The weaknesses of the Provisional

Government under the weak

leadership of Kerensky was the
main reason for Bolshevik success
in October 1917. How far do you
agree?
The failings of the Provisional Government, exacerbated by the weakness of
Kerensky as leader from July, certainly created a platform for revolutionary
activity, adding to the social and economic grievances felt by much of the
population. However, there was a necessity for a group of elite revolutionaries to
exploit these miscalculations, who presented themselves in the form of the
Bolsheviks. There is immense historiography surrounding the 1917 question,
originally with two conflicting schools of thought from liberal and Soviet
historians. Whilst Soviet historians view the October Revolution as the mass
movement of the people led by Lenins revolutionary prowess, liberal historians
damn the revolution a classic coup d-etat (Pipes, R. (1995)). Post Glasnost,
differing interpretations began to emerge, arguing that there was a degree of
popular support for the Bolsheviks, however that this support was based on the
idea of Soviet power over one-party rule. Whatever the line taken, all agree on
the importance of Lenin, his ideology and his leadership skills. The Bolshevik
seizure of power in October 1917 was in no way spontaneous as the preceding
revolution had been, however there was a consensus for further change which
the Provisional Government failed to satisfy. Thus, the Bolsheviks became the
only alternative and due to their ability to capitalise on disaffection, their
succession of power became inevitable.
Many hold the Provisional Governments failings to deal with the key questions
Russia faced in the revolutionary year as the key principle for Bolshevik success.
The tsarist nature of their policies certainly distanced themselves from the
radicalised population who had spontaneously overthrown the Romanovs. The
Provisional Governments stance was that, without a political mandate, they felt
unsuited to solve the pressing issues of land, food supply and the war especially.
However, with the elections to be held in November for a Constituent Assembly,
it would be too late. It is often suggested that had the Provisional Government
held an early election, Lvovs government could have avoided the Bolsheviks
anti-war support and led Russia to a democratic government. Failing to do so, the
coalition government were bound to many of Nicholas IIs policies, much to the
disillusionment of the masses. The Milyukov note (named after the Minister of
Foreign Affairs) began the process which divided the Government and its people.
In confirming Russian support to the allies, the government had advocated the
continuation of the very suffering which had generated the revolt in February.
The subsequent failure of the Kerensky offensive resulted in the July Days which
would become a turning point for Bolshevik support. Kerenskys
misunderstanding of Russias military capability led to such a demoralising and
embarrassing defeat, and so his inept leadership could to an extent be held
accountable. The governments failure to extract Russia from the war and deal
with the socio-economic deterioration of the country created the foundations for
a situation which a revolutionary elite would exploit. With this, it would seem the
failures of the Provisional Government certainly assisted the Bolsheviks success,
and that without these failures the seizure of power may well not have occurred.
Specific actions of both the Provisional Government and Kerensky as leader
abetted the huge increase of support for the Bolsheviks. After the failed offensive
and the uprising of the July Days, the government did successfully suppress the
left, closing the Bolsheviks Pravda and forcing many leaders back into exile
including Lenin. However, the political dice soon rolled the other way with the
Kornilov affair in August. Kerensky belatedly disassociated himself from the coup
and appealed to the Soviet to defend the capital from the counter-revolutionary
forces. This would prove decisive in the Bolsheviks seizure of power with the
government providing them with arms. This emphasised the Governments, or
Kerenskys weakness in not being able to deal with Kornilov alone. It could be
argued that this ineptitude made the Bolsheviks seem stronger when faced with
difficulty, further increasing patronage for the Bolsheviks at the expense of
Kerensky. The event further benefitted the Bolsheviks as Kerensky was obliged to
lift restraints on the Bolsheviks implemented after the July Days. With rumours
then developing that Kerensky was set to remove some of the Petrograd garrison
from the capital and surrender to the Germans, the Soviets set up the MRC to
defend the revolution. With an organised left and a discredited government, the
preconditions for Lenins annexation of power were set. It took only until
Kerensky ordered the closure of the Pravda, the MRC and Petrograd bridges that
Lenin could damn the actions an attack on the revolution, and thus seize power.
These miscalculated actions could deem many to argue the seizure of power was
made possible due to the failings of Kerensky and the Provisional Government,
with Kerensky failing to take a side, stuck in a centre that didnt exist (C Read).
Whilst Kerensky cant be blamed for the situation he was left in, he can be
blamed for not trying to rectify the situation, playing into the hands of the
revolutionaries. However, whilst the failures of the Provisional Government
certainly contributed, it took the political skill and ideological determination of
Lenin and the Bolsheviks to exploit such a situation; they offered the only
alternative to the government and offered what the masses sought peace,
bread and land.
Whilst the Bolsheviks certainly exploited the situation, the revolution could be a
spontaneous uprising more so than is assumed. Much of the social grievances
that led to the February Revolution and even the 1905 revolution were little in
the way of solves, even with a Provisional Government which became
increasingly left leaning as the months drew on. The situation that faced the
Provisional Government was partly because of the war intensifying grievances in
both the countryside and the cities as the people were pushed increasingly
harder. It was this breakdown of domestic order beginning as early as Alexander
IIs reforms, that caused the demise of the tsarist regime - a necessary
precondition for a Bolshevik seizure of power. In failing to appease the rife
discontent, the Provisional Government created a Russia in which a Bolshevik
takeover was inevitable as the only political alternative.
The success of the Bolsheviks and in particular Lenin in emerging as the only
alternative to the failing Provisional Government holds much merit when
considering the causes of the October Revolution. For the socialist revolution to
succeed, which much of the population sought, there needed to be a group to
expose the failings of the present institution in power. With Lenins revolutionary
aptitude and leadership, the Bolsheviks were able to, in a multitude of ways,
offer this alternative in the name of the Soviet. Lenins persistence in ensuring
they maintained dislocated with the Provisional Government and their unpopular
policies was key to their success in October. Not only did this guarantee the
Bolsheviks as the only alternative to the Government, but Lenins April Thesis
ensured they were an incredibly appealing alternative. Completely ideologically
driven, the Bolsheviks offered the populace what they wanted an end to tsarist
policies; peace, redistributed of land, food security and all power to the Soviets.
Lenin, with his political competence, recognised the need first for support of the
masses, then a majority in the Soviet, whilst undermining the authority of the
Provisional Government. Once Lenins April Thesis became Party policy,
patronage of the masses was simple to obtain, with the simple slogan of peace,
bread, land being all much of the population sought. The Bolsheviks, as of April,
became the official opposition to the bourgeois government. Tactical manoeuvres
led by Lenin and Trotsky further hold the Bolsheviks leadership to account for the
success of the seizure of power. Despite temptation, Lenin resisted the toppling
of the Provisional Government during the July Days, recognising that support for
the Party, especially within the Soviets, was not sufficient to support an
insurrection. This popularity did approach its zenith in September once Trotsky
was made chair of the Petrograd Soviet one of the key controlling institutions in
the Dual Power relationship which was currently controlling Russia. Deciding now
that the conditions for set for the seizure of power, Lenin faced opposition from
within the Party from Zinoviev and Kamenev, as well as from the Congress of
Soviets, in which the Bolsheviks were still a minority. Recognising this whilst
maintaining that now was the correct time, Lenin adapted his approach to ensure
successes; he knew he must present the insurrection as a defence of the left and
that the uprising must be conducted in the name of the Soviet, not the Party.
It is obvious that Lenins ideology and concept of a revolutionary party held great
success in the Bolsheviks annexation of power. They were able to capitalise on
the failings of the Provisional Government, gathering general popular support.
However they maintained a centralised group of adept revolutionaries, plotting
at the Smolni Institute where best should be taken around the city. There are
claims that Lenins prowess could not possibly hold merit when considering the
reasons for Bolshevik takeover as he truly was the absent revolutionary, present
for only a few months in the decade before the revolution. Some would also go
as far as to argue Trotskys skill and popularity was more significant in organising
and coordinating the revolution. However Lenins prestige and success in
providing an underlying ideology for the Party and a direction in which to take
surely maintains Lenin as a major factor for Bolshevik success. There is also
question as to whether the revolution would have taken place if Lenin had not
been present Trotsky certainly believes not. This would suggest that it is by
chance that revolutionary figures emerge to shift the course of history. Some
historians argue though that social circumstances generate a leading figure out
of whatever human material is present, thus reducing the significance of Lenin
in the coup. With Lenins persuasion and perseverance with his revolutionary
plan, it would seem either way that his political intelligence was hugely
significant in ensuring Bolshevik success.
The success of the Bolsheviks occurred due to an accumulation of circumstances
which would coalesce to create the preconditions for such a coup. The failings of
the Provisional Government with no doubt assisted the increasing disaffection
amongst the population as well as the fear that their spontaneous revolution was
being threatened, particularly after the Kornilov Affair. The Provisional
Government under Kerensky was too weak to prevent the Bolshevik takeover
which emerged inevitable as Lenin led the group to become the single opposition
to the Government. The Bolsheviks in no way radicalised the masses and the
masses likely didnt support their one-party socialism. However the masses
supported socialist policies which the Bolsheviks were presenting; in a sense it
was more the movement of the Bolsheviks exploiting a nation galvanised in
revolt. Without either of the failings of the Provisional Government or the political
ability of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, it is unlikely the revolution would have
occurred. However, had the Bolsheviks failed to exploit the circumstances
presented to them, their succession of power was anything but inevitable. Being
the only alternative to the current authority which failed to protect the peoples
revolution, as well as being a well-equipped and well led group, the success of
the Bolsheviks was inevitable.