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Singson v. NLRC aiguel Singson, an employee of
GR No. 122389 PAL, was dismissed from his job
19 June 1997 as Traffic Representative
d
 Passenger when after an
investigation, it was found that
he solicited money from a
passenger without issuing a
receipt.
Upon appeal to the NLRC, labor
arbiter Raul Aquino declared
Singson¶s dismissal illegal. On
appeal by PAL, the division
assigned to the case included the
same Raul Aquino, but this time
as Commissioner. The division
ruled in favor of PAL.
When Singson filed a motion for
reconsideration, it was denied by
the two members of the division,
without the participation of
Aquino.
 
W/N the subsequent NLRC
decision is valid even if the same
labor arbiter who previously
decided on the case actively
participated during the
proceedings of PAL¶s appeal.
NO. The officer who reviews a
case on appeal should not be the
same person whose decision is
the subject of review. Singson
was denied due process when
Commissioner Aquino
participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second
Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing PAL¶s appeal. The
infirmity of the resolution was
not cured by the fact that
Singson¶s aR was denied by 2
commissioners and without
participation of Aquino.
Singson¶s right to an impartial
review of his appeal started from
the time he filed his appeal. He is
not only entitled to an impartial
tribunal in the resolution of his
aR²his right is to an impartial
review of three commissioners.
The denial of Singson¶s right to
an impartial review of his appeal
is not an innocuous (harmless)
error; it negated his right to due
process.
Requisites of procedural due
process in administrative
proceedings:
(a) the right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present
one¶s case and submit evidence
in support thereof;
(b) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented;
(c) the decision must have
something to support itself;
(d) the evidence must be
substantial;
(e) the decision must be based on
the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(f) the tribunal or body or any of
its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate; and
(g) the board of body should, in
all controversial questions,
render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reason
for the decision rendered.
Administrative due process
includes:
(a) the right to notice, be it actual
or constructive, of the institution
of the proceedings that may
affect a person¶s legal right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to
appear and defend his rights and
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Parada v. Veneracion Parada was being tried for 4
Aa No. RTJ-96-1353 counts of estafa. He was on bail,
11 aarch 1997 and bonded with Eastern
{  Assurance and Surety Corp.
(EASCO) When he changed his
residence, he informed EASCO
and the court formally through
counsel.
When his case was re-raffled to
the sala of Judge Veneracion, a
W/N Parada was denied due YES. It is worthy to stress that
process. due process of law in judicial
proceedings requires that the
accused must be given an
opportunity to e heard. He has
the right to be present and defend
in person at every stage of the
proceedings. Incidentally, the
right to a hearing carries with it
the right to be notified of every
incident of the proceedings in
to introduce witnesses and
relevant evidence in his favor;
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to
give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one
of competent jurisdiction;
(d) a finding or decision by that
tribunal supported by substantial
evidence presented at the hearing
or at least ascertained in the
records or disclosed to the
parties.
The reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review.
No less than the Constitution
provides that no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of
law. A violation therefore of any
of the rights accorded the
accused constitutes a denial of
due process of law.
Unless charged with offenses
punishable by 
 


 
notice of hearing was sent to his court. Notice to a party is and the evidence of guilt is
old address. When Parada was essential to enable him to adduce strong, all persons detained,
unable to appear on the date of his own evidence and to meet arrested, or otherwise under the
the hearing, Judge Veneracion and refute the evidence custody of the law are entitled to
ordered his arrest, issuing a submitted by the other party. bail as a matter of right.
warrant ³with no bail Parada was not duly notified of
recommended.´ His bond was the trial date as the notice of
also confiscated, and a trial in hearing was sent to his former
absentia ensued. address. It is thus an invalid
service and cannot in any way
When Parada¶s counsel moved bind him. The circumstantial
that they be allowed to present setting of the instant case as
evidence, it was denied because weighed by the basic standards
his failure to appear was taken as of fair play impels us to so hold
a waiver of his right to adduce that the trial in absentia of
evidence. Parada and his subsequent

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conviction are tainted with the

Subsequently, Parada was vice of nullity, for evidently
convicted and the decision was Parada was denied due process
promulgated despite his absence. of law.
On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC decision, declaring it to be
null and void for not affording
Parada the right to rebut the
prosecution¶s evidence against
him, and to adduce evidence in
his own favor.

Parada then filed a complaint for

Judge Veneracion¶s dismissal for
being ignorant of the law,
leading to Parada¶s conviction
and premature incarceration. The
Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge
Veneracion did indeed deny
Parada due process.
People v. de Guzman Ricardo de Guzman was accused
GR No. 134844-45 of having raped 13-year-old
17 January 2001 aarlyn Perlas, the daughter of
a his live-in partner. He was then
sentenced to suffer 2 death
penalties.
In the automatic review, de
Guzman stressed that he could
not have been sentenced to 2
death penalties when the
information did not allege that he
was the common-law spouse of
the victim¶s mother.
People v. Hon. Laguio Lawrence Wang was accused of
W/N de Guzman should be made
to suffer the death penalty.
W/N an appeal by the People
NO. The factual recitals in the
two Informations as to how the
crime of rape was committed in
the case at bar, failed to
specifically allege the qualifying
circumstances which would
elevate rape to a heinous crime,
warranting the imposition of the
death penalty. It would be a
denial of the right of the accused
to be informed of the charges
against him and, consequently, a
denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form
punishable with death, although
the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment
on which he was arraigned.
YES. Although a judgment of
It has long been the rule that
qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the
indictment. If the same are not
pleaded but proved, they shall be
considered only as aggravating
circumstances, since the latter
admit of proof even if not
pleaded.
The death penalty may be
imposed only if the information
for rape has alleged and the
evidence has proven both the age
of the victim and her relationship
to the offender.
The right to appeal is neither a

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GR No. 128587 illegal possession of firearms, as from a judgment of acquittal acquittal in a criminal case may natural right nor a part of due
16 aarch 2007 well as the violation of the would deny Wang of due be assailed in a petition for process, it being merely a
J
 Dangerous Drugs Act and the
Comelec Gun Ban.
During his arraignment, he
interposed a continuing objection
to the admissibility of evidence
obtained by the police
operatives. He then filed a
demurrer of evidence, which was
subsequently granted by the
court. It was declared that the
confiscation of evidence was
illegal, and Wang was acquitted.
process. certiorari under Rule 65 of the statutory privilege which may be
Rules of Court (upon a clear
showing by the petitioner that the
lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the
judgment void), what the
petitioner did was to file an
appeal by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule
45 raising a pure question of law.
For being the wrong remedy
taken, the petition is outrightly
dismissible. The Court cannot
reverse the assailed dismissal
order of the trial court by appeal
without violating Wang¶s right
against double jeopardy.
exercised only in the manner
provided for by law.
Appeal in criminal cases throws
the whole records of the case
wide open for review by the
appellate court, that is why any
appeal from a judgment of
acquittal necessarily puts the
accused in double jeopardy.
An order granting an accused¶s
demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. The general rule in this
jurisdiction is that a judgment of
acquittal is final and
unappealable.
Generally, any further
prosecution of the accused after
an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. The exceptions
are:
(a)V when the prosecution
is denied due process
of law; and
(b)V when the trial court
commits grave abuse
of discretion in
dismissing a criminal
case by granting the
accused¶s demurrer to
evidence.
Where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction.

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Legal jeopardy attaches only:

(a)V upon valid indictment
(b)V before a competent
court
(c)V after arraignment
(d)V a valid plea having
been entered
(e)V the case was dismissed
or otherwise
terminated without the
express consent of the
accused

Rationale behind double

jeopardy: to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final
repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through
the abuse of criminal processes.

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Estrada v. Sandiganbayan Erap Estrada, the highest-ranking W/N RA 7080 violates the rights NO. A statute or act may be said to be
GR No. 148560 official to be prosecuted under of the accused to due process. 1. As it is written, the Plunder vague when it lacks
19 November 2001 RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Law contains ascertainable comprehensible standards that
  Penalizing the Crime of standards and well-defined men of common intelligence
Plunder), assails the parameters which would enable must necessarily guess at its
constitutionality of the said law. the accused to determine the meaning and differ in its
nature of his violation. In fact, application. In such instance, the
He avers that it violates the the Information itself closely statute is repugnant to the
fundamental rights of the tracks the language of the law, Constitution in 2 respects: it
accused to due process and to be indicating with reasonable violates due process for failure to
informed of the nature and cause certainty the various elements of accord persons, especially the
of the accusation against him, as the offense which Erap is alleged parties targeted by it, fair notice

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the said law (a) suffers from the to have committed. Thus, Erap is
vice of vagueness; (b) dispenses completely informed of the
with the ³reasonable doubt´ accusations against him as to
standard in criminal enable him to prepare for an
prosecutions; and (c) abolishes intelligent defense. A fortiori, he
the element of 
  in cannot feign ignorance of what
crimes already punishable under the Plunder Law is all about.
the RPC. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, he must be
aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by
the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which
he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its
legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
2. The thesis that Sec. 4 of the
law does away with proof of
each and every component of the
crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of
that provision. The legislature
did not refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime²a number
of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least
P50a.
of what conduct to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the
government muscle. But the
doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous
yet fairly applicable to certain
types of activities. The first may
be ³saved´ by proper
construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed
against such activities. With
more reason, the doctrine cannot
be invoked where the assailed
statute is clear and free from
ambiguity.
The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for
testing ³on their faces´ statutes
in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what
is involved is a criminal statute.
3. Plunder is a   
 
which requires proof of criminal
intent. With regard to the charge
of conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done
to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it
Procedural measures do not
define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law.

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proves beyond reasonable doubt

a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern
are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite 

 must be shown.

Thus, RA 7080¶s
constitutionality is upheld.
Adiong v. COaELEC Blo Umpar Adiong assails W/N COaELEC may prohibit NO. The COaELEC¶s When faced with borderline
GR No. 103956 COaELEC Resolution No. 2347 the posting of decals and stickers prohibition on posting of decals situations where freedom to
31 aarch 1992 regarding the prohibition of on ³mobile´ places, public or and stickers on ³mobile´ places speak by a candidate or party and
J  posting of decals and stickers in
³mobile´ places like cars and
other moving vehicles. He avers
that such prohibition is violative
of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 11(a)
of RA 6466. In addition, he
believes that with the ban on
radio, television and print
political advertisements, he,
being a neophyte in the field of
politics stands to suffer grave
and irreparable injury with this
prohibition. The posting of
private, and limit their location
or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.
whether public or private except
in designated areas provided for
by the COaELEC itself is null
and void on constitutional
grounds.
1. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizen¶s
fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution.
2. The questioned prohibition
premised on the statute and as
couched in the resolution is void
for overbreadth²it offends the
constitutional principle that a
freedom to know on the part of
the electorate are invoked against
actions intended for maintaining
clean and free elections, the
police, local officials, and
COaELEC should lean in favor
of freedom.
Property consists of the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of a
person¶s acquisitions without
control or diminution save by the
law of the land.
decals and stickers on cars and governmental purpose to control è 
other moving vehicles would be or prevent activities {
  



ù
his last medium to inform the constitutionally subject to state 


 
J 
electorate that he is a senatorial regulations may not be achieved 
candidate. Finally, he states that by means which sweep 
as of the date of the petition, he unnecessarily broadly and 
has not received any notice from thereby invade the area of 
any of the Election Registrars in protected freedoms. 
the entire country as to the 3. The constitutional objective to 
location of the supposed give a rich candidate and a poor 
³Comelec Poster Areas.´ candidate equal opportunity to 
inform the electorate as regards 
their candidacies is not impaired 
by posting decals and stickers on 

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cars and other private vehicles. 

Compared to the paramount 
interest of the State in granting 
freedom of expression, any 
financial considerations behind 
the regulation are of marginal 
significance. 

W/N this prohibition infringes on YES. The restriction as to where 
the people¶s right to due process. the decals and stickers should be 
posted is so broad that it 
encompasses even the citizen¶s 
private property, which in this 
case is a privately-owned 
vehicle. In consequence of this 
prohibition, another cardinal rule 
prescribed by the Constitution 
would be violated. Section 1, 
Article III of the Constitution 
provides that no person shall be 
deprived of his property without 
due process of law. In the 
posting of decals and stickers on 
cars and other moving vehicles, 
the candidate needs the consent 
of the owner of the vehicle. In 
such a case, the prohibition 
would not only deprive the 
owner who consents to such 
posting of the decals and stickers 
the use of his property but more 
important, in the process, it 
would deprive the citizen of his 
right to free speech and 
information. 

Concurring:   è 
Instead of limiting the {
 
 
   


dissemination of information on 
 
 


the election issues and the 



  {
 
qualifications of those vying for 
   
 èa
public office, what the
   

 
 
COaELEC should concentrate  
    
 



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on is the education of the voters   
   


on the proper exercise of their   
 
 
 
suffrages. This function is part of
  

 



 
its constitutional duty to  
supervise and regulate elections 
and to prevent them from 



 
 

deteriorating into popularity   
 èa 

contests where the victors are
 




chosen on the basis not of their 

       
platforms and competence but on 




their ability to sing or dance
(Bokal?), or play a musical
instrument, or shoot a basketball,
or crack a toilet joke (Kap?), or
exhibit some such dubious talent
irrelevant to their ability to
discharge a public office.
Sales v. Sandiganbayan Reynolan Sales, the incumbent W/N the Ombudsman followed NO. Due process requires hearing
GR No. 143802 mayor of Pagudpud, shot down the proper procedure in 1. The supposed preliminary before an impartial and
16 November 2001 the former mayor and his conducting a preliminary investigation was conducted in disinterested tribunal so that no

 !
 political rival, Atty. Rafael
Benemerito, in an alleged
shootout after a heated
altercation between them in
1999. Sales thereafter
surrendered and placed himself
under the custody of the
municipal office then asked to be
brought to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters. The following
day, a criminal Information for
murder was filed against him.
investigation.
W/N Sales was given an
opportunity to be heard and to
submit controverting evidence.
installments by at least 3
different investigating officers,
none of whom completed the
preliminary investigation. There
was not one continuous
proceeding but rather a case of
passing the buck, so to speak, the
last one being the Ombudsman
hurriedly throwing the buck to
Sandiganbayan.
2. The charge against Sales is
murder, a non-bailable offense.
The gravity of the offense alone,
not to mention the fact that the
principal accused is an
incumbent mayor whose
imprisonment during the
pendency of the case would
deprive his constituents of their
duly-elected municipal
executive, should have merited a
deeper, and more thorough
preliminary investigation. The
judge shall preside in a case in
which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and
independent.
The purpose of a preliminary
investigation or a previous
inquiry of some kind, before an
accused person is placed on trial,
is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution and to protect him
from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of
a public trial. It is also intended
to protect the state from having
to conduct useless and expensive
trials. While the right is statutory
rather than constitutional in its
fundament, it is a component part
of due process in criminal
justice. The right to have a
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Ombudsman instead swallowed
hook, line and sinker the
resolution and recommendation
of Graft Investigation Officer
Vivar.
preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound
over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at
risk of incarceration or some
other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right, it is a
substantive right. To deny the
accused¶s claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive
him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
Preliminary investigation is in
effect a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the
case. Sufficient proof of guilt of
the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the
trial court may not be bound as a
matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary
investigation has been called a
judicial inquiry. It is a judicial
proceeding. An act becomes a
judicial proceeding when there is
an opportunity to be heard and
for the production of and
weighing of evidence, and a
decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or
investigating officer duly
empowered to preside or to
conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than a
municipal judge or even a
regional trial court judge. While
the investigating officer, strictly
speaking, is not a judge by the
nature of his functions, he is and
must be considered to be a quasi-
judicial officer because a
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preliminary investigation is
considered a judicial proceeding.
A preliminary investigation
should therefore be scrupulously
(thoroughly) conducted so that
the constitutional right to liberty
of a potential accused can be
protected from any material
damage.

A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of
the State. aore important, it is a
part of the guarantee of freedom
and fair play which are the
birthrights of all who live in our
country.

The filing of a motion for

reconsideration is an integral part
of the preliminary investigation
proper. The denial thereof is
tantamount to denial of the right
itself to a preliminary
investigation.

RR