Egwin L.

Lamanilao

Dasmarias Garments vs. Reyes/American Pres. Lines

GRN 108229 August 24, 1993

FACTS:

APL sued Dasmarias Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a
motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the
deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories
under ROC. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction
before a private entity.

RULING:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in
the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are
principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not
therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court
is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen. etc., and
the defendants answer has already been served.

Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is
no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
deposition after pre-trial the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the
judgment of RTC to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court or during the
process of execution of a final and executor judgment.

California v. Green

United States Supreme Court

399 U.S. 149 (1970)

Facts:

Green (defendant) was charged with felony offenses related to the sale of marijuana. Green was charged on the basis

of statements made to an undercover police officer by Porter. The state called Porter to testify at Greens preliminary

hearing. The state called Porter as a witness again during Greens trial. When Porter gave testimony that conflicted
 with his testimony at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution introduced excerpts from the preliminary hearing. The

prosecution also called a police officer to testify about Porters initial statements to police. Green was convicted. The

state Supreme court had previously held that prior statements of a witness could not be admitted as evidence if the

statements had not previously been subject to cross examination. In Greens case, the state supreme court applied the

same ban to Porters preliminary hearing testimony. The state of California (plaintiff) petitioned the United States

Supreme Court for review.

Petitioner, State of California, sought review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of California, which held that Cal.

Evid. Code 1235 (1966) was unconstitutional insofar as 1235 permitted the substantive use of prior inconsistent

statements of a witness, even though the statements were subject to cross-examination at a prior hearing.

Respondent was charged with furnishing marihuana to a minor in violation of California law. Petitioner's principal

witness against respondent testified at the preliminary hearing and was subjected to extensive cross-examination by

respondent's counsel. At respondent's bench trial, the testimony of petitioner's witness was inconsistent with his

testimony at the prior hearing. Petitioner admitted excerpts from the witness' preliminary hearing testimony

under Cal. Evid. Code 1235 (1966), citing the truth of the matter contained in the excerpts. The state Supreme

court ultimately held that use of the witness' prior inconsistent statements denied respondent the right of

confrontation under U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI even though the statements were subject to cross-

examination at the preliminary hearing.

Issue:

Whether or not the declarants out-of-court statements is admissible?

Ruling:

The court vacated and remanded.

Admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant was testifying as a witness and was
subject to cross-examination, did not violate U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI.
State or federal evidence rules could restrict resort to prior sworn testimony where the declarant was
present at trial, but the restriction would not be as a constitutional matter.

The judgment was vacated and remanded. The court concluded that because the declarant was testifying as a witness
and subject to full and effective cross-examination, admitting his out-of-court statements did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000,
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked
out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
 EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of people power of freedom of

speech and freedom of assembly to petition
exercise of the people power of the government for redress of grievances
revolution which overthrew the whole which only affected the office of the
government. President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of

the new government that resulted from it intra constitutional and the resignation of
cannot be the subject of judicial review the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation
of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when
President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant issues
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan
Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did
not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as
the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to
the past opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.

Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after January
20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto
T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio
and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress
by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.
By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice
system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said
that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less
with prosecution.

G.R. No. 1785 July 17, 1905

SHANNON RICHMOND, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO ANCHUELO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

The defendant, who was blind, employed the plaintiff, a doctor, to treat his eyes. Plaintiff did so, without success,
and brought this action to recover for his services. The principal question in the case is, What was the contract
between the parties?

The plaintiff claimed that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a cure he was to receive 500
pesos more. The defendant claimed that if a cure was effected plaintiff was to receive 200 pesos, but if no cure was
effected he was to receive nothing. The court below found upon the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, and we think
this finding is supported by the proof.

At the trial the defendant presented a witness, Jose Pastor, and offered to prove by him that the defendant, on
returning from the plaintiff's office, had stated to the witness that the plaintiff had agreed to cure him for 200 pesos,
and not to charge anything if no cure was effected. The judge excluded this evidence, to which ruling the defendant
excepted.

Issue:

Whether or not the witness testimony against the plaintiff is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:

It will be noticed that the witness did not offer to testify to anything which the plaintiff had said, but offered to
testify to what the defendant said that the plaintiff had said. The witness did not know that the plaintiff had made
these statements; he only knew that the defendant said that the plaintiff had made them. Such evidence is
inadmissible, according to the provisions of section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the
expiration of twenty days judgment will be entered in accordance herewith, and the case remanded to the court
below for execution. So ordered.

Ohio v. Roberts

Fact:

Defendant, Herschel Roberts, was charged with forgery for writing checks in the name of Bernard Isaacs. Defendant
was able to question Isaacs daughter, Anita Isaacs, at a preliminary hearing, but she failed to appear for the trial.
Therefore the state introduced the record of the preliminary hearing as evidence. Testimony from a preliminary
hearing is admissible if the declarant can not be produced for the trial, but the prior testimony should have factors,
such as a prior opportunity for questioning by a defendants counsel and being under oath, to indicate the testimony
is reliable and trustworthy. Defendant stayed at Anita Isaacs apartment for a few days. During his stay, Defendant
used checks and credit cards under Bernard Isaacss name. At a preliminary hearing, Anita was called by
Defendants counsel and asked at length about granting permission to Defendant. She denied granting permission.
During the trial, Anita was not available despite an extensive search by the prosecution and her family. Therefore,
the prosecution submitted her preliminary hearing testimony as evidence. Defendant objected but the trial judge
allowed the evidence. Defendant was convicted, but the appellate court and The Supreme Court of Ohio sided with
Defendant in not allowing the evidence.

Issue. The issue is whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible.

Held. The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate Defendants rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a
good-faith effort in trying to locate her. There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her
testimony such as Defendants counsel asked her leading questions at length during the preliminary hearing. The
dissent does not believe that the record indicates that the state met its burden in procuring Anita Isaacs. The only
effort in reaching her was sending five subpoenas to her parents residence, even though they knew she moved after
the second subpoena. The dissent believes that even if there is a belief that further attempts will be fruitless that they
should nonetheless be attempted in order to satisfy the states burden. The court breaks the Confrontation Clause
requirements into two parts. First, the state needs to prove that they made a good-effort attempt to reach the witness.
Second, the state has to prove that the prior testimony carries an indicia of trustworthiness.

People v. Laguinon

Facts:
Accused Laguinon was charged with murder in CFI Davao del Sur for killing Pablo Remonde. The trial court found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

It happened November 1972 at around 11:30pm when barrio captain Sumama Buat heard gunshots coming from the
river bank 300 meters south of his house.

Then his brother arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help in at the river bank, so Sumama told him to
call the councilman and proceeded to the unidentified man.

When they got there, they saw a man lying on the sand, when he said that he is Pablo Remonde.

Sumama took the ante mortem statement of Remonde where the former asked him who he was and who shot him.
He answered Gregorio Laquinon.

Issue:

The issue therefore in this case is whether or not the dying declaration of Pablo Remonde is admissible as an ante
mortem declaration?

Ruling:

No. It is inadmissible as a dying declaration, but as part of the res gestae; since the declaration failed to show that
the deceased believed himself at the point of death where every hope of recovery is extinct; which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.

It may still be admitted however as part of res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident
and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

People v. Sabio

Facts:

Sabio was convicted by CFI Cebu of Robbery with Homicide. The victim is Catalino Espina, 80 year old and owner
of small sari sari store in his house. The victim was found wounded in his house and died 3 days later because of the
wound in his forehead.

Several witnesses saw Sabio entering Catalina Espina's house. Meanwhile, Fuentes is the policeman assigned to
receive a report about the crime and asked the victim who hacked him and answered it was Sabio.

Issue:

The issue is whether or not the ante mortem statement is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

Yes.

The Court stated that the seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead, his inability to speak and the
spontaneous answer he gave pointing to Sabio and his subsequent demise strengthen the conclusion that the victim
must have known that his end is inevitable.
People v. Sabio

Facts:

Sabio was convicted by CFI Cebu of Robbery with Homicide. The victim is Catalino Espina, 80 year old and owner
of small sari sari store in his house. The victim was found wounded in his house and died 3 days later because of the
wound in his forehead.

Several witnesses saw Sabio entering Catalina Espina's house. Meanwhile, Fuentes is the policeman assigned to
receive a report about the crime and asked the victim who hacked him and answered it was Sabio.

Issue:

The issue is whether or not the ante mortem statement is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

Yes.

The Court stated that the seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead, his inability to speak and the
spontaneous answer he gave pointing to Sabio and his subsequent demise strengthen the conclusion that the victim
must have known that his end is inevitable.

People v. Salison

Facts:

Accused Rey Salison and others were charged with murder of Rolando Valmoria on November 1990 in Davao. The
trial of the case proceeded only against him because the other accused are still at large.

It started when witness Ayola saw Salison approach Valmoria who was then watching TV in the store. Salison placed
his arm around Valmoria and brought him to the mango tree behind a neighbor's house, when he allegedly boxed
Valmoria in the abdomen.

Valmoria then with his parents went to the house of the purok leader Patricia Alcoseba. Valmoria asked Alcoseba to
write down his declaration explaining that if he should die and no witness would testify, the written declaration
could be utilized as evidence.

Issue:

Whether the written declaration is admissible as evidence? Yes.

Ruling:

At the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his
imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances
thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his
assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the
circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
People vs Majuri
Facts:

This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at
Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later. On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was
investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he
killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that
his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. Counsel de oficio assigned to present the
side of the accused in this review, contends that the marriage of Airol to Norija was not indubitably proven.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Majuri established a marital relationship with the victim.

Held:
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was
a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"

He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the
deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and
her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.

People vs Toledo
Facts:

This is a case of homicide against Toledo. Morales and Holgado agreed to a bolo duel over a parcel of land.Toledo
allegedly intervened in the duel that dealt a mortal blow to Morales. Holgado executed a written testimony that
during the duel there is no one present but him and the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact against penal interest) be admitted as
evidence.

Held:
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence,
and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime
and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the
statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never
committed.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn
statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the
fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where,
however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other
grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is
unavailable, something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or
was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment.

Fuentes vs CA

Facts:
Professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder of Julieto Malspina. Petitioner
assert the admission of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and
therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo
Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo
testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed
Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in
securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day
however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did
not commit.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Zoilo Fuentes be admitted as evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Held:
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must
not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

In the instant case, the court find that the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The reason why the admission against penal interest
cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is
dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence
from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. It is incumbent upon the defense to
produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having
killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration
of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even
authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and
falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.
 G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

PEDRO GRAVADOR, petitioner-appellee, vs.

EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, (all sued in their official and personal capacities),
respondents-appellants.

FACTS: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina,
Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr.,
through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 according to his prewar records as a teacher in the public schools,
including his Employees Record Card. He was advised of his separation from service effective immediately unless
you can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65 years of age today
(excerpt from the advice given).

On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the
ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was the
affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in
which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on December 11, 1901, in the
Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses,
NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were present when said
PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore,we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the
birth of said PEDRO
GRAVADOR."

***On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby
had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the
corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits,
considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of
service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as
the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court ultimately rule
that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth of the
petitioner.

RULING: NO. The court gave three cogent reasons:

1. As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his
age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.

2. The import of the declaration of the petitioners brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way
back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a
 deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of
Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired
on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say
in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.

People vs Alegado
Facts:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos
City. The accused was allegedly raped CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age,
against her will and without her consent. The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the
time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty; hence, it was error on the part of the trial
court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.

Issue:
Whether the offended party was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents

Held:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio
Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed
by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40
of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the
witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's
age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is
controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the
pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the
reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these
preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in
issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching
the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is
the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

Tison vs CA
Facts:

This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a
parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently
sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the
property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that
the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for
cross-examination.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.

Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by
reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege
which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of
the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

G.R. No. L-12993 October 28, 1918

RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts:

Under date of May 12, 1916, the attorney of Rafael J. Ferrer y Viademonte and Maria Angelina Ferrer y Viademonte
with her husband Ricardo Hernandez y Aracil filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
praying for the rendition of a final judgment declaring that Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzalez had the right to
succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of
the latter, namely, Ramon Viademonte, Rafael C. de Inchausti, Joaquin C. de Inchausti, and Clotilde de Inchausti de
Vidal; that the plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer are the only and legitimate heirs of the deceased Rosa
Viademonte and the only ones entitled to receive her share of the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez, that is, the on-
fifth part of the latter's estate; that the defendants render to the plaintiffs an account of the fruits and administration
of all the property from the moment the said community of property from the moment the said community of
property was constituted among them, and to deliver to the plaintiffs that part which corresponds to them in their
capacity as sole heirs of Rosa Viademonte y Gonzalez, that is, the one-fifth part of the inheritance with all its
accession, fruits, and interests; and , finally, that the defendants pay the costs. In fact, it is alleged that the plaintiffs
are the legitimate children of Rosa Matilde Viademonte , who in turn died on November 20, 1898, leaving the two
plaintiffs as surviving legitimate children that the said Isabel Gonzalez was married, first to Ramon Martinez
Viademonte, and from his marriage two children, named Roman and Rosa Matilde, and surnamed Viademonte y
Gonzalez survived; that after the death of her husband Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Sr., the widow, Isabel
Gonzalez, contracted a second marriage with Don Jose Joaquin de Inchausti with whom she had three children
named Clotilde, Rafael and Joaquin, all surnamed Inchausti y Gonzalez, that Ramon Viademonte y Gonzalez Jr.,
died on January 1, 1905, without leaving any forced heir, and by a will dated May 216, 1900, he left his property to
the son or sons which Rafael C. de Inchausti might have, and in default or such child or children, to the same Rafael
C. de Inchausti, by a will, left as his heirs and successors in interest his legitimate son Jose R. de Inchausti, his
recognized natural daughter Maria Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas, and his widow Maria Consolacion Rico y
Medina; that on her death, Isabel Gonzalez left a certain property in her marriage with Jose de Joaquin de Inchausti,
which would amount approximately to P1,000,000 with its accessions, according to present valuation, as shown by
the inventory of said property which makes up Exhibit A, that on January 14, 188, Jose Joaquin Inchausti y
Gonzalez and Clotilde de Inchausti y Gonzalez de Vidal, each of whom received on-fourth of the estate left by the
deceased Isabel Gonzalez, excluding therefrom Rosa Viademonte, the mother of the plaintiffs., notwithstanding the
fact that she had an equal rights to inherit from Isabel Gonzalez; that since January 188 till his death, Ramon
Viademonte, Jr. had been the possessor and administrator of the fourth part of the inheritance which he received
from his deceased mother Isabel Gonzalez which portion of the property later came to the possession and control of
Rafael C. de Inchausti, and on the death of the latter, this fourth part of the inheritance came to the possession of
Maria Consolacion Rico de Inchausti, widow of said Rafael C. de Inchausti, in her capacity as guardian of her son
Jose Rafael de Inchausti, and part of it, to the possession of Maric Consolacion de Inchausti de Ortigas; and that a
great part of the property which the defendants actual possess, came from the young children, who received from
Isabel Gonzalez with the earnings and accessions thereof; these children have been possessing it pro indiviso or in
coownership, in their lifetime, with Rosa Viademonte while living, and upon the death of the latter, with her heirs,
but that, in spite of the demands made by the plaintiffs for the delivery to them by the defendants of their
corresponding share in the inheritance the latter have always refused to do so.

Issue:

Whether or not Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr.,entries, of writing contained in the book, being a mere
memorandum of an interested party, can be admitted at the trial?

Ruling:

It can be met and disposed of by the provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of
common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.

The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect attributed to it, The witness Joaquin
Jose de Inchausti declared affirmatively that the memorandum under consideration has been written in the
handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the
testimony of this witness contains some reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning the family
genealogy of the same.
It remains now to be decided whether Rosa Matilde Viademonte was a natural daughter of the deceased Isabel
Gonzalez or was a mere protegee cared for and maintained in the house of said Isabel Gonzalez, and, if in the first
case, the plaintiffs have the right to succeed ab intestato to a part of the inheritance of Isabel Gonzalez in
representation of their mother Rosa Matilde Viaddemante or Robles.

The record does not furnish satisfactory proof that Rosa Matilde was a daugther or at least a natural daughter of
Isabel Gonzalez; on the other hand, it is shown in the records of the case that she was a protegee in the house of said
Isabel, for, in a conciliation proceeding had on April 15, 1893, between Rosa Matilde and Joaquin F. de Inchausti, it
appears in the record thereof that, although in some of the documents presented to justify the accounts, Rosa Matilde
called Rafael de Inchausti her brother, this manner of calling him was due to the intimacy in which both have been
brought up from childhood in the same house, she being a mere protegee of the latter's parents, and of because they
were really brother and sister.

This statement made by Inchausti in the presence of Rosa Matilde Viademonte did not bring about a protest or
objection on the part of Rosa Matilde herself or her attorney. In addition to this fact, Rafael C. De Inchausti stated
under oath that it is not true that Rosa MatildeViademonte was his maternal sister.

Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.

In family tradition, the declarant must be dead or unable to testify. In family reputation or tradition, there is not
even a declarant to speak of; just a witness who was aware of an exiting family reputation or tradition.

Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be
admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to have been made at the same time as the occurrence
of the events documented.