For my senior thesis, I decided to dive into the contentious historical debates surrounding the

CPUSA and what it means for genuine American radicalism. In order to do this in less than a

book, I have decided to focus on earl Browder: the leader of the Comintern from the early 30s

until his abrupt ousting in 46. In my paper, I will analyze the actions of Browder and their

motives in an attempt to show that his actions represented a genuine attempt to integrate the

internationalist communist movement with American radicalism as he understood it, and more

specifically that his actions were limited but not decided by soviet influence.

Points to dispute:

Browder as a Stalinist stooge.

The idea that Browder saw something in Stalin, trusted his opinions, and apologized for him

when his enemies spoke is founded. Undeniable, really. This goes farther than lip-service, as

well. For example, in of spite naturally lining up closer to him ideologically, Browder was quick

to side against Trotsky when Stalin secured power in the USSR, laminated on his death as one

less enemy in the world, and continued to write distorted critiques years after his expulsion. This

sense of dedication, when looked at as solely a devotion to Stalin, seems incredible. But Stalin is

only one factor in his devotion.

Browder, on a fundamental level, saw himself on the right-side of history. Its the great irony of

him as a figure. Based on a long-held notion, he fundamentally believed that the USSR was the

first step towards socialism. As events unfolded, he rationalized them by distorting reality to fit

his preconceptions. The actions of Stalin, and the demands of the COMINTERN, were not
selfish or driven by Soviet national interest in his eyes. Changes in party line were justified

within the context of a Global Leftist Movement, which Stalin was a large part of.

Not only did Browder seek to attach himself to the International Communist movements, he also

sought to define it. When Browder succeeded in arguing the Democratic Fronts Case to the

COMINTERN in 36, he deeply believed that he was making a mark on the movement. This

delusion broke new ground after the dissolution of the COMINTERN by Stalin, which Browder

took as a decided move towards autonomy.

Browder did not act in anticipatory compliance to Stalin. If he had, his mythic conception of

Stalin would have led him to even stranger ends.

The

In Hammer and Hoe, for instance, Kelley writes that the Soviet pact with the Nazis did little to

affect their day-to-day operations because the anti-communist southern democrats had left no

hope of a Democratic Front in the first place. Draper would go on to critique the revisionists as

writing books about communism without the communism, but thats more of an indication of his

own biases than theirs. The fact that the ongoing of upper politics were not impactful represents

historical context. His insistence that these forces should have been is an example of the

perspective he worked within: one which sees the CPUSA is solely an appendage of Soviet

revolutionary power.
For a while, the CPUSA represented a uneasy coalition forged between domestic working-class

radicalism and an international Soviet-led movement, held together by the only man with the

ability to attempt it, and the delusion to think it would last. Browder watched his career slip into

the chasm he had straddled for years, still unable to accept its widening. Soon after his departure,

the party laid in ruin by historical circumstances he could not have defended against. And,

quoting Drapers characterization of the events 20 years prior, Nothing else so important would

ever happen to it again.