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State Succession In International Law-Debt, Property & Asset


Written by: Divyam Agarwal & Mohit Goel - Final Year Students, Amity Law School
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rld War II, State succession has become increasingly important as it affects more States and more legal relationships than e
pproximately 100 new States emerged with the end of decolonization. Recently, Germany reunified, while the Soviet Union,
a and Czechoslovakia dissolved. These changes affected more legal relationships than the earlier decolonization process. T
med European States are more integrated into the political, economic and legal global framework and are of greater importa
ormer dependent territories that became new States.(1) This Article attempts to introduce the law of state succession, the e
cession on debts. This article tries to reflect upon the nature of the problems that arise and may go some way towards ameli
t. This Article will argue that in spite of a failure to codify State succession matters, a lack of consensus among learned auth
encies in older precedents, there seems to be an emerging consensus in recent practice suggesting that State succession
ally lead to a disruption of legal relationships at all levels.

pts to Codify or Legislate the Law of State Succession


has very correctly remarked that the law of state succession is a subject which presents such a rich diversity of practice as
usibility to a surprisingly varied range of theoretical analysis and doctrine. (2)It is a subject, which has been largely confused
o simple exposition. Despite the vast amount of literature on the subject, rarely is mention made of the topic without referen
y of issues involved, the almost total doctrinal schism that has polarized thinking, and the lack of any agreed theoretical stru
ommented, [a] close examination of State practice afforded no convincing evidence of any general doctrine by reference to
s problems of succession in respect of treaties could find their appropriate solution.(3)

national Law Commission (ILC) has considered the matter extensively (4), and two international conventions on the law of s
n have been adopted (5). Neither of the two conventions has entered into force although each requires but fifteen ratificatio
ns for entry into force.(6) The ILC deals with State succession under four categorical headings:
s: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Vienna I);(7)
roperty, State debt and State archives: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property Archive
enna II);(8)
ership to international Organizations: the ILC Rapporteur concluded that the subject matter was not appropriate for codificati
ur recommended a report to provide illustrations for resolving different categories of problems--illustrations which could have
ffect on the practice of Organizations;(9) and
uccession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons: the Rapporteur also failed to find any prospects for
on and recommended an ILC report or a United Nations General Assembly draft declaration setting minimum standards for t
acquisition of nationality. These minimum standards would serve as guidelines for State legislation concerned with State
n.(10)

Doctrine
failed efforts to codify or legislate a doctrine for State succession reflects the state of legal doctrine as supported by preced
xis and opinions of learned authors.(11) State practice and legal theory regarding succession yield separate approaches dea
consequences of such succession:
ntinuity of treaties, claims, debts, etc.;
continuity "clean slate" or tabula rasa;
stic distinction according to the type of State succession or to the type of legal relationship concerned; and
-by-case settlement by mutual agreement between the successor State and other States concerned. The fourth option inclu
n of the rebus sic stantibus principle although the widely-accepted Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties only allows the
o be applied within an existing treaty relationship.(12) The principle's invocation presupposes agreement on the treaty's con

authors, the central issue of substance is simply whether or not one of two alternative theses should be applied: the univer
n thesis or the clean slate (tabula rasa) thesis.(13) The former approach is a derivative of the Roman law concept of inher
n which the heres (the appointed successors) acquire not merely a single res, but an aggregate of rights and liabilities called
s.(14)

rasa: The Clean Slate Doctrine


n of simply denying State succession to treaties, known as the tabula rasa or clean slate doctrine and re-inventing internatio
h case of State succession has never been adopted or openly defended in recent State practice. The clean slate thesis app
rged in the late nineteenth century as a result of the influence of voluntarist or imperative approaches to law. It proceeds fro
nding of law as deriving from the expression of sovereign will, and embodies thereby the view that legal relations are essenti
As a result, the process of transformation necessarily involves a legal hiatus when the sovereignty of one state comes to an
akes its place. In such a situation, there can be no transfer of rights or obligations between the old and the new state.(15) R
ing sovereign is free of all rights and obligations save those it assumes afresh.

omas Baty(16) has asserted:


ernment functioning in a given area disappears, and is succeeded by no one government, but new governments arise and m
es in various portions of the original area, then it is clear that the State, as such ceases to exist, and that several new states
Were it otherwise, Italy as the heir of the Roman Empire would have a good title to the whole continent of Europe.

application of the tabula rasa doctrine also suggest that the Successor State may not have succeeded to either the property
e Predecessor State?(17) The ----main argument in favor of the clean slate doctrine is that treaties are generally burdensom
s to sovereignty and that a new State should be free to reconsider the Predecessor State's treaties. The rationale being tha
ntal change of circumstances results in the formation of a new state and it is not the upholder of the obligations entered into
sor.(18) The distinction Vienna I makes between newly independent States, which are offered a clean slate, and other succe
as been justified with the argument that these formerly dependent territories did not have a voice in the adoption of the prede
eaties, whereas separated States presumably did.(19) In fact, even Austria avoids application of its clean slate doctrine and
cal continuation of treaty relations until a new agreement has been reached.(20) Austria has negotiated lists of treaties to co
e States and has confirmed these lists in an exchange of notes after receiving Austrian parliamentary approval. Austria has p
one of novation and the conclusion of a new treaty.

ysis was also adopted by the Sixth Legal Committee of the General Assembly (21) during the dismemberment of Pakistan fr
d that when a new state is created by separation from a member of the United Nations it couldnt under the system of the Ch
status of a member of the U.N. unless it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter
, states will not remain members when they are legally extinguished and new states will remain as new states.(23

sal Succession: The Continuity Theory


nuation theory of state succession is an anti-thesis to the clean-slate theory of membership.(24) Under the continuity theory
s may still pass to States that have lost extensive portions of their territories and/or have undergone radical changes in gove
s they are considered to have inherited the essential legal identity of the former member.(25) In this regard, a distinction mus
ween the concepts of continuity and state succession. In the former, the same State is deemed to continue to exist, while in
ore successor States are deemed to have replaced the former State.(26) Prichard explains that at the time of Justinian:

rsal successor assumes the whole of the legal clothing of the person to whom he succeeds; steps, as it were, into his shoes
r his rights and liabilities of every kind; his property (res singulae) and iura in re aliena, the debts and other obligations (such
ction for damages for breach of contract) owing to him, and the debts and obligations which he owes

he work of Gentili(27), Grotius(28) and Pufendorf(29) that such concepts found their way, in rudimentary form, into the body
nal law, it being argued that the rights and duties of the predecessor passed ipso jure to a successor sovereign. Although su
ere generally concerned primarily with succession of the person of the sovereign (i.e. what is now referred to as succession
ents), rather than succession of states, the universal succession thesis survived largely intact until the late nineteenth centu
age it found its justification not so much in theistic dogma but in theories of popular continuity(31), organic substitution(32)
y enough, auto limitation(33).

continuity theory, there can be only two ways to view the division of a state: (i) as a "breakaway," in which one of the divisio
s the continuing existence of the State while the others represent States that have seceded from it; or (ii) as a complete "dis
he State has been dissolved and none of the resulting States represent its continuity. Thus, the determination of whether the
n a State constitute an extinction of its legal personality is critical to the inheritance of its rights and duties and other obligati
tity of a State might be destroyed through division,(34) if it loses (a) Majority of the population and territory of the former stat
vernment, its original territorial nucleus, or areas from which it obtained extensive revenues(36); (c) acceptance by the inter
y regarding its continuity.(37)

rsal succession thesis demands too much. It argues for the maintenance of legal continuity in circumstances in which some
of legal relations is both inevitable and necessary. It assumes that states may be burdened with obligations in a situation wh
onsent is palpably absent, not because of any universal necessity but because of some inchoate systemic interest in legal c
s approach in this regard is undoubtedly radical, and for that reason his tentative phraseology is entirely apposite. His sugg
nt to a disposal of all questions of succession understood as an inheritance or assumption of rights and obligations by ref
normal bivalent division between succession and non-succession but to the integrity of the legal relations themselves.(38)

f state succession has, for some time, been explicitly contingent upon the personality of the state, and specifically its ident
y, which remained the point of differentiation between the operation of two distinct legal regimes. Identity, therefore, serves t
te between a case of cession (or secession) and one of dismemberment,(39) between a case of absorption (or annexation)
and between the birth of a new state and its resurrection. In each case, the defining consideration is whether or not the state
d retains its legal identity; in other words, whether it continues its personality as a state. Such differentiations are thought to
y important because international law presumes that all decisions relating to the continuation or otherwise of a states rights
sets and liabilities, will be dependent upon the universal characterization adopted. This, in turn, flows from the proposition th
on of international rights and duties inheres in an entity with appropriate legal personality. Identity, therefore, provides the ke
ng the proper set of norms that are to be applied in a given case.

of difference between identity and personality of a state may be described as follows: whereas the concepts of statehood
y proceed on the understanding that states have certain attributes or qualities in common and that they are thereby attribute
ntly enjoy, certain competencies under international law, the concept of identity, by contrast, assumes that individual states,
mbers of a particular class of social or legal entities, also possess certain distinguishing features that differentiate one from a
herefore, presumes personality but is concerned with what is personal or exceptional in the nature of the subject.

stating as precedent the reunification of Germany did not affect the legal position of the Federal Republic of Germany since
identical with itself after the incorporation of the new Lander emerging from the former GDR. Because the State authority w
before and the State's territory was merely enlarged, the "moving frontier rule" applies under the law of succession.(40) Furt
population of the enlarged Federal Republic was identical. The GDR underwent a peaceful revolution when demonstrators c
ans from "We are the people" (i.e., the sovereign, above the State organs) to "We are one people." Despite the incorporation
the Federal Republic of Germany, there was of course State succession as to the GDR since the GDR had actually and leg
s a State entity.
rison, the claim of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), created on April 27, 1992, to be identical wi
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) could only be upheld if there still was a Yugoslav nation. However, this condit
y not present since four of the six federated States declared themselves independent after having been authorized to do so
s. Additionally, the organized political authority of the SFRY did not survive the disruption of the Federation.

Succession
state succession (41) forms part of the established corpus of classical international law, it is an area of especial confusion a
ency. As the German Federal Supreme Court noted in the Espionage Prosecution Case, (42) the problem of State Successio
st disputed areas of international law. (43) Why this should be so is a fascinating question. Different international crises resu
n of particular states or empires have not always been treated in a consistent fashion for a host of political reasons and this
led to difficulties in formulating the relevant legal rules which predictability. Accordingly, one needs to sift through such diffus
international practice, bearing in mind that specific bilateral solutions to particular problems may not necessarily be instantl
able. The pattern of international reaction to such specific episodes needs to be carefully weighed since recognition in a situ
ent and uncertain practice assumes perforce a greater importance than might perhaps otherwise be the case. As the Arbitrat
on established by the Conference on Yugoslavia starkly emphasized, there are few well-established principles of internation
to State succession. Application of these principles is largely to be determined case by case though the 1978 and 1983 Vie
on do offer some guidance.(44)

d the concept of statehood (45) lie at the heart of international law. As Oppenheim notes, States are the principal subjects o
nal law and thereby possess international personality of the fullest kind.(46) It is quit apparent that one cannot tackle the que
cession, i.e the issue of transmission of rights and obligations from one State to another without at first confronting the probl
. Succession is predicated upon the existence of two (or more) States has been resolved in a way that the issue of identity
of States has been resolved in a way that presents the international community with at least two states.(47) Of course, in th
f cases no problem will occur at this point, but in some situations this will not be so. In addition, it is important conceptually t
h issues focusing upon statehood from those concerned with succession in order to be able to appreciate the crucial distinc
he legal consequences flowing from a determination as between continuity and succession.

s State Succession?
m(48) has stated that a succession of international persons occurs when one or more international persons takes the place
nternational person, in consequence of certain changes in the latters condition.(49) Such a succession may involve any cate
nal persons, but it is convenient here to consider only successions involving states, whether fully or partially sovereign. Whil
eld simply notes that the transfer of one State to another is usually described as State Succession.(50)

and II state that succession is "the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of
51) This definition excludes mere changes of government like those revolutionary transformations of a State brought about
on of socialism or by its abolition. The Vienna Conventions' definition avoids tricky questions as to, what is a state? - In the s
vocations of the principle of self-determination avoid saying to whom the right is granted. The definition of State succession
symptom or to the effect relevant for international law in the succession of responsibility for a predecessor State's internatio
Yet this symptom of responsibility for international relations is the result of a social, political, and historical process with
nces in the fields of national constitutional, administrative, and civil law. And there the question concerning the process of S
n frequently becomes unavoidable, especially when it is necessary to determine the date on which State succession has ta
addressing the issue of when a succession has occurred, the Vienna Conventions simply state: 'date of the succession of S
e date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of t
o which the succession of States relates.(52) The nature of State succession must be considered when a State claims to be
mer State. The definition of the Vienna Conventions correctly reflects the general conviction that a State identical with anoth
its successor.(53)

of state succession can arise in a number of defined circumstances, which mirror the ways in which political sovereignty m
by, for example, decolonization of all or part of an existing territorial unit, dismemberment of an existing state, secession, an
er. In each of these cases a once-recognized entity disappears in whole or in part to be succeeded by some other authority,
ng problems of transmission of rights and obligations. However, the question of state succession does not infringe upon the
duties if states under international law. These exist by virtue of the fundamental principles of international law and as a
nce of sovereignty and not as a result of transference from the previous sovereign. The issue of state succession should als
hed from questions of succession of governments, particularly revolutionary succession, and consequential patterns of reco
onsibility.(54)

the problem is different in the case of total acquisition from what it is the case of partial acquisition. In the former case there
person to whom antecedent rights and obligations may still be attributed, whereas in the latter case there is. The problem in
ascertain what rights and obligations pass to the Successor State and what lapse for want of a juridical entity in which they
The problem in the other case is to distinguish those rights and obligations, which are automatically transferred to the succe
m those, which remain with the Predecessor State.
des whether State succession has taken place? The international community can influence this determination. Third State d
owever, determinative, creating a problem similar to that of recognition of States: As third States cannot recognize an entity
State that does not want to be one, likewise third States cannot impose their view in cases of State succession. Thus the c
Latvia and Lithuania not to be successor States to the Soviet Union has been generally accepted in State practice. Although
nnot force sovereignty upon an unwilling entity, third States can withhold recognition, and thus undermine a State's claim to
n. For example, the international community disregarded Yugoslavia's (Serbia and Montenegro) claim to be identical with th
ognition would not have been compatible with the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia
States with internationally recognized frontiers. It is precisely these frontiers that were questioned by the Federal Republic
a through its claim to be identical to the former SFRY.(55)

ssion to State Debt and State Property: Negotiated Settlements


Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, 1983 - A General outline.
was drafted on the basis of 13 reports elaborated by Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, the special rapporteur. The Convention was
otes in favor (mainly socialist and developing States), with 11 votes against and 11 abstentions (Western States). It has not e
as it obtained only 6 accessions out of the fifteen required - Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Repu
a and Ukraine. Six other States have signed the Convention. Significantly, States having deposited their instrument of acce
ed from the disintegration of the USSR and the SFRY.(56)

rovisions of the Convention (Art.1-6, concerning definitions, non-retroactivity of the Convention, requirement of conformity o
n with international law, general clause concerning guarantees of rights of third parties and individuals, etc.) correspond wit
e provisions of the Vienna Convention of 1978 on the succession of States in respect of treaties. Substantive provisions of th
on can be divided into two groups: general provisions concerning all the types of succession, and specific regulations dealin
types of succession. The State property was defined as all kinds of property, rights, and interests that, at the date of the suc
belonged to the Predecessor State in accordance with its domestic law. During the codification conference a special provis
order to guarantee the integrity of the predecessors property before its transfer to the Successor State (Art.13).(57) The effe
er of State property were defined in Art.9 of the Convention, according to which the property rights of the predecessor State
are replaced by the equal (as to the scope) rights of the successor State. The transfer of the property cannot influence any p
interests of third parties. The Predecessor State is not entitled to any indemnity. Finally, a general rule providing for the prio
nt between the Predecessor State and Successor State (so called devolution agreement) as to the partition of State property
.

ypes of State succession the transfer of an immobile property to the successor was confirmed. Specific regulations concern
mobile property in particular types of succession. In the case of cession, the successor State acquires the part of the mobil
connected with the predecessors activities in the ceded part of the territory. In the case of the uniting of States, clearly and m
ution provides that the successor State acquires the whole property of the predecessor State or States. According to Art.17
nvention, in cases of separation and dissolution of States the successor State acquires the immobile property situated in its
ry, the mobile property related to the activities of the predecessor State in the respective part of the territory, and -in the cas
n only- an equitable share of the remaining mobile property as well as of the property of the predecessor State situated abro
d immobile). Finally, special provision of Art.15 dealt with the position of the newly independent States (i.e. former colonies)
ould receive not only the whole property of the predecessor State situated in the territory of the new State, but also property
to the territory of the successor State and situated outside it and having become property of the predecessor State during th
dence. In particular, the proviso of Article 15, paragraph 4, as well as Art. 38, paragraph 2, with regard to debts, establishing
n agreements with newly independent States shall not infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people ov
d natural resources lead to the rejection of the Convention by the Western States.

of the Convention dealt with the succession in respect of State archives and constitutes leges speciales in relation to the pr
g the State property. General provisions of that chapter correspond with the regulations concerning the State property. Spec
s relating to the respective types of succession provide for the primacy of the devolution agreement. If no agreement was c
e of cession the successor State should receive the part of the archives necessary for an efficient administration of the acqu
s well all the documents relating fully or mostly to the ceded territory. Other documents should be reproduced upon request
of the successor State. The provisions concerning secession and dismemberment provide for the partition of the archives of
sor State in accordance to the model elaborated in the case of cession. Finally, in the case of the unification of States the su
uire all the archives of the predecessor State - in most cases all the archives are situated in its territory anyhow. Special pro
ed also a privileged position of the newly independent States, which should obtain a part of all the archives of the former me
on would seem contrary to Art. 25 of the Convention, proclaiming the principle of the unity of archives. Nevertheless, the fac
e archives obtained is closely related to the newly independent State, in particular to its territory, explains that choice.

g to Art. 33, the Convention regulated the succession of financial obligations of States towards other States, international
ons and other subjects of international law, then excluding private parties. The Convention did not refer to any classification
d above. Another important provision of the Convention reads that the succession of States itself does not infringe any rights
That clause is important in the light of the general provision that the succession cannot infringe rights and duties of third part
he creditor cannot be changed by a mere devolution agreement. In all cases in which a partition is required, the criterion gen
by the Convention was that the debt passes to the successor State in an equitable proportion. The exception was the situatio
ependent States, for which no debts pass to them, unless an agreement provides otherwise, provided that this agreement d
e principle of sovereignty of peoples over wealth and natural resources (Article 38).

s solution was one that provoked the rejection of the Convention by Western States. As to other particular types of successi
e cession the primacy of the agreement between the parties was emphasized. If there was no such agreement, the success
y an equitable share of the debt of the predecessor State debt. Similar solutions were applied in cases of secession and
erment of the predecessor State (Art.40 and 41) - the debt should be divided into proportional shares. With the exception tha
rights and interests that pass to the successor State shall be taken into consideration for the determination of an equitable
n, the Convention did not indicate any other criteria of equitable partition. Finally, in the case of unification of States, the deb
y the successor State.

Succession to Assets and Debts


ary rule with regard to the allocation of assets (including archives) and debts in succession situations is that the relevant par
ttle issues by agreement. Virtually all of the rules that are formulated in Vienna II are deemed to operate only where such ag
ken place. In addition the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission declared in Opinion No. 9 that the successor States to the SFRY
settle all aspects of the succession by agreement(58) and reinforced this approach in Opinion No. 14, declaring that the firs
e to State succession is that the successor States should consult with each other and agree a settlement of all questions rela
n.(59)

c debt (or national debt) is that debt assumed by the central government in the interests of the State as a whole. It constitute
y sensitive issue since third parties are involved who are often reluctant to accept a change in the identity of the debtor. And
of Vienna II notes a succession of States does not as such affect the rights and obligations of creditors. Art. 40 of Vienna II
e part of a state separates to from another state, unless otherwise agreed, the state debt of the predecessor state passes to
r state in an equitable proportion taking into account in particular the property, rights and interests which pass to the success
to that debt. It is doubtful that this proposition constitutes a codification of customary law as such in view of the confused an
practice of States to date, but it does reflect a viable approach.
) It follows from what has already been said that the successor state has a right to take up fiscal claims belonging to the form
the right to collect taxes due. Zemanek(60) confines succession to the situation where before independence an autonomous
ncy has through the agency of the metropolitan power contracted a localized debt, which is automatically attributed to the n
aration. In practice municipal courts will enforce obligations of the predecessor state against the successor only when the lat
d them. When the successor state is a newly independent state, no state debt shall pass, except by agreement (and then
her conditions are satisfied) (Art. 38). According to Article 2(I)(e) a newly independent state means a successor state the te
s been a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor state was responsible.

bts may be divided into national debts, being debts owned by the State as a whole; local debts, being debts contracted by a
ental territorial unit or other form of local authority, and localized debts, being debts incurred by the central government for th
of local projects or areas.
ts clearly pass under customary international law to the successor State, since they constitute arrangements entered into b
ental territorial authorities now transferred to the jurisdiction of the successor state and a succession does not directly affect
y continue to constitute debts borne by the specific territory in question.(61) Similarly, localized debts, being closely attache
o which the succession relates, also pass to the successor state in conformity with the same territorial principle.

ne cannot provide a definitive answer to the question as the allocation of the national debt as such. In the case of secession
n where the predecessor state continues to exist, it would appear that the presumption is that the responsibility for the gene
succession.(62)
rd to secured debts, the general view appears to be that debts secured by mortgage of assets located in the territory in que
e transfer of that territory. In question survive the transfer of that territory. The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon in 1919, f
(article 203 and 186 respectively) provided that assets thus pledged would remain so pledged with regard to that part of the
had been agreed would pass to the particular successor state. Such debts had to be specifically secured and the securities
salt mines or other property.(63) However, where debts have been charged to local revenue, the presumption would lie the o

es
P. O'Connell, Reflections on the State Succession Convention, 39 ZaoRV 725 (1979).
gs, General Course on Principles of International Law, 121 RdC (1967), at 437.
ok ILC (1974 - II, part i), at 168, para. 51. See also Castrn, Obligations of States Arising from the Dismemberment of Anoth
ZaRV (1951) 753.
oblem of state succession was placed on the ILCs agenda at its first session in 1949, following the recommendation of Laut
vey (UN Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, 10 Feb. 1949), 1 Yearbook ILC (1949) 53, UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1949.
Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties, 17 ILM (1978) 1488; Vienna Convention on State Succession in R
Archives and Debts, 1983, 22 ILM (1983) 306.
a, Iraq, Slovakia and Yugoslavia ratified Vienna I; while Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Morocco, Seychelles, Tunisia and Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia have succeeded. No States have ratified Vienna II and only Croatia, Estonia
nd Ukraine have acceded
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/31 (1978) [hereinafter Vie
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Apr. 8, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117
hereinafter Vienna II].
Mikulka, State Succession and its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons and State Succession in Respect
hip to International Organizations, in Outlines Prepared by Members of the Commission on Selected Topics of International
OR Int'l Law Comm'n, 45th Sess., at 26, 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/454 (1993).
33.
eport of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/36/10
er Report of the ILC]; Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974), reprinted in [1974
mm'n 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A.1974/Add.1 (Part One); see also Richard J. Graving, Status of the New York Arbitration
on: Some Gaps in Coverage but New Acceptances Confirm its Vitality, 10 Foreign Investment L.J. 1 (1995).
a Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 347 [hereinafter Law of Treaties].
fer, Succession to Treaties: South African Practice in Light of Current Developments in International Law, 30 ICLQ (1981) 5
owicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1954), at 127.
H. Anderson, International Law And State Succession: A Solution To The Iraqi Debt Crisis?, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 401, 406, 40
r Rasulov, Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties: is there a Case for Automaticity?, 14 Eur. J. Intl L. 141, 14
as Baty, The Obligation of Extinct States, 35 Yale L.J. (1925-26) 434.
rd J. Graving, Status of the New York Arbitration Convention: Some Gaps in Coverage but New Acceptances Confirm its Vit
nvestment L.J. 1, 24-38 (1995).
Connell, State Succession In Municipal Law And International Law 14-17 (1967); F.A. Vallat, Some Aspects of the Law of Sta
on, 41 Transactions of the Grotius Socy 123, 134 (1956); Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law: Rem
heory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. Intl L.J. 71, 115 (1997); Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: U.S. And Canadian Persp
es To Sovereignty and Governance, 20 Can.-U.S. L.J., 303 (1994).
24, 25.
ut Tichy, Two Recent Cases of State Succession--An Austrian Perspective, 44 Austrian J. Pub. & Int'l L. 117, 124 (1992)
ment by the Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee of the Legal problems raised by the Representatives of Argentina during the
n of the Admission of Pakistan, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/162 (1947). See Also U.N. GAOR, 6th
42d and 43d mtgs. at 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/149 (1947).
Charter of the United Nations 1945.
Connell, State Succession In Municipal Law And International Law (1967).
Connell, State Succession In Municipal Law And International Law (1967), at 228; Odon Udokang, Succession of New State
nal Treaties 22 (1972).
Schachter, The Development of International Law Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat, Brit. Y.B. I
8).
s Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 400 (1979).
re Belli Libri Tres (1612, Translated by Rolfe, 1964) III, at xxii.
re Belli ac Pacis, II, ix, 10-12, xiv, 1, 10. See OConnell, supra note 3, vol. I, at 9-10.
re Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (1688, translated by Oldfather and Oldfather, 1934) VIII, at xii, ss. 1-9.
nnell, State Succession and the Theory of the State, Grot. Soc. P. (1972) 23.
re, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction (5th ed., 1918), at 133.
stlake, International Law (1904), at 61; Idem, The Nature and Extent of the Title by Conquest, 17 LQR (1901) 392.
ew C.R. Craven, -The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law
o A. Martins, An Alternative Approach to the International Law of State Succession, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1019 (1993); Scharf
at 41.
Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in the Eastern Europe and the CIS 139 (1994); Yilma Makon
nal Law and The New States of Africa: A Study of The International Legal Programs of State Succession in The Newly Indep
East Africa 129-32 (1983).
f, supra note 14, at 41. See also Jenks, supra note 14, at 133-34; Vallat, supra note 7, at 134.
en Thomas Ebenroth et al., The Enduring Political Nature Of Questions Of State Succession And Secession And The Quest
Standards, 17 U. Pa. J. Intl Econ. L. 753, 755 (1996).
Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law, vols. I, at 3 (1968).
rek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (1954), at 205-210.
29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
nnell, Recent problems of State Succession in Relation to New States, 130 RdC (1970) p. 75; Mullerson, The Continuity and
on of States by Reference to the Former USSR and Yogoslavia, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1993) p. 473
nal Law Association, The Effect of Independence on Treaties (1965); Zemanek, State Succession after Decolonisation, 116
q.; O. Udokang, Succession of New States to International Treaties, New York, 1972; J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in His
ve, Leiden, 1974; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1998, chapter 28; UN, Materials on Successio
ew York, 1967 and supplement A/Cn. 4/263, 1972 and UN, Materials on Succession of States, New York, 191978; Internatio
on, The Effect of Independence on Treaties, London, 1965; S.Torres Bernardez, Succession of Staes in International Law;
ts and Prospects (ed. M. Bedjaoui), Paris, 1991, p. 381; M.N.Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 Finnish YIL, 1994, p.34;
on of States (ed. M.Mark), The Hague, 1999.
No. 2 BGs 38/91, 94 International law Reports, p. 68 et seq., at pp. 77-8
lso Brownlie, op. cit., p. 655 and Jennings, The Acquistion of Territory in International Law (1963) p. 7.
Opinion No. 13, 96 International Law Reports, p. 726 et seq., atp. 728.
nheims International Law, op. cit., pp. 234-5.
nheims international Law, op. cit., p.120.
k, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (1968) p. 10 et. Seq.
penheim, International Law a Treatise, Edited by H. Lauterpacht, 8th Edition (1955), E.L.B.S. reprint (1966), London.
of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 1978 and of the Vienna convention on succession
of state Property, Archives and Debts.
enfeld, Public Debts and State Succession (1931) p.2. See also O. Udokang, Succession of New States to International Tre
, 1972 p. 106.
a I, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(b) at 3; Vienna II, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(a), at 3. Both Vienna I and II exclude cases of State succ
been brought about contrary to international law. Vienna I, supra note 4, art. 6, at 6; Vienna II, supra note 5, art. 3, at 4.
a I, supra note 4, art. 2(1)(e), at 3; Vienna II, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(d), at 3.
O'Connell, The Law of State Succession I-2 (1956).
O Connell, State Succession, vol. I, chapters 8 and 14.
ecember 16, 1991, the member States of the European Communities have, in the framework of their political cooperation, ad
on on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States" demanding the respect of the inviolability of bou
Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1
er Guidelines on the Recognition of New States].
ational Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004), Aspects of the law of State Succession.
sue was decided by the PCIJ in the Chorzow factory case, PCIJ Publ. Series A, No.7, at 30.
ernational Law Reports, p. 205.
nnell, op. cit. vol. I, p. 199 et seq.; Feilchenfeld, op. cit.; Materials on Succession of States in respect of Matters other than T
ousseau, Droit International Public, tome III (1977) p.374; Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly; Reflections upon the History of
nal Law of Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, University of Illinois (1992) p. 39; Streinz, - Succession of State
d Liabilities- A New Regime?, 26 German Yearbook of International Law (1983) p.198; Degan, State Succession Especially
of State Property and Debts, IV Finnish Yearbook of International Law (1993) p. 130.
ague Recuiel (1965, III), 225-70. See also Pittacos v. Etat Belge, ILR 45, 24 at 31-2.
nnell, op. cit. vol. I, p. 416 et seq.
an Public Debt case, 1 UNRIAA, p. 529.
nnell op. cit. vol I. Pg. 411.

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