25.

Marquez vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying
for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against
Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against
him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A
warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged flight from that country.

Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was
dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto
proceeding against private respondent.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of
respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner
instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is
said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes
within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and
abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves
great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA
166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be
made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.

The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in
fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts
opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC
for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

26. People v. Holgado

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight
hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On may 8, 1948, the day set for the
trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:

Court: Is this the case ready for trial?

Fiscal: I am ready, your honor.
Court: to the accused.
Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this
question.
Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I
found no evidence against this Ocampo.
Court: Sentenced reserved.
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:

[Criminal Case No. V-118]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant.

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

SENTENCE

The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention in the following

INFORMATION

That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of

Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
being a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
 without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.

Contrary to law.

This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the
information above described.

The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by
article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18 and
punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate sentence
law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium
degree as minimum, or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years, with
the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of his
preventive imprisonment.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the offense
charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the
accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the formation filed
by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention."
The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital
offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the
accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party, the
trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding
the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and
one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true
facts of the case.

The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of
Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2
After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4
If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did
not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The
trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do
you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the
accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was
so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead
guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause
contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure
an attorney of his own.

It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but
with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire
as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was
real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no
way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of
the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated
Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was
wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified
plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by
counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to
be capital by the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counsel. So ordered.

27. United States vs. Ash

Brief Fact Summary. A number of informants were asked to identify a number of suspects in connection
with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the respondent), challenged the identification because
counsel was not present at what was arguably a critical stage of the prosecution.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to resolve the split in
the circuits as to the issue of whether an accused has the right to counsel at a post indictment
photographic lineup. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel at a display at which the defendant
himself was not entitled to be present was not embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution). The Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue. Whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants an accused the right to have counsel
present at a post indictment photographic identification procedure?

Held. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution does not grant an accused the right to counsel during a
post indictment photographic identification procedure because the accused himself is not entitled to be
present, rendering it impossible that the accused will be confused or overpowered by the proceedings.

28. People vs. Liwanag

Facts: This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-appellant was denied his
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by himself and counsel. He argues that his right to be heard
through his counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel throughout the proceedings,
from the time he was arrested up to the time judgment is rendered.

The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial court, accused-appellant was
represented by counsel de officio, Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys Office. In the middle of the
trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de parte Atty. Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing
Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on
behalf of accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the appellants brief because of the refusal
of accused-appellants mother to transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant
was required to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon
accused-appellants failure to reply, Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio.

There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him
during the arraignment and conducted the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as well as his
direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined up to the presentation of other
defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his choice.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgadoi and Powell v. Alabama,ii insofar as the right to be
heard by counsel is concerned, is misleading. Both cases only defined the right to be heard by counsel as
the right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these cases that the right to be heard by
counsel presupposes the right to an intelligent counsel. The requirement is not for counsel to be
intelligent, but to be effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in the light of Article III, Section 12 (1) of
the Constitution, which refers to the right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v. Lucero,iii
the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and
fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in
the same case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel
during that stage before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and
other undue influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible.
(Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution requires that the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for
the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental
right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for due process is the concept of
fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words, there can be no due process accorded an
accused if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in
order to be heard, and therefore be accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel must be
effective as implied in the rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to
American jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a
fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right
to effective assistance of counsel.iv
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends that the right to be heard by
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Citing Strickland v. Washington,v accused-appellant
contends that the assistance rendered by counsel is ineffective or is defective if the following elements
are present: (1) that counsels performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsels errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial which result is reliable. Accused-appellant claims that the
assistance afforded him by his counsel during the course of the trial was ineffective since the counsel de
officio failed to safeguard his rights necessary for the reversal of his conviction.
The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that appellants counsel de oficio, Atty.
William Uy, cross-examined the private complainant extensively as well as two other prosecution
witnesses (SPO1 Sevilla and Edith Hernandez). That said counsel opted not to cross-examine the
prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario, is of no moment because said witness merely explained in
court her findings and conclusions that she had arrived at after conducting the medical examination on
the private complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN, March 30, 1993, pp. 10-12). In fact, at one point, Atty. Uy raised
an objection to the private prosecutors question on how private complainants genital injuries were
sustained for being incompetent to answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial judge
(Ibid., p. 13).
In assessing the effectiveness of counsels assistance, the Strickland standard invoked by accused-
appellant is too stringent for application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only seeks to ensure that
the adversarial testing process is present in a case by requiring that the assistance rendered by counsel
be effective. The presence of an adversarial testing process, in other words, ensures that the trial is fair
by according the accused due process through the effective assistance of counsel.
While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Philippine Constitution, the
assistance afforded by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine constitutional requirement need
only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an
accused is presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the
circumstances in accordance with said norms.
In this regard, a counsel assisting an accused is guided by the following provisions of Section 20 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -- It is the duty of an attorney:
x x xx x x xxx
 (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law;
x x xx x x xxx
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. (Italics supplied)
The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, likewise, provide:
Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
x x xx x x xxx
Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
x x xx x x xxx
Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
x x xx x x xxx
Canon 19 -- A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Lastly, the Canons of Professional Ethics provide:
4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any
trivial reason and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf.
5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent persons, victims only of suspicious
circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound,
by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that
no person may be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law.
15.x x x xxx xxx
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken or
be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind
that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a counsels conduct in the performance of
his duty to assist a client in an effective manner as required by Article III, Section 14 (2). Said
constitutional provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the American Constitution. As in Article
III, Section 14 (2), the Sixth Amendment refers simply to counsel, not specifying particular requirements of
effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal professions maintenance of standards sufficient to justify
the laws presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment
envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms
29. People vs. Larranaga

FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn,
her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with
masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After
almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated
in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in
the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a
red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they
met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu
City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started
to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became
a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants
guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia,
that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16
years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.

HELD: 1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint
design and community of interest. The appellants actions showed that they had the same objective to
kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that the appellants indeed
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from
complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to
dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim;
and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to
the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when
the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion
perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the
statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing
two (2) reclusiones perpetua.

30. People vs. Simben

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating
paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of indecent
or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view in the City
of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid of counsel.

The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for
trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid
of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the information read
to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter
translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty.
He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law
would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of
guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed
upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net

What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and
safeguarded. The Court complied with its duly when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have
the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he was
aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he
waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information.

Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would
be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to
bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not
guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not
render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out to the defendant a
penalty which is provided by law.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.
i

ii

iii

iv