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the to the selling heirs. 51Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal
documents on which petitioners claims are based were infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance,
inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished
acknowledged before a notary public who was not several cottages, and introduced permanent improvements
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They thereon.
were never presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that
of the subject properties presented as witnesses. petitioners failed to adequately substantiate, with
convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof,
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject
estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In
of its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner
failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They is given more than ample opportunity to be heard,
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
of the subject lands based on the same. judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence
presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in
value and builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the the absence of any showing that the same were rendered
belief of title builder that the land the latter is building on is with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's.
Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest defects in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is
instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13,
been placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals
cottages and constructed improvement on the properties. for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment
Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given credence. dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217,
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be Certificates of Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family
modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are
mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed AFFIRMED.
resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in
our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient SO ORDERED.
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment is allowed only under the