SECOND DIVISION and damages. The action, docketed as Civil Case No.
68896
[G.R. No. 169292, April 13 : 2011]
SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND
AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS.
CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA,
REPRESENTED BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
August 11, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-GR. SP No. 89329, filed by petitioners, Spouses
Francisco De Guzman, Jr. and Amparo O. De Guzman
(petitioners). In the assailed decision, the CA found no
commission of grave abuse of discretion when the public
respondent therein, Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Judge Fabros),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City,
Branch 160 (RTC), denied petitioners' second motion to
dismiss, in Civil Case No. 68896, an action for annulment of
contract and damages.
The facts of the case have been succinctly summarized by
the CA as follows:
On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and
Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, ostensibly
acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment
of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale
and entitled Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa
M. Guevarra, et al., was raffled to Branch 160, presided by
the respondent RTC Judge.
On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil
Case No. 68896, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the
private respondents.
On December 16, 2002, the respondent RTC Judge denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and at the same time set Civil
Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference, directing the parties
to submit their respective pre-trial briefs.
On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a second motion to
dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum
shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the
principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint
fatally defective and thus dismissible.
The private respondents opposed the second motion to
dismiss.
On February 12, 2004, the respondent RTC Judge issued her
first assailed order, denying the second motion to dismiss,
disposing thus:
xxx
Inasmuch as the records show that the pending incident is
the second motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the
same is hereby Denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On May 25, 2004. the petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the
motion through her second assailed order dated December
29, 2004, to wit:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
dated February 12, 2004, filed by the defendant Spouses
Francisco and Amparo De Guzman, through counsel, on
May 25, 2004, and after considering the grounds stated
therein in support of their motion, and finding no cogent
reason to warrant the reconsideration sought for, the motion
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA
via a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC should
have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was
fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa
but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the
attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the
attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to
Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in
court. Thus, according to the petitioners, the denial by the
RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical
and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
should be struck down as null and void.
On August 11, 2005, the CA denied the petition for lack' of
merit. The CA, in its decision, agreed with the RTC that
following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the
complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed
waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to
dismiss.
Not in conformity, the petitioners filed this petition for
review under Rule 45, anchored on this:
GROUND
THE COURT A QUO DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DISMISS, THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT WAS INDUBITABLY SHOWN AND
ESTABLISHED THAT THE ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING PURSUANT TO SECTION 5,
RULE 7 OF THE RULES OF COURT WAS NOT
OBSERVED AND COMPLIED WITH SINCE THE
SAME WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PERSONALLY
BY THE PURPORTED PLAINTIFFS THEREIN.
It is the position of the petitioners that the second motion to
dismiss does not violate the Omnibus Motion Rule under
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue
raised in the second motion was a question of jurisdiction.
For said reason, the matter of the defective verification and
certification cannot be considered to have been waived when
it was not interposed at the first instance. Considering that
the issue is jurisdictional, the RTC should have dismissed the
complaint motu proprio.
The Court disagrees with the petitioners.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes
of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.[3]
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed
in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.[4]
Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the
Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By
"grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all
in contemplation of law.[5]
In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly
substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge
Fabros. Absent such showing of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the
ruling of the CA.
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus
motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or
proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion
because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this
reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion,
must raise and include all objections available at the time of
the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As
inferred from the provision, only the following defenses
under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application:
[a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is
another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the
statute of limitations or prescription.
In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of
defective verification and certification of forum shopping
only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite
the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at
the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent
any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the
ground of defective verification and certification of forum
shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be
questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
dismiss.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement
regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance with
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In
fact, the court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is
not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. [6]

Similarly, the rule requiring the submission of such

certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is
not jurisdictional.[7] The certification requirement is rooted
in the principle that a party-litigant shall
not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora, as this Q practice is detrimental to an orderly
judicial procedure.[8]

As to whether the trial court should have dismissed the

complaint motu proprio, the Court rules in the negative.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to
comply with the requirements on the rule against forum
shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of the case "upon
motion and after hearing."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the
Republic of the Philippines Resolution[1] dated December 18, 2008 of the Court of
SUPREME COURT Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611, entitled Maximo
Manila D. Sison v. Fr. Noel Labendia for Himself and in
Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement, Diocese of
Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar. The CA Resolution denied
THIRD DIVISION petitioner Office of the Ombudsmans Omnibus Motion for
Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration of the CAs June 26, 2008 Decision.[2]
OFFICE OF THE G.R. No. 185954
OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner, Present:
The Facts
CORONA, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar
VELASCO, JR., Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese
NACHURA, of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint
MAXIMO D. PERALTA, and addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo,
SISON, MENDOZA, JJ. accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public
Respondent. officials[3] of the Province of Samar, including respondent
Promulgated: Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered
February 16, 2010 into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison
x------------------------------------------------------------------------ was the Provincial Budget Officer.
-----------------x
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit
DECISION investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal
and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit
VELASCO, JR., J.: (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases
totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding
The Case procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared
by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines,
electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.

The Special Audit Team, which was created under
LAO Office Order No. 2003-059 dated July 7, 2003,
summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and
observations, to wit:
1. Rules and regulations pertaining to
procurement of supplies and materials
were consciously and continually
violated as disclosed in the verification
of selected purchases of the Province.
Below were the findings and
observations:
a. Purchases of various items,
totaling at least PhP 29.34
million and allegedly procured
through public bidding, were
found highly irregular for lack
of proper bidding procedures
and documentation;
b. At least PhP 28.165 million
worth of purchases through
repeat orders were made by the
Province without observing the
pertinent law, rules and
regulations governing this mode
of procurement; and
c. Emergency purchases of
medicines and assorted goods
totaling PhP 14.67 million were
found not complying with the
requirements set forth under the
Rules and Regulations on
Supplies and Property
Management in Local
Governments (RRSPMLG).
Moreover, the purchases were
charged against the calamity
fund, despite absence of any
declaration from the President
that Samar was under a state of
calamity, in violation of Sec.
324(d) of R.A. 7160.
2. Inconsistencies in the dates of
supporting documents relating to the
purchases discussed in finding No. 1
were so glaring that they raised doubts
on the validity of the transactions per se;
3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves
for calamity as funding source of
emergency purchases was not legally
established, there being no declaration
from the Office of the President that
Samar was under a state of calamity, as
required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A.
7160;
4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase
orders was resorted to in violation of
COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30,
1976;
5. There was overpricing in the purchase
of rice, medicines, electric fans and
cement in the amount of PhP
 580,000.00, PhP 322,760.00, PhP
341,040.00, and PhP 3.6 million,
respectively. An overpayment was also
committed in the payments of cement in
the amount of PhP 96,364.09;
6. Other observations gathered corollary
to the purchases made are the following:
a. Purchase Orders were not
duly accomplished to include a
complete description of the
items to be purchased, the
delivery date and the terms of
payment, in violation of the
provisions of Section 74 and
other corollary provisions of
RRSPMLG. Some were even
acknowledged by suppliers;
b. At least 36 vouchers/claims
were not supported with an
official receipt, in violation of
the provisions of Section 4 of
PD 1445 that all disbursements
must be supported with
complete documentation; and
c. Advanced deliveries of
medicines and assorted goods
were made on some purchases
even before the purchase orders
were prepared and before the
public biddings were conducted.
7. The necessity and veracity of the
distribution of t-shirts/caps, medicines,
assorted goods and cement purchased by
the Province of Samar could not be
established due to rampant
inconsistencies in dates, quantities, as
well as the signatures of the alleged
recipients in the Requisition and Issue
Slip; and,
8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance
to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS)
totaling at least PhP 5.4 million in 2002
and PhP 2.78 million as of April 2003
were granted to various applicant-
recipients without subjecting them to the
guidelines set forth by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).[4] x x x
On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed
with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial
officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The
latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and
countervailing evidence against the complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the
accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his
innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is
limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation
for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has
been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in
any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued SERVICE, and shall carry with it the cancellation of
by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. government service.

Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary Accordingly, Governor Milagrosa T.
evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his Tan and Executive Director Presentacion R.
signature and that he was neither factually connected nor Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government
directly implicated in the complaint. Finance, Department of Finance, are
respectfully directed to implement this
On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper Order upon receipt hereof and to forthwith
to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had inform the Office of compliance herewith.
not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use
of public funds by the Province of Samar. 2. The administrative complaint against
respondents MILAGROSA T. TAN, FE ORTEGA
On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman TAN ARCALES, SUSANO DIMAKILING
rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local SALURIO, BARTOLOME P. FIGUEROA,
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave ANTONIO DE LEON BOLASTIG, III,
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best ROSENAIDA A. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R.
interest of the service and dismissing him from service. The CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re-
dispositive portion of the Decision reads: election in May 2004;

VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING 3. The administrative complaint against

LIGHT, DECISION is hereby rendered as ERNESTO CARCILLAR ARCALES, FELIX T.
follows: BABALCON, JR., JIMMY R. DY, JUAN
COLINARES LATORRE, JR., MARIA LOURDES
1. Respondents ROLANDO B. MONTEJO, CORTEZ UY, BIENVENIDA P. REPOL and
DAMIANO Z. CONDE, JR., ROMEO C. RAMON P. DEAN, JR., who are no longer public
REALES, MAXIMO D. SISON, AURELIO A. officials, is DISMISSED.
BARDAJE and NUMERIANO C. LEGASPI are
FOUND GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, 4. For insufficiency of evidence, the
DISHONESTY and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO administrative complaint against ANAMIE P.
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and are MANATAD-NUNEZ and ROSIE AMARO
METED the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM VILLACORTE is DISMISSED.

5. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Office is
DIRECTED to conduct further fact-finding
investigations on the following:
a. On DV Nos. 221-2002-12-083 and
221-2002-11-065: (a) to DETERMINE the
other public officials who may be held
administratively liable; and (b) to FILE, if
necessary, the corresponding Complaint;
b. On Bid Nos. 079-2002, 442-2002,
554-2002, 861-2002, 937-2002, 947-2002,
1221-2002, 1375-2002, 1411-2002, 007-
2003, 014-2003, 023-2003, 047-2003 and
082-2002: (a) to VERIFY whether actual
public biddings took place relative to the
transactions covered by these bids; (b) to
CHECK the veracity of the documents
relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to
DETERMINE the other public officials who
may appear to be administratively liable
therefor; and (d) to FILE, if warranted, the
corresponding Complaint; and
c. On Bid Nos. 078-2002, 448-2002,
931-2002, 1230-2001, 411-2002, 944-2002,
1244-2002, 1407-2001, 198-2002, 316-2002
and 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE whether
actual public biddings were held relative to
the above-mentioned transactions; (b) to
CHECK the veracity of the documents
relative to the repeat orders made; (c) to
ASCERTAIN the other public officials who
may be held administratively liable therefor;
and (d) to FILE the corresponding
Complaint, if warranted.
Accordingly, let a copy of this
Memorandum be furnished the Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Office for its
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition
for Review under Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
96611.
On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision
reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman against Sison. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Ombudsman dated 22 August 2006 in OMB-
C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the
herein petitioner MAXIMO D. SISON
administratively liable for grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, he is
absolved from administrative liability as
charged.
SO ORDERED.[6]

In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the
Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to
convict Sison. Moreover, it reasoned that Sisons
responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to ensure
that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency
purchase being made and that he had no hand or discretion in
characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature.
Hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for simply
attesting to the existence of appropriations for a certain
purpose, save if such certification is proved to be false.
On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit
Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution of
December 18, 2008.
Hence, we have this petition.
The Issues
I Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying
petitioners right to intervene in the
proceedings, considering that (a) the Office
of the Ombudsman has sufficient legal
interest warranting its intervention in the
proceedings before the [CA] since it
rendered the subject decision pursuant to its
administrative authority over public officials
and employees; and (b) contrary to the
appellate court a quos ruling, petitioner
Office of the Ombudsman filed its Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration on a patently
erroneous decision of the [CA] which has
not yet attained finality.
II
Whether the [CA] erred in ruling that the
finding of the Office of the Ombudsman was
not supported by substantial evidence.
III
Whether the [CA] erred in giving due course
to respondents petition for review when this
was prematurely filed as it disregarded the
well-entrenched jurisprudential doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the Office of
the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.
In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of
the Ombudsman to intervene, because (1) the Office of the
Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in
the administrative case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus
Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA rendered its
Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the
quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision.
In its Petition, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman asserts that it has sufficient legal interest to
warrant its intervention in the proceedings, since it rendered
the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority
over public officials and employees. Further, it contends that
the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was timely filed, since, at
the time of its filing, the decision of the CA had not yet
attained finality.
We are not persuaded.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance
of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court.[7] The permissive tenor of the rules shows the
intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the intervention,[8] thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A
person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to
intervene. The motion to intervene may be
filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to
the motion and served on the original
parties.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an
interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to
protect their right or interpose their claim. [10] Its main
purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all
conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved.[11]
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor
be capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene,
must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
[12]
In support of its argument that it has legal interest,
the Office of the Ombudsman cites Philippine National
Bank v. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia). [13] In the said case, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee,
Garcia, the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of
duty. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against
him. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy,[14] this Court affirmed the standing
of the PNB to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution
exonerating Garcia. After all, PNB was the aggrieved party
which complained of Garcias acts of dishonesty. Should
Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent
upon PNB to take him back into its fold. PNB should,
therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision that, in its view,
hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy
employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a
premier banking institution in the country.
Based on the facts above, the Office of the
Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in
the appellate court for the following reasons:
First, Sison was not exonerated from the
administrative charges against him, and was, in fact,
dismissed for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of
the Ombudsman in the administrative case, OMB-C-A-05-
0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being,
unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on
appeal.
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the
Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its
right to appeal.
And third, Garcia should be read along
with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals [15] and National
Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v.
Mamauag (Mamauag),[16] in which this Court qualified and
clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to
actively participate in the appeal of decisions in
administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a
private complainant to appeal a decision of
the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and
45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to
appeal in the instances that the law allows
appeal. One party is the PNP member-
respondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The other party
is the government when the disciplining
authority imposes the penalty of demotion
but the government believes that dismissal
from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that
can appeal is not the disciplining authority
or tribunal which previously heard the case
and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government
party appealing must be the one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against
the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous
situation will result where the disciplining
authority or tribunal hearing the case,
instead of being impartial and detached,
becomes an active participant in prosecuting
the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court
 of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the
Court declared:
To be sure when the
resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission were brought to the
Court of Appeals, the Civil Service
Commission was included only as a
nominal party. As a quasi-judicial
body, the Civil Service Commission
can be likened to a judge who
should detach himself from cases
where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review.
In instituting G.R. No.
126354, the Civil Service
Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and
became an advocate. Its mandated
function is to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested
appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices
and agencies, not to litigate.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an
appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must
remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be
mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should
detach themselves from cases where their decisions are
appealed to a higher court for review. The raison detre for
such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active
combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing
parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate
court to decide the issues without the judges active
participation.[17] When judges actively participate in the
appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial
and have become adversarial instead.[18]
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG),[19] the
Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in
granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, to wit:
The court or the quasi-judicial
agency must be detached and impartial, not
only when hearing and resolving the case
before it, but even when its judgment is
brought on appeal before a higher court. The
judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-
judicial agency must keep in mind that he is
an adjudicator who must settle the
controversies between parties in accordance
with the evidence and applicable laws,
regulations and/or jurisprudence. His
judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law.
There must be no more need for him to
justify further his judgment when it is
appealed before appellate courts. When the
court judge or the quasi-judicial officer
 intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he
inevitably forsakes his detachment and
impartiality, and his interest in the case
becomes personal since his objective now is
no longer only to settle the controversy
between the original parties (which he had
already accomplished by rendering his
judgment), but more significantly, to refute
the appellants assignment of errors, defend
his judgment, and prevent it from being
overturned on appeal.
Likewise, the facts reveal that this case was elevated
to the CA via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, which govern
appeals to the CA from judgments or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies.
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-
95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full
names of the parties to the case without impleading the
court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents.
[20]
Thus, the only parties in such an appeal are the appellant
as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this
case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment
appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not
have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not
a third party who has a legal interest in the
administrative case against the petitioner
such that it would be directly affected by the
judgment that this Court had rendered. It
must be remembered that the legal interest
required for an intervention must be direct
and immediate in character. Lest it be
forgotten, what was brought on appeal
before this Court is the very Decision by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the
Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator,
and not an advocate, has no legal interest at
stake in the outcome of this Rule 43
Petition.[21]
Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on Time
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a
motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant
case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on
July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated
on June 26, 2008.
In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of
the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.[22] That case, however, is not
applicable here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
motion for intervention during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA.
 It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman
was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court
provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified
petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a
copy on the court or agency a quo.[23] Clearly, the Office of
the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a
motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not
now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is
expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive
onlooker.[24]

In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus

Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held
in Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no
intervention is permitted after a decision has already been
rendered.[25]

In light of the foregoing considerations, all other

issues raised in the petition are rendered moot and academic
and no further discussion is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA

Resolution dated December 18, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
96611 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION On appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated 31 May 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said
decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the
MAY D. G.R. No. 178221 Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros
AONUEVO,ALEXANDER Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and
BLEE Present: their siblings[4] to intervene in the estate proceedings of the
DESANTIS and JOHN late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.[5] The decretal portion of the
DESANTIS NERI, CORONA, C.J., decision of the appellate court reads:
Petitioners, Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE ACCORDINGLY, the petition for
CASTRO,* certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed
PERALTA,** Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26,
ABAD,*** and 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec.
-versus- PEREZ, JJ. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent
injunction is hereby issued enjoining
respondents [petitioners], their agents and
INTESTATE ESTATE OF anyone acting for and in their behalves, from
RODOLFO G. enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.[6]
JALANDONI, represented Promulgated:
by BERNARDINO G. The antecedents are:
JALANDONI as Special December 1, 2010
Administrator, Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20
Respondent. December 1966.[7] He died without issue.[8]

x------------------------------------------------------------------------ On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni

----------------------- x (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration [9] with the Court of First
DECISION Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial
settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the
PEREZ, J.: intestate court.[10]
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their
siblings filed a Manifestation[11] before the intestate court. In
the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the
children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was
revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one
John Desantis.[12]
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their
grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the
legal spouse of the latter.[13] For which reason, Isabel is
entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners
and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on
her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.[14] As it was, by the time the Manifestation was
filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with
the former predeceasing the latter.[15]
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings
appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and
Rodolfo;[16]
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; [17] and
c.) Their respective proof of births.[18]
It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings
that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish
that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her
lawful representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now
represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator,
however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the
ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to
establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very
evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage
with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married
to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation, [19] the respondent called
attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who
was born on 14 February 1946.[20] As it turned out, the record
of birth of Sylvia states that she was a legitimate child of
Isabel and John Desantis.[21] The document also certifies the
status of both Isabel and John Desantis as married.[22] The
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been
made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a
prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [23]
According to the respondent, Isabels previous
marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved,
made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and
void ab initio.[24]
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing
the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
proceedings.[25] The intestate court was convinced that the
evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the
legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the
petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings
on her behalf.[26]
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of
Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [27] It ventured on
the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia
regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may
have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family
from the social condemnation of having a child out of
wedlock.[28]
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was
denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January
2006.[29] Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. [30]
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that
it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have
disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.
[31]
The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that
Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the
facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her
parents.[32] Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John
Desantis should have been taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and
their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that
the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved
by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that
the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for
being bigamous.[33] From that premise, Isabel cannot be
considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners
and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has
any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.[34]
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals
erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court
allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the
following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review
under a writ of certiorari.[35] In nullifying the intestate courts
order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of
whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
[36]
Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon
the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.
[37]
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of
whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have
found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or
capriciously in issuing its assailed orders. [38] Grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the
fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2)
marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo. [39]
Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of
Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there
was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to
inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that
there was none.[40] A proper evaluation of the evidence at
hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a
previous marriage with John Desantis.[41]
To begin with, the respondent was not able to
produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel
and John Desantis.[42] The conspicuous absence of such
certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position
that no such marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of
Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove
a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [43] In assessing
the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals
should have taken note of a typical practice among unwed
Filipino couples who, in order to save face and not to
embarrass their families, concoct the illusion of marriage
and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.
[44]
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with
John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of
Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with
Rodolfo is bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at
best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels
status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit
discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand
of sound judicial procedure that only a person
with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to
intervene.[45] Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to
allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.[46]
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and
allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe
mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess
of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an
exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may
be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within
the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it
examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from
Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence
determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have
successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos
estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable
requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-
assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and
their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate
court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the
petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without
merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient
evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their
siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in
Rodolfos estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis was adequately established. This holds true
notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between
Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. [47] Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate.[48] Hence, even
a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents. [49]
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia
precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it
contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and
John Desantis were married and (b) that Sylvia is
their legitimate child.[50] In clear and categorical language,
Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,[51] the foregoing entries are
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be
true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts
attested.[52] In the case at bench, the petitioners and their
siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away
the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful
statements made only in order to save face.[53] They urge this
Court to take note of a typical practice among unwed
Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and
make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That,
the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of
a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage
was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners
would themselves argue that the document on which they
based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the
petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly
appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed,
previously married to John Desantis.Consequently, in the
absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved
by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to
present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest
in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the
petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings
cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed
SUPREME COURT before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an
Manila Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring
125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal
FIRST DIVISION (subject property), which was docketed as Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098.5 On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a
G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013 Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as
follows:
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs. It has been established by the evidence adduced by Landicho
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly
CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the spouses
INC., Respondents. Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes, Ignacio Santos and
Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome,
DECISION Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and
Justina Ramos, all of whom in January 1960, executed
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of Landicho, x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x
Court assails the Decision1 dated May 26, 2008 and which superseded the conditional sale. Gavino Espiritu, one
Resolution2 dated September 17, 2008 of the Court of of the vendors, fifty-five years old, farmer, resident of Barrio
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, testified that he and his co-
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land since
jurisdiction. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set 1930 and that the possession of Landicho, together with her
aside the Orders dated April 10, 20073 and November 22, predecessors in interest, has been open, peaceful, continuous
200t of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San and adverse against the whole world in the concept of an
Mateo, Rizal, in Land Registration (Reg.) Case No. N-5098 owner. It has also been established that the parcel of land is
(LRC Rec. No. N-27619). within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I.C. Project
No. 26 of San Mateo, Rizal, x x x; that the parcel of land is
The Facts are as follows.
classified as "montaoso" with an assessed value
of P12,560.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7081, x x x, taxes due to
which for the current year had been paid, x x x; and that the
same is not mortgaged or affected by any encumbrance.
The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but
presented the report of investigation of Land Investigator
Pedro R. Feliciano dated August 23, 1965, x x x which stated
substantially that during the investigation and ocular
inspection it has been ascertained that no public land
application is involved and that no reservation is affected
thereby, and therefore, he believed that the opposition
already filed can be withdrawn; x x x, 1st Indorsement dated
August 24, 1965 of the District Land Officer, District No. 7,
Bureau of Lands, to the Director of Lands, recommending
that, in view of said report of investigation, the opposition be
withdrawn; and x x x, office memorandum of the Chief,
Records Division, Bureau of Land, addressed to the Chief,
Legal Division, dated September 23, 1965, to the effect that
according to the records, plan Psu-201023 is not covered by
any kind of public land application or patent.
It is therefore clear from the evidence on record that the
applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48,
of C.A. No. 141, as amended.7
In the end, the CFI decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby confirms the title of the
applicant, Purita Landicho, of legal age, married to
Teodorico Landicho, Filipino, resident of 74-A South 19th
St., Quezon City, to the parcel of land under consideration
and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal
circumstances aforementioned.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is hereby dismissed.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the order
for the issuance of the decree issue. 8
Upon finality of its Decision dated November 16, 1965, the
CFI issued an Order9 on December 22, 1965 directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
"to comply with Section 21 of Act No. 2347"10 on the
issuance of a decree and original certificate of title (OCT).
Eventually, on July 11, 1966, Jose D. Santos (Santos),
Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal, issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16768111 in
Landichos name covering the subject property. Notably,
ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT
for the subject property; and although TCT No. 167681
stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no
other detail regarding the decree and the original registration
of the subject property was filled out.
The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and
as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled, new TCTs
were accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the
subject property could be traced from Landicho to Blue
Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired TCT No.
344936 in its own name on November 10, 1971; then to
Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No. 425582,
November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI),
TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975.12
Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc.
(ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case No. 12044, entitled A.
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which
was still pending before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City
as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject
property, which was a portion of a bigger tract of land
measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999,
dated February 20, 1956, in the name of said corporation.
This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the
name of Meerkamp Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant to
Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on
November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens (as regards Civil Case No. 12044) on
TCT No. 344936 of BCPI. Subsequently, based on the ruling
of this Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,14 ADRDI was also able to have its notice of
adverse claim over the subject property annotated on TCT
Nos. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI, respectively.
ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was
issued on March 25, 1983.
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of
Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of
herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two
years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an
Omnibus Motion before the RTC, Branch 75, of San Mateo,
Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged
therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and
Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landichos title over the
subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez
specifically stated that no decree of registration had been
issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT
had been ever issued by the ROD in Landichos name. As
Landichossuccessor-in-interest to the subject property,
Rodriguez prayed that:
a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City be
commanded to transmit to the Honorable Court the
complete records and expediente of LRC No. x x x
N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619);
b. After hearing, the Honorable Court give due
course to the instant motions and issue an Order as
follows:
 i. Directing the Administrator of the Land
Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree
of Registration, in accordance with the tenor
of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 x
x x and the Order dated December 22, 1965
x x x, in the name of the petitioner
[Rodriguez];
ii. Thereafter, ordering the Register of Deeds
for Marikina City, through the Administrator
of the Land Registration Administration as
having direct supervisory authority there-
over, to issue the
Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical
Description as duly confirmed in the said Decision and
Order x x x in the name of the herein petitioner [Rodriguez].
PETITIONER further prays for such other measures of relief
as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. 15
In the course of the proceedings concerning the
aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself
submitted as his Exhibit "GG" TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI
but alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus,
the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena
commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 set on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to
bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-
0229; and to testify in connection therewith.
On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a
Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that
it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial
legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject
property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed
out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No.
482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious.
PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in
his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and
subsisting, there being no direct action or final court decree
for its cancellation. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion constituted
a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not
sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI
asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests
over the subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in-
Intervention; and to deny Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for
utter lack of merit.
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion
in an Order dated April 10, 2007, reasoning as follows:
Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to
whether this Court may take cognizance of the instant case
previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and, subsequently, rule
upon the Omnibus Motion of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse
of more than forty (40) years after the finality of the
Decision of November 16, 1965.
Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because, as earlier stated,
the proceedings in this Court is merely a continuation of the
land registration proceedings commenced in the CFI Pasig.
More importantly, with the creation of this Court under the
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases
involving properties within its territorial jurisdiction,
specifically in San Mateo, Rizal, were transferred to this
Court (Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
Consequently, there is no legal impediment for this Court to
reiterate the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and the
Order dated December 22, 1966 because the Rules on
execution of Judgment pertaining to civil cases are not
applicable to this kind of proceedings. A final and executory
judgment in a land registration case, being merely
declaratory in nature, does not prescribe. (Sta. Ana vs.
Menla, 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316; vda. De Barroga vs. Albano, 157
SCRA 131; Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 159)
Secondly, a more important issue was put to forewhether
this Court may issue a writ of execution directing the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration over the subject property and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal to issue an original certificate
of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation of the
CFI Pasig proceedings, this Court can only reiterate the
directives in the Order dated December 22, 196[5]. It cannot,
however, issue, as prayed for, a writ of execution directing
the issuance of a decree of registration and an original
certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
Finally, during the proceedings in this case, this Court was
made aware of the existence of claimants to the subject
property. However, this Court cannot, at this time and in this
proceedings, rule on the legality or illegality of these claims
of ownership. It is best that these claims be ventilated in
appropriate proceedings specifically sought to for this
purpose.16 (Underscoring deleted.)
The RTC decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated
December 22, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Branch 6, is hereby REITERATED. The Land Registration
Authority is directed to issue a decree of registration while
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise
directed to issue an original certificate of title of the subject
property, both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita
Landicho, of legal age, married to Teodorico Landicho,
Filipino and a resident of 74-A South 19th St., Quezon City,
after compliance with issuance requirements and
procedures.17
PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Order of the RTC. The RTC resolved both the
Motion for Leave to Intervene with the attached Answer-in-
Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration of PCCAI in
another Order dated November 22, 2007. The trial court
held:
This Court after receiving evidence that a Decision was
rendered in favor of the applicants spouses Landicho as
owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that
no title was issued pursuant to the said Decision which has
become final and executory even after an Order to that effect
was issued, merely reiterated the said Order for the
implementation of the Decision dated November 16, 1966,
signed by the Hon. Andres Reyes as Judge. In other words,
Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has
become final and executory. The issue in the instant Petition
is the issuance of a decree of registration and nothing more is
being tried.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For Leave
To Intervene and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
PCCAI are both DENIED.18
The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated
April 10, 2007, filed a Manifestation dated February 4, 2008
informing the trial court that it cannot comply with said
Order since there were already two existing titles covering
the subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced
back to OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No.
482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landichos TCT No.
167681); and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in
Landichos name would only further aggravate the problem
of double titling. The LRA also explained that the ROD
issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to Landicho for the
subject property in 1966, following the Order dated July 7,
1966 of then LRC Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas
(Noblejas), who took cognizance of the fact that the subject
property, as part of a bigger parcel of land, was already
registered under OCT No. 301 in the name of Meerkamp
Co., pursuant to Decree No. 1480 under GLRO Record No.
2429 issued in 1906. LRC Commissioner Noblejas
additionally stated in his Order that:
The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue
hereof is deemed to have been derived from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-1. (Under Decree No. 1480 dated
November 22, 1906) which should be deemed cancelled with
respect to the said property and that the issuance of the same
has been effected without the presentation of the owners
duplicate of subsisting certificate of title. 19 (Emphasis
deleted.)
At around the same time, PCCAI filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing the Orders
dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC for
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the
ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of execution for a
final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued
that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired
which renders the execution of the final and executory
decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial court
should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. PCCAI
likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land registration court,
did not have the jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of
ownership over the subject property. PCCAI lastly
maintained that it was an indispensable party in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by
the RTC to intervene during the hearing of Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of
the CFI.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008,
found merit in the Petition of PCCAI. The appellate court
gave great weight and credence to the Manifestation dated
February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the double titling and
conflicting claims over the subject property. The Court of
Appeals held that:
The Land Registration Authority, being the repository of
land registration documents and the administrative agency
with the necessary expertise concerning land registration
matters, We cannot but agree with the above-quoted
Manifestation. Moreover, from the above facts admitted by
the parties and the LRA, it cannot be denied that there are
conflicting claims on the ownership of the property which
cannot be passed upon by the lower court as a land
registration court for lack of jurisdiction. 20
The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the
intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was
proper given the circumstances:
Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of Information
Technology of the Philippines vs. Comelec, G.R. 159139,
August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to
wit:
"The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no
longer be modified, except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or if supervening
events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the
decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. In the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed
exceptions to this rule. A person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof,
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action."
We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention
when the decision of the case was already final and
executory and during the execution stage of the case.
However, the supervening event which is the issuance of a
decree of registration which was already implemented and
enforced upon the order of the Administrator of the LRC
way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No.
167861 in the name of Purita Landicho instead of an OCT
makes the said intervention proper and well-taken.
From the foregoing, it appears absurd and senseless that an
OCT be issued in favor of Mr. Rodriguez. Furthermore, it is
in the paramount interest of justice that the assailed orders be
not implemented, [PCCAI] being an indispensable party in
the execution and/or implementation of the said orders. The
non-execution of the said orders will prevent further
disarray, confusion and complexity on the issue of who is or
who should be the real owner of the subject land which is a
matter that can be threshed out in a proper case for quieting
of title between adverse claimants.21
Based on the foregoing, the appellate court adjudged:
All told, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [Rodriguez, RTC Presiding Judge
Josephine ZarateFernandez, the LRA Administrator, and
Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and desist from
implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a
proper case before an appropriate court where the issue of
ownership of the subject land can be put to rest. 22
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
Decision but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated September 17, 2008.
Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court
through the present Petition, arguing that:
I
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED AN OPEN-
ENDED JUDGMENT.
A
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED
ITS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
ON THE MERE MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA
THAT THERE WERE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP
WHICH HAVE FIRST TO BE RESOLVED.
B
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED
AN ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN
RESOLVED.
II
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE [PCCAI] HAD
LEGAL STANDING TO PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE
OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS BY
WAY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING
THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR TO
COMPLY WITH THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 16,
1965.
A phrase "pending the outcome of a proper case before an
THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE
IN LRC NO. N-5098.
B.
THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN
GOOD FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS
DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE.
III
[RODRIGUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRECTIVE
AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
INSURE THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS ARE
PROPERLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED.23
The instant Petition has no merit.
At the outset, the Court finds unmeritorious Rodriguezs
claim that the Court of Appeals rendered an open-ended
judgment. In the dispositive portion of its Decision dated
May 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals clearly and categorically
"REVERSED AND SET ASIDE" the Orders dated April 10,
2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098. The cease and desist order of the appellate court
in the second line of the same dispositive portion is therefore
a superfluity. Obviously, by reversing and setting aside the
foregoing Orders, there is nothing more to implement. The
appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject
land can be put to rest,"24 does not mean that the very same
Orders which were reversed and set aside by the Court of
Appeals could later on be revived or reinstated; rather it
means that the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be
litigated and granted in an appropriate proceeding by a court
with proper jurisdiction.
To clarify matters, it must be stressed that the issue brought
before the Court of Appeals did not involve the question of
the ownership. The appellate court only concerned itself with
the proper execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 but, due to the intricacy of the
matter, was compelled to take notice of the controversy
between Rodriguez and PCCAI, both of whom trace back
their titles to Landicho. In view of these conflicting claims,
Rodriguez now avers that because ROD Santos issued TCT
No. 167681 for the subject property in Landichos name, the
November 16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
was not validly implemented since no OCT was
issued.25 Corollary to this, Rodriguez posits that PCCAI is
not a buyer in good faith of the subject property and that the
latters TCT No. 482970 is spurious. PCCAI, on the other
hand, insists that the issuance of TCT No. 167681 to
Landicho, from which its own TCT No. 482970 may be
traced back, was a valid execution of the said CFI decision.
The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 filed
before the RTC, explained that a TCT was issued to
Landicho because the subject property, as part of a bigger
parcel of land, was already covered by Decree No. 1480 and
OCT No. 301 dated November 22, 1906 in the name of
Meerkamp Co. In other words, Landichos TCT No. 167681
is a derivative of Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 of
Meerkamp Co. which were cancelled to the extent of the
subject property.
Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil
Case No. 12044 in the RTC, Branch 167, Pasig City. Not
only is PCCAI questioning the right of Rodriguez to the
issuance of an OCT pursuant to the November 16, 1965
Decision and December 22, 1965 Order of the CFI in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098, it is also defending the validity of
TCT No. 482970 (which is a derivative of TCT No. 167681
issued to Landicho) against Araneta who holds TCT No.
70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co.s OCT No.
301). In view of the foregoing, issuing an OCT covering the
subject property to Rodriguez would give rise to a third
certificate of title over the same property. Such act would
only cause more confusion and complication, rather than the
preservation, of the Torrens system of registration.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once
a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on
the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and
that they are valid.26 In this case, PCCAI is the registered
owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970, which
could be traced back to TCT No. 16781 issued to Landicho.
As between PCCAI and Rodriguez, the former is better
entitled to the protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI can
rely on its TCT No. 482970 until the same has been annulled
and/or cancelled.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, explicitly
provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the
Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America,27 the Court declared that a Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its
validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted
for that purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another
action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is
assailed as an incident in said action.
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for
registration of the subject property instituted by Landicho
before the CFI, which was granted by the CFI in its Decision
dated November 16, 1965. Rodriguez, asserting that he was
Landichos lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus
Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
seeking the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT
in his name for the subject property pursuant to the said CFI
judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of TCT
No. 482970 of PCCAI for the same property, but he simply
brushed aside said certificate of title for allegedly being
spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No. 482970
be declared void and/or cancelled; and even if he did, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land
registration case. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098, under the circumstances, is a collateral
attack on said certificate, which is proscribed under Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree.
If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT
issued in his (or even in Landichos name) for the subject
property, he should have directly challenged the validity of
the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the very same
property in an action specifically instituted for such purpose
(i.e., petition for annulment and/or cancellation of title,
petition for quieting of title) and pray the said certificate of
title be annulled or canceled. The proper court in an
appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues
involving the alleged fatal defects in Landichos TCT No.
167681 and/or its derivative TCTs, including TCT No.
482970 of PCCAI; the legal effects of Landichos sale of the
subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-interest of
PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good
faith or bad faith of PCCAI, as well as Rodriguez, in
purchasing the subject property. The resolution of these
issues will ultimately be determinative of who between
Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject
property.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according
weight and credence to the Manifestation dated February 4,
2008 of the LRA.
The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and
protecting the Torrens system of land titling and
registration.28 In particular, it is tasked with the following
functions:
(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final
judgments of the courts in land registration
proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars
of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding
certificates of title;
(2) Be the central repository of records relative to
original registration of lands titled under the Torrens
 system, including subdivision and consolidation
plans of titled lands; and
(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings and to the
other agencies of the government in the
implementation of the land reform program.29
The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision
of the court and with the data found in the record. They have
no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt
upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of
the decree, these officials ought to seek clarification from the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and
not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance
to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."30
31
In Ramos v. Rodriguez, the LRA filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision and order of the land
registration court respectively granting registration of a
parcel of land and directing the issuance of a decree of
registration for the same. According to the LRA, there was
already an existing certificate of title for the property. The
land registration court granted the motion for reconsideration
of the LRA and set aside its earlier decision and order. On
appeal, the Court declared that the land registration court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing itself
because it was merely following the recommendation of the
LRA, which was then acting as an agent of the court.
In another case, Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration
Authority,32 the Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus
compelling the LRA to issue a decree of registration as
ordered by a land registration court. The Court took into
account the LRA report that the parcels of land were already
registered and held:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs
reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose,
and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.33
The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation dated
February 4, 2008 to inform the RTC that the subject property
is already covered by two TCTs, both "uncancelled and
extant[;]" and for this reason, the LRA cannot comply with
the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, directing the issuance
of a decree of registration and an OCT for the same property
in Landichos name, as it would "further aggravate the
already existing problem of double titling." In filing said
Manifestation, the LRA was only faithfully pursuing its
mandate to protect the Torrens system and performing its
function of extending assistance to the RTC as regards Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098. Contrary to Rodriguezs assertion,
the Court of Appeals did not abdicate its jurisdiction when it
granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of PCCAI
largely based on the Manifestation of the LRA, since the
LRA filed such a Manifestation as an officer of the court.
Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, pertinent provisions of which read:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene
may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
The subject property is presently covered by TCT No.
482970 in the name of PCCAI.1wphi1 As the registered
owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject
property. The issuance of another certificate of title to
Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud
on its TCT No. 482970.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to
intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in
several cases, viz:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions
have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a
decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the
petition for review of the judgment has already been
submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even
where the assailed order has already become final and
executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention
filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this
Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once
and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for
intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress
again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.34 (Citations omitted.)
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders
property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the
16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the
on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the
the same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.
subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996.
Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Costs against petitioner.
Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the
intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice SO ORDERED.
the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in
which he prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965
Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case
only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground
that the subject property is already registered in its name
under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landichos
TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was
reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the
most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to
prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this reason,
the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
 ALFONSO JARDENIL and ANUNCIACION
JOVER, LEVITA LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY
HER HUSBAND ANTONIO BERLIZO), JOEL
LLERA, FEBE LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY
HER HUSBAND LUCIANO LIM), SALVACION
N. VDA. DE LLERA, HOSPICIO PEDRINA,
RUFO CALVEZ, and MONSERRAT VILLABA,
[1]
respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the Decision dated February 17, 1994, of

the Court of Appeals which dismissed the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
SECOND DIVISION
for preliminary injunction filed by petitioners in CA-G.R. SP
No. 30086. The decision effectively affirmed the Order dated
[G.R. No. 115813. October 16, 2000]
July 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 47, for the cancellation of Entry No.
EDUARDO FERNANDEZ, TERESITA FERNANDEZ-
178073, which was the notice of lis pendens pertaining to
CAVA, LETICIA FERNANDEZ-TORREA,
Civil Case Nos. 7687 and 7723 annotated in TCT No. T-
ADOLFO FERNANDEZ, GLORIA
165298 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod. This petition
FERNANDEZ-HUGONIN, ZENAIDA
now asks for (1) the annulment of the said order of
FERNANDEZ-ILEDAN, and ESMERNA
cancellation; (2) the re-annotation of said notice of lis
FERNANDEZ-LEGASPI, AS HEIRS OF
pendens; and (3) the annulment of the decision of said RTC
PRUDENCIO FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
dated October 15, 1991 that set aside the original decision
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
dated May 30, 1988 of the RTC in the aforecited civil cases,
ELEVENTH DIVISION), JESUS CIOCON, [2]
and the order dated October 31, 1991 granting private
CIRILO CIOCON, VICENTE URBANOZO,
respondent Jesus Ciocons Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal,[3] and all proceedings conducted pursuant to said
decision and order. It also seeks the review of the Court of
Appeals resolution dated May 30, 1994 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
This petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre
originally titled to petitioners predecessor-in-interest,
Prudencio Fernandez. After Fernandez acquired ownership
of the lot, he tried to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon
and some other occupants off the property. Allegedly,
Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a last chance to
repurchase the lot. Fernandez refused. After this rejection, on
September 21, 1985, Ciocon instituted against
Fernandez Civil Case No. 7687 before Branch 47 of the RTC
of Negros Occidental for reconveyance of the land or what
remains of it after deducting portions already sold to
others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance
price to Fernandez on February 7, 1958 for which Fernandez
signed a receipt. Fernandez through his guardian ad
litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and averred
that Ciocons receipt was a forgery. Fernandez died on
January 23, 1966. He was substituted in the civil suit by his
heirs namely: Dominadora,[4] and their children Eduardo,
Teresita, Leticia, Adolfo, -
Gloria, Zenaida and Esmerna.
Private respondents Levita Llera, Hospicio Pedrina,
Rufo Calves, and Monserrat Villalba were intervenors in said
suit who claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot
435 from Ciocon. Civil Case 7723 was filed by Alfonso
Jardenil, Anunciacion Jover, and Vicente Urbanozo who also
claimed to have bought portions of the lot from
Ciocon. Civil Case No. 7687 and Civil Case No. 7723 were
eventually consolidated.
On May 30, 1988, Judge Enrique Jocson, presiding
judge of RTC Branch 47, noting that the parties were
indifferent about submitting to a decision based on extant but
incomplete records proceeded to render judgment dismissing
both complaints and ordering private respondent Ciocon and
the intervenors to deliver immediate possession of Lot No.
435 to the heirs of Fernandez.[5]
Private respondents and intervenors timely filed their
notices of appeal which were given due course on July 29,
1988.
On March 12, 1990, Judge Jocson issued an Order
requiring the parties to state in writing within fifteen (15)
days whether or not they agree to have the records
transmitted to the Court of Appeals with incomplete
transcripts of stenographic notes, and if they should fail to
reply after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, the
court would consider the parties silence as conformity and
order the transmittal of the extant records to the Court of
Appeals.[6]
On July 29, 1988 an order was issued ordering
transmittal of the records to the appellate court. [7]
 Meanwhile the Court of Appeals noted the
incompleteness of the records and ordered the re-taking and
completion of missing testimonies.
On September 30, 1991, Ciocon filed a Motion to have
Above-Entitled Cases Decided Anew,[8] which Judge Jocson
granted on October 3, 1991. Judge Jocson reasoned that
since the cases were decided on the basis of the records
taken by his predecessor, and without the testimony of
Roberto Tolentino, the handwriting expert who testified on
the alleged forgery of Fernandez signature, granting the
motion was in the best interest of justice.[9]
On October 15, 1991, Judge Jocson rendered a second
decision setting aside the judgment rendered on May 30,
1988. In the second decision, the judge explained that the
Court of Appeals, after receiving the notices of appeal and
the incomplete records, remanded the case and ordered the
re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and
Tolentino. The second decision was a complete reversal of
the first decision and directed the return of the disputed lot to
Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being
litigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title
issued to Fernandez and the issuance of a new title in the
name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors.[10]
Not surprisingly, on October 25, 1991, petitioners
appealed the second decision.[11]
On October 29, 1991, Ciocon moved for execution
pending appeal.[12] Six days after, on November 4, 1991, the
trial court granted the motion ex parte.[13] The TCT in the
name of Fernandez was cancelled and a new TCT was issued
in the name of respondent Ciocon. On December 2, 1991,
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied.[14]
On March 17, 1992, Ciocon filed a motion asking that
the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed to cancel
entries in TCT No. T-164785, particularly Entries Nos.
44213, 1063, 5121, 5381 and 13188 upon the plaintiffs filing
of additional bond of P300,000.00.[15] Entry No. 178073, the
notice of lis pendens involved in Civil Case No. 7687 and
7723, was not among the entries listed in the motion.
It was only on April 20, 1992, at 3:45 P.M., that Entry
No. 178073 was annotated on TCT T-164785.[16]
On July 23, 1992, Judge Jocson ordered the cancellation
of the entries of the notices of lis pendens listed in the
aforementioned motion, including Entry Nos.
177656, 178526, 178527, and 178073, all unlisted in the
March 17, 1992 motion.[17]
Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo
Gargar, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. T-165298 in
Gargars name. Entry No. 178073 was one of the entries
carried over in TCT No. T-165298.[18] Gargar immediately
mortgaged the property to the Rizal Commercial and
Banking Corporation to secure a loan for P2,000,000.00.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court issued another Order,
directing the transmittal of the records to the Court of
Appeals.[19]
On February 2, 1993, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set
aside the Order dated July 23, 1992, of the Regional Trial
Court cancelling the lis pendens notations in the TCT, and its
Decision dated October 15, 1991 setting aside its original
decision dated May 30, 1988, for having been issued without
jurisdiction. Petitioners prayed that the trial court be
compelled to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 7687 and
Civil Case No. 7723 to the Court of Appeals. After hearing
on March 17, 1993, the case was submitted for decision. [20]
In its Decision, dated February 17, 1994, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and ordered the judge-
designate to desist from further proceeding with Civil Cases
No. 7687 and No. 7723, and to elevate the records for
consideration on appeal. Said the appellate court:
It is our considered opinion that justice would be better
served if we allow the regular appeal, which had been timely
filed, to proceed in due course instead of annulling the
various proceedings taken in the court below.
The observation is partly based on the single fact agreed on
by both parties, that the appeal be allowed to push through.
It must also be noted that until and unless there is a
definitive ruling, and this can only be achieved in a final
judgment, on the issue of rightful possession and ownership
of the property in question, there can be no satisfactory
solution to the case.
Section 1 of Rule 65 (Rules of Court) governing the special
civil action of certiorari presupposes that there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is available which,
we believe, would be more speedy and adequate, and
demonstrably congruent with law and justice under the
circumstances.
Evidence has been submitted, after the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction, that a judge has been
designated to substitute for the respondent Judge who had
been separated from the service. Hence, this Courts order is
directed to said judge-designate.
WHEREFORE, the judge-designate in Civil Cases Nos.
7687 and 7723 is hereby ordered to desist from further
proceeding with said cases. Instead, he is hereby directed to
elevate the record thereof to this Court for consideration on
appeal.
Petition DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition was denied. Hence, this petition, asserting that:
The order of July 23, 1992 (Annex C), insofar as it
cancelled the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated
by the petitioners, is null and void because it was issued
without jurisdiction, and in violation of due process and
fundamental rules of procedure.[22]
In its support petitioners argue that:
(1) The cancellation of said notice of lis pendens is
a patent nullity because no motion for the
cancellation of the notice (Entry No. 178073)
was filed.
(2) Assuming that a motion was filed, by then, the
RTC had already lost jurisdiction to grant the
same since the appeal by petitioners from the
first and even the second decision had been
perfected.
(3) Even assuming that the motion had been filed
and the RTC still had jurisdiction, there was no
showing of the necessity for the cancellation of
said notice of lis pendens. On the contrary,
there were reasons for maintaining said notice
of lis pendens.
(4) The execution pending appeal in 1991 was
itself invalid.
Considering that the issues of ownership and possession
are best left for determination by the Court of Appeals,
petitioners in essence aver that the appellate court erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari insofar as it refused to
pass on (1) the impropriety and invalidity of the trial courts
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and (2) the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter granted the
motion for execution of its second decision dated October
15, 1991, pending appeal, which was the basis of the
cancellation of the cited notice of lis pendens.
On the first point, petitioners contend that in
promulgating its assailed decision, and denying the
corrective writ of certiorari against the RTC, the Court of
Appeals refused to recognize that, at the very least, the
cancellation by the RTC of the notice of lis
pendens, particularly Entry No. 178073, upon a mere ex
parte motion is already grave abuse of discretion, and even
graver abuse since Entry No. 178073 was not even subject of
the motion at all. Petitioners stress that respondent Ciocon
prayed for cancellation only of certain entries appearing on
the TCT but not Entry No. 178073. Petitioners point out that
at the time Ciocon asked for cancellation of the other entries,
there was no Entry No. 178073 yet. This entry was made
more than a month after Ciocon filed his motion for
cancellation of certain entries. [23] Petitioners contend that
without a motion for cancellation of Entry No. 178073, no
hearing on it could be conducted. Without notice and
hearing, there was manifest denial of petitioners right to due
process. This infirmity in the ex parte cancellation resulted
in the hasty use by Gargar, the new registered owner of Lot
435, of the property as collateral for a P2,000,000.00 loan,
manifestly prejudicing petitioners.
Petitioners assert that in their motion for
reconsideration of the petition, they conceded that the issues
of rightful possession and ownership be resolved in the
appeal rather than risk more delay. But they resolutely ask
for the nullification of the order cancelling the cited notice
of lis pendens and pray for re-annotation thereof.
In their opposition and comment to the petition, private
respondents claim, with respect to the cited notice of lis
pendens, that the order cancelling the annotation of the
notice was within the discretion of the RTC and that there
was no abuse of discretion on its part because the RTC could
determine on its own if a notice was for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party or was not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused its annotation. They
contend that since the determination of the basis for
cancellation of the notice is factual, the Supreme Court is
already bound by such determination by the RTC.
We note, at the outset, that the trial courts determination
of the basis for cancellation of said notice is precisely the
bone of contention in the present appeal. While the trial
court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
such power is exercised under express provisions of law.
[24]
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation. Such
announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated
and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.[25] Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court,[26] now Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled
only after proper showing that the purpose of its annotation
is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
annotated. We have scrutinized the records but found no
showing that the annotation was caused by petitioners
merely to molest private respondents, nor that it was not
needed to protect petitioners rights. The peculiar and
exceptional circumstances of the case, as in the rendering of
two conflicting decisions by the same judge, indubitably
manifest that the annotation was not merely to molest the
other party but was needed to protect petitioners interest
from any hasty transfer of the property to another, making
recovery of the property extremely complicated. This is
exactly what happened in this case when the notice of lis
pendens was cancelled.
 Further, the trial courts inherent power to cancel a
notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional
circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are
imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the
litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other
party because of several continuances procured by petitioner;
where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation
was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the
plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party
who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is
deemed ipso facto cancelled.[27] These exceptional
circumstances are not present in this case. It will be noted
that although the case took long to resolve, it was not due to
petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of
the lot in the first decision and it was private respondents
who filed a motion that the case be decided anew, despite a
timely notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore,
it was the Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of
the lost testimonies, which the trial court erroneously took as
a remand of the case, resulting in a second decision which
was also timely appealed. The records mentioned no such
order to remand by the Court of Appeals. The cancellation of
the lis pendensnotations should not have been ordered since
there had been no final judgment yet, the decisions having
been timely appealed.
More significantly, a notice of lis pendens cannot be
ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less without
any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who
caused the annotation so that he may be heard to object to
the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that the
notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is
not merely to molest the other party.[28] As the records of this
case reflect, private respondent Ciocons motion dated March
17, 1992, to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not
include a request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular,
and it certainly could not have been included since the entry
was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of the
motion, on April 20, 1992. However, Judge Jocsons order of
cancellation included Entry No. 178073.[29]
Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled
upon the mere filing of a bond by the party on whose title the
notice is annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotation
which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court and to prevent the defeat of the judgment by
subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if private
respondents are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the
amount, in substitution of said notice. [30] As it happened in
this case, Ciocon sold the property to Gargar who
encumbered the property as security for a loan. We are,
therefore, constrained to conclude that, contrary to private
respondents stand, the Court could not be bound by the trial
courts determination of the bases of the cancellation of the
cited notice. Further, we find the trial courts order
injudicious and erroneous.
 We now resolve the question of jurisdiction. The
records show that the notices of appeal from the first
decision of the trial court were filed within the reglementary
period and were duly approved.[31] At such time the appeals
were perfected. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that
after perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction
to amend a decision appealed from, and also to issue orders
for execution pending appeal.The perfection of an appeal
divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case and the trial
court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual
functions. Fundamental is the doctrine that jurisdiction is
fixed by law. No amount of rationalization therefore, even a
declaration that a new decision is being made in the best
interest of justice, can confer on the trial court the
jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired,
waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or
omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by
acquiescence of the court.[32]
It must also be borne in mind that the order of
cancellation of notation of lis pendens was based on the ex
parte approval of the motion for execution pending appeal of
the trial courts second decision. This order is fatally flawed,
for being the result of a hearing ex parte, hence without
notice to the adverse party and thereby violative of due
process.
The Court is not unaware of Asmala vs. Comelec,
[33]
holding that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case to resolve
pending incidents; and Roxas vs. Dy,[34] that the cancellation
of a notice of lis pendens, being a mere incident to an action,
may be ordered at any given time by the court having
jurisdiction over it. The operative phrase, however, is that
the cancellation be ordered by a court having jurisdiction
over it. Such is not the case here for the RTC already lost its
jurisdiction upon the perfection of the appeal from its first
decision as early as 1988.
The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in
this case, Entry No. 178073, should be set aside for three
reasons. First, it was granted ex parte. Petitioners were
deprived of their right to be heard on notice.Second, there
was no showing that the annotation of the notice was for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it was not
necessary to protect the rights of those who sought the
annotation. And third, at the time of the order of cancellation
of the notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.
Lastly, we need not delve on the appellate courts
dismissal of the petition for certiorari. It is mooted by
petitioners acceptance, although reluctantly, of the appellate
courts judgment that the issues of rightful possession and
ownership of the property be resolved in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) The Order dated July 23, 1992 of the Regional JULIETA G.R. No. 183616
Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47, in PANOLINO,
Civil Cases No. 7687 and No. 7723 insofar as it Petitioner, Present:
directed the cancellation of the notice of lis
CARPIO
pendens, Entry No. 178073 on TCT No. T- MORALES, J.,Chairperson,
165298, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. versus BRION,
BERSAMIN,
(2) The Register of Deeds of the City of Bacolod is ABAD,* and
directed to RE-ANNOTATE the notice of lis VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
pendens, Entry No. 178073 on TCT No. T- JOSEPHINE L.
165298. TAJALA, Promulgated:
Respondent.[1] June 29, 2010
x-----------------------------------------
(3) The judge-designate in Civil Cases No. 7687 ---------x
and No. 7723 is ordered to elevate the records
of said cases to the Court of Appeals for
consideration on appeal. DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
(4) The Court of Appeals upon receipt of the
The Department of Environment and Natural
complete records is directed to immediately
Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director Jim O.
proceed with the appeal for the determination of Sampulna (RD Sampulna), by Decision[2] of June 19, 2007,
the rightful ownership and possession of the lot (1) denied for lack merit the application[3] of Julieta Panolino
in dispute. (petitioner), which was opposed by herein respondent
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land
Costs against private respondents. located in Kinayao, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat, (2)
directed petitioner to vacate the contested property and
SO ORDERED. remove at her expense whatever improvements she may
have introduced thereon, and (3) advised respondent to file
THIRD DIVISION her free patent application over the contested property within
sixty days.[4]
 Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June
27, 2007, of which she filed a motion for reconsideration
on July 11, 2007. Her motion was denied by
[5]
Order of September 6,
2007, copy of which shereceived on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal[6] before the Office of RD Sampulna, stating that she
was appealing the decision and order to the Office of the
DENR Secretary. By Order[7]of October 16, 2007, RD
Sampulna denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed beyond the reglementary period. The RD explained that
petitioner should have filed her appeal on September 13,
2007as she had only one day left of the 15-day reglementary
period for the purpose, pursuant to DENR Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990,[8] the pertinent portions of
which provide:
SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals.
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law or
executive order, appeals from the
decisions/orders of the DENR
Regional Offices shall be perfected
within fifteen (15) days after receipt
of a copy of the decision/order
complained of by the party
adversely affected, by filing with the
Regional Office which adjudicated
the case a notice of appeal, serving
copies thereof upon the prevailing
party and the Office of the
Secretary, and paying the required
fees.
(b) If a motion for
reconsideration of the
decision/order of the Regional
Office is filed and such motion for
reconsideration is denied, the
movant shall have the right
to perfect his appeal during the re
mainder ofthe period for appeal, r
eckoned from receipt of the resolu
tion of denial. If the decision
is reversed on reconsideration, the
aggrieved party shall have fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the
resolution of reversal within which
to perfect his appeal.
(c) The Regional office shall, upon
perfection of the appeal, transmit the
records of the case to the Office of
the Secretary with each page
numbered consecutively and
initialed by the custodian of the
records.
xxxx
SECTION 6. Applicability of the
Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall
apply when not inconsistent with the
provisions hereof. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the
2005 case of Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
[9]
petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration of RD
Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order that she still had a fresh
period of fifteen days from her receipt on September 12,
2007 of copy of the September 6, 2007 Order denying her
motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision of
the RD or until September 27, 2007. Her motion was denied
by Order[10] of November 28, 2007.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before
the Court of Appeals which, by Resolution[11] of January 25,
2008, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, she having bypassed the
Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of the
President before resorting to judicial action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that
her petition for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. By
Resolution of June 25, 2008, the appellate court, holding that
the issue raised is clearly a question of fact,[12] denied
petitioners motion. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether
the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes applies to
petitioners case, i.e., that he had a fresh period of 15 days to
appeal RD Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order to the DENR
Secretary, counted from her notice on September 12, 2007 of
the RDs Order of September 6, 2007 denying her motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
The fresh period rule in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court,[13] counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period
rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals;
and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
x x x. This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41,
[14]
Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of or in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the final order, which
we already determined to refer to the x x x
order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run
counter to the spirit
of Section 39 of BP 129[15] which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal x x x
remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a
party opts to file a motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15
days eradicates the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be countedfrom
receipt of notice of judgment x x x or from
receipt of notice of final order appealed
from x x x.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may
either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Courts decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the final order)
denying his motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse
of the original appeal period provided
in Rule 41, Section 3.[16] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate
court is one of law because it can be resolved by merely
determining what the law is under the undisputed facts.
[17]
The appellate courts ruling that such issue raises a
question of fact which entails an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties [18] is
thus erroneous.
Instead, however, of remanding this case to the
Court of Appeals for it to resolve the legal issue of whether
the fresh period rule in Neypes is applicable to petitioners
case, the Court opts to resolve it to obviate further delay.
 As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the
decision in Neypes, the fresh period rule shall apply
to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Petitioners present case is administrative in nature

involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed
governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87,
Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides
that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant
shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;
whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a
fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.

Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified

in Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not
apply to the case of petitioner whose motion for
reconsideration was denied.
WHEREFORE, the assailed issuances of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED, not on the ground advanced
therein but on the ground reflected in the foregoing
discussion. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 175507 October 8, 2014

RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES,

INC., Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES
IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals

of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-
dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at
the instance of the defendant.

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the

decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 86818, which upheld the (1) order4 dated November
22, 2002 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-103319 without
prejudice, and (2) the omnibus order5 dated July 30, 2004,
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Both
Republic of the Philippines orders were issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
SUPREME COURT Branch 6.6
Manila
The issues before this court are procedural. However, the
SECOND DIVISION factual antecedents in this case, which stemmed from a
complicated family feud, must be stated to give context to its
procedural development.
It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses
and properties, among which was Po Wing Properties,
Incorporated (Po Wing Properties).7 His total assets are
alleged to have been worth more than 380 million.8 It is also
alleged that whilehe was unmarried, he had children from
two women.9
Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio
Ching with his common-law wife, Lucina Santos.10 She,
however, disputed this. She maintains that even ifRamon
Chings birth certificate indicates that he was Antonio
Chings illegitimate child, she and Antonio Ching merely
adopted him and treated him like their own.11
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to
be Antonio Chings illegitimate children with his housemaid,
Mercedes Igne.12 While Ramon Ching disputed this,13 both
Mercedes and Lucina have not.14
Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill
sometime in 1996, he entrusted her with the distribution of
his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him.
She alleged that she handed all the property titles and
business documents to Ramon Ching for
safekeeping.15 Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from
illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return all
the titles to the properties and business documents. 16
On July 18, 1996, Antonio Ching was murdered.17 Ramon
Ching allegedly induced Mercedes Igne and her children,
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and
waiver18 to Antonio Chings estate in consideration of P22.5
million. Mercedes Ignes children alleged that Ramon Ching
never paid them.19 On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching
allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of
estate,20 naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating
upon himself the entirety of Antonio Chings estate.21
Ramon Ching denied these allegationsand insisted that when
Antonio Ching died, the Ching family association, headed by
Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes
Igne and her children financial aid considering that they
served Antonio Ching for years. It was for this reason that an
agreement and waiver in consideration of 22.5 million was
made. He also alleged that hewas summoned by the family
association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate
declaring him to be Antonio Chings sole heir.22
After a year of investigating Antonio Chings death, the
police found Ramon Ching to be its primary
suspect.23Information24 was filed against him, and a warrant
of arrest25 was issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and
Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 98-91046 (the first case).26
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave
of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po
Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary
stockholder.The amended complaint was for "Annulment of
Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction."27 Sometime after, Lucina Santos
filed a motion for intervention and was allowed to
intervene.28
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing
Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.29
On November 13, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.30 Upon motion of
the Chengs counsel, however, the Chengs and Lucina
Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file the appropriate
pleading. They did not do so.31
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties.32This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
103319 (the second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.33 When Branch 20 was made
aware of the first case, it issued an order transferring the case
to Branch 6, considering that the case before it involved
substantially the same parties and causes of action. 34
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed
a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case,
praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. 35
On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting
the motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not
yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties,
and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The
dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice. 36
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal
should have been with prejudice under the "two dismissal
rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first
case.37
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the
Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for
"Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer
for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon
Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-105251(the third case) and was eventually
raffled to Branch 6.38
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties filed their comment/opposition to the application
for temporary restraining order in the third case. They also
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, litis
pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were
filed by both parties.39
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus
order40 resolving both the motion for reconsideration in the
second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the
motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the second
case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the
filing of the third case.41 On October 8, 2004, while their
motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending,
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for
certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals,
assailing the order dated November 22,2002 and the portion
of the omnibus order dated July 30, 2004, which upheldthe
dismissal of the second case.42
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration in the third case. The
denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to
file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (the second certiorari case) with
the Court of Appeals.43
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the
decision44 in the first certiorari case dismissing the petition.
The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was
misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals
filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the
dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of the
defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the
instance of the plaintiffs.45
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 46 Ramon
Ching and Po Wing Properties filed this present petition for
review47 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the
dismissal of the second case was with prejudice since the
non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated
as a dismissal on the merits.48 They also argue that the
second case should be dismissed on the ground of res
judicata since there was a previous final judgment of the first
case involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.49
Lucina Santos was able to file a comment50 on the petition
within the period required.51 The Chengs, however, did not
comply.52 Upon the issuance by this court of a show cause
order on September 24, 2007,53 they eventually filed a
comment with substantially the same allegations and
arguments as that of Lucina Santos.54
In their comment, respondents allege that when the trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, Ramon Chings counsel
was notified in open court that the dismissal was without
prejudice. They argue that the trial courts order became final
and executory whenhe failed to file his motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. 55
Respondents argue that the petition for review should be
dismissed on the ground of forum shopping and litis
pendencia since Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties are
seeking relief simultaneously in two forums by filing the two
petitions for certiorari, which involved the same omnibus
order by the trial court.56 They also argue that the "two-
dismissal rule" and res judicata did not apply since (1) the
failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal, and (2) they
only moved for dismissal once in the second case. 57
58
In their reply, petitioners argue that they did not commit
forum shopping since the actions they commenced against
respondents stemmed from the complaints filed against them
in the trial courts.59 They reiterate that their petition for
review is only about the second case; it just so happened that
the assailed omnibus order resolved both the second and
third cases.60
Upon the filing of the parties respective memoranda, 61 the
case was submitted for decision.62
For this courts resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the trial courts dismissal of the second
case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case,
asper the "two-dismissal rule"; and
II. Whether respondents committed forum shopping
when they filed the third case while the motion for
reconsideration of the second case was still pending.
The petition is denied.
The "two-dismissal rule" vis--vis
the Rules of Civil Procedure
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The pertinent provisions state:
RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint
may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being
filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on
or including the same claim.
SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in
the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A
class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by
the court. (Emphasis supplied)
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a
plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case beforeany
responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is
donethrough notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the
court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise
declared by the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation
where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant
before the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to
dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is
generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the
court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of
the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is
dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the
court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice
unless otherwise declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of
the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the
instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
which covers motions to dismiss.63
In Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Hon. Plan,64 Consolidated Logging
and Lumber Mills filed a complaint against Insular Veneer to
recover some logs the former had delivered to the latter. It
also filed ex partea motion for issuance of a restraining
order. The complaint and motion were filed in a trial court in
Isabela.65
The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining
order as a writ of preliminary injunction. When Consolidated
Logging recovered the logs, it filed a notice of dismissal
under Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil
Procedure.66
While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending,
Consolidated Logging filed the same complaint against
Insular Veneer, this time in a trial court in Manila. It did not
mention any previous action pending in the Isabela court. 67
The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to
the nonappearance of Consolidated Loggings counsel
during pre-trial. Consolidated Logging subsequently
returned to the Isabela court to revive the same complaint.
The Isabela court apparently treated the filing of the
amended complaint as a withdrawal of its notice of
dismissal.68
Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the dismissal by the Manila court
constituted res judicataover the case. The Isabela court,
presided over by Judge Plan, denied the motion to dismiss.
The dismissal was the subject of the petition for certiorari
and mandamus with this court.69
This court stated that:
In resolving that issue, we are confronted with the
unarguable fact that Consolidated Logging on its volition
dismissed its action for damages and injunction in the
Isabela court and refiled substantially the same action in the
Manila court. Then, when the Manila court dismissed its
action for failure to prosecute, it went hack [sic] to the
Isabela court and revived its old action by means of an
amended complaint.
Consolidated Logging would liketo forget the Manila case,
consign it to oblivion as if it were a bad dream, and
prosecute its amended complaint in the Isabela court as if
nothing had transpired in the Manila court. We hold that it
cannot elude the effects of its conduct in junking the Isabela
case and in giving that case a reincarnation in the Manila
court.
Consolidated Logging [sic] filed a new case in Manila at its
own risk. Its lawyer at his peril failed toappear at the pre-
trial.70
This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in
the Isabela court was barred by the prior dismissal of the
Manila court, stating that:
The provision in section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
that an action may be dismissed because "there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause"
presupposes that two similar actions are simultaneously
pending in two different Courts of First Instance. Lis
pendensas a ground for a motion to dismiss has the same
requisites as the plea of res judicata.
On the other hand, when a pleading is amended, the original
pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands
for trial on the amended pleading only. So, when
Consolidated Logging filed its amended complaint dated
March 16, 1970 in Civil Case No. 2158, the prior dismissal
order dated January 5, 1970 in the Manila case could he [sic]
interposed in the Isabela court to support the defense of res
judicata.71
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are
without prejudice except when it is the second time that the
plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by
a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same
claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal werefiled by the
plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff
was consented to by the defendant on the ground
that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the
former.72
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid
vexatious litigation."73 When a complaint is dismissed a
second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief
on the same claim.
The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in
view of the "two-dismissal rule"
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It
was later amended to include not only new defendants but
new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a
special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed
by the defendants onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court granted that motion to dismiss, stating that:
A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended
Complaint dated February 10, 1999, filed by Plaintiff Joseph
Cheng, show that additional causes of action were
incorporated i.e. extra-judicial settlement of the intestate
estate of Antonio Ching and receivership, subject matters,
which should be threshed out in a special proceedings case.
This is a clear departure from the main cause of action in the
original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of
certificate of titles with damages. And the rules of procedure
which govern special proceedings case are different and
distinct from the rules of procedure applicable in an ordinary
civil action.
In view of the afore-going, the court finds the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Atty. Maria Lina Nieva S. Casals to be
meritorious and the Court is left with no alternative but to
dismiss as it hereby dismisses the Amended Complaint.
However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias, counsel
for the plaintiffs, he is given a period of fifteen (15) days
from today, within which to file an appropriate pleading,
copy furnished to all the parties concerned.
....
SO ORDERED.74
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo
Obias failed to file the appropriate pleading within fifteen
(15) days, he violated the order of the court. This, they
argue, made the original dismissal an adjudication upon the
merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a
dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they
argue that when respondents filed the second case and then
caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with
prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two
dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim.
Unfortunately, petitioners theory is erroneous.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the
motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. When it allowed
Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days
tofile an appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a
request made bythe plaintiffs counsel that had no bearing on
the dismissal of the case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss
the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a
situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction.
Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs
default, the trial courts instruction to file the appropriate
pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to
file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss
the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the
defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states:
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:
....
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim;
 ....
Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the
same action or claim subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were
merely refiling the same claim that had been previously
dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they
moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can
be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was
requested by respondents before the service of any
responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this
instance is a matter of right that is not subject to the trial
courts discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and
Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and
Development Corporation:76
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the
motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule
17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if
the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal,
the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as
dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a
matter of right, regardless of ground.77 (Emphasis supplied)
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated
November 22, 2002 dismissing the case, without prejudice.
The order states:
When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs
namely, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, Mercedes Igne and
Lucina Santos appeared without their counsels. That they
verbally affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss, as
shown by their signatures over their respective names
reflected thereat. Similarly, none of the defendants appeared,
except the counsel for defendant, Ramon Chang [sic], who
manifested that they have not yet filed their Answer as there
was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the
latter has not yet been served with summons.
Under the circumstances, and further considering that the
defendants herein have not yet filed their Answers nor any
pleading, the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic]
cause the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure without
prejudice. Thereby, and as prayed for, this case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.78 (Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the
same claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the
instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the
instance of the defendants. While it is true that there were
two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not
necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred
by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this
case.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of
Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading
in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section
3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second
case is still considered as one without prejudice. In Gomez v.
Alcantara:79
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect
of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood
to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated
differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for
failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on
the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action,
and the only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is
without prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court
specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is
only when the trial courts order either is silent on the matter,
or states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an
adjudication on the merits.
However, while the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice, respondents act of filing the third case while
petitioners motion for reconsideration was still pending
constituted forum shopping.
The rule against forum shopping and the "twin-dismissal
rule"
In Yap v. Chua:81
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by
any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable
opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil
action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
and congest court dockets. What iscritical is the vexation
brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the
process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being
renderedby the different fora upon the same issues. Willful
and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is
a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, the most important factor toask is whether the
elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain another;
otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity
of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought.82 (Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was
still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final
since it could still be overturned upon reconsideration, or
even on appeal to a higher court.
Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the
motion for reconsideration. This court has already stated in
Narciso v. Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a
motion for reconsideration of a trial courts order denying
the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of
such a motion for reconsideration."84 The second case,
therefore, was still pending when the third case was filed.
The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to
wait until the final disposition of the second case before
filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second
case was without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim,
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their
haste to file the third case, however, they unfortunately
transgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are
the rules on litis pendentiaand res judicata.
In Yap:
Litis pendentiaas a ground for the dismissal of a civil action
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that
a party is not allowed to vex another more than once
regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of
action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy
incourts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the
rights and status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless ofwhich party is successful, would amount to res
judicatain the other.85 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question that there was an identity of parties,
rights, and reliefs in the second and third cases. While it may
be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case
when the third case was filed, it failed to take into account
that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case
and, thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal
of the second case was the subject of the first certiorari case
and this present petition for review, it can be reasonably
concluded that the second case, to this day, remains pending.
Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged
in forum shopping. Any judgment by this court on the
propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably
affect the disposition of the third case.
This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different
petitions for certiorari before the appellate court. The
omnibus order dated July 30, 2004 denied two pending
motions by petitioners: (1) the motion for reconsideration in
the second case and (2) the motion to dismiss in the third
case. Since petitioners are barred from filing a second
motion for reconsideration of the second case, the first
certiorari case was filed before the appellate court and is
now the subject of this review. The denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration in the third case, however, could
still be the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. That
petition would be based now on the third case, and not on the
second case.
This multiplicity of suits is the veryevil sought to be avoided
by the rule on forum shopping. In Dy v. Mandy
Commodities Co., Inc.,86 the rule is that:
Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is
summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before
this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a
lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive
measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration
of justice.87 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez,
Jr.88 In Buan, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with
this court while another petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction was pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila involving the same parties and based on the
same set of facts. This court, in dismissing both actions,
stated:
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions . . . have incurred not
only the sanction of dismissal oftheir case before this Court
in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also
the punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that
in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well.
Quite recently, upon substantially identical factual premises,
the Court en banchad occasion to condemn and penalize the
act of litigants of filing the same suit in different courts,
aptly described as "forum shopping[.]"89
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by
dismissing all pending actions on the same claim filed in any
court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would
inevitably result in the summary dismissal of the third case.
Any action, therefore, which originates from the third case
pending with any court would be barred by res judicata.
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an
examination must first be made on the purpose of the
rule.1wphi1 Parties resort to forum shopping when they file
several actions of the same claim in different forums in the
hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the
courts as it "trifle[s] with the orderly administration of
justice."90
In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became
final and executory upon the failure of respondentscounsel
to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct
pleading the second time around but eventually sought its
dismissal as they"[suspected] that their counsel is not amply
protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost
three (3) years."91 The filing of the third case, therefore, was
not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result
butonly to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their
rights.
It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original
controversy between the parties has long beenmired in
numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be more
judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and
disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it
would not serve the ends of substantial justice. Courts of
justice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their
merits, rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities:
[C]ases should be determined on the merits, after all parties
have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules,
resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided.In fact, Section
6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules [on Civil Procedure] shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.92 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it
can be shown that (1) the original case has been dismissed
upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2)
the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration; and
(3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of
substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has
since been dismissed and is now the subject of a petition for
certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better
cause of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted
by a counsel they are more comfortable with. Substantial
justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim
to the labyrinth in the procedures that their travails led them.
It is for this reason that we deny the petition. WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 6 is ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-
105251 with due and deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003]

LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, THE EX-OFICIO
SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D.
VILLARIN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by Lincoln L.
Yao, assailing the resolution dated March 22, 2002 and
Order dated May 10, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, Branch 274,[1]which respectively granted
private respondent Bernadine D. Villarins petition for
prohibition and denied petitioners motion for intervention.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint
filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation,
PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and
Pablito Villarin, private respondents husband.
On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a
decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner
and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund
petitioner the amount of P2,116,103.31, as well as to pay
damages in the amount of P250,000.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution
against PR Builders and its managers, and referred the writ
to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for
enforcement.
Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a
parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna, registered in
the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent,
Bernadine Villarin. The property was scheduled for public
auction on March 20, 2002.
On March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the
RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for prohibition with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo
from proceeding with the public auction. Private respondent
alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the
execution sale; that the property regime between private
respondent and her husband was complete separation of
property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case,
hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer
for the separate liability of her husband.
On even date, public respondent Judge Norma C.
Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order and set
the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002.
The case was eventually raffled to RTC, Branch 276,
presided by public respondent judge. A conference was then
conducted, after which public respondent judge issued the
assailed resolution of March 22, 2002 granting private
respondents petition for prohibition and declaring
the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.
On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public
respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However, public
respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of
May 10, 2002:
ORDER
The MOTION FOR INTERVENTION is denied,
considering that this case has long been decided,
hence the intervention is too late. There is no case
for them to intervene.
Let the decision be executed to satisfy the judgment debt.
SO ORDERED in open Court.[2]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondent judge in: (a) declaring the subject property
exempt from execution and therefore could not be sold to
satisfy the obligation of private respondents husband, and (b)
denying petitioners motion for intervention on the ground
that the same was filed late.
It is a basic precept that the power of the court in the
execution of judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy
by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of attachment
may be considered as made under the authority of the court
only vis-a-vis property belonging to the defendant. For
indeed, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts.[3]In the case at bar, the property levied on by the
sheriff was clearly not exclusively owned by Pablito Villarin.
It was co-owned by herein private respondent who was a
stranger in the HLURB case. The property relation of
spouses Villarin was governed by the regime of complete
separation of property as decreed in the order [4] dated
November 10, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Paraaque City.
Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governing the
regime of complete separation of property provide:
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without
need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong
all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry
and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received
during his marriage from his or her separate property. (214a)
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or
default thereof, to the current market value of their separate
properties.
The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses
shall, however, be solidary. (215a)
It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the
separate properties of the spouses can be made to answer for
liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred
for family expenses. This has not been shown in the case at
bar.
Accordingly, private respondent acted well within her
rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the deputy
sheriff because the latter went beyond his authority in
attaching the subject property. This right is specifically
reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is
essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act
or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as
private respondent. Thus, as the judgment creditor in the
HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was an indispensable
party in the petition for prohibition and should have been
allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to
do so.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. (2a)
Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to
intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in
petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow
intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and
(b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both
requirements must concur as the first is not more important
than the second.[5]
 In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when
as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court fails to
there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the find grave abuse of discretion committed by public
defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon. respondent judge in rendering the assailed resolution and
order.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that
petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must exercise WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for
said right in accordance with the rules and within the period lack of merit.
prescribed therefor.
SO ORDERED.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.[6] Petitioner filed his motion only
on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the
rules. The court resolution granting private respondents
petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject
property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002,
after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already
become final and executory.

Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for

the reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is sufficient
cause for the outright dismissal of the instant
petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its
errors, if any.
 BRIONES, JUANITO METILLA, JR., FELIPE
A. FLORES, HERMINIO ELEVADO,
NARCISO S. SIMEROS, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, ATTY. CORAZON A.
MERRERA, ATTY. JEAN MAKASIAR-PUNO,
SERGIO ACABAN, represented by Atty. Ramon
Gerona, ATTY. ROGELIO VELASCO,
MARTINA S. NONA, OVIDEO MEJICA,
ALFREDO ITALIA, MARIANO GUEVARRA,
JESUS YUJUICO, DOMINADOR RIVERA,
SATURNINA SALES, represented by Atty.
Consolacion Sales-Demontano, FRED CHUA,
SONIA SY CHUA, LAWRENCE CHUA,
CAROLINA C. RUBIO, represented by Tessie
Sebastian, GEORGE G. GUERRERO, BEATRIZ
TANTOCO, represented by Filomena Cervantes,
ATTY. MARCELA CELESTINO-GARCIA,
FEDERICO GARCIA, ILDEFONSO
MORALES, LEONCIA VELASCO, OCRAVIO
F. LINA, ANA MARIA JARAMILLO,
ESTRELLA BASA, JOSE ESTEVA, JR.,
CIRILO GONZALES, VILLY TOBIAS,
MIGUEL DELA PAZ, RUBEN GUILLERMO,
FAUSTO YADAO, represented by Jeremias
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION Panlilio, RICARDO YAP, ROSAURO/PATRICK
MARQUEZ, represented by Emmanuel
[G.R. No. 91486. September 10, 2003] Marquez, MODESTA FABRIG and MAXIMINO
SALCEDA, MELIA LATOMBO, TERESITA
ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. PANGILINAN-RIVERO, ARCH. DANILO C.
DECENA, RODOLFO F. REYES, FELIPE
DE CASTRO, JOSE S. LEDESMA, JAIME P.
ANG, VEICENTE P. ANG, MAURO U.
GABRIEL, ATTY. VIRGINIA GOMEZ, GIL S.
BONILLA, LOURDES BLANCO, represented
by Catalina Blanco, JOSEFA SANCHEZ and
ROSALINA VILLEGAS, represented by Heidi
Bobis, SHIRLEY BUCAG, QUIRINA O.
TUVERA, represented by Wilfredo Orejuros,
GREGORIO AVENTINO, represented by Enrico
Aventino, LEONARDO L. NICOLAS,
NICOMEDES PENARANDA, FRANCISCA
MEDRANO, OFELIA IGNACIO, ROSENDO
ABUBO, represented by Santos Chavez,
SOLEDAD BAUTISTA DE COLUMNA,
represented by Zenaida Valle, MARQUITA/
SEBASTIAN LOPEZ, represented by Emmanuel
Marquez, DELIA DORION, GERARDO L.
SANTIAGO, FIDEL PANGANIBAN,
represented by Manuel dela Roca, MATEO and
OFELIA INOVEJAS, REMEDIOS C. DOVAS,
represented by Josefa Capistrano, DOMINGO
ALTAMIRANO and SPOUSES ROLANDO
ALTAMIRANO and MINERVA FETALVERO,
BEATRIZ RINGPIS, ROSARIO DE MATA,
RUFINA CRUZ, represented by JOSEFA
MANABAT, SPOUSES ANITA SALONGA-
CAPAGCUAN and MAYNARD CAPAGCUAN,
DISCORA YATCO, represented by VICTORINA
Y. FIRME, and CONSUELO YATCO,
GENEROSA MEDINA VDA. DE NOGUERA,
represented by ATTY. RAYMUNDO M.
NOGUERA, BEATRIZ SALANDANAN and
LOURDES ALONTE-VASQUEZ, PEDRO
COSIO and VICTORINA CARINO, RUTH C.
ZARATE, PRECIOSISIMA V. YAPCHULAY,
BASILISA B. YAPCHULAY, OFELIA B.
YAPCHULAY, FELISA B. YAPCHULAY, FE B.
YAPCHULAY, WILMA B. YAPCHULAY,
FELIX B. YAPCHULAY, MARIANO B.
YAPCHULAY, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and other
registered OWNERS OF VILAR-MALOLES
(VILMA) SUBDIVISION, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention[1] filed by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Registration Authority and the Motion for
[2]
Clarification filed by respondents.
The facts may be briefly restated as follows: The
controversy stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title
filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot
Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while
Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 614
and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March 21, 1988, the trial
court rendered a Partial Decision [3] in favor of petitioners and
against the defendants who were declared in default,
including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma)
Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioners and against the defaulted
respondents:
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners
hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena,
Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as
absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2
& 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the
exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer
certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;
2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No.
5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the
exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 as well as
the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom, with
the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents, from its record;
4) Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true
and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the
TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, covering the area in excess of said actual area,
with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in
excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the
exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;
6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated August
7, 1985, in so far as those areas covered by the cancelled
OCTs and TCTs hereof are concerned, as permanent;
7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue
herein petitioners the corresponding individual transfer
certificate of titles upon proper application made thereof.
SO ORDERED.
 On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial
Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a
decision[4] dated November 15, 1989. The appellate court
ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondents because of defective service of
summons by publication. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they
filed this petition for certiorari.
On January 19, 2001, we rendered a Decision denying
the petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[6] contending, inter alia, that the disposition
of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have
been annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition
for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents
concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed that the January 19,
2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is
concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution
partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by
reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the
trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
PARTIALLY GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on
January 19, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the
Partial Decision of the court a quo;
and
(2) affirming the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 in
all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that
judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in
line with the decisions this Honorable Court
had already rendered;
 2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its
original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not
forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case
No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333
are null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case
No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of
the hearings/proceedings having been sent to
the Republic and other interested parties.
The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be
just and equitable under the circumstances. [8]
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of
procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. [9] Indeed,
in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the
petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.[10]
In Mago v. Court of Appeals,[11] intervention was
granted even after the decision became final and executory,
thus
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows
the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full
measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised
judiciously and only after consideration of all the
circumstances obtaining in the case.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the
technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition
for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to
intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was
an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the
subject property cannot be disputed. It must be stressed that
the trial court granted private respondent's petition for
prohibition with injunction without petitioners being
impleaded, in total disregard of their right to be heard, when
on the face of the resolution of the Community Relations and
Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners
were the ones directly to be affected. We need not belabor
the point that petitioners are indeed indispensable parties
with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made in their absence without
affecting, nay injuring, such interest.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions
for intervention were filed when the case had already
reached this Court, it was declared:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention
filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where
trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x
the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are
obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed
under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now
Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure].
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules
therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole
purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does
not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to
an end.
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling,
much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
subordinate and inferior courts to abide and conform to the
rule enunciated by the Supreme Court.[12]
The Solicitor General summarized the interest of the
Republic in Lot No. 3 (originally covered by OCT No. 333),
as follows:
On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826 reserving for national government
center site a parcel of land situated in the Constitution Hill,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, containing an area of four
million for hundred forty thousand FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX SQUARE METERS. In a certification [Annex
F, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Registration Authority,
it attested to the fact that the National Government Center
described in Proclamation No. 1826 is within the area
covered by GLRO Record No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO
Record No. 5975 as plotted in our Municipal Index Sheet
(MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B and 3339-D.
In a letter [Annex B-2, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council certified that
within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National
Government Center Housing Project (NGCHP) and the
NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, the
following government buildings, offices and complexes are
situated:
1) House of Representatives;
 2) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
3) Department of Social Works and Development
(DSWD);
4) Sandiganbayan;
5) Commission on Audit (COA);
6) Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Depot;
7) Polytechnic University of the Philippines
(PUP) Commonwealth Campus;
8) TESDA Skills Training Center;
9) Several Public Elementary and High Schools,
Health Centers and Barangay Halls.
It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing
Alternative for Social Empowerment land Acquisition
Development Program (PHASE-LADP), has already
awarded 3,975 TCTs to its beneficiaries. This program
comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117
hectares intended for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National Governments
thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the NGCHP, the
remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to be awarded to qualified
beneficiaries.[13]
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to
protect public interest as well as government properties
located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The
Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law can
certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended
as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the
State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
properties.[14]
After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find
that our November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision
pertaining to Lot No. 3, overlooked certain aspects which, if
not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable confusion
and prejudice. The reinstated portions of the decision states:
4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true
and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs
subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, covering the area in excess of said actual area, with the
exception of those belonging to non-defaulted respondents,
as null and void ab initio;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in
excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the
exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;[15]
We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which
portions are in excess of the 4,574 square meter area of OCT
No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non-
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial
courts decision state the metes and bounds that would serve
as basis in implementing the dispositive portion
thereof. Verily, this flaw goes into the very identity of the
disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null and void
for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional
mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. [16] Hence, the November 20,
2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial
courts Partial Decision should be modified.
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid
and existing title is likewise meritorious. In Republic v.
Tofemi Realty Corporation (Tofemi),[17] an action for
Cancellation of Titles & Reversion of TCT No. 55747 and
TCT No. 55748, the validity of OCT No. 333 from which
said transfer certificates of title originated, has already been
settled. In dismissing the petition of the Republic, it was held
therein that OCT No. 333 is a valid title duly issued by the
Land Registration Court. The Republic did not appeal
therefrom and the decision became final and
executory. Pertinent portion of which states
Regarding the issue of nullity of OCT No. 333,
We find that the then Land Registration Court had the power,
authority and jurisdiction to issue it. It was issued after trial,
or presumptively in a fair and square trial with all the
requisites of the law (The Phil. British Co., Inc. vs. de los
Angeles, 63 SCRA 52).
The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known in local history
as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in its sections 13 to 18,
mentions three (3) classes of land, to wit, public land or
public domain, mineral lands, and timber land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175). Early decisions as regards
classification of public lands, such as Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil 175, Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, supra, and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil. 10, which were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
or prior to the passage of Act No. 2874, had impliedly ruled
that there was no legal provision vesting in the chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural; so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
invested with implicit power in so doing, depending upon
the preponderance of the evidence. In Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra, Feb. 10, 1908, the Court of Land
Registration granted the application for registration after
finding that it was neither timber nor mineral and came
within the definition of Agricultural land under Act 926. The
Attorney General appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
appealed judgment. In G.L.R.O. No. 1037, the application
for registration was granted and consequently the issuance of
a title was decreed in favor of the applicant because the Land
Registration Court found that the land applied for is
agricultural susceptible of private appropriation (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, supra; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, supra). We repeat by way of emphasis,
the record does not reveal that the Government has always
considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the
issuance of OCT 333. To declare the land now as forest land
on the authority of LC Map 639 of Rizal approved on March
11, 1937 only, would deprive defendants of their registered
property without due process of law. It was pronounced in
Ramos vs. Director of lands, supra:
x x x Upon the other hand, the presumption should be, in
lieu of contrary evidence, that land is agricultural in
nature. One very good reason is that it is good for the
Philippine Islands to have a large public domain come under
private ownership.Such is the natural attitude of the
sagacious citizen.
OCT No. 333 being legal and valid; ergo, TCTs Nos.
55747 and 55748, being derived from the said mother title,
are also legal and valid. These TCTs were in turn derived
from TCTs Nos. 45832 and 45833, covering Lots Nos. 65,
76 and 81 which originally formed parts of Parcel C of Plan
Psu-32606 approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
on October 21, 1924. (Emphasis supplied)[18]
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled. It is a salutary and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in
which the facts sued upon are substantially the same. [19] It is
beyond cavil, therefore, that since the court had already ruled
on the validity OCT No. 333, said issue must be laid to rest
and must no longer be relitigated in the present case.
With respect, however, to the area covered by OCT No.
333, the principle of stare decisis is not applicable because
the decision of the Court of Appeals did not indicate the
boundaries of the lot covered by OCT No. 333. While it was
held therein that the area of OCT No. 333 is 52,949,735
square meters, the metes and bounds of the land covered by
OCT No. 333 was not specified. We cannot adopt the
findings as to the area of OCT No. 333 for it might cause
deprivation of property of adjacent land owners without due
process of law.
So, also, the Court cannot nullify the entire Partial
Decision of the court a quo. The defaulted defendants whose
properties are located in Lot No. 1 did not question the
decision of the trial court. Neither was it shown in the
Petition-In-Intervention that the OSG is an indispensable
party to Lot No. 1.
In their Motion for Clarification and Manifestation,
respondents seek the clarification of paragraph 1 of the trial
courts Partial Decision declaring petitioners as owners of,
among others, Lot No. 2 where respondents properties are
located. Paragraph 1, provides:
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners
hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena,
Rodolfo F. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as
absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2
& 3 hereof by virtue of extraordinary prescription, with the
exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer
certificate of title belonging to non-defaulted respondents. [20]
In view of the annulment of the trial courts Partial
Decision with respect to Lot No. 2 originally covered by
OCT No. 614, all portions of the decision pertaining to Lot
No. 2, including that in paragraph 1 declaring petitioners as
absolute owners in fee simple of Lot No. 2, is declared
void. Likewise, the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and
5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo concerning
Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it
affects Lot No. 3, also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof, a
judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned
judgment or final order or resolution and render the same
null and void, without prejudice to the original action being
re-filed in the proper court.
In the meantime, the World War II Veterans Legionaries
of the Philippines (WW II) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
with prior leave of court. It alleges that the Court of Appeals
decision dated November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No.
17596, which is the subject of the instant petition for review,
ran counter to the June 22, 1989 decision of the same court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221, which merely amended the first
paragraph of the Partial Decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-35672. The latter decision of the appellate court
was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 90245 on April 8,
1990.
We find no conflict between the two decisions of the
Court of Appeals. It is true that both decisions affected the
portion of the Partial Decision of the trial court which
declared petitioners, who are individual members of the WW
II, as absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3. However, the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221 merely granted WW IIs
prayer that it be substituted for its individual members, who
were declared the owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the
Partial Decision. Aside from this, the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 17221 had nothing to do with the merits of the
case. As such, it did not contradict the Court of Appeals
decision of November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596
which set aside the Partial Decision of the trial court.
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Petition-In-Intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on
November 20, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows: The Decision
dated March 21, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-35762, is annulled
insofar as it concerns Lot No. 2, originally covered by OCT
No. 614 and Lot No. 3 originally covered by OCT No.
333. The November 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 is affirmed in all other
respects.
As clarified above, paragraph 1 of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the court a quo is void insofar as it
declares petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot
Nos. 2 and 3.
The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War
Veterans Legionaries of the Philippines is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.