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Case Digests in Civil Procedure

A Compilation

This is a compilation of digests of cases in Civil Procedure based on the

Civil Procedure Course Outline AY 2009 - 2010 made by the Legal
Resource Center
JURISDICTION corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.

THIRD DIVISION While petitioner's counterclaims were filed on December 1, 1998, the second
[G.R. No. 153886. January 14, 2004.] challenged order of the trial court denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of
the denial of its motion to dismiss was issued on October 9, 2000 at which time P.D.
MEL V. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. LOPEZ, INC., respondent. 902-A had been amended by R.A. 8799 (approved on July 19, 2000) which mandated
the transfer of jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies, subject of the
Facts: counterclaims, to RTCs.

Lopez filed a collection suit against Velarde, while the latter filed a counterclaim, But even if the subject matter of the counterclaims is now cognizable by RTCs, the
claiming that as the General Manager of Sky Vision (a subsidiary company of the filing thereof against respondent is improper, it not being the real party-in-interest, for
respondent), he was entitled to retirement benefits, unpaid salaries and incentives, it is petitioner's employer Sky Vision, respondent's subsidiary. It cannot be gainsaid
shares and similar benefits after he was supposedly coerced into retirement. Lopez that a subsidiary has an independent and separate juridical personality, distinct from
filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. He asserts that the counterclaims, that of its parent company, hence, any claim or suit against the latter does not bind
being money claims arising from a labor relationship, falls within the exclusive the former and vice versa.
competence of the NLRC. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleges that due to the
tortuous manner that he was coerced into retirement, it is the RTC and not the NLRC
which has jurisdiction over his counterclaims.
Issue: [G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004.]
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the counterclaims.
Adriana Chua filed an annulment case against his husband Jose Lam on the ground of
In determining which has jurisdiction over a case, the averments of the
psychological incapacity. However, Chua later on asked for the reopening of the case,
complaint/counterclaim, taken as a whole, are considered. XXX At the heart of
and was allowed to present new evidence of Lams previous marriages with other
petitioner's counterclaim is his alleged forced retirement which is also the basis of his
women. During the proceeding, she verbally asked for support of their son from Lam.
claim for, among other things, unpaid salaries, unpaid incentives, reasonable return on
The Trial judge asked for the prayer to be handwritten on the pleadings of Chua,
the stock ownership plan, and other benefits from a subsidiary company of the
without any formal amendment being made thereon. The case was decided in favor of
Chua and the prayer for support was likewise granted. Lam now questions the
propriety of the grant of support arguing that there was already a provision for support
Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A (as amended by R.A. 8799, the Securities Regulation Code)
of the child as embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana
applies to a corporate officer's dismissal. For a corporate officer's dismissal is always a
agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.
corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy and that its nature is not altered
by the reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action.
With regard to petitioner's claim for unpaid salaries, unpaid share in net income,
Whether or not the Trial Court has acted with jurisdiction on the granting of support.
reasonable return on the stock ownership plan and other benefits for services
rendered to Sky Vision, jurisdiction thereon pertains to the Securities Exchange
Commission even if the complaint by a corporate officer includes money claims since
such claims are actually part of the prerequisite of his position and, therefore,
There is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him
interlinked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration
and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated
involving a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer of the
February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of
corporation is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of
gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The
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provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias,
the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued
Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. The sheriff served the
support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on the petitioner's son,
the capabilities of the parents to give support. Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.

However, it is serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on issue not The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. The trial court, upon motion,
presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment declared the petitioner in default and declared their marriage void ab initio. Almost
of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, four years after, the petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the Order, alleging
indispensible so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage that the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for
of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by
have been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the Trial Court rendered the respondent.
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon
Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived Lam of due Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

[G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004.] Jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent. voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform
Facts: him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He
is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition against the respondent for the dissolution of service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even
and support pendente lite. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. A
Compromise Agreement was entered into where certain properties including the resort
Munting Paraiso were adjudicated to Marietta and her children. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000.]
Respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner, vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT,
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the respondent knew respondents.
that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was Facts:
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it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to
Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, contested Pepito Magalits, Dr. Magalit.
deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit, application for fishpond Registration
claiming that for 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the five-hectare area
included in Magalit's application. It was found that Macahilig was merely a laborer of SECOND DIVISION
Magalit. Hence, the same was denied by the BFAR Director and the Office of the
[G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004.]
President upon appeal. For failure to vacate the premises upon Order, Magalit
instituted a case in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA, petitioners, vs.
Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Aklan implemented the Writ issued on October 30, 1985. FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her co-respondents), and
The heirs of Magalit filed on August 6, 1990, a "Motion for Correction of the her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and
Implementation of the Decision of the Court of Appeals..." In that Motion, they prayed
that the trial court properly implement said IAC Decision by ordering Spouses ELOISA, all surnamed DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Macahilig to turn over to her the possession of the Lot. Dr. Magalit contended that the
Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because the spouses had refused to give up the Facts:
fishpond in question. The trial court ruled in favor of Magalit and the same was
sustained by the CA upon appeal by Macahilig. Respondents were the registered owners of a parcel of land. By virtue of an SPA,
Fidela mortgaged the land to Mariano Rivera. They executed Deed of Real Estate
Macahilig now questions the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the execution of the Mortgage and a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell). Although Fidela intended to sign only
decision rendered by the IAC. Macahilig contends that the court did not acquire the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature
jurisdiction over the res. on a Deed of Absolute Sale that was made by Marianos lawyer. From then, the Riveras
represented themselves to be the new owner of the land and negotiated with the
Issue: lands tenant Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latter's tenurial right. When Nieto
refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras
Whether or not the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the lot in question. offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in exchange for the surrender. Respondents filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be
Ruling: rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with damages. They
also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the lot in question. cancellation of the new TCTs, and the reconveyance to them of the entire property.
The RTC decided in favor of the respondents, which when appealed was upheld by the
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under CA with modifications.
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and Petitioners now question the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Petitioners contend that
made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid was only
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court. The trial P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was worth
court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid
Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents' predecessors in interest. filing fees amounting to P12,183.70. Petitioners also contend that the trial court does
Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized not have jurisdiction over the case because it involves an agricultural tenant. They
potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038, it is the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.


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Issue: [G.R. No. 149554. July 1, 2003.]

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged SPOUSES TEOFREDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO,
deficiency in the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an respondents.
agricultural tenant is involved in the case.
Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of deed of sale and
Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction was validly partition, alleging that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a portion of
acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this his 150-square meter parcel of land in Talisay, Cebu for a consideration of P15,000.00,
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the but despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them. Respondents
payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the filed a Motion to Dismiss, insisting that the action is one for annulment of title, and
subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it
considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Petitioners opposed the motion to
his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. dismiss, alleging that the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not therefore is cognizable by the RTC. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
automatically lost. jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Petitioners
maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as of deed of sale and partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation.
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and
17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P 15,000.00, it
incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petitioners falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition,
attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Clerk of Issue:
Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on
the instant case. Whether or not the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and is thus cognizable
by the RTC.
Further, the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights
and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all Ruling:
agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, the
cause of action in this case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
parties, for rescission of the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
party, stemming from whatever rights he may have acquired by virtue of the sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding TCT issued. Hence, it the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over the case. depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
FIRST DIVISION actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of


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money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial granted by the RTC. Consequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
Courts).XXX petition to annul the judgment on the ground that it was rendered with extrinsic or
collateral fraud. However, the CA dismissed the petition, and denied the subsequent
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal where petitioners contend that the writ
secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from of execution should be deemed void as the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue it. They
respondents. Petitioners' cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50- argue that the power of the court is limited to either upholding or setting aside the
square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared validity of the decision of the MTC.
owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, Issue:
which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of
sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution.
99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot
may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed Ruling:
to petitioners.
Petitioners' contention that the writ of execution issued by the RTC is void for lack of
Petitioners' argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation jurisdiction does not hold water. We do not agree that the RTC is circumscribed solely
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. As to either upholding or setting aside the validity of the decision of the MTC and that it is
stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the the latter court which has the authority to direct their ejectment. The complaint filed
caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed by the petitioners was not only for annulment of the MTC decision; it was also for
for. Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title. This is unmistakable from the allegations
real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the made therein. The RTC was consequently not restricted to determining the validity of
assessed value of the property subject thereof. the MTC decision. It may, as it correctly did, decide on the issue of who, between
petitioners and respondent Baroro, owns the disputed land as ownership is the crux of
the matter in an accion reivindicatoria and quieting of title.
[G.R. No. 154184. July 8, 2003.] Perforce, the RTC has the power to direct the ejectment of the petitioners and order
TEODORA A. CAPACETE and RODOLFO CAPACETE, petitioners, vs. VENANCIA them to vacate the disputed land. Accion reivindicatoria is a remedy seeking the
BARORO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT CABUYAO, LAGUNA * and PROVINCIAL recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as
SHERIFF OF LAGUNA stationed at BIAN, LAGUNA, respondents. well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession. As the RTC found that respondent Baroro owns the
Facts: disputed land, it can also adjudicate its possession in her favor. The writ, therefore,
was issued well within its authority.
This case arose from an unlawful detainer case filed by respondent Venancia Baroro
and her husband against petitioners contending that the latter took possession of the
disputed property by mere tolerance from them. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled THIRD DIVISION
in favor of respondent and her husband. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint [G.R. No. 155713 May 5, 2006]
against respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for accion reivindicatoria, MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent.
annulment of decision and quieting of title which was decided by the trial court in favor
of respondent. Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was Facts:


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[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332. February 16, 2004.]

Lumbuan leased to respondent a lot for a period of 3 years with monthly rentals and a RODRIGO Q. TUGOT, complainant, vs. Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES,
stipulation that it will be exclusively used for the respondents food business. However, respondent.
respondent later on used it as his residence without the petitioners consent. He also
failed to pay the increase in rentals. Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to Facts:
pay and vacate the premises. Petitioner referred the matter to the Brgy. Chairmans
office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Brgy. Chairman then issued a Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in an ejectment case which was dismissed by the
Certificate to File Action. Petitioner filed against respondent an action for Unlawful respondent judge. It was found that the respondent judge conducted the preliminary
Detainer. The MeTC decided in favor of petitioner but the same was set aside by the conference more than two years after the filing of the last answer which, according to
RTC which directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or the Punong Brgy. Section 8 of Rule 70, shall be held "[n]ot later than thirty (30) days after the last
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of RTC and ordered the dismissal of the ejectment answer is filed."
case for being prematurely filed. According to the appellate court, when the
mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level has not been complied Issue:
with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the case to the court of
origin. Whether or not the respondent judge should be held administratively liable.


Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the Ruling:
alleged failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation
proceedings in the barangay level. Respondent judge failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an
ejectment case. It must be noted that unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are
Ruling: covered by summary procedure because they involve the disturbance of the social
order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Accordingly, technicalities or
In this case, the Lupon/ Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the details of procedure should be carefully avoided. It must be emphasized that the
Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary
admittedly no Pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the to enforce the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It
office of the Brgy. Chairman for possible settlement. Although no Pangkat was formed, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive
there was substantial compliance with law. Under Sec. 412 (a) of RA 7160 determination of cases." Any member of the judiciary who causes the delay sought to
(Katarungang Pambarangay), the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the be prevented by the Rule 15 is sanctionable.
Pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. This
is true notwithstanding the mandate of Sec. 410 (b) of the same law that the Brgy. The present respondent has failed to abide by the provisions of the Rule on Summary
Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Sec. 410 (b) Procedure. He has thereby undermined the wisdom behind it and diminished respect
should be read together with Sec. 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and for the rule of law. He thus becomes administratively liable under Rule 140 Section 9,
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Brgy. Chairman or Punong which sanctions violations of Supreme Court Rules.
Brgy. is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the LGC.



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[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184. March 2, 2000.] the court shall render judgment. However, should the court find it necessary to clarify
AMPARO S. FARRALES and ATTY. RAUL S. SISON, complainants, vs. JUDGE certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
RUBY B. CAMARISTA, respondent. matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence
on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
Facts: rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
Complainants filed an Ejectment/ Unlawful Detainer Case which was raffled to the
court presided over by the respondent judge. In the first case, therein defendant, on The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of
June 22, 1994, filed her responsive pleading. On January 25, 1995, respondent, motu the judgment.
proprio issued an order referring the case for conciliation to the barangay chairman. Section 8 thereof, which provides the contents of the record of the preliminary
After a year, the case remained uncalendared for hearing. On February 2, 1996, the conference, includes a statement as to
plaintiff (complainant herein) filed a motion to set aside the order of January 25, 1995, c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions
and to set the case for preliminary conference, which was denied by respondent. made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further
Subsequently, the parties submitted themselves to conciliation but no settlement was proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
reached. There being no clarificatory hearing set, the case was deemed submitted for from issuance of the order;
decision as of October, 1996. On February 27, 1997, plaintiff filed a motion for early
decision. However, despite repeated follow-ups, the case remained undecided. When It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgment in cases falling under
still no decision was rendered, complainant Sison (plaintiff's counsel) wrote respondent summary procedure is thirty days. This is in keeping with the spirit of the rule which
on July 18, 1997 requesting that a decision be rendered in the case. Still, the case aims to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases falling
remained unresolved. thereunder. The jurisprudential direction consistently taken by the Court adheres to
the rule that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and
Herein complainants contend that the delay in the disposition of the abovestated cases constitutes gross inefficiency.
was a result of respondent's lack of basic knowledge of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure and/or her ignorance of the law. They likewise question
respondent's act of referring the case to the barangay level for conciliation when the
parties actually reside in barangays of different cities/municipalities.
[G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005.]
Whether or not there was a violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the part
APPEALS, and NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, respondents.
of the respondent judge.
Petitioner Corporation obtained loans from respondent Neal B. Christian, as evidenced
The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the period
by three promissory notes. While the payment of the principal loans was not yet due
within which judgment should be rendered. Section 10 thereof provides:
and demandable, Christian filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against
the Corporation. Two of the promissory notes matured during the pendency of the
SECTION 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
case. The corporation contends that the action should have been dismissed by the trial
last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,


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court and the CA because there was no cause of action at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the CA decision affirming the RTC Order which
dismissed their complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of the Original Certificate of
Issue: Title and other titles in the name of respondent Santiago over parcels of land which
petitioners allege to have been occupied and possessed by them by virtue of a Deed of
Whether or not the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case cure a Assignment executed by a certain Ismael Favila who claimed to be one of the heirs of
complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed. Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. According to the Deed, the Subject Property was part of a
vast land that was awarded by the Queen of Spain to Don Rodriguez. Respondent
Ruling: claims, on the other hand, that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the
complaint and thus, the complaint stated no cause of action.
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential element Issue:
are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means or by whatever law it [1] Whether or not the petitioners had no legal capacity to sue.
arises or is created; [2] Whether or not the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest.
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not violate
such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to Ruling:
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. [1] The petitioners had the legal capacity to sue. Lack of legal capacity to sue means
that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, necessary qualifications to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or representation he claims The term lack of capacity to sue should not be confused
other appropriate relief [i]t thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has with the term lack of personality to sue. While the former refers to the plaintiffs
not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack
alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers
an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity
underlying reason for this is that a person should not be summoned before the public to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on
tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature. the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

[2] The petitioners are not the real parties in interest. Petitioners failed to allege any
SECOND DIVISION other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject
[G.R. NO. 157447. April 29, 2005.] Property from time immemorial, which the Court was able to controvert; and the
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, et. al, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, Spanish title which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property
respondent. by virtue of the applicable provisions of P.D No. 892. Therefore, without legal or
equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an


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action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their complaint was properly corporation, which is a juridical person with a personality separate and distinct from its
dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. individual stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs,
that is the real party in interest.


[G.R. NO. 127210. August 7, 2003.] [G.R. NO. 160261. NOVEMBER 10, 2003.]

Facts: Facts:

Private respondent Guani, as agent of Guani Marketing Inc., bought a Mercedez Benz Former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
from petitioner Tan through a lease-financing agreement with CIFC, of which Tan was Hilario Davide and seven Associate Justices. The House Committee on Justice ruled
Assistant Manager. Less than two years after, the Bureau of Customs seized the vehicle that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the
forhaving been imported without payment of dues and taxes. The BOC filed a case same for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks after the filing
against Guani as possessor of the vehicle. Private respondent thus filed a complaint for of the first impeachment complaint, the second impeachment complaint was filed by
damages and attorneys fees against petitioner which was granted by the trial court Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Thus
and affirmed by the CA. Tan now questions the aptness of the decision, contending arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which
that private respondent did not have the legal personality to file the complaint, he petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
being merely the agent of Guani Marketing which was the lessee of the vehicle. unconstitutional as it violates Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: Intervenor Atty. Jaime Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners have no standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
Whether or not private respondent Guani is the real party-in-interest. sustain direct personal injury. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that
petitioners do have standing as taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in
Ruling: cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must Issue:
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit Whether or not the petitioners have a standing to file the instant petitions.
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the Rule
means material interest, an interest in issue ad to be affected by the decree, as Ruling:
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person who, by There is a difference between the rule on real party in interest and the rule on
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has
Constitutional underpinnings. Xxx the question on standing is whether such parties
Private respondent merely acted as agent of Guani Marketing, lessee of the vehicle. He have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
is thus not the real party in interest- plaintiff to prosecute the case. It is the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court

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so largely depends for illumination of difficult Constitutional questions. Xxx on the In the instant case, the Court held that, for purposes of action for annulment of TCT
other hand, the question as to real party in interest is whether he is the party who No. 199241, the only indispensable party-defendant was Renato and his wife. He was
would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the registered owner of the lot and was conclusively presumed, for all intents and
the suit. purposes, to be its owner in fee simple. A certificate of registration accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged owner, which, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title showing exactly the
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a owner's real interest over the property covered thereby. Renato thus had the authority
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably to bind the lot to the exclusion of all others and his participation, as party-defendant in
invoke the vindication of their own rights which were supposedly violated by the the civil case, was sufficient for the trial court to validly exercise its jurisdiction. Hence,
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. the non-inclusion of petitioners as parties-defendants will not affect the final
determination of the said civil case, because they were not the registered owners of
the subject lot. Moreover, petitioners have admitted that they donated and caused
registration of the subject lot to Renato and thus, would have no more rightful
FIRST DIVISION interest, inchoate or otherwise, that would be affected by the assailed compromise
[G.R. No. 150159. July 25, 2003.] judgment. Petition denied.
as represented by his attorney-in-fact, TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, THIRD DIVISION
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIA RICAFORT, respondents. [G.R. No. 141970. September 10, 2001.]
Facts: ALEJO, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela; and SY TAN SE, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondent spouses instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City SIAN SUAT NGO, respondents.
for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 199241 in the name of spouses
Renato and Teresita Villareal covering a parcel of land located in Makati City. In the Facts:
course of the proceedings, both parties entered into a compromise settlement. The
trial court approved the parties' compromise agreement in a judgment promulgated on Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from petitioner, as security for
July 30, 1999. As siblings of Renato and co-heirs to the disputed lot, petitioners which they mortgaged their land covered by TCT No. V-41319. Petitioner
sought the annulment of the compromise judgment. According to petitioners, the extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage when the spouses Acampado defaulted in the
compromise judgment was null and void because they were not impleaded as parties- payment of their loans and, at the foreclosure sale, the mortgaged property was sold
defendants despite the fact that they were co-heirs of Renato and indispensable to petitioner as the highest bidder. When the spouses failed to redeem the property
parties therein. within the reglementary period, title to the property was consolidated to the petitioner.
When petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership before the
Issue: Register of Deeds, it was informed of the existence of an RTC decision in Civil Case No.
4930-V-96, which annulled TCT No. 41319. Said case, a complaint for declaration of
Whether or not the petitioners are indispensible parties to the civil case. nullity of TCT No. V-41319, was filed by private respondent Sy Tan Se against the
spouses Acampado. Petitioner was not, however, made a party to the said case nor
Ruling: was it notified of its existence despite being the registered mortgagee of the real

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property covered by the title sought to be annulled. Petitioners petition for annulment
of the RTC decision was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this petition. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160053. August 28, 2006.]
LANTION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Fourth
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to ask for the annulment of the RTC Decision, Judicial Region, Branch 13, PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, ELIZABETH C.
petitioner not having been impleaded as an indispensible party to the case. UMALI, ALICE PERCE, JELEN MOSCA, REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LIPA CITY,

In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real Facts:
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. Evidently, petitioner
is encompassed within the definition of an indispensable party; thus, it should have Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin obtained loans from respondent Planters
been impleaded as a defendant. Development Bank and executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes
to cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so respondent bank foreclosed the
"An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or mortgaged lots and were later on sold at a public auction where the respondent bank
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without was the winning bidder. On November 8, 2003, petitioners filed against Planters
injuring or affecting that interest[;] a party who has not only an interest in the subject Development Bank and its officers Elizabeth Umali, Alice Perce and Jelen Mosca
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree (private respondents), a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in only their peso loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had already been
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged. They challenged the
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-payment of their dollar loans as the
one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward. A person is mortgages did not cover those loans.
not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter
is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro Manila. The
them." respondent judge dismissed the case for improper venue. Petitioners sought
reconsideration. They argued that the trial court in effect prejudged the validity of the
The joinder of indispensable parties to an action is mandated by Section 7, Rule 3 of loan documents because the trial court based its dismissal on a venue stipulation
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The absence of an indispensable party renders all provided in the agreement.
subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present." "The evident aim and intent of Issue:
the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment dismissed the case for improper venue.
cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties."

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ground that it was bigamous. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that
At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where action. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case was
the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an properly cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or likewise denied; hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. The case was,
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, likewise, denied the
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Clearly, the words motion to dismiss. The petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court reiterating her
"exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" used in the mortgages earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
and promissory notes executed by the parties are restrictive and used advisedly to jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
meet the requirements.

Petitioners claim that effecting the exclusive venue stipulation would be tantamount to Issue:
a prejudgment on the validity of the loan documents. We note however that in their
complaint, petitioners never assailed the validity of the mortgage contracts securing Whether or not the sharia court is the proper venue for the case and not the RTC.
their peso loans. They only assailed the terms and coverage of the mortgage
contracts. What petitioners claimed is that their peso loans had already been paid thus Ruling:
the mortgages should be discharged, and that the mortgage contracts did not include
their dollar loans. In our view, since the issues of whether the mortgages should be Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
properly discharged and whether these also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal
said loan documents, the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto. Considering actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be
all the circumstances in this controversy, we find that the respondent judge did not commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
commit grave abuse of discretion, as the questioned orders were evidently in accord where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
with law and jurisprudence. plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
made by the plaintiff in this case. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
FIRST DIVISION filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.] married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083.
Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under
Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
Senator Mamintal Tamano married private respondent Zorayda in civil rites. Their the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
marriage supposedly remained subsisting until his death. Prior to his death, Tamano and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's
also married petitioner Estrellita in civil rites. After the death of the Senator, Zorayda jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the

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complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated, displayed,
allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the or exhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offended party
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. resides, in which case the civil or criminal actions may be brought in the court of First
Instance thereof. The verb may is permissive. Hence, it does not necessarily imply a
complete abrogation of the general rule laid down in the preceding sentence except
[G.R. No. L 18726. August 31, 1966.] insofar as it broadens the [2] alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a
THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. DEMETRIO B. third choice of venue [i]ndeed, when the libelous imputations has not been published
ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendant and appellees. or circulated in the locality wherein either of the parties resides, the offended party
may not wish to initiate the action therein, for the same would have the effect of
Facts: giving additional publicity to the derogatory statements and increasing harm to
Gonzales filed with the CIF of Cagayan a complaint for damages against Encarnacion,
a resident of Cavite, who allegedly caused the filing of a pleading against him in Civil
case N- 151, containing words and expressions which are highly libelous, derogatory
and scurrilous to his worth, integrity and honor. Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss THIRD DIVISION
the complaint, alleging that it states no cause of action and that the venue is [G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002.]
improperly laid and/or the court has no jurisdiction. The CIF dismissed the complaint REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN, petitioner, vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION &
for improper venue. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

Gonzales takes the position that his venue is not improperly laid because under Art. Facts:
360 of the RPC, as amended by RA 1289, a civil action for damages in cases of written
defamation may be filed in the court of first instance of the province where the Petitioner filed an action for specific performance with damages against the
offended party resides. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the complaint respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the
should have been filed in Civil case N-151 of the CIF of Cavite because under the respondent be ordered to execute the necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a
aforesaid provision, the court where the criminal or civil action is first filed acquires portion of a property situated in Kay-biga, Paraaque, Metro Manila covered under TCT
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. No. S-30409, corresponding to 36.5 percent of its total area, as compensation for the
undertakings she and her companions had performed and accomplished in favor of the
Issue: respondent. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint on grounds of improper
venue, non-joinder of necessary parties, and nonpayment of the proper docket fees.
Whether or not the CIF of Cagayan erred in dismissing the complaint for improper Maintaining that the action is in personam, not in rem, petitioner alleges that the
venue. venue was properly laid. The fact that "she ultimately sought the conveyance of real
property" not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is, she claims, an
anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action was instituted. On
Ruling: the other hand, the RTC ruled that since the primary objective of petitioner was to
recover real property even though her Complaint was for specific performance and
Civil actions for damages in cases of written defamation shall be filed with the Court damages her action should have been instituted in the trial court where the
of First Instance of the province or city in which any of the accused or any of the property was situated. Hence this petition.
offended parties resides. In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of venue
to the Court of First Instance of his residence or to that of any of the accused. Plaintiff Issue:

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Whether or not the RTC of Pasig City is the proper venue for the case.

Ruling: Whether or not the action filed by petitioner spouses is one in rem or one in
The petition is meritorious. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an
answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or Ruling:
an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On Contrary to petitioners' belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or
the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where possession of the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, it does
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. In the present case, not automatically follow that the action is already one in rem. In a personal action, the
petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property,
performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
conveyance of real property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
ground of lack of cause of action. foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal

SECOND DIVISION liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against
[G.R. No. 127692. March 10, 2004.] the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF not necessarily an action in rem. The objective sought in petitioners' complaint was to
APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents. establish a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the
title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who
Facts: was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No.
CEB-11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely,
Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of
land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of
subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988, jurisdiction over their persons.
and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property
to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. PLEADINGS
Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties
to petitioners, hence, the complaint. The RTC decided the case in favor of petitioners, FIRST DIVISION
however the CA annuled the decision upon appeal for failure of the court to acquire [G.R. No. 136100. July 24, 2000.]
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant as they were not validly served with FELIPE G. UY, petitioner, vs. THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
summons. Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in its decision because the action respondent.
they filed was one in rem where jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant is not
necessary. Facts:
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the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if
The Land Bank of the Philippines filed before the Metropolitan Trial Circuit Court verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
(MTCC) of Iloilo City a complaint for unlawful detainer against Felipe Uy. The bank circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
claimed ownership of two parcels of land and the two-storey house built thereon, and order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. The lack of certification against
sought the ejectment of the petitioner, the occupant of the premises. The original forum shopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable by the submission thereof
owner of the properties was Tia Yu. Yu authorized Gold Motor Parts Corporation to after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that
mortgage the same as security for a loan from Land Bank. Unfortunately, Gold Motors the failure of petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
defaulted, hence, Land Bank foreclosed the properties. Before the foreclosure took petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
effect, Felipe Uy already occupied the house built on the lands. For Yu's failure to pay for the dismissal thereof. In some cases, though, this Court deemed the belated filing
the materials used in the construction of the house, Uy was allowed to occupy the of the certification as substantial compliance with the requirement. In the case at bar,
house and apply the rental thereon to the balance of Tia Yu's debt on the materials. the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a
The terms of their agreement were later put into writing in a lease contract. The MTCC "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition.
rendered its judgment in favor of Uy. Land Bank appealed to the Regional Trial Court That counsel for petitioner filed the "verification/certification" before receipt for the
(RTC), which affirmed the decision of the MTCC in toto. Land Bank filed in the Court of resolution initially denying the petition also mitigates the oversight. In any event, this
Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. The CA Court has the power to suspend its own rules when, as in this case, the ends of justice
allowed only a 15-day extension, but Land Bank failed to file its petition within the would be served thereby.
extension granted. Instead, Land Bank filed its petition beyond the extended period
with an accompanying manifestation. The CA granted the manifestation and motion,
and admitted the petition. Thereafter, the CA rendered a decision reversing the lower SECOND DIVISION
court's decision. Felipe Uy filed a petition for review of the CA decision with the [G.R. No. 128550. March 16, 2000.]
Supreme Court. The Court first denied the petition due to lack of certification against DIGITAL MICROWAVE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
forum shopping and lack of verification. After thorough explanation, the Court granted ASIAN HIGH TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, respondents.
the second motion for reconsideration of petitioner and required respondent to
comment thereon. In its Comment, respondent submits that the Court should not have Facts:
reinstated the petition.
Private respondent Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner
Digital Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Issue: Court of Pasig City. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court
denied the motion, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then initiated a
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should have been dismissed for lack of special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals for alleged grave abuse of
certification against forum shopping and lack of verification. discretion of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Revised Circular No. 28-91, as amended by Administrative
Ruling: Circular No. 04-94. The circular requires petitions filed before the Court of Appeals to
be accompanied by a sworn certification against forum shopping signed by the
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such petitioner himself. The petitioner's certification was signed by the counsel, thus the
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance dismissal by the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration having been denied,
of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is the petitioner sought the reversal of the ruling by the Supreme Court. Petitioner
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true contends that in the case of a corporation as petitioner, the certification against forum
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that shopping may be signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with knowledge

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of the required facts. The authorized person may be anyone authorized by the
corporation, not necessarily an officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint or the consignation of a
counsel of record has the authority to execute the certification on behalf of the premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
corporation its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period. Private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Issue: for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the
Whether or not the counsel of petitioner corporation may validly sign the certification amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee and considering that the total amount sought to
against forum shopping in behalf of the latter. be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed
Ruling: and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.

If we follow petitioner's line of reasoning, then the requirement in Revised Circular No. Issue:
28-91 that petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping
would have been rendered useless. The reason the certification against forum Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the case.
shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar Ruling:
actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Even his counsel may be
unaware of such fact. The Court rules as follows:

We disagree with petitioner that a corporation cannot possibly hope to comply with the 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
requirement laid down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
and not a natural person. If this were so, then it would have been impossible for a over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
corporation to do anything at all. Needless to say, this is the reason why corporations pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
have directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions with others. The same is payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
true for the certification against forum shopping. It could easily have been made by a prescriptive or reglementary period.
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation. "Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction." 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
EN BANC reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
[G.R. NOS. 79937-38. FEBRUARY 13, 1989.] period.
vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
respondents. appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
Facts: been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall

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Legazpi City


constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional Whether or not the respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee Under the factual setting of the case, the trial court ought to have considered the
that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim letter of respondent Enrique E. Pimentel as a responsive pleading even if it lacks the
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned formalities required by law. Undoubtedly, the letter made mention of the fact that the
from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay parties mutually settled the case, which allegation may be deemed as an averment of
the deficiency, if any. an affirmative defense and if proven in a preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 16, would constitute a meritorious defense of private respondents which would
bar petitions from recovering damages from the former as the claim or demand set
THIRD DIVISION forth in plaintiffs' (petitioners') pleading had been paid or extinguished. Pleadings as
[G.R. No. 85909. February 9, 1993.] well as remedial laws should be liberally construed in order that the litigant may have
TERESITA C. GERALES, CESAR DELA FUENTE, MARCELA GOLDING, MARIA ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and possible denial of substantial
VERGARA and PERLITO TRIGERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, justice, due to technicalities, may be avoided.
Litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on
Facts: technicality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
A car owned by Leticia Fideldia, then driven by Enrique E. Pimentel, hit a car, owned becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
by Teresita Gerales then driven by Cesar Dela Fuente; with Marcela Golding, Maria courts, and because there is no vested right in technicalities, in meritorious cases, a
Vergara and Perlito Trigero as passengers at San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga. liberal, not literal interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities
Private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules, which is
San Fernando, Pampanga with the crime of Damage to Property with Multiple Physical the proper and just determination of a litigation. In the light of the foregoing, it is
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence. During the pendency of the criminal case, evident that indeed the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioners filed a civil case for Damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against private respondents in default, and in denying their petition for relief from judgment.
Enrique E. Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia. This civil case is based on the same incident Consequently, the validity of the order of default and all the proceedings that
for which private respondent, Enrique E. Pimentel was charged in the criminal case. transpired subsequent thereto cannot be sustained.
After filing of the civil case, but before service of summons to the private respondents,
the parties were able to settle amicably. They duly executed and signed a Release of
Claim. The Criminal Case was dismissed upon motion and presentation of the Affidavit EN BANC
of Desistance. Respondent Enrique E. Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of [G.R. No. 89114. December 2, 1991.]
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan informing the court of the settlement. After FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
receipt of respondent Pimentel's letter, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS,
of Balanga Bataan issued an order declaring the private respondents in default and AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
thereupon ordering them to pay damages to herein petitioners. The CA reversed the
RTC decision. Facts:


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Aquinas University Professional Schools
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The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG and assisted by the OSG, The allegations in the complaint are deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions
filed an action against Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
particulars which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that what petitioner petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
was asking were mere evidentiary facts. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of
but the same was denied. Hence this appeal. corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
Issue: statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion for a bill of particulars. material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the
end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion for a bill of particulars. A complaint is [G.R. No. 87434. August 5, 1992.]
defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM
causes of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint PLASTICS INC., petitioners, vs. SWEET LINES INC., DAVAO VETERANS
shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of ARRASTRE AND PORT ERVICES INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant Facts:
clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the A maritime suit was commenced by petitioner against private respondents, seeking
material facts on which the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the recovery of the cost of the lost or damaged shipment plus damages allegedly due to
theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of liability. defendants negligence. Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into by the
parties, causing the dismissal by the trial court of the suit. The trail court thereafter
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate facts", rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the respondent court reversed
and the second, the "evidentiary facts." "The term 'ultimate facts' as used in Sec. 3, the decision of the trial court on the ground of prescription, based upon the bills of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause lading covering their transaction. The petitioners thus question the propriety of such
of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement reversal, contending that such bills of lading should not have been given weight since
of the cause of action insufficient. . . ." Ultimate facts are important and substantial it was not offered in evidence by the private respondents.
facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not Issue:
refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate, Whether or not the respondent court erred in reversing the trial courts decision.
constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests," while
the term "evidentiary fact" are those facts which are necessary for determination of
the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are Ruling:

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The respondent court committed no reversible error. As petitioners are suing upon rendered a decision awarding said lots to Pastor. Hence, petitioner appealed the same
SLIs contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of to the CA with the contention that the lower court erred in awarding said lots to Pastor
lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable document which under the who herself adduced evidence that said lots were public land and were subject to a
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the previous cadastral proceeding. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the CIF, hence
genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically this appeal.
denied by the adverse party. The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to
both a cause of action or defense based on said documents. Issue:
Whether or not the decision rendered in the Cadastral proceedings constitutes res
Petitioners failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and judicata as to the nature of the lots in question, thus a bar to private respondents
due execution, of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial application.
admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being
required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been Ruling:
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of We find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear from
the adverse partys failure to make a specific denial thereof, the instrument need not evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the CIF of Batangas, acting as
be formally presented in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not
interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res judicata with respect to the lots
Even granting that petitioners averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the in question. Such failure on the part of the Director of Lands is a procedural infirmity
procedural earmarks of what is in the law of pleadings called a negative pregnant, that which cannot be cured on appeal. Sec. 2, Rule 9, Revised rules of Court of 1964
is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading provides that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the the answer are deemed waived Thus, the defense of res judicata when not set up
averment it is directed to. Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded
agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.


[G.R. NO. L 47847. JULY 31, 1981.] [G.R. NO. 138822. JANUARY 23, 2001.]
PASTOR, respondents. respondent.

Facts: Facts:

Private respondent Pastor filed with the CIF of Batangas an application for confirmation Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, alleging that the latter owed them a
of imperfect title over 13 lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. The sum of money incurred by the petitioner in the course of her work as insurance agent
Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application. Pastor presented, together with of the respondent. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted
other evidences, a certification that said lots were declared public land in a cadastral her right for the payment of a sum representing commissions and bonuses. Petiitoner
case and the other lots were subject of a decision in a cadastral proceeding. The CIF also prayed for the award of damages for the allegedly unfounded action by the

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respondents. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim, or dependent upon petitioners counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will
contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the
petitioners non-payment of docket fees. Petitioner thus asked the respondent court to parties. However, petitioners claims for damages are compulsory.
declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is
compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer There is no need for the petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.
such counterclaim. The trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, granted On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her
respondents motion, finding that the counterclaim was merely permissive. Hence this permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed fees. The
petition. compulsory counterclaim of petitioner is reinstated.

Whether or not the counterclaim of the petitioner is compulsory or permissive in [G.R. NO. L- 29673. NOVEMBER 12, 1987.]
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals [263 SCRA 275, 1996], this Court capsulized the
criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory A "Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of Reparation Goods" was entered into
or permissive, summarized as follows: between petitioner and the private respondent REPACOM. Prior to the due date of the
first installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder thereof. Petitioners
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely response was to file two (2) special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging
the same? ambiguity in the contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the agreement's
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment
compulsory counterclaim rule? of the price would arise. On the other hand, when VISPAC subsequently failed, despite
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as several demands, to pay the first installment of the price on what REPACOM deemed
well as defendants counterclaim? to be the due date, the latter instituted an ordinary civil action for collection thereof.
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and counterclaim? VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection suit on the ground of the pendency of the
declaratory relief actions, arguing that until and unless the latter were resolved, no
Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals [279 cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of REPACOM for collection of said
SCRA 397, 1997], is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical first installment. The motion to dismiss was denied. Here, petitioners contention is
relationship between the claim and the counterclaim, that is, where conducting that it was error on the Appellate Court's part to have affirmed the Trial Court's
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial decision for the collection of the first installment of the price due from it under its
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. contract with REPACOM, because that money claim should have been set up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since REPACOM had not
Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby become
commissions, bonuses and premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence barred.
required to prove petitioners claims differs from that needed to establish respondents
demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioners such as cash
advances and cost of premiums. The recovery of respondents claims is not contingent Issue:

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violence to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for

Whether or not the claim of the private respondents have become barred for not being breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid
set up as a counterclaim. down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the achievement of
that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed
Ruling: for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

It is indeed the rule, embodied in Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, that a
counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected
with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's EN BANC
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom [G.R. NO. 105751. JUNE 30, 1993.]
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. In other words, a compulsory counterclaim B.A. FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, v. RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE
cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same MERCANTILE INC., LUCITA VELOSO YAP, CLOVERLEAF SUPERMARKET, INC.,
suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. The omission is not SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
however irremediable or irreversibly fatal. The Rules provide that when a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable negligence, or Facts:
when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-
claim by amendment before judgment. Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action to recover a sum of money
arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted
Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated upon to defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor
a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia, and/or dismissed on the ground of by his co-defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf
res adjudicata. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres Commercial. After defendants' Amended Answer to
relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial
or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially Conference. For various reasons, however, the conference was repeatedly reset.
different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of Petitioners counsel failed to attend the Pre-Trial Conference. Consequently, defendants
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice. The motion was granted. The trial
makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental court denied the motion of private respondents, prompting them to elevate the order
nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to of denial to the Court of Appeals which reversed the questioned order and directed the
special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the trial court to set the reception of their evidence on their counterclaim. Its motion for
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition. Petitioner
contends that the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that their compulsory
dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by counterclaim should not have been included in the dismissal.
way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and
were decided on the merits. The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits Issue:
instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of
all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and Does the dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial,
delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was upon motion of defendants, carry with it the dismissal of their compulsory
decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not counterclaim?
inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do

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Ruling: hence, we reverse the Court of Appeals and sustain the trial court. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED.
There is merit in the petition. The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely
permissive but compulsory in nature. Clearly, the same evidence needed to sustain the
counterclaim of private respondents would also refute the cause of action in FIRST DIVISION
petitioner's complaint. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain [G.R. NO. 104609. JUNE 30, 1993.]
pending for independent adjudication by the court." This is because a compulsory PHILIP LEE GO AND SPECIFIQUE GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC.,
counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CLOVER MANUFACTURING CORP.,
jurisdictional support therefrom. Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no respondents.
longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, as when it
dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal Facts:
controversy, must likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the
grant of any relief under the counterclaim. Denim materials deliveries were made by Clover Manufacturing Corporation to Philip
Go. The delivery receipts and packing lists, indicated Go as the "customer" and were
The Rules of Court provides a remedy to recover on defendant's counterclaim if duly acknowledged by his employees. Of the total purchase of P949,783.22, only the
plaintiff moves to dismiss the case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise price for the first delivery in the amount of P146,109.50 was paid to Clover. Demand
objection to the dismissal of the complaint; in such case, the trial court may not for the balance was made on Go but to no avail. Clover filed a complaint against the
dismiss the main action. petitioners for the said balance. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued but was
later on lifted after the filing by the defendants of a counterbond.
However, we are not unaware of the seeming unfairness, if not harshness, of the
application of the Rule herein enunciated that dismissal of the complaint for failure In their answer to the complaint, Go alleged that he had bought the denim materials
to prosecute automatically carries with it dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim from William Lim, to whom he had made full payment, in cash for the first delivery and
to a defendant who may be compelled to hire counsel to protect him in a frivolous by check subsequently encashed for the next four deliveries. Lim was no impleaded by
complaint. Equity and justice dictate that he be accorded adequate relief under the Go in a third party complaint.
Henceforth, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under
Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who Whether or not the denim materials were bought by Go from Lim or from Clover.
desires to pursue his compulsory counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move
for the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he should only move to have plaintiff Ruling:
declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no longer present his
evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on the The issue in this case is a factual one which this Court will not touch upon. However,
compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his the Court is convinced that the trial and respondent courts did not err in holding that
counterclaim. This will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his the denim materials were purchased by Go directly from Clover and not from William
compulsory counterclaim, which is intertwined with the complaint, because the trial Lim. The first thought that occurs to the Court is why, if Go had really paid Lim the full
court retains jurisdiction over the complaint and of the whole case. The non-dismissal value of the five deliveries, the latter was not impleaded by the plaintiffs in a third-
of the complaint, the non-suit notwithstanding, provides the basis for the compulsory party complaint under Rule 6, Section 12, of the Rules of Court. This rule states:
counterclaim to remain active and subsisting. But the procedure above stated,
unfortunately, was not adopted by private respondents herein in the court below,

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Sec. 12. Third-party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a portions of the river, with the same causing the property of the third-party plaintiffs to
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the become shallower and narrower. Third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or third-party complaint, which was sustained by the lower court and the CA, upon
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. reconsideration. Hence this appeal.

The circumstance that Go and Lim might have been close friends (although this is not Issue:
established in the record) was no impediment to Go's filing the third-party complaint
for the protection of his interests. Whether the dismissal of the third-party complaint is proper.
The Court cannot overstress the fact that Go should have sued William Lim in a third-
party complaint instead of merely using him as a defense witness. Whatever their Ruling:
relations might have been before, Go could not have failed to realize that he was being
made to pay the amount of more than three quarters of a million pesos which he says The order dismissing the third-party complaint is proper.
he had already paid to William Lim. His forbearance against Lim is difficult to
understand. The only plausible explanation is that, as the private respondent claims, A third-party defendant may not be impleaded if the effect would be to introduce a
Go had not paid the balance of the purchase price either to Clover or to William Lim. new and separate controversy into the action. Matters which should be threshed out
separately, cannot be joined to the original action by means of a third-party complaint.
We sustain the finding of the respondent court that the petitioners are liable for the Plaintiffs causes of action against defendants are unrelated to those of the latter
balance of the articles sold by Clover and not to William Lim as the petitioners against third-party defendants. It is not alleged how those circumstances stated in the
contend, but directly to the petitioners themselves. WHEREFORE, the petition is pleadings could affect plaintiffs cause of actions against defendants, or render third-
DENIED. party defendants liable for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in
respect of plaintiffs claim. The allowance of a third-party complaint is predicated on
the need for expediency and the avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits. But it should not
be considered as an excuse for indiscriminately filing any claim which a defendant may
[G.R. NO. L-18911. APRIL 27, 1967.] have against a third-party defendant although unrelated to the main action.
defendants. CLEOFE RAMOS,, third-party plaintiffs-appellants, vs. [SECOND DIVISION]
FELIPE ASUNCION,, third-party defendants- appellees. [G.R. NO. 160242. May 17, 2005.]
Facts: COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

Plaintiff Republic filed a complaint against defendants for the annulment of the Facts:
registration of a lot in the name of defendants, alleging that the same is part of the
public domain, and for an order prohibiting defendants from further excavating the Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a complaint for a sum of money with
Wawang Dapdap River, as well as for recovery of damages occasioned by such illegal against the Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) alleging that
excavations and appropriation of the public domain. Defendants filed their answer with ACDC leased generator sets, mobile floodlighting systems and several other
counterclaim, denying the alleged illegal excavations and constructions, but admitting equipments from MEC, the rentals of which ACDC failed to pay despite several
that they are the registered owners of the lot in question. With leave of court, demands. ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third party complaint
defendants filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendants, alleging that it against Becthel Overseas Corporation. In its answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness
is the latter who have illegally appropriated through artificial and illegal means to MEC but alleged that all the equipments they leased were used for Becthels

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projects and that ACDC remained unpaid by Becthel for their services, resulting in defendant, although the third-party defendants liability arises out of another
their non-payment of the lease rentals to MEC. transaction; and (3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC on the ground that the defendant already admitted
its principal obligation to MEC and that the transaction between ACDC and MEC, on The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other hand, are independent recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show
transactions. The RTC denied the motion of ACDC, sustained by the CA on appeal. possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the
Hence, this petition. allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined.
A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is
entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party
Issue: defendant.

Whether a third party complaint is proper.

In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the petitioner
as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such transactions
are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner as third-
party plaintiff for the construction of the latters projects, where the equipment leased
The petition has no merit. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to
from the respondent was used by the petitioner. The controversy between the
permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party which he
respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and
would otherwise assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. A
Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from each other.
prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-
party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation,
contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third party defendant is
[G.R. NO. L- 24103. AUGUST 10, 1967.]
proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of
BEATRIZ G. VDA DE DIOS, plaintiff- appellee, vs. LEANDRO BALAGOT,
the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third party defendants
petitioner- appellant, vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. AND PEDRO DEUDOR,
liability arises out of another transaction.

The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of Facts:
liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the An action for recovery of possession of land was filed by De Dios against Balagot,
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the alleging that the latter failed and refused to vacate a lot which she bought from J.M.
defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his Tuason & Co. Balagot filed an answer with a counterclaim, alleging that he had bought
complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant the land from Pedro Deudor, the successor-in-interest of the original owner of the land,
against the third-party defendant. and that pursuant to an agreement between J.M Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs,
his right over the land in question has preference over the sale in favor of the plaintiff.
In a case, the Court made out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of the After the case was scheduled for hearing, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based; or whether the third-party third party complaint against J.M Tuason & Co., and Pedro Deudor, for payment of the
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected value of the lot and house he constructed thereon, in case of eviction. De Dios
with the plaintiffs claim; (2) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the opposed the motion, stating that a third party complaint, to enforce a warranty of
plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original eviction, should have been filed before filing the answer. The motion was denied. On
25 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


appeal to CA, the appeal was certified to the SC since the CA found the same to by the National Treasurer in behalf of the petitioner corporation. Consequently,
involve pure questions of law. petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied and the case
Issue: was dismissed. The same was denied on reconsideration.

Whether the order denying the admission of the third-party complaint can be appealed Issue:
from at this stage of the proceeding.
Whether the denial of the Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence is
Ruling: proper.

[The SC ruled that the third-party complaint against JM Tuason & Co was inadmissible Ruling:
because there is no relationship of vendor-vendee between the latter and Balagot]
The denial of the Motion is not proper. It should be stressed that the amendment was
As to the admissibility of the order disallowing the third-party complaint against Pedro sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, particularly the testimony of
Deudor, suffice it to reiterate that the same would finally dispose of defendants right its treasury department manager and the debit memo from PNB proving that
to enforce his warranty against eviction, since a separate action for the same, without petitioner had paid PNB in the amount pursuant to its guarantees accorded to
having thus summoned to suit the vendor, would not prosper (Article 1558, CC). After respondent. Evidently, respondents failure to object to the evidence at the time it was
said disallowance, nothing further was left to be done in the court a quo, as regards presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived defect the
defendants right to enforce against Deudor the warranty of eviction. Said denial was complained had was cured by the introduction of petitioners evidence proving actual
therefore appealable. loss sustained by petitioner due to its payment to PNB. Thus, the contention of
respondents that the amendment would introduce a subsequently acquired cause of
action as there was none at the time the original complaint was filed, is not tenable.
SECOND DIVISION Verily, it was patently erroneous on the part of the trial court not to have allowed the
[G.R. NO. 120384. JANUARY 13, 2004.] amendments as to make the complaint conform to petitioners evidence that was
PHILLIPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, presented without any objection from the respondents.
petitioner-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC. et. al.,

Facts: [G.R. NO. 153777. APRIL 15, 2005.]
Petitioner issued five separate Letters of Guarantee in favor of Philippine National Bank DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
as security for various credit accommodations extended by PNB to respondent. When
PNB called on the guarantees made by the petitioner, respondents refused to settle Facts:
their obligation thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the LHDC entered into a loan agreement with PDB whereby the former was extended a
complaints states no cause of action since it does not allege any damages caused to credit accommodation to finance the construction of its building. To secure the loan,
the petitioner. Such motion was dismissed and hearing on the merits ensued. LHDC executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PDB. For failure to pay the loan, PDB
Petitioner presented a debit memo issued by the PNB, showing that the latter was paid foreclosed the lot and the property was sold to it as the highest bidder. LHDC filed a

26 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


complaint against PDB alleging that the mortgage and its foreclosure was void. PDB
filed its answer with counterclaim. LHDC filed a Motion for Leave to file a supplemental
complaint to cover occurrences subsequent to the original complaint. PDB opposed the [THIRD DIVISION]
supplemental complaint and urgent motion arguing that what goes against its [G.R. NO. 141180. JANUARY 11, 2005.]
admission is the fact that the supplemental matters involved therein would bring into GERTRUDES TEH, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the case new causes of action, distinct from the original complaint. The court admitted respondent.
the supplemental complaint.
Petitioner was convicted of estafa by the MTCC, Branch 2 of Davao City. On appeal, the
Whether the admission of the supplemental complaint is proper. RTC affirmed the MTCC decision. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA which
the CA however dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form, not being
Ruling: accompanied by duplicate original or certified true copies of the documents and
material parts of the record that would support the allegations. Moreover, there was no
The admission of the supplemental complaint is proper. written explanation why service of the petition was not done personally. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, the instant
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds petition. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that she failed to
something to the primary pleading. A supplemental exists side by side with the comply with Section 2, Rule 42 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental Procedure, as amended.
pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with
the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint. The purpose of the supplemental Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review.
pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of
relief to wich the plaintiff is entitled; hence any supplemental facts which further Ruling:
develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of
supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitutes a right of action. The The Court of Appeals did not commit any error. Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules
parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original provides:
pleading but not to introduce new and independent causes of action.

By its supplemental complaint, the respondent merely enlarged its original causes of "SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
action on account of events which transpired after the filing of the original complaint copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
and prayed for additional reliefs. The principal and core issues raised by the parties in petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
their original pleadings remain the same. There is no showing on record that the impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
petitioner would be prejudiced by the admission of the supplemental complaint. After indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
all, the petitioner has the right to file a supplemental answer to the supplemental concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
complaint, conformably to Section 7, Rule 11of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the
court cannot, thus be faulted for admitting the respondents supplemental complaint. reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of
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Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the denial of substantial justice if their petition would be dismissed merely by reason of
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material technicality. Citing previous rulings of this Court that procedural rules should be
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. liberally construed in order to promote substantial justice, petitioners prayed that the
affidavit of proof of service attached to their motion be admitted and that their petition
We note that petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition be given due course. Still unconvinced, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482 were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the October 8, 1999, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
MTCC. There were no copies of the pleadings filed below or other material portions of
the record which would support the allegations in the petition. Indeed, this is contrary Petitioners now allege that the said court acted with grave abuse of discretion
to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above. amounting to lack of jurisdiction by persisting in dismissing their petition for review
solely on technical grounds without regard whatsoever to the substantial merit of
Further, Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: their cause and the resulting injustice that could be created thereby. They pray that
the challenged Resolutions be annulled and that their petition be given due course.
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion it dismissing the
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
petitioners petition for review on technical grounds.
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She
contends, however, that no prejudice was caused to the parties by her non-
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribe
compliance. Clearly, petitioner violated both provisions quoted above which warrants
two modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
the dismissal of her petition by the Court of Appeals.
other papers. However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that whenever practicable,
the filing of pleadings and other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers
[THIRD DIVISION] on the adverse party or his counsel, must be done personally. But if such filing and
[G.R. NO. 141255. JUNE 21, 2005.] service were through a different mode, the party concerned must submit a written
LUCIANO ELLO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. explanation why they were not done personally.

Facts: The requirement under Section 11 is mandatory. Any violation of this Rule may be
cause for the court to consider the paper as not filed. However, such discretionary
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the
dismissing outright the petition for review filed by spouses Luciano and Gaudiosa Ello, following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service; (2) the importance of
petitioners herein, on the ground that they failed to incorporate therein the affidavit of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein; and (3) the prima facie
proof of service required under Section 11 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. In their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners averred that they failed to append to their petition the affidavit of service We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
due to an excusable oversight considering the time constraint in filing the petition with Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
its voluminous annexes; that they have a meritorious case; and that there would be a modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or

28 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal 1998 as shown by the Certification issued by the Philpost Mail Management
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable Corporation, not on July 14, 1998, the date stamped in the registry receipt, nor on
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written July 15, 1998, the date postmarked in the envelope, which contained the answer.
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the Issue:
prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it sustained the trial
Significantly, Gabriel Manasans affidavit of service shows that the petition for review court's ruling to strike out petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest on the ground that
was filed with the Court of Appeals in Manila through registered mail. This mode of the same was filed out of time.
filing is permitted under Section 11 of Rule 13 since it s obviously impractical for
petitioners and their counsel, who are all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, to Ruling:
personally file their petition in Manila. As to the service of copies of the petition,
Manasan personally served the same on respondents counsel and the RTC in Cagayan A close scrutiny of the record shows that the envelope which contained petitioner's
de Oro City, thus fully complying with Section 11. Answer with Counter-Protest was filed postmarked July 15, 1998. It is, therefore, clear
that the pleading was filed three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period
within which to file the same, considering that summons was served on him on July 7,
1998. Petitioner did not present the Operations Manager who issued the certification to
testify on the document and overcome the presumption, despite being given the
EN BANC opportunity to do so.
[G.R. No. 140158. January 29, 2001.] It would be a legal absurdity for the Court to allow a mere certification, whose author
FERNANDO T. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. has not been presented to testify on its veracity, to overthrow the evidentiary value of
ISAGANI PALAD, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, and an uncontroverted documentary exhibit such as the Registry Receipt and the postmark
CATALINA BAGASINA, respondents. actually stamped on the envelope itself to prove the actual date of mailing of the
pleading. Consequently, since petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest was filed out of
Facts: time, the trial court correctly declared that it had no jurisdiction over the same.
The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of
Petitioner Fernando Baltazar and private respondent Catalina Bagasina were both an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga petitioner was protest. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-
declared the duly elected mayor of the municipality. On June 29, 1998, private compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, an election
protest. Summons was served on petitioner on July 7, 1998. Thereafter, petitioner filed
with the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest. Private respondent filed a Motion [SECOND DIVISION]
To Expunge From The Records Of this Case Protestee's Answer And Counter-Protest on [A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1886. MAY 16, 2005.]
the ground that the same was filed out of time or three (3) days beyond the five-day ALFREDO G. BOISER, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR.,
reglementary period. Petitioner in this petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the respondent.
COMELEC En Banc Resolution which sustained the trial court's ruling to strike out
petitioner's Answer with Counter-Protest on the ground that the same was filed out of Facts:
time. Petitioner insisted that his Answer with Counter Protest was filed on July 13,

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Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the plaintiff in an ejectment case filed before the MTC It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not have a proper
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of notice of hearing. The date and time of the hearing were not specified. Neither
complainant. The case was appealed to the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 55. complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were never
Defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion to release bond on the ground that controverted by respondent judge.
the MTC of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental had already resolved the writ of preliminary
injunction without mentioning the applicants liability. Respondent judge granted the A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
motion. Complainant alleged that the issuance by respondent judge of the Order is question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the
indicative of his ignorance of the law considering that the motion did not state that he clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the
was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process. movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
He also averred that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for failure to state the time whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
and date of hearing. him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious
Issue: change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality
in the trial.
Whether the respondent judge committed gravely erred in issuing the questioned
orders. Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty
formality deserving no judicial cognizance. The rule mandates that the same shall not
Ruling: be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is mandatory.

Respondent judge had ignored a fundamental rule. He acted too precipitately in
[G.R. NO. 143646. April 4, 2001.]
granting defendants motion despite the absence of the requirements prescribed by
SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM, petitioners, vs. PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ, respondent.
the Rules of Court.

The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant,
except those motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by Vera Cruz
the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must
against Lim. Vera Cruz caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of
specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
the Transfer Certificate of Title. A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide:
petitioner on the ground that said notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is
not necessary to protect respondent's rights. The same was opposed by respondent
xxx insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to protect his right over
the property covered by the TCT and to avoid sale of property pending the execution
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties of the judgment in the case. Respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later lis pendens annotated at the back of the TCT upon the posting by petitioner of an
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. indemnity bond. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the CA
set aside the order of the trial court canceling the notice of lis pendens. Hence, this
SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary.- No written motion set for hearing shall be petition.
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

30 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


Issue: pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or
lien. It only means that a person purchases or contracts on the property in dispute
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed subject to the result of the pending litigation.
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.

Petitioners' contention lacks merit. Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens
practically covers his entire land covered by the TCT and thus molests his right as an
[G.R. NO. 128803. SEPTEMBER 25, 1998.]

Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the Facts:
registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a Asiavest sought to enforce a Hong Kong judgment against private respondent Heras,
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and ordering the latter to pay Asiavest a sum of money. The RTC ruled in favor of Asiavest
that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he intends to gamble on but was reversed by the CA after finding that the Hong Kong Courts never acquired
the results of the litigation. Based on this principle as well as the express provisions of jurisdiction over the person of Heras through valid summons. It was shown that Heras
Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular was a resident of Quezon City but stayed and maintained a business in Hong Kong at
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the time of the filing of the complaint. The summons was served through substituted
the 200 square meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis service at Heras QC address. The CA held that the summons should have been
pendens. In causing the annotation of such notice, respondent's aim is to protect his personally served in Hong Kong and that a notice sent outside the state to a non-
right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the notice resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in action against him personally for money
of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and restriction of petitioners' recovery.
right of dominion over the entire lot covered by the TCT is, therefore, an erroneous
conclusion. Issue:

Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, WON summons was validly served upon Heras so as to confer the Hong Kong court
earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two grounds: a) after jurisdiction over his person.
a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party; or
b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded. Ruling:

For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which The summons was not validly served on Heras by the Hong Kong Court; hence its
requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In fact, judgment cannot be enforceable here in the Philippines. Since the foreign (HK) rules
there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice must on service of summons were not duly proved at the trial, it is presumed to be the
prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Hence, even on same as the rules here in the Philippines which applies according to whether the action
the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on is one in rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is an action against a person on
the title. And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack against the the basis of his personal liability, while an action quasi in rem is one against the thing
certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis itself wherein an individual is just named as defendant in order to subject his interest

31 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


over the property to an obligation or lien. In actions in personam, jurisdiction over the Issue:
person of the defendant is necessary before the court can try the case, but not in
actions in rem where only jurisdiction over the res is necessary, the service of WON the court validly served to Pepsico, through a clerk, the summons necessary to
summons merely being for due process requirements. vest over it jurisdiction over the corporation.

The case at bar is an action in personam. Sections 7 and 8, Rule 14 of our Rules of Ruling:
Court provides for how summons may be validly acquired over resident defendants.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does Summons was validly served through a mere clerk by virtue of the rule on substantial
not voluntarily appear in court, personal service of summons within the State is compliance. The Rules of Court on the service of summons upon a private domestic
essential to acquire jurisdiction over his person. This method of service is possible if corporation is also applicable to a dissolved corporation. Thus, service upon a
such defendant is physically present in the country, if not, the court cannot acquire dissolved corporation may be made through the president, manager, secretary,
jurisdiction over his person and cannot validly try and decide the case against him. cashier, agent or any of its directors. As held in one case, although a clerk is not
Since Heras was not a resident of HK and the action against him was one in personam, authorized to receive a summons and complaint, if it appears that the summons and
summons should have been personally served on him in HK. The extraterritorial complaint were in fact received by the corporation through said clerk, the court shall
service in the Philippines is invalid and did not confer upon the HK court jurisdiction rule that there is substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons. The
over the person of Heras. It follows that the HK court judgment cannot be given force purpose of said rule is to assure summons on the corporation had thereby been
and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction. attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a technicality. Whomsoever
Miss Sison was acting for in receiving the summons, there is no question that the
[THIRD DIVISION] notice of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or Pepsico with whom
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO,, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND she is admittedly connected.
PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
[G.R. NO. 81123. FEBRUARY 28, 1989.] [SECOND DIVISION]
Facts: INC., respondent.
[G.R. NO. 139895. AUGUST 15, 2003.]
An accident occurred between a vehicle owned by petitioners and a truck owned by
Pepsi Cola, giving rise to an action for damages. Summons for the defendant Pepsi Facts:
Cola was served and was received by one Nenette Sison who represented herself to be
an authorized person to receive the same as she was the secretary of Pepsi Colas Two separate cases for collection of a sum of money were filed by respondent bank
legal department. The case was decided in favor of petitioners. When the judgment RFBI against petitioner Lazaro. Summonses were served at petitioners address at
became final and executory, petitioners filed for a motion for execution, a copy of Valenzuela City. For failure to answer, petitioner was declared in default in both cases
which was received by private respondent Pepsico, Inc., a foreign corporation which and judgment was rendered against him. A writ of execution was issued and served on
held offices in the country to settle the debts, liabilities and obligations of Pepsi Cola in petitioner at his actual residence at Quezon City. Lazaro sought annulment of
preparation for the latters expected dissolution. Pepsico opposed the judgment for judgment from the CA which dismissed the same. In this petition, Lazaro maintains
execution on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, questioning the validity of the service that he was not validly served with summons under Section 7, Rule 14 which requires
of summons to a mere clerk. It invoked Sections 13 and 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of that service be done by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence.
Court on the service of summons to private domestic and foreign corporations. The CA
granted the petition. Issue:

32 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


WON petitioner was validly served with summons. No, Layno was not validly served with summons. Considering that she was in Norway,
the summons and the complaint may only be validly servd on her through substituted
Ruling: service under Section 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the
mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
Petitioner was validly served with summons by the court. Section 6 of Rule 14, Rules person of the defendant. In a case, the court held that the term dwelling house or
of Court, lays the rule that summons must be personally served on the defendant. residence are generally held to refer to the time of service. It refers to the place
Said provision requires that summons, whenever practicable, be served personally to where the person named in the summons is living at the time the service is made,
the defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the
Service to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the service of summons intended for the defendant that must be left with a person of
defendants actual residence. It is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. There is no showing
summons in person by anyone authorized by law. Substituted service under Section 7 that the house where the sheriff found Laynos brother was the latters residence or
of Rule 14 relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. The sheriffs certificate that of respondent. As it turned out even, the occupant of the house was a mere
of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out. The burden lessee and Laynos brother was just collecting rentals. The service of summons at a
is on the petitioner to overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or
official functions by the sheriff. Such he did not successfully do here. place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which
he intends to return.
[G.R. NO. 158407. JANUARY 17, 2005.] ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG, petitioner, vs., SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARAI
HEDY VELAYO, respondents.
Facts: [G.R. NO. 155488. DECEMBER 6, 2006.]

Petitioner Domagas filed an action for forcible entry against respondent Layno. The Facts:
summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter
was apparently out of the country. The sheriff left the summons with Laynos brother Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner for maliciously instituting a
who received the same. The court rendered judgment against Layno and order her to criminal complain before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which prevented them
vacate the lot in question. When the corresponding writ of execution was served, from leaving the country, paralyzing all their business transactions. The case was
respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the judgment, alleging that decided in favor of respondents. Petitioner now questions the validity of the judgment,
summons was not validly served to her thorugh her brother who was never authorized contending that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
to receive the same for her and who was merely there to collect the rentals from the validly served with summons. She insists that she should have been extra-territorially
lessee of Laynos house while she was in Norway. The RTC, affirmed by the CA ruled in served with summons as she was a non-resident defendant, pursuant to Section 17,
Laynos favor. Rule 14, Rules of Court.

Issue: Issue:

WON Layno was validly served with summons through substituted service. WON petitioner should have been extra-territorially served with summons for being a
non-resident defendant.

33 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


No. Under Section 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court, when the defendant is a non resident
and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extra territorially. There WON the petitioners have not been properly served with summons, thus making the
are only four instances when extra-territorial service of summons is proper, namely: judgment against them void.
(a) when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiffs; (b) when the action
relates to a property within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or Ruling:
interest, actual or contingent; (c) when the relief demanded in the action consists in
excluding, in whole or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in the Petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a defendants
property and; (d) when the defendants property has been attached within the voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Further,
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)personal the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave or; (c) expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
any other manner deemed sufficient by the court. submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he does not wish to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object thereto.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons applies only in cases in rem or quasi in rem
and not in actions in personam such as the case at bar. Where the action is in
As the records would show, summons and copies of the complaint were served on the
personam and the defendant is a non resident, personal service of summons must be
petitioners. The petitioners appeared before the court on the scheduled hearing, as
had by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses, by
evidenced by their signatures in the minutes. Their voluntary appearance cured the
tendering it to him. Such was done in this case. Petitioners bare allegations of non-
defect, if any, in the service of summons.
service are not sufficient. The certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts
set out therein. Regularity is presumed and evidence against it must be clear and
VICTORIA and CRISTETA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs.BALIKATAN KILUSANG [G.R. No. 109648. November 22, 2001]
[G.R. No. 150859. March 28, 2005] Facts:
PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H.
Facts: Van Sebille and Federico C. Lim, for a sum of money. After service of summons upon
the defendants, they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period, hence
Petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained a loan with the other petitioners as co-makers. they were declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was then allowed to present its
When petitioner Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent evidence ex-parte. Judgment was rendered in their favor. Personal and real properties
filed a case for sum of money and damages. Summons were thereafter served. On the of defendant Carlos M. Farrales were levied and sold at public auction wherein PH
scheduled hearing, defendants appeared but because they failed to file their answer to Credit Corp. was the highest bidder. The CA declared null and void (a) the auction sale
the complaint, the court declared them in default. MTC, as affirmed by the RTC and of Respondent Ferrales' real property and (b) the Writ of Possession issued in
CA, rendered its decision finding for the respondent and against the petitioners. In this consequence thereof. It held that the liability of Farrales was merely joint and not
petition, the validity of the judgment by default is being assailed for lack of solidary. Consequently, there was no legal basis for levying and selling Farrales' real
jurisdiction, the petitioners allegedly not having been properly served with summons. and personal properties in order to satisfy the whole obligation.

34 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC
Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
Legazpi City


Petitioner contends that because private respondent did not question the joint and
solidary nature of his liability in his (a) Motion to Quash Levy Execution, (b) Urgent
Motion to Order Sheriff to Suspend Sale on Execution, and (c) Motion to Declare
Certificate of Sale Null and Void, he cannot now raise it as an objection. Petitioner
argues that the "Omnibus Motion Rule" bars private respondent's belated objection.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the basic policy of avoiding
multiplicity of motions.


The Rules of Court requires that all available objections to a judgment or proceeding
must be set up in an Omnibus Motion assailing it; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
In the case at bar, the objection of private respondent to his solidary liability became
available to him, only after his real property was sold at public auction. At the time his
personal properties were levied and sold, it was not evident to him that he was being
held solely liable for the monetary judgment rendered against him and his co-
respondents. That was why his objections then did not include those he asserted when
his solidary liability became evident.

Prior to his Omnibus Motion, he was not yet being made to pay for the entire
obligation. Thus, his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other
respondents was not yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to
by petitioner. Not being available, these objections could not have been deemed
waived when he filed his three earlier Motions, which pertained to matters different
from those covered by his Omnibus Motion.

True, the Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in
a single opportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory
norm, the objections must have been available to the party at the time the Motion was

35 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC