S| : e @ FILED Superior Court of California Superior Court of California ‘County of Los Angeles WAR 292017 pe County of Los Angeles ler, Ep yOfficer/Clerk Department 51 ix Deputy GUY FAUTEUX, Case No.: BC639261 Plaintiff, Hearing Date: 3/28/17 v. NARCONON INTERNATIONAL, et al., RULING RE: Defendants. Plaintiffs’ Pro Hac Vice Application; Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion and Demurrer to First Amended Complaint Background Plaintiffs sue defendants Narconon International and ABLE for wrongful death, alleging that defendants were negligent while plaintiffs’ daughter was housed in defendants’ drug rehabilitation program, leading to her overdosing on heroin, On November 1, 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint and on December 5, 2016, the operative first amended complaint for (1) wrongful death and (2) survivor action. On December 14, 2016, plaintiffs filed this unopposed application for their out-of-state counsel Gary L. Richardson to appear pro hae vice. On December 30, 2016, defendants filed this opposed demurrer to the FAC. On February 1, 2017, defendants filed this opposed anti-SLAPP motion. Request for Judicial Notice Defendants’ request for judicial notice of matters filed in this action is DENIED as superfluous. Plaintiffs’ Pro Hac Vice Application Plaintiffs apply unopposed for their out-of-state counsel Gary L. Richardson to appear pro hac vice. Pro Hac Vice Application Standard California Rules of Court, rule 9.40 provides that an attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction may apply to appear pro hac vice in this State by way of written application upon due notice to all interested parties, as well as service on the State Bar in San Francisco with payment of a $50.00 fee, so long as that attorney is not a resident of California, does not work in California and does not perform regular or substantial business, professional or other activities in the State. The written application must provide the following information: (1) applicant attomey's residence and office addresses; (2) the courts to which the applicant attorney has been admitted and dates of admission; (3) a representation that the attorney applicant is a member in good standing in the courts of admission and is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (4) the title of each court and action in which the applicant attomey has appeared pro hac vice in thisState in the preceding two years, if any; and (5) the name, address, and telephone number of the active California State Bar member who is counsel of record in the local action. CRC, rule 9.40(d).. Pro Hac Vice Application Analysis Plaintiffs? application does not satisfy the requirements. Plaintiffs supplied Richardson's office address and indicated his residence is in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Richardson Decl. | (second). supplied the names of the courts to which Richardson has been admitted, dates of admission, that he is in good standing in the courts, and that he is not currently suspended or disbarred. Richardson Decl. §f 2-3. Within the past two years, Richardson appeared pro hac vice in California in one matter, and defendants supplied the name of the court. Richardson Decl. 4. Plaintiffs supplied the name, address, and telephone number of Thomas F. Friedberg, counsel of record in this action. Richardson Decl. { 5. While plaintiffs represent in their memorandum of points and authorities that they paid the required $50 fee, they submit no proof of that. Additionally, plaintifls’ proof of service omits the State Bar. Therefore, the application is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion Defendants move to strike five allegations concerning proselytizing for the Church of Scientology while plaintiffs’ daughter was a recovering drug addict housed temporarily in Los Angeles as a part of defendants’ drug rehabilitation program, ‘The Motion is Not Untimely Plaintiffs argue that the motion is untimely. “The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” CCP § 425.16(f). Here, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on November 1, 2016. Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC and first amended summons on December 5, 2016. Plaintiffs did not file a proof of service and base their argument on their pleadings” filing dates. For this reason alone, plaintiffs do not satisfy their burden of showing that defendants filed their motion within some period “of the service of the complaint.” In any event, the anti-SLAPP statute permits the time of the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion “in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” Although the allegations in the FAC are substantially similar to those in the original complaint, the circumstances here warrant the Court's authorizing a late filing. The FAC was filed a short period after the original complaint with no litigation in between the two pleadings, and the motion was filed within 60 days of the FAC. Anti-SLAPP Standard Generally In determining whether to grant or deny a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 special motion to strike, the court must engage in a two-step process. Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 150. First, the court must decide whether the moving party has met the threshold burden of showing that the plaintiffs’ cause of action arises from the movingparty's constitutional rights of free speech or petition for redress of grievances. This burden may be met by showing the cause of action arises from an act that falls within one of the four categories of conduct set forth in CCP § 425.16(e). If the defendant meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, that is, present facts which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in the plaintifP’s favor, Id. at 150-151. In making its determination on this prong of the analysis, the trial court is required to consider the pleadings and the supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 646. The court does not, however, “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, {the court] accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluates the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 326. First Prong: The Claims Do Not Arise from Protected Activity In determining whether a defendant seeking to strike a claim under the anti-SLAPP statute has made a prima facie showing that the plaintiffs" action arises from activity protected by statute, the critical consideration is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself arises from an act taken by defendant in furtherance of his right of petition or free speech. Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig (2007) 154 Cal. App.4th 347, 357; Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281; Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal. App-4th 1356, 1364, “The anti-SLAPP statute's definitional focus is not on the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability — and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 (emphasis in original). The statute is to be broadly applied. ‘That is, under Code Civil Procedure Section 425.16(b)(1), the statute covers causes of action “arising from” acts in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition or free speech “in connection with a public issue.” The acts that are covered are defined as: (1) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law (CCP § 425.16(e\(1)); (2) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law (CCP § 425.16(¢)(2)); (3) Any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest (CCP § 425.16(e)(3)); or (4) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest (CCP § 425.16(e)(4)). In this wrongful death action, itis undisputed that a portion of plaintiffs’ causes of action is not based on protected activity. According to the FAC, plaintiffs’ daughter was a recovering drug addict who was brought from Texas to Los Angeles to live temporarily in defendants’ housing for training; was negligently treated by defendants while housed there; relapsed into heroin use; and died from an overdose of that drug while there.Specifically, the FAC alleges that defendant Narconon operates drug rehabilitation facilities nationwide, and defendant ABLE oversees Narconon’s drug rehabilitation programs. (FAC $f 6,7.). Plaintiffs’ daughter began her rehabilitation in Texas with defendants in July 2014, successfully was rehabilitated, and by a time between August and November 2015 was hired as a “trainer” of other addicts and was temporarily brought to defendants’ housing in Los Angeles for atraining program. (FAC $11). While being hosted in defendants’ housing, plaintiffs’ daughter allegedly was “provided herbs that are intended to mimic certain of the highs of heroin, including Kratom.” (FAC 49). Plaintiffs’ daughter’s death is alleged to have been caused by a non-exclusive list of defendants’ negligent acts, articulated in paragraph 16 of the FAC as failing to provide “reasonable and adequate supervision” of trainers and staff; failing to exercise proper care in selection, hiring and retention of staff; failing to prevent the promotion and use of herbal drugs by staff, particularly knowing that the trainers were former drug addicts; and using trainers who were drug users as “supervisors and role models” for the trainers such as plaintiffs” daughter. All this (putting aside the issues raised on demurrer) states a wrongful death cause of action, based on negligence — negligent supervision or negligent care in the training program ~ that does not arise from protected activity. The anti-SLAPP motion thus focuses only on allegations in the FAC — characterized by plaintiff as “incidental” to the non-protected activity — that defendants were engaged in religious proselytization of plaintiffs’ daughter on behalf of the Church of Scientology at the same time as she was being maintained in defendants’ apartments in the training program. Because there are no “statements” at issue, this argument must be based on the proselytizing falling under Section 425.15(¢)(4), ie, that plaintiffs’ claims arise from “other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with. a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Religious proselytization may be protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute in many circumstances. But in this Court's view, plaintiffs’ claims in this FAC arise from the alleged negligent supervision of plaintiffs’ daughter in the training program, and not from protected activity. “To determine whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, we disregard its label and instead examine its gravamen by identifying the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claim.” Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 822, 831-32 (citations and quotations omitted) (petition for review granted). “The trial court must distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning activity that mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.” Ibid. at 832 (citations and quotations omitted.). “Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been ‘triggered’ by protected activity does not entail that itis one arising from such.” Ibid. “Thus, the statute does not automatically apply simply because the complaint refers to some. protected speech activities.” Ibid. The allegations that plaintiffs? daughter was being pressured to join the Church of Scientology appear to be merely evidence in support of negligent supervision and treatment of het while she was housed in apartments and provided with Kratom, rather than the gravamen of the negligence claim, The primary focus of the proselytization allegations seems to be that the alleged focus onreligious recruitment distracted from, or replaced, reasonable care in treating plaintiffs? daughter’s drug treatment and rehabilitation. See FAC { 16:¢ (paragraph containing direct, statement of negligent conduct) (“exposing the trainees to recruitment to the Church of Scientology under the guise of drug treatment and rehabilitation”). This appears to be simply a dimension to proving that the supervision of plaintiffs” daughter in defendants’ program was negligent, and, as such, does not constitute an independent claim of liability. In form, at least, this allegation has nothing to do with the particular content of the conduct that allegedly was ‘occupying the supervisory staff that distracted from or prevented their providing reasonable care to their trainees. An allegation that the supervisors were focused on something other than the rug rehabilitation training mission for which plaintiffs’ daughter was brought and maintained in Los Angeles would simply be evidence that they were not providing reasonable care in treating or handling her as a recovering addict. In addition to alleging a misguided focus that supports a finding of negligence, the proselytization allegations may also be the alleged recruitment effort put psychological stress on plaintiffs’ daughter and made her more vulnerable to the heroin relapse that led to her death, See FAC § 22 (“Defendants ... knew that as a result of their course of conduct in ... pressuring Tabatha to join the Church of Scientology ... would likely result in Tabatha relapsing to using heroin.”); see FAC 4 16.¢ (generally focusing on control of the plaintiffs’ daughter by controlling her residence and daily activities). This again appears to be evidence related to liability for negligence (and perhaps causation) in handling a recovering drug addict who was being housed by defendants for training, and not a claim for liability based on conduct that was constitutionally protected activity. It is no different from a complaint that alleged that psychological stress causing relapse was placed on a vulnerable addict by (for example) requiring her to dress a certain way or to work long hours on a particular activity, Importantly as well, there is no claim — even by defendants ~ that the proper focus of the defendants was to engage in the protected activity (proselytization) at issue. For this reason, it is considerably easier for the Court to conclude that the allegations here arise from the negligent supervision and unprotected activity than in situations (that have divided the Court of Appeal) wherein an entity whose very purpose is protected activity (such as a news organization or a university) terminates an employee allegedly in violation of the FEHA. In such cases, the essential question is whether the entity is subject to generally applicable employment laws, or if the entire cause of action is protected because the employment decision was an act in furtherance of the entity's overall purpose. Here, the FAC alleges that defendants? purpose is to act in furtherance of drug rehabilitation (not religious proselytization) and defendants insist that they are secular with only that purpose (see the Declaration of Timothy Lomas.). Apparently, Nareanon and ABLE disclaim that they are even attempting to exercise the type of constitutional right (religious proselytization) that they effectively claim in their motion that the alleged conduct served to further. Given that background, it makes particular sense to evaluate the alleged actions as based upon evidence of negligence in executing the drug-rehabilitation purpose of the entities, rather than as based on conduct in support of protected activity that the defendants officially disclaim that they are attempting to further. Finally, it seems that even if all the allegations that defendants seek to strike were excised from the FAC, this case likely would proceed in just the same manner as if they were included. Discovery on the ways in which defendants may (or may not) have been negligent, and admissibility at trial, will have nothing to do with whether these allegations are in the FAC. The Court has little idea what the actual evidence might be. But testimony from percipient witnesses that relates to the defendants’ negligence in care for plaintif’s daughter would be admissiblesubject to typical relevancy and prejudice objections. For instance, if'a witness testified that plaintiffs’ daughter was being given Kratom by a supervisor who lacked medical or drug rehabilitation training but who was focused on a religious proselytization, that would bear on plaintiffs’ negligence claim, regardless of whether the proselytization allegation claims were articulated in the FAC. Likewise, evidence that supervisors were acting with reasonable care toward pliantffs’ daughter would be admissible by defendant, regardless of those supervisors” religious motivations. This manner of looking at the FAC underscores that, in the circumstances here, there is no separate claim arising from protected conduct apart from the negligence claim arising from non-protected conduct of supervising plaintiff's daughter in the housing for drug treatment training For the same reasons that the Court finds that the wrongful death claim arises from activity that is not covered by CCP § 425.16(e)(4), this Court would determine alternatively that the religious proselytization assertions are incidental to the central wrongful death claim involving negligent supervision of a recovering drug addict who was given Kratom while being boarded in a training program and who eventually overdosed on heroin, “Assertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ are not subject to section 425.16. [Citations omitted.] Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.Sth 376, 394; Wilson, 6 Cal. App. Sth at 831-832 (“Mere “collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.”) Because this Court concludes that the causes of action do not arise from protected acti Court need not reach the second anti-SLAPP prong. ry, the Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP motion is DENIED. Demurrer Defendants demur to both causes of action in the FAC for insufficient facts. Plaintiffs oppose. Defendants’ counsel submitted a compliant meet and confer declaration. CCP § 430.41; Forman Decl. §§ 2, 3, 6, 7, Exhs. C, D. Demurrer Standard ‘A demurrer may be sustained where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. CCP § 430.10(e). Thus, concerning the legal sufficiency of a pleading, the sole issue on demurrer is whether the facts pleaded, if true, state a valid cause of action, ie., if the complaint pleads facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garcetti v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1547; Limandri v, Judkins (1997) 52 Cal. App 4th 326, 339. The question of plaintiff's ability to prove the allegations of the complaint or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concem the reviewing court. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co, (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47. ‘The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 113 (stating, “[oJn demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”). Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Vance v. Villa Park Mobilchome Estates (1995) 36 Cal. App.4th 698, 709. Leave to amend must beallowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successfully stating a cause of action. Schulz y. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 92. If the demurrer is sustained, plaintiff “has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment.” Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 (quoting Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79 (internal quotations omitted)), Analysis Defendants argue that the FAC is defective because the Drug Dealer Liability Act (DDLA) bars the claims, the unclean hands doctrine bars the claims, and the FAC fails to plead causation. DDLA “Enacted in 1996, the DDLA created a ‘civil remedy for damages to persons in a community injured as a result of the use of an illegal controlled substance.” (Health & Saf:Code, § 11701.) The statute was intended to serve several purposes: to enable plaintiffs ‘to recover damages from those persons in the community who have joined the marketing of illegal controlled substances”; “to shift, to the extent possible, the cost of the damage caused by the existence of the market for illegal controlled substances’; ‘to establish the prospect of substantial monetary loss as a deterrent to those who have not yet entered into the distribution market for illegal controlled substances’; and ‘to establish an incentive for users of illegal controlled substances to identify and seek payment for their own treatment from those dealers who have sold illegal controlled substances to the user in the past.” (Ibid.; see Health & Saf,Code, § 11702.) The statute created a cause of action against a ‘person who knowingly participates in the marketing of illegal controlled substances’ (§ 11704), and it confers standing on a broad array of plaintiffs, including ‘{a] parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sibling of the individual controlled substance user,’ ‘[a}n individual who was exposed to an illegal controlled substance in utero,” and employers and other entities (§ 11705), as well as individual users under certain conditions (§ 11706).”” Barker xv. Garza (2013) 218 Cal. App.4th 1449, 1454-1455 (setting forth the statutory framework, otherwise focusing on the statute of limitations). Defendants rely largely on Whittemore v. Owens Healthcare-Retail Pharmacy, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App-4th 1194, There is little California case law interpreting the DDLA. In Whittemore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer without leave against the pharmacy defendants (but not defendant pharmacy employee Correa) “for the reason that the pharmacies did not knowingly market the controlled substances to Melody.” Id. at 1197, Along the way to that holding, the Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs that the unclean hands doctrine “does not preclude recovery in circumstances covered by the [DDLA] because the very purpose of the [DDLA] is to permit recovery of damages in specified circumstances by the user and others damaged by the use of the drugs. (§§ 11706, 11705.)” Ibid Plaintiff had sued defendants pharmacy and pharmacy employee Correa “seeking damages based on various theories including negligence. They alleged the pharmacy defendants failed to properly monitor and account for controlled medications in their possession, and failed to report to the federal drug enforcement agency that certain medications had been lost, missing ot stolen, and, in so doing, ‘were instrumental in providing (Melody] with assorted pain medication,’ and acted in ‘reckless disregard for Plaintiff's welfare.”” Id, at 1198. “Plaintiffs responded that theinjury was caused by the defendants’ failure to supervise Correa and to monitor the inventory of controlled medications; that defendants may properly be held responsible for their employees” crimes and tortuous conduct if it was (as here) foreseeable.” Id, at 1199. Significantly, “{tJhe question tendered [was] whether a pharmacy is liable under the [DDLA] for the conduct of an employee who furnished stolen prescription drugs to the plaintiff.” Id. at 1196. Applying the DDLA’s plain language, the Court of Appeal found that liability under the DDLA “would include Steven Correa, who sold the drugs to Melody without a prescription.” Id. at 1201. But, “[DDLA liability] would not include the defendant pharmacies since they did not ‘knowingly’ participate in the marketing of the drugs to Melody. Ibid. Whittemore is of little assistance to defendants here because plaintiffs do not seek to make defendants liable under the DDLA. There is no claim that defendants knowingly participated in marketing heroin to decedent. Rather, plaintiffs’ causes of action are for common law negligence (in the form of a wrongful death and survivor action), and Whittemore did not address the plaintiffs’ common law negligence claims. ‘The Court took this demurrer under submission for the sole reason that defendant’s counsel pointed out (correctly) at the hearing that Whittemore did affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff's husband’s claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, id. at 1199 (stating claims for which dismissal was affirmed). On close review, however, the Court concludes that Whittemore did not hold that the DDLA provides an exclusive remedy, pre- empting or altering otherwise existing causes of actions such as negligence. In Whittemore, both plaintiffs had pled a negligence claim, and the trial court had ruled for the defendants based on the “unclean hands” defense. The published portion of the opinion addressed only plaintiff's request for leave to amend to plead her claims under the DDLA to circumvent that defense. The logically prior question is whether the trial court was correct in finding that the unclean hands defense precluded the negligence claims, and this was not addressed in the published portion of the opinion; it would have been addressed, if raised, in the unpublished section II. The appellate court’s conclusion in affirming the dismissal of all causes of action, then, assumes both that that the unclean hands defense precluded the negligence claims (whether unchallenged on appeal or whether decided in unpublished section II) and that the DDLA is not available to plead around that defense (which was decided in the opinion.) Whittemore, then, does not affect the availability of a negligence claim that is not precluded by the unclean hands defense. It simply does not speak to that issue, addressing only the DDLA and holding that “the [DDLA] does not impose liability for negligent conduct.” Id, at 1201, fn. 9. In the main, the DDLA creates in section 11704 an affirmative basis for liability without indicating that it displaces the common law. In fact, it seems that the Legislature's goal was to supplement common law remedies. See, e.g., James N. Fincher, Civil Procedure: Drug Dealer Liability: A Potential Avenue of Recovery for Victims of Illegal Drug Use, 28 Pac. L.J. 681 (1997). Defendants look to section 11706, which limits liability under its provisions as follows: “An individual user of an illegal controlled substance may not bring an action for damages caused by the use of an illegal controlled substance, except as otherwise provided in this section.” Health & Saf. Code § 11706(a). ‘That subsection then requires the “individual user” to do three things, such as disclose to law enforcement all information about that individual's drug sources. This action, of course, is not brought by an individual user, so the section does not on its face apply. In a wrongful death case in particular, it is impossible for the decedent to do the things required by Section 11706(a). Even if the “individual user” language was somehow superfluous, it is not clear enough that it is meant to displace the common law. While decedent's heroin overdose is certainly part of the facts alleged here, the alleged cause in theFAC is defendants’ negligence in creating an environment that led to decedent’s overdose. FAC 1 16; see Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 665 (discussing actual cause and defining it as “substantial factor,” and legal or proximate cause). Additionally, subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 11706 use the terms “an action under this section,” suggesting that both the liability provisions and provisions limiting liability are limited to the DDLA’s application. ‘Therefore, the DDLA, by its plain language, is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants offer no authority interpreting the DDLA as a bar to common law negligence claims arising from drug-related injuries. Unclean Hands Defendants argue that the unclean hands doctrine bars plaintiffs’ claims because decedent admittedly overdosed on illegal drugs, “The defense of unclean hands arises from the maxim, ‘He who comes into Equity must come with clean hands.’ (Blain v. Doctor's Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059, 272 Cal.Rptr. 250 (Blain ).) The doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim. (Citations.) The defense is available in legal as well as equitable actions. [Citations.] Whether the doctrine of unclean hands applies is a question of fact. {Citation} [{] The misconduct that brings the clean hands doctrine into play must relate directly to the cause at issue. Past improper conduct or prior misconduct that only indirectly affects the problem before the court does not suffice. The determination of the unclean hands defense cannot be distorted into a proceeding to try the general morals of the parties. {Citation.] Courts have expressed this relationship requirement in various ways. The misconduct ‘must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the complaint is made, i.., it must pertain to the very subject matter involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants.” {Citation.] ‘[T]here must be a direct relationship between the misconduct and the claimed injuries“... so that it would be inequitable to grant [the requested] relief.” * [Citation] “The issue is not that the plaintiff's hands are dirty, but rather “that the manner of dirtying renders inequitable the assertion of such rights against the defendant.” [Citation.] The misconduct must ‘prejudicially affect the rights of the person against whom the relief is sought so that it would be inequitable to grant such relief.’ (Citation,] [{] From these general principles, the Blain court gleaned a three-pronged test to determine the effect to be given to the plaintiff's unclean hands conduct. Whether the particular misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous case law, (2) the nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries. [Citations.]” Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal. App.4th 970, 978-979 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court analyzes defendants’ contentions under these three prongs. Under the first prong, as plaintiffs observe in opposition, defendants provided no analogous case law. Defendants cite no court decision holding that one who dies from a drug overdose may not blame another person under any circumstances. Under the second and third prongs, the nature of the misconduct sued upon is defendants’ negligently creating an environment that caused plaintiffs’ relapse and ultimate overdose. The nature of decedent’s alleged misconduct is procuring and using illegal drugs in defendants’ environment. Based on this construction, it cannot be said (at least at the pleading stage) that decedent did anything to create the dangerous environment. In other words, decedent's drug use does not relate to defendants’ acts or omissions in their decisions concerning supervising their employees, for example, FAC 16.Thus, on the pleadings, there is an insufficient relationship to conclude that decedent’s conduct automatically invokes the unclean hands doctrine. Additionally, because the doctrine is equitable, defendants’ alleged misconduct must be considered before unclean hands can apply. This determination would require a factual analysis, inappropriate for resolution on the pleadings. Further, plaintiffs might successfully argue that their daughter's drug addiction was not morally blameworthy but rather was a morally neutral physical or psychological addiction that she did nothing to bring upon herself. Therefore, on the pleadings, the Court cannot conclude that the Blain and other considerations are present such that unclean hands bars plaintiffs’ claims Causation Negligence may be pleaded in general terms. Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.34 399, 407- 408. As mentioned in the anti-SLAPP discussion above, the Court has identified the allegations at paragraph 16 as supporting the causation element. They describe several acts or omissions by defendants, which are alleged to have caused the decedent’s death and the resulting damages. Plaintiffs are not obligated to plead the minutia of their factual causation theory and need not identify defendants’ representative or other details at the pleading stage. Conclusion Plaintiffs” pro hac vice application is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion is DENIED. Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendants to answer within 14 days and give notice. Dated: 3foalin ichael J. Raphael Judge of the Superior Court