06 RemRev Digests 2014 - Rule 39 (Case 11-18) To 65 (Certiorari) PDF

06
Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 1
(Certiorari)
5) Cole v. Court of Appeals, December 26, 2000, G.R. No. 137561 KING ................. 52
CONTENTS 6) Arcenas v. Queen City Development, G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010 LAGOS . 54
XXIX. Provisional Remedies ........................................................................................................................ 57
XXVI. Execution of Judgment (Rule 39) [continuation Case 11-18] ......................................... 3 a. Attachment (Rule 57) .......................................................................................................................... 57
11) D-Armoured Security v. Orpia, G.R. No. 151325, June 27, 2005 MAGTAGNOB3 a.1) Security Pacific v. Amelia Tria-Infante, G.R. No. 1444740, August 31, 2005.
12) Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004 LUCENARIO .................... 4 LIBONGCO ............................................................................................................................................... 57
13) Zamora v. Villanueva, A.M. P-04-1898, July 28, 2008 NARVASA .......................... 8 a.2) Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009 LOPA ......................... 58
14) Landrito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133079, August 9, 2005 MUTI .............. 10 a.3) Insular Savings v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.123638, June 15, 2006
LUCENARIO ............................................................................................................................................ 60
15) Marsmony Trading v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010 ORTIZ
...................................................................................................................................................................... 12 a.4) Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007 MAGTAGNOB ................ 63
16) Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001 - PEREZ DE TAGLE ............. 14 b. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58) .................................................................................................. 65
17) St. Aviation Services v. Grand International Airways, G.R. No.140288, October b.1) Universal Motors v. Rojas, A.M. RTJ 03-1814, May 26, 2005 MUTI .................. 65
23, 2006 PUNO .................................................................................................................................. 16 b.2) Greenstar v. Andiong, A.M. RTJ 041826, February 6, 2008 NARVASA ............ 67
18) City Government of Makati v. Odena, 2013 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO .................... 19 b.3) Aldover v. Court of Appeals, 2013 - ORTIZ (Sub: teves) .......................................... 71
XXVII.Appeals/Original Actions in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (Rules 40 to b.4) Bacolod City Water v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157994, December 10, 2004 - PEREZ
56 except Rule 47) ........................................................................................................................................... 21 DE TAGLE ................................................................................................................................................ 75
1) Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004 RAZON ............. 22 b.5) Calawag v. University of the Philippines-Visayas, 2013 PUNO ........................... 77
2) Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004 RESPICIO c. Receivership (Rule 59) ....................................................................................................................... 79
...................................................................................................................................................................... 24
c.1) Citibank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999 - QUIJANO-
3) BPI v. Sarabia Manor Hotel, 2013 SANCHEZ ................................................................... 29 BENEDICTO ............................................................................................................................................ 80
4) NAPOCOR v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 28, 2005 SUPERABLE ................ 30 c.2) Republic v. Saludares, G.R. No. 111174, March 9, 2000 RAZON ......................... 81
5) State Investment v. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444 TANDOC .................................. 32 c.3) Tantano v. Espino-Caboverde, 2013 RESPICIO .......................................................... 82
6) Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009 TEVES ..................................... 34 d. Replevin (Rule 60) .............................................................................................................................. 85
7) Cardona v. Amansec, G.R. No. 147216, April 15, 2004 TIU ....................................... 36 d.1) Twin Ace Holding v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006.
8) Canedo v. Kampilan Secutiry and Detective Agency, 2013 - VELASQUEZ ............ 38 SANCHEZ ................................................................................................................................................. 85
9) Esteban v. Marcelo, 2013 - AQUINO ...................................................................................... 38 d.2) Superlines Transportation v. PNCC, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007
SUPERABLE ............................................................................................................................................ 86
10) Dyoco v. Court of Appeals, 2013 - ARCEO ........................................................................ 40
d.3) Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M.-RTJ No. 06-2017, June 19, 2008 TANDOC ......... 88
11) Ang v. San Joaquin, 2013 - BASCARA ................................................................................. 43
e. Support Pendete Lite (Rule 61) ...................................................................................................... 91
XXVIII. Petition for Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47) ................................................................... 44
e.1) Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006 TEVES ......... 91
1) Orbeta v. Sendiong, July 8, 2005 CHAN ............................................................................. 44
XXX. Special Civil Actions ............................................................................................................................. 94
2) Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000 CORTEZ .................................... 46
a. Interpleader (Rule 62) ........................................................................................................................ 94
3) Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005 - DE LA PAZ .................... 49
a.1) Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005 TIU ........................................... 94
4) Salera v. A-1 Investors, G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002 GERALDEZ .......... 50
a.2) Maglente v. Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007 VELASQUEZ .................... 95
06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 2
(Certiorari)
a.3) Arreza v. Diaz, G. R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001 AQUINO ................................. 96
b. Declaratory Relief (Rule 63) ............................................................................................................. 97
b.1) Almeda v. Bathala Marketing, G.R. No. 150608, January 28, 2008 ARCEO .... 98
b.2) Malana v. Tapa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 BASCARA .................. 100
b.3) Sabistana v. Muertegi, 2013 CHAN ............................................................................... 102
b.4) Republic v. Roque, 2013 CORTEZ ................................................................................. 103
c. Review of Judgment of COA or COMELEC (Rule 64) ........................................................... 106
d. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65) ................................................................ 106
d.1 Certiorari ....................................................................................................................................... 106
1) Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002 - DE LA
PAZ .......................................................................................................................................................... 106
2) Jiao et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 182331, April 18, 2012 GERALDEZ .......................... 109
3) PNB v. Arcobillas, 2013 - KING ............................................................................................. 111

(Certiorari)
XXVI. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT (RULE 39) [CONTINUATION CASE Facts:
11-18] Orpia et al, who were employed as security guards by DArmoured Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc. and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc. (Fortune Tobacco), filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims
11) D-ARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA, G.R. NO. 151325, JUNE 27, 2005 MAGTAGNOB against DArmoured and Fortune Tobacco.
LA- Orpia et al won. DArmoured and Fortune are jointly and severally liable to
D-Armoured Security v Orpia pay complainants the total sum of P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, overtime pay, legal
Topic: Execution of Judgment holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund of
firearms bond + 10% of all sums as attys fees.
EMERGENCY DIGEST Fortune Tobacco appealed to the NLRC but DArmoured DID NOT appeal.
Quick Facts: NLRC- absolved Fortune Tobacco. This Decision became final and
Orpia et al were employed as security guards of DArmoured and assigned to Fortune executory. Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the LA became the sole liability
Tobacco. They filed with LA a case for illegal dismissal and monetary claims, which the of DArmoured.
LA granted. ONLY Fortune appealed, and NLRC absolved it of liability. This decision The records were then remanded to the Arbiter for execution. Upon Orpia et als
became final, hence DArmoured becamse solely liable. Orpia et al moved for the motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of
execution of the judgment, which was granted. The sheriff garnished the receivables that garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with
DArmoured has with Foremost Farms (they have an existing services agreement). whom DArmoured has an existing services agreement. Thus, DArmoureds receivables
with Foremost were garnished.
Issue: DArmoured filed with the NLRC a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution
W/N the receivables with Foremost Farms are exempt from execution? NO. and Garnishment which was opposed by respondents.
LA- denied the motion and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of
Ratio: money to Orpia et al pro rata.
The list of items exempt from execution pertain to properties of individuals. The NLRC- dismissed the appeal for DArmoureds failure to post a bond within the
exemptions do not apply to juridical persons such as DArmoured. reglementary period. MR was also denied.
Section 13 (i) of the Rule 39 pertinently reads: CA- also denied DArmoureds appeal.
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided ISSUE:
by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution: W/N DArmoureds monthly receivables from the Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are
x x x x x x x x x not exempt from execution. NOT exempt. MAY BE GARNISHED.
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his HELD:
personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 18,
support of his family. 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61799 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs
against petitioner.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil RATIO:
Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees wages, thus: We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment,
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of Rule IV
the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works EXECUTION
are manual. SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only the properties of the losing
party shall be the subject of execution, except:
Doctrine: (a) The losing partys family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or
Exemptions under Sec 13 Rule 39 are confined only to natural persons and not to Family Code or as may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead
juridical entities such as DArmoured. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection therewith, subject to the
earning from the personal services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule limits fixed by law;
further requires that such earnings be intended for the support of the judgment (b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
debtors family. (c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that
purpose by the losing party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount
COMPLETE DIGEST: fixed by law;
(Certiorari)
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months; In a civil case for sum of money, TRIANGLE ACE won a judgment award of
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, Php956,285 against CAJA et al. A writ of execution was issued addressed to
engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding the SHERIFF NANQUIL.
amount fixed by law; SHERIFF first garnished the PAG-IBIG account but was only able to get Php157,500
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the (insufficient). Alias writ of execution was issued and SHERIFF then levied real
month preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family; property right away with assessed value of Php1,786,870. This land was in fact
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing mortgaged to a third party for Php10,000,000 at the time it was levied.
out of any life insurance; Subsequently, SHERIFF came back for more and levied additional personal
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a property of CAJA: dump truck (worth 350,000), payloader (350,000), and 77 G.I.
value not exceeding three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos; sheet (5,500). During this levy, SHERIFF went to the business premises but CAJA
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law. was not there. He tried to serve it on CAJAs son but CAJAs brothers told him to just
The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from wait for CAJA to return. He nevertheless took the personal property without leaving
execution. It is apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural persons and a copy of the notice of levy.
not to juridical entities. On this point, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that SHERIFF then brought the dump truck, payloader, and G.I. sheets to the business
DArmoured, being a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption. premises of TRIANGLE ACE!
Section 13 (i) of the Rule 39 pertinently reads: CAJA filed a complaint against SHERIFF with the Office of Acting Court
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided Administrator for Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on Execution
by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution: under the Rules of Court.
x x x x x x x x x ISSUE: W/N SHERIFF is guilty of gross misconduct YES.
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his HELD: SC chose not to dismiss or suspend him because he has been with the service
personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the for over 35 years, was a few months from compulsory retirement, and this was his
support of his family. first offense. Fined Php79,644.00.
SHERIFF COMMITTED 4 VIOLATIONS:
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil
Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees wages, thus: VIOLATION 1: Levied Real Property before Personal Property
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except Garnishment is a type of levy on personal property. Hence, SHERIFF technically levied
for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance. on personal property before real property.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of However, SC still found him guilty due to his negligence when he immediately levied
the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works CAJAs real property without checking if the latter has other personal properties that
are manual. could satisfy the judgment. He should have verified if he had other personal properties
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons first.
and not to juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries,
wages and earning from the personal services rendered by the judgment VIOLATION 2: Excessive Levy
obligor. The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the support This is obvious. The judgment was only Php956,286. The real property levied was
of the judgment debtors family. assessed at Php1,786,870. More importantly, the land was mortgaged for
Php10,000,000. SC took judicial notice that the true value of the land is always more
12) CAJA V. NANQUIL, A.M. P-04-1885, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 LUCENARIO than the amount it is mortgaged for. Hence, the land is actually worth more than
Php10M. Moreover, SHERIFF was negligent levying it since he knew that obviously the
Caja v. (Sheriff) Nanquil, A.M. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004 creditors right would be preferred.
As for the value of the personal property, CAJA was unable to prove the value with
Execution of Judgment (RULE 39) sufficient evidence (i.e. deeds of sale of the vehicles). They only presented invoices and
delivery receipts. Hence, the court cannot appreciate it. Nevertheless, the value of the
- Sorry long digest, it is a gold mine of Execution of Judgment doctrines. ER will land alone is enough to constitute excessive levy.
suffice.
VIOLATION 3: Levying without leaving Notice of Levy and issuing receipt for the
property
Emergency Recitation: SC: SHERIFFs answer that he cannot remember if he did leave a copy of the Notice of
Levy with the judgment debtor only shows that he was not performing his duty as
(Certiorari)
sheriff. As sheriff, it was his duty to give the notice of levy or receipt to the person to General chronological facts of how SHERIFF implemented the writ of
whom the personal properties were taken. execution:
If no one would like to receive the same, it was his duty to leave copies of the notice at o Feb. 27, 1997 SHERIFF sent a Notice of Garnishment to the Manager
the place where he levied the personal property. Thereafter, he should have reported of PAG-IBIG (Take-Out Office) informing the latter not to deliver,
the proceedings by filing a report or return to the court. transfer or dispose defendants money, credits, shares, interests and
deposits therein except upon orders from the court. They were able
VIOLATION 4: Immediately delivered the levied personal property to TRIANGLE to hold on to the account of Edgar Ballesteros with a balance of only
ACEs premises prior to any auction sale. Php157,500. Evidently insufficient amount. Sheriff return indicated
A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody. that Writ of Execution was unsatisfied.
The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the levying o May 19, 1997 Alias writ of execution issued. SHERIFF then levied a
officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should not have been parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46478,
delivered to any of the partiesor their representative. The courts lack of storage facility including its improvements, declared in the name of Subic Realty
to house the attached properties is no justification. Corporation with assessed value of Php 1,786,870.
SHERIFF could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or could have sought o July 1, 1997 SHERIFF subsequently levied on CAJAs personal
prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution. properties: 1 payloader (worth X), 1 dump truck (worth X), and 77
Moreover, evidence was shown that the payloader and dump truck were actually even pieces of galvanized iron sheets (worth X)
used by third parties while in the premises of TRIANGLE ACE. The SHERIFF obviously Side note: during the case, a third party claim was filed by BAP Credit Guaranty
cannot allow the levied properties to be used by others while in his custody. This was a Corporation (BCGC) informing its sheriff, that the payloader and dump truck
clear act of negligence. he levied were previously mortgaged to BCGC. He requested that the levy
thereon be immediately lifted and/or discharged in accordance with Section
VIOLATION 5 (SHERIFF not guilty of this one): Waited for 4 years after levy before 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. This was denied by the court.
conducting the auction sale (hence, the properties were already greatly January 18, 2000 CAJA et al. filed a Motion to Lift Levy on Execution praying
depreciated) that the levy on their real property made on May 19, 1997 be lifted on the
The delay of the scheduling of the auction sale cannot be attributed to SHERIFF. There ground that the levy made on their personal properties is sufficient to satisfy
were pending incidents that had to be resolved by the court before the execution sale the judgment. They likewise asked the lower court to direct the sheriff to
can be held. conduct the appropriate execution sale.
SHERIFF cannot be held liable for any delay of the scheduling of the execution sale for On March 6, 2001, Judge Ubiadas denied the Motion to Lift Levy arguing that it
he merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to the properties he had cannot be determined at that time if the amount levied is way above the
levied. amount necessary to satisfy the judgment creditor. He further ordered Sheriff
Nanquil to immediately schedule the auction sale of defendants real and
BONUS: personal properties that were levied in accordance with the writ of execution.
SHERIFFs LAST DEFENSE: CAJA et al did not complain while he was doing all of this April 10, 2001 CAJA filed a complaint for Grave Misconduct and Gross
SC: The failure of complainant to lodge a complaint before the lower court will not Ignorance of the Rules on Execution under the Rules of Court against SHERIFF.
justify SHERIFFs improper actions. It is incumbent upon the latter to know that his This was filed with the Office of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
actions were not in accord with the Rules of Court. The non-filing of a complaint will not Complaint alleged SHERIFF was guilty of the following irregularities
validate his objectionable actions. amounting to gross misconduct:
o Levied real property before personal property
o Excessive levy
o Levied defendants personal properties without serving a Notice of
FACTS: Levy or issuing a receipt therefor
o Delivered the levied personal properties to the judgment creditor
Civil case No. 182-0-96 for collection of sum of money by Triangle Ace Corp. without conducting an auction sale
(TRIANGLE ACE) against Subic Realty Corp, Florentino and Erickson Caja o Sold the levied personal properties in an auction sale almost four
(CAJA) years after being levied
Nov. 19, 1996 RTC ruled in favor of TRIANGLE ACE and granted award of
Php956,285.
Feb. 12, 1997 Writ of Execution was issued addressed to Sheriff Nanquil
(SHERIFF)
(Certiorari)
ISSUE: W/N Sheriff NANQUIL is guilty of the alleged irregularities amounting to gross He could have easily asked the Land Transportation Office if complainant had vehicles
misconduct YES registered in his name. If he had done so, respondent sheriff could have known that
complainant had vehicles which he could levy first before levying any real property. He
Levied real property before personal property YES should have exhausted all means before going after the real property. This, he did not
Excessive levy YES do. It was only after levying complainants real property and after discovering that said
Levied personal property without serving a Notice of Levy or issuing a receipt property was encumbered did he look for other personal property.
therefor YES
Delivered the levied personal properties to the judgment creditor without Second, the claim that the judgment creditor desisted from proceeding with the levy on
conducting an auction sale YES the real property is no excuse. The levy on complainants real property was already
Sold the levied personal properties in an auction sale almost four years after effected and annotated as shown by Entry No. 122714 in TCT No. T-46478. It was the
being levied NO sale of the real property in an execution sale which the judgment creditor did not insist
HELD: SHERIFF guilty of gross misconduct. on because the same was already mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor of Town
Savings and Loan Bank of Bulacan per Entry No. 121262.46
However, considering that the SHERIFF had spent the best years of his life in the
Government Service he has been in the service for more than thirty-five (35) years,
and is about to retire and considering further that the offense he committed appears to VIOLATION 2: Excessive Levy
be his first, the Court is inclined to grant him certain leniency without, nonetheless,
being unmindful of the fact that he had breached the provisions of the Rules of Court. The decision calls only for the payment of P956,285.00 with interest at the rate of 18%
For this reason, the Court is wont to impose the penalty of suspension of six (6) months, per annum from April 27, 1995 plus ten (10%) percent of the amount as attorneys fees
without pay. However, since respondent sheriff will be compulsorily retiring this year, plus costs of the suit.
the penalty imposed can no longer be fully served.
However, SHERIFF levied properties totaling almost five million pesos which is an
Therefore, in lieu of the suspension, COURT imposes a fine equivalent to his six (6) amount over and above the judgment debt to be satisfied.
months salary or Seventy-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Four (P79,644.00)
Pesos, the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SHERIFF levied personal property with an amount of more than three million pesos, and
real property with an assessed value of P1,786,870.00 which is mortgaged for ten
RATIO: million pesos.
VIOLATION 1: Levied on Real Property before Levying on Personal Property CAJA also alleged that he offered the SHERIFF other real properties which are smaller in
value and not encumbered but he insisted on levying the real property which has a
Garnishment is a type of levy on personal property so technically, SHERIFF did levy on conservative assessed value of double the amount to be satisfied.
personal property before real property.
SHERIFF countered that, anyway, the levy on the real property was not continued
However, Court found that SHERIFF still violated the rule that satisfaction of the because the property was "heavily indebted at five million pesos." As to the levy on the
judgment must be carried out first through the personal property of the judgment personal properties, he alleged that same cannot be excessive because their acquisition
debtor, and then through his real property. After levying the real property of CAJA, cost is not the price in an auction sale, the latter being much lower than the former.
SHERIFF then levied CAJAs personal properties which is a direct violation of Section 8,
Rule 39 and of the writ and alias writ of execution issued by the court. We find respondent sheriffs contention that "the levy on complainants real property
was not continued" because it was previously mortgaged to be untenable. The levy
thereon was completed as shown by the annotation (Entry No. 122714) of the Notice of
SHERIFFs contention that he levied the personal properties of complainant after the Levy on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46478.
judgment creditor "desisted from proceeding with the levy" on the real property when it
was discovered that the real property he previously levied was already mortgaged for It is clear that the levy on the real property is still subsisting. There was a valid levy on
P5,000,000.00, cannot give him any relief. the real property. Thus, it is improper for respondent sheriff to rely, as a defense, on his
claim that the levy on the real property was not continued. It was the sale of the levied
First, there was negligence on his part when he immediately levied CAJAs real property real property in an execution sale which did not push through.
without checking if the latter has other personal properties that could satisfy the
judgment.
(Certiorari)
It must be remembered that the real property is mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor of the notice of levy. Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs
of Town Savings and Loan Bank of Bulacan. The fact that the property is mortgaged for addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns of their
ten million pesos only means that its value is more than said amount. This Court takes proceedings. On this score, respondent was again remiss in his duty as a sheriff.
judicial notice of the fact that the value of a property is usually bigger than the amount
for which it can be mortgaged. As it is, there is already a clear case of overlevy. Although VIOLATION 4: Delivered the personal property to the creditor without conducting
the levied realty was not auctioned at an execution sale, its value should still be taken an auction sale which is in contravention of the Alias Writ of Execution and a
into account in computing the total amount levied by respondent sheriff. violation of Section 9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

SHERIFFs act of levying complainants real property despite its being mortgaged is SHERIFF argues that he never delivered said personal properties to the judgment
tantamount to negligence. As an officer of the court, he knew fully well that the property creditor but merely kept the same in a secured place owned by the latter. He brought
cannot be used to satisfy the judgment debt since the mortgagee is the preferred them there because the Sheriffs Office and the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City had
creditor in relation to said property. no warehouse or place to keep levied personal properties. In support thereto, he
presented John Aquino, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, who
testified that they have no designated warehouse or building where sheriffs can keep
In the determination of the value of the two vehicles, it is the duty of complainant to levied personal properties. In so far as large motor vehicles, the practice as to where to
show their true value as substantiated by competent proof. In the case before us, keep them is left at the discretion of the sheriff.
complainant failed to present the best proof to accurately show their value. He should
have adduced in evidence the deeds of sale of said vehicles, but instead, he merely SC: This argument is untenable.
presented the invoices and delivery receipts. These pieces of evidence are not sufficient
to prove the value of these properties as claimed by complainant. A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody.
The rule is well-settled that a sheriff is guilty of misconduct where he failed to limit the The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the levying
goods to be levied to the amount called for in the writ. officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should not have been
delivered to any of the partiesor their representative.The courts lack of storage facility
VIOLATION 3: Levied personal properties without serving any Notice of Levy or to house the attached properties is no justification.
issuing any receipt
SHERIFF could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or could have sought
SHERIFF maintains that the Notice of Levy was not given to complainant or to anybody prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution.
at the place where the personal properties were taken because nobody would receive it.
He added that complainant knew where they were taken. Moreover, he said, despite In the case at bench, sheriff brought the personal properties he levied directly to the
meeting complainant several times, the latter neither complained to him about the levy vacant lot of Triangle Ace Corporation, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 182-0-96, in violation of
nor filed any complaint in court. the rule requiring him to safely keep them in his capacity, after issuing the
corresponding receipt therefor. There is nothing in the record that shows that prior to
The story was that CAJAs brother was there but did not want to receive the notice of his delivery of the levied properties to Triangle Ace Corporation, he sought permission
levy and told SHERIFF to wait for their brother to return. SHERIFF just took the of the court that issued the writ he enforced to keep the properties.
personal properties and stated in his testimony that he merely did not remember that
he left a notice of levy as required by the rules. Furthermore, Erickson Caja said he once saw the levied dumptruck being used in
hauling desilted materials from the Kalaklan River in Olongapo City. This claim was
SC: SHERIFFs answer that he cannot remember if he did leave a copy of the Notice of buttressed by BCGC in its Urgent Motion to Lift Writ of Attachment when it said:
Levy with the judgment debtor only shows that he was not performing his duty as 5. Also on December 10, 1997, an ocular inspection was made on the premises of
sheriff. As sheriff, it was his duty to give the notice of levy or receipt to the person to Plaintiff, located along Magsaysay Ave., Olongapo City, where the subject dumptruck and
whom the personal properties were taken. payloader were temporarily stored, however, the truck and payloader were not there.
Inquiries were made but no satisfactory explanation nor answer were elicited from
If no one would like to receive the same, it was his duty to leave copies of the notice at Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil, the Sheriff-in-charge and/or from Mr. David J. Sagun, the
the place where he levied the personal property. Thereafter, he should have reported Plaintiffs General Manager.65
the proceedings by filing a report or return to the court.
From these, it is apparent that sheriff was again imprudent in his duty in safekeeping
In the case at bar, even assuming that no one was willing to accept the notice of levy, the the properties he levied. In delivering the levied personal properties to the judgment
record is bereft of any evidence showing that sheriff reported his failure to leave a copy creditor, he allowed others to use them before they can be sold in a public auction. In
(Certiorari)
allowing the levied properties to be used is evidence that he had not taken care of, and (1) whether respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to
safely kept, them in his substantial presence, possession and control. the expenses of the execution sale;

The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses
VIOLATION 5: It took the SHERIFF almost four years from the time he levied the to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to
personal properties on July 1, 1997 to schedule the auction sale thereof, causing deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall
the chattels to deteriorate greatly in value. then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same
period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party who made the deposit. The Sheriff did not do any of these.
SC: SHERIFF not guilty Nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred that payment of any such commission is a
pre-requisite to an execution sale. Respondents refusal to conduct the execution sale
The delay of the scheduling of the auction sale cannot be attributed to respondent was baseless and illegal.
sheriff. There were pending incidents that had to be resolved by the court before the
execution sale can be held. (2) whether respondent prematurely adjourned the execution sale contrary to
Sec. 22, Rule 39, Rules of Court.
After the personal properties were levied on July 1, 1997, a Notice of Third Party Claim
was filed by BCGC on July 8, 1997. Thereafter, BCGC filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Writ Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that a sheriff has no blanket
of Attachment dated December 15, 1997 which Judge Ubiadas denied on May 7, 1998. A authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon written consent of the judgment obligor
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was stricken off the record per order and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the
dated November 27, 1998 upon motion of plaintiff Triangle Ace Corporation. On January sale to a date and time agreed upon.
18, 2000, defendants Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja filed
a Motion to Lift Levy on Execution which motion Judge Ubiadas denied on March 6, The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement
2001. In said order, Sheriff Nanquil was ordered to immediately schedule the auction but only if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day
sale of defendants levied real and personal properties. From the foregoing, respondent fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Consequently, respondents act
sheriff cannot be held liable for any delay of the scheduling of the execution sale for he of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.
merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to the properties he had levied.
Facts

Atty. Zamora, complainant, is the counsel for plaintiff in another case entitled Sps.
SHERIFFs LAST DEFENSE: CAJA et al did not complain while he was doing all of this Cruel v. Sps. Lim. In that case, the RTC granted plaintiffs motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution. Consequently, he informed respondent sheriff that the defendant has
SC: The failure of complainant to lodge a complaint before the lower court will not real property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to prepare the required Notice of
justify SHERIFFs improper actions. It is incumbent upon the latter to know that his Levy on the property. Respondent in turn demanded from complainant P10,000,
actions were not in accord with the Rules of Court. The non-filing of a complaint will not allegedly to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings. Complainant agreed and
validate his objectionable actions. initially gave him P5,000 as advance payment.
Zamora went to Batangas for the purpose of annotating the notice of levy on the
13) ZAMORA V. VILLANUEVA, A.M. P-04-1898, JULY 28, 2008 NARVASA
propertys title. After the notice had been annotated on the title, Sheriff refused to
proceed with the execution sale unless and until he was paid the balance of P5,000.
ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA v. RAMON P. VILLANUEVA, Sheriff RTC of QC,
Complainant acceded to respondents demand and gave him P5,000 after
Topic: Execution of Judgment (Rule 39) respondent assured him that he would proceed with the execution sale. However, before
the date of the execution sale, respondent demanded an additional five percent of the
ER: Atty. Zamora won a case for his client, and sought to secure a Notice of Levy from bid price before proceeding with the sale. Complainant, however, refused. Hence, Sheriff
the Sheriff of the RTC. Said Sheriff demanded 10k for expenses of the execution refused to proceed with the sale on the scheduled date; and further refused to accept the
proceedings. Zamora and client paid the 10k, but Sheriff asked for another 5% of the bid bid of complainants client. Thus this complaint.
price of the land. Zamora refused, and Sheriff then refused to proceed with the execution
sale.
(Certiorari)
In his Comment, respondent admitted having received the P10,000 but contended Thus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following:
that the amount was used in serving the writ of execution. He asserted that he, along
with another court personnel and two police officers, tried to attach the personal 1. prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which
properties of defendant Ernesto Pe Lim. However, Deputy Sheriff Joseph Visnar of the he must seek the court's approval;
RTC, was already implementing another writ of execution against the same defendant. 2. render an accounting; and
In his attempt to attach defendants properties, respondent incurred transportation, 3. issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment
representation and other expenses. Also when he tried to register the notice of levy, he debtor.
incurred further expenses. Lastly, he tried to serve the notice on the defendant twice The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses
and had to post it twice in three conspicuous public places and once in Nasugbu, to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to
Batangas. deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall
then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same
As regards the questioned auction sale, respondent contended that he was ready to period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be
proceed with the public auction, with complainants client as the only bidder. He then refunded to the party who made the deposit.
requested complainant to pay the corresponding Office Commission to the Clerk of
Court pursuant to the Rules of Court. However, complainant refused to pay, claiming In the present case, there was no evidence showing that respondent submitted to
that the title should first be consolidated. the court, for its approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he
demanded P10,000 from complainant. Neither was it shown that he rendered an
Issues: accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Any act deviating from these
procedures laid down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
(1) whether respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to the
expenses of the execution sale; and As regards respondents refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due to
the parties refusal to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred
(2) whether respondent prematurely adjourned the execution sale contrary to Sec. 22, that payment of any such commission is a pre-requisite to an execution sale.
Rule 39, Rules of Court. Respondents refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and illegal
Expenses Adjournment
It is undisputed that respondent demanded and received P10,000 from As to the validity of the adjournment of the execution sale, Sec. 22, Rule 39 of
complainant. He, however, reasoned that the amount was to defray the expenses he the Rules of Court clearly shows that a sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the
incurred in implementing the writ of execution and annotating the notice of levy on sale. It is only upon written consent of the judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly
defendants property in Nasugbu, Batangas. Nevertheless, his justifications for authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time
demanding and receiving the amount from complainant are futile attempts to exculpate agreed upon.
himself from liability under the law.
The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court1 requires the sheriff to secure the courts but only if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day
prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the writ. fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Consequently, respondents act
of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.

1 SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving processes. x x x
In addition to such fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental,
or final, shall pay the sheriffs expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied
(l) For money collected by him by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial, the
upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards fees, warehousing and
following sums, to wit;
similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said
estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff,
1. On the first four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, four (4%) per centum. who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the
same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the
2. On all sums in excess of four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, two (2%) per centum. deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriffs expenses
shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.

(Certiorari)
As officers of the Court (non-Rem) foreclosure should be limited to amount under the contract (P1M), and (3) SAN DIEGOs
husband granted an extension period. San diego filed an MTD which was granted
As employees of the court who play an important role in the administration of because of laches. Is the Sps LANDRITOs period to redeem suspended by their
justice, high standards are expected of sheriffs. This Court expounded in Vda. de action to annul the foreclosure sale? NO!
Abellera v. Dalisay:
First, the Court held that they were guilty of laches. R.A. 3135 is clear, the period to
At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are redeem is one year from and after the date of the sale (follow date of registration of
indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared certificate of sale). Second, assuming that they were granted an extension, they never
towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, hence, it becomes the made a valid offer to redeem within the said period, as required in the case of Lazo v.
imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and Surety. Instead, they filed the instant case for annulment. Lastly, the period within which
standing as a temple of justice. to redeem the property sold at a sheriffs sale is not suspended by the institution of an
action to annul the foreclosure sale.
By the nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and Sps LANDRITO have lost any right or interest over the subject property
decorum, to be above suspicion. Sheriffs are court officers, they cannot afford to err in primarily because of their failure to redeem the same in the manner and within the
serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders lest they period prescribed by law. Their belated attempts to question the legality and validity of
undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. the foreclosure proceedings and public auction must accordingly fail.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established or definite rule of action;
more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is
FACTS:
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules. For this, the Court finds VILLANUEVA guilty of Spouse Maximo Landrito, Jr. and Pacita Landrito (Sps LANDRITO) obtained a loan
Grave Misconduct. from Carmencita San Diego (SAN DIEGO). To secure payment thereof, Sps
LANDRITO executed a deed of REM over their parcel of land.
Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
classifies grave misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first (1st) After making substantial payments, Sps LANDRITO again obtained and were
offense. Moreover, Section 9 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive granted an additional loan. To secure this, the parties executed an Amendment of
Order No. 292 provides: REM, whereunder they stipulated that the loan shall be paid w/in 6 mos., and if not
paid, the mortgagee shall have the right to declare the mortgage due and may
Sec. 9. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of immediately foreclose the same.
leave credits and retirement benefits and the disqualification for re-employment in the
Sps. LANDRITO defaulted in paying their loan, prompting SAN DIEGO to send them
government service. Further, it may be imposed without prejudice to criminal liability.
a final notice of demand requiring them to settle their financial obligation w/c
already amounted to P1.95M. Two months later, SAN DIEGO filed with the Office of
WHEREFORE, Sheriff Ramon P. Villanueva is found GUILTY of grave misconduct. He is
the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC-Makati, a petition for the
ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or -controlled Said office sent to the parties a Notice of Sheriffs. The public auction sale was held
corporations and financial institutions. Respondent is furthered ordered to return the and the mortgaged property sold to SAN DIEGO as the highest bidder for P2M. SAN
amount of P10,000 to complainant Atty. Stanley G. Zamora. DIEGO caused the registration of the same sheriffs certificate of sale with the Office
of the Register of Deeds.
14) LANDRITO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 133079, AUGUST 9, 2005 MUTI Sps LANDRITO failed to redeem their property within the 1-year redemption
period from the date of inscription of the sheriffs certificate of sale. SAN DIEGO
KEYWORDS: spouses failed to redeem, questioned the legality of foreclosure sale caused the consolidation of title in their names.
instead
After more than a year, Sps LANDRITO filed their complaint for annulment of the
ER: Sps LANDRITO obtained a loan from SAN DIEGO secured by deed of REM. They extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale, with damages, alleging that:
failed to pay so SAN DIEGO foreclosed. 11 days after the expiration of the redemption
period, Sps LANDRITO filed for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction o said foreclosure and auction sale were null and void for failure to comply
sale, alleging that (1) SAN DIEGO bloated their original loan of P1M to P1.95M, (2) with the requirements of notice and publication
(Certiorari)
o the mortgaged property was illegally foreclosed in the light of the settled The law on redemption of mortgaged property is clear. R.A. 3135 provides in
rule that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount Section 6 the debtor may redeem the same at any time within the term of one
mentioned in the mortgage document, in this case, P1M, which amount year from and after the date of the sale
was allegedly bloated by SAN DIEGO to P1.95M
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the one-year
o the Sps SAN DIEGOs application for consolidation of title was premature redemption period should be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale, but
because the husband, Benjamin, allegedly granted them an extension of from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds.
the period of redemption
o Sps LANDRITO had only until 29 October 1994, the 365th day after
SAN DIEGO interposed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale on 29 October 1993. And
since this fell on a Saturday, they had until the following working day, 31
o said complaint failed to state a cause of action as no primary right of the
October 1994.
Sps LANDRITO had been violated since they actually failed to exercise
their right of redemption within the one-year redemption period From the foregoing, it is clear as day that even the complaint filed by Sps
LANDRITO with the trial court on 09 November 1994 was instituted beyond the 1-
o Sps LANDRITO never took any action which may stall the running of the
year redemption period.
same period, thereby leaving them no further right or interest in the
property in question. o In fact, Sps LANDRITO no less acknowledged that their complaint for
annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale was filed about 11
RTC granted SAN DIEGOs MTD saying that the latters cause of action, if any, is
days after the redemption period had already expired.
already barred by laches on account of their failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have Of course, Sps LANDRITO presently insist that they requested for and were granted
been done earlier. an extension of time within which to redeem their property, relying on a
handwritten note allegedly written by SAN DIEGOs husband on their statement of
Sps LANDRITO went on appeal to the CA. CA affirmed. They filed MR, denied. Hence,
account, indicating therein the date 11 November 1994 as the last day to pay their
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
outstanding account in full.
ISSUE: whether the period to redeem is suspended by an institution of an action to
o Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that they were indeed granted such
annul the foreclosure sale NO!
an extension, the hard reality, however, is that at no time at all did Sps
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and LANDRITO make a valid offer to redeem coupled with a tender of the
resolution of the CA AFFIRMED. redemption price.
RATIO: In Lazo v. Republic Surety, this Court has made it clear that it is
only where, by voluntary agreement of the parties, consisting of
We do not take issue with Sps LANDRITOs submission that a mortgage may be extensions of the redemption period, followed by commitment
foreclosed only for the amount appearing in the mortgage document, more so by the debtor to pay the redemption price at a fixed date,
where, as here, the mortgage contract entered into by the parties is evidently silent will the concept of legal redemption be converted into one of
on the payment of interest. conventional redemption.
Sps LANDRITO alleged that CA did not pass upon the legal issue they raised. SC o Here, there is no showing whatsoever that Sps LADRITO agreed to pay the
disagreed and quoted CAs decision, as follows: redemption price on or before 11 November, as allegedly set. On the
o It appears from the evidence on record that despite due notice and contrary, their act of filing their complaint on 09 November to declare the
publication of the same Sps LANDRITO did not bother to attend the nullity of the foreclosure sale is indicative of their refusal to pay the
foreclosure sale nor raise any question regarding the propriety of the redemption price on the alleged deadline set by the husband.
sale. It was only after more than one year from the registration of the The period of redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, that they filed the instant complaint. Clearly, provided by law to restrict the right of the person exercising
they had slept on their rights and are therefore guilty of laches redemption. Correspondingly, if a person exercising the right of redemption has
(paraphrased) offered to redeem the property within the period fixed, he is considered to have
complied with the condition precedent prescribed by law and may thereafter bring
an action to enforce redemption.
(Certiorari)
o If, on the other hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the right of
redemption is exercised, then the action to enforce redemption will not ISSUE: w/n the CA erred in allowing the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the
prosper, even if the action is brought within the ordinary prescriptive real property of Victor Morales? Yes, the petitioners have already exhausted all
period. remedies. The judgment has already become final and executory.

IMPORTANT PART:
The LAs decision has long become final and executory and it can no
Moreover, the period within which to redeem the property sold at a sheriffs sale longer be reversed or modified.
is not suspended by the institution of an action to annul the foreclosure sale. It is
clear, then, that Sps LANDRITO have lost any right or interest over the subject Nothing is more settled in law than when a final judgment becomes executory, it
property primarily because of their failure to redeem the same in the manner and thereby becomes immutable and unalternable. The judgment may no longer be
within the period prescribed by law. Their belated attempts to question the modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
legality and validity of the foreclosure proceedings and public auction must perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of whether
accordingly fail. the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land. The only recognized exception are the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nune pro tunc entries which cause no
15) MARSMONY TRADING V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 170515, MAY 6, 2010 injury to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void
ORTIZ
a litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
Marmosy Trading, Inc. and Victor Moralses v. CA (2010) effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
DOCTRINE: ------------------------------------------
when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes COMPLETE:
immutable and unalternable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the July 14, 2005 decision of the CA,
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is which affirmed the RESOLUTION of the NLRC. THE NLRC ordered the levy on execution
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the on the real property of VICTOR MORALES, president of Marmosy Trading.
land. The only recognized exception are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nune pro tunc entries which cause no injury to any party, and, Marmosy Trading, Inc. is a domestic corporation which acts as distributor of various
of course, where the judgment is void . chemicals from foreign suppliers. Petitioner Victor Morales is the President and General
Manager of Marmosy Trading, Inc.
ER: Joselita Hubilla was hired as a technical salesman of Marmosy Trading Inc. His
services was terminated in July 1997. He filed an illegal dismissal case against the Respondent Joselito Hubilla was hired as a Technical Salesman in February
company. The LA ruled in favor of the Hubilla and ordered reinstatement and payment 1991. Hubilla was terminated in July 1997.
of backwages. The decision was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. The NLRC decision
became final and executory. Hubilla filed a motion for the issuance of writ of execution. Hubilla filed a case for illegal dismissal. LA Cueto ruled in favor of Hubilla and ordered
Granted. THE NLRC ordered the levy on execution on the real property of VICTOR Petitioners (Marmosy) to reinstate complainant, or in case the same is no longer
MORALES, president of Marmosy Trading. This was appealed again by the company but available, to other equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.
the same was denied due to procedural infirmities. THE NLRC decision became final and Marmosy was also ordered to pay Hubilla full backwages from termination in July 97
executory again. Marmosy elevated this case to the CA and SC. Again, the SC affirmed until actual reinstatement. The judgment award amounted to 98 K (Backwages + 13
HUbillas illegal dismissal. An alias writ of execution was issued ordering the sheriff to Month pay+ Attys fees- seperation pay- tax deficiency- car loan)
execute the judgment and execute on the companys personal and real property.
Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff, garnished the bank account of the Company. Victor Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. NLRC issued a resolution on May 31, 2000 denying
Morales, president of the company, claimed that the account belonged to both the the appeal for lack of merit. THIS RESOLUTION BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ON
Company and to Morales. *** note: For several occasions, the petitioners challenged the JUNE 26, 2000.
writ of execution (based on: the fact that the company already ceased its operations,
computation of the monetary award, execution on the properties owned by the HUBILLA filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
president) thru several pleadings/motions that were filed despite the case being final
and already executory.
(Certiorari)
MARMOSY filed again a petition to the CA- this was dismissed outright by the CA The Sheriff garnished petitioners account with Equitable-PCI Bank in the amount
because of procedural infirmities such as failure to file a MR of the NLRC resolution ofP22K, which was later released to the NLRC cashier and, thereafter, turned over to
dated MAY 31 2000. THIS RESOLUTION became final and executory and an Entry of the respondent as partial satisfaction of the judgment in his favor.
Judgment was issued by the CA on 25 November 2000.

Marmosy elevated the decision of the CA to SC by a petition for review docketed as Petitioners objected to the garnishment by filing MR and to recall the order of
G.R. No. 145881. SC denied this petition because of the late filing of the petition and release and alias writ of execution alleging that the account with Equitable-PCI Bank
failure to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. Entry of Judgment belongs to both petitioner Marmosy Trading, Inc. and petitioner Victor Morales;
was issued on 13 August 2001. that only petitioner Marmosy Trading, Inc. was the employer of respondent
whereas petitioner Victor Morales, who was president of the Marmosy Trading,
Hubilla filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. On 28 August Inc. when the complaint was filed, is only a nominal party.
2001, Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas issued a writ of execution addressed to the NLRC
Sheriff commanding the sheriff to: Petitioners MR before the LA was denied. Appeal to NLRC also denied. THE NLRC
RESOLUTION stated that:
1. proceed to the address of Marmosy Trading, Inc, or wherever they may be
found, Morales, President & General Manager of the Corporation, is
2. to collect 296 K representing complainants total monetary award and responsible for the corporations obligations to the workers including
3. to turn over the amount collected to the NLRC Cashier for disposition to complainant especially when as alleged the company had already
complainant. closed its business operations.
4. In case collection fails, satisfaction must be made out the personal property of The termination of the existence of a corporation requires the
Marmosy, or in the absence thereof, from the immovable properties of the assumption of the companys liabilities and there is no responsible
respondents (Marsmony and Morals) not exempt from execution. officer but the President who must assume full responsibility of the
5. To return the alias writ of execution with corresponding report of the consequences of the closure.
proceedings within 60 days from receipt hereof
Petitioners MR was denied by NLRC. Elevated the matter to CA via ceriorari under Rule
Marmosy and Morales(petitioners) filed another MR with a motion to recall the 65 (denied again). CA explained that since petitioner Morales was likewise ordered in
writ of execution with the LA. THIS TIME THEY ARE ASSAILING THE COMPUTATION the decision sought to be executed to pay private respondent, the Sheriff properly levied
made by the LA and averred that the company ceased its operations as of June 1997; on his real property. Section 2 Rule 4 of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment
hence Hubilla, can no longer be reinstated and that Hubilla had already been paid his provides that the Sheriff or proper officer shall enforce the execution of a money
separation pay. They even showed that it is Hubilla who owes the company (22K). judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal, of the losing party, of
whatever name and nature and which may be disposed of for value, not exempt from
LA denied the MR, but the monetary award was corrected from 296 K to 274 K. execution.
SHERIFF was again directed to proceed with the execution.

AGAIN, petitioners filed before the NLRC a Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer for ISSUE: w/n the CA erred in allowing the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the
Injunction assailing the LA decision. Hubilla opposed this on the ground that petitioners real property of Victor Morales? ( w/n it was proper to hold the president of a
failed to a supersedeas bond and that no new issues were raised therein. corporation personally liable) YES (in this case)

NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to file the supersedeas bond. The NLRC in HELD:
the same order affirmed in toto the LA decision. Petitioners filed another MR, it was First the SC takes notice of the fact that petitioners already exhausted all
again denied by the NLRC and emphasized that no further MR shall be entertained. the remedies available to them since the time the LA rendered his decision dated
31 May 1999. In fact, the LAs decision was elevated all the way up to this Court by the
Hubilla filed with the LA an ex parte motion for the recomputation of his monetary petitioners via G.R. No. 145881. We denied this petition in a Resolution.
award and for the issuance of an alias writ of execution dated November 19, 2002.
Execution in favor of the respondent ought to have taken place as a matter of
LA Salinas issued on 11 March 2003 an alias Writ of Execution addressed to the NLRC right.
Sheriff ordering the sheriff to collect the total sum of 251 K, and in case this fails to
garnish personal property/ real property of the petitioners.
(Certiorari)
From the finality of G.R. No. 145881, this case was remanded to the LA for judgment; and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the
execution. Regrettably, due to the series of pleadings, motions and appeals to the court within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not
NLRC, including petitions to the CA filed by the petitioners, they have so far be made. The Sheriff shall continue making a report every 30 days on proceedings being
successfully delayed the execution of the final and executory decision in this taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied. The reason for this requirement is to
case. The decision of the LA, rendered on 31 May 1999, has been elevated to, for review update the court as to the status of the execution and give it an idea why the judgment
by, the NLRC, the CA and finally this Court which entered judgment on the matter nine has not been satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how efficient court
years ago, or on 13 August 2001. Until the present, the decision in 1999 has not yet processes are after the judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the
been executed. requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.

The LAs decision has long become final and executory and it can no Fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over to the judgment obligee or the
longer be reversed or modified. latter's authorized representative. In the absence of both, respondent is obligated to pay
them over to the clerk of the court who issued the writ or, if this is not possible, to
Nothing is more settled in law than when a final judgment becomes deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank.
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalternable. The judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by ER:
the highest court of the land. The only recognized exception are the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nune pro tunc entries which cause no There was an admin case against a sheriff for his dubious activities in issuing a writ of
injury to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void . execution relating to a public auction of a jeep. Among other things, he allegedly did not
comply with Rule 39, on execution.
Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an order or writ of
execution in this case is the dispositive portion of the LAs decision as affirmed by the the execution sale conducted on February 16, 1998 was simulated;
NLRC, the CA and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued by the LA does not vary respondent violated Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
but is in fact completely consistent with the final decision in this case, the order of Procedure;
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is beyond challenge. Mario Timbol was a dummy of respondent who had a prohibited interest in the
auctioned jeepney;
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the Joe Castillo, representative of Mario Timbol, was not present at the auction
expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution. This late in the day, sale, contrary to what appears in the minutes;
petitioner Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from advancing respondent ignored their bid;
the argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the monetary award the jeepney was sold for the unconscionably low price of P15,000.00;
in favor of respondent. Petitioner Victor Morales, as president of his corporation, the jeepney had not been delivered to the supposed buyer Mario Timbol but
cannot rely on our previous ruling that to hold a director personally liable for debts of a had been kept in Cavite as of April 2, 1998; and
corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the sale should have been conducted in Carmona, Cavite, and not in Bacoor,
the director must be established clearly and convincingly. Judgments of courts should also in the province of Cavite.
attain finality at some point lest there be no end in litigation. The final judgment Issue: is he liable for the simulation of the auction sale?
in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or
indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. The reason for this is Held: Yep.
that, a litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become Under Section 14, Rule 39, respondent is required
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
- (1) to make a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction
in part or in full of the judgment; and
16) BENITEZ V. ACOSTA, A.M. P-01-1473, MARCH 27, 2001 - PEREZ DE TAGLE - (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court
within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could
Doctrine: not be made.
- The Sheriff shall continue making a report every 30 days on proceedings being
Rule 39 Section 14: under this provision, respondent is required (1) to make a return taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied.
and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the
(Certiorari)
The reason for this requirement is to update the court as to the status of the Mario Timbol was a dummy of respondent who had a prohibited interest in the
execution and give it an idea why the judgment has not been satisfied. It also provides auctioned jeepney;
the court an idea as to how efficient court processes are after the judgment has been Joe Castillo, representative of Mario Timbol, was not present at the auction
promulgated. The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution sale, contrary to what appears in the minutes;
of decisions. respondent ignored their bid;
the jeepney was sold for the unconscionably low price of P15,000.00;
In this case, the records show that respondent received the writ of execution on the jeepney had not been delivered to the supposed buyer Mario Timbol but
December 11, 1997. Following Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil had been kept in Cavite as of April 2, 1998; and
Procedure, respondent was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after the sale should have been conducted in Carmona, Cavite, and not in Bacoor,
December 11, 1997, or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the also in the province of Cavite.
judgment has been satisfied. However, as of July 17, 2000, he failed to make any report The MTC annulled the auction sale. Found the Sheriff liable for grave misconduct and
to the court as it was his ministerial duty to do so. He was thus guilty of nonfeasance. not complying with Rule 39: due to Sheriff Medel P. Acosta's failure to make a proper
return of the writ of execution to this Honorable Court, in violation of 14 Rule 39 of the
Moreover, fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over to the judgment Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended and the evidence presented showing that the
obligee or the latter's authorized representative. In the absence of both, respondent is public auction sale allegedly held on February 6, 1998 was simulated, the SALE of the
obligated to pay them over to the clerk of the court who issued the writ or, if this is not Isuzu passenger jeep with plate no. PTY-292 thus levied and sold on execution is hereby
possible, to deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank. declared null and void; That the Certificate of Sale dated February 17, 1998 is hereby
cancelled;
The records show that when Mario Timbol paid the bid price to respondent, the latter
did not turn over the amount to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, as counsel of Leon Basas, Sr., or the Matter was referred to the office of the court administrator. It found the sheriff guilty on
Clerk of Court, but rather to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of plaintiff's counsel.[9] The charges of grave misconduct.
Minutes of the Public Auction Sale reveal that during the said sale, the judgment obligee,
Leon Basas, Sr., was absent and so was Cesar Gruspe. As such, under Rule 39, 9, Issue:
respondent was under the obligation to turn over the P15,000.00 to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, W/N respondent Sheriff liable for the simulation of the auction sale conducted on
the authorized representative of Leon Basas Sr. Instead, as evidenced by the Minutes of February 16, 1998 [Yes, for FOUR reasons, but im only providing the first 3 because they
the Public Auction, respondent paid the amount to Cesar Gruspe, who was not even relate to Rule 39]
present at the bidding, nor authorized by Leon Basas, Sr. to receive the amount from
respondent. Held:
COMPLETE WHEREFORE, in accordance with the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, respondent Sheriff Medel P. Acosta is hereby DISMISSED from service for
Facts: misfeasance, nonfeasance, and dereliction of duty, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
Administrative complaint against Medel P. Acosta, Sheriff IV for grave misconduct, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
Ratio:
In the MTC, judgment was rendered against Amparo Osila for a sum of money.
Complainant alleges that in implementing the writ of execution and conducting the The Sheriff is guilty!! For the ff. reasons:
execution sale to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02, respondent
committed grave misconduct, was dishonest, and exhibited conduct prejudicial to the First. On December 11, 1997, a writ was issued by Branch 19 of the Municipal Circuit
best interests of the service. Trial Court of Carmona and General Mariano Alvarez for the satisfaction of the judgment
in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02 entitled "Leon Basas vs. Amparo Osila." The writ of
Osila filed a Motion to Declare Null and Void the Public Auction Sale conducted on execution directed the respondent:
February 16, 1998. She alleged that:

the execution sale conducted on February 16, 1998 was simulated;
respondent violated Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil . to likewise return this writ into (sic) the Court at any time, not less than ten days nor
Procedure; more than sixty days after its receipt with your proceedings endorsed thereon.
(Certiorari)
obligee, or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful
fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over
As per the pertinent portion of the order issuing the writ of execution, respondent the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court that issued the writ.
should have made a return on the writ within 60 days from his receipt of the order, or
by February 9, 1998. To date, respondent has not submitted or made a return on the If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive
writ and has violated a mandate of the court. It is well settled that the sheriff's duty in payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing
the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial.[8] As such, any failure to sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the
comply with such constitutes nonfeasance in the performance of his duties same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not
practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government
Second. Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
Sec. 14 Return of the writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the
court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said
judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall
the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk
continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand
motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the that any payment by check be payable to him.
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.
The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and Thus, fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over to the judgment obligee
shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. or the latter's authorized representative. In the absence of both, respondent is obligated
(Emphasis supplied. to pay them over to the clerk of the court who issued the writ or, if this is not possible, to
deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank.
Thus, under this provision, respondent is required (1) to make a return and submit it to
the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment; and (2) if the The records show that when Mario Timbol paid the bid price to respondent, the latter
judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court within 30 days after did not turn over the amount to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, as counsel of Leon Basas, Sr., or the
his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. The Sheriff shall Clerk of Court, but rather to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of plaintiff's counsel.[9] The
continue making a report every 30 days on proceedings being taken thereon until the Minutes of the Public Auction Sale reveal that during the said sale, the judgment obligee,
judgment is full satisfied. The reason for this requirement is to update the court as to the Leon Basas, Sr., was absent and so was Cesar Gruspe. As such, under Rule 39, 9,
status of the execution and give it an idea why the judgment has not been satisfied. It respondent was under the obligation to turn over the P15,000.00 to Atty. Delfin Gruspe,
also provides the court an idea as to how efficient court processes are after the the authorized representative of Leon Basas Sr. Instead, as evidenced by the Minutes of
judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the Public Auction, respondent paid the amount to Cesar Gruspe, who was not even
the speedy execution of decisions. present at the bidding, nor authorized by Leon Basas, Sr. to receive the amount from
respondent.
In this case, the records show that respondent received the writ of execution on
December 11, 1997. Following Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Conformably to the findings in this case, we hold respondent guilty of misfeasance and
Procedure, respondent was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after nonfeasance for his failure (a) to make a return on the writ; (b) to make the periodical
December 11, 1997, or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the reports required by the Rules of Court; (c) to comply with Rule 39, 9 of the 1997
judgment has been satisfied. However, as of July 17, 2000, he failed to make any report Revised Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the disposition of proceeds of auction sales;
to the court as it was his ministerial duty to do so. He was thus guilty of nonfeasance. (d) to conduct a public auction sale as contemplated by law which resulted in the
simulation of the auction sale; and (e) for turning over the proceeds of the sale to parties
Third. Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: not authorized by law to receive them.
Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how, enforced. - a) Immediate payment on

demand.- The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding
from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ
of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank
check payable to the judgment obligee or any other form of payment acceptable to the
latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment
(Certiorari)
Parties agreed on the following:
17) ST. AVIATION SERVICES V. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, G.R. NO.140288,
OCTOBER 23, 2006 PUNO o Mode and manner of payment, contract price, including interest in case of
default.
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO. v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS (2006) o That the construction, validity and performance thereof shall be governed by
the laws of Singapore.
DOCTRINE o That they agree to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-
exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
EMERGENCY RECIT
St. Aviation is a Singapore (SG) company who entered into a Maintenance and repair St. Aviation performed the repairs and promptly delivered the aircrafts to Grand Intl. St.
contract of an airbus owned by Grand Intl. (domestic) who is a domestic airline Aviation billed Grand Intl the total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But
company. despite St. Aviations repeated demands, Grand Intl. failed to pay.
Grand Intl. failed to pay for the services. St. Aviation filed a case in SG courts for St. Aviation filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum
payment of sum of money. Upon motion, the SG court ordered that summons be of S$452,560.18, including interest and costs. St. Aviation motioned that the court issue
served through the Sheriff of Pasay. The Sheriff served summons to the Secretary of the a Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon Grand Intl.
General Manager of Grand Airways in Pasay City. Grand Intl failed to answer the claim. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the
SG court issued an order of default. St. Aviation presented case and won. summons upon Grand Intl. However, despite receipt of summons, Grand Intl. failed to
answer the claim.
St. Aviation filed with Pasay RTC a petition to enforce foreign judgment. Grand Intl filed
MTD on the basis of failure to acquire jurisdiction over person and violation of due On February 1998, on motion of St. Aviation, the Singapore High Court rendered a
process (since judgment by default). judgment by default against Grand Intl.
Court held that matters of remedy and procedure (i.e. service of process upon a St. Aviation then filed with the Pasay RTC, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment.
defendant) are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum (which is SG).
Singapore law states that the originating process may be served by a method of Grand Intl. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds:
service authorized by the law of that country (for service of any originating
process issued by that country). (simple words: basta compliant sa rules on service of (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and
summons ng PH, valid service sa SG) (2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been
rendered in violation of its right to due process.
Since in the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by
the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant or by substituted service, service was proper and jurisdiction RTC denied motion to dismiss, holding that neither one of the two grounds (of Grand) is
was acquired over the person of Grand Intl. among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
HELD
Grand Intl filed MR but was denied by the RTC.
FACTS
On July 30, 1999, the CA set aside the orders of the RTC without prejudice to the right
St. Aviation Services Co. is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the of St. Aviation to initiate another proceeding before the proper court to enforce its
manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. claim.
Grand International Airways, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in airline CA reasoning: Complaint did not involve the personal status of Grand Intl, nor any
operations. property in which the St. Aviation has a claim or interest, or which the St. Aviation has
attached but purely an action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an
On January 1996, parties executed an Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, the
of two air buses. Under this agreement, St. Aviation agreed to undertake maintenance service of summons should be personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to
and modification works on Grand Intls aircrafts. confer jurisdiction on the court.
(Certiorari)
St. Aviation filed MR but was denied. In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons
by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a
ISSUES: copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of
Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon Grand Intl at its office
(1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of located at Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriffs
respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines YES! Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of the
(2) whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High Court is General Manager of Grand Intl. But Grand Intl completely ignored the summons, hence,
enforceable in the Philippines. Depends! (Foreign judgment merely it was declared in default.
presumptive evidence of right still needs to go through court hearing for
enforcement) Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon Grand Intl in accordance with
HELD: SC GRANTS the petition. CA order SET ASIDE. Pasay RTC DIRECTED to hear Civil our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its
Case No. 98-1389 with dispatch. person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against Grand Airways
is valid.
RULING:
ON FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give
Grand Intl contends that the service of summons is void and that the effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of conditions that may vary in different countries. The Philippine legal system has long ago
the forum which in this case is the law of Singapore. In this case, St. Aviation moved for accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for
leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as
dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted leave to serve a copy of derived from internationally accepted doctrines.
the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law
of the Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, in our legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
or elsewhere in the Philippines. Procedure, as amended, thus:
This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final
r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore, which provides: order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to
be served on a defendant in any country with respect to which there (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for service in the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
that country of process of the High Court, the originating process may and
be served (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
a) through the government of that country, where that between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
government is willing to effect service; title;

b) through a Singapore Consular authority in that country,
except where service through such an authority is contrary to the law In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
of the country; or evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that
country for service of any originating process issued by that
country.
(Certiorari)
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in connection with the
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision. It is obvious from both the body and the
others, by: 1) want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by 2) want of notice to the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they carried instructions to enforce this
party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the Courts 2007 Decision, although erroneously made.
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
DOCTRINE: When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it
must be executed strictly according to its tenor. A definitive judgment is no longer
18) CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI V. ODENA, 2013 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the
Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter it. The 2007 Decision had been
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR C. BINAY clear and unambiguous to both parties; otherwise, the parties would have filed a motion
vs. EMERITA B. ODEA, (2013) - ponente: Serrano for its clarification, but neither party did in this case.

EMERGENCY DIGEST COMPLETE DIGEST:
Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA which Facts:
denied the MR filed by City. This case involves Emerita B. Odea, who was a teacher of 2007 DECISION
the Makati High School. She was illegally dismissed and CSC ruled that she be ODEA t had been employed by the City of Makati as a teacher since 1980. It was her
reinstated and awarded backwages from the time of separation to actual reinstatement. practice to sign an Attendance Sheet bearing her name and signature to signify
attendance, instead of using a Daily Time Record.
CA affirmed with modification: for civil service employees, backwages are
limited to a maximum of 5 years and not to full salaries from illegal dismissal to In 2000, she was asked to explain why she supposedly failed to report for work starting
reinstatement. SC affirmed CA in the 2007 decision. Decision became final. CSC directed in Nov 1999. She explained that she did not incur those alleged absences and presented
Mayor to immediately reinstate Odea but City did not reinstate. the employees log book as proof of her attendance. Her explanation was disregarded by
then education consultant Priscilla Ferrolino. Thereafter, Mayor Elenita Binay issued a
Odea opted for early retirement. City of Makati gave her money representing Memorandum dropping ODEA from the roll of employees due to her AWOL. ODEA
her supposed back salaries and other benefits. She acknowledged receipt of the money moved for reconsideration, motion was denied. She appealed to the Civil Service
and signed A "Release, Quitclaim, and Waiver". Afterwards, Odea filed a letter- Commission (CSC).
complaint to CSC asserting that the amount paid her did not correspond to the entire
amount she was legally entitled to. CSC ruled that the dropping of ODEA from the roll was not supported by evidence. The
She claimed that the payment made to her, the amount of which corresponded Attendance Sheet duly complied with regulations, as it indicated her name and
to 5 years of service, was insufficient to cover her almost eight years of suffering. The signature, as well as times of arrival and departure, and was verified by her immediate
CSC took cognizance of the Letter-Complaint. City of Makati denied the allegations. supervisor. The CSC directed City of Makati to: (1) reinstate her; and (2) to pay her back
Mayor argued that the 2007 Decision has become final and executory, and that, under salaries from the time of her separation up to her actual reinstatement. City of Makati
the same, payment of back salaries shall be limited to 5 years only. Moreover, ODEA filed MR, denied. City filed a Rule 43 petition to the CA. CA denied the Petition and
had not been forced to sign a Release, Quitclaim and Waiver, as she executed the same affirmed the illegal dismissal. CA modified CSC resolution and stated that an illegally
voluntarily. CSC held that despite the 2007 Decision, Odea is entitled to full payment of terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited to a maximum
backwages from illegal dismissal to early retirement. period of 5 years, and not to full salaries from her illegal dismissal up to her
reinstatement.
ISSUE: 1. W/N City of Makati undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43
Petition with the CA to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC - NO City of Makati went to SC (Rule 45). SCs 2007 Decision Petition dismissed and
2. W/N ODEA after receiving payment, is still entitled to the additional amount affirmed CAs ruling entirely. 2007 Decision became final.
awarded by the CSC. NO
The Present Case
RATIO: SC ruled that Rule 43 with CA is proper because Rule 43 is not limited to
judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, The CSC, upon motion of ODEA, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to
judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. And although the general immediately reinstate ODEA to her former position and pay all her salaries and other
rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, there are exceptions to this rule. A benefits from the date of her removal from service up to her reinstatement. City did not
writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate comply, CSC reiterated previous order. The directive to reinstate was never complied
of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment. By analogy, the CSC with. ODEA instead opted to avail herself of early retirement effective 13 February
(Certiorari)
2008. City of Makati paid her the amount of P558,944.19, representing her supposed benefits. The City of Makati is directed to immediately pay the same.
back salaries and other benefits. She acknowledged receipt of the money and signed A
"Release, Quitclaim, and Waiver". Ratio:
I. City of Makati correct in assailing the CSC Resolutions by filing a Rule 43 Petition with
Afterwards, ODEA complained to the CSC, asserting that the amount paid her did not the CA. SC ruled that Rule 43 with CA is proper, but not for the reasons advanced by
correspond to the entire amount she was legally entitled to. She claimed in her Letter- City.
Complaint that the payment made to her, the amount of which corresponded to 5 years
of service, was insufficient to cover her almost eight years of suffering. The CSC took First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
cognizance of the Letter-Complaint and directed City of Makati, through mayor, to file judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards,
her comment. City of Makati denied the allegations. She argued that the 2007 Decision judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Section 1, Rule 43 of the
has become final and executory, and that, under the same, payment of back salaries shall Rules, provides in part:
be limited to 5 years only. Moreover, ODEA had not been forced to sign a Release, Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Quitclaim and Waiver, as she executed the same voluntarily. Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
CSC ruled in favor of employee, and directed the City to pay her backwages and other Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
benefits from the period of her illegal dismissal until her early retirement, or for a In PAGCOR v. Aumentado, Jr., SC ruled that the CAs jurisdiction covers not merely final
period of 7 years, 8 months and 28 days. judgments and final orders of the CSC, but also awards, judgments, final orders or
The CSC, in its Resolution stated that the 5-year limit was inequitable. CSC held that resolutions of the CSC.
even if the SC had implicitly intended that Odena is entitled only to five 5 years of back
salaries and other benefits, such will not bar her from claiming payment of the same in Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, there
full for the entire period she was out from the service as a result of her illegal dismissal. are exceptions to this rule. A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the
City filed MR, denied by CSC. sheriff to carry out the mandate of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a
judgment. By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in
CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition. The CA regarded the CSC Resolutions, issued in connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision. It is obvious from
relation to ODEAs Letter-Complaint, as orders of execution of the final and executory both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they carried
2007 Decision of this Court. The recourse to a Rule 43 Petition was unavailing, because instructions to enforce this Courts 2007 Decision, although erroneously made.
orders of execution cannot be the subject of appeal, the proper remedy being a Rule 65
petition. The CA ruled that In all the instances (under Rule 41) where the judgment or II. ODEA is not entitled to the amount awarded to her by the CSC.
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil SC reversed the ruling of the CSC granting additional amounts pertaining to her back
action under Rule 65. City filed MR, CA denied MR. wages equivalent for the entire period that she was not reinstated. CSC Resolutions are
void and ineffectual for varying the tenor of the 2007 Decision. To recall, the 2007
On 8 April 2010, petitioner filed before this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Decision, in relation to the CA Decision the reinstatement portion was rendered moot by
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion for Extension), praying for an additional ODEAs early retirement.
period of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. On 27 April
2010, SC denied the Motion for Extension for failing to state material dates. City of
Makati received notice of the denial only one and a half months after its promulgation. To once again reopen that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence
City filed on 7 May 2010, the instant Petition. of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision
is beyond review or modification even by this Court. Every litigation must come to an
Issue: end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party
1. W/N City of Makati undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43 Petition has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has
with the CA to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC - NO the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the latters case by the
2. W/N ODEA after receiving payment, is still entitled to the additional amount execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." CSC gravely
awarded by the CSC. NO erred in taking cognizance of respondents appeal of this Courts 2007 Decision in the
guise of a Letter-Complaint. Any proceedings and resolutions arising therefrom should
Held: be rendered nugatory.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review filed by is GRANTED. The Resolutions of
the CA are REVERSED. The Release, Waiver and Quitclaim signed by ODEA, however, is It is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
without force and effect, and should not foreclose her entitlement to retirement becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even
(Certiorari)
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by this Court. The only recognized exception is the correction
of clerical errors; or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party or when the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration that
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose

SC deemed it appropriate to modify CSCs order to pay salaries from time of separation
up to actual reinstatement. It is settled that an illegally terminated civil service
employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, not
full back salaries from her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement (Marohombsar vs.
Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 62 [2000]). Considering that Odea was dropped from the
rolls effective at the close of office hours of May 15, 2000, her back salaries shall be
computed from May 16, 2000 up to date of reinstatement, but not to exceed five (5)
years.

When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it must be
executed strictly according to its tenor. A definitive judgment is no longer subject to
change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter it. The 2007 Decision had been clear and
unambiguous to both parties; otherwise, the parties would have filed a motion for its
clarification, but neither party did in this case.

The rule is fundamental, that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is
deemed terminated once and for all. It cannot be modified or altered. The CSC gravely
erred in modifying a judgment which had in fact already been satisfied even before
ODEA filed her Letter-Complaint.

D. The quitclaim executed by respondent is void and of no effect in terms of foreclosing
her rights to receive additional amounts pertaining to her retirement benefits.

SC ruled that the said waiver is void in two respects,: (1) there was fraud or deceit on
the part of City; and (2) the consideration for the quitclaim was unreasonable.
City basically cornered ODEA into signing the same by making its execution a pre-
condition before she could receive her back wages. Similarly, the consideration for the
quitclaim is unreasonably low, if we consider that she was supposed to receive her
retirement benefits as well, computed from the time she started way back in 1980. The
quitclaim basically meant that the P558,944.19 she received from as payment of back
wages was likewise in fulfillment of her retirement benefits as well. The quitclaim, in
effect, unduly limited the amount of retirement pay that she was supposed to receive
from petitioner. The waiver is, therefore, without effect insofar as it foreclosed her
entitlement to her retirement benefits. It should not prevent her from receiving her
retirement benefits for her employment.
(Certiorari)

XXVII.APPEALS/ORIGINAL ACTIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT AND Facts:
COURT OF APPEALS (RULES 40 TO 56 EXCEPT RULE 47) Fernando obtained loans from CHUA through the latters agent, Borres, on
three separate occasions. The loans were secured by a REM on Fernandos
property.
Allegedly, before the 3rd loan could be released, Fernando signed a Deed of
Absolute Sale of her property in favor of Chua, upon the assurance of Borres
1) FERNANDO V. SANTAMARIA, G.R. NO. 160730, DECEMBER 10, 2004 RAZON that the same was a mere formality.
Later, Fernando learned that the title to her property was transferred to Chua.
Fernando v. Santamaria et.al. Thereafter, Chua offered to sell back the property to Fernando, which the latter
accepted. However, Fernando came to know that Chua already sold the
G.R. No. 160730 December 10, 2004 property to Uy.
Fernando filed a complaint against Uy, Chua, and Borres on the following
Doctrine: As a general rule, an appeal of RTC decision to CA is perfected by filing a causes of action: (1) annulment of the deeds of absolute sale over the subject
notice of appeal. No record of appeal is required unless in cases of special proceedings lot in favor of Chua and Uy and the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules so require. of the latter; (2) recovery from Borres of the amount of P200,000.00 which she
allegedly gave as payment of the real property taxes of the lot as well as the
Emergency Digest: amount of P120,000.00 which Borres unlawfully deducted from her third loan;
and (3) recovery of damages against all respondents.
Facts: FERNANDO obtained several loans secured by REM on her property from CHUA Chua filed a MTD on the ground that the action which is founded on fraud is
through BORRES (agent). Allegedly, before the 3rd loan could be released, FERNANDO barred by prescription. In their Answer, Uy and Borres contended, among
signed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of CHUA upon assurance of others, that the cause of action, if any, has been waived or abandoned. A letter
BORRES that the same was a mere formality. Later, however, she learned that title to by Fernando to Uy containing an offer to repurchase the property was
property was transferred to CHUA, who later sold the property to UY. FERNANDO filed a evidence that Fernando acknowledged that Uy was already the owner.
complaint (annulment of the deed of sale + damages) against UY, CHUA and his agent, RTC dismissed the complaint against all the respondents on the grounds of
BORRES. UY and CHUA: for cancellation of TCT and annulment of Deed of Sale; and prescription, ratification and abandonment of cause of action. The decision
BORRES: for recovery of sum of money from alleged unlawful deduction. was later modified reinstating the case for recovery of sum of money against
Borres.
CHUA filed a MTD on ground of prescription of action grounded on fraud. BORRES and Fernando filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL questioning the said decisions.
UY interposed waiver and abandonment. Trial court dismissed the complaint as to
Chua filed a MTD the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal within the
CHUA and UY on ground of prescription and ratification but sustained the case against
required period.
BORRES (agent) for the recovery of sum of money. FERNANDO filed a NOTICE of
Fernando filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA contending that her complaint
APPEAL. CHUA filed a MTD the appeal for failure to file a RECORD on APPEAL within
seeks to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the fraudulent conveyance of
reglementary period. TC dismissed the appeal. Petition for certiorari to CA. CA
her property. She claimed that the trial court cannot render several judgment
dismissed. Thus, instant case for petition for review to SC.
and separate the liability of Borres with that of her co-respondents. As such,

appeal from the decision of the trial court can be perfected by the filing of a
Issue: Whether or not a record of appeal is necessary in the instant case? YES
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the questioned order without

need of submitting a record on appeal.
Ratio: In the instant case, several judgments is proper since the cause of action for
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding that the trial court validly
recovery of sum of money is only directed against BORRES and can separately be
rendered several judgment because the liability of Borres in the third cause of
adjudicated despite the dismissal of the case for annulment of deed and cancellation of
action (number 2 above) is distinct from the liability of the other respondents.
TCT against CHUA and UY. Section 2(a) Rule 41 provides that a record on appeal is
To perfect an appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that Fernando must file a
required in appeals of cases where multiple or separate appeals are present. Therefore,
record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal within 30 days from notice
FERNANDO is required to file a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the
of the assailed order pursuant to Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 41 of the Revised
judgment sought to be appealed. FERNANDO failed to file a record of appeal, thus,
Rules of Civil Procedure. MR denied. Thus, instant Petition for review to SC.
dismissal is proper.

Issue: Whether or not a record of appeal is required in this case? YES; Whether
Complete Digest:
Fernando was able to perfect her appeal? NO
(Certiorari)
portion; (2) the validity of petitioner-lessors claim for non-payment of rentals;
Held: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The August 18, and (3) the propriety of compelling petitioner-lessor to sell to the subject lot to
2003 Decision and the November 6, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. respondent-lessees. Separately resolving the issues in a motion to dismiss and
No. SP No. 72787, which sustained the August 19, 2002 order of the Regional Trial judgment on the pleadings, the trial court ruled that private respondents-
Court, of Makati Branch 145 dismissing the appeal of petitioner in Civil Case No. 00- lessees cannot compel petitioner-lessor to sell the lot and that the former
1249 are AFFIRMED. should pay rental arrearages to the latter. The same issues were raised before
the Court of Appeals, except for the existence of private respondents-lessees
Ratio: right to compel adjustment of the alleged encroachment which was not yet
resolved by the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the case is not one
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly where multiple appeals can be taken, hence a notice of appeal is sufficient and
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against a record on appeal is not required to perfect an appeal.
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. In the instant case, the In the said cited case, the issue of encroachment and the area thereof, if there
trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the complaint was is any, will determine the propriety of awarding back rentals as well as the
filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several basis of the computation of rental arrearages on a per square meter basis. The
judgment is proper. trial court cannot validly render decision on the amount of arrearages without
It is clear that the action for payment of the amounts of P200,000.00 and resolving first the question on encroachment. Hence, no several judgments can
P120,000.00 is directed only against Borres to the exclusion of Uy and be rendered and no multiple appeals can be made in the said case because the
Chua. There is no dispute that Chua, through Borres, granted loans to issues arose from a single cause of action, i.e., to compel correction or
petitioner secured by a mortgage on the subject lot. The issues of adjustment of the encroached area. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the
whether or not Borres should reimburse the amount of P120,000.00 decision of the Court of Appeals, holding among others, that the trial court
allegedly received from petitioner for payment real estate taxes of the erred in rendering partial judgment on the rental arrearages because the
lot, and the P200,000.00 purportedly deducted by Borres from averments and available evidence tendered a valid issue which could not be
petitioners third loan, are distinct from and independent of the question resolved merely on the pleadings.
of whether petitioner signed the deed of absolute sale through the
misrepresentation of respondents. Otherwise stated, even if the trial The doctrine laid down in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
court debunk petitioners claim that respondents (including Borres) Appeals, is not applicable to the instant case. Petitioners cause of action
connived in defrauding her to convey the property, the action against against Borres for collection of sum of money is clearly severable from her
Borres for sum of money will still subsist because it is based on issues action against the other respondents. Thus, rendition of several judgment is
which has nothing to do with the issue of fraud, i.e., whether Borres proper.
received the amount of P120,000.00 and whether she has the obligation
to pay the real estate taxes of the mortgaged lot. As to the amount of Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of Rule 41, petitioner is required to
P200,000.00 the question is the validity of the deduction of said amount file a record on appeal within thirty days from November 15, 2001, her date of
from the third loan obtained by petitioner. The cause of action for receipt of the October 25, 2001 order. Considering that no record on appeal
collection of sum of money against Borres can thus proceed was filed, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the order of the trial court
independently of the dismissal of the action to hold her solidarily liable dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary
with Chua and Uy for the alleged fraudulent conveyance of the lot (first, period. A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the
second and fourth causes of action of the complaint). As admitted by Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable
petitioner in her motion for reconsideration of the July 24, 2001 Order, interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial
the issue against Borres is one for misappropriation of the amounts business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than once been
sought to be recovered. held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the
CASE CITED BY FERNANDO: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of perfection of appeals. Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having
Appeals: been perfected, the assailed order or decision becomes final and executory and
Here, private respondent-lessees withhold rental payments to petitioner- the court loses all jurisdiction over the case.
lessor in order to force the latter to make adjustments or correction on the Finally, even if we brush aside the procedural flaws in the instant case, the appeal is still
area of the leased lot alleged to be encroached upon by the fence erected on dismissible because petitioners conduct is inconsistent with her claim of fraud. Instead
the adjacent lot. The issues presented before the trial court were: (1) the of impugning the validity of the sale of the lot to Chua, petitioner accepted the latters
existence of a right to compel correction or adjustment the alleged encroached offer to resell the property in the amount of P10 Million. After learning that Chua sold
(Certiorari)
the same lot to Uy, she again offered the buy the lot for P13 Million and to shoulder the jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
payment of all incidental expenses, thus, confirming that Uy has a valid title over the reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
property. What is more, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa with the Pasay gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
City Prosecutors Office against respondents only on October 6, 1998, or almost 3 years perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33]
from the time she learned of the alleged fraudulent transfers of her property. In
dismissing the complaint, the City Prosecutor found petitioner to be intelligent to Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
understand the import and consequences of signing the deed of sale and thus rejected
her claim that she was defrauded by respondents. He also gave no credence to her
contention that Borres refused to release the 3rd loan unless she sign the deed of sale
because said deed was in fact executed on October 24, 1995, a much later date than the As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
release of the 3rd loan on June 29, 1995. of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.[34]
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari

2) MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY, G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11, 2004 cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment
RESPICIO of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.[36] Even if the findings of the court are
EMERGENCY incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari.[37] Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error
Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy. [38]
Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping
requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
Madrigal filed insolvency case with RTC. Madrigal filed another case of damages jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the
in ANOTHER branch in RTC. Insolvency granted. MTD in second case is granted (on the proceedings of lower courts. [39] An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit,
basis on no cause of action) , since according to the RTC, when insolvency is granted, it is while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of
the assignor that should pursue the case, so dismissed. the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.[40]
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to
ISSUE: a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner)
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public
Is certiorari proper remedy to the dismissal in the second case? and the private respondents, respectively).[41]
Ratio As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the
Rules of Court so declare are appealable.[42] Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original
Certiorari is not proper remedy. The dismissal is an order disposing of the case. action for certiorarimay be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court
So must appeal. Certiorari is not available if there is a mode for appeal. The issue over prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
the RTC decision is the propriety of decision based on law (error of judgment), not grave or adequate remedy.[43]
abuse of discretion. In such cases, appeal is the proper mode.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.[44] Where a record on appeal
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order.[45] A petition for review
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision,
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.[46]
ordinary course of law.[30] In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of or motion for reconsideration.[47]
authority.[31] There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or
acts without any statutory authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.[48] If a motion for new trial or
(Certiorari)
motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res
of the motion.[49] judicata. However, such dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based
on other grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for appeal is the remedy for the dismissal of an action.
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in
order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,[61] petitioner further claims that it was
this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law.[50] Such prohibited from filing an appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an
motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.[51] appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, because the remedy is to
appeal the main decision as petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the
if Appeal Is Available judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the trial courts Order did
not dismiss the action without prejudice.[62]
Exception to the Rule

Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually Not Established by Petitioner
exclusive, not alternative or successive.[52] Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[53] One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[54] Where an appeal We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite
is available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of the availability of appeal.[63] Where the exigencies of the case are such that the
discretion. ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate -- either in point of promptness or
completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of
Second Issue: certiorari may still be issued.[64]Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the
CA Jurisdiction remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court,[65] but these are not applicable to
the present factual milieu.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not
Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction. The issue raised constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not
there was the trial courts alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of have dismissed the Complaint or should have at least allowed the substitution of the
action. Petitioner argues that it could still institute the Complaint, even if it had filed a assignee in petitioners stead.[66] These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not
Petition for Insolvency earlier.[55] As petitioner was challenging the trial courts constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary,
interpretation of the law -- posing a question of law -- the issue involved an error of petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal
judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed
of its legitimate jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of remedy of appeal.
discretion.[56]
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to
The Dismissal -- a Final Order elevate the RTCs Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have
involved a pure question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 2 (c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule 50,[67] Rules of Court.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.[58] It is not
Petition is DENIED,
interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done
by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.[59]
Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16[60] bars the filing of an appeal when
the dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy
of appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or on the statute of
limitations, or to claims that have been extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this
interpretation absurd. COMPLETE FACTS
(Certiorari)
that the questioned Orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal.[16]
The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely
are mutually exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available, legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to the general rule
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available.[17] Respondents Lapanday
discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of and Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for Reconsideration .[18]
appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

the appellate court granted Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzos Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that
an order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal,
The Facts not certiorari.[20]
Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still

have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, according to the CA.[21] The appellate
Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary court held that the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that
Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila Branch 49.[5] Subsequently, should be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section
petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday Holdings 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[22]
Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P.
Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila Branch 36.[6] Hence, this Petition.[23]
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture ISSUE
agreement with Lapanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the
shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.;[7] (2) that it had done so on the 1. the order of the lower court which granted private respondents Motions to
strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as chairman of the Dismiss are not proper subjects of a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65.
board or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had
thereafter been appointed -- allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday -- as broker, for 2. Does the CA have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Certiorari
the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the
joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000 RATIO
bank loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite
demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte
charter hire contracts.[8]
The Petition is unmeritorious.
the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.[9]
Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to First Issue:
Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch 36.[10] Remedy Against Dismissal of Complaint
Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause
of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law,[11] the trial court
The resolution of this case hinges on the proper remedy: an appeal or a petition
opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the
for certiorari. an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the
exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed
Appeal
assignee.[12]
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was later denied .[14]
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking
declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable.[25] The manner of appealing an RTC
to set aside the Orders of the trial court.[15] the CA issued a Resolution requiring
judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
petitioner to explain why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on the ground
(Certiorari)
Section 2. Modes of appeal. For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be ordinary course of law.[30]
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
filed and served in like manner. authority.[31] There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or
acts without any statutory authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such
(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
review in accordance with Rule 42. reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33]
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
accordance with Rule 45.[26]
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending

action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions
order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory which shall be explained below.
order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as
regards the merits of the latter.[27] As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.[34] In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we
Petition for Certiorari explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65, which reads: every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.[35]
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.[36] Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or the province of certiorari.[37] Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy. [38]
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.[28] As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot proceedings of lower courts. [39] An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit,
be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of
within the bounds of its jurisdiction.[29] the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.[40]
(Certiorari)
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for
a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. The issue raised there was the trial courts
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action. Petitioner argues
and the private respondents, respectively).[41] that it could still institute the Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency
earlier.[55] As petitioner was challenging the trial courts interpretation of the law --
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the posing a question of law -- the issue involved an error of judgment, not of
Rules of Court so declare are appealable.[42] Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate
action for certiorarimay be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.[56]
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
or adequate remedy.[43] The instant case falls squarely with Barangay Blue Ridge A of QC v. Court of
Appeals.[57] In that case, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days failure to state a cause of action. After the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.[44] Where a record on appeal petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The appellate court denied the
is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within Petition on the ground that the proper remedy was appeal. Holding that an error of
thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order.[45] A petition for review judgment should be reviewed through an ordinary appeal, this Court upheld the CA.
should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision,
or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.[46] The Dismissal -- a Final Order
In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration.[47]
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.[58] It is not
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done
days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution.[48] If a motion for new trial or by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.[59]
motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial
of the motion.[49] Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16[60] bars the filing of an appeal when
the dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for of appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or on the statute of
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in limitations, or to claims that have been extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this
order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that interpretation absurd.
this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law.[50] Such
motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.[51] The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res
judicata. However, such dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy on other grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an
if Appeal Is Available appeal is the remedy for the dismissal of an action.
Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,[61] petitioner further claims that it was
prohibited from filing an appeal. Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, because the remedy is to
be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are appeal the main decision as petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.[52] Hence, certiorari is not and cannot 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply, because the trial courts Order did
of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[53] One of the requisites of certiorari is that not dismiss the action without prejudice.[62]
there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[54] Where an
appeal is available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse Exception to the Rule
of discretion. Not Established by Petitioner
Second Issue:
CA Jurisdiction
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite
(Certiorari)
the availability of appeal.[63] Where the exigencies of the case are such that the review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties among
ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate -- either in point of promptness or others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabias capacity to pay and
completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of BPIs perceived cost of money and not merely an application of law. This especially
certiorari may still be issued.[64]Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the obtains in corporate rehabilitation proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have
remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court,[65] but these are not applicable to been designated on account of their expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject
the present factual milieu. matter, as in this case.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not
have dismissed the Complaint or should have at least allowed the substitution of the FACTS:
assignee in petitioners stead.[66] These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not
constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary, - SARABIA obtained a P150 Million loan from Far East Bank and Trust Company
petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal to finance the construction of a five-storey hotel building (New Building) for
had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed the purpose of expanding its hotel business. An additional P20 Million stand-by
remedy of appeal. credit line was approved by FEBTC in the same year.
o The debts were secured Real Estate Mortgages over several parcels of
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to land.
elevate the RTCs Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have o BPI merged with FEBTC, so BPI assumed all the rights against
involved a pure question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme Court Sarabia.
pursuant to Section 2 (c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule 50,[67] Rules of Court. - Sarabia encountered various cash flow problems, and filed a Petition for
corporate rehabilitation with prayer for the issuance of a stay order before the
Petition is DENIED, RTC as it foresaw the impossibility to meet its maturing obligations to its
creditors when they fall due.
o Sarabia argued that its contractor defaulted and abandoned them,
3) BPI V. SARABIA MANOR HOTEL, 2013 SANCHEZ
that the terrorist threats (9/11 & Abu Sayyaf) adversely affected the
hotel business. Because of this, the RTC issued a Stay Order.
BPI v. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation
o The RTC approved Sarabias rehabilitation plan as recommended by
the Receiver, finding the same to be feasible. Among others, the RTC
DOCTRINE: A question of fact raised in a Rule 45 petition which does not fall under the
imposed a fixed interest rate of 6.75% p.a. and an extended loan
exceptions will be dismissed by the Supreme Court.
repayment period.
ER: - [Note] BPI appealed to the CA, arguing that it is a secured creditor, but it lost
again. It also upheld the 6.75%. p.a. interest rate on Sarabias loans, finding the
SARABIA Hotel loaned from Far East Bank and Trust (later BPI because it merged with said rate to be reasonable given that BPIs interests as a creditor were properly
them) 150 Million Pesos, which were secured by REMs. SARABIA had cash flow accounted for.
problems, and filed for Corporate Rehabilitationit said that its contractor defaulted on o As published, BPIs time deposit rate for an amount of P5,000,000.00
them and that the terrorist threats of 9/11 and Abu Sayyaf were bad for business. The (with a term of 360-364 days) is at 5.5% p.a.; while the benchmark
RTC granted the rehabilitation plan. Among other orders, the RTC said that BPI will be ninety one-day commercial paper, which banks used to price their
subjected to a fixed interest rate of 6.75% p.a. BPI didnt like this because it is a secured loan averages to 6.4% p.a. in 2005, has a three-year average rate of
creditor, and appealed to the CA. The CA likewise denied BPIs appeal. BPI now files a 6.57% p.a. As such, the 6.75% p.a. interest rate would be higher than
Rule 45 action on the question of whether the 6.75% interest is proper. the current market interest rates for time deposits and benchmark
commercial papers.
Issue: WHETHER the SC should reconsider BPIs fixed interest rate of 6.75% in a Rule 45 - BPI filed an MR, but it got denied, hence it filed the current Petition for Review
Petition (NO. Its a question of fact) on Certiorari (Rule 45).
ISSUE:
Held: Nope. It is a question of fact which does not fall under the valid exceptions (look at
the enumeration below if you want). To elucidate, the determination of whether or
WHETHER the SC should reconsider BPIs fixed interest rate of 6.75% in a Rule 45
not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor in the
Petition (NO. Its a question of fact)
approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a
(Certiorari)
HELD: 4) NAPOCOR V. PADERANGA, G.R. NO. 155065, JULY 28, 2005 SUPERABLE
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 24, 2006 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE
and Resolution dated December 6, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV. PADERANGA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25,
No. 81596 are hereby AFFIRMED. PETRONA O. DILAO, FEDIL T. OSMEA, ISABEL T. OSMEA, CELESTINO O. GALON,
POTENCIA O. BATUCAN, TRINIDAD T. OSMEA, LULIA T. OSMEA, LOURDES O.
RATIO: DAFFON, VICTORIA O. BARRIGA and JUAN T. OSMEA, JR., and ESTEFANIA
ENRIQUEZ, respondents. July 28, 2005. (NONS)
- It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions of EMERGENCY RECIT
fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless, the QUICK FACTS: NAPOCOR initiated an expropriation complaint for the land of DILAO, et.
following exceptions are found to exist: al., and ENRIQUEZ. The appointed Board of Commissioners determined that just
o (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, compensation should be at P516.66. The RTC agreed with this. NAPOCOR filed a notice
surmises, or conjectures; of appeal on the judgment. The RTC denied the appeal due to the failure of NAPOCOR to
o (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or file a record on appeal which resulted to its failure to perfect the appeal within the
impossible; reglementary period.
o (c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; ISSUE: WHETHER A RECORD ON APPEAL IS REQUIRED IN
o (d) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; EXPROPRIATION CASES? YES! In Municipality of Binan v. Garcia, the Court recognized
o (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; that there two stages, and thus multiple appeals, in expropriation cases: the first stage is
o (f) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the with the propriety of expropriation and the second stage is with the determination of
admissions of both parties; just compensation. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules recognize that no record on appeal is
o (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; required except in special proceedings and where the rules or law requires.
o (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; DOCTRINE:
o (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and FACTS:
o (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
NAPOCOR initiated a complaint for expropriation in the RTC of Danao for its
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (for the establishment of transmission
- In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPIs petition to be improper and lines). It sought to expropriate the land of Petrona Dilao and her siblings, and
hence, dismissible as the issues raised therein involve questions of fact which
the land of Estefania Enriquez in Carmen, Cebu.
are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
Dilao filed an Answer with Counterclaim while Enriquez did not. NAPOCOR
- To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given
was granted a writ of possession over the lands, and the RTC also appointed a
to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor in the approved
Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.
rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a
In their report, the Commissioners recommended that the Dilaos property
review of the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented by the parties
appraisal value is at P516.66/m2. NAPOCOR opposed this report on the ground
among others, the various financial documents and data showing Sarabias
that the appraisal value per RA 6395 (the law creating NAPOCOR) should be
capacity to pay and BPIs perceived cost of money and not merely an
10% of the market value of the property, and that the land could still be used
application of law.
for agricultural purposes.
- Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI presents, and finding
none of the above-mentioned exceptions to exist, the Court is constrained to The RTC in its Nov.10, 1999 Decision adopted the commissioners
recommended appraisal of the land co-owned by Dilao and her siblings. The
dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
quo which are entitled to great weight and respect, and even accorded with
o WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered condemning the
finality. This especially obtains in corporate rehabilitation proceedings
property of Petrona Dilao et al. which has been affected by 7,281
wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of their
square meters in favor of plaintiff; declaring in favor of defendants
expertise and specialized knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case.
for plaintiff to pay the fair market value of said area affected at
P516.66 per square or a total of P3,761,801.40 plus P250,000.00 for
the value of the improvements affected by herein expropriation.
(Certiorari)
NAPOCOR received its copy of the decision on Nov. 18, 1999 and filed a Notice This order is a final one, since it finally disposes of the action and
of Appeal. The RTC denied the appeal on Jan. 17, 2000 on the ground that leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits.
NAPOCOR failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period o The second is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the
because it did not file the required record on appeal. NAPOCOR filed a MR just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done
contending that a record on appeal is not required as the RTC rendered a by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
decision against ALL of the defendants, including Enriquez, since the commissioners. An appeal could arise from this stage as well, on the
dispositive portion of the decision stated Dilao et. al. propriety of the just compensation determine by the commissioners.
The RTC denied the MR, clarifying that the reference to Petrona Dilao et al. in Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent
the dispositive portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao and her domain, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for
co-owner-siblings. appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice
NAPOCOR filed a petition for relief from the denial on the appeal on the ground thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions
that its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest mistake and in general. Hence, expropriation falls under the classification of other cases of
excusable neglect, it having believed that a record on appeal was not required multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require
in light of the failure of the other defendant, Enriquez, to file an answer to the The argument of NAPOCOR that it need not file a record on appeal since the
complaint. This was likewise denied. court did not acquire jurisdiction over Enriquez, which resulted to a bar to her
A motion for execution of judgment was rendered by the RTC. NAPOCOR went appeal from the judgment, will likewise fail.
to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA denied this holding that under Enriquez actually filed a letter-appeal addressed to the RTC, manifesting that
Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a record she has no objection to the expropriation, but that on the determination of just
on appeal is required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple compensation, should be based on the fair market value of the property. She
or separate appeals, as in an action for expropriation in which the order had no objections to the issuance of the writ of possession over her property.
determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the subsequent Despite the fact that she did not file an answer to the complaint did not
adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of foreclose the possibility of an appeal arising therefrom for this is allowed by
separate appeals. Rule 67, Sec. 3, third paragraph.2 Thus, if she does not agree with the just
NAPOCOR appealed to the SC via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. There compensation awarded by the court, she can appeal therefrom.
could be no multiple appeals in this case based on the following arguments: Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation
o Expropriation under Rule 67 is a not a special proceeding. case, NPC should have filed a record on appeal within 30 days from
o No law requires a record on appeal in expropriation cases. receipt of the trial courts decision.
o No appeal could arise from the complaint against Enriquez because
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her. Whether the just compensation determined by the Commissioners is proper
Even on substantive grounds, NAPOCORs appeal will not prosper.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA correctly ruled that a record on appeal is required in The Court in NAPOCOR v. Chiong had already stated that it is the nature and
expropriation cases? YES! character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to
determine just compensation to the landowner.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transfer of title or possession, it also includes right-of-way
RATIO: easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the
Whether a record on appeal is required in expropriation cases land traversed by transmission lines (in short, it imposes a burden on the
Under Rule 41, Sec. 2, a record on appeal is not required except in special property).
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or In NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, the Court stated that the easement imposes limitation
these Rules so require. on the proprietary rights of the land owner, as no plant higher than 3 meters is
In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, it was already recognized that multiple allowed and because of danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath
appeals could arise from expropriation cases: said wires due to the high voltage transmission lines.
o There are two stages in every action of expropriation. The first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such 2 A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit
exercise in the case. It ends with an order, either stating that the amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial
exercise of eminent domain is proper, or a dismissal of the action. of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he
may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share
in the distribution of the award.
(Certiorari)
Based on the Commissioners Report, there is basis for the just compensation -Nope. Res judicata does not apply because the judgment on the merits has not attained
awarded as the land is very fertile and suitable for crop production. The finality yet. It was even categorically stated by CA that the RTC decision on the collection
transmission lines had already caused damage to around 600 trees (mango, case has not attained finality
cacao, ipil-ipil, etc).
Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, -Even if there was an appeal with the CA, Delta was not yet estopped in questioning the
the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is validity of the writ of execution since the issues brought to the CA were just validity of
unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered, as the environment is made the summons and the denial of the notice of appeal (and not the merits per se of the
dangerous to the occupants life and limb. case, i.e. the rights and liabilities).
-Moreover, the RTC committed GADLEJ in granting the omnibus motion to continue with
5) STATE INVESTMENT V. DELTA MOTORS, G.R. NO. 144444 TANDOC the writ of execution since the records of the case were already transferred to the CA. In
other words, RTC has no jurisdiction anymore to decide on and to grant the omnibus
ER: (Nakakalito ang facts kasi sobrang dami ang inaappeal. Kelangan basahin ng tatlong motion.
beses ng mabuti)

State Investment filed a collection case against Delta with the RTC. Delta was
declared in default. RTC ruled in favor of State Investment. State Investment filed a writ FACTS:
of execution. RTC granted the writ of execution.
- An action for a sum of money filed with the RTC on February 29, 1984 by State
Delta went to CA questioning the validity of the RTC decision, stating that Investment Trust, Inc.3[8] (SITI) against Delta Motors Corporation
summons was not properly given. CA said that the summons was proper, however, the
RTC decision has not attained finality. -On December 5, 1984, the RTC rendered a judgment by default, ordering Delta to pay
SITI
Delta filed a notice of appeal with RTC. RTC denied. Delta went to CA again
questioning the denial of the notice of appeal. CA granted Deltas petition to grant the -The RTC Decision was published three times in the Thunderer, a Manila-based weekly
notice of appeal. CA also ordered the RTC to elevate the records of the case to the newspaper. Seventeen days from the last publication of the Decision, SITI moved for the
former. State Investment appealed the CAs order to SC. (SC dismissed this). issuance of a writ of execution. The RTC granted the Motion in its March 11, 1987
Order.
While the appeal of State Investment was pending in SC, Delta filed a motion to
annul the writ of execution issued by the RTC with the CA. CA dismissed the motion -On September 21, 1990, Delta obtained a certified true copy of the December 5, 1984
because this issue was not raised during the proceeding. (Note: Only the denial of the RTC Decision.
notice of appeal was brought to CA)
On October 11, 1990, it asked the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR SP No. 23068,
Now, State Investment filed an omnibus motion with the RTC that ruled the First Case, to annul the trial courts Decision on the ground that the summons had
collection case to continue with the writ of execution. Delta said that RTC should not been served upon a person not authorized to receive it; and prayed that judgment be
grant it since the collection case is still pending with the CA. RTC granted the motion rendered annulling/reversing or setting aside the Decision of the [RTC] judge dated
to continue with the writ of execution. December 5, 1984, Order dated March 11, 1987 issued by the [RTC] incumbent judge
and all other orders or proceedings issued and conducted pursuant thereto
Delta appealed the granting of the omnibus motion to CA. CA reversed stating
that the RTC decision has not attained finality that is why the omnibus motion should -On January 22, 1991, the CA rendered a Decision, declaring that the summons had been
have not been granted. END OF IT ALL = OMNIBUS MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN properly served upon Delta through one Evel Torres, the Corporations vice president
GRANTED. for finance, but that the RTC Judgment had not attained finality
ISSUE: W/on CA erred in annulling the omnibus motion to continue with the writ of -On November 12, 1991, Delta filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which, however,
execution on the basis of res judicata pursuant to the decision in the collection case dismissed it on June 3, 1992, upon SITIs motion. Thereafter, Delta filed a Petition for
HELD:

(Certiorari)
Certiorari in CA-GR SP No. 29147 (the Second Case), assailing the RTC Order -CA held that the RTC judgment, which had not been validly served on Delta, was
dismissing the Notice of Appeal. The CA granted the Petition not yet final and executory. The CA ruled that the RTC had acted without
jurisdiction when the latter issued its March 11, 1987 Order granting SITIs
-Moreover, RTC was ordered by CA to ELEVATE the records of the case to the Court Omnibus Motion. The appellate court noted that the RTCs assailed Decision was not
of Appeals, on appeal. yet final and executory
- SITI elevated the CA ruling that granted the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. SC
dismissed the appeal
ISSUES:
- While the appeal was pending in SC, Delta filed a motion with the CA asking the latter
to annul the writ of execution issued by the RTC in the first case (1) whether the Court of Appeals is barred by res judicata or the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment in nullifying the writ of execution issued by the RTC.- nope,
-CA dismissed Deltas appeal to annul the writ of execution because the writ of execution
the case has not yet attained finality
was not raised during the proceeding in CA (Note: denial of notice of appeal lang yung
dinala sa CA)
(2) whether the RTC acted without jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Execution. yes,
-Delta went to the Supreme Court docketed as GR No. 121075 to contest CAs decision. RTC cannot decide on the motion for writ of execution since the records are
SC affirmed CAs decision already with the CA
- SITI filed with the RTC on March 16, 1998, an Omnibus Motion4, asking for the HELD:
issuance of an order to continue with writ of execution
-RTC granted the motion. RATIO:
-Delta went to CA to question the grant by RTC 1.State Investment contends that by not nullifying the Decision of the RTC and the
subsequent proceedings it conducted, the CA5[18] and this Court6[19] affirmed the
validity of the March 11, 1987 Order of Execution. It contends that Delta is thus barred
from questioning the subsequent RTC Orders, which merely emanated from the
allegedly valid Order granting execution.
4 Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 84-23019, asking for the issuance of an order:
We disagree. The CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 23068 (First case) focused solely on the
1. Directing the incumbent sheriff of this branch, Eduardo E. Centeno, and/or his successor in office, to execute issue of whether or not there was valid service [of] summons as to vest [the RTC] with
an Alias Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale involving TCT No. 27847, issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City (now
title is with Register of Deeds of Paraaque) in favor of State Investment Trust, Inc.;
jurisdiction over x x x [Delta]. The appellate court ignored respondents assertion of the
validity of the March 11, 1987 Order for the execution of the RTC Decision. The silence of
the CA on the matter, however, cannot be taken as its imprimatur on the RTC Order.
2. Directing the Register of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, to cancel TCT No. 27847 registered in the name of
Delta Motors Corporation, upon the presentation of said Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale and issue a new title covering Contrary to petitioners argument, the validity of this Order cannot be inferred from the
the same property, in the name of State Investment [Trust], Inc.; CA Decision, which merely stated that the RTC Decision was not yet final and executory.
To put it bluntly, the RTC Order clashed with the CA Decision. The CA correctly
3. Directing the incumbent Sheriff of this branch, Eduardo E. Centeno and/or his successor in office, to sell at explained:
public auction Delta Motors Corporations shares of stocks in Canlubang Golf and Country Club covered by
Certificate Numbers 074 and 075, and the levied real properties under TCT Nos. 29567, 29563, 29564, 29171,
29565, 29566 and 32784 issued by the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City; It is without [a] doubt therefore that the decision of the [RTC] has not become final and
executory. As a natural or inherent and inevitable consequence of said declaration, a
4. Directing the incumbent sheriff, and/or his successor in office, to continue with the execution proceedings
commenced by the late sheriff Orlando M. Alcantara in the implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution, and to
execute all documents such as, but not limited to, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale or Final Deed of Sale, and to
perform all acts necessary to implement said writ and to transfer in the name of State Investment Trust, Inc. title
to the properties of Delta Motors Corporation subject of notices of levy.

Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.4[
(Certiorari)
decision which has not become final and executory may not be ordered executed or x x x x x x x x x
enforced under Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
x x x A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
Neither is the Order of March 11, 1987 properly an execution pending appeal parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the said Rule, as the ground of the RTC in objections.8[23]
granting the writ of execution was that the Decision had already become final
and executory which is patently erroneous as it had been expressly held by All the decisions relied upon by petitioner contain no discussion of the rights and
this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 23068 that the RTC decision insofar as Delta is the liabilities of the parties vis--vis the March 11, 1987 Order. The judgment in
concerned has not become final and executory. CA-GR SP No. 23068 was limited to the validity of the summons and the RTC
Decision. CA-GR SP No. 29147 and GR No. 121075 delved only on the Notice of
Appeal. Both matters were distinct from the subject of execution, which was
It follows that petitioners reliance on res judicata must fail. Such concept is spelled out involved in the March 11, 1987 RTC Order. In the absence of a final judgment or
in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: final order on the merits, there can be no res judicata to speak of.
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order In sum, the CA committed no error in brushing aside petitioners caterwauling on res
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or judicata.
final order, may be as follows:
2.The case at bar, the appeal filed by respondent was perfected on November 12, 1991,
x x x x x x x x x when it filed its Notice of Appeal. Considering that it had already filed such Notice,
and that the period of appeal for petitioner had already expired, the RTC no
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly longer had jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the trial court acted improperly when it
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, issued its May 27, 1998 Order granting petitioners Omnibus Motion. That Motion was
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to filed four years after this Court had affirmed the CA Decision directing the
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing elevation of the records on appeal. For having been issued without jurisdiction,
under the same title and in the same capacity; and the Order is plainly null and void.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, 6) AGUILAR V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 185140, JUNE 30, 2009 TEVES
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily TOPIC: Appeals/Original Actions in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (Rules 40
included therein or necessary thereto. to 56 except Rule 47)
In Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,7[22] the Court explained: CASE: Aguilar v. Court of Appeals
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first Aguilar won as chairman of Barangay Bansarvil, in Lanao del Norte, versus Insoy. Insoy
action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to protested in the MTC and it was discovered that he was the winner; thus Aguilar's win
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all was nullified.
other matters that could have been adjudged therein. Res judicata is an absolute bar to
a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment Aguilar filed notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee as per the Rules of
or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must Procedure for COMELEC Election contests, AM No. 07-4-15-SC but COMELEC dismissed
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; the appeal for failure to pay the required appeal fee, as per the COMELEC resolution
(d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject 8486, which required the appeal fee of 3,200.00 be paid to the COMELEC cash division.
matter and of causes of action.

(Certiorari)
RATIO: Yes. Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following
procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC of trial court decisions in election protests
Was dismissal by COMELEC proper? NOPE. Aguilar paid the 1,000php appeal fee on the involving elective municipal and barangay officials:
MTC, as per the Rules. Filing notice and payment of the fee perfected the appeal. Note
that the fee is paid to the court, and not the MTC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the SEC. 8.Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
records have to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the Commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a
COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual jurisdiction to notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served
resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been transmitted and before the on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
expiration of the period to appeal. Furthermore, it would be unjust for Aguilar to be
bound to circular that was not existing at the time he filed for his appeal. What was SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the
controlling in this case was the 1000php amount in the original AM, and not in the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos
subsequent resolution. (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal.

FACTS:
It should be noted from that the appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the
COMELEC but to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the
In the Oct 2007 elections, Aguilar won the chairmanship of Brgy. Bansarvil, Lanao del
notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal,
Norte, over Insoy by a margin of one vote. Insoy protested in the MTC and it found Insoy,
consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the
who, during the revision garnered 265 votes as against Aguilars 264 votes, as the duly
appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
elected punong barangay. The trial court consequently nullified the proclamation of
Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its
Aguilar and directed him to vacate the office.
residual jurisdiction to resolve pending incidents if the records have not yet been
transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.
Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.00 as
per Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the
COMELEC then issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486. This resolution is
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended.
and Barangay Officials. First Division of COMELEC ruled to DISMISS the appeal for
The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election contests involving
failure to pay the appeal fee as prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within
municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and
the five-(5)- day reglementary period.
the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within
the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the
Aguilar moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC First Division again denied this for
additional appeal fee ofP3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with
failure of Aguilar to pay the P700 motion fee. Aguilar then filed another MR contending
Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the
that the order issued in violation of the rule that MRs should be resolved by the
perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright oripso facto dismissal of the
COMELEC en banc. It was denied again. The COMELEC First Division issued the Entry of
appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be
Judgment. Aguilar then instituted the instant petition to assail the aforementioned
dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid,
issuances of the COMELEC First Division. the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the
ISSUE: WON Aguilar's should have been granted? (YES) discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.

Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioners
appeal, as it in fact did, for petitioners failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee. However,
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion
July 31, September 4 and October 6, 2008 Orders and the October 16, 2008 Entry of
in issuing the order dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court notes that the notice
Judgment issued by the COMELEC First Division in EAC (BRGY) No. 211-2008
of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC First Division
MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioners
for disposition in accordance with this Decision.
appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the
rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after
(Certiorari)
the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the - Cardona alleged (a) that her son, Ronald, owned a residential lot in Brgy.
issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cabalera, Alaminos. Ronald died intestate and Cardona was the sole heir.
petitioners appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the However, (b) Respondent Amansec entered the property without authority
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee. Considering that petitioner filed his appeal and started erecting residential houses. Despite receiving a formal demand to
months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners appeal vacate, Amansec refused to do so.
should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first directed petitioner
to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the - In his Answer, Amansec averred that he was the tenant of Isabel Raroque (Raroque) on
latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the the latters three parcels of land (TCT 10163, OCT 1559, and OCT 1379). The lands were
COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently classified as riceland, as per the Certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian
promulgated clarificatory resolutionwhich had taken effect only a few days earlier. Reform Office (MARO) and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The COMELEC First Division should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners - Amansec constructed a house on TCT 10163 with the permission of Raroque.
appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee Emancipation Patents were later issued to Amansec over the other two parcels of
given the public interest involved in election cases. land. Later, Amansec discovered that without his knowledge, Raroque had allegedly
sold the parcel of land covered by TCT 10163 to Ronald. However, considering the
existence of a tenancy relationship between him and Raroque, the MTC had no
7) CARDONA V. AMANSEC, G.R. NO. 147216, APRIL 15, 2004 TIU jurisdiction over the Complaint.
ER: Cardona filed an ejectment case with the MTC against Amansec. Cardona alleged
that she inherited the parcel of residential land from her son, Ronald; whereas Amansec
averred that he was a tenant of the same rice land and that its owner, Raroque, - Thereafter, in January 2000, Amansec filed with the DARAB against Cardona, a
permitted him to erect properties thereon. Petition praying for the (a) nullification of the Deed of Sale executed between
Raroque and Ronald and (b) issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor over
Amansec filed a petition with the DARAB, assailing the alleged Deed of Sale the said lot.
executed between Raroque and Ronald and praying that an emancipation patent over
the said lot be issued to him.
The MTC dismissed the ejectment case; while the PARAB ruled in favor of - In March 2000, the MTC (in the ejectment case) rendered a Decision, dismissing the
Amansec. [NOTE] Cardona (a) appealed the MTC decision to the RTC; but instead of Complaint because of the existence of a tenancy relationship. Cardona appealed the
appealing the PARAB decision with the DARAB, she (b) filed a petition for review with decision to the RTC.
the CA.

The RTC reversed the MTC in Cardonas favor, but the CA dismissed her
petition for review for having been filed out of time. - [NOTE] In a parallel development, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) rendered a Decision, granting the Petition of Amansec. Cardona decided to
Thereafter, Cardona filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, seeking to appeal the decision, but instead of perfecting her appeal to the DARAB, she filed a
reverse the CA Resolutions, so that the MTC may properly execute the RTC decision. Motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the CA. Cardona
Should the CA Resolutions be reversed? Nope! The SC referred to the DARAB Rules, averred therein that she received a copy of the PARAD Decision on 7 August 2000 and,
which provides that an appeal from a decision of the PARAB should be taken to the thus, had until 30 August 2000 to file the petition for review. She also prayed that she
DARAB. Here, Cardona not only filed her petition for review with the CA one day late, be given an extension of 15 days or until 15 September 2000 within which to file her
but she also filed it before the wrong body. petition. Cardona filed the petition for review on the said date.
- The CA issued a Resolution, granting the motion for extension of 15 days. The
said resolution was received by Cardona on 3 October 2000. On 5 October, the
Facts: Petitioner Rosalie Vda. de Cardona (Cardona), filed a Complaint for Ejectment CA issued a Resolution, dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time
against Marcelino Amansec (Amansec) with the MTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, with a (one day late). Cardona filed an MR, but the same was denied.
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

(Certiorari)
- On 27 November 2000, the RTC Decision, reversing and setting aside the decision of from an order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator to the Board by
the MTC because (a) Amansec failed to prove the existence of any tenancy relationship either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period of 15
between him and Raroque and (b) the only basis used by the MTC was Amansecs claim days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed
that such relationship existed. Amansec filed an MR, but the same was denied. Amansec from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, if the appeal is in
did not file a petition for review of the decision. writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the

Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be
- Cardona forthwith filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the MTC. served upon the adverse party within ten days from the taking of the
Cardona also filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC for the nullification of oral appeal.
the earlier CA Resolutions that dismissed her petition.

- [NOTE] Cardona alleged that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she
overlooked that the month of August consists not of 30 days, but of 31 days. SECTION 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the
Board from a final order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator on
any of the following grounds:
- In the meantime, the MTC held in abeyance the resolution of the motion for the a) That errors in the findings of facts or conclusions of laws
issuance of a writ of execution filed by Cardona pending the resolution of the present were committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and
petition. irreparable damage or injury to the appellant;
b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Adjudicator; or
Issue: Whether or not the CA Resolutions should be reversed in favor of Cardona? Nay!
c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through
fraud or coercion.
Held: In Samala vs. Court of Appeals, we held that a one-day delay does not justify the
outright dismissal of an appeal. Nonetheless, we resolve to deny due course to and
dismiss the instant petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the proper SECTION 3. Where to File. The notice of appeal shall be filed
remedy from a decision of the PARAD was an appeal to the DARAB and not a petition for with the Adjudicator concerned in three (3) legibly written copies.
review in the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

SECTION 4. Caption. In all cases appealed to the Board, the party
Ratio: The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be appealing shall be called the appellant and the adverse party the
availed of (a) within the period and (b) in the manner provided for by law; otherwise, appellee, and the case shall be assigned a docket number.
upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision or final order and no appeal has
been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or decision ipso facto becomes
final and executory. The appellate court does not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a
belated appeal from the said order or decision. SECTION 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The
Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date when the
appellant received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof
- Rule XIII, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure provides, thus: of service of the notice to the adverse party; and
SECTION 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid
(Certiorari)
by the appellant within the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier wearing proper uniform. Later on, NPC requested that Caedo be replaced which the
where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant shall, agency did. The petitioner then requested for a certification because he intended to
however, be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee. retire that month. The certification said He was employed by the agaency assigned at
NPCHe was terminated from his employment by this agency as per clients request.

Petitioner then filed an illegal dismissal and illegal suspension and demand for payment
Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites shall be a of benefits. LA ruled illegally dismissed based on the certification and ordered payment.
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. NLRC affirmed, modifying the monetary award.
On MR: NLRC reversed its decision agreeing this time with the Agency but awarded pay
during his suspension because he was not properly notified. (Agency said terminated
Thus, under the DARAB Rules, Cardona should have appealed the decision of the meant he was pulled out by NPC only. And the fact that the certification was only issued
PARAD to the DARAB orally or in writing, and perfected the said appeal within the so that petitioner can use it for the claiming of his benefits in SSS). MR of petitioner also
requisite period and in the manner provided therefor. Cardona failed to do so. denied.
Petition for certiorari in CA affirmed NLRC.

8) CANEDO V. KAMPILAN SECUTIRY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, 2013 - VELASQUEZ
Issue: W/N CA erred in its decision and that Petitioner was actually dismissed based on
Caedo vs. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency Inc. and Ramoncito Arquiza. (I the reading of the certification. NO.
suggest you read the full digest, short lang naman)
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 25, 2007 and
the Resolution dated July 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01530 are
ER: Canedo filed an illegal dismissal case based on a certification he requested from the AFFIRMED.
agency for early retirement. The certification stated that he was employed by the agency
and assigned at NPC and that he was terminated as per clients request. The LA ruled Ratio:
illegal dismissal. The NLRC reversed (employer won). The CA affirmed the NLRC. Issue:
W/N nadismiss talaga si petitioner (which is a factual question) Petition for review on RELEVANT: At the outset, the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be
certiorari under Rule 45 to SC. Although, question of law are not allowed under RULE raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.32However, when there is no
45, EXCEPTION(see doctrine). The SC held hindi talaga nadismiss, floating lang talaga. uniformity in the factual findings of the tribunals below, as in this case, this Court is
After he was suspended for not wearing uniform, NPC requested na replace siya. After resolved to again examine the records as well as the evidence presented to determine
niya masuspend, wala lang siyang assignment kaya floating siya. Considered dismissed which findings conform with the evidentiary facts. (Ang point niya is highly contended
ka lang if more than 6 months ka nang floating. Also, the certification was meant for SSS yung fact kung nadismiss ba talaga or hindi kaya sinabi to).
claims and si Canedo nga humingi eh. Arte niya kasi, di naman dismissed.

For the illegal dismissal case:
Doctrine: At the outset, the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be
raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. However, when there is no Although the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that a dismissal is legal, the
uniformity in the factual findings of the tribunals below, as in this case, this Court is employee must first prove that he was first dismissed. In this case, the employee merely
resolved to again examine the records as well as the evidence presented to determine anchors his claim based on the letter. Courts finiding: The certification only meant that
which findings conform with the evidentiary facts. he was pulled out from NPC as per clients request.He was only a floating employee.
The reason why he did not return to work after suspension was because NPC had him
replaced. A floating status is valid up to 6 months. After which, constructive dismissal
na.But in this case, wala pang 6 months, feeling niya natanggal na siya.
Facts:
Caedo was a security guard for the respondent agency. He was assigned to Naga Barge 9) ESTEBAN V. MARCELO, 2013 - AQUINO
102 of the National Power Corporation (NPC). He was suspended for a month for not
(Certiorari)
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (in substitution of the deceased GABRIEL O. ESTEBAN), o Likewise, the Court ruled that the respondents-spouses cannot be
Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO and CARMEN T. MARCELO, evicted as they are protected by Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
Respondents. (P.D.) 1517.
o Spouses qualify as beneficiaries under Section 16 of Republic Act No.
By Alexis Aquino (RA) 7279.
CA denied the Spouses partial motion for reconsideration anchored on the
Emergency Recit: Esteban allowed Spouses Marcelo to reside in his property as long as petitioners failure to effect a substitution of parties upon the death of the late
they pay rent. Spouses however stopped paying rentals. They failed to comply with the Esteban. The CA reasoned out that mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not
demand to pay and vacate. Esteban filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. MeTC a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision.
ordered the Spouses to pay and vacate. RTC affirmed. [AA: Not sure why the Spouses filed an MR since CA decision was favorable to them.
But anyway whats important here is that the CA ruled that the Spouses qualify as
CA reversed. CA ruled that the Spouses cannot be evicted as they are protected beneficiaries of RA 7279, something which was not raised before the trial court!]
by Section 6 of PD 1517. CA also said the Spouses qualify as beneficiaries under Section
16 of RA 7279. Note that these werent raised in the trial court proceedings.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Spouses qualify as beneficiaries of RA
Issue is whether the CA made an erroneous ruling. 7279
SC: The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts
cannot be raised on appeal: "points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought
to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a Held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic on certiorari. The decision dated January 1 7, 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 20
consideration of due process impels this rule." II of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211,
As the Esteban correctly observed, the Spouses never intimated, directly or Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. 20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
indirectly, that they were seeking the protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not respondents spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo.
have any authority to rule that the Spouses qualified as beneficiaries under RA 7279.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:

The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, Mark Anthony, had been in Ratio:
possession of a piece of land since the 1950s.
In the 1960s, Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the property.
The one-year prescription periodis counted from the last demandto pay and
In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, spouses
Marcelo were allowed to reside there, for a monthly rental fee. vacate
Since March 2001, the Spouses have stopped paying the rentals As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there should first be a demand to pay or
to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful
On October 31, 2005, Esteban, sent the Spouses a demand letter requiring them to
detainer arises.
settle their arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
P.D. 1517 does not apply: in theabsence of showing that thesubject land has been
For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the Esteban instituted
an unlawful detainer case against the Spouses declaredand classified as an Area forPriority Development and as aLand Reform
MeTC ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; the Spouses must vacate Zone
the property, on the grounds of expiration of the lease and nonpayment of monthly It was an error for the CA to rule that the respondents-spouses could not be ousted
rentals. because they were protected by P.D. 1517. This decree, in fact, does not apply to
RTC affirmed MeTC ruling. them.
CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that from the year of dispossession until the Subsequent to P.D. 1517, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
filing of the complaint for ejectment, more than a year had passed; hence, the case 1893 on September 11, 1979, declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area an
no longer involved an accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC. MeTC had no Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. On May 14, 1980, he
jurisdiction over the case so that its decision was a nullity. issued Proclamation No. 1967, amending Proclamation No. 1893 and identifying
244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land
(Certiorari)
Reform Zones. The Proclamation pointedly stated that: "the provisions of P.D. Nos.
1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the above-mentioned
Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones." EMERGENCY DIGEST
"Thus, a legitimate tenant's right of first refusal to purchase the leased property
under P.D. No. 1517 depends on whether the disputed property in Metropolitan Sps. Dycoco filed an ejectment case against Sanchez and Berma in the
Manila is situated in an area specifically declared to be both an Area for Priority Provincial Adjudicator (PA) of DARAB Albay. On June 27, 1995, the PA ordered
Development and Urban Land Reform Zone."26 the ejectment of Sanchez and Berma.
Based on the cited issuances, we find it clear that for P.D. 1517 to apply, the tenants Sanchez and Berma moved to quash the writ of execution and alleged that
must have been a legitimate tenant for ten (10) years who have built their homes under the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27, Sps. Dycoco executed deeds of
on the disputed property. These circumstances do not obtain in the present case as transfer in their favor. They also alleged that they filed a notice of appeal on
it was not the respondents-spouses who built their dwelling on the land; it was the Aug. 29, 1996. Sps. Dycoco argued that the notice of was filed beyond the
late Estebans sister who had the foundry shop built in the 1960s and eventually prescribed period.
leased the property to the respondents-spouses in the 1970s. Even assuming that On March 20, 2000, DARAB ruled in favor of Sanchez and Berma.
these two requirements have been complied with, P.D. 1517 still will not apply as Sps. Dycoco received the decision on Apr. 3 and had until Apr. 18 to file an
the issue raised in the present petition is not the right of first refusal of the Spouses, appeal. CA granted them an extension of 15 days. Thus, Sps. Dycoco had until
but their non-payment of rental fees and refusal to vacate. In fact, it was their non- May 3 to file their petition. However, they filed a Petition for Review under
payment of rental fees and refusal to vacate which caused Esteban to file the action Rule 43 by registered mail on May 8.
for unlawful detainer. CA denied the petition due to late filing. MR denied.
Finally, even assuming that the aforementioned circumstances were present, the Sps. Dycoco filed a Rule 65 Certiorari with the SC, asking for liberality on the
Spouses still cannot qualify under P.D. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the grounds that they hired a new counsel during the appeal period and that their
land had been declared an area for priority development and urban land reform property was taken w/o just compensation.
zone. Issue: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Sps
Dycocos Petition for Review under Rule 43. / WON Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 before the SC is a correct remedy. NO
Issues not raised may not beconsidered and ruled upon [relevant REM issue] Doctrines: (1) CA did not commit GADALEJ in dismissing the appeal on the
ground of late filing. It granted a 15-day extension in accordance with Sec. 4,
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts Rule 43. As the original deadline of Sps. Dycoco was April 18, they had until
cannot be raised on appeal: "points of law, theories, issues and arguments not May 3, to file their petition, but they filed it on May 8. The CA simply applied
brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered the rules; (2) Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari is a wrong Remedy. As the CAs
by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic resolutions were final and appealable, Sps. Dycoco should have filed an appeal
consideration of due process impels this rule."27 by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; (3) Issues not raised in the
As the Esteban correctly observed, the Spouses never intimated, directly or proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Sps. Dycoco did
indirectly, that they were seeking the protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not raise the issue of just compensation in the PA. It was claimed for the first
not have any authority to rule that the Spouses qualified as beneficiaries under RA time in the CA. The DARAB has primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction
7279. over cases involving payments for lands awarded under PD 27; (4) The "liberal
construction rule" is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Sps.
Dycoco caused their own predicament when they decided to engage the
Any one of the co-owners maybring an action for ejectment services of their present counsel just a week before the expiration of the
period to appeal in the CA. They filed their petition in the CA beyond the
We see no merit in the Spouses observation that the present petition is irregular prescribed period.
because the other compulsory heirs (or co-owners) have not been impleaded. The
present petition has been properly filed under the express provision of Article 487 of
the Civil Code.28 COMPLETE DIGEST

10) DYOCO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 2013 - ARCEO
FACTS:
SPOUSES DYCOCO v. CA, SANCHEZ and BERMA
(Certiorari)
Sps. Dycoco filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land On March 20, 2000, the DARAB ruled in favor of Sanchez and Berma.
transfer, damages and injunction against Sanchez, Berma, Eusebio, Rogelio, Sepato,
Talagtag, and Bonde in the Provincial Adjudicator (PA) of the DARAB in Albay. They
alleged that:
Sps. Dycoco received the DARAB decision on Apr. 3, 2000 and had until Apr.
they are the registered owners of Lot 216 situated at Bonbon, Albay; 18 to file an appeal. Upon motion, CA granted them an extension of 15 days to file an
respondents entered the property, registered as tenants for agrarian reform, appeal, with warning that no further extension will be given. Thus, Sps. Dycoco had until
and cultivated the property without paying rentals; and May 3 to file their petition.
in violation of agrarian laws, respondents subleased their lands.

On June 27, 1995, the PA rendered a decision ordering: (1) the ejectment of Sps. Dycoco filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 by registered mail on
Sanchez, Berma, and Talagtag; (2) Rogelio and Bonde to comply with their obligation May 8. CA denied the petition as it was filed beyond the extended period of 15 days that
under the Deeds of Transfer executed by Sps. Dycoco in their favor; (3) the dismissal of was granted pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 43.9 MR denied.
the case against Eusebio; and (4) Sanchez, Berma, and Talagtag to pay Sps. Dycoco
jointly and severally nominal damages and attorneys fees.
Sps. Dycoco filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the SC. They asked for
liberality because (1) On Apr.10, they hired a new counsel who still had to study the
The PA issued a writ of execution. Sanchez and Berma filed a Motion to Quash voluminous records. (2) They were deprived of due process when the DARAB granted
the Writ of Execution. They explained that they are the owners of the property by virtue respondents appeal although it was filed after the decision of the PA had become final
of the Operation Land Transfer under PD 27, wherein Sps. Dycoco executed deeds of and executory.
transfer in their favor. They asserted that the decision ordering their ejectment is not
yet executory as they have filed a notice of appeal on Aug. 29, 1996.
ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Sps. Dycocos
Petition for Review under Rule 43. / WON Sps. Dycocos Petition for Certiorari under
Sps. Dycoco submitted their Comments/Opposition to the Motion to Quash Rule 65 before the SC is a correct remedy. NO
Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal filed by Sanchez and Berma, where they argued
that these were filed beyond the prescribed period.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
On Oct. 16, 1996, the PA found that the June 27, 1995 decision was sent by
registered mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by Bermas daughter who resided in a
different barangay. Still, it ruled that Berma was bound by his daughters receipt. Thus, RATIO:
the notice of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no showing that
Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before she procured a copy of it from the
PA on Aug. 26, 1996. Hence, the notice of appeal was filed on time. Therefore, the PA
1. Sps. Dycoco filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari - Wrong Remedy. A
denied the Motion to Quash with respect to Berma, and granted the same with respect
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action that may be resorted to only
to Sanchez.

9 Sec. 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken 15 days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
Bermas MR was denied but he joined the appeal memorandum filed by denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of
the court or agency a quo. Only 1 MR shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of
Sanchez in the DARAB. Sps. Dycoco filed a Counter-Memo With MTD. the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an additional period of 15 days
only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed 15 days.
(Certiorari)
in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary Sps. Dycoco are entitled to receive just compensation for the property taken
course of law. The right recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a petition for from them under PD 27. Unfortunately, they did not raise it in the complaint or position
review on certiorari under Rule 45. 10 The Resolutions of the CA were final and paper which they filed in the PA. It was claimed for the first time in the CA. Issues not
appealable judgments. Thus, Sps. Dycoco should have filed an appeal by petition for raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. On
review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this jurisdictional grounds, the DARAB has primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Court. cases involving payments for lands awarded under PD 27. In any event, their right to
just compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership and possession of the
property because lands acquired under PD 27 do not revert to the landowner.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order
or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed is lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of The due process claim of Sps. Dycoco has no leg to stand on. Due process is
discretion in the findings of fact or of law. The availability of appeal prohibits the resort simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
of appeal. The failure of Sps. Dycoco to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 cannot action or ruling complained of. Sps. Dycoco submitted their Comments/Opposition to
be remedied by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal filed by Respondents. In the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an DARAB level, Sps. Dycoco filed a Counter-Memorandum With MTD Appeal where they
appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. again pointed out that the appeal of respondents was filed out of time. Thus, Sps. Dycoco
cannot correctly claim that they were not heard on the matter.

2. Sps. Dycoco claim that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their appeal on the ground of late filing - Wrong. The CA granted a 15- 4. The notice of appeal of Berma and Sanchez was filed on time. Questions of
day extension in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 43. As the original deadline of Sps. Dycoco fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. The copy of the PAs decision
was April 18, they had until May 3, to file their petition. However, they filed the petition was sent by registered mail to and received by Bermas daughter who lived in another
on May 8. Sps. Dycoco even admit that their petition in the CA was filed 5 days after the barangay. Such receipt by Bermas daughter was not a valid service of the PAs decision
extended period. The CA simply applied the rules, while Sps. Dycoco concededly failed to under Secs. 4 and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure.11 At that time, Berma
observe the very same rules. had neither counsel nor duly authorized representative. Therefore, the copy of the PAs
decision should have been served on Berma personally or by registered mail. As it was
not received by Berma but by his daughter who resided in another barangay, there was
no proper and completed service of the PAs decision on Berma. Thus, with respect to
Sps. Dycoco simply framed the issue as: WON THE CA ACTED WITH GADALEJ him, the notice of appeal was also filed on time.
IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW AND MR FILED BY
PETITIONERS. They did not, however, address the issue. They failed to establish grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
5. The "liberal construction rule" is not a license to disregard procedural
requirements. Procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
3. Sps. Dycoco argue that deprivation of property without just commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure.
compensation and denial of due process are compelling reasons to support their
petition Wrong.
11 SEC. 4. Service of Pleadings, Notices and Resolutions. ... b) Summons, notices and copies of resolutions, orders
or decisions shall be served personally as far as practicable, or by registered mail upon the party himself, his
counsel, or his duly authorized representative. However, notice to the counsel is notice to the party himself
whether he be a complainant or petitioner, or a defendant or respondent.

10 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or resolution of the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the CTA, the RTC or other courts, whenever authorized by
law, may file with the SC a verified petition for review on certiorari. ... SECTION 9. Proof of Completeness of Service. The return is a prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.
Service by registered mail is completed upon receipt by the addressee, his counsel, or by the duly authorized
representative or agent.
(Certiorari)
Sps. Dycoco caused their own predicament when they decided to engage the services of After the said hearing Ang began to treat San Joaquin and Fernandez with
their present counsel just a week before the expiration of the period to appeal in the CA. hostility and antagonism.
They filed their petition in the CA beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded One day, Angs wife, Rosa, needed help transferring monobloc chairs from the
the rules in various ways absent any compelling reason when they filed this petition. Virose store to her restaurant. San Joaquin refused to help when instructed to
saying that he was not an employee of the restaurant but a glass installer of
Virose. A heated argument ensued between San Joaquin and Rosa. San Joaquin
11) ANG V. SAN JOAQUIN, 2013 - BASCARA
left the store, shouting invectives
Ang tore apart San Joaquins Daily Time Record (DTR) that day and that of
Ang v. San Joaquin, 2013
Fernandez thereafter
Angs employees, San Joaquin and Fernandez, filed an illegal dismissal case against him When Fernandez reported for work, he was informed that he was placed on a
(Ang). The LA dismissed the case finding that there was no constructive dismissal. The one-week suspension for insubordination. San Joaquin received a
NLRC affirmed the LA decision. On appeal, the CA reversed the LA and NLRC decision memorandum from Ang placing the former under preventive suspension.
finding that San Joaquin and Fernandez were deemed constructively dismissed by Angs San Joaquin and Fernandez filed a case against Ang for illegal constructive
act of tearing apart the respondents Daily Time Records (DTR). Ang moved for dismissal with claims for backwages and separation pay.
reconsideration but the CA stood firm in its stance. Hence, the present Petition. In their The labor arbiter ruled against the respondents holding that they were unable
Comment, respondents San Joaquin and Fernandez also cited procedural errors, to show how Ang discriminated against them. He also concluded that
specifically that the attached copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA respondents were guilty of abandonment of work, and that their accusation of
were not certified by the appellate courts Clerk of Court and that the same contained no constructive dismissal was false.
certification that they were from original copies on file On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision and declared that there was no
constructive dismissal.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine that the findings of specialized administrative Respondents went up to the CA via an original Petition for Certiorari.
agencies should be respected holds in this case- No. The CA reversed the LA and the NLRC finding that San Joaquin and Fernandez
were illegally dismissed. It awarded to them separation pay, backwages and
The Court opts to forego the matter of procedural errors attributed by respondents. This attorneys fees. The CA held that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
is a labor case whose substantive issues must be addressed, more than anything else. misappreciated the facts which thus led to the erroneous conclusion that there
Besides, the nature of the alleged procedural infirmity cannot prod the Court to dismiss was no constructive dismissal.
the Petition outright without first considering its merits.When there is a divergence Ang moved for reconsideration but the CA stood firm in its stance. Hence, the
between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there is a need to review present Petition.
the records. In the present case, not only is there a divergence of findings of facts; the In their Comment, respondents San Joaquin and Fernandez also cited
conclusions arrived at by the two tribunals are diametrically opposed. For this reason, procedural errors, specifically that the attached copies of the assailed Decision
the doctrine that the findings of specialized administrative agencies or tribunals and Resolution of the CA were not certified by the appellate courts Clerk of
should be respected must be set aside for a moment. The CA is correct in its Court and that the same contained no certification that they were from original
pronouncement that San Joaquin and Fernandez were constructively dismissed from copies on file
work. Destroying their time cards may be considered an outright not only symbolic
termination of the parties employment relationship Issue: Whether or not the doctrine that the findings of specialized administrative
agencies should be respected holds in this case- No.
Facts
Vicente Ang (Ang) is the proprietor of Virose Furniture and Glass Supply in Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2008
Pangasinan, a wholesaler/retailer of glass supplies, jalousies, aluminum Decision and the December 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
windows, table glass, and assorted furniture. 75545 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum
Ceferino San Joaquin, Jr. (San Joaquin) was hired as a helper in Virose and on the total monetary awards from finality of this Decision until full payment is hereby
Diosdado Fernandez (Fernandez) was employed as a driver. San Joaquin imposed.
eventually became an all-around worker of Virose
When a co-employee named Abrera filed a case against Ang for non-remittance Ratio:
of SSS contributions, San Joaquin and Fernandez attended the court hearing The Court opts to forego the matter of procedural errors attributed by
and testified against Ang respondents. This is a labor case whose substantive issues must be addressed,
(Certiorari)
more than anything else. Besides, the nature of the alleged procedural annulled only in 1999 as he was not made a party thereto and that he was an
infirmity cannot prod the Court to dismiss the Petition outright without first indispensable party. CA granted the petition for annulment of judgment.
considering its merits.
When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that ISSUE - Whether the CA erred in having given cognizance to the petition for annulment
of the CA, there is a need to review the records. In the present case, not only is of judgment. NO.
there a divergence of findings of facts; the conclusions arrived at by the two
tribunals are diametrically opposed. For this reason, the doctrine that the RATIO - The grounds for annulment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If the
findings of specialized administrative agencies or tribunals should be action is based on lack of jurisdiction, it must be brought before it is barred by laches or
respected must be set aside for a moment. estoppel. Pauls petition for annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, owing to the
The CA is correct in its pronouncement that San Joaquin and Fernandez were failure to implead indispensable parties. Paul and Lourdes were indispensable parties
constructively dismissed from work. Moreover, by destroying their time cards, because they derived their rights to the Subject Property from Luis Sendiong, who
Ang discontinued and severed his relationship with them. The act may be acquired the property from Sps. Juan Sendiong, who purchased property from Orbeta.
considered an outright not only symbolic termination of the parties
employment relationship. The point of the complaint was that Orbeta could have sold only his conjugal share.
San Joaquin and Fernandez could not be faulted for failing to submit their respective Therefore, if such thrust of the complaint was to be upheld, then all the subsequent
replies to the Angs memoranda. By the time they were notified of the same, the labor transmissions of the subject land would be affected. This includes the rights of Paul and
Complaints had been filed; not to mention that their cause of action is based on Lourdes. This means that the ground of lack of jurisdiction is proper because of the
constructive dismissal, which they claim occurred even prior to their receipt of the failure to implead Paul and Lourdes.
subject memoranda. With the filing of their labor case, the submission of replies to the
Ang s memoranda became an unnecessary exercise. The petition for annulment is not barred by laches because it was filed 1 year after the
decision had been rendered. If 4 years are allowed for extrinsic fraud, then 1 year for
lack of jurisdiction should be allowed. Petitioners argue that the petition for annulment
XXVIII. PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT (RULE 47) of judgment is barred by res judicata. This is wrong because said petition precisely
challenges the validity of the judgment. The first judgment, in Civil Case No. 10173,
pertains to the merits of the action for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and
1) ORBETA V. SENDIONG, JULY 8, 2005 CHAN recovery of damages, whereas the cause of action in the petition for annulment relates
to the lack of jurisdiction.
Orbeta vs Sendiong

ER FACTS
Simeona sold to Spouses Maximo Orbeta and Basilisa Teves a portion of land. Maximo
sold to Spouses Juan Sendiong the subject land. Sps. Juan Sendiong donated the land to - Simeona Montenegro sold to Spouses Maximo Orbeta and Basilisa Teves
Luis Sendiong who sold the easternmost half of the land to Sp. Pretzylou Sendiong. Heirs (Spouses Orbeta) a portion of a parcel of land designated as Lot 606 of the
of Simeona and of Orbeta (PETITIONERS) filed before the RTC a complaint against Sps. Cadastral Survey of the Municipality of Dumaguete (Subject Land) by virtue of
Pretzylou for recovery of possession. PETITIONERS asserted that Maximo Orbeta sold a document denominated Escritura de Compra Venta.
the subject property to the Sps. Juan Sendiong without the consent of his wife so he o Subject Land was exclusive of a 884-sqm site occupied by the house
could have conveyed only his conjugal share in the property. of Simeona Montenegros grandmother
- Maximo Orbeta sold to Spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes the
Sps. Pretzylou filed MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action because heirs of Luis subject land
Sendiong (Paul and Lourdes Sendiong) have not been impleaded as indispensable - Upon the instance of the heirs of the Spouses Orbeta, Simeona Montenegro
parties. RTC denied. Sps. Pretzylou Sendiong filed Motion to Include Indispensable executed in their favor a Deed of Confirmation of Sale and Quitclaim,
Parties twice but RTC also denied twice. acknowledging and ratifying the sale of the Subject Land to the spouses Orbeta.
o On the same day, said heirs executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
SPS Pretzylou Sendiong filed Notice of Appeal but RTC denied on the ground that the Partition pertaining to the estate of Basilisa Teves-Orbeta, which
CNFS was signed by counsel and not by the Sendiongs themselves. Petition for Certiorari included her SHARE in the Subject Land
was denied by the CA. MR DENIED so lapsed into FINALITY. Paul Sendiong, represented - In the meantime, Sps. Juan Sendiong donated the Subject Land in favor of Luis
by his attorney-in-fact and daughter Mae Sendiong, filed a Petition for Annulment of Sendiong who sold the easternmost undivided portion to Sps. Pretzylou
Decision with the CA. Paul alleged having learned of the decision sought to be Sendiong. Luis Sendiong kept the other half.
(Certiorari)
- Simeona Montenegro, having lost possession over the 884-sqm excluded o This was challenged before the CA in a Petition for Certiorari. THIS
portion, filed a complaint against Luis Sendiong for recovery of possession of WAS DENIED BY THE CA. MR DENIED so lapsed into FINALITY.
said portion with the CFI of Negros Oriental. - Sendiong, represented by his attorney-in-fact and daughter Mae Sendiong filed
o Heirs of Basilisa Teves-Orbeta filed a complaint-in-intervention a Petition for Annulment of Decision with a Prayer for a Temporary
praying for the recovery of possession of their portion in the Subject Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA.
Land. Sendiong alleged having learned of the decision sought to be annulled only in
o During pendency of this case, the case records were destroyed in the 1999 as he was not made a party thereto and that he was an indispensable
fire. Said records were not reconstituted and the complaint was party.
never pursued. - Orbeta argued that the petition for annulment of judgment was fatally infirm
- Heirs of Simeona Montenegro, as well as the heirs of the spouses Orbeta as the CNFS was signed by the attorney-in-fact by virtue of a GENERAL POWER
(herein PETITIONERS) filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental a complaint OF ATTORNEY. They also allege that Res Judicata should apply because the
against the Sps. Pretzylou Sendiong, for recovery of possession, quieting of issue on indispensable parties had already been passed upon by the CA in the
title, and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Petition for Certiorari filed by Sps Pretzylou Sendiong.
injunction - CA GRANTED THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
- PETITIONERS asserted that Maximo Orbeta sold the subject property to the o The appellate court ruled that the absence of an indispensable party
Sps. Juan Sendiong without the consent of his wife so he could have in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the
conveyed only his conjugal share in the property. filing of the complaint, including the judgment, and that all
o Heirs of Simeona Montenegro also reiterated their claim over the subsequent actuations of the court are null and void for want of
884-square meter portion that had been excluded in the 1925 sale. authority to act.
- In the complaint of the PETITIONERS, they prayed that they be declared
absolute co-owners of the Subject Property, except for the 2,311 sqm conveyed ISSUE Whether the CA erred in having given cognizance to the petition for annulment
by Maximo Orbeta to Sps Juan Sendiong of judgment. NO.
- In the Answer of Sps Pretzylou Sendiong, they claimed that Simeona
Montenegro had actually sold Lot 606 in its entirety INCLUDING the 884 sqm. HELD - WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of the Court of
o They further alleged that Lourdes Sendiong and herein respondent, Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Paul Sendiong, being the heirs of Luis Sendiong, should be impleaded
as party defendants. Lourdes and Paul Sendiong were children of Luis RATIO
Sendiong. - Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
- Sps. Pretzylou Sendiong filed MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
because heirs of Luis Sendiong have not been impleaded as indispensable - Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds
parties. for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
o RTC DENIED THIS. o If the action is based on extrinsic fraud, it must be brought within
- Sps. Pretzylou Sendiong filed Motion to Include Indispensable Parties. four (4) years from discovery, and
o RTC ALSO DENIED. o If based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
- After PETITIONERS had rested their case, Sps Pretzylou Sendiong filed another estoppel.
Motion to Include Indispensable Parties, which was again denied by the trial - Respondent's petition for annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction,
court. owing to the failure to implead the indispensable parties
- Trial Court found that - The cited ground is ample basis for annulment of judgment. We have long held
o Simeona Montenegro had actually sold Subject Land, which did not that the joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non of the
include the 884 sqm portion exercise of judicial power.
o Spouses Juan Sendiong could have only acquired ownership over the o Paul Sendiong and Lourdes Sendiong were indispensable parties
CONJUGAL SHARE OF MAXIMO ORBETA considering that the consent o Paul and Lourdes Sendiong derived their rights to the subject
of his spouse, Basilisa, was absent. property from their father Luis Sendiong, who acquired the property
o TRIAL COURT ORDERED SPS PRETZYLOU to restore to PETITIONERS by way of donation from the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila
the title to and possession of their respective shares in the Subject Castellanes, who in turn purchased the property from Maximo Orbeta
Land in 1934.
- SPS Pretzylou Sendiong filed Notice of Appeal but RTC denied on the ground - The central thrust of the complaint in Civil Case No. 10173 was that Orbeta
that the CNFS was signed by counsel and not by the Sendiongs themselves. could have sold only his one-half conjugal share
(Certiorari)
o Accordingly, the prayer in the complaint was that petitioners be identity of parties is likewise not present. Paul Sendiong was not a
declared as the absolute co-owners of the subject land, minus 2,311 party to either Civil Case No. 10173 or CA-G.R. SP No. 48943.
square meters which they claimed was the maximum which Maximo - OTHER MATTERS
Orbeta could have conveyed to Juan Sendiong and Exequila o As to the General Power of Attorney of Mae Sendiong to sign the
Castellanes. CNFS, PETITIONERS are wrong. A perusal of the General Power of
o If such thrust and prayer were to be upheld, as it was by the RTC, Attorney shows that Mae Sendiong is empowered to a "to execute,
then all the subsequent transmissions of the subject land from sign, authenticate, and enter into any and all contracts and
1934 would be affected. This includes the rights of Paul agreements for me and in my name with any person or entity," and
Sendiong and Lourdes Sendiong, who derived their hereditary "to bring suit, defend and enter into compromises in my name and
shares in the property from Luis Sendiong. stead, in connection with actions brought for or against me, of
- the Court could not see how or why respondent and Lourdes Sendiong could whatever nature and kind."
not have been impleaded in Civil Case No. 10173 before the RTC. Petitioners argue that the petition for annulment should have been dismissed outright
o In the answer filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 10173, the for failing to cite the docket number of the case in the lower court. This is not supported
matter of the indispensable inclusion of Paul and Lourdes Sendiong by A.C. No. 28-91, which provides that "any violation of this Circular shall be cause for
was already raised. Petitioners could have easily amended their the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint." In short, dismissal of a
complaint to that effect, but they did not. petition for violation of A.C. No. 28-91 obtains only if the petition can be considered a
- whether respondent is otherwise barred from seeking the annulment of multiple petition or complaint. This does not involve multiple petition or complaint.
judgment by estoppel, laches, or procedural infirmities.
o Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar
o The petition for annulment alleges that respondent learned of the 2) NERY V. LEYSON, G.R. NO. 139306, AUGUST 29, 2000 CORTEZ
existence of Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the
decision therein had been rendered. Since he was not impleaded Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no basis to presume that respondent
was aware of the civil case during its pendency before the RTC. *NOTE: Case is mainly about Rule 39 sec 49 on Res Judicata. Very brief discussion on the
o Considering that a petition for annulment of judgment based on assigned topic on Rule 47.
extrinsic fraud may be filed within four (4) years from discovery
of the fraud, a similar petition based on lack of jurisdiction is DOCTRINE:
generally not barred by laches or estoppel if the petition is filed Section 9 of BP 129, as amended, vests in the CA exclusive jurisdiction over actions for
within one year after petitioner learns of the questioned annulment of judgments of regional trial courts xxx. Hence, a regional trial court has no
decision. authority to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.
o This moreover holds true, as in this case, since respondent is a The trial court in CIVL CASE 2 cannot annul the final judgment in CIVIL CASE 1,
foreign resident restrained by time and distance as jurisdiction over the subject matter, which in this case is annulment of final
- Petitioners argue that the petition for annulment of judgment is barred by res judgment, is vested by law in a higher court, the CA.
judicata, "as the issues on the alleged indispensability of 'Paul Sendiong' has
already been passed upon by the CA.
o SC: there is no way the petition for annulment of judgment could be EMERGENCY DIGEST:
barred by res judicata FACTS: There are 2 cases involved. On 1991, NERY, ET AL. CIVIL CASE 2 seeking the
o The petition for annulment of judgment precisely challenges the declaration of nullity a TCT under LEYSON, ET ALs name, as well as the proceedings in
validity of the "first judgment. Hence, the action for annulment CIVIL CASE 1. The TCT covers a parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu city. NERY, ET AL argue that
of judgment precludes the defense of res judicata. they own the land, tracing their title from their deceased MOTHER and maternal
o The requisites of res judicata are jurisdiction on the part of the court grandmother, by virtue of succession. LEYSON, ET AL countered this, saying that they
rendering the first judgment over the parties and identity of causes of own the land, tracing their title from their father, who acquired it through purchase; and
action between the first and the second actions. The first judgment, that NERY, ET ALs grandmother took possession thereof. The land in dispute became
in Civil Case No. 10173, pertains to the merits of the action for the subject of litigation in CIVIL CASE 1, Lourdes Leyson, et al vs. Agatona del Corro, et
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and recovery of al. which was filed on Dec. 1964 in CFI Cebu. Lourdes Leyson, et al won, and were
damages, whereas the cause of action in the petition for declared as owners of the land. Decision became final and executory. NERY, ET AL. claim
annulment relates to the lack of jurisdiction. The element of they were not made parties to CIVIL CASE 1; and that although their MOTHER was
impleaded as defendant, she was already dead when it was filed. They argue that the
(Certiorari)
decision in CIVIL CASE 1 does not bind them since they were not parties and hence, it o Said title contains their FATHERs name, Jose Leyson; who
was null and void. RTC Lapu-Lapu city dismissed CIVIL CASE 2. Appeal to CA was acquired the land through purchase from a Rosario Miranda.
denied. o They were in possession of the property until 1963 when NERY,
ET ALs GRANDMOTHER and her children took over its
ISSUE: W/N a trial court can to annul a co-equal courts decision (NO, it cannot) possession.
That the land in dispute became the subject of litigation
HELD & RATIO: petition DENIED; CA is AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals has exclusive in CIVIL CASE 1, Lourdes Leyson, et al vs. Agatona del
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of trial court decisions. Hence, a regional trial Corro, et al. which was filed on Dec. 1964 in CFI Cebu.
court has no authority to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court. Here, even if the Plaintiffs Lourdes Leyson, et al won.
trial court in CIVIL CASE 1 did not acquire jurisdiction over NERY, ET AL., the trial court The Leysons were declared as owners of the
in CIVL CASE 2 cannot annul the final judgment in CIVIL CASE 1, as jurisdiction over the land and TCT as valid.
subject matter, which in this case is annulment of final judgment, is vested by law in a Del Corro et als OCT 1 as null & void; and was
higher court, the CA. ordered to turn over the lands possession to
the Leysons.
Aggrieved, Del Corro, et al. appealed CIVIL CASE 1 to
COMPLETE DIGEST: Court of Appeals. CA affirmed CFI ruling.
FACTS: Decision became final & executory on April
Petitioners, Maria Mercedes, Benjamin, Maria Paz, Apolinar and Roberto Francisco, all 10, 1976 for failure to appeal it. This is
surnamed Nery (NERY, ET AL.) claim that they are children of Mercedes del Rio (THE evidenced by an Entry of Judgment.
MOTHER) who died during world war 2. There were efforts to execute the decision but
They likewise claim that they are also heirs of their maternal grandmother, it did not materialize.
Agatona del Corro (THE GRANDMOTHER), who died in 1976.
When THE MOTHER died, she left a share in the parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu Back to CIVIL CASE 2, RTC Lapu-Lapu city ruled in favour of LEYSON, ET AL. and the
City covered by O.C.T. No. RO-0083 (OCT 1) in the name of NERY, ET ALs case was dismissed.
GRANDMOTHER. CA denied NERY, ET ALs appeal.
o Said land is being managed by NERY ET ALs UNCLE named
Eduardo del Rio and Lourdes del Rio Espiritu.
ISSUE: W/N a trial court has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of a co-equal court
After THE MOTHERs death, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Partition and (NO, a co-equal court has NO jurisdiction)
Declaration of Heirs on Jan. 28, 1964, covering the share of the land in question.
THE MOTHERs death was duly annotated on the OCT 1 on Feb. 27, 1964.
o On Dec. 2, 1964, a Notice of Lis Pendens (Re-Civil Case No. R- HELD: The Petition is DENIED; assailed CA Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
8646 CFI Cebu) [CIVIL CASE 1] was executed and annotated on
the title by Atty. Hermosisima, representing Lourdes Leyson, et
al (LEYSON, ET AL). It appears that the LEYSON, ET AL filed a RATIO:
case for annulment & cancellation of OCT 1. This Petition cannot be granted is due to the trial courts lack of jurisdiction to annul a
o NERY, ET AL. claim that they were not made parties to this case, final judgment of a co-equal court.
and that although their MOTHER was impleaded as defendant, NERY, ET AL. allege that the decision in CIVIL CASE 1 passed upon the validity
she was already dead when CIVIL CASE 1 was filed. They claim of OCT 1 & 2. Such allegation makes the root of their present action one for
that the decision in this case does not bind them since they were annulment of a final judgment.
not parties and hence, it was null and void. This Court cannot ignore the fact that such action is outside the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
On 1991, NERY, ET AL. filed Civil Case No. 2379-L (CIVIL CASE 2) seeking the o On this point, the CA ruled, albeit in passing, that xxx the
declaration of nullity of T.C.T. No. 19747 (TCT 1) under LEYSON, ET ALs name, as well court a quo does not have the jurisdiction to annul the
as the proceedings in CIVIL CASE 1. judgment of a regional trial court as jurisdiction thereon is
LEYSON, ET AL., in defense, showed in their evidence that the land in dispute, lodged with the Court of Appeals. We sustain the Court of
Lot No. 73 of Cadastral Survey, is titled in their names under TCT 1, which was Appeals on this point.
derived from O.C.T. No. 15615 (OCT 2).
(Certiorari)
Section 9 of BP 129, as amended, vests in the CA exclusive jurisdiction over merits; and (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and
actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial courts xxx. causes of action.
Hence, even if the trial court in CIVIL CASE 1 did not acquire jurisdiction over o There is clearly no identity of parties between CIVIL CASE 1 &
NERY, ET AL., the trial court in CIVL CASE 2 cannot annul the final judgment in 2. NERY, ET AL. were indispensable parties in CIVIL CASE 1, as they
CIVIL CASE 1, as jurisdiction over the subject matter, which in this case is were the legal heirs of Mercedes del Rio, who was one of the
annulment of final judgment, is vested by law in a higher court, the CA. registered owners in OCT 1 & 2 which covered the disputed
land. Furthermore, she has been dead since 1942 or years before
Civil Case R-8646 was filed in 1964.
*OTHER ISSUE: ON COCNLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT (W/N NERY, ET AL are bound by o The joinder of indispensable parties or parties in interest, without
the decision in CIVIL CASE 1 by reason of res judicata on conclusiveness of judgment [NO, whom there can be no final determination of an action is compulsory
not bound]) under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.

NERY, ET AL challenge the application to this case of the principle of conclusiveness of However, NERY ET AL. were never served summons; neither did they join their relatives
judgment, arguing that jurisdiction over them was never acquired by the trial court; and in filing the Answer and Amended Answer. Nor were they given a chance to set up their
that barring their action would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due own defenses against the respondents claim of ownership over the disputed lot. Plainly
process of law. then, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.

LEYSON, ET AL., on the other hand, insist that the trial court in CIVIL CASE 1 acquired LEYSON, ET AL, on the other hand, contend that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein including the NERY, ET AL over the NERY ET AL when they failed to notify the lower court of the death of Mercedes
because (1) it was the duty of the attorney for the deceased Mercedes del Rio to inform del Rio during the trial of CIVIL CASE 1. We disagree.
the court of the clients death, and (2) the attorney represented the same interest as the Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only in a pending case is the
other defendants -- their grandmother, uncles and aunts. They add that NERY, ET ALs counsel of a party required to inform the court in case the client dies or
failure to raise this defense in the Answer and Amended Answer constituted a waiver of becomes incapacitated or incompetent.
this defense; hence, the latter are estopped from raising it now. A pending case necessarily implies that the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the party who died or became incapacitated or
The CA cited Rule 39, Section 49 of the Rules of Court as basis for the assailed Decision12. incompetent. Prior to this development, the trial court cannot impose such
To bar NERY, ET ALs action for annulment on the ground of res judicata, the requirement on the counsel for the defendants; Section 16 of Rule 3 thus finds
following elements should be present: (1) the judgment being sought to bar no application to this case.
the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by On the other hand, it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.
disposition of the case must be based on a judgment or an order on the OCT 1 & 2 reveal that Mercedes del Rio was a registered co-owner of the
disputed lot, but she was not placed under the jurisdiction of the trial court in
CIVIL CASE 1. Neither were her heirs.

12 SEC. 49. Effect of judgments.The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: LEYSON, ET AL also posit that the service of summons on NERY, ET AL could be
dispensed with, since there is substantial identity between the mother and the siblings
(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the of Mercedes del Rio, on the one hand, and the NERY, ET AL on the other. The reason for
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to
this substantial identity is that NERY, ET AL. represent the same interest as the other
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate defendants in CIVIL CASE 1. Again, we disagree.
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or True, res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it
intestate;
does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But

(b) In other cases, the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other there is substantial identity only when the additional party acts in the
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. This is
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing not so in the present case.
and under the same title and in the same capacity;
Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the property owned in
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have common. A subsequent action by a co-heir, who did not join the earlier
been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually dismissed action for recovery of property, should not be barred by prior
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

(Certiorari)
judgment. Neither will conclusiveness of judgment apply because there Complete Digest:
was no identity of parties.
o In view of the foregoing discussion, NERY, ET AL should not be bound Facts:
by the decision in CIVIL CASE 1. This, however, does not justify the Rosilyn complained against her father Simplicio for child abuse, particularly
reversal of the assailed Decision. prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated and Librada Ceruila could not be located, a
petition for involuntary commitment was filed by the DSWD.
The Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN
3) CERUILA V. DELANTAR, G.R. NO. 140305, DECEMBER 9, 2005 - DE LA PAZ TELIN DELANTAR," praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and
declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument
Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005 (Rule 47) of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all
material entries therein, as follows:
Doctrine: The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The b. The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a forgery;
action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule 47,13 is merely for the annulment of the c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as
RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact of
Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in
thereon. said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and therefore
marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually
Emergency Digest: (CONTEXT: Rosilyn accused Jalosjos of Rape and her father was the
not legitimate;
pimp. HOW HORRIBLE!) The Ceruilas (parents) filed a case before the RTC a special
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely
proceeding for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of Rosilyn. She
made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for the birth
was not made a respondent to the case. The RTC GRANTED THE PETITION AND
certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper recording;
CANCELLED HER BIRTH CERTIFICATE. Rosilyn filed before the CA a PETITION FOR
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT. CA abandoned RTC. Before THE SC, Ceruila argues that CA
Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.6
should have exercised its preemptory power to cancel the birth certificate. Delantar on
RTC issued an Order to set the case for hearing and directed the publication of said
the other hand, CA has no authority to rule on the merits in a Petition for Annulment of
order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Judgment. Delantar is correct. The function of a petition for annulment of judgment,
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila.8 However, no representative
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to
appeared during the scheduled hearing.9
be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule 47, is merely for the

annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
RTC DECLARED THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID. The trial court ruled on the
nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the
evidence presented by the lone witness, Platon Ceruila. The evidence presented
amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own
depicted that Rosilyns birth certificate was spurious because it a product of simulated
findings thereon.
birth certificate ( LIBRADA AND SIMPLICIO ARE SIBLINGS they have the same parents
on their birth and baptismal certificates). The Court ruled that due to abundance of
evidence to support the petitioners claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified
13 Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
the petition. To let the birth certificate be declared null and void as it is would adversely
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of affect the rights and interests of the herein petitioners.
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition
trial or petition for relief. for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper certificate.13 She claimed that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition
court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only from the news on May
court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted 16, 1997.14 She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in
therein. violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her

(Certiorari)
to be illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it
certificate, is the appropriate remedy.15 She further argues it was erroneous to cancel or is enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is
annul her entire birth certificate. without merit; all the indispensable parties should have been made respondents.

CA abandoned the RTC judgment and declared it NULL AND VOID. The Court explained In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who,
that Rosilyn should have been made a party to the proceedings because she has a claim however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to
or interest which would be adversely affected thereby. Due to the lack of adversarial comply with the requirements laid down by the Rules. Petitioners further claim that the
proceedings and the failure to make Rosilyn or the DSWD, her legal guardian, a party to lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order of the trial court
the proceeding, the decision is null and void and produces no legal effect. setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting
Before the SC, Ceruila claims that the CA should have exercised their preemptory power the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
to declare the birth certificate as null and void. process.40 This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
Delantar, represented by the SOLGEN ARGUES CA has no authority to rule on the merits her interest if she so chooses.
of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the petitioner was Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her
denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the merits of the case, it would birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor
have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondents record of General. It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the
birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD,
respondent. and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to the petition.
Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where her father, as
Issue: appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the
I. WON UNDER RULE 47, CAN THE CA REPLACE THE RTC DECISIONS FOR ITS OWN? criminal case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have
NO. been considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and thus find basis for
(OTHER ISSUES: 1. WON Petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch
is a special proceeding? YES 2. WON you need to comply with summons? YES , 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this regard,
adversarial proceeding) however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in
G.R. Nos. 132875-7642 considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. the commission of the crime.

Ratio: There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in
the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in exercise of its peremptory
on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion power to declare null and void the said certificate.
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules
Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The
present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.34 action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule 47,is merely for the annulment of the
RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more.
The Court ruled that the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the
is a special proceeding under Rule 108. The Ceruillas did not comply with the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its
requirements of Rule 108. Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who own findings thereon.
have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties
thereto.Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of
Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth 4) SALERA V. A-1 INVESTORS, G.R. NO. 141238, FEBRUARY 15, 2002 GERALDEZ
are at stake.
SATURNINO SALERA, JR., SARAH SALERA, SAMUEL SALERA, and SUSAN SALERA vs.
A-1 INVESTORS, INC. (G.R. No. 141238 February 15, 2002) - GERALDEZ
(Certiorari)
ER: Salera obtained a loan from A-1 Investors. He failed to pay. A complaint for sum of 2. Claiming to have been practically unaware of the proceedings, Saturnino filed a
money was filed with the QC MTC. Salera was declared in default and a judgment was complaint for Injunction with Damages against A-1 Investors with the Cebu
rendered against him (the summons were given to his son who refused to sign for it). An RTC.
execution and notice of levy were issued against him. Claiming that he basically had no a. He prayed for a TRO, then an Injunction, and that the Injunction become
knowledge of the proceedings, Salera filed a complaint for injunction with damages permanent after trial.
with the Cebu RTC to permanently enjoin the execution. The RTC ruled in favor of 3. Cebu RTC ruled in his favor. A TRO was issued enjoying the execution. A WPI was
Salera. A-1 filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA ruled in issued after.
favor of A-1, issuing an order prohibiting the RTC from proceeding with the case. The 4. A-1 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Urgent Motion to Quash the WPI.
Issue here is whether or not the complaint for injunction with damages should be a. This was denied and RTC ordered that A-1 file an answer.
treated as a Petition to Annul the Decision of the MTC. b. An MR was filed, but that was denied as well.
5. A-1 filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition with the CA.
By seeking to permanently enjoin the execution, Salera was actually permanently a. This was granted by the CA, thus prohibiting the RTC-Cebu from further
seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 which was the basis of the proceeding with the Injunction (against the execution) case.
writ of execution. Hence, Saleras proper remedy would have been an annulment of
judgment. The issue of not receiving summons is amounts to an allegation of extrinsic Issues
fraud, one of the grounds listed under Sec. 2 of Rule 47, dealing with actions for
annulment of judgment. Unfortunately, the complaint filed by Salera was not an 1. Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction should have been treated as a
annulment of judgment. Not only was it entitled injunction with damages, it also did Petition to Annul the Decision of the MTC (the one that ordered the payment of
not pray for an annulment of judgment. Even assuming that it was an annulment of the loan) YES. CA Affirmed.
judgment action, it would not have prospered since an annulment of an MTC decision
must be filed with the RTC having jurisdiction over the lower court. Here, the judgment
sought to be annuled was rendered by the QC MTC, while the action that purportedly Ratio
seeks an annulment was filed with the Cebu RTC.
While petitioners are correct that a complaint for injunction is a recognized remedy to
Facts: enjoin the performance of an act, which action falls within the province of Regional Trial
Courts, it must be taken into account that Saturnino, Sr. sought to permanently enjoin
the public auction of property levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case
1. Antecedent Facts: No. 15996 on the ground that he was not served with summons and was denied due
a. Teodora Salera loanded from A-1 Investors 50,000. She failed to pay. process. In doing so, Saturnino, Sr. was actually seeking the annulment of the decision in
b. A-1 filed a complaint for sum of money with the MTC QC. Saleras Civil Case No. 15996 which was the basis of the writ of execution pursuant to which the
husband, Saturnino, was impleaded. public auction was to be held. The proper remedy for petitioners' predicament is
i. The summons were received by their son at their residence in therefore not an action for injunction, but for annulment of judgment.
Cebu. The son refused to sign and receive it.
ii. The spouses Salera further claim that they received no summons
whatsoever because they were in Bohol, where the Saturnino The issue of whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City did not acquire
was a mayor. jurisdiction over the person of Saturnino, Sr. in Civil Case No. 15996 and his exclusion
c. They were held in default and ordered to pay. from the proceedings in said case amounted to extrinsic fraud which denied him of due
i. A copy of the decision was sent to their home again. It was process should be properly resolved in an action for annulment of judgment as
received by a certain Joel Arino, although the husband was still mandated by Sections 1 and 2 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
in Bohol. Civil Procedure, viz:
ii. The spouses never appealed. The decision became final and
executory. "Sec. 1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
d. A Writ of Execution and Notice of Levy was received by their daughter. Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Although she was 28 years old and a college graduate, she did not bother Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
reading the document and placed them in her drawer without telling her petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
parents. through no fault of the petitioner.
i. It was only a week after that she showed the documents to her
parents.
(Certiorari)
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.- The annulment may be based only on the It was thus proper for the Court of Appeals to grant the petition filed by respondent A-1
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Investors, Inc. on the ground that the RTC of Cebu did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint even though respondent did not raise the issue of
Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. - An jurisdiction on appeal.
action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be
treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule
shall be applicable thereto."
5) COLE V. COURT OF APPEALS, DECEMBER 26, 2000, G.R. NO. 137561 KING
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the complaint filed by Saturnino, Sr. in the RTC of Cole v. Court of Appeals, December 26, 2000, G.R. No. 137561 - KING
Cebu was, without a shadow of doubt, not for annulment of the decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 15996. Not only was the complaint captioned "Injunction with Damages,"
but it likewise did not pray for annulment of judgment.
ER:
It is clear from the contents of the complaint filed by the petitioners that the action is
not for annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996. It does not allege "with Cole filed a complaint for non-delivery of title with the HLURB against Agda and PNB.
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those HLURB arbiter ruled in favor of Cole. Appeal to HLU Board of Commissioner. Still in
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action" which petitioners now favor of Cole. Appeal to Office of the President. Still in favor of Cole.
claim are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of the
decision in Civil Case No. 15996 attached to the original copy of the petition intended for Agda sought to annul the decisions of the HLURB arbiter and the Office of the President.
the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits of witnesses or He filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.
documents supporting the cause of action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, submitted together with the complaint. SC:
Petitioners cannot now mislead the court into treating the complaint for injunction as an
action for annulment of judgment with the ancillary remedy of injunction. Said petition cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be
annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by an administrative agency
(HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court
More importantly, even assuming arguendo that the action was for annulment of of Appeals.
judgment, the RTC of Cebu did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint as Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the
President.
"Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.- An
action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. . ."
KK:
It is therefore the RTC of Quezon City which has jurisdiction over a case seeking
One cannot file a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA against decisions
annulment of the final decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
rendered by administrative agencies.
36, which is similar in rank as the above-mentioned Municipal Trial Court.

On the claim that A-1 is estopped
Facts:
Basically, Saleras assert that A-1 Investors did not assail the lack of jurisdiction early
enough. The Court, however, found that in all of A-1s pleadings, it was actually very Spouses Aurora and Luis Cinco, Leila Cingco-Jingco and Emmanuel Jingco, Lolita and
active in assailing the jurisdiction of the Courts over the subject matter of the action. Pete Cole (Petitioners) filed with the arbiter of HLURB a complaint for non-delivery of
title against Agda and PNB, as mortgagee of the property.

(Certiorari)
HLURB arbiter ruled against Agda and PNB ordering them to deliver titile to the Issue: Can the CA rule upon a petition for annulment of judgment of decisions
property. rendered by administrative agencies? No.
PNB appealed the Arbiter decision to the HLU Board of Commissioners. HLU Board of Ratio:
commissioners affirmed arbiter decision.
What was filed in the COURT OF APPEALS was a petition for annulment of judgment of
the decisions of the Arbiter and the Office of the President. Under Rule 47 of the Rules
PNB appealed the decision of the Board of Commissioner to the office of the President.
of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the Regional
Trial Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, to wit-
The office of the President affirmed the decision of the HLU Board of Commissioners.
RULE 47
Agda, on the other hand, questioned the Arbiters decision before the CA via rule 65. CA ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
dismissed on the ground:
-That the appeal should be to the HLU Board of Commissioners and thereafter SECTION 1. Coverage.This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals
to the President; and of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
- Of Laches. The petition was filed 6 yrs. after the arbiter decision. remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. (n)
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment.The annulment may be based only on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Agda also filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contracts against the Coles.
Cole filed MTD. MTD denied. Cole questioned the order denying the MTD via rule 65
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
with the CA. CA reversed the order and dismissed the RTC case because Agda was a
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)
forum shopper and the Board of Commissioners decision is res judicata in the RTC
action. Agda appealed to the SC, but SC denied for having filed beyond the reglementary
period. Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of judgment are fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision
sought to be annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by an
administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the
Agda also filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the Arbiters jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
decision and that of the Office of the President. Despite its pendency, Agda filed a
petition for review of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. COLEs filed a petition There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the
under Rule 65 praying for the dismissal of the new petition filed with the Office of the President.
President. Coles petition was dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same should have been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed to the
HLURB and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are beyond the
Meanwhile, on the annulment of judgment case, CA ruled that the decisions of the province of petitions under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of
Arbiter and the President are void for lack of jurisidiction. judgment. A petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy, hence no error
of judgment can be the subject thereof. Besides, the Arbiter and the Office of the

President indisputably have jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in line with
our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[23] promulgated on March 17,
Thus the petitions before SC.
2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers may seek protection from the HLURB
under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as Subdivision and Condominium

Buyers Protective Decree.
(Certiorari)
6) ARCENAS V. QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO. 166819, JUNE 16, 2010 LAGOS No. Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a
petition for annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are
SPOUSES OSCAR AND DOLORES ARCENAS vs. QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK AND available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If
COURT OF APPEALS Arcenas fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she
cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for
Sorry this case is a bit long. But I think the ER is sufficient. otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
In this case, the Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to
Doctrine: appear at the pre-trial conference in the breach of contract case Queen was
allowed to present evidence on its counterclaim. Such Order of Non-suit was
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for received by the secretary of Arcenas counsel. Arcenas did not move to set
annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition aside the RTC's order of non-suit and instead, went ahead by filing a Petition
for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. for Annulment of Order/Judgment.
Whether there was extrinsic fraud committed by Queens counsel?
Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for None. Since Arcenas claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by
annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for Queens counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within
new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule
been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure. 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment
of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new
ER: trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could
have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
This case involves 2 prior cases: a case for declaratory relief and breach of
contract. Facts:
Spouses Arcenas are the lessors of Queen Bank. (No details were given as to
their causes of action). Arcenas first filed for Declaratory relief, against Queen On January 23, 2002, the spouses Dolores and Oscar Arcenas (ARCENAS) filed
praying for the declaration of their rights as lessors under the contract of lease. with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, an Action for Declaratory
This was dismissed for being improper as the lease was already violated but Relief against respondent Queen City Development Bank (QUEEN).
RTC allowed Queen to present its evidence on its counterclaim. o The Spouses Arcenas prayed for the declaration of their rights as
Arcenas then filed for breach of the same contract of lease. lessors under the contract of lease
Both parties manifested their intention for amicable settlement and was trying Queen filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim
to reach an agreement on the amount. Thus, the pre-trial conference for the contending, among others, that the action for declaratory relief was not
breach of contract case kept on being reset because the court was waiting for proper, since the contract of lease had already been violated.
the parties to come to an agreement. o Queen counterclaimed for the rescission of the contract of lease,
On the continuation of the pre-trial conference, Arcenas counsel was not actual damages for its relocation, and attorneys fees.
present because the he requested for the postponement of the same due to a RTC dismissed the action for declaratory relief and set the hearing on Queens
conflict of schedule in his part. Queens counsel objected and moved to declare counterclaim for damages. The Arcenas' MR was denied. Queen later
Arcenas to be non-suited. presented its evidence on its counterclaim.
RTC declared Arcenas as non-suited. The RTC order was received by the Arcenas then filed another case with RTC Roxas City against Queen for breach
secretary of Arcenas counsel. of the same contract of lease and was raffled off to the same branch where the
Arcenas filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of order under Rule 47 action for declaratory relief was pending. Arcenas motioned to consolidate the
seeking to annul the Order of non-suit issued by the RTC of Roxas City, in the declaratory relief case and the breach of contract case. RTC denied
breach of contract case, on the ground of extrinsic fraud. They alleged that consolidation.
their failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was due to their mistaken o Pre-trial was set. In Arcenas pre-trial brief, they proposed an
belief that Queen was earnestly seeking a settlement on both civil cases; and amicable settlement which provided that Queen would continue to
that honest mistake and excusable negligence were grounds for lifting an order pay the agreed rentals until a substitute lessee can be found.
of non-suit. o Pre-trial was reset because there was no exact amount stated for the
CA denied the Petition for Annulment of the RTC order for failure of Arcenas to settlement.
resort to the appropriate remedy. Arcenas then filed a written Proposed Settlement in the amount of P1, 297,
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of order? 514.00. Queens counsel manifested that the parties were in the process of
(Certiorari)
settling the case. RTC ordered the resetting of the pre-trial conference without declared rescinded, and the Spouses Arcenas were ordered to pay Queenactual
prejudice to the filing of the compromise agreement that the parties may damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
finally execute before the pre-trial conference. o Arcenas filed their Notice of Appeal.
Queen then filed its Formal Counter Proposal for Settlement stating that the Oscar Arcenas died so only Dolores Arcenas filed a Petition for Review arguing
both parties will simultaneously and mutually dismiss all of their claims and that the CA erred in dismissing their petition for annulment of order on the
counterclaims in both cases. ground that their failure to take the other appropriate remedies was not due to
In the hearing for the declaratory relief case, RTC reset the case in view of the fault or negligence imputable to them. Also, they argue that the CA erred in not
manifestation that settlement was possible between the parties. However, appreciating the extrinsic fraud that was committed by Queens counsel.
during the actual hearing, the RTC noted that there seemed to have no meeting o ML: Their argument on extrinsic fraud was that there was an
of the minds between Arcenas and Queen from their respective settlement agreement to settle. Thats why they didnt go to the pre-trial
proposals. conference.
o RTC ordered for Arcenas and Queen to submit a compromise
agreement duly signed by both parties and to be used as basis for Issue:
judgment.
On the continuation of the pre-trial conference for the breach of contract case, Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of order? NO.
only Queens counsel was present. It turns out that the day before the pre-trial
Whether there was extrinsic fraud committed by Queens counsel? NONE
conference, Arcenas counsel moved for the postponement because of conflict
of schedule. Queens counsel objected to such postponement, as he was not
Whether Arcenas committed forum shopping? NO.
furnished a copy of the motion and the filing of such motion violated the three-
day notice rule on motions; thus, he moved that the Spouses Arcenas be
Held:
declared non-suited.
RTC declared Arcenas to be non-suited and set the presentation of Queens WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 18, 2004 and
evidence on its counterclaim. January 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83357 are AFFIRMED.
o The RTC order of non-suit was received by the secretary of
Arcenas counsel.
On the day of the hearing, still Arcenas failed to appear thus Queen presented
its evidence, rested its case, and submitted it for decision. Ratio:
Arcenas then filed a Manifestation with Motion alleging that their failure to file
an MR and appear at the pre-trial conference was due to their mistaken belief CA correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of order
that Queen was earnestly seeking a settlement on both civil cases; that honest
mistake and excusable negligence were grounds for lifting an order of non- Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court impose the conditions for the availment
suit; of the remedy of annulment of judgment, viz.:
o They prayed that the pre-trial conference be reset.
o Queen opposed. Section 1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by
Arcenas filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of order under Rule the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in
47 seeking to annul the Order of non-suit issued by the RTC of Roxas civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies
City, in the breach of contract case, on the ground of extrinsic fraud. of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the Spouses Arcenas failed are no longer available through no fault of the Arcenas.
to avail of the appropriate remedies without sufficient justification
before resorting to the petition for annulment of order. Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be
o CA ruled that assuming that Sps. Arcenas were able to substantiate based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
their allegations of fraud, they could have filed a petition for
relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court and prayed that the Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of,
assailed Order be set aside, but they did not. Thus, they cannot or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
benefit from their inaction. relief.
Arcenas MRed. Denied.
In the meantime, RTC rendered a decision in the declaratory relief and breach Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for
of contract cases wherein the contract of lease subject of the two cases was annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a
(Certiorari)
petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If Arcenas fails to avail of Moreover, since Arcenas claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by
these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the action for Queens counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the
annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47
inaction or negligence. clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of
order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
In this case, the Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have
pre-trial conference in the breach of contract case Queen was allowed to present been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
evidence on its counterclaim. Such Order of Non-suit was received by the secretary of
Arcenas counsel. Arcenas did not move to set aside the RTC's order of non-suit. Arcenas tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of
settlement. However, such promise was not an excuse for Arcenas's counsel not to lift
While Arcenas' counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of non-suit on the order of non-suit and to file a petition for relief.
December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Notably, from
December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on January 8, 2004, Arcenas did not take any Arcenas's claim that she was present when Queens counsel moved for the issuance of
remedial action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In the order of non-suit against her was not proven by any evidence.
fact, Arcenas and her counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004
hearing wherein Queen presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the case There was indeed a failure to show, to our satisfaction, that Arcenas could not
for decision. have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. Thus, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would
It was only on January 14, 2004 when Arcenas and her husband filed a pleading benefit from her inaction or negligence.
captioned as Manifestation and Motion, wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of
the Orders dated November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further pre-trial
conference. The RTC denied such Manifestation and Motion in its Order dated March 9,
2004, as the same was filed beyond the reglementary period, and such Order was No forum shopping
received by Arcenas on March 12, 2004. Arcenas then filed with the CA a Petition for
annulment of order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of Finally, we find no merit in Queens claim that Arcenas committed forum shopping. The
extrinsic fraud. The CA denied the petition as Arcenas failed to avail of the appropriate issue brought before us is whether the CA correctly dismissed Arcenas's petition for
remedies provided by the Rules to which we agree. annulment of the Order dated November 11, 2003 declaring her non-suited for failure
to appear at the pre-trial conference of the breach of contract case. On the other hand,
Arcenas's Notice of Appeal in both cases pertained to the decision of the RTC rendered
on the merits.
No presence of extrinsic fraud

It bears stressing that when Arcenas's counsel filed the Manifestation and Motion asking
for reconsideration of the Order declaring the Spouses Arcenas non-suited, the reason
stated was honest mistake or excusable negligence. To show such mistake, he explained
that since there was a pending negotiation for settlement in both cases, which were both
pending in the same court, and the parties had to come up with a settlement for the
hearing of the declaratory relief case, Arcenas's counsel then asked for the
postponement of the scheduled November 11, 2003 hearing set for the pre-trial
conference of the breach of contract case one day before the said date, because of
conflict of schedule and since he had in mind the December 4, 2003 deadline to submit
the settlement. Notably, Arcenas's counsel admitted that the date set for the submission
of settlement in the breach of contract case was indeed November 11, 2003; and that his

failure to attend the hearings and to file a motion for reconsideration of the declaration
of Arcenas as non-suited was because of his mistaken belief that Queen was earnestly

seeking a settlement. There was nothing in the Manifestation and Motion which alluded
the commission of extrinsic fraud to Queens counsel.

(Certiorari)
XXIX. Provisional Remedies - An attachment bond was posted by Anzures and approved by the court. The
sheriff attached certain properties of Villaluz which were duly annotated on
the corresponding certificates of title.
A. ATTACHMENT (RULE 57) - Trial court rendered a decision acquitting Villaluz of the crime charged, but
held her civilly liable. Villaluz appealed, CA affirmed RTC decision.
- Case was elevated to the SC. During the pedency, Villaluz posted a counter-
A.1) SECURITY PACIFIC V. AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE, G.R. NO. 1444740, AUGUST 31, 2005. bond in the amont of P2.5 M issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corp. She
LIBONGCO also filed an urgent motion to discharge attachment.
- SC promulgated a decision affirming in toto the decision of the CA.
Security Pacific v Amelia Tria-Infante - In view of the finality of the decisions, Anzures moved for the execution of
judgement before the trial court. Trial court granted the motion to proceed
ER: with garnishment.
- Security Pacific filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
- Anzures instituted a complaint against Villaluz for violation of BP 22. Anzures and/or TRO with the CA seeking the nullification of the trial court order
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
o They contended that Judge Tria-Infante and the sheriff committed
- Villaluz, through Security Pacific, posted a counter-bond. grave errors of law in proceeding against petitioner on its counter-
- Villaluz ultimately lost. Although she was acquitted by the court, she was still attachment bond, desite the fact that said bond was not approved by
found civilly liable.
the SC.
- Anzures move for the execution of the judgment. Security Pacific claimed it o CA found no grave abuse of discretion. Security Pacific filed an MR,
was not liable.
denied for lack of merit. Security Pacific filed for certiorari under
Rule 45
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC judge
- Spouses Anzures executed a memorandum of understanding, There was,
which allowed the execution on the counter-bond
however, a stipulation to the effect that the memorandum shall not be
construed as a waiver or abandonment of the appellate review pending before
- The suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of
the SC.
his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by
the principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence
Issue:
secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or
promise of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC judge
words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal.
which allowed the execution on the counter-bond
- Failure of the court to issue an order discharging the writ of attachment is not
a ground to avoid the liability of a surety in case of a counter-bond. Held:
Doctrine: Under the Rules, there are two (2) ways to secure the discharge of an WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
attachment. First, the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on Appeals dated 16 June 2000 and 22 August 2000, respectively, are both
his behalf may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
attachment was improperly or irregularly issued.
Ratio:
Facts:
- Security Pacific contends that since the writ was not discharged, then is
- Reynaldo Anzures instituted a complaint against Teresita Villaluz for violation liability did not accrue. The failure of the court to approve the counter-bond
of BP 22. Criminal information was brought before the Mania RTC branch 9. and to cause the discharge of the attachment against Villaluz prevented the
- An ex-parte motion for preliminary attachment was filed by Anzures praying happening of the condition upon which the counter-bond was premised.
that pending the hearing of the merits, a writ of preliminary attachment be - SC: there are not compelling reasons to reverse CA ruling!
issued ordering the sheriff to attach the properties of Villaluz - Tijam v Sibonghanoy: After the judgment for the plaintiff has become
- Trial court issued an order for the issuance of the writ upon complainants executory and the execution is returned unsatisfied, as in this case, the
posting of a bond fixed at P2,123,400 and the courts approval of the same liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to
under the conditions prescribed by Rule 54 Sec. 4
(Certiorari)
satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefore, writ of with the provisions of this section, the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale
execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond. thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or
- Luzon Steel Corp. v Sia et al: [C]ounterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a to the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in
writ of attachment is due to these bonds being security for the payment of any place of the property so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to
judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus mere be or become insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional
replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.
levied upon after final judgment in the case in order to realize the amount
adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties ascertainable after the
A.2) TORRES V. SATSATIN, G.R. NO. 166759, NOVEMBER 25, 2009 LOPA
judgment has become final. . . .
- A counter-bond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR
- Security Pacific does not deny that its contract with Villaluz is one of RESOURCES, INC., v. NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI
suretyship. However, it claims that the agreement is one that merely waives its NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN
right of excussion. This cannot be so. The counter-bond itself states that the
parties jointly and severally bind themselves to secure the payment of any Topic: Provisional Remedies; Attachment
judgment that the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the action. A Doctrine: [So many doctrines, read ratio of ER for doctrines]
surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to
whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities Emergency Recitation: Nicanor sold land belonging to the Torres siblings but failed to
are interwoven as to be inseparable. remit 19,000,000. Case filed by Torres siblings in the RTC Cavite for Sum of Money and
- Suretyship is a contractual relation resulting from an agreement whereby one Damages. They also filed an Ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment.
person, the surety, engages to be answerable for the debt, default or RTC granted the motion, issued the writ. Torres siblings complied with the
miscarriage of another, known as the principal. The suretys obligation is not requirements for a writ (got a surety bond etc) and the sheriff enforced it vs. Nicanor et.
an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but merely al. AFTER serving the writ, the RTC issued summons and gave Nicanor a copy of the
accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. complaint. Nicanor filed an answer with Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment. Torres
Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to siblings won and the writ stayed in the RTC and on MR. CA reversed and ruled in favor
a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promise of the of Nicanor.
principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is
directly and equally bound with the principal. The surety therefore becomes 1. W/N CA erred in ordering the lifting of the Writ of Attachment pursuant to Sec 13
liable for the debt or duty of another although he possesses no direct or Rule 57? Nope! Attachment lifted.
- Order of attachment and writ of attachment do not and cannot bind and affect the
personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit
therefrom. defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
- Under the Rules, there are two (2) ways to secure the discharge of an court. When the sheriff commences implementation of the writ, it is essential that he
attachment. First, the party whose property has been attached or a person serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment
appearing on his behalf may post a security. Second, said party may show that bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57,
the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued. but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint
- Grant of Attachment involves 3 stages [Cuartero v. CA]
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. After a writ of attachment 1. the court issues the order granting the application
has been enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing 2. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the
on his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or in part on the writ
security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the 3. the writ is implemented.
- for stages #1 and #2, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person
attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the
attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount of the defendant must be obtained. However, once the implementation
equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But if the commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property, the counter- defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
bond shall be equal to the value of that property as determined by the court. In either authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
- In this case, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired
case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment
that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served
be served on the attaching party. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance upon them.
(Certiorari)
- GR: an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper - Nicanor failed to remit P19,000,000.00 despite repeated verbal and written
issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of demands
action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the - Torres siblings filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC
main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. Cavite
- XP in this case: It is clear from the respondents pleadings that the grounds on - Torres siblings filed an Ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment,
which they base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its alleging that:
issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners cause of action. - respondents are about to leave the Philippines
- they have property in Metro Manila and in nearby provinces
2. W/N writ of attachment should be granted despite the bond being insufficient and - amount due them is P19,000,000 above other claims
having been improperly issued? RTC acted in GADLEJ when it accepted the bond posted - no other sufficient security
by the Torres siblings despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were - they are willing to post a bond fixed by the court to answer for all costs which may
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its be adjudged to the respondents and all damages which respondents may sustain
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected. by reason of the attachment prayed for, if it shall be finally adjudged that
- One of the requisites is that clearance from the SC showing that the company petitioners are not entitled thereto.
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days - RTC issued an Order directing Torres siblings to post a bond worth P7,000,000
from the date of its issuance. In this case, the Certification issued by the Office of the before the issuance of the writ of attachment
Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that - Torres siblings filed a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff stating that they had applied
the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the for the bond and prayed that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of attachment.
RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. This was RTC Cavite not complied Granted. Ordered sheriff to serve the writ
with! - RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15, 2002, directing the sheriff to
attach the estate, real or personal, of Nicanor.
3. W/N CA erred in not dismissing the petition by reason of estoppel, laches and - Copy of the writ was served on Nicanor et al. on November 19, 2002. Sheriff levied
prescription? Nope, no estoppel, laches and prescription here! their real and personal properties, including their household appliances, cars and
- 2 ways to discharge the attachment: land in Las Pinas, Manila.
1. file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57 - Summons were served on Nicanor et. al. on November 21, 2002.
2. quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or - Nicanor et al filed their answer on November 29, 2002. They also filed a Motion to
improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Discharge Writ of Attachment on the following grounds:
- Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways - bond was issued before the issuance of the writ
indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to - writ was issued before summons was served
have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by - sheriff did not serve copies of the application and order of attachment, plaintiffs
simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment affidavit and attachment bond
writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a - sheriff did not submit a sheriffs return
speedier way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other - grounds for the issuance of the writ are baseless and devoid of merit
way - offered to post a counter-bond for the lifting of the writ
- Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment was denied! But the RTC directed Nicanor et.
Facts: al. to file a counter-bond
- Sofia, Fructosa and Mario are the Torres siblings. They each own adjacent tracks of - Motion for Reconsideration. Denied again. Directed to file counter-bond again. So
land many efforts to have the writ lifted (MR, lift Order etc. were all denied!
- [1997] Nicanor Satsatin asked the Torres mother Aledia if she wanted to sell their - Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
land. She consulted her kids and decided to sell. The siblings authorized Nicanor to TRO before the CA finally Nicanor et. al. won. CA rendered the assailed Decision in
sell their land via a Special Power of Attorney. favor of the respondents, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
- [1999] Nicanor sold the land to Solar Resources Inc. plus another parcel of land excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing the Orders granting the writ of
owned by Rustica Aledia. Torres siblings were supposed to get P9,333,333.00 each attachment and denying the Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment. MR by Torres
- Solar paid the entire purchase price (P35,000,000.00) to Nicanor in 32 post-dated siblings. Denied.
checks
- From Jan 2000 - Apr 2002, Nicanor purchased a new house and a car which he Issues:
registered in the names of his own children. 1. W/N CA erred in ordering the lifting of the Writ of Attachment pursuant to Sec 13
Rule 57?
(Certiorari)
2. W/N writ of attachment should be granted despite the bond being insufficient and commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
having been improperly issued defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
3. W/N CA erred in not dismissing the petition by reason of estoppel, laches and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing
prescription from the Court will not bind the defendant.
- it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision person of the defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2004 and January 18, apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83595 are AFFIRMED. writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or
contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
Ratio: summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
- [Definition of a writ of preliminary attachment] - a provisional remedy issued upon attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond, and the order must be
order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or served upon him.
properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as - In this case, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served
action by the attaching creditor against the defendant upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
- RTC acted in GADLEJ when it accepted the bond posted by the Torres siblings despite implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the
the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a respondents in order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and
surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was
the bond should be rejected. validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind
1. One of the requisites is that clearance from the SC showing that the company and affect the respondents.
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) - GR: an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper
days from the date of its issuance issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of
- [in this case] it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the
of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion.
would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty - XP in this case: It is clear from the respondents pleadings that the grounds on
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, which they base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its
Pasay, and Pasig. issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners cause of action.
- Distinction between the issuance and implementation of the writs indispensably - 2 ways to discharge the attachment:
necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be 1. file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57
acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person. 2. quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or
- a party may, at any time after the filing of the complaint, avail of the provisional improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule.
remedies int he ROC Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law,
- for attachment - at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of
judgment. the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment
- Order of attachment and writ of attachment do not and cannot bind and affect the writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way
the court. When the sheriff commences implementation of the writ, it is essential
that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and
attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section A.3) INSULAR SAVINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.123638, JUNE 15, 2006
LUCENARIO
5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy
of the complaint (Davao Light v. CA)
- Grant of Attachment involves 3 stages [Cuartero v. CA] Insular Savings v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.123638, June 15, 2006
1. the court issues the order granting the application
2. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the Topic: Attachment (Rule 57)
writ

3. the writ is implemented.
- for stages #1 and #2, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person
Emergency Recitation:
of the defendant must be obtained. However, once the implementation
(Certiorari)
3 unfunded checks (total value of Php25,200,000) were drawn against FEBTC It also bears to stress that FEBTC did not pray for attachment on its other claims,
(drawee bank). INSULAR SAVINGS (collecting bank) presented the checks for contingent and unliquidated as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ should exclude
clearing but FEBTC failed to return them within the reglementary period. By such claims.
this time it was too late and the amount was credited already. INSULAR
SAVINGS refused to reimburse the money to FEBTC.
FEBTC and INSULAR SAVINGS underwent arbitration. During arbitration, Bonus: In case he asks, see super last part of ratio mentioning that this decision was
FEBTC filed a civil case against INSULAR SAVINGS to collect the disputed based on the old Rules of Court on attachment.
Php25,200,000 and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. RTC granted prayer and issued the writ.
Subsequently, however, both banks in the arbitration case agreed to
temporarily divide the amount (Php25,200,000) while the dispute has not yet FACTS:
been resolved. (The language of the case suggested that, during the
proceedings, each bank literally held Php12,600,000 representing half of the 3 (unfunded) checks with a total value of Php25,200,000 were drawn against
disputed amount) drawee bank FEBTC. Collecting bank INSULAR SAVINGS BANK presented the
Pursuant to this development, INSULAR SAVINGS filed a motion to discharge checks to FEBTC for clearing. FEBTC, however, returned the checks beyond the
attachment by counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00. reglementary period and by this time INSULAR SAVINGS BANKs account in
the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) was already credited with
RTC denied and ordered that the counter-bond should be P27,237,700.00
taking into consideration as basis not only the disputed amount, but also the the Php25,200,000. Hence, INSULAR SAVINGS BANK did not want to return the
unsecured portions of the claim such as actual damages, legal interest, money to FEBTC.
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. INSULAR FEBTC thus instituted Arbitration Case No. 91-069 against INSULAR SAVINGS
went up on certiorari to CA but CA affirmed RTC. Hence the present SC case. before the Arbitration Committee of the PCHC.
ISSUE: W/N INSULAR SAVINGS motion to discharge attachment by counter- January 17, 1992 While the dispute was pending arbitration, FEBTC
bond in the amount of Php12,600,000 should be granted YES instituted Civil Case No. 92-145 in the RTC Makati and prayed for the
Ratio: issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC granted the application for
preliminary attachment upon posting by FEBTC of an attachment bond in the
As can be seen from Section 12 of Rule 57, the amount of the counter-attachment bond amount of P6,000,000.00. RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment for the
is to be measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge amount of P25,200,000.00.
to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the During the arbitration proceedings, FEBTC and INSULAR SAVINGS agreed to
action. temporarily divide between them the disputed amount of P25,200,000.00
while the dispute has not yet been resolved. As a result, the sum
Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section, there can be no serious objection to the ofP12,600,000.00 is in the possession of FEBTC.
proposition that the attached property - and logically the counter-bond necessary to Consequently, INSULAR SAVINGS filed a motion to discharge attachment by
discharge the lien on such property - should as much as possible correspond in value to, counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00. On June 13, 1994,
or approximately match the attaching creditors principal claim. Else, excessive respondent Judge issued the first assailed order denying the motion. On
attachment, which ought to be avoided at all times, shall ensue. June 27, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in the second assailed order dated July 20, 1994"
RTC denied the motion and ordered the counterbond in the amount of P27,237,700.00:
If a portion of the claim is already secured (as in this case when the parties already "xxx (T)he counter-bond posted by INSULAR SAVINGS BANK should include
provisionally divided the disputed amount), we see no justifiable reason why such the unsecured portion of FEBTCs claim of P12,600,000.00 as agreed upon in
portion should still be subject of counter-bond. It may be that a counter-bond is the arbitration case, namely: Actual damages at 25% percent per annum of
intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in unsecured amount of claim from October 21, 1991 in the amount
the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, of P7,827,500.00; Legal interest of 12% percent per annum from October 21,
dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied 1991 in the amount ofP3,805,200.00; Exemplary damages in the amount
or secured need not be covered by the counter-bond. of P2,000,000.00; and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the amount
Hence, the RTC erred in requiring a counter-bond in the amount of P27,237,700.00. of P1,000,000.00 with a total amount of P27,237,700.00 (Adlawan vs. Tomol,
obviously. 184 SCRA 31 (1990)".
INSULAR SAVINGS BANK contends:
(Certiorari)
The starting point in computing the amount of counter-bond is the amount of Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be, or become
the FEBTCs demand or claim only, in this case P25,200,000.00, excluding insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-
contingent expenses and unliquidated amount of damages. And since there bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment"
was a mutual agreement between the parties to temporarily, but equally,
divide between themselves the said amount pending and subject to the final As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the
outcome of the arbitration, the amount of P12,600,000.00 should, so petitioner aforequoted Section 12, to be measured against the value of the attached property, as
argues, be the basis for computing the amount of the counter-bond. determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action.
From the order denying its motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond, INSULAR Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and without necessarily diminishing the
SAVINGS went to the CA on a petition for certiorari alleging GADLEJ. CA affirmed RTC sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no
hence the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached property - and logically
the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property - should as much as
possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditors
principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoided at all times, shall
ISSUE: W/N INSULAR SAVINGS motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in the ensue.
amount of Php12,600,000 should be granted YES. RTC and CA were wrong.

The following excerpts from Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. VII, 1997 ed., p. 61, citing
retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, drive home the same point articulated in Asuncion:
HELD: "The sheriff is required to attach only so much of the property of the party
against whom the order is issued as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicants
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision and demand, the amount of which is stated in the order, unless a deposit is made or
resolution of the Courts of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, along with a counter-bond is given equal to said amount. However, if the value of the
the orders dated June 13, 1994 and July 20, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court at Makati, property to be attached is less than the amount of the demand, the amount of
Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-145 insofar they denied petitioners motion to the applicants bond may be equal to the value of said property, and the
discharge attachment by counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, and a new one amount of the adverse partys deposit or counter-bond may be equal to the
entered GRANTINGsuch motion upon the reposting of the same counter-bond. applicants bond. The writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon approval
of the requisite bond".

RATIO: Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of respondent, as
plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of P25,200,000.00, representing the three (3) unfunded
checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, respondent bank.
The then pertinent provision of Rule 57 (Preliminary Attachment) of the Rules of Court Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and
under which the appellate court issued its assailed decision and resolution, provides as exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim.
follows:
"SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. At any time after
an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been
attached, . . . may upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge The order of attachment dated January 22, 1992 fixed the bond to be posted by FEBTC,
who granted the order or to the judge of the court which the action is pending, as applicant, at P6,000,000.00. The writ of attachment issued on January 27, 1992, in
for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. turn, expressly indicated that INSULAR SAVINGS is justly indebted to FEBTC in the
The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash amount of P25,200,000.00.
deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, Subsequently, however, both banks agreed to equally divide between themselves, albeit
on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the on a temporary basis, the disputed amount of P25,200,000.00, subject to the outcome of
application is made in an amount equal to the value of the property the arbitration proceedings. Thus, the release by INSULAR SAVINGS of the amount
attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any of P12,600,000.00 to FEBTC.
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. x x x .
(Certiorari)
Hence, INSULAR SAVINGS filed a motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in the and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment. Yu filed an answer with
amount of P12,600,000.00 which is the extent that FEBTC may actually be prejudiced in counterclaim for damages due to wrongful attachment and a motion to dissolve the
the event its basic complaint for recovery of money against INSULAR SAVINGS prospers. attachment. Yu also filed a claim against Visayan Surety (VS issued the attachment bond)
Essentially, FEBTCs principal claim against INSULAR SAVINGS immediately prior to the for the damages that Yu sustained because of the attachment. RTC ordered the
filing of the motion to discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down attachment of the land and 1 vehicle (bus), but discharged the 3 other vehicles. CA
to P12,600,000.00. The RTC was fully aware of this reality. Accordingly, it should have ordered the discharge of the land and bus, which the SC affirmed. This became final. The
allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counter-bond based on the reduced RTC, however, did not know of the SC decision, and it made a decision ordering the
claim of FEBTC. payment of damages from Visayan Surety but denied the award of other damages. Yu
If a portion of the claim is already secured, we see no justifiable reason why such fild a manifestation of the SC decision to the RTC. RTC denied Yus claim for damages
portion should still be subject of counter-bond. It may be that a counter-bond is saying that the SC decision did not mention anything about damages. CA affirmed the
intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in RTC decision saying that Yu failed to establish ther claim for damages.
the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, Issue:
dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied W/N the writ of attachment was procured in bad faith and that damages should
or secured need not be covered by the counter-bond. therefore be awarded to Spouses Yu? No bad faith. Only temperate damages and attys
Hence, the RTC erred in requiring a counter-bond in the amount of P27,237,700.00. fees were awarded.
obviously. Ratio:
Moreover, it bears to stress that FEBTC did not pray for attachment on its other claims, There was no bad faith in procuring the writ of attachment because Te has basis in
contingent and unliquidated as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ rightly excluded saying that Spouses Yu had no intention to pay their debt. Spouses Yu they had available
such claims. funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of covering the checks they
While the records do not indicate, let alone provide a clear answer as to the actual value issued. Hence, no moral or exemplary damages.
of the property levied upon, it may reasonably be assumed that it is equal to FEBTCs The entitlement to damages for the alleged malicious procurement of the writ of
principal claim. attachment should still be established by Spouses Yu.
Be that as it may, it was simply unjust for the trial court to base the amount of the (Doctrine) Where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may
counter-bond on a figure beyond the P25,200,000.00 threshold, as later reduced recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in
to P12,600,200.00. bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if it is alleged and established
that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the attachment
defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well. Either
As a final consideration, note that the certiorari proceedings before the appellate court way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of
and the denial of the motion to discharge attachment subject of such proceedings, damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of
transpired under the old rules on preliminary attachment which has since been revised. proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the
wrongful attachment.
Unlike the former Section 12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court where the value of the Spouses Yu were not able to substantiate their claim for damages with reasonable
property attached shall be the defining measure in the computation of the discharging certainty. They only submitted proof of average income in a year based on ticket stubs
counter-attachment bond, the present less stringent Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that sold in 5 different dates (5 days out of 1 year), which is totally insufficient. Also, the bus
the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant "makes a cash deposit, or has already been previously attached in an earlier case and is in a warehouse in Cebu.
files a counter-bond . . . in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of Yu also did not submit proof of loss re the land.
attachment, exclusive of costs." Not being in the nature of a penal statute, the Rules of Temperate damages were awarded because there was pecuniary loss suffered due to
Court cannot be given retroactive effect. the wrongful attachment, but the amount cannot be definitely ascertained.
Attys fees were awarded because Yu was forced to litigate the case due to the wrongful
attachment.
A.4) YU V. NGO YET TE, G.R. NO. 155868, FEBRUARY 6, 2007 MAGTAGNOB

SPOUSES YU v NGO YET TE
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Topic: Attachment
Facts:

Spouses Yu purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worth P594,240.00,
EMERGENCY DIGEST
and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment of the purchase price. When
Quick Facts:
Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment, said checks were returned
Yu purchased from Te bars of soap to which Yu issued 3 postdated checks. The
dishonored and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED". Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu
checks were dishonored. Yu failed to pay, so Te filed a complaint for collection of money
(Certiorari)
but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact, CA- affirmed in toto the RTC Decision, but it nonetheless made a ruling on the
Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the RTC a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and counterclaim of Spouses Yu by declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. evidence of their entitlement to damages.
Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of
fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the ISSUE:
contract price, and that they were about to move or dispose of their properties to W/N the writ of attachment was procured in bad faith, after it was established by final
defraud their creditors. judgment that there was no true ground therefor. NO bad faith.
Upon Tes posting of an attachment bond, the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy W/N Yu should be award damages after it was established by final judgment that the
on the basis of which Sheriff Alimurung levied and attached Spouses Yus properties in writ of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance- only temperate
Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land (known as Lot No. 11) and four vehicles, damages and attys fees.
specifically, a Toyota Ford Fierra, a jeep, a Canter delivery van, and a passenger bus.
Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful HELD:
attachment of their properties. On the same date, Spouses Yu filed an Urgent Motion to WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The March 21, 2001 Decision of the
Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment. They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond in Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners counterclaim
which they demanded payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation is PARTLY GRANTED. Gregorio Yu and Josefa Yu are awarded P50,000.00 temperate
(Visayan Surety), the surety which issued the attachment bond, of the sum of damages and P30,000.00 attorneys fees.
P594,240.00, representing the damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the
wrongful attachment of their properties. RATIO:
RTC- did not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond. Ordered the discharge from Visayan Surety was notified of the pre-trial conference to apprise it of a pending claim
attachment of the Toyota Ford Fierra, jeep, and Canter delivery van on humanitarian against its attachment bond. Visayan Surety received the notice as shown by a registry
grounds, BUT maintaining custody of Lot No. 11 and the passenger bus. MR was also return receipt attached to the records.49
denied. Moreover, even if it were true that Visayan Surety was left in the proceedings a quo,
CA- lifted the RTC Order of Attachment on their remaining properties (Lot 11 and bus). such omission is not fatal to the cause of Spouses Yu. In Malayan Insurance Company,
It reads in part: xxx the complaint and the accompanying affidavit in support of the Inc. v. Salas, we held that "x x x if the surety was not given notice when the claim for
application for the writ only contains general averments. Xxx Neither does Te contest damages against the principal in the replevin bond was heard, then as a matter of
the Spouses Yus allegations that they have been recently robbed of properties of procedural due process the surety is entitled to be heard when the judgment for
substantial value, hence their inability to pay on time. By the respondent courts own damages against the principal is sought to be enforced against the suretys replevin
pronouncements, it appears that the order of attachment was upheld because of the bond."
admitted financial reverses the Spouses Yu is undergoing. This is reversible error. We now proceed to resolve the issues jointly.
Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when defendant has not been Spouses Yu contend that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages as a matter
shown to have committed any act intended to defraud its creditors x x x. of right in view of the finality of SCs decision which affirmed the finding of the CA that
Went to the SC via Certiorai, and affirmed the CA decision. This became final. Te had wrongfully caused the attachment of their properties.
However, the RTC, apparently not informed of the SC Decision, rendered a Decision As early as in Lazatin v. Twao, we laid down the rule that where there is wrongful
declining to rule on the attachment on the ground that it is still being determined by the attachment, the attachment defendant may recover actual damages even without proof
SC. It also granted the award for the payment from Visayan Surety for wrongful that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if
attachment, but denied the award of other damages. it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also
Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the disposition malicious, the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary
of their counterclaim (lifting the attachment). They also filed a Manifestation informing damages as well. Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the
the RTC of the SC decision. automatic award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge
RTC- It has been ruled with definiteness by the Supreme Court that, indeed, the issuance the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the
by the Court of the writ of preliminary attachment appears to have been improvidently wrongful attachment.
done, but nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court and for that matter, the In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful
Court of Appeals decision which was in effect sustained by the High Court, did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their
contains any ruling or directive or imposition, of any damages to be paid by the counterclaim for damages.
plaintiff to the defendants. To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the
RTC granted two motions filed by Te, a Motion to Correct and to Include Specific attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or
Amount for Interest and a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The RTC also denied injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is
Spouses Yus Notice of Appeal. not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
(Certiorari)
certainty. KEYWORDS: jealous dealer; issuing TRO motu proprio; issuing TRO w/o bond
Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing standards. They
ER: UMC is the exclusive distributor of Nissan parts in Phils. Its relationship with NSSC,
point to the lists of their daily net income from the operation of said passenger bus
one of its dealers, went sour after the latters checks bounced. UMC contracted with
based on used ticket stubs issued to their passengers. They also cite unused ticket stubs
another dealer, NICAD, and eventually terminated its contract with NSSC. NSSC sued
as proof of income foregone when the bus was wrongfully seized. They further cite the
both UMC and NICAD for breach of contract. Judge ROJAS issued an order setting a
unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that, in the day-to-day operation of their passenger
summary hearing on the propriety of a TRO (w/c no one prayed for!) NSSC amended its
bus, they use up at least three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily income of
complaint to insert a prayer for TRO. After hearing, ROJAS issued the TRO. (TRO was
P1,500.00.
basically ordering UMC to stop dealing with NICAD and deal with NSSC instead) The next
Spouses Yus claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00 per day was based on their
day, NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bond and Approve/Admit UMCs Counterbond.
computation of their average daily income for the year 1992. Said computation in turn is
(Apparently, ROJAS did not also require the posting of a bond for the TRO he issued) ROJAS
based on the value of three ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in 1992. By no
stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence denied the motion and ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction (PI) upon
NSSCs posting of bond. UMC assailed the PI through certiorari with the CA. CA held that
of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its mean income.
ROJAS acted with GADLEJ. Hence, this admin. case charging ROJAS for serious
Besides, based on the August 29, 1994 Manifestation filed by Sheriff Alimurung, it would
misconduct, etc. Two relevant issues:
appear that long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment,
the same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection (1) Can the court issue TROs motu proprio? NO! A TRO may be issued only if it
with another case and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation, appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
Cebu City. Thus, Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the writ of PI could be heard.
the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment. HERE, NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a TRO to prevent any
Moreover, Spouses Yu did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by great or irreparable injury that it might suffer. NSSC prayed mainly of its reinstatement
reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11. as dealer, and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD.
Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when
their properties were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be (2) Can the court issue TROs without requiring the posting of bond? NO, EXCEPT
definitively ascertained. Hence, an award of temperate or moderate damages in the when it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage. A bond under
amount of P50,000.00 is in order. Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person against whom the
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that TRO is issued may sustain should the court finally decide that the applicant was not
the wrongful attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad entitled thereto. Unless it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage,
faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application. the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts
Based on Yus testimony, it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses could become instruments of oppression and harassment. HERE, both UMC and NICAD
Yu never intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but will suffer losses if the issuing of TRO turns out to be improper.
chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the checks they issued. Thus, we cannot
attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. We cannot hold
her liable for moral and exemplary damages. FACTS: (ER will suffice!J)
As a rule, attorneys fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are
Universal Motors Corporation (UMC) is the exclusive assembler and distributor in
not granted, the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a
the Phils. of Nissan light commercial vehicles and spare parts. It maintains a
wrongfully issued writ of attachment. Without a doubt, Spouses Yu waged a protracted
network of authorized dealers who purchase vehicles and spare parts from UMC
legal battle to fight off the illegal attachment of their properties and pursue their claims
and resell them in specified territories in the country. One of its dealears was
for damages. It is only just and equitable that they be awarded reasonable attorneys
Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC).
fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
In sum, we affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim of petitioners Spouses Yu for actual, NSSC purchased Nissan vehicles and spare parts from UMC and issued postdated
moral, and exemplary damages. However, we grant them temperate damages and checks as payment. The checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. After
attorneys fees. several demands, UMC stopped transacting with NSSC. UMC later appointed Nissan
Cagayan De Oro Distributors, Inc. (NICAD) to co-exist as dealer with NSSC to meet
the market demand in Northern Mindanao.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58)
Due to NSSCs continued failure and refusal to pay, UMC terminated its dealership
agreement with NSSC. It also filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22
B.1) UNIVERSAL MOTORS V. ROJAS, A.M. RTJ 03-1814, MAY 26, 2005 MUTI and/or estafa against the officers of NSSC.
(Certiorari)
In response, NSSC filed a civil case for breach of contract against UMC and its
officers. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Francisco G. Rojas, Sr
ISSUES: (1) whether TROs can be issued by the court motu proprio NO; and (2)
(ROJAS).
whether TROs can be issued without posting a bond NO, UNLESS it appears that the
ROJAS issued an order setting a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance enjoined party will not suffer any damage!
of a temporary restraining order. (NOTE: NO ONE PRAYED FOR A TRO)

o Thereafter, NSSC filed an amended complaint where it inserted a prayer
HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent judge is ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00
for TRO. ROJAS admitted it and conducted hearing.
and WARNED that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
ROJAS issued a TRO enjoining defendants, UMC and its officers, NICAD and its severely.
officers, Inc., from continuing in selling, dealing and marketing all models of motor

vehicles and spare parts of Nissan; from terminating the dealer agreement between
the NSSC and UMC; to stop the entry of NICAD and for the latter to do business on RATIO:
Nissan Products in the territory of NSSC as defined in the Dealer Agreement and for
the UMC to stop supplying and doing trading transactions NICAD. (Basically, the First, ROJAS ordered a hearing on the issuance of a TRO although it was not prayed
issued TRO is for the benefit of NSSCs business. for in the complaint. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that
great or irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff, NSSC, pending hearing on
The following day, NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant the preliminary injunction.
and Approve/Admit UMCs Counterbond with Prayer to Lift Temporary Restraining
Order. ROJAS denied the motion. (NOTE AGAIN: ROJAS DID NOT REQUIRE BOND FOR Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued
THE TRO) only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
ROJAS ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (PI) upon posting before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
by the NSSC of a bond in the amount of P1M. The writ of PI was issued after NSSC
filed its bond. On the same day, UMC filed with an Urgent Motion to Recall/Dissolve In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is clear: a PI or TRO may
Order/Writ of PI. ROJAS denied. be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified,
and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.
UMC filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the PI
o We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted
issued by ROJAS.
mainly of its reinstatement as dealer of Nissan spare parts in Northern
o In the meantime, NSSC filed with the trial court a Motion to Enforce Writ Mindanao, and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC
of PI. UMC, on the other hand, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Cancel and NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to
or Hold Proceedings in Abeyance. ROJAS granted NSSCs Motion to issue a TRO to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it might suffer
Enforce Writ of PI. while the PI is being heard
The CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Second, ROJAS issued the TRO without requiring the plaintiff, NSSC, to post a
writ of PI. Hence, UMC filed the instant administrative complaint against ROJAS bond. While Section 4(b) of Rule 5814 gives the presiding judge the discretion to
for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and grave require a bond before granting a TRO, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the
abuse of discretion. license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant.
o ROJAS justified his order setting a hearing on the issuance of a TRO by
citing the caption of the complaint which stated that it was for breach of
contract, damages, with PI and TRO. He also pointed out that the
complaint included a general prayer for such other relief just and

14 Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. A
equitable. preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when: (a) The application in the
action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded; and
o ROJAS also stated that he acted within the bounds of Rule 58 when he (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
issued the TRO because he issued the same only after notice and hearing proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
the parties. He argued that Sec. 2(b) of Rule 58 does not prohibit the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
issuance of a TRO without bond. Besides, he later required NSSC to post a applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall
bond as a condition for the issuance of the writ of PI. be issued.
(Certiorari)
The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or Topic: Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)
person against whom the TRO or injunction is issued may sustain by reason thereof
should the court finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. ER: Mangalindan won election as Brgy. Captain. The loser went to the RTC to get a TRO
and preliminary injunction against him and the comelec officials. Even before raffle of
o Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the enjoined party will not the case, Judge Adiong issued a TRO ex parte, and even extended it before it had expired.
suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant to After such extension, he issued a writ of preliminary injunction against Mangalindan.
post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of Subsequently the case was raffled, the raffle was irregular at best. The case was given to
oppression and harassment. Branch 10, but Sybill was approached by the plaintiff and asked him to remove the case
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of CivPro, no bond was required for the from Branch 10s sala. It was exchanged with a case handled by Judge Adiong. W/N the
availment of a TRO. However, the present Rules now regulate the issuance of TROs, issuance of the TRO and preliminary injunctions were proper? NO! Adiong
not only by requiring a hearing, but also by imposing a bond on the applicant to Dismissed.
prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants. As explained by Justice Regalado:
On injunctions, Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court15 is of utmost importance. Judge
o A TRO has been elevated to the same level as a PI in the procedure, Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. Adiongs issuance of the 72-hour TRO
grounds and requirements for its obtention. Heretofore, no bond was under the second paragraph of the rule quoted in the footnote was gravely improper
required for the issuance of a TRO, except in labor cases brought to the SC
on certiorari from a decision of the NLRC where a monetary award was first, he was not the executive judge.
o
granted, in which case the policy of the SC was to require a bond Second, his order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72
o
equivalent to the monetary award or benefits granted as a condition for hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were ordered to desist
the issuance of a TRO. The exemption from bond in other cases, plus the from releasing the subject funds until further orders from this
fact that no hearing was required, made a TRO a much sought relief for Court.
petitioners. (Basically, he said that TROs were being abused before because o Third, there was no showing that the order was being issued because
it was easier to get.) of extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72-hour TRO.
Judge Adiongs violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable.
o The TRO issued by ROJAS effectively enjoined UMC and NICAD from doing
Failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes the offense of grave
business as dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. Obviously,
abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
these companies will suffer losses if the court orders them to freeze
justice. Judge Adiongs failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs
operations. Not only will they be deprived of potential earnings from
constitutes gross ignorance and gross inefficiency.
sales but they will also have to expend for their overhead even if they are
not able to do business.

Any fair judge would require the plaintiff in such case to ensure compensation to 15 SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
the defendant if it is later found that the former is not entitled to the injunction. But facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
not ROJAS! He even rejected UMCs motion to fix the NSSCs bond, although UMC applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction
had clearly manifested its willingness to post a counterbond. was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
In the case at bar, the errors committed by ROJAS were not honest mistakes in the period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
performance of his duties. There was no urgency nor any irreparable injury granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
which would require the issuance of a TRO and/or PI in favor of NSSC. As However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
correctly pointed out by the CA, UMC had already terminated its dealership the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala
agreement with the NSSC as early as October 30, 2001 on clear grounds of failure court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the
to pay its obligations, and, thus, the latter (NSSC) were no longer entitled to avail provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served
of the remedy of injunction as the act to be prevented by the issuance thereof therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is
had long been consummated. pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two
hours provided herein.
B.2) GREENSTAR V. ANDIONG, A.M. RTJ 041826, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 NARVASA In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is
Greenstar Bocay Mangandingan v. Judge Adiong (RTC), Atty. Maruhom (Clerk of Court) not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend
or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

(Certiorari)
and in blatant and open violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224.
Facts:

Greenstar Bocay Mangandingan charges respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur with gross ignorance of the law Then Judge Adiong considered the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
or procedure; manifest unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious conduct; submitted for resolution. The following day, he granted plaintiffs application for a writ
grave abuse of authority; grave misconduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration of of preliminary injunction.
justice;

In his Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint, complainant charges respondents Atty.
Greenstar was proclaimed the Punong Barangay of Basak-Bangco, Lanao del Sur during Maruhom and Masbod Sybil with dishonesty, grave misconduct in office, conduct
the special election by virtue of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice, and violation of Section 3, paragraph
Resolution No. 03-0062. (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.16
The losing candidate, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur an action for damages with Complainant claims that Maruhom and Sybil conspired with Judge Adiong and Atty.
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction and Edgar Masorong, counsel for the plaintiff, to manipulate the raffle of the case.
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the seven commissioners of the COMELEC;
the winning and duly proclaimed barangay officials of Barangay Basak-Bangco including Complainant also alleges that instead of immediately notifying and/or
herein complainant; summoning the parties, Maruhom delivered the record of the case to Judge
Adiong.
It was then raffled to Branch 10
Sybil had taken the records of the case from Branch 10 without the knowledge
The respondent Clerk of Court Atty. Cairoding P. Maruhom issued the summons. and authority of the branch clerk of court and the presiding judge, and
replaced the case with another case,
Manipulated the system so that case would be assigned for hearing, in
conspiracy with Maruhom, Judge Adiong and Atty. Masorong.
Before summons could be served on any of the defendants, however, Judge Adiong
issued a TRO without conducting a hearing.
Judge Adiong claims:
He also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. There was valid service of summons or if there was any defect the same had
Complainant claims that there is no showing in the records that the case was been cured when the defendant filed his answer.
raffled to the branch presided by Judge Adiong when said TRO was issued. o Datu Hassan Mangondaya, the former Municipal Vice Mayor of
Madalum, Lanao del Sur is a man of suitable age and discretion.
TRO issued without prior notice and hearing was valid pursuant to Supreme
Sheriff made a return of service which partly provides that the defendants were served Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95, which authorizes the ex parte
with summons through Datu Hassan Mangondaya at his residence in Madalum. issuance of a TRO by an executive judge in matters of extreme urgency, in
order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury.
No valid service of summons on the defendants since the same was given to a He extended the TRO to its maximum duration of twenty (20) days from its
person who had absolutely nothing to do with the case and was not even issuance, no violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court or B.P. Blg.
authorized by the court to receive summons for the defendants. 224 was committed.

Complainant also alleges that barely six days after issuing the TRO, Judge Adiong,
without notice or hearing, issued another order extending the effectivity of the illegally
issued TRO for another twenty (20) days, prior to the expiration of the TROs effectivity 16 CJ: Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Certiorari)
Since that matter should have been brought to the attention of the court by the service of summons, and the violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of
defendants. But they did not; hence, the same is considered waived. Court.
Based on Rule 14 of the Rules of Court17 the proper service as provided for in the rules
Sybil: was not followed.
plaintiff Sangcopan came to see him and asked if it was possible to have his
complaint heard by RTC Branch 8 was concerned he might not have an No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were
impartial trial at RTC Branch 10 because the presiding judge therein was natural persons.
involved in the political career of his son, Yusoph Pangadapun, Jr., the Neither was a copy left at any of their residences or offices.
incumbent Vice Mayor of Marawi City. What the sheriff did was to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of
Datu Hassan Mangondaya, a total stranger to the case.
The sheriff also left a copy of the summons for defendant LBP with the
Because the case had just been raffled and there was no other sala to which it can be re- manager of the LBP Marawi City Branch, who is not one of those enumerated
raffled, Sybil told Sangcopan that they will have to ask RTC Branch 10 if said branch is upon whom service may be made when the defendant is a corporation.
willing to a Civil Case with a Branch 8 case. There is contrary evidence clearly showing that there was defective service of
summons, could not be justified in assuming that the sheriff regularly
To which Branch 10 and Judge Adiong agreed. performed his duties.
Shortly after the exchange, Dayondong informed Sybil that complainants
counsel had objected to the transfer prompting Sybil to immediately retrieve
the complete case file from Branch 8 and return it to Branch 10. On injunctions, Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court18 is of utmost importance.
Judge Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. (This is our topic)
Clerk of Court Maruhom avers that he had no participation or knowledge of the alleged
switching of cases by Sybil and it done without his knowledge, consent or instruction.
17 RULE 14

SUMMONS

x x x x
OCA found the complaint partly meritorious.
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant.Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served handing a copy
The summons served through the former vice mayor of Madalum, Lanao del thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sur was not the valid substituted service contemplated by law.
For the irregularity of the raffling procedure, Judge Adiong and Sybil should be SEC. 7. Substituted service.If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
held administratively liable in the amount of 20k. provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
SC:

Judge Adiong and Sybil should be held administratively liable. However, we 18 SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be
find the recommended penalties too light. granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from
facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
Also, the complaint against respondent Maruhom should not be dismissed applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction
because he is also administratively liable. was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
Judge Adiong granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
We find Judge Adiongs justifications for his acts unconvincing. applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the
presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section
No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify the procedural as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-
shortcuts employed by respondent judge, i.e. dispensing with the proper two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
(Certiorari)
He could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour TRO under the second Gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct are classified as serious
paragraph of the rule quoted in the footnote: charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for which any of the following
o first, he was not the executive judge. sanctions under Section 11 of Rule 140 may be imposed:
o Second, his order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72
hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were ordered to desist 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
from releasing the subject funds until further orders from this determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
Court. including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the
o Third, there was no showing that the order was being issued because forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
of extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72-hour TRO.
Judge Adiongs violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
inexcusable. not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes the offense of grave
abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of The Court notes that Judge Adiong was previously punished:
justice. Judge Adiongs failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs
constitutes gross ignorance and gross inefficiency. Fined P20,000 for ignorance of the law in Bantuas v. Pangadapun and P5,000
for gross ignorance of the law in Mutilan v. Adiong. He was also warned in the
latter case that repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with most severely.
We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of In Gomos v. Adiong, found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ
judicial functions on the part of Judge Adiong were negated by the circumstances on of preliminary injunction and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court
record. in disregard of Section 3, Rule 71. Accordingly, he was suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for six (6) months with a warning that a
First, there was no proper notice to the herein complainant and the other repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
defendants ithat an application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed. In De la Paz v. Adiong, was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse
Second, Judge Adiong did not conduct a summary hearing before granting the of authority and was suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay,
TRO. with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future will warrant
Third, he contravened the circular on the raffle of cases. his dismissal from the service.
All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of
knowledge of and participation in the TRO proceedings and ensured the
unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein.19 Under the circumstances, and considering his propensity for disregarding elementary
rules of procedure, the extreme sanction of dismissal is called for.
Maruhom (Clerk of Court)

heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein. Alleges that Judge Adiong was the only available RTC Judge at that time.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is
not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend
or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
We find such referral unjustified. The case had already waited for more than a day after
19 CANON 2A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
being filed in court. From all indications, the case was not so urgent that irreparable
of the judiciary. injury would be caused if the case was not acted upon in the first hours of March 5,
x x x x 2003. It could have waited some hours more for the arrival of the proper official, the
CANON 3A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND Executive Judge, to act on it.
DILIGENCE.
x x x x

(Certiorari)
The undue haste of Maruhom in referring the case to Judge Adiong for action, without a 2. Atty. Cairoding P. Maruhom GUILTY of simple misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from
raffle being first conducted, is a blatantly unjustified violation of the circulars of the office for three (3) months, effective immediately.
Court which makes him administratively liable. By his act he made a mockery of settled
procedure for the orderly dispensation of justice. Time and again, this Court has 3. Mr. Masbod M. Sybil GUILTY of simple misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office for
emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility of court personnel. They have been three (3) months, effective immediately.
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of their official functions must be avoided
B.3) ALDOVER V. COURT OF APPEALS, 2013 - ORTIZ (SUB: TEVES)

Spouses Aldover v. CA
For his prejudicial acts in the conduct of his official tasks, we find Maruhom guilty of
simple misconduct. In our view, his misconduct calls for the imposition of three (3)
months suspension from office.
TOPIC: PROVISIONAL REMEDIES: INJUNCTION

Sybil
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Supreme Court Circular No. 7.20.
Reyes Siblings, along with their dad Alfredo owned a lot. They obtained a loan from
The importance of assigning cases by raffle is obvious. Such method of assignment Aldover, secured by REM over the property. Reyes' failed to pay, so Aldover
safeguards the right of the parties to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal, extrajudicially foreclosed property and bought the same at the foreclosure sale. She also
while protecting judges from any suspicion of impropriety. For this reason, disregard of obtained a Writ of Possession but on execution, the sheriff could not implement it, as
Circular No. 7, which requires such raffle of cases, cannot be taken lightly. several persons were in the property (sobrang dami nila, so "PRIVATE RESPONDENTS"
sila, okay.). Private respondents allege that the sale is a nullity since they leased the
land since the 1960s and owned the property when the same was sold to them by the
Reyes'. The dispossession of their lots imminent, they prayed for a TRO and/or Writ of
The employees of the judiciary must be mindful and should tread carefully when Preliminary Injunction. RTC denied the TRO. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petition
assisting other persons. By not abiding by the rules on raffle, Sybil opened himself to the was initially denied, but on urgent MR, the writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted.
suspicion that he is biased and that he acted to favor the plaintiff. For this, the Court Hence Aldover filed R65 Certiorari, citing GADLEJ on the part of CA.
finds respondent Sybil guilty of simple misconduct.

Did the CA commit GADLEJ? NOPE. The CA's grant of Preliminary Injunction was within
WHEREFORE, the Court finds: parameters established by jurisprudence. A writ of preliminary injunction can be issued
at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order to prevent threatened or
1. Judge Santos B. Adiong GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law as well as gross continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify the issuance of the writ, applicants must
the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his accrued leave credits, if any. He is prove:
further disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
20 I. Raffling of Cases
All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or (3)there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to
distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. The the applicants; and,
raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge.

(Certiorari)
(4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the arguments in support of their opposing contentions, no grave abuse of discretion can be
infliction of irreparable injury. attributed to the court which issued the writ as it is given a generous latitude in this
regard, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

These were all properly proven by respondents, via deeds of conveyance, contracts to
sell, receipts and lease agreements dating prior to the REM. Also, while the law provides FACTS:
that the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner
by the same officer, an exemption is provided by law when a third party is actually Siblings Tomas M. Reyes and Sidra M. Reyes and their father Alfredo Reyes (the
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. Reyeses) were the registered owners of a 4.044-square meter lot, (TCT) No. PT-
107508. They obtained a loan from Antonia B. Aldover (Aldover) secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) over the said property.
While the scheduled hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. It When the Reyeses failed to pay, Aldover caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
has been held that there can be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale conducted, Aldover emerged as the winning bidder. A
respondent court in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction when the parties were Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor which was annotated at the back of TCT No.
amply heard thereon. There can be no GADLEJ when, in the issuance of a Writ of PT-107508. Thereafter, Aldover filed with the RTC of Pasig City a verified Petition for
Preliminary Injunction, a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was granted.
had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. In this case, by the time the
CA issued its challenged Resolution, the Aldovers had already filed their Comment and Consequently, the Reyes' filed a Motion to Recall and Lift Issuance of Writ of
Rejoinder where they argued at length why no injunctive relief should be granted in Possession claiming, among others, that the mortgage and the auction sale of property
favor of the private respondents. are both null and void as the mortgagee (Aldover) was not armed with a special power
of attorney to foreclose the mortgaged property extrajudicially. This drew Aldovers
Opposition where she also prayed for the issuance of the writ sans the requisite bond as
the property was not redeemed within the one-year redemption period. In the
DOCTRINE: meantime, Aldover also caused the consolidation of title over the foreclosed property in
her name.
1. The writ of preliminary injunction can be granted at any stage prior to judgment or
final order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable provided that applicants
RTC issued Order denying the Reyes Motion to Recall and granting Aldovers motion to
prove:
dispense with the posting of a bond. On the same date, a Writ of Possession was issued
(1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right directing the Branch Sheriff to place Aldover in possession of subject lot. In compliance
in esse; with the writ, the Branch Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate dated April 1, 2004. Then on
April 23, 2004, he issued a Sheriffs Partial Report informing the court that he cannot
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; fully implement the writ because there are several other persons who occupy portions
of subject lot claiming to be the owners thereof.
(3)there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to
the applicants; and, On May 17, 2004, Ahorro, et. al (private respondents) filed before the RTC of Pasig City a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance and
(4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
infliction of irreparable injury. Injunction against Aldover and her husband Carmelito, the Reyes' the Branch Sheriff,
and the Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Reyes' alleged that they have been residing in
the same lot subject of LRC Case No. R-6203 since the 1960s by virtue of lease contracts
wherein they were allowed by the Reyes' to build their houses. Subsequently, their
2. There is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Write of Preliminary occupation became in the concept of owners after the Reyes' sold to them portions of
Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and had the lot they respectively occupy. They insisted that the Aldovers were aware of the lease
exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. Hence, when contending parties and subsequent sale.
were both given ample time and opportunity to present their respective evidence and
(Certiorari)
Private Respondents also claimed that the REM is a fictitious transaction because at the Division which the CA granted. Thereafter, Aldovers sought recourse before us via this
time of its execution the Reyes' were no longer the owners of the entire property subject Petition for Certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
thereof. Hence, the mortgage as well as the subsequent foreclosure sale is null and void.

Private Respondents sought the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
(TRO)and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to immediately restrain petitioners from
prayer for injunctive relief? (NO)
further committing acts of dispossession and prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. PT-
122311. They filed a Motion to Admit Attached Amended Complaint as a matter of right

(with prayer for withdrawal of TRO and injunction).
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
The RTC issued an Order denying respondents prayer for TRO on the ground that it dated January 3, 2005 and January 24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
cannot interfere with the order of a coordinate court. This was followed by another 86363 are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the
Order granting private respondents Motion to Admit and admitting their Amended immediate resolution of the main petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86363.
Complaint where they withdrew their ancillary prayer for injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, in LRC Case No. R-6203, in view of the Sheriffs Partial Report, Aldover filed
a Motion for Special Order of Demolition. Branch 71granted the Motion in an RATIO: From our review of the case, nothing indicates that the CA acted without or
Order dated August 9, 2004, thus: in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Measured against jurisprudentially established
parameters, its disposition to grant the writ was not without basis and, hence, could not
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Special Order of have been arrived at capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. Private
Demolition is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ issue. Respondents amply justified the grant of the provisional relief they prayed for.
On appeal, private respondents filed before the CA a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the Aldovers and the Reyes'. The CA dismissed it outright A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or
on procedural grounds, but private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for final order to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Attached Amended Petition. This was followed by parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its
an Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion for Re-Raffle and for Early Resolution since the issuance, the applicants must prove the following requisites:
Justice to whom the case was assigned was then on official leave.

(1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
The CA reconsidered its resolution of dismissal and granted respondents prayer for the in esse;
issuance of a TRO. It restrained the implementation of the Order of demolition as well as
of the Notice to Vacate. In the same Resolution, the CA required the Aldovers to file their (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
comment to the Petition. After the parties filing of pleadings and upon respondents
motion, the CA set for hearing on January 4, 2005 the propriety of issuing a Writ of (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
Preliminary Injunction. This hearing, however, did not push through since the CA applicants; and,
already issued the challenged Resolution granting respondents ancillary prayer for
injunctive relief. (4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.

Aldovers filed a MR which was denied by the CA. Private respondents posted the
required injunction bond and the CA accordingly issued the Writ of Preliminary It is true that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
Injunction. Aldovers subsequently filed a Motion for Inhibition of the CA Sixth (6th) if it is not redeemed within one year from registration of the sale and title is
consolidated in his name. "As the confirmed owner, the purchasers right to possession
(Certiorari)
becomes absolute. There is even no need for him to post a bond, and it becomes the Aldovers cannot resort to procedural shortcut in ousting them by the simple expedient
ministerial duty of the courts," upon application and proof of title, to issue a Writ of of filing a Motion for Special Order of Demolition, for under the same Article 433
Possession to place him in possession. petitioners have to file the appropriate judicial process to recover the property from the
respondents. This "judicial process," as elucidated in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending
Investors Corporation, "could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reinvindicatory
action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard
This rule is clear from the language of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The and adjudicated." Moreover, to dispossess the respondents based on the proceedings
same provision of the Rules, however, provides as an exception that when a third party taken where they were not impleaded and did not take part would be tantamount to
is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor, the duty of the court taking of real property without due process of law.
to issue a Writ of Possession ceases to be ministerial. Thus:

There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; the disputed portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of
by whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. Indeed, the precipitate demolition of their houses would
the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a constitute material and substantial invasion of their right which cannot be remedied
conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty under any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
(60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice Besides, it has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in
thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner determining the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment
is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction involve
obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of findings of facts ordinarily left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing
the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making of grave abuse of discretion, the trial courts disposition in injunctive matters is not
the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same generally interfered with by the appellate courts.
validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and
executed it.
The Supreme Court also noted that, although the scheduled January 4, 2005 hearing on
the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not push through, the
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings. At the time the CA issued its
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the challenged Resolution, the Aldovers had already filed their Comment and Rejoinder
judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of where they argued at length why no injunctive relief should be granted in favor of the
the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same private respondents.
officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, private respondents alleged in their CA Petition that they possess and In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Continental Watchman Agency, Inc, it has been held that
own portions of the property subject of the Writ of Demolition. In support thereof, they there can be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in issuing a
annexed to their Petition and Reply deeds of conveyances, contracts to sell, receipts, etc. Writ of Preliminary Injunction when the parties were amply heard thereon. The
showing that the Reyeses already sold to them the portions of the subject lot they Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no grave abuse of discretion in the
respectively occupy. A number of these documents predate the REM which the Reyeses issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in
executed in favor of Aldover while others were executed subsequent thereto. Private court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses.
respondents allegation of actual possession is likewise confirmed by the Sheriffs Partial Hence, when contending parties were both given ample time and opportunity to present
Report which states that there are several other persons who occupy portions of subject their respective evidence and arguments in support of their opposing contentions, no
lot and claim to be the owners thereof. In fine, respondents have indubitably shown that grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the court which issued the Writ of
they are in actual possession of the disputed portions of subject property. Their Preliminary Injunction, as it is given a generous latitude in this regard, pursuant to
possession, under Article 433 of the Civil Code, raises a disputable presumption that Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
they are the owners thereof.

(Certiorari)
B.4) BACOLOD CITY WATER V. LABAYEN, G.R. NO. 157994, DECEMBER 10, 2004 - process. Over and above every desideratum in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be
PEREZ DE TAGLE resolved in favor of fairness.
COMPLETE
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen and City of Bacolod Facts:
Petitioner Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 198 as a government-owned and controlled corporation with
original charter. It is in the business of providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City.
ER:
BACIWA published in the papers a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments. The Public respondent City of Bacolod is a municipal corporation created by Commonwealth
City of Bacolod filed a case ofr injunction with prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of Bacolod.
Mandatory Injunction. BACIWA filed an MTD. Before it was resolved, Bacolod filed a
manifestation for a TRO which was granted by an Order dated Feb 24, 2000. MTD was On March 26, 1999, respondent City filed a case for Injunction With a Prayer for
dismissed eventually, and all MRs were likewise dismissed. Eventually, the Court ruled Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against
in favor of Bacolod and made the injunction permanent. The CA affirmed. petitioner in the sala of public respondent judge. The petition stated that on January 15,
1999, BACIWA published in the Visayan Daily Star,[1] a local paper of general
Issue: circulation, a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000
W/N what was granted was a preliminary injunction on Feb 24, 2000; NO and 2001. The rates were supposed to take effect seven (7) days after its posting in the
W/N it can be considered a preliminary injunction at all; NO local papers or on January 22, 1999. The increase was aborted after petitioner
W/N BACIWAs due process rights were prejudiced; YES unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999 scheduled implementation. On March 15,
1999, however, petitioner announced that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1,
1999. [2]
Held:
(1) It can be gleaned from the foregoing that both parties and respondent trial court Respondent City opposed. It alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due
have consistently referred to the directive as a temporary restraining order. It was only process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing required under Letter of
in the respondent courts assailed Decision that the Order was referred to as a Instructions No. 700[3] and Presidential Decree No. 1479.[4] Hence, it prayed that
preliminary injunction before the hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
(2) , since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining order injunction be issued.[5]
granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that
respondent court merely ordered the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any MTD filed by BACIWA. Not yet acted upon
person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings
the new water rate increase which will start on March 1, 2000[48] without stating the
period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining order to a After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, or on February 18, 2000, respondent City filed
preliminary injunction. an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of Preliminary Injunction[16] praying that the case be set for hearing on February 24,
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. 2000. On the same date requested, respondent court heard respondents application for
The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order and issued an Order[17] commanding petitioner to stop,
temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000 which
characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the were then supposed to take effect on March 1, 2000.
Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission
to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was On March 7, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution
prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. of the Temporary Restraining Order.
Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.
(3) The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the petitioner due process of Four (4) days after, in an Order[24] dated April 10, 2000, it denied petitioners
law. It was not able to allege its defenses in an answer and prove them in a hearing. The BACIWAs Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
convoluted procedure allowed by the respondent trial court and the pleadings filed by
the parties which are not models of clarity certainly created confusion. But this On April 19, 2000, respondent City filed a Manifestation praying that respondent trial
confusion should not be seized as a reason to deny a party the constitutional right to due court issue a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, stating thus:

(Certiorari)
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the respondents which, however, SO ORDERED.
expired before the parties were able to finish the presentation of their respective witnesses
and evidences; Ratio:

The instant case was submitted for resolution and decision of this Honorable Court during ISSUE 1
the last week of March but while awaiting the decision of this Honorable Court, several First. We quote the pertinent parts of the questioned Order:
complaints had reached the petitioner that the respondents had already reflected in the
water billings for the month of April the new water rates for the year 2000; x x x

Petitioner, for its part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] of respondent trial courts When this motion was called for hearing wherein both parties have argued exhaustedly
Order denying its Motion to Dismiss. Respondent City filed an Opposition to [the] their respective sides, this court denied the ten (10) days extension for further
Motion for Reconsideration[27] on June 1, 2000. amplification of the arguments of the respondent to oppose the said motion for issuance of
a temporary restraining order.
Respondent court did not act upon petitioners Motion for Reconsideration until It appearing therefore, that the acts of the defendant will actually affect the plaintiff
respondent City filed an [Ex Parte] Motion for Speedy Resolution[28] of the case on before the decision of this court can be rendered and in order to afford the court to pass on
October 6, 2000 praying that the case be resolved before the year 2000 ends in order to the issues without the same becoming moot and academic and considering the urgency of
prevent the implementation of the water rates increase for the year 2001 which was to the matter that immediate action should be taken, and pursuant to Administrative
be imposed allegedly without the benefit of a public hearing. Circular No. 6, Paragraph 4 and sub-paragraph 15 and The Interim Rules and Guidelines
[set forth] by the Rules of Court, this court hereby orders the respondent[,] its agents,
Consequently, On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed Decision representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March 1,
injunction 2000. The Deputy Provincial Sheriff of this court is hereby ordered to furnish copy of this
order to the respondent Bacolod City Water District as well as to its agents or
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration[30] of the assailed Decision on January representatives acting [o]n his behalf.
11, 2001 asserting, among others, that the case was not yet ripe for decision when the x x x [35] (emphases supplied)
court granted the final injunction, the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Order that what the trial court issued was a
answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the case tried on the temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction. The trial court has always
merits. referred to it as a temporary restraining order in the succeeding Orders it issued on
March 10, 2000[36] and April 6, 2000.[37]
Respondent court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit in an
Order[31] dated January 24, 2001. The parties, in their succeeding pleadings,[38] also referred to the assailed Order as a
temporary restraining order. The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
Rule 65 to CA. CA affirms trial court. and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[39] on March 1, 2000. This was
opposed by respondent City itself in its Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration and
Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[40] dated March 14, 2000.
Issues:
W/N the order issued by the trial court on Feb 24, 2000 was a preliminary injunction or It can be gleaned from the foregoing that both parties and respondent trial court have
not. [no] consistently referred to the directive as a temporary restraining order. It was only in the
W/N the order issued by the trial court can at all be considered a preliminary injunction respondent courts assailed Decision that the Order was referred to as a preliminary
[no] injunction
W/N the due process rights of BACIWA were prejudiced [yes]

Held: ISSUE 2
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated November 27, 2002 and February 28, 2003, respectively, are Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional
proceedings. remedy for and as an incident in the main action.[43]

(Certiorari)
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of mandatory pre-trial conference, and no trial on the merits, yet, a Decision was handed
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an down by the respondent trial court.
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the petitioner due process of law.
issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final It was not able to allege its defenses in an answer and prove them in a hearing. The
injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional convoluted procedure allowed by the respondent trial court and the pleadings filed by
remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo the parties which are not models of clarity certainly created confusion. But this
until the merits can be heard.[44] A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an confusion should not be seized as a reason to deny a party the constitutional right to due
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved process. Over and above every desideratum in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be
or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.[45] resolved in favor of fairness.

A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. B.5) CALAWAG V. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES-VISAYAS, 2013 PUNO
Under Rule 58[46] of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining
order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN
of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the CARLOS C. BAYLON
temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is And
taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE MARIE F. NASALGA AND CHE CHE B. SALCEPUEDES, v.
(20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day DR. CARLOS C. BAYLON, DR. MINDA J. FORMACI ON AND DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO
by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.[47] BE SUBSTITUTED BY ALFREDO E. PASCUAL, BEING THE NEW UP PRESIDENT),
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS,
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary
restraining order granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. [Consolidated cases. Hereinafter petitioners are called Calawag et al]
The fact that respondent court merely ordered the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from Doctrine:
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March 1,
2000[48] without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the temporary ER
restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
Calawag et al are MA Science in Fisheries Biology students at UP Visayas. Part of their
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of academic requirements was a thesis. They submitted to Dean Baylon their proposed
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. thesis titles with the consent form of their thesis adviser. In a letter, they also asked
The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their thesis committees. Dean Baylon,
temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be however, denied their application since their thesis titles connote a historical and social
characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the dimension study which is not appropriate for the masters degrees. Dean Baylon instead
Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission ordered the creation of an ad hoc thesis committee to advise the students.
to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was
prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. Calawag et al, in response, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC
Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court. praying that Dean Baylon be ordered to constitute their thesis committees and approve
their thesis titles. RTC granted writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
ISSUE 3
UP Visayas appealed and the CA annulled RTC Order granting writ. Calawag et al
Third. Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary injunction, petitioner appealed.
is correct in contending that the assailed Decision is premature.
SC said CA correct. Calawag et al wrong. Calawag et al failed to show clear and
The records reveal that respondent court did not resolve petitioners Motion for unmistakable right that needs protection. For the writ to the proper, it is necessary that
Reconsideration of the Order denying its Motion to Dismiss before it issued the assailed the following requisites are present:
Decision. Consequently, there was no answer filed by petitioner, no joinder of issues, no (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
(b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(Certiorari)
(c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious reliance on Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas is misplaced.
damage. Article 51 provides:

HOWEVER: The issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents Art. 51. The composition of the thesis committee shall be approved
a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or by the dean of the college/school upon the recommendation of the
dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not chairperson of the major department/division/institute. The GPO
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is shall be informed of the composition of the thesis committee and/or
improper. any change thereof.

Calawag et al are enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas Despite the mandatory language provided for composing the thesis committee under
under a scholarship from the Department of Science and Technology - Philippine Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, the CA construed it to mean
Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development (DOST-PCAMRD). They that the Deans approval is necessary prior to the composition of a thesis committee.
finished their first year of study with good grades, and thus were eligible to start their
thesis in the first semester of their second year. Calawag et al then enrolled in the thesis Lastly, the CA held that the case presents issues that are purely academic in character,
program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea which are outside the courts jurisdiction. It also noted that Dean Baylon has been
to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members consent to constitute accommodating from the beginning, and that the requirements he imposed were meant
their respective thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the to assist Calawag et al to formulate a proper thesis title and graduate on time.
Calawag et al sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of their thesis
committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members and the thesis advisers Calawag et al argues that the CAs decision should be set aside for the following reasons:
approval of their titles, as well as the approval of Professor Roman Sanares, the director
of the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology. a. They are entitled to the injunction prayed for since their rights (right to
education, the right to due process, and the right to equal protection) were
Upon receipt of Calawag et als letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos addressed violated by Dean Baylons actions. Dean Baylon violated their right to due
to Professor Sanares, questioning the propriety of the thesis topics with the colleges process when he added to and changed the requirements for the constitution
graduate degree program. He subsequently disapproved the composition of the thesis of his thesis committee, without prior publication of the change in rules. Dean
committees and tentative thesis topics. According to Dean Baylon, the thesis titles Baylon cannot arbitrarily change and alter the manual and the guidelines, and
connote a historical and social dimension study which is not appropriate for the cannot use academic freedom as subterfuge for not performing his duties.
masters degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered Calawag et al to submit a two-page b. A reading of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980,4 and Republic Act No. 95005
proposal containing an outline of their tentative thesis titles, and informed them that he shows that the college deans functions are merely administrative, and, hence,
is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of the the CA erred in its construction of Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual
thesis committees. of UP Visayas, as well as its proclamation that the college dean has supervisory
authority over academic matters in the college.
Calawag et al then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, asking it c. The Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas and the Guidelines for the Master
to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute their thesis committees and approve of Science in Fisheries Program are clear in providing that Dean Baylon has a
their thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory formal duty to approve the composition of the petitioners thesis committees
injunction against Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while the suit was upon the latters compliance with several requirements. Thus, when the
pending. Calawag et al complied with these requirements and Dean Baylon still refused
to approve the composition of their thesis committees, the petitioners had a
The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon right to have him compelled to perform his duty.
allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this order before the CA d. Academic freedom states that the Thesis adviser and the thesis committees, in
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order consultations with the students, have the right to choose the thesis topics, and
(TRO). not the dean.

The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTCs order, holding that ISSUE: Whether CA erred in setting aside the RTC Order granting writ of preliminary
Calawag et al had no clear right to compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of injunction No. CA correct.
their thesis committees as a matter of course. As the college dean, Dean Baylon exercises
supervisory authority in all academic matters affecting the college. According to the CA, HELD: Petitions Denied

(Certiorari)
RULING: Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special
Project** Committees and Masters or doctoral examination/oral
The CA did not commit an error in judgment in setting aside the preliminary mandatory defense panel for each student[.]7 (emphases and italics ours)
injunction that the RTC issued against Dean Baylon. Thus, there could be no basis for the
Courts exercise of its discretionary power to review the CAs decision. By necessary implication,8 the deans power to approve includes the power to
disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP Systems faculty
"To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition
establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and UP Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees composition needs the approval
prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided in Article 51
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines for the Master of
cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance Science in Fisheries Program.9
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth requirement: it]
is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the As to the argument that Dean Baylon acted arbitrarily in imposing additional
complainants right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal requirements for the composition of the thesis committee, which according to Calawag
right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper." violated their right to due process, we hold that the deans authority to approve or
disapprove the composition of a thesis committee includes this discretion. We also note
The CA did not err in ruling that Calawag et al failed to show a clear and unmistakable the CAs finding that these additional requirements were meant to assist students in
right that needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The dean has the formulating a thesis title that is in line with the colleges master of fisheries program.
discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, we cannot interfere with the exercise of
the Calawag et al had no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis the deans prerogative without encroaching on the colleges academic freedom.
committees.
Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the
Calawags citation of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980 and Republic Act No. 9500 to right to decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
show that the dean of a college exercises only administrative functions and, hence, has They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study in them,
no ascendancy over the colleges academic matters, has no legal ground to stand on. as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates.
Neither law provides or supports such conclusion, as neither specifies the role and
responsibilities of a college dean. The functions and duties of a college dean are outlined This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such
in the universitys Faculty Manual, which details the rules and regulations governing the as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by
universitys administration. Section 11.8.2, paragraph b of the Faculty Manual their students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless
enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which include the power there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their
to approve the composition of a thesis committee, to wit: judgment.

11.8.2 Administration The right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v.
x x x x San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of
the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course
b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
Dean/Director shall be responsible for the planning and requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading
to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a
implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the course of study would have to comply with.
Dean/Director shall exercise the following powers and
responsibilities based on the recommendations forwarded to
him/her, through channels: C. RECEIVERSHIP (RULE 59)

x x x x

(Certiorari)
C.1) CITIBANK V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 61508, MARCH 17, 1999 - QUIJANO- Citibank, on various machineries and equipment under the following terms and
BENEDICTO conditions:
(a) The machineries and equipment subject of the mortgage, stand as security for
CITIBANK V. CA (1999) defendant's account.
(b) All replacement, substitutions, additions, increases and accretions to the properties
(focused on issue of Receivership, Rule 59) mortgaged shall also be subject to the mortgage.
EMERGENCY DIGEST (c) The defendant appoints the plaintiff as his attorney-in-fact with authority to enter
Douglas Anama issued a promissory note to Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City the premises of the defendant and take actual possession of the mortgaged chattels
Bank), for the loan obtained. PN is payable in 60 equal successive monthly installments. without any court order, to sell said property to any party.
To secure payment of the loan, Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage of even date (d) All expenses in carrying into effect the stipulations therein shall be for the account of
in favor of Citibank, on various machineries and equipment. One of the terms of the the defendant and shall form part of the amount of the obligation secured by the
mortgage includes that In case the plaintiff institutes proceedings for the foreclosure mortgage.
of the mortgage, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver (e) In case the plaintiff institutes proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage,
without a bond. Anama failed to pay. Citibank filed a complaint for the collection of the plaintiff shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver without a bond.
unpaid balance based on the PN, for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered (f) xxx
by the Chattel Mortgage Law before the CFI of Manila. CFI issued an Alias Writ of
Seizure, ordering the sheriff to seize the properties involved and dispose of them in Anama failed to pay. Citibank filed a complaint for the collection of unpaid balance
accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court issued an Order granting the based on the PN, for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered by the Chattel
Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. MR denied. Anama went to CA. CA held that the Mortgage Law before the CFI of Manila.
provision of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied
with, in that (1) there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for The trial court, upon proof of default of the Anama in the payment of the loan, issued an
Replevin; (2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3) there was non- Order of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the Chattel Mortgage.
compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of office. Despite the issuance of the order of seizure of subject chattels, actual delivery of
ISSUE: Whether or not CITIBANK complied with the provisions of Section 5, possession to Citibank did not take place because negotiations for an amicable
Rule 59. NO. settlement between the parties were encouraged by the trial court. Citibank took over
Citibank cannot deny that nine days after the trial court issued the order of receivership, Anama's business as receiver. When further proposals to settle the case amicably failed,
it informed Anama that it would, as it did, assume receivership. The Court of Appeals the lower court proceeded to try the case on the merits. Citibank presented a Motion for
found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering the sheriff to seize the properties
with by Citibank, particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath. involved and dispose of them in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
Under the old Rules of Court, which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial court issued an Order granting the Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure, ruling thus:
stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the
applicant, except when the application was ex parte. Therefore, Citibank was not WHEREFORE, the motion for alias writ of seizure is hereby granted. At any rate, this
absolutely required to file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the chattel mortgage contract Order gives another opportunity for defendant and the intervenor who claims to be a
between the parties, Citibank, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a part owner to file a counterbond under Sec. 60 of Rules of Court.
receiver without a bond. However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such
assumption of receiver in that the requirement of taking an oath has not been complied Anama filed an MR, denied. Anama filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
with Section 5, Rule 59, states: Injunction to set aside and annul the questioned resolution of the trial court on the
Sec. 5. Oath and bond of receiver. Before entering upon his duties, the ground that they were issued "in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, discretion" because of the "lack of evidence and clear cut right to possession of First
executed to such person and in such sum as the court or judge may direct, National City Bank on the machineries subject of the Chattel Mortgage. CA granted
to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the petition holding that the provision of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership
action and obey the orders of the court therein. have not been complied with, in that (1) there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying
the Complaint for Replevin; (2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3)
COMPLETE DIGEST there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of office.
In considering for a loan obtained from Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City
Bank), Douglas Anama executed a promissory note to pay the Citibank the sum of CA ordered ex-officio sheriff of Quezon City and Citibank to return all the machineries
P418,000.00 in 60 equal successive monthly installments of P8,722.25. To secure and equipment to the original and respective places and position in the shop. The writ
payment of the loan, Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage of even date in favor of of preliminary injunction was made permanent.
(Certiorari)
Facts: PCGG issued a writ of sequestration against properties of Lianga Bay Logging
ISSUE: Whether or not CITIBANK complied with the provisions of Section 5, Company, Inc. (LBLC). PCGG filed sequestration case before Sandiganbayan (SB).
Rule 59. NO. SABIDO (stockholder LBLC) then filed a motion to lift the writ the sequestration before
the SB and was granted. MR of said decision was filed by PCGG. Meanwhile, during the
HELD: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. pendency of such MR, Hung Mik Kuk (HMK) filed a complaint for sum of money against
LBLC with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before RTC. PCGG was not
RATIO: impleaded nor reference to the pending sequestration case made. Thus, petition for
Citibank cannot deny that nine days after the trial court issued the order of receivership, certiorari was filed to SC. MR was then denied by SB. Thereafter, writ of preliminary
it informed the Anama that it would, as it did, assume receivership. attachment was issued against the properties of LBLC and later on rendered judgment
by default in favor of HMK. SC, on the other hand, affirmed the validity of the writ of
The Court of Appeals found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership sequestration.
were not complied with by Citibank, particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the
taking of an oath. PCGG filed instant petition.

Under the old Rules of Court, which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial Issue: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the claim of HMK? YES
stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the Whether or not preliminary attachment proper over properties subject of
applicant, except when the application was ex parte. Therefore, Citibank was not sequestration? NO
absolutely required to file a bond. Besides, as stipulated in the chattel mortgage contract
between the parties, Citibank, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a Ratio: RTC had jurisdiction over the claim of HMK inasmuch as the cause of action is
receiver without a bond. recovery of sum of money arising from debt of LBLC. PCGG was not impleaded as it was
not privy to the transaction which gave rise to the debt, nor did it take over the
However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receiver in that the operations of LBLC. However, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under
requirement of taking an oath has not been complied with Section 5, Rule 59, states: custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG, when
Sec. 5. Oath and bond of receiver. Before entering upon his duties, the respondent Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of HMK. At
receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. Said
executed to such person and in such sum as the court or judge may direct, writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga, because the PCGG is
to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of
action and obey the orders of the court therein. redemption over the property until after the final determination of the case or until its
dissolution.
Consequently, the trail court erred in allowing Citibank to assume receivership over the
machine shop of Anama without requiring the appointed receiver to take an oath. [only portion where receivership mentioned]: In the order affirming the validity of writ
of sequestration, the Court ruled that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover
are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership. The Court
C.2) REPUBLIC V. SALUDARES, G.R. NO. 111174, MARCH 9, 2000 RAZON
also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and
sequestration, freeze order and provisional takeover on the other. The latter three are
Republic v. Saludares ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos regime.

G.R. No. 111174 March 9, 2000
Complete Digest:
[No discussion of receivership except as to saying that sequestration is akin to
receivership and attachment] Facts:
PCGG issued a writ of sequestration over properties of LBLC. The writ of
Doctrine: Sequestration is akin to provisional remedy of receivership. Once sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in LBLC
sequestered, the properties are already under custodial egis and thus, a court may not owned by Peter A. Sabido formed part of "illegally acquired wealth."
subject the same properties to an attachment again (?)
On July 27, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the

Office of the Solicitor General filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
Emergency Digest:
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against, among

others, Peter A. Sabido.
(Certiorari)
Sabido then filed a motion to lift the writs of sequestration before SB, which legitimate business contract to supply goods and services in favor of LBLC.
the latter granted. When a collection suit was filed against LBLC by its supplier, Hung Ming Kuk,
PCGG filed an MR of the decision of SB praying for the nullification of the order evidently PCGG could not be the proper party to defend against such claim.
which lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC. More so, because when PCGG had not taken over the LBLC's business
In the meantime, on February 11, 1993, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk operations.
filed a complaint for sum of money against LBLC, with a prayer for a writ of PCGG is not an owner but a conservator. It can exercise only powers of
preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over.
Surigao del Sur. The PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk(HMK) as Even resort to the provisional remedies should entail the least possible
party-defendant nor was the sequestration case referred to the RTC's interference with business operations or activities so that, in the event that the
proceedings. accusation that the business enterprise is "ill-gotten" be not proven, it may be
Thus, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action for certiorari returned to its rightful owner as far as possible in the same condition as it was
under Rule 65, and was later on consolidated with other similar cases. at the time of sequestration. The holding in Pea which confers exclusive
Meantime, SB denied MR of PCGG. On the other hand, RTC granted preliminary jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases cannot also be relied
attachment of LBLC properties. Thereafter, a judgment was default was upon by in this case. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint
rendered in favor of HMK. Thus, PCGG filed a certiorari petition questioning for payment of money allegedly averred by LBLC to HMK.
RTC jurisdiction over the case. In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue
Meanwhile, SC rendered judgment in the consolidated case affirming validity of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when respondent
of the writ of sequestration against LBLC. Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent
Hung Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was
Issue: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the claim of HMK? YES subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga,
Whether or not preliminary attachment proper over properties subject of because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by
sequestration? NO operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final
determination of the case or until its dissolution.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partially GRANTED. The default Order issued
by the public respondent dated March 19, 1993, is AFFIRMED, but should be held in C.3) TANTANO V. ESPINO-CABOVERDE, 2013 RESPICIO
abeyance until the sequestration case involving LBLC before the Sandiganbayan is
determined. The Order of Attachment issued by the public respondent is declared NULL
EMERGENCY
and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: Dominada sought annulment of deed of sale of parcel of land apparently sold to children
In the case at bar, the claim of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is for a sum (registered in childrens name). Also filed case for receivership, kasi matanda na daw,
of money arising from a debt incurred by LBLC. Under a contract, private baka mamatay na xa di pa nya natikman ung fruits ng lupa nya, and she needs it for
respondent had extended cash advances and supplied LBLC hardware medication. Granted.
materials, auto spare parts, and rendered services, for cutting and hauling logs.
The total claim amounts to P18,031,563.78. Following Section 19 of B.P. Blg. Issue: Receivership ok?
129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the complaint falls
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. SC: no. Only grounds for receivership is when product is threatened to be impaired or
PCGG relies, however, on the case of PCGG vs. Pea, 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and lost. Here, not. For medication is not a ground. Receivership should be avoided if the
asserts that the controversy of LBLC or a sequestered company falls within the title is currently in defendant. Here, the daughter is the registered owner, how can you
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the trial court. In the put in in receivership for the benefit of the plaintiff, who is not the owner. Rights of
Pea case, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order which owner would be impaired if granted.
prevented PCGG from enforcing the memorandum of then PCGG Commissioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista. Her memorandum denied complainant's authority
Besides, its not true that the mother has no money for her needs. The other lands under
to sign and manage the funds of the sequestered company. The Supreme Court
dispute has been settled, and part of their income is given to her. Paawa drama no effect.
ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over PCGG being a co-equal body,
and therefore, the regional trial courts may not interfere with and restrain the
PCGG or set aside the order and actions of its Commissioner. In contrast, the Side issue: Filing of bond is MANDATORY; rule uses SHALL. Just because both parties
case now concerns receivables of the private respondent arising out of a consented to receivership does not mean that you can do away with that requirement.
(Certiorari)
of the said land, could not even enjoy the proceeds or income as these are all
appropriated solely by Mila Tantano in connivance with some of her selected kins;

That insofar as the defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde is concerned, time is of the
The Facts utmost essence. She immediately needs her legal share and legal interest over the
income and produce of these lands so that she can provide and pay for her vitamins,
medicines, constant regular medical check-up and daily sustenance in life. To grant her
Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are share and interest after she may have passed away would render everything that she
children of respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other had worked for to naught and waste, akin to the saying "aanhin pa ang damo kung patay
respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe),
na ang kabayo."
and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine).
the court heard the Application for Receivership and persuaded the parties to discuss
Petitioners MILA and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered
among themselves and agree on how to address the immediate needs of their mother.6
owners and in possession of certain parcels of land having purchased them from their
parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde.1
petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation formally expressing their
concurrence to the proposal for receivership on the condition, inter alia, that Mila be
The present controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before
appointed the receiver,
the RTC where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly
transferring Lots from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila
and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. the trial court granted Dominaldas application for receivership but the trial court again
noted that Mila, the nominee of petitioners, could not discharge the duties of a receiver,
she being a party in the case.9
As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA)
where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in
particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective Petitioners thereafter moved for reconsideration raising the arguments that the
products and improvements. Under the PSA, Dominaldas daughter, Josephine, shall be concerns raised by Dominalda in her Application for Receivership are not grounds for
appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to placing the properties in the hands of a receiver and that she failed to prove her claim
receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted that the income she has been receiving is insufficient to support her medication and
properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among medical needs.
others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
ISSUES
the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties for further
proceedings in the main case.
Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the (1) the appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by
RTC on a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and
under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest in the
controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income (2) the receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of
derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. the rules.
She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the income of these properties
for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver
is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave The Courts Ruling
danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by Mila and some of her
selected kin:
That defendant Dominalda Espina Caboverde, who is now sickly, in dire need of We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost
constant medication or medical attention, not to mention the check-ups, vitamins and circumspection and only in extreme situations.
other basic needs for daily sustenance, yet despite the fact that she is the conjugal owner
(Certiorari)
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that First, Dominaldas alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and
receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer support is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval
the disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with the applicant Dominalda, of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but
held that placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not
would receive her share in the income which she supposedly needed in order to pay for found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting
her vitamins, medicines, her regular check-ups and daily sustenance. the applicant was receivership. The RTCs insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified
already an octogenarian who may not live up to the day when the conflict will be finally under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from
settled, convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that
there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be
Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which states: placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. Upon a verified application, one or more Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost
receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and
court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.
or a member thereof, in the following cases:
Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought
x x x x receivership mainly because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she
would receive her share in the income of the disputed properties. Much emphasis
has been placed on the fact that she needed this income for her medical expenses and
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most
daily sustenance. But it can be gleaned from her application that, aside from her
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the
bare assertion that petitioner Mila solely appropriated the fruits and rentals
property in litigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
earned from the disputed properties in connivance with some of her siblings,
Dominalda has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing properties were in danger of being wasted or materially injured and that the
instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section.16 appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to
However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts preserve their integrity.
must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when
the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in
Further, there is nothing in the RTCs Resolutions that says why the disputed properties
the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of
might be in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured while in the hands of the
being impaired,17 and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be
defendants a quo. Neither did the RTC explain the reasons which compelled it to have
granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the
them placed under receivership. The RTC simply declared that placing the disputed
plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.18
properties under receivership was urgent and merely anchored its approval on the fact
that Dominalda was an elderly in need of funds for her medication and sustenance. The
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury RTC plainly concluded that since the purpose of the receivership is to procure money
resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if from the proceeds of these properties to spend for medicines and other needs of the
the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil Dominalda, who is old and sickly, this circumstance falls within the purview of Sec. 1(d),
the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as that is, "Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the
those of the person requesting for receivership.19 most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the
property in litigation."
Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the
appointment of a receiver is to take real estate out of the possession of the Verily, the RTCs purported determination that the appointment of a receiver is the most
defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the
appointment should be made only in extreme cases.20 properties is nothing but a hollow conclusion drawn from inexistent factual
considerations.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of
this case, We find that the grant of Dominaldas Application for Receivership has no leg Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save
to stand on for reasons discussed below. Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to
(Certiorari)
her assertions, Dominalda is assured of receiving income under the PSA approved To reiterate, the RTCs approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation
by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of of petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if
the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. Pursuant to the PSA, compelling reasons exist. Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less
Josephine, the daughter of Dominalda, was appointed by the court as administrator of proved in this case.
the eight (8) uncontested lots with special authority to provide for the medicine of her
mother. Thus, it was patently erroneous for the RTC to grant the Application for In any event, Dominaldas rights may be amply protected during the pendency of
Receivership in order to ensure Dominalda of income to support herself because Civil Case No. S-760 by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the
precisely, the PSA already provided for that. It cannot be over-emphasized that the certificates of title covering the disputed properties.27
parties in Civil Case No. S-760 were willing to make arrangements to ensure that
Dominalda was provided with sufficient income. In fact, the RTC, in its February 8, 2010
As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not
Resolution granting the Application for Receivership, noted the agreement of the parties
that "Dominalda Espina Caboverde shall be given 2/10 shares of the net monthly required prior to the appointment of the receivers in this case, We rule in the negative.
income and products of said properties."21
Respondents Eve and Fe claim that there are sufficient grounds for the appointment of
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the receivers in this case and that in fact, petitioners agreed with them on the existence of
registered owners of the disputed properties that were in their possession. In these grounds when they acquiesced to Dominaldas Application for Receivership.
Thus, respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there
cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that the appointment should be made
is no need for an applicants bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of
only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save the
the bond is to answer for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the
plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage.22
appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment
without sufficient cause. Thus, they further argue that what is needed is the receivers
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who bond which was already fixed and approved by the RTC.28 Also, the CA found that there
is in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary was no need for Dominalda to file a bond considering that petitioners filed a
injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the Manifestation where they formally consented to the receivership. Hence, it was as
possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party if petitioners agreed that there was sufficient cause to place the disputed properties
having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of under receivership; thus, the CA declared that petitioners were estopped from
evident usurpation.23 challenging the sufficiency of such cause.
Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not The foregoing arguments are misplaced. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that
proper when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the
property, depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is
such property24 unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the
lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no
occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.25 moment. Hence, the filing of an applicants bond is required at all times. On the
other hand, the requirement of a receivers bond rests upon the discretion of the
It must be underscored that in this case, Dominaldas claim to the disputed court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any
properties and her share in the properties income and produce is at best time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for
speculative precisely because the ownership of the disputed properties is yet to such damages.
be determined in Civil Case No. S-760. Also, except for Dominaldas claim that she
has an interest in the disputed properties, Dominalda has no relation to their
produce or income.1wphi1 D. REPLEVIN (RULE 60)
By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if D.1) TWIN ACE HOLDING V. RUFINA AND COMPANY, G.R. NO. 160191, JUNE 8, 2006.
the applicant has obtained indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is SANCHEZ
to deprive the other parties of the possession of the property until the
controversy between them in the main case is finally settled.26 This Court cannot TWIN ACE HOLDINGS V. RUFINA AND COMPANY
countenance this arrangement.
(Certiorari)
DOCTRINE: A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must - Rufina claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts were purchased from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.
that he is the owner of the property claimed o RTC DISMISSED the complaint, and ruled in favor of Rufina.
o Twin Ace appealed, but the CA still ruled against it.
ER:
ISSUE:
Twin Ace filed a complaint for replevin against Rufina. It alleged that it manufactured
liquor under the name of Tanduay, and sells its products to public excluding the bottles. Whether Twin Ace complied with the requirements for Replevin (No).
It alleged that Rufina is the business of selling patis and other food seasonings, and used
its bottles without Twin Aces permission. Twin Ace filed a bond, and the sheriff seized HELD:
around 24,000 bottles. After hearing the complaint, the RTC DISMISSED the complaint.
Twin Ace lost at the CA, too. Twin Ace goes to the SC. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and
the decision dated 27 September 2002 and resolution dated 29 September 2003, in CA-
ISSUE: Whether Twin Ace complied with the requirements of Replevin (No) G.R. CV No. 52852, both of the Court of Appeals are Affirmed.
HELD: A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must show RATIO:
by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that he
is the owner of the property claimed. In this case, Rufina at its discretion could either - Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party
retain or return the bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the bottles praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must show by his
when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and decided not to return them to own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that
the vendor. Twin Ace failed to prove that it is the owner of the bottles. he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled
to the possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that replevin is
FACTS: a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in
turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the
- Twin Ace filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of personal property, ownership of the object sought to be replevied. Wrongful detention by the
permanent injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
replevin, TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina. satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered,
- According to the complaint, Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation the writ should not be issued. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is
engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name and entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and consequently there is
style Tanduay Distillers. In the conduct of its business, it sells its products to thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation.
the public excluding the bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new - As stated by the court in the earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v.
bottles which it buys from glass factories and which they use for about five Court of Appeals:
times in order to recover the cost of acquisition.
Since the purchaser [in this case, Rufinaannotation is mine] at his discretion
o Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them
could either retain or return the bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a
over and over again as containers for its products.
sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and
- On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction,
decided not to return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the
fermentation and manufacture of patis and other food seasonings and is
standard practice today that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of
engaged in the buying and selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and
the product such that the buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not
products for domestic use or for export to other countries.
required to return the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container that
o In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as
possession of the bottle is retained by the store.
containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or
permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited
from the use of the bottles. D.2) SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION V. PNCC, G.R. NO. 169596, MARCH 28, 2007
- Upon the posting of Twin Ace of the required bond, RTC issued an Order SUPERABLE
granting the application for the issuance of a writ of replevin. Upon the
implementation of the said writ, the Deputy Sheriff was able to seize a total of SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
26,241 empty bottles marked TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., at the address of NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL, Respondents. G.R.
Rufina. No. 169596. March 28, 2007. (NONS)
(Certiorari)
release the bus was due to the absence of an order from the police authorities.
EMERGENCY RECIT PNCC likewise claimed damages in its counterclaim.22
QUICK FACTS: The bus of Superlines crashed into the radio room of PNCC. The bus was The RTC dismissed the complaint and granted PNCCs counterclaim. On appeal
taken by Lopera (a traffic investigator who investigated the accident) and asked the to the CA, the CA ruled that the storage for safekeeping purposes is in the
PNCC to take it for safekeeping due to lack of space. Superlines asked for the return of nature of a deposit, thus custody remained with Lopera who ordered the
the bus but was denied so it initiated a complaint for replevin. This was denied by the safekeeping and that PNCC cannot release the bus without Loperas order.
RTC and the CA. Whether the complaint for replevin should be granted? YES! First, Thus, the complaint should have been made against Lopera.
replevin is proper as the action involves property that was wrongfully detained. Second, Superlines then filed a Petititon for Review before the SC.
the Constitution prohibits unlawful seizure of property. There is no law that grants
Lopera the authority to order the impounding of the vehicle. Third, the property is not in ISSUE: Whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin
custodia legis as it was not taken by virtue of a legal process. against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint? YES IT IS A PROPER
SUBJECT OF REPLEVIN, but damages cannot be recovered in this case because
DOCTRINE: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is indispensable parties were not included in the action.
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, HELD: WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET
wrongfully detains the same. The seizures and impounding of a vehicle involved in an ASIDE. The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc., for recovery
accident, on a policemans request, is unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone of possession of personal property is GRANTED. The records of the case are REMANDED
by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is
DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioners complaint to its docket if petitioner is still
(From Mickey): A bus impounded after an accident is not under lawful custody since interested to pursue its claim for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing
there is no law authorizing such. It violates the Constitutional right of unlawful seizures. pronouncement of the Court. SO ORDERED.
Hence, it can be subject to a replevin.
RATIO:
FACTS: Procedural Matters
Superlines Transportations bus crashed into the radio room of Philippine PNCC argues that the petition raises only questions of facts and should be
National Construction Company whild traveling north and approaching the dismissed outright.
Alabang northbound exit lane. The Court said that the action involves questions of law and not of facts, as the
The accident was initially investigated by PNCCs toll way patrol and was issue whether an action for replevin against a depositary is proper.
turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau (ATB). The bus was likewise It also falls under one of the exceptions where the SC may look into questions
transferred to the ATB. Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, on of fact; which is when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
PNCC patrol to its compound where it was stored. justify a different conclusion.
PNCC made several requests for PNCC to release the bus and promised to PNCC also argues that Superlines failed to comply with Rule 45, Sec. 4 as it
repair the radio room. This was denied by Balubal who demanded P40,000 failed to include the material portions of the record that would support the
which is PNCCs estimate of the damage caused by the bus (Superlines petition.
estimate is only P10,000). The Court stated that while that may be true, the Court in the exercise of its
Because of this, Superlines filed a complaint for recovery of personal property equity jurisdiction may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be
(replevin) with damages21 in the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon. Superlines did not resolved on its merits.
put up a bond due to lack of money and just waited for the RTC decision.
PNCC argued that the bus was in the PNCC compound for safekeeping REPLEVIN ISSUE (our topic!)
purposes pursuant to a lawful order from police authorities and its failure to In Tillson v. CA, the Court stated that:
o The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully
taken or detained upon the persons giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action;" the
21 For damages, Superlines claimed the following: (1) the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as
of the date of the filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger
bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff; (2) the sum of P100,000.00 as and PNCC claimed the following as damages: P40,326.54 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
22
for attorneys fees; (3) the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and (4) the cost of suit P130,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
(Certiorari)
writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are o In Bagalihog v. Fernandez, the Court already stated the rule only
replevied, xxx applies when the property was lawfully seized in accordance with the
o Bouviers Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action which exceptions to warrantless searches and seizures. Property subject
lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. Only when
taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it
which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving Because of this, replevin should be granted.
pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or
return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states On Damages
that the term, "to replevy" means " to re-deliver goods which have The prayer for damages cannot be granted without impleading Lopera and any
been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the
pledges in an action of replevin." bus. It was the authorities through Lopera that requested PNCC to get the bus
o The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the for safekeeping.
recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy traditionally Since the police authorities are indispensable parties and for Superlines to pursue its
associated with it, by which possession of the property may be claim for damages then, it or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the
obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
action. [NSS: bold parts copied from decision itself, portions omitted]
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought D.3) DAGUDAG V. PADERANGA, A.M.-RTJ NO. 06-2017, JUNE 19, 2008 TANDOC
to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. ER:
Here, the bus was towed on the request of Lopera, and it was not distrained
or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a A team composed of representatives from PNP and DENR headed by Dagudag inspected
writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under container vans placed in a marine vessel located in Cebu since the team received
custodia legis. information that these container vans contained illegal forest products. True enough,
there were illegal forest products. The crew of the marine vessel where the container
The CA in its decision said that there is no law that authorizes or prohibits the
vans were placed could not produce documents for the forest products. An
impounding of vehicles involved in accidents, and that the SC stated that there
administrative adjudication was conducted by the DENR. Nobody appeared. The
is no clear cut rule on the matter.
adjudication officer recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director that the forest
The Constitution already grants the right against unreasonable seizures. The
products be confiscated in favor of the government. A complaint was filed before Judge
seizure and impounding of the bus on Loperas request clearly violates this
Paderanga by a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) that prayed for a writ of replevin to be
prohibition.
issued ordering the defendants DENR, Community Environment and Natural Resources
The Court of Appeals reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo to justify the
Office (CENRO), Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him. Judge
impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities is
Paderanga granted the writ of replevin. Gen. Dagudag, DENR and CENRO file a motion to
misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a trial
quash the writ of replevin. Denied
court judge. The Court stated the issue on the propriety of impounding the
vehicle was not raised in the administrative case, and thus the Court cannot Should the motion to quash be granted? YESSIR!
rule on the matter.
o The Courts statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a "clear-cut
policy" refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by the marine vessel. without the
of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently,
accidents. It has no application to the instant case which involves the DENR seized the forest products. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
the seizure and distraint implemented by PNCC upon a verbal administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
order by Lopera without the benefit or color of legality afforded administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any
by a court process, writ or order. administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and
The fact that the bus driver was criminally charged for reckless imprudence damages
resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be held as
evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. - Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the
(Certiorari)
proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen.
the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edmas bond was insufficient;
(2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma
was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal
document; (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time;
(6) the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the forest products
were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin
was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR;
(10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency
FACTS: responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad cautelam10
dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages
- A complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to
retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and
against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. products.
- Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received
information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ
container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The of replevin for lack of merit.
shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-
complaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law
- team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast and conduct
Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team
discovered the undocumented forest products ISSUE:
-The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and W/on Judge Paderanga committed gross ignorance of the law in denying the motion to
other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR quash the writ of replevin
Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the
forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as HELD: Yes
abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to RATIO:
NMC Container Lines, Inc
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc.
- DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the Community without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner.
Environment and Natural Resources Office CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.
the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the
administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
Nobody appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot
acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court
Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government. of Appeals,20 the Court held that:
In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts,
C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits
CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorneys and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity
fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)
(Certiorari)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the
that: agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin
itself stated that members of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan25 a case with a
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity similar set of facts as the instant case the Court held that:
to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by
The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours) appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been
sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing
the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action outright. (Emphasis ours)
for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that all actions seeking to recover
forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency not the In Paat,26 the Court held that:
courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
significant to be waylaid by the lower court. constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
x x x x does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in
pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of
said law is explicit that actions taken by the replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the
forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were
(Emphasis ours) validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action
(Certiorari)
for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)
TOPIC: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE as PROVISIONAL REMEDY
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of

replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28 the Court held that:
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he Belen and Federico Delgado were married in the 70s, but their marriage was annulled
plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from since it was solemnized without the required consent of the Old Civil Code. Their short
the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to marriage produced two twins, Rica and Rina. When they came of age, they were
him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss supposed to go to college, but they could not do so since Belen and her 2nd husband
the replevin suit outright. Danny couldn't pay for their college. So Belen filed a case for support against Federico.
Francisco, the grandfather, was impleaded as well.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
Can the grandfather be compelled to pay for tuition pending litigation for support? YES.
Under Rule 61, Sec. 1 and 4, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior
x x x x to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court
does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application
Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. record.
Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the
law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that DOCTRINE:
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of
Since the application for support pendente lite is provisional in nature, a court does not
Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this
knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep
relief. The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to
themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.29
the recipient. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, the grandfather, as the next
immediate relative, is tasked to give support to his grandchildren in default of their
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before parents.
administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an
exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma
had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed
the replevin suit outright. FACTS:

E. SUPPORT PENDETE LITE (RULE 61)
On February 16, 1975, Belen and Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21
E.1) MANGONON V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125041, JUNE 30, 2006 TEVES
years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
CASE: Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006 annulled on August 11, 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
(Certiorari)

On March 25, 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, On the other hand, Francisco argues that the trial court correctly declared that
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the Mangonon and Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed by their twin
assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code. He also maintains that aside from
private respondents had totally abandoned them. the financial package availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state tuition aid grant,
work study program and federal student loan program, Mangonon herself was eligible
for, and had availed herself of, the federal parent loan program based on her income and
properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that assuming he could be held liable for
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America where support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here in the Philippines the person claiming
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts. Rina, in turn, was support. As an additional point to be considered by this Court, he posits the argument
accepted by Long Island University and Western New England College. that because Mangonon and her twin daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke
the Family Code provisions on support as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." Federico, for his part, continues to deny having
Despite their admission to said universities, Rica and Rina were financially incapable of sired Rica and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised before the trial
pursuing collegiate education. The average annual cost for college education in the US is court. Like his father, Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the father of the twin
about US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina. sisters, he has the option under the law as to how he would provide support. Lastly, he
Rica and Rina also need general maintenance support each in the amount of
US$3,000.00 per year or atotal of US$6,000 per year. Unfortunately, petitioners monthly
income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give general
support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college educational support. Neither ISSUES: 1. W/N a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the
can petitioners present husband be compelled to share in the general support and rendition judgment or final order? (YES) ** FOCUS ON THIS, PROVREM SHIZ **
college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own
daughter (also in college) to attend to. Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal
Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S.Department of Education.
2. Who should be made liable for said award? Father or grandfather? (GRANDFATHER)

Due to these circumstances, on March 17, 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf
of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. Belen averred Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00
that demands were made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco, for general for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent
support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be
twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their
Federico and Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially well-off. education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award
support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until
they had finished their respective studies. determined by the trial court pursuant to this
Decision.
Mangonon concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to Rica and
Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. She contends, however, that the
records of this case demonstrate her as well as Federicos inability to give the support
needed for Rica and Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide RATIO:
support devolves upon Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina. Mangonon also
maintains that as Francisco has the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica ISSUE 1. Rule 61, sections 1 and 4 provide:
and Rinas schooling, the CA then erred in sustaining the trial courts Order directing
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award P5,000 each as monthly support
pendente lite.
(Certiorari)
SEC. 1 - Application: At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, (2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for
support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof. (4) The brothers and sisters.
SEC. 4. Order.: The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are
shall render such orders as justice and equity may require, having due regard the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged
to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in to support their childrens college education but being restricted by their financial
the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the income- respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked
court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been
support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party, and the terms of granddaughters education.
payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied, the
principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the Furthermore, Art. 204. states:
rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this
relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
Art. 204 The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, SC find
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
that Mangonon was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin
obstacle thereto.
daughters to the Delgados and the twins entitlement to support pendente lite. In the
words of the trial court By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico

cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather
Francisco. As a matter of fact, Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
and Rina. In the said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, Francisco wrote the
support. Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to
names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that they bear the
how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, Francisco insists that
surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or
Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
"Daddy Paco." In his letter of October 13, 1989, he said "as the grandfather, am
universities. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he
extending a financial help of US$1,000." On top of this, Federico even gave the twins a
may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in
treat to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed, Delgados, by their
this case since there are circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and
actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico.
petitioner which should be considered.

ISSUE 2: Art. 199 of the Family Code provides:
As such, Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by
Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent

Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business
endeavors, thus the amount of support should be proportionate to the resources or
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;
(Certiorari)
** NOTE: FRANCISCO IS FILTHY RICH ** Facts: Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Alvarez St., Pasay
City. Ocampo bought the land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the lands registered owner,
Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the land are claimed to be in
Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, Ocampos management, even though the TCT is not yet in his name. On the other hand,
substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.
is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns - In recognition of Ocampos ownership, Tirona paid some monthly rentals due.
the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the [NOTE] However, Tirona stopped payment, alleging that she is entitled to do
country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. so due to PD 1517, 1893, and 1968 the land was declared under area for
and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties priority development and she is invoking her right of first refusal.
here and abroad.

XXX. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before
the MTC. In her answer, Tirona asserted that the land is actually owned by Doa
Yaneza. Tirona claimed that the land was assigned to her by Edison Hindap, the General
A. INTERPLEADER (RULE 62) Overseer and agent of Yaneza.

A.1) OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147812, APRIL 6, 2005 TIU
- Because the Answer was not verified, Ocampo filed a motion to strike out the answer
JT: The topic is about interpleader, but the case is totally silent as to when the action filed and a motion for judgment.
therefor was filed. I am assuming that Tirona filed one, if ever, during appeal before the
RTC. The ratio all of a sudden included a short discussion of interpleader before the - Tirona filed a motion with leave to amend the answer, alleging that she
dispositive portion. filed her answer without the assistance of a lawyer. In her amended answer,
Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. Tirona
asked for attorneys fees and moral and exemplary damages.
ER: Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona. The - The MTC granted Tironas motion to amend her answer.
land was owned by Alipio Breton Cruz and Ocampo purchased the same from Rosauro,
Alipios heir. Ocampo alleged that Tirona unjustly refused to stop paying rentals and
refused to vacate despite demand. Before the MTC, Tirona asserted that the land was
owned instead by Doa Yaneza and her agent, Edison Hindap, assigned the land to her. - The MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo, finding that Tirona does not have any reason to
The MTC ruled in favor of Ocampo. On appeal before the RTC, Maria Breton-Mendiola, suspend payment of rents until after PD 1517, 1893, and 1968, is implemented in her
Rosauros sister, filed a motion with leave to intervene, claiming ownership of the land. favor. Tironas non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land
More importantly, Tirona also changed her theory on appeal, alleging, this time, that the illegal.
property was owned by Alipio, that Rosauro and Maria inherited the land, that Rosauro
executed a waiver thereof in favor of Maria, and that Tirona had never stopped paying
rentals to Maria ever since. The RTC affirmed the MTC, but the CA reversed, prompting
Ocampo to question the CA decision before the SC. Can Ocampo oust Tirona? Yes. Was - Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal; while Tirona filed a notice of
the interpleader suit filed in good faith? No. An action for interpleader is proper when appeal.
the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on

the property. Here, the good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for
Maria. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
- [NOTE] Eventually, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola (Maria), claiming to be the owner
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit
of the subject land, filed a motion with leave to file intervention before the RTC.
by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.

(Certiorari)
- The RTC issued a writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement of the MTCs - The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
decision. Although Tirona perfected her appeal on time, she failed to pay the required liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one
supersedeas bond, as well as deposit the current rentals as mandated by Sec. 8, Rule 70. liability.
- The RTC also denied Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiolas motion with leave to - When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves,
file intervention because granting the motion to intervene would violate the there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled
1964 Rules of Court and jurisprudence. interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the
action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
- [NOTE] In her memorandum before the RTC, Tirona, for the first time,
disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the land and that he is
her landlord since 1962. When Alipio Breton died, his children, Rosauro and
Maria, inherited the said land. Tirona claimed that she never stopped paying Bonus: Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements
her rent to Maria Mendiola. Tirona also stated that Rosauro could not transfer required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona
ownership to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of conveyance and that he purchased the subject land from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation
waiver in favor of his sister, Maria. Maria being Tironas rightful lessor, the of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms. However, Tirona
former the only person who can validly file an ejectment suit against the latter. eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
- The RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto. The CA set aside the RTC decision,
A.2) MAGLENTE V. PADILLA, G.R. NO. 148182, MARCH 7, 2007 VELASQUEZ
considering that the partition of the estate of Alipio Breton is a prerequisite to Ocampos
action.
Maglente vs Padilla (The case is really short so no need for ER)
- Ocampo filed a petition for review to annul the CA decision.
Doctrine: Thus, petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution[17] in
the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without
merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of
Issues: (a) Whether or not Ocampo may eject Tirona from the land? Yes; and (b) possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to
Whether or not the interpleader suit was filed in good faith? No. either.[18] The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue
Held: The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria. As a Facts:
stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending
claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo
against her before filing a bill of interpleader.
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) leased its land in Intrauros for three
- An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the years to Maglente. The contract included a right of first refusal in favor of Maglente.
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. There was also a prohibition against sub-leasing the property. Maglente, howerever,
sub-leased the prpoerty to the respondents (Padilla). Eventually, PRC notified Maglente
- The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property theat they are selling the property. Respondents, however, sent a letter to PRC
whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly indicating their intent to also buy.
or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court
and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to PRC filed a complaint for interpleader. RTC ruled in favor of Maglente and gave
litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one him the right to purchase. CA affirmed saying that the contract between petitioners and
or the other thing. PRC was valid and petitioners were able to express their intent to buy, giving rise to the
contract.
(Certiorari)
The petitioners were not yet owners of the property. Although it was ruled in
the interpleader that the contract had been perfected, there was no declaration as to
Petitioners requested a writ of execution which was issued by the RTC, ownership pending execution of deed of sale or delivery of the propery. The writ of
ordering PRC to execuute the contract. Petitioners then filed a motion for the issuance of execution issues only when the right of possession has been validly determined but the
a writ of possession. interpleader case did not rule on that.
Respondents objected saying the interpleader merely resolved the right to The proper remedy was to file the proper action and not through a mere
purchase and that there was no declaration of ownership. Trial court denied the writ. motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari (Rule 65).

A.3) ARREZA V. DIAZ, G. R. NO. 133113, AUGUST 30, 2001 AQUINO

EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner, vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent.
Issue: Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in
the interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that Emergency Recit: There is a case involving conflict of ownership between Arreza and
a deed of sale has already been executed in their favor. NO Diaz. Bliss filed a complaint for interpleader. The interpleader case was resolved in favor
of Arreza. Bliss then sold the property to Arreza. Thereafter, Diaz filed a complaint for
sum of money and damages against Bliss, Arreza and a certain Tapay [AA: I have no idea
who this is]. He basically wants these people to pay for acquisition cost and
Held: WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, improvement expenses. Issue seems to be whether there is res adjudicata in this case.
is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition isDISMISSED. But for REM purposes, I think the issue is whether Diazs claim for damages should have
been raised in the interpleader case. SC: The court in a complaint for interpleader shall
determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective
claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by
Ratio: the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule
62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader
action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive
pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was added to
(There was no allegation of grave abuse but because it was only a pure Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated
question of law, the SC still gave due course). therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.
Pursuant to said Rules, Diaz should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the
interpleader action.
The basis used was the courts order of the execution of the contract. This is Facts:
not, however a proper basis. A writ of possession shall issue only in the following
instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit in Quezon City. In
real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has the course of a case involving a conflict of ownership between Arreza and. Diaz,
possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.[12] Here, before RTC Makati, Bliss filed a complaint for interpleader.
petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the Trial Court: Interpleader is resolved in favor of Arreza. The case is dismissed as
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such against defendant Montano M. Diaz, Jr.
a case. The decision became final and was duly executed with Bliss executing a Contract to
Sell the property to Arreza. Diaz was constrained to deliver the property with all its
improvements to petitioner.
Thereafter, Diaz filed a complaint against Bliss, Arreza, and Tapay. He sought to
hold Bliss and Arreza liable for reimbursement to him of P1,706,915.58
(Certiorari)
representing the cost of his acquisition and improvements on the subject property Interpleader case and Damages case.
with interest at 8% per annum. In its assailed decision the pointed out that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, citing as grounds res adjudicata or provide that in a case for interpleader, the court shall determine the respective
conclusiveness of the judgment in the interpleader case as well as lack of cause of rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. The
action. DENIED for lack of merit. appellate court noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader case,
Arreza filed an MR. DENIED. namely Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the issue of damages and
Arreza filed a petition for certiorari before CA - DISMISSED for lack of merit. reimbursement although the answer of respondent Diaz did pray for
o The decision invoked by the petitioner as res adjudicata resolved only the affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith.
issue of who between Edgar H. Arreza and Montano Diaz has the better Following the same tack, Diaz now alleges that the issues in the Interpleader
right over the property under litigation. It did not resolve the rights and case, were delimited by the pre-trial order which did not include matters of
obligations of the parties. damages and reimbursement as an issue. He faults petitioner for not raising
o The action filed by Diaz against Bliss, et al. seeks principally the collection such issues in the prior case, with the result that the trial court did not resolve
of damages in the form of the payments Diaz made to the defendant and the rights and obligations of the parties. There being no such resolution, no
the value of the improvements he introduced on the property matters similar cause of action exists between the prior case and the present case,
that were not adjudicated upon in the previous case for interpleader. according to respondent Diaz.
Diaz in effect argues that it was incumbent upon Arreza as a party the
Interpleader case to put in issue Diazs demands for reimbursement. However,
Issue: Whether Diazs claims for reimbursement against petitioner Arreza are barred by
it was not Arrezas duty to do the lawyering for respondent. As stated by the
res adjudicata.
Court of Appeals, the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine
the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated December 24, claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if
1997 and the resolution dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in
43895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 96-1372 before the Regional Trial this case referred to respondent Diaz.
Court of Makati City, Branch 59, is hereby ordered DISMISSED as against herein The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
petitioner Edgar H. Arreza. Costs against respondent. Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive
Ratio: pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph
was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings
and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication
The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and of the controversy and its incidents.
the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must Pursuant to said Rules, Diaz should have filed his claims against
be between the first and second causes of action identity of parties, subject petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action.
matter, and cause of action.[8]
In the present case, we find there is an identity of causes of action between Civil Case
Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader was settled with. The judgment
No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No. 96-1372. Respondent Diazs cause of action in the prior
therein is now final.
case, now the crux of his present complaint against petitioner, was in the nature of an
When the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 146) rendered judgment, it unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There being a former final
had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Diaz judgment on the merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by Branch
however, contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same
property subject of the action, as the action was instituted in Makati City while parties, the same subject property, and the same cause of action, the present complaint
the subject unit is situated in Quezon City. of respondent herein (Diaz) against petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
By asserting his right as a buyer for value and in good faith of the subject 1372 before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should be dismissed on the ground
property, and asking for relief arising therefrom, Diaz invoked the jurisdiction of res adjudicata.
of the trial court. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 146) by filing his answer to secure affirmative relief against
petitioner, Diaz is now estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of said court B. DECLARATORY RELIEF (RULE 63)
after it had decided the case against him.
Diaz also claims that there is no identity of causes of action between
(Certiorari)
B.1) ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING, G.R. NO. 150608, JANUARY 28, 2008 ARCEO filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu
proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.
EUFEMIA AND ROMEL ALMEDA v. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES COMPLETE DIGEST
EMERGENCY DIGEST FACTS:
Bathala (lessee) renewed its Contract of Lease of Real Property with Almeda Bathala Marketing (lessee) renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano
(lessor) starting May 1, 97. It contained the ff. provisions: Almeda (lessor), husband of Eufemia and father of Romel. Ponciano agreed to lease the
o 6th (Provides for an increase in rental due to new taxes) Almeda Compound at Pasong Tamo, Makati for a term of 4 years from May 1, 1997. It
o 7th (Provides for a basis of computation in case of extraordinary contained the following pertinent provisions:
inflation/devaluation)
The Almedas wanted to increase the rent but Bathala asserted that the rentals
fixed in the contract were supposed to include the VAT, as it was executed on
6th It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate
May 1, 97 when the VAT law had long been in effect.
stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case
The Almedas also informed Bathala that its rent should be increased by 73%
the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be
pursuant to the 7th condition. Bathala insisted that there was no extraordinary
imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located,
inflation.
LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or
Bathala filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC Makati.
charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event
The Almedas filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages before the that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be
MTC of Makati.
entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion
RTC denied Almedas MTD the declaratory relief petition. CA affirmed RTC but leased by him;
it deleted the latters grant of affirmative reliefs.
Issue: WON the action for declaratory relief is proper. YES.
Doctrine: The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are present: 1)
subject matter of the controversy: deed, will, contract or other written 7th In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) terms of should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the
said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial obligation shall be the basis of payment;
construction; 3) no breach of the documents; 4) an actual justiciable
controversy; 5) issue is ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief
is not available through other means.
WON Bathala was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. Ponciano died. Eufemia and Romel (Almedas) advised Bathala that the former
NO. Bathala religiously fulfilled its obligations even during the pendency of shall assess VAT on its rentals. Bathala contended that VAT may not be imposed as the
the present suit. rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein,
WON the declaratory relief petition should be dismissed due to the considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long
commencement of a separate action for rescission and ejectment. NO. been in effect.
Panganiban v. Shell: Petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view
of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we
cannot apply the same to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the court before the dismissal of The Almedas also informed Bathala that its rental should be increased by 73%
the declaratory relief; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the pursuant to the 7th condition. Bathala insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation
action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. to warrant the application of Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.
Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission case during the pendency of the declaratory relief. In fact, the trial
court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension
of the proceedings pending the resolution of the declaratory relief. Also in Feb. 18, 98 Bathala filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC
Teodoro v. Mirasol, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the Makati for determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7.
(Certiorari)
1. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine
Mar. 10, 1998 The Almedas filed an action for ejectment, rescission and any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
damages. Before Bathala could file an answer, the Almedas filed a Notice of Dismissal. regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only
They refiled the complaint before the MTC of Makati. issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action
must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances.
The Almedas moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an
improper remedy considering that Bathala was already in breach of the obligation and
that the case would not end the litigation. RTC denied it.
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as
follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of
After trial, RTC ruled for Bathala. It also ordered the restitution by the Almedas said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
to Bathala of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an
affirmative reliefs are not awarded in an action for declaratory relief. actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6)
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
CA affirmed RTC but it deleted the grant of affirmative reliefs.
The foregoing requisites are present in the instant case.

ISSUES:
1.1. The Almedas insist that Bathala was already in breach of the contract when the
1. WON the action for declaratory relief is proper. YES petition was filed. We do not agree. After the Almedas demanded payment of adjusted
rentals, Bathala complied with the terms of the contract of lease by paying the stipulated
a. WON Bathala was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. rentals. Bathala religiously fulfilled its obligations even during the pendency of the
NO present suit. Thus, Bathala is not barred from instituting before the trial court the
b. WON the declaratory relief petition should be dismissed due to the petition for declaratory relief.
commencement of a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages.
NO
2. WON Bathala is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to RA 7716. NO
1.2. The Almedas claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate
3. WON the amount of rentals due the Almedas should be adjusted by reason of action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another
extraordinary inflation or devaluation. NO court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated
in the same forum. We are not convinced.

HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution It is true that in Panganiban v. Shell, We held that the petition for declaratory
dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED. relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban,
the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the
dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted
RATIO: that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer.
Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact,
(Certiorari)
the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of B.2) MALANA V. TAPA, G.R. NO. 181303, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 BASCARA
the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
Petitioners Malana et al filed before the RTC their Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents Tappa et
al. Before Tappa could file their answer to Malanas complaint, the RTC issued
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro v. Mirasol where an Order dismissing Malanas Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed The RTC referred to the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the
out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the
contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual property involved exceeds P20,000. It found that the subject property had a
milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case. value of less than P20,000 hence, Malanas action to recover the same was
outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the
jurisdiction- Yes
instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency

of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
petition would write finis to the parties dispute, as it would settle once and for all the
categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It
question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this
repeatedly uses the word may .The use of the word may in a statute
controversy.
denotes that the provision is merely permissive In contrast, the mandatory
provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the

word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
2. Bathala is not liable for VAT. Despite the applicability of Sec. 99 of the NIRC
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00 As found by
granting the lessor the option to pass on to the lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts
the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in its Tax
of lease as of Jan. 1, 1996, the original lessor, Ponciano, did not charge the Bathala the
Declaration is only P410 therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and
10% VAT nor provided for its additional imposition when they renewed the contract of
possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
lease in May 1997. Thus, the Almedas are estopped from shifting the VAT to Bathala.
the MTC, not the RTC. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of rights arising thereunder. In the present case, petitioners Complaint for
The Almedas reliance on the 6th condition of the contract is unavailing. It quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents
clearly states that Bathala can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the refused to vacate the subject property. Since petitioners averred in the
effectivity of the contract of lease (May 1997). Considering that RA 7716 took effect in Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their
1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a new tax in May 1997, as to fall within the property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an
coverage of the 6th stipulation. accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief

Petitioners Malana et al filed before the RTC their Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents
3. The Almedas cannot demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary Tappa et al alleging in their Complaint that they are the owners of a
inflation or devaluation. The erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past parcel of land situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. Malana et al inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao
And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of (Anastacio). During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed
the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo) to build on and occupy the southern
considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Art. 1250 of the Civil portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that
Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and
authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects his heirs might need it
of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. Malana claimed that Tappa et al (Consuelos family members)
continued to occupy the subject property even after her death,
already building their residences thereon using permanent materials.
(Certiorari)
Malana also learned that Tappa et al were claiming ownership over construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
the property. Averring that they already needed it, Malana rights or duties, thereunder.
demanded that Tappa vacate the same. Tappa et al however, refused Thus, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Before Tappa could file their answer to Malanas complaint, the RTC Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
issued an Order dismissing Malanas Complaint on the ground of lack Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second
of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to the Judiciary Reorganization Act paragraph that:
of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, o An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000. to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000 consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code,
hence, Malanas action to recover the same was outside the may be brought under this Rule.
jurisdiction of the RTC. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
Malana filed an MR arguing that their principal cause of action was specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an
for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code;
enable them to seek complete relief from Tappa et al. Malanas (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the
Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by
the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
jurisdiction of the RTC These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief
MR denied because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
Malana filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment
they prayed that the RTC Orders dismissing their Complaint, be set into effect..
aside. It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
The RTC issued an Order denying petitioners Motion. does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed
Issue: Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action
jurisdiction- Yes for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions
for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for
Held: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate
Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes
Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil that the provision is merely permissive
Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization
ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires
court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a stated in its Tax Declaration is only P410 therefore, petitioners
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is
includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there
or duties thereunder has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
petition for declaratory relief, to wit: obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their
o Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed,
other governmental regulation may, before breach or or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the
(Certiorari)
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, constitute a cloud over his title. Sabitsana claimed that RTC had no jurisdiction
and a commission of wrongs because the assessed value of the lot was only P1,230.00.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the
filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer ISSUE Whether RTC has jurisdiction despite the assessed value of only P1,230.00.
assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no YES!!!
more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject
has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of RATIO - Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or
the action remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. In order to prevent
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case
filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
vacate the subject property. relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been of the Rules.
deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for
them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, FACTS
not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the - September 2, 1981 = Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of
recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui (Juanito) over a parcel of unregistered land
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by
realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones Tax Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcias name.
recovery of possession over the real property as owner - Juanitos father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr.
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion took actual possession of the lot and planted coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They
reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the also paid the real property taxes on the lot for 1980 up to 1998.
value of the property involved. Given that the subject property - October 17, 1991 = Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty.
herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, with the Register of Deeds.
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without o TD No. 1996 was cancelled and TD No. 5327 was issued in Atty.
prejudice, petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Sabitsanas name.
As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio, the o Although Domingos paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also
following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana proves paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999.
instructive: o In 1996, Atty. Sabitsana introduced concrete improvements on the
If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the property, which were destroyed by a typhoon.
same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. - Domingo Sr. passed away so his heirs applied for registration of the lot under
the Public Land Act.
o Sabitsana opposed the application in a letter addressed to the DENRs
B.3) SABISTANA V. MUERTEGI, 2013 CHAN CENRO/PENRO office claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.
- Juanito, through attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case for quieting of
Sabitsana v. Muertegui title and preliminary injunction against Sabitsana and wife, Rosario, claiming
ER that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and
On September 2, 1981, Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito ownership over the same, which constitute a cloud over his title.
over a parcel of land located in Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. o Complaint prayed that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale and TD No. 5327 be
1996. Juanitos father (Domingo Sr.) and brother (Domingo Jr.) took actual possession of declared null and void
the lot. On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. - In the Answer with Counterclaim, Sabitsana asserted that
Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of absolute sale. TD 1996 was cancelled and TD o the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of
5327 was issued in Sabitsanas name. Domingo Sr. passed away so the heirs applied for Garcias wife, Soledad
registration of the lot under the Public Land Act. Sabitsana opposed. o they acquired the property in good faith and for value
o Complaint is barred by prescription and laches
Juanito, through Domingo Jr., filed a civil case for quieting of title and preliminary
injunction against Sabitsana and wife. It was claimed that Sabitsana bought the lot in
(Certiorari)
o RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which o Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to
involved title to a parcel of land with an assessed value of only real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
P1,230.00. appropriate RTC.
- Evidence of Juanitos witnesses during trial reveal that o In order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a
o Sabitsana was the Muerteguis lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot title, respondent filed Civil Case to obtain a declaration of his rights.
to Juanito and was consulted by the family before the sale was In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which
executed properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule
o After the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, 63 of the Rules.
adverse and continuous possession of the lot - NO LONGER RELEVANT BUT FYI
- Sabitsana testified that o Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving
o before purchasing the lot, he was told by a member of the Muertegui unregistered land so buyers good faith is relevant only where the
family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the
family had bought the lot BUT she could not show the document of same from the registered owner.
sale o Act 3344 applies to sale of unregistered land
o he conducted an investigation with the municipal and provincial Juanito has better right to the lot. The sale to Juanito was
assessors executed on September 2, 1981 while the sale to Sabitsana
o he failed to find any document, record, or other proof of the sale was made on October 17, 1991 (10 years after)
o he discovered that the lot was still in the name of Garcia Thus, Juanito has a better right to the lot because in the
o he concluded that the Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they subsequent sale, Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot
probably did not want him to buy the property because they were (Nemo dat quod non habet).
interested in buying it for themselves The mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give
- RTC issued its Decision which finds in favor of Juanito. It held that Sabitsanas him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the
are not buyers in good faith because he was the Muertegui familys lawyer and owner of the land
was informed that the Muerteguis had purchased the lot Moreover, as the Muertegui familys lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to
o Based on Article 1544 of the Civil Code, even though Sabitsana was safeguard his clients property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and
first to register the sale, the same was not done in good faith so pursuant to his general agency.
preference should be given to the sale in favor of Juanito.
o MR DENIED.
- CA denied Sabitsanas appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. B.4) REPUBLIC V. ROQUE, 2013 CORTEZ

ISSUE - Whether the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that Republic of the Philippines v. Roque, et al (G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013)
the assessed value of the subject land was only P1,230.00. (HAS JURISDICTION)
*NOTE: Short case. The complete digest is pretty much the full case. J
HELD - WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 25,
2007 Decision and the January 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV DOCTRINE:
No. 79250 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
First, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
RATIO other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
- Sabitsanas arguments Second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
o RTC did not have jurisdiction because the assessed value was only require judicial construction;
P1,230.00 so jurisdiction lies with the first level courts Third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
- Juanitos arguments Fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
o Suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is incapable of of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
pecuniary estimation and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
- SC: RTC has jurisdiction Sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
o It is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be action or proceeding.
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real
property in dispute.
(Certiorari)
EMERGENCY DIGEST: Section 18, for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws
FACTS: In 2007, ROQUE ET AL filed a petition for declaratory relief before RTC QC, or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 9372 or the Human Security International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting
Act of 2007. REPUBLIC moved to suspend proceedings since there are other SC petitions Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that are likewise assailing the statutes constitutionality. This was granted. On 2010, the Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and
Court dismissed the SC petitions. On 2012, REPUBLIC filed a motion to dismiss, saying Section 27, for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
that ROQUE ET ALs petition for declaratory relief does not meet the requirements seizures.
needed. ROQUE, ET AL opposed. RTC issued an order denying REPUBLICs motion to
dismiss and found that ROQUE, ET AL met the requirements for declaratory relief. THE REPUBLIC moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC
Hence, this petition. petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the
Court.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for declaratory relief has satisfied the requirements provided The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.
for by law (NO, not satisfied) On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern
Hemisphere cases23 and thereby dismissed24 the SC petitions.
HELD & RATIO: Petition GRANTED; ROQUE ET ALs petition for declaratory relief is
DISMISSED. Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for On February 27, 2012, THE REPUBLIC filed the subject motion to dismiss, contending
declaratory relief: 1) subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or that ROQUE, ET AL. failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief.
other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) terms Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been
of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases.
construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there
must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between In their Comment/Opposition, ROQUE, ET AL. countered that:
persons whose interests are adverse; 5) issue must be ripe for judicial determination; the Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality in Southern
and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based purely on technical
proceeding. While the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd requirements appear to exist in this case, the grounds; and
4th, 5th, and 6th requirements, however, remain wanting. As to the 4th requisite, there the requisites for declaratory relief were met.
is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
exists in this case. ROQUE, ET AL. petition for declaratory relief would show that they On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA ROQUE, ET AL. petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
9372- there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As to the 5th
REPUBLICs MR was denied.
requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
RTC observed that ROQUE, ET AL. have personal and substantial interests in
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, in ROQUE, ET
the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences of the
AL. petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized. The last requisite, the
aforesaid laws implementation considering that the case is of paramount
Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate
impact to the Filipino people.
reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the ROQUE, ET AL. exists in the first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the 4th and 5th requisites for an action for declaratory
REPUBLICs petitions to the Supreme Court.
relief, as well as the irrelevance of the 6th requisite, ROQUE, ET AL. petition for
REPUBLIC argues that ROQUE, ET AL failed to satisfy the requirements for
declaratory relief should have been dismissed.
declaratory relief and that the court has upheld with finality RA 9372s

constitutionality

COMPLETE DIGEST: ROQUE, ET AL argue that they complied with the requirements of declaratory
relief and that the Court has yet to resolve RA 9372s constitutionality
FACTS:
On July 17, 2007, ROQUE, ET AL. filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372 (Human Security Act 23 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
of 2007):
24 As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
Section 3, for being void for vagueness; prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus
Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication and due process legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension
of a failed legislative lobbying in CongressWHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
(Certiorari)
Sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding.
ISSUE: W/N ROQUE, ET ALs petition for declaratory relief has met the requisites
needed, as provided for by law and jurisprudence (NO, not met) Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the
first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and
sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED; RTC QC Orders are REVERSED & SET ASIDE; Petition for
Declaratory relief is DISMISSED. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
RATIO: controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent o Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient
to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at
"grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms
relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous ahead.
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degree of gravity, as o The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and
above-described, must be met. inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the A perusal of ROQUE, ET AL. petition for declaratory relief would show that
Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in
Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
ROQUE, ET ALs petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory of the assailed provisions of RA 9372.
relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether o Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere
improper. cases, ROQUE, ET AL. only assert general interests as citizens, and
taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled.
definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those o As their petition would disclose, ROQUE, ET AL. fear of prosecution was
consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi; and (c) addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these
petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. Therefore, there was remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared
no grave abuse of discretion. towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTCs o In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of
ruling on the sufficiency of ROQUE, ET AL. petition for declaratory relief. them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
relief: become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
First, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or characterized by "double contingency," where both the
ordinance; activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
Second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
and require judicial construction; theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
Third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
Fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of
Fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted
(Certiorari)
by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored 1) REPUBLIC V. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO.142572, FEBRUARY 20, 2002 - DE LA
on real events before courts may step in to settle actual PAZ
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002 (rule 65)

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Doctrine: Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist
(or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed ROQUE, ET AL. petition with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both
for declaratory relief all the same. rules. THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
It is well to note that ROQUE, ET AL. also lack the required locus standi to mount their thereof.
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. Emergency Digest: Carmel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with
While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance preliminary injunction against DEPED and Caloocan. DEPED filed an MR of the Orders
dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in denying the Extension of Time to file an Answer and Declaring DEPED in default. The
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that RTC set aside the orders yet denied to dismiss the case. The RTC citing substantial
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether compliance decided that DEPED should instead be allowed to submit an Answer. DEPED
different genus of constitutional litigation. filed an MR. DEPED filed a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed stating that that the
Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of petition does not contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this
case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each
other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
the above-discussed allegations in ROQUE, ET AL. petition, remain highly-speculative thereof. Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition
and merely theorized. for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was
It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging orders. Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies
it. This ROQUE, ET AL. failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the
Department of Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a by the presiding judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to short of the requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96
the ROQUE, ET AL. exists in the first place. considering that it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate
officer of the court nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for mark `ORIGINAL SIGNED atop the name of the presiding judge. Still, there is substantial
declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, ROQUE, ET AL. compliance with the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to originals of the orders being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. being primarily assailed in the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was
merely the denial of the motion to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the
Rules may be invoked in this instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
C. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF COA OR COMELEC (RULE 64) possible.

D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65) Complete Digest:
Facts: Carmel Development, Inc. filed with a Complaint for recovery of possession
D.1 CERTIORARI with preliminary injunction against the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(Certiorari)
and the Caloocan City School Board. Carmel sought to recover possession of a parcel of On August 17, 1998, the RTC denied the MR stating that the Motion is based on bare
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (64007)15807, allegedly occupied by assertions and no proof has been presented to substantiate their claims. Substantial
the Pangarap Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which were established compliance with the SC circular is sufficient.
by the Department of Education.
Dissatisfied, the Department of Education filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
DEPED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated April 16, 1998 as well as 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals
a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated April 24, 1998. seeking to annul the trial courts orders dated June 15, 1998 and August 17,
1998. Carmel filed a Comment as well as a Supplemental Comment while the
On April 27, 1998, Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default alleging that Department of Education filed its Reply.
the period to answer had already lapsed since the subpoenas were served upon the
Department of Education and the School Board on April 2, 1998 and March 2, 1998, On August 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Department of Educations
respectively. RTC granted the motion to declare in default and allow presentation of petition for certiorari and denied on March 17, 2000 the motion to reconsider the same.
evidence ex parte. CA held that the petition does no contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that the
In an Order dated April 29, 1998, the trial court declared the Motion for Extension of petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed orders and not by
Time to File Answer filed on April 28, 1998 by the Department of Education and the mere duplicate originals.
School Board as moot and academic.[7] Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 1998, the
trial court declared that no action shall be taken on the Manifestation with Motion to Hence, this Petition.
Dismiss filed on April 30, 1998 by the Department of Education and the School Board
considering that the defendants have already been declared in default and have lost
their standing in court.[8] Issue:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
On May 14, 1998, the Department of Education filed a Motion for Reconsideration PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY CERTIFIED
of the Orders dated April 27, 29 and 30, 1998 and to Lift Order of TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION BUT ONLY
Default It contended that it seasonably filed its motion for extension of time to file its DUPLICATE ORIGINALS. YES, DUPLICATES ALLOWED.
answer on April 16, 1998. It also claimed that it filed its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. It explained that the summons issued on March 23, 1998 was B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
received by the School Board on March 27, 1998 and not on March 2, 1998 as GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
erroneously found by the trial court. The Department of Education further claimed THE LATTER DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS NOTWITHSTANDING
that Carmel failed to notify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare it in THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PLEADING SHOWS LITIS PENDENTIA.
default. Aside from praying for the lifting of the order of default, the Department of YES
Education likewise sought the dismissal of the case for violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94[10] on forum shopping. Carmel filed an Opposition C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
on June 8, 1998. RESPONDENT HAS COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94. NO
In an Order dated June 15, 1998, the RTC set aside its orders dated April 27, 29 and
30, 1998 and lifted the order of default. The trial court, however, denied the
dismissal of the case, saying that justice would be better served if DEPED was allowed Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
to submit their answer. Appeals dated August 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 17, 2000 dismissing the
Department of Educations petition are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent
The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with Motion for Carmel Development, Inc. against the Department of Education with the Regional Trial
Reconsideration of the Order dated June 15, 1998. It contended that the trial courts Court of Caloocan City (Branch 125) in Civil Case No. C-18264 is DISMISSED without
finding of substantial compliance with the Supreme Court Circular had no factual or prejudice.
legal bases to stand on. It also maintained that Carmel is engaged in forum SO ORDERED.
shopping. Carmel filed its Opposition dated July 31, 1998 claiming that the issues in the
other pending cases are different.
Ratio:
(Certiorari)
First Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of the Petition accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
The filing of original actions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by orders.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines duplicate originals in this
for certiorari be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true wise:
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof x x x. The same 1. The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy of the
Section provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing decision, judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. party in the case or proceeding in the court or adjudicative body which rendered
and issued the same. xxx.
This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules 2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities
which read in pertinent parts: or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least
SECTION 1. Title of cases. In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party bear the dry seal thereof or any other official indication of the authenticity and
instituting the action shall be called the petitioner and the opposing party the completeness of such copy. xxx.
respondent.
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. This Rule shall apply to original actions Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies furnished
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the Department of
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed by the presiding
governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls short of the
warranto by Rule 66. requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 considering that
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - x x x. it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate officer of the court
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp mark `ORIGINAL
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the SIGNED atop the name of the presiding judge. Still, there is substantial compliance with
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate originals of the orders
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is being primarily assailed in
such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was merely the denial of the motion
relevant or pertinent thereto. xxx. (Emphasis supplied) to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in this
instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
The phrase [e]xcept as otherwise provided means exactly what it says, that is, except
as otherwise provided in Rule 46, original actions for certiorari shall be governed by Second issue: Litis Pendentia
Rule 65. Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its
provisions useless. This is evident in Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides that [i]n DEPED says that there two other cases pending before another court (seeking
petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision recovery of possession of the parcel of land, enjoining the principal and other
of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. representatives from building additional buildings of the same parcel of land, and an
action for declaration of ownership and quieting of title involving the same parcel of
This simply means that the following rules which are of primary governance in the land.) In sum, the Department of Education argues that all three cases revolve
Court of Appeals, viz.: Rule 46 (Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule 48 around the same parties' conflicting claims of ownership and possession over the
(Preliminary Conference), Rule 49 (Hearings on Oral Argument), Rule 51 (Judgment), same parcel of land. Carmel insists there is no forum shopping.
and Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration) have been expressly made applicable to An important issue of fact exists - whether there are two other similar cases
original actions in the Supreme Court save for those portions which deal strictly with pending in another court as alleged in the motion to dismiss. Since resolution of
and are specifically intended for appealed cases in the Court of Appeals.[17] (Emphasis this issue requires presentation of proof, the trial court should not have decided
supplied) the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to present proof of their
respective stand in a hearing duly held for that purpose.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court In light of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16, the appellate court erred in finding that
of Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in precipitately
co-exist with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every denying the motion to dismiss without so much as a hearing and giving the party
provision of both rules. concerned an opportunity to present its proof. Verily, the charge of forum shopping
or litis pendentia, which works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, requires the
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition presentation of proof and the Department of Education should have been given an
for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was opportunity to do so.
(Certiorari)
retained counsel will be deemed substantial compliance with the rule. A certification
Third Issue: Compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 against forum shopping executed by retained counsel should not pass muster in
We have ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on a this case lest the objectives of the rule be subverted.
technicality. However, we find that remanding the case to the appellate court to resolve
the remaining issue will serve no useful purpose. It is more in consonance with the
2) JIAO ET AL. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 182331, APRIL 18, 2012 GERALDEZ
speedy disposition of justice for us to resolve this particular legal question since no
factual issues are involved.
The Supreme Court Circular, with minor modifications, has been incorporated in G.R. No. 182331 April 18, 2012
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 before Carmel filed
its complaint on March 17, 1998. The requirement of a certification against forum MA. CORINA C. JIAO, et al. vs. NLRC, GLOBAL BUSINESS BANK, METROBANK, et al.
shopping has likewise been adopted in Rules 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 64 and 65.[20]
The rule on certification against forum shopping is intended to prevent the
actual filing of multiple petitions or complaints involving identical causes of ER: The employees of Philbank were under a Gratuity Pay Plan which provided for 1
action, subject matter and issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum month salary for every year of service in the event of separation without fault of the
shopping.[21] This is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be employee. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank, and the petitioners were
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is redundated. They received a Special Separation Program that gave them 150% months
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.[22] salary for every year of service. After receiving their separation pay, they filed a
The rule expressly requires that a certification against forum shopping complaint for more separation pay, saying they lacked 50% of a months salary because
should be attached to complaints or other initiatory pleadings filed before the 100% of the 150% rightfull belonged to them as separation pay (in other words,
courts. The rule also requires that the party, not counsel must certify under oath they want 200% salary: 100% separation pay and 100% gratuity pay). The LA ruled in
that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in the favor of the Banks. NLRC affirmed the LA. Without filing an MR, the petitioners went
courts or any other tribunal or agency. straight to the CA via Rule 65 certiorari. The CA dismissed for lack of an MR. Held: The
A cursory examination of Carmels complaint shows that the certification against SC affirmed the CA, saying the petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
forum shopping found at the end thereof was attested by its counsel Juan Victor R. determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense
Llamas and not by plaintiff or any of the principal parties as required by the rule. This with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a
is fatal to Carmels cause. concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations
The certification against forum shopping must be by the plaintiff or any of the from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation
principal parties and not by the attorney. It is mandatory that the certification be thereof.
executed by the petitioner himself, and not by the attorney. A certification against forum
shopping executed by counsel is cause for dismissal of the case. COMPLETE
In this case, Carmel admits that their lawyer signed the certification against forum
shopping. Carmel now asserts that their lawyers signature must be accepted as Facts: [*Note: All the labor stuff has nothing to do for our class. No need to read them
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Supreme Court Circular intently.]
citing Robern Development Corporation vs. Quitain.[29] Regrettably, reliance on said case
is misplaced and could not relieve Carmel of the adverse effect of non-compliance. The
same could not be said of the instant case. Carmel does not claim or imply that Atty. 1. The numerous petitioners here were regular employees of Philbank. They were
Juan Victor R. Llamas who executed the certification against forum shopping was subject to a Gratuity Pay Plan for employees, wherein basically any separation
Carmels internal legal counsel or corporate officer charged with monitoring Carmels without fault from the employee (reaching 60, death, sickness, resignation, etc.) will
legal cases before courts, tribunals or quasi-judicial agencies. For all intents and be paid 1 month salary for every year of service. (Old Plan)
purposes, he was merely a retained lawyer and his execution of the certification does 2. Another plan was devised by Philbank. Now, employees separated without fault
not constitute substantial compliance with the rule. shall be entitled to either one hundred percent (100%) of his accrued gratuity
The mandatory character of the requirement that the certification be signed by the party benefit or the actual benefit due him under the Plan, whichever is greater. (New
and not merely by the retained counsel is underscored by the Department of Plan)
Educations allegation in its Motion to Dismiss and subsequent pleadings that Carmel is 3. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank. Although Philbank was the surviving
actually engaged in forum shopping. The rationale for this requirement assumes greater entity, it opted to operate under the name Globalbank.
importance considering that the retained counsel may be unaware of the other pending 4. As a result of this merger, a Special Separation Program (SSP) was implemented
cases which he may not be handling. Surely, the policy of the rule to promote and and the petitioners were granted a separation package equivalent to one and a half
facilitate the orderly administration of justice will be undermined if certification by the
(Certiorari)
months pay (or 150% of one months salary) for every year of service based on The petitioners claim that it was error for the CA to have dismissed their petition on the
their current salary. sole basis thereof. According to the petitioners, they had opted not to file a motion for
5. The petitioners here availed of the SSP and executed the Letters of Acceptance and reconsideration as the issues that will be raised therein are those that the NLRC had
Waiver and Quitclaims. already passed upon. The petitioners likewise invoke the liberal application of
6. Metrobank then acquired all the assets and liability of Globalbank. procedural rules.
7. Subsequently, petitioners filed separate complaints for non-payment of separation
pay with prayer for damages and attorneys fees. To begin with, the petitioners do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the
a. The petitioners asserted that, under the Old Plan, they were entitled to an propriety of complying with procedural rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in
additional 50% of their gratuity pay on top of 150% of one months salary various cases involving the tedious attempts of litigants to relieve themselves of the
for every year of service they had already received. They insisted that consequences of their neglect to follow a simple procedural requirement for perfecting a
100% of the 150% rightfully belongs to them as their separation pay. petition for certiorari that he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
Thus, the remaining 50% was only half of the gratuity pay that they are manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. The
entitled to under the Old Plan. petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
b. They further allege they were defrauded into signing the quitclaims and reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion
that these were done without full knowledge of its legal implications. for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
8. In defense, Globalbank said that the additional 50% gratuity pay was already for doing so.
included in the computation of the separation pay. Further, the waivers should be
considered completely valid.
a. Metrobank disclaimed liability, saying it acquired Globalbank only after As the CA correctly noted, the petitioners did not bother to explain their omission and
this termination thing happened. Hence, there was no employment only did so in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition. Aside
relationship. from the fact that such belated effort will not resurrect their application for a writ of
9. Labor Arbiter ruled for the banks and against herein petitioners. NLRC affirmed the certiorari, the reason proffered by the petitioners does not fall under any of the
LA. recognized instances when the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
10. Petitioners went up to the CA via certiorari under Rule 65. with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise
a. Apparently, they did not MR the NLRC decision. of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every
11. CA dismissed the petition for failing to file an MR of the decision under review claim of injustice and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and
before resorting to certiorari. It further ruled that this case did not fall under claiming to be victims of a wrong.
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule on MRs.
12. Petitioners filed an MR of the CA decision. Denied. Substantive Issues
Issues: In sum, the New Gratuity Plan and SSP are valid and must be given effect, inasmuch as
their provisions are not contrary to law; and, indeed, grant benefits that meet the
1. W/N it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failing to file an MR before minimum amount required by the Labor Code. The petitioners have voluntarily sought
filing the petition under Rule 65 NO. CA was correct. such benefits and upon their receipt thereof, executed quitclaims in Globalbanks favor.
2. Substantive W/N they were entitled to the additional pay, the validity of the quit The petitioners cannot, upon a mere change of mind, seek to invalidate such quitclaims
claims, etc. NO. Lower courts were correct. and renege on their undertaking thereunder, which, to begin with, is supported by a
substantial consideration and which they had knowingly assumed and imposed upon
themselves.
Employees lose. Banks win. CA decision affirmed.
We hold that Metrobank cannot be held liable for the petitioners claims. The liabilities
Ratio: that Metrobank assumed can be characterized as those pertaining to Globalbanks
banking operations. They do not include Globalbanks liabilities to pay separation pay to
The petitioners unexplained failure to move for the reconsideration of the NLRCs its former employees.
resolution before applying for a writ of certiorari in the CA is reason enough to deny
such application. While Metrobank is indeed a parent of Globalbank, one fact cannot be ignored that
Globalbank has a separate and distinct juridical personality. In the instant case, none of
Procedural Issue
(Certiorari)
these circumstances is present such as to warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction In her Affidavit6 executed on May 5, 1999, Arcobillas admitted her mistake, apologized
and treating Globalbank and Metrobank as one. for it, and stated that she did not benefit from the unintentional misposting. She
narrated that she erroneously posted US$5,517.10, instead ofP5,517.10, which figure
represents the peso value of US$138.00. She honestly believed that the US$5,517.10 was
3) PNB V. ARCOBILLAS, 2013 - KING
correct because when added to the other on-line dollar transaction of US$1,004.60 the
result was US$6,521.70, which tallied with the tellers machine reading. Arcobillas
PNB v. Arcobillas, 2013 KING, G.R. No. 179648 further explained that the heavy workload that day, a Friday coinciding with payroll day,
plagued with intermittent power interruptions, brought on a severe headache which
ER:
greatly affected her work performance.
Arcobillas, teller of PNB, wrongly credited the Savings account of Nomad-Spoor. Instead
of adding P5,517.00 to the account, that amount was added in dollars. ($5,517). Nomad- On February 24, 2000, PNBs Administrative Adjudication Panel found Arcobillas guilty
Spoor withdrew the amounts and ran away with all the money. PNB fired Arcobillas on of gross neglect of duty and meted upon her the penalty of forced resignation with
the ground of gross and habitual negligence. Arcobillas filed an illegal dismissal benefits, to take effect immediately upon her receipt thereof. Upon denial of her plea for
complaint. reconsideration, Arcobillas instituted a Complaint7 for illegal dismissal with money
claims against PNB, PNBs Senior Manager Reynald A. Rey and Senior Vice-President
LA: reinstate Arcobillas. Rosauro C. Macalagay.
NLRC: same. Rule 65 with the CA. LA ruling
CA: same. But note here that CA took cognizance of the case without an MR of the NLRC PNB should reinstate Arcobilla. No finding of gross and habitual negligence. There was
decision this was fatal. no bad faith involved.
SC:
The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure.27 It is Appeal to NLRC
a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with.28
PNB alleges that bad faith is not a requirement before an employer may dismiss an
A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party employee.
can resort to the special civil action for certiorari.
But NLRC still affirmed LA.
Thus, PNBs "failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before availing
itself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."
Facts: CA took cognizance of PNBs petition for certiorari even without PNB filing an MR of the
NLRC.
On May 15, 1998, the PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account (FCD-S/A) Nevertheless, CA affirmed NLRC with a modification that the losses be shouldered as
No. 305703555-1 of Avelina Nomad-Spoor (Nomad-Spoor) was credited with follows:
US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent of P5,517.10, Arcobillas, the
assigned administrative teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch, erroneously posted PNB 40%
US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of US$5,379.10. Said amount was later
withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor on May 29, 1998 and June 8, 1998 to the damage of PNB in Arcobillas 60%
the amount of P214,641.23.

The misposting was discovered only about seven months later. After investigation by
PNBs Inspection and Investigation Unit Arcobillas was administratively charged with MR denied. Petition with the SC assailing the CA decision.
neglect of duty.5

(Certiorari)
Issue: May a petition for certiorari against an NLRC decisions be entertained by the CA
despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC? No
SC affirmed that Arcobillas should not be dismissed because there was no finding of
gross and habitual negligence.
Ratio:
The assailed CA Decision must be vacated and set aside.
PNBs failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before filing its Petition
for Certiorari before the CA is a fatal infirmity.
At the outset, the Court notes that after PNB received a copy of the August 31, 2004
Decision of the NLRC on October 14, 2004, it did not file any Motion for Reconsideration
such that the said Decision became final and executory on October 19, 2004. Instead,
PNB went directly to the CA to assail the NLRC Decision through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which the said court took cognizance of.
"a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved

party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari x x x. The rationale for the rule is
that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes
it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Of course, the rule is
not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a [P]etition
for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration,"25 such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved."26 Here, PNB did not at all allege to
which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any
plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for
Reconsideration before the NLRC.
It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality
of procedure.27 It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly
complied with.28 Thus, PNBs "failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration with the
NLRC before availing [itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."

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Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how, enforced. - a) Immediate payment on

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari

Exception to the Rule

Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending

-RTC granted the motion. RATIO:

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the

b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Petition for certiorari in CA affirmed NLRC.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Maruhom (Clerk of Court)

Hence, this petition for certiorari (Rule 65).

EMERGENCY DIGEST FACTS:

D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65) Complete Digest:

NLRC: same. Rule 65 with the CA. LA ruling

The assailed CA Decision must be vacated and set aside.

"a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved

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