Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Communicated by Fiedler
Abstract
People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people
place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves
versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not
others. This divergence did not arise simply from diVerences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to
the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections
when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and
actionand thereby about the fallibility of introspectiondid participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.
2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Bias blind spot; Introspection illusion; Selfother; Nonconscious inXuences; Self-perception
In a recent news story, a federal judge defended his ability The tendency to see bias in others, while being blind to it
to be objective in handling a case involving a long-time friend. in ourselves, has been shown across a range of cognitive
In another story, government scientists defended their impar- and motivational biases (for a review, see Pronin, Gilovich,
tiality in evaluating drug companies from whom they received & Ross, 2004). This article concerns a related question:
large consulting fees. In each of these stories, the relevant Why do people show this bias blind spot?
actors were convinced of their own objectivity, while outside
observers were quick to accuse them of bias. Such accusations Introspection and bias perception
of bias in people who are conWdent in their objectivity are as
common in everyday life as they are in the news. When our This research explores one possible mechanism contribut-
colleague judges the average work of his friend as better than ing to the tendency for people to acknowledge bias more
the stellar accomplishments of a mere acquaintance, or when readily in others than in themselves. This mechanism
our neighbor argues that the new bright-red Wre hydrant involves the value that people assign to introspective infor-
should go in front of any house but hers, we are struck by mation, relative to behavioral information, when drawing
those individuals blindness to their own biases. conclusions about the presence or absence of bias. Consider
the following example. In judging whether you have been
biased in your hiring of a new associate, your introspections
We thank Elana Jacobs, Jessica Karpay, and John Fleming for re- might involve the feeling that you tried to be objective in
search assistance. We thank Susan Fiske, Kathleen Kennedy, and Joshua
reviewing the applicants or that you never felt any bias
Rabinowitz for helpful comments on this research. Portions of this re-
search were supported by a grant to Pronin from the NASD. clouding your assessments. Your behavior might be that you
*
Corresponding author. hired an old college buddy. As this example portends, intro-
E-mail address: epronin@princeton.edu (E. Pronin). spections will be less likely than behavior to yield evidence of
0022-1031/$ - see front matter 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011
ARTICLE IN PRESS
2 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
bias. Biases typically operate nonconsciously, thereby leaving careful reasoning (Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur, 1995), posi-
their inXuence hidden from introspection (Wilson & Brekke, tive intentions (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Kruger & Gilo-
1994; Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002). vich, 2004), optimistic plans (Buehler, GriYn, & Ross,
1994), personal strength versus weaknesses (Kruger, 1999),
Access to introspections wishful thinking (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez,
2006), and even the absence of seemingly relevant introspec-
It is a truism that we have far more access to the contents tive information (Latane & Darley, 1968; Nisbett & Wilson,
of our own introspections than others have to our introspec- 1977a, 1977b). The thesis of this article rests in part on peo-
tions. We generally know what we are thinking and feeling, ples lack of awareness of the limitations of their own intro-
and what we are intending to do and hoping to accomplish, spections, and on peoples consequent over-valuation of
better than others know these things about us. This rich intro- their own (but not others) introspective contents.
spective access puts us in a unique position, though not The studies reviewed above converge on the idea that
always a better one, for understanding our past attitudes and actors consideration of internal information leads them to
actions and for predicting our future ones (Jones & Nisbett, make diVerent assessments than observers. These studies
1972; Nisbett & Ross, 1980, chapter 9). One might expect, have generally assumed that those diVerent assessments are
then, that the proposed selfother diVerence in weighting of attributable to diVerences in introspective access. This
introspective information is simply a matter of diVerences in assumption has also been made for other classic selfother
introspective access. This would suggest that if one knew a asymmetries, such as the tendency for people to describe
persons bias-related introspections (such as those of the boss themselves in terms of private and unobservable qualities
who hired his college buddy), ones judgment of that persons but to describe others in terms of public and observable
bias would resemble his or her own. ones (McGuire & McGuire, 1986; Prentice, 1990), and the
tendency for people to describe social interactions in terms
Valuation of introspections of private reactions in the case of self but public responses
in the case of others (Malle & Pearce, 2001).
The hypothesis of the current research, however, diVers We do not wish to argue that diVerences in awareness of
from this account involving introspective access. We suggest, internal information play no role in the eVects described
for example, that knowing the bosss desire to be fair and his above. What we would like to argue, however, is that diVer-
faith in the talents of an old buddy (and knowing his absence ences in valuation of internal information also play a role
of any willful bias) will not radically change ones perception particularly in the case of bias perception. Thus, when a
of bias. Instead, we predict that peoples lack of reliance on person tells us she is unbiased in taking 75% of the credit
others introspections is in part due to a diminished valuation for a project completed by a team of six peers, we are likely
of those introspections. When assessing bias in someone else, to consider her assessment biased even if we have access to
people are likely to view behavior (combined with theories of her thoughts about how much she contributed and about
what biased behavior looks like) as another important source her eVorts to provide a fair assessment.
of information. This hypothesized mechanism might be Researchers have provided evidence suggesting that the
referred to as an introspection illusion, since it involves an tendency to perceive bias more in others than the self is rooted
illusion about the relative diagnostic value of ones own ver- in diVerences in the information that people use in making
sus others introspections (Pronin, Gilovich et al., 2004). In assessments of bias in the self versus others (Ehrlinger et al.,
particular, it suggests that people over-value thoughts, feel- 2005; Pronin, Gilovich et al., 2004; Van Boven et al., 1999).
ings, and other mental contents, relative to behavior, when However, experiments have not examined the role of valua-
assessing their own actions, motives, and preferences, but not tion in this eVect. Yet, some research suggests that people may
when assessing others. The term introspection illusion thus value internal information more, and observable actions less,
involves a selfother asymmetry in the relative valuation of when assessing the self relative to others. People have been
introspective versus behavioral information. Although the shown to view themselves as deWned by their thoughts, feel-
term uses the word introspection rather than behavior, ings, goals, fears, and other unobservable qualities, even while
the illusion inherently involves a tendency for the self, but they are inclined to view others as deWned by their observable
not others, to disregard behavior (and to place unwarranted behavior (Andersen & Ross, 1984; Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky,
value on introspections). & Ross, 2001). People have also been found to view their
unobservable intentions as more indicative than their observ-
Previous research able actions for assessing their own (but not others) traits
(Kruger & Gilovich, 2004).
Previous research has demonstrated the tendency for
people to make inaccurate self-predictions and self-assess- Mechanism underlying the mechanism
ments when introspective information is available but mis-
leading. This phenomenon has been shown for Why might people value their own introspections more
introspective information involving intense emotional reac- than others introspections? Or, to put it another way, why
tions (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), might they disregard information about their behavior even
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 3
4 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
general (Ms D 3.48 vs. 6.10), F (1, 97) D 57.31, p < .0001. This condition): Imagine that [you have/an average Harvard
interaction was signiWcant, F (1, 244) D 70.31, p < .0001, and student has] to provide an accurate assessment of how sus-
it emerged for all three biases: self-serving, F (1, ceptible [you are/he or she is] to the above tendency. How
147) D 53.95, p < .0001, halo, F (1, 94) D 13.58, p D .0006, and valuable do you think it would be for [you/that person] to
fundamental attribution error, F (1, 94) D 8.07, p D .007. use each of the following strategies? They were provided
Finally, we expected that the information participants with descriptions of the two strategies described in Study 1
reported considering when making their assessments of bias and asked to rate each in terms of how valuable it would be
would be predictive of the amount of bias they imputed. We if they (or an average Harvard student) had to make the
expected that the tendency to give heavy weight to ones relevant self-assessment (1 D not at all, 9 D strongly).
assumptions about relevant thoughts and intentions, rather
than to assumptions about how people behave, would yield Results and discussion
lower assessments of bias (since evidence of bias rarely
emerges in conscious thought). This prediction was sup- Participants showed an asymmetry in their perceptions
ported. The more participants reported considering of what information would be most valuable for their own
thoughts and motives relative to human behavior (as mea- versus others self-assessments of bias. They reported
sured by a diVerence score between the two), the less bias believing that getting inside their head was a more valuable
they imputed, r(247) D .43, p < .0001. This correlation was strategy than considering their beliefs about human behav-
apparent, albeit to somewhat diVering degrees, when partic- ior for arriving at their own self-assessment of bias
ipants assessed their own susceptibility to bias, (Ms D 6.50 vs. 5.05), F (1, 40) D 16.19, p D .0002. By contrast,
r (132) D .19, p D .07, and when they assessed their peers when contemplating the average Harvard student assessing
susceptibility, r (115) D .29, p D .003. And, participants his or her own bias, they tended to believe that it would be
reports of considering thoughts versus behavior mediated less useful for that person to try to get inside his/her head
the observed bias blind spot, according to the Sobel test than for that person to look to how people in general
advocated by Baron and Kenny (1986), z D 3.06, p D .002. behave (Ms D 5.34 vs. 6.02), F (1, 39) D 3.77, p D .06. This
Does individuals consideration of internal information interaction was signiWcant, F (1, 81) D 17.93, p < .0001.
versus observable behavior (and general ideas about what Participants in this study made very diVerent claims about
biased behavior looks like) simply reXect natural diVer- what information they versus their peers should use for
ences in the availability of information? We suggest that it assessing personal bias. This result suggests that Study 1 par-
may be rooted in peoples beliefs about the probative value ticipants reported consideration of internal information when
of information. In Study 1a, we sought to more directly assessing their own bias, but of behavioral information when
investigate whether the selfother diVerence in reported assessing others bias, did not simply reXect an asymmetry in
consideration of internal versus behavioral information is availability but rather reXected an asymmetry in beliefs about
accompanied by a selfother asymmetry in the perceived which source of information was more probative.
value of these two sources of information. These studies involved fairly abstract assessments of
bias. Participants rated their own and others commissions
Study 1a: Assessing bias assessments of bias in general rather than with respect to a speciWc
instance of potential bias. In addition, participants were
Rather than rating how much they used diVerent sources asked about their reliance on observations of human
of information in assessing bias, participants rated how behavior in general rather than about their observations
valuable each of those sources would be for making self- of the actions of the target being assessed. Study 2 sought to
assessments of bias. We predicted that they would report investigate the proposed underlying mechanism with
that considering introspections was the better strategy for respect to a speciWc commission of bias associated with a
assessing personal bias when it was themselves making that speciWc action taken by a speciWc actor.
assessment, but that considering behavior was the better
strategy for peers making such self-assessments. Study 2: Examining others introspections
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 5
6 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
introspections more than behavior in assessing whether Along with the results of Study 1, these results provide
they were biased (Ms D 4.25 vs. 3.52), F (1, 30) D 6.29, further evidence that while people tend to rely on their own
p D .02. Observers showed no such privileging of introspec- inner thoughts and motives when assessing bias in them-
tions, and leaned towards considering introspections less selves, they are more likely to rely on observable actions
than behavior (Ms D 4.38 vs. 4.80), F (1, 62) D 2.58, p D .11. when assessing bias in others. Furthermore, these results
This interaction was signiWcant, F (1, 94) D 10.78, p D .001. suggest that people display a selfother asymmetry in per-
Analyses involving participants actual assessments of ceptions of bias regardless of whether they have access to
bias provided further evidence for these selfother diVer- the introspections of the other whom they are judging.
ences in information consideration. Whereas the amount of Despite our eVorts to provide observers with genuine
bias evident in actors ratings was not correlated with actors and useful accounts of actors introspections, it is worth
self-assessments of bias, r (30) D .17, p D .34, it was correlated considering whether this goal was accomplished. If actors
with observers assessments of bias, r (62) D .48, p < .0001. failed to provide understandable accounts of their ongoing
Thus, actors ignored their behavior in assessing their bias, thoughts (but rather simply wrote a few words and then
whereas observers used that information (see Fig. 1). proceeded to their next task), or if their accounts did not
Based on the hypothesized introspection illusion, we fur- seem to genuinely reXect their mental contents, then observ-
ther predicted that observers would impute a large degree ers failure to value such reports would tell us little. We thus
of bias to actors (relative to how much bias the actors saw next examined actors introspective reports more closely. In
in themselves) even when the observers were given access to so doing, we also sought to ensure that those reports did
actors ongoing thoughts. Consistent with this hypothesis, not yield evidence that actors were aware of their bias
observers assessments of bias did not diVer depending on (since our theoretical account posits that actors denials of
whether they had such access, F < 1 (see Fig. 2). Moreover, personal bias involve its nonconscious occurrence).
observers perceived more bias in actors than actors did in
themselves regardless of whether or not those observers Actors introspective reports
were provided with actors introspections, Fs (1, 30) D 8.26 Quantity. To explore whether actors provided useful intro-
and 8.06, ps D .008. spective reports, we Wrst recorded the length of their
reports. The median length was 96 words (SD D 50). One
7
report fell precisely at the median:
Observers
6 Actors Im pretty considerate, and I expect others to be as well.
One of my pet peeves is when people do not say thank
5
you when you hold the door for them. When Im in a
r = .48*
Perceived
Bias 4
bad mood my considerate qualities kind of Xy out the
r = .17 window.
3 I dont think Im very deceptive at all. Im a horrible liar
and feel guilty even thinking about lying.
2
Im not very patient, but generally I get along w/ others
1
pretty well.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I dont think I have anything to be snobby about, espe-
Degree of better-than-average effect evident in ratings cially compared to some of the people here.
Fig. 1. Attention to behavior (in the form of personality ratings) on the
part of actors versus observers assessing susceptibility to the better-than- We next examined whether the results of this study
average eVect (Study 2). would persist among observers who read lengthy introspec-
tive reports. We thus conducted our analyses againbut
this time only with those actor-observer triads in which
5 actors provided reports in the upper tertile for word length.
The results supported the hypothesis that observers disre-
gard of introspective reports was not a function of those
Perceived Bias
Fig. 2. Actors versus observers reports of whether actors personality rat- Quality. Next, we examined the question of whether
ings were inXuenced by the better-than-average eVect (Study 2). observers disregarded actors introspective reports because
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 7
they thought those reports were not faithful accounts of the people accurately. Aspects of this ability include the ability
actors thoughts. Two research assistants rated each intro- to make quick judgments about people based on their facial
spective report in terms of whether or not it appeared to be expressions, the way in which they present themselves,
an understandable and descriptive account of what the per- apparent categories to which they belong, and other aspects
son was thinking, and whether or not it appeared to be a of their appearances and/or behaviors. They were told that
genuine reXection of what the person was thinking. we were investigating the validity of diVerent measures of
Of the 32 introspective reports, 75% were viewed by both this ability.
raters as understandable and descriptive accounts of the Participants were then presented with our purported test
actors thoughts, and 78% were viewed by both raters as of social intelligence (adapted from Pronin, Lin et al., 2002)
honest and genuine accounts. When we limited our analyses and told what it involved (i.e., matching peoples appear-
to only those triads in which actors accounts were viewed ances with their alleged written self-descriptions). They
as understandable/descriptive and genuine (72% of triads), were told that their performance would be assessed by com-
our predictions were again supported. Observers who paring it to that of other Princeton students who had taken
received such reports saw the actors who provided them as the test for the purpose of building standardized norms on
more biased than those actors saw themselves (Ms D 4.52 it. Before leaving the participant to take the test, the exper-
vs. 3.39), F (1, 22) D 6.18, p D .02. And, observers who imenter commented that social intelligence is determined
received those reports attributed similar amounts of bias as mostly by unconscious processes and that it is thus diY-
did observers who received no reports (Ms D 4.52, 4.41), cult to gauge how one is performing on the test.
F D 0. After the participant completed the test, the experi-
menter appeared to score it, and she gave the participant a
Nonconscious bias. Our introspection illusion account is score sheet indicating that 7 of 18 matches had been made
rooted in the assumption that actors commissions of bias correctly, placing the participant in the 30th percentile
typically occur nonsconsciously and that, as a result, atten- among Princeton students who had taken the test. To
tion to introspections will not yield evidence of bias. Con- obtain a recording of the participants thoughts about the
sistent with this hypothesis, a research assistant coder of test validity, the experimenter said:
actors written accounts found that only one of the 32
To help get your perspective on the validity of this social
actors indicated any conscious awareness of the possibility
intelligence test, Id like to give you a chance to think
that her ratings may have been positively biased; that par-
about your opinion as to whether this might or might
ticipant wrote: Hmm I wonder if Im snobbier than I
not be a valid test of social intelligence, and Id like you
perceive.
to record your thoughts about this as they go through
These analyses lend credence to our suggestion that a
your head. Your thoughts dont have to be complete
lack of good introspective access was not the only cause of
sentences or even fully formed thoughts; words or
observers weighing introspections less than actors. Our
phrases are Wne, just whatever goes through your head.
next study aimed to obtain yet better introspective access
by having actors verbalize their ongoing thoughts. After providing their tape recording (in privacy), partici-
pants were asked: Do you think this task is a valid mea-
Study 3: Richer access to others introspections sure of social intelligence? (1 D Not at all valid, 7 D Very
valid). Then, in an ostensible eVort to inform them about
Actor participants took a purported test of social intelli- the study, the experimenter provided a description of the
gence and received a low score. They then were asked to self-protective tendency in evaluations of test validity (see
think aloud about the tests validity, and then to rate its Pronin, Lin et al., 2002). Participants then assessed whether
validity. Observer participants were shown the test, a yoked this bias had aVected them: To what extent do you think
actors purportedly low score on it, and that actors rating your own score inXuenced your evaluation of the test?
of the tests validity. Half of observers also heard their (1 D Not at all inXuenced, 7 D Very much inXuenced).
yoked actors thoughts. All participants then rated their
own (or a yoked actors) bias in evaluating the test. Other-assessment conditions. These conditions resembled
the self-assessment condition, except that rather than being
Method left to take the test, participants were told: Youre not
actually taking the test. They were told (underlined por-
Participants tions for introspective-access participants only):
A total of 81 Princeton undergraduates participated in
To help us get an observers perspective on the validity
exchange for course credit.
of this social intelligence test, Im going to show you one
students score on the test and the rating of validity that
Procedure and questionnaire
that student gave the test. Before providing this rating,
Self-assessment condition. Upon agreeing to participate in a
the student was told, Id like to give you a chance to
study concerning social intelligence, participants were told
think about your opinion as to whether this might or
that: Social intelligence involves the ability to judge other
ARTICLE IN PRESS
8 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 9
To examine whether the eVects observed in this study about situations in which bias might arise (e.g., hiring deci-
would persist in the case of observers who were provided sions). Each one was described as involving either the par-
with lengthy introspective reports, we conducted our analy- ticipant or another person. Participants were asked to
ses againbut this time only including those actor- choose between an action-oriented versus an introspection-
observer triads in which actors provided reports in the oriented description of what it might mean to be biased
upper tertile for length. The blind spot eVect again in that situation.
appeared. Observers who heard lengthy introspective
reports nevertheless saw their yoked actors as more biased Method
than those actors saw themselves (Ms D 5.00 vs. 3.78), F (1,
16) D 4.99, p D .04. Moreover, those observers attributed Participants
similar amounts of bias to actors as did their peers without Thirty-eight Princeton undergraduates participated in
such access (both Ms D 5.00), F D 0. exchange for candy.
Quality. Next, we examined whether observers may have Procedure and questionnaire
disregarded actors introspective reports because they Participants completed a questionnaire describing eight
viewed those reports as less than genuine. We recruited a situations in which bias might occur: Hiring job applicants
new set of Princeton students (N D 27) to participate in the from diVerent groups (gender or race bias); Evaluating the
other-assessment condition with introspective access. This quality of a test after doing poorly on it (self-protective bias);
condition resembled that already reported in every way Feelings about two previously liked products after choosing
except that participants were asked one additional ques- one of them (dissonance reduction); Reactions to negative
tion: i.e., whether or not they thought the report they heard self-relevant information (motivated processing); Attribu-
was a genuine reXection of the test-takers thoughts. tions about crime victims (fundamental attribution error);
Of these participants, 81% felt that their yoked peer pro- Evaluations of collaborative contributions (egocentric bias);
vided a genuine introspective account. When the responses of Betting on a roulette wheel (gamblers fallacy); Interest in
these 81% were analyzed (along with the responses of their suddenly available romantic partners (reactive devaluation).
yoked actor and no-introspective-access observer peers), our For participants in the self-assessment condition, the sce-
usual pattern of results emerged. Participants who were satis- narios were worded such that they themselves were the
Wed with their yoked actors introspective reports neverthe- actor in each scenario. For participants in the other-assess-
less saw those actors as more biased than those actors saw ment condition, another person (with a diVerent name in
themselves (Ms D 4.64 vs. 3.59), F (1, 42) D 8.87, p D .005. each scenario) was always the actor. After reading each sce-
Moreover, those satisWed observers attributed similar nario, participants were asked, depending on condition,
amounts of bias to actors as did their peers who had no What might it mean for you to be biased in this situa-
introspective access (Ms D 4.64, 4.82), F < 1. tion? or What might it mean for [Carol/John/etc.] to be
biased in this situation? They were given two response
Nonconscious bias. Our introspection illusion account is options, one describing an action and another describing a
rooted in the assumption that commissions of bias typically thought, feeling, or motive. For example, the dissonance
occur nonsconsciously and that, as a result, attention to reduction scenario (in the self-assessment condition) was as
introspections will not yield evidence of bias. Consistent follows, excluding the bracketed information:
with this assumption, a graduate student coder found that
only 3 (out of 27) actors mentioned in their recordings the You recently had to make a purchase, and you couldnt
possibility that their test score may have inXuenced their decide whether to choose item X or item Y. You ulti-
perception of the test. No participant used the word bias. mately select item X.
The forgoing studies provide evidence for our hypothesis What might it mean to be biased in this situation?
of a selfother asymmetry in valuation of introspective A. After selecting item X, you try to make yourself
versus behavioral information for assessing bias. Our par- feel better about your choice by thinking about all of
ticipants seemed to act as though they had two diVerent the positive qualities of item X and all of the prob-
theories of what it means to be biased: one, relying on lems with item Y [Thought/feeling/motive]
introspections, that they applied to themselves, and B. You tell people all the great things about the
another, relying on behavior, that they applied to their item you chose (item X), and the negative things
peers. Study 4 explored this hypothesis more directly. about the one you didnt choose (item Y). [Action]
Study 4: Theories of bias in self versus others The other seven scenarios can be found in the Appendix
This study aimed to further explore the hypothesis that Results and discussion
people are more likely to view bias as deWned by introspec-
tions (rather than behavior) when they are deWning it with As predicted, participants showed a selfother asymme-
respect to themselves (rather than others). Participants read try in how they deWned bias. They were more likely to
ARTICLE IN PRESS
10 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
spot measure.
60%
Procedure
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were told
40% that they would be completing two unrelated studies. The
Wrst, they were told, was a message comprehension study.
For it, they were given a scientiWc article or articles to read
20% (see below), with each one followed by a series of true/false
Behavioral definition Introspection definition questions included to bolster our cover story. The second
study, they were told, was a perceptual questionnaire. In
Fig. 5. Selection of behavioral versus introspective deWnitions of bias
reality, the Wrst task constituted our experimental manipu-
when considering the self versus others (Study 4).
lation, and the second our dependent measure.
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 11
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, (1 D much less than the average student, 6 D same as the aver-
Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005; Nail, Harton, & Decker, age student, 11 D much more than the average student).
2003), social judgment (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977b), and pan-
tyhose preferences (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977a). Thus, for Results and discussion
example, Bargh and colleagues (1996) classic experiment
was described as follows: Consistent with past research, participants in the control
condition showed a bias blind spot. They reported being
In one study, subjects were led to think about elderly
less susceptible than their collegiate peers to the set of
people. The subjects were then told that the experiment
biases (M D 5.29, where 6 D same as peers), t (38) D 4.67,
was over and that they were free to go. What did the
p < .0001. Our primary concern in this research involved
experimenter measure? How quickly the person walked
participants in the experimental condition, which had edu-
down the hall when leaving the experiment. And yes, the
cated them about the importance of nonconscious pro-
people with the elderly thoughts took longer (16).
cesses. Consistent with our hypothesizing, those
These various nonconscious eVects were described as participants did not show a bias blind spot (M D 5.88), t < 1.
arising from a range of diVerent sources that participants Moreover, participants who were educated about the role
failed to recognize as causally responsible, including sub- of nonconscious processes not only avoided committing the
liminal primes, the media, and behavioral mimicry. Evi- bias blind spot but also were more likely than their control
dence for these eVects was described as deriving from a condition peers to avoid that commission, F (1, 76) D 6.69,
variety of scientiWc methods, including laboratory experi- p D .01.
ments, fMRI studies, survey research, and longitudinal data These results provide further evidence for the introspec-
sets. The central message of the article was that there are tion illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. When partic-
many factors inXuencing our behavior and judgments that ipants were taught that valuing introspections is likely to
do not register in our introspections. The concluding para- lead one astray in making judgments about inXuences on
graph included the following summary: the self, they ceased claiming that they were less susceptible
to bias than their peers. These results also demonstrate an
Try as they might, experimenters have not been able to
eVective method for eliminating the bias blind spot. This
make people realize when they have been unintention-
may be a useful goal in its own right, as the tendency to
ally inXuenced. We believe that we would know if our
claim objectivity in ones own judgments, while readily
actions were being so drastically altered. Yet these stud-
imputing bias to others, can exacerbate conXict (Pronin,
ies and hundreds of others have all shown that we know
Kennedy, & Butsch, 2006; Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002).
less about our motivations and about the sources of our
actions, judgments, and decisions than we thought.
General discussion
The article was formatted to appear as though it were
photocopied from Science. It was 1643 words excluding ref- The research reported here supports the contention that
erences. As with the Nature piece, it was followed by a series the bias blind spot is rooted at least in part in an introspec-
of true/false questions. Most participants (93%) answered tion illusion. These results suggest that the tendency to
at least 8 of the 9 questions correctly. impute bias more to others than to the self is rooted in peo-
ples tendency to value introspective informationat the
Dependent measure expense of considering actionswhen assessing bias in
Our dependent measure described 10 diVerent biases and themselves, but not others.
called for participants to rate their own susceptibility, rela- First, participants showed a selfother asymmetry in
tive to that of their Princeton peers, to each one. Partici- the information they considered when making assessments
pants were told that the survey dealt with several of bias. In Study 1, they reported attending to introspective
tendencies that can aVect judgment and thought and that information more than behavioral information for assess-
they would be asked to indicate how much you think that ing bias in themselves but not others, and this selfother
YOU PERSONALLY show each tendency relative to diVerence mediated the eVect of self/other on imputations
other students AT PRINCETON. The measure included of bias. The results of Studies 23 extended these Wndings
the bias descriptions used in Study 1 (for the self-serving on information consideration to participants assessing a
bias, fundamental attribution error, and positive halo speciWc instance of bias in themselves or in a peer. Partici-
eVect), as well as descriptions of the disconWrmation ten- pants reported considering introspections more than
dency (biased assimilation), the spreading of alternatives behavior for self but not a peer (Study 2). And, in Studies 2
after free choice (dissonance reduction), self-interest, the and 3, actors ignored their biased actions in drawing con-
hostile media eVect, the anchoring eVect, the better-than- clusions about whether they had been biased, whereas
average eVect, and in-group favoritism (Cronbachs yoked observers took such information into account.
D .70). Each bias description was followed by the ques- Second, the selfother diVerence in participants reli-
tion: To what extent do you believe that you show this ance on introspective information was not simply a matter
tendency compared to the average Princeton student? of observers lacking access to actors introspections.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
12 E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx
Participants in Study 1a reported that introspections were a thoughts (Study 1), and with their actual disregard of spe-
more valuable source of information about their own bias ciWc biased actions (Studies 2 and 3).
than others bias. In Studies 23 the observed selfother These Wndings of behavioral disregard are noteworthy in
asymmetry in bias perception emerged not just among the general context of lay social judgment. In most of life,
actors with introspective access and observers without it, we are judged by our actions rather than by our intentions,
but also when observers were provided with introspective hopes, or feelings. We are generally characterized as good
access. Indeed, these eVects persisted even when observers or evil, generous or greedy, and wild or dull, not by what we
were provided with substantial introspective reports (more think about but by what we actually do. In this light, it is
than 150 words) and when they believed that those reports striking that people ignore their own actions when making
were faithful accounts of actors ongoing thoughts. In assessments of bias. Although the term introspection illu-
Study 4, participants literally chose to deWne bias in terms sion emphasizes selfother diVerences in the faith that
of introspective contents rather than actions when primed people place in their introspections, a necessary component
to think about bias in themselves rather than others. of it involves the neglect with which people treat their own
Finally, the results of Study 5 demonstrated that when par- behaviors.
ticipants were informed (in an allegedly separate study)
that it would be unwise to place so much value on their Self-enhancement and bias perception
introspections, they overcame the usual tendency to see
themselves as less biased than their peers. The tendency to rely heavily on ones own introspections
The observed selfother asymmetry in peoples willing- when making bias assessments, while ignoring ones behav-
ness to rely on introspective information has been referred ior, may have a motivational component to it. Biases are gen-
to as an introspection illusion because the faith people have erally viewed as undesirable and thus people are likely to
in the diagnostic value of their introspections is misplaced. want to deny them. Indeed, past research has shown that
It is true that introspective contents, such as thoughts, feel- people are more likely to deny their relative susceptibility to
ings and intentions, can provide a useful source of informa- negatively valenced biases than to positively valenced ones
tion about the self, for example when it comes to (Pronin, Lin et al., 2002). In this regard, motivational con-
understanding the causes of our behavior or predicting how cerns may provide a mechanism that underlies the introspec-
we will act in the future (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). But, it is tion illusion mechanism we have shown. Given a choice
also true that such information can mislead us in those very between considering their behavior versus considering their
same cases, when our behavior has been inXuenced by non- thoughts, actors may have preferred to consider thoughts
conscious cues or when future circumstances prevent our and thereby see themselves as bias-free (rather than consider-
good intentions from translating into good behavior. ing behavior and thereby being compelled to acknowledge
possible bias).
Behavioral disregard Yet, we hasten to note, peoples motive to deny personal
bias probably could not be served by their relying on intro-
In the present research, participants not only weighted spective information if they were well-aware of the striking
introspective information more in the case of self than oth- fallibility of such information. It would be diYcult to feel
ers, but they concurrently weighted behavioral information good about ones self-proclaimed lack of bias if one knew
more in the case of others than self. Our participants even that this proclamation relied on false information. Thus, we
seemed to claim that such behavioral disregard was imagine that the selfother asymmetry in valuing thoughts
appropriate for judging themselves, but not others. This versus actions likely involves an interplay of both cognitive
claim is clearly unjustiWed. Apart from the obvious problem factors (involving the felt validity of personal introspec-
of holding self and other to diVerent standards for judging tions) and motivational factors (involving the increased
bias (standards which will clear the self of bias more often possibility for denying bias when introspections provide the
than others), treatment of introspective information as sov- basis for judgment). Though our participants were likely
ereign leads to frequent misjudgments, as we have already motivated to see themselves in a positive light, their eVorts
noted. Although some research suggests that observers are could easily have been thwarted were they fully aware of
overly prone to view actors as biased (Kruger & Gilovich, the weak value of their own introspections. The results of
1999; Van Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich, 1999), the present Study 5 support this hypothesis. When participants were
studies show that actors are overly prone to deny their own informed that introspective information generally is a poor
bias. Even when actors collectively rated themselves as bet- source of information about inXuences on human judgment
ter-than-average, and even when they questioned the valid- and action, they no longer showed the tendency to deny
ity of a test on which they had performed poorly (a test that their relative susceptibility to bias.
they would have praised had they performed well, as shown Of course, the judgmental biases that are the focus of
by Pronin, Lin et al., 2002), they denied showing signs of this article are not the only inXuences that can elude intro-
bias. Moreover, these denials were associated with their spective awareness. Decades of research have revealed that
self-reported disregard of behavior and reliance on much of human behavior is guided by mental processes and
contextual cues that are beyond conscious awareness (for
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Pronin, M.B. Kugler / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xxx (2006) xxxxxx 13
classic and modern reviews, see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977a; A. You feel motivated to make yourself feel better,
Wegner & Bargh, 1998). The present research suggests the so you try to think of reasons why the exam was unfair.
hypothesis that individuals may deny the inXuence of a B. You complain loudly and strongly about the
whole host of nonconscious inXuences on their own judg- fairness of the professors grading criteria for the
ments and actions, while readily imputing those inXuences exam.
to other people. Recent work suggests that people may see 3. You just read a magazine article about the declining
others as far more susceptible than themselves to confor- beneWts of an Ivy League education. What might it mean
mity and implicit social inXuence (Pronin, Berger, & Molo- to be biased in this situation?
uki, 2006). Perhaps individuals also view themselves as less A. You throw the article in the garbage and say it
susceptible to implicit prejudice and to priming eVects in is absurd.
general. Future studies could examine whether when we B. You feel the need to Wnd Xaws in the articles
deny our own susceptibility to racial or gender prejudice, or arguments.
even to the subtle inXuence of the weather on our mood, we 4. Youre sitting on a jury in a case where someones home
are alone in those denials. The present research suggests was robbed. What might it mean to be biased in this situ-
that such selfother asymmetries are especially likely to ation?
occur in cases where the relevant inXuence is likely to oper- A. You point out to the jury that the victims front
ate below conscious awareness (while leaving behavioral door had been left unlocked and so the robbery is due
evidence). to the victims own foolishness.
B. You personally believe that people get what
ConXict and misunderstanding they deserve, and so you feel that the robbery was the
victims fault because the door was left unlocked.
The tendency to deny bias in oneself while imputing it to 5. You just turned in a group project that you know the
others is likely to foster interpersonal conXict and misun- professor likes, and the professor asks every member of
derstanding. When others have shown just the same the four-person group to write down how much he or
amount of self-interest in their political views as we have, or she contributed to the Wnal project. What might it mean
when they have shown just the same amount of intergroup to be biased in this situation?
bias in their decisions about whom to reward and whom to A. You write down that you did about 60% of the
punish, we are likely to see them as biased and ourselves as work.
objective especially when those others views and deci- B. You want to see yourself as having contributed
sions diVer from our own. ConXict is likely to ensue, and more than everyone else to the project.
feelings of enmity are likely to worsen, as we resent their 6. Youre gambling, and the roulette wheel has now landed
accusations of us as biased, when we are certain that we on red four times in a row. What might it mean to be
have not been, and when we are certain that they have been. biased in this situation?
Here, one lesson of this research is clear. Whether we A. Although your prior bets have all been small,
choose to deWne bias according to behavior or introspec- you now place a rather large beton black.
tion, fairness dictates that we apply the same deWnition to B. You think that since there has been a streak of
others that we apply to ourselves. If we are unwilling to red, black must be due to come up next.
accept that our adversaries are free of bias because their 7. Youre at a school dance and you immediately notice
thoughts were pure, we should not use this argument to someone great-looking who you point out to all your
defend our own freedom from bias. Likewise, if we think it friends. The person comes right over and asks you to
is reasonable to accuse others of bias based on their actions, dance. What might it mean to be biased in this
we should be prepared to consider our own actions as situation?
equally capable of betraying signs of bias. A. You suddenly think that the person must not
be as cute as you thought, or else they would be more
Appendix A. Questionnaire Items (Study 4) hard to get.
B. You suddenly tell all your friends that youre
1. Imagine that you are the manager at a store, and you are not interested in the person at all, and you set your
sifting through job applications to decide whom to hire. eyes on someone new.
What might it mean to be biased in this situation?
A. You end up hiring people mainly of your race Note. Excludes one item reported in Methods section.
and gender. Above items are for the self version.
B. While you are reading the applications, you
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