ARTICLE 159

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMIGIO PONTILLAS

FACTS:

That on or about the 24th day of December, 1935, in the City of Manila, Commonwealth
of the Philippines, the said accused, having been granted on September 8, 1922, by His
Excellency, the Governor-General, a pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of this sentence of
six years one day of prision correccional imposed upon him in criminal case No. 21823 of the
Court of First instance of Manila for the crime of illegal marriage, which he began to serve on
February 14, 1921, subject to the condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippine Islands, which condition was accepted by him on September 8, 1922, causing
thereby his immediate release on that date from the Bilibid Prisons, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violate the conditions of such pardon, by then and there committing
the crime of damage to property thru reckless driving, for which he was received again in Bilibid
Prisons on June 26, 1936, to suffer thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of P61 fine and
P60.30 indemnity imposed upon him by the Municipal Court in criminal case No. H-47583, by
virtue of the judgment rendered by the said court, which judgment has become final and
executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person - who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive
for illegal marriage or bigamy after he has served nineteen months of the penalty of six years and
one day of prision correccional imposed upon him - be criminally prosecuted for violation of a
conditional pardon on the sole ground that, contrary to the condition that "he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands" he has committed the crime of damage to
another's property through reckless imprudence?

HELD:

In this jurisdiction a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the
Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not become
perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all its conditions.
Accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill
its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its strict terms.
Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as before he was pardoned and he could
be compelled to serve the remainder of his sentenced, which he has not yet served. In the
appealed resolution it is stated that the crime of damage to property committed by the appellee is
not one which shows moral perversity on his party, meaning thereby that, strictly speaking, he
did not infringe any condition of his pardon. The above reason has no weight at all because the
condition of the pardon did not consist in that he would not commit any crime, more or less

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grave, which might denote perversity, but in any violation of any penal law of the Philippines.
The crime of damage to property of another, through reckless imprudence, is a crime expressly
punished and considered as such by article 356 in relation to article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the question and the facts before us are different, it is not necessary for us to decide
whether an action may be brought for the purpose of enforcing the service of a part of a sentence,
which was not extinguished on account of conditional pardon, after the usual period of
prescription of the penalty.

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ARTICLE 161
MAXIMINO GAMIDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Maximino B. Gamido was convicted by the Regional Trial Court on eleven counts of
having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in 11
cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines in documents and making it
appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the Philippines.
On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer,
petitioner appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E.
Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's) presence. The lone witness for the prosecution,
Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the Malacaang Records Office (MRO),
testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in his office and that the signatures
thereon did not appear to be those of the former President. The RTC held Gamido guilty, to
which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Gamidos conviction.

HELD:

The petition has no merit. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacaang Records
Office, testified that his office did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive
Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as
nonexistent and its alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected
with the Office of the President. From these premises it is rational to conclude that the
documents in question, which purport to have been signed by then President Marcos, are bogus
documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to be the author of the
forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the forger
thereof. What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos
and that the signatures on the documents in question were not those of President Marcos. This is
sufficient to establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, 22 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting of another must have seen
the latter write the document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting
to be his [the subject's] upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has been record custodian at
Malacaang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired familiarity with the
signature not only of President Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served. There
was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the challenged
signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly
technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or

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molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a
handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less
compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The
signatures on a questioned document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise
independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such signatures." Here, as the trial court
observed, "the forgeries were not only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly
discernible to the naked eye or mere ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from
their appearance.

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ARTICLE 163
UNITED STATES VS. AGUSTIN BASCO

FACTS:

The defendant attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he bought at a certain
store with what appeared to be silver coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a Philippine copper
cent; that he insisted that the owner of the store should accept the same as a peseta, that is to say,
a twenty cent piece; that the latter refused to accept it upon noticing what the real value and
denomination of the coin was; that the defendant again insisted that the money be accepted and
the owner of the store refused to do so; that as a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued between
them; that a policeman then interfered, and upon being informed of what had happened, placed
the defendant under arrest and took him to the police station, where several Mexican and
Japanese coins were found in his possession together with a roll of Philippine copper cents, the
latter being silver plated, and identical with the coin which he had attempted to pass at the store
as a twenty-cent piece; and that upon an examination of these plated coins it was found that they
were genuine Philippine copper cents, which apparently and been whitened with quicksilver to
give them the color and brightness of silver. The defendant having been asked as to where he had
obtained the said coins, first answered that he had received them as change, but later admitted
that he had silvered them himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Basco should be charged of counterfeiting of money or estafa.

HELD:

There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in this case, no spurious or clipped

coin was used. The coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore their original designs
and inscriptions. The defendant did not make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and
inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give them the appearance of silver pieces for
the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate the
peculiar design of such coins. The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding
third persons by deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime
of estafa and not of counterfeiting money. There were not legal grounds upon which a charge for
these latter offense could be based.

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ARTICLE 169
UNITED STATES VS. MARIANO SOLITO

FACTS:

That the defendant Mariano Solito was, at the time mentioned in the complaint,
correspondence clerk and acting chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of schools
in the municipality of Dumaguete; that, as such clerk, he was intrusted with the care of the
correspondence of said office, and was authorized to open letters of an official character
addressed to the office; that it was the custom to the Director of Education to forward to the
division superintendents of schools checks for the reimbursement for travel expenses and for the
payment of the salary of employees; that on the 19th day of April, 1915, said Treasury Warrant
No. 428426 was issued to the said Alvah D. Riley for the sum of P657.53 by the Auditor of the
Philippine Islands directed to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands for payment; that on the
same day (April 19th, 1915) said warrant was sent to the Director of Education; that said warrant
was sent to Alvah D. Riley, through the division superintendent of schools, by the Acting
Director of Education on April 29, 1915; that the defendant herein presented said warrant to the
municipal treasurer for payment, bearing the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley, early in the month
of May, 1915, and received the amount of money called for (P687.53) from said municipal
treasurer; that Alvah D. Riley never had in his possession said warrant, nor had he ever seen the
same, until after the defendant had presented it for payment to the said municipal treasurer; that
he did not indorse the same by writing his name on the back thereof; that his signature which
appears upon the back of said warrant was not his signature; that he did not write his name
thereon; that the said division superintendent of schools did not receive said warrant and had
never seen it until after the defendant herein had received the money thereon; that there is no
proof in the record showing that any person or persons had in his possession said warrant after it
left the hands of the Acting Director of Education until it was presented by the defendant to the
said treasurer indorsed as above indicated; that, at the time the defendant presented said warrant
to the municipal treasurer for payment, he also presented a note purported to have been written
and signed by Riley, in which the latter requested the said treasurer to cash the warrant. Riley
denies absolutely that he gave to the defendant said note.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Solito committed forgery.

HELD:

Said warrant was a check issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands and,
therefore, an obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands as defined by section 1 of
Act No. 1754. It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to his order. When it was
indorsed as above indicated, it became a check or warrant payable to bearer. The indorsement
made a material alteration in said warrant. The indorsement changed said check from one

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payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he ordered it paid, to one payable to bearer. The
indorsement by the defendant had the effect of erasing the phrase "or order" upon the face of the
warrant. Whenever the holder of a check, without the consent of the maker, changes its terms so
as to make it payable to bearer by erasing or changing the words "or order" after the payee's
name, he thereby makes a material change in said document. Changing the phrase "or order" to
"bearer" is a material alteration. While the instrument was payable to Alvah D. Riley, or order, it
was negotiable by the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley only. The change made it payable to
"bearer" and it was thereafter negotiable and transferable by delivery simply. In construing the
effect of the indorsement we must only look to said indorsement, but to the face of the document
also, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the indorsement operated to alter the terms or
conditions of the original contract. The defendant having passed and uttered an altered obligation
of the Government of the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud is guilty.

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ARTICLE 171
UNITED STATES VS. MARIANO SOLITO

FACTS:

That on or about the 14th day of January, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being a field agent of the National Bureau of Investigation of the Department of
Justice, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such and hence a public officer, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or caused to be falsified and commit acts of
falsification in the Personnel Information Sheet of the said office which is a public and official
document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, well knowing that having been born
of Chinese parents, he is a Chinese citizen and as such is not qualified to hold a public office of
confidential and delicate nature, in the Philippine Government, but having somehow obtained
employment as field agent of the National Bureau of Investigation but desiring to continue in
such employment, filled up or caused to be filled up the blanks in the said Personnel Information
Sheet of said office stating therein that he was a naturalized Filipino citizen, a first grade civil
service eligible and attended the first year law course of the Far Eastern University in 1942 when
in truth and in fact as said accused fully knew those statements were false and untrue and made
solely to convince the authorities of the said office that he was fit and qualified to continue in
such employment, thus making untruthful statements in the narration of facts, and once the said
Personnel Information Sheet was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused, in
pursuance of his desire to mislead the authorities so that he may be retained as field agent in the
said office, executed an affidavit on the last page of said Personnel Information Sheet.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Santiago Uy, as a public official, falsified an official document.

HELD:

The court of first instance held the sheet to be a public document. The defendant however
maintains it is not. He has right to support the appealed order of dismissal with reasons different
from those of the court a quo; he is not bound by them. However, it cannot be seriously
contended that a document required by a Bureau to be filled by its officers for purposes of its
record and information is not an official document. The provision allegedly violate by defendant
is Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. That the defendant took advantage of his position may
be gathered from the fact that he himself filled the information sheet which obviously was to be
submitted by each and every officer or employee of the N.B.I. It is based on his opinion that the
crime was a mere falsification of a certificate of merit under Article 174 of the Revised Penal
Code. This contention must be over ruled, because as above stated the violation is prosecuted
under Article 171.

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ARTICLE 173
UNITED STATES VS. JOAQUIN ROMERO

FACTS:

On April 24, 1908, Joaquin Romero, as postmaster in charge of the post-office and
telegraph station in the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac, received from one named Eugenio
two telegrams for their transmission one to Olongapo, addressed to Mariano de la Cruz, and
the other to Los Banos, addressed to Severino Maguigao. The telegram sent to Cruz in Olongapo
was drawn up in the following terms: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Sr. Mariano de la Cruz.
Olongapo. Aver is hay dinero necesita porque estoy enfermo manda si puede, Eugenio." (See
whether there is money. I need it because I am sick. Send if you can. Eugenio.) This telegram
consists of twenty-one words and was transmitted by the telegraph operator Romero in the
following form: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Mariano de la Cruz. Olongapo, Mandame
dinero pronto, estoy enfermo Eugenio." (Send me money soon, am sick. Eugenio.) The original
telegram was thus reduced to nine words, and twelve words were omitted. The telegraph operator
Romero received for the transmission of the said telegram P1.26, the price charged for the
twenty-one words which it contained, and by the reduction gained P0.72, corresponding to the
twelve words omitted. The second telegram was originally worded as follows: "Paniqui, April,
24-08. Sr. Severino Maguiago. Los Banos. Haga el favor de remitir lo que me debe
estoy muy enfermo y necesita el dinero. Eugenio." (Please remit what you owe me. I am very
sick and need to money. Eugenio). The operator omitted eight words from this telegram, which
was reduced to the following: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Severino Maguigao. Los Banos.
Remitame dinero, necesito estoy enfermo. Eugenio." (Remit me money. Need. Am sick.
Eugenio.) By the reduction of words made, the telegraph operator Joaquin Romero gained the
price corresponding to the difference of eight words, to wit, P0.48. The case having come to trial,
the judge, in view of the evidence adduced thereat, sentenced the accused, on January 13, 1909,
to the penalty of three years and seven months prision correccional, crediting him with one-half
of the time he was held as a detention prisoner, to the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
the payment of the costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of telegrams.

HELD:

It is a fact, admitted by the defendant, that he changed the wording of the telegrams
which he received, by omitting several words in each of them; and the record of the cause shows
no proof of his allegation that he made an error in recounting the amount received for each one
of the telegrams, owing to the number of words they contained, and that he was therefore obliged
to diminish the number of words of each of them. Such allegation is negatived by the proven

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facts that he affixed stamps only to the value of P.054 to one of the telegrams, and of P0.60 to the
other, and as he received P2.34 for the dispatch of the two messages, it is evident that the surplus
money must have remained in his possession, since, on striking a balance, instead of a surplus it
was found that there was a shortage of P3 in the postal funds, as the defendant himself confesses
in his official letter of April 25, 1908 (p. 39 of trial record). From all of which it is concluded, as
aforesaid, that the defendant obtained profit from the remainder of the sum received by him,
equivalent to the price of the words omitted by him from the two telegrams before mentioned.
The defendant, therefore, with manifest violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the unlawful
act in question and has thereby incurred the penalty which he merits for his criminal acts. In view
of the fact that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance enters into the commission of the
crime, the punishment should be imposed upon him in the medium degree of the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees.

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ARTICLE 177
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO HILVANO

FACTS:

When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official
business early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein Defendant
Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office. Later, during office hours on
that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the municipal building; and having found
Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written notices to the corresponding
municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the
duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been
designated by the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary
informing the latter of the controversy. And the said Secretary replied by letter, that under sec.
2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge the duties
of the Mayor during the latters temporary absence. Shown this official pronouncement, Hilvano
still refused to surrender the position. Again the Vice-Mayor sought the opinion of the Provincial
Fiscal, who by letter replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to the office. Notwithstanding
such opinion which was exhibited to him Hilvano declined to vacate the post, which he held
for about a month, appointing some policemen, solemnizing marriages and collecting the
corresponding salary for mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hilvano usurped authority.

HELD:

There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals.
For one thing it applies to any person; and where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Furthermore, contrary to Appellants assumption that Articles 238-241 of the
Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurption of official functions by public officers, said
articles merely punish interference by officers of one of the three departments of government
(legislative, executive and judicial) with the functions of officials of another department. Said
articles do not cover usurption of one officer or employee of a given department of the powers of
another officer in the same department. There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In the
beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he
had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he
had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted. But the
penalty imposed on him should be modified, in accordance with the recommendation of the
Solicitor General. He is sentenced to an indeterminate term of 4 months of arresto mayor to two
years of prision correccional. So modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed with costs against
Appellant.

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ARTICLE 179
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMERO

FACTS:

In November 1955, information reached the Mother Superior of the religious order of
Daughters of St. Paul, that a woman was roaming around alone asking for alms for orphans in
the name of the said organization. The woman was wearing the organizations habit. The
Daughters of St. Paul had no orphans, asking for alms was not its mission. Among those
approached by said woman was Leandra Sajagon, mother of two sisters in the convent of the
Daughters of St. Paul. Leandra gave her P 1.00 to which no receipt was issued.

HELD:

To bring a culprit within the coverage of Article 179 of the Revised Penal Code on the
illegal use of uniforms and insignia, an exact imitation of a uniform is unnecessary. A colorable
resemblance calculated to deceive the common run of people not those thoroughly familiar
with every detail or accessory thereof is sufficient.

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