I N JULY

the German
1941,
fall of Crete,
two months
General
airborne
after the
Kurt Student,
leader, was sum-
after Crete we shall never do another
amborne operatjon The parachute
is one that rel!es en[wely
arm
on surpr/se
moned to Hitlers headquarters at That surprwe factor has now exhausted
Wolfschanze Together with a number Itself The day of the paratroops is over.
of senior paratroop of f!cers who had Was Htler right?
surwved the Crete battle, he was awarded In seeklrrg an answer, we must trace
the Knights Cross The Fiihrer con- the early history of a!rborne warfare, up
gratulated the airborne warriors on to Hitlers abrupt statement, and ask
accomplmh{ng a vital task by the only ourselves whether or not subsequent
method possible m the clrcumstances airborne operations con fwmed or con-
airborne assault This was encouraging founded his judgment Finally, we may
talk for Student Already h!s airborne consider another quest !on Does
corps was nearly back up to strength Hitlers statement hold good today? Is
The many casualties had been replaced, the day of the paratroops really over?
equipment losses made good He had
amblttous plans for further operations In Early History
the Mediterranean against Cyprus, The history of atrborne warfare starts
Egypt. and Malta. wtth a question. Ben)amin Franklin,
But after lunch, over coffee, Hitler then US ambassador In France, asked,
shattered hls hopes Turning to Student, Where is the Prince who can afford
the FWrrer said quietly: so to cover his country with troops for
Of course, GeneraL you know that its defense, as that 10,000 men,

40 Military Review
 PARATROOPS

descending from the clouds, might not, were to be overlooked by airborne

m many places, do an in ftmte amount of enthusiasts a century and a half later
mischief before a force could be broughr It was another American, Colonel
to repel them? B,lly Mjtchell, who first made plans to
Frankllns !nqutry, Insp]red by the turn Frankllns Idea Iflto reallty In 1918,
sight of pioneer balloonists ascend)ng Mitchell, who was commander of the
and floattng away downywnd, remains US AIr Corps in France, proposed a
relevant today, for N !s always the case parachute operat,on to help break the
that land forces WIII be concentrated to deadlock of trench warfare The Idea
counter perceived threatsalong was to drop a force from the 1st US
borders or coastlines or whereverand Dlvlamn behind the German Ilnes to
this preoccupation WIII Ieava other attack Metz from the rear General
areas--usually the heartlandrelatively Pershing, hls commander In chief,
Ilghtly guarded Any method of warfare vetoed the plan It was a wild scheme,
that enables the attacking force to out- considering what I]ttle knowledge
flank the main defense and to attack the anyone at the time had about
OPPOnentS vulnerable rear areas has parachutes Any cold assessment of the
obwou$ merits However, It is ln - problems Involved would lead one to
teresttng to note that, In foreseeing the conclude that Pershtng was r!ght
potential of vertical envelopment, except for just one thing Billy Mlrchell
Franklln was equally al!ve to the was a commander with ws!on and
dangers Inherent In such enterprises energy that sometimes made the
His ommous qualifying phrase before a wildest dreams come true The world
force could be brought to repel them was to wait another 22 years to discover
recognized problems that all too often that, with the rtght equipment and
traln!ng. the !dee was sound
Between the wars, many nations
tjnkered with parachute or air-landed
troops The earilest recorded airborne
m!sslons lnvolwng uniformed regular
troops took place In Iraq In 1923 The
Royal A!r Force had been assigned
responstbll!ty for pac!f!catlon of tribal
areas and, }n the main, discharged thle
duty by direct alr power against dls.
s!dents, Sometimes, It was necessary
for troops to Intervene on the ground
and, using V!ckers Vernon
bomber/troop carriers, the massive d!s-
Brtgad[er Maurrce A. J. Tugwell.
tances were covered by a!r The Bntlsh
British Army, is currently appointed
Br)gadier Eastern D)strlct, Umted soldiers were landed on any convenient
Kingdom Land Forces. Nottingham. open space close to their ob)ectwes,
England He has been a member of the and, when the!r search-and-destroy
Parachute Regiment since 1944 and, tasks were completed, they were flown
durtng 1965-68. commanded the out again In a sense, these were early
Parachute Regiments tra!rrlng airmob!le operations They were
organization In 1973-74, he was a economical and, In the short term,
member of the Anglo .Amer{can Ad- effectwe. but, m the longer term, the
visory Team to the Imperial {ranian polltical consequences of such tactics
National Defense University in Teheran. could prove counterproductwe No prize
His books Airborne to Battle and IS offered for drawing a parallel,
Arnhem, A Case Study were pubhshed During the second Nicaraguan Cam.
m 1971 and 1975 respectively. paign, 1925-29, US Marine Corps

March 1977 41
 iARATROOPS

aviation provided a casualty evacuation The Umted Kingdoms attach~ was Ma-
serwce, and, later, most troop rotation to }or General (later Fjeld Marshal) WaveIl.
remote outposts was by atr. In 1931, He was \mprassed by the demonstration
Major General Preston Brown moved a and by the quallty of the paratroopers
field arttllery battery by alr transport but expressed reservations as to the real
from the Atlantm to the Paciftc stale of tactical value of the drop As a
the Panama Canal Zone. In the professional soldler concerned with the
maneuvera at Fort du Pent, Delaware, realfttes of full-scale confhct between
an alr corps captain named George C. modern armies, Wave(ls doubts were
Kenney surpr!sed the enemy, the valld How were these lightly armed,
umptres and observers when he sparsely suppl!ed paratroops to hold out
successfully amlanded an infantry against a force brought to repel them,
detachment on a tacttcal mwslon especially If that force cona!ated of
Meanwhile, at Kelly and Brook Ftelds, tanks? Wavell had no way of foreseeing
Texas, small-scale experiments In that a combination of political and
parachuting men and weapons were military pressures could create con.
going on. d!tlons where such troops might, m
The f!rst nation to form a real many places, do an Inflnlte amount of
paratroop unit was Italy The Inlttal mcsch!ef, conditions in which a force
collectwe drop was made a! Clnisello might never arrwe to repel them The
Balsamo, near M[lan, on 6 November man wdh this foresight recently had
1927 from CA73troop carrters of the achieved absolute power #n National
Regfa Aerorraut/ca The Italians used the Soc}ahst Germany and was busy
Salvator stattc.llne parachute and creating armed forces capable of turning
earned no reserve, a policy decision that his expansionist dreams Into reality
must have seemed mistaken to the This man was Hitler
untts General Gutdonl as he fell to hw
death a year later, hls Sa/vator Fallschirmjager
streaming above htm m the dreaded In 1935, Hnler had abrogated the
Roman candle In the late 1930s, the mll}tary clauses of the Versailles Traaty
Italians raised complete parachute bat- wh!ch had Ilmned the size of Germanys
talions, and these later expanded mto Armed Forces and forbtdden the
the Folgore and Nembo Dwlsions, manufacture of mllnary aircraft, The
destined to ftght w!th dtstlnctlon but Junkers 52 CIVII alrllner had been In
never to partake In full-scale airborne mass production for some years,
operations tailored for easy conversion to mtlltary
Meanwhile, m the USSR, Marshal use Thus, when In eerly 1936 the
Tukhachevskl and Comm!ssar of German General Staff ordered Ma)or
Defense Voroshllov ware Iaylng the Immanns to set up a parachute school
foundations for a masswe airborne at Stendal, the essential troop-carrier
force Cwhan lump clubs were set up aircraft were to hand. The Luftwaffes
throughout the country to provide basrc possession of large numbers of these
training for thousands of young men robust, trlmotor transports made
and women Military paratroops posstble the German achievements In
appeared first in the 193o maneuvers the realm of a!rborna warfare,
when a ra!dmg team captured the achievements that to this day remain, in
enemy corps commander By 1935, many Important respects, unique.
practice jumps at regimental strength Hitler was a leader who rose to
were possible and pnmttwe, but powar through the organized terror of
effectwe methods of heavy drop were hls 5A storm troopers, To be sure, he
coming Into use All this was had a lot going for him besides
damons~rated to foreign mllltary terrorism, but these more positive
observers during the 1936 exerctses. factors did nothing to leasen the impor-
r

42 Military Review
.
 PARATROOPS

tance of brutqllty as the malnapring of ward off counterattacks, Like Wavell,

Nazi powar The Nat!onal Soclalmt party Student had been an observer at the
had more In common with the Mafia or 1936 Sowet manauvers. Unlike Wavell,
Al Capones gangstara than with normal he belleved that airborne troops with
polmcal parties In civillzed soctaty the right weapons could resist the force
H!tlers special qualnies as a polltic!an brought to repel them, According to one
rested upon hls understandlrrg of the of his own subordinates, General
use or threat of violence, the double Melndl, Student had b!g ideas but not
cross, Ilea, propaganda and polemtc the faintest conception as to how they
When he turned hls talenta to high were to be carried out The orthodox
mllttary command, he used the same always wew or!ginal and daring thinkers
tools For 18 months, he was supremely wnh susplclon, and often their reserve
successful, then, it all began to go bad is justlf!ed, But airborne operations are
T!me had run out for the methods of the high-rtsk ventures, Aa such, they
pohtlco-mlhtary terrorist, and Hitler had prosper best if daring and tmagmat!on
none of the answers In a war of attrlt(on combine so to stun the opposmon that
against Russta, America and Erltarn risks are mlmmlzed, The motto of
Long before 1939, Hitler wrota, 1 shall Brltatns Special Alr Serwca Regiment
never start a war without the certainty Who dares, w!ns M more than a
that a demorallzad enemy will succumb romantic slogan; for those who live
to the first stroke . For so long as he dangerously, !t IS hard, pract!cal advice
stuck to thts formula, he was brilllant Hnler was dellghted by the airborne
The early growth of German airborne arm h strengthened the means by
forces was a haphazard affair. Inmaliy, which hw, enemies could be made to
there was an army regiment, a succumb at the first stroke. It Improved
Luftwaffe contingent, an S.S platoon and hls chances of forcing hm enemies to
no poltcy Later, the SA formed an capitulate under the threat of force, In
atrborne battallon Still, there was no the manner of a protection racketeer
clear POIICY, and service staffs were Consider the Implicatlona of hls words,
squabbling over control. It was not unt!l hurled in mad fury at the Austrian
June 1938 when Luftwaffe General chancellor on 12 February 1936
Kurt Student was placed in overall You dont serjously be fteve that You
command fhat the young German a\r- can stop me. or even delay me for half
borne arm began to make military an hour, do you>. After the Army, my
sense SA and the A ustr:an Leg/on would move
Student insisted that all hts m, and nobody can stop their just
paratroops, the Faltschmmjager, be tn revengenot even I
the Luftwaffe although the army con- In his best guttersnipe manner,
tinued to supply troops to be used m the Hnler was telhng the defenseless
air-landing role. He threw sabotage Austrian leader Either surrender quietly
tasks overboard and concentrated on or face not just mdltary defeat but
orgamzmg and tralnmg his men along licensed butchery of the defeated.
conventional Imes-conventional. that Austr{a fell w!thout flghtmg, so did
is, insofar as the troops were formed Czechoslovakia. Had the Czechs fought,
mto a dwlsion wfth hght aupportmg they would have experienced the first
arms and trained to ftght as a team. T e large-scale atrborne attack. Students
tactical employment Student had [ in embryo airborne dwmlon stood by to
mind was anything but conventionallt land near Freudenthal, Moravia, in the
was to make landings m the enemys 1938 seizure of the Sudetenland and
rear, so concentrated in space and in agaip to land around Prague when the
time that objectwes could be ae!zed by remainder of that country was occupied.
the exploitation of the surprise factor The second plan is interesting, partly
and then held in sufficient strength to because it involved a direct attack upon

March 1977 43
PARATROOPS

the seat of government and partly parachute assault. At Fornebu, thick

because 29 years later a stmllar cloud had forced the atrcraft to turn
operatton actually took place back, and the Junkers loaded w}th
Poland would not yteld to Germanys infantry began Iandmg In the face of
demande, and, on 1 September 1939, dmect fwe They suffered casualties.
the series of bloodless vtctones gave Escort}ng fighter bombers, running
way to the first of the vmlent conquests shOrt Of fuel. landed and trained thejr
Atrborne troops were brtefed for a guns on the defanders, Chaos was
number *of operations In the Pol\sh somehow turned to victory The
campaign, but the rapid advance of the operation continued, and the defenders
armored dwstons made tham un. gave up. Within hours, a German
necessary It was Aprtl 1940 when the milnary band was leading troops mto
Fa//schirm/ager made their debut m Oslo, all part of the dtsarmmg psy-
the mvas!ons of Denmark and Norway, chological tactics, All southern Norway
This small campa}gn was of was taken over quickly and at relatwely
secondary Importance
to German small cost, justifying the risks taken.
strategyall the more reason for rapjd Farther north, the Brnlsh landed troops
and econommal wctory This was and aircraft, and a protracted but
achieved by excellent army, navy and atr tsolated little campaign continued until
force cooperation and by superb msk the Unned Kingdom forces finally wera
assessment on the part of the plann}ng ejected
staff The alm In both countries was to The German decision to use the
overwhelm resistance by bold In\tlal Fa//sch/rmjiger In Norway,
strokes By making defense appear nevertheless, may have been mwtaken.
hopeless, Danes and Norwegians were Surprise can take many forms, and one
to be encouraged to accept the Invader of these N the employment of a new
By quickly occupying the ports and idea or method The price that was patd
alrflelds, BrNmh assmtance was to be for afrborne assistance In the
excluded Norwegian campaign was the exposure
Just one parachute battal!on was to the allies, and to nations still neutral,
made available It had orders to drop of the tactics of seizing airfields by small
one company less a platoon to seize the parachute assaults and then using
Vordtngborg bridge Itnk\ng Copenhagen these fields to accept large numbers of
wlh Its ferry terminal, the rematn{ng air-landed reinforcements As we shall
platoon at Alborg to capture two alr- soon see, thts price was to be h{gh
flelds, a company at Sola Alrf,eld,
Stavanger: and the remainder of the Belgmm and the Netherlands
unit on Fornebu Field, Oslo. At all the The apogee of HKlers mllltary career
captured landing grounds, Infantry sub. was the campatgn that began on 10
sequently were to be alrlanded, and, at May 1940 and ended with the defeat of
the same time, the navy would bring France and the eject!on of BrKlsh forces
more troops ashore through ports In from the European mainland. Two
Denmark, there was virtually no neutral nattons, Belgium and the
resistance, and the attacks succeeded, Netherlands, also were conquered rn the
m Norway, things went less smoothly course of thts blitzkrieg attac!c and n
Sola was stubbornly defended, but was in these countries that General
the Fallschirm/ager were well-trained Students amborna troops were com-
and ready for the problems en- mitted
countered. Fighter bombers provided The thrust mto Belgium was a vital
close support whale the paratroops part of the overall attack plan, While the
threw grenades through pillbox em- main point of effort waa developed
brasures. The field was ready to receive farther south, through the Ardennes, a
Jurrkers within 20 mmutes of the powerful subsidiary stroke was to be

44 Military Review
 ..
PARATROOPS

made across the BelaIan border due weapon hollowcharge explosives that
west toward the Cha-nnel coast The could penetrate the . roofs of gun
French and Brmsh, so the Germans emplacements hitherto belleved im-
hoped, would see this as the main pregnable They blasted thew way
threat and hasten to the Belglans aid through, dtsabled the guns and
But, to make this threat convlncjng, the neutralized the garrison The small am
Efelglan frontier defenses had to be borne assault force unlocked the
overcome swiftly, and this posed serious Belglan defenses on the Albert Canal
problems and Prowded a free run for the panzers
The Albert Canal ran just west of the The threat to the Channel ports could
border, and the three bridges In the not be Ignored, and French and BrKlsh
German attack sector were well. forces were moved north to meet K, Just
defended The whole area was as overall German strategy demanded
dom:nated by artillery sited in the Polmeai deceptton. surprwe-both tac-
modern fortress of Eben Emael, built ttcal and technicaland well-calculated
into the hlllslde, constructed of concrete risk-taktng by bold and skillful troops
and steel and manned by 1,200 soldlers combined to achieve a legendary wctory
The task of forcing the passage of Whjle the 400 gilder troops were
the Albert Canal was entrusted to a flghtlng on the Albert Canal. General
400-strong glider force commanded by a Students main forces were flying
young captain In utmost secrecy, the toward the Netherlands The overland
attack was planned and practiced Then. jnvason of this nation was entrusted to
before dawn on 10 May, the 41 gilders relatwely light German forces under
cast off from their Junkers tug amcraft General von Kuechler, numerically
while sttll over Germany Silently, the weaker than the defenders, and this fact
gl}ders continued on thew course, over made the a!rborne contribution v!tally
the narrow strip of Dutch territory and Important and extremely hezardous The
Into Belglan atr space Dawn was lust Dutch defensesrested on three
breaking as they touched down on or successwe Imes a Ilghtly fortlf!ed
near their objectives The airborne delaying posltlon at or near the frontier,
troops had been allowed 5 mmutes the main Grebbe-Peel hne wh,ch
surprwe time. stretched by their made use of natural defensive barriers,
capta)n to 10 minutes, ahead of the and, finally, Fortress Holland
main Invasion of the Netherlands and Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The
Belgmms neutral borders As usual. Hague--protected by estuartes, rwers
Hitler had kept his Intended wct!ms and areas of extenswe floodlng
negotiating till the last moment and The airborne plan for the Dutch
then had fallen upon them wnhout so operation remains, for thts wrKer, the
much as a declaration of war most interesting jn the history of air-
One of the three bridges was borne warfare There were two dw)slons
demolished by Its defenders, but the available Students own 7th Airborne,
other two were captured Intact and, subordinate to him, Graf von
Meanwhile, mne ghders landed on the Sponecks 22d Atrland!ng Conslderlng
very top of Fort Eben Emael, the only the weakness of the main German
area wlthln miles that could not be ground attack and the fact that no large-
raked with fire from the forts guns The scale amborne operation had been
landing zone was too small for a launched ever before, any commander
parachute assault, end gilders never of orthodox upbnngmg would have
before had been used to delwer troops sought to mlrrlmlze the msks by
The Belglan defenders were taken com- employlng the airborne m direct support
pletely by surprise. Fur{her unpleasant of the ground attack where early Imkup
surprwes awaited them. The Germans was Ilkely. Thts IS precisely what
were armed with another novel General von Kuechler proposed. He

March 1977 45
PARATROOPS

planned to use hts airborne force to Thus, wherever the Fallschirmjager

breek the Grebbe-Peel line In the area landed, they met stiff resistance. In the
of Soesterberg. But Students un- south, Students 7th Airborne Division
orthodox mind saw an altogether captured all but one of its bridge objec-
different way of mlnlmlzlng the risks tives by surprise and shock action. The
Use the airborne to crack open Fortress landings at Waalhaven were costly but
Holland, he argued, and aim part of the ultimately successful, and the atr-
force directly at the nerve centers of Iended troops moved off to capture the
government, and the entire Dutch bridge still [n Dutch hands and to help
defense $ystem will crumble. What IS defend the narrow corridor agalnat
more, the national WIII to conttnue the counterattacks, In Rotterdam,
fight WIII be shaken so by such an attack paratroops landed !n a football stadium,
that the ground force advance across the nearest open space to the New
the frontier and through the Grebbe- Meuse brtdge, then hijacked a tram
Peel line WIII be made easy which earned them to their objectwe,
Thts revolutionary Idea attracted op- Other troops were landed on the New
pos!tton from the H}gh Command Meuse in seaplanes and clamberad up
Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Jeschonnek, the bridge superstructure and cut the
nevertheless, put the proposal to Hitler wires to the demolition charges. The
at the next war-plannlng conference fight was hard and costly, and, on
The Ftihrer was dellghted Here was a several occasions, the outcome hung in
mllttary plan that reflected exactly hts the balance, But, when on the morning
politico. mllltary theor!es, It was the of D plus 2 the leading panzer dwlston
tact!cs of the terrormt raid played out on reached the MoerdlJk bridges, the air-
a vast scale He gave the go. ahead borne corr!dor lay intact before them.
The operation fell mto two parts In Fortress Holland had been cracked.
the north. Von Sponecks dwtston was North of Rotterdam, Von Sponecks
to seize the airfields at Valkenburg, 22d Dwwon was hawng a tough time,
Ockenburg and Ypenburg by parachute He had just sufficient paratroops to
assault, then elrlend two Infantry setze the three airfields, prowded
regiments which were to enter the resistance was weak and the operations
Dutch capital, seize the royal family, went like clockwork, Only 15 minutes
government end High Command m the would elapse between the parachute
hope of end{ng organtzed resistance or, drops and tha first touchdowns by
at any rate. disrupting defense plens Junkers bringing in his predominantly
South of Rotterdam, Students dwlsion Infantry force Things started going
was to land by parachute at battalton or wrong at the outset, The flat, patchwork
company strength to seize crossings landscape confused the German pilots
over the major water obstacles that who dropped many paratroops wtde of
protected Fortress Hollands southern their objectwes. The Dutch Indeed had
flank Simultaneously, an infantry learned eomething from the lessons of
reg!ment would alrland at Waalhaven Norway Resistance was dogged, and
near Rotterdam to prowde a reserve. mobtle reserves including armored cars
Theirs were the tasks of holdlng open a moved down from the north to counter
secure route mto Rotterdam for Von the landings. The result was that troop
Kuechlers panzers, blocking any French carriers containing men of the 47th
relief force com]ng up from the south Infantry Reg!ment landed at Valkenburg
and preventing movement of Dutch !n the face of intense fire. Junker 52s
reserves. sank to thetr axlas in the soft mud and
Although the Dutch clung stuck; further waves could find no apace
desperately to neutrality, they also were to land and turned~ack. At Ypenburg,
determmed to defend themselves m the 11 of 13 Jurrkers carrying the firat
event that neutrality was overturned. aasault company of the 65th Regiment

46 Military Review
 ..

PARATROOPS

were shot down In flames by antiaircraft method no longe~ was viable. What
artillerY, General von Sponeck was due went wrong?
to land here. Seamg the chaos below, Students plan was to land his four
he flew on to Ockenburg. But there the regiments in four widely separated
same grim ptcture unfoldedan airfield areas and attack all wtal towns, ports,
strewn with the wrecks of a mraft. PI lots alrflelds and installations
put down wherever they could, on sand simultaneously He was under orders to
dunes, highways and small fields The complete the campaign quickly so as to
shock effect on the Dutch nervous release the troop carriers for the
system was considerable, and rumors forthcoming attack on Russta, The
spread like wlldflre, The attackers had whole concept of Students plan rested
done damage, but not an tnflnjte upon rapid subjugation of the allled
amount The planned action Inside The garrrson, believed to consist only of a
Hague never materialized, and the retnfarced brigade plus some coast and
dwlston was forced onto the defenswe, antiaircraft defenses Had he known
The price of unvelllng the techn!que of that General Frey bergs garrison had
amlandmg directly onto alrflelds one grown to the equwalent of nearly two
month earher m Norway had been pajd. dwlslons, alben poorly armed, lacking jn
Nevertheless, the combined effects of mobjlny and with wrtually no com-
the two airborne attacks and tha munications, he surely would have
overland advance brought about a Dutch adopted a less rmky form of attack
surrender after a war lasting only fwe It IS dlfflcult not to see tn General
days Students Crete planning the workings
Thare was one other ingredient In of an orlgmal mind that had become
the German Invaston of the Netherlands hypnotc?ed by Its own orlglnallty In
that we should note Ahead of the Norway, the direct attack upon airfields
overland advance by panzers and }n- worked; In the Netherlands, a month
fantry, shadowy groups of men In plaln later, It failed In the Netherlands, risks
clothes, or In Dutch police or military had been m[mrnlzed by going straight
uniforms, undertook small but Important for the enemys jugular vein, \n Crete,
coup de rnam operations to secure the same rattonale seemed to prevail
bridges, overpower guards and Yat Crete was no neutral country un-
generally undermine defense prepared for war, [t was an alllad base
arrangements. fully alart to the Ilkellhood of airborne
attack Even allowing for the misleading
~Wn~~~~~~~d~tellgence as to ailed
only a guess that slmll r groups were strangth on the wland, the attack plan
standing by m The Hagu ready to guide seemed based on the assumptions that
Von Sponecks men to the offices and nothing whatever had been learned by
homes of senior offlcla /s,to ensure that the defenders from the prewous
certain gateways or entrances were summers experiences and that resolute
unguarded, to jam telephone exchanges Commonwealth and Greek soldlers
and to spread rumors. Against the would be thrown Into con fuston by
peaceful and unprepared, the methods multiple a}rborne landings
of the terrorist can be horribly effectwe. The result was near disaster for the
7th Atrborne Division By the end of the
The Grave of the Fallschirmjager first day, none of the four regiments had
One year later, in May 1941, achieved Its ob}ectwes, and each was
Students airborne troops launched their hanging on by its fingernails. Since no
blggeat and moat celebrated attack In amfleld had been captured, the followup
conqtiering Crete, the Fa//schirm/ager infantry could not be flown m to tilt the
won a remarkable wctory, but the cost balance The British, Australian and
convinced Hitler that the airborne New Zealand defanders had foreseen

March 1977 47
PARATROOPS

the importance of these fields and was the Grave of the German
defended them accordingly At two out Paratroopers. Before the attack on
of the three airstrips, quick cour,terat- Russia, Germanys victories had been
tacks deprwed the Germans of all hope accomplished at remarkably small cost;
of capturing them; at the third, m the the losses in Crete came as a severe
west, the defenders dithered and dld shock to Hitler, However, n IS fair to
nothing, The Fa//schirm/ager were able assume that the German leaders con-
to turn Inltlal fatlure Into ultlmate victory clusion that the day of the paratroops
because the Gods of War provided two was over rested on a stronger premise
lucky breaks and because their leader, than shock. Hitler, better than any of his
Student, recovering hts old brllllance, generals, had understood the oppor-
recognized these gifts and acted accor- tunities for comblnlng political in-
dingly, tlmtdation wkh bold military action to
Although Student had planned to achieve rapid, cheap victories. He saw
commit wrtually all hls paratroops the airborne arm as a valuable in-
durvng the first day, the second wave gredient In this formula But, now that
that went In during the afternoon had the weak had been defeated, Germany
got into such a muddle that two com- faced a war of attrition in which terrorist
pames were left behind In Greece tactics could no longer play a significant
These, together with trainees and any part. Although hoping for a rapid con-
spare men that could be found at the quest of Russia, Hitler appreciated that
mounting airfields, were mustered to this campa!gn would be a war of the big
prowde Studant with lucky break battalions In which the relatively
number onea reserve force of vulnerable airborne arm, Iacklng the
parachutists At the westernmost advantage of total surpr!se, could ac-
Iodgment, the assault brigade, although complish ltttle except Its own extinction
severely mauled in savage flghtlng, In this setting, hla assessment probably
sensed the opportunity prowded by the was correct
defendera If the New Zealanders would So far as the Fallschirmjiger were
not grasp the jnltlatwe, then perhaps concerned, HNlers prophesy was self-
the Germans could. This shrewd fulflll!ng A well-planned and carefully
assessment tted In ntcely with lucky rehearsed scheme to capture Malta in
break number two, for not only had the 1942 by a combined German-ltallan
New Zealanders failed to counterattack, airborne assault was rejected by tha
but, m one wtal positton overlooking the Ftihrer with the words The affair will
arrfleld, a battallon had been withdrawn go wrong and WIII cost too many
This tactical errorand it was Indeed an losses. The Mediterranean In 1942
error and not any lack of stamina on the was one of the last places where the
troops partensured the success of Luftwaffe was to enjoy the degree of
Students bold decwon to press hls superiority that made a hugs airborne
attack through the west, Once the alr- operatron feas{ble Thereafter, the
fleld was captured and the Infantry Fal/sch/rm/ager were grounded effec-
drwion was able to land, the outcome tively by allied alr power aa well as by
of the battle was no longer In doubt. Hitlers orders They fought brilliantly as
Wjth continued air supremacy, and now infantry, but that IS another story.
with military superiority, the Germans
were not to be stopped by the dispersed Allied Airborne Operations
defenders. Although In his dismissal of atrborne
Using prirnartly rifles and bayonets, warfare after Crete Hitler was obviously
Freybergs men ktlled one out of every referring to German operations, there IS
four paratroopers who landed on the little doubt that he also disregarded
flr.st day. Many more were wounded. alllad airborne potential, There is ample
General Student lamented that Crete evidence that subsequent events caused

48 Military Review
 PARATROOPS

htm to rewse hm valuatton of parachute The way the alhea used their airborne
troopa, but, by that time, he was seeing troops to support the D-day Iandlngs
them, as It were, from the recaiwng end was cautious apd unorlglnal, Planning
The Russians committed their 4th staffs in Washington had advocated
Airborne Corps between January and daring drops near Paris to divart
April 1942 in a desperate attempt to German armor from the beachhead,
sever German Ilnes of communmatton Fortunately, those closer to the scene
east of Smolensk and ease the pressure had grasped the fact that, agajnat an
on Moscow Units were dropped experienced, determined enemy, es-
piecemeal, by night, to ambush convoys, pecially In terrain where ha could use
attack base and supply unns and to join his tanks. the bold a)rborne stroke could
with or form partisan groups which succeed only tn very special cir-
would operate behind enemy Ilnes ln- cumstances, and they had decided that
defmltely They were to do as much France /n June 1944 was certainly not
mtschtef as posstble unttl the forces one of these occasions
sent to repel them eventually hunted Instead, the one Brmsh and two US
them down No plans existed for the]r airborne d}visons were used to dlmintsh
rellef or withdrawal; they were to fight the risks attend!ng the main Iandlngs
until killed or, for the lucky few, until the There were sufflctent Iand!ng craft to
tide of war eventually turned and the put ashore the assault echelons of only
Sowet Army drove the Germans from fwe Infantry dlvlalona In the first wave
the motherland Thla sacrifice of the Delwerlng another three dwlslons by air
Sowet airborne corps tells us something represented a 60-percent Increase m
of Russ Ian philosophy for the the strength of this force. By Iandlng the
employment of airborne forces h IS that airborne at the two flanks of the ln-
sold!ers who volunteer for a corps elne vaslon beaches Immediately prior to the
need not expect a fair chance of sur- amphtbfous assaults, the defenders
vwal The Soviet paratrooper expects were confused and In some areas
only the toughest and most desperate weakened During the battle to hold and
assignments He IS expendable enlarge the beachhead, the Germans
Anglo-American airborne soldlers were denied opportunny to a!m their
operated on a small scale In North counterattacks at the alljed flanks The
Africa In the Slc,ly ,nvaslon in 1943, drops, carried out by night, were
they were employed m four separate scattered Nevertheless, the paratroops
brigade-strength Iandlngs, all dw- and gilder troops fought with great
tlngutshed by numerous acts of dmtlnctlon to accomplish their tasks
gallantry amid general chaos. These Although the dispersal of men over a
adventures were not without tactical wide area caused problems for the
worth, but their real value lay m the airborne umts, n also served to confuse
lessons learned for the future and, In many rnatances, paralyze the
The mvaslon of the European defenders. The airborne contribution to
mainland in 1944 posed severe Operation Over/oral fully justified the
problems for the Allies. The first m- allled dectslon to ratse airborne
revolved getting large numbers of troops dwwlons and proved Hitlers prophesy
ashore, the second was to overcome the false so far as hls enemies were con.
German defenses along the beaches cerned
and !mmedlately inland, and the thmd Crmcs may argue that the outcome
was to resist the Inewtable counterat- of the next great alhed airborne
tacks by armored dwislons The most endeavor contradicted the ewdence of
crmcal periods would be tha actual Normandy and indicated that H\tler had
assault Iandmgs and the subsequent 48 been right after all. This was Operation
hours during which the Germans might Market-Garc/err, In which three alrbo.rne
be able to obhterate the allled Iodgment. dmwons attempted to capture and hold

March 1977 49
PARATROOPS

open a 70. rode-long corridor across the viewed with reserve. The condmon that
Dutch water obstacles so that Br!tish tavored the paratroops at the outbreak
armor might break through the German of war-a weak and unprepared
pcrs(ttons, outflank the Slegfrled line and adversaryrecurred mslde GermanV as
pose a threat to the heart of Germany. defeat on all fronts undermined the
Launched in mid-September 1944, the nations wtll and abd@ to fight Had tt
operation gamed all but the last tactical been our poltcv to extend the Anglo-
objectwe-the Rhine bridge at Arnhem Amerlcan sphere of influence In Europe
But thrs ,was supposed to be a breakour, farther east, the awborne arm could
and, just as the would-be ja!lbreaker have been Invaluable.
would regard failure on the last obstacle The war against Japan demonstrated
as fatal to his whole enterprme, so the a number of uses for airborne troops,
defeat of the 1st Atrborne Dwwon at notablv General Orde Wlngates glider
Arnhem was fatal to the st:ateglc object Iandlngs behind enemv Imes m Burma,
of Operation iVlarket-Garden Failure General KenneVs operations }n the
had many causes The project lacked Markham Vallev of Papua and the 503d
top-level support, and delay In obtaining US Parachute Regiments splrlted
such support wasted the precious and assault onto Corregtdors island fortress.
fteettng moment when the Germans, Perhaps the antes should have concen-
shattered by their defeat [n France, had trated more airborne effort tn the
wrtually no means of resjstlng Fortune Pacific In Europe, paratroops con.
favored the Germans with part of an fronting a modern armv are Inevitably
armored corps camprng just outside vulnerable to the forces sent to repel
Arnhem at the time of the landings and them which usuallv means tanks and
the weather turning sour to hamper ajr artillery In Jungle terrain, the opposition
operations after the first day The Brltlsh IS I!kelv to be Irmned to the same Itght
made mistakes which greatly magnlfled equipment that paratroops carry, thus
the advantages that the Germans brightening the airbornes chances of
gained from thetr good luck The 1st surwval If the objectwe is an tsland,
Airborne Dwlsjon landed 7 miles from then the defenders means of retaliation
Its bridge objective and thereby sur- are restricted to what can be spared
rendered the element of surprise. from the garrtson The flexible response
Arrangements for close air support were of distant mobile reserves IS denied
weak and fatled utterfv m the event The
employment of reserves was decided In Postwar Opinion and Experience
advance, and the opportunity to recast In the aftermath of war, the victors
the plan of battle In the Ilght of the first glor(fv thetr deeds and tend not to ask
davs flghtlng was thrown awav If themselves how, In Its earlv stages, th,e
gallantrv alone could guarantee wctorv, war was nearlv lost Thus, the allted
we would have won the battle of arrborne actions were lauded and
Arnhem, but, unfortunately, manv magnlfled, often with Insufflclent crltlcal
,harsher factors also are taken Into ac- analvsls, while the German operations
count. were neglected The airborne arm
One resu[t of the setback at Arnhem tended to be seen solelv as a battlefield
was a reluctance of allled commanders weapon Almost no attention focused on
to rrak another daring airborne plan In Its use as an instrument of coercion in
the last operat!on In the European condmons short of full-scale war.
warthe Rhine crossingtwo airborne Gliders were abandoned by all the
dwislons were put down onlv 2 or 3 great powers during the 1950s. The
m[les beh!nd German Imes. This was a French and the Brmsh used their
succe$.sful operation m the sense that paratroops in various campaigns that
all objectwes were taken k+lthough, m punctuated their wmhdrawal from lm-
terms of cost-effectweness, it must be penal commitments. In Korea, the US

50 Military Review
 PARATROOPS

Army undertook two brigade-slza Sowel paratroops are selacted from

operations, As helicopters became polmcally reliable volunteers Ideological
avadable, these were used Increasingly tndoctrlnatlon IS more thorough than
for tactical mwslons By the t!me of usual The fwe airborne dwsons and
masswe American involvement In the special serwce umts-known as
Vietnam, It was cleiir that, for diversionary b~lgades are under
operations over relatively short dis- central and Independent command and
tances, the helicopter provided a means are destined for special and m-
of delwery superior to the parachute independent mlsslons In the plannlng of
The paratroops remained In bustness for these ventures, the KGB WIII be a
airborne action over long ranges s!nce gu!d!ng hand
there IS no way that helicopters can Lika the Americans, the Russians
compete with fixed-wmg troop carriers have concluded that, for battlefield air.
for range and payload However. among mobile actions, the helicopter IS the best
NATO powers concerned only w,th vehicle Unlike the Americans, the
defense, the utlllty of paratroops now !s Sowets reject the alr cavalry or alr
questioned In Ilmfted war, as the Turks assault dwmon concept and mswt that
demonstrated recently In Cyprus, all motor rifle battalions eventually
parachute troops sttll are useful, but should be capable of undartakmg
what relevance have they {n Western helicopter-borne tasks ahead of the
Europe? To fjnd an answer, we must mechanized advance As an interim
examine Ilkely Sowet airborne tactics measure, one battalion per dwwon IS
trained especially for thm role This
The Warsaw Pact Threat pohcy has freed the airborne dwwons
When in the summer of 1968 Sowet from short and madlum-ranga tactical
leaders decjded they must return a commitments m support of Sowet
liberalized Czechoslovakia to Com- aggression against NATO and prowded
mun!$t orthodoxy, they employed the the RussIan leaders with a powerful
same mlx of polmcal mtrmidatf on. force for strategic use
double cross, hes, propaganda and swift The strategic uses to which the
milltary action that once served Hitler so Russian airborne might be committed
well Aft e r negotiating a political are not disclosad to the wrner for ob-
settlement to lull their intended victims, Vi0L15 reasons The four scenarjos which
the Russians secretly completed the!r follow are based upon a study of history,
Invasion plans During the eventng of 20 RussIan pollt!cal ambitions and up-to-
August, the KGB (CommKtee of State date Soviet md!tary sources
Securny) mounted a terrorist-style The Prague operation typtfles one
attack on the amport control tower at use the swift sublugatlon of hberal,
Ruzyne A\rport, Prague Control of alr nat!onal or independent tendencies
space was assumed from a specially wnhin the Russ(an Empire !n a manner
equipped Aeroflot awlmer landed an that avolda the display of brute force
hour earlier. Within minutes, the frost of that harmed Soviet reputation in
hundreds of ,4ntonov troop carriers had Hungary In 1956. As Russ!a con-
landed Soviet paratroops of the 2d sohdates its hold over client states In
Airborne Dwlalon secured the airport the Near Eest and Africa, and if the
and surrounding areas. Light armored West remams ewdently unwilling or
vehicles followed, and these motored unable to intervene whatever the
into Prague to neutralize the Czech provocation, such operations may be
Government and ensure that the mounted further afield rather than allow
Warsaw Pact invasion over land fron- chent states to opt out of Soviet control
tiers would go unopposed. A second use might be on the NATO
The close cooperation between KGB flanks. Suppose a renewed conflict
and airborne troops is characteristic. aroae over Cyprus and that enher

March 1977 51
 PARATROOPS

Greece or Turkey felt Itself at the same have lost suffjcjent terr]torv. men and
time, vulnerable to attack and betrayed matertel that their leaders are con-
by Its alhes A minor sense of grievance templating resorting
nuclear to
could be worked up quickly by the KGB weapons The Sowets are confident they
mm an antt-NATO frenzy, In such cir- can overrun Europe and achfeve their
cumstances, an offer of technical war alms using only conventional ord-
assistance by the Sowet Umon m{ght be nance, n M wtal for them that the war
accepted easily Once the huge does not turn nuclear and devastate
transports begin to land, who w!II com - their homeland What they need la a
plaln about a few security guards? One means of d!sruptmg the NATO declsion-
.4rrtorrov An.22 can carry a battalion. 20 makmg machinery and of convtnclng
could land a complete RussIan dwwon Western European publlc opmlon that
mslde one hour At this stage, who wtll corrtmued resstance w futile This IS
dare complam? how that need might be fulftlled.
My third and fourth scenarios bring Four days of conventional alr attack
us nearer home Consider a period of have reduced NATOs a!r defenses suf-
acute polltwal tension In Europe in- ficiently to Dermlt masswe afrborne
volving Warsaw Pact moblllzatlon and operations to be launched against, shall
NATO reactions to achieve mtlnary we say, Brussels and Bonn One
preparedness KGB agents strive to dwts{on IS dropped on or near each city
undermine morale, turn populations $n the first wave, and more troops land
against governments that are lead]ng on captured atrf!elds These events are
them towards war, d!wde ally from ally supported by cleverly contrived
and suborn all from NATO allegiance propaganda In the form of dwnfor-
Sowet propaganda, stresses the \n- mation exercises Dwnformation dtffers
evnabllny that any con fl{ct WIII Involve from normal propaganda In that the
masswe nuclear attack on cjv;llan pop. pubilc IS deceived by contnved or
ulatlons Fear undermines resolution, counterfeit information so that they are,
and, eventually. one NATO members as it were, conwnced by the ewdence of
nerve breaks and Its government seeks their own eyes, llttle suspecting that
an accommodation with MOSCOW Such this ewdence has been planted The
a settlement Involves sacrlflce The KGB are the authors of such plots and
Russ!ans mswt on guaranteeing the do not lack the means of staging them
states neutrat!ty by a token security In one caprtal, Ieft-wmg extremists seize
guard BY the t!me anyone counts these the radio and television statjons and set
guards, there are two Sowet airborne out to convince the generel pubhc that
dtwslons m what was recently a NATO the government has been overthrown by
country All at once, the polnrcal tensmn a popular Peace Committee In the
is relaxed, the Warsaw Pact armored other bes{eged ctty. newsmen are
dwsmns return to barracks and, a fort. presented with what seems to be incon-
night later, a Communist government trovertible evidence that government
takes over m a West European state. leaders, accompanied by their families
Would NATO ever recover? Another and wealth, are on the point of
question Might not the population of deserting their posts and flying to South
that frightened nation actually have America. So, the general publlc gets to
welcomed the first Soviet paratroopers hear of this apparent betrayal from the
In their sky-btue berets as liberators same reporters and newscasters they
from the horrors of nuclear war? Think have grown to trust over the years
about It before drsmmsmg the Idea as Police and mtlltary fight bravely to
unrealistic repel the airborne invaders amid cwiltan
Finally, consider war m Europe reactions ranging from panic to apathy,
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact loyalty to treachery. The Russians suffer
Ey the fourth day, the Western, alhes severe casualties m the alr and on the

52 Military Review
 PARATROOPS

ground, In some sectors, whole mvadlng surwval chances in various tactical set.
units are wiped out, and the mllltary ttngs In a European confhct Forget
s)tuatlon IS restored In others, these, use helicopters We need a mul.
desperate battles, continue, and ln- tmat!onal NATO airborne force, w!th.
fdtrattng paratroopers hnk LIP w)th troop carriers, to react, in peacetime, to
Soviet agents emerg}ng after years nun. perce!ved threats If NATO IS to survwe,
derground The terrible truth that It must summon up the courage to
dawns slowly on the NATO soldlers IS challenge the USSRS Imperlal!st ac-
this Even if they succeed !n kllllng every tions outside Europe as well as along
single Russian paratrooper, the battle the frontiers of the alllance The only
sttll may have been lost, for thw like the react!on rapid enough IS an atrborne
1968 Tet offensive In Vietnam, IS not a react!on The force must be expert ]n the
struggle for real estate or for any wslble techntque of counterlandlng which
mllltary gain, d IS a battle for a nations snuffs out a host,le airhead wlth,n
guts The mtschlef done IS Inflnlte hours of Its Incept!on In the event of
The close ties between the Soviet full-scale hostlllt!es, such a force could
airborne command and the KGB equip prov!de NATO leaders wnh an optmn
these paratroopers to follow the early less final than the resort to nuclear war,
example of the Fallsch)rmjager The either for restoring a s!tuatlon slmllar to
RussIan leaders. Ilke H\tler, draw no that imagined earl!er or for unsettling
hard Imes between diplomacy and war the dubious loyalty of the Warsaw Pact
The rule that pol!t)cs IS the art of the These would be mlss!ons from which
poss!ble applles worldwlde Through the few would return Let us not dece.we
threat or use of wolence, an un- ourselves Surwwng world war Ill !s
scrupulous nation expands the bounds going to be a rare experience among
of posslblllty We should recogn(ze the soldlers In Europe The only levels at
roles that Sowet airborne forces can which survival need Influence planners
play In crtsls situations and plan to are the hopes of national survival and
counter them world surwval The NATO a,rborne force
Thw leads us back to NATOS attitude could contribute to these asplratjons
toward Its own airborne troops, at The day of the paratroops IS longer than
present dominated by largely Irrelevant we may have thought
arguments Concerning their value and ml:

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March 1977 53