According to Fong et al. (in Gintis et al.

, Moral Sentiments and

Material Interests), "a compelling case can be made that people
support the modern welfare state because it conforms to deeply
held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others."
Explain. What, in addition, helps explain why the welfare state has
taken such different forms, in which redistributive efforts vary so
much in type and generosity? Is it meaningful to organize welfare
states into a small number of varieties' (or regimes'), and are these
tending to converge towards a single model? You may also address
one of the following related questions: why doesn't the U.S. have a
European-Style welfare state? And to what extent do developing or
emerging nations have welfare' states, and how are they evolving?

All policies are designed as a reflection of the relationship between

individuals in which reciprocal obligations are necessitated to maximize
utility. Modern welfare state policies are mirrored in this assumption insomuch
that conditionality is a stipulation to redistribution policies. However, the
nuances between states and typologies of regimes results in varying
redistributive policies with different policy repercussions; European welfare
regime policies differ from American ones because of their histories,
economies, institutions, and political atmospheres for example. The existence
of a variety of welfare state systems stems from economic divides, history of
differing opinions on the concept of welfare state as well current debates
regarding evolving welfare state regimes. Utilizing a cadre of authors to
explain the varieties of capitalism and welfare state capitalism (Hall &
Soskice, Esping-Anderson, Fong, Bowls and Gintis, Piven and Cloward, and,
Haggard and Kaufman), I will argue why different regimes take various
welfare state forms substantiated by meaningful historical examples and case
studies of redistribution policies to demonstrate the application of these
theories (Alesina). I will then elaborate on alternate discourse on social
protection to show that they are not propelling towards a particular model
(Freeman, Layard, Glyn and Haggard and Kaufman). Finally, I will close the
argument by showing that the evolution of distinct welfare state regimes is
based on multiple variables and constraints both internally and regionally.
Fong, Bowls, and Gintis define reciprocity as "a propensity to cooperate and
share with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost" so long an
assumption is that the capability to penalize those who are on the peripheries
of social norms and cooperative orders may be personally costly. Individuals
who operate to add into a common pool resource are automatically a part of
a social contract in which they can also receive from that which they provide
for and contribute towards. The social contract itself is based on reciprocity
as such, in which individuals giving will also receive. FB & G note that
reciprocal assumptions based on self-interest for those who oppose this social
contract results in a theoretical opposition to reciprocity (FB&G, 290). This
leads to assumptions showing that differences between American and
European views on the relationship between strong reciprocity and
egalitarianism differ. Furthermore, this difference results in a difference
between the various kinds and levels of reciprocity between nations due to
socially held beliefs resulting in varying opinions on how reciprocity policies
should be constructed. FB&G found that where Americans find the lethargy of
the poverty-stricken to mean they should be disqualified from involvement in
the social contract, Europeans attribute the lack of common pool resource
involvement as a direct result of inaccessibility, or, luck. Irrespective of these
differing world views on reciprocity, FB & G argue that deeply held individual
norms favor reciprocity because of the relationship between putting into the
common pool resourcein this case, social welfareand individuals' personal
morals relative to the system as a whole by concluding that "there is
substantial support for generosity towards the less well off as long as they
have tried to make an effort to improve their situation and in are good moral
standing." In gist, FB&G argue that individuals are keen on helping the poor
but when the perception of cheating the system in a morally deceptive way is
evidenced, that support drops.
Welfare state differences are explained through various theoretical
approaches about how nations have developed; differing economic
fundamentals and politics have resulted in narratives associated with
different path dependent histories resulting in the creation of institutions
pertinent to the political, economic and socio-cultural landscapes of different
states. Hall and Soskice categorize differing states by their institutional
structures and argue that relationships in the political economy change the
results of calculated interactions between people and the welfare state. With
business firms at the center of the political economy, the authors discuss that
a modernization approach has been applied in post-WWII which is fixated on
leveraging states via strengthened institutional structure against private
sectors which may not act in the best interest of the society. The capacity of
the state to act against neo-corporatism in the 1970s has resulted in
bargaining abilities of the state to negotiate with employers on labor
conditions and wages relative to related economic and social policies. For
Hall and Soskice, tools enacted by the state to organize society and
institutions within welfare states framework in developed nations take
different forms resulting in a "correspondence between types of political
economies and types of welfare states." Overall, the introduction of these
tools is related, as Hall and Soskice contend, because of political partisanship
and labor productivity reasons and that these tools may be complimentary to
market efficiency rather than act as impediments.
Hall and Soskice argue that bridging corporations with institutions is
important for political economies. They differentiate nations between
coordinated market economies (CME, i.e. Germany), and, liberal market
economies (LME, i.e. the USA). Both represent the institutional structures of
political economies in various countries in the OECD. Asymmetries in
corporate institutions result in differences in business strategies as CMEs and
LMEs have systemic variations with regards to corporate governance styles of
firms. CMEs focus their effort on individuals having specialized trades
garnering less of a knowledge gap between employees and management.
Contracts are negotiated with management, in turn, creating a transparent
tone between heads of firms and labor organizations that lead to better
production. Interestingly, comparative GDP tables show lower unemployment
rates in CMEs for the previous 30 years (Hall, 20). Furthermore, focus on non-
market institutions such as labor unions and contract negotiations are based
on interactions with other firms and institutions in the market.
Esping-Anderson identifies liberal, corporate and social democratic states as
three distinct forms of welfare states. Production regimes and welfare states
are embedded showing that outcomes of welfare state regimes are correlated
with distributive outcomes which require further inquiry into the relationship
between institutions responsible for redistributions and the economy. This
type of welfare state includes innovations in research in comparison to
production regimes in developed nations. Also, the impact of market
transformations in post-USSR nations and Latin America on institutions aimed
at ensuring social justice and protection in the latter half of the 20th century.
Through research capabilities, core elements of society such as gender,
fertility rate changes, and family makeup changed which were originally at
the crux of the reasoning for strengthened institutions in the welfare state
debate. As per Esping Anderson, explanations for how the rise of the welfare
state takes different forms include the industrialism approach where
traditional systems were obsolete, the state-centric approach focusing on
cross-national bureaucratic differences coming together to form the welfare
state, and the power resources approach based on the potential for power
distribution to shape civil society and government.
Piven and Cloward focus on the United States influence of electoral based
institutions and whether the US federal capacities can account for differences
resulting in historical explanations of patterns in welfare state policies.
Historical events have influenced the American welfare state by impacting
the weaker middle class while hampering the manifestation of popular public
opinions into enactable policies due to weakened institutions with political
party appointees (Piven and Cloward, 422). Because party system formation
occurred before industrialization but had been influenced by lobbying forces,
there is a great deal of fragmentation and decentralization of the federal
government that has perpetuated debates between individuals needs and the
state welfare policies (Piven and Cloward 431, 435). Because of the way the
constitution was organized, it did not allow for labor-based political parties to
emerge and a subsequent advocacy network for unions thus creating a jungle
of bureaucratic power which hindered access to welfare institutions cross-
nationally. These elements collectively have resulted in representative
institutions that do not adequately shape redistribution policies and
generosity towards the poor hinder on the beliefs that causes of poverty and
endeavors to ensure fairness in the system enable free-riders. Therefore, this
form of the American welfare state involves a misaligning of the needs of the
constituencies against those politically polished by the state resulting in
massive inefficiencies to implement various redistributive policies.
A fourth explanation for the typology of welfare state regimes is Haggard and
Kaufman's approach in which they compare different countries' welfare state
regime paths which have installed more democratic institutions by creating
regulations aimed at liberalizing economies. The performance of their
economies has resulted in a push to reform institutions and welfare systems
which have had a profound effect on their societies and the following
redistribution policies. Exclusionary welfare programs in Latin America aimed
at increasing incentives and social policy reforms whereas entitlement
programs in Eastern Europe have hindered this effort. Thirdly, East Asian
nations which have moved towards democratizing institutions exhibit
increased levels of economic growth have subsequently created social
entitlements.
Three previously mentioned typologies of welfare state varietiesliberal,
social democratic and conservativeare meaningful to organize into specific
pockets because of the major practical and path-dependent historical reasons
for why they were designated into these specific categories. It is important to
differentiate developing from developed countries, nations that are either
LME or CME and the historical differences to understand why a single model
is impossible. For example, in 1999, Germany, a CME with a relatively
expansive government, spent 1.7% of GDP on subsidies, 10.7% on
government consumption (excluding wages), and 20.5% on social benefits.
Comparatively, the United States, an LME with a relatively small federal
government, spent .2% on subsidies, 5.2% on government consumption
(excluding wages), and 11% on social benefits (Alesina, 56). The difference
between institutional structures, federal governments, economies, political
systems and legacies within society is evident. The United States offers less
sickness, family, disability, and poverty relief program benefits to citizens in
any working profession (Alesina, 7-8) likely because of the political influence
of lobbying groups, voting politicians, and heads of secretaries opposing relief
to those considered lazy as FB&G have pointed out. Germany, on the other
hand, spends a larger portion of tax revenue on social welfare programs
irrespective of their social status or current employment (Alesina, 7-9). At the
minimum, these statistics show a quantitative application of Hall and
Soskice's discussion insomuch that the problem of political economies such
as the United States and Germany is rooted in their spending on social
welfare programs which is based on ideologies of who the state feels is most
deserving; in nation's where corporations work with labor organizations and
governments intricatelysuch as the Scandinavian statestheir citizens
benefit greatly from social welfare programs because the institutional
structures are already in place within their constitutions and government
systems.
There are also nuances between developed nations which indicate welfare
state regimes are nuanced in their institutional and government systems; the
primary reasons the United States does not have a European system welfare
state can be explained by the organization of financial markets and organized
labor about regulations mitigating social policy. In the United States,
corporate structures support deregulation of financial markets resulting in
conflicts of organized labor insomuch that "LMEs are likely to pressure
governments for deregulation since firms that coordinate their efforts through
the market can improve their competencies" (Hall, 57); Deregulation allows
innovation in the market and corporations but weakens organized labor;
Alesina solidifies this point in regards to employment protections by stating
that "in all categories the US scores lower than the European average
regarding labor regulation and protection (Alesina 10)."
In Europe, labor specializations allow for regulations relating to unions to be
involved in the institutional structure that mitigate the welfare state. Hall
argues that firms in LMEs have employees who are generalists versus
specialists in CME countries, and as such a knowledge gap appears between
management and employees. Because the focus for LMEs is how market
economies mold firm strategies to maintain a competitive advantage, there
becomes less concentration on labor organizations and contracts between
other market actors. Higher educated and skilled individuals with specific
training lower the costs of internal company training and allow for innovation
because the education obtained is generalized and as such employees are
easily replaceable; doctors, CPAs, and engineers all require identical licenses
in their respective professions. Firms can easily replace one professional with
another if the skill set and licensing is the same. In the United States, labor is
tangible and corporations are market inclined where top management is able
to release employees based on how the market is acting.
In developing states, regionalism results in multiple transregional differences
rooted in how state institutions were formed. Arts and Gelissen recognize the
typical three typologies, but they ask why nations form into these three
distinct classifications. However, there is a "misspecification" of
Mediterranean states, placing the Antipodean states in the liberal bucket, and
the inability to address gender-related gaps of social policy within all three
welfare state regimes. Also, there are three other groupings aside from
Esping Andersons categorization which include Leibfried's residual,
institutional, modern and rudimentary systems; Castles & Mitchell's liberal,
non-right hegemony and radical states; and Siaroff's Protestant liberal and
advanced Christian Democratic forms (Arts and Gelissen). These designations
seem more probable for smaller OECD countries and developing Middle
Eastern and Southeast Asian states which have a compelling case for
divergence towards a new, modernized welfare state different than Esping
Andersen's original typologies. Examples include the Gulf Arab states which
subsidize health care costs at public run hospitals to all individuals and
provide cash transfer programs to citizens with heritage in the given country
at a specific age of maturity as deemed by the state. Other examples include
government managed union syndicates in North Africa which require college
graduates to pay dues to keep up licenses in their given trades; the dues
serve as social security insurance resulting in retirement pensions for both
the employee and their dependents. These types of programs have been
existent in post-colonial majority Islamic states and are increasing in the Gulf
States; these forms of social welfare programs and the governments they fall
under do not fit within the spectrum of liberal, conservative or social-
democratic states but the social policy programs of this type in developing
MENA region countries are increasing as well as sustaining at a minimum.
Conclusively, I have presented an argument which elaborates on the various
types of welfare state regimes about understanding reciprocity and
conditionality. The synthesis of theories by Hall & Soskice, Esping-Anderson,
Fong, Bowls and Gintis, Piven and Cloward, and, Haggard and Kaufman
presented have included secondary case studies and analysis on differing
forms of welfare state regimes by Alesina and Arts & Gelissen resulting in
practical policy examples in the MENA region as to why there is not a
convergence towards a single model. In addressing both developing and
developed nations, I have made a case for why the United States does not
have a European-style welfare state due to the different forms of labor
structures and markets that exist between both nations. In gist, this
discussion has included a synthesis of welfare state regimes and the analysis
of the different typologies that exist in the world today.