LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been Indias premier journal for Proteinaceous productivity of pulse crops. It has enabled
comment on current affairs us to extend pulse cultivation from tra-
and research in the social sciences.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (19491965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
T his is with reference to the incisive
article, Making Pulses Affordable
Again: Policy Options from the Farm to
ditional areas to other areas as well. For
example, arhar from eastern India, Bihar
and eastern Uttar Pradesh is now grown
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (19692004) Retail in India by P K Joshi, Avinash in Punjab and Haryana. Similarly, gram
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. Kishore and Devesh Roy (EPW, 7 January which was grown earlier in the North is
editor
2017). The importance of pulses in the now grown in the South too. Indeed,
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta vegetarian diet could hardly be overem- technology is very beneficial, provided
EXECUTIVE Editor phasised. Pulses are lacking in certain people understand it and it is tested
Lina Mathias amino acids, while cereals are lacking in thoroughly. Modern biotechnology, par-
Deputy Editor others. But they complement each other ticularly genetic engineeringpopularly
Bernard DMello and the balanced amino acid composition called genetic modificationhas opened
SENIOR Assistant editorS of cereals and pulses protein blend seems unusual opportunities to boost production
lubna duggal
ABHISHEK SHAW to match the milk protein, the high-quality of pulses. However, there are a number
copy editor protein that gets broken down and is ab- of unanswered questions. We need to go
jyoti shetty sorbed into our bloodstream quickly. by Socrates definition of wisdom: know-
Assistant editorS Moreover, pulses are rich in fibre and ing that you do not know. Biotechnology
P S Leela
SANGEETA GHOSH
minerals. Their high iron and zinc con- research should be hastened, but to avert
tents also help combat anaemia in wom- a terrible backlash, if any, we must be slow
ASSISTANT Editor (DIGITAL)
SHIREEN AZAM en and children. As pulses are cheaper in application until we gather enough data.
EDITORIAL Assistant than meat (animal protein), they are of- Jaydev Jana
Advait Rao Palepu ten referred to as poor mans meat in Kolkata
production developing countries like India.
u raghunathan
Besides being a rich source of protein Indian Non-profit
s lesline corera
suneethi nair and other nutrients, pulses are also im- Organisations
Circulation MANAGER portant for sustainable agriculture since

I
B S Sharma they improve physical, chemical and bio- read with much interest Rajesh Tandons
Advertisement Manager
logical properties of soil and function as insight into the The Hidden Universe
Kamal G Fanibanda
mini nitrogen factories. It has rightly been of Non-profit Organisations in India
General Manager
Gauraang Pradhan pointed out in the article that among all published in EPW dated 21 January 2017. I
Publisher protein-rich foods we consume pulses fully agree with his analysis on the legal
K Vijayakumar have the lowest carbon and water foot- complexity, diversity and intentions of the
editorial print. Indeed, pulses emit less green- wide variety of non-profit organisations
edit@epw.in
house gases. According to a study, the (NPOs) that are operating in 21st century
Circulation
circulation@epw.in production of 1 kilogram (kg) of pulses India. It is also true that there are issues of
Advertising emits only 0.5 kg of CO2, whereas 1 kg of transparency and hidden agendas in these
advertisement@epw.in beef produces 9.5 kg of CO2. Due to tap organisations, which are under scrutiny
Economic and Political Weekly root system, these crops open up soil by by various government organisations.
320321, A to Z Industrial Estate which soil aeration improves. The heavy I think the point raised by Tandon is
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 leaf drop increases the organic matter in valid, that is, nobody knows the numbers!
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 the soil. Moreover, pulses also have an Why is it so? Who is responsible for this?
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
inherent quality to trap moisture from Is it just the lack of modernisation of
EPW Research Foundation
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts lower strata of the soil; therefore, they data collection practices? Or is it the lack
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. are considerably drought tolerant and fit of interest from the political, judiciary
Director well in a rain-fed environment. One kg and bureaucracy circlesbecause they
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate of pulses requires 50 litres of water for are the ones, perhaps, owning or run-
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 production while 1 kg of chicken or meat ning a small number of NPOs indirectly,
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
Fax: (022) 2887 3038 requires 4,325 and 5,520 litres of water, but with an annual turnover of millions
epwrf@epwrf.in respectively. of rupeeswhose self-interests are at
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Pulses are the backbone of the Indian stake if the sector is modernised and
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and meal and constitute the main protein more transparency is sought? Or is it
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
element of the Indian diet. The Indian that the market will take care of the sector,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. Council of Agricultural Research has that is, survival of the fittest? Good NPOs
Editor: Paranjoy Guha Thakurta.
taken many initiatives to improve the will survive and the rest will die. So,
4 february 11, 2017 vol lII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

there is no need to spend huge resources
to count them.
Tandons work amply describes the
legal complexities and the irrelevance of
some of the provisions under which mil-
lions of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs)/NPOs are operating in modern
India. Hence, further discussion on the
difficulties of conducting a census of NPOs
may not be relevant. I argue that where
there are initiatives like the Aadhaar
scheme, a nationally recognised election
card, or for that matter a ration card being
issued to millions of Indians and their
families, why is it that we are not able to
account for a few million NPOs? Why
cannot we think of allocating a unique
number to each one of these NPOs (not just
the FCRA [Foreign Contribution (Regula-
tion) Act] approved ones, but every single
registered NGO in any part of India) and
bring them under single legal purview?
Finally, the formation of a national
commission with independent powers is
needed to look into the nurturing and
monitoring of this very important sector,
which has all the potential to become a
lifeline for a transparent India.
Bala Raju Nikku
Nepal School of Social Work,
Kathmandu, Nepal
Open Letter to CBSE and NCERT
T he Central Board of Secondary Educa-
tions (CBSE) decision to go back to the
compulsory mode of national-level Class
10 examinations is regrettable. As has been
pointed out by many educationists, this
goes in the wrong direction and against
the reforms that one expects in our school
examination system. This decision is in
reaction to the no-detention policy accepted
under the Right to Education Act, 2009.
The progressive clause of the act is being
blamed for all the ills and dysfunctionality
within the government school system.
The spirit of the clause was to retain all
children at school and provide them with
an enabling atmosphere alongside regular
feedback through continuous and compre-
hensive evaluation (CCE) as was suggested
by the act. A lack of collaboration and fore-
sight between the CBSE and the National
Council of Educational Research and
Training (NCERT) in implementing this
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017
clause has resulted in the reaction that
we find at the school level.
One of the reasons why schoolteachers
and the administration appear to welcome
this move back to the board examina-
tion system at the Class 10 level is the
great dissatisfaction with which CCE
was implemented. The forms required
to be filled and reported acquired a life of
their own and defeated the purpose of pro-
viding feedback to teachers and increasing
their confidence levels. As some colleagues
pointed out, this was ceaseless monitoring
and disempowerment for all concerned.
The spirit of CCE was overturned.
The current move, more of a reaction to
this situation, would lead to an increase
in guidebooks, selected questions, model
answers and all the paraphernalia around
special coaching for board examinations.
But, more than this, it determines the
atmosphere that will prevail in thousands
of classrooms, even for students in non-
board examination years. Teachers would
be guided by the practice of teaching to
the test. This impact is far-reaching as
teachers will avoid and deem irrelevant
the suggested activities of the textbooks,
students questions would be put aside,
and, most importantly, they will ignore
their own innate sense of what is best for
their classrooms.
We need to acknowledge in a forth-
right manner that the lack of dialogue
and collaboration between the CBSE and
NCERT is one of the main reasons for this
state of affairs. When CCE was being
rolled out, there were attempts at dia-
logue, but that did not go very far. This
collaboration is essential because the
perspective on assessment, as embedded
in the textbooks and NCERT source books,
should match the views of the board
that conducts the final examination. The
NCERTs view would allow for variation
in answers, open-ended questions, reason-
ing in ones own words that may not fol-
low model answers, and, most impor-
tantly, new questions that would not be
labelled as out-of-course.
CBSE is not disinclined to this, but views
all these changes in operational terms.
In its view, discretion in evaluation is
suspect; model answers must capture all
variation(s) in minute terms and should
be predetermined; self-assessment by
vol lII no 6
LETTERS
teachers is bound to be motivated; and,
multiple-choice tests are the best mode.
There is a difference between assessment
as an aid for learning and assessment as
production of evidence for marks allotted.
This may be a caricature, but it does cap-
ture the differences in the stance adopted
by these two bodies. This dialogue was
essential if one has to reconcile the ele-
ments of a progressive pedagogy with
the demands of a fair and tamper-proof
national test.
There are experiences of programmes
within the country and abroad that could
easily contribute. A genuine dialogue
between these two institutions, and open-
ness to seek support, can break this
impasse. A genuine attempt should be
made to evolve methods through the
active participation and orientation of
teachers. Teacher involvement in under-
standing the perspective of the textbooks
has been minimal and has largely been
left to individual school managements.
The NCERT shies away from active teacher
orientation because of the sheer scale in-
volved, and the CBSE does not utilise its
network of school-groups, Sahodaya, to
actively engage in intensive teacher work-
shops by seeking faculty from the NCERT
or related institutions. Some teacher
workshops are held by both institutions,
but not at the required scale or through
active collaboration. Teacher voices would
bring in what is reasonable in practice
and also give them an opportunity to
grapple with the changes, in perspective.
It would be best if the CBSE or rather
the Central Advisory Board on Education
were to reconsider its decision. Regard-
less, the CBSE and NCERT should actively
collaborate and evolve a new pattern for
board examinations. This would bring a
change in perspective through the crea-
tion of a new format with an open mind
and with the widespread involvement of
teachers, and not just of a select few. The
pressures of the outside world demand
creative engagement between the ideal
and the real. The example that the CBSE
sets for other state boards should be a
more creative one than one where it just
backtracks to an old pattern.
Arvind Sardana
Eklavya,
Bhopal
5
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6 february 11, 2017 vol lII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 FEBRuary 11, 2017
Trumping the Environment
A climate change denier in the White House is bad news for the world.
W
ith so much of the focus on United States (US) Presi-
dent Donald Trumps 27 January Muslim ban, the
90/120-day ban on citizens from Iraq, Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen from entering the US, his
executive orders affecting environmental regulations have slipped
under the radar. Just as the visa ban is having repercussions
around the world, so too will some of his actions with regard to
the environment. Of special concern are his current actions, and
anticipated future ones, that will affect US greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Given the levels of GHGs that the US continues
to spew, any increase, or even the status quo, spells disaster for
efforts to contain processes of climate change and global warming.
Trumps disdain for environmentalists was known even dur-
ing his campaign. So his choice of advisors, including Myron
Ebell who is heading the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in the transition team until Scott Pruitt, the nominee for
director of the agency is confirmed, is not surprising. Ebell, a
director in the ultra-conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute,
is on record describing the environmental movement as the
greatest threat to freedom and prosperity in the modern world.
Pruitt is a climate change denier who, as attorney general of the
state of Oklahoma, filed as many as 14 lawsuits against the EPA
on behalf of oil companies. That these are the men who are
tasked to protect the environment is an ominous indication of
what we can expect.
Within days of being sworn in, Trump announced a freeze on
funds to the EPA (he had actually suggested it be disbanded
during his campaign) and called for a drastic reduction in its
staff of 15,000 engineers and scientists. He also placed a virtual
gag order on the EPA staff saying they could not communicate or
discuss research findings with anyone, including the press.
What this means is that the latest data on GHG emissions, for
instance, will not be available in the public realm. It is also not
surprising that the White House Climate Change page has now
been replaced by An America First Energy Plan page in which
there is no mention of climate change. This energy plan, ac-
cording to Trump, envisages clearing an estimated $50 tril-
lion in untapped shale, oil and natural gas reserves, especially
on federal lands. In other words, the Trump administration is
setting aside, as quickly as it can, what had begun to be put in
place by the previous administration as part of the Climate
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol lII no 6
Action Plan and the Clean Power Plan and is paving the way for
the fossil fuel lobby to operate without too many restrictions,
all in the name of making America great again and providing
jobs to Americans.
The consequences of this will be serious not just for the US
but also for the rest of the world. The US did not sign on to the
legally-binding Kyoto Protocol, the first international climate
treaty that sought to put curbs on GHG emissions by the indus-
trialised countries held responsible for the global accumulation
of these gases. However in 2015, under the Obama administra-
tion, it did come on board for the Paris Treaty that allowed every
country to set its own Intended Nationally Determined Commit-
ments (INDC) to reduce GHG emissions. The US committed to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 30% lower than 2005 levels
by 2030 and has apparently already reached 27% of this target.
But it has not made significant progress on other GHGs, including
from transportation systems that account for 26% of emissions,
or agriculture accounting for 9% of emissions.
Even if the US does not pull out of the Paris Treaty, as Trump
threatened it would during his election campaign, it could slide
back on its commitments. According to the World Resources
Institute, even if all the signatories of the Paris Treaty fulfil their
pledges to reduce GHG emissions, the possibility of meeting the
goal of capping global temperature rise to 2 Celsius is difficult.
Given this, if one of the worlds largest economies decides that it
need not bother about these commitments, the repercussions
would be grave.
As serious as the possibility that the Trump administration will
actively dilute its commitment to the climate change treaty is the
issue of funding. In Paris, the US had committed to contribute $3
billion by 2020 towards the $100 billion United Nations Green
Climate Fund to help poor countries adapt to climate change and
adopt cleaner energy. So far it has only given $500 million, partly
due to resistance from the Republican-dominated Congress. It is
more than likely, given the Trump administrations attitude towards
climate change, that the US will not fulfil this commitment.
It is clear already that a climate change denier sitting in the
White House is bad news for the world in more respects than
one. First, the Trump administration will encourage greater
use of fossil fuels, thereby disregarding existing environmental
regulations. So it is unlikely that the US will meet the targets
7
EDITORIALS

on GHG emissions that it has set for itself following the Paris that a country that is turning back people fleeing from wars
Treaty. Secondly, this will lead to a severe setback to global that it has partly been responsible for triggering, is now on the
efforts to deal with the environmental catastrophe triggered verge of pushing millions of people in poorer countries to
by global warming that is already on our doorsteps. How tragic become environmental refugees.

8 FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol lII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS
The Universal Basic Income Proposal
A watered-down UBI based upon a dismantling of the existing social welfare schemes would be disastrous.
I
magine a world in which everyone is unconditionally given
a subsistence-level income by the state. This, combined with
access to well-functioning public services would be, to quote
Jean Dreze, a fool-proof way of safeguarding the right to digni-
fied living. The chapter on Universal Basic Income (UBI): A
Conversation With and Within the Mahatma in the Economic
Survey 201617 (ES) begins with this. But unfortunately, given
self-imposed fiscal prudence, the proposed UBI, which is
neither universal nor basic, requires the dismantling of the
most socially necessary welfare schemes, namely, the Public
Distribution System (PDS), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) and the Mid-day
Meal Scheme. The envisioned UBI turns out to be no more than
a small compensatory transfer (or income top-up) to a part of
the population, and that too, one that will require the govern-
ment to prune or do away with in-kind transfers of food,
guaranteed minimum days of wage work, and other public
social security measures.
The desire is to stick to budget neutrality even as its concep-
tion is the most illogical part of the UBI vision. In the face of the
monstrous economic inequality that plagues the country, surely
a proper UBI can be financed from income and wealth taxation
of the very rich, as also, from indirect taxation of socially less
desirable economic activities. Given that India has one of the
lowest tax to gross domestic product ratios in the world, more
so with respect to direct taxes (that include wealth and corpo-
rate taxes), it is inconceivable why the policymakers of this
country cannot envisage a UBI that builds on higher tax reve-
nue collections to expand the fiscal space.
Instead, a UBI as seen in the ES is anchored on minimising
fiscal cost and pruning the governments social-welfare ad-
ministrative machinery. The chapter argues that the current
social security system in India is bulky, inefficient, and in
large part misallocates resources, and that these realities
necessitate a serious thinking-through of better ways of spend-
ing public money for social welfare. It emphasises the gross
misallocation of resources under six welfare schemes, in
two simplistic maps which show that the shares of welfare
spending in the poorer districts are less than the shares of
poor persons in these districts. The UBI, the authors of the ES
claim, is a way of rectifying this imbalance. However, any
such rectification would assume a targeted cash transfer, not
a UBI.
Further, it must not be overlooked that each of these welfare
schemes has underlying mechanisms that ensure a safety net
8 FEBRuary 11, 2017
against market uncertainties. The PDS entails the states inter-
ventions in agricultural commodity markets that have histori-
cally resulted in more stable prices and a semblance of income
security for farmers. The political currency of the public pro-
curement system and minimum support prices is but an indica-
tion of the significance of such market interventions. The
Mid-day Meal Scheme has shown that cooked meals in schools
encourage school enrolment, apart from providing timely
nutrition. The MGNREGS not only promises minimum days of
wage work, but also creates and helps maintain locally planned
public infrastructure, protects against seasonality of work, and
provides some bargaining power to workers in rural labour-
market wage setting. In fact the ES does make a passing refer-
encereplacing the PDS will increase market prices of cereals
the poor face. Similarly, phasing down MGNREGS might reduce
market wages for rural casual labourbut goes on to make a
case against these interventions.
Between 200405 and 201112, the offtake from the Food
Corporation of India (FCI) grew by 71%; and household pur-
chases through the PDS grew by 117%, indicating greater, more
efficient coverage, while leakages in the PDS have come down
from 54% to 35%. The ES extrapolates the leakage figures up
to 2016, which points to a further reduction to 20.8%, without
accounting for improvements in technology and expansion
of coverage that must have occurred in the last five years.
There has been a rise in rural wages, which in part is attribut-
able to MGNREGS. Undeniably, rural infrastructure and more
recently, farm assets are being created substantially under
this scheme.
What is important today is that provisioning of social secu-
rity services and goods has become a matter of political impor-
tance even in Indias northern states, as it has been for decades
in the southern ones. In fact, in a few of these states, corrup-
tion and leakages have been reduced in the PDS and the
MGNREGS even as they cover a greater proportion of the
targeted population. This needs to be emulated in other states.
To say that the time is ripe for serious discussion around a
UBI that would entail dismantling existing hard-won social
welfare measures, does not seek to build on past gains or social
experience. The past decade has shown that the implementa-
tion of social welfare programmes can be improved by the
participation of beneficiaries, ensuring greater transparency
and accountability, the involvement of concerned non-govern-
mental organisations, a degree of political will, and a proactive
local administration.
vol lII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The Vulnerable Majority
Indias informal sector workers are growing in numbers and precariousness.
T
he World Employment and Social OutlookTrends 2016
report by the International Labour Organization (ILO), in
its predictions on global vulnerable employment, states
that the number of jobless in India will increase from 17.7 mil-
lion in 2016 to 18 million by 2018 even though its employment
rate is expected to go down from 3.5% to 3.4% in 2017. The ILOs
definition of vulnerable employment covers the own-account
workers and unpaid family workers more likely to lack decent
working conditions, proper social security and any form of ef-
fective representation through unions or similar organisations.
The report predicts only marginal improvements in the share
of workers in vulnerable employment all over the world with
the rate of such employment expected to fall by less than 0.2
percentage points per year over the next two years. This form of
employment is expected to remain above 42% of the total
employment in 2017 and accounts for 1.4 billion people all over
the world. In emerging countries (India is classified as such by
the ILO), one in two workers fit this definition while in develop-
ing countries it is four out of five workers. The two regions most
affected by vulnerable employment are Southern Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa with the number of such workers projected to
grow globally by 11 million every year.
The ILOs statistics about India are not unexpected. The large
majority of Indias workers, 92% of them, are in the informal sector.
The slowdown in agriculture has pushed landless labourers and
small farmers also into this sector, notably into construction.
More alarmingly, even the new jobs being created in the formal
sector are informal in nature due to the lack of employment ben-
efits and social security. Barely regulated by the government, this
sector nevertheless makes a significant contribution to the econo-
my quite apart from providing employment to people the state
cannot help. It stands to reason, therefore, that this would be the
section of workers mostly found in manufacturing, construction,
transportation, storage and wholesale and retail trade. It is also a
known fact that women tend to be overwhelmingly employed in
this sector, subjected to even greater precariousness than their
male counterparts, facing especially gender disparity in wages
and sexual harassment at the workplace.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol lII no 6
EDITORIALS
One should expect that policymakers and those in government
would make efforts to not only mitigate the insecurity that these
workers face but also to ensure that they enter into more formal
and therefore regularised and protected forms of employment.
This would entail legislating for greater regularisation of their
working conditions and wages and providing state support in
terms of better infrastructure and connectivity. It would also mean
paying attention to some of the biggest hurdles that small entrepre-
neurs and businesses facebyzantine red tape and corruption.
Yet, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government at the
centre and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led states like Rajasthan and
Maharashtra seem to have got hold of the wrong end of the stick.
It must be noted here that the NDA governments much vaunted
demonetisation drive most brutally affected the vast majority of
workers in the informal sector, leaving them jobless and subjecting
their families to untold privations. Not only did the recently
announced budget not take cognisance of their sufferings and the
many units forced to close down due to demonetisation, the
finance minister announced in his budget speech that existing
labour laws would be simplified and merged into four codes
wages, industrial relations, social security and welfare, and safety
and working conditions. Given the small percentage of workers
within the organised sector who are supposed beneficiaries of
existing laws and the poor implementation of these laws, it is
ironical that they are being blamed for investors shying off. The
term archaic is constantly used to describe labour laws, and the
Industrial Relations Code Bill, 2016 and Wage Code Bill, 2016 are
expected to take care of this state of affairs once they are passed.
According to the ILO report, the vulnerable employment num-
bers look set to rise in the AsiaPacific region. The report echoes
familiar remedies for this: structural transformation, greater
investment in education and skills for the most vulnerable groups
to take advantage of the so-called democratic dividend, incen-
tives to labour-intensive sectors like clothing, leather, farming
and food processing, and attending to Indias notorious high
export duty structure. These are the suggestions the government
needs to heed to ensure that Indias ill-protected majority can
look forward to job security and a dignified old age.
9
 EDITORIALS

From 50 Years Ago
Vol II, No 6 FEBRUARY 11, 1967
EDITORIALS
Not Breaking Down, but
The Deplorable Incident at Indira Gandhis elec-
tion meeting in Bhubaneshwar on Wednesday,
in which the Prime Minister was hit in the face
by a stone, has dramatically turned the atten-
tion of the whole country to the danger of the
elections being disrupted by acts of violence.
This was not, of course, the first instance of vio-
lence at an election meeting. Stones were thrown
at a meeting of the Congress President at Tiru-
pati; election meetings of Morarji Desai have
been repeatedly disturbed; in West Bengal the
Left Communist leader, Jyoti Basu, was recently
injured by a brickbat; in Bombay poll meetings
have ended in disorder more than once. Ad-
dressing a press conference in New Delhi almost
a week before the Bhubaneshwar incident, the
Chief Election Commissioner had referred to vi-
olence at election meetings as one of the most
alarming developments and had warned politi-
cal parties that it was time for them to sit up
and ponder whether they want elections or not.
While the warning was by no means irrele-
vant, by and large the opposition parties as well
as the Congress have enough stake in the demo-
cratic process to recognise the futility of dis-
rupting the elections through violence. Some of
the violence that we have seen has come from
groups and organisations which do not have this
stake. In Bhubaneshwar it was the students,
carrying on the legacy of the wave of student
unrest which swept through northern and eastern
India in the latter half of last year. In Bombay it
was the Shiv Sena, a non-political, blatantly
parochial, Maharashtra-for-Maharashtrians organi-
sation. Even when candidates or their supporters
have been responsible for violence, the acts
have been sporadic, purely locally initiated.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol lII no 6 9
COMMENTARY
Politics of Jallikattu
Kalaiyarasan A
The protest of Tamils against
the ban on Jallikattu is a trigger.
The pent-up anger against the
successive policies of the central
government and corporate
encroachment of resources is the
main cause of massive turnout
in the protests. The protests
displayed the limits of the
Hindu rights attempts to make
inroads into the states politics by
valorising Tamil language and
culture. The protests indicate a
continuity of Tamil politics with
renewed strength through
social media activism.
The author thanks Ezhil, Babu Jayakumar and
Anandhi S for their inputs in writing this article.
Kalaiyarasan A (kalaijnu@gmail.com) is with
the Institute for Studies in Industrial
Development, New Delhi.
10
A condition for individual experiences to link
up and form a movement is the existence of a
communication process that propagates the
events and the emotions attached to it.
Manuel Castells (2015: 15)
T
he massive protest of Tamils
against the ban on Jallikattu, a
bull sport held during the harvest
festival of Pongal, attracted much atten-
tion across the world. A sport that was
popular among only some communities
of a few districts in Tamil Nadu suddenly
acquired an authentic Tamil identity, over
a decade after it drew the attention
of those who struggled to banish it.
Animal lovers have been waging a legal
battle, besides embarking on a vicious
campaign against Jallikattu on the charge
that it amounted to cruelty to bulls. But
the argument of the protesters is that
the sport is not about bull taming but
embracing them. Taking a cue from the
ancient Tamil literature, Yeru Thazhu-
vuthal (embracing bull), the supporters
argue that the sport is more about em-
bracing the bull than the show of human
bravery over the bull. The literal mean-
ing of Jallikattu isJalli/salli (coins)
and kattu (tied)grabbing a bag of
coins tied to the horns of the bulls.
However, as the debate raged for over
a decade in courtrooms, newsrooms and
other public fora, animal lovers, who
came under a slew of banners like Animal
Welfare Board of India (AWBI) and People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA), were ahead of those who wanted
the conservation of their ancient culture.
Two Pongal festivals went by without a
Jallikattu event much to the chagrin
and disappointment of the subaltern
communities. But this year, a group of
supporters of the Jallikattu converged at
Alanganallur, the village near Madurai
that is famous for the sport, demanding
the lifting of the ban.
Many of the protesters were students
who were expressing solidarity with the
FEBRuary 11, 2017
local people. When police arrested the
protesters, the news spread like fire
through social networking sites and
WhatsApp messages, and a group of
students in Chennai gathered at the
Marina sands to demand the release of
the students. On the same day, people
all over Tamil Nadu organised impromptu
protests, led by students and youth, and
hence subsequently came to be called
a Tamil Spring and also as a Thai
Revolution (Thai referring to the Tamil
month that is synonymous with hope
and new opportunities).
The protest acquired an iconic place
in the history of Tamil Nadu for many
reasons. Not only was it massive, non-
violent, and spontaneous, it attracted
people from all walks of life with a large
number of women participating in the
protest. The protesters saw the Jallikattu
ban as an attack on Tamil culture and
identity, though many of them might not
have watched a live bull sport in their
lifetime. Thus, Jallikattu became a symbol
of Tamil pride.
Jallikattu as a Trigger
So, if the protests saw a forced violent
end, it is because the Tamil Spring
earned the ire of not just animal lovers
but an entire establishment sensed socio-
political repercussions in such mobilisa-
tions. If Tamil was used to produce hori-
zontal solidarities among the lower
castes and classes in the past, Jallikattu
was used as a symbol of Tamil pride now.
If Jallikattu is seen as a weird custom
of Tamils, the protest seeking its preser-
vation was seen as lawlessness by both
the Tamil elites and their counterparts
in Delhi. They resented that Tamils have
been taken over by passion and pride,
instead of reason and nuance. What they
failed to note, however, was that Tamils
are more than emotional. The critics
missed the context and history. It is not
new for Tamil elites to look down upon
such large-scale protests led by students.
For instance, in 1939, C Rajagopalachari,
the premier of the Madras Presidency,
ridiculed the first anti-Hindi martyr
L Nadarajan, who died in prison. It was
due to his illiteracy that he picketed and
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

it was due to his picketing that he hap-
pened to be in jail, but his illness was
certainly due to other causes (Pandian
1996: 3327). Following Rajagopalachari,
T N Seshan, in the case of 1965 anti-
Hindi agitation in Tamil Nadu, observes
that, Mobs of illiterate and semi-literate
Tamil people, mostly poor, lapsed into
fits of fury in the cause of so remote
a language, English (Pandian and
Kalaiyarasan 2013).
On the same lines, Nirupama Subra-
manian (2017) called the current protest
an act of lawlessness which sets a dan-
gerous new precedent in the country.
What she could not understand perhaps
was that the Jallikattu is more than hurt
sentiment and injured pride. Her coun-
terpart, Subramanian Swamy, calls the
protesters porukkis (thugs). As in the
past, this protest too was dubbed as anti-
national. The honour of being dubbed as
anti-national is not new to Tamils, the
protesters claim. As the anti-Hindi agita-
tion was not simply about the language,
Jallikattu protest was not just about a
sport. Though, undoubtedly, Jallikattu
was the trigger, at least two other
strands of popular discontent were dis-
cernible at the various protest sites, in-
cluding Marinaone, anti-corporate,
and two, anti-centre.
Anti-corporate Sentiment
The omnipresent placards conveying the
message, PETA is a corporate lobby and
the ban is a corporate ploy, and the
slogans that rang through the protest
sites in the state were clear indicators that
anti-corporate sentiments have gripped
the collective psyche of the Tamils. So,
it is not a surprise that a fallout of the
protest is that at least the international
brands of soft drinks, Coke and Pepsi,
have gone off the shelves of many shops in
Tamil Nadu. The slogans running down
Coke and Pepsi, along with PETA, were
repeatedly raised to drive home the point
that there was an international corporate
ploy to play with the health of Tamils.
A housewife, Usha, when asked about
her motive for attending the protest
said:
Corporatisation is happening rapidly. All
things we used are controlled now by the
corporate. What worries me most is that
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
corporate things are occupying my kitchen.
My children like junk food, noodles, soft
drinks like Coke and Pepsi and so on. Now,
the corporate has brought in substandard
quality milk that would make my children
weak. But the milk from native cows would
make him stronger. This understanding has
pushed me to the protest that was called by
the students.
By linking the ban on Jallikattu to the
imagined corporate takeover of milk
production in the state, protesters man-
aged to connect with the women who
have been repeatedly told by various
activists, carrying out different campaigns
on the need to follow traditional culi-
nary cultures by warning of corporate
baits. The story of cattle told to women is
that the bulls used in Jallikattu are of
pure breed, and are preserved through
the sport. Jallikattu helps in segregating
the best bulls from the weak ones. The
cows that are bred from these bulls offer
the best milk. These cows are expected
to live long and offer milk enough for
both the calf and people. The indigenous
bulls known as Kangayam and Pulikulam
are pure ones and they are preserved
primarily for breeding and to take part
in Jallikattu.
If the sport is banned, we will lose
these native cattle, resonated all along
the protest. Karthikeya Sivasenapathy,
who runs Cattle Research Foundation,
also spearheaded this campaign. He
said:
The banning of Jallikattu and the demand
for banning of other rural sports like rekhla
race will ultimately result in the vanishing
of native species and ultimately result in the
country turning into import dependent on
bovine animals. (Babu 2017)
The fear among women in particular
is that losing these cattle is losing
the self-sufficiency in milk production.
It is a corporate ploy, they were told.
The corporate-run cross-bred cow has a
short life and produces a huge quantity
of milk. This milk has many health
issues affecting digestion and causing
allergies in infants. This campaign was
done to such a level that it bordered
on neo-nativism. Not only did the
campaign capture the existing anti-cor-
porate imagination of the people, it
turned the protesters and the people in
general against the central government
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
that was projected as a natural ally of
the corporates.
Anti-centre Politics
Among others, an issue which echoed
during the protest is the Cauvery water
dispute. The dispute has influenced the
politics of the state for long as the river
has a deep cultural and economic sig-
nificance. Despite its complex history,
the dispute has generated a sense of
betrayal among Tamils. Karnataka has
failed to implement the Supreme Court
directive for the release of water to save
the samba crops this year. Despite the
state governments efforts, the insuffi-
cient release of the Cauvery water was
seen as the main cause of the agrarian
crisis in 2016, which took a toll of more
than 100 lives. The National Human
Rights Commission took suo motu cog-
nisance of the deaths and issued a notice
to the Tamil Nadu government seeking
explanation (Janardhanan 2017).
The people of the state perceive that
the centre has not done enough to ensure
adequate water supply from the Cauvery
to Tamil Nadu. The farmers deaths have,
thus, accentuated the resentment against
the centre. The wound is still fresh in
peoples memory. The slogan, enough
is enough is driven by this frustration.
The supporters also mentioned Mullai-
periyar water dispute where Tamil Nadu
is being seen as the victim of larger con-
spiracy of the centre. There was a strong
sentiment among the protesters that the
centre has favoured Kerala and deceived
Tamil Nadu. In some sites of protests,
the Sri Lankan Tamil issue was also
articulated, where the centre was not
spared for its collusion with the Sri
Lankan state for the massacre of Tamils
in 2009.
In addition, there are other policies
initiated by the centre that the state has
been opposing or seeking an exemption.
One such issue is the National Eligibility
cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Supreme
Court made NEET mandatory for all
medical admissions across the country.
Tamil Nadu has been opposing it stating
the need to preserve its social justice
policy and other state-specific objec-
tives. All these issues have generated a
pent-up anger against the centre.
11
COMMENTARY
This became evident when the pro-
testers carried caricatures of Narendra
Modi. The slogans and placards asked
why Tamil Nadu should respect the
Supreme Court when it cannot enforce
the water rights of Tamil Nadu. The
states inactions on several other issues
ailing Tamil Nadu too resonated in the
protests. Jallikattu was just a trigger.
Tamil against Hindu
A new yet significant player in this
politics of the sport is the Hindu right.
For the last two decades, the Hindu right
has been courting Tamil language and
culture. Its new-found slogan appears
to be Tamil, Hindu and Hindustan
(Pandian 2000). Tamil used to be a sub-
nationalist assertion for many in the past.
It is no longer so. When the early Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) spoke of
Tamil, it was more than a language. The
assertion of speaking Tamil is simulta-
neously anti-caste, secularist and anti-
Sanskrit. Tamil is harmless now. One can
be a good Tamil, good Hindu and a good
Indian together. This option was not
available earlier. The Hindu right could
indeed find its takers in the state now.
It mobilised Thirvalluvar, an ancient
Tamil poet, to display its new-found love
for Tamil. Thirvalluvar, and his works
Thirukkural were seen as the symbols of
secular tradition of the Tamils. Along
this line, the Hindu right attempted to
take up the issue of Jallikattu to pre-
serve Tamil culture. It backfired. The
weight of history is stronger than their
current political manoeuvres.
The recent move by the centre impos-
ing Hindi and Sanskrit in schools did not
find many takers in Tamil Nadu. In addi-
tion, the imprint of Hindi and Devanagari
numerals in the newly-introduced rupee
notes in November 2016 also attracted
wide oppositions in the state. The at-
tempt to subsume Tamil identity under
Hindu and Indian is perhaps not work-
ing. The Jallikattu protest shows the re-
fusal of Tamil to be subsumed. Those
placards and slogans displayed in the
protest are witness to this. A quote of a
senior leader of Bharatiya Janta Party in
the state sums up this mood:
All sorts of anti-national elements are par-
ticipating in the protests. We dont bother
12
if you shout against Modi, but what
about the nation? There are those in the
crowd carrying placards which say that if
you dont allow Jallikattu, Tamil Nadu will
secede. Portraits of LTTE leader Prab-
hakaran are rampant at the venue. Small
children are carrying Modis placards with
denigrating words about the prime minister.
(Ramasubramanian 2017)
The protests have also warmed the
hearts of raucous Tamil nationalists.
Both share pure love for Tamil, though
for different reasons. The symbol of Eru
Thazhuvuthal (embracing a bull) is seen
as Tamil glorythe seal with the bull
depicts the Tamil age. Does this protest
signify redefining Tamil nationalism?
Tamil identity was presented as one that
was beleaguered, and its defence carried a
broad appeal and performed the radical
task of mobilising horizontal solidarities
among different sections. It was more
than a language. It was a vehicle for
lower-caste assertion. Now the state
has a vibrant Tamil culture, and a self-
confident segment of lower castes who
are placed across the spectrum due to
successive reser vation policies (Pandian
2011).
Does this mobilisation signify change
in Tamil identity? Whether it is more of
pride now than the one which is rooted
in deprivations is yet to be seen.
New Social Movement?
Tamil Nadu has been witnessing a vibrant
social media-led activism in recent times.
The student uprising against war crimes
in Sri Lanka in 2013, well-organised
flood relief in 2015 and the current mobi-
lisation for Jallikattu are evidence of
such trends. For instance, Chennai and
Cuddalore witnessed the worst floods in
nearly a hundred years. The state gov-
ernments ineptitude in both preventive
and post-flood relief efforts are still
fresh in peoples memory. It is the youth
and students who took a lead in rehabili-
tation of flood victims and mobilised
support across the state through social
media. A similar style of work is evident
during the Jallikattu protests.
A vibrant social media needs an edu-
cated class, shared vocabularies and a
cultural language to connect, communi-
cate and mobilise the people. How does
this become possible in Tamil Nadu? A
FEBRuary 11, 2017
slice of history would not be out of place
here. The significant outcomes of the
Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu are
achievements in social justice and asser-
tion of Tamil identity. While the former
produced social and economic mobility
for a substantial section across caste
groups by innovative reservation poli-
cies, the latter produced a well-informed
Tamil cultural public. The Dravidian
movements assertion of Tamil identity
made this cultural public possible. As
Pandian (2000) sums up:
Avant-garde magazines, proliferation of
publishing houses, an expanded reading
public, globally-informed debates, and books
which both in their content and design can
compete with the best in the world, are all
hallmarks of the new self-confident Tamil
cultural public.
If the mobilisation for Jallikattu is
driven by active social media, the latter
itself became possible because of an
educated section of the people cutting
across caste groups and Tamil cultural
public in the state. The current uprising
of student and youth is being seen as
a Tamil Spring akin to the Arab Spring.
It is indeed so in mobilisation if not
in content. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube
and WhatsApp have played a significant
role in disseminating information, organ-
ising rallies and planning the occupa-
tion of public spaces. The social media
supplied slogans to the protest sites
across the state.
This sort of social media networks-led
mobilisation changed the traditional
protest or demonstration into what Cas-
tells (2015) calls the new social move-
ment. He argues that the internet not
only facilitates instant communication
but also liberates individuals to shape a
new autonomy and freedom. In the pro-
cess, mass self-communicated horizon-
tal networks get built which can criticise
anyone, offer space to vent out all collec-
tive anger against powers that be and
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal, H. B. Road
Ranchi 834 001, Jharkhand
Ph: 0651-2205640
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

ensure mass participation. Since it offers
independent and autonomous space,
people can share their experiences and
relate their lived stories with others.
This helps them to overcome the power-
lessness of their solitary despair by net-
working their desire (Castells 2015).
As a woman participant says:
This is the first protest I have ever partici-
pated in. Though I have resentments over a
few other doings of the government, I have
never come out boldly like this before. I also
spoke among the gathering at the protest
venue in my first protest itself. I have left my
one year-old baby in my mother-in-laws care
and come to this protest with my husband.
When I said this in my speech, many women
appreciated me. I have come to know about
these issues through Whatsapp, Facebook
and YouTube videos.
Similarly, it is observed in the protests
that whenever a person says that she/he
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
comes from Madurai or from places
other than Chennai, and starts narrating
her/his experience in the city and life in
corporate workspaces, she/he gets a huge
applause from the crowd. The gathering
in Chennai Marina is, thus, both protest
and celebration. The claiming of a social
space which was not available for some-
one in the city became a new-found
source of freedom and joy for the one
who is alienated from her/his work and
her/his surroundings in the city.
If social media worked to coordinate,
communicate and disseminate the mes-
sages, non-stop coverage of Tamil elec-
tronic media helped in magnifying the
movement, which drew women from
across various sections. As the self-
immolation of a young street vendor in
Tunisia triggered a sea of protest and
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
became Arab spring, the Jallikattu is a
trigger for Tamil spring.
ReferenceS
Babu, Gireesh (2017): Jallikattu: Tug of War over
Bull-taming Festival in Tamil Nadu Continues,
Business Standard, 10 January.
Castells, Manuel (2015): Networks of Outrage and
Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age,
Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Janardhanan, Arun (2017): NHRC Notice to Tamil
Nadu over Farmer Deaths, Indian Express,
6 January.
Pandian, M S S (1996): Towards National-Popular:
Notes on Self-Respecters Tamil, Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol 31, No 51.
(2000): Tamil-Friendly Hindutva, Economic
& Political Weekly, Vol 35, No 2122, pp 180506.
(2011): New Times in Tamil Nadu, Seminar,
No 620.
Pandian, M S S and Kalaiyarasan A (2013): Tamil
Spring? Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48,
No 15, pp 1011.
Ramasubramanian, P (2017): Jallikattu Protestors
Battle Tamil Nadu Police, but for Many, Modi,
Centre Are Main Target, Wire, 23 January.
Subramanian, Nirupama (2017): Lawless on the
Shore, Indian Express, 24 January.
13

Is the Governments Overly
Aggressive Solar Thrust in
Public Interest?
Kannan Kasturi
The government wants to raise
solar power generation capacity
from the current 8 GW to 100 GW by
2022. How will such an aggressive
solar programme impact Indias
electricity distribution
companies? How will it affect the
cost, availability and quality of
electricity for consumers? Does
the pace of solar adoption being
pushed by the government serve
the public interest?
Kannan Kasturi (Kasturi_kannan@yahoo.com)
is an independent researcher and writes on
public interest and policy.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
I
ndias current solar capacity is less
than 8 GW. Shortly after coming to
power, the Modi government de-
clared a fivefold increasein the 2022
target for solar generation capacity in
the countryto an eye-popping 100 GW.
Less than a year before, Indias electri-
city establishment had estimated 100
GW to be Indias solar potential till 2032
(MoP 2014: 22)! The target has been set
without reference to the coal-fired capa-
city addition in progress and at a time
when capacity utilisation of existing
thermal plants is very low and there is
a large uncertainty on how electricity
demand will develop in the next few
years (Singh 2016; Tongia 2016: 6). The
only argument the government has
offered in favour of its aggressive solar
thrust is that this would help India meet
its international commitments on carbon
emissions (GoI 2015a). Questions have
been raised about whether such a rapid
build-up of non-fossil fuel capacity is
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
indeed necessary to meet these commit-
ments (Tongia 2016: 17), but they have
remained unanswered.
The government estimates the invest-
ment requirement for 100 GW of solar
generation to be of the order of `6 lakh
crore. Globally, renewable energy (RE) is
a favourite of investors, and the govern-
ments solar programme has been enthusi-
astically received. Foreign investors, such
as SunEdison, SkyPower, Fortum India
and SoftBank and Indian business hous-
es, including Adani, Tata and Mahindra,
have aggressively participated in the
large solar tenders. Competition is fierce
and the Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy has had to hire large halls to
accommodate all interested players dur-
ing pre-bid meetings (Kenning 2015).
Challenges of Renewable Energy
on the Grid
The thrust of the government is entirely
on grid connected solar energy. A little
background is useful to understand the
challenge this poses for electricity distri-
bution. Electricity demand typically varies
through the day. For example, the all-
India average pattern shows a higher
demand during the day than at night
with a sharp late evening peak (PGCIL
2012: 57). It is a basic requirement of
a stable electricity grid that demand
and supply be balanced, or in other
13
COMMENTARY
words, matched at all times and over dif-
ferent time scales.
Balancing Demand and Supply
There are several options for balancing.
On the supply side, the output of power
plants can be controlled to follow demand.
On the demand side, the options can be
to store energy when there is excess
supply and to curtail demand forcibly or
through economic disincentives when
there is a deficit. Conventional power
plantssuch as coal, gas-fired and res-
ervoir-based hydropowerare amena-
ble to output control to varying extents.
Their use in balancing is determined by
their operational flexibility: the range
over which their output can be changed
and the rate at which the change can be
made. The capacity available for flexible
use is termed balancing capacity.
The output of gas-fired and hydro-
power plants with reservoirs can be chan-
ged rapidly and over a large range to
handle changing load. These plants are
high in flexibility. The old (subcritical)
coal-fired plants were designed to pro-
vide a steady output. Output changes in
these plants happen relatively slowly
and over a smaller range and frequent
output changes can lead to wear and
tear with attendant costs. These plants
are low on flexibility. Newer supercriti-
cal coal-fired plants are by design more
flexible and resilient than the older sub-
critical plants (PGCIL 2012: 12024).
Currently, demand is typically asse-
ssed from load profiles from the past
(previous day, same day previous week
or year) which can give an indication of
the load variations to be expected. Con-
ventional generators are scheduled to
match the expected load. The intra-day
variation in demand is addressed mainly
by varying output of reservoir-based
hydro plants. Coal plants provide the base
load and their output is varied only in a
small range (PGCIL 2012: 125). In recent
years, this range has been expanding
steadily indicating the need for increas-
ing balancing capacity (MoP 2016b: 28).
The use of gas-fired plants in balancing
has been discouraged by non-availability
of gas and high price. When there is
insufficient supply, load shedding is
resorted to. The Indian grid has hardly
14
any storage capacity available as the
need for storage solutions has not been
acutely felt in the past.
Implications of Renewable
Energy for Balancing
The presence of solar energy generators
on the grid makes balancing more chal-
lenging for several reasons. One is that
electricity regulation in India incentivises
solar energy by conferring a must run
status on solar generators; their entire
output must be accepted into the grid. This
makes solar power plants inflexible
from a balancing standpoint. A second is
that solar power is variable. Solar power
plants produce power only in daylight
hours and their output varies with the
movement of the sun, peaking at mid-
day. Balancing now needs to be carried
out for load as well as supply variability.
A third reason is that solar output is
dependent on weather. Cloudy or foggy
conditions lower output and introduce
intermittency into the variations. The
expected output under such conditions,
obtained from models using weather
forecasting data, has to be available suf-
ficiently in advance to enable scheduling
of conventional generators for balanc-
ing. Since weather is not entirely pre-
dictable, actual generation will show
deviations from forecasts and these have
to be handled in real time.
Windmills are the other major source
of RE in the Indian context. Together
with solar, they account for over 90%
(160 GW) of the RE target for 2022. These
plants also have a must run status and
produce output that is variable and in-
fluenced by weather conditions. From a
balancing perspective, they have issues
similar to solar.
Balancing Areas in the Federal
Electricity Set-up
There is another dimension to balancing
that derives from Indias federal electri-
city set-upelectricity provisioning is a
state government responsibility. Each
state has to maintain the supplydemand
balance in its own grid which becomes
the balancing area. Access to balanc-
ing capacity commensurate with the RE
capacity planned is required in each
balancing area, that is, at the level
FEBRuary 11, 2017
of every state. The RE potential of a
state depends on various factors, like
the level of solar irradiation and wind
conditions. Seven statesTamil Nadu,
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan
are suitable for both wind and solar
generation and account for 70% of the
aggregate wind and solar capacity
planned across India (MNRE 2016). These
have been termed RE rich states.
So far as generation goes, historically,
states have had their own dedicated
power plants or shares in the capacity of
central public sector power plants. State
distribution utilities procure a bulk of their
power requirements (89% in 201112)
through long-term power purchase agree-
ments (PPA s) with these state-owned
plants and some private plants (NTPC
2012). The remaining comes from gene-
rators with untied capacity that are
either recently commissioned private
plants that have not found long-term
customers or private plants operating as
merchant producers. Long-term PPAs
pretty much fix the generation resources
and balancing capacity in the portfolio
of a state. They also come in the way of
states pooling their balancing resources.
A state looking for additional balancing
capacity outside of its fixed portfolio has
to find it from the limited pool of untied
generators. For these reasons, there can
be a wide mismatch between the balanc-
ing capacity in different states and the
RE capacity planned for them.
Experience of Tamil Nadu
Tamil Nadu has the highest RE capacity
penetration currently among all states,
with RE (largely from windmills) ac-
counting for 56% of its overall genera-
tion capacity. Its balancing capacity is
inadequate for this level of penetration
(GIZ 2015: 54, 6365). Use of its limited
reservoir-based hydro capacity for bal-
ancing is restricted by irrigation release
schedules and periods of high inflows
into reservoirs when hydropower gener-
ation cannot be curtailed. Neighbouring
Karnataka and Telangana, which are
part of the southern electricity region,
are rich in hydropower resources, but
these are not available to Tamil Nadu.
The state has no flexible gas-fired plants
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and limited flexibility available in its old
coal-fired plants (CEA 2013: 13).
Till early 2016, in the absence of capa-
bility for wind power forecasting, short-
term power purchases were planned
after making assumptions about wind
generation. If wind power generation
was greater than expected, after exhau-
sting its limited balancing options, the
state utility would have only two opti-
onseither back down power from pri-
vate coal plants contracted for short-
term power or cut off wind power plants
from the grid.
Either option has been problematic for
the utilityviolating contract provisions
in one case and not respecting the must
run status accorded to wind generators
in the other. The dispute involving the
state utility, coal-fired plants and the
wind power producers is now in the
courts (Vaitheeswaran 2015). Legal is-
sues aside, there are negative economic
consequences, either way. Varying pow-
er from coal plants means underutilisa-
tion of capacity and higher costs related
to wear and tear. Backing down wind
power means wasted energy.
Preparations for RE
The central governments massive RE
targets require a commensurate increase
in balancing capability at least in the RE-
rich states. Balancing resources can be
augmented by dedicated transmission
corridors distributing RE across states,
grid storage and additional flexible gen-
eration, which are all infrastructure of
long gestation (PGCIL 2012: 116). Besides
resources, accurate forecasting of RE
generation is essential for balancing.
What follows is an assessment of the
central governments preparatory work
in each of these areas.
Grid Storage
Pumped storage is not only the most
widely deployed grid-level energy stor-
age technology, but also the most flexi-
ble and competitive one (GIZ 2015: 80).
Pumped storage hydroelectric plants
store and generate electricity by moving
water between reservoirs at two diffe-
rent heights. While India has a very
limited capacity of operational pumped
storage, the electricity establishment has
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
identified a number of hydropower pro-
jects that can be developed to support
pumped storage (CEA 2013: 3943). The
government, however, has just woken
up to the need to identify concrete pro-
jects and there is talk of setting up 10 GW
of pumped storage (ET Bureau 2016).
Grid-level battery storage technologies
are evolving and in one estimate, are
38 times more expensive than pumped
storage (GIZ 2015: 80). There are several
vested interests active in promoting these
technologies, including the USIndia
business council and the government
seems to have fallen for the hype created
around them. The public sector Solar
Energy Corporation of India has put out
tenders for solar capacity with storage
components potentially driving up the
cost of solar electricity (Clover 2016).
The storage component is minuscule as
of now and nowhere near the scale needed
to be practically useful to the distri-
bution companies (DISCOMS). It seems
that storage can be safely discounted
as an option for balancing in the run-up
to 2022.
Forecasting and Dispersing RE
Renewable energy management centres
(REMCs) are to be set up in at least all the
RE-rich states with the responsibility for
statewide forecasting of RE. The costs in-
curred in managing the uncertainty in
predicting renewable generation will
not be part of its purchase cost; these
costs are to be socialised among grid
users (CERC 2015). Till mid-2015, there
was no centralised forecasting for re-
newable generation anywhere in India
(GIZ 2015: 60). Tamil Nadu has inaugu-
rated its REMC recently (Srikanth 2016).
Transmission corridors (termed Green
Energy Corridors) providing RE clusters
in RE-rich states access to neighbouring
states were a part of the Twelfth Plan.
The corridors are under implementation
with an enlarged scope to include con-
nectivity to the ultra mega solar parks
and will enable RE generators to dis-
perse electricity in a wider geography
with more balancing resources than
available in the RE-rich states (MoP
2016b: 42).
Both the forecasting and transmission
infrastructure are early work in progress
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
and there is no visibility into when they
will be ready.
Flexible Generation
There is little chance of capacity addi-
tion in gas-fired thermal plants in the
2022 time frame with existing gas-fired
plants running at partial capacity because
of the cost of gas which has to be imported.
Hydropower projects totalling over 12 GW
are under construction (CEA 2015). Possi-
bly less than half of this capacity will be
amenable to flexible use. Most projects
are many years behind schedule because
of environmental-related stand-offs and
opposition from local populations. Old
coal-fired plants can be made more
flexible through retrofitting. This will
require capital expenditure and there
are no signs that governments (who own
most of these plants) are seriously con-
sidering this option. A total of 73 GW of
coal capacity is under construction of
which supercritical plants account for 50
GW (CEA 2016; MoEFCC 2015: 72).
One can conclude that coal-fired
plants, in particular supercritical ones,
will be the mainstay of RE balancing.
With conventional capacity addition, far
lower than planned RE capacity addition
(of 130 GW), Indias overall balancing
potentialthe ratio of balancing capa-
city to RE capacityis set to decrease in
the run-up to 2022.
Market for Balancing Capacity
The mere existence of flexibility in gene-
ration will not translate to flexible opera-
tions as the latter has negative financial
implications for the operator. For in-
stance, in the case of coal-fired plants,
these are due to wear and tear reducing
the life of the plant, higher maintenance
costs and costs associated with capacity
underutilisation and lower efficiency.
The government is therefore moving to
incentivise flexible operations. There is
already a regulation to compensate gen-
erators for holding capacity in reserve
for responding to grid management
requests in real time. A framework for
market-based pricing for balancing capa-
city is just down the line.
Will market-based incentives solve the
problem of making adequate balancing
capacity available in the RE-rich states?
15
COMMENTARY
There are some constraints. First, the
generation capacity available in the
electricity market untied to PPAs is cur-
rently limited, though it is slated to rise
with the commissioning of new plants.
Second, interregional transmission con-
straints can come in the way of RE-rich
states using flexible capacity from regi-
ons other than their own. The later prob-
lem is illustrated by the southern elec-
tricity region which has been facing a
generation capacity deficit for several
years. Coal-fired generators in the west-
ern electricity region are unable to pro-
vide power to the southern region bec-
ause of transmission bottlenecks and
their capacity lies underutilised. Market-
based pricing has not solved the problem
of electricity deficit in the southern region
in five years; electricity prices at the Indian
Electricity Exchange have remained sig-
nificantly higher for the southern region
compared to the western region from
2011 onwards (Kasturi 2016: 24).
Two years after announcing massive
RE targets, the government still does not
have an assessment of the actual balanc-
ing capacity available with the RE-rich
states or how this will grow in future! It
appears to believe that the market for
balancing capacity will somehow solve
all problems.
Real Cost of Solar
State utilities are generally strained fin-
ancially and will not be keen to purchase
RE as long as it is relatively expensive. To
make RE more attractive, the central
government has worked out ways of sub-
sidising it at the cost of public sector
companies in the power or fuel sector.
Interstate transmission charges for solar
electricity have been waived at the cost
of the Power Grid Corporation of India.
NTPC contracts for solar power from
producers and sells it to DISCOMS after
subsidising it in the following way. It
bundles solar power with low-cost
power from its coal-fired plants and
offers utilities power at a rate which is
lower than its purchase price for solar
electricity (Upadhyay 2015). This bundled
price has to approach grid paritythe
average price of electricity contracted by
utilitiesfor NTPC to be able to find
willing buyers.
16
Of course, even if solar prices reach
grid parity it does not mean that solar has
become cost-effective compared to other
sources of energy. The cost of balancing
variability in generation through flexi-
ble capacity held in reserve must also be
attributed to solar power. To this must
also be added the cost of infrastructure
for forecasting RE and the costs arising
from errors in forecasting. The govern-
ment has not even hazarded a guess at
these costs yet. As subsidies alone are not
enough to make solar power attractive,
the government has also taken recourse
to coercion. The new tariff policy calls for
high RE purchase obligations for DISCOMS
with the target for solar alone being 8%
of non-hydropower consumed by every
utility by 2022 (MoP 2016a). To make sure
that states comply with the Renewable
Purchase Obligation targets, such compli-
ance has been made part of the conditions
associated with the Ujwal Discom Assur-
ance Yojana (UDAY) that provides relief
to indebted state DISCOMS (GoI 2015b).
Negative Consequences of
Force-feeding RE
Forcing DISCOMS to absorb RE beyond
their ability to handle it will have conse-
quences for their health and the cost and
quality of electricity supply. A key as-
sumption behind UDAY is that power
costs will come down with lower cost of
coal and help DISCOM finances. Rapid so-
lar penetration will push up the cost of
power. Utilities are already hard put to
handle load variation, even today. They
lack accurate load forecasting, flexibility
in conventional generation, balancing
resources such as pumped storage and
generation reserves to handle different
eventualities on the grid (MoP 2016b: 11).
For customers, this has meant a regime
of poor quality and unscheduled power
cuts. With high RE penetration and an
expected further deterioration in bal-
ancing potential, this regime is bound to
continue in to the future. The govern-
ment is also preparing to use demand
curtailment for balancing by pushing for
large-scale installation of smart meters
that will allow setting time-of-day tariff
(MoP 2016a).
Public interest will be better served if
the pace of solar (and wind) capacity
FEBRuary 11, 2017
build-up is compatible with the balancing
capacity available with the states and
their ability to manage RE variability. The
government must pay as much attention
to capacity building in inter-regional
transmission, pumped storage and highly
flexible generation as it is doing to solar
generation. Renewable energy targets
based on these considerations rather than
impetuous declarations will be sustain-
able and allow steady decrease of carbon
emissions. A slower adoption of solar gen-
eration will be beneficial for yet another
reason: solar power, as long-term trends
suggest, will only get cheaper with time.
References
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newable Energy SourcesWay Forward, Cen-
tral Electricity Authority, November, http://
cea.nic.in/reports/others/ps/pspa1/large_
scale_grid_integ.pdf.
(2015): Hydro Electric Projects under Execu-
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http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/hy-
dro/2015/hydro_execution-11.pdf.
(2016): Monthly Report on Broad Status of
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reports/monthly/broadstatus/2016/broad_
status-07.pdf.
CERC (2015): Framework on Forecasting, Sched-
uling and Imbalance Handling for Variable Re-
newable Energy Sources (Wind and Solar):
Statement of Reasons, Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission, http://www.cercind.
gov.in/2015/regulation/SOR7.pdf.
Clover, Ian (2016): India: Storage to be Included in
100 MW Tranche of Andhra Pradesh 750 MW
Solar Tender, PV Magazine, 15 March, http://
www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag
/india--storage-to-be-included-in-100-mwtra
nche-of-andhra-pradesh-750-mw-solar-tender
_100023702/#axzz4Hs5QeTPR.
ET Bureau (2016): India Readies Plan to Improve
Renewable Power Storage, Economic Times, 22
August, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com
/industry/energy/power/india-readies-plan-to
-improve-renewable-power-storage/article-
show/53802021.cms.
GIZ (2015): Report on Forecasting, Concept of Re-
newable Energy Management Centres and
Grid Balancing, Deutsche Gesellschaft fr In-
ternationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH,
May, http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/User Files/
draft-report-fscb-remcs.pdf.
GoI (2015a): Revision of Cumulative Targets under
National Solar Mission from 20,000 MW by
202122 to 100000 MW, Government of India,
17 June, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.
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(2015b): UDAY (Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yo-
jana) for Financial Turnaround of Power Distri-
bution Companies, Government of India, 5
November, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRe-
lease.aspx?relid=130261.
Kasturi, Kannan (2016): Private Thermal Power in
a Liberal Policy Regime, Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 51, No 10, pp 2226.
Kenning Tom (2015): Indias Cutthroat Solar Auc-
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ber, http://www.pv-tech.org/features/indias-
cutthroat-solar-auctions-behind-the-hype.
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MNRE (2016): Tentative State-wise Break-up of
Renewable Power Target to be Achieved by the
Year 2022 So That Cumulative Achievement Is
175000 MW, Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy, http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/User
Files/Tentative-State-wise-break-up-of-Renew
able-Power-by-2022.pdf (21 September 2016).
MoEFCC (2015): First Biennial Update Report to
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change, December, http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indbur1.pdf.
MoP (2014): Perspective Transmission Plan for
Twenty Years (20142034), Ministry of Power,
August, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/com-
mittee/scm/allindia/notices/3rd_report.pdf.
(2016a): Resolution, Tariff Policy, Ministry of
Power, Gazette of India, 28 January.
(2016b): Report of the Technical Committee
on Large Scale Integration of Renewable Energy,
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Need for Balancing, Deviation Settlement
Mechanism and Associated Issues, Ministry of
Power, April, http://powermin.nic.in/sites/de-
fault/files/uploads/Final_Consolidated_Report_
RE_Technical_Committee.pdf.
NTPC (2012): Annual Report, 201112, National
Thermal Power Corporation, http://www.ntpc.
co.in/annual-reports/720/management-discussi
on-and-analysis-2011.
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Renewable Capacity, Vol 1, Power Grid Corpora-
tion of India Limited, July, http://www.power-
gridindia.com/_layouts/PowerGrid/WriteRe-
adData/file/ourBusiness/SmartGrid/Vol_1.pdf.
Singh, Sarita (2016): Power Demand May be Low-
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72598691_1_power-ministry-power-demand-
electric-power-survey.
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Srikanth, R (2016): Tangedco Sets Up Centre to
Tap Renewable Energy, Hindu, 26 March,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ta-
mil-nadu/tangedco-sets-up-centre-to-tap-re-
newable-energy/article8398352.ece.
Tongia, Rahul (2016): Indias Updated (2016) Re-
newable Energy Guidelines: Bold Targets, But
Can We Meet Them?, Brookings India IMPACT
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Power Plants to Subsidize Solar, Bloomberg, 7
September, http://www.bloomberg.com/news
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plants-to-subsidize-15-gigawatts-of-solar.
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status-wind-power-wind-mills.
17

Injectable Contraceptives
Failing Indian Women
Smitha Nair
The campaign against
Depo-Provera and the questions
raised by the womens groups still
remain relevant. Reproductive
rights, when reduced to choice
of contraceptives without
considering the overall health and
well-being of women, result only
in the control and unfreedom
of women.
Smitha Nair (smitha.s83@gmail.com) is a
PhD student at the Centre of Social Medicine
and Community Health, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
T
he Government of India has exp-
ressed its intention of introducing
the controversial injectable con-
traceptive Depot Medroxyprogesterone
Acetate (DMPA; brand name Depo-
Provera) into the family planning pro-
gramme (FPP) of India. The most com-
mon arguments for the introduction of
Depo-Provera are the increase in choice
for women, ease of administration, and
availability in the private market for
over two decades. They blame the oppo-
sition by certain womens groups for
the delayed entry of these injectables
into the FPP of the country. This article
argues that the campaign against Depo-
Provera and the questions raised by the
womens groups still remain relevant and
that the simplistic argument of choice
fails to bring out the complex interac-
tions of the dominant overpopulation
discourse, international organisations,
and the unfreedom experienced by the
majority of women in the country.
The Movement
DMPA or Depo-Provera is a three-month
progesterone injectable, the patent for
which is owned by the transnational
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer. The proven
side effects of Depo-Provera include
irregular bleeding, amenorrhoea in women,
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
carcinogenic effects, bone mineral den-
sity deficiency leading to osteoporosis,
hypertension, and clitoral hypotrophy
(Sathyamala 2000; Akhter 1992). Fur-
ther, it does not provide protection from
HIV/AIDS (Visvanathan 2009). Contra-
indications include diabetes mellitus,
liver diseases, depression, blood-clotting
problems, weight problems, pregnancy
in women, breast cancer, or desire to
become pregnant within 824 months
(Satyamala 2000).
Depo-Provera reached India in 1974 and
the Indian Council of Medical Research
(ICMR) started trials with the contracep-
tive. However, these trials were stopped
because of the high dropout rate of wom-
en. By the early 1980s, the ICMR concluded
that Depo-Provera was not suitable for
introduction in India (Sarojini 2010).
In 1986, Stree Shakti Sanghatana, a
womens group in Hyderabad received in-
formation that another injectable, Net-En,
was being used on women in Patancheru
(Andhra Pradesh) primary healthcare
centre. They investigated and found that
the women enrolled for the study were
only told that injection le lo, baccha
nahin hoga (take the injection, you will
not have a child) (Sarojini 2010). The
health workers admitted to them that
they did not tell the women any more
than this, as they were under pressure of
fulfilling population control targets. It
was this small fact-finding team that later
became a full-fledged campaign. Stree
Shakti Sanghatana (Hyderabad), Saheli
(Delhi) and others filed a writ petition
in the Supreme Court against the Union
of India, ICMR and Andhra Pradesh
17
COMMENTARY
asking for a stay on the Phase IV clinical
trials of Net-En (Stree Shakti Sanghatha-
na & Others v Union of India & Others
1986). They raised questions on issues of
safety, effectiveness, and the medicali-
sation of womens bodies.
In a letter dated 11 July 1986, Saheli
states that experimentation and promo-
tion of injectables were perceived as the
first step towards [] greater state con-
trol over womens bodies. The organisa-
tions gave information to the public
about the harmful effects of the injecta-
bles through different means and using
simple language. Stree Shakti Sangha-
tana in 1987 came out with a publication
titled An Analysis of Studies on the
Injectable Contraceptive Net-En and Its
Promotions in Developing Countries.
They analysed the discontinuation rate
and brought to the fore the long-term
and short-term side effects of the inject-
ables (Stree Shakti Sanghatana 1987).
The groups circulated these debates in
the public arena through the media.
They ensured that the press releases
were a constant feature of any action
taken by them. This helped reach out to
a larger public and at the same time it
helped mount pressure on the state and
the judiciary to take cognisance of the
protests by these groups.
Five years after the case was filed to
keep injectables out of the FPP, the gov-
ernment declared its decision to intro-
duce Depo-Provera into the Indian mar-
kets. In a letter to the ICMR director gen-
eral dated 18 September 1992, 12 wom-
ens groups and health groups expressed
surprise and concern at the ICMRs clear-
ing of Depo-Provera for sale without
conducting any trials in India.
The groups also expressed concern
over the problems that would arise in
the context of India if the contraceptive
was introduced into the market. They
explained that these injectables could be
misused on a population where the gov-
ernment runs an FPP and could be ad-
ministered to women without their
knowledge and consent, especially the
poor and illiterate women of the coun-
try. They also elaborated that there was
a high likelihood that the women will be
injected with the contraceptive in the
early stages of pregnancy and will not
18
be able to abort in time. Womens of the injectables so as to be able to con-
organisations talked about the harmful verse with doctors and the administrative
effects of long-term foetal exposure to officers. They questioned the efficiency,
Depo-Provera and of heavy bleeding in safety and ethical use of a contraceptive
an anaemic population. that had been proved physically harmful
In spite of the protests, the Government for women. They repeatedly stressed on
of India sanctioned social marketing of the fact that unless there existed a good
Depo-Provera. In 1994, organisations like public health system to deal with the
Jagori, Saheli, Multiple Action Research complications that would arise from the
Group, Purogami Mahila Sanghatana, contraceptive, it would be absolutely
Janwadi Mahila Samiti and National detrimental to the health of women to
Federation of Indian Women brought out introduce the contraceptive into the FPP.
a brief joint statement which strongly They explicitly stated that the dominant
opposed the introduction of the injectables neo-Malthusian ideology is responsible
into the market, based on the harmful for the introduction of harmful contra-
long-term side effects and the mislead- ceptives whose only benefit is easy ad-
ing product information given by the ministration. They criticised the Indian
manufacturers. Also, the womens groups government for working on the diktats
questioned the mechanism to monitor the of the International Monetary Fund and
long-term side effects that the women the World Bank and cutting down on
will face when the injectables were going health services while subjecting mil-
to be available over-the-counter. lions of Indian women to life threaten-
The women in these groups who were ing hazards from contraceptives devel-
from non-medical backgrounds made oped without an iota of concern for
earnest efforts to learn the technicalities womens health (Saheli 1994).
Dr Arun Kumar Banerji Fellowship Programme
Applications are invited from students for the Arun Kumar Banerji Fellowship Programme.
The Fellowship has been named after the late Dr Arun Kumar Banerji, a well-known
economic historian and former Executive Director of the Reserve Bank of India.
The programme has been funded by a generous endowment provided by
Mrs Usha Banerji.
Under this Programme, two students pursuing postgraduate (PG) or Doctoral degree
in economics or public policy are awarded summer internship at the EPW Research
Foundation, Mumbai, for a period up to three months each starting from April 2017.
The students will work under the direct supervision of a senior staff at EPWRF.
Though undertaking assigned work, they will be encouraged to do research on an issue
bordering on any aspect of Indias or any other countrys economic history. They will
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publication.
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studying. Applications should reach by March 15, 2017.
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The verdict on the legal case filed by
Saheli and others was given in August
2000, 14 years after it was filed. The
womens groups, after 14 years of strug-
gle managed to keep the contraceptives
out of the FPP, but could not prevent
them from entering the private market.
Over time, there have been continuous
efforts to include the injectables into the
FPP of the country. A document titled
Injectable Contraceptives in India: Past,
Present and Future was prepared by the
Futures Group International based on a
three-year project named Innovations in
Family Planning Services Technical As-
sistance Project (ITAP) which began in
2005 and was commissioned by United
States Agency for International Develop-
ment. The project was specifically aimed
at increasing the choice of contraceptives,
like injectables and implants, into the
FPP. This document reviewed the history
of injectables and other contraceptives
in India, the present situation and steps
that need to be taken for the creation of
a favourable environment to introduce
the injectables into the FPP of the country.
In a letter dated 19 April 2007, respon-
ding to the concerns raised by the
organisations about these attempts, the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
assured the organisations that unless
the safety of the injectables is ascer-
tained by the ICMR and the National
Institute for Research in Reproductive
Health (NIRRH), they will not be intro-
duced into the FPP. However, the gov-
ernments interest in introducing the
injectables in the FPP while subverting
the resistance by womens groups is visi-
ble in a policy document of the National
Institute of Health and Family Welfare,
wherein womens groups and health
activists are represented as reducing the
choice for women through their opposi-
tion to injectables (Srivastava et al 2012).
The attempts at promoting underuti-
lised contraceptives like injectables recei-
ved impetus after the London Summit
on Family Planning, FP2020 held in 2012.
The Battle Ahead
Womens groups, along with health ad-
vocates and concerned individuals, have
fought a long and hard battle over two
decades to prevent the entry of injectables
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
into the FPP. They brought out the ma-
trix of domination of the neo-Malthusi-
an ideology of the state, international
organisations, and the patriarchal atti-
tude of the scientific community. They
questioned the poor public health facili-
ties of the country and the control of
womens bodies by technology. They also
questioned the absence of monitoring
mechanisms to help women who face
side effects and of public health facilities
to ensure that all women undergo full
body check-ups for contraindications.
The groups opposed the medicalisation
and control of womens bodies and the
reductionist understanding of reproduc-
tive rights post the Cairo Consensus,
1994. Many argued that this consen-
sus brought out a change in the seman-
tics of rights in the policy, but the
rights having been narrowed down
to contraceptive choice and womens
empowerment, became a tool to de-
crease population.
The entry of injectables will most
severely affect the poor and margin-
alised women, who do not have the
means to take care of their health in the
case of long-term side effects. This debate
has to be placed within the context of
the socio-economic backgrounds of the
women who are targeted for population
control programmes. It is clear that the
conditions under which the womens
movement opposed the injectables still
remain very relevant today and debates
in this regard are necessary.
The public health facilities continue to
remain in abysmal conditions and the
poor budget allocation to the health
sector means increased out-of-pocket
expenditure. In a country with a strong
neo-Malthusian understanding of over-
population, it will not be erroneous to
assume that injectables will be used on a
large scale without taking proper pre-
cautions or giving mandatory counse-
lling (which seems to be the solution for
the side effects that the women will
face). Reproductive rights when reduced
to choice of contraceptives, without
considering the overall health and well-
being of women, results only in control
and unfreedom of women. It has to be
strongly argued that it is the opposition
of certain womens groups that saved a
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
generation of women, and by ignoring
these voices the government will be fail-
ing the women of India.
References
Akhter, Farida (1992): Depopulating Bangladesh:
Essays on the Politics of Fertility, Dhaka: Nar-
igrantha Prabartana.
Barry, Ellen and Celia W Dugger (2016): India to
Change Its Decades-old Reliance on Female
Sterilisation, New York Times, 20 February,
viewed on 2 March 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/ 2016/02/21/world/asia/india-to-change-
its-decades-old-reliance-on-female-sterilisation.
Nair, Smitha Sasidharan (2010): Contraceptive
ControversiesChoice or Control, MPhil thesis,
Centre of Social Medicine and Community
Health, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Saheli (nd): Net En: Another Chapter in The Saga
of Injectable Contraceptives, Saheli Womens
Resource Centre, New Delhi, viewed on 12
April 2011, https://sites.google.com/site/sahe-
liorgsite/health/hazardous-hormonal-contra-
ceptives/net-en.
(1994): Statement on Depo-Provera, 12 May,
Saheli Womens Resource Centre, New Delhi.
(1999): Enough Is EnoughInjectable Contra-
ceptives Net-En: A Chronicle of Health Hazards
Foretold, Saheli Womens Resource Centre,
New Delhi.
Sama (2003): Unveiled RealitiesA Study on
Womens Experiences with Depo-Provera, an
Injectable Contraceptive, Sama-Resource Group
for Women and Health, New Delhi.
Sarojini, N B and Lakshmi Murthy (2005): Why
Womens Groups Oppose Injectable Contracep-
tives, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol 2,
No 1, pp 89.
Sarojini, N B (2010): Women as Wombs, Info-
change, December, http://infochangeindia.
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=8621:women-as-wombs&catid=257
:medical-technology-ethics&Itemid=149.
Sathyamala, C (2000): An Epidemiological Review
of the Injectable Contraceptive-Depo-Provera,
Medico Friends Circle and Forum for Womens
Health, Mumbai.
Srivastava, R K et al (2012): Injectable Contracep-
tives to Expand the Basket of Choice under
Indias Family Planning Programme: An Up-
date, National Institute of Health and Family
Welfare, New Delhi, viewed on 25 September
2014, http://www.nihfw.org/Doc/Policy_unit
/Injectable%20Contraceptives%20Programme
% 20An%20Update.%20September%202012.pdf.
Stree Shakti Sanghathana & Others v Union of India
& Others (1986): Writ Petition (Civil) No 680 of
1996, decided on 24 August 2000.
Stree Shakti Sanghatana (1987): An Analysis of
Studies on the Injectable Contraceptive Net-En
and Its Promotions in Developing Countries,
Stree Shakti Sanghatana, Hyderabad.
Sushmi Dey (2015): Government to Allow Injecta-
ble Contraceptive for Women, Times of India,
16 September, viewed on 20 December 2015,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sci-
ence/Government-to-allow-injectable-contra-
ceptive-for-women/articleshow/48979064.cms.
Visvanathan, Nalini (2009): Hormonal Contra-
ception and HIV Disease Acquisition: A Limited
Review and Reassessment of Findings, Popu-
lation and Development Programme, Reviving
Reproductive Safety, discussion paper, Hamp-
shire College, Amherst.
WHO (2005): Technical Consultation on the Ef-
fects of Hormonal Contraception on Bone
Health-Summary Report, Department of Re-
productive Health and Research, World Health
Organization, Geneva.
19
COMMENTARY
Can Conditional Transfers
Eradicate Child Marriage?
Sajeda Amin, Niaz Asadullah, Sara Hossain, Zaki Wahhaj
Child marriage is associated with
a range of negative social
consequenceslower schooling,
early pregnancy, decreased
agency within the marital
household, and adverse
reproductive and sexual health.
With respect to the eradication of
child marriages, will conditional
cash transfers for delaying
marriage have the same logic as
the more widely investigated
conditional transfer programmes
for childrens schooling? Will such
transfers enable adolescents to
make decisions or exercise
choices regarding marriage,
beyond simply delaying the event?
Sajeda Amin is with the Population Council,
New York. Niaz Asadullah teaches at the
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Sara
Hossain practises law at the Supreme Court
of Bangladesh and Zaki Wahhaj (z.wahhaj@
kent.ac.uk) teaches at the School of Economics,
Keynes College, University of Kent, UK.
20
I
n recent years, governments, national
and international donors and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)
have increasingly focused attention on
policies and initiatives that can effec-
tively tackle the phenomenon of child
marriage. These include: (i) schemes that
transfer cash or other resources conditional
on school attendance and/or marriage
postponement (the Apni Beti Apna Dhan
programme in India, the Zomba Cash
Transfer programme in Malawi (Baird et al
2015) and the Female Secondary School
Assistance programme in Bangladesh;
(ii) programmes to develop the capacity
and ability of adolescent girls to invest in
their own future, by improving life skills
and expanding opportunities for educa-
tion and work (the Ishraq programme in
Egypt, Tostans Community Empower-
ment programme in Senegal, the Popu-
lation Councils BALIKA programme in
Bangladesh (Bandiera et al 2015), BRACs
Empowerment and Livelihood for Ado-
lescents (ELA) scheme in Uganda and
Tanzania1 and the Adolescent Develop-
ment programme in Bangladesh).
In addition, in most settings, there are
efforts in place that attempt to change
norms of marriage through legal bans
and harsher penalties for under-age
marriages. The highest rates of child
marriage are typically found in low or
lower middle-income countries where
millions live below the poverty line.
UNICEFs State of the Worlds Children
2016 report noted that Girls from the
poorest householdsand those living in
rural areasface twice the risk of being
married before turning 18 as girls from
the richest households or those living in
urban areas. A recent review of existing
evidence suggests that cash-based inter-
ventions are effective for ending child
marriage, as are multipronged progra-
mmes that do not include incentives
related to marriage-timing. Which of these
approaches is most effective in bringing
FEBRuary 11, 2017
about the desired social outcomes, is an
empirical question. This, ultimately, can
only be addressed through careful anal-
yses of implemented programmes. An
understanding of the theory of change
which implicitly underlies these app-
roaches is just as important, as this can
help highlight potential pitfalls, both in
designing and evaluating programmes.
We aim to contribute to this understand-
ing by addressing a specific question. Do
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) for
delaying marriage have the same logic
as the more widely investigated condi-
tional transfer programmes for childrens
schooling? And do such transfers on their
own enable adolescents to make decisions
or exercise choices regarding marriage,
beyond simply delaying the event?
By their very nature, conditional trans-
fer programmes (with transfers in cash
or kind) have to be tied to specific,
observable and verifiable outcomes. In
the case of educational programmes,
these outcomes typically include school
attendance, or performance in school,
above a minimum threshold. The logic
of these programmes is that they reduce
parents opportunity cost of sending
their children to school. As long as the
programme succeeds in making children
turn up at school, the potential benefits
are closely linked to school quality: teacher
quality and time, classroom size, availa-
bility of textbooks, etc. In the case of
conditional transfers tied to marriage
postponement, their effectiveness dep-
ends much more on decisions made
within the household, specifically, on how
parents of adolescent girls respond to
these incentives. The transfers depend
on one verifiable outcomeat what age
do their daughters marry?while par-
ents (or the household as a whole) are
free to adjust the other parameters asso-
ciated with that decision as they see fit.
There is no guarantee that a household
meeting the conditions set by the pro-
gramme would result in improved agency
of adolescent girls in their own marriage
decisionswhether, when, and whom
to marryor increased investment in
their education or earning skills, or a
shift in beliefs and attitudes within the
wider community, which could have a
lasting impact on these outcomes.
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

We can illustrate this last point using
a hypothetical example. Imagine a house-
hold with an adolescent daughter eligible
for a conditional transfer programme,
who would ordinarily be married off
before the age-of-marriage criterion set
by the programme has been fulfilled.
Given the programmatic incentives to
delay marriage, parents may tweak the
marriage process to satisfy this condition
artificiallyby lengthening the engage-
ment period or entering into prolonged
negotiations with the grooms family
regarding the terms of the marriage.
A recent evaluation of Apni Beti Apna
Dhan in Haryanathe oldest conditional
transfer programme targeting early mar-
riageprovides an illustration.2 Eligible
households had the opportunity to enrol
in the programme within three months
of the birth of a daughter. Upon enrol-
ment, households received a savings
bond which could be redeemed when
the girl turned 18 (with an expected
value of `25,000) provided she had not
married by this date. The study found
that programme beneficiaries were more
likely to marry during their 18th year
than non-beneficiaries, suggesting that
parents were postponing the marriage
of their daughters just long enough to
receive the conditional transfer. More
than half the respondents reported using
the transfers to cover marriage expens-
es. By contrast, current evidence from
programmes with a gender rights or ed-
ucation as focus, points to significant ef-
fects on marriage age (Bandiera et al
2015; Amin et al 2016).
There is considerable evidence availa-
ble today showing that marriage post-
ponement by adolescent girls in traditional
societies has a positive (causal) effect on
other social outcomes. This evidence is
primarily based on an approach pionee-
red by Field and Ambrus (2008). They
used the variation in the timing of onset
of menarche among adolescent girls
which can shape social expectations
about when a girl can and ought to marry
in traditional societiesto investigate
how early marriage affects female school-
ing. Subsequent studies have, broadly,
confirmed these patterns and extended
the findings to other social outcomes
(Sekhri and Debnath 2014; Asadullah
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
and Wahhaj 2016). However, the causal
effects obtained from these studies do not
translate easily to the case of conditional
transfers for marriage postponement.
The reason being that these studies focus
on the effects of marriage postponement
resulting from a social constraint which
forbids or discourages the marriage of
girls before the onset of menarche. By
contrast, CCTs operate by providing fi-
nancial rewards for delaying marriage.
This reasoning does not imply that
programmes providing conditional trans-
fers for marriage postponement will nec-
essarily be ineffective. Rather, they must
be evaluated in terms of a wider set of
outcomes, some of which may be diffi-
cult to measure. An outcome for which
the problem of measurement is particu-
larly acute is the agency of a young bride
in her sexual relations following marri-
age. There is systematic evidence regar-
ding young womens experience of non-
consensual sex with an intimate partner
(Jejeebhoy et al 2005), but household sur-
veys rarely touch upon the issue because
of its sensitive nature. Consequently, a
fundamental outcome of relevance to
adolescent girls and young women may
be invisible in standard evaluation exer-
cises. More generally, this example high-
lights that adolescent empowerment
programmeswhich aim to improve
the agency of adolescent girls in their
marriage decisionsmay have intrinsic
value beyond any material change in the
timing of marriage they may bring
about. This is because they enable girls
to understand that they have the power
to choose, and enable them to build the
confidence and decision-making capacity
to exercise that choice.
Impact on Social Norms
Another outcome, for which measure-
ment is a concern, relates to the long-term
impact of the programme on social norms
and attitudes within the community. Some
interventions involving adolescent girls
explicitly target these outcomes. Condi-
tional transfers for marriage postpone-
ment do not. Nevertheless, these shifts
may be important to ensure that the pro-
grammes effects reach those not direct-
ly targeted; endure beyond the period of
intervention; and carry over to future
vol lIi no 6
COMMENTARY
generations (Wahhaj 2015). Therefore, they
need to be factored in for a costbenefit
analysis of different types of interventions
designed to tackle early marriage and
improve outcomes for adolescent girls.
There is a broad consensus among
practitioners that child marriage is an
outcome of broad social norms and soci-
etal pressures. Financial poverty certainly
adds to the pressures, leaving parents
with the choice of trading-off the long-
term welfare of their daughters for short-
term relief from the burden of poverty.
However, it is unclear whether removing
economic pressures, per se, is sufficient
to achieve the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) of ending child marriage,
along with early and forced marriage, by
2030. This is evidenced by the paradoxical
experience of countries like India and
Bangladesh where the prevalence of
child marriage remains high despite
decades of rapid macroeconomic growth
and substantial decline in poverty.3
Given this uncertainty, policymakers
should support a multidimensional,
longer term and holistic view of the im-
pact, which takes into account dimensions
such as realised rights, health and access
to education, rather than costbenefit
based approaches that rely on single-
focus indicators that may or may not
have a lasting impact on individual well-
being. The former will have added pay-
offs in terms of improving the well-being
of women within marriage, including
freedom from marital violence, irrespec-
tive of how the interventions affect the
age at first marriage. Under their own
constitutions, and as per international
human rights law, all countries have
committed to securing girls rights to
personal liberty, freedom of expression
Permission for Reproduction of
Articles Published in EPW
No article published in EPW or part thereof
should be reproduced in any form without
prior permission of the author(s).
A soft/hard copy of the author(s)s approval
should be sent to EPW.
In cases where the email address of the
author has not been published along
with the articles, EPW can be contacted
for help.
21
COMMENTARY
and freedom of movement. It is essential
that the development agenda strengthen,
rather than undermine this commitment.
notes
1 https://www.brac.net/search/item/723-emp-
owerment-and-livelihood-for-adolescents.
2 http://www.icrw.org/publications/making-c-
hange-cash.
3 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-re-
lease/2015/10/15/south-asia-extreme-poverty-
falls-but-challenges-remain.
References
Amin, S, J Ahmed, J Saha, M I Irfan and E F Haque
(2016): Delaying Child Marriage Through Com-
munity-Based Skills-Development Programs for
Girls, Population Council.
22
Asadullah, Niaz and Zaki Wahhaj (2016): Early
Marriage, Social Networks and the Transmission
of Norms, Studies in Economics, 1602, School
of Economics, University of Kent.
Bandiera, Oriana, Niklas Buehren, Robin Burgess,
Markus Goldstein, Selim Gulesci, Imran Rasul
and Munshi Sulaiman (2015): Womens Em-
powerment in Action: Evidence from a Ran-
domized Control Trial in Africa, mimeo.
Clark, S J Bruce and A Dude (2006): Protecting
Girls from HIV/AIDS: The Case Against Child
and Adolescent Marriage, International Family
Planning Perspectives, Vol 32(2), pp 7988.
Das, Jishnu, Quy-Toan Do and Berk zler (2005):
Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Pro-
grams, The World Bank Research Observer, 20,
No 1, pp 5780.
Field, E and A Ambrus (2008): Early Marriage,
Age of Menarche, and Female Schooling At-
tainment in Bangladesh, The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol 116, pp 881930.
FEBRuary 11, 2017
Jejeebhoy, S, I Shah and S Thapa (2005): Sex With-
out Consent, Zed Books.
Lee-Rife, S, A Malhotra, A Warner and A M Glinski
(2012): What Works to Prevent Child Marriage:
A Review of the Evidence, Studies in Family
Planning, 43, pp 287303.
Raj, A, L McDougal and M L Rusch (2012): Chang-
es in Prevalence of Girl Child Marriage in
South Asia, The Journal of American Medical
Association, Vol 307, pp 202729.
Sekhri, S and S Debnath (2014): Intergenerational
Consequences of Early Age Marriages of Girls:
Effect on Childrens Human Capital, Journal of
Development Studies, Vol 50, No 12, pp 167086.
UNICEF (2014): Ending Child Marriage: Progress
and Prospects, http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/
reports-and-publications/ending-child-marri-
age-progress-prospects/
Wahhaj, Z (2015): A Theory of Child Marriage,
University of Kent Economics Discussion Paper
Series, 15/20.
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Sustainably Unsustainable
Peace in Assam
Nazimuddin Siddique
Assam has been marked by severe
violence for decades which has
unfolded in a structured manner
since the days of the infamous
Assam movement. It is because of
this movement that multiple
massacres have taken place in the
state, separated by periodic lulls.
This article looks at the Bodo
movement and how the
government and non-Bodo
communities of the state must deal
with the effects it has unleashed.
Nazimuddin Siddique (nazim10dream@
gmail.com) is a PhD student at the Gauhati
University, Assam.
22
O
n 5 August 2016, Kokrajhar, the
violence-torn district of Assam,
was the scene of fresh killings.
This horrific attack took place in broad
daylight, in a weekly market, situated
near the Kokrajhar district headquar-
ters. Unleashing violence while people
thronged the weekly market, the terror-
ists fired indiscriminately, using sophis-
ticated weapons. The result was the an-
nihilation of 16 persons with more than
20 severely injured. This most recent
attack by the Bodos cannot be viewed
in isolation.
Continuity of Violence
Assam has been marked by severe
violence for decades. Violence in the state
has unfolded in a structured manner
since the days of the infamous Assam
movement. It is because of this egregious
movement, that multiple massacres have
taken place in Assam, separated by peri-
odic lulls. Drawing the reference of the
Assam movement, a violent Bodo move-
ment came forth in the 1980s. Driven
by a strong appetite for an exclusive
territory for the Bodos, the movement
has become known for perpetration of
horrific violence. The worst sufferers of
this violence have been the non-Bodos,
FEBRuary 11, 2017
primarily other Adivasis and Muslims,
two groups which have been considered
the softest of targets. On 10 February
2003, a memorandum of settlement (MoS)
was signed between the Assam govern-
ment, the central government and the
Bodo Liberation Tigers (a former Bodo
militant group), which resulted in the
formation of the Bodoland Territorial
Autonomous District (BTAD). The BTAD
was created under the Sixth Schedule
of the Constitution and was expected
to bring sustainable peace to western
Assam. But the violence continued and
time has proved the BTAD model to be
severely flawed. The model is highly
unrepresentative in an ethnically, cul-
turally, linguistically and religiously
plural region.
The BTAD comprises
the four districts of Kokrajhar, Baksa, Udal-
guri and Chirang, covering an area of 27,100
sq km (or 35% of Assams area). This was
awarded to the Bodo tribewhich, accor-
ding to the 2001 Census, had 1,296,000
members (or 5.3% of Assams population).
(Borooah 2013)
The BTAD is governed by a council com-
prising of a maximum of 46 members,
out of which 30 will be reserved for STs,
five for non-tribal communities, five
open for all communities and six to be
nominated by the Governor of Assam.
Fundamentally, that the autonomous
district, which has about 75% non-Bodo
population, is governed by the Bodos
consisting about only 25% of the total
population of the BTADportrays noth-
ing but the undemocratic and unrepre-
sentative structure of the council.
vol lIi no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

In the attack, the Bodo militants wore
kurtas and covered their faces seeming-
ly in an attack, to make them appear as
jihadis. Luckily enough, the plot was
foiled when one of the militants was
killed by the security forces and identi-
fied as a leader of the National Demo-
cratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit)
[NDFB(S)], a Bodo militant group. This
was a major plot to ignite a fresh com-
munal conflagration between Bodos and
Muslims, to initiate a new phase of ethnic
cleansing, similar to those carried out
against non-Bodos for decades. Assa-
mese digital media initially engaged in a
propaganda spree, spreading the fabri-
cated news that the attack was carried
out by the jihadis. Additionally, had the
plot been successful, this conflict would
have diverted the attention of the secu-
rity forces towards some presumed
jihadis rather than the Bodo militants.
The question remains, who is trying to
incite one more conflagration between
the Muslims and Bodos? Is it just the
NDFB(S) or are there more people associ-
ated with the conspiracy?
Techniques identical to these are
not new in the region. Most of the vic-
tims of the deadly violence of 2012 were
Muslims, where more than 150 people
were killed. Blatantly labelled as Bangla-
deshis, the Muslims were falsely accused
of infiltration into Bodo areas by the
Assamese media. As a result, the entire
discourse was intentionally shifted to
infiltration, while the brutal violence
continued for days and the real perpe-
trators were forgotten. The vernacular
media took the initiative to propagate
these fabricated stories and, in this
way, justified the violence in a shame-
less manner.
Habit of Impunity
The government has seldom prosecuted
the perpetrators of violence in Assam.
The Nellie massacre was the worst
mass killing in the history of Assam, in
which no less than 4,000 Muslims were
butchered to death on a single day on
18 February 1983. Not even a single culprit
of such a large-scale massacre has been
prosecuted. Ranjan Daimary, the main
convict of the bomb blast of Ganeshguri,
in which about a hundred people were
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
COMMENTARY
killed, is roaming free like a VIP under along with civil society, should be fo-
bail. Similarly, Hiren Gohain observes cused on bridging the deep fissures of
that hatred and mistrust between the Bodos
The BTAD is now being administered by the and the non-Bodo communities. People
Bodo Peoples Front (BPF), led largely by of Assam must protest against killings
former cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers and violence en masse, no matter who it
(BLT), a dreaded ruthless militant group that is perpetrated against. The Bodoland
once blazed its name with massacres and Territorial Council, which is truly un-
acts of extreme terror. (2008)
democraticin terms of the number of
These soft attitudes of the government communities represented within it
towards terrorists and mass-murderers must be substituted with a more repre-
have acted as a source of encouragement sentative structure. The non-Bodo com-
for some to commit such brutal crimes. munities should not be kept voiceless
Over the years, terrorism has become a anymore (as has been the case so far),
business for many in the BTAD region for that would only open up avenues for
of Assam. further bitterness in the region. Ram-
pant corruption in the BTAD must also be
Way Forward effectively countered by anti-corruption
The pressure of the security operations agencies. Though BTAD is ruled by the
against the NDFB(S) along the Indo Bodos, sharing of power with diverse
Bhutan border has forced the terrorists sections of the social group, too, is cru-
to come out of the jungles and mix in the cial for sustained peace.
villages and towns with the local people.
Security operations against the outfit References
began after the horrendous massacre of Borooah, Vani Kant (2013): The Killing Fields of
approximately 90 Adivasis on 23 De- Assam: Myth and Reality of Its Muslim Immi-
cember 2015. However, the security forc- gration, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48,
No 4, pp 4352, 26 January.
es should put more effort in identifying
Gohain, Hiren (2008): Once More on Ethnicity
these militants merged with the civilian and the North-east, Economic & Political
population. Additionally, the government, Weekly, Vol 43, No 21, pp 1821, 24 May.
Journal Rank of EPW
Economic and Political Weekly is indexed on Scopus, the largest abstract and citation
database of peer-reviewed literature, which is prepared by Elsevier N V (bit.ly/2dxMFOh).
Scopus has indexed research papers that have been published in EPW from 2008 onwards.
The Scopus database journal ranks country-wise and journal-wise. It provides three broad sets
of rankings: (i) Number of Citations, (ii) H-Index, and (iii) Scimago Journal and Country Rank.
Presented below are EPWs ranks in 2015 in India, Asia and globally, according to the total cites
(3 years) indicator.
Highest among 37 Indian social science journals and second highest among 187 social
science journals ranked in Asia.
Highest among 38 journals in the category, Economics, Econometrics, and Finance in the
Asia region, and 37th among 881 journals globally.
Highest among 23 journals in the category, Sociology and Political Science in the Asia
region, and 17th among 951 journals globally.
Between 2009 and 2015, EPWs citations in three categories (Economics, Econometrics,
and Finance; Political Science and International Relations; and Sociology and Political
Science) were always in the second quartile of all citations recorded globally in the Scopus
database.
For a summary of statistics on EPW on Scopus, including of the other journal rank indicators
please see (bit.ly/2dDDZmG).
EPW consults referees from a database of 200+ academicians in different fields of the social
sciences on papers that are published in the Special Article and Notes sections.
vol lIi no 6 23
The Creative Zeal of the Rays
Utsa Ray
I
n The Rays before Satyajit, Chandak
Sengoopta tries to situate the ances-
tors of Satyajit Ray in their historical
context. The book, in many senses, tries
to search for the historical roots of the
maestros modernity. However, it does
much more than simply trace the histori-
cal and familial origins of Rays genius.
In fact, Sengoopta is more interested in
narrating the story of Rays predecessors
and less in writing a biography of Ray in
this book. He picks up the case of the
Rays to narrate the bigger story of moder-
nity in India. So far, scholars who have
written about the history of the Ray fam-
ily have either tried to make a connec-
tion between the early Rays and Satyajit
Ray or have focused on the literary
contributions of writers like Upendra-
kishore Raychaudhuri and Sukumar
Ray. But Sengoopta argues that in order
to comprehend the negotiations that the
early Rays made with colonial modernity,
one needs to look at their contribution to
other fields such as art, social reform,
and last but not the least, nationalism.
Sengoopta states succinctly that he has
chosen to narrate the history of this par-
ticular family because this biography
can tell us about the character and am-
biguities of colonial modernity (p 9).
Sengoopta begins by tracing the gene-
alogy of the Rays, for which he turns to
Mymensingh, their native place. While
most of the middle-class men in Mymen-
singh chose to pursue government jobs,
the Rays traversed a different path alto-
gether. They did not just steer clear from
administrative jobs (except Pramada-
ranjan Ray), they also never showed any
interest in pursuing careers in law, engi-
neering, or medicine. While Sarada-
ranjan Ray, Upendrakishore Raychaud-
huris elder brother, always remained a
staunch Hindu, his brothers opted to
follow the Brahmo religion. Sengoopta
owes much of Upendrakishores interest
in conversion to his father-in-law,
24
book reviewS
The Rays before Satyajit: Creativity and
Modernity in Colonial India by Chandak Sengoopta,
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016; pp xi+418, `995.
Dwarakanath Ganguli. In fact, Sengoopta
further states that the story of the Ray
family is integrally connected to the
reformism of Dwarakanath Ganguli. It is
a well-known fact that Ganguli was a
steadfast advocate of womens education.
His passion for designing a proper cur-
riculum for women needs to be situated
in the larger context of female education.
At first, a few Bengali Hindu men
objected to female education on the
grounds that many of the early schools
had been started by missionaries. But
by the 1850s, Indian men themselves
started organising institutions for female
education. The middle-class advocated
female education, believing that education
would make women better mothers and
better wives and equip them better for
housework. Undoubtedly, Dwarakanath
Ganguli, like many of his contemporary
Hindu middle-class men, endorsed the
kind of education for women that would
include learning needlework and cook-
ing along with English and mathematics;
nevertheless, Sengoopta reminds us that
Ganguli championed womens education
so that they could earn an independent
livelihood (p 111). Kadambini Ganguli,
his wife, went on to become one of
the first Indian medical practitioners. In
his discussion of Dwarakanath Gangulis
championing of womens education, Sen-
goopta critiques scholars who have merely
looked at women as objects of male
reform. While Partha Chatterjee and
Dipesh Chakrabarty have made us aware
of the complexities that have emerged
because of the peculiar character of the
modernity found in India as a result
of colonialism, Sengoopta posits a dif-
ferent argument. His discourse is akin
FEBRuary 11, 2017
to arguments made by scholars like
Judith Walsh, who believe that the focus
on domesticity found in educational
reforms for women was tied to transna-
tional constructs of a global domesticity.
Modernity, as many scholars now argue,
has never been an ideal construct. Sen-
goopta belongs to that genre of histori-
ans who problematise any idealised
reading of European modernity.
When Upendrakishore Raychaudhuri
discovered how to split each half-tone
dot into four, which led to great impro-
vements in the quality of the printed im-
age (p 210), his role becomes that of an
innovator and not merely an imitator.
His innovations won recognition, albeit
on a small scale from the metropolitan
perspective. This recognition signified
universal acknowledgement for people
like Upendrakishore, which for them
was not touched by colonialism. In fact,
these universalist aspirations were linked
to the nationalistic tendencies of many
from Upendrakishores generation. Rec-
ognition won from institutions in the
West had the potential to add to the
nations pride. But this nationalism of
Upendrakishore and others like him was
also complex. He did not simply turn to
an idealised depiction of tradition. He
rather tried to remove the shortcomings
of those by studying European art. The
synthesis of what was good in Europe
with what was good in India was impor-
tant for him.
Chandak Sengooptas work is certain-
ly appreciative of the reformist zeal as
well as the entrepreneurial skills of the
Ray family. He tries to link their experi-
mentation and innovations to their na-
tionalist ardour, without simplifying the
connotations of nationalism. Sengoopta
tries to establish that derivative and
original or universal and national
were dialectically related and not nec-
essarily exclusive categories. It is also
very refreshing to read a work that prob-
lematises modernity itself rather than
swaying bet ween what is original and
what is derivative. Of course, Sengooptas
is not the sole voice in this endeavour
to problematise modernity. The story
of the Rays definitely complicates this
vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

story of modernity, but it often remains
unclear throughout the book. In fact,
some of the instances that Sengoopta pro-
vides endorse the notion of derivative
modernity. Suprabha Ray, Satyajit Rays
mother, who traversed the paths of tra-
dition without losing her moorings in
the modern universe is a case in point.
Nevertheless, the book is a refreshing
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
read, especially for those who do not
have access to vernacular sources on this
fascinating family. The greatest strength
of The Rays before Satyajit lies in its abil-
ity to appreciate the efforts made by the
Rays and their associates to negotiate
with colonialism and nationalism. Sen-
goopta brings out their limitations and
shortcomings in the book while never
vol liI no 6
BOOK REVIEW
losing sight of the creative zeal of the
Rays. The addition of a few images and a
bibliography would have enriched the
book, but then the author hardly has a
say in these matters.
Utsa Ray (utsaray@yahoo.co.in) is with the
Department of History, Jadavpur University,
Kolkata.
25

(En)Gender Inclusive Disaster
Management
Lessons from South Asia
Malini Nambiar
T
he differential roles of women,
men, girls and boys are powerful
forces in every culture, especially
in South Asia. These culturally con-
structed gender roles, and stereotypes
about what men and women can and
cannot do, or should and should not do
can contribute to different types and
levels of exposure and vulnerability to
natural hazard impacts. In addition,
disasters and the resulting post-disaster
response can often launch communities
into power dynamics and patterns of
hierarchy that favour the decisions of
men over women. Yet, the abilities and
capacities of women and men to miti-
gate disasters consistently are one of the
weakest areas of humanitarian respons-
es that need to be explored and incorpo-
rated into disaster reduction policies
and practices.
This weakness of not recognising gen-
der differences is taken seriously by the
anthology under review. It is a compila-
tion of 13 articles covering an array of
disasters in South Asia, over a seven-
year span. The book is the product of
collaboration between activists, field
workers and academicians to highlight
the factthrough the voices of South
Asian women, sexual minorities and
othersthat recovery and development
are gendered. It thereby attempts to for-
mulate better responses by adopting a
gendered perspective. The book not only
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
Women and Disasters in South Asia: Survival,
Security and Development edited by Linda Racioppi
and Swarna Rajagopalan, Routledge India, 2016;
pp 318, `1,050.
highlights lessons but also provides a
few tried-and-tested solutions for achiev-
ing equal participation of women in deci-
sion-making and presents approaches for
integrating a gender perspective into
disaster risk reduction strategies. It reit-
erates the fact that unless relief workers
and officials acknowledge womens vul-
nerable status and plan relief efforts ac-
cordingly, women and other vulnerable
groups will continue to be disproportion-
ately affected by natural disasters.
The editors introduction and con-
cluding chapters are concise and well-
researched on the impact disasters have
on people and the vulnerability of the
region. The first eight chapters cover the
impacts of many natural hazards across
South Asia (three anthologies have been
published earlier), all resonating missed
opportunities of gender inclusion in dis-
aster response, recovery and sustainable
development. It seeks to answer questions
on the extent and ways pre-disaster gender
relations affect the course of post-disaster
relief and reconstruction; the extent and
ways gender relations might be altered by
disaster and post-disaster reconstruction;
and the ways by which women can take
advantage of the post-crisis environment
vol liI no 6
BOOK REVIEW
to press for a changed understanding of
security, enhanced rights, public voice,
political participation and inclusive de-
velopment. Most importantly, the les-
sons drawn from the research findings
and on-the-ground practice are guide-
posts for future responses.
These chapters highlight mixed results
on how responses are framed as well as
how certain communities (particularly
economically weaker men and women,
lower caste and lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender (LGBT) persons) have
been ignored altogether. Despite claims
made by most institutions active in re-
covery after disasters and addressing
the special needs of women, these chap-
ters bring to light the field experiences
and testimonials from women that high-
light the gaps in the implementation of
best-practices in the context of gender
focused recovery and sustainable deve-
lopment. Very often the dynamic con-
cept of building back better invariably
returns communities back to the status
quo where women have been experienc-
ing insecurity.
The last four chapters focus on ap-
proaches for integrating gender perspec-
tives into disaster risk reduction strate-
gies by going beyond treating women as
victims and empowering them through
SouthSouth partnership and women-
for-women empowerment initiatives.
These articles point out that mere inclu-
sion of women without enhancement of
capabilities serves little purpose in the
metamorphosis from being marginal-
ised groups to stakeholders in main-
stream development.
Some Lacunae
The book offers engaging testimonies and
accounts of exclusion of women and other
groups for social scientists, researchers
25
 Must have resources on Economics &
Development studies
Interrogating the liberal economic policies and PRABHAT PATNAIKHis role in advocating progressive
` 995 their consequences reforms and ideas in the global economy
` 1,195

T
The book interrogates liberal This book brings together diverse
eeconomic policies and their scholarship on various aspects
cconsequences in various fields such of economic development that
aas inequalities in human development, underscore the importance of
ssocial tensions, marginalisation of tackling dominant and contemporary
aagriculture, language and culture issues concerning the national
iin the Indian caste-based society. and global economy, such as
Comprehensive in analysis, it looks
C economic growth, engaging with
aat political processes in India through globalisation, poverty and inequality,
tthe oligarchy of castes and examines macroeconomic issues, political
tthe structure of inequality that still economy and developmental
ppersists. aspects.
22017 412 pages HB 978-93-859-8511-9 2016 348 pages HB 978-93-515-0878-6

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Call for Papers

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Responsibility and Ethics Regional Economic Development Regulatory Economics Resource Management Risk and Security Management Six Sigma and Quality
Management Strategic Management Strategic Management Policy Stress Management Supply Change Management Sustainable Innovation and Technology Incubation
Systems Management Systems Thinking Taxes (related areas of taxes) Technological Change; Research and Development Technology & Innovation Time Management
Total Quality Management Tourism and Hospitality Management Transparency and Accountability Travel/Transportation/Tourism Welfare Economics
Full Paper Submissions: Deadline: October 30, 2017
Electronic Submissions should be sent in MS Word format to : icaeb2017@gmail.com; vijaykumarjha2017@gmail.com
All Accepted Papers will published in Scopus Index Journals, ABDC and JEL Index

International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research ISSN: 0972-7302 International Journal of Economic Research ISSN: 0972-9380
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26 FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and practitioners of disaster recovery
and development in South Asia.
However, it has its share of gaps that
need to be filled. The anthology is re-
stricted to pre-2010 disasters, about
which much has already been written
and analysed. First, the need now is to
assess the extent South Asia has imbibed
learnings from its past of missed oppor-
tunities and compare their responses to
more recent disasters such as Cyclone
Phailin in Odisha (2013), the Jhelum
floods impacting Pakistan and India
(2015), the Chennai floods, Tamil Nadu
(2015), and the Nepal earthquake (2015).
By not providing a comparative analysis
of disasters in similar locations leaves
the readers with the initial unanswered
questions on approaches and how deci-
sions are made during disaster recovery.
The present collection of essays loses a
lot of its potential due to the absence of a
comparative historical perspective on
gender inclusion in disaster recovery
and mitigation over the years. Hence,
there is no clear benchmark of where we
are now, where do we want to be and
what needs to be done in order to alter
the post-disaster and development process
so that it is more gender inclusive within
each country and South Asia as a whole.
Second, the anthology does not pro-
vide a fair sense of how disaster re-
sponse, recovery and reconstruction are
a challenge for governance. In post-
disaster scenarios, the governments are
pressurised to respond quickly and
effectively, and hence massive develop-
ment and reconstruction needs are com-
pressed in time and space. This also
brings with it the challenges of coordi-
nation and better collaboration among
various stakeholders, striking a balance
between speed, quality, consultative
process and quick decision-making in a
compressed time frame (Olshansky 2012).
In addition, there is also the challenge of
mobilising and managing the flow of
funds coupled with transparency and
accountability. The articles shed no light
on the institutional mechanisms to ad-
dress disaster recovery and reconstruc-
tion/development. The utilisation of op-
portunities presented by a disaster
greatly depends on a number of factors
related to governancesuch as quality
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
BOOK REVIEW
of leadership, planning and organisation of gender differences and/or women
for reconstruction, dedicated institu- exclusion to focus more on gender capabi-
tions for disaster recovery and mitiga- lities and the ways by which women
tion, and others. There are just two par- have altered post-disaster reconstruc-
agraphs at the conclusion of Chapter 5 tion to change mindsets and stereo-
on the success of Odishas response and types. This will not only convince poli-
recovery after Cyclone Phailin 2013. It cymakers and officials alike but would
warrants elaboration on what the state also inspire women by convincing them
institution did differently since the 1999 of their inherent capabilities.
super cyclone and about the nature of
the gender-related issues that were not Conclusions
given attention. The book brings together interdiscipli-
Lastly and most importantly, the point nary perspectives in gender studies. It
is well described by Mihir Bhatt: provides a good collection of references
women have not only special vulnerabilities
for students and researchers to build
but also capabilities. Their capacity to work upon. However, in the absence of any
with local researchers, cooperation and discussion on comparative works on dis-
their looking forward approach cannot be asters at specific locations, analysis of
undervalued. (p 76)
institutional mechanisms, and a focus
Reducing disaster risk is not new to women.
Women deal with disasters on a day-to-day
on gender capabilities rather than gender
basis; given a chance, they can take a lead; differences within debates on gender in-
given resources and position, women can make clusion for recovery and development,
disaster recovery and risk reduction an op- the present anthology falls short of
portunity to galvanize the community. (p 76)
answering some of the important ques-
Similarly, Prema Gopalan rightly tions it raises initially in the book.
states that
Malini Nambiar (malini.nambiar@yahoo.com)
policymakers and institutions are likely is an independent disaster management
to pay a huge cost if they continue to treat professional focusing on gender inclusion and
women as victims. They would miss the op- community-based disaster risk management.
portunity to build local capacities and fail
to create women leaders to ensure future References
development activities do not increase haz- Gangwar, Sneh (2013): Integrating Gender Issues
in Mitigation and Management of Disaster in
ards. (p 208)
India, International Journal of Environmental
Engineering and Management, Vol 4, No 6,
These are important and established ar- pp 61320.
guments that have figured in a lot of lit- Olshansky, R, L Hopkins and L Johnson (2012):
erature on disasters and women. We Disaster and Recovery: Processes Compressed
in Time, Natural Hazards Review, Vol 13, Issue
need to go beyond the usual repetition 3, August.
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vol liI no 6 27

Bajpai, Amita and Meenakshi Dwivedi (eds) (2017);
Learning Disability: Uncover the Myths, Delhi:
Kalpaz Publications; pp 269, `990.
Bhattacharya, Bhaswati (2017); Much Ado Over
Coffee: Indian Coffee House Then and Now, New
Delhi: Social Science Press; pp xxii + 411, `975.
Bibek Debroy (ed) (2017); India 2047: Voices of the
Young, New Delhi: Academic Foundation;
pp 162, `895.
Chopra, P N (2017); The Sardar of India: Biography
of Vallabhbhai Patel, New Delhi and Seattle,
USA: Konark Publishers; pp xix + 275, `695.
Habib, Irfan (2016); A Peoples History of India 14:
Economic History of India, Ad 1206-1526: The
Period of the Delhi Sultanate and the Vijayanagara
Empire, New Delhi: Tulika Books and Aligarh
Historians Society; pp x + 125, `280.
Haines, Daniel (2017); Indus Divided: India, Pakistan
and the River Basin Dispute, Gurgaon: Viking
and Penguin Random House; pp xi + 264, `599.
Hariharan, S V, P Abdul Kareem, Rameshwar
Tandon and Thomas Ziesemer (2017); Climate
Justice and Policy, Delhi: B R Publishing; pp x +
231, `1,500.
Hirway, Indira (ed) (2017); Mainstreaming Unpaid
Work: Time-use Data in Developing Policies;
New Delhi: Oxford University Press; pp xlii + 430,
`1,195.
Jeevanandam, S and Rekha Pande (2017); Devadasis
in South India: A Journey from Sacred to Profane
Spaces, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications; pp 322, `1,225.
Kannan, K P, Rajendra P Mamgain and Preet Rustagi
(eds) (2017); Labour and Development: Essays
in Honour of Professor T S Papola, New Delhi:
Academic Foundation; pp 722, `1,495.
Kapila, Uma (ed) (2017); Demonetisation: The Econo-
mists Speak, New Delhi: Academic Foundation;
pp 150, `595.
Kalra, Virinder S and Shalini Sharma (eds) (2016);
State of Subversion: Radical Politics in Punjab in
the 20th Century, Oxon: Routledge; pp viii + 264,
`995.
Kapur, Devesh and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds)
(2017); Navigating the Labyrinth: Perspectives
on Indias Higher Education, Hyderabad: Orient
BlackSwan; pp x + 273, price not indicated.
Kipgen, Nehginpao (2016); Myanmar: A Political
History, New Delhi: Oxford University Press;
pp xvi + 230, `745.
Kishore, Usha and Jaydeep Sarangi (eds) (2017);
Home Thoughts: Poetry of the British Indian
Diaspora, Allahabad: Cyberwit.net; pp 123,
`200/US$14.99.
Kumar, Megha (2017); Communalism and Sexual
Violence: Ahmedabad since 1969, New Delhi:
Tulika Books; pp xi + 255, `775.
Kumar, Nilotpal (2017); Unraveling Farmer Suicides
in India: Egoism and Masculinity in Peasant Life,
New Delhi: Oxford University Press; pp xv + 309,
`995.
Kumar, Pramod and Dipanwita Chakraborty (2016);
MGNREGA: Employment, Wages and Migration
in Rural India, Oxon and New York: Routledge;
pp xxi + 274, `895.
Mander, Harsh (2016); Fatal Accidents of Birth: Stories
of Suffering, Oppression and Resistance, New
Delhi: Speaking Tiger; pp ix + 203, `499.
Merton, Thomas (ed) (2016); Gandhi on Non-Vio-
lence: Selected Texts from Mohandas K Gandhis
28
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Non-Violence in Peace and War, New Delhi:
Speaking Tiger; pp 152, `399.
Mathur, Om Prakash (2016); Cities and the New Eco-
nomic Vibrancy: Evidence from Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh & Odisha, New Delhi: Institute of Social
Sciences; pp xxiii + 171, `795/US$24.50.
Misra, Alok (2017); Responsible Finance India Report
2016: Client First: Tracking Social Performance
Practices, New Delhi, California, London,
Singapore: Sage Publications and New Delhi
ACCESS Development; pp xviii + 145, `995.
Mukharji, Projit Bihari (2016); Doctoring Traditions:
Ayurveda, Small Technologies, and Braided
Sciences, Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press; pp xi + 374, $45/31.50.
Mukherjee, Sujata (2017); Gender, Medicine and
Society in Colonial India: Womens Health Care
in Nineteenth-and Early Twentieth-Century
Bengal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press;
pp xxxv + 224, `895.
Nayyar, Deepak and Rana Hasan (eds) (2017);
Shaping Indias Future: Essays in Memory of
Abid Hussain, New Delhi: Academic Foundation;
pp 245, `995.
Novetzke, Christian Lee (2016); The Quotidian
Revolution: Vernacularization, Religion, and
the Premodern Public Sphere in India, New York:
Columbia University Press; pp xxiv + 402,
price not indicated.
Pettigrew, William A and Mahesh Gopalan (eds)
(2017); The East India Company, 16001857:
Essays on AngloIndian Connection, Oxon and
New York: Routledge; pp xii + 236, `850.
Pramod Kumar and S Mohanakumar (eds) (2016);
Indian Agriculture: Performance, Growth and
Challenges, Oxon and New York: Routledge;
pp xxii + 380, `995.
Puri, Hardeep Singh (2016); Perilous Interventions:
The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos,
Noida: HarperCollins India; pp xvi + 264,
`599.
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vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
Understanding Ambedkar from
the Cauvery Valley
Shivasundar
Indian democracy today lacks
trustworthy leadership and
an inclusive politics capable
of producing an atmosphere
conducive to the resolution
of disputes, especially water
disputes. Even so, there are
some important lessons from
B R Ambedkar for the
Cauvery dispute.
Shivasundar (shivasundar35@gmail.com) is
a freelance journalist and activist based in
Bengaluru.
Economic & Political Weekly
E
very distress year in the Cauvery
basin demonstrates the trust defi-
cit and democratic deficit in the
federal polity of India, intertwined with
the anxiety and turmoil of farmers in
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Independ-
ent India has faced and resolved several
major interstate river water disputes. A
solution to the age-old Cauvery dispute,
however, has remained elusive, its reso-
lution demanding the utmost democrat-
ic maturity from both, civil societies and
governments of the two states.
The aggregate demand of the states
far exceeds the overall flow in the Cauvery
River. The aggregate demand of all the
states amounts to 1,260 tmcft (thousand
million cubic feet), whereas the overall
availability of water in the Cauvery, at
50% dependability, is hardly 740 tmcft
(Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 2007).
The crisis is intensified by the absence of
livelihood alternatives other than agri-
culture, with yields directly dependent
on the supply of adequate water from the
river. The problem is compounded by
declining state support for agriculture.
The Cauvery water disputeor for that
matter any interstate water disputeis
essentially a question of the democratic
redistribution of diminishing resources.
It demands not only techno-legal but
also politico-economic solutions.
Access to water, use of water and shar-
ing of water are not just routine matters
of human activity in a country like India.
They are politico-social acts that perpet-
uate caste, class and regional injustice
and deprivation on a daily basis. Hence a
techno-legal tinkering will not suffice.
An all-out restructuring of socio-eco-
nomic structures is required to achieve
an equitable water democracy in India.
B R Ambedkar is arguably the only
leader in the freedom struggle who fully
comprehended the complexities of water
EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
issues in India. Ambedkar was himself a
victim of the inhuman caste system,
which denied him and his community
access to water. The Mahad Satyagraha
of 1927 was a great civil rights struggle
led by Ambedkar to democratise public
water sources. Ambedkar strongly advo-
cated the breaking of caste and class
barriers, along with geographical barri-
ers, to access and use of water (Central
Water Commission 2016). In his multi-
faceted roles as economist, educationist,
agitator, advocate, historian, anthropo-
logist and architect of the Indian Consti-
tution, and as a proponent of state
socialism, he strove to conceive of pro-
cesses and mechanisms that would
result in democratic sharing based on
the principles of social justice. Economic
and social democracy is the prerequisite
for political democracy in India, he said
(Dreze 2005). Many aspects of what
could be termed water democracy can
be traced to the contours of economic
and social democracy enunciated by
Ambedkar.
Ambedkar has elaborated on the
problems of redistribution in a country
like India in many of his great works
Annihilation of Caste, States and Minori-
ties, The Problem of the Rupee, and Small
Holdings in India and Their Remedies
as well as lectures and memorandums.
He dealt most directly with the use and
sharing of river water in many of his
addresses as a member of the Viceroys
Executive Council in charge of labour,
irrigation and power during 194246
and later as a member of the Constituent
Assembly that framed the Constitution.
Ambedkars thoughts and struggles
for access to water are well known. In this
article, I present his ideas on the use and
sharing of river water, though of course
his thoughts on these issues overlap with
his analysis of agrarian problems in gen-
eral and the socialist economy and polity
that he visualised as solutions.
Water as Wealth
As early as 1918, Ambedkar declared
that the Indian village is overly dependent
on agriculture. As a student, Ambedkar
challenged dominant scholarship on the
29
PERSPECTIVES
subject and declared prophetically that
neither the consolidation of landholdings
nor distribution of land would solve the
agrarian crisis. The perpetual fragmen-
tation of land and overdependence of
village population on it lowers produc-
tivity, he argued, leaving no surplus for
productive investment, and keeping
Indian agriculture in a vicious cycle of
fragmented holdings and low productiv-
ity. Ambedkar diagnosed agricultural
distress as a result of non-optimal use of
the factors of production. The vicious
cycle of Indian agriculture, he argued,
could only be broken through industri-
alisation. Industrialisation was expected
to absorb rural labour and produce a
surplus that could be ploughed back into
capital-starved agriculture (Ambedkar
2014a). At the same time, he strongly
refuted the approach of the then provinces
and princely states, which considered
surplus river waters an evil for fear of
floods. He considered water a major
national asset in an agrarian country
and advocated that every drop be used.
Most importantly, Ambedkar argued for
a socialistic economic and political restr-
ucturing of the village, with nationalisa-
tion of land and abolition of landowner-
ship by both, hegemonic landlords and
small farmers. He advocated that the
state should parcel out land to culti-
vators collectives and undertake the
responsibility of supplying the requisite
inputs, including technology, to be cost-
deducted from the agricultural produce
(Ambedkar 2014a).
Ambedkars thoughts and ideas on
water issues are to be located in this
vision of state socialism. However, we
should not forget that Ambedkar had to
implement his vision in a world of class,
caste and regional cleavages.
During his tenure as a member of the
Viceroys Executive Council, Ambedkar
wrote and spoke on the need to consider
multipurpose uses of river waters. This
was the period of post-war reconstruc-
tion and Ambedkar was a member of the
Reconstruction Committee. Ambedkar
pointed out that reconstruction had a
different meaning in England, ravaged
by war, and in India, where it meant new
construction (Central Water Commission
2016). Optimal use of river waters to
30
develop the capacities of people and the
nation was an important part of nation-
building. However, the Government of
India Act, 1935 had placed irrigation
completely under the provinces, with
virtually no role for the central govern-
ment. Ambedkar raised serious objec-
tions to this localised perspective of
water management. He argued for a
national perspective led by the central
government (Ambedkar 2014b).
During those years, India had been
suffering huge damages due to recurring
floods. Thus, flood control dominated
policy on river waters. It was Ambedkar
who placed the multipurpose use of river
waters on the agenda, stating that in an
agrarian country like India every drop of
water is an asset and should be used for
the overall development of the poorest.
In one of his speeches to the Orissa
government and central government
functionaries over the Mahanadi project
in 1945, Ambedkar declared:
It is wrong to think water in excessive quan-
tity is an evil. Water can never be so exces-
sive as to be an evil. Man suffers more from
lack of water than from excess of it. The
trouble is that nature is not only niggardly in
the amount of water it gives, it is also erratic
in its distribution, alternating between
drought and storm. But this cannot alter
the fact that water is wealth. Water being
the wealth of the people and its distribution
being uncertain, the correct approach is not
to complain against nature but to conserve
water. If conservation of water is manda-
tory from the point of view of public good,
then obviously the plan of embankments is
a wrong plan. It is a means which does not
subserve the end, namely conservation of
water, and must, therefore, be abandoned.
(2014b: 304)
For Ambedkar, river water was not
only a source of irrigation, but also of
power and navigation. He wondered why
rivers were not being considered for
navigation purposes, despite being much
cheaper than other modes. Ambedkar
also critiqued the central governments
lack of enthusiasm in exploring the
hydel power potential of rivers to
augment cheap power supply for rapid
industrialisation and development (2014b:
305306).
Ambedkars thoughts on the use of
river waters are contained in five speeches
he gave between 1943 and 1946. The
multipurpose model of the Tennessee
FEBRuary 11, 2017
Valley Corporation in the United States,
realised under the leadership of then
President Franklin D Roosevelt, con-
vinced him that dams along rivers could
harness water for multiple uses and
simultaneously control floods.
In sum, Ambedkar believed that:
(i) river water is a great national asset
and the fear of floods should not deter
governments from making the best use of
it; (ii) multipurpose river valley projects
should be planned for irrigation, power
generation and navigation; (iii) these
projects should be built around the prin-
cipal objective of aiding the develop-
ment of the most dispossessed, and pro-
viding water and cheap power; (iv) there
should be a regional, rather than local,
approach to the use of river waters since
the whole basin constitutes a single
hydrological entity; (v) a river valley
authority should be constituted for this
purpose; and (vi) the central govern-
ment should constitute technical and
expert teams to help the provinces with
these projects (Central Water Commis-
sion 2016).
Ambedkar was successful in consti-
tuting the Central Waterways Irrigation
and Navigation Commission (CWINC),
which took the responsibility of assisting
provinces and states in irrigation and
other river water ventures. This evolved
into the present-day Central Water Com-
mission (CWC) and Central Electricity
Authority (CEA).
Interstate Sharing of River Waters
As discussed above, Ambedkar remained
firmly against federalism in interstate
river water sharing, arguing for a domi-
nant central government, and a regional
rather than local approach. While irriga-
tion was totally under the provinces and
states, with hardly any powers of inter-
vention to the centre, the Government of
India Act, 1935 and the earlier Govern-
ment of India Act of 1919, did provide for
the mediation of the office of the gover-
nor general in water-sharing disputes.
The central government, however, could
not take any initiative for river valley
projects on its own (NCRWC 2000).
As a member of the Viceroys Executive
Council, Ambedkar initiated dialogues
between the governments of Bengal and
vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Bihar over sharing of the Damodar River,
convincing them to partner on the
Damodar Valley Project that has brought
the people of these states the benefits of
five dams and five thermal and hydel
power projects constructed over the
river. Likewise, Ambedkar successfully
convinced the Orissa government to
undertake the Hirakud Project and the
United Provinces to undertake the Sone
River Project. It is to his credit that he
could convince the provincial govern-
ments even in the absence of any consti-
tutional mechanism.
Trustworthy leadership, visible mutual
benefits from the projects, and a cooper-
ative atmosphere were important ingre-
dients in the success of these projects,
ingredients that are conspicuously
absent in negotiations on river water
sharing today.
Despite these successes at the state
level, Ambedkar wanted the national
government to take the lead in water
projects. Therefore, he argued for the
constitution of a river valley authority
through the mediation of the central
government, depriving states of the
ability to manipulate parochial interests.
In a memorandum for the Sone River
Valley Project, Ambedkar argued that
the proposed Sone River Valley Authority,
must be given by provinces and the states
full authority over the waters of the Sone
and its tributaries and should agree that
such authority should have the sole right of
generating electricity in the area covered by
the authority. (Central Water Commission
2016: 161)
He feared that the elite would subjugate
the freedom of the people in the name of
federalism. The potential for such subju-
gation lurked in the excessive conces-
sions given to princely states through
instruments of accession. This scepticism
about the nature of the federal polity in
India is expressed in many of Ambed-
kars works, including Federation ver-
sus Freedom. In his appeal to the First
Round Table Conference, 1930, he voiced
another fear about the dangers of feder-
alism for the depressed classes: As
members of a minority, we look to the
central government to act as a powerful
curb on the provincial majority to save
the minorities from the misrule of the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
majority (Ambedkar 1931). Ambedkar
thought the interests of the common
citizen were safer in the hands of the
central government than the state or
provincial governments, which he regar-
ded as nothing but the brute power of
the majority.
This sentiment is also reflected in the
Constituent Assembly debates. In the
end, even the Constitution made India a
union of states with the flexibility to
become both unitary and federal, depend-
ing upon the situation. As far as the use
and sharing of river waters is concerned,
the provisions of the Government of
India Act, 1935 regarding the distribution
of powers over water to the states and
union government were continued in
the Constitution of independent India.
The legislative framework of the Con-
stitution on water is based on Entry 17 of
the State List which places water supply,
irrigation and canals completely under
the jurisdiction of state governments,
though Entry 56 of the Constitution
places regulation and development of
interstate river valleys under the Central
List. Apart from this, Article 262 of the
Constitution empowers the central gov-
ernment to design legal mechanisms to
adjudicate interstate water disputes and
bars the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in these matters. Following Article
262, the Interstate River Water Disputes
Act, 1956 was also enacted, which reiter-
ates the bar on the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over water disputes
(NCRWC 2000).
This bar on the Supreme Courts juris-
diction is a continuation of provisions in
the Government of India Acts of 1919 and
1935. There does not seem to be a com-
prehensive debate on why the bar on
jurisdiction is restricted to water disputes
when Article 136 extends the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
all judgments, orders and decrees of all
the authorities, tribunals and courts in
the country.
However, in spite of Article 262, and
the passing of the Interstate River Water
Disputes Act, 1956, one or other aspect
of the verdicts of water tribunals has been
challenged in the Supreme Court. For
example, resettlement in the Narmada
Tribunal order, some aspects of previous
vol liI no 6
PERSPECTIVES
accords between Punjab and Haryana
over Ravi waters, or inadequate release
of Cauvery water in the Cauvery dispute.
However, it is also a fact that no order
of a water tribunal has been questioned
in its entirety in the Supreme Court to
date. Therefore, the recent judgment by
the three-judge bench of the Supreme
Court over the unanimous submissions
of the states of Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu affirming the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over the Cauvery Tribu-
nal orders, passed on 9 December 2016,
has serious constitutional implications
with far-reaching effects.
Ambedkars opinion on this, as docu-
mented in the Constituent Assembly
debates, is confined to the emphasis on a
permanent body of adjudication to be
created by an act of Parliament. On 9 Sep-
tember 1949, Ambedkar moved an ame-
ndment for the creation of an adjudicating
body by an act of Parliament. Ambedkar
justified the amendment by stating that
disputes regarding water were earlier
considered rare enough to warrant a
special machinery appointed to resolve
each case. This needed to be reconsidered
because the creation of river boards and
corporations under the Interstate River
Board Act would mean takeover of prop-
erty that belonged to the respective
states in the river basin, and the many
disputes that might arise would warrant
a permanent mechanism of resolution
(Constituent Assembly 1949).
Though the idea of the interstate river
valley authority as envisaged by Ambed-
kar was incorporated in the Constitution
through Entry 56, empowering the central
government to constitute river boards to
regulate and develop interstate river
authorities, not a single river board has
been set up to date. This is despite the
fact that the boards were only recom-
mendatory in nature and had no execu-
tive authority as visualised by Ambed-
kar (Chokkakula 2012).
Lessons for Resolution of
Cauvery Dispute
In sum, at the core of Ambedkars per-
spective on interstate river water disputes
is the need for a regional approach in-
stead of a localised one. This is possible
only when the give-and-take involved is
31
PERSPECTIVES
reasonable and the mediating authority
commands the respect and confidence of
the contending parties. Ambedkar was
successful in negotiating the Damodar
Valley Project between Bengal and Bihar
and the Mahanadi or Sone River Valley
Projects because he could deliver on all
these fronts.
Today, Indian democracy suffers from
a lack of trustworthy leadership and an
inclusive politics capable of producing
an atmosphere conducive to the resolution
of disputes, especially water disputes.
Even so, there are some important lessons
from Ambedkar for the Cauvery dispute.
First, at the core of Ambedkars strategy
in resolving water disputes is the evolu-
tion of a regional rather than localised
approach, which enables the state to
address the anxieties of farmers and
others. The state can provide immediate
alternatives and adequate compensation
when required. If the risk factors are taken
care of by the state, emotional politics
can make way for mutual negotiation
and understanding and a regional
approach could be forged.
Thus, the first step towards resolution
of the Cauvery dispute is to demand that
the state completely bear the burden of
risk, at least during distress years, as
described in Ambedkars States and
Minorities. Some progressive groups and
farmers organisations in Karnatakas
Cauvery belt are trying to mobilise
popular opinion around this step.
Second, another impediment in the
evolution of a regional approach in the
Cauvery dispute is Tamil Nadus reluc-
tance to acknowledge colonial discrimi-
nation in fixing the share of river waters,
and Karnatakas refusal to acknowledge
the equal rights of Tamil Nadu over the
Cauvery.
This stalemate can be broken only by
adhering to the Ambedkarite policy of
positive discrimination to overcome his-
torical injustice, or by complete nation-
alisation of land in the Cauvery valley
(so that there will only be Cauvery farm-
ers, and no Karnataka or Tamil Nadu
farmers). Affirmative action to mitigate
historical injustice in sharing of river
waters cannot be enforced by law alone.
It requires reciprocal accommodation,
which is possible only by political
32
dialogue in the democratic spirit. No sin-
gle leader or political party in either
state has the vision or ability to carry
this through today.
Some enlightened civil society groups
from both states have taken combined
initiatives in this direction in the name
of the Cauvery Family. They have had an
impact on the political atmosphere of both
states and helped in creating a spirit of
mutual understanding. This process, un-
fortunately, has come to a halt after the
declaration of the final verdict of the
Cauvery Tribunal in 2007.
Another important and effective step
could be to make the informal initiative
of the Cauvery Family a political move-
ment by initiating more dialogue
bet ween farmers of both states. Of
course, due caution should be taken
that old and new hegemonic forces in
civil society do not manipulate or hijack
the process (Maramkal 2016). Such ini-
tiatives assume greater importance
because, in the seven decades since in-
dependence, competitive politics based
on political manipulation of parochial
and local sentiments have dominated
the political scene. This is also because
of the economic and political empower-
ment of regional elites. Thus, in a sense,
the federal polity of India has marginal-
ised the interests of the depressed class-
es as foreseen by Ambedkar.
In addition, no national government is
in a position to ensure a proportionate
and balanced bargain after the advent of
the neo-liberal economy, the trademark
of which is a withdrawal of the state and
the promotion of private corporate inter-
ests at the cost of public interest. Thus,
the total departure from the Ambedkarite
vision of a socialist order is also pushing
the problem of river water sharing to
a dead end. A serious re-adherence to
Ambedkars vision of a water democracy
and a corresponding course correction
are therefore imperative to save river
valleys and the people dependent
on them.
It is pertinent to quote two important
recommendations made on 17 October
2016 by the Central Water Commissions
Expert Committee on River Cauvery,
headed by G S Jha, constituted by the
Supreme Court to look into the plight of
FEBRuary 11, 2017
farmers in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and
the actual position of water in the river:
...4 Both the States of Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu need to appreciate interest of Tamil
Nadu and Pondicherry in protection of their
established irrigation and Karnatakas as-
piration for development respectively and
should educate their people accordingly...
...8 Participatory Irrigation Management is
to be encouraged for optimal, efficient and
equitable distribution of water amongst the
farmers. (Expert Committee on River Cau-
very 2016)
These recommendations reiterate the
Ambedkarite perspective of resolving
water disputes. They also indicate the
only way out of this growing crisis.
Gaps and Questions
Ambedkars water democracy is difficult
to realise in a democracy bereft of socio-
economic equality. This is why we need
a shift towards politico-economic solutions
from purely techno-legal perspectives.
Having said this, there are some prob-
lem areas in Ambedkars thoughts on
the sharing and pattern of use of river
waters. Five areas need detailed exami-
nation:
(i) Assumptions regarding the repre-
sentative nature of national govern-
ments: For Ambedkar, the provincial
government represents the brute rule of
the majority over the minority. He con-
sidered the national governmentthe
then colonial state and the union gov-
ernment lateras the saviour in all
issues including water. Even in the Con-
stituent Assembly debates, Ambedkar
placed maximum emphasis on the
national government and the unitary
nature of governance. After seven dec-
ades of independence, we have seen that
the national government has become in-
corrigibly unrepresentative of minority
interests and less sovereign in its nature.
Thus, there is an over-reliance on the
national government in Ambedkarite
thought.
(ii) Corporate state and Brahminical
civil society: Ambedkar did not place
much faith in civil society which, acc-
ording to him, was hierarchical, hegem-
onic and Brahminical in nature. There-
fore, most of his solutions to problems,
vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

including the sharing of river waters,
relied on the state. He tried hard to
make the state less majoritarian and
more inclined towards social justice by
fighting for the adequate representation
of minorities in the executive and legis-
lature, and for adequate safeguards and
remedies in the interests of the depressed
classes. This has been only partially suc-
cessful, and the state in the last seven
decades has proved to be an unashamedly
corporate state that legitimises loot to
the extent of allowing corporate control
of entire rivers. The excessive reliance
on the state needs to be re-examined.
(iii) Peoples movements as a counter
to a hegemonic civil society: Despite
its Brahminical nature, there has been a
democratisation of civil society through
the emergence and articulation of the
oppressed sections. Though the corporate
state, hegemonic forces in civil society,
and corporate-capitalist forces are trying
to coerce and co-opt such non-hegemonic
civil society forces, they still exist and
thrive. Ambedkars failure to recognise
the transformative potential of such
agencies needs to be debated.
(iv) Big dams, big problems: The latter
half of the 20th century has seen a dif-
ferent set of problems and consequently,
a different set of solutions. History has
produced enough evidence of the solu-
tions of the past creating new problems
in the present. One such problematic
solution is the concept of big dams for
food production, irrigation and rapid
industrialisation. History has proved
that this mode of development leads to
not only ecological disaster but also dif-
ferential economic and political gains in
societies that are biased towards upper
classes and castes. Socialist theories
Fabian and Marxist includeddid not
anticipate the exploitative nature of the
technologies and processes of production.
Ambedkars solutions to water issues,
especially irrigation, were products of
their times, and suffer similar inadequa-
cies. Still, the universality of Ambedka-
rite thought about water democracy and
the use of every drop of water in the ser-
vice of the people need to be underlined
even in present times. The world is now
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
PERSPECTIVES
facing a severe scarcity of water, as well and particular, addressing the time-
as the disastrous ecological, social and bound and space-bound problems of the
economic impacts of big dams and other era. It is only by continuing the universal
unsustainable processes of development. aspects and discarding aspects that are
The optimal use of water, change in time- and space-specific, that we keep
agrarian practices and reorganisation of thoughts from becoming dogma.
agriculture on a cooperative basis, plac- What we need today is a socialism of
ing the needs of the people before those the 21st century, not a replication of
of markets, and the rejuvenation of water Marxism, Fabian socialism or Ambedka-
bodies are some immediate corrective rite thoughts in their entirety. To realise
measures that need to be taken. the goal of social justice and equality, we
Ambedkars propositions on the use of need a leap in our thinking, simultane-
river waters need to be re-examined in ously assimilating the universalities of
this light. earlier visions, discarding the specificities
of irrelevant ones, and developing new
(v) Regional discrimination is also visions to suit the new space and time.
social discrimination: One of the main
impediments in the resolution of the References
Cauvery dispute is the reluctance to Ambedkar, B R (1931): Ambedkar at the Round
Table Conferences, http://ambedkar.org/am-
recognise colonial discrimination in allot- bcd/15A.%20Dr.%20Ambedkar%20at%20
ting quotas. Such historical discrimina- the%20Round%20Table%20Conferences.htm.
tion needs to be redressed through com- (2014a): Writings and Speeches, Vol 1, Dr Ambed-
kar Foundation.
pensatory mechanisms, without which (2014b): Writings and Speeches, Vol 10, Dr Amb-
regional disparities can become mecha- edkar Foundation.
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (2007): The Report
nisms of social discrimination. Ambed- of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal: Vol IV,
kars focus, however, appears to be http://wrmin.nic.in/writereaddata/Inter-S-
tateWaterDisputes/VolIV4010027822.pdf.
exclusively on the consolidation of the
Central Water Commission (2016): Ambedkars
power of the elites in the name of feder- Contribution to Water Resources Development.
alism. The last seven decades of devel- Chokkakula, Srinivas (2012): Disputes, (de)Politi-
cisation and Democracy: Interstate Water Dis-
opment have proved, however, that the putes in India, Centre for Economic and Social
backwardness of the regions is also a Studies, Working Paper No 108.
Constituent Assembly of India (1949): Vol IX: Pro-
function of regional discrimination. ceedings of 9 September, http://parliamentof-
None of these observations contradict india.nic.in/ls/debates/vol9p30c.htm.
Dreze, Jean (2005): Dr Ambedkar and the Future
the fundamental contributions made by of Indian Democracy, Indian Journal of Hu-
Ambedkar to the development of a man Rights, JanuaryDecember.
democratic understanding of access to Expert Committee on River Cauvery (2016): Con-
stituted by the Supreme Court.
water, and the use and sharing of river Maramkal, M B (2016): Cauvery Water Row: When a
water in India. Rather, they supplement Breakthrough was within Reach of Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu, 12 September, http://scroll.
them by arguing for the innovative app- in/article/816254/cauvery-water-row-when-a-
lication of Ambedkarite thought to the new breakthrough-was-within-reach-of-karnataka-
and-tamil-nadu.
and complex conditions of the present. National Commission to Review the Working of the
Every vision, thought or ideology has Constitution (NCRWC) (2000): A Background
Paper on Article 262 and Interstate Disputes
its roots in a particular time and space. Relating to Water, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncr-
The solutions they offer are both universal wc/finalreport/v2b3-6.htm.
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vol liI no 6 33
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Indebtedness among Farmers and
Agricultural Labourers in Rural Punjab
Gian Singh, Anupama, Gurinder Kaur, Rupinder Kaur, Sukhvir Kaur
The paper examines various hitherto unexplored
aspects of indebtedness among farmers and agricultural
labour households in rural Punjab. It analyses the extent
and distribution of indebtedness among farmers and
agricultural labourers, their sources of debt and the per
household debt incurred for various purposes. The
paper also compares and contrasts variations in the rate
of interest paid by different categories of farmers and
agricultural labourers.
This research paper is based on a field survey conducted for the research
project Indebtedness among Farmers and Agricultural Labourers in
Rural Punjab, sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science
Research, New Delhi.
The authors thank the anonymous referee for important comments and
suggestions.
Gian Singh (giansingh88@yahoo.com), Anupama (anupamauppal@yahoo.
com) and Rupinder Kaur (rupinderkaur0076@gmail.com) teach economics
at Punjabi University, Patiala; Gurinder Kaur (gurinder2005@yahoo.co.in)
and Sukhvir Kaur (drsukhvir.sk@gmail.com) teach economics at
Dashmesh Khalsa College, Zirakpur.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
I
n India, the rapid productivity gains of the green revolution
increased producers incomes, raised labourers wages and
lowered the price of food. In addition, new livelihood opp-
ortunities were generated when success in agriculture provid-
ed the basis for economic diversification (Thompson 2004).
However, despite decades of investment in new agricultural
technology and rural development, poverty and indebtedness
continue to plague rural areas.
The state of Punjab was at the forefront of adopting new
agricultural technology, which resulted in a large increase in
the use of capital inputs to realise the benefits of this technology
(Kaur and Singh 2010). Since most of the inputs used by farmers
are now purchased from the market, the farmers have to spend
huge amounts of cash on purchasing market-supplied farm
inputs to carry out their production operations (Kaur 2011).
Rising costs along with stagnant technology and a near freeze
in the minimum support price of wheat and paddy, which
turned the already adverse terms of trade from bad to worse,
reduced returns on foodgrain production (Sajjad and Chauhan
2012). The tremendous changes in technology and mode of
farming have led to increasing costs and declining farm
income, and the farmers are facing difficulties in meeting both
farm and domestic expenditure (Sharma et al 2015).
The demand for human labour in the farm sector has been
decreasing since the late 1980s. There has been a sharp decline
in the number of marginal and small holdings in the state. On
the other hand, due to the unfavourable nature and structure
of the industrial sector in the state, the small and marginal
farmers released by the agricultural sector were not being
absorbed outside agriculture (Singh and Toor 2005). Sustained
agricultural growth up to 1990 reduced rural poverty in the state.
Since then, a slowdown in agricultural growth has become a
major cause for concern. Stagnant technology, rising input pric-
es, weakening of the support system, and declining profitability
have made cultivation a highly risky and unremunerative
enterprise (GOI 2007). The decline in production, increase in
the cost of production, and insufficient increase in minimum
support prices have made the agricultural activity unremuner-
ative. As a result, indebtedness in agriculture has increased
(Mahajan 2015).
The rural borrowers have been depending upon institutional
sources for production/investment credit requirements. But
for consumption credit needs, these people are forced to go to
non-institutional sources for which they have to pay a very
high rate of interest. The rural financial services have mostly
51
SPECIAL ARTICLE
been controlled by rich farmers, who are able to use their large
endowment base and influence within the local power structure
to secure loans at very advantageous terms (Sharma 2009).
The marginal, small, semi-medium farmers, and agricultural
labourers have almost been excluded from these financial
services because they are not considered creditworthy. The
informal sources cater to the social and consumption require-
ments for credit to a great extent in rural areas (Amandeep and
Sidhu 2012). Despite the tremendous expansion of banking
network and the growth of institutional credit for agriculture,
the severity of agricultural indebtedness persists (Sidhu and
Rampal 2016).
Indebtedness per se need not lead to economic impoverish-
ment but happens when repayment is difficult and the house-
hold resorts to sale of assets. Similarly, a fall in economic posi-
tion can also lead to a greater reliance on credit and thereby
increase the debt burden (Mishra 2007). Most of the studies on
prevalence of indebtedness in agricultural sector of Punjab
mainly deal with the farmers, but none have touched the
severity of the same among the agricultural labour households
who are economically more vulnerable, as they do not own
any productive assets. Hence, the present study will add to the
existing literature on rural indebtedness. In the case of farmers
as well, an attempt has been made here to elaborate the internal
dynamics of rural indebtedness.
Though there are studies which have discussed indebtedness
according to the farm size (for example, Shergill 2010; Singh et
al 2014), none of them have analysed it according to the size of
owned as well as operational holdings. Though Shergill (2010)
has included the variable of owned holding, he has taken it as
a farm unit which gives equal weight to every farm size. Due to
this flaw, the results show that indebtedness per farm unit
increases with the increase in farm size. Whereas in the present
study, by including the variable of debt per owned acre (rather
than per owned farm unit), we try to show that it falls with the
increase in farm size. Thus, in this study, an attempt has been
made to show that the burden of debt is higher for farmers
with smaller holdings (owned as well as operated) than those
with larger holdings.
This study has been mainly inspired by the landmark study
of Darling (1925); an attempt has been made to revisit all the
important findings of this study in the context of the present
scenario. As compared to other recent studies on the same
problem, this study also reveals greater severity of debt
among the agricultural households of rural Punjab. Another
important point of departure is regarding the tendency of
leasing in land. The existing studies mainly show that a loan
is taken for the purchase of new land only, while the reality is
that small and marginal farmers have to take a loan some-
times even to pay the rent on leased in land. Actually, these
farmers lease in land to make their farm size viable for culti-
vation, but sometimes the adverse agricultural conditions
push them to take loans even to pay the rent on these leased
in holdings.
Thus, the present paper is an attempt to examine various
hitherto unexplored aspects of indebtedness among farmers
52
and agricultural labour households in rural areas of Punjab.
More specifically, the present paper concentrates on the foll-
owing objectives: to analyse the extent and distribution of
indebtedness among farmers and agricultural labourers; to
examine the various sources of debt; to analyse per household
debt incurred for various purposes; and to compare and contrast
the variations in rate of interest paid by the different categories
of farmers and agricultural labourers.
Methodology
For the purpose of the present study, data have been collected
from the three districts of Punjab representing three different
regionsthe South-west, the Central Plains, and the Shivalik
foothills. The South-west region comprises Bathinda, Mansa,
Ferozepur, Fazilka, Faridkot, Muktsar, and Moga districts. The
Central Plains region constitutes Patiala, Fatehgarh Sahib,
Sangrur, Amritsar, Kapurthala, Jalandhar, Nawanshahr, Tarn
Taran, and Ludhiana districts. The Shivalik Foothills region
comprises Hoshiarpur, Pathankot, Gurdaspur, and Ropar dis-
tricts. Keeping in view the differences in agroclimatic conditions
and to avoid the geographical contiguity of sampled districts,
it was deemed fit to select one district from each region on a ran-
dom basis. Mansa district from the South-west region, Ludhi-
ana district from the Central Plains region, and Hoshiarpur
district from the Shivalik Foothills region have been selected
for the purpose of the present study.
On the basis of random sample method, one village from
each development block of the selected districts has been
chosen. There are 27 development blocks in the selected three
districts. Thus, in all, 27 villages have been selected from the
three districts under study. A representative proportional
sample of households comprising marginal farmers, small
farmers, medium farmers, large farmers, and agricultural
labourers have been surveyed. Out of these 27 villages, 1,007
farm households and 301 agricultural labour households have
been selected from the three districts for the purpose of our
survey. Out of a total of 1,308 households, 240 farm
households and 111 agricultural labour households are from
Mansa district; 481 farm households and 139 agricultural
labour households from Ludhiana district; and 286 farm
households and 51 agricultural labour households are from
Hoshiarpur district.
A household is considered to be a farm household only if
more than 50% of its income comes from farm business opera-
tions. Here, it must be noticed that farmers are not a homogene-
ous group. For the purpose of comparison, we have classified
them in different categories. We have defined the large farm-
ers as those who own more than 15 acres of land, as the land
ceiling limit in Punjab is 17.5 acres, and the medium farmers
have been defined as those who own more than 10 acres and
up to 15 acres. Out of the 1,007 selected farm households, 408
belong to the category of marginal farmers (owning land up
to 2.5 acres), 273 to small farmers (owning more than 2.5
acres and up to 5 acres), 192 to semi-medium farmers (owning
more than 5 acres and up to 10 acres), 88 to medium farmers
(owning more than 10 acres and up to 15 acres) and 46 to
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

large farmers (owning land more than 15 acres). The present increases as farm size goes up. This reveals that the needs of
study relates to the agricultural year 201415. farmers are increasing as farm size increases because without
investing in operational as well as fixed costs, the major share
Extent of Debt of income cannot be generated. The average amount of debt
The extent of debt among different farm-size categories in the per indebted agricultural labour household in rural Punjab is
three districts under study is shown in Table 1. This table depicts `68,329.88, while the average amount of debt per sampled
that 85.9% of the farming households in the state of Punjab are agricultural labour household is `54,709.30.
under debt. There are certain variations across the different
farm-size categories. As many as 89.06% of the semi-medium Per Acre Indebtedness
farm households are under debt, while in the case of marginal, The amount of debt per operated acre and per owned acre is
small, medium, and large farm-size categories these percentag- given in Table 2. This table reveals that for an average farming
es are 83.33, 88.64, 84.09 and 82.61, respectively. Slightly more household the amount of debt per owned acre and per operated
than 80% of the agricultural labour households are under debt. acre is `1,16,801.97 and `71,203.60, respectively. The category-
The average amount of debt per indebted farm household in wise amount of debt per owned acre decreases as the farm size
rural Punjab is `5,52,064.16, while the average amount of debt goes up. The amount of debt per operated acre is the highest
per sampled farming household is `4,74,215.99. The amount of among the marginal farm-size category, followed by the small,
loan per indebted household and per sampled household semi-medium, large, and medium farm-size categories. This
Table 1: Extent of Debt among Farmers and Agricultural Labourers has an important implication that the burden of debt is greater
Category-wise on the lower farm-size categories as compared to the upper
Farm-size Categories No of Households Indebted Average Amount of Debt (`)
Sampled Indebted Households Per Sampled Per Indebted farm-size categories. Some of the reasons identified for indebted-
as Percentage Household Household ness among marginal and small farmers are lower income due
of Sampled
Households to low productivity levels, increased cost of production, rising
Marginal farmers 408 340 83.33 2,30,699.75 2,76,839.70 cost of living, inadequate institutional credit, unproductive
Small farmers 273 242 88.64 4,94,051.29 5,57,338.85 expenditure on social ceremonies, intoxicants, etc (Singh 2010).
Semi-medium farmers 192 171 89.06 6,09,765.63 6,84,649.12 The upper farm-size categories partly finance their crop pro-
Medium farmers 88 74 84.09 7,86,761.36 9,35,608.10 duction operations from their own savings.
Large farmers 46 38 82.61 13,52,695.65 16,37,473.68
All sampled farmers 1,007 865 85.90 4,74,215.99 5,52,064.16 Debt Incurred from Different Credit Agencies
Agricultural labourers 301 241 80.07 54,709.30 68,329.88
The role of various credit agencies in the study area has been
Source: Field Survey, 201415.
analysed, and the information is presented in Table 3. This
Table 2: Amount of Debt per AcreCategory-wise (Mean values in `) table shows that an average farming household in rural
Farm-Size Categories Debt per Owned Acre Debt per Operated Acre
Punjab has taken `1,17,279.05 from non-institutional agen-
Marginal farmers 1,40,670.58 65,169.42
cies, and `3,56,936.94 from institutional agencies. The aver-
Small farmers 1,20,794.93 55,573.82
age debt per agricultural labour household from non-institu-
Semi-medium farmers 81,847.74 52,839.31
Medium farmers 63,244.48 45,398.81
tional agencies is `50,217.61 and from institutional agencies it
Large farmers 57,512.57 50,211.41 is only `4,491.69. The marginal farmers are under a total debt
All sampled farmers 1,16,801.97 71,203.60 of `2,30,699.75, out of which `91,019.61 has been taken from
Source: Field Survey, 201415. non-institutional agencies and the remaining `1,39,680.14 from
institutional agencies. The small
Table 3: Debt Incurred from Different Credit AgenciesCategory-wise (Mean values in `) farmers are indebted to the extent
Sl Source of Debt Marginal Small Farmers Semi-medium Medium Large Farmers All Sampled Agricultural
No Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Labourers of `1,46,754.58 to non-institutional
A Institutional agencies and `3,47,296.7 to institu-
1 Primary agricultural tional agencies, whereas the corre-
cooperative societies/
cooperative banks 32,628.68 85,805.87 1,15,078.13 1,22,750 1,20,413.04 74,650.94 1,823.92
sponding figures are `1,34,375 and
2 Commercial banks 1,02,517.16 2,53,798.53 3,48,697.92 5,10,375.00 10,36,956.52 2,68,795.43 2,667.77 `4,75,390.63 respectively for the
3 Land development banks 2,696.08 4,029.30 7,447.92 0.00 60,978.26 6,390.27 0.00 semi-medium farmers. The medi-
4 Regional rural banks 1,838.22 3,663.00 4,166.67 39,772.73 23,913.04 7,100.30 0.00 um farm-size category has taken
Subtotal 1,39,680.14 3,47,296.70 4,75,390.63 6,72,897.73 12,42,260.87 3,56,936.94 4,491.69 `1,13,863.63 from non-institu-
B Non-institutional tional agencies and `6,72,897.73
5 Commission agents 48,117.65 96,172.16 95,130.21 67,727.27 57,065.22 72,231.38 0.00
from institutional agencies. The
6 Moneylenders 21,575.98 29,432.24 31,536.46 34,090.91 45,217.39 27,778.55 1,574.75
large farm-size category obtained
7 Traders and shopkeepers 2,700.98 2,798.53 1,875.00 113.64 8,152.17 2,592.85 5,152.82
`1,10,434.78 from non-institutional
8 Large farmers 3,894.61 3,553.12 2,604.17 5,681.82 0.00 3,534.26 37,096.35
9 Relatives and friends 14,730.39 14,798.53 3,229.17 6,250.00 0.00 11,142.01 6,393.69
agencies and `12,42,260.87 from
Subtotal 91,019.61 1,46,754.58 1,34,375.00 1,13,863.63 1,10,434.78 1,17,279.05 50,217.61 institutional agencies. The margi-
Total 2,30,699.75 4,94,051.28 6,09,765.63 7,86,761.36 13,52,695.65 4,74,215.99 54,709.30 nal, small, semi-medium, medium,
Source: Field Survey, 201415. and large farm-size categories
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 53
SPECIAL ARTICLE

have incurred the highest amount of debt from commercial this proportionate share is the highest for the marginal farm-size
banks. But the agricultural labour households owed the highest category, followed by the small, semi-medium, medium, large
amount of debt to large farmers. The reason behind the greater farm-size categories. The agricultural labour households have
reliance of agricultural labour households upon non-institu- incurred about 3% of the total debt from moneylenders.
tional agencies is that they lack adequate collateral which is The share of large farmers is 0.75% for an average farming
essential for raising loans from institutional agencies. household. The agricultural labour households owed about
68% of the total debt to large farmers. Slightly less than 2.40%
Pattern of Debt Incurred from Different Credit Agencies of the total debt has been raised from relatives and friends by
The proportionate shares of different credit agencies in the an average farming household. This proportion is 11.69 and
total debt are given in Table 4. This table depicts that an 6.39 respectively for the agricultural labour and marginal
average farming household has incurred 75.27% of the total farm-size category household.
debt from institutional agencies. This proportion increases As far as the source of the debt is concerned, the marginal
with the increase in farm size. The remaining 24.73% of the and small farm-size categories follow a similar pattern. For these
total debt has been incurred from non-institutional agencies. categories, the major sources of debt are commercial banks,
This proportional share is inversely associated with farm size. commission agents, cooperative societies, moneylenders, and rel-
About 57% of the total debt is incurred from commercial atives and friends. For the semi-medium and medium farm-
banks by an average farming household. This proportional size categories, the major sources of debt are commercial banks,
share is positively related with farm size. All categories of commission agents, cooperative societies, and moneylenders.
farmers owed the highest debt to this source. These figures The remaining two categories follow a different pattern. For
confirm the findings of Sekhon and Saini (2008) that com- the large farm-size category, the major sources of debt are
mercial banks now play a major role in agricultural produc- commercial banks, cooperative societies, and land develop-
tion and economic development of rural areas by supplying ment banks. In the case of agricultural labour households, the
credit facilities to farmers. The agricultural labour house- major sources of debt are large farmers, relatives and friends,
holds have hardly incurred 5% of the total debt from this and traders and shopkeepers. The above findings clearly bring
particular source. out the fact that even after nearly seven decades of independ-
The primary agricultural cooperative societies/cooperative ence, the marginal, small, medium farmers, and agricultural
banks are the second important source of debt for an average labourers in Punjab are still in the clutches of non-institutional
farming household, contributing 15.74% to the total debt. This agencies, particularly commission agents and large farmers.
proportion is the highest for semi-medium farmers, followed
by the small, marginal, medium, and large farm-size categories. Debt Incurred for Different Purposes
The agricultural labour households have incurred only 3.33% The purpose for which a loan is raised is an important indica-
of the total debt from this source. tion of its potential to be repaid. The amount of debt incurred
The commission agents are the third important source of for different purposes is provided in Table 5 (p 55). The table
debt from which an average farming household has incurred shows that the purchase of farm inputs and machinery is the
15.23% of the total debt. This proportion is inversely related major purpose for which debt has been incurred by farmers. An
to the farm size. average farming household incurs `3,32,064.05 for this pur-
At the fourth rank were the moneylenders to whom an pose, and this amount increases as the farm size goes up. This
average farming household owed 5.86% of the total debt, and is due to the adoption of new agricultural technology which is
a costly affair and is known as inputs package.
Table 4: Debt Incurred from Different Credit AgenciesCategory-wise (Percentage of total debt) An average farming household owes `32,852.04
Sl Source of Debt Marginal Small Semi-Medium Medium Large All Sampled Agricultural
No Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Labourers for domestic needs, `32,467.73 for house con-
A Institutional struction, addition of rooms and major repairs,
1 Primary agricultural and `21,305.86 for marriages and other socio-
cooperative societies/
cooperative banks 14.14 17.37 18.87 15.60 8.90 15.74 3.33 religious ceremonies. In the case of marginal,
2 Commercial banks 44.44 51.37 57.19 64.87 76.66 56.68 4.88 small, and semimedium farm-size catego-
3 Land development banks 1.17 0.82 1.22 0.00 4.51 1.35 0.00 ries, loans are raised for the purchase of farm
4 Regional rural banks 0.80 0.74 0.68 5.06 1.77 1.50 0.00 input and machinery, house construction, ad-
Subtotal 60.55 70.30 77.96 85.53 91.84 75.27 8.21 dition of rooms and major repairs, domestic
B Non-institutional needs, renting land, and marriages and other
5 Commission agents 20.86 19.46 15.60 8.61 4.22 15.23 0.00
social and religious ceremonies.
6 Moneylenders 9.35 5.95 5.17 4.33 3.34 5.86 2.88
For the medium and large farm-size cate-
7 Traders and shopkeepers 1.17 0.57 0.31 0.01 0.60 0.54 9.41
8 Large farmers 1.69 0.72 0.43 0.72 0.00 0.75 67.81
gories, the reasons for incurring debt are
9 Relatives and friends 6.39 3.00 0.53 0.79 0.00 2.35 11.69 purchase of farm inputs, machinery and
Subtotal 39.45 29.70 22.04 14.47 8.16 24.73 91.79 implements, house construction, addition of
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 rooms and major repairs, education, and pur-
Source: Based on Table 3. chase of land. In the case of agricultural
54 FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Table 5: Debt Incurred for Different PurposesCategory-wise (Mean values in `) This proportion decreases as the
Sl Purpose Marginal Small Semi-medium Medium Large All Sampled Agricultural farm size increases.
No Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Labourers
1 Farm inputs and machinery 1,41,991.42 3,25,263.74 4,49,687.50 5,88,011.36 10,77,695.65 3,32,064.05 265.78
The agricultural labour house-
2 Rent of land 12,083.33 32,161.17 14,583.33 7,386.36 0.00 17,040.71 0.00 holds have incurred the highest
3 Marriages and other social proportion of debt for domestic
and religious ceremonies 10,600.49 14,102.56 53,229.17 31,363.64 6,521.74 21,305.86 17,853.82 needs, that is 36.09%, followed by
4 House construction, addition the marginal, small, semi-medium,
of rooms and major repairs 14,522.06 47,435.90 32,916.67 46,590.91 73,913.04 32,467.73 4,734.22
medium, and large farm size cate-
5 Domestic needs 33,230.39 39,098.90 24,843.75 28,181.82 34,782.61 32,852.04 19,745.85
gories. The field survey has re-
6 Healthcare 7,291.67 6,593.41 14,322.92 5,681.82 0.00 7,969.22 10,083.06
7 Livestock 2,720.59 3,754.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,120.16 465.12
vealed the fact that the annual
8 Education 3,921.57 19,780.22 13,020.83 36,363.64 96,739.13 17,030.78 863.79 consumption expenditure of the
9 Purchase of land 0.00 0.00 3,776.04 43,181.82 32,608.70 5,983.12 697.67 marginal, small, medium farm and
10 Repayment of debt 3,602.94 5,860.81 3,385.42 0.00 0.00 3,694.14 0.00 agricultural labour households
11 Small business 735.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 30,434.78 1,688.18 0.00 exceeds their annual income. This
Total 2,30,699.75 4,94,051.28 6,09,765.63 7,86,761.36 13,52,695.65 4,74,215.99 54,709.30 finding confirms the findings of
Source: Field Survey, 201415. the study by Singh (2010), which
Table 6: Debt Incurred for Different PurposesCategory-wise (Percentage of total debt) shows that in Punjab, the annual
Sl Purpose Marginal Small Semi-medium Medium Large All Sampled Agricultural income of the marginal and small
No Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Labourers
farmers falls short of their total
1 Farm inputs and machinery 61.55 65.84 73.75 74.74 79.67 70.02 0.49
2 Rent of land 5.24 6.51 2.39 0.94 0.00 3.59 0.00
expenditure by 41.4% and 35.5%,
3 Marriages and other social and respectively. They frequently re-
religious ceremonies 4.59 2.85 8.73 3.99 0.48 4.49 32.63 sort to borrowing mainly for con-
4 House construction, addition of sumption purposes. The field sur-
rooms, and major repairs 6.29 9.60 5.40 5.92 5.46 6.85 8.65
vey also revealed another disturb-
5 Domestic needs 14.40 7.91 4.07 3.58 2.57 6.93 36.09
ing fact that very often the small
6 Healthcare 3.16 1.33 2.35 0.72 0.00 1.68 18.43
and marginal farmers sell a part
7 Livestock 1.18 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.85
8 Education 1.70 4.00 2.14 4.62 7.15 3.59 1.58
of their already small landholding
9 Purchase of land 0.00 0.00 0.62 5.49 2.41 1.26 1.28 to raise funds for consumption
10 Repayment of debt 1.56 1.19 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 needs of the family.
11 Small business 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.25 0.36 0.00 About 7% of the total debt has
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 been incurred for house construc-
Source: Based on Table 5. tion, addition of rooms, and major
labour households, the maximum amount of debt has been repairs by an average farming household. This share is 9.60%
incurred for domestic needs, marriages and other socio-reli- and 8.65% for the small farm-size category and agricultural la-
gious ceremonies, and healthcare. The amount of debt owed bour households, respectively. An average farming household
for these purposes is `19,745.85, `17,853.82 and `10,083.06 owed 4.49% of the total debt for marriages and other social
respectively. Thus loans used for non-income generating and religious ceremonies. This proportional share is about
activities do not generate any income for their repayment, 33% for the agricultural labour households, followed by the
and hence the loans go on accumulating and are passed from semi-medium, marginal, medium, small, and large farm-size
generation to generation (Kaur 2016). categories. The field survey has revealed the fact that debt for
marriages and other social and religious obligations, house
Pattern of Debt Incurred for Different Purposes construction, addition of rooms, and major repairs was quite
The proportional share of debt spread on different purposes is significant and widespread. Thus to maintain their social status
presented in Table 6. This table indicates that an average farm- and keep up with basic cultural practices and norms, these
ing household owes the highest proportion of total debt for the sections incur some expenditure which is beyond their means
purchase of farm inputs and machinery. As much as 70.02% of and results in their indebtedness.
the total debt has been incurred for this purpose. This propor- About 4% of the total debt has been incurred for education
tion is 79.67%, 74.74%, 73.75%, 65.84%, and 61.55% for the by an average farming household. The large, medium, and small
large, medium, semi-medium, small, and marginal farm-size farm-size categories give greater importance to education, and
categories respectively. These figures are somewhat different out of their total debt, the proportion of debt incurred for edu-
from the findings of Kaur et al (2016) in which the major cation stands at 7.15%, 4.62% and 3.95%, respectively. As much
proportion of debt is taken for this purpose, but the respective as 3.59% of the total debt of an average farming household is
proportions of debt for the same among all farm size categories also incurred for payment of land rent. This proportional share
are much lower than those found by the present study (this is the highest for the small farm-size category, followed by the
study has given the same proportions as 71.85%, 56.99%, marginal, semi-medium, and medium farm-size categories. The
48.58% and 38.1%). About 7% debt is owed for domestic needs. operational size of holding is uneconomic for these categories
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 55
SPECIAL ARTICLE

of farmers so they lease-in land from large farmers. About 2% categories owed the highest amount of total debt in this range
of the total debt is incurred for healthcare by an average of rate of interest. About 14% of the total debt of farmers has
farming household. This proportion is as high as 18.43% for been incurred at the rate of interest ranging between 15% to
the agricultural labour households and 3.16% for the marginal 21%. This proportion decreases as farm size increases except
farm-size category. An average farming household has in- for the medium farm-size category. This proportion is 20.41%
curred very little share of the total debt for purchase of land, for the agricultural labour households.
repayment of debt, and small business, that is 1.26%, 0.78% Table 8: Pattern of Debt According to Rate of InterestCategory-wise
and 0.36% respectively. (Percentage of total debt)
The above analysis clearly indicates that the marginal, Sl Categories Rate of Interest (%)
No 0 1 to 7 8 to 14 15 to 21 22 to 28 Above 29 Total
small and semi-medium farmers, and agricultural labourers 1 Marginal farmers 4.45 44.01 18.21 19.55 13.04 0.74 100.00
owe debt mainly for domestic expenditure and marriages and 2 Small farmers 0.38 35.63 36.02 18.87 8.73 0.37 100.00
other social and religious ceremonies. On the other hand, the 3 Semi-medium
medium and large farmers largely incur debt for the purchase farmers 0.19 41.24 39.21 8.35 11.01 0.00 100.00
of farm inputs and machinery, education, and purchase of 4 Medium farmers 0.79 33.10 50.55 12.87 2.69 0.00 100.00
land. This result is in clear contrast to the study conducted by 5 Large farmers 0.00 22.16 66.78 4.65 6.40 0.00 100.00
6 All sampled farmers 1.12 36.54 39.42 13.71 8.96 0.25 100.00
Singh et al (2014), which states that in percentage terms the
7 Agricultural labourers 11.16 7.28 5.18 20.41 52.11 3.86 100.00
large farmers spend the lowest share on farm inputs and
Source: Based on Table 7.
machinery and the highest on marriages and social and
religious ceremonies. About 9% of the total debt has been incurred at the rate of
interest ranging between 22% to 28% by an average farming
Debt According to the Rate of Interest household. The agricultural labour households incurred the
The mean values of debt according to the rate of interest are maximum proportion of total debt (52.11%) in this range of
given in Table 7. The table depicts that an average farming rate of interest. A very small proportion (0.25%) of the total
household owed the maximum amount of total debt at the rate debt is incurred at the rate of interest ranging from 29% and
of interest ranging between 8% to 14% per annum, followed by above by an average farming household. The agricultural
the ranges 1% to 7%, 15% to 21% and 22% to 28% per annum. labour households have incurred 3.86% of the total debt at this
The marginal, small, medium, and large farmers have incurred rate of interest.
the maximum amount of total debt at the rate of interest ranging The foregoing analysis brings out the fact that the margin-
between 8% to 14%. The marginal and semi-medium farmers al, small, medium, and large farm households have incurred
have incurred the maximum amount of total debt at the rate of the maximum amount of debt at relatively lower rates of
interest ranging between 1% to 7%. The agricultural labour interest, but the agricultural labour households have incurred
households owed the maximum amount of total debt at the rate the maximum amount of total debt at higher rates of interest.
of interest ranging between 22% to 28%. This is because this poor These households are still mainly dependent upon the non-
section of the farming community is not able to get loans from institutional sources, which charge exorbitant rates of interest.
the institutional sources due to the lack of adequate collateral. This result of the present study is in line with the findings of
another study by Kaur et al (2016),
Table 7: Outstanding Debt According to Rate of InterestCategory-wise (Mean values in `)
Sl Categories Rate of Interest (%) which shows that the agricultural
No 0 1 to 7 8 to 14 15 to 21 22 to 28 Above 29 Total labour households have no other choice
1 Marginal farmers 10,276.96 1,01,530.64 42,009.80 45,112.75 30,078.43 1,691.18 2,30,699.75 than to avail loans from the non-insti-
2 Small farmers 1,868.13 1,76,014.65 1,77,967.03 93,234.43 43,135.53 1,831.50 4,94,051.28 tutional sources because the loans by
3 Semi-medium farmers 520.83 2,51,718.75 2,39,348.96 50,989.58 67,187.50 0.00 6,09,765.63
institutional agencies are advanced to
4 Medium farmers 6,250.00 2,60,397.73 3,97,727.27 1,01,250.00 21,136.36 0.00 7,86,761.36
only those who can offer some collat-
5 Large farmers 0.00 2,99,760.87 9,03,369.57 62,934.78 86,630.43 0.00 13,52,695.65
eral in shape of some land or other as-
6 All sampled farmers 5,315.79 1,73,297.42 1,86,926.51 64,999.01 42,495.53 1,181.73 4,74,215.99
sets. The field survey has revealed the
7 Agricultural labourers 6,107.97 3,983.39 2,833.89 11,167.77 28,506.64 2,109.63 54,709.30
Source: Field Survey, 201415.
fact that commission agents, the most
important among the non-institutional
Pattern of Debt According to the Rate of Interest sources, because of legal and political implications now
The relative shares of debt incurred in different ranges of rate advance fewer loans to farmers.
of interest are given in Table 8. This table shows that on an
average 39.42% of the total debt has been incurred at the rate Conclusions and Policy Implications
of interest ranging between 8% to 14% by farmers. This pro- The above analysis shows that more than four-fifths of the
portion is the highest for large farm-size category, followed by farming and agricultural labour households in rural areas of
the medium, semi-medium, small farmers, and agricultural Punjab are under debt. The amount of debt per indebted
labour households. A substantial proportion of the total debt of household and per sampled household increases as the farm size
an average farming household (36.54%) is in the range of 1% goes up. The average amount of debt per indebted agricultural
to 7% per annum. The marginal and semi-medium farm size labour household is `68,329.88, while the average amount of
56 FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

loan per indebted farming household is `5,52,064.16. For an
average farming household, the amount of debt per owned
acre and per operated acre is `1,16,801.97 and `71,203.60,
respectively. The category-wise amount of loan per owned acre
decreases as farm size goes up. The analysis further shows that
institutional agencies are the most important source of loans
in the case of farm households. This may be attributed to some
extent to the awareness about institutional facilities, easy availa-
bility of loans, and greater accessibility to banks in rural areas.
In the case of agricultural labour households, major sources
of debt are large farmers, relatives and friends, and traders
and shopkeepers. These facts clearly bring out that even after
nearly seven decades of independence, the agricultural
labourers in the rural areas of Punjab are still in the clutches of
non-institutional agencies, particularly large farmers and traders
and shopkeepers which charge exorbitant rates of interest.
The majority of farmers and agricultural labourers are una-
ble to meet their consumption expenditure with their income.
This expenditureincome gap compels these farmers to use
some proportion of debt to meet their daily requirements. This
gap compels the agricultural labourers to use a major propor-
tion of debt to maintain their minimum level of consumption.
In spite of the fact that the institutional agencies are the most
important source of agricultural credit, it appears that the
burden of indebtedness among farm and agricultural labour
households is likely to continue in the coming years on account
of their low income and outstanding loans. Indebtedness will
continue to grow in the case of farm and agricultural labour
households if their income remains static and no efforts are
made to improve their economic conditions.
To overcome the problem of indebtedness, effective meas-
ures should be taken to increase the income of the farm and
agricultural labour households. It is extremely necessary to
revisit land reforms in favour of the marginal and small farmers,
as it would result in increasing their farm size and as a result
will be helpful in increasing their farm business income. The
agricultural labourers, an important section of the farming
community that has been ignored for ages, must be equally
considered while revisiting the land reforms. Emphasis should
be laid on the establishment of agro-based industries owned by
the producers cooperatives in the rural areas on a priority basis.
It will produce gainful employment opportunities at the village
level and benefits of value addition would go to the producers.
Cooperative societies should be promoted so that these socie-
ties can help in marketing of agricultural products, providing
finance to farmers, and making machinery available on rent.
The enforcement of the already existing special programmes
for rural development should be framed in proper perspective.
Increase in the plan allocation and enlarging the scope of rural
specific schemes to cover a larger proportion of population can
go a long way in improving the economic conditions of the
farm and agricultural labour households in the state.

References
Amandeep and R S Sidhu (2012): DemandSupply
Gap of Institutional Credit in Punjab, Journal
of Agricultural Development and Policy, Vol 22,
No 1, pp 7580.
Darling, Malcolm L (1925): Punjab Peasant in Pros-
perity and Debt, London: Oxford University
Press.
GoI (2007): Report of the Expert Group on Agricul-
tural Indebtedness, Ministry of Finance, New
Delhi: Government of India.
Kaur, P, G Singh and S Singh (2016): Magnitude and
Determinants of Indebtedness among Farmers
in Rural Punjab, Indian Journal of Economics
and Development, Vol 12, No 1a, pp 24151.
Kaur, R and G Singh (2010): Extent and Determi-
nants of Indebtedness among Farmers in Rural
Punjab, Journal of Government and Politics
Studies, Vol 35, No 2, pp 6479.
Kaur, R (2011): Indebtedness among Farmers, Patiala:
Twenty First Century Publications.
Kaur, P J (2016): Extent of Rural Indebtedness with
Special Reference to Punjab, Indian Journal of
Economics and Development, Vol 12, No 1a,
pp 31116.
Mahajan, R K (2015): Dwindling Agricultural Per-
formance and Lifeless Rural Economy in India,
Agriculture Performance and Rural Develop-
ment in India, Gian Singh (ed), Patiala: Publica-
tion Bureau, Punjabi University, pp 2036.
Mishra, S (2007): Risks, Farmers Suicides and
Sajjad, H and C Chauhan (2012): Agrarian Distress Punjab 19972008, Chandigarh: Institute for
and Indebtedness in Rural India: Emerging Development and Communication.
Perspectives and Challenges Ahead, Journal Sidhu, J and V K Rampal (2016): Causes and Con-
of Geography and Regional Planning, Vol 5, sequences of Indebtedness: A Brief Review,
No 15, pp 397408, http://www.academic- Indian Journal of Economics and Development,
journals.org/JGRP. Vol 12, No 1a, pp 20912.
Sekhon, A and S K Saini (2008): Awareness of Singh, N (2010): Rural Health Care and Indebted-
Farmers Regarding Agricultural Credit Facili- ness in Punjab, Economic & Political Weekly,
ties Provided by the Land Bank of Ludhiana, Vol 45, No 11, pp 2225.
Indian Journal of Social Research, Vol 49, No 2, Singh, S and M S Toor (2005): Agrarian Crisis with
pp 15254. Special Reference to Indebtedness among
Sharma, N (2009): Nature and Extent of Household Punjab Farmers, Indian Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol 60, No 3, pp 33546.
Saving and Indebtedness among Weaker
Sections in Rural Areas of Haryana, Political Singh, Sukhpal, Shruti Bhogal and Randeep Singh
Economy Journal of India, Vol 18, No 2, pp 5964. (2014): Magnitude and Determinants of Inde-
Sharma, V K, H S Kingra, S Bhogal, and S Singh btedness among Farmers in Punjab, Indian
(2015): Sustainable Agriculture Development Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 69, No 2,
and Pattern of Domestic Consumption Expend- pp 24356.
iture of Punjab Farmers, Indian Journal of Eco- Thompson, A (2004): Agriculture, Growth and
nomics and Development, Vol 11, No 1, pp 43947. Poverty Reduction, Department for Interna-
Shergill, H S (2010): Growth of Farm Debt in tional Development (DFID) Working Paper 1.
Sameeksha Trust Books
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 57
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Mothers-in-Law and Son Preference in India
Marie-Claire Robitaille, Ishita Chatterjee
Mothers-in-law are often portrayed as the most
powerful entity in the household in Indian popular
culture and media. In most literature too, the influence
of Indian mothers-in-law is often taken for granted.
However, most of the empirical evidence relies on
qualitative data or on small samples. Looking at stated
son preference and using the third National Family and
Health Survey data set, the authors show that
mothers-in-law do indeed have an influence on their
daughters-in-law. Given the stronger son preference
among mothers-in-law, this contributes to the high
imbalance in the male to female sex ratio observed
among children in India.
Marie-Claire Robitaille (Marie-Claire.Robitaille-Blanchet@nottingham.
edu.cn) teaches at the School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Ningbo China, Ningbo. Ishita Chatterjee (Ishita.Chatterjee@uwa.edu.au)
is with the Department of Economics, University of Western Australia,
Perth.
42
My first child is a girl. My mother-in-law said that is okay, she said at
least it is good that I can have babies. But when my second child was
also a girl, she did not want to hold her after the birth. She yelled at
me that I should have had this test to know if I had a boy or girl. This
is why I am getting the test now for my third child. (Puri et al 2011)
1 Introduction
I
n India, sons are often preferred over daughters for various
socio-economic reasons. With the advent of new medical
technologies it has become even easier to selectively abort
unwanted foetuses when compared to sex-selective infanti-
cide.1 Son preference has thus become a serious issue, with an
estimated annual half a million female foetuses selectively
aborted (Jha et al 2006), thereby causing significant gender
imbalance. In this article we argue that one reason behind this
practice is the influence of the mother-in-law.
With trade liberalisation in the early 1990s, job opportunities
have opened up for women in India and the younger generation
has been influenced by Western values. Those important social
changes are reflected in the media. For example, in the 1970s
and 1980s, films would depict women entering the workforce
mostly under dire straits and being a wife or mother was
perceived to be the most important role for a woman. However,
in the last few decades, films depict women as choosing
professional careers. Thus, with more modern attitudes about
gender roles, the younger generation of mothers is not expected
to have as strong a preference for sons as older generations of
mothers did, which is supported by data on stated son prefer-
ence. This, however, has not translated into more balanced sex
ratios among children less than six years old, which have
worsened since the last four decades.
Indian mothers-in-law are generally considered powerful
figures in the household (Gangoli and Rew 2011). Also, they
generally have a stronger son preference since they come
from an older generation. We postulate that they use their in-
fluence to interfere in the decision to engineer the sex ratio
among their grandchildren, either through pressure or via so-
cialisation (out of respect and affection). While we cannot
distinguish between those two mechanisms, this article
shows that mothers-in-law are indeed influential in impact-
ing the preference of the daughters-in-law. It seeks to contri-
bute to the existing literature on the subject: by using a na-
tionally representative data to quantify the impact of the
mother-in-law on her daughter-in-laws preference and deci-
sion and; by discussing the importance of older generations
on stated son preference.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 2
gives the background information on son preference in India
february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 1: Sex Ratio among 0 to 6 Years Old and Stated Son Preference across Time and Geography
A: Census: 1991 B: Census: 2001 C: Census: 2011

16401740 16401740 16401740

15401640 15401640 15401640
14401540 14401540 14401540
13401440 13401440 13401440
12401340 12401340 12401340
11401240 11401240 11401240
10401140 10401140 10401140
9201040 9201040 9201040
No Data

D: NFHS: 1992 E: NFHS: 1998 F: NFHS: 2006

16401740 16401740 16401740

15401640 15401640 15401640
14401540 14401540 14401540
13401440 13401440 13401440
12401340 12401340 12401340
11401240 11401240 11401240
10401140 10401140 10401140
9201040 9201040 9201040
Panels A to C: Number of boys per 1,000 girls aged 0 to 6 years old. The natural sex ratio among this age group is around 1.050 boys per 1,000 girls. Panels D to F: number of boys desired per
1,000 girls desired.

while Section 3 describes the data and the model. Section 4
presents some descriptive statistics followed by Section 5,
which discusses key results and robustness checks. Finally,
Section 6 concludes with policy implications.
2 Background
As early as 1853, the British recorded abnormal sex ratios
among some communities in India (J P Grant, Officiating
Secretary, Government of India, 7 September 1853, cited in
Oldenburg 2002: 41). In his report, Grant states that the moti-
vations behind sex-selective neglect and infanticide, leading to
these abnormal sex ratios, are based on religious, caste and
financial reasons. Almost two centuries later, the root causes
of son preference remain the same. What has changed,
however, is that the imbalance in sex ratio has now spread
across communities with the process of sex-selective elimina-
tion of females becoming widely accessible and easy. Among
the key cultural motivations for preferring sons to daughters
are the crucial role played by the son in performing religious
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017
rites and rituals, believed to secure a good afterlife for his par-
ents (as per Manus doctrine), continuing the family name
(Das Gupta et al 2003) and inheriting the family land (Kishor
and Parasuraman 1998).
Financial motivations, rooted in cultural practices, also play
a crucial role. By and large, in most communities, indeed, once
a son marries, he will bring home a daughter-in-law and dowry
to his natal family; he will remain with his parents and the
fruits of his labour will be shared with his parents and siblings.
In contrast, a daughter is married off, with a dowry, will have
to live with her marital family and will be forbidden from
supporting her natal family due to both cultural taboos and
her in-laws (Das Gupta 1987; Das Gupta et al 2003). Her parents
are, however, expected to offer her gifts, pay for her upbringing
and keep offering gifts after her marriage. An Indian saying
summarises this situation well: Raising a daughter is like
watering your neighbours garden (Guilmoto 2007).
As bearing a son is considered to be a daughter-in-laws duty
and responsibility, a woman who cannot give birth or who gives
vol liI no 6 43
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 2: Stated Desired Sex Ratio (Boys per 1,000 Girls) are, however, more widespread among the oldest generations
Panel A: Women Aged 15 to 35 Years Old across Time and Generation than among the youngest ones (Figure 2, Panel B).
1,450
This has significant consequences. Given the importance of
male descendants in India and the perceived important role
1,350 of the mother-in-law in decision-making, it would be surprising
NFHS-1 that mothers-in-law do not influence, or at least try to influence,
Stated Sex Ratio

NFHS-2
their sons and daughter-in-laws desire for sons. As they have
1,250
NFHS-3 on average higher stated son preference than their daughters-
in-law, their influence would lead to an increase in the sex
1,150 ratiodefined as the number of boys to the number of girls
among young children, even though the mothers of those
children may have no ex-ante preference for sons (before
1,050
marriage, that is, before being influenced by the mother-in-law).
1980 1990 2000 2010
This, we believe, partly explains why, amidst a decrease in stated
Panel B: By Womens Age across Different NFHS Waves son preference, the sex ratio remains very high (Figure 1).
1,550
While only a limited number of studies have been conducted
on the role of mothers-in-law in decision-making on matters
1,450
directly concerning their sons, there is some evidence that
they do indeed play an important role. These evidences, how-
Stated Sex Ratio

1,350
NFHS-1
1,250
NFHS-2 NFHS-3
1,150
1,050
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Age
Notes panel A: This figure should be read as follows: Change in desired sex ratio across
generation can be read by moving horizontally on a given curve. Change overtime, for a
given generation, can be seen by comparing the stated desired sex ratio for a given year
across NFHS wave.
Source: NFHS data.
birth only to daughters may be scorned by her in-laws until
the birth of her first male child (Das Gupta et al 2003). This
displeasure would be expressed with the daughter-in-law
being given less autonomy, having to perform a higher share
of household chores or being given less time to recover after
the delivery of a female child. As a result, having a son is
generally seen as empowering women in their marital family,
leading them to dearly desire sons (Das Gupta et al 2003). In a
more extreme case, not giving birth to a son may result in do-
mestic violence, psychological abuse or abandonment. The
birth of a son would not only eliminate one reason behind
physical and emotional abuse but can also provide protection
against future violence, once the son is old enough to protect
his mother (Rao 1997).
For all those reasons, there is an entrenched preference
for sons in India, with the average women desiring 1.16 sons
for each desired daughter in 2006 (authors calculation,
NFHS data).
While the level of stated son preference is still high, it has
declined significantly in recent years (Figure 1, Panels D to F,
p 43). This drop in stated son preference came about by the
oldest generations reducing their stated son preference as
they come into contact with modern beliefs, and by the
youngest generation having much lower stated son preference
to start with (Figure 2, Panel A). Strong stated son preferences
44
ever, come mostly from qualitative studies and/or studies that
have a limited geographic coverage. Starting with qualitative
evidence, Ganatra and Hirve (2002) and Puri et al (2011)
show, in very different contextsin Maharashtra and among
Indian immigrants in the United States, respectivelythat
mother-in-laws pressure was often invoked as a reason for
seeking sex-selective abortion. While no quantitative studies
have yet looked at the impact of mothers-in-law on stated son
preference, Char et al (2010) have looked at the influence of
mothers-in-law on modern contraception use in rural Madhya
Pradesh, using a sample of 60 daughter-in-law/mother-in-law
dyads. They conclude that the mothers-in-law do not have an
impact on temporary contraception use but they have a say on
when the daughters-in-law should get sterilised and that this
decision depends on the number of sons the daughter-in-law
already has.
While there seems to be a consensus among scholars that
Indian mothers-in-law are powerful, the same cannot be said
about respondents opinions. Indeed, a study on Karachi,
Pakistan (Kadir et al 2003) shows that for a range of decision-
making events, mothers-in-law, and even more so, sons,
believe that the mother-in-law has a say.2 This belief, however,
is not shared by the daughters-in-law. Hence, while the litera-
ture seems to point towards a key role played by the mothers-
in-law in decision-making, respondents perception is much
less obvious. In any case, a mother-in-law can use three main
strategies to influence the sex ratio among her grandchildren.
The first strategy is simply to select a daughter-in-law who
shares the same degree of preference for sons. This is feasible
in the Indian context, given the involvement of parents, parti-
cularly the mothers, in selecting the bride/groom of their
offspring, often without the direct involvement of the bride
and groom (Mathur 2007). If this is the case, a similarity in son
preference between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-
law should be observed immediately after marriage. The second
strategy would be to condition the daughter-in-law to develop
an attachment towards her mother-in-law, so that she takes
february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

into account the preference of the mother-in-law. This strategy
would take some time and, the influence of the mothers-in-law
would be felt only some years after the marriage. Finally, a
mother-in-law can use a stick and carrot strategy to align her
daughter-in-laws son preference to hers.3
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
To empirically test if the mother-in-law is able to influence her
daughter-in-laws stated son preference, we use the third
National Family and Health Survey (NFHS-3), a nationally
representative survey, conducted from November 2005 to
August 2006. Each of the 26 Indian states has been divided
into rural, urban and sometimes slum/non-slum areas, having
a probability of one, to be sampled. Each rural stratum has
then been subdivided into primary sampling units (PSU),
with a probability of being sampled proportional to size. In
urban areas, within each PSU sampled, a census enumeration
block was selected with a probability proportional to size. House-
holds have then been randomly selected from those PSU/census
enumeration blocks, and a household questionnaire was
administered. A woman questionnaire was also administered
to all women aged 1549 years. In order to study the impact of
a mother-in-law on her daughter-in-laws son preference, we
observed the daughter-in-law along with her mother-in-law. In
NFHS-3, this situation occurs whenever the mother-in-law and
her daughter-in-law co-reside.4 More precisely, NFHS-3 data con-
tains information about all women aged 1549 years old in the
surveyed household. Given the average age of marriage in
India (18 years for women and 23 years for men in 2001)
(UNICEF 2014), we are able to match the daughter-in-law with
her mother-in-law in 3,534 cases.5
One caveat is that the information is only available for
relatively young daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law, as
mothers-in-law cannot be aged more than 49 years old if they
are to be part of the sample. Young women are, however, the
most important group as they are the ones starting their fertility
history and, hence, whose decision on the number of sons and
daughters they will bear matters in determining the sex ratio
among young children for the overall population.6
Another limitation is that we are only looking at the preference
of daughters-in-law living in extended households. Around 46%
of the women surveyed by NFHS-3 are living in such house-
holds.7 Thus, while our results cannot be generalised to the
whole Indian population, it does shed light on how preferences
are constructed for almost half of the Indian female popula-
tion, a group that is far from negligible.
A third caveat is that we do not have data on mother-in-laws
stated son preference for her daughter-in-law but rather need
to rely on her stated son preference for herself. Even though
these two variables are not the same, they are likely to be
highly correlated since mothers-in-law would want to pass on
their own beliefs to their daughters-in-law. This is, however, a
non-tested assumption.
Finally, it is likely that other personsnotably her parents,
the husband and the father-in-lawalso influence the daughter-
in-laws stated son preference. While ideally, we would include
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
SPECIAL ARTICLE
the preference of all of the above in the model, data limitation
precludes us from doing so. Indeed, data on daughters-in-laws
parents are not available and while data on the husband and
the father-in-law have been collected, it is only for a sub-
sample of the households. Thus, once we restrict the sample to
the daughters-in-law cohabiting with their mothers-in-law
aged less than 49 years old and for whom we have data for
their husband (or their father-in-law), the sample size drops so
much that it will be unwise to estimate a three-stages-least-
square model, necessary in such a case as both spouses will
influence the other. However, we investigate the relation bet-
ween husbands and wifes stated son preference in another
article and we have performed a simple robustness check to
see if the mother-in-laws coefficient would be significantly
reduced if we were to include her sons preference. We con-
clude that our results are unlikely to be driven by the omission
of the husbands stated son preference.
Using NFHS-3 data, we want to estimate the impact of mother-
in-laws stated son preference on their daughter-in-laws, holding
as constant the other determinants of son preference identified
in the literature. More specifically, we estimate:
prefd = + prefm +Xd + ...(3.1)
where, prefd is the daughter-in-laws stated son preference;
pref m is her mother-in-laws stated son preference; Xd is a vector
of other variables influencing the daughter-in-laws stated son
preference and is the error term. is the influence of the
mothers-in-law on their daughters-in-law.
We define stated son preference as the number of additional
sons a woman wants relative to the desired number of daughters.
More specifically, following Pande and Astone (2007), a woman
is classified as either desiring the same number of sons and
daughters (or more daughters which represent less than 2% of
our sample), desiring one son more than the desired number of
daughters, or desiring at least two more sons than the number
of daughters she wants.8
Dummy variables are included for rural residence (rural),
cattle ownership (own cattle), land ownership (own land);
religious denominations (Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist,
other and the reference category is Hindu); caste (Scheduled
Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Backward Caste, dont know caste, the
reference category is: other caste); access to mediaradio,
television or newspaperat least once a week (access to
media); acceptance of domestic violence (domestic violence is
acceptable); working status (work); wealth quintiles (poorest,
poorer, richer, richest and the reference category is middle)
and; main cultural regions (North, East, West and the reference
category is South).9 Other control variables are years of educa-
tion (years of education), age (age in years) and the number of
children a woman desires (number of children). Those control
variables are fairly standard in the literature on son preference
(Arnold and Kuo 1984; Chung and Das Gupta 2007; Koolwal
2007; Pande and Astone 2007; Robitaille 2013 and Yount
2005). The characteristics at the household level are shared
by the daughter-in-law and her mother-in-law, while the
characteristics specific to the daughter-in-law are: religion,
45
SPECIAL ARTICLE

caste, access to media, years of education, age in years, work, likely to have those characteristics than their mothers-in-law
number of children and if domestic violence is acceptable. Given (Table 1).
the ordered nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit Not only do mothers-in-law have a stronger stated son prefer-
model is used. Interpreting the ordered logit coefficients is not as ence than daughters-in-law, the two of them are also highly
straightforward as in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) case. correlated. In our sample, 82% of daughters-in-law with a moth-
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, predicted prob- er-in-law having no son preference, have no son preference
abilities for changes in the variables of interest are presented. themselves; for mothers-in-law preferring one additional son,
this proportion drops with only 75% of their daughters-in-law
4 Descriptive Statistics having no son preference, and drops further to 69% for those
From a public policy perspective, the influence of mothers-in- with a mother-in-law preferring two additional sons or more.
law on the child sex ratio matters only if they have, on an However, this relationship between the son preference of
average, higher son preference than their daughters-in-law. As mothers-in-law and their daughters-in-law may be due to some
shown in Table 1, this is indeed the case. While co-residing shared characteristics believed to influence stated son prefer-
daughters-in-law have no preference for sons at a proportion ence, such as, the state of residence and wealth of the house-
of 79%, this is true for only 65% of co-residing mothers-in-law, hold. Therefore, we turn next to multivariate analysis.
a statistically significant difference.10
This difference in son preference between daughters-in- 5 Multivariate Results: Mother-in-laws Influence
law and mothers-in-law is likely to be due, in part, to differences
in their characteristics. In Robitaille (2013), it was shown that, Base model: From Table 2 (p 47) (Column 2), we find that the
with everything else remaining constant, younger women, stated son preference of mothers-in-law is significantly
more educated women and women more exposed to media correlated with that of their daughters-in-law, everything
have lower stated son preference. Daughters-in-law are more else held constant (and, nothing else constant, Column 1).
Having a mother-in-law desiring one additional son is associ-
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Household Co-residing Co-residing
ated with an increase in stated son preference and, even
Daughter-in-Law Mother-in-law more so, if the mother-in-law has a preference for at least two
Son preference: None 0.7887 0.6518*** additional sons. Interpreting ordered logit coefficients is not
Son preference: One 0.1853 0.2721*** easy. We can easily make sense of the direction of the impact
Son preference: At least two 0.0260 0.0761*** by looking at the coefficient sign, but to obtain the marginal
Rural 0.6631
effect, we need to select a value for all control variables.
Own cattle 0.6164
Thus, we have calculated the marginal effect of mother-in-
Own land 0.5412
laws stated son preference for the average daughter-in-
Religion: Hindu 0.7898 0.7879
Religion: Christian 0.0308 0.0303 law; that is, we have used the average value and the mode in
Religion: Muslim 0.1400 0.1404 our sample for, respectively, the continuous and dichoto-
Religion: Sikh 0.0223 0.0227 mous variables.
Religion: Buddhist 0.0074 0.0091** For the average daughter-in-lawa non-working rural
Religion: Other 0.0096 0.0096 North Indian Hindu woman, owning cattle and land, from a
Caste: Scheduled Caste 0.1924 0.1943 Backward Caste and of average wealth, who has access to
Caste: Scheduled Tribe 0.1143 0.1137 media at least once a week, is 21 years old, with six years of
Caste: Backward Caste 0.3590 0.3567 education and desiring two childrenthe predicted probability
Caste: Dont know 0.0368 0.0371
of desiring no additional son decreases by about 4 percentage
Caste: Other 0.2976 0.2982
points by having a mother-in-law desiring two additional sons
Education: Years 6.0034 1.7337***
(4.7715) (3.2448) and by almost 3 percentage points by having a mother-in-law
Access to media 0.6851 0.5649*** desiring one additional son (Table 3, p 47). 11
Age: Years 21.3327 44.1573*** To put it differently, assuming that all women have the aver-
(3.4869) (3.8230) age characteristics, the sex ratio would be of 119, 123 and 126
Work 0.3100 0.4963*** boys per 100 girls if all mothers-in-law had no son preference,
Wealth quintile: Poorest 0.1298
a preference for one additional son or a preference for two
Wealth quintile: Poorer 0.1813
additional sons, respectively.
Wealth quintile: Middle 0.1924
The results for the control variables are as expected. As the
Wealth quintile: Richer 0.2337
Wealth quintile: Richest 0.2628 number of males in the nuclear family determines the share of
Number of children 2.2022 2.8687*** land inherited after the extended family splits (VeraSanso
(0.7022) (1.1906) 1999), owning land increases son preference. We also find that
Domestic violence is acceptable 0.4385 0.5117*** Muslim and Christian women have lower son preference,
Obs 3,535 3,535 everything else being constant.12 Lower fertility, womens
t-tests have been performed between the co-residing daughters-in-law sample
and the co-residing mothers-in-law sample. ***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and
education and exposure to media are all negatively associated
*p-value<0.10. with son preference, as different results have shown.13
46 february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Table 2: Daughters-in-laws Stated Son PreferenceOrdered Logit Power structure: Most households are
(1) (2) (1) (2) headed by the parents-in-law (father-in-law,
Rural 0.0880 Age: Years -0.0148
(0.5373) (0.2544) 83%; mother-in-law, 10%). This is likely to
Own cattle -0.0549 Work 0.0210 have important implications in terms of
(0.6787) (0.8391) power structure. Indeed, the couple head-
Own land 0.3622*** Wealth quintile: Poorest -0.2196 ing the household is likely to be the domi-
(0.0012) (0.1630)
Religion: Christian -0.7089** Wealth quintile: Poorer -0.0093
nant force. Hence, a daughter-in-law who is
(0.0477) (0.9441) the household heads spouse is assumed to
Religion: Muslim -0.2580* Wealth quintile: Richer 0.0767 be less likely to listen to/care for or obey her
(0.0969) (0.5823) mother-in-law.
Religion: Sikh -0.2362 Wealth quintile: Richest -0.0190
(0.5155) (0.9091)
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a
Religion: Buddhist -0.1798 Number of children 1.2564*** model in which the mother-in-laws stated
(0.8374) (0.0000) son preference is interacted with a dummy
Religion: Other 0.0591 Domestic violence 0.0785 taking the value of one if the daughter-in-
(0.9143) is aAcceptable (0.3960)
law or her husband is household head. The
Caste: Scheduled Caste -0.0280 Region: North 0.8566***
(0.8444) (0.0000) results are striking (Table 4). While we
Caste: Scheduled Tribe -0.0355 Region: East 0.7054*** conclude as before that the mother-in-laws
(0.8428) (0.0011) preference has a strong impact on her
Caste: Backward caste 0.0500 Region: West 0.8642*** daughter-in-laws stated son preference, this
(0.6751) (0.0003)
is true only in households where the mother-
Caste: Dont know 0.3519 Mother-in-law: 0.4357*** 0.1907**
(0.1508) Son preference: One (0.0000) (0.0493) in-law or her husband are heads. In house-
Education: Years -0.0334*** Mother-in-law: 0.7503*** 0.2827* holds headed by the daughter-in-law or her
(0.0055) Son preference: At least two (0.0000) (0.0552) husband, the mother-in-law has no influence
Access to media -0.2287**
when her preference is moderate (desire for
(0.0262)
Cut-off point: 1 1.5102*** 4.6972***
one additional son) and has a negative in-
(0.0000) (0.0000) fluence when her preference is strong (desire
Cut-off point: 2 3.8294*** 7.3269*** for two additional sons). Thus, the underly-
(0.0000) (0.0000) ing household power structure is a signifi-
Obs 3,535 3,535
cant determinant of son preference.14
Pseudo R-squared 0.00962 0.147
Log pseudolikelihood -2082 -1792
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster at the primary sampling unit level. ***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and Influence or selection in the marriage
*p-value<0.10. market: As already discussed, if the mothers-
in-law select daughters-in-law with similar son preference,
Table 3: Predicted Probability
Mother-in-law: Son Preference
we should observe a similarity bet ween the mother-in-laws-
None One At Least Two daughter-in-laws son preferences in the very first year of mar-
Daughter-in-law: Son preference riage. Put differently, the coefficient in front of the mother-in-
None 0.8352 0.8072 0.7925
laws stated son preference should be positive for women who
(0.8028, 0.8676) (0.7690, 0.8454) (0.7426, 0.8424)
One 0.1508 0.1759 0.1890 have been married for less than one year. If, however, sociali-
(0.1214, 0.1802) (0.1413, 0.2104) (0.1442, 0.2338) sation, altruism or coercion take place, women who have been
At least two 0.0140 0.0169 0.0185 married for a longer period of time and, henceforth, who have
(0.0099, 0.0182) (0.0118, 0.0220]) (0.0121, 0.0249) been exposed to their mother-in-laws stated son preference
90% confidence interval in bracket.
over a long period of time, should be more influenced by their
Table 4: Robustness CheckPower Structure mother-in-law than women who just got married. To test this
Mother-in-law: Son preference: one 0.1855* hypothesis, we allow the coefficient in front of the mothers-in-
(0.0638) laws stated son preference variable to vary according to the time
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two 0.3638**
since marriage. More specifically, we differentiate between
(0.0115)
HH head: Daughter-in-law -0.1863 women who have been married for less than one year, women
(0.4304) who have been married for one to two years, women who have
Mother-in-law: Son preference * HH head: Daughter-in-law been married for three to five years and women who have been
Mother-in-law: Son preference: one 0.0671 married for more than six years. The results presented in Table 5
(0.8520)
(p 48) indicate that for the first two years of marriage there is no
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two -2.6227**
(0.0300) significant impact of the mother-in-laws stated son preference
Control variables Yes on her daughter-in-laws preference (reference group: mothers-
Joint significance in-law with no son preference for a given number of years since
Mother-in-law: Son preference: One, alone and interacted (0.4700) marriage). However, after three years of marriage, we observe
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two, alone and interacted (0.0624) a positive and significant influence. Hence, while appealing,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 47
SPECIAL ARTICLE

and probably happening in some cases, the idea that the rela- abort a child. However, we believe that those costs are fairly
tion between the mother-in-laws and daughter-in-laws stated moderate in the Indian context. Indeed, while there is an
son preference comes from the marriage market does not estimated half a million female foetuses aborted each year in
appear in empirical data. India, there are 6.5 million abortions overall every year (Sinha
2012). Thus, abortion is a fairly common procedure in India
Does preference translate into realised sex ratio? There is a and is well accepted as a fertility control method. An impor-
difference between stating a son preference and to be willing tant emotional cost might be to go against the law that bans
to carry a sex-selective abortion, necessary to alter the natu- sex-selective abortion; however, as the risk of prosecution is
ral sex ratio among the respondents children. Indeed, there extremely low, this cost is likely to deter only a fraction of
are emotional, financial and physical costs to sex-selectively respondents. Moreover, the financial costs are quite low as a
Table 5: Daughters-in-laws Stated Son PreferenceSelection or sex-selective abortion costs only between $5 and $30 (Booth
Socialisation? Ordered Logit et al 1994; Vella 2005) which is much less than the cost of rais-
Married since one or two years -0.1065 (0.5543) ing and marrying off an unwanted daughter.15 Finally, mater-
Married since three to five years 0.0947 (0.5989)
nal depletion and maternal mortality risk are lower in the case
Married since at least six years 0.2363 (0.2827)
of abortion than when pregnancy is carried to term. Thus,
Married since less than one year
Mother-in-law: Son preference: one -0.0408 (0.8541) while there is an undeniable cost, it is fairly nominal. Never-
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two -0.5539 (0.1975) theless, as robustness check, we look at the impact of mother-
Married since one or two years in-laws stated son preference on the realised child sex ratio of
Mother-in-law: Son preference: One 0.0876 (0.6281) her daughter-in-law. As sex-selective abortions are more likely
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two 0.3603 (0.1731) late in the fertility history, we restrict our sample to those
Married since three to five years
women who have achieved their fertility target. Thus, given
Mother-in-law: Son preference: One 0.2133 (0.2171)
the young age of our daughters-in-law, our sample drops sig-
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two 0.4480* (0.0511)
nificantly and we are left with only 995 observations. The
Married since at least six years
Mother-in-law: Son preference: One 0.4552** (0.0188) results are presented in Table 6.
Mother-in-law: Son preference: At least two 0.4319 (0.2175) It is important to note at this stage that the sex ratio among
Control variables Yes ones children is biologically purely random. Indeed, while
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster at the primary sampling unit level. some medical articles claim that the gender of a foetus is partly
***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and *p-value<0.10.
determined by the characteristics of his/her parents, such as
Table 6: Daughter-in-law Having Achieved Their Fertility TargetNumber
of Additional Sons parents age, the gender of the previous child, the frequency of
Rural 0.0210 Age: Years 0.0046 sexual relations, and the type of response to the Hepatitis B
(0.8908) (0.7742) virus (Drew et al 1978; Ruder 1985; Tremblay et al 2003), the
Own cattle -0.0437 Work 0.0673 impact found is always extremely small and we can thus safely
(0.7433) (0.5588)
assume that the sex ratio is random.16
Own land -0.0329 Wealth quintile: Poorest -0.1839
(0.7907) (0.4019) Given the limited sample size, we again struggle to get
Religion: Christian -0.0355 Wealth quintile: Poorer -0.3637** significance for almost all our variables. Nevertheless, we can
(0.9482) (0.0341) conclude that when the mother-in-laws son preference is high
Religion: Muslim 0.0717 Wealth quintile: Richer -0.0415 (she desires at least two additional sons), the male to female
(0.6855) (0.7684)
ratio among her daughter-in-laws children increases (marginally
Religion: Sikh 0.2641 Wealth quintile: Richest -0.2374
(0.1854) (0.1410) insignificant). Thus, mothers-in-law not only influence their
Religion: Buddhist -0.2401 Number of children -0.0386 daughter-in-laws preference, they are also able to influence
(0.5122) (0.6818) the sex ratio among their grandchildren.
Religion: Other -0.6386 Domestic violence 0.0097
(0.4204) is acceptable (0.9259) 6 Discussion and Policy Implication
Caste: Scheduled Caste 0.0946 Region: North -0.1523
(0.5300) (0.4129) In this article, we have tested empirically a common assumption
Caste: Scheduled Tribe 0.2775 Region: East -0.2762 in the anthropological and sociological literature, namely, that
(0.1346) (0.1769) Indian mothers-in-law have a strong influence on the decisions
Caste: Backward caste 0.1719 Region: West -0.2404 taken by their daughters-in-law on important personal questions,
(0.1488) (0.2639)
such as the number of sons they will have. In line with general
Caste: Dont know -0.0905 Mother-in-law: -0.0103
(0.7331) Son preference: One (0.9255) beliefs in the literature, we find that in India, holding constant
Education: Years -0.0056 Mother-in-law: Son 0.2754 the daughter-in-laws characteristics, the mother-in-laws stat-
(0.6678) preference: At least two (0.1451) ed son preference does have a significant impact on their
Access to media 0.2867** Constant 0.0925 daughters-in-laws stated son preference. The result is robust
(0.0268) (0.8259)
to different specifications. While we have not looked directly
Obs 995
at the decision to sex-selectively abort female foetuses, there is
R-squared 0.0269
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster at the primary sampling unit level. ample evidence that the stated son preference is a key determi-
***, p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05 and *p-value<0.10. nant leading parents to sex-selectively discriminate between
48 february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

their children (Robitaille 2010). As a robustness check we have
estimated an OLS model with the difference in the number of
sons and the number of daughters as dependent variable for
those women who have achieved their fertility target. Given
the young age of the respondents, this represents less than
30% of our original sample. Despite the very large sample
drop, we still conclude that the mother-in-law has a marginally
insignificant impact.
The focus of this article is on stated son preference. However,
it is likely that the influence of mothers-in-law is felt not only on
how many sons to bear. For example, Char et al (2010) find that
Indian mothers-in-law also have a say in the use of contraception
by the young couple. Moreover, it is highly plausible that their
influence could also be felt on decision regarding childrens
education, childrens vaccination, childrens care such as breast-
feeding, etc. More research on those questions is necessary.
From a policy perspective, our results indicate the importance
of not only targeting the reproductive-age married couples but
also to target the older generations in the marital household,
namely, the mothers-in-law and, potentially, also the fathers-in-
law on matters of sex-selective abortions, importance of girls
education and health. The limited availability of male respon-
dents in NFHS-3 did not allow us to test the importance of the
stated son preference of fathers-in-law on their daughters-in-
laws stated son preference. This would be an interesting
avenue for future research.
The conclusion reached here may also apply to countries
other than India. In particular, in China, a country with an
even more distorted sex ratio at birth, there is some evidence
that grandparents preference matters. For example, in a study
by Xiaolei et al (2013), a respondent explains the imbalance in
sex ratio by saying: Its the fault of the grandparents. The older
generation still prefer sons and they put pressure on their chil-
dren to have sons (male aged 35, urban Guizhou). Quantify-
ing the impact of grandparents preference on Chinas sex ratio
is another interesting avenue for future research.

notes
1 Stopping behaviourthat is, to continue child-
bearing until the desired number of sons is
reachedwas the common practice in the
past. However, as it does not lead to higher sex
ratio at the country level, it will not be
discussed further here.
2 As India and Pakistan used to be one country
before partition in 1947 and are culturally very
similar in many aspects, results found in Paki-
stan are likely to also hold for India.
3 There is some evidence that indeed, mothers of
son have been found significantly less likely to
be abused physically and verbally (Fernandez
1997; Rao 1997).
4 While it is not possible to study the influence
of non-co-residing mothers-in-law on their
daughters-in-law, we expect the influence of
the mother-in-law to be smaller in such families.
5 In India, most women enter wedlock before the
age of 25, with 72% of our sample married at
this age. In the case of men, 45% are married
by the age of 25.
6 However, if our hypothesis that older genera-
tion is able to pass on their own beliefs to the
younger generation is true then the current
mothers-in-law would bear the trace of beliefs
of generations before her.
7 Excluding non de jure residents.
8 In NFHS-3, the relevant question for respond-
ents who have no living children was: If you
could choose exactly the number of children
to have in your whole life, how many would
that be? For respondents who have living
children the relevant question was: If you
could go back to the time you did not have any
children and could choose exactly the number
of children to have in your whole life, how
many would that be? Finally, for all respond-
ents, the question was: How many of these
children would you prefer to be boys, and
how many girls? And for how many would it
not matter?
9 We consider Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu to be southern states;
Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi,
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and
Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh to be
northern states; Assam, Jharkhand, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Odisha, Sikkim, Tripura
and West Bengal to be eastern states; and,
Goa, Gujarat and Maharashtra to be western
states. As a robustness check we have also esti-
mated a model including state-fi xed effects.
The results are very similar and are available
on request.
10 While with our data we can only show that
mothers-in-law have on average stronger stated
son preference than their daughters-in-law,
there are evidences in the literature that
they may also see female foeticide with more
favourable eyes than their daughters-in-law.
Indeed, Joshi and Bajwa (2012) using a sample
of 200 respondents from the Jat Sikh community
in Ludhiana district (Punjab) find that while
78% of the mothers-in-law are neutral vis--vis
female foeticide and 12% are favourable,
among the daughters-in-law 78% are unfa-
vourable and 23% are neutral, with none being
favourable. Alongside a decrease in stated son
preference, an important decline in desired
fertility has also occurred in India in recent
years. In our sample, while mothers-in-law
have on average a desire for 2.9 children,
their daughters-in-law desire only 2.2 children.
Higher fertility, by allowing more free space
for daughters, should result in smaller stated
son preference. Indeed, if women have a desire
for at least one or two sons (49% and 22% of
all 1,24,355 women in NFHS-3 express such a
desire, respectively), a lower overall fertility
will automatically increase the desired sex ratio,
a result first discussed by Das Gupta (1987).
Henceforth, if mothers-in-law were to have the
same desired fertility as their daughters-in-
law, we should expect mothers-in-law to state
an even stronger son preference than they do
in our data.
11 As some mothers-in-law co-reside with more
than one daughter-in-law, to ensure that those
over-represented mothers-in-law do not drive
the results, we have re-estimated the model
using just those mothers-in-law who have a
single co-residing daughter-in-law. While the
smaller sample (17% of the original sample was
composed of daughters-in-law co-residing with
other daughters-in-law) leads to less precise es-
timate, we still conclude that the preference of
the mothers-in-law for a son prevails over their
daughters-in-law (results available on request).
Given the nature of the dependent variable, the
most suitable models are either the ordered
logit or the ordered probit. However, given the
complexity involved in interpreting the results,
we have also estimated the model using logit
and OLS. For those models, the dependent
variable is redefined as a dummy variable tak-
ing the value of 1 when the respondent has a
preference for son and 0 otherwise. We reach
the same conclusion as before (results availa-
ble on request). Pande and Astone (2007) con-
clude that a key variable explaining stated son
preference is the sex ratio of existing children.
This variable is however likely to be endoge-
nous as the availability of sex-selective abor-
tion techniques make it is easy for parents with
strong stated son preference to engineer the
sex ratio among their children. As the sex ratio
of existing children is random, no instrument
variable can be found. So far, we have ignored
the issue by not including the sex ratio of exist-
ing children in the model. The main conclu-
sions remain even when the sex ratio of exist-
ing children is included in the model (results
available on request).
12 In contrast, Pande and Astone (2007) conclude
that Muslim women have higher son prefer-
ence than Hindu women but that women who
are of another faith than Hinduism or Islam
have lower son preference than Hindu women.
13 For education, see Chung and Das Gupta (2007),
Koolwal (2007), Pande and Astone (2007),
Robitaille (2013), Yount (2005). For media
exposure, see Pande and Astone (2007) and
Robitaille (2013).
14 While this article focuses on mothers-in-laws
influence, there is no doubt that husbands are
also important decision-makers. Husbands and
wives are expected to influence each others
preference post marriage. When we include
the husbands preference for a smaller sample
(due to data restrictions) we are unable to get
the statistical significance for the mother-in-
laws preference, along with other explanatory
variables (results available on request). While
those results cannot be used to invalidate or
confirm either the impact of mother-in-law or
the impact of husband, they are reassuring in
the sense that we do not fi nd any statistical
differences between the coefficient for the
mother-in-laws stated son preference when
we include her sons stated son preference
and when we exclude her sons stated son
preference. This supports our assumption that

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 49
SPECIAL ARTICLE
the mother-in-law has an influence on her
daughter-in-law that is not mediated by her
son. It should be clear that those results are
only a robustness check. As we do not control
the potential endogeneity between husband
and wife on stated son preferences, the results
found are not causal.
15 Marrying off daughters is considered a social
responsibility for parents (Das Gupta et al 2003).
16 It can also measure under-reporting of females.
However, great care was taken by the NFHS
team to collect full fertility history. Moreover,
as our sample includes only young women,
they are less likely to have had time to forget
giving birth to some of their daughters.
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vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Is the Pink Tide Ebbing?
Achievements and Limitations of the Latin American Left
Samyukta Bhupatiraju, Rahul Sirohi
Starting from Hugo Chvezs electoral victory in 1998 to
the resounding victory of the Bolivian indigenous leader
Evo Morales in 2006, a sequence of leftist governments
with explicitly anti-neo-liberal programmes rose to
power in various regions of Latin America. But a little
more than a decade later, there are indications that the
pink tide is beginning to ebb. In Argentina, the
centre-right is in power, ending 12 years of left rule. Even
in Venezuela and Brazil, recent trends point towards an
unmistakable resurgence of right-wing forces. How does
one interpret these changes? Does the current crisis
mark the end of the Latin American left? While seeking
to answer some of these questions, an understanding of
the achievements and limitations of the left turn
in Latin American politics is presented.
We would like to thank the anonymous referee for several helpful
suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
Samyukta Bhupatiraju (samyukta.b@tiss.edu) and Rahul Sirohi
(rahul.sirohi@tiss.edu) teach at the School of Development Studies,
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
34
T
he massive resurgence of left movements across Latin
America in the early 2000s has baffled even the most
seasoned students of the region. In a region where tra-
ditional leftist movements had been all but destroyed by bru-
tally repressive authoritarian regimes and where governments
of all hues and colours had unquestioningly adopted thorough-
going structural adjustment reforms aimed at reintegrating
Latin American economies into the neo-liberal world econo-
my, this laboratory of neo-liberal experiments (Sader 2009)
was the last place anyone would have expected to witness
large-scale political success of anti-systemic movements. But
starting from Hugo Chvezs electoral victory in 1998 to the
resounding victory of the Bolivian indigenous leader Evo
Morales in 2006, a sequence of leftist governments with
explicitly anti-neo-liberal programmes rose to power in vari-
ous regions of Latin America. If the initial scale of this pink
tide wave was not surprising enough, the fact that these gov-
ernments survived, and in fact prospered in the face of stiff
political opposition and the threat of imperialist inter-
ventions from their North American neighbours was even
more noteworthy.
There can be little doubt that the resurgence of the left
ranging from the radical to the more reformisthas posed
a major challenge to the hegemony of the neo-liberalism and
has opened up avenues for more radical changes in the region.
All these achievements notwithstanding, the leftist regimes
are now facing a massive political and economic crisis that
threatens to unravel the work that has been done in the last
decade. The deepening of the global financial crisis and falling
commodity prices have increased economic pressures on these
fledgling experiments. Argentinas growth has slowed down
while Brazil has entered a recession. In countries like Venezue-
la inflation rates have skyrocketed and poverty rates have in-
creased (Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean 2014). To make matters worse, this period has coin-
cided with successful elite mobilisations which have been ins-
trumental in uniting the splintered opposition. In Venezuela
the untimely death of Chvez has opened up new opportuni-
ties for the resurgence of pro-neo-liberal forces, and in Brazil
the right-wing opposition has successfully ousted President
Dilma Rousseff only to replace her with a conservative politi-
cal coalition that has begun to implement some of the most
drastic austerity measures in recent Brazilian history. In neigh-
bouring Argentina, the recent elections have brought back the
centre-right to power after 12 years of left rule. All these
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

dramatic reversals suggest that the region may very well be on
the brink of a conservative counter-revolution.
Contextualising the Left Turn
For most of the 19th century, Latin American economies,
though nominally sovereign, remained within the orbit of
influence of British imperial rule. This was not surprising as
Latin American economies were important markets for West-
ern manufactures, and perhaps more significantly, they were
important sources of primary goods like cotton, sugar, rubber
and coffee. As exporters of primary commodities, Latin Ameri-
can nations were successful in capturing global markets and
these international linkages were crucial for incipient indus-
trial growth, but the reliance on primary commodity exports
also meant that these economies were extremely dependent
on American and European markets and remained vulnerable
to exogenous price volatilities (Kohli 2004). Apart from giving
foreign investors untrammelled control over economic deci-
sions, the deepening pattern of economic dependency also
strengthened the political clout of the agro-exporters, much to
the detriment of industrial classes. As a result, industrialisation
remained muted and the sort of structural change that adva-
nced capitalist nations were undergoing, completely bypassed
Latin America (Bagchi 1972, 1982).
In this context the global commodity slump in the 1930s
proved to be a game changer (Franko 2007). In the face of fall-
ing demand from major export markets, Latin American econ-
omies began to face severe balance of payments problems. As
primary commodity prices fell and foreign finance dried up,
Latin American economies were forced to experiment with
protectionist policies. In addition to external changes, this pe-
riod also coincided with the growth of economic nationalism
in the region. There was growing resentment against the
export-oriented pattern of development and by the early dec-
ades of the 20th century several nationalists had begun to
openly criticise the excessive dependence on foreign trade,
which they argued, had restricted Latin American economies
to being producers of raw materials and had allowed foreign
capital to gain a foothold in domestic economy to the detri-
ment of local capitalists (OToole 2014; Ocampo 2006; Burns
1968). Moreover, faced with dwindling international prices it
was felt that the only way these economies could hope to
develop themselves was by espousing an autocentric develop-
ment strategy based on state interventionism, protectionism
and across-the-board industrialisation. This provided the
backdrop to the adoption of the import substitution industri-
alisation (ISI) policies across the continent.
In terms of economic performance the new policy stance
proves to be successful on several dimensions. For instance,
between 1950 and 1980 gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rates averaged 5.5% (Ocampo 2006). During the same period
the growth rates of the manufacturing sector were around 6%
(Ffrench-Davis et al 1994). As an indicator of the extent of
import substitution we may note that for Latin America as a
whole, the share of imported capital goods in total capital for-
mation fell from 28% in 1950 to 15% in 1973 (Ffrench-Davis
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
SPECIAL ARTICLE
et al 1994: 192). Therefore what was striking about the rapid
rate of growth in the region was that the industrial sector
played an important role in the process. Manufacturing
became the leading engine of growth, reaching a peak share
of 26% of GDP in 1973, seven percentage points more than in
1945, a feature shared by all countries (Ocampo 2006: 68). As
can be expected, much of this growth was fuelled by high rates
of investment which grew at an average rate of 7.4% per year
in 195180 for the region taken as a whole (Ffrench-Davis
et al 1994).
Underlying all these achievements were some glaring flaws
which had started to become apparent by the 1970s. Despite all
the rhetoric, most countries avoided radical changes in the
economys income and asset distribution structure and thus
the size of the home market remained very narrow and ine-
qualities remained high. Added to this, the capital intensive
nature of industrialisation meant that industrial growth far
outstripped the rates of labour absorption (Baer 1972; Prebisch
1978; Tokman 1982). As a result, large sections of the society
were effectively excluded from formal sector jobs and since
most social security benefits were linked to formal sector jobs,
only a few could enjoy the welfare benefits that the state pro-
vided. On the whole, therefore, the ISI project became locked
into a self-defeating cycle of inequality, informality and limit-
ed industrialisation. The inability to address income concen-
tration was reflective of a larger malaise in the institutional
structure of Latin American economies. Unlike in Asia where
countries had inherited strong state apparatuses from their
colonial rulers and where anti-colonial movements had suc-
cessfully pushed these states to seek greater autonomy from
foreign capital, in Latin America the state assumed a depend-
ent character which severely restricted its reach and power
(Kohli 2009). The weakness of the state meant that not only
were politically contentious reforms avoided but the Latin
American variant of ISI also came to be heavily dependent on
foreign capital. By the 1970s this dependence increasingly took
the form of debt.
Initially because foreign capital was easily accessible and
interest rates were low, the unsustainability of debt did not
seem to concern policymakers.1 Eventually, however, this
entire process of funding growth via foreign finance ran into
problems when the United States (US) hiked its interest rates in
1979 causing a sudden increase in interest payments. Between
1979 and 1984 interest payments on debt jumped by over
300% (Chodor 2014). To make things worse, as these econo-
mies stumbled, capital flight ensued. In Venezuela capital
flows worth 131.5% of total external debt flowed out of the
economy in the five-year period from 197984 alone. In Argen-
tina and Mexico the numbers were 76.9% and 73.3%, respec-
tively (Franko 2007). The explosion of external debt and sud-
den changes in US monetary policy pushed these over-indebt-
ed economies into a grave economic crisis as GDP growth fell,
industrial development faltered and inflation skyrocketed
(reached four digit figures in Peru, Nicaragua, Brazil and
Argentina). This formed the backdrop to the adoption of neo-
liberal policies.
35
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 1: Minimum Wages
350
300
250
200
Brazil
150
100
50
0 forced a number of people into the informal sector. In Brazil,
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Source: CEPAL database.
Faced with this crisis, defaulting countries turned to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for
assistance. As a part of loan conditionalities set forth by the
multilateral institutions, defaulting economies were forced to
adopt neo-liberal policies in return for loans. It may be noted
that the manner in which structural adjustment was imposed
differed from one country to another. In countries like Chile,
liberalisation had already begun in the 1970s under Pinochets
military dictatorship. For others, like Brazil, liberalisation was
relatively late in the sense that it followed the debt crisis of
1982. Whether imposed by the IMF or by military rulers, what
was common to all these regions was that structural adjust-
ments were essentially deflationary in nature. The logic be-
hind this was that immediate problems facing Latin American
economies stemmed from a mismatch between expenditure
relative to resources. Since debt was a reflection of too much
expenditure, it would followor so it was arguedthat
income deflation could provide a corrective to this situation by
squeezing domestic demand and bringing it in line with avail-
able resources (Franko 2007). In the short-term this structural
adjustment would also release sufficient funds for repaying
debt to all those financial institutions that faced massive expo-
sure due to sovereign default. At a broader level neo-liberals
argued for deeper reforms. In their opinion the economic
crisis of the region was not a one-off incident, but rather it
was a reflection of the malaise of statist development models.
The irrational and market distorting policies associated
with ISI were simply unsustainable. What was required was
a shift towards a more market-oriented growth strategy
(Edwards 1995).
Three important aspects of neo-liberal adjustment may be
noted. First, from the very beginning there was a stress on re-
ducing the role of the state in the economic sphere. As we have
noted, ISI was based on the idea that markets alone were un-
suitable instruments for promoting economic development
and that therefore advocates of ISI believed that the state had
to intervene in the economic sphere to ensure full-fledged eco-
nomic development. In contrast, the adoption of neo-liberalism
represented an attempt to dismantle the state and instead im-
pose a more laissez-faire framework. Not surprisingly adjust-
ing economies witnessed massive cuts in government expendi-
ture, especially on social spending and also witnessed whole-
sale privatisation of state-owned enterprises. According to Franko
(2007: 170), seventy seven percent of all privatisations in
36
developing countries in 1998 took place in Latin America; in
1999 the region accounted for more than half of such privatisa-
tions. A second important point that needs to be mentioned is
that the entire burden of neo-liberal adjustments fell on the
poorest classes. Minimum wages dropped dramatically, with
Mexico Mexico and Brazil witnessing major reversals in the 1980s and
1990s (Figure 1). The rationalisation of public companies, lib-
eralisation of trade and the introduction of labour market flex-
ibility caused a huge increase in the ranks of unemployed, and
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
informality increased by 10% between 1990 and 2000 while in
Argentina urban informality alone increased by 10% between
1992 and 2003 (Bosch et al 2007). Similar trends were visible
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela as well (Jutting and Laigle-
sia 2009).
The third salient feature of the entire process relates to the
political environment within which reforms took place. In ear-
ly liberalisers like Chile, unaccountable military dictatorships
were instrumental in imposing liberalisation policies, but in
many late-liberalisers the transition towards neo-liberalism
occurred under democratic regimes where governments were
subject to electoral pressures. The expansion of associational
spaces that occurred in the wake of this wave of democratisa-
tion had brought about an unprecedented politicisation of the
working classes and there were explosions of popular anti-
neo-liberal movements all across Latin America (for example,
the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Landless Workers
Movement. Landless Workers Movement [Movimento dos Tra-
balhadores Ruraus Sem Terra or MST] and the Workers Party
or Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, Movimiento al So-
cialismo or MAS in Bolivia).2 Therefore what was striking about
the introduction of austerity policies was that despite the res-
toration of democracy and the massive groundswell opposi-
tion to neo-liberalism, the political class remained staunchly
wedded to imposing the austerity agenda. Major economic ini-
tiatives were insulated from popular pressures and were in-
stead pushed through executive decrees causing severe disen-
chantment with established parties (Silva 2009; Chodor 2014).
The institutionalisation of equality in the political sphere and
the continuous exclusion in the economic sphere created major
tensions within the neo-liberal model.
The Pink Tide Model
The ruinous policies executed under the tutelage of IMF and
other multilateral agencies left Latin American economies in a
mess. According to one estimate the net resource outflow from
the region was a staggering $100 billion during the 1990s
alone (quoted in Veltmeyer and Petras 2014: ch 1). On the in-
dustrial front, the slow but steady gains made during the ISI
era were all but wiped out as economy after economy fell prey
to deindustrialisation (Rocha 2003).3 Apart from a slowdown
in growth and investment, the attack on labour created large-
scale misery and deprivation. By the end of the 1980s, chronic
hunger was killing 40,000 people a day and 55 million were
undernourished, while mortality due to chronic, non-
infectious diseases doubled (Chodor 2014: 74). Poverty rates
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

increased from 40.5% in 1980 to 43.8% in 1999 (Grugel and
Riggirozzi 2012). This large-scale devastation proved to be
politically unsustainable as neo-liberalism came under increas-
ing attack. From the Caracazo riots in Venezuela in the late
1980s to the Bolivian Water Wars in the early 2000s, the neo-
liberal social bloc was under severe pressure from the disgrun-
tled public. Added to this, the shift towards democracy had
made it harder for governments to control political mobilisa-
tions in the same way as it was possible for military authorities
of yesteryears (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Of course even
within a democracy the state could have, and did use coercion,
but ultimately its repressive powers were highly curtailed giv-
en the democratic set-up. Added to all this, the Latin American
left responded to this situation with novel organisational and
ideological strategies. Having been isolated from the political
scene and after having faced severe repression during the pre-
vious decades, there was a realisation amongst leftist activists
that meaningful opposition to neo-liberalism required forging
broad alliances between industrial workers, indigenous move-
ments, informal workers and middle classes, all of whom had
borne the brunt of austerity.4 In Brazil, for example, PT played
a crucial role in uniting the various factions of the traditional
left which splintered into several factions in the previous dec-
ades. At the same time it drew support from intellectuals,
grass-root social movements, trade unions and church-based
communities (French and Fortes 2005, 2012). On the ideologi-
cal front there were attempts to broaden the notion of class
struggle to include concerns raised by identity-based move-
ments and to incorporate the demands of indigenous people.
These tactics were a major factor in weakening the hegemony
of markets and in ensuring groundswell support for the lefts
agenda (Silva 2009; Riethof 2004).
A Heterogeneous Left
Before proceeding it is necessary to point out that there is no
single left in Latin America today. Rather, the pink tide
phenomenon has been highly heterogeneous. This hetero-
geneity is no coincidence since the very success of left forces
in Latin America has stemmed from their ability to adapt to
historical, political and institutional peculiarities of their
constituencies. Despite these differences the undeniable fact
remains that the pink tide governments share a central
programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic in-
equalities (Levistky and Roberts 2011: 5). Across the Latin
American region, left governments have initiated massive
redistribution programmes and have developed comprehensive
safety nets for the poorest and most vulnerable. Even the
targeted schemes have tended to cover large sections of the
population (Huber and Stephens 2012). The Plan de Equidad
of Uruguay reached around 50% of children, while in Brazil the
Bolsa Familia cash transfer programme benefited 57.8 million
individuals in 2012 (Huber and Stephens 2012; Weisbrot et al
2014). In Argentina, the Universal Child Benefit programme
reaches four million households, consisting of those mainly
employed within the informal sector (Grugel and Riggirozzi
2012). In Venezuela health coverage has increased sixfold
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
SPECIAL ARTICLE
between 1998 and 2007 benefiting as many as 20.5 million
individuals (Chodor 2014). Moreover
strong redistributionary social policies, implemented through so-
called missions, which tripled pension beneficiaries; increased sec-
ondary educational enrolment from 47.7% to 73.3% of the school-aged
population; introduced low-cost, state-run food stores and community
doctors in poor neighborhoods, which increased Venezuelans daily
consumption of calories by 50%; and provided over 550,000 state-
built homes to the poor in the last two years. (Wilpert 2014: 3)
Along with explicit social policies, these states have also
successfully intervened in labour markets by increasing mini-
mum wages, reducing vulnerable employment, and increasing
the bargaining power of unions.5 As a result wage shares have
increased in many countries even while unemployment has
reached historical lows. All these changes have allowed for re-
ductions in poverty levels and improvements in income distri-
bution as measured by the Gini coefficient (Table 1).
Table 1: Inequality, Poverty and Unemployment in Select Latin American
Countries
Countries Gini Unemployment Poverty (% of Population
below $1.9 PPP)
1990 2000 2010 1991 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Argentina 46.8* 51.1 44.5 5.8 15 7.7 1.1* 5.7 2.05
Bolivia 42.04 63 49.6*** 2.9 4.8 3.3 8.2 29.7 11.92***
Brazil 60.5 59.3** 53.9*** 6.9 9.5 7.9 20.56 13.62** 6.18***
Ecuador 56.4 49.3 4.3 7.2 5 17.13* 28.15 7.05
Venezuela 45.3 48.2** 9.5 13.2 8.6 4.31* 9.59** 9.24#
* Data refers to 1991 for Argentina, 1992 for Venezuela and 1994 for Ecuador.
** Data for 2001; *** Data for 2009; # Data for 2006; Data for 1989.
Source: World Bank Database; CEPAL Database.
Along with explicit economic policies that defy policy ortho-
doxy, pink tide governments have also initiated an ideologi-
cal attack on neo-liberalism by reconceptualising the very
notion of development and questioning the there is no alter-
native (TINA) doctrine. Speaking at a conference in 2007,
Brazils president Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (popularly referred
to as Lula) explained that increasing growth in itself was a
meaningless pursuit. Instead, true development required that
the fruits of growth be distributed to all without exclusion
and without perpetuating historical inequalities be they of
gender, race, or any other type (quoted in French and Fortes
2012: 7). In a similar vein, drawing on indigenous cultures, the
Ecuadorian constitution defines the prime objective of deve-
lopment to be sumak kawsay or good living:
In the new Constitution, sumak kawsay implies more than improv-
ing the populations quality of life, [it also involves] developing their
capabilities and potentials, relying upon an economic system that
promotes equality through social and territorial redistribution of the
benefits of development, guarantees national sovereignty, promotes
Latin American integration, and protects and promotes cultural diver-
sity. (quoted in Radcliffe 2012: 24142)
Development, according to sumak kawsay, is a process that
prioritises the well-being of human beings and nature. As a
concept, it goes beyond paternalistic concerns typical of capi-
talist welfare regimes and instead focuses on capabilities and
potentials of citizens. Sumak kawsay therefore entails noth-
ing short of a revolution in the statecitizen relationship,
where the state is subordinated to popular pressures and
where citizens are actively engaged in governing their own
37
SPECIAL ARTICLE
futures. In practice the implementation of participatory forms
of governance has varied. In Brazil, prior to the electoral vic-
tory of Lula in 2002 the PT was at the forefront of experiments
in participatory budgeting. In the city of Porto Alegre the local
government headed by the PT gained international fame for
organising large assemblies in which the public had an oppor-
tunity to be involved in decisions related to local governance.
The electoral victory in 2002 raised hopes that these experi-
ments would be replicated at the national level as well, but
that has not happened (Hunter 2011). Though the PT continues
to maintain strong links with trade unions, grass-root move-
ments, non-governmental organisations, and other stakehold-
ers, but its approach is more consultative rather than delib-
erative (Goldfrank 2011). On the other end of the spectrum,
Venezuela seems to be experiencing an explosion of commu-
nal power (Ciccariello-Maher 2007). Here the government
has begun delegating decision-making powers to local-level
communal councils (CCs) consisting of 150400 families
(smaller numbers required for registering CCs in rural areas),
in an attempt to construct a countervailing power structure to
the state. As of 2013, reports suggest that as many as 40,000
such councils had been registered by the government (Foster
2015). Participation rates have been very high with over eight
million people being involved in these initiatives and accord-
ing to a survey held in 2007, an estimated 35% of those sur-
veyed claimed to have taken part in one or more CCs (quoted in
Goldfrank 2011).6
Understanding the Current Crisis
Despite all the massive progress that has been made in the last
decade, many have begun to question the sustainability of left
policies in Latin America. These views have been expressed
not only by neo-liberals but also by radical left-wing thinkers.
These criticisms have become more important in the light of
the severe economic crises that are afflicting many left-wing
regimes in the region. In the post-2011 period, global economic
growth has been sluggish, exports to China have dwindled
and primary commodity prices have fallen creating severe
economic difficulties for Latin America. These external chang-
es have adversely affected economic growth and, perhaps
more importantly, the rates of poverty reduction. Given the
scale and extent of the crisis that the left is facing there have
been raging debates about the nature of the current crisis, and
more broadly, about the inherent limitations of the leftist pro-
ject in Latin America. The fact that many of these criticisms
have been raised by trade unionists and representatives of
popular social movements points to the urgency of the situation.
From an orthodox perspective, the abandonment of free-
market principles and the associated rise of economic pop-
ulism is the most important flaw in the pink tide model.
This is especially true for the more radical regimes (like Vene-
zuela) where the political leadership has been more intent on
maintaining popularity at any cost, picking as many fights as
possible with Washington, and getting as much control as they
can over sources of revenue, including oil, gas, and suspended
foreign-debt payments (Castaeda 2006: 3839). The problem
38
according to neo-liberals, is that while this policy stance
makes for good political sloganeering it does not make for sen-
sible economic policy. Sooner rather than later governments
have to face up to the facts that populist policies are simply
unsustainable (Edwards 2010).7 Instead, neo-liberals argue
that Latin American economies will be better served by deep-
ening neo-liberal reforms, though perhaps tempering with
smart (that is, targeted) social policies (Edwards 2010;
Fukuyama 2008).
While simplistic in its diagnosis, the position taken by the
neo-liberals does not provide an adequate analysis of the prob-
lems afflicting Latin American economies and neither does it
give us any insight into the nature of the current logjam. The
problem with the orthodox line of reasoning is twofold. First it
ignores the elephant in the roomneo-liberalismwhich, far
from being a solution to the current woes of Latin American
economies, has been an absolute failure in the 1990s. It failed
not simply because it did not provide room for growth, but also
because it completely failed to deliver broad-based development
in the region. In this context, it hardly makes sense to criticise
governments for trying to break away from such a discredited
development model. Second, the entire debate about economic
populism is theoretically inaccurate and completely ahistorical.
If anyone deserves to be accused of economic and financial irre-
sponsibility it is the neo-liberal governments of the 1990s
which doled out large sums of money to upper classes by priva-
tising publicly held resources at throwaway prices (including
something as basic as water in Bolivia) and who, in the name of
free markets, supported frenzied financialisation which entailed
massive transfers of funds from public coffers to private ones.
To argue that the left has been irresponsible for having at-
tempted to stem this massive drain of funds and for having
tried to repay the social debt owed to the citizens of the coun-
try, is problematic to say the least. Moreover at a theoretical
level the entire accusation of populism is steeped in neoclassi-
cal orthodoxy which equates state intervention of any sort
with economic mismanagement. In fact, looking at the record
of growth and industrialisation it is abundantly clear that most
Latin American economies performed much better in the diri-
gisme period than they have in the decades when neo-
liberalism was adopted (Ocampo 2006).
If for neo-liberals the problem with the pink tide govern-
ments is the heterodox nature of its economic policies, for the
left critics the problem is exactly the opposite; namely, that
the left governments have not been heterodox enough. In a
stinging critique of the Lula government, ex-PT member and
eminent sociologist Francisco De Oliveira (2003, 2006) criti-
cises the government for betraying the original objectives for
which PT had been formed. He lambasts Lula for failing to
restructure the economy and for not breaking away from the
vice grip of the financial sector. The coexistence of low invest-
ment rates, low research and development expenditures with
a grossly overgrown financial sector has led to complete disar-
ticulation of the economy. The result, in his opinion, is that the
Brazilian economy resembles a duck-billed platypus (an ani-
mal that is half mammal and half reptile). For Oliveira, the
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

political implications of this are even more dangerous: rather
than emboldening the working classes and radicalising them
for an assault on neo-liberal capitalism, Brazils left represents
a hegemony in reverse where the very sectors that are sup-
posed to transform the system end up legitimising it.
A second line of criticism made by the left critics points to
the massive dependence of Latin American economies on pri-
mary commodity exports. On this aspect, the pink tide model
being implemented in countries ranging from Brazil to
Venezuela does not really provide an alternative to the
neo-liberalism according to these scholars. The problem, as
Veltmeyer and Petras (2014: ch 8) see it, is that extraction
entails a high composition of capital and appropriates but little
to labour. For example, in the case of Bolivia where although
all their natural resources have been declared as belonging to
the people, the share of mining wealth that accrues to labour is
a pittance. To make things worse, in all these countries extrac-
tivism has exposed economies to international price volatili-
ties in a way that is reminiscent of earlier periods of Latin
American history and has led to a depletion of natural resources
causing extreme environmental losses (Sankey 2014). The
practice of soyazation in Argentina, for example, has not
only led to monocropping that leads to huge losses in times of
price fluctuations, but has also resulted in contamination of
soil and water resources, in turn affecting the health of local
populations. Similarly, with open-pit mining in Argentina
has led to huge losses of biodiversity and glacial resources
(Giarracca and Teubal 2014). According to critics this environ-
mental degradation and depletion should be accounted for, far
more seriously than what is being currently done.
The left critics provide an incisive and relevant criticism of
leftist governance. To a large extent the deepening crisis today
reflects the inability of the left governments to initiate a truly
post-neo-liberal economic project. Yet one cannot but help
wonder if such harsh judgments are not oversimplifying the
situation in the region. In this regard two points are worth
considering. First, one may note that Latin Americas external
dependence is not a new phenomenon and neither is the deeply
entrenched domination of finance capital. Thus when the left
acquired power in various parts of the continent in the first
decade of the 21st century, it found itself face to face with an
institutional structure that was at once exclusionary and one
that was deeply rooted in the society and had successfully re-
produced itself for years. Keeping this in mind many argued
that the entire process of transcending neo-liberal capitalism
would most likely be a long drawn out process wherein left
governments, while seeking to transcend the system, would
nonetheless be forced to work within existing structures until
conditions were ripe enough for more radical changes to be
implemented (Linera 2013; Harnecker 2015; Catacora 2011). So
the gradualism that left critics complain about is actually a
reflection of tactical difficulties involved in breaking away
from historically generated path dependencies and not some-
thing that can simply be wished away by radical movements.
Second, it is important to understand that economic crises
have an element of intentionality associated with them, in the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6
SPECIAL ARTICLE
sense that they have often been used to further elite interests
(Harvey 2007; Klein 2007). In the context of Latin America it
would be hard to ignore the fact that the current logjam stems
not simply from the lefts moderate agenda, but also from a
concerted effort by national and transnational capital to
squeeze these governments.
Right Reaction
On the political front there have already been numerous
attempts to destabilise governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Ecuador through organised violence and armed coups, many
of which have been linked to government agencies in the US.
In this context, the Brazilian case is particularly interesting
because it reiterates the strength of elite mobilisations and the
fragility of left rule in the region. A complete report card of the
PT administration in Brazil cannot be given here but a few
points may be noted.8
After coming to power in 2002, PT found itself in an unenvi-
able position of having to shore up support by forming a broad
coalition in order to secure its government. In the following
years it largely failed to disassociate itself from hawkish mon-
etary policies of previous periods, but the administration was
nonetheless successful in using the commodity export bonan-
za to introduce a semblance of flexibility within the system.
For a while things seemed rosy for big capital as credit policies
were eased, investment increased and growth rates soared.
But as its hold on the government tightened, the PT adminis-
tration also unleashed a series of poverty alleviation schemes
which were successful in reducing poverty and inequality.
What was even more threatening to the countrys elites was
that with every success, the government turned more and
more radical. First minimum wages were increased, labour
regulations were strengthened, and if this was not enough, the
government went on to weaken deficit targets as well. In a
country where finance capital dominates and where there is a
long history of socio-economic hierarchies, even these pithy
changes were not acceptable to the elites who saw these poli-
cies as a precursor to more radical shifts in the country.
The dampening of international markets provided the per-
fect opportunity for a reassertion of elite power. Mired in cor-
ruption scandals, facing imminent economic slowdown and
under fire from a highly mobilised opposition, the PT was
brought under tremendous pressure. Even though the govern-
ment decided to impose austerity measures in the hope that
this would restore investors confidence, the governments
constant backtracking on this issue and its hesitation to scale
back its social security policies angered the financial elites. Finally
in May 2016 the opposition garnered enough numbers in the
legislature to press for the suspension of PTs presidential can-
didate, Rousseff, before formally impeaching her in August
2016. This was despite the fact that she had received a popular
mandate from the Brazilian people to be the countrys presi-
dent till 2018. Her alleged crime was that she had broken fiscal
responsibility laws in order to preserve the social security pro-
grammes that were initiated by her party. What repercussions
this political coup will have on the lefts future is too difficult
39
SPECIAL ARTICLE

to foretell but what is obvious is that the current crisis is not a
result of PTs alleged reformism. Rather, it is a reflection of the
asymmetric balance of power between class forces in the region.
While the Brazilian case shows the political difficulties
faced by pink tide governments, the economic assaults on the
left have been equally vicious. In the case of Venezuela, politi-
cally motivated production disruptions and artificial shortages
have weakened the government considerably and have been a
major factor behind its recent electoral setbacks. Such actions,
of course, are not a new phenomenon. Ever since Chvez was
elected to power, the government faced bitter opposition from
the traditional oligarchy. During the early days of Chvezs
tenure, brutal economic assaults by big capital in the form of
hoarding, disinvestment and production disruptions had
become commonplace (Levingston 2014). At one point the
shortages were so bad that the country was even forced to buy
oil from abroad (Camacaro and Mills 2015). What was even
more interesting was that inflationary surges and shortages
tended to follow the electoral cycle suggesting that these were
intentional acts of disruption rather than a simple case of
rational actors responding to the opportunities for arbitrage
(Levingston 2014).
In response to this, the government initiated a series of
measures to bring back a semblance of control over the econo-
my. It outlawed hoarding and cracked down heavily on viola-
tors. As a part of an economic overhaul the government estab-
lished price controls and set up a multiple exchange rate sys-
tem that allowed basic commodities to be imported at low
prices. These policies seemed feasible initially because of the
huge inflow of oil revenues from abroad, but in the recent pe-
riod the governments ability to provide cheap dollars has be-
come more limited due to the decline in oil prices (Wilpert
2015). Added to this, the importation of basic goods is still un-
dertaken by the private sector and this has meant that unscru-
pulous elements have had ample opportunity to bilk the sys-
tem. In one recent case reported by Telesur, it was discovered
that 135 tonnes of detergent, 5,000 packs of diapers, 94,000
razors, 50 tonnes of milk, 38 tonnes of rice, and 158,000 cans
of tuna had been hoarded away in a warehouse.9 The fact that
these hoarders are openly associated with opposition parties
cannot come as a surprise. To make things worse private com-
panies have diverted huge sums of foreign exchange, meant for
the imports of basic commodities, to offshore accounts. Accor-
ding to a Telesur report the Central Banks own figures show
that between 2003 and 2013, the Venezuelan private sector in-
creased its holdings in foreign bank accounts by over $122 bil-
lion, or almost 230%.10
From this perspective, the problem, it appears, is not simply
that the Latin American leftists have somehow mistakenly ac-
cepted the very policies they set out to oppose. Instead the
problems arise from the fact that the implementation of even
the most limited pro-poor policies within the auspices of the
neo-liberal system have been received by bitter opposition from
elites. It is surprising that the very policies that could stabilise
and legitimise the economic system are precisely the policies
that are becoming increasingly difficult to implement in this
region. This reflects a complete subordination of economic
rationality to the class interests of the rich and powerful.
Conclusions
The current crisis is turning out to be a crucial test of resilience
for the Latin American left. Whether this turns out to be only
minor inflection in an otherwise smooth and gradual transition
towards 21st century socialism or whether it marks the begin-
ning of the end of another cycle of left rule in the region, only
time will tell. The experiences of Bolivia and Ecuador on the
one hand and Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil on the other,
suggest that the outcome of this struggle is still very open. One
thing that is becoming abundantly clear is that the intransigence
of the Latin American elites to make even the smallest of conce-
ssions leaves the left governments with two very stark choices:
they can either slip down a path of austerity and financialisation
in the mistaken hope that this will reboot the economy or they can
deepen their anti-neo-liberal stance by mobilising popular sec-
tors to defend the governments achievements. The third way
of humanising neo-liberalism seems like a distant dream.

Notes
1 One high ranking Latin American policymaker
confidently declared, debts are not paid, debts
are rolled (quoted in Galano III 1994: 330).
2 This argument draws on Silva (2009: Chs 2
and 3). See also Chodor (2014) and Grugel and
Riggirozzi (2012).
3 The term, deindustrialisation, has to be used
carefully. Here we use it to refer to the reduc-
tion in industrial share in total employment
and GDP.
4 There is an interesting literature regarding the
impact of alliance strategies and anti-neo-liberal
policies. See Ellner (2004); Morais and Saad-
Filho (2003); Saad-Filho (2015).
5 Informality rates continue to be high in many
of these countries (Jutting and Laiglesia 2009).
6 Goldfrank (2011) has some interesting critiques
of the process. See also Salazar (2013) and
Hawkins and Hansen (2006).
7 Lefts economic populism, according to Edwards
(2010), is not primarily rooted in expansive
fiscal and monetary policies. In his opinion it is
rooted in excessive and unproductive state in-
tervention in the economic sphere.
8 This discussion is based on Sirohi (2016). See
Saad-Filho (2016); French and Fortes (2005,
2012) for a further analysis.
9 In Venezuela, Opposition-Linked Firm Hoards
Millions of Goods, Telesur, 14 January 2015,
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/In-
Venezuela-Opposition-Linked-Firm-Hoards-
Millions-of-Goods-20150114-0053.html.
10 Behind the Food Lines in Venezuela, Telesur,
14 May 2016, http://www.telesurtv.net/eng-
lish/analysis/Behind-the-Food-Lines-in-Vene-
zuela-20160514-0035.html.
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Paths Toward Twenty-first Century Socialism,
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Hunter, Wendy (2011): Brazil: The PT in Power, Rocha, G M (2003): Neo-Dependency in Brazil,
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vol liI no 6 41
NOTES
Two Class Distribution of
Income in India
Evidence from Income Tax Data (201213)
Rishabh Kumar
Results from the 201213 income
tax data reveal that Indian
incomes, particularly high salaries
and wealth-related income, are
statistically distributed into two
distinct classes. The bulk of the
reported income distribution can
be explained by an exponential
distribution, while a small
fraction at the top follows a more
unequal power law (Pareto)
distribution. This distinction
has important implications for
inequality, and provides a point
of comparison with similar
statistical regularities observed in
rich countries.
Rishabh Kumar (kumar603@newschool.edu)
is a doctoral student at the Department
of Economics, The New School for Social
Research, New York.
58
to measure the shares of top income earn-
I
nformation on tax returns by indi-
viduals, families and businesses has
recently been released by the Central
Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). Drawing
on the data, this article studies the shape
of the distribution of reported incomes
by individuals in India during 201213.
Since independence, there was a tradi-
tion of regularly producing these nation-
al statistics under the All India Income
Tax Statistics (AIITS), but this practice
stopped around 19992000. The recent
data released, although limited to a sin-
gle fiscal year, sheds substantial light on
the concentration of income amongst
top earners as well as wealth-related
sources such as interest, property, busi-
ness and capital gains. The granular
breakdowns of income thresholds provide
important information about the distri-
bution of individual Indian incomes,
consistent with historically observed
statistical regularities.
The general trend amongst econo-
mists and statisticians interested in the
distribution of income is to use survey
data, in the case of India usually through
the various rounds of the National Sam-
ple Survey. These survey data can then
be used to compute inequality measures
such as the Gini or Theil coefficients.
However, surveys tend to be top coded
or do not receive adequate responses
from extremely high-earning members
of the society. The emerging and recent-
ly popularised alternative is to use
administrative data, such as reports of
the Income Tax Department. These high
quality data are cheaper to collect (com-
pared to expensive surveys) since people
are required to automatically report their
incomes to tax authorities.
Originally initiated by Simon Kuznets
in the United States (US), today the effort
FEBRuary 11, 2017
ers using administrative data is being
led by the World Wealth and Income
Database. For India, Banerjee and Piketty
(2005) made the first systematic effort to
measure top incomes between 1922 and
2000 using AIITS.
With the data on hand, income inter-
vals can be used to compute the relative
frequency of tax filers and thereby con-
struct the shape of the income distribu-
tion. Typically, the complementary cumu-
lative distribution function cCDF = P(Y>y)
can offer insight into the upper tail of the
distribution, that is, the proportion of
filers above a given income threshold (y).
Empirical quantities often cluster
around typical values (for example, the
height of males in an urban city), which
make it useful to completely character-
ise distributions using just the mean and
variance. The upper tail diminishes rap-
idly as values deviate a few factors above
the mean. This, however, is not a neces-
sity in economic variables and heavy-
tailed distributions are very often found
in income, wealth and rates of return to
stock market activity. For example, the
incomes of all males in an urban city
could have wide-ranging values depend-
ing on professions, skills, education, etc.
Wealth distributions in particular have
a long tail, extending perhaps to hundreds
and thousands of factors away from the
typical range. Power laws are often used
to characterise such distributions so that
the probability is inversely proportional
to a fixed power of the other (for exam-
ple, P(y)= yn). Unlike thin-tailed distri-
butions, the probability of an extreme
observation decays slowly. The Pareto
distribution is one such heavy-tailed
power law, which originated in eco-
nomics and was used by Vilfredo Pareto
to describe the concentration of land-
ownership amongst a small proportion
of the Italian population.
In this article, I show the two class
structure underlying Indian incomes
reported to the tax authorities in the 2012
13 assessment year. This class structure
is not the usual social class category,
such as labour, capitalists, and entrepre-
neurs, but rather (and relatedly) applies
vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

to the shape of the Indian income dis-
tribution. The bulk of individual in-
comes follow a thin-tailed exponential
distribution which has a well-defined
mean and dispersion along with the par-
ticular property that the mean and
standard deviation are the same. Thus,
higher the mean, more is the degree of
disparity. Within this class, the probabil-
ity of a person reporting income greater
than a few deviations from the mean
decays rapidly because the probability
decays exponentially (P(y)= ey). Salaries
reported by 96%97% of the individuals
can be well accounted for by this distri-
butional law, and the theoretical Lorenz
curve formula agrees with the data.
The upper tail of salaried income (or
the top few percentiles of the salaries
class) and nearly all wealth-related in-
come systematically deviates from this
law and corresponds to the Pareto distri-
bution (or a power law). The estimated
parameter signifies infinite variance,
implying extreme incomes carry a sig-
nificant (in population terms) probabi-
lity. Within this group, we may see (and
so does the data suggest) that individu-
als report hundred or thousand times
the corresponding income threshold
with significant probability. In terms of
income concentration, Pareto or power
laws exhibit scale-free properties or
self-similarity. For example, if 40% of
income is distributed amongst the top
10% of individuals with a Pareto law,
then the top 10% of the top 10% will own
40% of the income share of the top 10%
itself, and so on.
Studies by Dragulescu and Yakovenko
(2001) and Silva and Yakovenko (2004)
have found similar results for wealth
and incomes in the United Kingdom (UK)
and the US, applicable to the top 1%3%
of incomes. In a similar tradition of ap-
plying statistical laws to India, Sinha
(2006) and Jayadev (2008) report evi-
dence for power-law tails for high net
worth individuals using Forbes 400 and
survey data, respectively.
The findings of this article are, to the
best of my knowledge, a first attempt to
approximate the shape of Indian income
distributions across a large cross-section
of tax brackets. I present summary sta-
tistics of reported incomes by category
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017
of incomes. Although the direct tax base
is very limited, it covers about 30 million
individuals over a vast range of incomes.
Property and capital incomes are almost
entirely concentrated amongst a small
fractile (about 1%2%) of the reporting
population. By appropriately scaling
income levels, identifying the exponential
and power law characteristics of incomes
becomes straightforward.
The implied statistical regularities
suggest a two-class structure that differ-
entiates Indian incomes, similar to the
case for advanced economies such as the
US or the UK. The properties of these
distributions are important for income
inequality in the formal sector and
amongst those that report their incomes
to the tax authorities. To gather infer-
ence on these highly aggregated com-
plex systems, I conclude by drawing on
the principle of maximum entropy,1 that
is, the most likely income distribution
that emerges once certain possibilities
are ruled out by knowledge we already
possess such as average incomes or the
growth rate of incomes.
Exponential and
Pareto Distributions
Logarithmic rescaling is commonly
used to graphically assess the exponen-
tial or power law features of a probabi-
lity distribution. If income (y) is expo-
nentially distributed, then it has the
probability distribution function (PDF)
P(y)=(1/T) e(y/T) where the parameter
T is mean income.
The complementary cumulative prob-
ability distribution (cCDF) which gives
the probability of persons reporting in-
come above y is C(y)=e(y/T) and becomes
parameter-free for normalised income
= y/T. Logarithmic transformation of
C(y) results in ln C(y) = (y/T) = ,
thus the empirical distribution should
collapse around a downward sloping lin-
ear trend on a vertical log scale (log
probability). The mean (or expected
value) T equals the standard deviation.
A typical measure of income concen-
tration is the Lorenz curve which depicts
the cumulative share of population on the
horizontal axes and the cumulative share
of income on the vertical axis. For a pure-
ly exponential distribution, Dragulescu
vol liI no 6
NOTES
and Yakovenko (2001) calculated this
relationship as
A = B+(1B) ln (1B)
where A is the cumulative share of
income and B is the cumulative share of
population.
For a Pareto distribution, the proba-
bility of observing very high incomes
decays slowly relative to exponential
distributions and the cCDF is given by
C(y) = (y/ym), where is the so-
called Pareto coefficient and ym is mini-
mum income to which the Pareto distri-
bution applies. The empirical scatterplot
of a Pareto distributed variable will con-
tinue to demonstrate a heavy tail on a
vertical log scale (log probability). On
the loglog scale, the cCDF transforms to
ln C(y) ln (y), resulting in a down-
ward sloping linear trend. Low values of
imply higher inequality and the mean
is defined for > 1, while the variance is
only defined if > 2.
Data and Results
The Income Tax Department published
its return statistics in a similar manner
to previous AIITS reports. The number of
filers are listed for various income
thresholds and pre-processed into in-
come bins with corresponding total
and average income within the bin. In-
come tax returns are reported for differ-
ent categoriesall taxpayers, individu-
als, Hindu Undivided Families (HUF),
firms, association of persons (AoP) or
body of individuals (BoI) and companies.
These categories, to an extent, reflect
the various institutional sectors underly-
ing national accounts. However, for the
purposes of distribution, the most rele-
vant category is individual taxpayers.
The HUF section is also important, but a
complete analysis needs to encompass
inheritance and allocations within fami-
ly members (besides the fact that this
category is more important in measure-
ment of wealth concentration and inher-
itance). Other categories reflect the eco-
nomic activities of firms and businesses
and not wage-earners.
A cursory look at the number of
returns filed in 201213 by individual tax-
payers highlights the low tax base, no
doubt exacerbated by the limited labour
force in the formal sector, tax evasion as
59
NOTES
well as high tax exemptions. As many as
17 million individuals reported no salary
income, while 11.7 million individuals
reported at least some salary income.
Other income categories are more closely
related to the ownership of assets which
generate capital income (property, equities,
businesses, fixed income claims, etc). In
these income sources, the proportion of
filers who report at least some positive
income is much lower, since wealth is more
concentrated than income. Table 1 sum-
marises these statistics by income category.
Table 1: Number of Income Tax Returns
(Based on income category)
Income Category 0 income
Salaries 1,70,89,773
Property 2,67,70,527
Business 1,36,88,033
Long-term capital gains 2,85,66,826
Short-term capital gains 2,83,35,857
Interest income 2,32,74,619
As Table 1 indicates, salaries- and
business-related income are the only
two categories where a significant num-
ber of filers reported positive income
(that is, at least `1). All positive capital-
related incomeproperty, long-term
and short-term capital gains, interest in-
comeare reported by a very small frac-
tion of the total filers. In fact less than 0.2
million individuals reported long-term
positive capital gains. Although there is
no microdata to determine the exact
shares in these reports, it is quite evident
that capital gains from a positive revalu-
ation of existing assets are extremely
concentrated.
Table 2 shows the number of people
above major income thresholds. We see
that salaries are the most broadly appli-
cable categoryover 35% of individuals
reported income above `1.5 million. By
contrast, only 0.24% reported the same
income from short-term capital gain
earnings. A very small fractile (0.00065%)
earned salaries of over `100 million,
although almost double that proportion
of persons reported similar earnings of
long-term capital gains. Given the pau-
city of returns filed, tax evasion and
Table 2: Cumulative Number of Returns
Income Threshold Salaries (%) Property
Income (%)
1,500 35.03 1.88
1,000 3.80 0.12
10,000 0.06000 0.00258
1,00,000 0.00065 0.00002
60
Figure 1: Distribution of Tax Filers by Income Category
(log-log
(Loglog scale)
1 10
100.00000
10.00000
Cumulative percent of people
1.00000
Short-term capital gains
0.10000
0.01000
0.00100
0.00010
> 0 income
0.00001
1,16,76,493
19,95,739
1,13,20,215 under-reporting is quite likely although
1,99,340 many newspapers and dailies in their as-
4,30,409 sessment of this report have incorrectly
54,91,647
confused stocks and flows2the num-
bers filed in these reports only list flows
of income.
Moreover, capital incomes are extreme-
ly concentrated. While 50% of total sala-
ries accrued to 11% of total individuals,
over 80% of property income is received
by 1%. As Table 2 shows, for long- and
short-term capital gains, almost all
income in this category was made by the
top 0.5% to 1%. This is not exactly sur-
prising since wealth is likely to be very
concentrated, hence income drawn from
returns on wealth (interest or capital gains)
will also flow to very few persons. The
number of filers reporting billions of rupees
of annual income tend to range in the
hundreds for salaries and business income.
For capital gains and interest income,
the corresponding number of returns
are at most in single or double digits.
Shape of Income Distribution
Figure 1 plots the cCDF for various in-
comes (salaries, property incomes, busi-
ness, capital gains and interest income)
over the entire range (`1 to `5 billion) on
the loglog scale, for proportionality.
The vertical axis indicates the cumula-
tive probability of tax filers above the
Business (%) Long-term Capital
Gains (%)
39.48 0.35
0.97 0.11
0.03010 0.01367
0.00106 0.00115
Distribution of tax filers by income category
scale)
100 1,000 10,000 1,00,000 10,00,000 1,00,00,000
Salaries
Business
Interest income
Long-term capital gains
Property
Income (000's
Income (000sofofIndian
IndianRupees)
rupees)
income threshold, which is measured on
the horizontal axis. Given that a flatter
slope indicates more inequality (the tail
is longer), two noticeable trends emerge.
First, salaries and business incomes
are relatively less concentrated as op-
posed to capital incomes (interest, prop-
erty and capital gains). Salaries are a
broadly applicable category while many
small business owners (such as shop-
keepers, self-employed professionals)
are counted in business incomes.
Second, for salaries the tail diverges
into a straight line at `1 million. To the
left of this threshold, the datapoints
cluster around the range `0.1 `1 million
with decaying probability (a downward
slope decreasing at an increasing rate).
Figure 2 isolates the right tail for wealth-
related income categories. Depending
upon the income category, this tail cap-
tures the top 2%, 0.3%, 0.2% and 2% of
the population for property incomes,
long-term capital gains, short-term capi-
tal gains and interest incomes, respec-
tively. The chart is loglog scaled and
the points collapse into a straight line as
predicted by the Pareto law.
Two Class Salary Distribution
Since salaries have the broadest applica-
tion, the entire range is plotted in Figure 3
on the loglog scale. The exponential
(Income thresholds in `000) trend (bowed) fits the income range
Short-term Capital Interest leading up to `1 million (the point which
Gains (%) Income (%)
0.24 2.14 bifurcates the Pareto and Exponential),
0.03 0.18 and the Pareto portion falls on the
0.00153 0.00623 straight line. The exponential fit captures
0.00003 0.00011 about 96.3% of the salaried population.
FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 Tail of wealth-related income NOTES
(log-log scale)
Figure 2: Tail of Wealth-related Income exponential category side-by-side with
(Loglog scale)
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 1,00,000 10,00,000 1,00,00,000
the theoretical formula for a purely
100.00000 exponential distribution (A = B+(1B)
ln (1B)) with the former explaining
10.00000
98% of the values in the latter.
Cumulative percent of people

1.00000
Short-term capital gains Discussion
0.10000 This article has shown that statistical
Interest income regularities seen in the distribution of
0.01000
incomes in international and historical
Long-term capital gains
0.00100 perspective are found in reported in-
comes for India in 201213. A complete
0.00010 description of income disparities can be
Property explained as a combination of (at least)
Two-class salary
0.00001 distribution
Income (000s of Indian rupees) two different kinds of probability distri-
(log-log
Figure 3: Two Class Salary Distribution scale) butions. In a fictional experimental
(Loglog scale) sense, it is as if individuals with differ-
0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 1,00,000 10,00,000
100.00000 ent skills and a few members of Indias
Forbes 400 have been packed into the
Cumulative percent of people

10.00000
same room. This is the core of the two
Cumulative percent of people

1.00000 class theory of income distribution

peoples income generating process de-
0.10000
termines their distribution.
0.01000 Although data is limited, one way of
rationalising these statistical regulari-
0.00100
ties is on the basis of the maximum en-
0.00010 tropy principle. This is a common way of
describing complex aggregated systems
0.00001 (such as energy levels of gas particles
Income (000s of Indian rupees)
Lower than `1,000 K Greater than `1,000 K Exponental Pareto in a cylinder) in statistical mechanics
Figure 4A: ExponentialSalaries below `1,000 K downward sloping and Bayesian inference (Jaynes 2003). A
(Vertical log scale) straight line. Figure 4B seminal paper by Foley (1994) argues
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000
100.00000 comprises the Pareto that complex economic systems tend to
Cumulative percent of people

tail for salaries with display statistical (or maximum entropy)

R = 0.9858 an estimated slope of equilibriums rather than general (or
10.00000 -1.913 (the Pareto ex- market clearing) equilibriums.
ponent = 1.913) Interestingly, the development of util-
and thus, the distri- ity maximisation in economics is closely
1.00000 bution has no finite linked to the principle of maximum
Income (000s of Indian rupees)
variance. entropy in physical systems.3
Figure 4B: Pareto: Salaries above `1,000 K
(Loglog scale) In both cases (Fig- If any variable has the probability dis-
100.00000
1 10 100 1,000 10,000 1,00,000 10,00,000
ures 4A and 4B), the tribution function (), then its entropy
fits are good, at R2 = is simply f (xi) log f (xi). This line of
i
Cumulative percent of people

10.00000
99 for the exponen- reasoning argues that the maximum
1.00000
tial bulk and R2 = entropy distribution of any complex
0.10000
99.8 for the Pareto system is the distribution that can be
R2 =R0.9984
= 0.9984
0.01000 tail. Remember that achieved in the largest number of ways
0.00100 the slope for salaries (or combinations), whilst satisfying some
0.00010 is steeper (high abso- prior knowledge or information about
lute value of the expo- the system (such as the expected value).
0.00001
Income (000s of Indian rupees) nent) than the other Maximising the entropy subject to
In Figure 4A, the exponential bulk is income categories, therefore, the vari- known constraints will give the macro-
separately plotted on the vertical log ance cannot be defined either for the level outcome corresponding to the most
scale, in accordance with the logarith- capital gains, interest, etc. number of micro-level combinations.
mic transformation of an exponential Figure 5 (p 62) computes the Lorenz Almost every probability distribution
distribution, the datapoints scatter on a curve for persons who fall within the can be easily derived from this line of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 61
 NOTES
Figure 5: Lorenz Curve for Exponential Bulk
120.00
Cumulative percent of income
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
0.00
reasoning. Thus, for example, the income
distribution amongst persons most like-
ly to be observed can be derived by max-
imising entropy constrained by some
known income statistic such as mean
and (or) variance of income.
The maximum entropy distribution
under a constraint only on the arithmetic
mean of a non-negative variable x results
in the exponential form f(x) e.x,
where is the weight (or in economics,
the shadow price) on the constraint.4
Silva and Yakovenko (2004) argue this
class to be in equilibrium inequality
because decentralised exchange in capi-
talist economies distributes the con-
served variable (wages or salaries)
exponentially.
A Pareto distribution is the maximum
entropy distribution when a constraint
is placed on the expected value of the
logarithm of the variable (the CDF has
the form f(x) x). This can be ration-
alised through the income source for
individuals falling into the Pareto class
(top salaries, capital gains, investment
income). These incomes are closely relat-
ed to the rate of return (where the loga-
rithm implies proportionality of returns),
either through the fates of wealthy port-
folios or compensation (salary) depend-
ent on profitability management.5
Pareto distributions also result from
multiplicative shocks, so that changes in
the variable are proportional to its value.
These shocks may be a windfall gain
such as when entrepreneurs salaries are
linked to equity and a new IPO (initial
public offering) is announced, or a coal
mine owner enjoying a productive year
or a real estate mogul profiting from a
spike in real estate prices. The Classical
or Marxian conjecture of capital seeking
62
Lorenz curve for exponential bulk
Theoretical formula (exponential)
Lorenz Curve (empirical)
20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00
Cumulative percent of people
(and turbulently equalising) the rate of
return across sectors holds resonance.
The Pareto class may be defined as a rel-
ative capitalist class, while the exponen-
tial bulk consists of wage earners.
Conclusions
To conclude, Indias income distribution
statistics have strikingly similar statisti-
cal properties as those observed in rich
and advanced economies. The expected
value of incomes for all but a small
percentage can be described with one
parameter (mean income). For the re-
maining few, the distribution has no
well-defined measure of variance and
invites a sharp disparity of incomes.
The divergence of the upper-income
tail at the 97th percentile and the con-
centration of wealth-related incomes are
in close agreement with the finding of
Silva and Yakovenko (2004) for the US.
Naturally, the question arises: why do
we find similar statistical properties for
two very different economies? Such
political economy aspects of these find-
ings are important, although we need to
aggregate more years of data to establish
persistent facts.
There are still challenges in fully
applying this kind of analysis to India.
First, the tax base is very low, hence not
many people report incomes to tax
authorities in the first place. Second, the
pervasiveness of tax evasion and black
money sources (particularly in property
and real estate) needs accounting, to
gather a more complete picture of in-
come inequality. Finally, the CBDT
should regularise these reports and also
start reporting similar statistics on
collection of wealth and property taxes.
This will allow economists and social
FEBRuary 11, 2017
statisticians to start similar studies on
the distribution of Indian wealth, about
which very little is known.
Notes
1 Also known as the Principle of Insufficient Rea-
son. See Foley (1994) for a discussion of these
issues in economics.
2 The wealth of high net worth persons (such as
the many dollar millionaires) pertains to a
stock. It is only when such people earn returns
on these assets, will such wealth result in in-
come flows.
3 See Mirowski (1992) for the related history of
neoclassical economic theory and physics.
4 In statistical physics, this exponential distri-
bution is known as the GibbsBoltzmann dis-
tribution.
5 For an exposition of the power law wealth dis-
tribution based on maximising entropy, an ex-
cellent proof is given in Castaldi and Milakovic
(2007).
References
Banerjee, A and T Piketty (2005): Top Indian
Incomes, 19222000, World Bank Economic
Review, Vol 19, pp 120.
Castaldi, C and M Milakovic (2007): Turnover Ac-
tivity in Wealth Portfolios, Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol 63,
pp 53752.
Dragulescu, A and V M Yakovenko (2001): Expo-
nential and Power-law Probability Distribu-
tions of Wealth and Income in the United King-
dom and the United States, Physica A: Stati-
stical Mechanics and Its Applications, Vol 299,
pp 21321.
Foley, D K (1994): A Statistical Equilibrium Theory
of Markets, Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol 62, pp 32145.
Jayadev, A (2008): A Power Law Tail in Indias
Wealth Distribution: Evidence from Survey
Data, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its
Applications, Vol 387, pp 27076.
Jaynes, E T (2003): Probability Theory: The Logic of
Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Mirowski, P (1992): More Heat Than Light: Eco-
nomics as Social Physics, Physics as Natures
Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Silva, A C and V M Yakovenko (2004): Temporal
Evolution of the Thermal and Superthermal
Income Classes in the US during 19832001,
Europhysics, Vol 69, pp 304.
Sinha, S (2006): Evidence for Power-law Tail of
the Wealth Distribution in India, Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications,
Vol 359, pp 55562.
available at
Oxford Bookstore-Mumbai
Apeejay House
3, Dinshaw Vacha Road
Mumbai 400 020
Ph: 66364477
vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
DISCUSSION
Poverty Alleviation in Bihar
Alternative Views
Pradeep Kumar Mishra
The paper Eliminating Poverty in
Bihar: Paradoxes, Bottlenecks and
Solutions is near perfect in terms
of the issues raised. But there is
a need to go beyond focusing on
the economic and infrastructural
aspects of development.
A complex society like Bihar
needs a revolution in terms
of bureaucratic restructuring,
remittance-based planning,
and promotion of an
entrepreneurial culture.
Pradeep Kumar Mishra (pkmishra@ximb.ac.in)
teaches at the School of Rural Management,
Xavier University, Bhubaneswar.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRUARY 11, 2017
M
ihir Shahs paper Eliminating
Poverty in Bihar: Paradoxes,
Bottlenecks and Solutions
(EPW, 6 February 2016) provides a well-
thought of and almost comprehensive
idea of possible solutions to the problem
of eliminating poverty in Bihar. Howev-
er, a close reading suggests that it over-
looks a few important issues. While I
agree with a majority of the suggestions
made by Shah, I find weaknesses par-
ticularly in suggestions on three points
agriculture, self-help groups (SHGs), and
interventions of the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA).
Agriculture-based Approach
First of all, about 30% of rural house-
holds in Bihar were landless in 200203
(Alam 2009). According to a survey con-
ducted by the Communist Party of India
(MarxistLeninist), about 60% of rural
families are landless (DNA 2014). This
survey cannot be taken at its face value,
but it is true for certain areas. About 90%
of the landowners are small and marginal
farmers as per the Census of India 2011.
Hence, agriculture development as a
poverty alleviation strategy must be ex-
amined with caution. First of all, the re-
lationship between per-worker growth
in agriculture gross domestic product
(GDP) and poverty reduction is signifi-
cant in limited number of places only
(Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre 2010).
Given that 81% of workforce in Bihar de-
pends on agriculture (p 57), the state
would be better off by focusing on the
non-agriculture growth. The fact that
about 4.55.0 million people from Bihar
migrate to other places in search of live-
lihood is an indicator of this situation
(IIPA 2010).
I do not argue that growth in agricul-
ture sector is not useful and it is also
vol lII no 6
true that Bihar needs a much more com-
prehensive approach to move ahead in
agriculture sector as pointed out by
Shah (p 47), but it might not have an
extensive impact on reducing poverty.
SHG-based Approach
The second problem lies with the sug-
gested SHG-based approach and the
potential of MGNREGA interventions. A
report by the Mahila Abhivruddhi Society,
Andhra Pradesh (2014) says that 56% of
SHGs in Bihar were of A grade. My own
observation in Rajasthan is that good
quality SHGs are much less in proportion.
We cannot compare SHGs formed by
organisations like Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (MYRADA) and
Professional Assistance for Development
Action (PRADAN) with SHGs formed by
government agencies. The success of
SHGs is limited and they cannot be con-
sidered as panacea for all problems.
When it comes to MGNREGA, let us not
forget that the ultimate purpose of it is to
provide employment to unskilled workers
on demand; that also with minimum
wage. Despite all its potentials, MGNREGA
as a long-term poverty alleviation strate-
gy cannot be taken at its face value. The
maximum expectation from this can be
that it could be a fallback option when
there are no other sources of employ-
ment. It may be argued that through
MGNREGA assets have been developed in
villages, but such assets can be developed
under any other programme too, and
most of such assets are of short to medium
term (15 years) in nature.
Governance Challenges
To make the interventions effective,
there has to be a fundamental change in
the way Bihar is governed. Unlike other
backward states (with the exception of
some parts of Uttar Pradesh), Bihar is
perceived to be facing a serious law and
order deficit. Though such perceptions
heightened in 1990s, this current situa-
tion is not exactly a creation of that era.
There was already a history of lack of
good governance in Bihar (Bharti 1991).
But during the tenure of the previous
government, the situation exacerbated
63
DISCUSSION

(Alam 2009; Kumar 2009; Sharma
1995).
Bihar has a strong caste-based identi-
ty and the social structure that deter-
mines the access to resources (Chakra-
varti 2001), probably led to such a law
and order crisis. Bharti (1991) argued
that the old socio-economic structure
was challenged in the early 1990s, but
the benefit of such a challenge went to a
limited group of people (Kumar 2009). It
never percolated to the masses. Thus
poverty in the state is not just the result
of poor infrastructure and low standard
of technology transfer in agriculture,
but also of the subversion of law and or-
der for a long period of time (several
decades at least). This led to a situation
in which the state was not able to foster
a positive social change. The required
educational, health, and social security
could not be delivered. A lot has im-
proved in the last one and a half decades
but it is still inadequate.
This must be supplemented by re-
vamping the state machinery as the ma-
jority of the proposed interventions are
going to be implemented by the existing
state machinery. Shah (p 64) recognises
the lack of capacity of this actor. Apart
from it, the dubious role of state machin-
ery has also been pointed out by some
scholars (Kumar 2009). Revamping is
required not just within the state bureau-
cracy but the support of non-government
actors is also required.
One must look beyond the govern-
ment for such implementation. Civil so-
ciety and market, the two other compo-
nents elaborated in the new governance
framework should provide the much-
needed support. Of course, the govern-
ment has a crucial regulatory and facili-
tating role, but it has limits; had every-
thing been left to the government we
would have no white revolution in this
country. Diversifying the role of imple-
mentation would also bring many inno-
vative solutions.
Specific Initiatives
The state must continue to ensure ac-
tions in the above fundamental areas.
Being dynamic in nature, once a certain
benchmark is attained, new benchmarks
would be required (say going to the level
of top ranked states, then looking for a
global standard, and so on). At each level,
specific activities would be required. As
for now, the following activities (apart
from the existing initiatives that are on
cards, like the suggestions made by
Shah), would be appropriate:
Migration support: Bihar is highly de-
pendent on migration. As mentioned
earlier, about five million people migrate
to other places. Bihar is a state from
which migration rate is very high2.7%
in 2001 (Census of India 2001). Now it
would be about 5%. With such a high
rate of migration, the state has continu-
ously drawn flak from several quarters,
particularly from Shiv Sena and parties
with similar approach in Maharashtra.
Shah mentioned that the recent im-
plementation of MGNREGA programme
had toned down outmigration, still the
importance of migration is going to be
there. Hence, there must be some serious
initiatives related to supporting mi-
grantsin terms of skill-building, issuing
identity cards, and providing official
placement support. This will make the

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64 FEBRUARY 11, 2017 vol lII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

migrants better-skilled and eligible for
more remunerative jobs. In the absence
of social security, the plight of the mi-
grants is not unknown; their children
drop out, they do not get loans, they do
not get benefits of government schemes
and so on. There are examples of such
migration support in other parts of India
for example, Ajeevika Bureau, Udaipur,
a non-governmental organisation works
on similar issues and has successfully
dealt with such problems (Khandelwal
et al 2012). Given the huge number of
migrants from Bihar, the approach has
to be much more broad-based and needs
some government support at least in
legal and legislative terms.
Building entrepreneurial culture: One
reason why schemes like MGNREGA have
a limited potential is that such schemes
make a direct effect on the public spend-
ing. The state governments in India are
not known to be prudent in managing
their finances and several states are sit-
ting on huge piles of debt. Under such
constraints, a livelihood option invaria-
bly based on public spending may not be
sustainable in the long-run, particularly
during crisis situations. If such liveli-
hoods are market-linked, it is likely to
face natural booms and recessions for
which the entrepreneur has to be pre-
pared. Under such crisis situations, the
government support may be called for.
This is a more reasonable proposition
than the perpetual dependence on the
government.
Farmer producer organisations: Shah
(p 59) suggests that farmer producer or-
ganisations (FPOs) hold the key to fu-
ture. I completely agree with this view.
However, how far the FPOs, for example,
producer companies, would fare if such
organisations are promoted by govern-
ment is a big question. We have already
witnessed that cooperatives have suc-
ceeded only when they have been able to
do with minimum intervention of the
government. At best the government
can provide an enabling environment in
which producer organisations would
operate freely. Further with regard to
organising the artisans in Bihar, the sug-
gestion is that Organising these weavers
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRUARY 11, 2017
DISCUSSION
into SHGs and SHG Federations could an environment, millions of flowers
help overcome the syndrome of indebt- will bloom.
edness (p 63). Why do we always need
to go through the SHG-route to reach the References
stage of producer organisations? The Alam, M S (2009): Can Lalu Prasad Reclaim Lost
SHGs do not always work. Simple pro- Ground, Economic & Political Weekly, 44 (17),
pp 1114.
ducer organisations would do better in APMAS (2014): Quality and Sustainability of Self
many places. A paper suggesting policy Help Groups in Bihar and Odisha Study Com-
directions for government making such missioned by NABARD, 201314, https://
www.nabard.org/Publication/QualitySustain-
sweeping solution may not always be in- abilityofSHGsinBiharandOdisaH.pdf, viewed
terpreted in its true spirit. on 16 February 2016.
Bharti, I (1991): Survival against Heavy Odds,
Conclusions Economic & Political Weekly, 26 (3), pp 9193.
Census of India (2001): Data Highlights: Migra-
The subtle flaw in the suggestions of tion Tables, http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_
Shah lies not with its content, but the Products/Data_Highlights/Data_Highlights_
link/data_highlights_D1D2D3.pdf, viewed on
way a few of the suggestions have been 15 February 2016.
positioned. The effectiveness in SHGs Cevantes-Godoy, D and J Dewbre (2010): Economic
and MGNREGA cannot be achieved in Importance of Agriculture for Poverty Reduc-
tion, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
making it saturated, but in recognising Working Papers No 23, France: Organisation
that there are inherent weaknesses in for Economic Co-operation and Development.
these approaches. As we recognise such Chakravarti, A (2001): Caste and Agrarian Crisis:
A View from Bihar, Economic & Political Week-
flaws, we would design new solutions ly, 36 (17), pp 144962.
not only to make these programmes DNA (2014): 60% Rural Families Landless in Bi-
more effective, but also to discard these har: According to Socio-Economic Survey by
CPI-ML, DNAIndia.com, 16 November, http://
approaches where they would not pro-
www.dnaindia.com/india/report-60-rural-
vide the desired results. That would families-landless-in-bihar-according-to-socio-
serve two purposesfirst it would yield economic-survey-by-cpi-ml-2035714, 16 Febru-
ary 2016.
better results, and second, it would save
Kumar, A (2009): Illegitimacy of the State in
resources, which would otherwise be Bihar, Economic & Political Weekly, 44 (44),
wasted away, for investment in other pp 811.
suitable activities. IIPA (2010): Abstract of the study Bihari Migrant
Labourers: Incidence, Causes and Remedies,
The need to recognise is that while Research Report by Girish Kumar and Pranab
the government must work to its fullest Banerji, http://www.iipa.org.in/cus_res.html,
viewed on 21 February 2016.
potential in its regulatory and facilit-
Khandelwal, R, A Sharma and D Varma (2012):
ating role, it should not barge into areas Creative Practices and Policies for Better Inclu-
where it is not good at. In a society like sion of Migrants: The Experience of Ajeevika
Bihar, where repression of certain cate- Bureau in Workshop Compendium Vol 2 (Na-
tional Workshop on Internal Migration and Hu-
gory of people has been historically man Development in India, 67 December
allowed, there are chances that many 2011, New Delhi), UNESCO and UNICEF, New
Delhi.
hidden talents would flourish in a free
Sharma, A K (1995): Political Economy of Poverty
and unrestrained environment. If the in Bihar, Economic & Political Weekly, 30 (41
government is able to provide such 42), pp 258702.
EPW Index
An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968 to
2012. The PDFs of the Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW
website. Visitors can download the Index for all the years from the site. (The
Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded when
ready.)
EPW would like to acknowledge the help of the staff of the library of the
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, in preparing the
index under a project supported by the RD Tata Trust.
vol lII no 6 65
CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign TradeMerchandise

The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI inched up to 3.4% in
December 2016 from 3.2% in November 2016 and against -1.1%, a year ago.
The index for primary article decreased by 0.3% in December 2016 compared
to 4.6% in December 2015, with index for food articles declining by (-)0.7%
against 7.9% last year. The index for fuel and power increased substantially
by 8.7% in December 2016 over (-)9.2% in December 2015. The index for
manufactured products rose by 3.7% compared to the fall of 1.5%, in the same
period last year.
The merchandise trade deficit narrowed to $10.4 billion (bn) in December 2016
from $11.5 bn in December 2015. Exports and imports increased by 5.7% and 0.5%
to $23.9 bn and $34.3, respectively, in December 2016 compared to $22.6 bn and
$34.1 bn, a year ago. Oil imports were higher by 14.6% at $7.6 bn, while non-oil
imports were lower by (-)3% at $26.6 bn in December 2016 compared to $6.7 bn and
$27.4 bn, last year. During AprilDecember 201617, the trade deficit narrowed to
$76.5 bn from $100.1 bn, last year. Cumulative exports rose by 0.8% to $198.8 bn
and imports declined by (-)7.4% to $275.4 bn during AprilDecember 201617.

Consumer Price Index Index of Industrial Production

After a two-year low of 3.6% in November 2016, the CPI inflation rate eased further
to 3.4% in December 2016 and was considerably lower as compared to 5.6%
witnessed a year ago. Consumer food price inflation slowed substantially to 1.4% in
December 2016 from 6.4% in December 2015. The rural and urban inflation rates
decreased to 3.8% and 2.9%, respectively, in December 2016 compared to 6.3% and
4.7% last year. As per the Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for agricultural
labourers and industrial workers decreased substantially to 2.7% and 2.2%,
respectively, in December 2016 from 5.7% and 6.3%, respectively, in December 2015.
The y-o-y growth rate of IIP increased to 5.7% in November 2016 against -3.4%, a year
ago. The index of eight core industries grew by 5.6% in December 2016 compared to
2.9% in December 2015. Growth in coal production and electricity generation slowed
to 4.4% and 6.0%, respectively, in December 2016 from 5.3% and 8.8%, last year.
Fertiliser production declined sharply by (-)4.7% in December 2016 against 13.5%,
a year ago, and growth in crude oil and natural gas production continued to fall for the
10th month in a row at -0.8% and -0.01%, respectively, in December 2015. Steel
production increased by 14.9%, in December 2016, against -3.1% in December 2015.

Movement of WPI Sub-indices JanuaryDecember 2016 Merchandise Trade December 2016

Year-on-Year in %
December 2016 Over Month Over Year AprilDecember
12 ($ bn) (%) (%) (201617 over 201516) (%)
Exports 23.9 19.4 5.7 0.7
8.7% Imports 34.3 3.7 0.5 -7.4
6 Trade Deficit 10.4 -20.3 -9.9 -23.5
Primary Articles
3.7% Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
0.3%
0
Trade Deficits April 2015December 2016
Manufactured Products $ billion

-6 0

Non-oil Trade Deficit

Fuel and Power -3
-12
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec -$4.9 bn
2016 -$5.5 bn
-6
* Data is provisional.
Oil Trade Deficit
Trends in WPI and Its Components December 2016* (%) -9
Total Trade Deficit
Financial Year (Averages) -$ 10.4bn
Weights Over Month Over Year 201314 201415 201516 -12
All commodities 100 -0.2 3.4 6.0 2.0 -2.5
Primary articles 20.1 -1.2 0.3 9.9 3.0 0.3 -15
April M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J J A S O N Dec
Food articles 14.3 -2.2 -0.7 12.9 6.1 3.4 2015 2016
Fuel and power 14.9 0.7 8.7 10.3 -0.9 -11.7 Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
Manufactured products 65.0 0.1 3.7 3.0 2.4 -1.1
* Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of Components of IIP Growth April 2015November 2016
Year-on-Year in %
Movement of CPI Inflation April 2015December 2016 16
Year-on-Year in %

8
Electricity 8.9%
8
Rural 5.5%
3.9%
6
0

Mining
4 Manufacturing
3.8% -8
CPI (Combined) Urban 3.4% April M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J J A S O Nov*
2.9% 2015 2016
2 * November 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100.

0
Growth in Eight Core Industries December 2016* (%)
April M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J J A S O N Dec* Financial Year (Avgs)
2015 2016 Weights Over Month Over Year
201415 201516
* December 2016 is provisional. Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO); Base: 2012=100.
General index # 100.0 -1.3 5.7 2.8 2.4
Infrastructure industries 37.9 6.1 5.6 4.5 3.2
Inflation in CPI and Its Components December 2016* (%)
Coal 4.4 6.3 4.4 8.1 4.5
Latest Month Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
Weights Index Month Year 201415 201516 Crude oil 5.2 6.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4
CPI combined 100 130.4 -0.6 3.4 5.9 4.9 Natural gas 1.7 2.5 0.0 -4.9 -4.2
Consumer food 39.1 133.1 -1.8 1.4 6.3 4.9 Petroleum refinery products 5.9 7.7 6.4 0.3 3.7
Miscellaneous 28.3 123.9 0.1 4.7 4.6 3.7 Fertilisers 1.3 -3.7 -4.7 -0.1 12.2
CPI: Occupation-wise Steel 6.7 13.4 14.9 4.7 -1.2
IIndustrial workers (2001=100) 275.0 -0.7 2.2 6.3 5.6 Cement 2.4 7.2 -8.7 5.6 4.9
Agricultural labourers (198687=100) 876.0 -0.2 2.7 6.6 4.4 Electricity 10.3 1.0 6.0 8.4 6.8
* Provisional; Source: CSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL). * Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100; # November 2016. Source: CSO and Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

66 febrUARY 11, 2017 vol LII no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
Indias Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
201415 201516 201617
` crore | at 201112 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Private final consumption expenditure 1406817 (8.2) 1422029 (9.2) 1495823 (1.5) 1539614 (6.6) 1504442 (6.9) 1511464 (6.3) 1618333 (8.2) 1666888 (8.3) 1605527 (6.7) 1625619 (7.6)
Government final consumption expenditure 294338 (9.0) 322557 (15.4) 261886 (33.2) 223826 (-3.3) 293720 (-0.2) 333116 (3.3) 269808 (3.0) 230308 (2.9) 349059 (18.8) 383906 (15.2)
Gross fixed capital formation 832420 (8.3) 828754 (2.2) 843733 (3.7) 903344 (5.4) 891627 (7.1) 909117 (9.7) 853858 (1.2) 886147 (-1.9) 863956 (-3.1) 858337 (-5.6)
Change in stocks 48976 (23.0) 48434 (20.6) 45077 (16.0) 52521 (21.6) 50754 (3.6) 51068 (5.4) 48547 (7.7) 55448 (5.6) 54345 (7.1) 53462 (4.7)
Valuables 42871 (16.3) 38194 (0.3) 37174 (10.8) 55036 (32.2) 43138 (0.6) 42932 (12.4) 42192 (13.5) 45549 (-17.2) 22129 (-48.7) 22756 (-47.0)
Net trade (Exportimport) -40831 -55355 -45813 -13988 -60253 -78201 -59076 -15520 -3901 -15305
Exports 620869 (11.6) 625875 (1.1) 636468 (2.0) 625191 (-6.3) 585324 (-5.7) 599264 (-4.3) 579684 (-8.9) 613471 (-1.9) 604052 (3.2) 601193 (0.3)
Less imports 661700 (-0.6) 681230 (4.6) 682281 (5.7) 639179 (-6.1) 645577 (-2.4) 677465 (-0.6) 638760 (-6.4) 628991 (-1.6) 607953 (-5.8) 616498 (-9.0)
Discrepancies -49687 -36835 21305 29933 761 -7146 78020 143210 26232 34059
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2534903 (7.5) 2567778 (8.3) 2659185 (6.6) 2790285 (6.7) 2724188 (7.5) 2762350 (7.6) 2851682 (7.2) 3012029 (7.9) 2917348 (7.1) 2962834 (7.3)

Indias Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

201516 ($ mn) 201617 ($ mn) 201516 (` bn) 201617 (` bn)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Current account -6132 -8559 -7121 -338 -299 -3450 -389 [-1.2] -556 [-1.7] -469 [-1.4] -23 [-0.1] -20 [-0.1] -231 [-0.6]
Merchandise -34175 -37173 -33975 -24755 -23833 -25642 -2169 -2415 -2240 -1671 -1594 -1717
Invisibles 28043 28614 26854 24417 23535 22192 1780 1859 1770 1648 1574 1486
Services 17751 17835 18013 16077 15769 16273 1127 1159 1187 1085 1055 1090
of which: Software services 17512 18058 18556 17328 17569 17699 1111 1173 1223 1170 1175 1185
Transfers 16153 16263 15250 14961 13965 13865 1025 1057 1005 1010 934 928
of which: Private 16267 16421 15305 15146 14161 14048 1033 1067 1009 1022 947 941
Income -5861 -5484 -6408 -6621 -6200 -7946 -372 -356 -422 -447 -415 -532
Capital account 18637 8121 10915 3455 7104 12706 1183 [3.7] 528 [1.6] 720 [2.1] 233 [0.6] 475 [1.4] 851 [2.3]
of which: Foreign investment 10226 3150 11256 7259 6192 23246 649 205 742 490 414 1557
Overall balance 11430 -856 4056 3274 6969 8512 725 [2.3] -56 [-0.2] 267 [0.8] 221 [0.6] 466 [1.3] 570 [1.6]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

27 January 29 January 31 March Over Over Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2017 2016 2016 Month Year 201516 201617 201112 201213 201314 201415 201516
` crore 2322130 2229700 2229020 26400 92430 219300 93110 108086 82800 251570 322660 218620
$ mn 340655 330619 337605 2640 10036 9311 3050 -14361 -485 16769 40486 16297

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` crore 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Money Supply (M3) as on 20 January 12156100 111150 (0.9) 735790 (6.4) 870150 (8.2) 538490 (4.6) 1127560 (13.4) 1032780 (10.9) 1067450 (10.1)
Components
Currency with public 912680 129770 (16.6) -604600 (-39.8) 131090 (9.5) -684570 (-42.9) 104760 (9.2) 140370 (11.3) 211060 (15.2)
Demand deposits 1177810 -22360 (-1.9) 266200 (29.2) 19980 (2.2) 187970 (19.0) 58760 (7.8) 79650 (9.8) 98210 (11.0)
Time deposits 10050080 3480 (0.0) 1071320 (11.9) 721000 (8.7) 1035010 (11.5) 965330 (14.9) 800140 (10.7) 757310 (9.2)
Other deposits with RBI 15530 270 (1.8) 2870 (22.7) -1930 (-13.2) 80 (0.5) -1270 (-39.2) 12620 (640.6) 860 (5.9)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 3929350 116360 (3.1) 636850 (19.3) 285100 (9.5) 690860 (21.3) 335850 (12.4) -37470 (-1.2) 231090 (7.7)
Bank credit to commercial sector 7967160 73330 (0.9) 360560 (4.7) 556870 (7.9) 164090 (2.1) 777430 (13.7) 604440 (9.4) 753340 (10.7)
Net foreign exchange assets 2644410 50100 (1.9) 202820 (8.3) 190940 (8.5) 110690 (4.4) 287280 (17.6) 326710 (17.0) 283070 (12.6)
Banking sectors net non-monetary liabilities 2409430 129970 (5.7) 467550 (24.1) 164850 (9.3) 429860 (21.7) 275010 (16.8) -137040 (-7.2) 202540 (11.4)
Reserve Money as on 27 January 2017 1497170 61600 (4.3) -508410 (-25.3) 77120 (4.0) -683570 (-31.3) 217860 (14.4) 195710 (11.3) 252280 (13.1)
Components
Currency in circulation 1016720 78340 (8.3) -567460 (-35.8) 135870 (9.4) -646740 (-38.9) 110090 (9.2) 147240 (11.3) 215150 (14.9)
Bankers deposits with RBI 465110 -15870 (-3.3) 57060 (14.0) -57510 (-12.4) -36710 (-7.3) 109020 (34.0) 35860 (8.3) 36260 (7.8)
Other deposits with RBI 15340 -880 (-5.4) 1990 (14.9) -1240 (-8.5) -110 (-0.7) -1280 (-39.5) 12630 (644.4) 860 (5.9)
Sources
Net RBI credit to government 210250 157930 (301.9) -203780 (-49.2) 49510 (13.6) -214740 (-50.5) 108120 (18.3) -334180 (-47.8) 60470 (16.6)
of which: Centre 208430 157600 (310.1) -205400 (-49.6) 52800 (14.6) -216130 (-50.9) 107150 (18.1) -336620 (-48.3) 63530 (17.6)
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector -247140 -106180 (75.3) -403950 (-257.6) -45690 (-22.6) -551670 (-181.2) 14070 (32.4) 145020 (0.0) 102030 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 2465950 15810 (0.6) 116930 (5.0) 221740 (10.4) 82470 (3.5) 244460 (15.7) 324760 (18.0) 256200 (12.0)
Govts currency liabilities to the public 24620 0 (0.0) 3100 (14.4) 2080 (10.7) 2710 (12.4) 2000 (13.0) 2100 (12.1) 2470 (12.7)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 956510 5970 (0.6) 20710 (2.2) 150530 (19.2) 2340 (0.2) 150810 (21.8) -58050 (-6.9) 168900 (21.5)

Scheduled Commercial Banks Indicators ( ` crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 20 Jnuary 2017) 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Aggregate deposits 10495280 -20960 (-0.2) 1277010 (13.9) 684990 (8.0) 1167990 (12.5) 955110 (14.1) 827720 (10.7) 794010 (9.3)
Demand 1064430 -21540 (-2.0) 252310 (31.1) 18090 (2.3) 175440 (19.7) 51620 (7.8) 80110 (11.2) 94960 (12.0)
Time 9430840 580 (0.0) 1024690 (12.2) 666890 (8.6) 992550 (11.8) 903480 (14.8) 747620 (10.7) 699030 (9.0)
Cash in hand 63700 -77640 (-54.9) 2420 (3.9) 7930 (14.9) 6270 (10.9) 5380 (13.3) 7480 (16.3) 4080 (7.6)
Balance with RBI 432000 840 (0.2) 51210 (13.4) 7710 (2.1) 44560 (11.5) 34080 (12.1) 56740 (17.9) 14360 (3.8)
Investments 3583020 -26230 (-0.7) 883600 (32.7) 207590 (8.3) 957510 (36.5) 206720 (10.3) 279010 (12.6) 133680 (5.4)
of which: Government securities 3580180 -26020 (-0.7) 882630 (32.7) 207800 (8.3) 956250 (36.4) 207540 (10.4) 278560 (12.6) 134180 (5.4)
Bank credit 7417780 69720 (0.9) 362300 (5.1) 519060 (7.9) 168160 (2.3) 733640 (13.9) 542320 (9.0) 713200 (10.9)
of which: Non-food credit 7313760 70770 (1.0) 360470 (5.2) 511290 (7.9) 169400 (2.4) 731610 (14.2) 546350 (9.3) 702360 (10.9)

Capital Markets 3 February Month Year Financial Year So Far 201516 End of Financial Year
2017 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 201314 201415 201516
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100) 28241 (16.6) 26643 24223 (-16.5) 24674 29045 22952 29044 22386 (18.8) 27957 (24.9) 25342 (-9.4)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100) 9038 (21.4) 8423 7442 (-15.9) 7656 9203 7051 8980 6707 (18.1) 8607 (28.3) 7835 (-9.0)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100) 3790 (22.0) 3532 3106 (-14.2) 3193 3844 2938 3691 2681 (17.2) 3538 (31.9) 3259 (-7.9)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000) 8741 (18.7) 8192 7362 (-15.9) 7546 8953 6971 8834 6704 (18.0) 8491 (26.7) 7738 (-8.9)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)* 168588 (2.8) 168425 163921 (-0.7) - - - - 149745 (9.9) 168116 (12.3) 166107 (-1.2)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW febrUARY 11, 2017 vol LII no 6 67
 POSTSCRIPT
MIGRATION

Of Migrants and Mindsets

A train journey unravels the experiences of migrant workers in Kerala.

C S Venkiteswaran

A
friend, who has worked and lived in Kolkata for the on the part of the hosts to acknowledge them as humans,
last 15 years, was travelling by train to her home town equal and real.
in Kerala recently. It was her annual visit to spend a While listening to their endless banter about Malayalees,
few days with her ageing parents. As she couldnt get a reser- my friend had a feeling of dj vu and was reminded of a
vation in the AC coach, she was travelling by second class. striking parallel. She had heard the same kind of Gulf
The coach was thronged with young men from Bengal and jokes and similar kinds of hilarious incidents recounted by
Odisha who were on their way to Kerala. They were very Malayalee migrants about their workplaces in the Middle
young, between the ages of 15 and 30, from interior villages East and the dealings with their Arab employers. Here, the
and agricultural families. From their interactions, it was tables had turned, with the same Malayalees who made fun
evident that almost all of them had attended some years of of the rich Arabs now being the butt of ridicule for the very
schooling or college. Each of them invariably had a mobile same attitudes.
phone, ranging from smartphones to the small, rustic Not that every migrant wage-earner and Malayalee wage-
Nokias. Throughout the journey they were talking on the payer is like this, but in the migrant narratives, the host
phones, or watching videos in groups, laughing and com- community always tends to take on a certain stereotypical
menting loudly. The queue at the charging point for mobile image, assuming weird habits and outlandish personality
phones at the end of the compartment was perpetually traits. Such comic subversions are also a coping strategy
crowded, with four or five phones stuck to the One of the most to make sense of the alien surroundings into
multi-plug adaptor and being charged, their painful and striking which the migrants are suddenly thrown. These
red lights glimmering. At all hours of the day and observations they in-house narratives are mostly associated with
night, the youngstersall malewere constantly made was about the the hosts total disconnect with the ground reali-
walking up and down, sharing seats and berths, propensity of the ties or the sweat and grind of labour, which is an
snacks and drinks, jokes and gossip. Into the sec-
average Malayalee internal assertion and assurance of the migrant
ond day of the journey, when they had all settled identity, for it is what he/she is paid for and en-
to look sideways
down, the senior ones among them began talking gaged in, day in, day out. It is also a way in which
or tangentially
about their experiences in Kerala. They had been the migrants can humanise the alien-ness of
while dealing with
working in Kerala for the past few years, while their bosses, and customise them into their
the eager listeners were on their first trip, lapping
them; there was a own everyday discourses. Most importantly,
up their tales about the alien land towards which
certain diffidence such reactions reflect and capture the essence of
they were headed. or refusal to look the migrant life in curious ways; a very pungent
Interestingly, they were talking about the strange the migrant worker summary about the tenor and texture of the
and funny habits, behaviour, and beliefs of Malay- in the eye hospitality they receive at the destination where
alees: their obsession with personal cleanliness and daily they have come seeking livelihood, leaving their homes
bathing rituals, their children who are rarely found playing behind. These jokes also painfully indicate the insularity of
on the streets, working in paddy fields, or loitering in the migrant lives, which are totally cut off from those of the
neighbourhood, their general aversion to manual work, etc. hosts or locals. Crucially, these are jokes that are not
They were recounting amusing incidents about their meant to reach the ears of their subjects, in which case these
Malayalee bosses or muthalalis (pronounced with a distinct may potentially trigger an exchange or dialogue of some
accent) who didnt have a clue about the crucial little details kind. If kept insular and denied airing and reciprocation,
of the work at the ground level, and about their inefficiency these jokes may gather moss and fester whenever
in terms of supervision and in negotiating wages, being sur- circumstances turn volatile.
prisingly stingy on certain occasions, and at other times Sadly, it is panic and suspicion that presently mark all the
foolishly generous. One of the most painful and striking public and media discourses about migrant workers living in
observations they made was about the propensity of the Kerala, despite the fact that it is they who literally move its
average Malayalee to look sideways or tangentially while economy. This is also very strange and paradoxical for a soci-
dealing with them; there was a certain diffidence or refusal ety like Kerala, which has a long and complex diasporic his-
to look the migrant worker in the eye. This, the young work- tory. Kerala has been a money order economy for a long
ers felt, was a kind of denial of their humanity, a hesitation time, and during the last century, Malayalees have migrated
68 february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
MIGRATION | GENDER

to all the major cities in India and South East Asia, to the
Middle East in the 1970s, and to the United States and Europe in
recent decades. Kerala need only wake up to its cosmopoli-
tan heritage, and tradition of hospitality and openness to the
outside world, which in turn have nurtured its economy, ex-
panded its political vision, and enriched its culture. Distrust
and hatred towards migrant workers only lay bare the star-
tling lack of self-reflexivity, and the inability to transform
collective social experience and memory into sustainable
and humane modes of togetherness. Only then can we break
this mutually exclusive and insular circulation of jokes and
begin to laugh together.
C S Venkiteswaran (venkitycs@gmail.com) is a film critic and commentator based in
Thiruvananthapuram.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 69
 POSTSCRIPT
MIGRATION | GENDER

women, the patriarchal and social expectation of a domestic,

conformist female who patiently caters to the needs of
their men and children continues to prevail in our society.
Even today, a man helping in the kitchen during festivals
is a rare sight. Cooking also makes women invisible
from the public spaces of celebration, which are dominated
by males.
Exceptional culinary skills displayed during ceremonies
render a unique aura, one of conformity to the idea of the
woman in the patriarchal sense. Food in festivals becomes
symbolic of the conservative male desire for ritualised and
structured domesticity. Festivals infuse a sense of gendered
responsibility in women.
The figure of the cooking woman as a bearer of tradi-
tion and culture occupies centre stage in festivals, which
demands culinary expertise in terms of exclusive religious

Festive Kitchens and cultural cuisine. Patriarchy expects women not only to
cook well, but also to demonstrate her culinary skills as a
successful wife, daughter, and mother. Ignorance of specific
Women and girls cook on most days and even more dishes becomes tantamount to violation and an inability to
during festivals, while the men and boys rejoice. uphold the knowledge of traditional cuisine. The tastes,
smells and colours of various food items permeating the
kitchen accord a culturally flavoured identity to women
Divya N
during festivals.

D
uring festivals there is celebration and joy in every Festivals appropriate and create good and bad mothers,
household. But a closer look would reveal that this sisters and daughters, perceived and judged through their
euphoria by and large is confined to the masculine culinary skills. The images of good mothers, obedient
public sphere, while the domestic circle of women, cons- daughters, and respectful sisters persist in the households.
ciously or unconsciously, accepts most celebrations with Women who cook well and satisfy the tastes of their husbands
mixed feelings. The comfort and security associ- Kitchens need to and sons are categorised as good mothers in con-
ated with celebrations is more or less confined to be transformed trast to the socially conscious mother who is
the realm of masculinity and patriarchy. into gender-equal aware of the need for equal participation from
Kitchens, as perpetually gendered spaces, play spaces, ensuring the other members in domestic chores. Analogous to
an important role in the context of festivals as
equal participation the role of good and bad mothers we have the
well. These spaces become conformist habitats, figures of obedient sisters and daughters who are
of men and women.
which tame the tendencies of emancipated wom- entrusted and expected by the society to help
The domestic
en to transgress. The gendered narratives their mothers in the kitchen, while the sons and
sublime of the
around festivals script the method and tale of brothers continue to be happily spared.
obeisance for the modern woman.
ideal cooking During special occasions of ceremonies and
During festivals, the cooking space becomes woman needs to rituals, the media also plays a significant role
a site of production, where women labour and be destroyed and in propagating the image of the woman who
bear the agony of domesticity. Unfortunately, deconstructed is subservient to the needs of the patriarchal
even with the proliferation of fast-food culture, in favour of an institution of family. Festival culinary shows
restaurants, and pre-cooked instant foods, things emancipated one hosted by celebrities who counsel women to cook
remain the same in Indias households. A majority of house- festive dishes dominate small screens and social networking
holds would still prefer to have at least one meal at their sites. Advertisements of cooking powders, spices, and instant
homes during such special occasions. Festivals continue to mixes occupy the sphere of online and offline media. The
be trying times for women. subordinated woman, cooking and serving the family, always
The conservative depiction of women as servants in with an obedient smile, in the background, often forms
the kitchen, and men as the joyful consumers of food the core of the medias representations of celebrations.
continues to persist in almost all festivals across religions. Visuals of dominating male elders joyously approving the
For women, festivals and celebrations are synonymous culinary skills of wives, daughters, and sisters constantly
with extra labour even in this era of professed gender flash as part of these advertisements and culinary program-
equality. Regardless of being housewives, maids or employed mes. In fact, the media by and large continues to contribute
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 69
 POSTSCRIPT
GENDER | RURALITY

to the sustenance of the stereotyped images of women as

cooks, specifically during festivals.
Cooking and kitchen spaces during festivals demonstrate
another sad case of oppression and marginalisation too, as
sometimes it forms a prohibited arena for menstruating
women, who might even be excluded from the act of prepar-
ing and serving food.
The patriarchal projection of cooking during festivals as a
practice of pleasure for women needs to be counteracted: it is
yet another method of gendered appropriation. Enforced do-
mestic labour in the guise of festive cheer can never be a
means of empowerment. It is only a method of patriarchal
oppression. Kitchens need to be transformed into gender-
equal spaces, ensuring the equal participation of men and
women. The domestic sublime of the ideal cooking woman
needs to be destroyed and deconstructed in favour of an
emancipated one.
So, the next time any festival is around the corner, let us
hope for equal enjoyment and celebration. Whenever we
see festival wishes and cards, let us remind ourselves of the
fact that any festival becomes truly joyous only when we
ensure equal participation and emancipation in sharing
and celebrating.
Divya N (divmn2012gmail.com) teaches at the Department of English, Sree Kerala Varma
College, Thrissur, Kerala.

70 february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
GENDER | RURALITY
A Letter from Rural India
A visit to Karda village explores the life there with
caste interdependence and limited aspirations.
DhanANJAY Singh
H
aving been born and brought up in an urban setting,
it was a pleasant experience to go back and stay in a
village. I still remember how much I used to love
staying in my parental village during summer vacations,
when my parents used to take me back there. It is interesting
to ponder on how much rural India has transformed over the
past two decades. How the roads and the means of transpor-
tation have changed for the good, and how the natural
beauty, greenery and forests have taken a beating over the
years due to human overpopulation and over-exploitation of
natural resources.
My recent village sojourn was to Karda village, located
in Karda gram panchayat, Gogunda tehsil, in Udaipur dis-
trict, Rajasthan. Historically, Gogunda was the site of the
coronation of the Rajput king Maharana Pratap of Mewar,
and also that of the battle of Haldi Ghati (where Maharana
Pratap fought with the Mughals). The local Bhil population
has played a significant role in protecting its motherland,
along with the Rajputs, in the glorious past of the Mewar
70
region. Thus, the settlement of Gogunda has proud descend-
ants of the martial clans that fought the Mughals more than
five centuries ago.
Some of the dwellings in the village belong to various kin
members from the same unilineal descent group. Here, the
community is patrilineal. The tribal villagers, by and large,
follow a simple religion and are usually devotees of Ashapuri
Mata and Bhairon Baba. An interesting aspect is the assimi-
There are very few lation of the local Bhil tribals with the
factors conducive Hindus, though they have retained
to upward social some elements from their earlier reli-
mobility because gious beliefs in the form of totems. I
the felt need for also witnessed a Gameti Bhil mar-
riage, which looked more like a Hin-
education and
du marriage than any of the eight
the aspiration
classic types of Indian tribal marriag-
for individual
es as documented by D N Majumdar.
achievement are
This type of assimilation of tribals in
limited to the
the mainstream Hindu religion was
present setting also observed by Indian sociologist
G S Ghurye in his study of the tribes of India, where he
described them as backward Hindus.
The village largely follows traditionalism with ascriptive
qualities, giving more importance to birth rather than
achievement. The village has a subsistence economy with
simple division of labour. It is common practice among the
villagers to take turns in helping one another in their agri-
cultural fields. The village is characterised by homogeneity
and interdependent social relations to a large extent. Certain
remnants of the jajmani system remain in the form of caste
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february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
RURALITY | POEM

interdependence, though not truly as a patronclient relation-

ship. However, the occupational caste groups are now in-
creasingly shifting to open occupations.
In the village, the highest level of education that any child
aspires to is up to Class 8 or 10, after which they migrate to
nearby states like Gujarat to earn their living. Overall, the
literacy rate is about 60%, and it is still lower among the tribal
people and women.
There has been no direct or significant influence of
local political institutions, like the gram panchayat, on the
lives of the villagers (especially the deprived groups); the
villagers see them only at the time of elections seeking
their votes. The signs and symbols of the relationship of
the village with the government are witnessed in the form
of the names of households that have been granted work un-
der the rural employment guarantee scheme painted on the
walls of the local government primary school. Also, social
messages about education, sanitation, and health have been
painted on the walls of the dwellings in the village.
There is an interplay of caste, class and status that influ-
ences the stratification in Karda village. Stratification in the
tribal society has its roots in British policy, due to the uneven
implementation of government policies and impact of eco-
nomic development. There are very few factors conducive to
upward social mobility because the felt need for education
and the aspiration for individual achievement are limited to
the present setting. It is widely accepted that our country
can progress on the path of sustainable development only
when there is inclusive development of villages as well.
Dhananjay Singh (dhananjay.s@gov.in) is Assistant Commissioner (P), Indian Revenue
Service, Ministry of Finance, Government of India and a PhD candidate at the Indian
Institute of Technology Kanpur.

LAST LINES

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 71
 POSTSCRIPT
RURALITY | POEM

Atlas Has Muddy Feet

Nilesh Mondal

In monsoons when our gutters

overflowed, Tipu Chacha appeared
almost magically, his teeth yellowing
from early morning nicotine and last
nights rum, 7.30 in the morning and
already smelling of a life
spent digging into sewers

At school Sabina Masi reminded boys

to tuck shirts into their pants and sat
under a banyan tree in winter, when
the leaves fell around her, anyone who
arrived early to class could see her
sweeping the floor and wiping the desks,
but no one remembered
touching her wrinkled hands,
she shrank back with horror
even if you tried

Old Bhujang had wobbly kneesarthritis

some would saybut his shoulders could
carry the world, though mostly they carried
a basketalmost as wobbly as himselffilled
to the brim with filth from the municipality
dustbin, and every time a car passed beside
him as he walked with his basket,
thered inevitably be the sound
of a window rolling up

Yesterday the gutters overflowed again

dustbins hadnt been cleaned for weeks
and someone had left carcasses on the
streets and my father desperately keeps
punching numbers on his phonehoping
one of them would answermeanwhile the
stench keeps growing stronger till Cologne
cant mask it anymore, and I wonder
whod shrink from whose touch, now?

Nilesh Mondal (neel.reyez93@gmail.com) is an engineer by choice and a

poet by chance. His first book of poetry Degrees of Separation is slated for a
2017 release.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 11, 2017 vol liI no 6 71
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The IGIDR is pleased to invite applications for the Visiting Students Program for 2017. If you are a student who wants to learn
what academic research is all about and would like to learn the ropes and get some hands on experience working with faculty
researchers, you can now apply to spend the summer at the IGIDR. The IGIDR Visiting Students Program is part of the institutes
mandate to reach out to the larger academic community, to foster interactions and nurture the capacity of students to undertake
research.
The Program: Selected students will be assigned a faculty supervisor to work with for the duration of their visit. Students are
expected to produce a report at the end of their sojourn in the IGIDR.
Eligibility: Students in the first year of their Masters program (M.A., M.B.A., M.Com., M.Sc. and M.Stat.) or third year
engineering (BE, BTech.).
When: 45 days in one stretch from May 15, 2017 to June 30, 2017.
Stipend: Rs.6000/month, 2nd class roundtrip train fare, free accommodation on IGIDR campus.
How to Apply: Apply online through the webpage http://www.igidr.ac.in/vsp/
The last date for receiving applications is February 28, 2017. Make sure you have the following documents before you apply.
1. A statement of purpose of 300 words or less in English (tell us why you want to be here, what your research interests are and
a bit about your background)
2. An updated Curriculum Vitae
3. A scanned copy of a bonafide certificate from College/Institute/University authorities
About IGIDR: The IGIDR in Mumbai is an advanced research institute established and funded fully by the Reserve Bank of
India for carrying out research on development issues from a multi-disciplinary point of view. The IGIDR also offers MSc,
MPhil, PhD degrees. Our faculty interests cover a broad range of themes, environment, energy, agriculture, industry, finance,
macroeconomics, development, international trade, microeconomic theory, and poverty, among others. For more information
about the IGIDR, visit www.igidr.ac.in.

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74 february 4, 2017 vol liI no 5 EPW Economic & Political Weekly