TSHOD

The SAGE Handbook of
Diplomacy
EDITORIAL BOARD
Michele Acuto, University College London

Rebecca Adler-Nissen, University of Copenhagen
Karin Aggestam, Lund University, Sweden
Peter van Bergeijk, Erasmus University, Netherlands
Corneliu Bjola, University of Oxford
Caitlin Byrne, Bond University, Australia
David Clinton, Baylor University, USA
No Cornago, University of the Basque Country
Erik Goldstein, Boston University, USA
Paul Harris, The Hong Kong Institute of Education
Gunther Hellmann, Goethe University Frankfurt
Alan Henrikson, Tufts University, USA
Dennis Jett, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Christer Jonsson, Lund University, Sweden
Richard Langhorne, University of Buckingham
Jan Melissen, Clingendael, Netherlands
Raquel Meneses, University of Porto
Iver Neumann, The London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE)
Donna Oglesby, The Public Diplomacy Council
Geoffrey Pigman, Bennington College, USA
Kishan S. Rana, DiploFoundation
Joana Setzer, The London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE)
Mikael Soendergaard, Aarhus University, Denmark
Yolanda Kemp Spies, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Yannis Stivachtis, Virginia Tech, USA
See Seng Tan, Nanyang Technical University, Singapore
Sam Okoth Opondo, Vassar College, USA
I. William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Qingmin Zhang, Peking University, China
The SAGE Handbook of
Diplomacy
Edited by
Costas M. Constantinou,
Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp
SAGE Publications Ltd Introduction & editorial arrangement Costas M. Constantinou,
1 Olivers Yard Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp 2016
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Contents
List of Abstracts ix
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes xxvi
Notes on the Editors and Contributors xxvii
Introduction: Understanding diplomatic practice 1

Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp
PART I DIPLOMATIC CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 11
1 Theoretical perspectives in diplomacy 13

Costas M. Constantinou and Paul Sharp
2 A conceptual history of diplomacy 28

Halvard Leira
3 Diplomacy and the colonial encounter 39

Sam Okoth Opondo
4 Statecraft, strategy and diplomacy 54

Markus Kornprobst
5 Diplomacy and foreign policy 67

Brian Hocking
6 Diplomacy, communication and signaling 79

Christer Jnsson
7 Diplomatic agency 92
Rebecca Adler-Nissen
8 Diplomatic culture 104

Fiona McConnell and Jason Dittmer
9 Diplomacy and the arts 114

Iver B. Neumann
10 Diplomatic ethics 123

Corneliu Bjola
11 Diplomatic knowledge 133

No Cornago
vi THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
PART II DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONS 147
12 Embassies, permanent missions and special missions 149

Kishan S. Rana
13 Consulates and consular diplomacy 161

Ana Mar Fernndez Pasarn
14 The diplomatic corps 171

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman
15 Diplomacy and international law 185

David Clinton
16 Diplomatic immunity 197

Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey
17 Diplomacy and negotiation 207

I. William Zartman
18 Diplomatic mediation 220

Karin Aggestam
19 Diplomatic summitry 231

David Hastings Dunn and Richard Lock-Pullan
20 Diplomatic language 242

Donna Marie Oglesby
PART III DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 255
21 Diplomatic relations between states 257

Alan James
22 Great power diplomacy 268

Cornelia Navari
23 Middle power diplomacy 281

Yolanda Kemp Spies
24 Small state diplomacy 294

Baldur Thorhallsson and Alyson J.K. Bailes
25 European Union diplomacy 308

Michael Smith
26 American diplomacy 319

Alan K. Henrikson
Contents vii
27 Russian post-Soviet diplomacy 336

Tatiana Zonova
28 Chinas diplomacy 348

Zhimin Chen
29 Diplomacy in East Asia 361

Pauline Kerr
30 Latin American diplomacy 372

Sean W. Burges and Fabrcio H. Chagas Bastos
31 Middle East diplomacy 385

Stephan Stetter
32 African diplomacy 398

Asteris Huliaras and Konstantinos Magliveras
33 Southern African diplomacy 414

Stephen Chan
34 Developing states diplomacy 423

Stephen Calleya
PART IV TYPES OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 435
35 Public diplomacy 437

Ellen Huijgh
36 Quiet and secret diplomacy 451

William Maley
37 Crisis diplomacy 462

Edward Avenell and David Hastings Dunn
38 Coercive diplomacy 476

Peter Viggo Jakobsen
39 Revolutionary diplomacy 487

David Armstrong
40 Conference diplomacy 499

Paul Meerts
41 City diplomacy 510

Michele Acuto
42 Citizen diplomacy 521

Melissa Conley Tyler and Craig Beyerinck
viii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
43 Celebrity diplomacy 530

Mark Wheeler
44 Digital diplomacy 540

Eytan Gilboa
45 Economic diplomacy 552

Maaike Okano-Heijmans
46 Business diplomacy 564

Huub Rul and Tim Wolters
47 Religion and diplomacy 577

David Joseph Wellman
48 Military diplomacy 591

See Seng Tan
49 Environmental diplomacy 601

Saleem H. Ali and Helena Voinov Vladich
50 Sports diplomacy 617

Stuart Murray
51 Science diplomacy 628

Daryl Copeland
52 Indigenous diplomacy 642

J. Marshall Beier
53 Pariah diplomacy 654

Hussein Banai
Index 666
List of Abstracts
1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN DIPLOMACY COSTAS M. CONSTANTINOU AND

PAUL SHARP
This chapter maps the evolution of diplomatic theory, within and across the discipline of
International Relations (IR). It looks at early (classical and modern) perspectives in diplomacy
as developed by orators, scholars and reflective practitioners. It also examines the perceived
neglect of diplomacy within mainstream IR theory, its contested purpose and means, whether
it is an instrument or a medium, its epistemic links to the study of foreign policy and statecraft,
and its role in the production, maintenance and transformation of international systems. It out-
lines the contributions of critical theorizing with regard to exposing the knowledge contests and
power implications of dominant understandings and practices of diplomacy, and its retrieving
of alternative, non-elitist and non-state-centric cultures and practices. Finally, it looks at theo-
retical perspectives in diplomacy as developed within other disciplines, such as anthropology,
psychology, religious and cultural studies.
2. A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY HALVARD LEIRA
This chapter deals with the development of the concept of diplomacy. The focus is on how a
specific understanding of diplomacy emerged and has developed over the last 250 years.
Detailing first the etymological roots, the chapter deals primarily with how diplomacy emerged
as a derogatory term during the revolutionary period, and how its meaning was immediately
challenged by revolutionaries seeking to replace the old diplomacy with a new one. Calls for
new diplomacy have been many in the ensuing centuries, but the way in which diplomacy itself
has changed content is evident in that the calls are now for reform, rather than for revolution
and/or abolishment.
3. DIPLOMACY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER SAM OKOTH OPONDO
This chapter raises questions about modern diplomacys entanglements with colonial encoun-
ters and practices. Through a contrapuntal reading of the ethic of the necessity for continuous
negotiations among other conceptions and practices of diplomacy, the chapter raises questions
about discourses on the genres of man, Eurocentrism, elitism and the statist geophilosophy
that underlines the monological conception of diplomacy as statecraft or a set of skills, norms
and rituals peculiar to professional diplomats. It also reveals the coloniality of modern diplo-
macy and the transgressive and life-affirming diplomatic practices and imaginaries that emerge
in the colonies and elsewhere.
x THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
4. STATECRAFT, STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY MARKUS KORNPROBST
How do statecraft, strategy and diplomacy hang together? This chapter identifies five perspec-
tives that address this question: classical realism, rational choice, cognitive approaches, cultural-
ist approaches and critical approaches. After identifying the strengths and weaknesses of these
perspectives, I make a case for more eclecticism. Statecraft, strategy and diplomacy are more
important than ever in our globalizing age, in which more and more political issues move from
the domestic to the international stage. But given global changes, we need to re-think the con-
ceptual triad, similarly to scholars before us when they tried to make sense of a changing world.
5. DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY BRIAN HOCKING
As the nature of foreign policy has changed in response to shifts in both international and domes-
tic policy milieus, so the boundaries traditionally regarded as demarcating both features of the
international order have weakened. This has produced challenges for both practitioners and
observers of diplomatic processes and structures. In one sense, this is a manifestation of a long-
established dual problem reflecting fundamental questions concerning the legitimacy of diplo-
macy and its efficiency in meeting the challenges of a changing foreign policy environment.
6. DIPLOMACY, COMMUNICATION AND SIGNALING CHRISTER JNSSON
Communication is essential to diplomacy. Diplomatic communication is both verbal and non-

verbal, including not only words as well as actions, but also silence and inactivity. Diplomats
send signals intended to convey messages, which are subject to decoding and interpretation.
Throughout history verbal communication has relied on a lingua franca of diplomacy. More
importantly, a common language has been developed in terms of shared symbols and references
and interpretation of words and actions. Nonverbal signaling covers a range from personal
gestures, via meeting and travel logistics, to the manipulation of military forces. The tension
between the need for clarity and the incentives for constructive ambiguity impels diplomats to
spend much time and effort on the formulation and interpretation of signals. The speed of dip-
lomatic communication has varied over time. The revolution in information and communica-
tion technology tends to challenge the privileged role of diplomats in transborder communication
and endanger flexibility and confidentiality. While there is no paradigmatic approach in the
study of diplomatic communication, there is a store of applicable analytical tools and ample
room for more theory-driven, systematic studies of diplomatic communication.
7. DIPLOMATIC AGENCY REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN
Diplomatic agency is intriguing. On the one hand, diplomats are crucial to the management of
day-to-day international relations and the negotiation of war and peace. On the other hand,
most diplomatic action is highly constrained or invisible. This chapter provides an overview of
the ways in which diplomatic agency has been conceptualized in International Relations theory
(English School, game theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, constructivism, practice
List of Abstracts xi
theory, post-positivism) before presenting and exemplifying major and overlapping types of
diplomatic agency, including communication, negotiation and advocacy. It analyzes how pro-
fessionalization, legalization, personalization and popularization of diplomacy have shaped
diplomatic agency including how international law, bureaucracy, public diplomacy and new
information technologies have impacted the scope and content of diplomatic agency. Finally, it
discusses how diplomatic agency is linked to conceptions of diplomatic representation and
legitimacy in its actual, functional and symbolic forms.
8. DIPLOMATIC CULTURE FIONA MCCONNELL AND JASON DITTMER
This chapter discusses diplomatic culture in its various iterations. It begins by tracing the
genealogy of diplomatic culture as a universal cosmopolitan culture, a perspective most com-
monly associated with Hedley Bull and the English School of International Relations. We then
turn from this abstraction to the concrete ways in which diplomats seek to reproduce particular
aspects of their culture through professionalization. In the final section, we examine the prolif-
eration of diplomatic cultures, concluding that the multiplicity of diplomacies (and hence,
diplomatic cultures) is a source of strength for diplomacy, and attempts to produce a monolithic
diplomatic culture are bound to fail.
9. DIPLOMACY AND THE ARTS IVER B. NEUMANN
Diplomatic sites are saturated with art. Art always creates ambiance, and is sometimes also
used by diplomats to project representations of polities. Art and diplomacy need one another to
create the high status that they share. If diplomats are interested in art, art is also interested in
diplomats. Diplomacy and diplomats are objects of artistic representation. They are also
amongst the phenomena represented in popular culture, particularly within the genres of sci-
ence fiction and fantasy. These representations have legitimacy effects. The chapter breaks
down these questions and discusses the sparse extant literature.
10. DIPLOMATIC ETHICS CORNELIU BJOLA
The delegated source of authority of diplomatic agency protects diplomats against ethical scru-
tiny, but their indirect exercise of power manifestly turns them into morally accountable sub-
jects. This chapter examines this puzzle in two steps. First, it argues that the normative basis of
ethical judgement of diplomats actions has historically revolved around the principle of loy-
alty, first to the Prince, later to the State and more recently to People. Each loyalty dimension
sets limitations for moral inquiry, which are rather difficult to address from a theoretically
abstract perspective. Second, the paper offers a contextually tailored framework of ethical
analysis centred on the concept of reflection-in-action by which diplomats seek to align the
practical requirements of the situation at hand with the normative imperatives prompted by
their divided loyalties. The context in which diplomats handle ethical challenges through
reflection and action is therefore a determining factor for understanding the extent to which the
actions taken by a diplomat are morally justifiable.
xii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
11. DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE NO CORNAGO
This chapter examines the crucial importance of knowledge for the instrumental and commu-
nicative functions that diplomacy has performed historically and is still expected to perform.
In so doing, the relationship between diplomacy and knowledge is examined through four
different but related prisms. First, in the light of current discussions in the fields of epistemol-
ogy and sociology of knowledge, specific attention will be paid to the conditions under which
the mutually constitutive relationship between the practice of diplomacy and the acquisition
and diffusion of knowledge in the most diverse domains emerged and evolved historically.
Second, the importance of diplomacy as heterology, that is, as a venue for trans-cultural com-
munication, humanistic discovery and understanding and its unending negotiation of identity
and difference between political communities, is examined. Third, the theoretical foundations
and the practical dimensions of diplomatic knowledge as statecraft and its corresponding tech-
niques from personal observation, reporting or espionage to remote sensing and satellite
driven geographical information systems are discussed. Finally, it will discuss what can be
called the diplomatization of knowledge in the wider social realm, as well as its implications
for our understanding of diplomacy as it is practised today, in the post-Wikileaks era, by a
growing variety of public and private agents.
12. EMBASSIES, PERMANENT MISSIONS AND SPECIAL MISSIONS

KISHAN S. RANA
The resident embassy symbolizes the international system. Embassies are older than foreign
ministries and have evolved since inception in ancient times when emissaries were sent to
foreign courts. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sets the framework
for the functioning of embassies. The utility of maintaining embassy networks is a perennial
question; counter-intuitively we now find that resident embassies provide enhanced value
in our globalized world of instant communication, volatility of international affairs and
information overload, if only foreign ministries use them as key agents of bilateral diplo-
macy. Permanent missions, accredited to international or regional organizations remain
equally pertinent. We witness the emergence of new representation forms, aimed at cost
reduction, and these trends are likely to gain traction. Countries will always need agents on
the ground, to build trust and pursue relationships with widening circles of state and
non-state actors, working in varied circumstances, far removed from the formal settings of
the past.
13. CONSULATES AND CONSULAR DIPLOMACY ANA MAR FERNNDEZ PASARN
This chapter analyses the consular dimension of diplomacy. It traces the historical development
of the consular institution as a subfield of diplomatic representation, and examines its interna-
tional codification, traditional functions and evolving practice in the face of contemporary
challenges such as border security policy or the management of large-scale natural or man-
made disasters. These developments have contributed to highlighting the strategic role played
by consular officers in a globalized society. Key aspects of consular affairs today
List of Abstracts xiii
include dealing with increasing citizens expectations for responsive, efficient, multi-channel
and customer service-oriented administrations: demands that have led foreign affairs ministries
(MFA) to implement new forms of consular governance, among which consular cooperation,
the delegation of representation, the automation of services, or the outsourcing of less sensitive
consular functions stand out.
14. THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS PAUL SHARP AND GEOFFREY WISEMAN
The diplomatic corps is a term which conventionally refers to the diplomats of other sovereign
states resident in a capital city. It can also refer to the diplomats accredited to regional or
international organizations. Both its practical operations and its theoretical significance have
been neglected until recently. This chapter examines the possible reasons for this neglect in the
context of two trends: First, the terms apparently increasing use to refer to the diplomatic
service of a particular state. Second, the rising significance of a broader term the diplomatic
community of which the diplomatic corps is only one part and which encompasses the pro-
liferating number and types of other international actors active in a capital city or international
headquarters city. Although less significant than formerly, the diplomatic corps persists and
remains an important, if elusive, set of practices that help constitute the international society
of states.
15. DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DAVID CLINTON
Diplomacy and international law share ancient origins as ways in which the participants in a
highly pluralistic society, engaging in intensive interactions but lacking an authoritative sover-
eign over them, found means of regulating their conflictual and cooperative dealings. Despite
the similarity in their background, diplomacy and international law have always been charac-
terized by a complex relationshipsometimes competitive, sometimes complementary, and
sometimes mutually reinforcing. They are also alike in that the rise of non-state actors seeking
at least partial recognition as players in diplomacy and subjects of international law has diversi-
fied the roster and complicated the rules. This development, if no others, will ensure that these
two primary ways of carrying on international society will continue to evolve, as they have
throughout their history.
16. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY LINDA S. FREY AND MARSHA L. FREY
From ancient times to the present, many civilizations have respected the inviolability of envoys.
Necessity forced most cultures to accord envoys basic protections because only then was inter-
course between peoples possible. Rooted in necessity, immunity was buttressed by religion,
sanctioned by custom, and fortified by reciprocity. As the essential foundations of immunity
shifted from religious to legal, what had once been an expedient became over time a precedent.
Courtesies hardened and over time became rights. When expedients evolved into precedents
and earlier courtesies into rights, the issue of whether and under what circumstances envoys
xiv THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
were entitled to immunity became a legal one. Ultimately, national laws and international
treaties codified these privileges.
17. DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATION I WILLIAM ZARTMAN
Negotiations are the basic means of diplomacy, to pursue, prevent, manage, resolve, and
transform conflicts among states (and other parties), to overcome problems and to instill
cooperation. Negotiation has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, but faces
new types of challenges in fanatical ideological conflicts and worn out cooperative regimes.
Negotiation operates under an unspoken Ethos of Equality, with notions of equal status, equal
treatment, reciprocity and justice as its defining characteristics. Although parties are never
equal in power, a sense of equality is helpful to productive negotiation. A perception of a mutu-
ally hurting stalemate (MHS) and a way out (WO) define a ripe moment, necessary but insuf-
ficient for the initiation of negotiations. Negotiations pass through the overlapping phases of
diagnosis, formulation, and detailing to create a coherent agreement, reached through conces-
sions, compensation, and construction (reframing). Conflict management ends violence and
contains the promise for conflict resolution, which settles the issues of the conflict, removes
the pressure to attain it.
18. DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION KARIN AGGESTAM
The study of international mediation reflects a broad range of theoretical perspectives, meth-
odological approaches and empirical practices. This chapter compares two dominant modes:
principal and pure mediation. They illuminate contrasting assumptions about leverage,
resources, power, strategy, entry and outcome. The chapter identifies three salient challenges
that diplomatic mediation faces in theory and practice: (1) resistance to negotiation and media-
tion; (2) quest of timing; and (3) management of devious objectives. The chapter concludes by
arguing that the study of international mediation needs to engage more with normative and
critical perspectives including gender analysis as a way to move the research agenda
forward.
19. DIPLOMATIC SUMMITRY DAVID HASTINGS DUNN AND RICHARD LOCK-PULLAN
Summit diplomacy is the meeting of political leaders at the highest possible level. Although
this practice dates back to the earliest days of diplomacy it was rare for the rulers of powerful
states to meet in person until the nineteenth century. Now, however, summits are frequent and
have superseded many more traditional forms and methods of diplomacy, especially as demo-
cratic politics has become more important in the summit processes. Summits have also increas-
ingly become institutionalized. This chapter explores the history of summitry, the nature of
modern summitry since the advent of nuclear weapons, and examines how to define the current
nature of summitry as the range of meetings between executive leaders has expanded and
evolved, ranging from G8 summits to personal bi-lateral summitry.
List of Abstracts xv
20. DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE DONNA MARIE OGLESBY
The chapter Diplomatic Language examines the signals, codes and conventions constructed
over time by diplomats to smooth and soothe the process of communication between states and
the organizations created by states in the international political realm. It argues that diplomatic
language is instrumental: it serves the purpose of allowing diplomats to form and maintain
relationships with those who manage international relations. The chapter examines the theory
and the practice of diplomatic speech acts through various theoretical perspectives. It explores
the balance diplomats attempt to achieve between ambiguity and precision in the production of
diplomatic texts. And, it considers how the expanded, and increasingly diverse, cast of actors
on the diplomatic stage, with their contesting scripts and varied audiences, are changing the
discourse patterns.
21. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES ALAN JAMES
States, being notional persons, can only communicate with each other through their
representatives. Such communication is primarily conducted via the diplomatic system the
world-wide network of embassies and allied arrangements, staffed by a multitude of diplo-
mats. But to get easy and straightforward communication started (or resumed) between any
two states, they have to agree to be in diplomatic relations. Almost all pairs of states do this.
Accordingly, the concept of diplomatic relations is the key which opens the way to normal
communication between states. As such it is a fundamental element in the whole inter-state
set-up.
22. GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY CORNELIA NAVARI
This chapter defines Great Powers and the capacities they are expected to have. It provides a
brief history of their presence as diplomatic actors from the peace negotiations that concluded
the Napoleonic wars through the nineteenth century, the major congresses that ensued and their
results, and the institutionalization of their roles in international organization in the
twentieth century. It considers the influence/power that each exercised, over what issues,
during what periods, and through the use of what methods and mechanisms. It concludes with
the four different approaches through which great power diplomacy can be understood, revis-
ited and revised.
23. MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY YOLANDA KEMP SPIES
Middle power diplomacy may be a contested and equivocal concept, but it offers a useful ana-
lytical tool to scholars and practitioners of diplomacy. It facilitates the understanding and pre-
diction of state behaviour in the global diplomatic arena, and provides insights as to the
projection of state identity through diplomacy. It also assists with comprehension of the
xvi THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
changing norms and conventions that infuse the notion of international society. Importantly,
middle power theory elucidates a fascinating phenomenon within global structural power: the
dynamic diplomacy of states whose influence and leadership seem disproportionately large
compared to their material, quantitative attributes.
24. SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY BALDUR THORHALLSSON AND ALYSON J.K. BAILES
Small states must acknowledge their limited diplomatic capacity. They need to take appropriate
measures to compensate for these limitations, and utilize special characteristics of their public
administration and foreign service such as informal ways of communication, flexibility in
decision-making and autonomy of officials in order to defend their interests and gain influ-
ence in dealings with the outside world. Small states vary enormously in their diplomatic
capacity, but those possessing basic economic and administrative competence can build on
these and other features associated with smallness to succeed in international negotiations.
25. EUROPEAN UNION DIPLOMACY MICHAEL SMITH
The emerging system of diplomacy in the European Union has gained additional impetus and
been newly institutionalised since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This hybrid
system of diplomatic representation and action involves not only a range of Brussels institu-
tions but also the EU Member States. The chapter looks first at the evolution of the current
system and then at the new institutional context following the Lisbon Treaty. Ensuing sections
explore the nature of the EU diplomat and of EU diplomatic practices, the orientation and
impact of EU diplomacy, and the types of theoretical approaches that can be deployed in order
to understand the EUs system of diplomacy.
26. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ALAN K. HENRIKSON
The diplomacy of the United States originated in the American nation, rather than deriving
from state authority, and it continues to reflect republican ideals and democratic values.
Somewhat paradoxically, while inheriting an anti-diplomatic bias owing to the American
Revolutions rejection of the hierarchy of European society, egalitarian Americans themselves
have freely engaged in making international connections. Benjamin Franklin is the prototype.
Americas first public diplomat, he set an example of citizen involvement. US professional
diplomacy, as distinct from consular activity in support of American commerce, came only
with the Rogers Act of 1924. The Second World War and the Cold War as well as the Global
War on Terror have increased the role of the military and the intelligence community in
Americas international relations. The Department of State has sought to augment its influence
at home and abroad by drawing upon the nations civilian power and engaging foreign publics
directly through the use of information technology and social media. Never merely intergov-
ernmental, American diplomacy is international as well.
List of Abstracts xvii
27. RUSSIAN POST-SOVIET DIPLOMACY TATIANA ZONOVA
Russian diplomacy has evolved through several historical stages. Over time, Byzantine tradi-
tion was substituted by a secular diplomacy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the foreign
policy decision making process also changed. According to the Constitution it is the President
who determines the guidelines of foreign policy. From the mid-1990s the idea of creating
a multipolar world and maintaining relations based on effective multilateralism has become
more and more important for Russias foreign policy and diplomacy. Relations with the former
Soviet republics became one of its priorities. Russian diplomacy has tried to improve existing
diplomatic structures and processes, and to create new ones for multilateral interstate coopera-
tion. Great attention is paid to economic and energy diplomacy, network diplomacy and public
diplomacy. Nearly 1000 Russian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are also engaged
in foreign relations. The Subjects of the Russian Federation develop their international activity
in the framework of what is increasingly known as paradiplomacy. The role of women in diplo-
macy still tends to be underestimated and there is considerable room for improvement in this
framework.
28. CHINAS DIPLOMACY ZHIMIN CHEN
Historically, China, as a pivotal regional power in East Asia, developed its own ways of
conducting foreign relations. In the nineteenth century, in a western-dominated world, China
was forced to embrace modern diplomacy. Through its internal revolutions in the nineteenth
century, China rebuilt itself into a strong sovereign state. Due to its economic success,
unleashed by its integration with the world economy from the late 1970s, China is now
reemerging as a major power in world affairs and starting to adopt a more proactive diplomacy.
To make this argument this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part provides an histori-
cal account of the factors that influence Chinese diplomacy. The second part analyzes the
institutional arrangements of contemporary Chinese diplomacy. And in the third part, behavio-
ral patterns of Chinas diplomacy are identified. Finally, various understandings and predic-
tions of Chinas future diplomacy are canvassed.
29. DIPLOMACY IN EAST ASIA PAULINE KERR
There is a surprising deficit of studies on diplomacy in East Asia. Surprising because the region
is economically the worlds most dynamic and, politically, one of the worlds most tense, not
least because there is diplomatic competition between the US and a rising China. The Asian
Century in East Asia is under-investigated in diplomatic studies. Unless its past and present
evolution is understood, signs of its possible demise may be missed. This chapter starts from
the assumption that this situation needs to be rectified. It argues that, from its examination of
multilateral economic and security diplomacy in the region, there are several generalisations
that could inform hypotheses needed to start an urgently required research agenda on diplo-
macy in East Asia.
xviii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
30. LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY SEAN W. BURGES AND FABRCIO H CHAGAS

BASTOS
In this chapter we argue that although there is a temptation to view Latin American diplomacy
as a single entity, such an approach is mistaken. Pressure to manage relations with the US and
external assumption of homogenization underpins a double movement in regional diplomacy
that sees a simultaneous process of coordination and fragmentation. With this in mind, we offer
five principles for a general understanding of Latin American diplomacy. First, the region is not
a homogenous entity. Second, although coordination is frequent, it is too much to speak of
either unity or coalition in the Americas. Third, regional collectivization of positions is used as
a strategy to protect national autonomy. Fourth, foreign policy is predominantly directed at
structural, not relative power games. Finally, national development is the overriding priority
and aim.
31. MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY STEPHAN STETTER
This chapter studies contemporary Middle East diplomacy by drawing from historical sociol-
ogy, global history and social theory. It focuses in particular on how modern world society/
culture, on the one hand, and a global political system characterized by considerable underly-
ing hierarchies both in colonial and post-colonial environs, on the other, shape Middle East
diplomacy. It then discusses three major sites of Middle East practice/struggles in this context
of modern world society, namely (1) diplomatic anxiety, (2) popular, transnational as well as
cultural diplomacy and (3) sublime diplomacy.
32. AFRICAN DIPLOMACY ASTERIS HULIARAS AND KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS
In the 1960s, after a long period of colonialism, most African states acquired their independ-
ence and soon became embroiled in the Cold Wars competition. Bipolar rivalry obstructed the
internationalization of Africas diplomacy. Only after the mid-1990s did Africas foreign rela-
tions expand considerably, having been assisted by economic development and recurrent waves
of democratic consolidation as well as by the advent of multilateralism. Today, the African
Union aims at becoming the continents principal representative on the international plane.
33. SOUTHERN AFRICAN DIPLOMACY STEPHEN CHAN
This chapter looks at Southern African Diplomacy as developed after the independence process
began. It focuses on the Rhodesia issue and Zimbabwean diplomacy and how African and
international diplomacy dealt with the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It then examines the
challenges and prospects of South African diplomacy in the post-Apartheid era. It finally pro-
vides an overview of the great issues ahead within the context of African Union diplomacy and
the future of the continent.
List of Abstracts xix
34. DEVELOPING STATES DIPLOMACY STEPHEN CALLEYA
This chapter examines the challenges small developing states are facing and identifies trends
in their foreign policy decision-making track record. The fact that small developing countries
have limited human and natural resources gives rise to numerous questions addressed in this
analysis: what are the strategic mechanisms that small developing states employ?; what are
the primary motivations that guide developing states diplomacy?; how do small developing
states pursue their strategic objectives; how do small developing states prioritize their
foreign policy objectives to remain relevant in the international society of states? This
chapter also includes a review of the evolution of Maltas foreign policy, as an example of a
developing states diplomatic practice. The study concludes by exploring future options
available to developing states to help them maintain a relevant stance in an ever changing
international system, including focusing on multilateral diplomacy.
35. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ELLEN HUIJGH
Public diplomacy is a widespread practice at the heart of diplomacy, shaped by the ebbs and
flows of circumstances in society as a whole. Part of the ongoing democratization of
diplomacy, it is also a driver of it, kicked into high gear by globalization and the
communication revolution. The development of public diplomacy amounts to the broaden-

ing of actors, issues, and instruments and must therefore contend with increased complexity
and blurring boundaries in this digital age. Public diplomacy has become a multidiscipli-
nary field of study that now extends beyond the confines of diplomatic studies. Its present
form is so diverse that it has become a generic term with a fluid meaning. Within diplomatic
studies, what are referred to as traditional and new diplomacy are now seen as too cat-
egorical, with moves toward more integrative scholarship. Much more study, particularly of
a comprehensive nature (such as theoretical and empirical case study research on integra-
tive public diplomacy), is required before claims about the future of public diplomacy
solidify.
36. QUIET AND SECRET DIPLOMACY WILLIAM MALEY
Quiet and secret diplomacy entail more than simply discretion: they involve a conscious
desire to leave activities unadvertised, or to hide certain forms of engagement from scrutiny.
Secrecy has a long history: it has been reinforced on occasion by laws and institutions, and
has long been used to hide the frailties of political leaders. Secrecy can provide space for
complex negotiations, especially with unappealing actors such as terrorist groups. However,
it may be difficult to maintain, it may be a barrier to learning from experience and it is
increasingly challenged by vigorous media, and by the expansion in the range of actors
involved in diplomacy. Its consequences are often difficult to assess; as a result, it may be
that it is best appraised by attention to situational issues rather than some grand ethical
theory.
xx THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
37. CRISIS DIPLOMACY EDWARD AVENELL AND DAVID HASTINGS DUNN
Crisis diplomacy plays a vital role in the modern international system. It has had to be continu-
ally adapted as the world has changed. The crises that dominated the twentieth century are very
different from those that are occurring in the twenty-first century. These crises are no longer
restrained to armed conflicts between states but can emerge from every arena, financial, medi-
cal and natural. As the world has become smaller the potential impact of these crises has
become much greater, with some able to quickly effect every corner of the globe. New tools
and practices have developed, such as the Responsibility to Protect, which marks a significant
development in crisis diplomacy. Researchers studying crisis diplomacy need to work closer
with those practising it to better understand the changing nature of crisis and ensure that the
practice of crisis diplomacy is fit to meet these challenges.
38. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY PETER VIGGO JAKOBSEN
Coercive diplomacy (CD) involves the use of military threats and/or limited force in support of
diplomatic negotiations relying on persuasion, rewards and assurances. This combination of
coercion (sticks) and diplomacy (carrots) is as old as the practice of diplomacy, and it is typi-
cally employed when actors want to resolve war-threatening crises and conflicts without resort-
ing to full-scale war. This chapter analyses the establishment of CD as a field of study during
the Cold War and shows how the theory and practice of CD has evolved in response to the
strategic challenges of the day. Four separate strategic eras with distinct challenges and theo-
retical developments are identified since the fields emergence in the 1960s: the Cold War, the
humanitarian 1990s, the war on terror and the hybrid future. The record clearly shows that
skilful use of coercive diplomacy can resolve crises and conflicts short of full-scale war when
the conditions are right. However, it is equally clear that our understanding of these conditions
remains wanting in several respects. More research and scholarly attention are needed if we
want to realize more of the potential for peaceful conflict resolution that coercive diplomacy
does hold.
39. REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY DAVID ARMSTRONG
Revolutionary diplomacy refers to the international outlook and conduct of states which,
having undergone an internal revolution, adopt very radical postures in their external relations.
Such postures inevitably have consequences for the ways states approach their diplomatic
relations with other states. Examples include the United States of America, France, Soviet
Russia, China, Iran and Libya. In the more extreme cases revolutionary states view world
politics from a completely different perspective from the underlying principles of conven-
tional diplomacy. The chapter outlines the role of diplomacy as an institution aimed at resolv-
ing disputes within a society of sovereign states and the inevitable confrontation between
the conventional and the revolutionary views of diplomacy. It concludes by considering the
degree to which revolutionary states become socialised into adopting the more conventional
norms and practices prevailing in the international community and also the extent to which
List of Abstracts xxi
international society itself changes in the process of the interaction between revolutionary and
conventional diplomacy.
40. CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY PAUL MEERTS
As modern technology makes war more costly, negotiations within and outside diplomatic
conferences are becoming increasingly important, both as a peaceful decision-making and a
conflict-management mechanism. This chapter analyzes the nature and evolution of conference
diplomacy. It argues that negotiations are vulnerable, unless they are protected by procedural
frameworks, comprising rules and conventions, such as those adopted in conference diplomacy
conducted by organizations such as the United Nations. The study also raises questions about
the future role of conference diplomacy in a globalizing world in which diplomats are losingtheir
traditional hegemony in international relations. It concludes with several recommendations for
enhancing the effectiveness, and thereby the significance, of conference diplomacy in the future.
41. CITY DIPLOMACY MICHELE ACUTO
World affairs are today more and more intertwined with the growing implications of urbanisa-
tion. Cities are increasingly popular actors on a number of fronts from the environment, to
security and health. Yet how does this shape diplomacy? The chapter takes the phenomenon of
city diplomacy as the practice of mediated international relations by local governments as a
starting point to answer this question. It argues that city diplomacy helps us expand our narrow
International Relations horizon, reacquainting ourselves with the long dure of world politics,
and appreciating the networked patterns that cities are weaving in international affairs. To make
this argument the chapter explores the long affair between cities and diplomacy, the challenges
in studying city diplomacy, the advances and limitations of practices of city diplomacy and
concludes with observations about its future in an increasingly urban age.
42. CITIZEN DIPLOMACY MELISSA CONLEY TYLER AND CRAIG BEYERINCK
Definitions of what citizen diplomacy is and who can be considered to be citizen diplomats are
highly contested. The term citizen diplomacy can be used either as a metaphor for those who
are involved in international interactions or, more narrowly, to refer to state-sanctioned use of
citizens in more traditional forms of diplomacy. While the actions of private citizens have long
played a role in interstate relations, either for or against their states interests, there has been a
strong preference by states for official diplomacy. However, ease of travel and communication
have led to a growing role for private citizens in relations between states. People-to-people
contact between citizens can have benefits including forming deep and long-lasting relation-
ships that are perceived as authentic and untouched by government. Changes in diplomatic
practice mean a growing place for citizen diplomacy to fill the gaps found between publics and
traditional diplomatic practice.
xxii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
43. CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY MARK WHEELER
This chapter analyses whether celebrity diplomats have effected a politics of attraction
through which they may bring public attention to international causes, such as poverty and
human rights. It situates the theoretical concepts of celebrity diplomacy associated with soft
power within a broader public diplomacy literature. It provides case studies of humanitarian
initiatives supported by international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and go it alone individuals or groups. Finally, it considers the critiques
of celebrity diplomacy in relation to celebrity-driven affective capacities (for example,
famous peoples ability to establish representational relationships with their audiences).
44. DIGITAL DIPLOMACY EYTAN GILBOA
This chapter explores the meaning, evolution, contribution and effects of new information and
communication technologies (ICTs) on diplomacy. It clarifies definitions and distinctions
between digital diplomacy (DD) and other areas of diplomacy. It traces the historical develop-
ment of DD, primarily via the American experience. It moves from diplomacy 1.0 to diplomacy
2.0, from passive email and websites to the hyper interactive social media of Facebook,
YouTube and Twitter. The chapter investigates the effects of DD on foreign ministries, the
Foreign Service, audiences, and public diplomacy (PD), and exposes limitations and challenges
for both research and practice.
45. ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY MAAIKE OKANO-HEIJMANS
Economic diplomacy is a contested concept and a diverse practice. Nonetheless, the processes
of globalization including the revolution in communications technologies are connecting
the worlds economies, while shifts in global power are causing governments to review the
balance between their different national interests. The economic dimension of states foreign
policies and therefore the role of economic diplomacy is receiving much attention. This chapter
argues that as a result of these changes, the concept and practice of economic diplomacy is
evolving, becoming more comprehensive and covering at least three types of diplomatic activ-
ity: trade and investment promotion (commercial diplomacy), negotiations on economic agree-
ments (trade diplomacy) and development cooperation. The evolving nature of economic
diplomacy is driving change in domestic and multilateral institutions, including new ways of
decision making. Despite these and other changes, such as diplomatic networks of state and
non-state actors, the state continues to be the primary actor in economic diplomacy.
46. BUSINESS DIPLOMACY HUUB RUL AND TIM WOLTERS
Decades of globalization have intensified the relationship between business and governments,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and interest groups. The role of multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) in todays complex business landscape has grown to such an extent that MNCs
List of Abstracts xxiii
have a leverage that is comparable to nation-states. In this perspective, MNCs have become
diplomatic actors. However, they are experiencing increased pressure from a multitude of stake-
holders. In order to manage these pressures and create legitimacy, MNCs need to engage in
long-term relationships with foreign governments and NGOs. This chapter aims to deepen our
understanding of this relatively unexplored and fragmented concept of business diplomacy.
47. RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY DAVID JOSEPH WELLMAN
When examining the religious dimension in the analysis and practice of diplomacy, it is impor-
tant to first distinguish between two broad categories of analysis. The first category, which
comes under the rubric of religion and diplomacy, refers principally to the influence of religion
on the practice of track-one diplomacy among nation-state actors. The second category, faith-
based diplomacy, generally refers to the practice of diplomacy on the part of track-two actors in
the form of religious institutions, religiously affiliated NGOs and/or individual practitioners of a
religious tradition. This chapters goal is to examine the approaches these two categories engage,
in an effort to understand the insights they can provide analysts and practitioners of diplomacy.
48. MILITARY DIPLOMACY SEE SENG TAN
Military diplomacy has grown in prominence as a strategy in response to the changing strategic
environment and the evolving remit of militaries in the post-Cold War era. It involves the
peacetime cooperative use of military assets and resources as a means of a countrys foreign
and security policy. Its goals are both conservative or pragmatic, such as building capacity and
interoperability and enhancing mutual understanding among countries and their militaries, and
transformative, such as resolving conflicts and developing democratically accountable armed
forces. While its rise has been encouraging, its contributions to enhancing military transpar-
ency and strategic trust among states have at best been mixed.
49. ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY SALEEM H. ALI AND HELENA

VOINOV VLADICH
Ecosystems transcend geopolitical boundaries and hence diplomacy has been essential to
manage environmental resources most efficiently and effectively. However, environmental
diplomacy, as a term and concept has evolved to encompass not only interactions on natural
resource governance between nation-states but conflict resolution and peace-building around
the environment more broadly. This chapter situates environmental diplomacy within the
broader context of conflict resolution, consensus-building and peace-building. We also investi-
gate the tools being used to improve the efficiency of environmental diplomatic negotiation and
processes, such as mediated modeling and GIS technology, and the role science can play as an
arbitrator for environmental diplomacy while recognizing that scientific knowledge can also be
socially and politically constructed by stakeholders. Our chapter suggests that environmental
diplomacy transcends conventional notions of Westphalian inter-state dynamics and also
xxiv THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
operates in a parallel community-driven field of human endeavor. While international relations

remain the dominant arena for environmental diplomacy, grassroots environmentalism has also
necessitated that community-based conflict resolution also be encompassed by such an
ecological worldview.
50. SPORTS DIPLOMACY STUART MURRAY
Compared to some of the major problems in twenty-first-century international relations

terrorism, poverty and climate change, to name but a few sports diplomacy is a positive
phenomenon that should be encouraged. However, in the modern diplomatic environment it is
often oversimplified either as a remedy for the worlds problems or derided as a gimmick, an
accoutrement that only rich states can afford in these austere times. Such opinion is parochial
and unhelpful. This chapter argues that to realise the potential of sport as a diplomatic tool it
is necessary to map the relationship between states, sport and international relations. From this
survey it introduces and critiques two categories of sports diplomacy: the traditional (version
1.0) and a new networked form (version 2.0). As a result, the landscape of sports diplomacy
becomes clearer, as do certain pitfalls and limitations of using sport as a tool for overcoming
and mediating separation between states. In this chapter, opportunities for cooperation
between theorists and practitioners are generated, and research gaps in the sports diplomacy
identified. By mapping and re-imagining the relationship between sport, international rela-
tions and diplomacy, it then becomes conceivable that sports diplomacy could become a major
soft power tool.
51. SCIENCE DIPLOMACY DARYL COPELAND
Science diplomacy is a critically important but under-resourced, under-utilized instrument of

international policy. Since the end of the Cold War, science diplomacy, and collaborative pro-
grams in the area of international science, technology and innovation more generally, have been
marginalized and replaced by a preference on the part of governments for the use of armed
force. Militarizing international policy and privileging defence over diplomacy and develop-
ment have proven costly; there are no military solutions to the complex transnational issues
which imperil the planet. Science diplomacy offers a better way forward, especially if it regains
its former standing as a soft power tool of public diplomacy. This chapter provides a critical
introduction to the relationship between science, technology, diplomacy and international
policy and examines the prospects for improving science diplomacy.
52. INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACY J. MARSHALL BEIER
Despite broadened and still broadening understandings of diplomacy in recent decades, as well
as of the range of actors and sum of practices it connotes, relatively little attention has been
paid to historic and contemporary diplomacies of Indigenous peoples. At the same time, impor-
tant developments in Indigenous-state relations, in hegemonic fora of global governance
List of Abstracts xxv
concerned with Indigenous issues, and in the rise of global indigenism characterized by,
among other things, a complex network of networks through which Indigenous peoples interact
and coordinate globally have become increasingly prominent. Notwithstanding oft times
considerable resistance from sovereign power, Indigenous peoples global political subject-
hood has grown in visibility and in applied efficacy with respect to a wide range of political
projects. These developments have not escaped the notice of states, even if students and schol-
ars of diplomacy have been slow to take note. This chapter takes Indigenous peoples unique
and varied traditions of diplomatic practice seriously as well-functioning diplomacies which,
though qualitatively different in many cases from even the more novel preoccupations of dip-
lomatic studies, have nevertheless underwritten the provision of political order and have
worked to sustain relations and exchange between peoples in myriad contexts across time and
space. It also offers the important cautions that these distinct traditions are not reducible to one
another or to some aggregate form and that care must be taken, so far as it is possible to do so
without relevant competencies, to engage them on their own terms rather than those of hegem-
onic imagining.
53. PARIAH DIPLOMACY HUSSEIN BANAI
Pariahs are actors whose rogue behavior constitutes a source of disorder in international soci-
ety. Precisely because pariahood is a subjective mode of conduct, it requires diplomatic tools
and methods to articulate its grievances, aims, and interests, and to negotiate the terms of
coexistence with others in international society. Such practice is routine by both the great
powers and states at the periphery of world politics. Pariah diplomacy testifies to the methods
by which extra-legal and disorderly conduct whether by members of the international society
or those standing outside of it are justified or impressed upon other diplomatic actors in
international politics.
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes
FIGURES
38.1 Conceptual overview 478

45.1 The trinity in economic diplomacy 556
46.1 Business diplomacy and its related concepts 568
49.1 Anatomy of environmental conflicts and concomitant
opportunities for diplomacy 603
TABLES
4.1 Five perspectives on statecraft, strategy and diplomacy 55

12.1 Embassy functions: past, present and anticipated 157
17.1 Conflict outcomes over time, 19462009 208
24.1 Selected small states in the UN: economic capacity and size of mission 300
24.2 Selected small states in the EU: economic capacity, size of
foreign service and EU delegation 303
35.1 Summary of the stages in public diplomacy 439
38.1 Comparing diplomacy, coercion and war 477
49.1 Consensus catalysis by environmental planners 611
BOXES
38.1 Schellings five conditions for coercive (compellence) success 479

38.2 George and Simons coercive diplomacy framework 480
38.3 Jakobsens ideal policy481
38.4 Jentleson and Whytocks coercive diplomacy framework 482
Notes on the Editors
andContributors
THE EDITORS
Costas M. Constantinouis Professor of International Relations at the University of Cyprus.

He also taught at the Universities of Lancaster, Hull and Keele and as visiting scholar at the
Taras Schevchenko and Middle East Technical Universities. He specializes in diplomacy, con-
flict, international theory and legal and normative aspects of international relations. He has
taught academic courses on diplomacy, organized training courses for new diplomats, and
published numerous books and articles, including On the Way to Diplomacy (Minnesota Uni-
versity Press, 1996), States of Political Discourse (Routledge, 2004) and Sustainable Diploma-
cies (co-edited with J. Der Derian, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Pauline Kerr is Emeritus Fellow in the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) at the
Australian National University. She teaches courses in the APCDs Master of Diplomacy pro-
gramme and her research focuses on theories and practices of diplomacy, both ancient and
contemporary. Her recent publications include Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories
and Practices (co-edited with Geoffrey Wiseman, Oxford University Press, 2013. Second edi-
tion forthcoming 2016.); and Chinas New Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?
(edited with Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing, Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2008).
Paul Sharpis Professor and Head of Political Science at the University of Minnesota Duluth
and Senior Visiting Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.
He was formerly Department Head, Director of International Studies and Director of the
Alworth Institute, as well as founding chair of the Diplomatic Studies and English School sec-
tions of the International Studies Association. His recent books include American Diplomacy
(co-edited with Geoffrey Wiseman, Brill, 2012), and Diplomatic Theory of International Rela-
tions (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
THE CONTRIBUTORS
Michele Acutois Research Director in the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering

and Public Policy (STEaPP) at University College London, where he is also Associate Profes-
sor in Global Networks & Diplomacy, and Director of the UCL City Leadership Initiative, a
joint project of UCL, World Bank and UN-Habitat. He is also a fellow of the Programme for
the Future of Cities at the University of Oxford, expert advisor on city diplomacy for the World
xxviii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
Health Organization, a senior fellow of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and author of
The Urban Link (Routledge, 2013).
Rebecca Adler-Nissen is Associate Professor and Research Coordinator in the Institut for
Statskundskab at the University of Copenhagen. Her research focuses on International Rela-
tions theory (especially international political sociology, stigma, status, norms and the practice
turn), diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration, as well as fieldwork, participant obser-
vation and anthropological methods in IR. She has authored several books including the prize-
winning Opting out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration
(Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Karin Aggestamis Professor of Political Science, honorary Professor at University of Queens-

land and former Director of Peace and Conflict Studies at Lund University. Her research inter-
ests include conflict analysis, diplomacy, peacebuilding, gender, negotiation/mediation and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She has authored and edited numerous international journal articles
and seven books, including the recent volume Rethinking Peacebuilding (Routledge, 2013/2014).
Saleem H. Ali is Director of the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) and
Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. He
is also Adjunct Professor of Environmental Planning at the University of Vermont in the USA.
Professor Alis research focuses on environmental conflicts in the extractive industries and how
ecological cooperation can promote peace in international relations. He is the author of three
sole-authored books including Treasures of the Earth: Need, Greed and a Sustainable Future
(published by Yale University Press), and Environmental Diplomacy (with Lawrence Susskind,
Oxford University Press). Professor Ali was chosen as a Young Global Leader by the World
Economic Forum in 2011 and received an Emerging Explorer award from the National Geo-
graphic Society in 2010, and has since then also been a member of the IUCN World Commis-
sion on Protected Areas. He received his doctorate in Environmental Planning from MIT, a
Masters degree in Environmental Studies from Yale University and Bachelors degree in
Chemistry from Tufts University.
David Armstrongis Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the University of Exeter.

He was founder-editor of the journal Diplomacy and Statecraft and his books include Revolu-
tionary Diplomacy: the United Front Doctrine and Chinese Foreign Policy (California Univer-
sity Press, 1977), Revolution and World Order (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) and The Rise
of the International Organisation (Macmillan Press, 1982). As well as articles in journals
including International Organization, Review of International Studies, International Affairs
and Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, he has published six single and co-
edited books, most recently Civil Society and International Governance (Routledge, 2008), A
Handbook of International Law (Routledge, 2008) and Force and Legitimacy in World Politics
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) and a co-authored book, International Law and Interna-
tional Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Edward Avenellis a Research Administrator for the Developmental Leadership Program and
the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre at the University of Birmingham.
His research interests include US Foreign Policy, USUK relations, and the ChineseUS
relationship.
Notes on the Editors andContributors xxix
Alyson J.K. Bailes served as Visiting Professor at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik,
teaching on general security topics and on Nordic and European security. Alyson Bailes
former career was spent largely in the British Diplomatic Service, where her foreign postings
included Hungary, the UK delegation to NATO, Bonn, Beijing, Oslo, and finally the post of
British Ambassador at Helsinki. She published widely on issues of general security policy,
European security and defence, arms control, and Arctic and Nordic matters.
Hussein Banaiis Assistant Professor of International Studies at Indiana University, Blooming-

ton, and Research Affiliate at the Center for International Studies at MIT. He is a co-convener
of the multi-volume critical oral history project on USIran relations. The first volume in this
series, Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88, was published
in 2012. His broad research agenda concerns the impact of Western imperialism on the devel-
opment of diplomatic institutions in post-imperial settings, especially in Iran. Currently, he is
completing a book manuscript on the hidden but robust influence of liberalism in Irans politi-
cal development.
J. Marshall Beieris Professor in the Department of Political Science at McMaster University.

His research and teaching interests are in the areas of childhood and militarism, Indigenous
peoples global diplomacies, critical security studies, Canadian foreign policy, and postcolonial
and feminist theory. He is the author of International Relations in Uncommon Places:
Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Theory (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005,
2009), editor of Indigenous Diplomacies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and The Militarization of
Childhood: Thinking Beyond the Global South (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 2013), and

co-editor with Lana Wylie of Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010). He has authored numerous book chapters and his articles have appeared in
Contemporary Security Policy, Critical Studies on Security, Global Governance, International
Political Sociology, International Politics, International Studies Review, Security Dialogue and
Third World Quarterly.
Craig Beyerinck holds a Master of Arts (Honours) in International Relations from the
University of St Andrews and is currently pursuing a Masters in Development Studies at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. His professional
experience centres on global health and he currently works at the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. He has previously worked at the UNAIDS Global Secre-
tariat, the UNAIDS Secretariat for Nepal and Bhutan, the Australian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, Local Interventions Group and the Attorney Generals Office in the Republic
of Palau. He is specifically interested in the topics of global health, LGBTI rights and
diplomacy.
Corneliu Bjolais Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies in the University of Oxfords

Department of International Development. Bjolas general research interests lie at the inter-
section of diplomatic studies, negotiation theory, international ethics and crisis manage-
ment. His current research focuses on the structural and normative conditions by which
digital technologies inform, regulate and constrain foreign policy. He has authored or edited
five books, including the recent co-edited volumes on Secret Diplomacy: Concepts, C ontexts
and Cases (Routledge, 2016) and Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Routledge,
2015). Bjola is also Editor-in-Chief of the new journal Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
withBrill.
xxx THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
Sean W. Burges is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the College of Arts and
Social Sciences and Deputy Director of the Australian National Centre for Latin American
Studies at the Australian National University. His research focuses on Brazilian foreign policy,
inter-American affairs and emerging market countries (BRICs) in world affairs, with special
reference to trade and foreign aid. Burges is author of two single-author books and over twenty
peer-reviewed articles and chapters on Brazilian foreign policy and inter-American affairs.
Stephen Calleyais the Director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC),
and Professor in International Relations at the University of Malta. As well as being an advisor
to Maltas Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he is the author of Security Challenges in the Euro-Med
Area in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2013) and has published several articles on Mediterranean
affairs in international journals including in Mediterranean Quarterly, Duke University Press.
Fabrcio H. Chagas Bastosis an Assistant Professor in International Relations at the Political

Science Department at the Universidad de Los Andes (Bogot) and a Research Associate of
the Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies at the Australian National Univer-
sity, and an Associate Research Fellow at the International Relations Research Centre (NUPRI)
at the University of Sao Paulo. His research concerns the global insertion of Latin America
countries in contemporary international systems, especially Brazil and Mexico.
Stephen Chan is Professor of World Politics at SOAS University of London. His research
focuses on the international politics of Southern Africa. Chan was an international civil servant
involved with several key diplomatic initiatives in Africa, helping to pioneer modern electoral
observation, and continues to be seconded to diplomatic assignments today.
Zhimin Chenis the Dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan
University, Shanghai, China. He is a Professor of International Relations and a Jean Monnet
Chair of European foreign policy. He is vice president of the Chinese Association of Interna-
tional Studies. His research interests include international relations theory, diplomacy studies,
Chinese foreign policy and EU studies. His major publications include: China, the United States
and Europe: Cooperation and Competition in a New Trilateral Relation (2011, first author);
Contemporary Diplomacy (2008, first author); Foreign Policy Integration in European Union: A
Mission Impossible? (2003, first author); Subnational Governments and Foreign Affairs (2001).
W. David Clintonis Professor of Political Science at Baylor University, Texas, USA. He stud-
ies International Relations theory, American foreign policy, the art and practice of diplomacy,
and ethics and international relations.
Melissa Conley Tylerwas appointed National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of
International Affairs in 2006. She was previously Program Manager of the International Con-
flict Resolution Centre at the University of Melbourne and Senior Fellow of Melbourne Law
School. She is a lawyer and specialist in conflict resolution, including negotiation, mediation
and peace education. She is a lawyer with an international profile in conflict resolution includ-
ing membership of the Editorial Board of the Conflict Resolution Quarterly. During her time
with the AIIA, she has edited more than 40 publications, organized more than 60 policy events,
overseen dramatic growth in youth engagement and built stronger relations with other institutes
of international affairs worldwide. She is listed in Routledges Whos Who in International
Affairs and International Whos Who of Women.
Notes on the Editors andContributors xxxi
Daryl Copelandis an educator, analyst, consultant and former Canadian diplomat. He is the
author of Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations, a Research Fellow at the
Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a Policy Fellow at the University of Montreals Centre
for International Studies and Research (CERIUM). Mr Copeland specializes in the role of sci-
ence and technology in diplomacy, international policy, global issues and public management.
He is Visiting Professor at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and has taught at the University
of Torontos Munk School of Global Affairs, the University of Ottawas Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs, the London Academy of Diplomacy (University of East
Anglia), Otago University (NZ) and the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (Malay-
sia). In 2009 he was a Research Fellow at the University of Southern Californias Center on
Public Diplomacy. Mr Copeland is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Place Brand-
ing and Public Diplomacy, and sits on the International Advisory board of the Canadian For-
eign Policy Journal. During his 30 year career in the Canadian foreign service, he served
abroad in Thailand, Ethiopia, New Zealand and Malaysia, and at headquarters in Ottawa as
Senior Intelligence Analyst, South, Central and Southeast Asia; Director of Communications
Services, Director for Southeast Asia, and as Senior Advisor: Public Diplomacy; Strategic
Policy and Planning. From 1995 to 1999 he was seconded to the Canadian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs in Toronto as National Program Director and Editor of Behind the Headlines. He
has published over 175 articles in the popular and scholarly press.
No Cornagois Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of the Basque

Country in Bilbao, Spain, where he is also in charge of the Graduate Programme in Interna-
tional Studies. His research interests are focused on the transformations of diplomacy, global
regulation, critical sociology of knowledge, post-development and aesthetics and politics. He
has held diverse visiting positions at Ohio State University, Sciences Po Bordeaux and Univer-
sity of Idaho, and was the Basque Visiting Fellow (201112) at St. Antonys College, Univer-
sity of Oxford. He is the author of Plural Diplomacies: Normative Predicaments and
Functional Imperatives (Brill, 2013).
Jason Dittmeris Professor of Political Geography at University College London. His research
focuses on three key areas: geopolitics, critical approaches to diplomacy and geographies of
media, especially comic books. His recent books include Geopolitics: An introductory reader
(Routledge, 2014).
David Hastings Dunnis Professor in International Politics and Head of the Department of
Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. His research inter-
ests are diverse and have evolved and broadened over his career. They fit largely within the
areas of US Foreign and Security Policy, Strategic and Security Studies and Diplomacy and
Statecraft.
Ana Mar Fernndez Pasarnis an Associate Professor in Politics and Public Administration
at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and an Associate Researcher at Sciences Po Paris
(Observatory of European Institutions). Her main research areas are European institutional
dynamics, with specific reference to the EU presidential system and comitology procedures,
and consular diplomacy. She has co-edited Consular Affairs and Diplomacy (Brill, 2011) and
published articles in European Foreign Affairs Review and The Hague Journal of Diplomacy.
She is a member of the scientific team of the Observatory of European Institutions (OIE) of
Sciences Po Paris and the scientific coordinator of the EUGOV Consolidated Research Group.
xxxii THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
Linda S. Frey,Professor of history, University of Montana and Marsha L. Frey, Professor of

history, Kansas State University have specialized in the history of international relations and the
development of international law. They have written in tandem The History of Diplomatic
Immunity; Proven Patriots: The French Diplomatic Corps, 17891799; The French Revolu-
tion; Friedrich I; and edited The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession and Daily Lives
of Civilians in Wartime Europe, 16181900 among others. The Earhart Foundation, the National
Endowment for the Humanities, American Council of Learned Societies, the Newberry Library
and the Folger Shakespeare Library, to name but a few, have generously funded their work.
They are currently completing a monograph on the culture of French revolutionary diplomacy.
Eytan Gilboa is Professor of International Communication and Director of the Center for
International Communication at Bar-Ilan University. He is also a visiting Professor of public
diplomacy at the University of Southern California. He has written several books and numerous
articles and book chapters on media diplomacy, public diplomacy, media and international
conflict, and the CNN effect. He received his MA and PhD degrees from Harvard University,
and has been a visiting Professor in leading American and European universities. He has won
several prestigious international awards.
Alan K. Henriksonis the Lee E. Dirks Professor of Diplomatic History and Director of Dip-
lomatic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA. He has
taught the history of the foreign relations of the United States, USEuropean relations, political
geography, and the theory and practice of diplomacy. He was Fulbright-Schuman Professor at
the College of Europe in Bruges and served earlier as Fulbright Professor at the Diplomatische
Akademie in Vienna. He has also lectured at the Estonian School of Diplomacy, University of
Pretoria, China Foreign Affairs University, US Department of State and the National Institute of
Defence Studies in Japan. His writings in the field of diplomacy include Diplomacys Possible
Futures in The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2006) and Negotiating World Order: The Arti-
sanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy (Scholarly Resources, 1986) of which he was
editor.
Brian Hockingis Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Loughborough University

and Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, where he is
involved in various projects relating to contemporary diplomacy currently, on digital diplo-
macy and has produced a report co-authored with Jan Melissen: Diplomacy in the Digital Age
(Clingendael Institute, 2015). He currently teaches a course on diplomacy at the College of
Europe in Bruges and was an associate editor of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy from 2005
to 2016. His research interests focus on the evolution and changing nature of foreign policy
and diplomacy.
Ellen Huijghconducts research on public diplomacy, including its domestic dimension, at the
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (since 2008) and the University
of Antwerp (since 2010). She was also a Research Fellow at the University of Southern
Californias Center on Public Diplomacy, working on emerging powers public diplomacy
(20132015). She is currently conducting research in Beijing. Huijgh was also a Resident
Visiting Fellow at Carleton University in Ottawa (20072012) and the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Jakarta (2012). She has provided government consultancy and diplo-
matic training to several (sub)national governments, and has written widely in academic jour-
nals and book chapters, including as lead author of an annotated bibliography of public
Notes on the Editors andContributors xxxiii
diplomacy literature (Oxford University Press, 2013), and as guest editor of a special issue of
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy on public diplomacys domestic dimension (2012).
Asteris Huliaras is Professor in the Department of Political Science and International

Relations at the University of the Peloponnese, Greece, and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair
in EU Relations with Less Developed Countries. He specializes in NorthSouth relations,
international development assistance, African politics and foreign policy analysis. He has
participated in EU and UN missions in several African countries. He has published ininter
national academic journals including African Affairs and the Journal of Modern
AfricanStudies.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish
Defence College, and Professor (part time) at the Center for War Studies, University of South-
ern Denmark. He is a former head of the Department of Conflict and Security Studies and
director of The Defence and Security Studies Research Programme at the Danish Institute for
International Studies (DIIS), and former Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science, University of Copenhagen. He is frequently used by the Danish and international
media as a commentator on defence and security issues, gives many lectures on these issues
and has acted as an advisor and consultant for several governments and international organiza-
tions. He has written extensively on civilmilitary cooperation and the integrated approach,
coercive diplomacy, Danish and Nordic foreign and security policy, NATO, peace and stabiliza-
tion operations, and use of military force.
Alan James spent two years in the British Civil Service, taught at the London School of
Economics from 1957 to 1973, and was Professor of International Relations at Keele Univer-
sity, UK, from 1974 to 1998. With G.R.Berridge he co-authored the first and second editions
of A Dictionary of Diplomacy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 and 2003).
Christer Jnssonis Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden and a
member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. His main research interests are interna-
tional negotiation and diplomacy, international organization and transnational relations. His
publications include Communication in International Bargaining (1990, Pinter), Essence of
Diplomacy (co-author 2005, Palgrave), Transnational Actors in Global Governance (co-editor
2010, Palgrave) and The Opening Up of International Organizations (co-author 2013,
Cambridge University Press) along with several articles in leading academic journals. He is a
contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft (2012).
Yolanda Kemp Spiesis a research associate of the SARCHI Chair in African Diplomacy
and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. She trained as diplomat at the South
African foreign ministry and at Oxford University, and practiced diplomacy for 18 years,
living and working on four continents before she joined academia. Her doctoral studies on
diplomatic training for developing countries, completed in 2005, resulted in her designing
and presenting training for diplomats from various African countries. As senior lecturer at
the University of Pretoria, from 2008 to 2016, she taught International Relations and devel-
oped a customised Master of Diplomatic Studies programme, a programme she also directed.
Her areas of a cademic specialisation include diplomacy, international ethics, foreign policy
analysis, international organisation, conflict resolution in Africa, and changing global power
relations.
xxxiv THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
Markus Kornprobstholds the Chair in International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy of

Vienna. He previously taught at the School of Public Policy at University College London and
Magdalen College at Oxford University. He held research fellowships at the Mershon Center
at the Ohio State University, and the Department of Politics and International Relations at
Oxford University. His research appears in leading journals in the discipline such as Inter
national Organization, European Journal of International Relations, International Studies
Review, Review of International Studies and Millennium. He is the author of Irredentism in
European Politics (2008, Cambridge University Press), co-author of Understanding Interna-
tional Diplomacy (2013, Routledge), as well as co-editor of Metaphors of Globalization (2008,
Palgrave) and Arguing Global Governance (2011, Routledge).
Halvard Leirais currently senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
(NUPI). Leira has published extensively in English and Norwegian on international political
thought, historiography, foreign policy and diplomacy. His work has appeared in e.g. Review
of International Studies, Millennium, Leiden Journal of International Law, International Stud-
ies Perspectives, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Global Society and Cooperation and Con-
flict. Leira has been co-editor of the Sage Library of International Relations sets International
Diplomacy (2013) and History of International Relations (2015). He is currently chair of the
Historical International Relations Section of the International Studies Association.
Richard Lock-Pullanis Senior Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Political

Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. He is interested in
twentieth-century international history and teaches and researches on traditional security and
strategic issues. He is currently working on issues of religion and politics.
Konstantinos Magliverasis Professor of the Law of International Organizations at the Uni-

versity of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece. His teaching and research interests cover Public Inter-
national Law (with an emphasis on International Criminal Law), European Union Law,
International and Regional Protection of Human Rights, Transnational Migration and Human
Trafficking. He also has a strong interest in African legal affairs and multilateral institutions.
His publications include K. Magliveras and G. Naldi, The African Union: Institutions and
Activities (2014).
William Maleyis Professor of Diplomacy, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australian

National University. He is author of Rescuing Afghanistan (2006) and The Afghanistan Wars
(2009) and co-editor of Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart? (2008) and Theo-
rising the Responsibility to Protect (2015).
Fiona McConnellis Associate Professor in Human Geography at the University of Oxfords

School of Geography and the Environment. As a political geographer Fionas research aims to
develop new areas of thinking regarding governance beyond the state and different modes of
political legitimacy. In particular, she is interested in how communities officially excluded from
formal state politics are nevertheless engaging with aspects of statecraft, and in using such
seemingly anomalous cases as a lens to critically examine the norms of governance. With
Jason Dittmer, she is the co-editor of Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Transla-
tions, Spaces and Alternatives (Routledge, 2016).
Paul Meerts is Senior Research Associate and former Deputy Director of the Netherlands
Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague. He is also Visiting Professor
Notes on the Editors andContributors xxxv
at the College of Europe in Bruges and Member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of
International Negotiation (PIN) programme.
Stuart Murrayis a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at Bond Univer-
sity, Australia, a Global Fellow at the Academy of Sport, Edinburgh University, and Associate
Editor of the academic journal Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (Brill). Alongside reflections on
traditional diplomacy, he has extensively published on new forms of international dialogue and
exchange such as sports, digital and secret diplomacy.
Cornelia Navariis Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the University of Buckingham,

UK, and Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of Birmingham. Her publications include
Internationalism and the State in the 20th Century (2000), Theorising International Society
(2009) and Guide to the English School in International Studies, edited with Daniel Green
(2014). Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations, edited with Tonny Brems
Knudsen is forthcoming from Macmillan.
Iver B. Neumannis the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London
School of Economics and Political Science and a lifelong associate of the Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs. His research focuses on Public Administration, in Russia and Scandi-
navia in particular. He has published widely on diplomacy, inter alia, At Home with the Diplo-
mats (2011) and Diplomatic Sites (2012).
Donna Marie Oglesbyhas spent nearly three decades as an American diplomat, learning four
languages to serve in American embassies in Latin America, Europe and Asia. She also held
senior headquarter positions, including Director of Latin American Affairs, Director of the Presi-
dential Youth Exchange Initiative and, finally, Counselor of Agency (USIA), the ranking career
position. On retirement from the United States Foreign Service, she came to Eckerd College as
Diplomat in Residence to resume an academic journey. As a member of the Public Diplomacy
Council, she devotes her teaching and writing to spanning the boundary between practitioners
of statecraft and scholars of the art. She recently concluded extensive research comparing how
diplomats and academics teach diplomacy in the United States. The SAIS Review, The Center
for Public Diplomacy (CPD) and the Foreign Service Journal have published her earlier work.
Maaike Okano-Heijmansis a senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Interna-
tional Relations Clingendael in The Hague and a visiting lecturer at the University of Leiden.
Her research interests are in economic diplomacy and international relations in East Asia and
in consular affairs and diplomacy. She is the author of Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the
Balance of National Interests (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013). Her work has been pub-
lished/translated in Dutch, English, Japanese, Spanish, Chinese and Arabic.
Sam Okoth Opondo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Vassar College, NY. His
research is guided by an interest in colonialism, race and the mediation of estrangement. With
an emphasis on violence, ethics and diplomacies of everyday life, he engages the problematics
of humanitarianism, the politics of redemption and the popular culture in urban Africa. He
teaches courses on comparative politics, settler colonialism, postcolonial diplomatic cultures
and African cities.
Kishan S. Rana was Indias Ambassador/High Commissioner to Algeria, Czechoslovakia,

Kenya, Mauritius and Germany, and was on the staff of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in
xxxvi THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
198182. He currently holds positions as Professor Emeritus of DiploFoundation, Malta and

Geneva and is an Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. His books include
Bilateral Diplomacy (2002), Asian Diplomacy (2007), Diplomacy of the 21st Century (2011),
The Contemporary Embassy (2013) and Diplomacy at the Cutting Edge (2015). His teaching
and research include economic and public diplomacy, and also comparative study of diplomacy
practices in the Global South.
Huub Rulis Professor of International Business at Windesheim University of Applied Sci-

ences (The Netherlands) and affiliated with the University of Twente (The Netherlands). He
studied Psychology and European Studies, and holds a PhD in Business Administration from
the University of Twente (The Netherlands). His research focuses on commercial diplomacy
and business diplomacy.
Michael Smithis Professor in European Politics at the University of Warwick, and Emeritus
Professor of European Politics at Loughborough University. His key areas of research are
European Union external relations and the development of the EUs system of diplomacy, and
Relations between the European Union and the United States, both in terms of their historical
development and in terms of current policy issues. He is the co-editor of International Rela-
tions and the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2011).
Stephan Stetteris Professor of Global Politics and Conflict Studies at the University of the
Bundeswehr Munich, Germany/EU. His research focuses on the Middle East and on global
social theory. He is an editor of the leading German-language International Relations journal,
the Zeitschrift fr Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB).
See Seng Tanis Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of Interna-
tional Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. A student of Asian security, his most
recent books include Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders
(Routledge, 2015) and The Making of the Asia Pacific: Knowledge Brokers and the Politics of
Representation (Amsterdam University Press, 2013).
Baldur Thorhallssonis Head and Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the Univer-
sity of Iceland. He is also Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies and Programme and
Research Director at the Centre for Small States at the University. His research focus is primar-
ily on small state studies, European integration and Icelands foreign policy. He has published
extensively in international journals and contributed to several academic books. He has written
two books on small states in Europe: Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge and The
Role of Small States in the European Union.
Helena Voinov Vladichis a senior scientist at the Ecole Polytechnique Federal de Lausanne
(EPFL), Switzerland. She works on Systems Analysis, Geospatial tools, and a concept of
Ecosystem Services for the Natural Capital assessment and environment decision making in
the regional context. She earned her doctorate at the University of Vermont, Rubinstein
School of Environment and Natural Resources and her MS in Automatic Control Systems
from the Department of Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology,
specializing in the modelling of ecological-economic systems. She is a fellow of the Institute
for Environmental Diplomacy and Security, James M. Jeffords Center, University of
Vermont, USA.
Notes on the Editors andContributors xxxvii
David Joseph Wellmanis an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at DePaul University,

Chicago. Wellmans work focuses on the relationship between religion and diplomacy, ecologi-
cal ethics and interreligious engagement. He is the author of Sustainable Diplomacy: Ecology,
Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and
Sustainable Communities (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2001). Wellmans writing on
diplomacy was used as the basis for an international conference, whose outcome was the col-
laborative volume Sustainable Diplomacies, edited by Costas Constantinou and James Der
Derian (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Mark Wheeleris Professor of Political Communications at London Metropolitan University.

He has written four books including Celebrity Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). He has pub-
lished numerous peer-reviewed articles such as Celebrity diplomacy: UN goodwill ambassa-
dors and messengers of peace, Celebrity Studies: Special Edition on Celebrity and the Global
and contributed chapters to many edited volumes.
Geoffrey Wisemanis Professor of the Practice of International Relations at the University of

Southern California. He is a former Australian diplomat, serving in three diplomatic postings
(Stockholm, Hanoi and Brussels) and as private secretary to the Foreign Minister, Gareth
Evans. He has co-edited a textbook, with Pauline Kerr, entitled Diplomacy in a Globalizing
World: Theories and Practices (Oxford University Press, 2013). His most recent book is an
edited volume Isolate or Engage: Adversarial States, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Public Diplo-
macy (Stanford University Press, 2015).
Tim Woltersis a researcher at Windesheim University of Applied Sciences and a consultant.

He holds a MSc in Business Adminstration with a focus on International Management from the
University of Twente (The Netherlands).
I. William Zartmanis the Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International

Organization and Conflict Resolution at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Dr Zartman is the author of a number of
works on North Africa and he has also developed the field of negotiation analysis.
Tatiana Zonovais Professor of Comparative History and Theory of Diplomacy at MGIMO

(Moscow State University of International Relations) and RUDN (Peoples Friendship Univer-
sity of Russia). She has the diplomatic rank of the 1st class Counsellor and a Doktor nauk
(PhD) in political science. She is a member of the International Advisory Board of The Hague
Journal of Diplomacy and a member of the Scientific Council of the Rivista di Studi Politici
Internazionali (Italy).
Introduction: Understanding
Diplomatic Practice
Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr
and Paul Sharp
Welcome to The SAGE Handbook of what we progressively learn about how it was
Diplomacy. Handbooks generally aspire to practiced in the past, what global trends and
give readers a handy toolkit, a practical challenges we face in current times, and what
guide. Recalling one of the most famous hopes and aspirations we harbor for the
handbooks of diplomacy, Sir Ernest Satows future. Like Satow we aim to be useful about
A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, the aim was the ways and means of practicing diplomacy;
to offer practical utility, not only to mem- unlike Satow, however, we do not offer a
bers of the services, but also to the general single authoritative, declaratory account but
public and to writers who occupy themselves a scholarly handbook that poses questions
with international affairs (Satow 1, 1917:ix). and problematizations, and provides possible
Similarly, this Handbook aims to provide answers to them.
guidance to three audiences: (a) the profes- Preparing a handbook on diplomacy now
sional in national diplomatic services as well adays reflects a major challenge that was not
as governmental and non-governmental present during Satows times, and which lets
organizations; (b) the student and researcher us say a great deal more about diplomacy
of diplomatic and international affairs; and than Satow could. Specifically, a handbook
(c) the interested layperson who recognizes today encounters and benefits from the devel-
or suspects that diplomacy is an important opment over the last 100 years of the aca-
daily occurrence with immense consequences demic discipline of International Relations
for how we live together in a globalized and within it the rich and expanding field of
interdependent world. Mindful of the practi- Diplomatic Studies. It must therefore refer to
cal imperative then, this Handbook provides and engage this literature the accumulated
a collection of sustained reflections on what body of knowledge on diplomacy. Indeed, a
it means to practice diplomacy today given practical guide that disregards such theoretical
2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY
developments that is, the more or less sys- specific practices of diplomacy are implicated
tematic thinking aimed at understanding with colonial governance and displacements of
and explaining diplomatic practice will be indigenous diplomacy as well as pre- and sub-
broadly unreflective and have little practical state diplomacy (see Beier in this Handbook).
utility as to what works as well as how, where The Handbook suggests that both the stu-
and when it works, or doesnt work. dent and the practitioner of diplomacy ought
It is useful to remember that practice moves to remain robustly engaged with normative
on in ways that practitioners sometimes are questions. That is to say, one should, where
the first to understand and recognize, yet also scholarly research has already yielded new
sometimes dogmatically resist acknowledg- and critical knowledge, scrutinize the usage
ing for a variety of reasons. At the same time, of dominant universals, their geographical and
theory is sometimes pioneering in analyzing historical utility, and their proper or inappro-
trends or re-conceptualizing practice, yet priate use. In this respect, the Handbook exam-
sometimes only belatedly catches up on what ines the extent to which the nature of foreign
practitioners realized and routinely practiced policy has changed in response to shifts in
for some time. What is needed to redress this both international and domestic policy milieus
dissonance is quite simple and often repeated: and changes in the demarcation, including the
better cross-fertilization between theory and impossibility of demarcation, of the domes-
practice (see, among others, Brown 2012). tic and the international (see Hocking in this
The renewed interest in practice theory Handbook). It points to how the mobility
in diplomatic studies (Sending et al., 2015; of political issues from the domestic to the
Pouliot and Cornut, 2015; Wiseman, 2015) is international stage necessitates the reconsid-
a welcome development in this respect. eration of the conceptual triad of statecraft,
strategy and diplomacy, and specifically the
limits of state power and the different kinds
of actors the state needs to engage nowadays
THE PRACTICETHEORY NEXUS in order to achieve results (see Kornprobst in
this Handbook). It also suggests that atten-
The Handbooks advance of the practice tion should be paid to how diplomatic agents
theory nexus and the view that diplomatic are entangled in their everyday practice with
practice and theory are two sides of the same deeply established but also contested concep-
coin is not new (see Constantinou and Sharp in tions of representation and legitimacy (see
this Handbook). It suggests that a diplomatic Adler-Nissen in this Handbook). Furthermore,
handbook for the twenty-first century ought to the delegated authority through which diplo-
be conceptual and historical but also fully matic agency operates raises issues of ethical
global in terms of issues and scope. It needs scrutiny and accountability, and should encour-
ambitiously to engage and understand the con- age reflection-in-action [...] by which diplo-
cept of diplomacy in history, the contexts mats seek to align the practical requirements of
within which it emerges as a positive or nega- the situation at hand with the normative imper-
tive term, as well as what is at stake in atives prompted by their divided loyalties (see
demanding or claiming moves from old to Bjola in this Handbook). None of this is pos-
new diplomacy (see Leira in this Handbook). sible without coming to terms with the chang-
It also needs to appreciate the complex entan- ing currency of diplomatic norms and values.
glements of modern diplomacy with the colo- These normative aspects open up wider
nial encounter, and what forms of diplomacy it questions about the functional and symbolic
legitimated or eradicated in colonial and post- forms of diplomatic practice. For example,
colonial times (see Opondo in this Handbook). the verbal and non-verbal forms of diplomatic
It should be concerned with how historically communication need to be understood in
Introduction: Understanding Diplomatic Practice 3
their instrumentalist mode, i.e. as tools of of it appears to recede. A guide to the practice
the trade necessary for the fulfillment of of diplomacy must acknowledge this meta-
daily diplomatic functions and signaling, but theoretical lack and, at least, explore the pos-
also in their constitutive mode, producing sibility that it is not necessarily a matter for
meaning and enacting the diplomatic worlds regret, quite the reverse.
within which actors operate (see Jnsson in This resistance to meta-theorizing with
this Handbook). Similarly, with the notion of its associated sense of fragmentation and
diplomatic culture we encounter the technical, pulling apart is reflected in both the general
professional culture of the diplomatic corps organization of the Handbook and in some of
but also the wider notion of the diplomatic its individual chapters. Part I focuses on con-
community beyond state officials and thus cepts and theories of diplomacy, followed by
the pluralization of diplomatic cultures Parts II, III and IV on diplomatic institutions,
that are linked to everyday mediations and diplomatic relations and, finally, types of
conflict resolutions (see the chapters of diplomatic engagement. One might expect,
McConnell and Dittmer, and Sharp and therefore, a rather stately progress from the
Wiseman in this Handbook). Moreover, art orthodoxies of the past when aristocrats and
is often used instrumentally in diplomacy to professionals managed the relations of sov-
project the representation of polity or policy, ereign states, through the excitements and
but such representations as well as counter- disappointments of the new diplomacy and
representations by artists have legitimacy conference diplomacy of 1919 onwards (see
effects that need to be understood and taken Meerts in this Handbook), up to a present in
on board by practitioners (see Neumann in which economics, terrorism, social media-
this Handbook). tion, and a host of other usual suspects,
To support a better understanding of this as Captain Louis Renault might term them,
practicetheory nexus, this collection seeks to conspire to subvert, obscure, and transform
present the latest theoretical inquiry into the the perceived orthodoxies of diplomacy. This
practice of diplomacy in a way which is acces- happens to some extent, but more in individ-
sible to students and practitioners of diplomacy ual chapters than in the collection as whole.
alike as well as the interested general reader. Taken in the round, the collection often
That said, the readers of this Handbook will presents a series of surprising and suggestive
note that there are different views about the juxtapositions. Thus, for example, a chap-
status of theory within Diplomatic Studies that ter on what it means for states to be in dip-
are reflected in various chapters. Diplomacys lomatic relations an utterly orthodox, yet
resistance to being theorized (Wight, 1960; surprisingly ignored aspect of diplomacy to
Der Derian, 1987) is no longer a tenable date (James in this Handbook) rubs shoul-
proposition (see Constantinou and Sharp in ders with an essay on pariah diplomacy, i.e.
this Handbook). There are plenty of theories the methods by which extra-legal and dis-
of diplomacy. What remains conspicuous by orderly conduct are justified or impressed
its absence, however, is any meta-theory of upon other sovereign entities in international
diplomacy a theory of the theories of diplo- politics (Banai in this Handbook). There are
macy which might present all the different chapters on key institutions, such as on the
things that people want to identify and discuss diplomatic and consular missions (Rana and
in a single set of coherent relations with one Pasarin), international law (Clinton), diplo-
another. The more people become interested matic immunity (Frey and Frey), negotiation
in practicing and theorizing diplomacy and (Zartman), mediation (Aggestam), summitry
the more the hubris of grand theorizing is (Dunn and Lock-Pullan), and diplomatic
revealed and taken to task, the more the pros- language (Oglesby). There are regional, subre-
pect for any such overarching general account gional, and single country perspectives, where
diplomatic relations are analyzed with regard exclusively by the accredited representatives
to what theories and concepts the specific of sovereign states, then much of what is called
authors assessed as pertinent to their case. diplomacy today and is presented as such in
Specifically, the Handbook examines the this collection will appear to be mislabelled.
European Union and its hybrid system of dip- If, on the other hand, one has an open concep-
lomatic representation and action (Smith in tion of diplomacy as ways of conducting rela-
this Handbook); the revolutionary legacy and tions, or is content to accept as such whatever
changes in American diplomacy (Henrikson other people present as being diplomacy, then
in this Handbook); the changing policy and diplomacy and diplomats remain blurry
discursive shifts in Russian post-Soviet diplo- and indistinct. This is particularly the case
macy (Zonova in this Handbook); the mod- with studies focused on elaborating the con-
ernization of Chinese diplomacy and its shift texts in which diplomacy is undertaken.
to more proactive foreign policy (Chen in this
Handbook); the surprising deficit of stud-
ies on diplomacy in East Asia as well as the
near absence of anything that might be called THE MEANING OF DIPLOMACY:
regional diplomacy (Kerr in this Handbook) SINGLE OR PLURAL?
at least compared to the EU region of Europe
(see Smith in this Handbook) and even com- Such elaborations on contexts are necessary,
pared to the regional adherence to the concert- especially in a time which people character-
acin approach to diplomatic management ize as one of change and innovation. The
in Latin America (Burges and Bastos in this danger, however, is that they stop short of
Handbook); and how colonial and postcolo- discussing diplomacy as such, or what it
nial environments shaped Middle East diplo- means to be diplomatic. The question why
macy (Stetter in this Handbook), African and how do we come to call this diplomacy
diplomacy (Huliaras and Magliveras in this or diplomatic? remains a powerful one,
Handbook), and Southern African diplo- although not as an attempt to discipline
macy (Chan in this Handbook). In short, the departures back into line from an orthodox or
Handbook has a global outlook but there is no classical standpoint. It is an open question
single theoretical perspective from which to which admits of multiple answers, but it does
view and order the knowledge of diplomatic ask that people attempt to answer it.
institutions or through which to explain his- Indeed, it is a useful exercise to canvass
torical and current diplomatic relations in their how this open question might be answered
entirety. There are often common understand- even when people call something diplomacy
ings about the value of diplomatic institutions or name someone an ambassador, catachresti-
or the forms of diplomatic relations, but there cally or unprofessionally. Considering how
is also a prioritization of different levels and such terms feed into everyday reality and think-
units of analysis by different authors. ing, literal or metaphorical, is quite crucial for
Conventional scientific and social scientific fully appreciating the conceptual richness of
approaches concerned with rigor in method, diplomacy as well as its practical applications
coherence in conceptualization, and cumula- in social life (Constantinou, 1996). This is for
tion in the production of knowledge, suggest two reasons. First, concepts carry within them
that resistance to meta-theorizing should be and often begin themselves as metaphors
regarded as a problem. People interested in words carrying meaning from one context to
diplomacy, however, seem less concerned. To another. Concepts then get modified through
be sure, a more relaxed approach courts certain consciously literal but also consciously and
dangers. If one insists that diplomacy should unconsciously metaphorical use (Derrida,
be properly regarded as a practice performed 1982: 25871). One can be sympathetic to
the critique of conceptual overstretching, the language gaming or trope, just as it may be
private and excessive broadening of a concept expressive and symptomatic of a major politi-
just in order to prove a scholars latest theory cal claim or power context or representation
or idea. But it is difficult to be sympathetic to anxiety.
approaches that essentialize and police con- On the whole, the difficulties created by a
cepts, striving to prove conceptual purity and relaxed approach to defining diplomacy and
extricate historical interbreeding and the inev- establishing the boundaries of what can prop-
itable hybridization of ideas. In both, the quest erly be regarded as such are far outweighed
for a fake clarity can shade over into a quest by the advantages. This is certainly the
for control which is all too real. It is reminis- shared position of the editors for this project.
cent of an age where religion could only be Certainly, each of us had our preferences in
defined by the church and the priest, meaning the sense of wishing that more attention be
in effect that the differing religious and spiri- given to one aspect of diplomacy and less to
tual ideas of people and their forms of expres- another more on state practices, more on
sion were denied any reality, and thus could transformational potentials, more on real life
only figure as either mythical or heretical. diplomatic practice in concrete situations,
Second, especially for those working for example. Each of us working individu-
within a critical or constructivist mode, lin- ally might have produced a different balance
guistic uses are not just instrumental to between themes than the one which emerged
communication but enact and create the from our joint efforts.
worlds within which we live and operate. However, it is difficult to avoid the con-
The Wittgensteinian motto that to imagine a clusion that diplomacy is an inherently
language means to imagine a form of life is plural business which encourages an inher-
worth recalling here (Wittgenstein, 1958: sec- ently plural outlook on the way people see
tion 19). Words are not just passive tools but things and see things differently from one
active mobilizers of imagination. To imagine another, and to that extent how diplomatic
that one is experiencing a life in diplomacy has knowledge is crucially implicated not only
power effects and affects. Some flights into in the instrumentality of official communi-
diplomatic fantasy may be harmless and frivo- cation but also in the development of rival
lous, as when one is playing the board game perspectives over any issue (see Cornago,
Diplomacy and decides for the sake of fun 2013 and in this Handbook). A social world
to practice intrigue and coercion on a friend composed of different actors with different
as the game encourages one to do. But other interests, identities, and understandings of
flights into diplomatic fantasy may have more what the world is, how it works, and how it
serious implications, such as if one thinks that might work to the point that we may use-
the board games strategic understanding is fully talk of many worlds (Walker, 1988;
the natural way of relating to others and diplo- Agathangelou and Ling, 2009) whose rela-
macy can only be that. Moreover, it is often tionship to each other is captured by no single
missed that non-official or unauthorized use claim invites a number of responses. Which
of diplomatic discourse and terminology may differences should some effort be made to
hide wider or unresolved issues, be it claims resolve, and which should be left alone? And
to recognition or territorial sovereignty; tak- by what means should differences be resolved
ing exception to someone elses governmen- or maintained by force when there is suf-
tal jurisdiction; aspirations to fully represent ficient power, by law when there is sufficient
or rightly speak for someone or something; or agreement, and by habit and tradition when
power to negotiate or reopen negotiation or there is sufficient sense of belonging? Good
opt out of an agreement, and so on. In short, diplomacy with its emphasis on peace-
quotidian diplomatic terminology may be just ful relations, avoiding misunderstandings
and unwanted conflict, and on paying atten- Nevertheless, there are some signs that
tion to the Other offers ways of conduct- this change is beginning to happen. While
ing relations in a plural world where power, diplomatic careers have no doubt been dam-
law and community are in short supply. Even aged as a result of the diplomatic indiscre-
bad diplomacy can sometimes offer a way tions revealed by WikiLeaks, they no longer
of rubbing along together where these are produce the drastic outcome in diplomatic
absent. relations that they have produced in the past
(Satow, 1917: 375). Younger diplomats,
reflecting the outlook of their peers in soci-
ety at large, are much more likely than their
THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY: elders to agree with the proposition that peo-
TRADITIONAL OR ple say all sorts of stuff. Diplomatic practice,
TRANSFORMATIONAL? therefore, might evolve in the direction of not
holding diplomats so tightly to their words
In a sense, therefore, the breadth of this col- or, perhaps, specifying when their public or
lection and the, at times, most tenuous con- revealed utterances should be taken as ex
nection between some of its constituent cathedra and when they should be regarded
elements is itself an appropriately diplomatic as harmless instances of people saying all
response to the subject matter. Two general sorts of stuff. A similar shift might take
themes emerge, nevertheless. The first is that place in attitudes towards the crisis character
in a world where power and authority seem with which contemporary international news
to be diffusing, people are looking to some- is presented by authorities and reported by
thing which they traditionally understand as, mass media, a character often amplified in the
and want to call, diplomacy as a way of con- tweeted and blogged responses within social
ducting their relations with one another. The media. Rather than trying to lower the temper-
second is that many of the contextual changes ature, diplomatic practice might seek to take
which fuel this demand for more diplomacy, the higher temperature as the normal operat-
make diplomacy at least as it has tradition- ing level and recognize that people are neither
ally been understood more difficult to as upset nor as energized as they often sound.
undertake. However, the need for diplomatic practice
There is very little desire to return to a to adjust, in some instances, to changing con-
world in which a relative handful of carefully ditions, is matched by the concomitant need of
selected, refined, low key, discreet, diplomatic the myriad of new diplomats to take on at least
guardians of the universe plied their trade, some aspects of diplomatic practice as these
secure in their shared values and respect for have evolved from what appear in the pres-
confidentiality. And even if there was such a ent to have been quieter, simpler times. The
desire, such a world is unrecoverable, not least representatives of new international actors
because of the considerable extent to which it private corporations, humanitarian organiza-
was a myth in the first place. Accordingly, the tions, and transnational political actors, for
task that confronts those theorizing and prac- example have traditionally positioned them-
ticing diplomacy today is a complex one. What selves as outsiders acting upon a world of
is required is a fundamental change in some insiders, that of the system or society of sover-
elements of diplomatic practice, but not all eign states. As a consequence, they have been
of them. The prospects for reinsulating diplo- viewed and tended to act as lobbyists, pressure
macy and diplomats from the consequences of groups, agitators, and subversives on behalf of
low cost, high content, information instantly rather narrowly defined objectives. So too at
available to the general public, for example, times have the more traditional state-based
are probably very low, at least for now. diplomats, of course. In addition, however,
the best among the latter have had some sense need for more effective diplomacy. In his elec-
of ownership of, responsibility for, and even tion campaign for US President, Barack
affection towards the system or society which Obama called for more diplomacy and was
facilitates and makes possible their work. This rewarded with victory at the polls and a Nobel
can be seen to work at the level of what Adam Peace Prize, just one year after taking office.
Watson (1982) calls la raison de systme and However, it is perhaps worth noting two points
underpins a diplomatic theory of international about this diplomacy revival claim, for they
relations that can valorize political collabora- have a considerable bearing not only on pro-
tion and coexistence whilst accepting separa- moting a less cynical outlook on diplomatic
tion and difference (Sharp, 2009). practice but also on how the study of diplo-
As Navari (2014 and in this Handbook) macy has developed in recent years, which is
notes, within the basic structures of state- reflected in this collection.
based diplomatic practice as these have been The first point is that the claim refers to
articulated in the 1961 Vienna Convention on interest in diplomacy, not diplomacy itself.
Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Of course, diplomacy did not disappear dur-
Consular Relations, there are other rules and ing the Cold War. Even ideologically driven
conventions some more tacit and less formal and strategically minded superpowers needed
than others by which specific dmarches may diplomacy albeit diplomacy of a certain
be judged to be instances of the diplomatic kind and their diplomacy was neither so
game more or less well played. A similar sense dominant, nor as ubiquitous, as their own
of responsibility, however, can be found at the accounts of international relations at the time
individual level when people who are not only suggested. Even so, the Cold War left its mark,
radically different from one another, but who particularly on the academic study of interna-
might also have a highly problematic place for tional relations which was, and remains, heav-
each other in their respective universes, experi- ily centered on the United States. Diplomacy
ment in conflict transformation and coexistence was necessary, everyone could acknowledge.
(Constantinou, 2006). How they are to make Missing, however, among practitioners and
meaningful representations, or conduct rela- students alike, was a sense that diplomacy was
tions without conquering the other or capitulat- important to making things happen in inter-
ing to the expectations of the other, constitute national relations or understanding why they
diachronic diplomatic problems which require happened as they did. It was widely assumed
both reflection and self-reflection. that if one wanted to act internationally or
explain international actions, one should look
at structures be these constituted by the
distribution of state power, concentrations of
THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD: REVIVAL capital and production, or, more recently, the
OR EXPANSION? distribution of scientific and technical com-
petencies. More agency-focused approaches
One of our starting observations in this could not escape this structural framing,
Handbook is that it has become commonplace whether of the foreign policy bureaucracy or
to claim that interest in diplomacy is reviving. the cognitive make up of decision makers.
The end of the Cold War is often credited with And even studies of bargaining focused on the
initiating this revival, while the ongoing revo- structure of contexts in which sparsely elabo-
lution in information and communication tech- rated agents were presented as operating.
nologies (ICT) seems to be supercharging it. As may be seen in many of the Handbooks
The War on Terror threatened to put diplomacy chapters, the emphasis on structure continues
back in the deep freeze, but the foreign policy to leave its mark on both the practice and the
disasters which resulted merely underlined the study of diplomacy, as indeed it must. What
many of them also reveal, however, is the Jakobsen, Armstrong, Meerts, Acuto, Conley
shift to an emphasis on diplomatic agency, Tyler and Beyerinck, Wheeler, Gilboa, Okano-
its actions and relations and the capacities, Heijmans, Rul and Wolters, Wellman, Seng
both actual and potential, that agents have for Tan, Ali and Vladich, Murray and Copeland in
shaping international relations and, indeed, this Handbook). Other chapters in other parts
producing or enacting the structures which are equally important observation sites of
seem to exert so much influence on our sense this dynamic (for example see Spies, Navari,
of what happens and can happen. Thorhallsson and Bailes, and Calleya in Part
The form of this shift of focus draws III of this Handbook).
attention to the second point which needs Looking across this expansion of types of
to be noted about the revival of interest in diplomacy reveals that the extent of cross-
diplomacy the description of the process as a fertilization between practice and theory
revival. The implication is that there was once varies. Among the reasons for this are that
a greater interest in both the practice and the research and scholarship around a particular
study of diplomacy which went into decline type of diplomacy also varies. There is frequent
and is currently recovering to something like acknowledgment among the authors in Part
previous levels. Strictly speaking, this is not the IV, and throughout the Handbook, that more
case. Certainly, it was plausible for a relatively research and scholarly attention is needed to
small group of people in the fairly recent past better understand the practicetheory nexus
to equate what they regarded as important and there are calls for researchers to work
international relations those conducted closely with those practicing diplomacy (for
between an even smaller group of sovereign example, see Avenell and Dunn in this
states of which they were citizens and some of Handbook) to meet the practical and theoretical
them represented with diplomacy. Even so, challenges ahead.
the diplomatic histories produced between the Nonetheless the overall observation about
late eighteenth century and the mid twentieth cross-fertilizations between practice and the-
century missed a great deal of what was going ory in this Handbook is that the many gen-
on at the time. Much of what is presented eralizations, or theoretical claims based on
as diplomacy today, however, would have systematic thinking, about particular types
been unrecognizable as such to those who of diplomacy require qualifications and cave-
maintained that it consisted of the adjustment ats and are therefore bounded within tem-
of relations between sovereign states poral and spatial contexts. To illustrate the
principally through negotiations undertaken by point, digital diplomacy (see Gilboa in this
their accredited representatives. Rather than a Handbook), which is clearly one of, if not the
revival of interest in diplomacy, therefore, it is most, recent types of diplomacy being prac-
perhaps more accurate to refer to an expansion ticed, is an area of study that currently offers
of interest, and a double expansion at that. The generalizations: for example, that the recent
number of people interested in diplomacy has means of diplomatic communication, namely
expanded within and across the discipline of the ICTs and Internet, are clearly different
International Relations, and with that so too from those of the past, many more actors are
have conceptions of what people want to mean involved, digital networks are evolving; and
when they try to talk about diplomacy. that this is having an impact on diplomatic
As evidenced in Part IV of this Handbook, practice. Simultaneously, qualifications are
the typologies of diplomatic engagement have offered: for example, that much of the research
also expanded, giving us an important labora- on digital diplomacy is based on US experi-
tory for observations about the cross-fertiliza- ence, that the impact of different actors may
tion between practice and theory (see chapters well vary depending on such factors as the
by Huijgh, Maley, Avenell and Dunn, Viggo issue-area and the political system of a country,
that traditional and new instruments of commu- be understood, but, taken together, we sug-
nication co-exist, and that the digital landscape gest that they provide the Handbook with its
is changing so rapidly that future impacts are distinctive contribution the advancement of
difficult to predict, including whether or not thought about theory and practice and the
such new technologies will change the nature relationship between them. Looking ahead, a
of diplomatic relationships and knowledge. number of challenging ontological, episte-
Rather than undermining the practicetheory mological, and practical questions arise out
nexus, such careful qualifications add to its of the Handbooks focus on theorizing and
robustness and support the point made earlier practicing diplomacy. We strongly advise
that there are many theories of diplomacy, students and professionals to pose these
albeit in various stages of maturity, and that the questions in different contexts, to make their
absence of meta-theories is far from holding own judgments, and to act upon them accord-
back our understanding of diplomacy today. ingly. For example:
In addition to being mindful of this double
expansion illustrated above and elsewhere, What does diplomacy mean, what does it mean
we as editors of the Handbook noted gaps to be diplomatic and how do the answers to
in the existing literatures on diplomacy and both questions change in different social
to engage with some of them we invited our contexts?
What are the roles of diplomacy and diplomats in
authors as experts in their specialized fields
producing, reproducing, and transforming differ-
to individually and collectively tackle spe-
ent social contexts?
cific tasks, including the following: Can the diplomatic be examined independently
of the political, the governmental, the legal, and
Offer perspectives on the past, present, and possible
the personal and what is at stake in doing or
future activities, roles, and relations between the
not doing so?
diplomatic actors of the global society specifically
How far should the diplomatic identity be
who has power/influence when, why, and how.
extended and at what cost or benefit?
Provide a major thematic overview of diplomacy
To what extent should diplomatic identity be
and its study that is both retrospective and
denied and at what cost or benefit?
prospective.
Can `new actors, for example, the Coca Cola
Provide an overview of the field that is intro-
corporation, or the Doctors Without Borders
spective, self-reflective and critical of dominant
organization, or the Invisible Children campaign
understandings and practices of diplomacy.
cultivate not just transnational but diplomatic
No one can singly undertake such a massive relationships?
Can certain aspects of diplomatic practice be
task. We think the cumulative result is splen-
privatized or subcontracted and at what cost
did and has certainly fulfilled our own expec-
or benefit?
tations! We also think the result contributes To what extent are diplomatic immunity and dip-
to knowledge about contemporary diplomacy lomatic asylum important norms or unnecessary
in other recent texts and handbooks (see, for privileges in a globalized age?
example, texts by Pigman, 2010; Bjola and To what extent and under what conditions can
Kornprobst, 2013; Kerr and Wiseman, 2013; diplomacy and violence coexist?
and the handbook by Cooper etal., 2013). What constitutes diplomatic knowledge, how
should it be acquired, and how far should the
general public have access to it?
How do diplomatic relations historically evolve
PERSISTENCE IN QUESTIONING and how are they artfully maintained?
DIPLOMACY What are the main issues that traditionally
concern particular diplomatic actors, what issues
The chapters in the Handbook demonstrate that interest them are regionally and globally
the plural character of how diplomacy may sidelined, and why?
In diplomatic relationships, who has what influence/ Brown, C. (2012). `The Practice Turn,
power, over what issues, during what periods, and Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a
through the use of what methods and mechanisms? Phronetic International Political Theory?
How can the diplomatic practice of particular Millennium-Journal of International Studies,
actors be understood, revisited, and revised when 40 (3): 439456.
viewed through different theoretical perspectives? Constantinou, C.M. (1996) On the Way to
How are alternative diplomatic cultures, both actual Diplomacy. Minnesota University Press.
and potential, to be studied and learned from? Constantinou, C.M. (2006) On homo-
To what extent are we moving into a mana- diplomacy, Space and Culture, 9 (4):
gerialization, de-professionalization, or trans- 35164.
professionalization of diplomacy? Cooper, A.F., Heine, J., and Thakur, R. (eds)
(2013) The Oxford Handbook of Modern
A final word. In the early stages of the process Diplomacy. Oxford University Press.
of assembling this Handbook it seemed at Cornago, N. (2013) Plural Diplomacies:
times as if we had committed ourselves to cre- Normative Predicaments and Functional
ating a veritable Leviathan of diplomacy cov- Imperatives. Martinus Nijhoff/Brill.
Der Derian, J. (1987) On Diplomacy: A
ering nearly every conceivable aspect of the
Genealogy of Western Estrangement.
practice from nearly every conceivable angle. Blackwell.
As our work progressed, however, we became Derrida, J. (1982) Margins of Philosophy.
increasingly aware of three things: substantive Harvester Press.
gaps which we will leave to our reviewers to Kerr, P. and Wiseman, G. (eds) (2013)
identify; a wide range of views on diplomacy Diplomacy in a Globalizing World. Theories
which cannot always be coherently related to and Practices. Oxford University Press.
each other; and, above all, a sense that the col- Navari, C. (2014) Practices in the Society of
lection was producing more questions than States, paper presented at the International
answers. Social formations come and go, while Studies Association 55th Annual Convention,
diplomacy is perennial. Nevertheless, as social March 2014.
Pigman, G.A. (2010) Contemporary Diplomacy.
formations change, so too do diplomatic prac-
Polity Press.
tices, as do the opportunities for diplomacy, in Pouliot, V. and Cornut, J. (2015) Practice
its turn, to enable positive changes in the ways theory and the study of diplomacy: a research
in which people think about and conduct their agenda, Cooperation and Conflict, 50(3):
relations with one another. 297513.
At the end of the project, we have a strong Satow, E. (1917) A Guide to Diplomatic
sense that we are at the beginning, but just the Practice, Vol. 1. Longmans.
beginning, of such changes. As you read the Sending, O.J., Pouliot, V., and Neumann, I.B.
following collection, we very much hope that (eds) (2015) Diplomacy and the Making of
the essays in it encourage you to think about World Politics. Cambridge University Press.
and make your own sense of what diplomacy Sharp, P. (2009) Diplomatic Theory of International
Relations. Cambridge University Press.
is, what it is becoming, and what it might be.
Walker, R.B.J (1988) One World, Many Worlds:
Struggles For A Just World Peace. L. Rienner.
Watson, A. (1982) Diplomacy: The Dialogue
REFERENCES Between States. Methuen.
Wight, M. (1960) Why is there no International
Agathangelou, A.M. and Ling, L.H. (2009) Theory?, International Relations, 2 (1), 3548.
Transforming World Politics: From Empire to Wiseman, G. (2015) Diplomatic practices at
Multiple Worlds. Routledge. the United Nations, Cooperation and
Bjola, C. and Kornprobst, M. (2013) Conflict, 50(3): 316333.
Understanding International Diplomacy. Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical
Routledge. Investigations. Blackwell.
PART I
DIPLOMATIC CONCEPTS
AND THEORIES
1
Theoretical Perspectives in
Diplomacy
Costas M. Constantinou and Paul Sharp
Diplomacy has been theorized long before the of speculation about diplomacy whose his-
development of the subfield of diplomatic torical absence might lead one to conclude
theory that we currently associate with the that there is a kind of recalcitrance of diplo-
academic discipline of International Relations macy to be theorized about, or indeed that
(IR). Within modern academia, theorizing is there is no international and, hence in Wights
commonly perceived as a systematization of framing, no diplomatic theory at all (Wight
thinking, an extensive elaboration of ideas and 1966). By contrast, we suggest that there is a
principles governing or seeking to explain a lot of diplomatic theory around, including
particular phenomenon. Early theorizing, when writers do not name what they do as
however, is often fragmentary and unsystem- diplomatic theory. Our theoretical perspec-
atic, as are certain strands of contemporary tives in diplomacy are thus grounded in the
theorizing, specifically strands that follow key conceptual explorations, epistemological
what Paul Feyerabend (1975) called an anar- exchanges and normative and critical proposi-
chistic theory of knowledge. All approaches tions concerning different aspects of diplo-
can provide valuable perspectives, insights matic practice.
and modes of inquiry. That is why, in this
chapter, we look at various disciplinarian
attempts that seek to offer more or less com-
plete explanatory narratives of diplomacy, but EARLY DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT
also others that go beyond the so-called grand
theory approaches (Skinner 1990) and under- Bearing the above in mind, the diplomatic
score the contributions of fragmentary and researcher might be initially struck by the
unsystematic thought. To that extent, we do archaic link between the practice of theory
not limit our account to established traditions and the practice of diplomacy. Ancient Greek
theoria, as retrieved from the writings of When following a Judeo-Christian tra-

Herodotus and Plato, was the sacred embassy jectory, however, a different version of how
sent to consult the oracle as well as the ecu- faithfully to fulfil the diplomatic mission is in
menical embassy sent to see the world and operation. Based on the mytho-diplomacy
reflect on the doings, ideas and values of of the Fall from the grace of God, diplomatic
foreigners. That the name of these special missions reflect attempts at the horizontal
missions of problematization and sustained mediation of estrangement between earthly
reflection began to be employed by Socrates communities but also vertical mediation of
and his followers to designate the arduous estrangement between the human and the
activity of philosophical contemplation, of divine (Der Derian 1987). Medieval diplo-
knowing thyself and seeking to discover the matic thought based on Augustines magis-
true essence of beings, offers an interesting terial City of God, written in the fifth century
point of departure for diplomatic theory. It CE granted the Church mediating powers
suggests a complex entanglement between between the earthly cities and the heavenly
early theorizing and diplomatizing, the link- city. Within a sacralized cosmology, this in
ing of the incompleteness of human knowl- effect gave the Church not only spiritual but
edge with the ceaseless search and negotiation temporal diplomatic powers and established
of the foreign, the unknown and the unex- in Western Europe a hierarchical diplomatic
plained. From quite early on, diplomacy has system with the Pope at its head.
been as much about the negotiation of mean- In medieval and early Renaissance treatises
ing, value and knowledge as of the negotia- on the diplomatic office, topics like the socia-
tion of interests and positions (Constantinou bility, court behaviour, polymathy, oratorical
1996; see also Chapter 11 in this Handbook). and persuasive skills of diplomatic agents
Among classical, medieval and modern are extensively discussed (see Mattingly
thinkers of diplomacy, a key and recurring 1955, Queller 1967, Hampton 2009). A trait
issue has been the outlining of the necessary to which diplomatic theorists have also paid
conditions for fulfilling the diplomatic mis- attention is temperament and emotional intel-
sion. It includes the demarcation of the role ligence or, as Bernard du Rosier aptly put it,
of the diplomatic agent, delineating the skills the development of equanamitas, that is, tam-
and ethics of the ideal ambassador within ing ones emotions and cultivating a balanced
different diplomatic cultures. One of the ear- psychology. The enhancement of these quali-
liest exchanges on this subject is found in ties has been strongly linked to the evolution
the orations of Aeschines and Demosthenes of diplomatic civility and tact (Mastenbroek
on The False Embassy (Peri Parapresbeias), 1999).
which concerned legal charges pressed by the Another key focus of the diplomatic craft
latter on the former for his ambassadorial con- has been negotiation. Not only the conditions
duct in fourth-century BCE Athens, follow- for a successful negotiation but the ends of
ing a series of embassies to the Macedonians negotiation have been a major concern for
(Demosthenes 2000, Aeschines 2005). The philosophers and practitioners. Early on in
orations offer valuable insights on what con- ancient Rome, stoic philosophers, like Cicero
stituted a properly discharged embassy at and Seneca, re-conceptualized negotiation as
the time, outlining arguments and counter- something other than mere public business
arguments on the responsibility for ambassa- and/or bargaining of interests (Cicero 1913,
dorial reporting and policy advice; on faithfully Seneca 1932a, 1932b). For these philoso-
implementing the instructions of the polis; the phers, negotium was valorized as an occu-
appropriate conduct of the ambassador while pation that strived to benefit the extended
abroad and on taking responsibility for miss- community beyond the polis, and only if
ing opportunities as assessed post facto. that was not possible, then benefiting ones
Theoretical Perspectives in Diplomacy 15
limited community, if not possible, benefiting On the other side of the spectrum, however,
those who are nearest, and if not possible, then and especially when one realizes that diplo-
striving for the protection of private interests. macy is almost always not a one-off game
In short, negotiation as primarily or exclu- but an iterative business, one finds thinkers
sively a self-serving exercise was rejected by such as De Callires (1983) underscoring the
these philosophers (Constantinou 2006). importance of honesty in negotiation, cru-
In seventeenth-century Europe, Cardinal cial in developing long-term and sustainable
Richelieu has been the key thinker of continu- relationships with others and not simply con-
ous negotiation, elevated and valorized as an cerned with short-term gains or empire build-
end in itself, including during war and even ing. The complete reversal of Machiavellian
with no possible agreement in sight (Richelieu, strategy comes with thinkers like Mahatma
1965). The idea of continuous negotiation Gandhi (1997), where the means employed
underscored the importance of always retain- should always match the ends, projecting a
ing open channels of communication, so that more holisticspiritual approach in dealing
compromise and settlement could follow when with rivals irrespective of the means they
conditions allowed for them some time in the choose to use. While this re-integrates personal
future. This notion further highlighted the morality with public morality it also offers a
value of indirection or multi-directionality in different strategy in sync with the moral, phil-
diplomacy, the importance of negotiating for osophical and anti-colonial aspirations that
side effects. These sideway pursuits could those involved were professing at that time
occur not merely strategically or as a devious (see also Chapter 10 in this Handbook).
objective of negotiation, but as a pragmatic Raison dtat has been suggested to be
response when stalemates have been reached, the founding principle of modern diplo-
informing and reformulating unsustainable macy (Kissinger 1994). Conceived in
policy objectives and as a means of explor- early Renaissance Italy by thinkers such as
ing modi vivendi in the midst of protracted Guicciardini and Machiavelli, it legitimated
disagreement (Constantinou 2012; see also diplomatic action through policies and activi-
Chapter 17 in this Handbook). ties that promoted the status of the ruler, but
Philosopherspractitioners have reflected which progressively acquired an impersonal
on strategy, often depicted as a crucial ingre- legal quality and autonomous ethics. Yet, it is
dient of diplomacy that underscores the in the more sustained meditations of Cardinal
meansends method of getting ones way with Richelieu in seventeenth-century Europe that
others. In this regard, the importance of deceit raison dtat finds its fully-fledged appli-
and dissimulation, or less darkly of ambigu- cation; that is, in building alliances with
ity, has been highlighted by thinkers from Protestant states by reason of acting in the
Sun Tzu to Machiavelli. Crucially retrieved national interest of France rather than on the
from these strategic thinkers, although often basis of ideological and religious reasons
singularly and absolutely interpreted, has that should have supported contrary alliances
been the bypassing of restraining ethics or the with Catholic states.
development of a different ethics (i.e. public Beyond theorizations linked to statecraft
morality vs private morality) in determining a concerns, there have been humanist medita-
course of action. The prevalent motto in such tions among a number of diplomatic think-
diplomatic thinking is that the end always ers with regard to the ends of diplomacy in
justifies the means, which has worked as a early Renaissance Europe. These reflec-
moral license in diplomacy for lying abroad tions have been subsequently sidelined or
for ones country, for intrigue, coercion and co-opted in accounts of diplomatic thought
the use of force (see also Chapter 3 in this tied to statecraft. Whether to serve the peace
Handbook). or the prince and international order or
dynastical/patriotic interest were major call diplomacy is not, properly speaking,

concerns for writers like Ermolao Barbaro, diplomacy but something else, for example,
Etienne Dolet, Torquato Tasso, Gasparo foreign policy or statecraft. The claim is
Bragaccia and Alberico Gentili, often pre- interesting because, despite the efforts of its
sented as predicaments, not as settled posi- advocates over a period of nearly two dec-
tions (Hampton 2009, Constantinou 2013; ades, the study of diplomacy remains on the
see also Chapter 2 in this Handbook). margins of mainstream IR. It is also inter-
esting because some of the most innovative
and challenging work on diplomacy has been
Key Points undertaken not in any spirit of advocacy for
diplomacy as it is conventionally understood,
Early diplomatic encounters combined advocacy, but more from a fascination with the prob-
negotiation and problem-solving with missions
lems which diplomacy seeks to address or,
of reflection and problematization.
more properly, give cause for its existence.
The diverse means and ends of diplomacy have
been historically debated with regard to the nor- Nevertheless, the claim that diplomacy has
mative aspirations of diplomatic actors. been neglected may not be particularly impor-
In the modern era, raison dtat has predomi- tant. The question neglected by whom?
nantly linked diplomacy to statecraft, sidelining admits a range of possible answers American
its humanist legacy and promise. IR, leading academics, academics in general,
ordinary people which provide grounds for
valorizing or bypassing diplomacys perceived
neglect. It might be useful to note in this con-
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL text that most of the subfields of mainstream
RELATIONS IR are minor powers whose advocates voice
concerns about being undervalued by the rest
It is an article of faith among most scholars of the profession both as a natural disposition
of diplomacy that their chosen field and its and as a way to capture more resources, exert
subject are unjustly and unwisely neglected more influence and achieve more status.
by their mainstream IR colleagues (Cohen IR developed as a state-centric field
1998, Sharp 1999, Murray etal. 2011). This of inquiry, and very much remains one
is true up to a point, but it is true in a way today. States, their roles and their signifi-
which is complicated and interesting. The cance remain the axis around which inquiry
extent to which this issue is deemed impor- revolves. Even the descants and challenges
tant depends on how seriously one takes to their privileged position which are pro-
diplomacy to be an autonomous concept that liferating still seem to reinforce, rather than
can in itself offer valuable perspectives in undermine, this centrality. As a consequence,
understanding and explaining international diplomacy has been seen in mainstream IR
relations. as a state practice. It is assumed to exist, and
The claim of diplomacys neglect is only exist in the way that it does, because states
true up to a point because, as even a cur- and the modern system of sovereign terri-
sory glance at some of the major works in torial states exist. It is assumed to function
IR reveals, quite a lot of attention is devoted in accordance with the interests, priorities
to something called diplomacy (Morgenthau and concerns of these entities. In short, for
1967, Kissinger 1994, Avenhaus and most scholars the sovereign territorial state
Zartman 2007). The claim is complicated provides diplomacys raison dtre (see also
because when this is pointed out to students Chapter 21 in this Handbook).
of diplomacy, they tend to respond that So far so good; but what is diplomacy
what people like Morgenthau and Kissinger thought to be in mainstream IR? This is
where things become complicated. Often, (1967), for example, saw good or wise diplo-
especially in the United States (US), the term macy as the most realistically achievable way
is used as a synonym for foreign policy or of escaping the fate to which the national
international relations in general (James interests of states were otherwise propelling
1993). Its use for international relations in humankind death in the nuclear age.
general may be regarded as a holdover from a If we can accept that states, or their rep-
time in the history of the modern state system resentatives, very often approach matters of
when it was reasonable to claim that nearly all common concern simply by talking things
important international relations were under- through, then diplomacy may be seen as an
taken by professional diplomats representing instrument of foreign policy. One way of
sovereign states. It may also be regarded as getting what you want is by talking to other
evidence of people, and Americans in par- people. However, the claims in mainstream
ticular, using language loosely, although the IR that diplomacy can render foreign policy
argument has been made that in the latter more efficient, serve as a force multiplier or
case, treating diplomacy and international constitute a morally better way of conducting
relations as synonyms is rooted in a rejection international relations all pose problems for
of the idea that international relations ought the idea that diplomacy is simply one among
to be treated differently from other human several instruments of foreign policy. As soon
relations (Clinton 2012). In this view, the as states move from simply talking to com-
term diplomacy should not be used to desig- municating threats and promises about pun-
nate a privileged subset of either international ishments and rewards, then diplomacy moves
or human relations demanding to run to its from simply being an instrument of foreign
own codes and to be judged by its own moral policy to being a medium by which the possi-
standards. ble use of the other instruments is communi-
Similar arguments can be made for treat- cated. It may be important, indeed necessary,
ing diplomacy and foreign policy as syno- but it is no more interesting than the pro-
nyms (see also Chapter 5 in this Handbook). cesses by which the message gets delivered,
In addition, however, diplomacy is presented especially when compared to the things being
in mainstream IR as an instrument of foreign communicated (see further Chapter 6 in this
policy along with propaganda, economic Handbook).
rewards and punishments, and the threat Even as diplomacy is viewed as a medium
or use of force to crush or punish (Holsti by which the possible use of other foreign
1967). Morgenthau, in particular, presents policy instruments is communicated, how-
diplomacy as an undervalued instrument of ever, it acquires another and more com-
foreign policy and one which, if used prop- plex form of instrumentality. This becomes
erly, confers the advantages of a force mul- apparent as soon as it is acknowledged that
tiplier, and a morally significant one at that. diplomatic messages can be more or less
Good diplomacy enhances the more mate- effectively delivered, diplomatic conversa-
rial instruments of power allowing a state tions can be more or less effectively con-
to punch above its weight or achieve what ducted and diplomatic dmarches can be
it wants more cheaply. Bad diplomacy can more or less effectively undertaken. There is
result in a state using its other foreign policy more to getting what states want than simply
instruments unwisely and underperform- communicating it and what they are prepared
ing as a consequence. In addition, however, to do or give to get it. And when the idea of
good diplomacy is good because it is asso- diplomacy is imbued with the notion that it is
ciated with pursuing foreign policy objec- a particularly good way for states to get what
tives peacefully and taking a bigger picture they want because it is generally cheaper
view of what needs to be done. Morgenthau than the alternatives and peaceful, then this
raises the question of for whom and for what better understood. A number of reasons for
purposes diplomacy may be regarded as an why diplomacy has been depreciated and
instrument. If monopolized by statecraft, it devalorized have been put forward. The rise
thus raises questions of representation and of IR, it is sometimes argued, coincided with
inclusiveness as well as of substate and trans- a period of international history in which
national interests. strategic issues were to the fore, an anti-
Mainstream IR has not been interested diplomacy superpower performed the role
in considering, let alone resolving, these of hegemon and structural factors appeared
puzzles about whether diplomacy should be to rule over agency in making things happen
viewed as an instrument (and if so whose (Der Derian 1987, Lee and Hudson 2004,
instrument and for what purposes), a medium Wiseman 2012). By the turn of the twenty-
(and if so why and when a virtuous one), or first century it was suggested changes in
a combination of both. Instead, it has simply structure whether of a transformational or
treated them as aspects of other issues, leav- balance of power kind were re-opening
ing its understanding of diplomacy compart- the door to agency and therefore to a revival
mentalized to the point of being fragmented of diplomacy (see also Chapter 7 in this
and incoherent. Thus diplomacy, viewed sim- Handbook). These changes may be occurring,
ply as the way a state talks to other states, but they have not been matched by a rise of
has been presented as not only unimportant interest in diplomacy in mainstream IR.
but in its traditional form as a way of com- Those who are the most closely interested
municating through resident embassies and in traditional state-based diplomacy take
foreign ministries as in decline (Fulton two different tacks in explaining this lack of
1998). Diplomacy as a way of enhancing (or interest. First, they hold on to the old argu-
inhibiting) the effectiveness of other foreign ment that diplomacy is necessarily an eso-
policy instruments has been treated as state- teric business beyond the understanding of
craft the preserve of the great statesman or most people and incapable of arousing their
stateswoman especially during crises (George sympathetic interest (Berridge 1995). This
1991) as a not particularly distinctive type is sometimes accompanied by the corol-
of bargaining and negotiation (Crocker etal. lary of little respect for other IR academics.
1999), and as a similarly undistinctive type of Compare, for example, what is covered and
organizational and network activity (Hocking attracts attention and what is ignored on the
etal. 2012). Finally, diplomacy viewed as a programme of a mainstream IR academic
good way of handling international relations conference like the annual ISA Convention
has been treated as a subfield of the ethics of with what a Foreign Ministry, a bar of foreign
international and human conduct in general, correspondents or ordinary people on a bus
as a component of international institution- would list as pressing international issues.
building and as a practice being superseded Under pressure, however, diplomacys more
and displaced by the emergence of global traditional advocates sometimes retreat into
governance and public diplomacy conducted maintaining that diplomacy is simply the IR
by the representatives of an emerging civil equivalent of Public Administration a worthy,
society (Seib 2009). but not particularly exciting, subfield about
The response of those interested in which it is important to know something and
diplomacy to mainstream IRs fragmented which happens to interest them (Berridge
understanding has been uncertain. On the 1995, Rana 2000).
whole, it has mirrored that fragmentation This modest position on diplomacy
rather than made a coherent and appealing is plausible but not convincing. Most
case for their shared view that diplomacy students of diplomacy maintain that it is
is interesting, important and needs to be interesting because it is important and
that this importance makes its neglect by them with restraint so that they would not
mainstream IR a source of concern. Why do damage the international system or society
they think it is important? In part they tap as a whole which made their existence and
into the sense that members of professions actions possible (Butterfield 1966, Sharp
and trade unions have of their being at the 2003).
centre of things. Whether it is the operating There are at least two problems with this
table, the classroom, the law court or the conception of diplomats acting as guardians
coal face, they are all liable to claim that of the international system and handlers
their particular site is where the real action of their respective sovereigns to that end.
takes place and the real work gets done. The The first is that it is possible to obtain only
diplomatic system of embassies, consulates, glimpses of them as system guardians and
ministries and international organizations state handlers while we see a great deal of
is thus the engine room of international them as state instruments. The diplomats
relations (Cohen 1998; see also Chapter themselves can occasionally be spotted
12 and 13 in this Handbook). This may be praising one of their number for restraining
a professional conceit, but it is backed by or subverting the wishes of his or her own
a body of literature on diplomacy which political masters for a bigger interest or
stresses its role, not as one of the instruments value. And once in a while we get the sense
of foreign policy, but as a practice which that a group of diplomats have taken it upon
constitutes, reproduces, maintains and themselves to act in this way to prevent
transforms international systems and world matters getting out of hand. When pressed
orders (Sending etal. 2011, 2015). to acknowledge this sort of activity directly,
This body of literature has a long pedigree, however, a diplomat will become uneasy and
reaching back in Europe, at least, to the late for the record quickly fall back on versions of
Medieval debates referenced above about Barbaros famous formulation, namely that a
how ministers (ambassadors) should strike diplomats duty is to do, say, advise and think
the right balance between their obligations to whatever may best serve the preservation and
their respective Princes and to Peace. Thus, aggrandizement of his own state (Mattingly
preserving the peace of Christendom was 1955).
argued to take priority over the interests of The second problem with the broad con-
Princes when these two conflicted, and it was ception of what diplomats do, or think they
this which provided the functions of ministers are doing, is the general claim that, for a
with their sacred quality. This broader host of technical, social and political rea-
conception of the duties of diplomats and the sons, whatever they are doing is becoming
functions of diplomacy was further elaborated less important for understanding what people
in the eighteenth century by references to want to know about international relations.
a diplomatic body or corps diplomatique Diplomats may work quietly as the guardians
constituted by all the diplomats in a capital of the international society of states and oth-
and their shared interest in knowing what ers as they understand this to be. However,
was going on (Pecquet 2004 [1737] (see this may amount to no more than saying that,
also Chapter 14 in this Handbook). In the like the secret order in a Dan Brown novel,
twentieth century this emerging collective they are working on behalf of a conception of
professional consciousness was captured by things in which hardly anybody else has any
the distinction between the demands made on interest. The more traditional approaches to
diplomats by la raison dtat and la raison the study of diplomacy in mainstream IR have
de systme (Watson 1983). Good diplomats no effective response to this criticism. To find
would recognize that the wider interests of that, one has to look at other approaches to
their states were best served by pursuing the study of international relations.
Key Points literature and the arts, critical IR theorists

draw attention to the problems with mak-
Within the IR discipline, diplomacy has often
ing such an assumption. It is impossible to
been understood and studied synonymously with
make true or false claims about what diplo-
foreign policy, state communication and interna-
tional relations. macy really is, only from what people say it
Diplomacy has been approached as an instru- is and how they use the term. If this is so, then
ment or medium of statecraft raising practical attempts to define diplomacy objectively are,
and normative questions about representation, in effect, attempts to define it authoritatively
inclusiveness and purpose. which, intentionally or not, exclude, margin-
Beyond statecraft pursuits, diplomacy has been alize or suppress other uses of the term as
theorized as a practice that produces, secures well as alternative practices and cultures of
and transforms international systems and world diplomacy. Critical theorists argue that how
orders. people talk about and practise diplomacy
often differently in different times, places and
circumstances should be explored. Histories
of the way the term has come into being and is
DIPLOMATIC THEORY AND used among technocrats but also in popular
CRITICAL IR culture and imagination should be traced.
Changes in the way its practice is used to
In particular, it is useful to look at those IR help constitute the world of international
approaches which style themselves, or are relations whether it would be colonial or
presented, as post-modernist, post-structuralist, postcolonial, statecentric or pluralist, and so
post-colonialist and post-positivist (hereafter on should be identified. And theorists them-
all identified as critical approaches to diplo- selves should self-consciously use, stretch
macy to distinguish them from mainstream and transgress the term to explore possibili-
ones). The divide between mainstream and ties for making helpful, empowering, and
critical is intentionally overdrawn to clarify transformational interventions of their own in
patterns of inquiry. Most mainstream IR, political life (Der Derian 1987, Constantinou
viewed from a critical standpoint, assumes 1996, Constantinou and Der Derian 2010,
the existence of an objective, observable Cornago 2013).
world which is produced by law-governed While diplomacy has enjoyed the status
processes of cause and effect. Problems of of a backwater in mainstream IR, it is nota-
context and perception may make it hard to ble how critical theorists have been drawn
access this world in a way that is agreeable to into the backwater by the current. They
all, and some phenomena of interest within it have so for a variety of different reasons.
may have less independent existence than Critical theorists often, although not always,
others. Nevertheless, a mainstream consen- are interested in the way understandings of
sus exists that the effort to access this real international relations may be ordered in
world and explain its patterns is possible the interests of constellations of wealth and
and worth making. Thus, it is assumed we power. Diplomacy and diplomats, both con-
can identify and observe something which ventionally understood, are easily presented
everyone, or at least reasonable people, will as obvious manifestations, guardians and
agree is diplomacy, then take it as a given, perpetuators of the separations and aliena-
examine how it works, and make an assess- tions (ethnic, racial, colonial, gender and so
ment of its place and significance in the on) upon which those orders of wealth and
overall scheme of things. power are seen to depend (Der Derian 1987,
Drawing on a variety of sources in phi- Opondo 2010, Neumann 2012a). To be sure,
losophy, psychology, sociology, linguistics, diplomacy employs wealth and power to
achieve ends, but it is also less pronounced entrenched and unchanging, same old char-
yet rather revealingly a site for the deploy- acterizations of the same old melodramas
ment of truth claims and identity games, that of international relations. While critical inter-
is, a site for exercising knowledge as power national theorists interested in diplomacy
and power as knowledge. share this insight, however, they put it to dif-
In addition, the practice of diplomacy is ferent uses. Some approaches, for example,
identified as providing us with one of the offer detailed accounts of how phenomena as
more obvious glimpses of what critical theo- varied as the naming of street signs, the ensu-
rists want to tell us the rest of life in society ing political arguments and the commentaries
is like. Diplomats are explicitly engaged in of experts and diplomats on the whole pro-
creating and maintaining the ambiguous and cess help constitute international narratives,
shifting identities of the states and other enti- while revealing their gaps, concealments
ties which they are employed to represent and contradictions at the same time (Der
(Sharp 1999). They are also engaged in con- Derian 2012). Some approaches study con-
stituting international systems through the ventional anomalies non-state actors with
performance of their roles. Often, top-down well-established diplomatic standing, for
diplomatic practice is not as autonomous example to demonstrate how the diplomatic
as it seems; it is revised and complemented system is more open, and hence amenable to
by local practices and discourses (Neumann change, than it is conventionally presented
2002, 2012b). This performative aspect of (Btora and Hynek 2014 ). Some approaches
the diplomatic vocation is quite revealing. demonstrate how apparent breakdowns
Sometimes diplomats actually tell us this is are managed in such a way as to deepen
what they are doing (though often after the and consolidate the arrangements to which
fact in memoirs), and they reflect on the sort they are a response (Adler-Nissen 2015).
of disposition which is required to do it effec- Others retrieve the non-Eurocentric origins of
tively. Yet by observing the diplomats we diplomacy, engaging, for example, ancient
obtain the insight that the rest of social life classics like the Mahabharata to illustrate
is not so very different from diplomacy and how putatively mythical principles of nego-
that the lives of all human beings, particularly tiating a unified cosmos offered valuable
in their social and public aspect, are not so diplomatic principles before, during and after
very different from the professional lives of the colonization of India (Datta-Ray 2015).
diplomats. In other words, we can appreci- Still others point to the need to reject the con-
ate that diplomacy is not merely an inherited sensus and embrace the diplomatic dissen-
courtly profession but actually is all around sus, that is, the need to broaden and change
us, not a mere practice of trained initiates popular perception of what is sensible, to
but an everyday vocation and mode of living appreciate the dark sides of diplomatic agree-
(Constantinou 2013 and 2016). We also learn ment and conviviality, and their effects on
that the fragmented, incoherent, but mainly the less powerful, the unrepresented and the
unfocused accounts of diplomacy provided dispossessed (Opondo 2012; see also Chapter
by mainstream IR are not weaknesses. They 3 in this Handbook). Finally, others draw on
are clues that something very interesting an ethics of inclusiveness and prudence with
might be going on that needs to be investi- regard to diplomatic conduct as a way of
gated and accounted for (Constantinou 1996, recalibrating diplomacy (Cooper etal. 2008,
Sharp 2009, Cornago 2013, Holmes 2013). Bjola and Kornprobst 2013).
With this insight, the diplomatic backwa- Sociological approaches identify the gaps
ter becomes a wider space promising escape which exist between the actual practice of
from mainstream IR and its artificially diplomats in the day-to-day and the accounts
fixed channels with their contending, but which mainstream IR observers and the
diplomats themselves provide of what is sup- of international practice and theory. What
posed to be going on (Sending et al. 2011, is clear is that, in borrowing from outside
2015). Practice approaches are not neces- the discipline of mainstream IR, students of
sarily all critical, however. Some are more diplomacy have benefitted from and, in turn,
rooted in legal traditions, seeking to iden- contributed to long traditions of speculation
tify the authoritatively specified goals and about diplomacy which exist in other fields.
explicit principles of conduct for diplomacy
by which undertakings of it may be evalu-
ated (see also Chapter 15 in this Handbook). Key Points
However, they do so not to define diplomacy
and its functions authoritatively, but to dis- Critical perspectives in diplomacy have chal-
lenged dominant accounts of what diplomacy is
cover these principles, explicate them and
or ought to be.
explore their implications (Navari 2010). Most of these approaches seek to expose the
Some approaches seek to uncover specifi- ethical and power implications of different prac-
cally diplomatic elements in the conduct of tices of diplomacy, and specifically the margin-
international relations and human relations alizations, hierarchies, exclusions and alienations
generally. They seek to capture the views, that these practices consciously or unconsciously
priorities and assumptions of those who find produce.
themselves situated between, and charged Some of these approaches are sympathetic to
with managing the relations of, human groups diplomacy as a practice for managing a world
which wish to remain separate from one composed of agents equipped with positivist
another (Sharp 2009, Bjola and Kornprobst and universal, yet competing, understandings of
this world.
2013). Still others recover the lost, forgotten
Critical approaches have helped to bring the
and ignored origins of terms like diplomacy, field of diplomatic studies into conversation
embassy and theory to create openings for with other fields of IR and underscored the
more imaginative and creative explorations significance of opening up diplomacy to scholarly
of what it might mean to be a diplomat and developments beyond the discipline.
do diplomacy (Constantinou 1996).
There has been an expansion of interest in
critical approaches to theorizing diplomacy.
They are more than well-represented in the DIPLOMACY BEYOND THE IR
recent publications in what Neumann has DISCIPLINE
called the rapid professionalization of diplo-
macy studies (Btora and Hynek 2014). Two Diplomacy has also been theorized outside
established book series in diplomatic studies the IR discipline. Even though such works
have recently been joined by two new ones, have not intensely or deeply engaged the
plus another series devoted to public diplo- concept of diplomacy per se, they have
macy. The only journal devoted exclusively broadly conceived and applied it. At the same
to the study of diplomacy has just completed time they have imported standard or alterna-
its first decade and journals focused on pub- tive definitions of diplomacy into their
lic diplomacy and business diplomacy have research. Their theoretical contributions,
appeared. Nevertheless, the impact of all though tangential, as far as mainstream IR is
these diplomatic studies on the citadels of concerned, are nonetheless important; spe-
mainstream IR, especially in the US, remains cifically in the way they extend the scope and
unclear. Equally unclear, however, is the understanding of diplomatic practice with
extent to which capturing these citadels, or regard to a multiplicity of actors beyond
even only breaching their walls, matters in states but also with regard to conflict resolu-
an increasingly plural and horizontal world tion or transformation, reconciliation and
peace-building, dialogue of civilizations, rituals, marriage settlements, breast-feeding

place-branding or communication strategy, across rival communities, and so on, have
and so on. been seen to constitute overt or subtle ways
For example, there have been attempts of extending kinship and commonality, and of
to bring together diplomatic and religious mediating otherness. More recently, Richard
studies, thus engendering a theological and Sennett (2012) has employed the term eve-
spiritual dimension into the theory of diplo- ryday diplomacy in the context of discussing
macy. Already within IR there have been togetherness and to refer to the daily activi-
commendable attempts to revive diplomacy, ties and tactics that people use in order to
through the Christian notions of care, char- cooperate in the midst of conflict and rivalry.
ity and self-sacrifice (Butterfield 1954) or Specifically, Sennett highlights the tact and
through the Islamic notions of truth, justice indirection, the coded gestures, but also the
and extensions of community, as contrasted empathetic talk, dialogic conversations and
to cunning and guile, coercion and national performances that create conditions of collab-
interest (Igbal 1975). In some other writings, orative togetherness in everyday encounters.
religion has been suggested as the miss- Interesting contributions from within
ing dimension of statecraft or faith-based geography have highlighted the legiti-
diplomacy promoted as a means of trump- mizing strategies of unofficial diploma-
ing realpolitik (Johnston and Sampson cies (McConnell et al. 2012). Focusing on
1994, Johnston 2003). Also within the con- actors that imitate state diplomacy, such as
text of new age spirituality, the pursuit of governments-in-exile and micropatrias (self-
world diplomacy has been suggested as a declared parodic nations), the authors exam-
means of approaching holistically the com- ine how diplomacy is used mimetically in
mon good of all humanity, promoting global order for these actors to make interventions
rather than national interests and by doing and gain degrees of recognition and legiti-
so seeking to get in touch with the divine macy in the international system. Others
unity of the world (Sidy 1992). An espe- have looked at the bureaucratic production of
cially interesting eco-religious dimension knowledge, authority and expertise in supra-
has been proposed by David Wellman in pur- national diplomatic services (Kuus 2013).
suit of a sustainable diplomacy (2004). He From within pedagogy, it has been suggested
specifically identifies common Christian and (Richardson 2012) that multicultural educa-
Islamic precepts that help people to relate tion should be reconsidered as a diplomatic
more constructively to each other and their activity; specifically in the way it is supposed
environment, but also to bring about conflict- to enhance a diplomatic sensibility; not only
transformation and awareness of structural in the sense of teachers as representatives
violence; in the end producing a sustainable of their institutions but also as negotiators of
diplomacy that supports empathetic encoun- the differences of minoritized communities.
ters and self-critique. This has been argued as a way of fostering
Works in anthropology and sociology culturally responsive pedagogy as cultural
have brought diplomacy down from the level diplomacy, to counter-balance state-centred
of high politics and reconnected it to prac- cultural diplomacy that simply brands a token
tices of everyday life. One key early work multiculturalism. The theory of the living
has been Ragnar Numelins The Beginnings systems has also been employed to high-
of Diplomacy (1950), which has provided light the interrelatedness, non-linearity and
a plethora of illustrations of pre- and non- uncertainty of the world system, something
state diplomatic activities among tribes that renders problematic the exact calculation
and groups in non-western societies. Gift- of interests, the obsession with winning and
exchange, participating in common religious losing as well as the strict determination of
causal links and final effects in diplomatic In this regard, the Actor Network Theory
practice (Gunaratne 2005). of Bruno Latour (2005), suggesting that we
Volkans work (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) need to move beyond subjects and review
has sought to explore the entanglements of objects as non-human agents, can be use-
diplomacy and psychoanalysis: specifically ful with regard to diplomacy, especially his
the shift from individual to large group iden- proposition concerning the ability of objects
tities, and from small ego to large ego for- to act as mediators and intermediaries in
mations; the unconscious links between the different contexts: intermediaries being mere
nation, natality and the mother figure which carriers of power and knowledge, whereas
creates specific emotional attachments; the mediators having transformative ability, mul-
association of the leader and his policies with tiplying difference and supporting the recon-
the authority of the father, whose decisions stitution of subjectivity (Latour 2005). In his
may be challenged but ultimately sublimated latest major work, Latour suggests that the
at critical moments and followed due to current ecological crisis and the recognition
family loyalty; the constant use of others as of different modes of existence demand an
reservoirs for the projection of the negative entrusting to the tribulations of diplomacy.
aspects of ones identity. Overall, Volkans That is to say, resolving conflicts over value
work has outlined how diverse and recurring and ways of being in the world requires the
diplomatic activity can be better informed emulation of diplomatic agency; i.e. dip-
through introspective examinations into the lomats who are not just advocates of the
individual and collective unconscious. principles and interests of their masters but
Finally, works on ethnology and art his- directly interested in formulating other ver-
tory have sensitized diplomatic studies as sions of their [masters] ideals (Latour 2013:
to the value and role of diplomatic objects. 4834).
Kreamer and Fee (2002) have suggested that Negotiating what presents as real, refor-
we see diplomatic objects as envoys them- mulating what appears as ideal and, perhaps
selves, with the high symbolic value that above all, acknowledging that we are doing
specific objects, such as textiles or body arte- neither more nor less than this may be an apt
facts, might engender in particular cultures. principle of diplomatic method. If and when
This is something that is commonly missed applied, it may indeed help to constructively
in non-visual, language-centric approaches to engage the plethora of complex problems
diplomacy. Moreover, the work of Kreamer in contemporary global society as long as it
and Fee illustrates how the value of such dip- does not become a licence and caricature for
lomatic objects is transformed through ritual cynically prioritizing interests and discount-
and exchange (2002: 22). In McLaughlin ing aspirations. It may also serve as a final
et al.s Arts of Diplomacy (2003), we get point of reflection upon which to finish our
a fascinating glimpse of how diplomatic theoretical tour of diplomacy.
objects were instrumentalized in the encoun-
ters between US government emissaries and
Native Americans, but also how such objects Key Points
currently figure in the remembrance and com-
New theoretical perspectives in diplomacy have
memoration of these lost communities. This
been provided from within disciplines beyond
gives them a different functional value today, IR, such as sociology, anthropology, psychology,
serving as transhistorical envoys, supporting theology, philosophy and cultural studies as well
the mediation of contemporary estrangement as from within cross-disciplinary perspectives.
between settler and native communities in Such studies support the need for a more plural
the United States (see also Chapter 9 in this understanding and broadly conceived notion of
Handbook). diplomacy.
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2
A Conceptual History
of Diplomacy
Halvard Leira1
INTRODUCTION emergence of diplomacy was part of a much

larger shift in political languages, replacing
Scholars of diplomacy have identified diplo- the understandings of absolutism with the new
matic practices across the human experience, understandings of the Enlightenment. What
spanning the globe and going back before we today refer to as diplomacy was, accord-
recorded history. Even so, the actual term ing to this understanding, born out of (Western)
diplomacy did not enter into usage until the revolution and enlightenment. Drawing on a
last decade of the eighteenth century.2 Does relatively modest secondary literature, as well
this discrepancy matter, and if so, what can it as a number of primary sources, I will thus
tell us? These are the underlying questions of emphasise the relative modernity of the con-
this chapter. The position taken here is that the cept of diplomacy, and how it emerged very
emergence of the specific concept is cru- rapidly as part of a much wider transformation
cial to our understanding of diplomacy. of political vocabularies around 1800.
Transhistorical reference to diplomatic prac- Furthermore, I will stress how it emerged as a
tice obscures the very distinct historical speci- contested concept (almost a term of abuse),
ficity of what we today refer to as diplomacy. and how it has repeatedly been contested over
The advent of the concept marked not only the the last two centuries. Where diplomacy was
drawing together of a number of what had for a long time viewed with strong suspicion,
been perceived as political activities of and even for its multiplicity of meanings, pre-
princes and their representatives and named dominantly associated with the state, over
them collectively as the business of interaction recent decades more positive connotations
between polities, it also happened as the cul- have been associated with the concept, and it
mination of a long process of critique against has been stretched to cover ever more
the very same practices. Furthermore, the phenomena.
A Conceptual History of Diplomacy 29
I make my argument in four steps. First I conceptual baggage to times when it is not
present the usefulness of conceptual history, warranted, insisting that concepts attain mean-
and the notion of conceptual change, which ing from their usage in specific historical
underlies this chapter. Then follows a longer contexts; thus one must study not only the
discussion about the emergence of diplo- meaning of concepts, but also how they are
macy, subdivided into sections dealing with put to work. Conceptual histories start from a
conceptual change in related concepts, the conviction that concepts are not simply tags
etymology of diplomacy and how diplomacy for fixed phenomena, but in and of themselves
emerged as the negatively loaded term set to tools or weapons in political struggle.
cover all that which radicals towards the end In the discipline of International Relations,
of the eighteenth century disliked about the conceptual history under that name has been
executive prerogative over external affairs. largely associated with the works of Quentin
The ensuing section covers the repeated chal- Skinner and the Cambridge School, while
lenges from new diplomacy, and how diplo- studies inspired by Michel Foucault have
macy has become a more positively loaded touched some of the same ground. For the pur-
term in recent decades. A brief conclusion pose of this chapter, some basic insights from
wraps up the chapter. the German school of conceptual history, asso-
ciated in particular with Reinhart Koselleck
(1985, 1988), will be utilised; namely the
notion of concepts as inherently ambiguous,
CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND and the overarching claim that the period from
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 1750 to 1850 witnessed a radical transforma-
tion of political language during the transition
When writing a regular history of diplomacy from the early modern time to modernity. Let
(like Black 2010), discussing the diplomacy us briefly discuss them in reverse order.
of some historical epoch or polity or present- First, the notion of a transformation of polit-
ing definitions or even the essence of diplo- ical language, of conceptual change, is tied to
macy (Jnsson and Hall 2005), writers work the enlightenment and the age of revolutions,
with some more or less abstracted or ideal- with emphasis on changes in established con-
typical notion of diplomatic practices and/or cepts as well as the emergence of completely
diplomatic institutions, and explore these in new concepts. Key to Koselleck is how this
their given context. Focus is on the signified, period witnessed what we can call the histori-
on the perceived content of diplomacy, and cising of history; for the first time history was
although long periods of time might be conceptualised not as a field of recurrence,
covered, the underlying theme is one of
but as inherently open-ended. What had come
stability diplomacy is recognisable across before needed not determine what was to
time and space. In contrast, a conceptual his- come. This was a radical departure, enabling
tory of diplomacy asks when and for what many of the other conceptual innovations of
purpose the concept diplomacy emerged, the period simply by breaking the bonds of
and what it has implied across time. Focus is recurrence. For our purpose, with diplomacy
on the signifier, on the meaning of the term emerging around 1790, this conceptualisation
diplomacy, and the underlying theme is one of general conceptual change seems pertinent.
of change diplomacy is expected to change Diplomacy emerged mainly as a negative
across time and space. The reasons for a con- description by non-diplomats, and almost
ceptual focus are many. At a basic level, one from the outset, the evils of old diplomacy
seeks to avoid explicit anachronistic usage; were contrasted with the new diplomacy,
the reading of the past in terms of the present. ideally without diplomats. Second, the differ-
More importantly one desires not to add ence between words and concepts, according
to Koselleck, lies in the surplus-meaning as a forerunner of diplomacy. When diplo-

of concepts. Following from Nietzsche, he macy entered the political vocabulary, it built
argues that concepts can never be fully pinned on existing terms and practices, but it gave a
down, that there is always some ambiguity new name to something which had not been
involved. This fits the current usage of diplo- collectively named until then. Terms such as
macy, which can refer to the practice of dip- negotiations (a staple of the widely read
lomats, in particular negotiations, but also to texts of e.g. Wicquefort and Callires) and
skill in the conduct of international relations. politics (as when the first school for future
It is also used as a synonym for foreign policy ministers in France, established in 1712, was
writ large, and as shorthand for both tact and called LAcadmie Politique) cover some of
finesse and a life of champagne, canaps and the same ground, and a number of specialised
receptions (Berridge and James 2001). The titles (such as ambassador, minister, envoy
multiplicity of meaning is evident also in the etc.) existed for the practitioners, but the
etymological development of diplomacy, totality of practice had not before been named.
and in the history of related concepts (see also Even so, some attention must be paid to poli-
Chapter 1 in this Handbook). tics and foreign policy, as the domain of the
unnamed group of princely representatives.
Key Points
Politics and foreign policy
A conceptual history of diplomacy treats diplo-
macy as a contingent phenomenon. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
Understanding diplomacy as a concept implies tury, ambassadors and envoys were clearly
acceptance of ambiguity and a surplus of meaning. seen as engaged in politics. Koselleck (1988)
suggests that absolutism rested on a concep-
tual dichotomy where the state monopolised
DIPLOMACY AND RELATED TERMS politics, leaving morality to the subjects.
Viroli (1992) and Palonen (2006) provide
more detailed readings of the conceptual
General, as well as etymological, dictionar-
history of politics and related concepts, sug-
ies pin the emergence of diplomacy to the
gesting that with the coming of reason of state,
last quarter of the eighteenth century, with
politics was no longer the most powerful
diplomatic, albeit largely with connotations
means of fighting oppression and corruption
which differ from the ones of the twenty-first
but the art of perpetuating them (Viroli 1992:
century, emerging some decades before.
477). Politics was also considered a whole,
Constantinou (1996: 78) argues that during
covering all forms of governance, from the
the medieval period,
household to relations between princes. Thus,
there was no single term that conveyed the the first sentence of the entry for politique in
themes of diplomacy in terms of statecraft, depu- the great encyclopaedia of Diderot and
tation, negotiation, foreign policy, tact, and so on, DAlembert, published in 1765, reads: La
nor was there a word that could be simply used as
philosophie politique est celle qui enseigne
a substitute for the term diplomacy without any
supplementary political associations and meaning. aux hommes se conduire avec prudence, soit
la tte dun tat, soit la tte dune famille
Although words with diploma as the root (Diderot and dAlembert 2013).3 Around the
started being used in the late medieval age, middle of the eighteenth century, a beginning
Constantinous assessment could easily be differentiation can nevertheless be discerned
stretched well into the eighteenth century. in English usage, as when Dr Johnson (1768)
Moreover, there never emerged any concept defined policy as: 1. The art of government,
chiefly with respect to foreign powers. 2. Art; commented upon under the collective term
prudence; management of affairs; stratagem. diplomatica (such as in Mabillons De Re
The association of politics and policy with Diplomatica from 1681), which was also
matters relating to other powers was neverthe- used as a term for the science of establishing
less not complete; it would be more precise to the legitimacy of such documents.4 Since
argue that politics was in the process of being diplomas were regularly dealing with privi-
reconstituted as a sphere, a move which leges relating to other polities, it was but a
allowed for a specialised (and in principle small step to consider collections of treaties
spatialised) term like foreign policy to between princes in the same way, and in
emerge, which it did for the first time around 1693 Leibniz published Codex Juris Gentium
1730 in England, and some decades later in Diplomaticus and in 1726 Dumont Corps
France (Leira 2011). Thus, when the radical Universel Diplomatique du Droit de Gens.
enlightenment thinkers opposed the politics of These were collections both of treaties and
the absolutist states, they could direct their fire other official documents, but around this
both against politics in the wider sense and time corps diplomatique seems to have signi-
against foreign policy more specifically fied the corpus of texts defining international
(Gilbert 1951). But while ambassadors were law in practice (corps du droit des gens).
attacked as practitioners of politics, they were How the concept expanded to cover not
not yet named as a wider collective. only the total body of treaties, but also the total
body of those engaged in negotiating such
treaties, is unclear. What is clear is that, from
around the middle of the eighteenth century,
The etymology of diplomacy
corps diplomatique was also used to cover
The etymology of diplomacy is well known the totality of ministers accredited to one spe-
and referenced in etymological dictionaries, cific court. Pecquet (1737: 134) presents an
the OED and in a little more elaborated form understanding of the phenomenon, but with-
in Satow (1922: 23). A much richer, schol- out naming it, referring to it as Le Corps des
arly account is provided by Constantinou Ministres dans un Pas. Ranke (183336:
(1996: 7689). Very briefly, the term comes 724, note 1) dates the term to Vienna in the
from ancient Greek, where it was used as a mid-1750s, but without anything but anec-
verb (diploo) to designate double folding dotal evidence, and again referring to the
(diploun), and as a noun (diploma) to denote notion of a community, rather than the actual
official documents which were folded, and concept. A decade later, corps diplomatique
which gave the bearer a specific set of rights. was repeatedly used in Chevalier dons
Originally, diplomas functioned as some- (1764) published letters, in the sense of the
thing resembling modern passports, but grad- collective of ministers. The concept was also
ually, through the medieval era, the term was reiterated in original and translated form (as
used about any sort of document granting the diplomatic body) in English commen-
privileges. By the Renaissance, diploma was taries (and commentaries on commentaries)
used as the term for papal letters of appoint- the same year (Smollett 1764: 177).
ment, with the associated term diplomatarius Even so, usage was not consistent, and the
used to designate the clerk writing these reference to documents more common than
diplomas (Constantinou 1996: 78). Towards the reference to practitioners. In French dic-
the end of the seventeenth century, and par- tionaries, diplomatique can first be found
ticularly in the beginning of the eighteenth in the fourth edition of the Dictionnaire de
century, yet another usage emerged. Older lAcadmie Franaise (1762), but here only
letters of privilege (diploma) were being in the sense of the art of recognising true
scrutinised for authenticity, and collected and from false diplomas. This was also the case
in the great encyclopaedia, where the article early usage of the term by Burke (1796: 121,
on diplome & diplomatique (from 1754) note), who, in one of the first usages of the
deals solely with official documents and the concept in English, praised Louis XVI for
art and science of knowing true documents doing what he could to destroy the double
from false and interpreting their content diplomacy of France, that is, referring to the
(Diderot and dAlembert 2013). In the fifth parallel accreditations to the same ruler, with
edition of the Dictionnaire, from 1798, there opposing instructions, and their duplicitous
has been added a second meaning, where le practices thereon.
corps diplomatique is defined as a collec- To this we should add the following: being
tive term for the foreign ministers residing derived from the study of treaties, diplo-
in any one power. Turning to the 30-volume matic was strongly connected to issues of
Dictionnaire universel des sciences morale, alliance, war and peace (as these were the
conomique, politique et diplomatique; ou issues typically covered by treaties), and to the
Bibliotheque de lhomme-dtat et du citoyen, secrecy with which these treaties were most
published from 1776 and onwards, where dip- often associated. Furthermore, by its connec-
lomatic science is promised in the very title, tion with diploma, the term also had a strong
the results are similar.5 Corps diplomatique affinity with privilege. This affinity was made
was used intermittently, in the sense of a col- even stronger by the usage of diplomatic
lection of treaties and reports, and the science corps to designate the collective of ministers,
of diplomacy is related to the knowledge of a collective which was increasingly claiming
such treaties. None of diplomate, diploma- (and being accorded) a number of privileges
tie nor diplomatique were index words. (Anderson 1993: 54), and which was largely
constituted by the nobility, the foremost car-
riers of privilege. In sum, the term conveyed
specialisation, duplicity, secrecy, privilege
The emergence of diplomacy
and a fixation on war and alliance (see also
Etymological dictionaries provide a little Gilbert 1951, Frey and Frey 1993). From the
more insight, suggesting that diplomate and perspective of a broader conceptual history, it
diplomatie were derived from diploma- covered a number of the terms on the wrong
tique, on the pattern of aristocratique aris- side of the dualistic enlightenment scorecard
tocrate aristocratie (v. Wartburg 1934: 83).6 (Koselleck 1988), terms associated with poli-
From at least the 1770s, diplomatique was tics rather than morals (see also Chapter 10 in
used to describe the practice of envoys, as this Handbook).
when Linguet (1777: 383) discussed intrigues The association with the ways of the past
diplomatiques. The associated words diplo- was underscored in what would prove to be a
mate and diplomatie, dealing with interstate decisive conceptual break, the establishment
practice rather than documents, have their of the comit diplomatique of the French
origin in the revolutionary period (Imbs 1979). constitutional assembly in 1790 (on this, see
In the 1780s, diplomatique/diplomatic Martin 2012a). Tellingly, the first suggestion
was thus in a process of gradual change, of such a committee mentioned un comit
but still with multiple layers of meaning. politique, a committee dedicated to what we
As Constantinou (1996: 838) argues, the discussed above as the external component
connection with written diplomas suggests of politics, and not diplomacy. However,
a connection between a form of specialised naming was soon to change. There are a few
handicraft and statecraft, and the roots in the examples of diplomatique having been used
accrediting authority of diplomas and their to designate something other than documen-
(in)authenticity suggest a capacity for duplic- tary study before that date, but the establish-
ity, a capacity which was underscored in an ment of this committee brought together the
practical question of checking the existing later, changes in usage had worked their way
treaties of the old regime, and the ongoing into dictionaries, with Webster (1817) defin-
desires for abandonment of the royal preroga- ing diplomacy as the customs or rules of
tive over external affairs. The committee was public ministers, forms of negotiation; body
established with the sole purpose of studying of ambassadors or envoys. Even so, diplo-
and evaluating treaties, but increasingly also matic still had the double meaning pertain-
dealt with the conduct of foreign affairs. In ing to diplomas, relating to public ministers.
what seems to have been a fairly rapid con- In French, diplomatie can be found
ceptual development, diplomatique came to for the first time in the fifth edition of the
cover not only the inspection of documents, Dictionnaire from 1798, where it is defined
but all activities falling within the purview of as Science des rapports, des intrts de
the comit diplomatique. Although the com- Puissance Puissance.7 Only in the sixth
mittee never had executive powers, as argued edition from 1835 are the actual people who
in the literature, it spawned debate about diplo- made the treaties and wrote the reports cov-
macy in both the national assembly and the ered by the term and, by this stage, diplo-
press, thus rapidly popularising the concept. matique was also considered as ordinarily
English usage seems to have been largely concerning matters related to diplomacy.
derivative of French usage. Thomas Paine Even though some conceptual uncertainty
(1792: 42), writing Rights of Man as a reply remained, the spread and uptake of the con-
to Burkes early criticism of the French revo- cept was rapid across enlightened Europe.
lution, referred to Benjamin Franklins work In German, it can be found at least as early
as minister to France arguing that it was of as 1795, again in relation to France, when
the diplomatic character, which forbids an article in Europische Annalen discussed
intercourse by a reciprocity of suspicion; Frankreichs diplomatie oder geschichte der
and a diplomatic is a sort of unconnected ffentlichen Meinung in Frankreich (Posselt
atom, continually repelling and repelled. 1795).8 The scepticism towards the concept
The genius of Franklin lay in his transcend- and its association with absolutism and aris-
ence of this role, He was not the diplomatic tocracy seems to have been a common fea-
of a court, but of MAN. Burkes later use of ture as well; at the Norwegian constitutional
diplomacy and related terms, as referenced assembly of 1814, representatives spoke
above, was likewise in texts dealing directly with scorn and admitted lack of knowledge
with the situation in France. In the diary of about the dimly-lit corridors of diplomacy
Gouverneur Morris (1888: 299), who was at and the cold and slippery ice of diplomacy
the time representing the US in France, the and politics (Leira 2011: 174, 177; see also
term likewise appears in 1797. Chapters 3 and 11 in this Handbook).
Considering its newness, it should come as
no surprise that the concept had yet to attain a
precise meaning. In Masons (1801) supple- Key Points
ment to Dr Johnsons dictionary, diplomatic
is, for example, defined as Privileged, based Before the eighteenth century there was no col-
on a traditional (if probably unintended) lective term for the activities of ambassadors
and envoys.
reading of Burke. As the previous discussion
Until the eighteenth century, relations between
of etymology has demonstrated, the connec- princes were seen as political; foreign policy was
tion was not far-fetched, and in 1805 another not established as a separate sphere before the
dictionary based on Dr Johnsons defined mid-century.
diplomatic as relating to diploma; which Diplomacy grew out of an etymological
is again defined as a letter or writing confer- background of treaties, duplicity, secrecy, and

ring some privilege (Perry 1805). A decade privilege.
Diplomacy first emerged during the French claimed that French diplomacy was simply
revolution, largely as a term of abuse, and spread la vrit, la libert,11 and demanded the sup-
rapidly across Europe. pression of the diplomatic committee (quoted
in Frey and Frey 1993: 716). From 1794,
there was an increased emphasis on trade
and science (Martin 2012b: 510), but the
NEW DIPLOMACY, NEWER complete abandonment of diplomacy proved
DIPLOMACY, NEWEST DIPLOMACY impossible for France at war. In the USA,
however, more could be done. Upon taking
Considering how the revolutionaries treated office, Thomas Jefferson abandoned half of
diplomacy as emblematic of most which the US missions, and would have wanted to
had been wrong in the past, it should come as cut the rest as well, claiming in 1804 that:
no surprise that an alternative was soon for-
mulated, indeed with Koselleck it could be I have ever considered diplomacy as the pest of the
world, as the workshop in which nearly all the
argued that contestation over the content of a
wars of Europe are manufactured. [] as we wish
new concept should be expected. Gaspard not to mix in the politics of Europe, but in her com-
Joseph Amand Ducher (1793: 75), who had merce only, Consuls would do all the business we
worked as an ancien rgime consul in the ought to have there quite as well as ministers.
USA, and was writing about external affairs (quoted in Gilbert 1951: 31, note 92)
for the revolutionary government, in 1793
called for a Nouvelle diplomatie basically Calls for a new diplomacy would persist,
concerned with commercial matters and but a departure from the past need not be
desires for direct trade. He argued that French associated with trade; it was also noted some
foreign affairs should solely deal with exter- decades later (Cuvier 1829: 7) how France
nal trade, and that politics should simply be had sent out her scientific ambassadors to all
the extension of commerce. Thus there would quarters, and war itself has not interrupted
be no need for the former secrecy or noble this new diplomacy. The association
privileges, the new ministers of France were between regular diplomacy and war never-
to be ni marquis, ni intrigans,9 and where theless persisted, and the distinction between
the treaties of old diplomacy had simply been an old, political diplomacy and a new diplo-
giving titles to the royal family, the French macy, focused on trade, was maintained as a
family (i.e. the French nation) would guaran- liberal critique throughout the nineteenth
tee itself (Ducher 1793: 74). The new diplo- century, as when Thorold Rogers argued
macy would be simpler, fairer and cheaper (1866: 496) that:
than the old one, where the diplomats had The ancient habits and instincts of political diplo-
been like priests, with their doctrines relating macy are silently or noisily wearing out or passing
to the true relations of the peoples in the away, and a new diplomacy of commerce, assum-
same way as theology related to morals ing for a time the guise of formal treaties, is occu-
pying no small part of the ground once assigned to
(Ducher 1794: 23). What this opposed was
labours which were called into activity by distrust,
not only the previous practice of French dip- and effected their purpose by intrigue.
lomats, but also the current practice of the
enemy: in the hands of Pitt, diplomacy had The newness of new diplomacy was, how-
become la science des trahisons & de la ever, not restricted to trade and science; it
guerre civile (Ducher 1794: 23).10 was also used by liberal promoters of impe-
Duchers call for a new diplomacy echoed rialist ventures. Towards the end of the
the general dissatisfaction with diplomacy, century, this combination took another
and for many the solution was simply to form, when Joseph Chamberlain argued for
abolish the whole thing, as when Saint-Andr a new diplomacy, characterised by
openness towards the public, in dealings be founded (Reinsch 1909: 14). This, he
with the Boers. argued, was leading diplomacy to gradually
The combination of liberal critique, open- lose its association with shrewdness, schem-
ness and expansion was evident in American ing, and chicane, and to the rise of a:
debate at the same time as well, as when an
unnamed American diplomat addressed the new diplomacy [which] makes its main purpose
the establishment of a basis for frank cooperation
public and noted that the new diplomacy:
among the nations in order that, through common
action, advantages may be obtained which no
is as old as the United States [] A European dip-
isolated state could command if relying merely on
lomat works by intrigue and dissimulation [] The
its own resources.
American diplomacy has always been the reverse
of this. We ask for what we want, and insist upon
it. [] The new diplomacy, in the popular mean- All of the above ideas fed into the intellectual
ing of the word, is not diplomacy at all. It is simply debates about the Great War, leading to the
knowing what we want, fearlessly saying it and repeated rejection of the old diplomacy and
insisting upon it with a disregard for conse-
the hopes and promises of a new diplomacy
quences. (Los Angeles Herald, 1898)
in 191820. The extent to which this was
Again, the rejection of what had previously achieved need not concern us here, the central
been known as diplomacy, and which relied point being that once again an international
on intrigue and dissimulation, is obvious. practice celebrated by its opposition to the
The feeling that there was something inher- diplomacy of old was being put forward
ently American was echoed by government diplomacy was in essence defined by its
officials as well: The discovery of America flaws and failures, by its secrecy and its fail-
opened up a new world; the independence of ure to avoid war. The new diplomacy, how-
the United States a new diplomacy (Scott ever, promised peace and co-operation.
1909: 3). Secretary of State Elihu Root (Root The failure of the League of Nations and
1907: 113) stressed the historical develop- the Second World War was to change the
ment more than the uniqueness of America: valuation of diplomacy, over time completely
transforming the conceptual grid around it.
There was a time when the official intercourse Where diplomacy had for 150 years been seen
between nations which we call diplomacy con- as related to war and as the opposite of true
sisted chiefly of bargaining and largely of cheating co-operation, it gradually became defined as
in the bargain. Diplomacy now consists chiefly in the opposite of war, and as the prime mecha-
making national conduct conform, or appear to
conform, to the rules which codify, embody and nism of co-operation. While there have been
apply certain moral standards evolved and repeated discussions of new diplomacy in
accepted in the slow development of civilization. the decades following the war (e.g. Graud
1945, Butterfield 1966, Sofer 1988, Riordan
And from politics, the term found its way 2003), the newness has been associated with
into academe. Paul Reinsch, one of the fore- evolution rather than revolution; with gradual
runners of what would become the discipline changes in the means, methods and content
of International Relations, writing in 1909 of diplomacy, rather than the wholesale rejec-
contrasted the old kinds of treaties, with the tion of traditional practice.
purpose being conciliation and compromise The revaluation of diplomacy has not only
of conflicting interests, in essence exercises implied that the calls for its abandonment
in balancing and marginal gains, with the have disappeared. On the contrary, defined as
new economic treaties seeking to find a the opposite of hostile conflict and as asso-
basis for cooperation, an essential equality of ciated with expert skill in negotiation and
interests between all the nations upon which the mediation of difference, diplomacy has
permanent international arrangements may become not only a growth-business, but also
a growth-concept. More and more practices diplomacy is relatively modern. Considering

are latching on to diplomacy as something to how diplomacy is currently regularly
emulate, and in effect we are seeing the emer- defined through a set of practices (e.g. com-
gence of composite diplomacy (or perhaps munication, representation, negotiation), it is
hyphen-diplomacy), where new actors, noteworthy how the actual concept has its
arenas, topics and forms of interaction are roots not in practice as such, but in the mate-
claiming diplomacy for themselves or being rial results of practice; in privilege rather than
claimed by diplomacy. Diplomacy is now in parity.
associated with units above, below and par- Situated in a conceptual web undergoing
allel to the state; with supra-national organi- rapid development in the decades around
sations, regions and cities, multi-national 1800, the newness of diplomacy illustrates
corporations and rebel groups, to name but well how the very conceptualisation of rela-
a few. Likewise, diplomacy is described as tions between political entities was changing,
taking place not only in the traditional arenas and how this new naming was part and parcel
of state-to-state interaction, but in individual of the domestic struggles over political power.
lives, families, public spheres and business, Never before named as a collective practice
again to name a few. The list of topics con- with specific content, diplomacy became
nected with diplomacy is limited primarily one of the key pejorative terms associated
by the imagination, but special attention has with the ancien rgime, defined by its oppo-
been paid to sports and health. As for modali- nents and by virtue of all that had been wrong
ties, an emphasis on citizens hails back to with how external affairs were handled. It
earlier hopes for a new diplomacy, and this clearly matters that there was no established
can also be said for the emphasis on new term for diplomacy until it arose as a deroga-
media and public diplomacy witnessed over tory label. Whereas the earlier titles in use
the last decade (see further Chapters 35, 36, (like ambassador or envoy) were descriptive
39, 41, 42, 43 and 44 in this Handbook). terms, the concept of diplomacy was evalu-
ative, and strongly negative, leading to the
almost immediate call for something else to
Key Points supersede it, namely new diplomacy.
The negative associations of diplomacy
Calls for a new diplomacy, centred on trade,
would persist for a century and a half, only
instead of the old diplomacy of intrigue and
politics, arose almost as soon as the concept had abating with its gradual disassociation from
been coined. war and coupling with co-operation. In
More radical critics have wanted to abolish diplo- current parlance, diplomacy is no longer
macy altogether. to be exchanged for a new diplomacy,
Around 1900, new diplomacy became more rather the old version is to be upgraded to
associated with openness and co-operation. diplomacy 2.0.
After the world wars, diplomacy was largely
re-evaluated as a vehicle for peace and co-
operation, with calls for new diplomacy now
focusing on evolution and reform, rather than
revolution and abandonment. NOTES
1 Thanks for comments on an earlier draft are

due to the editors, Benjamin de Carvalho, Iver
CONCLUSION B. Neumann, Ole Jacob Sending, Minda Holm,
Morten Skumsrud Andersen, Mateja Peter, Kari
Osland, Cedric de Coning, Bjrnar Sverdrup-
Although the etymological root and many of Thygeson and Pernille Rieker. The usual dis-
the associated practices are old, the concept of claimer applies.
2 For etymological reasons, the discussion below Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal (April
deals not only with diplomacy, but also, when October): 114.
appropriate, with diplomatic. The discussion is dEon, Chevalier (Charles Genevive Louis
also limited to English and French language, a Auguste Andr Timothe d Eon de Beau-
limitation which is justified both by the centrality
mont) (1764) Lettres, mmoires & ngocia-
of France, Britain and the US to political and con-
ceptual innovation in the eighteenth and nine-
tions particulires du chevalier don, Ministre
teenth centuries and by the importance of these Plnipotentiaire de France Aupres Du Roi de
countries to the admittedly Eurocentric theory la Grande Bretagne. London: Dixwell.
and practice of diplomacy (Neumann 2012). Dictionnaire de lAcadmie franaise 4th edn
3 Political philosophy is one that teaches men how (1762) Diplomatique, [online], http://art-
to behave with prudence, either at the head of a flsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdi-
state or at the head of a family. co1look.pl?strippedhw=diplomatique&
4 The term diplomatics, referring to the study of headword=&docyear=ALL&dicoid=ALL
documents, retains this meaning. [accessed 1 August 2014].
5 All volumes can be searched on http://gallica.bnf.fr/
Diderot, Denis and Jean le Rond dAlembert
6 Considering how aristocracy was itself changing
from a neutral descriptor to a derogatory politi-
(eds) (2013) Encyclopdie, ou dictionnaire
cal term over the second half of the eighteenth raisonn des sciences, des arts et des mtiers,
century, it was hardly coincidental that the terms etc., Robert Morrissey (ed.). Chicago, IL: Uni-
related to diplomacy followed this particular versity of Chicago. ARTFL Encyclopdie Pro-
pattern. ject (Spring 2013 edition), [online], http://
7 The science of reports on the interests between encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.
powers. Ducher, Gaspard Joseph Amand (1793) Acte de
8 French diplomacy, or the history of public opin- navigation, avec ses rapports au commerce,
ion in France. aux finances, la nouvelle diplomatie des
9 Neither marquis [that is noble] nor making
Franais. Partie 1. Paris: Impr. Nationale.
intrigues.
10 The science of betrayal and war.
Ducher, Gaspard Joseph Amand (1794) Acte de
11 The truth, liberty. navigation, avec ses rapports au commerce,
aux finances, la nouvelle diplomatie des
Franais. Partie 2 Paris: Impr. Nationale.
Frey, Linda and Marsha Frey (1993) The Reign
of the Charlatans Is Over: The French Revo-
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3
Diplomacy and the Colonial
Encounter
Sam Okoth Opondo
Europe is literally the creation of the Third World what it is not (Plischke, 1979: 28). Implied
So when we hear the head of a European state in Plischkes exploration is an acknowledge-
declare with his hand on his heart that he must
ment of the subjective and even inter-
come to the aid of the poor underdeveloped peo-
ples, we do not tremble with gratitude. Quite the subjective dimensions of diplomacy and the
contrary; we say to ourselves: Its a just reparation entangled discourses and worlds that enframe
which will be paid to us. (Frantz Fanon, The those who practise diplomacy or are consid-
Wretched of the Earth, p.102) ered capable of being diplomatic in the first
place. The stakes of this search for the mean-
ings of diplomacy are raised when he calls
for us to distinguish diplomacy from other
MODERN DIPLOMACY AND/AS concepts including foreign relations, foreign
COLONIAL APPARATUS policy, various specific aspects of diplomatic
practice, individual diplomatic functions
The term diplomacy, Elmer Plischke tells such as negotiation and the like.
us, has many meanings and tends to be Plischke is not alone in this quest for a
defined by the individual user to suit his par- clearer and less messy conception of diplo-
ticular purposes. In this quest for diplomatic macy. Jos Calvet De Magalhes, a retired
meaning and the meanings of diplomacy, Portuguese ambassador and author of The
Plischke suggests that we seek diplomacys Pure Concept of Diplomacy, calls for a more
etymological, lexicographical, theoretical, precise definition of diplomacy and hav-
functional, and academic interpretations and ing defined diplomacy, it becomes possible
goes ahead to propose a method of refine- for him to identify a pure diplomat while
ment that may be both positive, denoting providing a sense of diplomatic pathology
what diplomacy is, and negative, determining (backchannel diplomacy, combat diplomacy,
diplomatic intelligence and counter intelli- highlight the entangled and darker side of
gence) (Magalhes, 1988: 60, 71, 79). It is diplomacy. Taking the entanglement and
important to note that concept of pure diplo- coeval emergence of modern diplomatic and
macy articulated by De Magalhes is for the colonial worlds as its starting point, this chap-
most part derived from partial histories and ter explores the violence of recognition/non-
genealogies of diplomacy as well as a limited recognition that makes modern diplomacy
conception of the diplomatic world. possible and its relationship to the colonial-
If we take the work of De Magalhes and ity of power. Through a series of contrapuntal
some of his interlocutors seriously, it becomes readings of diplomatic and colonial encoun-
clear that a concept or history of diplomacy ters, the chapter carries out a simultaneous
that does not acknowledge the pluricen- narration of metropolitan diplomatic history
tric, contested and continuously negotiated and those other histories, subjects and prac-
character of diplomacy produces an idea of tices against which (and together with which)
diplomacy that is essentially Eurocentric and, this dominating discourse works (Said, 1993:
when viewed from the perspective of colo- 51). Such a comparative study of diplomacy
nized others, anti-diplomatic. For instance, departs from a concern with non-European
Harold Nicolson attempts to sanitize the his- cultures of diplomacy that locates them in
tory of the old diplomacy by acknowledg- another time as part of the beginnings of
ing that the mistakes, follies and the crimes diplomacy (Numelin, 1950) or those that
of diplomacy that took place during the era consider modern diplomacy to be the rela-
of the old diplomacy can be traced to evil tively narrow and applied body of knowledge
foreign policy rather than to faulty meth- pertaining to the right conduct of professional
ods of negotiation (Nicolson, 1979: 43). diplomats in their relations with one another
According to Nicolson, the theory and prac- and other servants of the states to which they
tice of international negotiation originated by are accredited (Satow, 1957; Sharp, 2009: 7).
Richelieu, analyzed by Callieres and adopted Doubtless, attempts at placing statecraft in
by European countries during the three cen- a historical perspective or the theorizing of
turies that preceded the change of 1919 was diplomatic essences and common sense has
the method best adapted for the conduct of enabled diplomatic theorists and historians to
relations between civilized states. Not only look at practices of statecraft in non-Western
did it regard Europe as the most important of texts like the Arthaastra and the Armana
all the continents, other continents, namely letters. However, fidelity to Eurocentric and
Asia and Africa were viewed as areas of disciplinary categories means that Kautilya
imperial, commercial or missionary expan- is referred to as the Indian Machiavelli
sion. Accordingly, the old diplomacy was (Gowen, 1929) while the 3,000 year old
concerned with great powers and the fact Egyptian correspondence is incorporated into
that they had a shared diplomatic culture and a preexisting idea of diplomacy that consid-
desired the same sort of world character- ers it to be the beginning of International
ized by continuous and confidential negotia- Relations (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000).
tion (Nicolson, 1979: 45). Combined with the These extensions of an already formed idea
fact that European states had wider responsi- of diplomatic history and theory beyond the
bilities, and above all, more money and more West present us with alternative (diplomatic)
guns, they also had the right to intervene in histories rather than alternatives to hegemonic
the affairs of smaller powers for the the pres- (diplomatic) history (Nandy, 1995: 53).
ervation of peace (Nicolson, 1979). Heeding insights from James Der Derians
In contrast to the above articulations or (1987) genealogical study of the media-
quest for a moral and pure concept of mod- tion of Western estrangement and Costas
ern diplomacy, the following explorations M. Constantinous (1996) re-reading and
Diplomacy and the Colonial Encounter 41
rewriting of the theme of diplomacy by relat- Acknowledging that diplomacy is a cultur-

ing it to the crafts of the double hand (the pro- ally biased game, and the bias is Western,
cess of doubling), the following exploration Neumann concludes that diplomacy has
is also a meta-diplomatic quest that interro- proven itself as a global institution, one that
gates modern diplomacys claims of origi- has proven to be able to adapt to challenges
nality, truth and, finality by taking seriously such as revolutions and decolonizations
the place of the colonial/colonized other (Neumann, 2010: 144).
(Constantinou, 1996: 84; Der Derian, 1987). However, acknowledging and then locating
Not only does this enable us to raise questions modern diplomacys colonial and Eurocentric
about the conditions under which colonized logics in a past that we have since surmounted
subjects and peoples are considered diplo- is not an innocent practice. At a minimum, it
matic or non-diplomatic and the differential endorses a moral project that makes distinc-
treatment accorded to peoples or places that tions between modern diplomacy and colo-
were considered external to the European dip- nialism while failing to acknowledge the
lomatic milieu, it highlights the relationship coloniality of modern diplomacy. This means
between discourses on diplomatic negotiation that the long-standing patterns of power that
and their related colonial and race-mediated emerged as a result of colonialism, but that
forms of negation that present the human and define culture, labor, inter-subjective rela-
political experience of non-European peoples tions, and knowledge production well beyond
as something that can only be understood in the strict limits of colonial administrations
terms of an absence or a negative interpre- remain unquestioned (Maldonado-Torres,
tation thus giving way to colonial violence 2007: 2434). In addition to illustrating that
and governance, missionary conversion the structure of diplomacy is both the struc-
and present-day postcolonial intervention ture of Western metaphysical thought and
(Mbembe, 2001: 1; Mignolo, 2001). the structure of representation, this chapter
The reading of the co-constitutive ele- traces and questions the coloniality of diplo-
ments of modernity and coloniality, diplomacy (Constantinou, 1996: 103). It illustrates
macy and colonialism, and the estrangement that the diplomatic/colonial structure is found
and mediation that accompanies these pro- in places beyond the West given that the
jects, departs from texts that disavow these West, as Edouard Glissant asserts, is not in
entanglements. While Nicolson and De the West. It is a project, not a place that was
Magalhes might not acknowledge the entan- reshaped by the entanglements of diplomacy
glements between Eurocentrism, diplomacy and modernity/coloniality (Glissant, 1992:
and colonialism, critical diplomatic theorists 2). That is, one recognizes that beyond the
like Iver B. Neumann note that the historical cultures and institutions it propagates, mod-
preconditions for diplomacy and the way it ern diplomacy, as a way of being, seeks to
operates as a social practice through conven- maintain this metaphysical space, to direct
tions of immunity, permanent representation this global stage and to continuously sustain
and the corps diplomatique reveals contem- its fictions. Not only does it develop what
porary diplomacys Christian myths and its Constantinou refers to as an elaborate techne
Eurocentrism. However, Neumann maintains of diplomacy, which involves the fiction of
that these sociabilities have spread to third the sovereign subject, the fiction of the repre-
parties and third parties use them for their sentative agent, the fiction of the instrumental
own interaction in transformed and hybrid- object, the fiction of the specialized process,
ized forms such that diplomacy remains a modern diplomacy is also a techne of colo-
public good, meaning that we should not niality (Constantinou, 1996: 103). A techne
care too much about Eurocentrism at the level that encounters, recognizes, represents
of diplomacy itself (Neumann, 2010: 128). and inserts or abjects foreign practices and
peoples into a diplomatic milieu that is con- of raison dtat exemplified by his dealings
stantly being invented and reinvented accord- with the Huguenots and the call for religious
ing to the grids of colonial difference (see tolerance during the Thirty Years War, he is
also chapters 1, 2 and 11 in this Handbook). also lauded in texts like Henry Kissingers
Diplomacy (1994), where he is presented as
the promulgator of modern statecraft who
Key Points replaced the medieval principle of universal
moral values with the more rational princi-
The decolonial project engages practices of ple predicated on the pursuit of the state
transculturation that make it possible for us rather than religious interests (Kissinger
to read as diplomatic and ultimately political a 1994: 58). Given that Richelieu made the
whole range of colonial/colonized peoples, sites
case for France to have a broad network of
and mediation practices or forms of estrangement
diplomatic agents who negotiate ceaselessly,
that are trivialized, erased or silenced by modern/
colonial regimes of recognition and intelligibility. either openly or secretly, and in all places,
It recognizes an array of colonial modes and even in those from which no present fruits
modalities that exist parallel to diplomacy com- are reaped, his Testament Politique is con-
plementing or competing with the regular foreign tinuously invoked within diplomatic circles
policy of the government (Cornago, 2010: 94). in order to emphasize the strategic impor-
These para-diplomatic mediations make it diffi- tance and ethics of continuous negotiation
cult for one to proclaim a new diplomacy at the (Richelieu/Hill, 1989: 94; Berridge et al.,
moment of formal decolonization or to have a 2001: 94). Beyond formal diplomatic circles,
moralized idea of diplomacy predicated on inat- Richelieu also found a place within the popu-
tentiveness to the coeval emergence of modern
lar and literary imagination through
diplomacy and colonial worlds and the colonial
Alexandre Dumas swashbuckler novel, The
spectres that continue to haunt the diplomatic
present (Mamdani, 1984: 1048). Three Musketeers (1844), where Richelieus
It explores the diplomacycolonialism nexus by crafty handling of personal matters and mat-
engaging the disavowal of colonial diplomacies, ters of state is at the centre of intra-European
diplomatic colonialism and the coloniality of diplomatic, religious and romantic intrigues.
diplomacy within official narratives of colonial- While the image of Richelieu as a com-
ism and dominant treatments of diplomacy. mitted advocate of the reason of state is often
considered proto-diplomatic such that mod-
ern diplomacy comes to be read as a dialogue
between states, a different story and idea of
COEVAL PRODUCTION OF COLONIAL diplomacy and modernity emerges when we
AND DIPLOMATIC MAN engage the world of Richelieu and modernity
from spaces other than the self-contained and
To mark the entanglements of colonial and self-referential Europe of the Thirty Years
diplomatic worlds and the coloniality of War or the religious accommodation that
diplomacy, we can turn to Armand-Jean du he is well known for. Treated in this way,
Plessis (15851642), commonly referred to Richelieus settlement of the religious ques-
as Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister of tion in France, and the said move from medi-
Frances Louis XIII. As a key figure in eval universalism and religious orthodoxy, is
modern diplomacy, Richelieus diplomatic read alongside the religion-mediated colonial
ventures are an especially apt vehicle for unsettlement of other religions in Africa, Asia
thinking about the techne of diplomacy and and the Americas, where the universalist and
the colonial worlds it produced (and those colonial side of Richelieus career and the
that produced it). Not only is Richelieu rec- civilizational aspects of the modern state and
ognized as a key proponent of the principle the darker side of diplomacy are constantly
revealed and contested. On the literary front, initial failures, contributed to the colonial
the fictional Richelieu of Alexandre Dumas imaginary that enabled France to establish
The Three Musketeers is read alongside the links with, and eventually govern, parts of
larger world of Georges, an earlier Dumas Africa, North America, the Antilles and Asia:
novel set in Mauritius (Ile de France), where
The Compaignie du Morbihan, founded for the
the literary and geographical space is popu- trade with Canada, the West Indies, Russia and the
lated with Yoloffs, Mozambicans, Malgaches North Compaignie de la Naceelle de St. Pierre
and Anjoun slaves from the Comoros Islands Fleuredelysee, which succeeded it and took almost
as well as Chinese traders, French settlers and the world for its province The Compaignie des
Cents Associes, for Canada alone, collapsed for
British colonial governors/diplomats (Sollors,
lack of funds. The Compaignie des Iles dAmerique,
2007: xvixvii). With the protagonist Georges although it secured for France the Islands of St.
Munier moving between worlds and rebel- Kitts and San Domingo, dragged on a bankrupt
ling slaves making reference to the Haitian existence until it was liquidated in 1651. Numerous
Revolution, Dumas offers a wider and wilder African companies were equally unfortunate. The
East India Company staggered through its early
picture of diplomacy and colonialism where
years, but with all its achievements far in the
race, slavery and estrangement are negotiated future. The fundamental mistake in the constitu-
and negated in a manner that resonates with tion of all these companies was the excess of
Frantz Fanons analysis of the psychopathol- government interference Yet, the initial energy
ogy of oppression and the possibilities of a was not lacking. An embassy pushed as far as
Moscow. French ships reached the East and West
critical humanism (Fanon, 1967). In this his-
Indies, explored the St. Lawrence, took possession
torical novel, Dumas offers glimpses into his of Madagascar. (Wedgwood, 1954: 13940)
own family history (Dumas is the grandson of
a slave from Saint Domingue) while reveal- In addition to the above economic interests,
ing the world that created and was created diplomatic representation merged with colo-
by French colonial ventures of which he is a nial governance such that the principle of
product (Martone, 2011). Not only does such continuous negotiation was transformed into
a contrapuntal reading of Richelieu call for practices of negation and conversion. Unlike
a consideration of the other worlds that his the equally violent colonial expansion of
diplomatic theory and practice is implicated England where New England represented the
in, it is also a call for thinking about modern withdrawal from the authority of the estab-
diplomacy from the perspective of the colo- lished church of England, Richelieus diplo-
nial logics that it is entangled with and the matic vision and theory of state transformed
dynamics of race, capitalism and violence colonial spaces like New France into an
that constitute modern diplomatic distinction. expensive mission or another outpost of the
For instance, the names and ventures of French Church where Huguenots were not
numerous colonization and trading compa- allowed and Jesuit missionaries were consid-
nies associated with Richelieu point to the ered agents of God, the church and the state
colonial ambitions of this revered diplomatic (Wedgwood, 1954: 141).
figure such that his diplomatic dictum of hav- The Jesuit missionaries work among the
ing agents in all places, even in those from Hurons and Algonquins are well documented
which no present fruits are reaped becomes in the annual ethnographic/diplomatic/mis-
part of colonial venture, where representatives siological report Jesuit Relations (Dablen
of the state or state-sanctioned agencies nego- and Marquette, 1891). In the second chapter
tiate, enter into agreements and even govern of Volume XXIII of the Jesuit Relations of
foreign peoples on behalf of the French state 1643 (appropriately titled Of The House Or
and the Catholic Church. C.V. Wedgwood has Permanent Residence of Sainte Marie), the
excellently documented how Richelieus eco- missionaries note that the new language of
nomic and diplomatic policies, despite their conversion of the savages requires of them
to be both master and pupil at the same time. with the related questions of race, the state,
The representational force of these dispatches diplomacy, colonialism and the governance
meant that practices like the Iroquois mourn- of natives. In short, the modern diplomatic
ing wars were subjected to European and question, much like the colonial question,
Christian grids of interpretation that focused becomes a question of the genres of the
on the brutality of the war while overlook- human and the mediation of human and
ing other mediation capacities of this prac- civilization estrangement (Wynter, 2003:
tice among the Five Nations (Richter, 1983; 2878).
Shannon, 2008). Like Richelieu, the Jesuits It was precisely this question of the gen-
considered the French colony a foundational res of man that was at the centre of the
site of conversion and an efficacious way of sixteenth-century dispute between the mis-
procuring the salvation of indigenous people sionary priest, Bartolom de Las Casas and
(Dablen and Marquette, 1891: 271). Given Gins de Seplveda, the humanist royal
that Richelieu had allowed the Jesuits to act historian and apologist for the Spanish set-
as negotiators in the fur trade and granted tlers of then Santo Domingo (Wynter, 2003:
them the monopoly on missionary work in 2878). This modern question borne out of
New France, the Jesuits received news of his the colonial encounter freed European diplo-
death with great sorrow while acknowledg- matic relations from their exclusive Christian
ing the relationships between old diploma- and European milieus by presenting a new set
cies and new world ventures, for besides the of objects and subjects in need of diplomatic/
care that he [Richelieu] had for old France, colonial mediation (Der Derian, 1987: 101).
he was not forgetful of the new (Dablen and With the discovery of the Americas and the
Marquette, 1891). enslavement of black Africans, a different
While often read as a theory of state, the classificatory and hierarchical system was
double anthropology that Richelieu and devised so as to provide the grammar and
the Jesuits represent in their dealing with technics appropriate to dealing with a world
old and new worlds deploys a theory of where otherness exceeded the familiar cat-
diplomacy and colonialism that simultane- egories of a Christian Europe cohabiting with
ously pursues the interests of the state and or working against Muslims, Moors, Jews
universal ideals while producing cultural and Turks (Mignolo, 2006: 17).
and colonial difference. Thus, the colonial/ In addition to providing a context for the
diplomatic encounter, as a form of man- emergence of Eurocentrism as a concep-
craft articulates descriptive statements of tual and political reality, the conquest of
the human that were central to the evange- the Americas transformed the periphery
lizing mission of the Church, the expan- into the repository of material and symbolic
sion of the zones and content of diplomatic commodities, thus radically transforming
representation and the governance-oriented the economies and cultures of Europe includ-
imperializing mission of the state based ing the notions of rights and some of the
on its territorial expansion and conquest conventions of the old diplomacy (Dussel,
(Wynter, 2003: 286). According to Sylvia 1981: 15; Moraa etal., 2008: 4). Emerging
Wynter, the visions of Man and the idea from these ethnologies and inventions of dip-
of order that emanated from it was the basis lomatic and colonial man is the will-to-con-
of the coloniality of being that manifested vert, save or govern rather than converse with
itself in the relation between Man over- the non-European other as well as the desire
represented as the generic, ostensibly supra- for diplomatic and colonial objects that con-
cultural human and its subjugated Human tinues to haunt the present. While Las Casas
Others (i.e. Indians and Negroes) and was was overly concerned with the human status
a foundational basis of modernity complete of the Indian, other Spanish colonialists
like Cortes failed to recognize the diplo- Pope in the Vatican but they were denied
matic and human agency of the Indigenous free passage and detained as they stepped
Americans and were more concerned with off the boat in Lisbon (Hochschild, 1999:
the objects that they produced. Writing about 14). The enslavement and colonization of
the Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov the Kongo is not an isolated event. It is part
notes that Cortes goes into ecstasies about of a structure and meta-discourse through
the Aztec productions but does not acknowl- which Africans came face to face with the
edge their makers as human individualities to opaque and murky domain of power where
be set on the same level as himself (Todorov, they, like other colonized peoples, had to
1999: 129). This leads him and other Spanish negotiate or contest the problem of free-
authors to speak well of the Indians, but dom from servitude and the possibility of
with very few exceptions they do not speak an autonomous African subject (Mbembe,
to the Indians (Todorov, 1999: 132). The 2001: 14).
non-recognition of humans and recogni- As illustrated above, the new world
tion and desire for objects transformed the engagements by icons of the old diplomacy
idea of diplomatic agency, conceptions of like Richelieu and Bartolom de Las Casas
fellowship and the rights and obligations of reveal the coloniality of diplomacy. Given
European and non-European peoples by cre- the diplomatic innovations that accompanied
ating a law of inviolability within which the colonial ventures and vice versa, colonial
Spanish were considered the ambassadors subjects and spaces of colonial mediation
of Christian peoples in the new world while like Haiti or the Kongo become potent sites
the Indians were bound to give them free for reflection on the transformation in mod-
passage and a friendly hearing (Der Derian, ern diplomacys ethical, geopolitical and
1987: 101). ontological referents (see also Chapters 8, 52
With culture as a privileged site for the and 53 in this Handbook).
mediation of metropolitan and colonial dif-
ference, the conversion and use of indig-
enous peoples, slaves, things and colonial Key Points
spaces in the pursuit of profit, the interests
of the state and narratives of the human was The colonies were the site of diplomatic imagi-
nation and designs where frontiers were con-
legitimized. For instance, the large number
structed not only in geographical terms but also
of slaves taken by the Portuguese to work in in terms of the boundaries of humanity (Mignolo,
Brazil after their encounter with the Kongo 1995: viiixi).
kingdom (Mbanza Kongo) in Africa led the The invention and articulation of the genres
ManiKongo (ruler) Nzinga Mbemba Affonso of man as evinced by the idea of diplomatic
I, a convert to Christianity and a selective man, colonial man and the human in general
modernizer, to write numerous letters to his meant that diplomatic encounters with non-
brother King Joao III of Portugal. In his European others were quickly transformed into
letters of 1526, Affonso I protests the depop- some form of colonial governance through the
ulation of his country arising from the kid- non-recognition of indigenous diplomatic agents,
napping of his free subjects, sons of nobles denigration of gods and reneging on treaties as
well as the conversion of a people and a space
and vassals and even people of his own
into something familiar and governable.
family. He goes on to state that the kingdom The modern diplomatic mediation of difference
only needs priests and schoolteachers and is entangled with the mediation of colonial
no merchandise unless it is wine and flour difference. These entanglements play out in
for mass (Hochschild, 1999: 13). Besides spectral spaces where global designs have to
pleading to his fellow sovereign, Affonso be adapted, adopted, rejected, integrated, or
I also attempted to send emissaries to the ignored (Mignolo, 1995: viiixi).
COLONIES, POLITIES, EMBASSIES Domingue, this pluralistic popular religion

became an important organizational tool
Nowhere is the entanglement of genres of for resistance and mediated the slave insur-
man, colonial difference, the diplomatic gencies led by voodoo priests and Maroon
order and a radical quest for autonomous leaders like Francois Makandal (Fick, 1990:
human subjectivity clearer than in Saint- 589). Through the symbolic and strate-
Domingue (Haiti). Not only was Hispaniola gic facilitation of secret meetings, as well
(present day Haiti and the Dominican as the initiation and adherence of slaves
Republic) the earliest site of the European of diverse origins, voodoo provided a
conquest of the Americas, the island also matrix of communing and communication
provided the context for Las Casas reflec- among the slaves in different plantations
tion on the possibilities for more humane and helped create a network of slaves who
encounters between the Spanish and Indians gathered clandestinely to participate in the
after witnessing the suffering of the indige- ceremonies, and secured the pledge of soli-
nous Taino population. Ironically, Las Casas darity and secrecy of those involved in plots
advocated for the importation of African against the masters (Fick, 1990: 589). In
slaves to save the brutalized indigenous later years, voodoo was part of the imagi-
population and years of Spanish and French nary in the popular slave insurgencies and
colonialism and slavery on the island trans- intersected with the 17911804 Haitian rev-
formed Saint-Domingue into the most profit- olution led by Toussaint Louverture and his
able slave colony in the world, receiving black officers, Henri Christophe, Mose and
thousands of slaves from the West African Jean-Jacques Dessaline, which challenged
coast and the Kingdom of Kongo (Dubois, and eventually overthrew French imperial
2005: 15; Thornton, 1993). authority and the system of racial inequality
Hailing from different parts of Africa, and set out to abolish the existence of slav-
and speaking in mutually unintelligible lan- ery itself.
guages or believing in diverse religions, the In order to avoid exoticizing or occiden-
Africans of Saint-Domingue mediated the talizing the Haitian revolution, we must read
estrangement caused by their collective it as both an anti-colonial, anti-diplomatic
experience of slavery through Haitian cre- and diplomatic event. As an anti-colonial
ole/kreyl, a language of survival, and transcultural and planetary formation, the
hybrid religions like Haitian voodoo, which, revolution created a space where France,
for all its African sources and resonances, the Americans, Spaniards and British could
was a product of the cross-cultural encoun- no longer send commissioners to speak to
ters that were part of the plantation economy Toussaint but had to send charges daffaires
(Farmer, 2006: 156). As Carolyn Fick illus- and ambassadors as their representatives
trates in her study of popular movements (James, 1989: 266). As an anti-diplomatic
and popular mentalities in revolutionary innovation, the Haitian revolution high-
eighteenth-century Santa Domingue, voo- lighted what C.L.R. James calls the sad
doo incorporated rituals from various parts irony of human history as it revealed that
of Africa, such as the Congolese chants, the French revolution was a bourgeois revo-
which were then inserted into a broader lution, and the basis of bourgeois wealth
religious structure complete with its own was the slave trade and the slave plantations
rules, procedures, hierarchy, and general in the colonies (James, 1939: 339). The
principles. With Dahomean Voodoo serv- Haitian revolution also revealed that the cor-
ing as an existing substructure for diverse relative idea of emancipation and diplomacy
religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions that emerged from the French conception
of the diverse African nations in Santa of the French Revolution was Eurocentric,
racial and colonial, especially when it was for the subjects/objects of Saint Domingue
extended to spaces like Saint Domingue who, up until then, had been subjected to
where its concept of rights excluded colonial the anti-diplomacies of slavery and colonial
subjects and slaves. In Saint Domingue, one governance.
found the most concrete expression of the Recognizing the significance of the
idea that the rights proclaimed in Frances Haitian revolution as a site of physical and
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and metaphysical emancipation, C.L.R James
Citizen were indeed universal given that Black Jacobins (1989[1938]) presents this
the slaves did not hesitate to lay a claim to world-historical event as the precursor to
the rights of man, rights to citizenship and the struggles for African decolonization and
the right to diplomatic recognition (Dubois, the emergence of new diplomacies. That is,
2005: 3). the revolution goes beyond its particular his-
While some French enlightenment think- torical and geographical location in order to
ers and abolitionist movements like the reveal the pretensions of universalist theo-
Amis des Noirs (Friends of the Blacks) ries of the Rights of Man by making them
were critical of the excesses of slavery, truly universal through decolonization and
few, if any, made the case for liberty, fra- the emancipation of slaves. However, Haiti
ternity and equality on racial grounds as was also the site of a different kind of diplo-
articulated by the slaves during the Haitian matic encounter. One characterized by both
revolution. (Buck-Morss, 2000: 828; 833 non-recognition and unthinkability by the
4). As a result of such a racialized and great powers of Europe and the USA that
colonial conceptualization of the world, Nicolson privileges in his conceptualization
diplomacy and philosophy, the Haitian rev- of diplomacy. As a result of non-recognition,
olution remained unthinkable insofar as diplomatic sanctions, isolation and later on
enlightenment philosophy and theories of military and humanitarian interventions, the
man were concerned and unrecognizable site of the first successful slave revolt and
insofar as diplomatic history, theory and first modern black state was transformed
practice were concerned. Michel-Rolph into the first third world nation in the world
Trouillot captures this phenomenon well (Dubois, 2005: 15). It is for these reasons that
in his reflections on the unthinkability of the Haitian state combines an unusual his-
the Haitian revolution in the West based on torical depth and a fragility typical of much
the revolutions challenge to slavery and new entities (Trouillot, 1990: 31). Laurent
racism and also due its methods (Trouillot, Dubois analysis of the entanglement of colo-
2013: 40). Not only did the revolution pre- nial and diplomatic practices and the denial
sent intellectual and ideological challenges of recognition and coevalness is worth quot-
to enlightenment philosophy, the practices ing at length:
that marked the events of the mass insur-
rection of 1791 to the proclamation of inde-
pendence for a modern black state in 1804 They would begin with the simple denial that
Haiti existed in 1806 one of them [planters],
crossed numerous political thresholds that exiled in Louisiana, noted as part of his property
enabled Haiti to challenge the ontologi- his Negroes remaining in Saint-Domingue.
cal order of the West and the global order Many governments reacted similarly. The refusal
of colonialism (Trouillot, 2013: 41). To of diplomatic relations with Haiti pioneered by
put it otherwise, the anti-colonial revolu- Jefferson would last until 1862 The denial of
political existence was accompanied by other
tion was considered anti-diplomatic by the attacks on sovereignty. In 1825 the Haitian gov-
French due to its use of violence. However, ernment agreed to pay an indemnity to France in
it was a move towards establishing a dif- return for diplomatic and economic relations
ferent kind of diplomatic order and agency it was meant to repay them for what they had
lost in Saint-Domingue, including the money GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINARIES AND

invested in their slaves, and amounted to a fine
for revolution. Unable to pay, the Haitian govern-
MORAL RE-ARRANGEMENTS
ment took loans from French banks, entering a
cycle of debt that would last into the twentieth The violence inherent in the disavowal of the
century the United States occupied Haiti in entanglements between colonialism and
1915, crushing a resistance movement whose modern diplomacy, or denial of their coeval
soldiers believed they were fighting a second emergence, is revealed in the shifting geo-
Haitian Revolution, and departed in 1934, but
not before Haitis constitution was altered to
graphical locus of the moral discourse on the
allow whites again to own land there. (Dubois, slave trade. In the post-abolition era, Europes
2005: 3034) ethico-political and ontological commitments
to anti-slavery shifted from a moralizing
In Haiti, we witness the colonized subjects condemnation of European demand for slaves
quest for universal freedom or humanity to work its plantations in the new world to
through the mediation of the universal Africas willingness to supply (Thorne, 1997:
alienation of mankind rather than the pur- 241; Opondo, 2010). Accordingly, the fight
suit of the mediation of the particular alien- against the slave trade moved to the East
ation of states. This contributes to an African coast where Arab allies like the
ambiguous project where one contests or Sultan of Zanzibar were considered crucial to
negotiates rather than seeks to resolve with both the colonization and civilization of
absolute certainty the conflict between par- Africa and the abolition of the slave trade.
ticularism and universalism (Der Derian, These concerns over the introduction of
1987: 136). Critical diplomatic theorists like European civilization and a commitment to
James Der Derian have fruitfully illustrated the opposition of slavery in Africa were the
how anti-colonial utopias can be anti- subject of a meeting on International
diplomatic and even contribute to terror, as Geography held in Brussels in 1876 with dev-
illustrated by his reading of Frantz Fanons astating effects for Africa. For instance, the
Wretched of the Earth. formation of the Belgian Committee of the
Association Internationale Africaine (AIA)
and expeditions into the interior of Africa
organized by King Leopold created the condi-
Key Points tions of possibility for the colonization of the
Congo. Not only did Pope Pius IX (184678)
The coloniality of modern diplomacy and the mul-
tiple ways in which anti-colonial practices create support Leopolds civilization project, the
and tap into a bond between liberators, thus AIA was recognized by the multi-lateral
creating new spaces of diplomatic encounter Berlin conference (188485), thus making
as well as a new idea of (diplomatic) man (Der Leopold the sovereign of the Etat independ-
Derian, 1987: 156). ent du Congo while partitioning most of
To read the history of Haiti as part of colonial Africa along the lines that are the basis of
history without considering its diplomatic predi- postcolonial state diplomacy and violence in
cates and vice versa contributes to a moralized the postcolony (Mudimbe, 1994: 106).
diplomatic history that overlooks the histories As Ali Mazrui puts it in the preface to
of violent mediation of estrangement that Haiti
Adekeye Adebajos The Curse of Berlin, the
reveals, contests and reproduces.
irony of Bismarck is that he helped to unify
Like the history of many Caribbean and African
societies, overlooking the colonial diplomacies Germany while initiating the division of
and coloniality of diplomacy leads to the assump- Africa. As a result of these old diplomatic/
tion that postcolonial diplomacy begins with colonial machinations, we saw the emer-
decolonization and entry into the world of sov- gence of one of the most powerful nations
ereign statehood. in the world on one hand and the invention
of the most vulnerable region on the other countries, and the passive right of legation
(Mazrui, 2010: ix). The resultant regimes (jus passivum), by receiving foreign diplo-
of recognition meant that groups that were matic missions; while the colonized peoples
hitherto the subject of foreign relations in are relegated to the reception of a range of
a diplomatic sense (complete with its proto- foreign diplomatic agents and colonial gover-
cols, privileges and immunities), became the nors, explorers and missionaries without the
subject of a colonial rationality and credo of correlative right of sending them. In spite of
power that makes the native the prototype of the complex set of diplomatic norms that the
the animal or a thing to be altered at will Bey of Tunisia shared with European states
while simultaneously producing diplomatic for many years, it could receive but not send
man (Mbembe, 2001: 46). However, it is its own diplomatic agents given that rela-
worthwhile to note that colonial rhetoric on tions with Tunisia as a French protectorate
what it meant to be European, diplomatic, were mediated through the Resident General
African or human was riddled with contra- appointed by the French government (Silva,
dictions and constantly sought meanings on 1972: 35, 38). In the post-French revolution
which to anchor the desire to know, reorgan- era, the Bey also had to deal with a unilat-
ize and dominate colonized peoples. In order eral transformation of protocol among other
to achieve their own ends, some colonized forms of non-reciprocity when the French
peoples like Mzilikazi, the Ndebele leader, consuls and nationals refused to kiss his hand
appropriated the colonial apparatus or cre- as was the custom among the Beys subjects
ated zones of negotiation from which they and consuls (Windler, 2001: 93, 98).
could resist or transgress against the coloniz- With the shift to the new diplomacy, a
ing cultures. As a result, in his friendship with supposedly more moral form of diplomatic
the missionary Robert Moffat in the 1820s, engagement, we witness a continuation of
Mzilikazi did not welcome the mission- the old partialities with regard to colonized
ary as an evangelizing force but as a good peoples. Whereas the Berlin Conference
messenger who would inform him about partitioned and divided Africans in order to
approaching enemies to the Ndebele state, colonize them, the League of Nations, and
agent of Western culture, trading agent with more so its mandate system, can be seen as
white South Africa and technician with the a continuation rather than a move towards
skills required to mend and repair firearms the abolition of colonial logics as it merely
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 100102). re-distributes colonies based on the assump-
These colonial contradictions made the tion that colonized peoples were not ready
colonial encounter more than a one-sided to govern themselves. Not only did the man-
affair. By altering conceptions and orienta- dates system set up under Article 22 of the
tions towards the foreign and the domestic, Covenant of the League of Nations uphold
friend and enemy, the culturally proper and the idea that the colonies were being held
the improper, they transformed established in trust for civilization, it also categorized
diplomatic protocols and ceremonies while the colonies along developmental and civili-
creating a space where the everyday colonial- zational lines (Upthegrove, 1954: 5). In the
ist could act as some form of diplomatic agent trusteeship plan (The League of Nations A
complete with the immunities, privileges and Practical Solution) published by General Jan
the sliding credentials required for the colo- Smuts on 16 December 1918, the mandates
nial enterprise. The same can be said for the were divided into three categories based
principle of the right to legation. In the colo- on their location, economic states and cul-
nial context, we witness Europeans exercising tural development. The Class A mandates
both the active right of legation (jus activum), (Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq) were all
by establishing diplomatic missions in foreign received by Great Britain and were considered
to have a higher stage of development; while The spectres of the colonial system continue to
Class B mandates (British Togoland, British haunt the postcolonial present. A case in point
Cameroons and Tanganyika) were formerly is the mandate system that structured apartheid
owned by Germany and were considered era South West Africa (Namibia)South Africa
less advanced and thus requiring more relations; another is the mandate for Palestine,
which, unlike other mandates, acted as a trustee
supervision (Upthegrove, 1954: 17). The last
for the conscience of the civilized world by privi-
category of mandates (Class C: South West leging and holding in trust the land for Jewish
Africa and the Pacific Islands) were assigned people as a whole who are not yet there on the
to neighbouring powers due to the sparse- ground (Upthegrove, 1954: 145).
ness of population, their small size and their However, the historical abuses of morally-
remoteness from the centers of civilization inflected diplomatic discourses have not gone
(Upthegrove, 1954: 12). uncontested by those who resist or negotiate the
In the 1960s, actively anti-colonial Asian, colonial negations.
African and Latin American governments
sought to prevent the abuse of Chapter XI of
the UN Charter by noting that the colonial
powers had used the general act of the Berlin CONCLUSION
Africa Congress of 1884 and Article 23b of
the Covenant of the League of Nations to The above attempts to reveal the diplomacy
achieve their colonial objectives. As such, the colonialism nexus make it possible for us to
United Nations became one of the sites for the engage the postcolonial present in a manner
collision of the giant forces of colonialism that does not distribute colonial guilt on the
and anti-colonialism, while the discourses one hand, or create a sanitized idea of diplo-
related to safeguarding the well-being of col- macy on the other (Mamdani, 1984: 1048).
onized peoples became the subject of critique Rather than think of the colony and the post-
(Ahmad Hassan, 1974: 3; see also Chapters colony as spaces of lack and incompleteness,
10 and 2934 in this Handbook). a place where diplomacys promises can only
The contrapuntal reading of the ethic of be realized through the logics of command,
the necessity for continuous negotiations administration and conversion, the chapter
that this chapter explores points to both the illustrates how the postcolony a site that is
negations and negotiations that accompany at once necropolitical and life affirming
diplomatic and colonial encounters. presents some of the most complex negotia-
tions of the meanings of modern diplomacy
by revisiting its connections to nature and the
question of being, the denigration and
Key Points
mismeasure of man, colonial rule, the cel-
The civilizational mission, abolitionism, capital- ebration of the nation-state as an anti-colonial
ism and will-to-convert contributed to the shift apparatus, to more recent revelations of the
in moral and diplomatic discourses resulting in pitfalls of national consciousness.
the replacement of slavery with colonialism and As such, the postcolony (and the colony
settlement or passing on of the colonies from one before it) encourage us to continuously plu-
colonial master to another.
ralize or renegotiate our idea of modern diplo-
The resultant moral cartography was at once
macy given its entanglements with colonial
colonial and diplomatic. Its colonial imperatives
continuously limited the diplomatic possibilities. violence as well as transgressive life-affirm-
For instance, multi-lateral diplomatic entities like ing imaginaries. This means that critical
the League of Nations found it easier to imagine reflections on the diplomatic, colonial and
the end of war for Europeans or world peace anti-colonial or postcolonial self should be
than the more modest project of decolonization. more patient and vigilant as they could very
easily become self-congratulatory forma- exist across difference (Glissant, 2000). While
tions that forget that the world is a crowded the promise of modern diplomacy might be
place (Said, 1993: xxi). The same can be said presented as that which would enable us to
for recognition-based practices that seek to have an effective cosmopolitan, humanitar-
expand the domain of diplomacy or citizenship ian, multicultural and even a more peaceful
through the incorporation of colonized others dialogue among states, the critical diplomatic
into existing political and diplomatic imagi- project enables us to recognize the limits of
naries as a corrective to centuries of colonial these projects while experimenting with or
exploitation. These range from present day apprehending multi-natural and cosmopoliti-
multi-track diplomatic efforts that tap into cal possibilities in an age where violence on
indigenous conflict resolution methods not as human and non-human beings in the name of
diplomacy proper, but as ethno-diplomacies humanity or culture is becoming moralized,
to be used to solve some of the local problems common and acceptable. An age which, like
arising from colonial and postcolonial politi- the colonial era that precedes it, is marked by a
cal arrangements while distracting us from a human and humanitarian calculus that makes
critique of the arrangements themselves or the it possible to purse violence as a lesser evil, to
material conditions of existences of subaltern convert rather than converse with difference or
groups. In the context of settler colonial soci- where the responsibility to protect vulnerable
eties like Canada, recognition-based mod- human life has become the right to punish.
els of liberal pluralism also act as a form of
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4
Statecraft, Strategy and
Diplomacy
Markus Kornprobst
INTRODUCTION 174 articles with a title including the word

diplomacy but only ten with a title includ-
It is simply stating the obvious that statecraft, ing the word statecraft. Of these ten articles,
strategy and diplomacy are closely related. only seven are research articles and only one
Strategy is an important guide for statecraft. of these a discussion of Machiavelli ends
Diplomacy features prominently both in this up discussing the concept in depth. When the
guide and in actual practices of statecraft. Yet journal web-page outlines the objectives of
this chapter seeks to go beyond the obvious. the journal, there is mentioning of diplomacy
What is statecraft? How are strategy and and diplomats but not of statecraft.1
diplomacy to be conceptualized? How do A similar pattern prevails in books writ-
these concepts hang together? ten on statecraft. There are many books that
I deal with these questions one after the feature the term statecraft in the title but
other. The reason for this is simple. While the content of the books does not define the
there are rich literatures on strategy and concept. The concept does not even appear in
diplomacy, statecraft is something akin to a the index (Ledeen, 1988; Zelikow and Rice,
conceptual enigma in International Studies. 1995; Barrett, 2003; McKercher, 2012).
Statecraft is widely considered to be an impor- There seems to be something about the term
tant concept. But there is a lack of conceptu- statecraft that is of some importance. This
alization of the term. For instance, the term is why authors choose to use the term. At the
features in the title of the well-known jour- same time, however, the meaning of the term
nal Diplomacy & Statecraft. But the actual often remains up in the air.
content of the journal is lop-sided. There is a I contend that most authors address-
lot about diplomacy but not that much about ing the conceptual triad of statecraft, strat-
statecraft. Thus far, the journal has published egy and diplomacy draw from five broader
Statecraft, Strategy and Diplomacy 55
Table 4.1 Five perspectives on statecraft, strategy and diplomacy

Statecraft Strategy Diplomacy
Classical realism Prudent choice of means Plan for choosing means to Crafting balance of power
to secure survival achieve an end
Rational choice Compute costs and Sequential plan of moves to Bargaining international institutions
benefits attain preference into being
Cognitive Putting heuristics to use to Adaptive plan for choosing Wielding power without waging war
approaches serve interest means to achieve an end (producing of heuristics)
Culturalist Context as resource for Compass for coping with Communicating global order into
approaches reasoning international relations being
Critical approaches Habitual reasoning Strategy without strategist Unreflectively communicating unjust
global order into being
perspectives to make sense of the concept: uncovers five perspectives: classical realism,
classical realism, rational choice, cognitive rational choice, cognitive approaches, cultur-
approaches, culturalist approaches and criti- alist approaches and critical approaches.
cal approaches. These perspectives underline Table 4.1 provides an overview of these
that statecraft, strategy and diplomacy are lenses.
closely interrelated. But they differ in terms Classical realism is close to the founda-
of how they define these concepts and how tional works on statecraft written by Kautilya
they relate them to one another. Discussing (1915), Plato (2013) and Machiavelli (1979)
the strengths and weaknesses of these per- when it comes to conceptualizing statecraft.
spectives, I argue for more eclecticism. Statecraft is, above all, about prudent rea-
Classical realism, rational choice, and cogni- soning. The end of this reasoning is state
tive approaches are more concise and parsi- survival (Carr, 1964: 1534; Wolfers, 1962;
monious when they address the conceptual Morgenthau, 1985: 11584; Kissinger, 2001:
triad. But cultural and critical approaches 31).3 Given that classical realists consider
provide important insights that need to be statecraft an art, they do not try to squeeze
taken seriously when we want to make sense prudent reasoning into an elegant theory
of our changing global polity. (Morgenthau, 1985: 565; Kissinger, 2001:
This chapter is organized as follows. First, 285). But they are very vocal about what it
I provide an overview of how the five per- is not. It is to be sharply distinguished from
spectives link strategy and diplomacy to emotions and ideological zeal (Morgenthau,
statecraft. Second, I discuss these linkages. 1985: 5847; Kissinger, 2001: 26473).
Third, I propose an eclectic agenda for further It comes quite naturally to classical real-
research. Fourth, I conclude on an empirical ists to link statecraft closely to strategy and
note, highlighting the need to move beyond diplomacy. Statecraft revolves around relat-
entrenched understandings of the conceptual ing means to an end. Strategy stands in the
triad. middle between means and ends. Strategy
is the guide for choosing means to achieve
an end. Classical realist scholarship tends to
conceptualize strategy in terms of grand strat-
FIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATECRAFT, egy. It advocates particular grand strategies
STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY and related courses of action. The balance
of power always looms large in these strate-
This section discusses the main perspectives gies. Such a balance is the only kind of (tenu-
on statecraft, strategy and diplomacy.2 It ous) stability that is possible in an anarchic
system (Morgenthau, 1965; Kissinger, 2012). the sanctions regime (Solingen, 2012b) and
This is where diplomacy comes in. Prudent not, say, by negotiation skill. Liberal inter-
state leaders gear their strategies towards governmentalism also reduces diplomacy to
crafting a balance of power. It is no coin- bargaining. What economic sanctions are to
cidence, therefore, that Morgenthau con- authors such as Solingen, credible threats
cludes his influential Politics among Nations with implications for domestic economies
with a chapter on diplomacy (Morgenthau, are to Moravcsik (1998: 3). They are the key
1985: 56194). It is also no coincidence that causal force that determines the outcomes
Kissinger (1994) titles one of his most-cited of bargaining, i.e. whether more integra-
books simply Diplomacy. Diplomatic means tion happens or not. Nevertheless, there is a
are considered to be highly important. A bal- notable difference between the two rational
ance of power does not just happen. It has to choice strands. In Moravcsik, the bargaining
be made by diplomats with an adequate strat- of diplomats has the potential to create an
egy for how to do so. institutional order within which future dip-
Some authors conceptualize statecraft as lomatic bargaining takes place. The kind of
rational choice. In this view, state leaders bargaining addressed in the economic sanc-
compute what means are best suited to attain tions literature, by contrast, is not productive
a states given goal. Statecraft thus under- in this fashion. It affects behaviour directly
stood is not an art. Practising statecraft is but does not create an order for future diplo-
something akin to a science, and it is to be matic encounters.
analysed by the scientific means of elegant Authors putting cognitive approaches to
and parsimonious theories (Solingen, 2009: use to write about statecraft also weave the
14851; Moravcsik, 2013). This perspective concept together with strategy and diplomacy.
encompasses two main strands of thought on Statecraft is again conceptualized in terms of
statecraft, i.e. research on economic sanc- relating means to ends. Leaders weigh the
tions (Cain, 2007; Solingen, 2012a)4 and lib- expected costs and benefits of their actions
eral intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998, in terms of how they serve the national inter-
1999). est. But cognitive approaches conceptualize
For the rational choice perspective, strat- processes of reasoning differently from the
egy is a key term. Strategy is important perspectives above. They are not content
because a leader engaging in statecraft never with the normative prescription to be prudent
acts alone on the world stage. There are other (classical realism) and they are highly scep-
actors as well. In game theoretical language, tical about the far-reaching computational
players are locked into a game that they play powers of leaders assumed by rational choice.
with one another. Striving for getting what Instead, they vow to look into the analytical
one wants in this game requires something black boxes of decision-making (George,
akin to a game plan. A particular move by 1997: 44). Leaders acquire a heuristic bag-
one player is to be countered by a particular gage and put these cognitive shortcuts to use
move by another player and so on. The anal- to make sense of reality and make decisions.
ogy here is a chess game. The players cal- This putting to use, in turn, may reshape their
culate several moves ahead (Barrett, 2003). heuristics.5 Authors often use the term judge-
Research on economic sanctions puts much ment to describe these processes of sense-
less emphasis on diplomacy than on strategy. making and decision-making (Lamborn and
Economic sanctions do the explanation of Mumme, 1988: 6; Rosenthal, 1995; Ross,
the behaviour of the target stage. Diplomacy, 2007: x). This line of inquiry heavily borrows
understood as bargaining, makes its appear- from Herbert Simons path-breaking work on
ances in these studies. But the bargaining bounded rationality (Bulpitt, 1986; Baldwin,
outcome is explained by the properties of 1999/2000; Buller, 2000: 13).
Cognitive approaches take strategy and judgement. But they are not clear about
diplomacy seriously, too. Similarly to classi- what judgement actually is. This is somewhat
cal realism, cognitive approaches understand reminiscent of classical realism. Again, state-
strategy as something that is located in the craft is considered an art, and culturalists are
middle between means and ends. Nevertheless, reluctant to over-theorize this art (Butterfield,
the cognitive conceptualization of strategy is 1960: 99120; Bozeman, 1992: 25355;
distinctive. Strategy is a plan for action that Hirschman, 2013).
evolves over time. Decision-makers have the Culturalist approaches offer alternative
ability to adapt their strategies (Lauren etal., understandings of strategy and diplomacy.
2014: 290). Strategy, in other words, is not Hirschman conceptualizes strategy more com-
something that merely features among the prehensively than rationalist perspectives. He
parameters of rationality. It is also a potential includes a wider range of means. Strategy is
outcome of interaction. Diplomacy plays a key about making use of resources that are usually
role when it comes to this interaction. Authors hidden (Hirschman, 1958: 5). He also prob-
tend to relate diplomacy to policy outcomes. lematizes how interests come to be defined by
Research on coercive diplomacy, for instance, actors (Hirschman, 1986: 3555). Bozeman
is concerned with how leaders put robust breaks with rationalist conceptualizations
diplomatic means to use in order to avoid with more determination. Strategy is akin to
the escalation of a crisis into war. Cognitive a compass that helps actors to come to terms
approaches, therefore, deliver a hands-on per- with life (Bozeman, 1992: 1). Butterfields
spective on diplomacy. They are about how work on statecraft is clearly influenced by the
diplomacy leads to a certain policy outcome. English Schools tendency to define diplo-
They are in contrast to classical realism and macy in terms of communication (Watson,
liberal intergovernmentalism not concerned 1982: 11; Bull, 1995: 1623). Bozeman
with the making of political order. (1979), having undergone diplomatic training
The culturalist perspective is very het- herself, conceptualizes diplomacy as multi-
erogeneous.6 Albert Hirschman, Herbert cultural communication. Understandings of
Butterfield and Adda Bozeman address diplomacy as communication, although more
the conceptual triad of statecraft, strategy implicit, are found in Hirschmans work as
and diplomacy in quite some depth. These well (Hirschman, 1978). Very much in line
authors share in common that they conceive with the emphasis on social context, the inter-
of actors as socially embedded in context. relatedness of statecraft, strategy and diplo-
Hirschman (1977) approaches capitalism as a macy can have a very broad impact, the social
social context, and Butterfield (1952) is very context within which this interrelatedness
much indebted to the English School when he happens very much included. Hirschman, for
writes about international society. Bozeman instance, is primarily interested in issues of
(1992: 1) comes close to defining statecraft economic and developmental order. Bozeman
in terms of social context: The term state- and Butterfield allude to how statecraft shapes
craft [] stands for the sum total of human a diplomatic context that is widely shared
dispositions, doctrines, policies, institutions, beyond nation-state boundaries.
processes, and operations that are designed to Critical approaches, similarly to cultur-
assure the governance, security, and survival alist ones, draw heavily from sociological
of a politically unified human group. Yet for insights. But the epistemological stance of
all the insights provided by culturalists on the former differs from the latter. Critical
the social context within which reasoning approaches do not merely seek to understand
takes place, there are not many clues as to statecraft, strategy and diplomacy. They aim
how reasoning proceeds. Some authors, simi- at critiquing it. Borrowing from poststruc-
larly to cognitive approaches, use the term turalist thought, critical scholars allude to
oppressive background ideas.7 These give than in culturalist approaches (Der Derian,
rise to unreflective practices of exploitation 1987; Constantinou, 1996) (See also Chapters
and injustice. Reflecting on the USMexico 5, 7 and 8 in this Handbook).
border, Roxanne Lynne Doty (2001: 525)
argues that statecraft is:
Key Points
rooted not in the rationality of atomistic actors
made up by IR scholars, but in the forces, the There are five main perspectives on state-
impulses, and energies that traverse this seemingly craft, strategy and diplomacy: classical realism,
endless tract of land divided, on maps, by a line rational choice, cognitive approaches, culturalist
that separates the worlds richest country from one
approaches and critical approaches.
of the poorest.
They agree that statecraft is, ultimately, about
rationality. But they conceptualize reasoning
This quote also illustrates the potential differently, alluding to prudence, computation,
effects of statecraft. According to critical heuristics, social contexts more generally and
scholars, statecraft reproduces taken-for- exploitative contexts more specifically.
granted ideas that are implicated in sustain- They agree that statecraft, strategy and diplo-
ing oppressive orders. These are substantive macy are interwoven. But they conceptualize
and procedural in nature. Cynthia Weber strategy and diplomacy differently as well.
(2010), for instance, critiques liberalism for Schisms cut deep, with scholars coming down
justifying oppressive domestic and interna- on different sides of the structureagency debate
tional practices.8 Richard Ashley (1989) (ontology) and even on how to conduct research
(epistemology).
deals more with the procedural aspect of who
is entitled to engage in statecraft when he
chastises statecraft as mancraft.
With very few exceptions (Doty, 1996: DISCUSSING THE FIVE PERSPECTIVES
83; 1045) critical scholars provide only a
few hints about how statecraft, strategy and This section discusses the strengths and
diplomacy are related. But these are worth weaknesses of these five perspectives. I con-
discussing. Some authors address strategy tend that rationalist perspectives are, com-
but give it a rather different spin. The con- pared to sociological perspectives, more
cept of strategy without strategist (Rabinow, concise about what statecraft, strategy and
2003: 54; Thomas, 2014: 170), for instance, diplomacy are, and how these three concepts
re-
conceptualizes strategy and squarely hang together. Yet this comes at the price of
locates it in the social context as opposed overly narrow conceptualizations of state-
to autonomous individual decision-making. craft, strategy and diplomacy. Sociological
Strategies, too, are habitual. They are outside perspectives provide important insights for
of the realm of the reflective. In the last two how to move beyond these narrow
decades, critical scholarship has generated a confines.
number of important studies on diplomacy. Among the three rationalist perspectives,
Similarly to culturalist research, communica- rational choice defines its terms in the most
tive encounters feature prominently in these concise and parsimonious manner. Rationality
studies. The focus is not on explicit encoun- is assumed to be the maximization of expected
ters but more on the orthodoxies and hetero- utility, strategy is the plan for how to do so
doxies that underpin these communicative while interacting with others, and diplomacy
encounters and constitute them in the first is about the actual interaction, defined as
place. To put this differently, context and bargaining. Cognitive approaches, too, are
the production and reproduction of hidden concise. Reasoning revolves around heu-
context is considered even more important ristic devices and strategy is an adaptive
plan linked to these heuristics. Diplomacy and decision-making. At times, sociologi-

is often not addressed in its full breadth. cal perspectives, too, are overly narrow. This
Authors focus on a particular aspect of it: applies especially to critical approaches.
coercive diplomacy (see also Chapter 38 in They put heavy emphasis on the unreflected
this Handbook). But cognitive approaches as opposed to the reflected. This is quite a
are less parsimonious. Opening up the black radical move. It is far from clear whether
box of decision-making has the major ben- reasoning and applying strategies are always
efit that researchers do not merely rely on habitual.
assumptions about how decisions are made Nonetheless, sociological perspectives
but actually inquire into the process of make important contributions. They help us
decision-making. Classical realism is par-
re-think entrenched categories. They push us
simonious but not always as concise as the to work towards a more sophisticated under-
other two rationalist approaches. At the standing of rationality and strategy. Cognitive
risk of oversimplifying the classical realist approaches make a very strong case that
account, statecraft, strategy and diplomacy clues held by individuals matter for how they
are, ultimately, about one particular demand figure out what to do. Culturalist and criti-
placed on leadership by international anar- cal approaches highlight that clues held by
chy: Realpolitik. But processes of reasoning communities matter, too. They also highlight
are not addressed in any rigorous fashion. that not all reasoning is all out in the open.
The same applies to strategy and diplomacy. There are reflective and unreflective dimen-
Rationalist accounts, however, also have sions. Perhaps most importantly, sociological
their drawbacks. With the conceptualizations approaches prompt us to embrace a broader
of statecraft, strategy and diplomacy being view of diplomacy. Statecraft and strategy
rather narrow, authors miss important aspects leave their mark on global and regional orders
of the conceptual triad. The conceptualiza- and they do so via diplomacy. Vice versa,
tions of statecraft and strategy are all about diplomacy shapes statecraft and strategy. In
autonomous, individual decision-making. some encounters, diplomacy may amount
There is nothing about advisors shaping the to little more than bargaining. But in oth-
views of leaders or leaders bowing under pub- ers, it may go much beyond that. Messages
lic pressure. There is nothing about shared may win over other actors. In the language
decision-making clues. Conceptualizations of rational choice, diplomatic communica-
of diplomacy are, arguably, even more nar- tion can change preferences. Equally impor-
row. In classical realism, the diplomats that tantly, diplomatic communication may leave
matter are the key decision-making figures its mark on the authority of the interlocutors,
of great powers, and the only kind of diplo- strengthening or weakening their status as
macy that is elaborated on in depth is the senders of messages. This communication is
crafting of the balance of power. Rational by no means confined to state-to-state interac-
choice reduces diplomacy to bargaining tion (or even the interaction of great powers).
among states. Cognitive approaches, too, are It potentially encompasses all governors of
all about state interaction, especially coercive regional and global governance no matter
diplomacy involving great powers (see also whether they are state or non-state actors.
Chapter 22 in this Handbook).
Sociological perspectives are more ten-
tative when they define statecraft, strategy
and diplomacy. They often find it particu- Key Points
larly difficult to deal with reasoning and Rationalist perspectives (classical realism,
strategy because their focus is on social rational choice, cognitive approaches) are more
context as opposed to individual autonomy concise and parsimonious in their discussion of
statecraft, strategy and diplomacy than soci- Precisely such discussion is required, how-
ological ones (culturalist approaches, critical ever, in order to get a better understanding of
approaches). rationality. Rationality, after all, is probably
But sociological perspectives provide important the key concept underpinning statecraft.
inputs for moving beyond the limitations of How does statecraft come to pro-
rationalist perspectives.
duce what aspects of international order?
Conceptualizing order, many international
relations theorists have moved far beyond
simple dichotomies of anarchy and hierarchy
AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER along with unidimensional views of interna-
RESEARCH tional order that are all about military capa-
bilities. Global governance may very well be
Based on the discussions above, this section a fuzzy concept. But research on global gov-
develops an agenda for further research. ernance shows plenty of potential to improve
Drawing upon current debates in interna- our understandings of the complex nature of
tional relations theory and the study of diplo- international order (Rosenau and Czempiel,
macy, it identifies questions for improving 1992; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Hurrell,
our understanding of the conceptual triad as 2007). It makes a compelling case, for
well as our normative discussions about it. instance, that the world becomes more and
How do agents come to figure out what to more interdependent. It also demonstrates
do? Research on statecraft would benefit if it that more and more issue areas that used to be
engaged in more detail with the concept of dealt with on the domestic level are pushed
rationality. In international relations theory, onto the international one, such as environ-
there are numerous debates about rational- ment, health and migration. These changes
ity. There are debates about how utilitar- are of major importance for research on state-
ian actors weigh costs and benefits between craft. They demand new answers to old ques-
rational choice and psychological approaches tions. Questions about statecraft and national
(Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott, 2004). security, at the forefront of research and
Furthermore, there are debates about logics practices of statecraft, have to take the evolu-
of action other than this consequentialist one. tion towards more and more interdependence
Scholars putting forward the logic of appro- into account. The changes also pose entirely
priateness hold that the actors we study do new questions, such as how some issue areas
not always weigh costs and benefits; some- make it onto the global agenda while others
times they are rule-followers (March and do not. This may very well have something to
Olsen, 1989). Writers arguing for the logic do with statecraft.
of argumentation hold that there are cir- How does strategy link up with rational-
cumstances under which actors come to be ity and order? Old and new debates among
persuaded to change their views, even their international relations theorists help to
preferences, while interacting with others elaborate on the entrenched scholarly defi-
(Risse, 2000). Authors making a case for the nition of strategy as a plan for choosing
logic of practice submit that actors do not means to pursue a given end. They add to
always reflect in order to figure out what to the pool of means (Nye, 2004; Barnett and
do; at times they simply do, following the Duvall, 2005) and put the concept of inter-
background knowledge they hold (Pouliot, est under scrutiny (Wheeler, 1992; Weldes,
2008). In research on statecraft, these differ- 1999). They contend that grand strategy is
ent scholarly understandings of rationality a taken-for-granted guide for action that is
are present. But there is very little discus- not just about means and ends but also about
sion about them across perspectival divides. epistemic understandings of the security
environment and representations of iden- a particular mode of communication with one

tity (Kornprobst, 2015). These elaborations another (Kornprobst, 2012; see also Chapters
make for thought-provoking questions for 6 and 35 in this Handbook).
research on statecraft: What are the sub- How ought statecraft be conducted and
tle means of statecraft in our age? Is there what ought to be the relationship between
such a thing as an enlightened self-interest academia and statecraft? Most writings
in statecraft? Where do understandings of about statecraft are normative in nature. They
security environments, identity, interests and are, ultimately, not just about how statecraft
means come from and how do they, woven works but about how it ought to work. There
together, come to assume a taken-for-granted is, in principle, nothing wrong with that. But
quality? For the most part, these questions normative theory needs to be discussed as
pertain to processes of how strategy guides normative theory. This means two things:
practical reason to build order. Yet there are first, there has to be a meta-theoretical debate
also questions most notably the last one about how scholarly knowledge affects state-
that would make researchers look into how craft. What are the processes through which
order is implicated in shaping the ingredients scholarly ideas make it out of the supposed
of strategy, which in turn deeply influences Ivory Tower of academia and come to inform
practical reasoning. statecraft? What kinds of processes are war-
How does diplomacy link up with ration- ranted and what kinds are not? With the
ality, strategy and order? Recent research exception of critical approaches, writings on
on diplomacy revisits these concepts. It statecraft are not sufficiently self-reflective,
underlines the importance of the questions and critical approaches run the risk of throw-
outlined above. Research on global health, ing the baby out with the bathwater, i.e. they
for instance, often mentions the concept of tend to equate statecraft with oppression.
enlightened self-interest (Yach, 1998; Fauci, Second, there has to be a theoretical debate
2007). The telecommunications revolu- about morality and statecraft. In the 1980s,
tion has prompted scholars of diplomacy to normative research in international relations
elaborate on the means used by diplomats. still felt constantly obliged to defend the
Public diplomacy and, very much related purpose of normative writings against the
to it, e-diplomacy are among these means classical realist stance that morality in inter-
(Gilboa, 2008). There is also a more and national affairs is simply about pursuing the
more nuanced understanding of different national interest and securing the nations
forms of power that necessitates revisiting survival (Beitz, 1988). Yet normative theory
the means used by diplomats. Several stud- in international relations has come of age.
ies on diplomatic routines provide evidence It is much more self-confident now and no
for the logic of practice (Guzzini, 2000; longer feels the constant need to defend its
Neumann, 2002). All of these elaborations very existence against classical realism.
on practical reason and the role of strategy In the age of globalization and global gov-
in it point towards the salience of the context ernance, research on statecraft, too, has to
in which diplomats are embedded. Authors address normative issues in a more sophis-
address this context in substantive and pro- ticated fashion. Orthodox interpretations of
cedural terms. When diplomats communi- classical realism should not curb normative
cate about a particular issue concerning arms research. Critical engagement (Lebow, 2003;
control, for instance, they do so based on (a Williams, 2005), by contrast, facilitates it.
selective reading of) existing arms control So do several avenues of research advocated
agreements. Additionally, the way they com- above, including the scrutiny of enlightened
municate with one another is a peculiarly interest and the interaction of state and non-
diplomatic one. Diplomats are socialized into state actors.
Key Points bombardments and a ground troop invasion

into Gaza. Once again, civilians suffer the
Future research on the nexus of statecraft, strat-
horrible and deadly consequences of refus-
egy and diplomacy should develop our under-
als by political leaders to look for political
standings of practical reason (statecraft and
strategy) and communication among different solutions. Islamic State (IS) jihadists, hav-
actors (including diplomacy) further. ing proclaimed a new caliphate, expand the
The key explanandum of such investigations territories they hold in Syria and Iraq. They
should be the making and unmaking of order. terrorize the population, targeting Christians,
In addition to research focused on explaining the moderate Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and
making and unmaking of order, there should also especially Yazidis. Boco Haram, a militant
be a normative research agenda. Muslim sect, burns villages, abducts people,
rapes and kills in Nigeria. The situation for
civilians in the embattled Eastern Ukraine
worsens. Russian separatists shoot down a
CONCLUDING EMPIRICALLY: SOME civilian aircraft headed for Malaysia. The
THOUGHTS ON OUR GLOBAL POLITY Netherlands mourns; most of the passengers
were Dutch.
July 1914. Austria-Hungary issues a sharp Far away from the headlines, people con-
ultimatum to Serbia. Germany declares its tinue to die because of poverty and poverty-
unconditional support of Austria. On 28 July, related diseases. Child mortality continues to
Vienna declares war on Serbia. The world be a major problem in the Global South, in
slides into the First World War. July 2014. A particular Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern
hundred years later, there is no world war. Asia. About 1,500 children under the age
Indeed, there is not a single inter-state war. of five die every month due to preventable
Yet leaders are struggling to cope with a host diseases that are closely linked to poverty.9
of issues that have been recurring over and The situation is particularly dire in countries
over again for some time. ravaged by war. In South Sudan, war causes
To name but a few, it is boat season starvation. West African states join in their
(Sherwood etal., 2014) in the Mediterranean efforts to battle Ebola. The United Nations
Sea. Trying to escape intra-state war, violence, Development Programme (UNDP) publishes
poverty and crime, tens of thousands embark its annual Human Development Report, high-
on largely unseaworthy and hopelessly over- lighting yet again that environmental deg-
crowded boats to cross the Mediterranean radation, poverty and conflict hang closely
from Africa to Europe. In the European Union, together.10
the flows of migration are often understood as This comparison between the 1914 July
a security issue and dealt with accordingly crisis and the world a hundred years on is, of
(Zaiotti, 2011). At the USMexico border, course, very sketchy. But it is suggestive. On
well over 50,000 children try to cross the the one hand, todays global politics is mark-
border, their parents desperately hoping for edly different from the past. More and more
better lives for their children in the United issue areas that were considered domestic in
States. Congress refuses to allocate funds for the past move onto the international agenda,
humanitarian aid. Instead, Texas mobilizes and more and more new and old items on
1,000 troops of the National Guard and sends this agenda become closely interwoven.
them to the border, determined to secure Take migration flows to Europe, for instance.
the Southern border of the United States Intra-state wars make the number of refu-
(Governor Rick Perry, quoted in Bever, 2014). gees increase to the highest number since
Israel, targeted by Hamas missiles yet the Second World War. IS, therefore, makes
again, responds with yet another round of itself felt not only in Iraq and Syria but also
in neighbouring countries and Europe. This century more than fifty years ago, the postu-
is not only due to the many refugees trying lates and critiques we deliver are unlikely to
to escape the slaughter. Among its fighters be very helpful for the twenty-first century.
are a large number of foreigners. European If we engage in a broad debate with scholars
governments debate nervously about what to from different perspectives and practitioners
do when European citizens, having fought for representing different kinds of state and non-
IS, return to Europe. IS, to continue this short state actors, we may have opportunities to do
list of interrelatedness in todays global pol- better than that (see also Chapters 2933 in
ity, formed in response to the US-led invasion this Handbook).
of Iraq in 2003.
On the other hand, leaders especially
state leaders are struggling to find answers
to todays problems. All too often, they hold
on to a deeply entrenched security reflex. NOTES
When major problems arise for a state, they
1 Diplomacy & Statecraft, www.tandfonline.com/
equate these problems with threats to national action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&jo
security and choose military means that origi- urnalCode=fdps20#.U7ZaP53mSUk [accessed 4
nate as responses to inter-state wars. The US July 2014].
reaction to Latin American children trying 2 Note that I only include perspectives in this over-
view that address all three concepts. Neoclassical
to cross the border shows this security reflex
Realism, thus far, has tended to shy away from
all too clearly. The security reflex, however, engaging with statecraft explicitly. Those neoclas-
is often highly misleading. There is, after sical realists who do write on statecraft borrow
all, a difference between nuclear weapons, considerably from cognitive approaches. See, for
tanks and heavy armoury on the one hand instance, Field (2007).
3 Contemporary scholarship remains influenced by
and children struggling to escape poverty on
classical realism (Murray 2010; Freeman 2010:
the other. Furthermore, state leaders find it 137).
difficult to embark on multilateral solutions 4 Yet note that there is also research on eco-
to global problems. The Security Council nomic sanctions that is informed by cognitive
becomes more and more ineffective because approaches (Baldwin, 1985). Solingen (2012b),
who draws heavily from rational choice assump-
its permanent members, reminiscent of the
tions, is open to eclecticism, too. Research on
Cold War, threaten or actually use their veto economic sanctions traces itself back to Albert
powers. More and more divided internally, the Hirschman, whose eclectic work allows for vari-
European Union is as far away from taking on ous interpretations. Since Hirschman puts a very
a more determined role in world politics as strong emphasis on cultural forces, I include his
work in my discussion of culturalist approaches
ever (see also Chapter 25 in this Handbook).
below.
The gist of this is simple. Statecraft, 5 There are overlaps between cognitive approaches
strategy and diplomacy in our age have a and the work of historians in this regard. See
lot to do with regional and global govern- especially Kennedy (1983).
ance. States and the leaders that represent 6 I borrow the label of culturalism from Lichbach
and Zuckerman (1997), intending to indicate
them are important governors of world
that this cluster of scholarship is broader than
politics. Statecraft is about building regional entrenched schools of thought dealing with cul-
and global orders that have the potential to tural and ideational forces (such as constructivism
address the problems of our times appropri- and the English School).
ately. Scholars should not underestimate the 7 There are some hints that instrumental rationality
is among these background ideas. This critique,
role they play in all of this. If we hold on to
of course, is much further developed in critical
too many understandings of statecraft that scholarship that does not deal with the concep-
were arrived at by scholars engaging with tual triad under scrutiny. See, for example, Hork-
the nineteenth century and early twentieth heimer (1991).
8 This is a response to Deudney and Ikenberry Government and the European Union,
(1999). 19791997. London: Pinter.
9 UNICEF, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality Report, Bulpitt, Jim (1986) The discipline of the new
2013. democracy: Mrs Thatchers domestic state-
10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2014: Sus-
craft, Political Studies 34 (1): 1939.
taining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities
and Building Resilience.
Butterfield, Herbert (1952) Christianity in
Human History. London: Collins.
Butterfield, Herbert (1960) International Con-
flict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian
View. London: Routledge.
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5
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
Brian Hocking
The relationship between diplomacy and for- themselves, which is the focus of foreign policy.
eign policy is an intimate yet sometimes con- The distinction underpins Watsons definition
fused one. As Harold Nicolson noted when of diplomacy as the process of dialogue and
identifying five common usages of diplo- negotiations by which states in a system con-
macy, the two terms have been used inter- duct their relations and pursue their purposes
changeably (Nicolson 1939). He went on to by means short of war (Watson 1982: 11).
argue that this had led to uncertainties amongst The confusions that concerned Nicolson
the public regarding the essential differences have been thrown into greater relief and
between the two and, therefore, confused given a new gloss in the late twentieth and
expectations regarding their functions. If this early twenty-first centuries. A rapidly chang-
was a problem for diplomats in the era in which ing foreign policy environment in which the
Nicolson was writing, it remains so today. But meaning and content of the term is contested
it also characterises academic analysis. Here, poses major issues for all aspects of diplo-
foreign policy and diplomacy are commonly matic process, the actors participating in them
treated as interlinked components in a process and the institutions through which diplo-
through which the objectives of policies macy is conducted at all levels (Hill 2003;
directed towards the management of relations Webber and Smith 2002). Consequently, the
with an actors international environment are very constitution of foreignness is ques-
translated into outcomes through the employ- tioned in an environment in which processes
ment of a range of institutionalised techniques of deforeignisation affect policy content
and strategies mediated through a set of estab- and arenas as well as the norms, rules and
lished structures, rules and norms. At the same structures associated with the diplomacy of
time, diplomacy focuses on interactions the modern state era. Adapting the latter to
between actors rather than the actors new needs thrown up by complex processes
of globalisation, regionalisation and locali- up with changes in the character of social,

sation is part of the current agenda, as is political and economic structures at both
creating spaces in which new diplomatic domestic and international levels, the erosion
forms attuned to new needs can develop. of the boundaries demarcating them and con-
Hence the appropriateness of foreign policy sequent issues of agency. Commonly, these
and diplomacy as subjects for investigation issues are subsumed under the broad categori-
in an era preoccupied with global govern- sation of globalisation and the set of referents
ance are questioned, being regarded as rem- employed in discussions relating to it
nants of decreasingly relevant state-centred although their contours and implications are
approaches to understanding the contempo- contested (Clark 2014).
rary global environment (Smith et al. 2008; The significance of these changes and
Alden and Aran 2012). In this sense, foreign the linkage between the character of foreign
policy and diplomacy share a legitimacy policy and the consequent shape and forms
and efficiency problem which turns on their assumed by diplomacy over time is captured
effectiveness and appropriateness as foci of in two contrasting images taken from very dif-
academic enquiry as well as modalities of ferent historical contexts. The first comes from
managing complex international processes. Rebecca Wests acclaimed account of her trav-
Against this background, the follow- els in Eastern Europe in the 1930s, in which
ing discussion explores the relationship she describes a diplomatic system that of
between these two long-established features the Republic of Ragusa (latterly Dubrovnik)
of the international system, the parameters of which transcended the worlds of politics and
change affecting them, the consequences that diplomacy, regarding them as closely interwo-
these are having for the processes of diplo- ven in the quest for survival:
macy and the traditional norms and institu-
tional structures on which they rest. The Republic (Ragusa/Dubrovnik) was surrounded
by greedy empires whom she had to keep at arms
length by negotiation lest she perish: first Hungary,
then Venice, then Turkey. Foreign Affairs were her
domestic affairs; and it was necessary that they
LANDSCAPES OF FOREIGN POLICY should be conducted in complete secrecy with
AND DIPLOMACY enormous discretion. It must never be learned by
one empire what had been promised by or to
another empire, and none of the greedy pack
Mapping the nature of twenty-first century could be allowed to know the precise amount of
foreign policy and diplomacy requires us to the Republics resources. There was therefore every
grapple with their functions and structures in reason to found a class of governors who were so
an era of profound change in both domestic highly privileged that they would protect the status
quo of the community at all costs, who could hand
and international policy environments. But on training in the art of diplomacy from father to
the narratives surrounding diplomacy often son, and who were so few in number that it would
fail to help us make sense of this complexity. be easy to detect a case of blabbing. (West 1994)
Too often they obscure its fundamental char-
acter, equate it with the attributes of one Contrast this with Robert Coopers descrip-
period, namely that of the states system, tion of a post-modern diplomatic environ-
stress discontinuities at the expense of conti- ment encapsulated in the European Union:
nuities and confuse arguments about the
status of transitory diplomatic machineries The postmodern system does not rely on balance;
nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation
with those concerning the enduring character
of domestic and foreign affairs. The European
of its functions. This has produced a number Union is a highly developed system for mutual
of propositions regarding the nature of con- interference in each others domestic affairs, right
temporary diplomacy. Each of them is bound down to beer and sausagesMutual interference
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 69
in some areas of domestic affairs and mutual those associated with the domestic policy
surveillanceis normal for postmodern states. sphere. Here, the concern with territorial
(Cooper 2004)
defence implies an identifiable collective
national interest, marking off one commu-
Whilst there are echoes in Wests description
nity from another and symbolically expressed
which resonate with our own times in terms of
in geographical borders. The growing signifi-
the close relationship between domestic and
cance of what, in the terminology of complex
foreign policy environments and the tran-
interdependence of the late 1970s, was desig-
scending of the political and the diplomatic
nated low policy manifested in economic/
arenas, Cooper presents a milieu marked by
ecopolitical agendas was reinforced by the
the transition from the emphasis on sover-
perceived shift from geopolitics to geoeco-
eignty, secrecy and hierarchy in the image of
nomics in the post-Cold War era.
Ragusan diplomacy to the centrality of mutual
Even before the events of the late 1980s
interference and mutual surveillance as key
and 1990s onwards, the highlow dichotomy
features of the twenty-first century diplomatic
was looking increasingly frayed, not sim-
environment. But, as Cooper suggests, this is
ply in the sense that what had hitherto been
only part of a broader, more complex picture
designated as low policy was becoming
in which pre-modern, modern and post-mod-
more salient, but because the very distinction
ern forms of foreign policy and diplomacy
appeared to be losing its utility as a means of
coexist. In other words, no single image fits
describing the substance of the policy envi-
the intricacies of contemporary world politics
ronment. Changing perceptions of the consti-
which comprise densely textured features of
tution of security among publics as well as
neo-medievalism, layers of modernism as
policy-makers were a major factor here. The
represented by determinedly modern states
demands for collective action in key areas
such as China and Russia alongside manifesta-
such as climate change, global pandemics,
tions of post-modernism.
global terrorism, international crime and the
Part of this growing complexity is rep-
challenges posed by fragile states became
resented by the redefinition of boundaries
identified in terms of a new international
demarcating the foreignness of foreign pol-
security agenda (NISA) wherein interna-
icy and the role and character of diplomacy
tional security is seen not simply in terms
as a component of the processes through
of the integrity and stability of the state, but
which it is managed. This touches on agendas
as the physical, psychological and economic
in an increasingly broad policy milieu which,
security and welfare of the citizen within it.
if not demolishing, obfuscates the nature of
The close interrelationship between these
the foreigndomestic policy distinction, the
agendas became even more marked in the
goals that international policies are intended
post-9/11 environment with a growing recog-
to serve and the characteristics of diplomatic
nition of the need to link the critical facets of
processes and structures (see also Chapters
foreign policy in the form of defence, devel-
11, 25 and 41 in this Handbook).
opment and diplomacy (Clinton 2010).
At the same time, however, the character
of these issues and the linkages between,
BOUNDARY EROSION AND THE for example, the problems of fragile states,
POLICY PROCESSES organised crime and terrorism constitute
uniquely challenging issues. What have been
Seen in its most conventional expression termed wicked issues are not susceptible to
foreign policy possesses a clear agenda, rational policy processes of problem defini-
heavily focused on military security and tion, analysis and solution often because
attended by policy processes distinct from there is no agreed definition of the problem.
Consequently, they defy generalised man- more closely linked in terms of the sources
agement prescriptions and demand tailored of policy inputs as a result of globalization
management strategies for each situation and regionalization. Additionally, changing
(Edwards 2008). agendas and the importance of social power
Associated with these developments enhance the role of civil society organisations
are three significant changes in the broad operating across national boundaries, fre-
goals of foreign policy which impact on the quently forming transnational coalitions and
conduct of diplomacy. First, the primary placing added demands on national govern-
imperatives of control associated with the ments (Higgott et al. 2000; Reinalda 2011).
dominance of states and territory-related Simultaneously, the internationalization of
issues have been overlain by the more subtle the domestic policy environment provides
demands of access to and presence within the authorities with resources for action at the
key nodes in an increasingly complex inter- collective as opposed to national level.
national environment. Second, the diverse A third dimension of the domestic
challenges confronting actors on the world international relationship focuses on arenas
stage not least the experience of the global of activity. The point here, following from
financial crisis are reflected in the grow- what has already been said, is that the political
ing emphasis on the capacity to absorb sud- arenas in which policy objectives are pursued
den and unexpected shocks that is to say are increasingly porous in the sense that both
resilience (Evans and Steven 2010; Cascio governmental and non-governmental actors
2009; Hudson 2009). This highlights the find themselves operating in subnational,
importance of key features of foreign policy national and international environments
processes including analytical capacity, col- simultaneously. Furthermore, groups and
laborative strategies and a commitment to even individuals are now able to operate at all
systems open to external inputs which, as we three levels, partly as a consequence of the
shall see later, have important consequences revolution in communications technology (de
for the character of diplomacy. Jong etal. 2005).
A further change in the foreign policy The impact of the shifting boundaries
environment is to be found in the mutabil- between domestic and international policy
ity of power and the growing importance of arenas is to create a continuum of policy
social power in world politics. This high- types which blend together differing ele-
lights the significance of discursive power ments of domestic and international influ-
in the form of shaping perceptions of the ences, variously located in subnational,
world through processes of issue framing, national and international arenas. Some
agenda setting and norm advocacy (van Ham areas of policy, especially those relating to
2010). This is not to say that other, more tra- military security, will tend towards situa-
ditional, conceptions of power are irrelevant tions in which policy-making is the preserve
but that, as van Ham puts it, a postmodern of a restricted cast of players and the inputs
eclecticism is appropriate to understanding from the domestic environment are more
the complexities of power underpinning the controlled. On the other hand, the NISA will
range of issues that constitute contemporary be marked by a plurality of influences and a
foreign policy and diplomatic processes (van high degree of domestication, often projected
Ham 2010: 21). across national boundaries through linkages
Closely related to the developments out- between groups in different national settings.
lined above is the redefinition of the assumed The evolving foreign policy environment
boundaries separating domestic and inter- also challenges boundaries imposed on the
national policy arenas. First, the domestic activities of and relationships between states
and international policy environments are and non-state actors. The debate between
competing perspectives on international rela- agendas and participation by diverse actors.

tions is clearly reflected in discussions of This fluid and multilayered policy milieu
foreign policy and diplomacy. State-oriented weakens traditional assumptions regarding
perspectives have focused on the processes what foreign policy is, who is involved in
attaching to communication and information- it and where it is located (Christensen and
sharing between sovereign states, whilst glo- Petersen 2004) (see also Chapters 1, 2, 4 and
balist approaches emphasise the diminished 8 in this Handbook).
significance of the state and the enhanced
role of non-governmental actors. Latterly,
however, there has been a move towards Key Points
more subtle, less zero-sum inclined inter-
pretations of relationships between state and Traditional images of foreign policy have under-
non-state actors (Coward 2006; Bisley 2007). gone profound change in terms of agendas and
Rather than emphasising the separateness of the arenas in which it is conducted. Given the
linkages between them, these changes in the
the two, the emphasis has moved towards
constitution of foreign policy have significant
analysing the patterns of interaction between implications for diplomacy.
them and the complex relationship roles that Alongside agenda change, there have been key
they perform in different policy environments shifts in the modalities of power the rise of
(Hocking etal. 2012). social power which impact on the character
The redefinition of these various forms of and role of diplomacy.
boundary has had a major impact on the ways Additionally, redefinition of domestic
in which foreign policy is conceived, going international policy boundaries and closer
far beyond the heightened relative impor- linkages between governmental and non-
tance of economic as contrasted to military governmental actors has expanded the locations
security issues. Their significance is reflected in which diplomacy has to operate.
Consequently, unitary images of foreign policy
in debates regarding the appropriate perspec-
are weakened as the emergence of issue com-
tives to employ in analysing the conduct of plexes lead states (and non-states) to have a
foreign policy. The application of insights diversity of foreign policies.
from international political economy and
foreign economic policy has reinforced this
debate, focusing, for example, on the nature
of the state and the motivations economi- THE DIFFUSION AND REDEFINITION
cally rather than security related which OF DIPLOMATIC PROCESS
explain the ways in which actors behave both
domestically and internationally (Lee and Each of the developments concerning the
Hudson 2004). constitution of foreign policy is reflected in
The resultant images of foreign policy diplomacy conventionally regarded as the
that these trends are producing are ones that means through which foreign policies are
weaken clearly defined and unitary depictions effected. Indeed, the policy formulation
of foreign policy. Rather, as Williams has implementation distinction, always problem-
argued in the context of UK foreign policy, atic in any policy process, has become
we are confronted with a diversity of foreign increasingly so given the developments set
policies situated in interlinked and overlap- out above (Brighi and Hill 2008). As the con-
ping arenas and involving an extensive range tent and the locations of foreign policy have
of participants from the public and private become more extensive and the participants
spheres (Williams 2004). Additionally, these more diverse, so the feedback processes have
multiple foreign policies are located within become more densely configured. If the
issue complexes reflecting cross-cutting essence of diplomacy lies in its character as
institutionalised communication (Jnsson interactions between actors with clear and

and Hall 2005; Sharp 2009; Pigman 2010; defined interests, gradually moving towards
Bjola and Kornprobst 2013) then the patterns a point of convergence between those inter-
that define it have become hugely more com- ests, it is more akin to a management pro-
plex. This is reflected in the ways in which cess (Winham 1977). Here, actors are locked
our definitions of what diplomacy is and how together in the management of problems
it is deployed are responding. Here, tradi- marked by their technical nature, complex-
tional distinctions regarding diplomatic pro- ity, and uncertainty in terms of content and
cesses appear increasingly outdated and outcome, together with the bureaucratization
misleading. The familiar arguments about the of the processes through which negotiations
replacement of bilateral with multilateral proceed.
processes fail to recognise the significance of A consequence is that the diplomatic envi-
the interactions between them, changes in ronment becomes one in which a key test of
their purpose and the extended range of success for actors, both governmental and
actors involved in them. non-governmental, in achieving their objec-
Similarly, summit diplomacy is still tives is their capacity to develop strategic and
differentiated from other forms despite the tactical relationships to meet specific needs.
fact that it has become an increasingly com- Thus, for example, a test of diplomatic resil-
mon feature of diplomacy in which diverse ience is the ability to deploy co-optive power
actors, state and non-state, claim a place in through links with a diverse range of non-state
the shaping of diplomatic spaces such as entities (Nye 1990). Establishing and manag-
those offered by the G20 (Feinberg 2013; ing coalitions of the willing and sometimes
Martin 2013). At the national level, the shift- unwilling is regarded as a manifestation of a
ing parameters of foreign policy are reflected broader trend in diplomacy the challenging
in the reconstitution of established forms of of hierarchical structures by network forms
diplomacy in the face of new environments. and processes (Castells 1996; Metzl 2001;
The growing importance attached to consu- Slaughter 2004). Thus, instead of thinking of
lar work is one example (Okano-Heijmans international policy as an area dominated by
2011). On the one hand, this has a long his- governments and a relatively small group
tory predating the extensive diplomatic struc- of players within government we are pre-
tures associated with state building. But, on sented with policy networks comprising a
the other hand, what might be termed the diversity of actors, often dependent on the
new consularisation of diplomacy reflects nature of a specific issue, and constructed
the pressures confronting governments from to serve particular objectives. Moreover,
a potent mix of greater mobility of publics these networks embrace a diversity of actors
and expectations from these publics regard- located in various political arenas not deter-
ing the services governments should provide, mined by national boundaries.
the multiplicity of human and natural disas- One way in which these developments
ters, and the problem of defining the nature of are interpreted is the replacement of hier-
commercial diplomacy in an era of complex archical diplomatic forms and processes
economic interdependence. associated with the state by network forms
Another set of challenges for diplomacy and processes better attuned to the nature
derives from the fact that significant elements of modern societies and current global pol-
of the contemporary foreign policy agenda icy agendas (Hocking 2004; Heine 2008;
concerns issues whose very nature even Kelley 2010). Networks are seen as inclu-
existence is contested even before nego- sive, flexible and capable of tapping essen-
tiation can be brought to bear on them. Not tial knowledge resources that are no longer
infrequently, rather than diplomacy involving the monopoly of the state and its agencies.
All levels of diplomacy reflect the growing policy agendas by developing dialogues
importance of global public policy networks. with relevant stakeholders. Domestically,
At the multilateral level, initiatives such as older notions of policy ratification through
the Global Compact redefining the relation- formalised processes are reconfigured as
ship between the UN, business and civil soci- international negotiation is paralleled by
ety are matched at the national level by the multilevel consultative processes involving
emphasis placed by foreign ministries on the key constituencies and on which successful
importance of stakeholder relationships in negotiation outcomes are increasingly
the management of foreign policy. Whilst a dependent (Evans et al. 1993; Webber and
common claim is that networks are replac- Smith 2002). The mainstreaming of public
ing older hierarchical organisational forms in diplomacy as an integrated component of
the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy, the diplomatic environment and no longer a
reinforced by the growth of the Internet peripheral activity restricted to specialist units
and social media, in fact the two continue is one of the significant consequences of the
to operate in symbiosis with one another. changing environment in which foreign policy
Diplomatic networks themselves display is framed and conducted (Gregory 2008).
hierarchical characteristics and are multidi-
mensional phenomena assuming a variety
of forms determined by the nature of a spe-
Key Points
cific diplomatic domain. Thus some are more
heavily intergovernmental, possessing higher Foreign policy change has had a differential
levels of traditional hierarchical or club- impact on diplomatic process, challenging the
like characteristics, whilst private actors conventional distinctions maintained in termi-
dominate others (Coleman and Perl 1999). In nologies employed. Increasingly, complex prob-
short, networks are not an alternative to hier- lems lead to diplomatic negotiation assuming the
characteristics of a management process.
archy but different aspects of organisational
A key feature of this development has been an
design. Contemporary diplomacy requires increasing emphasis on the construction and
blends of hierarchical and network forms to maintenance of coalitions through networks
meet the challenges of a daunting interna- embracing both governmental and non-
tional agenda. governmental actors.
The centrality afforded to public Public diplomacy has become increasingly sig-
diplomacy within the diplomatic landscape, nificant and has both international and domestic
as demonstrated in other chapters in this dimensions.
Handbook (see Chapters 35, 42, 43, 44
and 50), is another consequence of the
changing agenda and power configurations
underpinning foreign policy. The logic of STRUCTURES OF DIPLOMACY
social power directs key diplomatic strategies
towards influencing varying publics, both The structures of diplomacy in any period
internationally and domestically. At both reflect the character of international policy
levels, public diplomacy strategies reflect the and the international and domestic environ-
hierarchynetwork debate. Thus, influencing ments in which they are located. As we have
international publics in the pursuit of foreign seen, the evolution of foreign policy in the late
policy goals demands supplementing twentieth and twenty-first centuries has
traditional strategies, in which communication emphasised the need for modes of collabora-
is a predominantly top-down process between tion frequently manifested in networks
senders and receptors of messages, with embracing an expanding cast of players,
interactive ones, where the goal is to influence both governmental and non-governmental.
Unsurprisingly, this presents challenges to policy agendas, it is more useful to view the
diplomatic structures as they grapple with the structures of national diplomacy as consti-
task of marrying established principles, insti- tuting a national diplomatic system (NDS)
tutional forms and modes of behaviour with comprising a diverse and fluid range of actors
changing demands (Hocking 2006). The and agencies amongst which the MFA plays
resultant pressures can be seen in all forms of a significant but not necessarily the dominant
diplomacy, from the national to the various role (Hocking 2012).
forms of multilateralism. In the case of the Consequently, the delineation of the NDS
latter, the need to accommodate growing and the relationship between its component
claims for involvement from civil society elements needs to be continually re-examined.
combined with the realities of rapid changes in For example, the increasingly critical link
communications technology has resulted in between diplomacy and development poses
what has been variously termed complex questions of organizational form and the
(OBrien etal. 2000; Badie 2012), Web 2.0 degree to which development and foreign
(Van Langenhove 2010) or, more colloquially, policy need to be linked. Whilst most
messy multilateralism (Haass 2010). Each of governments integrate their aid programs
these relates changing demands on interna- and their foreign ministries, in the US and
tional organisations with functional adaptation the United Kingdom (since the late 1990s),
and enhanced participation underscored by the the trend has been to separate them. Thus the
development of what is loosely termed digital US Agency for International Development
diplomacy (Seib 2012; Copeland 2013). (USAID) is not fully integrated into the State
Similar pressures are to be found at the Department, and the UK Department for
national level. Here, the picture is configured International Development (DFID) is separate
by the impact of systemic change on the role from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
and functions of the state and its agencies. Reinforcing the link between diplomacy and
Clark (2014) has identified the implications development through the strengthening of
of globalisation on what he terms the glo- what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
balised state, whilst Jayasuriya analyses termed civilian power was a central theme
the impact of the rise of the new regulatory of the State Departments first Quadrennial
state (Jayasuriya 2004). Both draw attention Diplomacy and Development Review
to the internal consequences of globalisa- (Clinton 2010).
tion as it changes the architecture of the state Bureaucratic/political conflicts in foreign
and, in the case of Jayasuriya, the resultant policy management are part of the profile
fragmentation of diplomatic functions. It of the contemporary NDS. Here two broad
has always been the case that national diplo- trends are evident: fragmentation and con-
macy is a projection of complex relationships centration. Fragmentation indicates the
between a range of bureaucratic and politi- diversification of the NDS as sectoral min-
cal actors, including diplomats serving at istries found their responsibilities acquir-
overseas posts. These internal dimensions of ing enhanced international dimensions.
globalisation, including the diffusion of for- Alongside this situation, in many settings
eign policy management through the diplo- subnational authorities practice what has
matisation of line ministries alongside the come to be termed paradiplomacy, whilst
concentration of power and functionality a broader societisation of diplomacy occurs
at the centre of government, has resulted in as civil society gains an ever-greater pres-
growing uncertainty as to the role of the MFA ence in diplomatic processes. Concentration
(ministry of foreign affairs). Rather than denotes the enhancement of the foreign pol-
claiming pre-eminence for one government icy capacity of central agencies, particularly
department in managing complex foreign prime ministerial and presidential offices.
Whilst this is partly a reflection of the grow- diplomacy requires the alignment of the three
ing significance of heads of state and govern- factors and for each NDS to establish a rep-
ment in diplomacy, it is also recognition of resentational matrix based on this frame-
the potential costs of lack of coordination in work. Increasingly, the form that diplomatic
the management of foreign policy and the presence assumes is being re-evaluated, as
desire to minimize its costs by centralizing small, flexible and quickly deployable posts
policy-making functions. are often better attuned to contemporary
Each of these developments is posing chal- needs than the traditional embassy (see also
lenges for the constitution and role defini- Chapters 7, 12, 13 and 21 in this Handbook).
tion of MFAs and their diplomatic services
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2011). As we have seen, many of the features Key Points
of twenty-first-century diplomacy challenge
traditional features of state-based diplomacy. Change in diplomatic processes is reflected in all
The emphasis on partnership, inclusive- layers of diplomatic institutions, global, regional
ness and transparency challenges the closed, and national.
Whilst the traditional focus of attention at the
guild-like characteristics of traditional diplo-
national level has been the ministry of foreign
macy and associated definitions of the role of affairs (MFA), each government has configured
the professional diplomat (Copeland 2009). an evolving national diplomatic system for the
Rather than that of a gatekeeper, policing management of foreign policy, in which the MFA
the boundaries between domestic and inter- is a subsystem.
national policy environments, an alternative The changing foreign policy environment chal-
role image more suited to the contemporary lenges many key assumptions about how diplo-
environment is that of the boundary-span- macy should be conducted, the roles performed
ner. This recongizes that boundaries between by professional diplomats and the nature of
organizations and policy arenas remain sig- diplomatic representation.
nificant but are fluid and continually reconsti-
tuting themselves, thereby becoming sites of
intense activity which demand a special role
for those capable of acting as linkage points. CONCLUSION
In such an environment, professional diplo-
mats can assume significant roles as media- The environments which foreign policy and
tors or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs diplomacy cohabit in the early twenty-first
(Hocking and Spence 2005). Doing so sug- century are marked at one level by processes
gests the growing importance of the capacity of deforeignisation of the international and
to develop strategic visions of global agen- foreignisation of the domestic policy milieus.
das, understanding growing conflicts over A redefinition of boundaries separating the
norms and rules, and the ability to establish two combines with a bewildering network of
and manage complex networks. linkages between policy arenas through
In terms of diplomatic representation, which actors relate to one another in a variety
determining the requirements of an effective of ways. Policy-makers are required to oper-
diplomatic network involves the juxtaposi- ate in an environment spanning subnational,
tion of three factors: First, what purposes national and international arenas, where the
is the network intended to serve? Second, achievement of goals at one level of political
which policy nodes do countries need access activity demands an ability to operate in the
to in performing these functions? Third, what others. Moreover, the challenges associated
modes of presence best serve the needs of with the configuration of contemporary for-
function, access and participation? Effective eign policy and diplomacy redefines the
relationships between governmental and Dunne, T. (eds), Foreign Policy: Theories,

non-governmental actors and the complex Actors, Cases. Oxford: Oxford University
roles that they perform in changing policy Press.
environments. Strategies for accomplishing Cascio, J. (2009) The next big thing: resilience,
foreign policy often require, therefore, that Foreign Policy, 15 April.
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network
negotiators conduct diplomacy in several envi-
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6
Diplomacy, Communication
and Signaling
Christer Jnsson
Communication is one of the logically neces- independence (Watson, 1982: 33) or the
sary conditions for the existence of interna- conduct of international relations by negotia-
tional relations. Without communication, tion (Berridge, 1995: 1). Students of negoti-
there is no diplomacy. In fact, diplomacy is ation have similarly pointed out that without
often defined in terms of communication. For communication there is no negotiation
instance, diplomacy has been understood as (Fisher and Ury, 1983: xi, 33) and that in
a regulated process of communication essence, international negotiation is commu-
(Constantinou, 1996: 25), the communica- nication (Stein, 1988: 222).
tion system of the international society To communicate, whether in a negotia-
(James, 1980: 942), or communication tion setting or not, diplomats send signals
among internationally recognized represent- intended to convey messages to their coun-
atives of internationally recognized entities terparts. As signals have no inherent meaning
(Bjola and Kornprobst, 2013: 201). or credibility, the message actually conveyed
is a matter of decoding and interpretation by
Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the the receivers. Diplomatic signaling is verbal
human body. Whenever communication ceases,
as well as nonverbal. All social communica-
the body of international politics, the process of
diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict tion involves the transmission of messages to
or atrophy. (Tran, 1987: 8) which certain meanings are attached, and the
pristine form of diplomacy is the transmitting
Frequently, diplomacy is associated with a of messages between one independent politi-
specific subclass of social communication: cal community and another (Bull, 1977:
negotiation. Thus, diplomacy has been char- 164). As in all social communication, these
acterized as negotiations between political messages can be conveyed either by words or
entities which acknowledge each others gestures. Just as the verbal components in a
normal person-to-person conversation carry value. By way of analogy, diplomats are in

only part of the social message, so nonverbal the same predicament as students at one psy-
messages and body language constitute impor- choanalytically oriented school, who were
tant aspects of diplomatic communication. considered hostile if they came to class late,
Diplomatic signaling, in short, includes both anxious if they came early, and compulsive
what diplomatic agents say and what they do. if they came at the appointed time (Simons,
This is evident from the very first records 1976: 42). There is simply no escape from
of diplomatic communication. The Amarna producing message value.
Letters, a remarkable cache of diplomatic At the receiving end, the tendency to look
exchanges from the fourteenth century BC for message value in most verbal and non-
between the Egyptian court and other kings verbal behavior and non-behavior seems to
of the Ancient Near East, include many exam- rest on an implicit assumption of intention-
ples of both verbal and nonverbal messages ality (cf. Cohen, 1987: 20). Yet signaling
to which certain meanings were attached. does not necessarily imply intentionality.
For instance, the address of the clay tablets Even unconscious, unintended behavior and
in cuneiform script followed a pattern where non-behavior may convey messages in a dip-
the sender would name himself first only if he lomatic setting. Hence we may refer to sign-
was superior to or the equal of the addressee. aling whenever one actor displays behavior
Deviations were noted and given sinister inter- that is perceived and interpreted by another,
pretations. The exchange of gifts stands out as whether or not it is spoken or intended or
a prominent form of body language in early even within the actors conscious awareness.
diplomacy. Messengers in the Ancient Near This chapter will, first, take a closer look
East not only carried oral and written commu- at verbal and nonverbal communication,
nications between royal courts but also dis- respectively. It will then address the question
tributed presents among the rulers, the varying of whether clear or ambiguous messages or
values of which were perceived as symbols of both are characteristic of diplomatic signal-
status and relations (see Jnsson, 2000). ing. Another section will discuss the extent
The meanings of verbal and nonverbal to which, and in what ways, developments in
signaling may not be immediately obvious to communication technology affect diplomatic
the uninitiated observer, but require interpre- communication. Finally, different approaches
tation or decoding. Meaning does not reside to the study of diplomatic communication
in the message itself but is produced in inter- will be identified and summarized.
active processes between senders and receiv-
ers. Diplomatic expertise includes encoding
messages at the sending end and decoding
signaling at the receiving end. Diplomats are, VERBAL COMMUNICATION: A
as it were, intuitive semioticians, conscious COMMON DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE?
producers and interpreters of signs (Jnsson
and Hall, 2005: 72; see also Chapter 1 in this We commonly associate diplomacy with lin-
Handbook). guistic skills. One may speak of a semantic
Diplomatic communication includes not obsession of diplomats resting on the reali-
only words as well as actions, but also silence zation that speech is an incisive form of
and inactivity. In fact, diplomatic actors know action (Eban, 1983: 393). Ancient Greece
well that whatever they say or dont say and can be seen as the forerunner of the verbal
whatever they do or dont do will be scruti- skills and eloquence associated with modern
nized and interpreted by others in the diplo- diplomacy. Diplomatic communication
matic community. Thus, words and silence as among the Greek city-states depended on
well as action and inactivity assume message direct and oral exchange and face-to-face
Diplomacy, Communication and Signaling 81
contacts between representatives. Moreover, common language of diplomacy arose until

communication was open and public, relying the eighteenth century, when French became
on oratorical skills. Celebrated orators, such the language of the European nobility and,
as Pericles and Demosthenes, were frequently by implication, the diplomatic language par
entrusted with diplomatic missions. prfrence. The multilateral conferences of
Diplomacy involves communication the twentieth century offered the English
between political units that are often sepa- language the first real opportunity to oppose
rated by different languages. To find a com- French linguistic supremacy (Ostrower, 1965:
mon diplomatic language has thus been a 356). While English has increasingly become
major consideration throughout the ages. the lingua franca of diplomatic communica-
The word communication, we may recall, tion, the vocabulary remains replete with
derives from the Latin verb communicare, French expressions (demarche, note verbale,
which means to make shared or common. charg daffaires, doyen, rapprochement, etc.).
The problem of achieving shared meanings Multilateral diplomacy represents a lin-
is central to diplomatic communication. The guistic challenge but has also generated crea-
quest for shared meanings has involved find- tive solutions. For instance, a constructive
ing a common language both in the purely distinction between working languages and
linguistic sense and, more importantly, in a official languages was introduced at the 1945
broader sociological sense. San Francisco Conference. Occasionally, lin-
As the use of different languages has been guistic variety can be an asset rather than a
a source of misunderstanding and discord liability. For instance, at the G20 meeting in
since the dawn of history, there have always St Petersburg in September 2013, which was
been efforts to develop a lingua franca of held at a time of growing USRussian tensions
diplomacy. Sumerian, the first known lin- over the Snowden affair and Syria, the Russian
guistic medium of culture and civilization in hosts avoided seating Barack Obama and
the TigrisEuphrates valley, was the earli- Vladimir Putin next to each other by not using
est language of diplomatic intercourse and the host country language, as is customary, but
expression (Ostrower, 1965: 164). From switching to English when placing the state
the third millennium BC until the time of delegates in alphabetical order. That way five
Alexander the Great, Akkadian became the leaders of other countries were seated between
recognized diplomatic language. Akkadian the Russian Federation and the United States.
was a rather peripheral Semitic language but Similarly, at the NATO summit in Prague in
had certain advantages over Egyptian hiero- November, 2002, the controversial Ukrainian
glyphs by using a more versatile cuneiform leader Leonid Kuchma, who was suspected of
script that was suitable for the clay tablets providing Iraq with radar equipment, appeared
on which diplomatic messages were written uninvited and would sit next to George W.
(Ostrower, 1965: 1323). When Akkadian Bush and Tony Blair if placed in alphabetical
ceased to exist as a living language, it was order following the English spelling of partici-
superseded by Aramaic, which had adopted pating countries. The embarrassing situation
alphabetical script, as the leading diplomatic was solved by changing to French, whereby
language (Ostrower, 1965: 18994). USA became Etats Unis and United Kingdom
Greek, and later Latin, became common Royaume Uni.
diplomatic languages in the wake of expand- Languages may be one source of com-
ing empires. When command of Latin began munication problems in diplomacy, and may
to be rare among European diplomats by occasionally contribute to their solutions. Yet
the early seventeenth century, conversa- far more important is the development of a
tions through interpreters became normal common language in terms of shared symbols
practice (Mattingly, 1955: 236). No other and references and intersubjective structures
of meaning and interpretation of words and Silence may send messages as well. For
actions. The institutionalization and profes- instance, Finlands policy vis--vis the Soviet
sionalization of diplomacy in the past few Union during the Cold War was often char-
centuries has entailed the development of a acterized as eloquent silence careful
distinct diplomatic subculture with mutually avoidance of signaling that might provoke
understood phrases and expressions. The rit- its powerful neighbor. One instance of conse-
ualized diplomatic language is characterized quential and carefully designed silence was the
by courtesy, non-redundancy and construc- US decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis
tive ambiguity. The emphasis on courtesy of 1962 to ignore and refrain from replying
has given rise to ironic definitions of diplo- to the second, less conciliatory of two con-
macy as the art of saying pleasant things to secutive letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy.
people you hate. Non-redundancy implies Whereas the first letter was perceived to be
that a diplomatic communication should written by Khrushchev personally, the second
say neither too much nor too little because letter was more formal and assumedly drafted
every word, nuance of omission will be by the Foreign Office. By responding only to
meticulously studied for any shade of mean- the first one, the United States strengthened
ing (Cohen, 1981: 32). Constructive ambi- Khrushchevs hand in the apparent internal
guity avoids premature closure of options. struggle in the Kremlin and contributed to a
Circumlocution, such as understatements peaceful resolution of the crisis.
and loaded omissions, permits controversial In sum, a carefully deliberated diplomatic
things to be said in a way understood in the language has evolved, which allows commu-
diplomatic community but without needless nication across a multitude of national cul-
provocation (cf. Cohen, 1981: 324). tures with a minimum of misunderstanding.
Diplomats, in short, have adopted a series The other side of the coin is that the meanings
of conventional expressions and idioms that, of diplomatic exchanges are not immediately
however amiable they may seem, convey obvious to outsiders (see also Chapters 17,
a message that their counterparts clearly 20, 36 and 40 in this Handbook).
understand. For example, a verbal or written
communication to the effect that the diplo-
mats government cannot remain indiffer- Key Points
ent to an international issue, is understood
to signal intervention; and the government There has always been a tendency to develop a
that expresses grave concern over a mat- lingua franca of diplomacy.
Linguistic plurality can be exploited for signaling
ter is expected to adopt a strong position
purposes.
(Nicolson, 1977: 123). If a diplomat says my The professional diplomatic language is character-
government feels obliged to express reserva- ized by courtesy, non-redundancy and constructive
tions with regard to , it means that my ambiguity.
government will not allow (cf. Ishmael, Both words and silences send messages in diplo-
2013). In a multilateral conference setting, a matic communication.
phrase like While I have deep respect for the
distinguished delegate of , who has stated
his view with intelligence and conviction, I
must point out that can be interpreted as NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION:
I do not agree with the delegate of ; and DIPLOMATIC BODY LANGUAGE
I may have misunderstood the distinguished
representative of translates into The rep- Nonverbal signals have the advantage of cap-
resentative of has been talking nonsense turing the attention of a wider audience and
(Kaufmann, 1996: 162). of allowing greater flexibility and deniability
than verbal messages (Cohen, 1987: 3540). The choice of delegates to meetings also
Diplomatic body language encompasses a sends signals. Generally, a lower level of
wide variety of behavior, ranging from per- representation communicates coolness or
sonal gestures to the manipulation of military disapproval, a higher level respect or esteem
forces. (Cohen, 1987: 156). At the Moscow talks
Among personal gestures, a handshake leading to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban in
sends signals of friendly interstate relations. 1963, the selection of Averell Harriman to
A classical example is John Foster Dulless lead the US negotiating team sent positive
refusal to shake hands with Zhou Enlai at the signals, as Harriman was well known to the
1954 Geneva Conference, which was read by Soviets and had established a relation with
the Chinese as a signal of American rejection Khrushchev. In the words of one Soviet dip-
and harmed USChinese relations for years lomat at the Washington embassy, as soon
to come. Interestingly, when Henry Kissinger as I heard that Harriman was going, I knew
met Zhou Enlai seventeen years later in the that you were serious (Seaborg, 1981: 252).
process of opening USChinese diplomatic Many saw President Obamas attendance at
relations, Zhou inquired whether Kissinger the climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009 as
was one of those Americans who refused to a sign of policy change. Conversely, envoys
shake hands with Chinese leaders (Kissinger, of low rank may signal lack of respect. In
1994: 719). At the Oslo accord ceremony on one of the Amarna Letters, the Egyptian
the White House lawn in 1993, Yitzhak Rabin Pharaoh complains to the Babylonian king
knew he had no choice to avoid commitment who, instead of sending dignitaries, had
when Yasir Arafat stretched out his hand dispatched a delegation of nobodies, one
before the TV cameras broadcasting live to a of whom was an assherder (Jnsson, 2000:
world audience. Had he chosen not to accept 203). His reaction foreshadowed similar con-
the outstretched hand, it would have sent cerns at later international gatherings.
strong signals of lingering hostility. By accept- The travel schedule of statesmen can also
ing it, he made an equally strong commit- be part of nonverbal signaling. When Chinas
ment to friendly relations. President Obamas new president Xi Jinping made his first visit
handshake with Cuban leader Ral Castro at to the Korean peninsula in July 2014, he went
Nelson Mandelas funeral in December 2013 to Seoul rather than Pyongyang. In the diplo-
was commonly interpreted as a signal herald- matic community, this was interpreted as dis-
ing improved USCuban relations. content with Chinas North Korean ally. That
At the intermediate range, the venue same month Finlands new prime minister
and format of as well as attendance at Alexander Stubb chose Estonia, a neighbor
international meetings may send signals. with NATO membership, as the destination
The implied prestige conferred upon the of his first trip abroad rather than Sweden,
host has made the selection of venues prob- as is customary. As Stubb had been known
lematic throughout history. For instance, the to favor Finnish NATO membership, this
fifteenth-century meeting between Edward was perceived to have symbolic significance.
IV of England and Louis XI of France was Both these examples illustrate that it was
held on a bridge (Goldstein, 1998: 50). In both what was done and what was not done
the 1930s Neville Chamberlain conceded that created message value.
to Mussolinis insistence that negotiations Protocol, the body of customs governing
between Britain and Italy be held in Rome, the procedure and choreography of diplomatic
with Anthony Eden and the Foreign Office intercourse, is a convenient medium for non-
disagreeing on the grounds that this would verbal signaling. All deviations from ritualized
be regarded as another surrender to the dicta- forms and expressions send subtle signals. For
tors (Cohen, 1981: 3940). example, the rank of the welcoming or farewell
delegation for a visiting dignitary and the qual- (1966: 2): The power to hurt is bargaining
ity of state visit arrangements can be used to power. To exploit it is diplomacy vicious
signal esteem or lack of it (see Cohen, 1981: diplomacy, but diplomacy. The term coer-
38). When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat cive diplomacy is sometimes used to refer to
made his surprise visit to Israel in November threats or the limited use of force as a signaling
1977, the first Arab leader ever to visit the or bargaining instrument (George etal., 1971;
Jewish state, he was greeted at Ben Gurion George, 1991). The central task of such sig
airport by Israels Prime Minister Menachim naling is to create in the opponent the expec-
Begin and Israeli President Ephraim Katzir tation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode
and a gun salute was fired in his honor. In his motivation to continue what he is doing
addition to a long meeting with Begin, Sadat (George, 1991: 11). President Kennedys
was allowed to address the Israeli parliament, choice of a naval blockade to signal determi-
the Knesset. When US President George Bush nation without risking war in the 1962 Cuban
announced that he would attend the funeral of Missile Crisis is a prominent example of coer-
Japans emperor Hirohito in 1989, this caused cive diplomacy (see, e.g., George etal., 1971:
a seating problem. According to protocol, the 98100). In the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the
heads of state were to be accorded preference US at one point ordered a worldwide military
by the date they assumed their positions, and alert including its nuclear forces, and a Soviet
Bush had only just taken office. This problem freighter, transiting the Bosporus en route to
was solved by treating the funeral as a cel- Alexandria, gave off neutron emissions, indi-
ebration of Hirohitos life rather than a state cating the possible presence of nuclear weap-
event. Thus, it was announced that heads of ons on board. On both sides these moves were
state would be treated in the order of coun- interpreted as signals, warning against uni-
tries Hirohito had visited, which gave the lateral intervention, and did not cause undue
US president a seat at the center of the front alarm (cf. Jnsson, 1984: 186, 188, 190).
row of attending heads of state (Goldstein, Naval forces have proven particularly use-
1998: 53). ful signaling instruments. Capable of con-
Conversely, when the Clinton admin- spicuous presence and withdrawal, they offer
istration tried to link renewal of Chinas readily perceived and understood signaling
most-favored-nation status to concessions opportunities (Cable, 1981: 67). The Six-
on human rights in 1994, Secretary of State Day War of 1967 was the first time Soviet
Warren Christopher received an eloquently and US warships operated in close proxim-
cool treatment on his visit to China: reception ity to each other during a major international
at the airport by a deputy foreign minister, no crisis. By circumscribing their preparedness
pomp, no public words of welcome, no ban- moves in various ways staying well clear
quet, and cancellation of the planned news of the battle zone, avoiding reinforcement of
conference (Cohen, 1997: 157). Similarly, amphibious and other offensive forces, and
when Putin came to the annual EURussian not interrupting or shortening scheduled port
meeting in Brussels in January 2014, the calls Washington and Moscow signaled
usual summit format starting with a welcom- their intentions to avoid military involvement
ing dinner and ending with a press conference (cf. Jnsson, 1984: 1667).
was abandoned in favor of a closed two-hour Often, nonverbal signals are used when
meeting with a small circle of participants. explicit verbal signals are politically incon-
This signaled EU concern about Russias role ceivable. One example is taken from the
in the burgeoning crisis in the Ukraine. buildup to the 1973 Yom Kippur War in
At the louder end of the scale, nonverbal the Middle East. Three days before the war
signaling involves the exploitation of military started, Soviet dependents and civilian per-
hardware. In the words of Thomas Schelling sonnel were hurriedly evacuated from Syria
and Egypt. As the evacuation was made in a signals, such as retaining flexibility and deni-
deliberately conspicuous manner, it could be ability or needing to take multiple audiences
interpreted as a tacit warning to Washington into account. At the same time, clarity and
of the impending attack and a signal that the precision are often called for. Diplomats have
Soviet Union was not involved in the final been characterized as specialists in precise
decision to go to war. At the same time, it and accurate communication (Bull, 1977:
could serve as a reminder to Egypt and Syria 179). In short, the tension between the need
not to expect direct Soviet intervention. The for clarity and the incentives for ambiguity
point is that Moscow could not have given impels diplomats to spend much time and
the United States an explicit warning without effort on the formulation and interpretation
openly acknowledging its complicity in the of signals.
Arab military preparations and betraying its Constructive ambiguity is a term that is
clients (see Jnsson, 1984: 1789). often associated with Henry Kissinger. Most
In the same way that silence may send sig- often it is used to denote the deliberate use
nals, so non-action can have message value. of vague language in an agreement to allow
For instance, the absence of signaling from opposing parties to interpret it in different
Moscow no military mobilization and no ways. But it may also refer to signaling that
actions in support of the incumbent regimes leaves future options open. For example,
was of vital importance for the developments such expressions as use our best endeavors
in Eastern Europe during 1989 (see also or take all possible measures leave consid-
Chapters 38 and 53 in this Handbook). erable leeway for discretion (Cohen, 1981:
33). A subtle example of signaling charac-
terized by constructive ambiguity dates back
Key Points to USChinese parleys preparing President
Nixons momentous visit to China. On one
Diplomatic body language ranges from personal of his trips to Beijing, Henry Kissinger was
gestures, via meeting and travel logistics, to the taken for an ostentatious public appearance
manipulation of military forces. at the Summer Palace in plain view of hun-
Protocol provides a convenient medium for non-
dreds of spectators. Among them was a North
verbal signaling.
Vietnamese journalist taking photographs, as
Coercive diplomacy involves the threat or limited
use of force as a signaling instrument. his host, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, later told
Both actions and non-actions send messages in Kissinger apologetically. Zhou could thus
diplomatic communication. signal to North Vietnam and ensure that
Washington grasped that China would not
permit North Vietnams problems to stand in
the way of a rapprochement with the United
CLARITY VS AMBIGUITY States (Cohen, 1997: 152). In this example,
the Chinese were able to exploit nonverbal
It has been said that signaling is as essential signaling to send messages to multiple audi-
to diplomacy as to a busy airport, with the ences while retaining deniability.
crucial difference that there is much more Another example of carefully crafted ambi-
scope for ambiguity in diplomatic signaling. guity concerns the US reaction to the Soviet
Whereas ambiguous communication between military buildup along the Chinese border in
pilots and traffic controllers may be a prelude September 1969. President Nixon author-
to disaster, ambiguity is considered construc- ized a statement to the effect that the US did
tive and creative in diplomatic signaling (Bell, not seek to exploit for our own advantage
1971: 74). This needs to be qualified. There the Sino-Soviet conflict but was deeply con-
may be several incentives to send ambiguous cerned with an escalation into war. Denying
any intention to exploit the conflict signaled Secretary of State John Kelly stated in a con-
that the US had the capacity to do so and that gressional hearing that the US had no formal
the conflicting parties should do nothing to obligation to defend Kuwait in the event of
jeopardize US neutrality. The expression of an invasion.
deep concern conveyed that the US might Nonverbal signals tend to be more ambig-
assist in some unspecified way the victim of uous than verbal ones. Words, like gestures,
aggression. The statement was delivered by require interpretation; yet there is more
Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, latitude for misunderstanding in nonverbal
who was high enough in the hierarchy to signaling. One reason is that different cul-
leave no doubt that he was speaking on behalf tures ascribe different meanings to nonverbal
of the president while at the same time not so signals.
conspicuous as to challenge the Soviet Union
A gesture of approval in the United States may be
head on (Kissinger, 1994: 7234).
taken for a very rude sign in Egypt. A smile in
Ambiguity may, however, in some cases Japan may mark embarrassment rather than indi-
be destructive rather than constructive. The cate enjoyment. Even when the act or expression
prelude to the Suez War of 1956 offers a clas- itself the frown, the gift is common, rules of
sic example of counterproductive ambiguous legitimate display may differ. What is an appropri-
ate moment for tears in Egypt is one for self-
signaling. Divergent expectations colored the
restraint in the United States. An act of hospitality
main actors interpretation of each others in Mexico City may be seen as a bribe in
signaling. The firm belief of British Prime Washington. (Cohen, 1997: 154)
Minister Anthony Eden in US support, or
at least tacit acceptance, of military action At the interpersonal level, proxemics the
against Nassers Egypt caused him to misread signaling problems arising from the differ-
mixed and ambiguous US signals about the ences between cultures concerning physical
use of force if all other methods failed and to proximity and normal speaking distance
look for green light in messages that were not may affect diplomacy. One episode in the
intended as such. At the same time, Edens chain of events leading up to the Suez War is
reliance on the Munich analogy alerted him illustrative. In February 1955, British Prime
to behavior on Nassers part that reminded Minister Anthony Eden visited Cairo. One
him of the dictators of the 1930s while blind- photograph shows Egyptian President Gamal
ing him to other aspects of Nassers conduct, Abdel Nasser trying to hold the hand of the
whereas US Secretary of State John Foster clearly embarrassed Eden. In another picture
Dulless preoccupation with the Soviet Union Eden can be seen uneasily poised at the very
predisposed him to perceive Nassers Egypt as corner of a sofa with Nasser edging up to him
a pawn in a larger game (see Jnsson, 1991). and coming too close for his comfort. What
US signaling to Baghdad in the period constituted normal speaking distances and
before Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is friendship gestures to the Egyptian, sent the
another example of ill-fated ambiguity. A wrong signals to the British nobleman. As
proposal for economic sanctions in response Eden knew Arabic and was no stranger to the
to revelations of Iraqs illicit acquisition of Middle East, Nasser took away the unfortu-
nuclear weapons parts was voted down by nate impression that his reserve was an inten-
the US Congress six days before the inva- tionally political signal of unfriendly relations
sion. Around the same time, US Ambassador (Cohen, 1987: 104).
April Glaspie told Saddam Hussein that the In sum, there is considerable scope for
US had no opinion on inter-Arab conflicts, intentional or unintentional ambiguity in dip-
which could have given him the impression lomatic signaling, which means that shared
that the United States would not intervene meaning the essence of communication is
if he attacked Kuwait. In addition, Assistant not always achieved. Diplomats have to be
content with saying both less and more than diplomats of their privileged role in commu-
they intend: less, because their verbal and non- nicating across state borders and has facili-
verbal signaling will never immediately convey tated direct communication among political
their meaning; more, because their signaling leaders. The speed of communication often
might convey messages and involve them in forces decision-makers to react instanta-
consequences other than those intended (see neously to international events, bypassing
also Chapter 11 in this Handbook). traditional diplomatic channels. Whereas
President Kennedy in 1961 could wait eight
days before commenting publicly on the
Key Points erection of the Berlin Wall, President Bush
was compelled to make a statement within
Carefully crafted ambiguity can be constructive, hours of its dismantling in 1989 (McNulty,
but frequently ambiguity is destructive. 1993: 67).
Nonverbal signals tend to be more ambiguous Television and other electronic media may
than verbal ones.
affect diplomacy in uncontrollable ways, but
Diplomats tend to say both less and more than
may also be exploited for diplomatic signaling
they intend.
purposes (cf. Jnsson, 1996; Gilboa, 2001).
Media diplomacy has become a familiar
term. The new media offer opportunities for
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY diplomats to communicate to a global audi-
ence, while at the same time depriving them
The development of available means of com- of their signaling monopoly across state bor-
munication and transportation has affected ders. Signaling via the new media takes the
diplomatic signaling in various ways. Most indirect route via public opinion. Diplomatic
importantly, the speed of diplomatic commu- signaling then tends to become a public rela-
nication has varied over time. In the Ancient tions exercise whereby various actors try to
Near East, diplomatic missions could take influence the public attitudes and opinions
years to complete, and communication over that bear on another governments foreign
great distances traveled slowly well into the policy decisions (Grunig, 1993: 142).
nineteenth century. It was only with the tech- Signaling via electronic media often
nological evolutions in the past few centuries implies a loss of flexibility. Broadcast signals
that the premises of diplomatic communica- tend to incur commitments. In November
tion changed dramatically. The invention of 1977 President Sadat underscored his will-
the telegraph permitted fast and direct com- ingness to visit Jerusalem and speak to the
munication between governments as well as Knesset in an interview with American jour-
between foreign ministries and embassies. nalist Walter Cronkite. Im just waiting for
When the first telegram arrived on the desk the proper invitation, he told the world in the
of British Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston satellite broadcast. Interviewing the Israeli
in the 1840s, he reputedly exclaimed: My prime minister later the same day, Cronkite
God, this is the end of diplomacy! (Jnsson asked Begin for his reaction to Sadats state-
and Hall, 2005: 91). The rapid speed of comments. Begin assured that he would meet
munication was seen to endanger the careful Sadat cordially and let him talk to the par-
reflection that is the hallmark of good diplo- liament. By making the statements on inter-
macy. New, electronic media have further national television and not via secret cables
compressed the time and distance separating passed through foreign diplomats, the two
the worlds states (Roberts, 1991: 113). leaders essentially made a public commit-
The remarkable revolution in information ment to the world to hold the unprecedented
and communication technology has deprived meeting in Jerusalem.
By highlighting the visual elements of the repertoire of signaling instruments while

messages, television and other media have adding time pressure and making the differ-
enhanced the symbolic and metaphorical ele- entiation among audiences and the preserva-
ment of diplomatic signaling. The enhanced tion of confidentiality more problematic. Yet
significance of nonverbal communication, the basic premises of diplomatic communica-
beyond the conventions of traditional diplo- tion searching for the optimal combination
matic language, has enhanced the difficul- of verbal and nonverbal instruments, of noise
ties of signaling to different audiences. For and silence, and of clarity and ambiguity
example, Saddam Husseins signaling via remain (see also Chapters 9, 35, 43 and 44 in
television during the Gulf War may have this Handbook).
been successful vis--vis certain Arab audi-
ences, but it estranged Western viewers.
The videotape provided by Iraq to CNN, in Key Points
which Saddam, dressed in civilian clothes,
visited British guests (hostages) and pat- Historically, technological changes affecting
ted the head of a reluctant five-year-old boy, diplomacy have primarily concerned the speed of
acquired notoriety. To many in the West, it communication.
Recent technological developments tend to chal-
recalled pictures of other smiling dictators
lenge the privileged role of diplomats in transbor-
patting the heads of children and reinforced der communication and endanger flexibility and
the prevalent Saddam-as-Hitler metaphor. confidentiality.
While facilitating information gathering,
the Internet and social media present new
challenges to diplomatic communication.
Terms such as cyber diplomacy, digital APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF
diplomacy and e-diplomacy are gaining DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION
currency. Often they refer to efforts at reach-
ing out to other audiences than governments Different analytical tools have been used in
and are seen as new forms of public diplo- the scholarly study of diplomatic communi-
macy. Increasingly, diplomats are active in the cation. Raymond Cohen (1987) has sug-
blogosphere, becoming tweeting Talleyrands gested that it can be understood in terms of a
(Fletcher, 2013: 43). This new form of signal- theater metaphor. Just as in the theater, dip-
ing to a wider audience may be more lively lomatic communication takes place within a
and engaging than traditional diplomatic com- setting contrived for that purpose. In the
munication, but the lack of nuances and need performance, actors manipulate gestures,
for oversimplification entail risks. For exam- movements and speech to conjure up a desir-
ple, the active tweeting by former Swedish able impression for a watching audience.
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt engendered criti- Policy-makers and their aides assume the
cism both abroad and at home for using for- role of producers or stage managers, molding
mulations that were unnecessarily drastic. the total performance.
Secrecy and confidentiality seem to be Discursive approaches focus on diplo-
endangered by the digital revolution. The matic signaling as speech acts or discursive
unauthorized release of some 250,000 US practices, inspired by Michel Foucault and
State Department documents by WikiLeaks in Michel de Certeau (Neumann, 2002); or
2010 revealed the vulnerability of electronic communicative action, drawing on Jrgen
storage of confidential diplomatic records. Habermas (Lose, 2001). The central chal-
At the same time, it has made the exchange lenge to Iver Neumann is to re-combine the
of confidential information more risky. In study of meaning with the study of practice
sum, the advent of new media has expanded (Neumann, 2002: 630). Lars Lose argues that
diplomatic communication, understood as schemata). Attribution theory, which deals

communicative action, produces and repro- primarily with the perception of causation,
duces what Habermas labels a lifeworld, is of relevance to the study of how receiv-
which comprises the linguistically acquired ing agents answer the question why did
and organized stock of patterns of understand- they send that signal? To be persuasive, sig-
ing and, hence, constitutes an intersubjective nals need to be not only communicated but
structure of collective understandings that also deemed credible. Receiving agents ask
enables meaningful communication (Lose, themselves do they say what they mean,
2001: 185). and do they mean what they say? To verify
Game theoretically inspired analyses make or falsify other actors signals, receiving
a distinction between cheap and costly actors rely on various indices, believed to
signals. It is based on the observation that be beyond the ability of the actor to control
the signaling actor must suffer some costs for the purpose of projecting a misleading
for sending the signal if it is to be credible. image (Jervis, 1970: 26). Capability, domes-
Actors can send credible signals either by tic events and information received through
tying hands, that is, creating ex post audi- clandestine channels are examples of indi-
ence costs for bluffing; or by sunk costs, ces used to assess credibility in diplomatic
creating financially costly moves. Costly communication. The study of interpretations
signals are those that come with high levels of signals, in short, can draw on theories of
of tying hands and/or sunk costs, whereas human perception (see, e.g., Jervis, 1970,
cheap signals have low levels of tying 1976; Jnsson, 1990).
hands and sunk costs because they do not In sum, there is no paradigmatic approach
require the signaling actor to make any sig- to diplomatic communication. However, as
nificant investment to reinforce its position this sketchy overview suggests, there is a
(see Fearon, 1997: 6970). store of applicable analytical tools and ample
Semiotics, the study of signs and the room for more theory-driven, systematic
way they acquire meaning, seems relevant studies of diplomatic communication.
to the study of diplomatic communication.
Semioticians emphasize the arbitrary nature
of signs and symbols, the meaning of which
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7
Diplomatic Agency
R e b e c c a A d l e r- N i s s e n 1
INTRODUCTION diplomatic agency has been conceptualized;

secondly, present and exemplify major and
Politicians often complain about the passiv- overlapping types of diplomatic agency,
ity of diplomats. John F. Kennedy grumbled including communication, negotiation and
that US diplomats never came up with any advocacy; thirdly, examine how diplomacy
new ideas: the State Department is a bowl of has developed as a profession from envoys
jelly (Sofer 2001: 107). In contrast to mili- of kings to trained career diplomats; fourthly,
tary and political leaders, diplomats are often analyze how the personalization and popular-
portrayed as pathetic heroes (Sofer 2001). ization of diplomacy has shaped diplomatic
Meanwhile, diplomats tend to find politi- agency with the rise of public diplomacy
cians irresponsible and ignorant of world and new media technologies; and, finally,
politics, hindering diplomatic work. Can discuss how diplomatic agency is linked to
diplomats be considered agents? If so, what conceptions of diplomatic representation in
does diplomatic agency imply? its actual, functional and symbolic forms.
Clearly, diplomatic agency is constrained.
The diplomat acts within a restricted reper-
toire, but remains an object of public wrath
and may be a target of aggression as a sym- CONCEPTUALIZING DIPLOMATIC
bolic representative of his or her nation AGENCY
(Sofer 2001: 110). Yet, as this chapter will
show, there is room for different kinds of Traditionally, diplomacy is the organized
agency in diplomatic affairs. To analyze conduct of relations between states
diplomatic agency, the chapter will, firstly, (Henrikson 2013: 118), making states the
provide an overview of the ways in which principal agents in diplomatic affairs.
Diplomatic Agency 93
However, states cannot act on their own in implementation. Foreign policy activities
the international arena; instead they operate increasingly concentrate around prime min-
through organizational agencies (foreign ser- isters and presidents, directly instructing or
vices) and individual agents (diplomats) sidelining the foreign ministries. Moreover,
(Faizullaev 2014: 279). Moreover, non-state written and unwritten rules regulate relations
actors crowd the diplomatic scene. Among between these groups of individuals and insti-
the rapidly expanding types of actors, we tutions. Because such rules are often locally
find sub-national and regional authorities negotiated, the scope for diplomatic agency
such as Catalonia, multinational corporations cannot easily be put into an abstract formula.
such as Nestl, celebrities such as George In poorer countries, the lack of trained per-
Clooney, who is a UN Messenger for Peace, sonnel, resources and national stability limits
as well as non-governmental organizations the room for diplomatic maneuver considera-
including Independent Diplomat and bly, both in terms of the number of diplomatic
Transparency International and regional and staff and missions and in the actual conduct of
intergovernmental organizations such as the diplomacy (Anda 2000: 124). Also, in richer
World Health Organization (WHO), the countries, diplomatic agents often find domes-
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and tic interactions and negotiations, including
ASEAN. All of these agents are involved in the fight for resources and money, to be even
diplomacy, but what do we mean when we more complex and cumbersome than inter-
talk of diplomatic agency? national ones. Last, but not least, increased
involvement of broader society and the 24/7
live media coverage of foreign policy events
Structural limits to diplomatic put structural limits on diplomatic agency.
Previously, decision-makers and leaders had
agency
more time to understand a crisis situation,
An agent can be understood as an individual examine the evidence, explore various options,
or collective unit that commits an act of con- and reflect before choosing among them. As
sequence upon its environment (Kelley 2014: Graham T. Allison writes, looking back at the
4). Agency is thus the capacity of an agent (a Cuban Missile Crisis: In 1962, one of the first
person or other entity, human or any living questions Kennedy asked on being told of the
being in general) to act in a world. In the missile discovery was, How long until this
social sciences, agency is generally concep- leaks? McGeorge Bundy, his national security
tualized as the opposite of structure, which is adviser, thought it would be a week at most
seen as a force that organizes the actors so (Allison 2012: 16). Today, confidentiality is
that their actions fall in a certain social order. measured not in days, but in hours. This puts
Structure is, to borrow John G. Ruggies enormous pressure on political leaders and
notion, what makes the world hang together diplomats to act fast sometimes too fast (see
(Ruggie, quoted in Kelley 2014: 4). also Chapter 36 in this Handbook).
Diplomatic agency, whether performed
by individuals or groups, is thus necessarily
constrained by structure. This structure may Diplomatic agency in
take both material and ideational forms. For international law
instance, foreign office staff work in multi-
organizational settings that usually comprise One particularity of diplomats is that they act
a presidential administration, other govern- on behalf of the state: This does not mean
mental agencies, a parliament, a ministry that the state and the individual becomes one,
of foreign affairs and an embassy, affect- but rather by, for example, representing
ing foreign policy decision-making and France to a foreign state or an international
organization, a French diplomat performs as prosecution by Augusto Pinochet. Following

France (Adler-Nissen 2014a: 623). One of the 1973 coup, the ambassador took a
the challenges in conceptualizing diplomatic Swedish flag in hand and marched up to the
agency is therefore to distinguish diplomatic Cuban embassy that was under fire by tanks
agency of a foreign minister or ambassador and fetched refugees out of the embassy, took
from the agency of the foreign ministry, them to the Swedish embassy and got them
embassy, or country he or she represents. In out of the country safely. Similar examples
diplomacy, individuals are often institution- of exceptional diplomatic agency (indeed
alized (a head of state, minister, or ambassa- heroism) can be found across the globe.
dor is not just an individual but an institution, Chiune Sugihara was a Japanese diplomat
too), and institutions are individualized (they who served as Vice-Consul for the Empire
may function differently when headed or of Japan in Lithuania. During World War II,
presented by different individuals). Any new Sugihara wrote travel visas that facilitated the
foreign minister or ambassador inevitably escape of more than 6,000 Jewish refugees
brings personality to the job (think of the dif- from Lithuania to Japanese territory, risk-
ference between Madeleine Albright and ing his career and his familys lives (Levine
Colin Powell) while also functioning within 1996). This is a form of diplomatic agency
a certain organizational framework, having made possible by diplomatic privileges codi-
to use particular diplomatic tact and man- fied in international law, but it may require
ners, and carrying the states identity, values, disregarding instructions (or exploiting lack
and interests (for a discussion of diplomatic of instructions). Both Edelstam and Sugihara
agency, see Faizullaev 2014). did what they found morally right, not what
Diplomatic agency is thus distinctive their states had instructed them to do (see
because the diplomat (still) represents the also Chapters 15 and 16 in this Handbook).
sovereign (LEtat cest moi). This sov-
ereignty logic has been formalized in
international law, including in the Vienna Theorizing diplomatic agency
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961),
which specifies the privileges that enable dip- Most IR scholars, including neo-realists and
lomats, ministries of foreign affairs, embas- neo-liberalists, do not accord diplomats
sies, governments and envoys to perform much attention. For them, material resources
their functions (Gardiner 2003: 339). The tend to define much of what goes on in world
Vienna Convention also clarifies the institu- politics. However, IR theory features at least
tion of diplomatic immunity, which is crucial five exceptions to this dismissal of diplo-
for diplomatic agency because it ensures that matic agency: the English School, rationalist
diplomats are given safe passage and are not game theory, foreign policy analysis, the
susceptible to lawsuit or prosecution under practice turn and post-structuralism.
the host countrys laws. Diplomatic immu- In contrast to most of mainstream IR,
nity thereby allows the maintenance of dip- the English School has always granted
lomatic agency during periods of strained diplomacy a key role. Hedley Bull (1977)
relationship or even armed conflict. highlighted diplomacy as one of the five
Diplomatic immunity also makes it pos- institutions integral to international society.
sible for individual diplomats to take excep- Without diplomacy there would be no com-
tional forms of action. For instance, during munication between states and without com-
the 1970s, the Swedish ambassador Harald munication, no international society. Other
Edelstam, who was posted in Chile, helped English School theorists elevated diplomatic
thousands of Cuban diplomats, Uruguayan agency to a (potentially) virtuous art. Most
refugees and Chilean political activists escape prominently, Paul Sharp suggests that there
are particular diplomatic values of charity agent (e.g. ambassadors or diplomats) (See
and self-restraint, which can help political also Chapter 38 in this Handbook.)
leaders who work under terrible pressures Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) explicitly
and have to respond to multiple constituen- puts emphasis on diplomatic agency. Valery
cies and considerations, and whose motives Hudson has argued that FPA constitutes
are not always of the finest (Sharp 2003: the very micro-foundation for international
875). Political decision-makers therefore relations because foreign policy analysis
need to be surrounded by virtuous advisers is characterized by an actor-specific focus,
and agents embodying and advocating the based upon the argument that all that occurs
values of diplomacy (Sharp 2003: 875; see between nations and across nations is
also Chapters 8 and 14 in this Handbook). grounded in human decision makers acting
In contrast, game theory assumes that singly or in group (Hudson 2005: 1). What
each state is a rational actor concerned with FPA brings to the study of diplomatic agency
promoting its national interests, and diplomatic is particularly the idea that the cognition
agency is understood as tactical moves in a and information processing of decision-
game, which are calculated by the players or makers are crucial. Graham T. Allisons
negotiators. In Putnams (1988) perspective, (1971) work on the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the two-level game gives the diplomat Robert Jervis (1976) research on perceptions
negotiator leverage and the possibility of and misperceptions in foreign policy are
pursuing the chief negotiators interest, but pioneering in this respect. Today, FPA scholars
that room for maneuver is constrained by build on political psychology, examining
structure (i.e. the role of domestic preferences leader types, cognitive constraints etc., while
and coalitions, domestic political institutions also taking geopolitics, bureaucratic politics
and practices, the strategies and tactics and organizational culture into account (e.g.
of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic Mouritzen and Wivel 2012).
reverberation of international pressures). IR constructivists argue that diplomatic
Other diplomatic scholars have borrowed agency, as any other social activity, is not a
ideas from principal-agent theory (first product of immutable scientific laws, but is
developed by economists in the 1970s, see rather the result of learning and socializa-
Miller 2005: 205) to understand diplomatic tion that create relationships, identities and
agency. Diplomats, as Christer Jnsson and perceptions that condition the actions taken
Martin Hall note, whether in bilateral or by actors in world politics (Jackson 2004).
multilateral forums, always negotiate on behalf This leads to an understanding of diplomatic
of others, in the sense that they are agents of agency, which sees diplomatic negotiation not
a principal with ultimate authority, be it an just as bargaining, but also as changing per-
individual king or a collective government ceptions and continuous interaction, learning
(Jnsson and Hall 2005: 84). A principal and and adaption (Checkel 2005). In other words,
an agent are considered individuals who enter diplomacy is where beliefs about state inter-
into a specific relationship: the first gives ests and capacities are enacted, reproduced
instructions and the second executes them in and changed.
order to achieve the goals set by a superior. More recently, scholars engaged in the
Accordingly, diplomatic agency is studied as practice turn of IR have accorded diplomatic
actions, which determines the payoff to the agency a much larger role than IR scholars
principal. To analyze the agency of diplomats normally do. They have argued that diplo-
in this way, one can for instance focus on matic practice is constitutive of world politics
information asymmetry, which prevents the (Sending etal. 2015). Practice scholars focus
principal (e.g. government, president, or on everyday habits and professional codes
Congress) from successfully monitoring the that are central to diplomacy. They have
analyzed how diplomats identify competent oneself from the sides. Practical experiences
and incompetent behavior, building on partic- with conflict-mediation show how difficult it
ipant observation and interviews (Adler and is to preserve the legitimacy from the interstitial
Pouliot 2011; Neumann 2012; Adler-Nissen and not be drawn into the conflict (see also
and Pouliot 2014). In practice theory, the Chapters 1, 3 and 11 in this Handbook).
logic of diplomatic agency is neither one of Notwithstanding these important advances
consequence, nor of appropriateness, but of in the theorization of diplomatic agency,
practicality (Pouliot 2008). For instance, offi- much work remains to be done to excavate the
cials engaged in the multilateral diplomacy of agency involved in the conduct of diplomacy.
the UN will tacitly come to know their place
in the international pecking order despite
the formal sovereign equality of all member Key Points
states (Pouliot 2011). Similarly, national dip-
lomats working in Brussels will experience, in IR theories have generally bracketed diplomacy,
an embodied sense, that new proposals need concentrating instead on the material distribu-
to be framed as European interests to carry tion of resources or the development of norms
and ideas, thereby assuming that diplomatic
weight at the Council of Ministers (Adler-
agency is limited and unproblematic.
Nissen 2014a). Some IR-oriented approaches accord more impor-
Post-positivists such as James Der Derian tance to diplomacy: The English School claims that
(1987) and Costas Constantinou (1996) build diplomacy is one of the constitutive institutions
on post-structuralist insights on subjectivity of international society; rationalist game theory
and identity and have problematized the abil- argues that bargaining and negotiation are crucial
ity of diplomatic representatives to speak fully for world politics; foreign policy analysis insists
for the sovereign. A diplomatic representative on individuals role in foreign policy decisions;
can never be regarded as an authentic surro- poststructuralists investigate the very possibility
gate for the sovereign. Departing from a con- of articulating diplomatic agency and practice
ceptualization of diplomacy as the mediation theory points to the crucial role of diplomats in the
everyday performance of world politics.
of estrangement, they have explored how rep-
The study of diplomatic agency will benefit from
resentatives, as go-betweens, are influenced more explicit and systematic theorizing as it has
or captured by their host nation. Recently, largely been examined through case studies,
they have promoted what they call sustain- anecdotal accounts and historical analyses with
able diplomacy that emphasize practices of limited attention to theory.
self-knowledge and [is] open to identity trans-
formation (Constantinou and Der Derian
2010: 2). Constantinou has argued that:
TYPES OF DIPLOMATIC AGENCY:
Diplomacy changes face, posits a different ontol- COMMUNICATION, NEGOTIATION,
ogy, whenever its practitioners conceive them-
selves as being on the side or in the middle [] ADVOCACY
when the diplomat sees him or herself as being in
the middle, they promote mediation or activity Diplomatic agency as
that brings different sides together [] in a con- communication
structive relationship. (Constantinou 2013: 145)
Communication is probably the most funda-
Accordingly, two-sided diplomats or double- mental form of diplomatic agency. Following
agents gain their legitimacy from the the invention of the institution of residential
interstitial from the international or diplomacy in the fifteenth centurys Italian
intercommunal making the most of not city-states, a nations diplomat is required to
taking sides or by functionally distancing function as his or her countrys eyes, ears and
voice abroad (Cooper et al. 2013: 2). have demonstrated the importance of personal
Gathering information on the local scene and leadership for negotiation processes. For
reporting it home is still seen as one of the example, it is apparent from the correspondence
most important functions of the resident between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the
embassy (Jnsson and Hall 2003: 197). Cuban missile crisis that they (and their
However, the job as a communicator is not advisors) were trying to figure out how they
just about reporting home or gathering intel- could both retain personal and national honor
ligence, but also delivering the message and in relation to each other and globally (Ting-
being aware of national interests and influ- Tooney 1990). But behind-the-scenes
encing foreign governments and publics negotiations are rarely subjected to direct
through meetings, workshops, interviews to observation and remain under-theorized.
the local media, dinners, receptions, cultural The advent of more open and multilat-
events and parties. In other words, the main eral diplomatic negotiation does not detract
activity involved in the role as communicator from the importance of skillful negotiation
is message-delivery, which requires intelli- techniques. Effective diplomatic negotiation
gence, networking, tact, discretion, team- is still often undertaken in private, without
work, creative imagination, etc. the intrusion of competing preoccupations
In ancient times, when direct consultations and loyalties. In a study of the negotiations
and back-and-forth communications were in the UN Security Council and NATO that
not feasible, the monarch or republic was far led to the international intervention in Libya
more dependent on the ambassadors skills in 2011, Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent
and judgments when it came to communica- Pouliot (2014) found that, in crisis negotia-
tion. When the first telegram landed on the tion, countries may rely on their permanent
British foreign minister Lord Palmersons representatives whose positions emerge from
desk in the 1840s, he reportedly declared: mutual trust and local moves in New York
My God, this is the end of diplomacy and Brussels just as much as from national
(Dizard 2001: 5). The telegraph changed instructions.
diplomatic practice, but it did not make the A particular type of negotiation is linked
diplomat-as-communicator obsolete. Today, to conflict resolution. Here, those in conflict
cheap flights and communication technol- seek the assistance of or accept an offer of
ogy, including e-mail, telephones, Skype and help from an outsider to mediate (Ahtisaari
video calls, have limited the autonomy of the and Rintakoski 2013: 338). The UN has been
resident diplomat. Information overload and a principal actor in the peace-making scene,
new actors have made the monitoring of dip- using the Secretary-General and his represent-
lomats by the capitals more difficult, as the atives. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
chapter will explore further below (see also was known to play up his agency. For
Chapter 6 in this Handbook). instance, Hammarskjold engaged in extensive
coalition-building, creating alliances between
member states through intensive traveling to
capitals, building trust and access and oper-
Diplomatic agency as negotiation
ated at several levels of diplomacy (see also
Negotiation is the second major type of Chapter 17 in this Handbook).
diplomatic agency. When diplomacy takes
the form of negotiation be it bilateral or
multilateral diplomats become more explicit Diplomatic agency as advocacy
agents. They are involved in a back-and-forth
process, requiring an additional set of skills to It is not new that diplomats focus on the
that of the communicator. Numerous studies broader public and try to achieve change
through persuasion, i.e. though advocacy. In Advocacy involves the promotion of national
the eighteenth century, an increasing sense interests through strategic partnerships with
developed among statesmen of a public NGOs and companies and through public diplo-
below the state whose opinion mattered for macy. Many countries now team up with NGOs,
diplomacy (Mitzen 2005). The diplomatic companies and individuals engaged in various
forms of lobbying.
scene is increasingly on public display as
interrelated revolutionary changes in politics,
international relations and mass communica-
tion have greatly expanded the role of publics
in foreign policy. More recently, the increased PROFESSIONALIZATION,
visibility of foreign policy made possible by PERSONALIZATION AND CHANGING
new communication technologies has led to a CONCEPTIONS OF REPRESENTATION
focus on soft power (Nye 2004), public
diplomacy (Melissen et al. 2005), nation- The fundamental question regarding the pro-
branding (Van Ham 2001) and social media fessionalization of diplomacy is who gets to
in diplomacy (Seib 2012). be considered as a diplomat. Traditionalists
Oriented towards a wider public, diplomatic cling to the view that only official state repre-
advocacy can take many forms. Former US sentatives are diplomats, but a lot of diplo-
ambassador to the UN, John R. Bolton, finds matic action is taking place outside traditional
that diplomats have lost sight of the promo- diplomatic institutions such as embassies and
tion of national interests and advocacy (Bolton foreign services. Non-state actors, from pri-
2007). Advocacy, however, can also mean vate companies to non-governmental organi-
more sophisticated promotion of national inter- zations, and other parts of the state apparatus
ests through strategic partnerships or public increasingly engage in their own separate
diplomacy. Many countries now team up with diplomatic activities. Today, most ministries
NGOs, companies and individuals engaged in have their own skilled international secretari-
various forms of lobbying and advocacy, from ats that uphold relations with their peers in
the Red Cross to the International Campaign other states and they send their own personnel
to Ban Landmines, in ways that also favor on diplomatic missions. These tendencies
particular national interests. imply that international relations are no longer
the exclusive preserve of foreign ministries.
As all other professions, diplomacy has a
history of gradual and non-linear developments.
Key Points In fact, the distinctions that make diplomacy
Diplomatic agency takes three generic forms: as a profession possible are relatively recent.
communication, negotiation and advocacy. On The differentiation between domestic and
the one hand, cheap transportation and com- foreign was only gradually institutionalized
munication technology have limited the com- (Neumann 2012: 53). The first diplomats
municative autonomy of the resident diplomat; were personally appointed envoys, acting for
on the other hand, information overload and new the king or republic, often belonging to the
actors have made the monitoring of diplomacy by aristocratic elite. Gradually, diplomacy gained
capitals more difficult.
its status as a meritocratic profession, starting
When negotiating or mediating be it bilater-
in France in the sixteenth century with an
ally or multilaterally diplomats become more
explicit agents. Numerous studies have demon- academy, secretariat, archives and manuals
strated the importance of personal leadership for (Weisbrode 2013: 14) (See also Chapters 2, 5
negotiation processes, not just in bilateral but and 12 in this Handbook.)
also in multilateral negotiations in the UN, WTO, One of the particularities of diplomacy
EU, NATO, etc. is that it has never accepted the distinction
between official and private life. Being sta- One of the major developments in diplo-
tioned abroad and having to attend and organ- matic agency is personalization. The formal
ize social gatherings, diplomats have relied on codes of conduct, including courtesy calls
their (female) spouses in their work. Yet, as and presentation of credentials, have not dis-
Cynthia Enloe (2014) notes, the role of diplo- appeared (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013: 70),
matic wives (and womens role in international but such ritualized performances are supple-
politics more generally) is still misrepre- mented with informal interactions diplomat-
sented by practitioners and scholars. Indeed, to-diplomat and diplomat-to-foreign-publics.
the agency of diplomatic partners (female or States (and their leaders) seek to present
male) is unofficial and under-appreciated. Yet, themselves as favorably as possible, both pro-
diplomatic partners can have remarkable influ- actively through public diplomacy and nation
ence also on state-to-state relations, exploiting branding, and more reactively by trying to
their transversal agency. They not only oil the manage media coverage. Media handling
machinery and shape the conditions for good often takes place simultaneously and inter-
conversations during dinner parties, they also feres directly with closed-door negotiations.
take strategic and agenda-setting roles during Foreign ministers and diplomats interact and
foreign postings (Dommet 2005). monitor each other electronically, as during
Today, state agents and more specifically the propaganda war between the West and
national foreign services have acquired a Russia over Ukraine in 2014. Texting, email-
dominant position in diplomatic affairs. This ing, Facebooking and Tweeting may seem
is largely due to what the French sociologist like more private ways of interacting, requir-
Pierre Bourdieu called symbolic power, ing users to present themselves as someone
which is the imposition of particular per- like their audiences. The EUs Foreign Policy
ceptions upon social agents who then take Representative Federica Mogherini might
the social order to be just (see Adler-Nissen choose to reveal personal details on Facebook,
2014b). Symbolic power requires the con- but personalization may also produce embar-
stant performance of social distinctions. For rassment. For instance, one US diplomat used
instance, when France inaugurated a new her professional Twitter profile to mention
diplomatic academy in 2001, French for- purchasing a bathing suit in the midst of a
eign minister Hubert Vedrine explained: we meltdown in the Middle East (Cull 2011: 5).
are creating a diplomatic institute to further There are both critics and defenders of the
demarcate the amateurism from the profes- transformations and increased visibility of
sionalism, which is ours (Vedrine, quoted diplomatic agency. One key critic includes
in Colson 2009: 74). Many countries have Paul Sharp, who insists on an ethos of rep-
adopted formal training programmes and resenting (not creating) national interests. As
diplomatic schools. Some countries, such Sharp puts it:
as Germany, Chile and Peru require all new
employees to go through one year at a dip- Diplomacy has an important role to play relative to
lomatic academy before they start working the policy process, but it is limited and should be
specifically defined. To expect it to contribute more
(Rana 2007). Notwithstanding the formaliza- is not only to offend the democratic ethic, but also
tion of diplomatic training, most diplomats obscures the true location of the policy-making
still acquire their skills and status mainly by responsibility, which is with the political leaders.
experience and patronage. Indeed, national (Sharp 2003: 565)
diplomats have generally been in a posi-
tion to rebuff challengers and they have Accordingly, diplomatic agency is to be lim-
largely been able to affirm their mastery over ited to the interpretation and translation of
the art of diplomacy (for a discussion, see different cultures to political leaders. Yet
Adler-Nissen 2014b). such self-restraint may be difficult when the
diplomatic profession is under pressure. For Today, however, the rise of non-state actors
instance, export-oriented companies increas- ranging from transnational companies to global
ingly require a wide variety of professional media, over non-governmental organizations
diplomatic services as markets and produc- to multilateral organizations, challenges the
tive operations expand globally and non- image of national diplomats as custodians
governmental organizations expect diplomats of the idea of international society (Bull
to advise and assist them when they operate 1977: 176). Symbolically, new articulations
across cultures. of collective representation, differing from the
Former diplomat and scholar Daryl traditional promotion of national interests,
Copeland (2009) has a completely opposite such as the Occupy movement and various
take on diplomatic agency to Sharp. If nation- attempts to create a transnational public sphere,
based diplomacy is to remain relevant in a challenge territorial-based diplomacy (see
globalized and interlinked world, Copeland also Chapters 41 and 42 in this Handbook).
argues, it must transform itself into Guerilla Changes in diplomatic representation also
Diplomacy. The guerrilla diplomat interacts happen through formal or functional delega-
with people outside the embassy walls. He or tion as states choose to delegate or open up
she is comfortable with risk and has an affinity diplomacy. For instance, the member states
for outreach. Standard operating procedures, of the European Union have delegated their
awaiting instructions and doing things by trade policy to the supranational level. As a
the book will rarely be sufficient in resolving consequence, the European Commissioner
the complex problems which characterize the is the sole representative of European trade
sorts of fast-paced, high-risk environments of interest in negotiations of trade agreements
modern world politics (Copeland 2009: 146). with the US, Japan, or Canada. Moreover,
When for instance, the Danish ambassador to international organizations such as the UN
Pakistan organizes a rock concert with other and OSCE invite new actors such as NGOs
ambassadors from the diplomatic corps in inside, partly to solve problems that the tra-
Islamabad, including the Bosnian ambassador ditional intergovernmental diplomacy cannot
on guitar, Japanese ambassador on drums and solve, partly to increase legitimacy as inter-
Australian ambassador on flute and vocals, he national organizations engage in far-reaching
signals more than musicality. By engaging in cooperation with real life implications for cit-
such informal and non-diplomatic activities izens across the globe (Tallberg etal. 2013).
outside the embassy walls (and later sharing it Interestingly, this process of opening up mul-
on Facebook), the Danish ambassador displays tilateral diplomacy has to a large extent been
mutual understanding within the diplomatic controlled by states (Tallberg etal. 2013: 256).
corps and informality as modern diplomatic Diplomacy largely still takes place within a
values. However, many diplomats and inter- field of rules and roles established over hun-
national policy managers lack the skills and dreds of years where states officially commu-
experience to combine formality and infor- nicate with each other. We should thus avoid
mality (Bjola and Holmes 2015). Diplomatic looking at diplomatic agency in isolation,
scholars also lack theoretical and methodo- and instead ask how it adapts, transforms, or
logical tools to grasp how social media affects undermines international interactions.
diplomatic agency (see also Chapters 35 and
43 in this Handbook).
Four decades ago, Raymond Aron wrote: the
ambassador and the soldier live and symbolize Key Points
international relations which, insofar as they Personalization is a strategy used by diplomats
are inter-state relations, concern diplomacy and to promote a range of values and national inter-
war (Aron quoted in Cooper etal. 2013: 67). ests off- and online. Yet, such activities involve
more risk-taking as well-tried diplomatic rituals NOTE

are discounted and the traditional boundary
between the private and public is transgressed. 1I wish to thank Costas Constantinou, Mads Dagnis
Diplomatic scholars lack theoretical and meth- Jensen and Anders Wivel for helpful comments.
odological tools to grasp how public diplomacy
and social media affects diplomatic agency.
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8
Diplomatic Culture
Fiona McConnell and Jason Dittmer
Something we may call a diplomatic culture arises permits diplomats to exert their own influence
out of the experience of conducting relations on the conduct of international relations?
between peoples who regard themselves as dis-
Insofar as such a culture exists, what does it
tinctive and separate from one another. (Sharp
2004: 361) look like, is it a good thing and, if it is, how is
it to be sustained? In starting to address these
questions this chapter looks first at the evolu-
tion of the concept of diplomatic culture, from
INTRODUCTION its roots in pre-Westphalian negotiations
between empires through to its framing as
If diplomacy is understood as the practice of universal and codification within diplomatic
conducting negotiations between representa- protocols and international law. The second
tives of distinct communities, then questions part of this chapter turns attention to the
of culture and cultural exchange are at its core. articulation of diplomatic culture by diplo-
This includes the promotion of particular mats themselves, looking at the emphasis
ideas and values (whether these be grounded placed on tact and civility, the professionaliza-
in so-called national cultures or framed as tion of diplomatic services, the unifying role
universal), the mediation of different values that a shared diplomatic culture plays, and
and political priorities and, in recent decades, tensions between diplomatic culture and
the formal engagement of foreign publics with national cultures. The final section considers
national ideals and institutions in the form of the multiplicity of diplomatic cultures that
cultural diplomacy (Finn 2003). But what of emerge and shape one another, from national
the culture of diplomacy itself? As Paul Sharp diplomatic traditions to unofficial or paradi-
(2004: 361) asks: To what extent does an plomacies that feed off diplomatic culture and,
independent diplomatic culture exist which in the process remake it.
Diplomatic Culture 105
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT societies have had as one of their foundations
OF DIPLOMATIC CULTURE a common culture (Bull 2002: 304). Or, as
Sharp puts it, an underlying, cosmopoli-
Within diplomatic studies, the notion of diplo- tan set of values which human beings have
matic culture is a relatively recent conceptual been claimed to share whether or not they
addition, dating to the broader cultural turn in are aware of the existence of each other
the social sciences in the 1990s. Prior neglect (Sharp 2004: 364). Whilst the broadness of
of questions of culture has been attributed to this definition means that it includes cultures
a perceived thinness of cultural context of pre-Westphalian city-states and empires,
between polities, and a scepticism towards the inside this circle lies the international politi-
cal culture which is specific to the context of
idea of culture within the positivist approaches
the modern interstate system. At the centre of
of North American International Relations
these circles, and thus at the core of interna-
(IR). This prevailing view saw diplomatic
tional society, lies the diplomatic culture: the
culture [as] too vague, ambiguous or unverifi-
common stock of ideas and values possessed
able to warrant serious intellectual attention
by the official representatives of states (Bull
(Der Derian 1996: 87; Sharp 2004). Where
2002: 304).
the idea of diplomatic culture has been dis-
Diplomatic culture, here specifically writ-
cussed within the various schools of thought
ten in the singular, is thus the label given to
in IR it has had a contested uptake. In Geoffrey
an overarching structure that constrains the
Wisemans review of the term (Wiseman
behaviour of states and their diplomats. A
2005) the responses are grouped into four number of key elements to diplomatic culture
perspectives: Diplomatic culture exists and are apparent when we consider Bulls notion
its importance is underestimated (English of diplomatic culture alongside Wisemans
school of IR); Diplomatic culture exists but is more detailed definition, also from an English
not important (negotiation theorists); The School perspective: the accumulated com-
existence of diplomatic culture is either municative and representational norms, rules,
ignored or taken for granted (a constructivist and institutions devised to improve relations
critique of neo-Realism); and Diplomatic and avoid war between interacting and mutu-
culture exists but harms the national interest ally recognizing political entities (Wiseman
(neo-conservative policy think tanks). 2005: 40910). These elements include com-
In light of this, it is the English School per- mon values (including a shared religion and
spective on diplomatic culture and Hedley a preference for peace-making), a common
Bulls ideas in particular which has had the intellectual culture, institutionalized norms, a
most significant influence on debates to date. presumption of equivalent diplomatic actors,
For Bull (1975, 20021) diplomatic culture is and a heritage accumulated over long periods
a concept that underpins and, in many ways, of time and handed down to the present. We
constitutes the international society of states. will briefly discuss these elements in turn.
In a reading of Bulls understanding of dip- Der Derian (1987) traces the genealogy
lomatic culture through the lens of critical of European diplomacy from well before the
theory, James Der Derian argues that it plays modern state instead finding its roots in
a meta-theoretical role in his work on inter- Judeo-Christian theology. As humanity was
national society (Der Derian 1996: 85). Der meant to be united in Christ, so were its polit-
Derian usefully outlines the multiple uses of ical units (then cities). However, mankinds
culture in Bulls writings in terms of three fallen nature leads to estrangement between
concentric circles. The outer, all-embracing these Christian polities, and it is in this space
circle is constituted of world or cosmopoli- between would-be fellows that diplomacy
tan culture which all historical international emerges. As Christendom became Europe
with the fracturing of the sacred unity of international law, and the establishment of its
the Church and the Ottoman threat from the rules and conventions through protocol and
southeast, diplomacy became tied to the rise institutionalisation.
of the modern state. Der Derian argues that If the understanding of diplomacy as a
Machiavellis treatise marked the emergence formerly culturally-specific but now-universal
of a new political rationality that prioritized facet of the international society is true, then
the interests of the state over the needs of the practice of diplomacy itself takes on the
any larger community. Iver Neumann argues, role of translation. In a world of estranged
however, that this new rationality did not dis- polities by definition alienated from one
establish the Christian nature of diplomatic another diplomacy serves as the middle
culture: ground in which representatives can meet.
Diplomatic culture is thus the mechanism
As late as 1815, although Tsar Alexander of Russia through which estrangement is mediated:
did not succeed in making his holy alliance the it facilitates the movement of people and
framework for a new European diplomatic order, ideas across alien boundaries (Der Derian
he still managed to recruit his brothers in Christ,
the Habsburg emperor and the king of Prussia, 1996: 85). Indeed the notion of alienation
with a treaty text that bore the explicit religious understood as something made separate and
and kinship markers of the diplomacy of foreign lies at the core of English School
Christendom. (Neumann 2012: 304) engagements with diplomatic culture (Wight
1979; Watson 1984; Bull 2002). From this
Neumann identifies three facets of contem- perspective diplomacy not only manages the
porary diplomacy that have their roots in the consequences of separateness, but, in so doing,
Christian origins of diplomacy: immunity of it reproduces the conditions out of which those
envoys (but see Numelin 1950), permanent consequences arise (Sharp 2004: 370). As Der
representation, and the ordering of the diplo- Derian asserts, the existence of a diplomatic
matic corps. Implied, of course, is that there culture only becomes self-evident, and subject
are many more. to inquiry, when the values and ideas of one
Diplomatic culture is thus given as a society are estranged from another (Der
European inheritance, emerging in modern Derian 1996: 92). This estrangement exists
form with the state system itself and diffus- in a range of intersecting relations: between
ing through the world through processes of high and low cultures (read Western and non-
colonization and de-colonization (Watson Western), between different political actors,
1984). As Shaun Riordan notes, it is [s] and between society and self (ibid.).
triking the extent to which the structures and As such, the idea of a common intellectual
decision-making procedures of the British, culture underpinning diplomatic culture is
French and US service have been replicated, key to facilitating communication between
with greater or lesser efficiency, by develop- estranged members of the international
ing and even communist countries (Riordan society of states. According to Bull, this is
2003: 30). From an English School perspec- constituted of a common language (in broad
tive the universalizing of this diplomatic cul- brushstrokes Latin until the mid-nineteenth
ture is instrumental to the place of diplomacy century, French until the end of World
within international society (Bull 2002). Yet War I, and English since then), a common
this is hardly a new idea: it also a sentiment scientific understanding of the world, [and]
articulated by Franois de Callires (1717) certain common notions and techniques that
who noted the need for negotiation to be derive from the universal espousal by
continuous and universal. The subsequent governments of economic development
codifying of diplomatic culture was achieved and their universal involvement in modern
both through its co-evolution with cultures of technology (Bull 2002: 305).
Whilst, as we note below, the existence on articulated and re-worked by diplomats

the ground of such a universal diplomatic themselves. As Sasson Sofer (2007; 2013)
culture based on such a broad set of common argues, it is the diplomatic corps (and, pre-
cultural values is patchy at best, it is neverthe- ceding that, the looser notion of the diplo-
less promoted as an ideal to which to aspire. matic community) that is the primary
The extent to which this always produces the repository of diplomatic culture. It is perhaps
best international relations is, however, open notable that the first book on the diplomatic
to debate. Joyce Leaders (2007) account of corps was only relatively recently compiled
the Kigali diplomatic corps role in the Arusha (Sharp and Wiseman 2007). Through the
peace talks in 199293 is a case in point. Leader institutionalisation of the diplomatic corps
notes that, on the one hand, the diplomatic we can trace the development of an increas-
corps adherence to a shared diplomatic culture ingly codified diplomatic culture. Given that
based on common norms and values relating to it is practiced by a few carefully selected
the conduct of negotiations played a key role in representatives of international polities and
unifying what was a disparate group of Western has aristocratic origins, diplomatic culture is
donors, neighbouring and other African states, conventionally understood as an elitist mani-
a European Commission delegation, and UN festation of international culture. Aristocratic
aid agencies. Yet on the other hand: fraternity based on shared cosmopolitan
values was central to the unity of the diplo-
Diplomacy failed in Rwanda at least in part matic corps until the turn of the twentieth
because the Kigali diplomatic corps was a victim of
its own diplomatic culture. The Kigali diplomatic century. Yet even then the tradition of diplo-
community were so committed to the success mats being so wedded to dynastic European
of the Arusha process, as a way of both ending the culture did not go uncontested. In the eight-
war and bringing democracy to Rwanda that they eenth century, de Callires and others argued
failed to see or to comprehend the warning signs that the ideal ambassador needed more than
that the process was not leading to peace. (Leader
2007: 192) blue blood: negotiation should be a profes-
(See also Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 11 in this sion in and of itself as It demands all the
Handbook) penetration, all the dexterity, all the supple-
ness which a man can well possess. It
requires widespread understanding and
Key Points knowledge, and above all a correct and pierc-
ing discernment (de Callires 1963: 9).
Some question the existence of diplomatic cul- While the transition from an aristocratic to
ture, and others contest its implications. a professional diplomatic culture is still ongo-
Diplomatic culture, such as it is, is largely derived ing in many parts of the world, the process can
from European and Christian traditions.
be seen to originate in the regularisation and
If diplomatic culture provides a space of transla-
codification of what had hitherto been a body
tion between estranged polities, it carries within
it the potential for improving relations and occa- of knowledge that aristocrats learned through
sionally degrading them. being immersed in their milieu. This process,
which included such new rules as the intro-
duction of precedence within a diplomatic
corps on the basis of the date of accreditation,
DIPLOMATIC CULTURE AND can be traced to the Congress of Vienna (Sofer
PROFESSIONALIZATION 2007). Through the self-aware creation of a
body of professional knowledge, diplomatic
Thus far we have considered diplomatic culture came to be the object of its own gov-
culture somewhat in the abstract. We now ernment; the mannerisms of aristocracy had
turn to how diplomatic culture is learned, become the by-laws of interstate negotiation.
This separation of diplomacy as a pro- those apparently at war with the world are
fession distinct from, for instance, soldiers, quick to learn its prevailing forms of civility
lawyers or priests, fostered the idea of a (Sharp 2009: 206). While this is the ideal that
community of individuals who were unique diplomats should aspire to, it is not always
within broader society and who often seem necessarily the reality of diplomatic practice
to have more in common with each other than on the ground. Often norms are most appar-
with those they allegedly represent (Mayall ent in their violation, such as:
2007: 1). Indeed, they were often related to
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavezs ad hominem
one another. To this day, in the popular imagi-
remarks about US president George W. Bush
nation diplomats are often seen as belonging during the 2006 Annual General Debate [at the
to a cohort set apart from ordinary citizens. UN]. The reaction of UN diplomats to Chavezs
How has such an idea of separation endured? speech illustrates how deeply the norm of civility
Sharp argues that, to an extent greater than runs in diplomatic culture in general and in the UN
corps in particular. Many linked Venezuelas
other professionals, diplomats not only serve
subsequent failure to win a coveted two-year term
their professional universe, they constitute it on the Security Council to that speech. (Wiseman
(Sharp 2004: 376). And certainly the privi- 2007: 256)
leges and immunities that diplomats enjoy
not only constitute the conditions which Indeed, although the majority of diplomatic
make diplomatic work possible, but also relations, even the most difficult and politically
serve to bolster the perceived separateness charged ones, are still conducted with great
of this profession. Beyond this, the norms, civility it is widely believed that the stand-
roles and traditions of diplomacy created ard of civility achieved in modern diplomacy
powerful poles of identity to which practi- has now greatly declined (Sharp 2009: 205).
tioners could feel bound. Diplomatic services Sharp attributes this to international rela-
consisted of officials representing their tions today being more culturally divided,
governments in foreign capitals (who) pos- ideologically driven and popularly based
sessed similar standards of education, simi- (ibid.). Indeed English School proponents of
lar experience, and similar aim. They desired diplomatic culture (Wight 1979; Bull 2002)
the same sort of world. As de Callires had expressed concern about its declining stand-
already noticed in 1716, they tended to ards, which they saw as a result of a dilution
develop a corporate identity independent of of a shared international culture. It is worth
their national identity (Nicolson 1954: 75). noting that, in general, a decline of formality
Further, as Neumann (2012) notes, the need and manners is noted throughout the modern
to easily know who your opposite number era in many spheres of social life, and so this
is in another embassy or foreign ministry lament may simply speak to a larger phenom-
meant that there were powerful incentives for enon. Still, the decline of diplomatic culture
foreign ministries and diplomatic services to might be remedied by enhanced engagement
create parallel hierarchical structures. in practices of professionalization.
Of course, perhaps the strongest norms in Given these shared norms, obligations
diplomatic culture are civility and tact. In fact, and traditions it would stand to reason that
in Satows celebrated definition diplomacy the training of individual diplomats would be
is the application of intelligence and tact to not only key to their admission to the pro-
the conduct of relations between the govern- fession, but would be as standardized across
ments of independent states (Satow 1957: national diplomatic services as other aspects
1). Indeed, these norms have carried over into of diplomatic culture are. Nevertheless, this
the quasi-diplomacy of non-state actors: As is far from true (e.g., Cohen 1997) there
the experience of the Taliban diplomats in the is a remarkable lack of consistency across
Islamabad diplomatic corps suggests, even states in terms of the provision and nature of
diplomatic training (e.g., extensive training ALTERNATIVE AND NEW DIPLOMATIC

in Spain, minimal in the UK and US where CULTURES
most training has, to date, been done on the
job). In this way, the continued class-based The idea of a monolithic diplomatic culture is
elements of diplomatic culture can be seen, a denial of the difference that diplomacy seeks
as particular elite schools in both the US and to overcome. As Sofer notes, The duality of
UK might be understood as providing train- closeness and estrangement is inherent in
ing in diplomatic culture without being voca- diplomacy, as it is always surrounded by
tional training. However, as countries like the suspicion and divided loyalties (Sofer 2007:
UK increasingly aim to recruit a representa- 35). This is true both in a general sense and in
tive work force to the Foreign Office, such particular encounters. Regarding the former,
informal systems of training are increasingly Costas Constantinou (2006) argues for homo-
seen as inadequate, and change is coming. diplomacy, an understanding of diplomacy
Whilst diplomats are perceived as specialists that draws on two aspects of diplomatic
in the technical aspects of their art particularly practice that remain understudied: (1) non-
in precise and accurate communication professional, non-state diplomacy and (2) the
(Bull 2002: 173) they have traditionally been transformative potential of diplomacy.
generalists when it comes to knowledge and
experience. But diplomatic practice is changing: Within this context, homo-diplomacy would be
diplomats are now expected to engage with far about the mediation of same-ness, internal media-
tion, as a condition for as well as a neglected
more than just foreign policy. Their remit may aspect of the mediation of the estranged. In
now include issues of trade and investment, homo-diplomacy not only the Other but the Self
humanitarian aid, environmental regulation becomes strange, a site to be known or known
and public health. As such, contemporary anew. Self becomes strange so as to creatively deal
international relations increasingly require with alterity, overcoming the diplomatic fixation of
clear and unambiguous identity, which renders
specialists (Riordan 2003): an elite society mediation a one-dimensional external process.
of cultured, educated diplomats have been (Constantinou 2006: 352)
replaced by technically competent experts
whose knowledge and experience are limited to In this sense, we can see diplomatic cultures,
very few issue areas, and who do not have in the plural, as proliferating and relational.
the cultural background evident in the old Human encounters (whether between polities
diplomacy (Lipschutz 1996: 107) (See also or not) are necessarily diplomatic as they
Chapters 6, 7, 12, 14 and 21 in this Handbook) both seek to bridge the Self/Other divide and
enable communication, cooperation, or
something more like the creation of a new
us. Further, each encounter not only
Key Points
changes those communicated with, but also
Shift from aristocratic to professional diplomacy is changes the Self. Diplomatic cultures there-
an ongoing process, with many cultural holdovers. fore can be understood as alive, dynamic and
Professionalization entailed the production of a hardly the stable structural ground on which
body of knowledge that could be perpetuated international society is built.
and modified by diplomats themselves
Intriguingly, Constantinou (2006) argues
Diplomatic culture has much continuity with the
that a missing dimension in contemporary
past, such as tact and civility. However, new pro-
fessional demands require new skills. diplomacy is the role of spirituality with
There is a trend towards greater formalisation of its emphasis on knowing the Other so that
diplomatic training and a shift from diplomats one might know thyself as an antidote
being generalists to increasingly requiring spe- to the raison dEtat that Machiavelli
cialist knowledge. introduced to European diplomacy. Parallel
to Constantinous argument, although not Indeed, in an interview with one of the authors,
framed as homo-diplomacy, is Megorans a Canadian protocol officer noted that:
(2010) study of the Reconciliation Walk, in
which evangelical Christians walked the path We have other countries too who, theres no dif-
ference in what their expectations are per se, but
of the first Crusade to apologize for it. The just the way they go about it is more informal.
unexpected outcome of the evangelicals Theres still a definite expectation that their head
own transformation through the process of state is received in a certain way, but the prepa-
reversing their previous understandings of the ration and the lead-up to it has a different kind of
IsraeliPalestinian conflict is an indicator of tone and is more informal. Our Latin colleagues,
for example, are like that, just more relaxed.
the transformative potential within diplomatic (unpublished interview, 2010)
practices, even when conducted by non-
traditional diplomatic actors. Therefore diplomatic encounters require cul-
Of course, any analysis of encounters tural translators those individuals who not
between differing diplomatic cultures (in only speak the universal diplomatic lan-
the traditional, macro-sense) illustrates how guage but also understand the local dialect.
such an encounter is an event that changes Indeed, it is notable that state visits are nego-
both. When the Iroquois engaged in diplo- tiated between the protocol officers of the
macy with European states, it was not done receiving country and the staff at the local
on strictly European terms but instead was a embassy of the sending country; the stage for
hybrid set of practices that were improvised diplomacy must be set by a pre-diplomacy
over time and conventionalized: conducted between these interlocutors, who
Although the roots of forest diplomacy can be presumably have a minimal cultural divide:
traced to the Iroquois Condolence Council, a ritual
for mourning dead chiefs and installing their suc- When the country were receiving comes to pre-
cessors, by the mid-eighteenth century it incorpo- pare their state visit or their official visit they all
rated many elements borrowed from European have demands [] and then we have to negotiate
practice. Gun salutes, toasts, the distribution of [] Its just an example but if our standard is a six
European trade goods as presents at the conclusion foot wide red carpet but they want ten feet, these
of councils, and especially the keeping of written are the little variants they might have in terms of
records of the proceedings and treaties were demands. (unpublished interview, 2010)
European innovations. [] In order to be successful
in their dealings with the Iroquois, English govern- As a result of this recognition of difference,
ment officials found it necessary to operate within recent studies have eschewed studies of
the established system of Iroquois council protocol,
abstract diplomatic cultures whether uni-
just as the Indians had to accept and adopt certain
colonial practices. (Hagedorn 1988: 601) versal or national and have turned to diplo-
mats as embodied practitioners. The rise of
It could be argued that this is a historical studies using ethnography (Neumann 2005;
example drawing from a time in which the 2007) or drawing on the work of Bourdieu
state system was not yet universal. But this is (Adler-Nissen 2012; Kuus 2014) to examine
to miss Constantinous primary point, which the lived performance of diplomacy marks
is that all human encounters are efforts to this practice turn within diplomatic studies.
overcome estrangement. The practice turn thus enables the recog-
Even within the established, formalized nition of each diplomatic encounter as both
diplomatic protocol (the heart of official dip- a repetition of well-established protocols or
lomatic culture) there are geographic varia- scripts, and also a unique performance dif-
tions and emphases. In Iver Neumanns words, ferent from all previous encounters (Deleuze
clashes on the level of practices are fairly 1994). Draining diplomacy of its categori-
everyday in diplomacy, and they are to a cer- cal status and shifting attention from a mono-
tain degree inevitable (Neumann 2012: 316). lithic diplomatic culture to a multiplicity of
diplomacies has enabled a greater recognition in which that encounter is occurring, then we
of the various diplomacies that might formerly can imagine diplomatic culture as the aggre-
have fallen outside our attention. The above gate of these encounters, clustered around
example of the travelling American evangeli- one another in a possibility space with a few
cals apologizing for the Crusades is a good outliers. Further, if diplomatic encounters
start, and indeed religion provides a range of are transformative, with both the sender and
examples of non-state polities engaging in received changed by the experience, and if
diplomacy (e.g., McConnell etal., 2012). each group is having encounters with mul-
Another area in which diplomacy thrives tiple groups, then diplomatic culture must
beyond the sovereign state system is in the be imagined as not only multiplicitous but
realm of indigenous peoples, who have a also dynamic. A constant flux and flow rip-
topological relationship with the states in ples through the networks of diplomacy, with
whose territories they exist: both within norms and expectations changing over time
and yet beyond the state (Jennings 1985). in a radically de-centred fashion:
As Marshall Beier notes, indigenous diplo-
So, the president of Japan is coming Prime
matic relations and cultures long pre-dated Minister, sorry coming with foreign media. We
the arrival of Europeans in the Americas and used to provide ground transportation for all of
elsewhere, and in recent years there has been them, so we would rent buses and vans and we
a growing prominence of Indigenous peo- would look after them. We consult and we talk
ples in international fora, not merely as an amongst each other and we realized that geesh,
the past ten visits our Prime Minister has done
issue, but as important and effectual global abroad and not one country has provided a van to
political actors in their own right (Beier our media, so why are we doing it? So we adjust
2007: 9). Yet, scholarship within interna- our standards and thats pretty much international
tional relations has been almost completely practice. (unpublished interview, 2010)
silent on indigenous peoples, their diploma-
cies and the distinctly non-Western cosmolo- Given the number of diplomacies in play with
gies that underwrite and enable them (Beier new diplomacies emerging all the time there
2010: 11). Attending to the diversity of indig- is no chance for the dynamism of this multi-
enous diplomatic cultures can offer a reveal- plicity to settle out. Rather, we are left with a
ing lens on the boundaries of hegemonic de-centred, amorphous, dynamic set of diplo-
understandings of diplomacy as well as what matic cultures: each sharing some commonali-
constitutes bona fide diplomatic practice ties with the others yet remaining distinct, both
(Beier 2007: 10; de Costa 2007). Beyond from the others and from past selves (see also
religion and indigeneity, diplomacy can be Chapters 42, 43, 50 and 52 in this Handbook).
seen to proliferate in many directions, includ-
ing the paradiplomacy of cities (Acuto 2013) Key Points
and regions (Aldecoa and Keating 1999;
Cornago 2013). Each varietal both mimics Any diplomatic encounter necessarily involves
official diplomacy in some ways even as it different national dialects of diplomatic culture.
inflects it with regional or cultural specific- Homo-diplomacy highlights both the transforma-
ity. Diplomatic culture serves as a hegemonic tional possibilities of these encounters and the
need to account for diplomacies beyond the state.
norm that paradiplomatic and indigenous
Research following from the practice turn in
actors can nevertheless draw legitimacy from diplomatic studies enables us to consider each
even as they subvert it for their own purposes. encounter as it is performed rather than through
If each of these groups diplomatic abstract categories like diplomatic culture.
encounters draws on some general sense of There is increasing recognition of multiple diplo-
what diplomatic culture is or ought to be, matic cultures articulated by state and non-state
and yet is also inflected by particular context actors.
CONCLUSION Beier, J. M. (ed.) (2010) Indigenous Diplomacies.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Diplomatic culture refers to an ensemble of Bull, H. (1975) World Society: some definitions
and questions, Paper presented on 30 June
practices, comportments and historical prec-
1975 to the Seminar on World Society, at
edents which may or may not be found in any Department of International Relations,
specific new encounter. Attempts to nail Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian
down what is, or what is not, diplomatic cul- National University.
ture are therefore bound to fail. Fruitful ways Bull, H. (2002) The Anarchical Society: A Study
to study diplomatic culture in the future of Order in World Politics, 3rd edition.
would seem to be rooted in the recognition of Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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Constantinou, C. (2006) On homo-diplomacy,
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Space and Culture 9 (4): 35164.
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de Costa, R. (2007) Cosmology, mobility and
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Journal 13: 1328.
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9
Diplomacy and the Arts
Iver B. Neumann1
While the last two decades have seen a coming communication is supposed to change peo-
of age of the study of aesthetics in international ples minds. For the individual diplomat, it is,
relations (Bleiker 2009, Danchev and Lisle as sociologists have put it for half a century,
2009), the diplomatic arena remains understud- about impression management. Impression
ied. What little there is we find scattered across management is about face work direct
disciplines such as history, art history, musicol- communication and face work always
ogy, geography and, indeed, international rela- happens in contexts. Those contexts have a
tions and political science. This chapter looks visual quality. The sites and the artefacts that
at the prominent aspect of aesthetics that has to go into creating the sites have a user value.
do with art, broadly understood as the high- A negotiation table may be rectangular to
status genres of culturally significant expres- facilitate leadership from one of its short
sion (literature, painting and so on), as well as ends, or it may be round, so that all partici-
cultural artefacts that also attempt to concen- pants seated around it are placed on a par in
trate life experience but have a broader appeal a physical sense. However, the sites and arte-
(popular culture). It only tangentially relates to facts used also have an aesthetic quality. A
the wider aesthetics agenda of scrutinizing the negotiation table may be plain, ornamented,
visual and sensual appreciation of the (diplo- beautiful and so on. One way in which
matic) world in general. I concentrate on two diplomacy and the arts interact concerns the
general interfaces between art and diplomacy constitution of diplomatic sites. This is the
and catalogue extant work that is particularly topic of the first part of the chapter.
ripe for follow-up. En route, I also take note of Art is also about communication. It rep-
this fields many lacunae. resents phenomena. One such phenomenon
Diplomacy is about communicating with is diplomacy. We find paintings, includ-
the other. It is also instrumental, in that ing portrait paintings, of diplomats, we find
DIPLOMACY AND THE ARTS 115
diplomats on the pages of novels and we find the point of view of an ambassador, the major
diplomats being represented on stage. Here we point with a painting that adorns a residence
find another interface between diplomacy or an embassy is to make for a conversation
and the arts. Note that the arts as a term piece. Her objection was not to the factual
privileges a certain set of cultural artefacts she did not contest my observation as such
with high social status. Works of art are an but to the fact that the world was not more of
obvious match when diplomats meet, for an art for arts sake kind of place. I would
diplomats also have a high social standing. argue that she underestimated the politi-
It is no coincidence that persons and arte- cal potential of her guild, for by definition,
facts of high social standing crop up in the the surplus of meaning that makes a piece
same place, for they partly owe their high of art great has the ability to escape being
social standing to their association with one instrumentalised for political purposes
another. Art is not the only place where we (Butler and Bleiker 2014: 1). Some cultural
find representations of diplomats, however. artefacts make for a certain illness-at-ease
If art is high culture, there must necessarily which has an invariance-breaking potential.
also exist a low culture or, to use the gen- It is certainly the case that diplomats make
eral expression, popular culture. If art is asso- use of artistic work, but it is also the case
ciated with high status and so is politically that the best of such work also makes use of
constitutive of privileged position, popular diplomacy, in the sense that they challenge
culture is associated with low status and so what is taken for granted. Diplomats try in
is associated with authority and legitimacy. various degrees to aestheticise politics, but
How diplomacy is represented in genres that the politics of the aesthetic will always be
are historically considered to be low, such about more than such instrumentalisation of
as novels with a mass readership, films, TV cultural artefacts.
series, cartoons (Hansen 2011) and comics In conclusion, I speculate about yet another
(Dodds 2007), is important for the legitimacy intersection between art and diplomacy,
of both diplomacy and diplomats, for popular namely how the two may meet in scholarly
culture normalizes phenomena. I discuss this analysis of diplomacy.
in the second part of the chapter.
Note should also be taken of an underly-
ing factor of the relationship between diplo-
macy and art, which is particularly present USES OF ART IN DIPLOMATIC
when artists and diplomats meet. Artists COMMUNICATION
depend on Ministries of Foreign Affairs
(MFAs) and other customers for their liveli- The perhaps most conspicuous use of art in
hood. At the same time, artists take an inter- diplomacy concerns so-called signature
est in how their works are consumed. I once buildings. MFAs are frequently shorthanded
addressed the annual meeting held by the by their addresses Itimaraty for the
Norwegian MFA on the matter of art and Japanese MFA, Ballhausplatz for the
diplomacy. Norway is a consensus-seeking Austro-Hungarian MFA, Quai dOrsai for
country, so all the major arts have their pro- the French one and the addresses are short-
fessional national organizations and they all hand for the building itself. The buildings
have institutionalized cooperation with the tend to be monumental. By the same token,
MFA. Their representatives were present at permanent embassies are often works of art,
the occasion. While most of what I said went drawn by architects with a view to capturing
down well, the representative of the organi- the face of the country being represented (the
zation for national painters objected vehe- Nordic embassy complex in Berlin comes to
mently when I pointed out that, as seen from mind), or hybridization between the country
represented and the host nation (the American There is probably no form of plastic art,
embassy in New Dehli would be an example from the traditional European oil painting to
of this) or avantguardism in world architec- installations, that has not been pressed into
ture (French embassies tend to be particu- this kind of diplomatic service. Ministries of
larly elegant). Since the nation represented Foreign Affairs will usually have one or more
often adds to the bragging by publishing people, often art historians, who are in charge
richly illustrated brochures or even entire of buying art to adorn the MFA itself as well
books about their embassy buildings, there is as its embassies. Once again, the empirical
a rich empirical literature. There is, however, literature covering specific ministries and
little of any scholarly value. The key work is specific embassies is brimming with illus-
a broad overview of American diplomatic trations and presentations of these works,
architecture (Loeffler 1998). The American but little or nothing has been done on how
fortress model, which is a radical break specific countries choose to represent them-
with aesthetics and a turn towards a hedge- selves by way of specific kinds of artefacts
hog model of security, aims to churn out with specific kinds of motives over time.
embassies in three ready-made module sizes There are entire literatures available to tap
to be collated on site. During the Cold War, a for such a task, with the one on how nations
self-assured United States aimed to be a have represented themselves at world exhibi-
dominating presence in the middle of the tions and international art exhibitions such as
worlds capitals. Now they hide in heavily the Venice Biennale lying perhaps closest to
guarded compounds in suburbs. Loeffler hand (Martini and Martini 2011; for an intro-
(2012) has also written about how diplomats duction, see Lfgren 1993). Danish research-
have tried to stand up to this development, so ers Lene Hansen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen
far with little success. Meanwhile, the rest of are at work on how countries choose to rep-
the world continues to build embassies resent themselves during the art exhibitions
according to various aesthetic standards. that are regular official fringe events during
The aim to dazzle ones own subjects as European Union summits.2
well as visiting diplomats with monumental If self-presentation in terms of embassy
architecture, works of fine art and other heav- design and interior decoration has not been
ily wrought artefacts has a long pedigree that much studied, there is another kind of diplo-
stretches back at least to Pharaonic Egypt and matic self-presentation that is well covered
probably to Mesopotamia. The key exam- historically. This is the diplomatic gift, arte-
ple in the literature is, however, Byzantium. facts that are exchanged on the occasion of
Byzantine emperors dazzled their visitors meetings and visits (see French 2010). These
with sensual stimuli. For the eyes, there were artefacts tend to be luxury goods, which
great halls, beautiful colours and roaring Appadurai (1986: 38) defines as goods
mechanical lions behind the throne. For the whose principal use is rhetorical and social,
ears, the lions as well as beautiful music. The goods are simply incarnation signs, the neces-
touch got feather-light silks and the palate got sity to which they respond is fundamentally
the most exquisite dishes. The root metaphor political. Works of art are such goods and,
of Byzantine diplomacy was that, in line with historically, they are richly represented in dip-
the state religion, which held that the Emperor lomatic gift exchanges. One exemplary study
was Gods representative on earth, guests who that focuses on the materiality of the gifts
came to Byzantium actually arrived in the exchanged is a special issue of the niche jour-
earthly representation of heaven. The use of nal Studies in the Decorative Arts dedicated
art was consistently and emphatically geared to Early Modern European Diplomatic Gifts
towards bringing out the heavenly quality of (Cassidy-Geiger 20072008). Note should
the host country (Neumann 2006). also be made of the fact that music, which had
religious significance, was a frequently used Greek sculptures from the Parthenon. The
gift in mediaeval East Asian diplomacy (Pratt ill-begotten marbles remain in the British
1971). Within the understudied field of diplo- Museum to this day and remain also a thorny
macy and art, the study of music is particu- issue in BritishGreek diplomatic relations
larly understudied; but for groundbreaking (Rudenstine 1999). These marbles are the
research on the fairly obvious topic of what most visible case of such repatriation debates,
kind of music is played during diplomatic which are ubiquitous in post-colonial settings.
proceedings and beyond, see Agnew (2008) The most well-known post-war parallel to
as well as Ahrendt etal. (2014). post-colonial tugs of war over stolen art is
Art and its presentation abroad was, once probably the case of Nazi Germanys loot-
again, a staple in East Asian diplomacy, ing of paintings during its occupation of a
where artists were often part of embas- number of other countries during the Second
sies. It has remained an important part of World War (De Jaeger 1981). Seventy years
so-called cultural diplomacy. Orchestras, in later, the issue keeps cropping up on the dip-
the European case often but not exclusively lomatic agenda every time a new case of theft
symphony orchestras, seem to be a popular comes to light.
choice, particularly when relations between Finally, art may also be a standard object
two states have glazed over and are in need of running diplomatic relations between two
of thawing. In such cases, art is not used con- states, as when an art exhibition goes on
textually and contemporaneously, but as an tour and logistics have to be worked out. If
overture to hoped-for and subsequent diplo- relations between the two states in question
macy (see Gienow-Hecht 2009). are distant, this tends to be treated as a state-
One of the few works on art and diplomacy to-state affair, with diplomats on both sides
with a theoretical intent discusses Australias being active. If the context is close diplomatic
use of aboriginal art in its diplomatic campaigns relations, however, the sending and the
to establish itself as a United Nations member receiving museums or foundations will be the
in the 1940s and again in its campaign to secure main actors, with diplomats at the respective
a seat at the Security Council in the 2000s. In MFAs and embassies providing support from
the first case, Australia used art to underline the wings (see also Chapters 57, 35 and 43
its difference from the imperial homeland and in this Handbook).
its similarity to the US. In the second case, it
played to the indigenous lobby at the UN.
Butler and Bleiker (2014: 6) note laconically
that [t]he kind of cultural diplomacy at play Key Points
here was rather different to how it is sometimes Art is important as a context for diplomacy, in
seen: as an exchange of art and other cultural the form of architecture, decoration, music etc.,
artifacts and ideas in the spirit of genuinely to create the right ambience.
increasing cross-cultural understanding. Art, particularly paintings, but also music, is a
Art may also be found as an object of dip- frequent diplomatic gift, often aiming to give
lomatic communication. There is first the expression to a certain trait of the giver or of the
fraught issue of return of objects of art after relationship between giver and receiver.
Art and its presentation, particularly in the forms
a stint of colonialism, or after war. The para-
of touring ensembles, is a staple amongst ways
digmatic example of the former is possibly of thawing frozen relations.
the so-called Parthenon or Elgin Marbles. Art and its return after colonial exploits or war
While serving as British ambassador to the has been the object of heated diplomatic debates.
Ottoman Empire around 1800, the Earl of Art is also an object of standard running diplo-
Elgin negotiated a deal whereby Britain matic communication, when countries cooperate
took most Greeks would say stole ancient about art exhibitions etc.
REPRESENTING DIPLOMACY IN THE been the focal point of the only concerted
ARTS AND POPULAR CULTURE thrust of literary scholarship of diplomats.
This work was begun within the discipline of
Diplomacy does not produce art directly. The International Relations (Constantinou 1994,
closest thing would probably be the calligra- but see also Strong 1984) and subsequently
phy that has gone into certain treaty docu- taken up by literary historians (Watkins 2008,
ments produced by diplomatic negotiation. Charry and Shahani 2009, Netzloff 2011).
Then there are the commissioned buildings, Spurred, among other things, by the pub-
paintings, furniture and other artefacts com- lication of Timothy Hamptons Fictions of
missioned for use in and around permanent or Embassy (2009), a work that concentrates on
the intertext between diplomacy and literature
fleeting sites. Ministries and individual diplo-
during the Renaissance, Oxford University
mats commission portraits and biographies.
harbours a textual ambassadors network.
Representations of diplomats in the arts may
Yet another reason why the Renaissance
or may not be spawned by such a history.
has been the almost sole focus of scholarly
The genre of high culture where diplomats
concern regarding the painting of diplomats
seem to be most present is literature, with
may reside in the somewhat anachronistic
the European novel standing out as the most
fact that the paradigmatic painting of the
crowded genre (Shapiro 1989). Again, there
European diplomat remains Hans Holbein the
is little scholarly literature, but a recent doc-
Youngers The Ambassadors (1553), on dis-
toral thesis looks at the British post-Second
play in the National Gallery, London. A cer-
World War novel as an attempt at setting out tain collusion of art forms over the centuries
to former imperial and colonial subjects both is suggested by the fact that the oil painting
what happened, often with a view to rec- is dominated by a foregrounded anamorphic
onciliation, and thinks of this as a kind of skull, the art term for which is a vanitas. The
diplomacy (Krzakowski 2011 and 2015). picture features on the cover of the book that
Impressionistically, English, German, introduced theory to diplomatic studies (Der
French, Russian and Scandinavian litera- Derian 1987) and was indeed the main focus
tures seem to treat the diplomat as a vain, of the article that inaugurated the literature on
swinging dipsomaniac (for paradigmatic diplomacy and the arts (Constantinou 1994).
examples of this, see Albert Cohens Belle Two art genres stand out when it comes to
du Seigneur [1968] and William Boyds A representing diplomacy. These are science
Good Man in Africa [1981]). Further study fiction and fantasy. They are both ostensibly
is certain to disclose other representations non-mimetic, and they are both, probably to
and regional variation. Particularly stimulat- some degree for that very reason, tradition-
ing works that point us in this direction are ally categorized as popular. Science fiction
Constantinou (2000) and Badel etal. (2012). fastens on the question of what it is to be
Painting is yet another genre where repre- human. One of the major ways of explor-
sentations of diplomats, and to some degree ing the issue is by juxtaposing the human
diplomacy, is rife. Luke (2002) and Sylvester species with other animals on the one hand,
(2009) have done groundbreaking work on and with cybernetic beings on the other.
international relations on display in museums, Another is to have humans interact with
but the only literature that specifically concerns other self-aware (or, in the lingo, sentient)
diplomacy focusses on Early Modern Europe. but extraterrestrial species. Fantasy fastens
Perhaps due to a combination of rich literary on the question of fantastic beings, often in
pickings, limited numbers of personnel to interaction with humans. Where there are dif-
study and the advent of permanent diplomatic ferent polities that attempt communication,
representation, this particular chronotope has there is diplomacy. Diplomacy is, therefore,
a frequently discussed practice in science young adults prominent amongst them, spend
fiction and fantasy. A number of artefacts, long hours exerting agency within these simu-
such as the science fiction TV show Babylon lated worlds, one would hypothesize that there
Five (19931997) or the Hollywood mov- would be some kind of spill-over between how
ies The Constant Gardener (2015) and The they represent the world and how they decide
Whistleblower (2010), have the conduct of on it in-game and in-world. These and related
diplomacy as their main theme. problems are ripe for the scholarly picking.
While the study of the relationship between With the opening up of diplomacy to wider
international relations and popular culture in public scrutiny, representations of diplomats
general has yielded a by now crowded shelf, in the arts and in popular culture may become
however, the study of how diplomacy is rep- ever more important. Diplomats mediate
resented in popular culture is in its infancy. I between polities. For an increasing number
only know of two scholarly works. One is a of both state and non-state diplomats, that
study of diplomacy in the American television means that they mediate on behalf of profes-
franchise Star Trek (1966present), which sional politicians. Increasingly, politicians
fastens on how in-show Star Trek representa- are dependent on day-to-day support from a
tions of the dilemmas inhering in talking to large number of polity members in order to
the enemy while violence may be ongoing or remain in office and get things done. The key
imminent are more sophisticated that what we tool for politicians to maintain legitimacy is
find in much American foreign policy debate now the media. A consequence of this is that
(Neumann 2001). The other is a reading the media are they key provider of legitimacy.
of how a character in the Harry Potter uni- There is no reason whatsoever to read the
verse (novels 19972007, films 20012011), media as news media only; the media include
who hails from two different species one of mass media, but also traditional media such as
which is depicted as much older than the exhibitions. With an increasing political role
other, stands in for the indigenous peoples of for the media in producing legitimacy for pol-
this world. The half-giant Hagrids in-book iticians, the medias political poignancy is on
failure as a diplomat whose mission it is to the up, and their representations of phenom-
mediate between humans and giants corre- ena such as diplomacy are on the increase,
sponds to in-world problems of establishing for they contribute to diplomacys legitimacy
diplomatic relations between sovereign states in the eyes of the polity at large, and politi-
and indigenous polities (see Chapter 52 in this cians increasingly have to take the question
Handbook; also Epp 2001). of legitimacy seriously. This argument car-
One genre that holds out particularly low- ries different weight in different political set-
hanging fruit for International Relations tings throughout the globe, but regardless of
scholarship is video games. Despite the fact degree of censorship, there is hardly a place
that its turnover has been larger than that of left where it can be totally ignored (see also
the film industry for years, it has yet to receive Chapters 1, 3, 8 and 11 in this Handbook).
any attention whatsoever. Ian Bogosts (2007,
2011) work is key to the opening up of video
games for scholarly attention, and suggests a
number of foci for diplomatic studies: which Key Points
kinds of (artificial) cultural environments Representations of diplomats in the arts seem to
that offer variation that invite diplomatic be rather one-dimensional, but the issue awaits
selection rather than, say, war; under which scholarship.
circumstances diplomacy is represented as Popular culture, particularly the genres of science
yielding Pareto optimal outcomes, and so on. fiction and fantasy, frequently discuss diplomacy,
If millions of people, with adolescents and often in sophisticated ways.
When politicians need for legitimacy increases, discipline or sub-discipline is under an imper-
so does their dependency on favourable represen- ative to draw on as wide a sample of data as
tations of what they do, including their diplomacy. possible. As I have tried to demonstrate here,
many promising inroads have been made. The
field of diplomacy and art offers a number of
themes that are ripe for the picking, and may
CONCLUSION be in the process of becoming a separate sub-
field of the study of diplomacy.
Diplomacy uses art as a prop in staging con-
texts and easing communication. Art and
popular culture represent the phenomenon of
diplomacy. Both issues remain understudied. NOTES
In conclusion, I should like to touch on the
issue of a third way in which art and diplo- 1. The chapter is part of a project on Images and
macy intersect. This is art as a potential prop International Security based at Copenhagen
for the analysis of diplomacy. Every picture University and funded by the Danish Research
tells a story. Photography and other visual or Council for Independent Research, grant no.
DFF -132-00056B.
linguistic representations of diplomacy are, 2.Hansen, Lene and Rebecca Adler-Nissen `Self
among other things, data about diplomacy in presentations at fringe art exhibitions at EU
need of analysis of what they tell us about Summits, unpublished ms.
diplomacy (Kennedy 2003). They may be
particularly useful for what they tell us about
a deeply understudied aspect of diplomacy,
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10
Diplomatic Ethics
Corneliu Bjola
INTRODUCTION stance on issues, or as Edmund Burke once

observed, a statesman, never losing sight of
What does it mean to act ethically as a diplo- principles, is to be guided by circumstances;
mat? What is the latter supposed to do when and, judging contrary to the exigencies of the
caught in the horns of a moral dilemma? moment, he may ruin his country forever
What kind of normative prescriptions is she (Burke and Stanlis 1997). In other words,
required to follow in morally ambiguous sit- what normative challenges do diplomats face
uations? Under what conditions can she in their day-to-day work, how do they handle
break ranks and pursue a moral agenda? them, and to what extent are they capable to
Should a diplomat, for instance, serve as a shape or transcend the ethical limitations of
loyal deputy to the prince regardless of the their profession?
orders that he is being asked to execute, or as Unlike the more systematic study of the
De Vera once pointed out, he should be ready constitutive role of moral principles in inter-
to risk his job, the favor of the prince and national affairs (Rosenthal and Barry 2009),
perhaps his life (Berridge 2004: 93) when he the question of diplomatic ethics has been
judges the assigned mission to be unjust? rather sparsely discussed in the scholarly
Similarly, should a diplomat represent only literature. The few notable studies that have
the interests of her government or, as Adam approached the subject have sought to exam-
Watson argued, should she also consider the ine the space of compatibility between eth-
impact the representation of these interests ics and diplomacy (Toscano 2001), unpack
may have on international or regional stabil- the international legal constraints on diplo-
ity (Watson 1984)? Equally important, should macy (Bolewski 2007) or discuss the norma-
a diplomat refuse to let considerations of tive underpinnings of diplomatic conduct in
pragmatic expediency influence his moral contemporary international relations (Bjola
and Kornprobst 2013: 14798). Building on diplomatic ethics: to what extent are diplo-
these studies, this chapter seeks to develop an mats morally accountable for their actions
applied conceptual framework for understand- given the limited scope of agency they enjoy
ing the ethical imperatives and challenges of and on what principled basis should a moral
diplomatic practice. In so doing, it aspires inquiry of diplomatic conduct be pursued
to advance the debate on diplomatic ethics given the subdued manner in which diplo-
from more general assumptions regarding the mats exercise power? This chapter argues
ethical discourse in diplomacy as mentioned that the answer to the first question rests with
above, to more tangible conclusions about the principle of loyalty, while the second
how moral principles concretely inform, regu- question could be most fruitfully addressed
late or constrain the practice of diplomacy. from a contextually based perspective. More
Diplomacy and ethics have always shared specifically, the way in which loyalty is
a controversial relationship, primarily understood in specific circumstances of dip-
because of the competing moral constraints lomatic engagement informs the scope of dip-
and responsibilities that diplomats have to lomatic agency and the ethical boundaries of
juggle in their work. On the one hand, dip- diplomatic use of power. I develop this argu-
lomats capacity to exercise moral agency ment in two steps. The first section provides
is limited by the very nature of diplomatic an overview of the evolution of the concept of
agency. Diplomats do not represent them- diplomatic ethics from three distinct angles:
selves, but they always act on behalf of a Loyalty to the Prince; Loyalty to the State and
collective authority (primarily states, but Loyalty to People. The second part introduces
also regional organizations or international the phronetic method of ethical analysis and
institutions). Diplomatic agency is thus the explains its added-value for understanding
result of a conditional transfer of prerogatives how diplomats address ethical challenges as
from the legitimate authority to the diplomat professionals and how to normatively assess
(Neumann 2005). It is this delegation of their actions (see also Chapters 1, 2 and 7 in
authority that makes it possible for diplomats this Handbook).
to perform their traditional functions of rep-
resentation, information-gathering and nego-
tiation (United Nations 1961: Art 3). On the Key Points
other hand, diplomacy puts people in touch
with power, albeit in a paradoxical manner: Diplomatic ethics concerns itself with the dual
diplomats largely live and work in the prox- question of whether and under what conditions
diplomats can be held morally accountable for
imity of power, but they rarely exercise the
their actions.
power directly (Sharp 2009: 58). However, Diplomats are legitimate subjects of moral
as Diderot reminds us, power always comes inquiry since, despite having limited agency, they
with boundaries: it presupposes conditions exercise power via functions of representation,
which makes its exercise legitimate, useful information-gathering and negotiation.
to society, advantageous to the republic, fix-
ing and restraining it within limits (Diderot
etal. 1992: 7). In sum, whereas the restricted
scope of diplomatic agency partially protects THE EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMATIC
diplomats against ethical scrutiny, their exer- ETHICS
cise of power, even in an indirect manner,
subjects them by necessity to considerations Loyalty refers to the obligation implied in
of moral accountability. the personal sense of historical connection to
The inbuilt tension between agency and a defining set of familial, institutional and
power largely frames the terms of debate on national relationships (Fletcher 1995: 3).
Diplomatic Ethics 125
As a principle of social conduct, loyalty goes (Vattel 2004: 17980). This understanding
beyond friendship, gratitude or respect and of the diplomat as the loyal minister to the
includes the willing, practical, and thorough- prince took a variety of forms in the medieval
going devotion of a person to a cause period. For example, the nuncius often served
(J. Royce cited in Foust 2012: 41). It also as a living letter by communicating the
comes with a critical reluctance about hastily princes messages in a way that was as near
shifting ones associations when they fail to a personal exchange as possible (Hamilton
deliver on their initial expectations and with a and Langhorne 1995: 24). By contrast, the
willingness to bear the costs of persistence vicarii had the capacity to stand in the Popes
(Hirschman 1970: 78). At the same time, loy- place and perform official acts on his behalf
alty must be distinguished from blind obedi- (Constantinou 1996: 105).
ence and unworthy attachment to a misguided Having the prince as the primary object
cause (e.g., an extremist ideology), although of diplomatic loyalty had an important ethi-
this distinction is not always easy to draw in cal implication for how medieval diplomats
practice. As Ewin points out, the line between performed their functions. It extended an aura
loyalty and vice is often thin since both rely of moral protection to diplomats by removing
on different degrees of exclusion. Loyalty to considerations of personal honour from the
ones country may occasionally mutate, for way in which they accomplished their mis-
instance, into extreme forms of nationalism, sion in the service of the prince. Diplomats
in which exclusion takes the forms of intoler- were not supposed to feel ashamed if the ruler
ance and injustice (Ewin 1992: 417). By called upon them to lie or if they got involved
shedding light on how diplomatic agency and in dishonourable actions on his orders (Black
the exercise of power have historically shaped 2010: 44). Remarkably, the line between loy-
each other, the loyalty principle offers a alty and vice was defended by the aristocratic
unique conceptual tool for understanding the code of honour that prevailed among diplo-
evolution of diplomatic ethics. mats at the time and by professional consid-
I pursue this line of inquiry from three erations. Wicquefort, who was actually twice
different perspectives: diplomatic duty as imprisoned for espionage while working as a
Loyalty to the Prince; as Loyalty to the State; diplomat, agreed that the ambassador ought
and as Loyalty to People. For many classi- to seek his masters glory and advantage on all
cal theorists, the scope of diplomatic agency occasions and to that extent he could conceal
in the early modern period was informed and dissemble his losses. At the same time,
by the degree of loyalty of the diplomatic he insisted that a diplomat cannot forge nor
representative to the ruler of the country. In contrive false pieces without dishonouring his
his famous treaty on diplomatic practice, character (Wicquefort 2004: 132). Machiavelli
Wicquefort remarked, for instance, that an concurred with Wicquefort about the occa-
ambassador is nothing less than a public sional necessity to conceal facts with words,
minister dispatched by a sovereign prince to but he also insisted that diplomats should take
some foreign potentate or state, there to rep- great care to avoid earning a reputation of
resent his person, by virtue of a power, letter being mean and dissembling as that could
of credence, or some commission that noti- have negative consequences on their ability to
fies his character (Wicquefort 2004: 124, my perform their functions (Machiavelli 2004: 41).
emphasis). In the same vein, Vattel insisted The transformation of the international
that a public minister represents the person system from a dynastic- to a territorial-
in whom resides the rights which he is to sovereign principle of domestic legitimacy
look after, maintain and enforce, but he cau- after the Peace of Westphalia (Hall 1999)
tioned against the minister being regarded shifted the object of diplomatic loyalty from
as representing the dignity of his sovereign the prince to the state. Ideologically, this
move was made possible by the doctrine of considerations are deemed irrelevant for the
raison dtat, which was intellectually pre- conduct of foreign policy and if everything is
pared by Machiavellis reflections on states- permitted in the name of state survival, then
manship, but was given a coherent structure what would stop diplomats from using their
as a guiding principle of foreign policy by power to breach international law and to even
Cardinal Richelieu (Butterfield 1975: 11). foment war as illustrated by the case of the
The importance of the new doctrine on dip- Third Reichs Foreign Minister, Joachim von
lomatic relations cannot be overstated. The Ribbentrop (Salter and Charlesworth 2006)?
idea that the public interest ought to be the The excesses attributed to raison dtat
sole objective of the prince [] and pre- diplomacy were seen as determinant in the
ferred to all private gain (Hill 1961: 76) outbreak of World War I. This prompted a
shortly became the fundamental principle rethinking of the diplomatic method in gen-
of national conduct, the States first Law of eral, and of the relationship between diplo-
Motion (Meinecke 1984: 1). An important macy and ethics in particular, to the point
part of the explanation for its success lay that the very basis of diplomatic loyalty was
with the fact that it offered states a way to called into question. Should diplomats repre-
establish and maintain international order sent only the interests of their governments or
in disregard of ethical considerations. What should they also consider the impact the rep-
mattered was no longer the religious orienta- resentation of these interests may have on the
tion of the rulers, but the survival of the state international order? As Watson pointed out,
through the accumulation and rational use of states had not only an interest but also a moral
power. At the same time, as Kissinger notes, obligation to preserve international order and
the concept of raison dtat had no in-built to make it work, a principle he coined as raison
limitations as if everything would be permit- de systme (Watson 1984: 195). The new con-
ted in order to satisfy the interests of the state cept comes, though, with a thorny corollary
(Kissinger 1994: 66). which places diplomats in front of a serious
Raison dtat transformed diplomatic predicament: on the one hand, if they let the
loyalty from a personal type of relationship principle of raison de systme unrestrictedly
between the diplomat and the prince as in guide their actions then they risk circumscrib-
the early modern period, into an impersonal ing the autonomy of their sovereigns and, by
mode of affiliation to a collective entity, the implication, their own position. On the other
state. The implications of this move were hand, if they unrestrainedly pursue diplomatic
subtle but far-reaching. First, the scope actions in line with the raison dtat doctrine,
of diplomatic agency expanded. The dip- then they risk undermining the fabric of the
lomat was still serving the sovereign, but system itself by demotivating other diplomats
from the broader perspective of protecting from respecting the shared norms and rules
and enhancing the stature of the state and that sustain international order (Bjola and
not of the prince. While this theoretical dis- Kornprobst 2013: 150).
tinction would usually face no challenge in Raison de systme takes the question of
practice, it would occasionally force diplo- diplomatic loyalty to a new level of generali-
mats to take sides. Talleyrand defended, for zation. Unlike the principle of Loyalty to the
instance, his controversial shifts of politi- Prince that keeps the object of diplomatic
cal loyalties during his diplomatic career loyalty at the personal level, or Loyalty to
on the grounds that he sought to protect the State that favours the group, the concept
France against Napoleons misjudgements of Loyalty to People extends concerns of
(Talleyrand-Prigord 1891: 101). Second, diplomatic ethics to humankind. In principle,
the raison dtat made the line between loy- this means that diplomatic agency cannot
alty and vice more difficult to hold. If ethical be restricted to diplomats serving the prince
or the state, but as the English School long DIPLOMATIC ETHICS IN PRACTICE
argued, diplomats are, in fact, custodians of
the international society (Bull 1997: 176; Far from having only a historical character, the
Sofer 2007). In practical terms, this concep- three traditions of diplomatic ethics discussed
tion of diplomatic agency translates into a above retain substantial relevance for
commitment to an evolving set of interna- contemporary diplomatic practice. Whilst
tional norms (sovereignty, non-use of force, diplomats now share the stage with a broad
mutual recognition, continuous dialogue, range of actors and institutions, diplomacy
reasonableness, equality of states) that are remains a dominantly state-centric profession
constitutive of international order. From an (Hocking etal. 2012: 5). Heads of diplomatic
ethical perspective, this move leads, how- missions are still officially appointed by
ever, to a rather puzzling situation. On the heads of state and their core mission
one hand, this cosmopolitan model of agency continues to revolve around serving their
strengthens the moral profile of diplomats as countries while upholding international
the set of universal standards of international
peace. The ethical principles subsumed by the
conduct they help create and reproduce is
three forms of loyalty (to the prince, to the
what makes international cooperation pos-
state and to people) are therefore constitutive
sible (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013: 13145).
of diplomatic agency and they carry analytical
On the other hand, it puts them on a colli-
weight for examining the normative value of
sion course with the other sources of diplo-
contemporary diplomatic interactions. It
matic loyalty. Guarding state interests while
should also be noted that, as a method of
defending international norms is a challeng-
sustainably managing relationships of
ing task that invites suspicion and even dis-
estrangement between political communities
regard. As Sofer (1997) insightfully remarks,
it renders diplomats into professional stran- (Sharp 2009: 10), diplomacy relies on the
gers (Sharp 2009: 100) who cannot comfort- recognition of a certain degree of institutional
ably walk the line between loyalty and vice in and normative heterogeneity, a condition
confidence their professionalism will never which sits rather uneasily in the company of
be called into question (see also Chapters 4, strong ethical prescriptions. Therefore,
5, 8 and 14 in this Handbook). attempts to advance a universalistic conceptual
framework capable of providing firm ethical
prescriptions to every single aspect of the
Key Points diplomatic lifeworld are rather misplaced and
contra-productive for diplomatic theory and
As loyal ministers of their sovereigns, diplomats
benefited from an aura of moral protection in
practice. Hillary Putnams advice that the
the early modern period; the aristocratic code of primary aim of the ethicist [is not to] produce
honour and professional considerations served as a system, but to contribute to the solution of
counter-balances to ethical transgressions. practical problems (Putnam 2004: 4) ought
Raison dtat shifted the object of diplomatic therefore to be heeded and acted upon.
loyalty from the prince to the state; this move That being said, what is a diplomat sup-
offered diplomats a moral anchor for challenging posed to do when she faces a loyalty con-
the authority of the ruler, but it also made their flict? Should she side with the head of state
position more prone to moral abuse.
or government even when the latter is morally
The principle of Loyalty to People extends
concerns of diplomatic ethics to humankind. As
wrong, should she pursue state interests as
custodians of the international society, diplomats she interprets them even at the expense of her
face suspicions of divided loyalties, but they also personal loyalty to elected officials, or should
help create and reproduce the norms that make she make sure her actions would not endan-
international cooperation possible. ger international peace even if that would
contradict the official policy of her govern- uncertainty, complexity, instability, unique-
ment? Echoing Putnam, I argue that conflicts ness and value conflict (Schn 1983:
of diplomatic loyalty are difficult to reconcile 17), which are difficult to address from an
from a theoretically abstract perspective. The abstract theoretical perspective. He instead
contextually rich environment of norms, rules argues that doing and thinking are comple-
and power relations, in which diplomacy is mentary. Doing extends thinking in the tests,
embedded, is less amenable to scrutiny from moves, and probes of experimental action,
Archimedean points of ethical validity. What and reflection feeds on doing and its results.
matters, I argue, is the diplomats capacity Each feeds the other, and each sets bounda-
to professionally judge what moral action is ries for the other (Schn 1983: 280).
appropriate to pursue in a particular context by Applied to the case of diplomatic ethics,
carefully balancing loyalty demands against the concept of reflection-in-action captures
each other. Aristotle called this particular skill the repetitive process of action and reflection
phronesis usually translated as prudence by which diplomats seek to align the prac-
or practical wisdom a form of knowledge tical requirements of the situation at hand
concerned with what is context-dependent with the normative imperatives prompted by
and particular, rather than what is abstract and their divided loyalties. As Schn points out,
universal. The phronimos, the one exercising it is the surprising result of action that trig-
practical wisdom, is an experienced practi- gers reflection, and it is the production of a
tioner with strong perceptual and intellectual satisfactory move that brings reflection tem-
capacity who can deliberate rightly about porarily to a close (Schn 1983: 280). For
getting other peoples accounts right, and example, during the Libyan uprising in 2011,
perceiving the details of situations correctly diplomats at Libyan embassies around the
(Hursthouse 2006: 300). world decided to resign from their posts or
While the principle of loyalty defines the to disavow links to Gaddafis government on
nature of ethical challenges that diplomats the grounds that their actions on behalf of the
may face in their work, phronesis offers them Libyan leader could no longer be reconciled
a method for addressing these challenges as with the ethical requirements of their posi-
professionals. For Ellett, phronesis coincides tions: We are not loyal to him, we are loyal
with the range and scope of professional to the Libyan people (Al Jazeera 2011).
judgments. Being a good professional means Their decision is illustrative of the conflict-
having not only the (cognitive) capacity to ing identities that diplomats carry with them
deliberate (judge) well but also the appro- between their professional selves and that of
priate (affective) attitudes and dispositions the state they represent (Faizullaev 2006).
(Ellett Jr. 2012: 17). Put differently, being When facing such ethical challenges, diplo-
a competent practitioner, in the technical mats may choose to respond pragmatically
sense of being able to perform ones func- through self-effacement (Neumann 2005),
tions effectively, is a necessary but not a suf- or they may decide to express their dissent
ficient condition for becoming a professional officially, as in the example above, or unof-
diplomat (i.e., a phronimos). To accomplish ficially, if such channels are available to them
this, a diplomat must demonstrate technical (Kiesling 2006). In each case, they activate
skill while taking on board the ethical con- reflection-in-action as a phronetic instrument
straints of his working environment. Drawing of ethical resolution.
on Deweys concept of reflective thinking Resolving ethical dilemmas using the pro-
(Dewey 1933), Schn develops the concept cess of reflection-in-action involves three
of reflection-in-action for understanding how steps. First, as a result of a particular situa-
professional phronesis works. For Schn, tion in which she finds herself, the diplomat
practitioners frequently face situations of experiences a contradiction between her
different layers of loyalty. She may choose to reacting to ethical challenges (institutional
ignore this tension, but that may lead to a loss resistance, low levels of experience, extenu-
of integrity, stress and possible breakdown ating personal circumstances)? Finally, does
depending on the intensity of the contradic- the chosen solution help mitigate the loy-
tion (Johns 2013: 28). When the latter crosses alty conflict? It should also be noted that a
a personally defined threshold, the diplomat phronetic approach offers no definitive solu-
may decide to do something about resolving tion to a moral predicament, as reflection-
the moral tension or at least about not allow- in-action is a dynamic process. Each action
ing it to grow. She will thus initiate, in the and reflection slightly changes the context
second stage, a reflective conversation about of normative inquiry. As a result, differ-
the ethical trade-offs implied by her prioritiz- ent configurations of ethical trade-offs may
ing of one level of loyalty over the others. gradually become available as the process of
This reflective conversation does not neces- reflection-in-action repeats itself.
sarily involve an instrumental calculus of the As a way of illustrating these insights, let
pros and cons of the different moral trade- us consider the case described by a former
offs she draws for herself, but it often relies British diplomat, Brian Barder, who served
on an intuitive feeling about what is reason- in Poland during the Cold War in the late
able to do under the circumstances (Ellett Jr. 1980s. As a result of the Polish communist
2012: 16). The decision to follow from this government engaging in acts of persecution
reflective conversation shifts the diplomats of the Solidarity leaders (the independent
attention back to action. In the third stage, trade union federation), Barder found him-
the diplomat suspends reflection and pursues self, alongside other Western diplomats, fac-
a form of action in line with the chosen moral ing a moral conundrum. He questioned, for
trade-off. If the action taken fails to resolve instance, whether the duty of diplomats is to
the moral contradiction, then the process of promote strictly their countrys interests and
reflection-in-action resumes but from within policies or to also stand for more general val-
a slightly modified context. ues of freedom, civil rights and democracy.
Phronesis thus offers a different perspec- A reflective conversation followed between
tive for holding diplomats morally account- him and other Western diplomats about the
able for their actions than theoretically driven pros and cons of the different moral trade-offs
models of ethical analysis. Instead of relying entailed by each option. From a pragmatic
on exogenously defined criteria of moral perspective, the Polish government, however
validity, phronetic ethics focuses on contex- undemocratic, had a far greater capacity for
tually tailored standards of normative inquiry. damaging or supporting Western interests
The context in which diplomats handle ethi- than Solidarity. On the other hand, by protest-
cal challenges through reflection and action ing against the actions of the Polish govern-
is therefore a determining factor for under- ment, Western diplomats could have helped
standing the extent to which the actions taken secure some degree of protection against arbi-
by a diplomat are morally justifiable. Typical trary harassment and persecution for ordinary
questions to ask from a phronetic perspective Poles. Despite attracting a firm condemnation
would be: Does the situational context place from the Polish Government, the decision to
the diplomat in front of a legitimate ethical deliver a dmarche to the Polish foreign min-
predicament or can the latter be reasonably ister on behalf of all members of the European
ignored? Is the process of reflection-in-action Economic Community (EEC) was viewed as
pursued in response to the ethical challenge an acceptable compromise between the two
guided by reasons other than loyalty con- courses of action (Barder 2010: 2902).
tradictions? Does the diplomat face unusual The core ethical contradiction experienced
obstacles that prevent him from properly by Barder and the other Western diplomats
was essentially one between the principles of two sources of loyalty, the decision to deliver
Loyalty to the State vs Loyalty to People. In a dmarche changed the context and prompted
order to find out whether Western diplomats the Polish government to react by describing
reaction to this challenge was morally valid the action of Western diplomats as an unac-
from a phronetic perspective, we need to ceptable interference in the countrys inter-
examine the context of the case. Was the ethi- nal affairs (Barder 2010: 290). Fortunately,
cal contradiction legitimate in light of the cir- the statement of the Polish government was
cumstances? Without offering many details, followed by no immediate resumption of
Barder points to a particularly flagrant act the persecution of Solidarity leaders. Had
of persecution of the Polish government that occurred, then the ethical contradiction
against a prominent Solidarity leader (Barder between the two sources of diplomatic loy-
2010: 290), a fact that indicates the presence alty would have been rekindled, arguably in
of a serious moral issue that deserved diplo- a more severe form, thus requiring diplomats
matic attention. Barders account also sug- to engage in reflection-in-action on a different
gests that reflection-in-action was primarily basis and likely with a different outcome.
guided by concerns over how to reconcile The phronetic model of ethical analysis
the conflict between the two sources of loy- presented above calls attention to two impor-
alties as opposed, for instance, to attempt- tant research directions on diplomatic ethics.
ing to score Cold War propagandistic points. First, how do the ethical challenges experi-
Furthermore, there is no indication in the text enced by diplomats as a result of conditions
about diplomats not being able to tackle the of conflicting loyalties influence their perfor-
ethical predicament due to professional or mance? As every diplomat is likely to face
personal reasons. The moderately engaging such challenges in her career, it is important to
discussion among Western diplomats about understand the conditions under which moral
the pros and cons of the two moral choices is conundrums may undermine the effective-
actually indicative of an institutional culture ness of diplomats in fulfilling their functions.
within Western diplomatic services reason- Second, what kind of training do diplomats
ably open to normative deliberation. Finally, require in order to improve their capacity
the chosen solution (dmarche) helped for ethical reflection-in-action? Generalized
reduce the original tension between the two prescriptions of moral behaviour have argu-
sources of loyalty, albeit the extent of the ably limited value as professional guidelines
relief remained of course a matter of debate. for contextual action. Ethical training must
Overall, the reaction of Western diplomats therefore take into account the uncertainty,
to the Polish governments repression of complexity, instability, uniqueness and value
Solidarity enjoyed substantial moral valid- conflict that diplomats face in their day-to-
ity from a phronetic perspective. The loyalty day activity (see also Chapters11, 15 and 36
conflict was sufficiently intense to justify a in this Handbook).
response, reflection-in-action was primar-
ily guided by legitimate concerns, diplomats
faced no major institutional constraints, and Key Points
the final solution helped to satisfactorily
While the three principles of loyalty (to the prince,
mitigate the original ethical predicament. By
to the state and to people) define the nature of
contrast, had they decided, for instance, to ethical challenges that diplomats may face in
pursue no action or to let their reflection-in- their work, phronesis offers them a method for
action be guided by Cold War propagandistic addressing these challenges as professionals.
motivations then their actions would have The phronetic concept of reflection-in-action
lacked moral legitimacy. While bringing a captures the repetitive process of action and
temporary close to the tension between the reflection by which diplomats seek to align the
practical requirements of the situation at hand Dewey, John (1933) How We Think, a
with the normative imperatives prompted by Restatement of the Relation of Reflective
their divided loyalties. Thinking to the Educative Process. Boston,
The intensity of the loyalty conflict, the nature of the MA: D.C. Heath and company.
concerns informing reflection-in-action, the type Diderot, Denis, John Hope Mason, and Robert
of institutional or personal constraints diplomats Wokler (1992) Political Writings, Cambridge
face when engaging in reflection-in-action, and texts in the history of political thought.
the extent to which the diplomatic response action Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
helps mitigate the original ethical predicament Ellett Jr., Frederick S. (2012) Practical rationality
are the key criteria of phronetic ethical analysis. and a recovery of Aristotles phronesis for
Future research directions on diplomatic ethics the professions, in Elizabeth Anne Kinsella
could explore the relationship between ethi- and Allan Pitman (eds) Phronesis as
cal challenges and diplomatic performance and Professional Knowledge: Practical Wisdom in
examine the type of training diplomats require the Professions. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers,
in order to improve their capacity for ethical pp. 1332.
reflection-in-action. Ewin, R. E. (1992) Loyalty and virtues,
Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (169): 40319.
Faizullaev, Alisher (2006) Diplomacy and self,
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 17 (3): 497522.
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University Press. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 12237.
11
Diplomatic Knowledge
No Cornago
This chapter examines the relationship diplomacy and knowledge emerged and
between diplomacy and knowledge. It evolved.
explores the practical dimensions of this par- Second, this chapter discusses diplomatic
ticular relationship, such as those exempli- knowledge as heterology, that is, as a way of
fied by the interest of diplomatic services all dealing with the alien, the foreigner; in other
over the world on new technologies of words, as a way of mutual engagement with
knowledge production and management or otherness. In so doing, it underscores that
their growing concern regarding the implica- diplomacy has been for centuries a venue
tions of social media. In addition, it aims to for trans-cultural communication, reflexive
emphasize the deeper socio-historical signifi- understanding and unending negotiation of
cance of diplomatic knowledge, as well as its identity and difference, not only for those
crucial importance for the instrumental and belonging to distant and mutually exotic cul-
communicative functions that diplomacy is tures but also amongst those living separately
expected to perform. albeit in close proximity.
The argument has been organized in four Third, it examines both the theoretical
parts. First, it adopts a reflective and criti- foundations and the practical dimensions of
cal approach to diplomatic knowledge and diplomatic knowledge as statecraft. More
in doing so the relationship between diplo- specifically, it will focus on the variety of new
macy and knowledge will be problema- techniques such as observation and report-
tized in the light of current discussions in ing, fact finding missions, strategic negotia-
the fields of epistemology and sociology of tion, or espionage developed most notably
knowledge. Specific attention will be paid in the modern era as well as the main fea-
to the historical conditions under which the tures of statecrafts historical evolution. The
mutually constitutive relationship between legal and administrative regimes designed for
its management such as those regulating religious ceremonies or discharge religious

secrecy and public disclosure of diplomatic duties. Derived from theos (god) and orao
knowledge and its current transforma- (to see), he contends that in addition to other
tion under new technological conditions and meanings it had the meaning to see god,
transnational societal pressures will be also invoking therefore a specific truth-making
briefly analysed. process. Those ancient ambassadors were
Finally, and in line with recent contribu- peripatetic theorists charged with the dis-
tions to the anthropology of knowledge and covery of what was right or true. That con-
the widely extended recognition of its negoti- nection was further developed in the Platonic
ated character, we will discuss the pros and conception of knowledge. As Constantinou
cons of what can be called the diplomatiza- summarizes it:
tion of knowledge in the wider social realm,
Theoria constitutes, therefore, the philosophical
as well as its implications for our under-
journey out of the cave of ignorance The
standing of diplomacy as it is practised, in information and knowledge acquired by such
the post-Wikileaks era, not only by official theoria was then to be communicated to the
diplomats, but also by a great variety of citizens of the model polis to confirm the rightness
public and private agents, such as scientists, of its laws or to amend the deficient ones.
(Constantinou 1996: 57, 59)
political activists, social workers or corporate
representatives.
Despite its theological foundations, that
ancient understanding of theory as embassy
and embassy as theory may help us to
THE CO-PRODUCTION OF counteract the ahistoricism of prevailing
approaches to epistemology. It emphasizes
DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE
instead the historical conditions under which
knowledge flourishes and evolves, in the vein
Although somewhat underestimated by the
of the historical epistemology represented by
most influential and authoritative accounts of
Wartofsky (1979) or Rheinberger (2010). In
the social history of knowledge (e.g. Van
addition, its peripatetic character demands
Doren 1992; Burke 2000), a careful examina-
greater attention to the changing geogra-
tion of the history of diplomacy reveals the
phies of diplomatic knowledge (cf. Dumas
extraordinary importance that knowledge has
1999; Agnew 2007). Jonathan Wright aptly
had since the most remote antiquity, not only
summarizes how crucial the cultivation of
for diplomatic practice in diverse spatial and
knowledge was in the history of diplomacy:
temporal settings, but also for the wider con-
figuration of diverse domains of sciences and
Over the course of millennia, from the cuneiform
humanities. Not in vain, knowledge of the civilizations of the ancient near east to the empires
world has been always linked to the evolving of the modern era, it has been the ambassadors
ways in which political communities have who have allowed the world to meet itself. They
been organized, represented and related his- would embark on missions of faith and trade, of
politics and love, but wherever they journeyed they
torically through a variety of means, includ-
would as likely as not report back on everything
ing most notably diplomatic means (e.g. the moralities and the myths, the plants and the
Nechaeva 2007). animals, the fashions and the foods they
The importance of that relationship is even encountered There would be moments of
inscribed in the very etymology of the word misunderstanding and embarrassment, but there
would be just as many of clarity and insight.
theory. Constantinou (1996: 538) explains
Through the efforts of ambassadors, civilizations
that the word theoria was frequently used would compare and contrast one another, prejudices
in ancient Greek to designate an old type and affinities would emerge, and admiration and
of solemn or sacred embassy sent to attend loathing would result. (Wright 2006: 67)
Diplomatic knowledge 135
In view of these historical precedents, we shall for discovery were invariably combined with
move away from those approaches that tend more utilitarian and power-based approaches.
to consider knowledge either a simple Cautious but sincere dialogue with others
reflection of the truth about nature or, con- always coexisted with strategic negotiation,
versely, a mere creation of social and politi- mutual mistrust, surveillance and espionage.
cal interests. We shall rather follow what Diplomatic historians, for instance, have
Jasanoff terms the co-production approach, aptly described the variegated or multitasked
which she introduces as follows: knowledge-related skills that early-modern
diplomats were expected to perform:
In broad areas of both present and past human
activity, we gain explanatory power by thinking of
These agents and diplomats made no distinction
natural and social orders as being produced
between the many arenas in which they worked to
together. The texture of any historical period, and
exert their influence on behalf of those who
perhaps modernity most of all, as well as of
employed them. Even those largely employed in
particular cultural and political formations, can be
surveillance took the opportunity of their extended
properly appreciated only if we take this
periods abroad to gather knowledge that they
co-production into account society cannot
believed might be useful to those at home.
function without knowledge any more than
(Adams and Cox 2013: 5)
knowledge can exist without appropriate social
supports. (Jasanoff 2004: 2)
Later, in the classic era of realpolitik, interna-
Knowledge, in sum, she contends, embeds tional diplomatic conferences on the most
and is embedded in social practices and disparate issues, such as those represented,
identities, norms and conventions, instru- for instance, by the control of cholera, astron-
ments and institutions, representations and omy and observatory sciences, or the admin-
discourses. More specifically, she asserts, istering of prisons (cf. Huber 2006;
knowing the world is inseparably linked to Saint-Martin 2009; Shafir 2014), served as a
the ways in which people seek to organize technology that mediated intellectual
and control it (Jasanoff 2004: 3). According exchange and scientific communication and
to this view, diplomatic knowledge not only thus were crucial in the global shaping of
was historically crucial and remains so contemporary understanding of social and
nowadays for diplomacy and its perfor- natural sciences (Shafir 2014: 72). As experi-
mance but also for the most diverse domains enced scientists increasingly recognize, it
of knowledge. In other words, science and would be difficult to understand the pro-
technology permeate the history of diplo- gresses of a range of scientific disciplines
macy and correspondingly, the historical without considering the many ways in which
development of geography, medicine, biol- diplomatic practices and institutions rang-
ogy, anthropology, architecture, engineering, ing from ancient exploratory missions and
administration or information sciences was espionage to contemporary multilateral con-
closely related to the practices and institu- ferences of scientific or technical issues
tions of diplomacy as well. The co-production contributed to them (e.g. Zewail 2010; Kaplan
and management of knowledge through dip- 2011). Although the rise of modern scientific
lomatic means including its storage, reten- knowledge, with its corresponding process of
tion and dissemination has nonetheless autonomization and disciplinary specializa-
historically served for very different pur- tion, displaced temporarily diplomacy from
poses (Kurbalija 2002), including the careful the frontline of scientific discoveries, nowa-
administration of knowledge about the past days there is a new and widely shared demand
(Scham 2009). As this chapter will later for a new transnational partnership between
show, adventures of knowledge driven by scientists and diplomats in front of the politi-
genuine humanistic interest and fascination cal and technical challenges of a global
political agenda which requires their respec- of subjectivities. Following Michel De

tive expertise. Interestingly enough, that old Certeaus inspiring work on the resurgence of
interplay between science and diplomacy is indigenous movements in Latin America, that
thus receiving a renewed attention amongst inter-subjective dimension of diplomatic
those concerned with the advancement of knowledge may be considered as a form of
knowledge in a new global era in which both heterology, for its actual performance
the national scientific system and diplomatic endlessly demands of the self in front of a
services are being radically reorganized returning other which can neither be avoided
(Chalecki 2008; Flink and Schreiterer 2010; nor overcome the establishment and
Sutcu 2012; Benson and Kjelgren 2014; see cultivation without assimilating each other
also Chapter 1 in this Handbook). to the category of sameness of a mutual and
durable relationship (De Certeau 1987).
That understanding of diplomatic knowl-
Key Points edge as a venue for empathy and mutual self-
transformation has been widely confirmed by
From ancient exploratory missions and diplo- historical research. In antiquity metaphors of
matic reporting to contemporary multilateral
kinship and friendship were always accom-
conferences on scientific or technical issues, dip-
panied with the expression of mutual rec-
lomatic knowledge not only was historically cru-
cial and remains so nowadays for diplomacy ognition and respect for mutual difference
and its performance but also for the formative (Cohen 2001). The humanistic character of
processes of the most diverse domains of knowl- those ancient forms of diplomatic knowl-
edge, such as, for instance, geography, medicine, edge understood as mutual discovery was
biology, anthropology, architecture, engineering, slowly displaced under the imperatives of the
administration or information sciences. modern doctrine of reason of state, in a long
Although the rise of modern scientific knowledge, historical period ranging from the Peace of
with its corresponding process of autonomiza- Westphalia in 1648 to the Congress of Vienna
tion and disciplinary specialization, temporarily in 1815 that is, when a new understanding
displaced diplomats from the frontline of scientific
of diplomatic knowledge as a mainly strategic
discoveries, nowadays there is a new and widely
resource for power politics finally acquired
shared demand for a new transnational partnership
between scientists and diplomats to face the politi- the overwhelming predominance that we are
cal and technical challenges of a global political still witnessing nowadays. But, against the
agenda which requires their respective expertise. influential narratives that portray Renaissance
diplomacy as a moment of humanistic plural-
ism (e.g. Mattingly 1973) definitively dis-
placed by the rise of the nation-state (e.g.
DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE Anderson 1993), the new stream in diplo-
AS HETEROLOGY matic history emphasizes continuity more
than rupture in the passing from pre-modern
As Constantinou has convincingly argued to early-modern diplomacy (Antiel-Quiroga
(1996: 11220), any reflective understanding 1989; Watkins 2008; Carri-Invernizzi 2014).
of diplomatic knowledge should consider the This therefore provides a much wider space
experiences of diplomats in their engagement for the survival of the humanistic tradition in
with the diplomatic other, either considered diplomacy (Black 2010).
as object, placed in a position of observable The study of diplomatic relationships
exteriority outside the closed boundaries of beyond the European contours offers a fertile
the self, or conversely as subject, whose field for research, such as, for instance, those
presence involves the very questioning of the existing between both France and Spain
self in a process of mutual re-configuration with Muslim countries in the late eighteenth
century. Although incidents abound that the importance of what we have called diplo-
reveal how difficult the task of diplomacy macy as heterology:
was due to cultural difference, estrangement
in the face of otherness was more frequently A good diplomatist will always endeavour to put
himself in the position of the person with whom
transformed in a reflective and critical under- he is treating, and try to imagine what he would
standing of cultural difference under notions wish, do and say, under those circumstances.
of tolerance to different religious beliefs (Satow 1917: 1334)
(Windler 2001). Of course, these processes
of mutual discovery with their corresponding The idea of diplomatic knowledge as heterol-
part of mutual misunderstanding were not ogy, however, should not be idealized.
circumscribed to the closer Mediterranean Moreover, it does not necessarily entail a
proximities. Before their displacement in strong normative foundation. Some authors
the colonial era by the violent deployment have convincingly shown how the simple
of modern sovereignty, early diplomatic cultivation of prose, politeness and conversa-
encounters between Europeans and Africans tion were crucial for shaping the grammars of
also offered multiple opportunities for heter- diplomacy in early modern Europe (Fumaroli
ology (Lowe 2007). 1994; Sofer 2013). Interestingly enough, the
Bearing in mind these and other simi- distinctive value of diplomacy as a way of
lar precedents, Constantinou has recently dealing with otherness has also been recently
vindicated the historical importance of the confirmed by neurosciences. The importance
humanistic tradition of diplomacy as a model of some salient specific features such as the
for the contemporary cultivation of reflexive importance of face-to-face communication
knowledge (Constantinou 2013), calling for or its adaptability to ever-changing context-
new forms of diplomatic engagement, such specific situations explains the timeless
as those represented by the resurgence of significance of diplomatic encounters as a
indigenous diplomacies (Bleier 2009) and venue for empathy, mutual understanding of
for the better mediation of the many forms of each others intentions, the acquisition of
estrangement in global life: knowledge and enhancement of human
reflexivity (Holmes 2013). The virtualization
The mission is not only, not just, the knowledge of diplomacy and the proliferation of internet
and control of the other but fundamentally the social networks that the world is experiencing
knowledge of the self and this knowledge of
the self as a more reflective means of dealing nowadays makes particularly important the
with and transforming relations with others. cultivation of that form of communication.
(Constantinou 2006) A long time before the arrival of digital
diplomacy, however, another understanding
In contrast with the abstract treatment that of diplomatic knowledge, namely one that
this question used to receive in the field of considers the other more as an object to be
contemporary philosophy by influential observed than as subject to be engaged with,
authors such as Buber, Levinas or Ricoeur, has proven to be significantly more influen-
that understanding of diplomacy as heterol- tial. That second understanding of diplomacy
ogy comes easily from the attentive exami- has been crucial as our next section will try
nation of the phenomenology of diplomacy, to show in shaping both in theory and prac-
its observable practices, accumulated experi- tice the notion of diplomatic knowledge as
ences and related sociabilities. Ernst Satow, statecraft. From the perspective that this sec-
for instance, aptly formulated in his influen- tion aimed to underline, the most important
tial Guide to Diplomatic Practice, albeit in a effect of this process, as Constantinou has
rather self-celebratory tone, how diplomats convincingly argued, has been the conceal-
actually realize in their professional practice ment of the symbiotic relationship between
diplomatic knowledge and practice, a sym- although not completely the humanistic
biosis that can neither be reduced to the nar- dimension of diplomacy in favour of a new
row conceptual grammars of utilitarianism understanding of diplomatic knowledge as
nor to the practical or bureaucratic manage- statecraft, that is, as an instrument of state
ment of the one-sided definition of interests. power and governmentality (Neocleous
That symbiosis of mutual and reflexive learn- 2003; McMillan 2010). The origins of that
ing singularizes the unavoidable double loca- doctrine can be traced back to classical
tion of diplomats as both representatives and authors such as Tacitus, but it was most nota-
mediators, placing them in some unstable but bly developed in early-modern Italy by
distinctive middle ground, between these two Machiavelli in The Prince (1532), and Botero
poles (Constantinou 2013; see also Chapters in his Della ragioni di stato (1589), an influ-
2 and 3 in this Handbook). ential work to which the doctrine owes its
name (cf. Viroli 1993). Its huge impact was
propelled by the course of historical events in
Key Points sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.
Yet early-modern diplomatic practices were
Diplomatic knowledge may be considered as a embedded in a wider geopolitical context
form of heterology, for its actual performance that simultaneously configured the founda-
endlessly demands of the self in front of a tions of modern sovereignty in Europe as
returning other which can neither be avoided nor
well as beyond. In that context, new tech-
overcome the establishment and cultivation
nologies of state power were of paramount
without assimilating each other to the category of
sameness of a mutual and durable relationship. importance. Antony Carty aptly portrays the
The understanding of diplomacy as heterology implications of that transformation:
comes easily from the attentive examination of
Knowledge presupposes a subject, and this sub-
the phenomenology of diplomacy, its observable
ject, for international relations, is the Hobbesian
practices, accumulated experiences and related
sovereign who is not named, but names, not
sociabilities. That understanding of diplomatic observed, but observes, a mystery for whom eve-
knowledge as a venue for empathy and mutual rything must be transparent. The problem of
self-transformation has been widely confirmed knowledge is that of security, which is attained
by historical research. through rational control and analysis Other
sovereigns are not unknown others in the modern
anthropological sense, but simply enemies, oppo-
nents, with conflicting interests, whose behaviour
can and should be calculated. (Carty 2007: 6)
DIPLOMATIC KNOWLEDGE AS
STATECRAFT At the risk of oversimplifying, the corre-
sponding historical events that framed that
Whilst the previous section examined the transformation can be summarized as follows:
importance of diplomacy as a venue for first, wars of religion; then competition
humanistic discovery of otherness, diplo- amongst European monarchies; later the radi-
matic knowledge also has been fostered, cal challenge of the French Revolution and
since ancient times, by utilitarian considera- the subsequent spread of the Napoleonic
tions and hidden intentions, even acquiring in wars; and finally and simultaneously European
modern diplomacy undisputable centrality. colonial expansion and the rise of Western
The importance given to a states stability imperialism. All these critical historical
and self-preservation under the doctrine of aspects, in their combination of accumulated
reason of state served historically to justify effects, largely displaced the humanist tradi-
a reconsideration of the very rationale of tion in diplomacy to a secondary role, forging
diplomatic knowledge, largely displacing instead the theory and practice of diplomacy
as statecraft that remains highly influential the writing of short but relevant and inquisi-
nowadays (cf. Graig and George 2013). That tive reports based in the model offered by the
historical process, which was crucial for the Venetian relazioni. But those treatises also
global emergence of the modern states system, included advice about the careful execution
was coincidental with the professionalization of some covert methods of intelligence such
of diplomacy and the emergence of new dip- as espionage, surveillance, eavesdropping or
lomatic bureaucracies. These bodies were the use of ciphered messages and cryptogra-
dedicated not only to knowledge production phy. As Colson has pointed out, diplomats:
and information gathering but also, as histori-
ans have recently pointed out, to the produc- needed to find ways to protect their own
secrets from third parties and uncover the secrets
tion of ignorance, always submitted to the of others. These concerns from earlier times
better performance of the operational needs helped to establish secrecy as the paradigm for
of modern statecraft (cf. Wieland 2012). As modern negotiation. (Colson 2008: 179)
previously discussed, that transition was not
always straightforward, however. Initially, Despite the frequent eruption of incidents, the
critical distinctions were often effaced compatibility of those techniques of espio-
amongst writers, philosophers, medics, art- nage and secrecy with the shared standards of
ists, naturalists, diplomats and spies at this diplomacy was commonly accepted during
particular moment in history in which a new that long historical period in which the bases
world vision was taking shape (Ordine 1999). of modern diplomacy crystallized (Pearton
But the fact remains that it was at that histori- 1982). More importantly, despite the succes-
cal moment when diplomatic knowledge, and sive challenges posed by the American,
the mastering of its corresponding techniques, French and Soviet revolutions, the new canon
was considered for the very first time as survived for centuries without significant
worthy of professionalization and all-encom- changes, from Wicquefort to Kissinger, from
passing rationalization. wars of religion to the Cold War (cf. Berridge
In that particular context, a number of influ- etal. 2001). Only in the early decades of the
ential diplomatic treatises were published twentieth century, when advocates of the so-
from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries called new diplomacy acquired significant
establishing the canon on the proper combina- albeit fleeting prominence, some limitations
tion of knowledge and skills that any diplomat to secret diplomacy were agreed without sub-
was expected to demonstrate and to duly per- stantially changing the terms of the debate
form (cf. Behrens 1936; Bazzoli 2002). From (Weisbrode 2014). The corresponding legal
the analytical prism that this chapter adopts, and administrative regimes designed for the
however, more than in the doctrinal dimen- management of diplomatic knowledge such
sion itself, we shall concentrate our attention as those regulating the place of secrecy and
on the variety and durability of techniques public disclosure of information or the
that this new understanding of diplomatic recourse to some special methods were
knowledge as statecraft entailed. Generally developed in parallel, rapidly acquiring the
written by experienced diplomats, such as profiles that are still recognizable today
by Vera, Wicquefort or Callires, those pio- within diplomatic services all over the world
neering treatises offered a variety of practical (cf. Rangarajan 1998; Stempel 2007).
recommendations about some critical aspects Despite the formal incompatibility of
related to diplomatic practice. Aspects such espionage with the Vienna Convention on
as the importance of paying due attention Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961, such
and respect to ceremony and protocol, the old forms of intermingling diplomacy and
prudent management of the delicate negotia- espionage survived, conveniently updated
tions including those conducted in secrecy, or and refined, in contemporary practice. This
is clearly shown in the widespread use of in diplomatic training, as well as in the

equivalent contemporary techniques such as importance of a closer cooperation between
data mining, network and traceability analy- diplomatic services and the private sector
ses, social networks surveillance, and satellite- through the cultivation of innovative clusters
based Geographical Information Systems within global transnational networks (cf. Del
(GIS). The persistence of these practices Giudice et al. 2012).
within democratic political systems, and their Successive technological and other material
ambiguous ethical foundations, are subject to innovations, from telegraphy to digital social
a new scrutiny nevertheless, frequently raising networks, constantly modify, however, the
severe criticisms in both academia and interna- organizational infrastructures of diplomatic
tional media. For some observers, intelligence services all over the world, transforming not
and diplomacy despite occasional overlaps only their material environment but also their
are realities clearly differentiated: whilst the working routines and even the emotional cli-
former provides knowledge by special meth- mate in which they operate (see Dittmer 2016).
ods the latter uses it (cf. Herman 1998: As Black and Bryant convincingly assert:
1). For others, in contrast, the distinction is
The historic knowledge-management role of the
both theoretically and practically fuzzy, thus diplomat highlights the part technology has played
deserving a systematic and critical examina- in the world of diplomacy, including the relation-
tion of its ethical justification and pragmatic ship between the ambassador abroad and the
necessity (cf. Bjola 2013). Recently, however, political centre. It also offers a further perspective
the growing awareness of the ultimate uncon- on the ways in which technologies open up new
possibilities, intended and unintended, often
trollability of new information technologies, fraught with ambiguity and potential for enhance-
as exemplified in the Wikileaks case, has ment and disruption. (Black and Bryant 2011: 1)
provoked a serious reconsideration not only
of its ethical justification but also of its tech- Unsurprisingly, the impact of new social
nical feasibility. Whilst some observers con- media on diplomacy has been a subject of
sider that the age of secret diplomacy may considerable interest. Arguably, their rapid
have come to an end (cf. Colson 2009), others and widespread diffusion all over the world
understand the impact of new technologies in both constrains and enables new modes of
terms of a new illusion of transparency, which diplomatic knowledge management, and dip-
will hardly displace it (cf. Bolt 2010; Page lomatic services all over the world try to
and Spence 2011; Roberts 2011). maximize their possible functionalities (cf.
Beyond its more controversial dimen- Holme and Ghoshal 2009). But they do so in
sions, however, diplomatic knowledge can a way far less linear than we frequently tend
also be approached in terms of its standard- to think. As Archetti has convincingly sum-
ized practices and routines. Kurbalija aptly marized, the variety of actors and audiences
identifies three main dimensions of diplo- that interact nowadays, either face-to-face or
macy as knowledge management: (a) intel- virtually, use technologies to pursue their
ligent access to information; (b) automation own agendas within the structure of opportu-
of procedures through workflow and rou- nities and constrains of the specific environ-
tine; and (c) cultivation of knowledge as an ment in which they operate, in a way that
institutional resource (Kurbalija 2002). His remains elusive to comfortable generaliza-
approach serves to introduce a new under- tions (Archetti 2012: 206).
standing of diplomatic knowledge influ- Diplomatic knowledge can also be
enced by knowledge-management theories approached through the examination of the
imported from the corporate world. These organizations structures, such as the national
approaches put an emphasis on giving more foreign services that contain it. Based on his
serious attention to knowledge management ethnographic work on the contemporary
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professionalization of diplomacy and the emer-

Neumann argues that when diplomats are gence of modern diplomatic bureaucracies.
posted abroad their work can be basically Through the development and mastering of its
understood as a form of knowledge produc- corresponding techniques, these administrative
tion framed in highly specific and ephemeral bodies performed an all-encompassing process of
the rationalization of diplomacy and ever chang-
social constellations, highly dependent on
ing adaptation that remains observable nowadays.
the perceptions and sociability of diplomats Despite its incompatibility with diplomatic law,
themselves (Neumann 2012: 7). Conversely, some old forms of intermingling diplomacy and
when they are placed at home their work espionage survived, as clearly shown in the
tends to be significantly more bureaucratic, widespread use of equivalent contemporary tech-
frequently adopting a distinctive institutional niques such as data mining, network and trace-
tone which is less indicative of the need to ability analyses, social networks surveillance,
express a personal opinion or an insightful remote sensing and GIS. The persistence of these
personal analysis than of the perceived need practices within democratic political systems, and
to fit within a wider consensual ministerial their disputable ethical foundations, are subject
voice. Neumanns insights may be applied to a new scrutiny nevertheless.
Diplomatic knowledge can also be approached
to diplomatic innovations such as that rep-
through the examination of the organizations
resented by the European External Action structures, such as those of national foreign
Service (EEAS), to the extent in which their services and international organizations, and
corresponding organizational transforma- more recently, in the context of some innova-
tions can be examined as the expression of a tive institutions such as the European External
new transnational form of diplomatic knowl- Actions Service (EEAS). Ethnographic research
edge production in the making (Cross 2007; reveals that when diplomats are posted abroad,
Kuus 2013; Bicchi 2013) see also Chapters 4 their work tends to be highly context-specific and
and 5 in this Handbook). credited not only to the analytical competence
In sum, as aptly formulated by Cornut, but also to the social skills of diplomats them-
diplomats remain primarily knowledge pro- selves. In contrast, those working at the head-
quarters frequently adopt a more bureaucratic
ducers, using their craft to understand and
and consensual institutional tone.
represent a situation as well as possible
(Cornut 2015: 385). For so doing they must
combine analytic competence with social
skills, deploying a number of distinctive
practices, not only within the walls of their DIPLOMATIC MODE OF KNOWLEDGE
own embassies or in dialogue with their peers
within the diplomatic corps in a particular This final section brings our discussion beyond
country, but also, and very specially, cultivat- the diplomatic realm. Not in vain, the signifi-
ing social interaction with the most diverse cance of diplomacy as a mode of knowledge
local agents: government and administrative has been vindicated recently by some out-
officers, the common people they meet in the standing contemporary intellectual figures
markets and streets, or political, religious, that, paradoxically, remain largely ignored in
cultural or business elites (cf. Cornut 2015). the field of diplomatic studies. A new under-
standing of diplomacy as a form of practical
knowledge is taking ground, becoming
increasingly influential in the most disparate
Key Points fields. This new understanding does not, how-
The understanding of diplomatic knowledge ever, fit the restrictive assumptions that char-
as statecraft, under the doctrine of reason of acterize the on-going discussions on
state, was historically coincidental with the communities of practice, conventionally
circumscribed to knowledge production and based on the unfair comparison of cultures by

collective learning within specific professional those installed in a self-assigned ethnographic
communities (e.g. Wenger 2000). Quite the authority (see Clifford 1983) but in the expe-
opposite, those advocating for a generalization riential knowledge acquired by diplomats in
of diplomacy, a sort of socialization of diplo- their practical intercourse (Latour 2000; 2004;
matic knowledge beyond professional diplo- 2007). In Latours view, the predicament for
macy, as the most promising way of facing the this new diplomatic inspired anthropology
challenges of contemporary global life, rarely is less a matter of knowledge about other cul-
are diplomats themselves. Business consult- tures than about the challenge of peaceful and
ants, social workers, educators, scientists and sustainable coexistence. This implies the
lawyers (e.g. Saner 2000; Mormont 2007; enhancement of symmetrical capability to
Lee, Witte and Cusick 2015; Thoreau and revise each sides own assumptions, and
Despret 2014; Bartram et al. 2015; Braithwaite
and Hong 2015) are the most active in this to appear once again in front of other peoples
trend. Isabelle Stengers contribution to this with a new peace offering. Diplomats are used to
these kinds of redefinitions, they always know
debate has been particularly pioneering and how to rephrase their requirements, this is why
influential. She strongly suggests the need to they are cleverer than scientist-philosophers. But
generalize the experiences and practical they run the risk, or course, of being called unscru-
knowledge of diplomats to many other fields: pulous traitors. (Latour 2007: 20)
I have named as diplomats those participants

Moral philosopher Pablo Iannone (1999:
whose obligations designate the possibility of gen-
erating rhizomatic connections where conflict 745) has also promoted the idea of diplo-
seems to prevail To speak about diplomacy is to macy as a particularly promising model for
speak about borders and the possibility of wars. wider social and political practice with simi-
Borders do not mean that connections are cut but lar arguments. He contends that, as an open-
that they are matters of arrangement. Reciprocity
ended activity, diplomacy avoids the
itself, if it exists, is part of an arrangement, with
different risks and challenges for each involved shortcomings of both consequentialist and
party As such, the art of diplomacy does not deontological approaches to moral philoso-
refer to goodwill, togetherness, the sharing of a phy, favouring instead a realistic and prag-
common language, or an intersubjective under- matic approach to the many challenges of
standing. Neither is a matter of negotiation
social and political life. More specifically, he
between flexible humans who should be ready to
adapt as the situation changes Such events summarizes the virtues of diplomacy as fol-
have nothing to do with heartfelt reconciliation: lows: first, he argues that diplomacy is sensi-
neither are they meant to produce mutual under- tive to the concurrent varieties of policy and
standing. Indeed, they are such that each party decisional problems, and procedural alterna-
may entertain its own version of the agreement
tives; second, in contrast with approaches that
It is an art that does not exhibit a deeper truth than
their very achievement. (Stengers 2010: 29) hopelessly seek consensus or invariably opt
for confrontation, diplomacy aims to ascer-
Consequently, Stengers finds in the diplo- tain the procedures that are likely to address
mats an inspiring model that may serve to the problems in a feasible and effective way;
forge a new cosmopolitanism, not under the third, diplomacy is realistic insofar that it
sign of any universalized singular, but upon does not merely dwell on abstract ideas, but
the need to manage the unavoidable recur- on the social fact that there is a recurrent
rence of global multiplicity in a constructive issue that something should be done about it;
way (Stengers 2011). That understanding of fourth, diplomacy does not presuppose that
diplomacy is largely shared by Bruno Latour, problems are either exclusively or primarily
who has repeatedly advocated the idea of a settled through the appeal to principles, no
new symmetrical anthropology no longer matter how important these may be; fifth,
diplomacy recognizes that policy-making and contrasting modes of knowledge production

theoretical assessments of the moment are produce in their most dedicated practitioners
often unfeasible to spell out all significant may offer valuable insights about the future
implications of a particular problem; and of diplomacy in a fast-changing world (see
sixth, and perhaps the most important: also Chapters 6 and 810 in this Handbook).
diplomacy takes seriously the fact that certain
unsettled data are worked out in the process and
are not available at the time initial policy discus- Key Points
sions take place. Indeed they often result in part
A new understanding of diplomacy as a form of
from such discussions. The process of critical scru-
tiny and social interaction leads to the settlement practical knowledge is taking ground becoming
of reasons for assessing policies and decisions. increasingly influential in the most disparate
These are new, previously non-existent, and hardly fields beyond the diplomatic services all over the
predictable data. (Iannone 1999: 75) word. This new understanding does not, however,
fit the restrictive assumptions that character-
Consequently, against the presentation of ize conventional approaches to diplomacy. An
diplomats and scientific experts as necessary increasingly important number of voices, coming
contenders (Auer 1998), or the dismissal of from the most disparate fields, advocate for a
diplomacy and diplomats as irrelevant for the generalization of diplomacy, a sort of socializa-
global production or dissemination of tion of diplomatic knowledge beyond profes-
sional diplomacy, as the most promising way of
knowledge (e.g. Stehr and Ufer 2009), some
facing the challenges of contemporary global life.
voices are defending consistently the under- The revalorization of diplomatic knowledge in
standing of diplomatic knowledge in a way contemporary epistemology and anthropol-
that may serve as a model in the most dispa- ogy, and the growing recognition of its validity
rate fields. The revalorization of diplomatic amongst educators, consultants, social workers
knowledge in contemporary epistemology and lawyers, can be read in short as a sort of
and anthropology can be read in short as a vindication of the value of diplomatic skills vis-
sort of vindication of the value of diplomatic a-vis the limitations of scientific expertise, policy
skills vis-a-vis the limitations of scientific advice and legal adjudication, in contexts of
expertise and policy advice in contexts of social complexity and epistemic uncertainty.
social complexity and epistemic uncertainty
(cf. Ravetz 2006; Funtowicz and Ravetz
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PART II
DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONS
12
Embassies, Permanent Missions
and Special Missions
Kishan S. Rana
Even more than the foreign ministry, the since in common perception they are cloaked
resident embassy symbolizes the international in exotica, glamor and mystery.
system. Embassies are older than the In times ancient, kingdoms of varied hue
institutions that came up in home capitals to sent out emissaries, often on special missions,
manage them; it was the need to furnish sometimes to reside at foreign courts. The
manpower for embassies, absorb their Amarna Archives (13501330 BC), clay tab-
reportage, and manage them that led to the lets of ancient Egypt, contain correspondence
establishment of foreign ministries, starting between the administration of the Pharaohs
with France. As foreign country outposts and representatives of kingdoms in Babylonia,
embedded in the receiving state, embassies Assyria, Syria, Cyprus and elsewhere. In other
manifest for each country their connection world regions, too, that same method was used,
with the outside world. For the host country, sending empowered representatives to foreign
embassies are accessible representations of kingdoms. Kautilyas Arthashastra, complied
the other, in culture, ways of life, and often in the third century BC as a comprehensive trea-
language as well. tise on statecraft, offers advice to the envoy
The publics see diplomatic missions as residing in the foreign court.1 Rudimentary
expressions of their international personality. notions of immunity of envoys emerged in
For countries that were colonies and struggled those days, founded on the understanding that
long for their independence, the exchange of they were messengers of other powers, and that
embassies is proof of sovereignty, i.e. their their ill treatment would invite reciprocal action.
presence in the international system, and also Reciprocity remains the central ingredient of
their equality with other nations. In every the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
capital, the media track news and activity of Relations (VCDR), the universal doctrine gov-
foreign embassies with a particular fervor, erning the functioning of diplomatic missions.
RECENT HISTORY non-state actors, including public diplomacy,

under some regulation. But there is little
Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, appetite among states for starting a revision
embassies were exchanged mainly between process, and even less prospect for crafting
monarchies and republics. Some were at the new consensus over a revised framework.
level of legations, a lesser form of diplomatic In sum, the resident embassy is unchanged
representation than the embassy; for instance, in basic structure over several hundreds of
even in 1945, the majority of foreign missions years, while its ways of work have evolved.
in London and Washington DC were lega- In contrast, the permanent mission is of
tions, headed by ministers plenipotentiary. recent origin, as a key player in multilateral
But as decolonization moved forward after and regional diplomacy.
the end of World War II, newly independent
states opted for embassies as their standard
form of representation and the legation has
gone the way of the Dodo. CONTEMPORARY EMBASSY: IN
The 1961 VCDR was negotiated for more REGRESSION OR RENAISSANCE?
than two years, on the basis of a draft pro-
duced by the International Law Commission; Conventional wisdom suggests that advances
it codified existing international regulations in communications have tightened control by
and conventional practices, but also brought foreign ministries and governments over
in some innovation.2 VCDR is a child of the embassies, reducing their latitude for pleni-
Cold War, and incorporates some provisions potentiary or discretionary action. That has
that are rooted in that ethos.3 Some of its reg- indeed been the case, but other trends have
ulations have been overtaken by technology; also been at work in parallel, producing a
for instance, elaborate provisions governing complex net outcome that reflects interplay
the installation of radio links by embassies of counter-currents. Thus, while embassies
have become redundant in an internet age are tied more closely to the home capital than
of quotidian global connectivity. But its key anyone might have imagined even two dec-
provision of untrammeled immunity for dip- ades back, one result is a counter-intuitive
lomatic officials is as vital today as when it enhancement in the embassys role.
was framed; it is the pillar on which ambassa- Let us briefly list the elements that influence
dors and embassy personnel function. VCDR the work of embassies, before we consider the
essentially covers the activities of govern- consequences. These are: the entry of many
ments acting through embassies, to reach out new state and non-official actors in interna-
to the official agencies of the receiving coun- tional affairs; an expanded direct role of the
try, specifying that the foreign ministry is the head of government in foreign issues, includ-
prime channel of contact for foreign embas- ing participation in bilateral, regional and
sies, a provision that embassies routinely global summits; new technical, interlocking
breach today.4 VCDR did not anticipate the and amorphous issues in international dialogue
development of public diplomacy as an that bring in issues of human and environ-
activity undertaken by official agencies and mental security; intermingling of foreign and
by non-state actors, reaching out to publics domestic issues as a consequence of globali-
and non-state actors in foreign states, to pro- zation and interdependence; an expanded role
ject their own viewpoints, to influence them. played by publics, domestic and foreign, in
A few scholars and practitioners hold VCDR shaping outcomes; and the emergence of an
to be outdated, and would like to see its pro- international order that is more democratic and
visions concerning immunity to be modi- region-focused than before, in effect mediating
fied; some wish to bring activities directed at the exercise of conventional power, with new
Embassies, Permanent Missions and Special Missions 151
concepts such as soft power and country Second, a further consequence of the
brands. How do these impact on the embassy? above situation is that the embassy needs
First, as a consequence of the explosion alertness, and a wide local network of con-
in information, the bilateral embassy is now tacts, for a holistic understanding of devel-
the best resource for the country on develop- opments, to offer to the home stakeholders,
ments in the assignment country. With feet on not just the MFA, the full range of informa-
the ground, it can offer a holistic perspective tion they require on the assignment country.6
on developments there, and how these impact The embassy is no longer the lead negotia-
on the interests of the home country. With tor on most issues, since it is the functional
plural actors, state and non-state, involved ministries that handle such bilateral dialogue.
in the bilateral relationship, it is only the Butthey depend on the advice of the embassy
embassy on the ground that has information on the cultural cues and negotiation tech-
on the activities they undertake in that assign- niques they are likely to encounter from the
ment country, on which the foreign ministry other side. The old requirement for language
is often out of the picture. For instance, very expertise and area specialization is thus rein-
few business enterprises keep their govern- forced; countries that had reduced emphasis
ments informed of their foreign activities, but on these skills, such as the UK, are now rein-
it is often ones embassy in the target country forcing them (House of Commons, 2011).
that is likely to have some information; that Third, the embassy gains in value as a
applies even more to foreign collaboration by contributor to the MFAs domestic outreach,
academic institutions and think tanks. Not all because of the breadth of its contacts with
foreign ministries fully take this into account, home partners that are involved in economic,
because superficially it goes against the tenet cultural, educational, media, S&T and other
that it is the headquarters that gives authorita- activities in the assignment country. In prac-
tive assessments on bilateral relations. tice, the embassy depends on these varied
Application of information and commu- stakeholders for its own contacts and actions
nications technology (ICT), especially the in the assignment country, as an agent for
use of intranets for MFAembassy com- whole of government and whole of coun-
munication, means that embassies can be try, holistic diplomacy. This too rebalances
virtually embedded into the MFA, permitting the MFAembassy equation.
them access to foreign ministry dossiers, and Fourth, aid delivery and management is
engaging them in continual conversation. witness to disintermediation. Most Western
For instance, in contrast to the past when an donors have transferred to their embassies
embassy might only be consulted once or responsibility for aid disbursement within
twice during the formulation of a proposal the allotment for the recipient country. The
in the ministry, it is now possible to treat fact that more of this aid now goes to local
the embassy as a constituent in the decision NGOs and for small schemes, with direct
process; even before a proposal takes shape, impact on local beneficiaries, also adds to
a desk officer can consult an embassy coun- the embassys role. Developing countries that
terpart for a first reaction, through point-to- increasingly implement their own aid pro-
point confidential communication that may grams also use embassies as delivery agents
not be subject to the protocol that applies for their project aid, and even more for the
to cypher messages.5 This happens in some deployment of their technical assistance that
Western countries, notably Austria, Canada, has special focus on training programs, nec-
Germany and the UK, which have conse- essarily based on the needs of the recipients.7
quently thinned out staff in their foreign min- The above developments impact on the
istry territorial units, and redeployed them to embassys role in the bilateral relationship. If
work on cross-cutting, thematic issues. the embassy is the locus of information, and
has the best concentration of specialists on and is now seen to be at the disposal of the
the country concerned, why not also use it as government as a whole. In particular, the head
a partner in decision-making? Countries such of government is now a direct participant in
as the UK and Germany now do this, partly international affairs, which makes the ambas-
as a consequence of staff reductions in ter- sador sometimes directly answerable to the
ritorial units at the foreign ministry. But the head, and more frequently to the office of the
notion is anathema to other countries such head. The new element today is that indirectly
as China and the US, where such reductions the embassy is under the influence of a wide
have not taken place, and where the MFA range of non-official agencies that have a
embassy personnel balance remains tilted strong stake in the assignment country, includ-
heavily in favor of the MFA.8 ing but not limited to: opposition political
While the above narrative takes into account parties, in strongly democratic states, which
most of the new trends noted at the start of this expect to receive briefings from embassies on
section, how does more direct involvement of their foreign visits;9 associations of business
the head of government into foreign affairs and even individual enterprises; academic and
impact on the embassy? When heads and S&T institutions and think tanks; the media;
even foreign ministers communicate with civil society actors and development agen-
one another via smart phone messages and cies; and the public at large, if an issue gains
other forms of personal communications, the popular attention, as with consular cases or
foreign ministry establishment is often left out evacuation of ones citizens in the midst of
of the loop, at least in real time. The situation foreign conflict. Among these, business exerts
for the embassy is no better, but it has slightly a strong influence much of the time.
better prospects for catch-up by virtue of its While the embassy is not directly answer-
local contacts, not just at the foreign ministry able to entities in the receiving state, official
but also vis--vis the office of the foreign head and non-state actors may exert some influence
of government. In this respect, too, it becomes on it, as a relatively weak force. The diaspora
a resource for the home foreign ministry. is an element of rising importance, given
Rather little of the above applies to embas- heavy international movement of people, both
sies of developing countries in Africa, Asia in pursuit of work and as migrants; in our
and Latin America, except insofar that: first, globalized world, the home public also show
all countries are party to the information sharp concern for their welfare. That makes
explosion that has made foreign ministries embassies concerned with their diaspora, even
depend on their embassies for comprehensive if they have taken up citizenships in their new
information on the assignment country; sec- homeland. Increasingly, the diaspora is now a
ond, with plural actors engaged in external link between the states concerned.
activity, the MFA depends on the embassy to
provide a more complete picture of the home
countrys engagement overseas. Both these Key Points
factors enhance the utility of embassies.
Who are the main entities that guide The bilateral embassy has a bigger role than
embassies? Are embassies only answerable to before in the formulation of policy and in its
execution, which adds to its work demands.
the home country, or do some elements in the
It functions more closely with varied state and
receiving country also affect their work? Let non-state partners, both in the home country and
us first look at the home agencies. Under the in the country of assignment, including diaspora
classic format, the foreign ministry has been groups. This adds to its ability to monitor issues,
the master of the diplomatic system, with giving it a holistic perspective.
direct day-to-day control over embassies. But The embassy also finds itself answerable to a
the embassy represents the entire country, wider range of home actors than hitherto.
NEW EMBASSY FORMS are often nationals of foreign countries, or

members of ones diaspora, or other long-
In most countries, foreign ministries are con- term residents in the target country (see
fronting budgets cuts and manpower reduc- Chapter 13 in this Handbook). This does not
tions. In consequence, networks of overseas provide diplomatic representation; honorary
missions are often, but not always, shrinking. consuls work on consular, commercial, cul-
At the same time, international commitments tural and related tasks, but not political tasks.
have expanded for most, so that they look for They do fly the flag, and provide limited
different kinds of representation options, support to the home country at almost zero
going beyond the established method of cost. Honorary consuls, who may be located
concurrent accreditation under which one in a foreign capital or in other cities, can be of
embassy simultaneously handles representa- considerable practical assistance in building
tion in other countries, usually in its neigh- local contacts, and help businessmen and vis-
borhood. A few countries, such as Brazil, iting delegations, in addition to undertaking
China, Mexico and Turkey, have significantly some consular tasks. Many developing states
expanded their embassy networks; India is could benefit from more extensive use of
slowly adding new missions. honorary consuls, but are perhaps inhibited
One method is a non-resident ambassa- by perceived difficulties in choosing the right
dor, when someone typically based in the individuals. Managing an extensive network
home country it may be a senior foreign of this kind also requires the foreign ministry
ministry official, a businessman or public to invest in manpower and effort to assist and
figure takes on a part-time ambassadorial supervise them.
position, traveling to the assignment country Other approaches have emerged. One is
a few times in the year, sometimes accompa- to concentrate staff in select regional embas-
nied by a young MFA official.10 Malta and sies, which become service providers to
Singapore appoint some twenty to thirty such smaller missions in that neighborhood. For
envoys. It is not a substitute for resident rep- instance, an agriculture or IT expert based
resentation, but is an effective alternative to at one embassy can serve neighboring mis-
no representation at all. sions. Such a hub-and-spoke arrangement
A variation on the above, used especially by pools services; sometimes it engenders the
Scandinavian countries, is the laptop ambas- thought that a regional embassy under a sen-
sador who visits the country of assignment ior ambassador might also supervise neigh-
for a few weeks at a time, say in advance of a boring missions, but no one has tried this,
major event like an outbound visit by a high perhaps as it would add a needless interme-
personality from the home country, operating diate layer.11
out of a hotel. For the rest of the time, the
official attends to his duties from the home
capital. On occasion they embed an ambas- Key Points
sador in a fellow-Scandinavian embassy,
sharing some services, usually without any It is likely that new forms of representation will
direct staff support. The UK and a few oth- be tried out more in the years ahead, including
embassies that are trimmer and share facilities
ers have also resorted to sending from home
with others, as well as replacing some resident
an ambassador unsupported by any home- missions with non-resident ambassadors, and
based staff, relying on the services of locally wider use of honorary consuls, to cope with
recruited personnel for support. budget cutbacks.
An entirely different approach is to bring In contrast, some countries are still at a phase
into the overseas representation network a of expanding their diplomatic representation
substantial number of honorary consuls, who networks.
PERMANENT MISSIONS personal credibility and interpersonal skills

are at a premium. Chairing a meeting, or act-
Diplomatic representation attached to an ing as a rapporteur, calls for domain skill that
international organization is called a perma- comes mainly from practice, as does work in a
nent mission, distinguishing it from delega- drafting group that hammers out a resolution or
tions sent to take part in conferences and statement; this is part of the essential training
other activities at these organizations. In in multilateral work. Permanent missions do
practice these permanent missions are not engage in economic, cultural, consular, or
attached by member-states to the UN and its other kinds of outreach, though on the margins
agencies, and also to regional organizations, of conferences and other meetings, bilateral
to work with these entities on a continuous contacts are pursued by leaders, be it at New
basis. They serve as a mechanism for uninter- York, Geneva, or elsewhere. Small countries
rupted negotiation. The 1961 VCDR, which with limited global networks use these places
does not mention permanent missions, applies for bilateral contact with countries where they
to them loosely; they are governed by the do not have resident representation; here the
rules established by the UN or the concerned permanent mission plays a post office func-
entity, and by agreement between the organi- tion, transmitting messages as needed. New
zation and the country where it is located, a York in particular is a global listening post.
so-called headquarters agreement.12 The diplomats stationed at permanent missions
This has several consequences. Ranks and mainly act as political officers; some are spe-
designations of officials do not follow VCDR cialists. Functional experts on climate change,
norms.13 Permanent missions often have two disarmament, or other issues in dialogue may
or more ambassadors; this rank becomes an be brought in as needed as advisers, or may
honorific, since the head of mission is usually be stationed at these missions, but in general,
called a permanent representative. The work these diplomats are less diversified in the work
handled by permanent missions is narrower in handled than those at embassies.
focus compared with embassies. Their princi- The Organization of American States,
pal interlocutors are the permanent missions headquartered at Washington DC, was one
sent by other countries, i.e. representatives of the first regional organizations to which
of fellow member-states, plus officials at the member-states sent permanent missions,
organizations secretariat. Mutual cultivation by tradition separate from their embassies
among missions is intensive. No less impor- in the US capital. At the EU headquarters at
tant, especially today, are the non-state actors Brussels, the permanent missions of member-
that are active in multilateral and regional countries are vast in size, some with over
diplomacy. This includes the media, from the a hundred diplomat-level officials.14 An
home country and foreign, key information increasing number of regional organizations
multipliers, and non-government organiza- now have permanent representatives attached
tions (NGOs) active on the subjects handled to their secretariats, be it the African Union
by that international organization, often with at Addis Ababa or ASEAN at Jakarta; some
consultative status. These NGOs act as non-members also feel obliged, depending
information providers and as connectors with on their stakes, to send their permanent rep-
civil society, at home and internationally. resentatives to important entities.
Thus, public diplomacy has become a major How has the work of permanent mis-
new task for permanent missions. sions changed over the years? What further
The skills needed for multilateral diplo- evolution should we anticipate? Three main
mats are not intrinsically different from those changes are so far evident. First, the subjects
entailed in bilateral diplomacy, but with special in dialogue have grown, so that diplomats
emphasis on the negotiation craft. As always, attached to such missions now deal with many
new subjects. They need to be quick learners, IMPROVING EMBASSY

not so much to become instant experts, but PERFORMANCE
to absorb new ideas, work with domain spe-
cialists, and integrate their knowledge with The diplomatic system of each country requires
national objectives, to advance the home coun- its overseas missions to contribute to national
trys interests. Second, they have to deal with a objectives. This would typically include
wider gamut of non-state actors and master the national security and a peaceful environment
public diplomacy aspect of multilateral activi- in its neighborhood, development and prosper-
ties. Third, bilateral issues crop up increas- ity through trade, investments and technology,
ingly at multilateral fora, adding to the work and advancing the welfare of people through
burden. This demonstrates the connectedness education, international travel and other
of global, regional and bilateral themes. exchanges. In our globalized age, countries are
Multilateral problem solving is less effec- more dependent on one another than ever
tive than many have hoped. Afghanistan, Iraq, before, as reflected in the ratio of the countrys
Libya and Syria have taught us that the eradi- international trade and foreign investment to
cation of terrorism and elimination of abhor- national GDP, and also in the interconnections
rent regimes involve complex human security between national development and the regional
issues. Seemingly decisive initial results from and global environment.
military intervention engender deeper, per- Do all embassies rise to their potential?
sisting challenges. New concepts such as Much hinges on the degree of professional-
peace-enforcement and responsibility to ism, as well as the motivation and leadership,
protect are increasingly difficult to practice in the embassy, and the training provided to
on the ground. Some scholars have hoped that its personnel. To the extent that politicians
diplomats might practice enlightened mul- and other non-career ambassadors are sent
tilateralism, and follow a professional ethic abroad in many developing countries, notably
that rises above national interests.15 Decades in Africa and Latin America, embassies start
earlier, Harold Nicolson had also spoken in with an initial handicap. Such recourse to non-
such an idealistic vein, but that is neither fea- professionals is distinctly less in Asia, and rare
sible nor likely in an international system that in Western diplomatic systems.16 If we accept
remains animated by sovereign states. that diplomacy is a profession that requires its
We may expect growth in permanent mis- domain knowledge and expertise, it stands to
sions, especially those attached to regional reason that in the main embassies should be
organizations, working along traditional lines, headed by experienced professionals.
but more agile and serving the interests of Embassies are governed by rules framed by
diverse home constituencies, beyond the foreign the MFA, and are typically supervised jointly
ministry. Diplomats working at these would by MFA territorial units and by the administra-
continue to widen skillsets and competencies. tion mechanism, the former concentrating on
functional output and the latter on managing
personnel and rule compliance. How they per-
Key Points form depends on: selection of personnel, espe-
cially the ambassador; the training given to both
Diplomatic missions that are embedded in
them and locally engaged staff; aligning their
international and regional organizations are in
essence permanent mechanisms for negotiation,
work to the objectives of the MFA; the qual-
focused on much narrower agendas, compared ity of their tasking and supervision; monitoring
with bilateral embassies. performance, typically through annual assess-
They deal with wide range of subjects, in an envi- ments; and mentoring, morale and motivation.
ronment that is dynamic and volatile, calling for high The traditional methods for performance
professional skills. Their numbers are likely to grow. enhancement include periodic inspection of
embassies through visits by senior officials Other countries have come up with their own
from the MFA, who examine staff strength methods. India requires its embassies to produce
and suitability to the assigned tasks, and the an annual plan of action, but does not enforce
working of different sections of the embassy, this with any rigor.18 In the mid-2000s, the Thai
ranging from political to economic and con- Foreign Ministry prepared a five-year projection
of what it sought to achieve in its relations with
sular, plus the quality of supervision over
some 25 major partner countries, with inputs
all these activities by the ambassador. In from other ministries and official agencies. This
the better systems, the focus is not so much is a particularly wholesome method of forward
on the assessment and grading of individu- planning, for managing bilateral relations.
als, important as this is, but also help for the
embassy to overcome problems and to deliver Performance enhancement actions are of real
better results. utility if they help embassies to better work
In well-managed MFAs, performance on their tasks. That depends on whether the
evaluation methods have been refined, accom- stipulated norms are relevant and applied in
modating ideas borrowed from corporate man- realistic fashion, taking into account the
agement that are applied across public services intrinsically unquantifiable nature of diplo-
(Rana, 2013: 8993). They may include: matic work. It is also essential to distinguish
between process and outcomes; for instance,
Aligning embassies tasks to the MFAs major an embassy or a foreign ministry can stipu-
priorities. The MFA typically sets these at three
late that x number of ministerial visits or
cascading levels: principal national objectives;
delegations are to be exchanged, but say
several goals articulated under each objective;
and finally a compendium of desired outputs nothing about the results from those visits.
or deliverables for each goal. Embassy tasks Outcomes in diplomacy are notoriously dif-
thus become an extension of these MFA objec- ficult to quantify. Further, one can set a target
tives. Some foreign ministries stipulate elabo- for bilateral trade or flow of foreign direct
rate embassy tasks without setting out their investment, but since the result hinges on
own objectives, which produces responses from actions by business enterprises, official
embassies that are unrealistic and difficult to agents, be they embassies or ministries, can
assess or implement.17 only speak of their facilitator roles, the more
Some countries, ranging from Botswana to so as outcomes depend on many exogenous
Malaysia to the UK, require their embassies to
factors.
project their activities against Key Performance
With all such caveats, monitoring embassy
Indicator matrices. Other countries, including
Canada, Kenya and Switzerland, take this a step performance is an inexact science. No par-
further to sign performance contracts with ticular method can be identified as best. Yet
ambassadors. This has shown mixed results. it is useful to benchmark, and refine, ones
The French have pioneered the method of ambas- monitoring and assessment mechanism. It is
sadors instructions, under which every envoy also worthwhile to heed the advice of a 2011
setting out at the start of a mission receives in British parliamentary committee, which
Paris elaborate, custom-tailored guidelines on the cautioned the Foreign and Commonwealth
tasks that this individual is expected to accom- Office against an excess of managerialism,
plish, on behalf of all the ministries that have saying:
a stake in that bilateral relationship. Within six
months the ambassador presents to Quai dOrsay
We received evidence that this was a factor behind
a plan of action to implement these instruc- the claimed decline in the quality of FCO foreign
tions, along with a request for resources, human policy work, as it led to managerial skills being
and material, that are deemed essential (Rana, emphasized rather than geographic knowledge,
2013: 91). A few other European countries have and time and attention to be diverted from core
adopted a similar method, with mixed results. diplomatic functions. (House of Commons, 2011: 3)
Key Points To the extent that priority is given to setting

goals and direction, such methods can deliver
Embassies and foreign ministries confront value. But rigid application of evaluation criteria
demands that are common to public services borrowed from the corporate world leads to
across the world: to deliver value and to be pointless form filling and applying standards that
measured in their performance. The essentially miss the real work of diplomacy management.
unquantifiable nature of the bulk of diplomatic
tasks makes this problematic.
Table 12.1 Embassy functions: past, present and anticipated

Function Traditional Contemporary Future
Representation Core activity, embassy as Somewhat taken for granted. Expect greater plurality, including
exclusive agent. Embassies rub shoulders with within embassies; diplomats
other official representatives, will jostle with representatives
face problems over establishing of other official agencies, sub-
primacy coordinating local state entities, and non-state
actions (US issues Presidential actors. Embassy will remain
Letters; Thailand has law naming prime channel for official
ambassador as CEO of Team contact, and best source on
Thailand) (Rana, 2013: 74). local information.
Main influencers Foreign Ministry of home A wide range of official agencies, All the agencies mentioned
country, plus other across the entire government are earlier, plus the publics in
branches of government. its customers; also parliament general, in the home country,
Especially answerable to entities; plus non-state actors that and to an extent also the
the head of government. have a stake in the assignment publics of the receiving
country. Indirectly, the embassy state. The diaspora in the
is also under the influence of receiving country is a special
official and non-official agencies responsibility for the embassy.
of the receiving country.
Negotiation Embassies as prime channel. Functional ministries handle their Embassies act more as facilitators,
own negotiations; they involve with reduced direct role in
embassies to a limited extent. negotiations; will remain key
resource for advice on cultural
and other local characteristics.
Relation Central task, under close In practical terms, this is highest Will become multi-dimensional
building supervision from home, priority, involving full range of activity, in which public
with main focus on official official actors, including sub-state diplomacy dimension will be
actors, and limited outreach entities; business actors; media; especially important. Much of
to non-state agents. academia and think tanks; the process but of course
diaspora; plus publics across not all will be open, and
entire range, including NGOs and accessible to outside scrutiny.
civil society, and anyone that Further growth in interactive
influences bilateral, regional and social media will add to
international activities of target openness.
country. Embassy is increasingly
a co-manager, together with
the MFA.
Promotion Starting in 1950s, trade Economic promotion and public Likely to remain major priority.
promotion grew in outreach have become core Publicprivate partnerships
importance; attracting FDI tasks. will grow in importance.
became new task from end
1960s.
(continued)
Table 12.1 Embassy functions: past, present and anticipated (continued)

Function Traditional Contemporary Future
Image Not treated as a priority First priority has been to build Will be mainstreamed as key
projection initially, though emergence favorable image to attract tourists, activity. But image marketing
of electronic media made which has morphed into wider specialists may encounter
diplomatic systems aware image projection. Concepts of more savvy diplomatic clients,
of importance of country country brand and re-branding who better understand long-
image. embraced by many states. term nature of image building.
Reportage MFAs depended on embassy Embassy no longer first source Embassy remains key source for:
assessments as key input for hard information; does not comprehensive analysis, joint
into policy making compete with instant news reports by several missions,
sources. Focus has shifted to giving full picture; prediction
predictive analysis, and home of likely developments;
country perspective on external identification of future key
developments. Embassy only actors, in political, economic
one of many other sources for & public fields. Reportage
MFA. telescopes into relationship
building.
Aid Embassies had little role, Has grown in importance; for Embassies will have to mediate
management foreign aid emerged after donors, embassy is now between multiple actors;
World War II. prime delivery channel, with greater role of non-state
some disbursement decisions agents among both donors
delegated; for recipients, and recipients. Also close
outreach to govt. agencies and monitoring by publics and
to NGOs is major task. media.
Services Consular, not a priority activity Consular work has strategic value Migration, travel and diaspora
in age of extensive foreign communities will demand
travel, migration. Public more attention. Education
outreach and information diplomacy will also gain
services also important. Student further traction.
exchanges also larger.
WILL EMBASSIES BE NEEDED track, has witnessed even a slightly greater

IN THE FUTURE? swing in favor of such non-professionals.
To the extent the latter come from public life,
Are embassies indispensable? Contemporary often with a wide range of experiences, they
information and communication technology add real value, but not when the appointees are
permits countries to maintain contact with drawn from the ranks of presidential campaign
one another virtually, overcoming distance contributors.19 The situation is much less
and geography. Officials and delegations can favorable in a number of developing states,
visit foreign capitals as needed, without especially in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin
maintaining expensive permanent establish- America, where such appointments are seen
ments. We saw that some countries have as the head of governments prerogative, with
employed the method of non-resident little care for job competence. That degrades
ambassadors and laptop envoys in such the performance of embassies, and leads to
fashion. We can count on further innovation. demoralization in the professional cadre.
Will there be a shift towards greater One scholar has described the contempo-
professionalism? The US, which is unique rary work of embassy officials as gumboot
among major states in drawing up to 30% of its diplomacy.20 Another has spoken of the pro-
ambassadors from outside the diplomatic career fessional as a high-functioning, street-smart,
renaissance humanist with well-developed 6 This increasingly includes non-state entities, such
instincts, a Blackberry, and where neces- as chambers of business, think tanks, and other
credible entities. Many foreign ministries do not
sary, a Kevlar vest (Copeland, 2009: 259).
have specific regulations covering embassies
Attired in tuxedos or cargo pants, as cir- sharing reports with domestic non-state actors,
cumstances mandate, countries will always but my experience at different embassy posts was
need representatives on the ground, to reach that, handled with discretion, this seldom posed
out to diverse foreign actors, to engage with a problem.
7 This has been the Indian experience; the Ministry
them and negotiate, and to furnish authentic
of External Affairs established its Development
ground information. Will they need to operate Partnership Administration (DPA) in 2012 for
out of lavish residences and project an aura of holistic oversight over an expanding aid program,
glamor? Perhaps not. But image is also part in which Indian embassies are the key implement-
of public diplomacy. It is likely that these ing agents.
8 The concept of the MFAembassy manpower
swans on the seemingly gilded lake will need
balance is based on empirical study. See Rana,
to pedal harder than ever beneath the surface. Bilateral Diplomacy (DiploFoundation, Malta and
Embassies will endure; if they did not exist, Geneva, 2002b), p. 121.
they would need to be invented. 9 In a growing number of countries, including India,
it is customary for ambassadors who come home
on consultations to meet with opposition leaders.
10 Non-resident envoys also look after high or
influential visitors from the assignment country,
NOTES which helps them build contacts. Combining this
method with a virtual embassy would render it
1 See LN Rangarajan, The Arthashastra (Penguin, even more effective, though this does not seem
New Delhi, 1992). Kautilya advised the envoy to to be the practice in Malta or Singapore.
uphold his kings honor, and to deliver the mes- 11 This was one of the notions advanced by the Sen
sage entrusted to him exactly as it was given to Committee in India in 1983; that report has not
him, even if he apprehended danger to his own been published, though its main findings were
life; the envoy was advised not to let honors go disclosed in JN Dixits book (2005).
to his head, avoid liquor, and sleep alone. 12 The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representa-
2 For example, Article 3, setting out the functions tion of States in their Relations with International
of embassies, brought into the draft a vital con- Organizations of a Universal Character sets out
cept that was not in the original draft prepared privileges and immunities, but it has not been
by the International Law Commission: promot- widely accepted, much less incorporated into the
ing friendly relations between the sending State municipal law of most member-states.
and the receiving State, and developing their eco- 13 In 2000, Indias BJP government sought to appoint
nomic, cultural, and scientific relations (Article 3, an Indian Green Card holder living in the US as
1 (e)); this was proposed by Yugoslavia and the a special envoy for overseas Indians; the US State
Philippines. Department turned down his designation at the
3 Example: VCDR Article 3 1(d) reads: ascertaining Indian Embassy as special adviser in the rank of
by all lawful means conditions and developments ambassador, on the ground that this was not in
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon accord with VCDR. He was eventually given that
to the Government of the sending State. The designation and rank at the Indian Permanent
convoluted language is intended to ensure that Mission to the UN at New York. The appointment
receiving governments do not restrain embassies was terminated in 2004 when a Congress gov-
from gathering information for their reports to ernment came to power in New Delhi.
home governments; it also reflects the concern 14 Daily prayer meetings at large EU missions are held
of Soviet bloc countries of the time over activities in auditoria; the permanent representative often
of Western embassies in their countries. delegates this coordination task to their deputies.
4 Article 39 of VCDR says that embassies should 15 Former German ambassador Karl Theodore
conduct official business through the foreign Paschke set out some of these ideas in a statement
ministry. at a Wilton Park conference in January 2003.
5 This is based on research interviews with diplo- 16 Spain is one exception now, and sends a number
mats. See Rana, The 21st Century Ambassador, of political appointees as ambassadors. In most
2004, pp. 167. Western countries, at any point of time one
would not find more than one or two non-career Report of Session 201012, Vol.1, The
ambassadors. In Asia, such appointments are rela- Stationery Office Ltd, London, 2011.
tively few, compared with Africa or Latin America. Jett, Dennis C, American Ambassadors: The
Brazil has a law that mandates that ambassadors Past, Present, and Future of Americas
must belong to the diplomatic service. In Trinidad
Diplomats (Palgrave Macmillan, New York,
and Tobago, or Uganda, the majority are political
appointments, which demoralizes their profes-
2014).
sional diplomats. Langhorne, Richard, Who are the Diplomats
17 This observation is based on research and inter- Now? (HMSO, London, 1996).
views with diplomats from several countries. Locke, Mary and Yost, Casimir A (ed.), Who
18 I had pioneered this method at Algeria in 1977, Needs Embassies? How US Missions Abroad
and applied it at other missions I headed; in 1980 Help Shape Our World (Institute for the
it caught the MEAs attention and was thereaf- Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University,
ter applied to all Indian embassies (Rana, 2002b: Washington DC, 1997).
812); it now receives cursory attention, and Paschke, Karl Th, Report of the Special
many Indian embassies ignore this.
Inspection of 14 German Embassies in the
19 Bloomberg Business, 25 July 2013: Obama Ambas-
sadors gave $13.6 million in campaign money,
Countries of the European Union (German
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013- Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, September
07-25/obama-ambassadors-gave-at-least- 2000).
13-6-million-in-campaign-money. See also: BBC, Wolfe, Robert, Still Lying Abroad? On the
28 June 2013: Should campaign contributors Institution of the Resident Ambassador
become ambassadors? www.bbc.com/news/ (Diplomatic Studies Program, Paper No. 33,
world-us-canada-22894459 University of Leicester, 1997).
20 This evocative metaphor comes from Professor
Dietrich Kappler, former President, DiploFoundation.
REFERENCES
FURTHER READINGS
Copeland, Daryl, Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethink-
American Foreign Service Association, Inside a ing International Relations (Lynne Reiner,
US Embassy, 2nd edition (AFSA, Washington Colorado, US, 2009).
DC, 1996). Dixit, JN, The Indian Foreign Service: History
Barder, Brian, What Diplomats Do: The Life and and Challenge (Konarak, New Delhi, 2005).
Work of Diplomats (Rowman & Littlefield, Rana, Kishan S, Bilateral Diplomacy, DiploFoun-
2014). dation, Malta and Geneva, 2002a).
Berridge, GR, The Resident Ambassador: A Rana, Kishan S, Inside Diplomacy, revised paper-
Death Postponed (Discussion Papers, No. 1, back edition (Manas, New Delhi, 2002b).
Diplomatic Studies Program, Centre for the Rana, Kishan S, The 21st Century Ambassador:
Study of Diplomacy, Leicester, September Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive (Diplo-
1994). Foundation, Malta, 2004; Oxford University
Berridge, GR, Diplomacy: Theory & Practice, Press, New Delhi, 2005).
4th edition (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010). Rana, Kishan S, The Contemporary Embassy:
Eban, Abba, The New Diplomacy (Weidenfeld Paths to Diplomatic Excellence (Palgrave-
& Nicolson, London, 1988). Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013).
House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Rangarajan, LN, The Arthashastra (Penguin,
The Role of the FCO in Government, 7th New Delhi, 1992).
13
Consulates and Consular
Diplomacy
Ana Mar Fernndez Pasarn
Consulates and consular diplomacy refer to approaching consular services as an instru-

different aspects of consular affairs. While ment of foreign policy, reflects this evolution.
the former puts the accent on the definition
and formal description of the consular insti-
tution, the latter focuses on the political
output of consular administrations. THE ORIGINS
This terminological differentiation reflects
a conceptual nuance that has been taking Consulates are an old institution in interna-
shape in consular literature over the years. tional society. Their origins lie in Europe,
Traditionally, the analysis of consulates has well before the emergence of the modern
been the domain of legal and historical stud- state and the creation of resident diplomatic
ies. Whereas international public law has paid services. The fertile ground for their emer-
particular attention to the codification of the gence was not a specific form of political
status, functions and privileges of consuls, organization but rather the flourishing of
historians have traced the origins and the economic activities between territories and
path of sedimentation of the consular institu- the demand for their securitization from the
tion across countries and throughout history. Middle Ages onward (Leira and Neumann,
Contemporary consular studies have incor- 2011).
porated the perspectives of political science Signs of the early consular system can be
and international relations studies, which are found in the figures of the prostatai and the
nowadays less oriented towards pure insti- proxenoi of the ancient Greek city-states. The
tutionalism and more towards public policy former were appointed by Greeks living abroad
analysis. The recent emergence of the con- to act as intermediaries between the colony and
cept of consular diplomacy, which involves local authorities in legal and political matters,
while the latter, who were chosen from among for adjudicating disputes among merchants
the nationals of the receiving state, are consid- and seamen of their nationality residing in
ered to be the ancestors of modern honorary foreign lands. As pointed out by Lee, these
consuls (Lee, 1991; Leira and Neumann, 2011; legal agreements conceding judicial privilege
Nez and Mart, 2009). They were appointed mainly to merchants and seamen of the send-
to look after the interests of the nationals of ing authority predate the modern diplomatic
the Greek sending polity, ensuring, in particu- doctrine and privilege of extraterritorial-
lar, their protection and the promotion of their ity, defined as the exemption from the local
merchandise. The Roman republic created a jurisdiction or the extension of jurisdiction
similar figure, the praetor peregrinus, to serve beyond the borders of the state (Lee, 1991).
as arbitrator in trade disputes between foreign- In addition, consuls were also gradually
ers and Roman citizens. At the time, the term invested with the general mission of safe-
consul, which is of Latin origin, was coined guarding commercial affairs and facilitating
to designate the two elected civil and trade, travel and residence in foreign lands.
military heads of the Republic. The title of Illustratively, from the eleventh century on,
consul survived during the Roman Empire, cities like Genoa, Pisa and Venice started
although consuls were no longer elected but to sign treaties with the Byzantine Empire
appointed by the emperor and their importance that gave them the right to appoint the first
greatly decreased (Leira and Neumann, 2011). European resident consuls in the Eastern
During the Middle Ages, the term con- Mediterranean (Berridge, 2007). In the late
sul came to mean diverse functions that Middle Ages, the practice of appointing con-
developed in the western Mediterranean. The suls in foreign lands also became frequent in
consuls of the sea and consuls of traders Western countries. As noted by Lee (1991),
were respectively on-board magistrates who in the fifteenth century there were Italian con-
accompanied ships and port merchants, who suls residing in England and the Netherlands,
were elected from among their peers and had while English consuls could be found in the
their own business in foreign havens. Both Netherlands and in the Nordic countries.
were invested with certain judicial com- The modern consular institution developed
petences aimed at solving disputes during with the gradual centralization of political
voyages on vessels and among merchants in power and the emergence of the European
foreign lands. modern state in the sixteenth century. The
As mentioned by Leira and Neumann, consolidation of absolute monarchies with
the different meanings gradually merged. mercantilist ambitions in the context of inter-
The distinction between consuls of traders national trade expansion involved increas-
and consuls of the sea became increasingly ing public control over the appointment of
blurred. In addition, the office of consul of consuls and the definition of their role. The
the sea lost most of its practical relevance regulation and professionalization of the con-
with the emergence of the consuls at sea sular office with the exception of honorary
as leaders and judicial chiefs of their mer- consuls under the aegis of state authority
chant compatriots in foreign lands (Leira and involved the attribution of new representative
Neumann, 2011: 234). and political functions. Consuls were con-
The rise of resident overseas consuls came firmed in their responsibility over their com-
in the wake of the crusades. Trade expansion patriots in foreign countries but they were
on the part of the Western seafaring powers in also tasked with the mission of fostering the
the Mediterranean entailed the signing of trea- general interest of the polity and of transmit-
ties with Eastern countries, which expanded ting, in particular, economic and political
consular networks, functions and privileges. information concerning the receiving pol-
Consuls were given exclusive competences ity. This phenomenon of diplomatization
Consulates and Consular Diplomacy 163
of consuls (Nez and Mart, 2009), their China started to accredit consuls one century
transformation into public officers in charge later with the opening of the first Chinese con-
of furthering the states general interests, consulate in Singapore in 1877 (Liping, 2011).
tributed to creating confusion over the limits The prominent role played by consuls as
between their competences and those in the international trade promoters and protec-
hands of diplomats. This was also due to tors started nevertheless to decline with the
the fact that both the diplomatic service and appointment of Economic attachs in the dip-
the consular service, although technically lomatic missions, who assumed the responsi-
differentiated (mostly in Western countries), bility for the promotion of foreign trade and the
were placed under the authority of the same consolidation of commercial actors operating
external administration of the state (see on a global scale. For states and major com-
Chapter 12 in this Handbook). By way of panies, commercial expansion soon became
example, the US Department of State, created too strategic to depend only on the diligence
in 1789, included both sections. There was, of consuls, and the image of consular services
however, a geographical difference between as marginal players and the poor cousin of
embassies and consulates. Whereas the former diplomacy became more familiar. The need
were located in capitals in order to maintain for new economic structures specifically in
relationships with the central government of charge of promoting commercial interests rel-
the receiving country, the latter were placed egated the consular institution to a secondary
in major ports and commercial cities with role. Illustratively, shortly after the adoption
the objective of promoting trade interests. of the Rogers Act of 1924, which involved the
Territorial decentralization was thus one of the merger of the US Consular and Diplomatic
characteristics of the deployment of consular Services into the US Foreign Service, the com-
posts. mercial duties of the consuls were reassigned
The significant development of permanent to the Foreign Commercial Service, which
diplomatic missions relegated the consular was created in 1927 (Hamilton, 2011).
institution to a position of secondary impor- The emergence of new consular tasks under
tance in the eighteenth century. However, the the pressure of globalization restored the role
expansion of commerce and industry in the of consuls at the beginning of the twenty-first
second half of the century allowed consuls century. Such phenomena as increasing flows
to preserve their former standing in the eco- of citizens living or traveling abroad, inter-
nomic domain. Consulates reached the apex of national terrorist threats and natural disasters
their development and recognition in the nine- have led to the prominent role played by con-
teenth century in the wake of the Industrial suls nowadays in visa diplomacy as well as
Revolution and the promotion of Western in the domain of protection and assistance.
trade in the Asiatic and American continents. Illustratively, the 50 Mexican consulates
The European example was soon followed operating in the United States issue about
by Russia and the United States, which also 825,000 passports and 900,000 identification
started to expand their consular networks cards per year (Hernndez Joseph, 2012).
throughout the world during the century. Contemporary consuls have lost their past
Tellingly, by the end of the eighteenth cen- prominence as commercial and jurisdictional
tury, there were 70 US and 34 Russian consu- agents but they have gained importance as
lar posts overseas (Hamilton, 2011; Zonova, interfaces for communication with diaspora
2011). In the case of Russia, it is worth men- and, more generally, as agents of securitiza-
tioning that the consular network expanded tion. This recent shift has been particularly
particularly in the Balkans, a region with size- noticeable in the field of border control and
able Orthodox communities, with 23 Russian the prevention and management of overseas
consulates by the mid nineteenth century. crisis situations.
Key Points of national consular regulations specifying the

status, rights and responsibilities of consuls in
Consulates are an old institution whose origins
the contemporary age (Sen, 1965).
must be located in pre-modern Europe.
As for international codification of the con-
Their emergence is related to the Western
seafaring powers economic expansion in the sular institution, this stems from the Vienna
Mediterranean from the Middle Ages onwards. Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.
The modern consular institution developed with This legal text, which was drafted under the
the centralization of political power in the six- umbrella of the United Nations and had been
teenth century. signed by 177 states by 2014, defines and
Contemporary consuls have gained importance harmonizes in five chapters and 79 articles
as agents of securitization in the fields of visa the principles ruling the establishment and
diplomacy and citizens protection and assistance conduct of consular affairs and, in particular,
the question of the connection between diplo-
matic and consular relations.
In Article 5, the Vienna Convention pro-
INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFICATION vides its own list of consular functions. First
AND EVOLVING PRACTICE are those tasks relatively similar to those
carried out by resident diplomatic missions,
Consuls have enjoyed different statuses and among which consular protection, the promo-
privileges throughout history. They have also tion of commercial, economic and cultural
performed a wide range of functions that have relations and information functions stand out.
evolved according to the development of the Second is the function of consular assistance,
modern state. In legal terms, the consular which consists of assisting nationals of the
office has been regulated by domestic rules sending state during their stay or transit in the
and bilateral treaties for centuries. In this territory of the receiving state in cases of tem-
regard, the Code of Euric, drawn up in Spain porary difficulty, detention, or incarceration,
during the Visigothic period, the Book of the and of facilitating administrative procedures
Consulate of the Sea, a compilation of norms pertaining to repatriation in case of death or
and traditions regulating maritime trade that serious illness. The other main aspects of the
was also issued by the Crown of Aragon in consular function involve such duties as the
Barcelona in the fifteenth century, or the trea- exercise of notary and public register func-
ties of Capitulations that were signed between tions; the supervision of maritime and aerial
the Christian and the Muslim countries since navigation (inspection of vessels or aircraft
the same period, constitute some of the having the nationality of the sending state;
attempts to codify the early functions of the assistance and investigation in the event of
consular institution. Later on, the Industrial incidents); functions of international judicial
Revolution fostered the adoption of the first cooperation such as representing or arranging
bilateral treaties regulating aspects of the appropriate representation for fellow-nation-
specific status of consuls. France and Spain als before the tribunals of the receiving state
inaugurated this practice with the signing of and guaranteeing the preservation of their
the Convention of El Pardo in 1769. States rights; control of migration and travel flows
domestic regulations also developed: The through the issuance of passports to fellow-
French Ordinance of 1781, The Netherlands nationals and the issuance of visas to foreign
Consular Regulations of 1786, the United citizens wishing to travel to the sending state.
States Consular Service Acts of 1792 and Overall, in this contemporary light, the con-
1856, the first Russian Consular Charter of sular function can be defined as the capac-
1820 and the British Consular Advances Act ity of action attributed to the administration
of 1825 represent some of the first examples of the state in the areas mentioned in order
to protect the interests of the individuals and such as massive evacuation of citizens in the
corporate bodies that form part of that state event of major crises caused by political situ-
when in a foreign country. ations or natural disasters, governments have
Consular affairs were marginalized dur- started to engage in mutual cooperation and
ing the twentieth century. Considered to be publicprivate partnerships as a means of
of low intensity in comparison with the high improving their effectiveness as providers of
politics of inter-state diplomacy, diplomacy consular services.
for people was for long somewhat disdained In many regions of the world, especially in
within foreign affairs ministries. Since the Europe and Latin America, consular affairs
beginning of the new millennium, how- have become an exercise of power-sharing and
ever, several phenomena have contributed to pooling of resources. While the classic consu-
reversing this tendency. Consular affairs have lar institution has not disappeared, what we do
gained a new political saliency thanks to a observe is an increasing tendency to resort to
series of overlapping processes. The globali- innovative formulae of collaboration, not only
zation of the economy and the transnation- between states but also between states and
alization of national communities, with the non-state actors in order to deal with the new
corresponding migration pressure, as well as developments arising in international society.
changes in the logics of security due to man- New modes of consular governance
made or natural phenomena such as the inter- include the development of new patterns of
national terrorist threat or large-scale natural intergovernmental consular cooperation,
disasters, have highlighted the strategic role enhanced inter-administrative coordination,
of consular posts overseas. These new vari- the delegation of representation to state and
ables characterizing todays society are the non-state actors and the deployment of IT
main reasons for the shift of consular ser- solutions to move consular administration
vices from the periphery in which they were closer to citizens, while extending, speeding
confined within the external administration of up and facilitating their access to information
the state towards the center of most foreign and consular procedures.
affairs ministries concerns. Interestingly, the
Consular Department of the Russian MFA is
today the largest department of the ministry Key Points
(Zonova, 2011: 187). Increasing pressure on
governments to anticipate and prevent risks Consuls have performed a wide range of func-
and to provide immediate assistance to their tions throughout history.
nationals when threats occur abroad have Until the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963, these tasks had been regu-
renewed consideration for consular affairs
lated by domestic laws and bilateral treaties.
within a context of 24/7 exposure and moni- Under globalization pressure, consulates have
toring of political elites activity by the media. increasingly invested in the deployment of new
Global phenomena have underlined the key modes of governance such as enhanced inter-
role played by consular services in the event of governmental cooperation, publicprivate part-
major transnational crises. Notwithstanding, nerships, or the use of IT solutions in consular
similarly to the contemporary tendencies administrations.
observed in the general design and man-
agement of public policies, globalization
has also highlighted the limits of individual
action in dealing with transnational security CONSULAR COOPERATION
problems. Increasingly aware of the added
value of enhanced coordination and joint Nowadays, consular cooperation, especially
strategies to cope with common problems when developed locally or overseas, has
become a primary strategic instrument. and staying in its territory. In general, this
Different factors and events, especially the function has been regulated on the basis of
security challenges posed by the growingly bilateral treaties. For treaties of trade and
transnational nature of organized crime, navigation, friendship, and those establish-
increasing migrations flows, natural disas- ing specific consular conventions, states
ters, or the fight against international terror- have usually operated on the principle of
ism, have stimulated the rise of consular reciprocity of freedom of entry and exit for
cooperation as a policy tool of securitization. the respective nationals in the other states
The large-scale emergency situations territory (Lee, 1991). In this respect, the visa
that the consular services had to deal with regime has emerged as a low-intensity diplo-
on occasions such as the terrorist attacks in matic instrument: when granting or denying a
the USA of September 2001, the tsunami of visa to a foreign national, a state is indirectly
South-East Asia in 2004, or the Mumbai ter- taking a foreign policy stance with respect to
rorist attacks in 2008 underlined the strategic the state of origin of that citizen.
position of consular officers overseas at a time September 11th substantially elevated
when citizens increasingly travel overseas governments awareness of the importance
and when such phenomena as international of visa policy and, in particular, of local con-
terrorism, natural disasters, or major politi- sular cooperation as a means of administer-
cal crises multiply the potential number of ing internal security abroad. The willingness
situations requiring consular assistance. Yet, to develop stable channels of cooperation in
these events also revealed the weaknesses third countries to prevent illegal immigra-
of governments individual approaches in tion and terrorism has translated into the
major crisis prevention and management. adoption of legal and practical measures,
Traditionally, consular services only regulate prominent among which are the exchange
typical, individual cases and fail to consider of information over criteria used for issuing
exceptional cases, such as natural disasters, visas, verifying applications and preventing
wars or humanitarian crises, affecting large the existence of simultaneous or successive
groups of citizens whose states are not rep- applications.
resented in the third state. This was the case By way of example, in the aftermath
in December 2004, when a large number of of 9/11, the European Union adopted the
states did not have any representation in the Common Consular Instruction in 2002, set-
countries affected by the disaster (Fernndez ting common criteria for the processing of
Pasarn, 2009). Increasing governments applications and the exchange of informa-
awareness about the shortcomings of indi- tion on potential networks of illegal immi-
vidual administrative, financial and human gration. It also published catalogues of best
resources capacities led to the development practices and recommendations aimed at
of enhanced overseas consular cooperation deploying common procedures regarding the
as a means of guaranteeing higher degrees of security of consulate buildings, the comple-
consular protection and assistance to citizens tion of forms, interviews with applicants, the
when they are abroad. detection of forged documents, the function-
Furthermore, consular cooperation has ing of the archives system, or the training of
also developed as part of border security personnel in information technology. In the
policy and thus as an instrument to control United States, in addition to reinforcing inter-
migration flows to or through territories. agency coordination between the Department
Traditionally, the granting of visas has been of Homeland Security and the Bureau of
considered an act of territorial sovereignty Consular Affairs, this latter administration
through which the state has exercised preven- also negotiated fifteen bilateral agreements
tive control over foreign nationals entering (2011 data) with countries for which the
United States has waived visa requirements In the field of consular assistance and
on the sharing of terrorist screening informa- assistance overseas, the delegation of repre-
tion. In doing so, visa policy also ended up sentation has also extended in recent years,
making an indirect contribution to the design although here the practice does not usually
of a foreign policy. go beyond handling civilian crisis manage-
ment operations in exceptional, collective and
temporary circumstances. By way of example,
in 2011, during the Libyan crisis, Hungary
Key Point
made an aircraft available to evacuate 29
Overseas consular cooperation has become a key Romanians, 27 Hungarians, 20 Bulgarians,
policy instrument for dealing with trans-national eight Germans, six Czechs and six other EU
security challenges such as organized crime, and non-EU nationals from Tripoli, with
increasing migratory flows, natural disasters, or the Monitoring and Information Centre of
the fight against international terrorism.
the European Commission co-financing the
operation. Following the European example,
the Andean Community of Nations and the
Mercosur countries plus Bolivia and Chile
DELEGATED REPRESENTATION also adopted agreements on consular coop-
eration and the delegation of representation in
Another practice that has consolidated in third states since 2000.
recent times is the delegation of consular In the case of both visa diplomacy and
representation: the possibility for a state to be civil protection and assistance operations, the
represented in a third country by another rationale behind the delegation of represen-
state even when it is already represented in tation is the willingness to improve the effi-
that third country. These bilateral agreements ciency of consular affairs management and at
among sovereign states are based on an the same time reduce the material, financial
extended practice among Commonwealth and personnel costs associated with a par-
states, especially the smaller ones, who often ticular task. Cost-saving solutions based on
delegated their representative functions to the functional considerations have thus driven the
former imperial power. In general, the chosen change in the workings of consular posts.
state for delegation is the so-called domi- Another innovation that has also devel-
nant consulate by virtue of the number of oped in recent years is the creation of joint
visa applications that it normally deals with, or common consular centers. As Lee points
or its historical ties with the host country or out, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain
with the state represented. and the United States were among the first in
In general, states have been reluctant to inaugurating this kind of multilateral arrange-
see this practice extended, given that it would ments in Oaxaca, Mexico in the 1980s (Lee,
involve a loss of control over migratory flows 1991: 701). The Nordic countries have also
and especially over illegal immigration. being particularly enthusiastic about develop-
Indeed, the delegation of powers means that ing this practice. In the European Union, the
the state taking on the responsibilities must sharing of consular services is more recent.
act with the same degree of diligence that it In Chisinau, Moldova, the consular section
employs, for instance, when processing its of the Embassy of Hungary represents, since
own visas. However, it also means that the 2007, 13 EU member states (Austria, Belgium,
state in question must bear sole responsibility Denmark, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece,
for the evaluation of the risks of illegal immi- Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the
gration. This can generate a basic problem of Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden)
trust that is difficult to overcome. and two non-EU members (Norway and
Switzerland) for the processing of visa appli- and vertical, between consulates and between
cations. As these examples illustrate, this does consulates and foreign affairs ministries, par-
not involve the fusion of states consulates, ticularly as regards visa procedures (applica-
but rather bringing together the consular sections, rejections and issuances). This flow
tions in the same building, which would main- of information aimed at enhancing border
tain their autonomy. In the European Union, security through the identification of for-
France and Germany are the main forces behind eign travelers and detection of forged docu-
these types of initiatives, considered beneficial ments became of crucial importance after
from the standpoint of both efficiency and eco- 9/11. Illustratively, the US Enhanced Border
nomic and security criteria. Centralizing infra- Security Act of 2002 required the inclu-
structures is considered not only to contribute sion of biometrics on all entry documents.
to saving resources but also to improving the In addition, three information pillars of the
security of consular personnel. US consular system were strengthened:
the Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), gathering the data of persons who
Key Points were considered ineligible for visas as well
as those suspected of terrorism or criminal
The delegation of consular representation and the activities; the State Departments intranet,
creation of joint consular centers has increased in which allows high-speed information
recent years. exchange between consular posts on visas,
Cost-saving solutions based on functional con-
updated travel information and citizens reg-
siderations are the main rationale behind these
istration data; and the Consular Consolidated
institutional changes to the map of political
representation abroad. Database (CCD), fed by this intranet, which
These practices are considered beneficial from is the main dataset with consular informa-
the standpoint of both efficiency and economic tion and includes data of US citizens living
and security criteria. and traveling abroad and records of visa
applicants.
The European Union followed the same
path. In 2006, the Visa Information System
NEW TECHNOLOGIES (VIS), which included compulsory biom-
etric elements, was adopted jointly with a
The twenty-first century has also witnessed Community Code on Visas that unified all
the watershed of the telecommunications provisions concerning procedures and con-
revolution. The exercise of the consular func- ditions for the issue of short-stay visas and
tion has been deeply transformed over the transit visas through the territories of mem-
last two decades by the extraordinary upsurge ber states and associated states applying
of IT solutions applied to consular services. the Schengen acquis in full. This regulation
This swift adaptation of consular administra- came into force in April 2010. It applies to
tions to new technologies can be explained nationals of third countries who must be in
by a need for enhanced security, especially possession of a visa when crossing the exter-
after 9/11, and greater efficiency in the face nal borders of the EU, as listed in Regulation
of growing citizens expectations and media (EC) No.539/2001 and periodically amended
scrutiny. since then. It also includes a list of third coun-
The application of informatics solutions tries whose nationals are required to hold an
to consular administration is particularly airport transit visa when passing through the
noticeable in two domains. First of all, it is international transit areas of member states
worth mentioning the increasing automation airports. In the field of protection and assis-
of exchange of information, both horizontal tance, a secure consular-on-line website
(CoOL) for information sharing by EU con- OUTSOURCING OF CONSULAR TASKS

sular authorities was launched, and EU joint
crisis procedures and pilot exercises in third Last but not least, another tendency observed
countries in collaboration with EU delega- in recent years is the increasing outsourcing of
tions were drawn up. less sensitive consular tasks. It could be argued
Second, as well as the above, citizens that the early consular institution inaugurated
access to information via the internet has also to some extent the externalization of consular
been sharply enhanced by the creation of spe- services with the creation of the figure of the
cific websites within MFA homepages, with honorary consuls. Indeed, the logic underlying
information on consular services, country the appointment of honorary consuls, non-
details and travel advice and real-time warn- career consuls and locally appointed consuls,
ings, in addition to the local data delivered whose status was regulated by the Vienna
by sites run by consulates themselves, or by Convention of 1963, conforms to the idea of
the consular section of embassies abroad. delegating the execution of certain consular
In more and more countries like the US or functions to a third party. The added value of
Russia, interactive websites have also been honorary consuls in terms of cost effectiveness
set up that allow citizens to directly process and local business networks and conditions
passport and visa applications online or reg- has expanded their presence in commercial
ister their passage or stay overseas. cities since the second half of the twentieth
Overall, both the quantity and the quality century. Over recent years, in parallel with the
of information and services made available growing tendency to resort to honorary con-
to citizens have spectacularly increased with suls, another practice that has developed is
the arrival of new technologies. So have pub- that of outsourcing administrative consular
lic expectations. Nowadays, populations of tasks to non-state actors, such as administra-
most countries in the developed world expect tive agencies like VSF Global, travel agen-
their governments to facilitate rapid access to cies and tour operators, which process visa
accurate, up-to-date information on consular applications in a given city where the consular
issues. The communications revolution has services have to deal with a particularly high
not, therefore, altered the functions of the con- number of applications, or to call centers man-
suls but rather the way of performing them. aged by private companies in areas that receive
Fast communication is a key aspect of todays a large number of country-specific travel
consular services functioning. It is also what safety and security inquiries. By contracting
people expect, especially in the event of a cri- out these functions, the idea has been to relieve
sis affecting nationals abroad, as they become consular services of less sensitive tasks that
more familiar with the activity of Foreign can be performed by non-consular officers.
Affairs Ministries through the internet. In general, over the past years, consulates
have undergone a deep transformation. This
has been fostered by several phenomena, one
Key Points of which is the growing vulnerability of citi-
zens in the face of unpredictable factors that
In the twenty-first century, the management of can have devastating consequences, such as
consular affairs has been deeply trans-formed by
international terrorism, natural catastrophes,
the development of IT solutions.
The need for enhanced security, especially after
or sudden and serious political crises.
9/11, and greater efficiency in the face of grow- These new coordinates characterizing con-
ing citizens expectations and media scrutiny temporary international society have made
explain the rapid adaptation of consular admin- governmental elites aware of the strategic role
istrations to new technologies. played by consular services within MFAs in
the event of a crisis, in a world in which the Affairs in Diplomacy. Leiden, Boston: Marti-
flow of human beings is on the increase. This nus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 14572.
growing awareness has led to the adoption of Hernndez Joseph, D. (2012) Mexicos concen-
new forms of consular governance, among tration on consular services in the United
which consular cooperation, the delegation States, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,
7 (2): 227236.
of representative tasks to state or non-state
Lee, L.T. (1991) Consular Law and Practice.
actors and the outsourcing of less sensitive Oxford: Clarendon Press.
administrative consular tasks stand out. The Leira, H. and Neumann, I.B. (2011) The many
twentieth century disdained consular diplo- past lives of the consul, in Melissen, J. and
macy as the Cinderella service within MFA. Fernndez, A. (eds), Consular Affairs in
The twenty-first century has restored its role Diplomacy. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
as an agent of securitization both in civil pro- Publishers. pp. 22546.
tection operations and border security policy. Liping, X. (2011) Chinas consular reform and
changes in diplomacy, in Melissen, J. and
Fernndez, A. (eds), Consular Affairs in
Diplomacy. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers. pp. 199224.
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14
The Diplomatic Corps
Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman
The diplomatic corps is a term mainly used to on behalf of their states, usually within cities
refer to the diplomats of different sovereign other than the capital of the state to which
states resident in the capital city of another they are accredited. Practitioners and academ-
sovereign state. It also refers to the diplomats ics alike have neglected the diplomatic corps.
of member states present at the headquarters There exists only one collection of scholarly
of major regional and international organiza- essays devoted exclusively to it (Sharp and
tions. Heads of missions, secretaries, attachs, Wiseman, 2007). Many practitioners would
others with diplomatic functions, and some- regard this as appropriate. In addition to con-
times personnel whose functions are of a fusion over the way the term is used, it also
more technical nature are conventionally increasingly has to compete with the rising
regarded as members of the diplomatic corps use of a broader term the diplomatic com-
(Satow, 1917: 33964). People recognized as munity of which the diplomatic corps
being members of the diplomatic corps enjoy appears as a subset. Nevertheless, the diplo-
certain immunities and privileges, although matic corps remains an important, if elusive,
these are derived from their diplomatic status set of practices by which the international
rather than their membership of the diplo- society of states is constituted.
matic corps. The term is sometimes, and per- The diplomatic corps is generally thought to
haps increasingly, used to refer to the have had its formal origins in fifteenth-century
diplomatic service of a particular state. The Rome where the popes, and especially Pius
practical consequences and possible theoreti- II, developed the practice of summoning the
cal significance of this dual use of the term resident representatives of other polities to be
will be examined below. The diplomatic corps addressed jointly (Mattingly, 1937; Berridge,
has its counterpart in the consular corps, con- 2007). This practice persists in Rome as an
sisting of those engaged in consular activities annual routine (The Holy See, 2014). The papal
diplomatic corps may also be summoned on of a freemasonry of diplomacy based on this

special occasions. Prior to the 1995 Beijing shared interest (Callires, [1716] 1919: 113).
Conference on Women, for example, John Paul However, these translations may be unreliable.
II summoned all 168 ambassadors accredited In 1737, Pecquet refers to le corps des min-
to the Holy See to meet with senior cardi- istres trangers dans une pas. This body of
nals to hear the Vaticans strong anti-abortion diplomats, he argues, forms a kind of inde-
views (Ryall, 2001: 51). It may be surmised pendent society, whose members live among
that groups like the diplomatic corps existed at themselves in an intimacy proportionate to
earlier times and other places wherever the rep- how well their Sovereigns get along. The
resentatives of separate political entities came members of this body are driven by different
together, for example, congresses, coronations, and often opposed interests. However, they
weddings, funerals, games, religious occasions, are bound together by the need for knowledge
and other ceremonial meetings (Cohen, 2013: about the state in which they are residing and
17). It is likely, however, that two developments by the need to defend their community of
were critical to the emergence of the diplomatic privileges, such that the infraction that harms
corps as that idea is currently understood. The one becomes the cause of all (Pecquet [1737]
first was the development of a distinctive, and 2004: 73). By the Vienna Rglement of 1815,
eventually, professional class of diplomats fac- the diplomatic corps has become an established
ing the same set of problems associated with institution requiring a measure of reform and
their work and developing similar understand- regulation regarding the procedures by which
ings of those problems. The second was the its dean (doyen) is determined (Satow, 1917:
establishment of specifically resident missions 339; Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 42). There has
which put such diplomats in daily proximity been no significant institutional change in the
to one another over extended periods of time. formal arrangements of the diplomatic corps
Together, these allowed a sense of collective since 1815 although, as we shall see, the same
identity to emerge between the diplomats of dif- cannot be said in regard to what it does, or the
ferent states at a shared location. The growing general significance which is attributed to it by
number of resident missions and the increased practitioners and students of diplomacy alike.
number and density of interactions between
them also generated new problems which
required some form of collective management. Key Points
We have some evidence of resident mis- The diplomatic corps refers to the diplomats of
sions developing and glimpses of negotiators different sovereign states resident in the capital
enjoying a measure of shared identity and city of another sovereign state.
self-awareness at different times and places in It may also refer to the diplomats of member
the world (Numelin, 1950: 128). The Forest states present at the headquarters of major
Diplomacy of the Iroquois, for example, exhib- regional and international organizations.
its elements of both (Jennings etal., 1985: 99). The consular corps refers to the members of the
However, in the most developed and familiar consular services of different sovereign states
present in a city. A consular corps is more easily
account of the emergence of the diplomatic
identifiable in non-capital cities.
corps, the story begins in Europe between the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1716
(although the book was probably written ear-
lier) Callires noted how the diplomats of dif- THE FORMAL PRACTICES OF THE
ferent sovereigns were bound together by their DIPLOMATIC CORPS
common interest in finding out what is going
on (Callires, [1716] 1983: 113). In some In the formal sense, the principal members of
early translations, he is presented as speaking the diplomatic corps at any capital or
The Diplomatic Corps 173
international organization headquarters are of this sort have been eased by the practice of
the heads of mission. These rarely meet as a separating the deans role as dean from his or
whole except on the occasion of formal state her role as head of mission. The vice deanship
ceremonies necessitated by such occasions has also been used to finesse such difficulties
as the inaugurations and funerals of leaders (Berridge and James, 2003: 272). Departures
or formal addresses by chief executives to from the seniority principle occur in cases of
their legislatures, and in unusual circum- multiple representation when the senior mem-
stances, for example when the immunities ber of the diplomatic corps in one capital is
and privileges of diplomats have been normally resident in another capital, and when
infringed upon by the host government. The the senior diplomat declines the role on per-
main formal differentiation in the diplomatic sonal grounds or because their mission is not
corps is between the dean and the other heads sufficiently resourced to undertake the bur-
of mission. Historically, the question of who dens of the post. Some sources suggest that in
was to be dean was resolved in the context of the past small states would have been unlikely
broader arguments about precedence and to decline this opportunity for honor and pub-
seniority between the leading states of licity, and that their willingness to do so today
Europe, especially Spain and France. General may be indicative of the declining status of
or local power preponderance would settle the diplomatic corps or the increasing bur-
the question. The practice of appointing the dens of work placed on the members of small
papal nuncio as the dean originally reflected missions (Rana, 2007). There were also some
the temporal power of the papacy. Where this difficulties about appointing Commonwealth
practice is maintained today, however, in High Commissioners to the role, only set-
Catholic states and especially in Latin tled when agreement was reached that High
America, it reflects a traditional respect for Commissioners are the functional and sym-
the Holy See, together with a desire to avoid bolic equivalent of ambassadors (Berridge and
precedent and seniority arguments by having James, 2003: 125).
a simple rule (Rana, 2007: 129). The same Deans act as the formal link between the
may be said for the procedure adopted at diplomatic corps and the host government.
Vienna in 1815 by which the longest serving The formal precedence attached to the posi-
senior diplomat is appointed to the position. tion is almost entirely ceremonial and its
There has been some variation between holder is regarded as only the first among
states regarding whether the date of arrival equals (Sofer, 2013: 53). Deans act in the
or, as is more often, the date of accreditation name of the whole diplomatic corps only with
is used for determining seniority in this the consent of their colleagues. In the past,
regard (Satow, 1917: 342). On occasions, a this consent was given only after other ambas-
vice dean or committee of senior diplomats sadors had received special instructions from
has been appointed to assist the dean. their governments that they should support a
The appointment is rarely controversial. deans initiative (Satow, 1917: 340). Deans
In the past, problems might arise when bad generally lack resources other than those pro-
relations or no relations existed between the vided by their own mission or informal assis-
state represented by the dean and another state tance from other missions. In some capitals,
whose ambassador was a member of the dip- records of meetings of the diplomatic corps
lomatic corps. This situation arose, for exam- and the representations of the dean to the
ple, when the representative of the German host government are kept. In others they are
Democratic Republic or the Peoples Republic not, and some diplomats maintain that they
of China was entitled by seniority to be dean but have served in capitals where the corps, in a
before their respective states enjoyed almost formal sense, barely exists and never func-
universal diplomatic recognition. Problems tions (private source). The reasons why the
diplomatic corps exists and the functions it Nevertheless, accounts of diplomats from dif-
performs remain those identified by Berridge ferent missions sharing services and working
as operating at Constantinople in the early together on the most practical of issues exist,
seventeenth century. First, the representatives provided especially by those who have served
of European powers came together for their in such places as North Korea (Hoare, 2007:
own physical security. Second, they collabo- 11621) and Vietnam (Wiseman, 2007: 253).
rated to protect the rights and privileges under The key tasks confronting the formal dip-
the Capitulations granted them by the Sultan. lomatic corps and its dean continue to involve
Third, they collaborated to provide and main- questions of precedence at state ceremonies
tain practical services which they required and protecting the immunities and privileges
in common to function. Fourth, they tended of the members of the diplomatic corps from
to live in the same neighborhood of the city. encroachments intended or otherwise by
Finally, like the Pope in Rome, the Sultan the host government, local authorities, or pri-
in Constantinople often liked to address and vate actors. Questions of protocol have lost
treat the representatives of the European much of their significance. Arguments over
powers as a group (Berridge, 2007: 25). titles and precedence in the arrangements
The issue of security persists. Indeed, it for ceremonial processing and sitting now
has become more important, although physi- rarely delay business for months and never
cal threats to missions increasingly have an lead to wars as they could do in the past.
unofficial character (Wikipedia, 2014). Nevertheless, details of state protocol con-
Nonetheless, Rana notes how members of tinue to take up considerable time, and deans
the diplomatic corps appeared at Beijing air- of diplomatic corps work with host protocol
port to say goodbye to members of the Indian offices to head off misunderstandings and
and Soviet delegations as a gesture of soli- mistakes which may still contribute to diffi-
darity after the latter had been declared per- culties in the personal relations of ambassa-
sonae non gratae during the Great Cultural dors and visiting ministers. Moreover, while
Revolution (Rana, 2007). Red Guards habitu- most senior professionals and politicians will
ally posed a considerable, although not mor- profess a relaxed outlook on questions of
tal, threat to the diplomats of states with protocol today, they often have highly devel-
which China was not in good relations when oped antennae sensitive to perceived slights.
they left the safety of their missions. The It is useful then to have a formal, if archaic-
British embassy in Beijing, for example, was sounding, code of rankings and orderings to
sacked and burned by them in 1967. In con- refer to since it provides a blanket defense for
trast, Ken Taylor, the Canadian ambassador to everybody against concerns of this nature.
Iran during the embassy hostage crisis begin- Ask most contemporary diplomats about
ning in 1979, recalls that the Bulgarian dean what significance, if any, the formal diplo-
of the Teheran diplomatic corps orchestrated matic corps holds for them, however, and they
no formal protest at the extensive violation of will likely refer to its role in safeguarding their
the immunities of diplomats and their mis- immunities and privileges. As noted above,
sions. The maintenance of practical services, these can still be associated with life and
except perhaps in the midst of an exceptional death matters. Typically, however, questions
political breakdown, would no longer appear regarding immunities and privileges espe-
to be a major concern of the diplomatic corps. cially the latter revolve around low key and,
Modern states and capitals can be generally indeed, banal concerns with exemptions from
relied upon to provide these. And for simi- tax regimes, duty free import allowances, and
lar reasons, living in the same neighborhood conduct by the officials of local authorities.
insofar as diplomats continue to do this The days when the diplomatic corps might
would seem to be of diminishing significance. meet to discuss diplomatic asylum and debate
whether it was making international law on the diplomatic corps may impose difficulties on
matter, as it did in Lima in 1867, are long past members of it who are not in formal relations
(Satow, 1917: 291). As one former diplomat with one another when one of them is quali-
expressed it, today the dean of the diplomatic fied to be the dean, as noted above. More
corps may find himself absorbed by trade informally, however, the diplomatic corps
union issues concerning the terms and condi- permits contacts between members whose
tions under which its members carry out their states are not in diplomatic relations. As in the
work (private source). Novelists might have case of USNorth Korean contacts in Beijing
notions of the diplomatic corps as romantic inter alia over the latters nuclear programs,
freemasonry (Rana, 2007: 125). Some diplo- these can on occasions lead to serious negotia-
matic corps may have lived up to this notion tions (Berridge and Gallo, 1999). The formal
in the past when a real esprit de corps existed grouping of ambassadors around deans is mir-
among the aristocrats and high bourgeois who rored by less formal groupings of diplomats of
staffed the European services up to the early other ranks meeting in one case, for example,
twentieth century. The siege of the lega- for monthly luncheons (Rana, 2007: 125).
tions at Peking in 1900 is emblematic in this More obviously, it is possible to identify sub-
regard. The contemporary reality, most diplo- groups of the diplomatic corps organized on a
mats want to assure us, is far more prosaic. regional basis, or because they share member-
Indeed, if Lawrence Durrell is to be believed, ship of an organization, meeting together and
the operations of the diplomatic corps can making sure that they are seen to be doing so.
border on the farcical at times (Durrell, 1957). Thus, an African diplomatic corps and a
Caribbean grouping operate in Washington
DC (Henrikson, 2007: 59). The members of
Key Points the Commonwealth coalesce on occasions,
especially within the diplomatic corps in the
The principal members of the diplomatic corps at capitals of states which are members of these
any capital or international organization head- associations. Members of the old Warsaw Pact
quarters are the heads of mission.
military alliance used to caucus especially in
The dean of the diplomatic corps represents the
the capitals of states which were members of
corps to the host government, usually on practical
matters, but occasionally on questions of policy. NATO, and today the members of the
The processes by which the dean is determined European Union (EU) increasingly seek to
may vary, but it is usually the ambassador who coordinate their positions not only at the level
has been longest in post. of policy formulation in Brussels, but also at
the level of policy implementation and deliv-
ery, especially in states where the EU has
development programs. Less formal group-
THE INFORMAL PRACTICES OF ings can also come together around specific
THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS issues as did the Addis Ababa diplomatic
corps in coordinating the famine relief efforts
The informal aspects of the diplomatic corps of their respective states in the 1980s (private
present a somewhat different story in terms of source). However, these examples raise the
both structure and processes. Deans may have question of whether sub-groupings within a
little or no institutional power, but the power capital city or at an international organization
of personality, sociability, and hard work in headquarters may usefully be regarded as sub-
individual cases may contribute to other diplo- elements of their respective diplomatic corps
mats sense that they are members of some- as opposed to political alignments. The answer
thing beyond their own respective missions in very much depends on what these constella-
a capital city. The formal structure of the tions actually attempt to do.
The Bejing lunch club of second and third THE CONSULTING VS CAUCUSING
secretaries to which Rana refers, engaged in BALANCE
trading information reasonably freely where
key interests were not prejudiced by such Even so, the distinction between informal
exchanges. Wiseman (2007: 253) notes simi- constellations within the diplomatic corps
lar arrangements by which members of the which consult for primarily professional or
Hanoi diplomatic corps at several levels could information-gathering reasons, and caucus-
meet each other due to the flatter than usual ing or collective lobbying of the host govern-
diplomatic hierarchy, a feature common to ment by groups of diplomats to advance a
smaller diplomatic corps. Like the attendees shared policy, is not always easy to make.
at receptions, buffets, and cocktail parties, Consider, for example, the role of EU and
these junior diplomats shared an interest in NATO members of the Skopje diplomatic
finding out what was going on. As Watson corps in the 2001 Macedonian crisis. Senior
notes, all diplomats have had their views ambassadors presented themselves as acting
corrected and amplified by a member of on behalf of an international society into
another embassy which happened to be better which they were attempting to socialize the
informed on a particular issue (Watson, Macedonians. Macedonias full membership
2004: 128, also Berridge, 1994). In addition, of that society, they argued, was conditional
however, members of this informal corps on its government accepting their govern-
share information about their experiences of ments proposals for how to deal with its
what works, what does not, to whom to listen, armed opposition in a civilized way. Many
and how to listen to them in much the same Macedonians, in contrast, viewed the same
way that the members of any other profession process as the product of selfish and ignorant
share information. Members of sub-corps great powers interested only in imposing a
or regional corps engage in similar trading, diktat (Sharp, 2007: 207). It would seem,
facilitated and fueled by the shared elements therefore, that the activities of the diplomatic
of their general interests, identity, experience, corps need not involve every member and
and ways of seeing things. However, it is dif- need not be formal in character, but that their
ficult to describe them as emanations of the objectives need to be of a general nature con-
diplomatic corps when they caucus around tributing to a consensus that those activities
specific policy objectives, especially objec- are for a higher good and transcend narrow
tives which the host government and/or other national interests. It might be added that the
members of the corps might not welcome. more members of the corps are actively
The same conclusion might be drawn where, engaged in supporting a specific action, and
as in the EU case, a major purpose of acting the more clearly this action is directed at con-
together is to give expression to a new actor tributing to the smooth and effective opera-
namely the EU itself. tion of diplomacy in a particular location, the
easier it will be to maintain that it is an action
undertaken on behalf of the diplomatic corps,
Key Points as opposed to a political grouping within it.
The informal powers and influence of the dean
depend on his or her personal qualities. Key Points
The diplomatic corps may provide opportunities
for contacts between the diplomats of states The diplomatic corps may sometimes lobby the
which do not enjoy diplomatic relations. host government on matters of policy.
The diplomatic corps may serve to socialize junior Some members of the diplomatic corps may
diplomats and those new in post. sometimes claim to act for the entire group.
THE GROWTH AND PROLIFERATION undermined the functional justifications for

OF STATES, DIPLOMATIC CORPS, AND the diplomatic corps have, at the same time,
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITIES given a new life to its ceremonial significance
by making the politics of the spectacle more
The structures and processes of the diplo- important. Ceremonies by which the exist-
matic corps may have changed little since ence and the power of the state are enacted
1815. However, the proliferating number of have become easily available to global audi-
sovereign states since World War I has ences for entertainment certainly, and legiti-
entailed a similar proliferation in the number mation possibly. The diplomatic corps, as
of diplomatic corps in existence and an noted above, has had a long-established, if
increase in the size of many individual diplo- poorly understood, role in many of these cer-
matic corps. In addition, the proliferating emonies, both as legitimator of the state con-
number and types of other international actors cerned and of international society itself, as
has given greater currency to the idea of a argued further below.
diplomatic community also present in a capi- The strength of weak ties may help to explain
tal city or international headquarters city. This the capacity of the diplomatic corps to endure
diplomatic community may be viewed as part by hanging on. However, it tells us little about
of the context in which the diplomatic corps the strength of the diplomatic corps in other
operates and, on occasions, as an actor in its terms, notably its capacity to produce or con-
own right. These developments have brought tribute to the production of significant effects.
problems associated with complexity as noted To obtain a clearer picture in these terms
above, but in many of the newer and smaller requires an examination of the inquiries of aca-
states, the diplomatic corps retains much of demics, and international relations theorists in
the character of its past. What has changed, particular, into the practices of diplomacy. It
of course, is the context. The general thrust is conventionally maintained that those who
of this change has called into question the study international relations have not been
importance and significance of the diplomatic interested in diplomacy until recently (Murray,
corps just as it has called into question the 2008; Murray etal., 2011). Diplomatic histo-
entire panoply of state-based diplomacy rians, it is said, have used diplomatic records
anchored in residential missions. If the latter to construct narratives of international history,
may be criticized as a system premised on the while International Relations scholars have
elite values present and the communication ignored diplomacy in their efforts to estab-
technologies available in seventeenth century lish patterns of foreign policy-making and
Europe, then it would seem that the diplo- state behavior. This is not entirely accurate.
matic corps, with its apparently archaic Diplomacy viewed as an instrument of foreign
emphasis on privileges, protocol, and prece- policy making and implementation, or as a
dence, might be one of the more prominent dimension of statecraft, has received consider-
targets for the critics. It has not been, and for able attention, as has negotiation, the defining
at least two possible reasons. First, the diplo- activity (for some) of diplomacy. What have
matic corps seems to exhibit what Granovetter been neglected, however, are insider perspec-
has called in another context the strength of tives of diplomats on their own activity and
weak ties (cited in Sending etal., 2011: 542). their understandings of the broader contexts in
Maintaining it, in this view, incurs few costs which it is situated, together with close analy-
while ending it holds out the prospect of few ses from outside of what diplomats actually
rewards and, hence, the diplomatic corps do and how they do it (Watson, 2004; Sharp,
endures. Second, the information and com- 2009; Neumann, 2012). As a consequence, the
munication revolutions which have arguably diplomatic corps has generally been ignored
as a sub-institution of diplomacy and viewed Studies take the argument a step further. If
as a marginal and possibly obsolescent form there is an international society in the English
of state practice. Schools sense, then where do we actually see
The same sources that speak of diplomacys it? Governments, embassies, diplomats, and
neglect also refer to the revival of a measure border guards in themselves do not constitute
of interest in it in recent years made possible it. Rather, they help constitute the states they
by the development of two related clusters of govern, represent, or protect. We only see the
approaches to theorizing about international international society where the representatives
relations. The first of these revolves around the of states are collectively gathered at, for exam-
English School and Diplomatic Studies, with ple, congresses, conferences, and international
their shared focus on the international society or regional organizations and, on a daily basis,
of states as their analytical point of departure in the diplomatic corps (Sharp and Wiseman,
(Bull, 1977; Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011; 2007). Not only does the diplomatic corps
Buzan, 2014). The second revolves around safeguard the institution of diplomacy, there-
sociological, anthropological, and linguistic fore, it also gives expression to the interna-
investigations of the long-term sources and tional society of states. Nor does it do this
immediate causes of the states system (as passively, simply by existing. The diplomatic
opposed to the consequences of such a sys- corps has its own distinctive understanding of
tem existing), shaped by a broadly critical international relations and how they should
orientation to how social phenomena present be handled which is captured by the notion
themselves (Der Derian, 1987; Constantinou, of la raison de systme in contrast to la rai-
1996; Neumann, 2005, 2012). The two clus- son dtat (Watson, 2004). This telos guides
ters are linked by a shared understanding that the diplomatic corps collective actions in
the relationships between language, ideas, the direction of subordinating the contents of
and actions, and thus between agents and international relations the interests, policies,
structures, are necessarily complex, possibly and issues which preoccupy those represented
ambiguous, and always less clear than they by the diplomats to their conduct. Therefore,
appear. From within both clusters, diplomacy diplomats in capital cities and international
and even the diplomatic corps take on a sali- organization headquarters, acting together as
ence which is not apparent from within other the diplomatic corps, work to avoid misun-
more established approaches to understanding derstandings which might lead to unwanted
and explaining international relations. conflict, to restrain the ambitions of political
For the English School, diplomacy is a leaders (including their own political leaders),
master institution of the international society the aggressive pursuit of which might threaten
of states (Wight, 1986: 113). It is important in peace, and they work to restore peace where
both an explanatory and a constitutive sense. conflict has broken out. Working on behalf of
According to some (Mayall, 2007: 1), while la raison de systme, the diplomatic corps
diplomats undertake much practical work, it is is not a corps in the sense of an elite looking
their symbolic significance taken as a whole after itself. It is a body, to use a literal English
which is vital. This is so because it is the translation of the French, which has substance
institution of diplomacy that translates inter- and acts on its views of how international
national society from a theoretical proposition relations should be conducted. It may act as a
into some kind of practical reality (Mayall, weak force in this regard but, according to pro-
2007: 5). It is the diplomatic corps, by its ponents of Diplomatic Studies, it is an impor-
defense of the immunities and privileges of tant force and a good force which should be
its members, which acts as the guarantor of supported and encouraged in what it seeks to
this sovereign representational role (Mayall, achieve and, perhaps more importantly, what
2007: 5). Those involved in Diplomatic it works to avoid.
That it needs support and encourage- embassies Diplomatic Lists providing the
ment, however, suggests an obvious and names and rank of all accredited diplomats.
difficult problem with this view of the dip- However, the protocol documents of Foreign
lomatic corps. If it is so important, why is it Ministries, while they sometimes mention the
so neglected, even by diplomats themselves diplomatic corps, do not discuss it as a whole,
and those who study them? To be sure, diplo- only in terms of how regulations pertain to its
mats consulted for this chapter were at pains individual missions and members (Australian
to stress the trade union dimension to the Government Department of Foreign Affairs
diplomatic corps. They also noted the very and Trade, 2014). And just as it is possible to
real, but not ubiquitous, sense of camaraderie find International Relations texts which fail
with their colleagues from other diplomatic even to mention diplomacy, it is also possi-
services which can emerge, for example, ble to find authoritative and recent accounts
when one of their number is badly treated by of diplomacy which either completely fail
a host government, or when they are work- to mention the diplomatic corps or note it
ing hard together to produce an agreement or merely in passing (Anderson, 1993; Cooper
create institutionalized measures of coopera- and Shaw, 2009; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2013).
tion. They regarded the role of the diplomatic There is another Janus-faced aspect to
corps as presented by the English School as this puzzle, however. On the one hand, it is
overblown, however, and struggled to grasp hard to square the neglect of the diplomatic
quite what Diplomatic Studies was saying corps by practitioners and scholars alike
about the way the international society of with claims about its importance. Yet on
states is embodied and enacted by the dip- the other, it refuses either to disappear or to
lomatic corps and its functions. In addition transmute into a synonym for the national
to holding this minimalist view of the diplo- diplomatic service completely. It is the more
matic corps, diplomats and academics alike sociological, anthropological, and linguistic
often follow the general publics tendency approaches to international theory and the
(notably in the US) to use the term diplomatic study of diplomacy that help make sense of
corps when they are talking about the diplo- both halves of this puzzle. Regarding the
matic service or foreign service of a particular diplomatic corps/diplomatic service overlap,
state, thus blurring an important distinction they remind us to think of language in terms
(Berridge and James, 2003). Even Satow, on of uses which change, rather than meanings
at least one occasion, uses diplomatic corps which are fixed and true. The ambiguity here,
in this sense (although he always uses dip- therefore, may be seen as evidence of the
lomatic body correctly) (Satow, 1917: 183). currently heterodox character of contempo-
According to Oppenheim, As the Diplomatic rary diplomacy mixing, as it does, elements
Corps is not a body legally constituted it per- of the old gentlemanly or club diplomacy
forms no legal functions, but it is neverthe- with other newly diplomatic agents and prac-
less of great importance, as it watches over tices crowding on to the international stage
the privileges and honours due to diplomatic (Sending et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2013).
envoys (Oppenheim, 1955: 779). The Vienna People misuse the term diplomatic corps
conventions on diplomatic and consular rela- because they are unfamiliar with its proper
tions, together with the unratified New York use, unfamiliar with the idea it represents,
convention on Special Missions and the unrat- and do not find that idea to be important. This
ified Vienna convention on the Representation would conform to the view of traditionalists
of States in their Relations with International in Diplomatic Studies that diplomacy contin-
Organizations of a Universal Character fail to ues to be an esoteric business about which
mention the diplomatic corps (Rana, 2007). ordinary people are doomed to remain igno-
Foreign Ministries publish or distribute to rant. Adding corps after the word diplomatic
really does signify something different from their internal affairs. New actors seek, if not
when corps is added to, for example, the word membership of the diplomatic corps as yet,
army, officer, or peace because, they then to align with it as members of the diplo-
argue, diplomacy is different. Traditionalist matic community to advance their diplomatic
complacency about this state of affairs seems standing. All these are aspects of the rela-
less and less warranted as more and more tional power and influence which the diplo-
people become involved with diplomacy. matic corps possesses, even if others, or some
However, the eliding of the two terms, dip- of its members, seek to co-opt it for their own
lomatic corps and diplomatic service, might purposes. Even then, the professional values
also suggest that people actually do, at some and priorities of its immediate membership
level, regard the diplomats of their own state the diplomats exert a restraining influence
as part of a general category of diplomats or on the ways in which it may be exploited. A
international society clique as Hitler called diplomatic corps might be mobilized to pres-
them. If so, this might be taken as evidence of sure its host government when sufficient inter-
a door which is slightly open to systemic or national consensus exists about what is being
even cosmopolitan thinking about diplomacy attempted, as we have already seen in Skopje
in peoples consciousness a door which in 2001 for example. It could not be mobilized
might be pushed open wider through argu- in the absence of this consensus, for example
ment and reflection (Constantinou, 2013). in Baghdad prior to the second American-
These alternative and emerging approaches led invasion of Iraq in 2003, in Damascus
are also useful in thinking about the problem to get the Assad regime to negotiate with its
of the diplomatic corps apparent lack of opponents, or in Moscow to get the Russians
ability to produce effects. A standard power to suspend their assistance to pro-Russian
analysis, of course, reveals its weakness. Ukrainians in 2014.
The diplomatic corps lacks the hard power
resources of guns and money. It also lacks the
soft power resources of being attractive or, Key Points
more importantly, presenting itself as attrac-
tive. Both hard and soft power resources, Diplomatic corps have proliferated with growth
conventionally understood, are distributed in the number of sovereign states since the end
among the individual states which members of the Cold War.
International theorists note the significance of
of the diplomatic corps represent. Yet as with
diplomatic corps as rare tangible expressions of
Evans-Pritchards Leopard Skin Chief who international society.
brokered deals among the Nuer tribes of Diplomats value diplomatic corps for their formal
the Nile Valley, Neumann (2011: 571) notes role in safeguarding their working conditions and
that a lack of power may serve as a source their informal role as agents of socialization.
of strength in certain situations for it helps
convey neutrality and disinterest in particu-
lar policy outcomes. For a variety of reasons,
people find the idea of the diplomatic corps FROM DIPLOMATIC CORPS TO
both useful and, up to a point, necessary. DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITIES
Governments want witnesses from their fel-
lows to their state ceremonies. Diplomats While these theoretical approaches may
may seek the legitimacy its support confers re-signify the relational and rhetorical power
when they make dmarches to their host gov- of the diplomatic corps, however, their focus
ernments. States and peoples may present it on the heterogeneity and hybridity of the
as the source or point of focus of their prob- contemporary international system raises
lems when others are seen to be interfering in questions about the membership of the corps.
How does the range of new actors and new often only initially in its consular form. Thus,
types of actors engaged in international and while a Google search for diplomatic corps
diplomatic activity affect the composition of reveals very little besides the occasional
the diplomatic corps, what it does, and its news item, academic treatments of the insti-
claim to help enact, embody, and constitute tution, and a host of references to a popular
international society? The formal composi- board game, a similar search for consular
tion of the diplomatic corps has not yet corps reveals the websites of several US-based
changed, but it may be beginning to do so. consular corps. The Oregon Consular Corps,
The presence of traditional fringe players for example, maintains a website which lists a
like the Holy See and the Sovereign Military dean, a vice dean, a treasurer, and past deans,
Order of Malta is being re-visited and re- all of whom are honorary consuls (Oregon
interpreted in terms of the precedent it might Consular Corps, 2014). Similar websites exist
set for other non-traditional members (Btora for the large consular corps in Los Angeles,
and Hynek, 2014). The emergence of the which lists as one of its objectives fostering
European Union as an international actor an esprit de corps among its members
with its own diplomatic service and claims to (LA Consular Corps, 2014) and, elsewhere,
representation is actually challenging the the Consular and Honorary Consular Corps
established membership rules in many capi- of the Lebanon (Consular Corps, 2014). Of
tal cities (Adler-Nissen, 2014). And, as noted course, this development also reflects the
above, it is becoming easier and more intui- rising status of consular issues in relation to
tive to analyze not the diplomatic corps in a more traditional security and political issues
capital city or international headquarters city, in the diplomatic systems of most states
but the diplomatic community of which it (see Chapter 13 in this Handbook).
increasingly appears to be a part (Henrikson, Furthermore, given this new focus on consu-
2007; Sharp and Wiseman, 2007). The diplo- lar issues, which includes low-politics trade
matic community is a broader site for action and economic matters, it may well be that the
and, on occasions, a broader actor than the idea of community will take hold sooner in
diplomatic corps, involving many more par- consular cities than in diplomatic capitals.
ticipants besides the representatives of sover- Moreover, while diplomatic corps worldwide
eign states as in Kigali in the early phases of may be seen as having a relatively thick
the Rwanda genocide (Leader, 2007). It social fabric within a clearly identifiable
dilutes the significance of the corps, cer- and well-developed diplomatic culture,
tainly, blurring the boundaries between state the emerging diplomatic communities that
and non-state actors, and public and private we are conceptualizing currently have a thin
actors, and weakening the obstacles to the social fabric. With the possible exception of
latter actor in each pairing engaging in diplo- new artificial capitals where diplomacy is the
macy. However, the flow is not entirely in only business in town Abuja, Brasilia,
one direction, for what we see is not the ero- Canberra, Naypyidaw the evidence implies
sion of diplomacy and its institutions by the a historical trend away from the more exclu-
rise of traditionally non-diplomatic actors, sive diplomatic corps and more towards the
but the gravitation of the latter towards diplo- more inclusive diplomatic communities.
macy as Wiseman (2015: 13) suggests is The diplomatic corps retains many diverse
happening, for example, at the United features and functions which it is reasonable
Nations. Transnational businesses and banks, to suppose would be found in any situation
humanitarian organizations, religious groups, where relations are undertaken between
and sometimes even individuals seek diplo- separate peoples by representatives engaged
matic standing to varying degrees, indeed to in what we would recognize as diplomacy
become members of the diplomatic corps, if (Sharp, 2009). It also retains many of the
features and functions of the particular sys- micro-practices (Gotlieb, 1991; Shaw, 2006).
tem of modern diplomacy which emerged in It can also lie dormant until someone seeks to
Europe, and perhaps of the broadly Christian summon it up as a vehicle for exerting pressure
understanding of the world which, arguably, on a host government to conform its actions
continues to underwrite key elements of that to the demands of world opinion and, less
system. Consider, for example, the reasons often, when a government or its people seek
for the variations, referred to above, in how a target so they can push back against the
the deanship is determined in different places. rest of the world. In terms of its future, the
The diplomatic corps appears as a trade union most important questions revolve around
or lobbying organization on behalf of its the relationship between the diplomatic corps
members, and as an ensemble through which and the diplomatic community. Is the former
the international society of states is enacted. in danger of being swamped by the latter, or
The symbolic significance of the latter, does the desire of new actors and new types
however, ensures that even trade union con- of actors to become diplomatic suggest that
cerns with terms and conditions can generate a process of co-option of the community by
international political conflict on occasions. the corps is getting underway? If the latter,
Diplomats are not just unionized workers, and then it will be important for new actors to
their host governments are not their bosses, realize that becoming diplomatic is not
and not even their contractual partners in any merely a matter of status, but also a manner
simple sense. But the diplomats can certainly of conduct. This being so, the traditional
be characterized as an epistemic community role of the diplomatic corps as an agent of
of professionals (Davis Cross, 2007). And socialization and education for its own may
while diplomats do not lobby to be assigned be poised to undergo a dramatic expansion.
by their Foreign Ministry to the Washington
DC diplomatic corps per se, but rather to
Washington DC, they instinctively know that Key Points
part of the attraction of the US political capi-
Diplomatic corps persist although with less sig-
tal is the presence of a diplomatic corps filled
nificance than formerly.
with the best of every countrys diplomatic The presence of diplomatic corps is overshad-
service, a corps that operates within a wider owed by the rising significance of the diplomatic
community of think tanks, lobbyists, and major community composed of both state and non-
international organizations and that signifies state actors.
the USs evolving world standing. In short, The rise of the diplomatic community may
the historical rise of the US as a world power strengthen the diplomatic corps trade union
has been reflected in the status attributed by function and weaken its claim to represent inter-
diplomats to a Washington posting. In fact, national society in a capital.
this idea has extended to the dean of the dip-
lomatic corps (for an early telling illustration
of this point, see A Veteran Diplomat, 1910).
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15
Diplomacy and International Law
David Clinton
Diplomacy may be considered a means of car- system.3 Both survive the vicissitudes of inter-
rying on the business of international society national life because states (and other aspiring
through negotiation, communication and rep- members of international society) want and
resentation.1 International law may be consid- need the smoothing out of rough passages in
ered a means of regularizing the conduct of their relations, and have learned through expe-
this business through the definition, accept- rience that diplomacy and international law, in
ance and, occasionally, enforcement of gen- their different ways, can perform just this role.
eral principles governing the interactions of Still, the relationship between the two is not
entities accorded an international personality. an uncomplicated one, and current changes in
Both seem to have been present in some vari- international relations may have significant
ant in so many international systems through consequences for the role that they play, sepa-
history that it is easy to take for granted the rately and together.
assumption that they are automatically paired
in organized international life. Yet scholarship
indicates that one or both have been present
only in an attenuated form or in a form very DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
different from contemporary conceptions and LAW: CO-CREATED
institutions, in some international systems
marked by durability and renown.2 Both It is certainly true that, despite the near-
diplomacy and international law are central universality of some form of diplomatic
components of the contemporary global inter- contacts wherever there have been political or
national system, however, and both have been other entities that could not or did not wish to
identified by Hedley Bull as central elements ignore one anothers existence, that had
in the preservation of order within that business of one sort or another to transact with
one another, and that recognized no What these players did in one area of inter-
authoritative common superior over them all,4 national life had effects on other areas, and so
and despite the fact that the contemporary it was in the complementary relation between
body of international law has long historical diplomacy and international law. The per-
antecedents that can be traced back at least as ceived advantages of what Wight described
far as the jurisprudence of Rome and the as the master-institution of diplomacy, the
ethical codes of the ancient Hindu world, the resident envoy, were accompanied by a host
idea that both diplomacy and international law of irritants and conflicts caused by the long-
are means of both governing and softening the term residence of subjects of one prince in
relations among juridically equal political the capital of another. Since rulers quickly
communities lacking a universal head is one discovered that they could not claim respect
that draws heavily on the conception of for the persons and property of their diplo-
international life that has governed first matic envoys abroad while mistreating in
Europe and later the world since the rise of the their own realm the representatives of other
sovereign state. Both, in other words, take on sovereigns, shared self-interest produced
some Westphalian characteristics, which increasingly detailed common rules on the
might not have been found in earlier examples rights and duties of diplomatic personnel (see
of either legal codes or efforts at negotiation. Chapter 16 in this Handbook). The very needs
Even in an international environment without of successful diplomacy therefore created
a supreme political authority, the idea that the a new body of international law that in turn
players would all have the complete political regulated the conduct of diplomats, and this
power summed up in sovereignty lies at one long before the negotiation of international
end of a spectrum along which political conventions turning these regulations from
control can be more or less dispersed.5 customary law into codified treaty law. The
In this world of political entities, each of same process took place in the establishment
which theoretically has unchallenged control of treaties and conventions on other subjects
over its territory, but all of which are con- it was diplomacy, in the negotiation of these
stantly thrown together by the coinciding and legally binding agreements, that created and
clashing interests that geographic proximity, elaborated international law. Such diplomatic
trade, migration and unifying or unwelcome efforts also hammered out the charters of an
cultural influences create, the practices rec- increasing number of international organiza-
ognizable as contemporary diplomacy and tions, both general and specialized, and these
international law grew up. It was never an institutions in turn became the venues not
uncontestable assumption that it was per- only for a new parliamentary diplomacy of
fectly clear who the subjects of international resolutions, debates and votes in public are-
law and the legitimate practitioners of diplo- nas but also for a traditional diplomacy of
macy were, and that a recognizable line sepa- private talks and bargaining in the corridors
rated them from those who were not players and anterooms of the buildings constructed
of the game, but a Westphalian world made to house international quasi-parliamentary
the assumption close enough to the truth for bodies.
the status of a subject rather than an object of This gradual development of diplomacy
international law to be a widely desired one. and international law as institutions and
That status tended to coincide with recogni- practices that regulated and moderated the
tion as a political authority with the right to contacts among equal sovereign political
participate in the diplomatic practices of the communities did not, of course, proceed in a
day, and increasingly it was authorities recog- smooth and unbroken ascent from unlimited
nized as states that occupied this sought-after conflict to peaceful cooperation. Periodic
rank. war disrupted the functioning of both, even
Diplomacy and International Law 187
if it has never been true that in war either the when the leaders of states perceive that they
laws or diplomatic expectations were entirely are facing existential crises, and so states
silent. Moreover, when the participants in have sometimes employed their sovereignty
international life have divided, not only over to contend that they have a higher duty to
rivalries concerning material objectives that their people than to the practices of either
could potentially be compromised, but more diplomacy or international law.
fundamentally over the basic precepts of
political life over the definition of the good
life within each regime then, even if there
was not ongoing overt military conflict, these DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
basic differences have often led to open vio- LAW: COMPETITORS
lations of the most widely endorsed precepts
of law and diplomacy. Their common histori- Despite their common origins, diplomacy
cal trajectory has therefore been a jagged one, and international law have often been seen as
marked by breaks and discontinuities and by being in some tension, because of differences
painful efforts to recover. Taking the long his- in their methods and in the assumptions
torical view, one might be as impressed by about international society that have been
the fragility of diplomacy and international attributed to them. Adherents of a view of
law as by their resilience.6 international politics that emphasizes the role
Yet despite the fact that war and the dif- of bargaining over interests and the necessity
ferences leading to war can be the enemy of of taking differentials in power into account
both diplomacy and international law, it is have often claimed that traditional confiden-
also the case that both these limitations on tial diplomacy among experienced profes-
the complete freedom of action of states can sionals performs this task most effectively,
continue to perform their functions during with the consequent benefit of making it most
war, especially during wars that are not wars likely that peace can be preserved. By con-
over principles such as those of the French trast, they say, when international contact
Revolution. That diplomacy and international becomes consumed with creating and then
law can survive the storms of international applying standing rules for international life,
life and indeed have developed elaborate with the fixity and durability of laws, interna-
rules applicable to such disruptions of peace tional society becomes rigid and unable to
indicates that neither aspect of international cope with change, making conflict more
life is only a restriction upon states, thwart- likely. E.H. Carr gave the classic statement of
ing their capacity fully to pursue their self- this point of view when he compared interna-
interest. Rather, both international law and tional legal institutions to judges handing
diplomacy exist because states have created down decisions divorced from the needs and
them (or in the case of some rules of inter- capacities of the parties involved, and diplo-
national law recognized their inherent valid- mats to law-makers alive to the dynamic
ity) out of a recognition that they advance the contest for power that underlies all particular
interests of states interests that cannot be disputes. Quoting Bernard Shaw, Carr
fully served in a world lacking regularized remarked, the functions of judge and legisla-
channels of communication and dispute reso- tor are mutually exclusive: the former must
lution on which states can rely. States benefit ignore every interest, the latter take every
from both modes of interaction, and so they interest into account.7 In a related but some-
have consistently recurred in the relations of what different line of concern, Morgenthau
states, even after tensions in those relations worried that the publicity associated with that
have impaired them; states also chafe against other form of the legalization of international
the restraints of both modes, particularly politics, the quasi-parliamentary international
organization, exacerbated disputes by encour- diplomacy. The impartiality of law would

aging each party to frame its demands in the generate support from public opinion, which
most extreme form possible, which it declined in turn would require governments to abide
to compromise for fear of being attacked at by the rulings of international judicial bodies;
home for relinquishing what it had previously there would be no need for the grubbiness of
declared was vital.8 diplomatic haggling or the problematic resort
Meanwhile, advocates of a more prominent to force required by the theory of collective
place for law in international life have tended security.
to object to the very concern of diplomacy More recently, Michael Akehurst has
with interests and power as compromising identified several reasons why states may
justice, while they have contended that the prefer negotiation over resorting to judicial
impartial standards of international law have mechanisms, whether those might be referral
more fully embodied justice. In the interwar to the United National Security Council,
period, Nicholas Murray Butler, a promi- a request for arbitration or mediation, or
nent supporter of increasing the authority the filing of a claim before an international
of international legal institutions supported court. The governments of states may well
by internationalist public opinion, criticized be reluctant to be placed in the position
the debates and negotiations that went on of the defendant in an international dock,
under the auspices of the League of Nations as opposed to the position of legal and
as overly political and suggested instead that psychological equality in which the parties
the focus of international reform should be on to a diplomatic negotiation can be conceived
the Permanent Court of International Justice to be. Governments are often risk-averse,
and on adding to the body of international and they may fear the unpredictability of
law that the court would apply. In a state- arbitral or judicial decisions, particularly as
ment issued to the New York Times in 1925, courts depart from black-letter treaty law
for example, Butler emphasized what he saw and base their decisions on standards such as
as the non-political and humanitarian work jus cogens. The perceived danger of judicial
of the League, pointing to the field of public unpredictability increases as governments
health, to the work of the League in maintain- reflect on the fact that the decision may
ing statistical and other records on a number well not only be binding in the immediate
of questions of public policy, and to the cleri- instance but also serve as a precedent in
cal role of the League in registering all trea- the future. The consequence is that to start
ties and conventions, thereby curtailing the judicial proceedings against another state is
influence of secret diplomacy.9 Seven years sometimes [itself] regarded as an unfriendly
earlier he had indicated where he believed act.11
the emphasis of international reform should To sum up, international law may seem
lie: to lay stress upon the power and author- most incompatible with diplomacy when
ity of a single international judicial author- law is considered through the Austinian lens
ity, and to accustom the public opinion of the of the enforceable command of a sovereign.
world to seek and to defer to the findings of If this is the defining characteristic of law,
such authority.10 In this view, then, interna- then law is by definition impossible to find
tional organizations gave excessive scope to in a realm open to the practice of diplomacy,
the machinations of diplomacy, which would which rests on persuasion, representation,
result only in further wars, while international and coexistence among entities who lack
law proper, along with its attendant insti- such a central authority among themselves. If
tutions like courts, would be successful in one takes the concept of law propounded by
promoting peace precisely to the extent that H.L.A. Hart, on the other hand its authority
it resolved disputes in a way that was unlike resting on the legitimacy of the entity laying
it down then international law and diplo- of the broader society. Perhaps because they
macy appear much more similar, for both are guilds, each may be tempted to under-
would rely on the legitimacy granted to their value the importance of the other though
institutions and defining presuppositions by this tendency seems to be more common
those who participate in them and accept among outside observers, academicians, and
them as rightful social practices. political leaders than among diplomats and
international lawyers themselves. (An amus-
ing but not always reliable exception to this
rule may be Callieres warning that a judge
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL does not make a good diplomat, for his habit
LAW: COMPLEMENTARY of giving judgment makes him assume an
air of gravity and superiority, which renders
For all these ways in which diplomacy and him ordinarily of a less flexible temper, of a
international law can be in tension, there more difficult access, and of a less engaging
have also been those who have argued that carriage, than are commonly courtiers, who
they can exist side by side. It is worth noting, know how to please the officials to whose
after all, that Satows classic work on diplo- court they are dispatched.14)
matic practice first appeared in a series enti- Diplomacy and international law are alike
tled Contributions to International Law and as well in that international organizations
Diplomacy, an indication that to the editor may employ experts in both. It is a rare
of the series (the renowned scholar of inter- agency of the United Nations or other inter-
national law Lassa Oppenheim), at least, the national institution that does not contain a
two activities had enough in common to legal staff that can advise it on the powers
make intelligible a series devoted to both.12 granted to it under its founding charter, on
Oppenheimss reference to diplomatists the precedents that exist in any particular
reminds the reader that both international case, and on the most effective legal argu-
law and (at least professional) diplomacy ments that can be made on behalf of whatever
produce a cadre of skilled practitioners course of action is preferred by the officers
who can form epistemic communities with and staff of the organization. Likewise, in
their counterparts abroad. Both can, in other the ranks of officials in intergovernmental
words, develop into guilds, which can have organizations (IGOs) former diplomats of
both beneficial and baneful consequences. member states are well represented, includ-
A common professional language and coming their top-most leaders; every person
mon habits of mind, along with adherence to who has served as Secretary-General of the
common forms, can improve communica- United Nations has had a background that
tion and make the resolution of differences, included service as a professional diplomat
even outside the formal institutions of law or Foreign Minister.
and diplomacy, speedier, more effective, and Turning from the personnel to the activities
more amicable than might be the case if the involved, both diplomacy and international
letter of the law or the formal machinery of law are considered by Bull to be primary insti-
diplomacy were not oiled by personal trust tutions of international order, with the former
and professional courtesy.13 On the other having the functions of facilitating commu-
hand, self-identification as a professional can nication, negotiating agreements, gathering
also encourage an attitude of exclusivity that intelligence, minimizing the effects of fric-
resists directives from responsible (but not tion, and symbolizing the existence of the
professional) political leaders and underval- society of states and the latter having the
ues the contributions to international order functions of identifying, as the supreme nor-
that can be made by interested representatives mative principle of the political organization
of mankind, the idea of a society of sovereign rationalist, and revolutionist but he appears
states, stating the basic rules of coexistence to devote more attention to the rationalist
among these states, and helping to mobilise appreciation for and theorization about plu-
compliance with the rules of international rality in international life (the special concern
society.15 It will be seen that these two sets of the rationalists) than he does to either of
of contributions to international order have a the other two traditions.16 In this conception,
large area of overlap, particularly in the cen- then, diplomacy and international law stand
tral task of recognizing the fundamental nature side by side in performing distinct but com-
of international politics as existing among plementary tasks for international society, but
juridical equals who lack a shared superior their primary area of overlap may lie in the
but nevertheless must regulate the dealings fact that they both symbolize the high degree
among themselves that they wish to under- of society that exists in international rela-
take or cannot avoid. The particular ways in tions. Plural but cooperative this seems to
which each institution of order regulates these be the nature of the international realm when
interactions differ, but, as Bull identifies them, diplomacy and international law play a large
they do not conflict; there is nothing in either role within it.
list that would prevent states from entering
into participation in both. Moreover, in their
employment of both, states implicitly recog-
nize a high degree of society among them- DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
selves a recognition that is based on more LAW: MUTUALLY REINFORCING
than resigned acceptance of the impossibility
of destroying other states or absorbing them In some interpretations, diplomacy and inter-
into a single cooperative project, but asserts national law do more than remain shoulder to
a real good to be served by plurality in inter- shoulder in representing and thereby strength-
national life. When those claiming to speak ening international society; each can assist
for ISIL put forward the goal of destroying the smooth functioning of the other.
existing states and replacing them with a International law in the form of the UN
supranational entity dedicated to the tenets of Charter makes use of diplomacy as an alter-
Islam, this is not the sort of cooperation that native to war. In his analysis of what he calls
appeals to others. Violence and terror may be a constitution for the world community,
used to coerce the recalcitrant. On the other Eugene Rostow suggests that all societies
hand, the mind-numbingly complex and pro- ordered by law are necessarily pluralist:
tracted multilateral rounds of negotiations only a wide dispersal of influence and author-
that have proceeded under GATT and now ity can protect them from the risks of
the World Trade Organization demonstrate lawless power. As the pluralist society par
the painstaking work of diplomacy as the excellence, international society has pro-
players haggle, bargain, bluff, and compro- vided itself with law, and this law in turn
mise in the search for a new set of rules gov- relies on that other pluralist institution, diplo-
erning international commerce that will be macy, as it seeks to deter and to resolve con-
acceptable to each government with its own flict. For the first aim of preventing conflict,
economic interests in mind. Plurality requires the Charter contemplates that the political,
diplomacy and results in addition to interna- economic, and social goals of the instrument
tional law. be sought by persuasion, diplomacy, and
Bulls mentor, Martin Wight, discusses other means of peaceful international coop-
international law and diplomacy as they eration, and not through the use of force.
would be understood and employed by adher- Here one sees the reappearance of those
ents of all three of his traditions realist, humanitarian and reformist tasks that Butler
thought were the primary contribution of the instance of true diplomacy, then its status
League, accompanied by a recognition that as legal seems settled as a matter of practice,
these goals, because they must be accepted even if not according to a strict reading of the
and pursued by a number of independent UN Charters prohibition on the threat or use
political communities with varying interests of force. If every movement of armed forces
and conceptions of the good, are necessarily intended to send a message of deterrence or
political, requiring the employment of the compellence were to be considered as con-
politically pluralist institution of diplomacy. travening the Charter, then diplomacy and
Far from being at odds with law, diplomacy international law would indeed be at cross-
is here at the service of international law. purposes. In fact, attitudes toward the Charter
Rostow also recognizes that at times the appear relaxed enough to allow the practice
effort to avoid war may fail, and on these of coercive diplomacy to go on. In the sec-
occasions too he argues that the Charter ond decade of the twenty-first century, for
envisages the resort to diplomacy as one of example, both Russia in its employment of
the bows in the quiver of those attempting to armed force to absorb Crimea and its support
resist and defeat aggression or other viola- for insurgent forces in eastern Ukraine and
tions of international law. When the Security NATO in its training exercises on the ter-
Council is unable to function, he states a ritory of the Baltic states apprehensive that
not infrequent occurrence during the Cold they could come under pressure resorted
War, when he was writing the vindication to coercive diplomacy. Each criticized the
of the Charter is left to the efficacy of actions of the other as inconsistent with inter-
individual or collective self-defense: that is, national law, but neither seemed able to mus-
to trial by battle, supplemented by the per- ter an overwhelming majority of the members
suasive and mediating influence of diplo- of international society to take actions that
macy and public opinion.17 Rostow here would support the view that a breach of inter-
seems to make of diplomacy something more national law dangerous to the whole society
than a neutral instrument available to any of states had occurred. Coercive diplomacy
member of international society to employ it revealed the limits of what was considered to
in any way that that party finds desirable. be undeniable, enforceable international law;
Diplomacy in this view assumes a substan- it helped to define international law. Adam
tive content in that it takes its character from Watson has called this activity indicating the
the lineaments of international society, which limits of the possible identifying the views
is naturally ordered to peaceful interchange on legitimate conduct held by something like
among the members of a pluralist world, and a consensus of the recognized entities prac-
hostile to those who attempt by force or fraud tising diplomacy and subject to international
to subvert the pluralist nature of the society law, and thereby demonstrating just how far
of states. Nevertheless, it remains distinct international law extended.19 If it is an advan-
from battle as more persuasive than coer- tage to international law that the members of
cive, more mediating than imperative. In international society have an accurate under-
those qualities, it is more similar to interna- standing of its bounds, then such episodes of
tional law than to war. testing and response do in fact constitute a
Of course, there is an extensive literature service to the international legal regime.
on coercive diplomacy that is reliant pre- If diplomacy can thus benefit international
cisely on the sending of messages through law, international law can return the favour by
the threat or use of armed force.18 Even in strengthening diplomacy. One obvious way
this realm, however, international law and in which international law aids diplomacy is
diplomacy appear to have made their peace. the widely-held opinion that having the law
If one accepts coercive diplomacy as an on ones side is a diplomatic advantage.
Andrew Jacovides, who served in the dip- interpretations, it brings other states to adopt
lomatic service of Cyprus in many capitals, similar understandings of international law.
has argued that the leaders of states wish to International law is thereby changed by the
be seen as law-abiding. The vast majority practice of diplomacy, because law follows
of States ordinarily observe their obligations from behaviour rather than leading it.21
under international law, even if motivated Diplomacy therefore serves as one dynamic
only by enlightened self-interest, he con- for change in international law the very
tended. And even when they do not observe dynamism that Carr thought that politics,
such obligations, they tend to attempt to negotiations, and diplomacy possessed and
justify their actions or omissions by invok- law lacked.22
ing legal arguments, however contrived, This deep interpenetration of law and
rather than admit their [sic] such actions or diplomacy makes clear the high degree to
omissions violate the relevant rules of inter- which the supposedly free-wheeling practice
national law. Elsewhere he went further, of diplomacy has been made the subject of
declaring that international law was more detailed international law, both customary
than a convenient cover for policies perhaps and positive. Michael Hardy has given us a
determined for other reasons that the legal likely explanation for this reliance of diplo-
staffs of foreign ministries did in fact play mats on international law: a desire to avoid
a substantial part when policy was being unnecessary trouble.
decided: in my own experience the rules
Diplomatic relations are regulated by law for the
of international law played a very substan- same reason as many other branches of human
tial role, [in] that the principles and rules activity, namely from a general recognition that
of international law frequently provided the only by so doing can affairs be conducted smoothly.
framework in which diplomatic negotiations, The foundation of diplomatic law lies accordingly
in the desire of States that their diplomatic rela-
arguments and positions were formulated.20
tions should function on a stable and orderly
Jacovides recalls that diplomats tend basis.23
to assume that being perceived as the law-
abiding party under existing international Perhaps the best-known example of this legal
law strengthens ones hand in negotiations regulation may be found in the Vienna
and before public opinion, and act accord- Convention on Diplomatic Relations and its
ingly. Ian Hurd takes this observation a step counterpart on consular relations, which in
further in declaring that diplomatic inter- 1961 translated into treaty law what had long
changes can invoke international rules, been governed by customary law. Diplomatic
provide interpretations of behaviour and immunity and the rights, privileges and
of rules, and construct arguments using the duties of diplomats and their families and
resources of public international law and in staffs are, however, far from the only subject
so doing produce the public, social, and legal on which a body of international legal rules
resources with which future state behaviour has developed. The opening of diplomatic
is understood, justified, and argued over. relations and the granting or withholding of
That is to say, in relying on international law diplomatic recognition, the organization and
and in seeking to justify their actions under procedures of international conferences, dip-
international law, states make arguments to lomatic protocol, the conduct of business by
other participants in international society foreign ministries, and the institutions of the
based on interpretations of law. If their dip- UN system have all been made part of inter-
lomatic gambits are successful, this outcome national law.24 What once might have been
not only gains them the objective for which the occasion for angry dispute and even vio-
they were striving in the immediate instance; lence is now (usually) governed by reference
in demonstrating the effectiveness of such to generally accepted standards of law,
supported by the shared self-interest of this capacity must exist over time, so as to be
(most) parties; diplomacy has been calmed able to look ahead to make promises about
by international law. the future, and to be held responsible for
commitments made by their representatives
in the past. International law is such a set of
rules, and because they are in the main
observed, they give a pattern of conformity
CONCLUSION: SHARED CHALLENGES and thus a sense of predictability to the way
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND in which states and other organizations
DIPLOMACY such as private corporations behave on the
international scene.25 The greater the number
This serene picture of advancing order and and diversity of non-state actors grows, the
efficiency in diplomacy and international less that this assumption of predictability
law, with each helping to guide the other, is may reflect international reality.26
complicated by contemporary questioning of The entrance, or attempted entrance, of
the foundational assumption that introduced different kinds of actors into the ranks pre-
this essay the equation of international viously almost monopolized by states affects
society and a society of states, and the domi- both law and diplomacy. The effort by the
nance in international life of sovereign states Palestinian Authority to obtain recognition
that were the only legitimate participants in as a state, with all the rights that come with
diplomacy and the only recognized subjects holding that status, has raised both legal and
of international law. The rise of non-state diplomatic questions. Its effort to join the
actors challenges both law and diplomacy, International Criminal Court could be seen
because traditionally both have assumed that as part of this strategy of raising its juridical
it is possible to know the accepted players status, but, once a party to the ICC, it could
through their possession of sovereignty, and seek to bring charges against the government
to distinguish these players from other enti- of Israel as a way of putting pressure on Tel
ties. This is not to say that either mode of Aviv to accept a true Palestinian State freed
international interaction, conflict resolution of almost all restrictions on its territory or
and interest advancement claims to freeze the its freedom of action in such matters as its
roster of its participants the literature on armaments.
state succession, which deals precisely with Of course one might say that for the
the question of the way in which political Palestinian Authority this existence as an
communities become recognized participants entity that might be recognized as a state only
in both international law and diplomacy by some of the members of international soci-
illustrates that but the requirement of both ety, while it exercised rights and powers pre-
law and diplomacy that those who undertake viously held to belong only to states, would
them be capable of carrying out their agree- be only a way-station on the road to full
ments or their legal obligations does pose statehood. A more far-reaching example of
problems for the entrance into the game of the challenge to the Westphalian order could
those who are not equipped to assure others be the increasing participation of non-state
that they are capable of honouring their actors in the negotiations that lead to interna-
word. That is to say, both international law tional conventions. Perhaps this phenomenon
and diplomacy rely on truth-telling and could be seen most clearly in the active role
promise-keeping. These fundamental social played by NGOs (non-governmental organi-
norms in turn require some degree of institu- zations) in recent multilateral conferences
tional capacity to ensure fidelity to either on climate change and other environmental
bargains or rules. The institutions possessing issues not only as sources of information
and as lobbyists on the outside, but as nego- beneficial it may consider its ideas to be) and
tiators at the table on the inside. Once such a host of others who are to obey. Conceptually
a precedent has been set, then such is the and practically, both modes of international
influence of law on thinking it becomes dif- interaction are carried on by those who know
ficult to reverse in future talks, on these or that they occupy the same international ball-
other subjects. Legal recognition can carry room. The question is whether they are always
diplomatic consequences, and the desire of dancing to the same tune.
formerly non-state actors to become states
forces existing states to rethink both.
Another assumption receiving renewed
scrutiny concerns the motivations of the NOTES AND REFERENCES
members of the swelling ranks of diplo-
macy and law. It has always been an over- 1 The author wishes to express his appreciation
simplification that the leaders of states for the acute and insightful comments on this
chapter from the editor of the volume and from
follow only the material interests of their
the anonymous external reviewers of the
states pride, belief in an idea and a desire manuscript.
for revenge have frequently driven state 2 See the discussion of The Institutions of Diplo-
action. It would be surprising if some non- macy in Frank Adcock and D. J. Mosley, Diplomacy
state actors were not also faithful to goals in Ancient Greece (New York: St. Martins Press,
1975), pp. 183226. See also Martin Wights dic-
so important to them that they are willing
tum that the Hellenic system had no notion of
to sacrifice the material advantages of both international law and that the Greeks did not
law-abidingness and diplomacy. Zealotry know the master-institution of the modern
and utter cynicism both are in tension with Western states-system the diplomatic network
the humane moderation that a respect for of resident embassies, reciprocally exchanged.
Wight does acknowledge that the Greek inter-
law and diplomacy promote. It is possible
national system possessed a different form of
that participation in both activities will itself diplomatic representation and that a sense of
subtly alter states and non-state actors religious piety and prudential calculation some-
estimation of where their true good lies, but times brought Greek states to observe standards
there would still be danger in the intervening applicable to international life, but he finds the
latter so frequently ineffective that he hesitates to
period before the calming effect of the give-
accord them the description of law. (See Martin
and-take of international society takes hold, Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leices-
and history holds examples in which military ter: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 1503.)
force was required to restrain revolutionary 3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of
actors until they arrived at a modus vivendi Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2002), pp. 12277.
with their international environment.27 Both
4 See Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International
the most sophisticated diplomacy and an Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press,
appreciation of the possibilities and limita- 2009), p. 10.
tions of international law will be required to 5 See Adam Watson, The Limits of Independence:
manage these challenges. Relations between States in the Modern World
(New York: Routledge, 1997).
Recognizing that their starting assumptions
6 In Positivism, Functionalism, and International
are not accepted by all returns the discussion Law, 34 (April, 1940), pp. 26084, Hans Mor-
of international law and diplomacy to its genthau argues that during the 1930s, political
beginning. Diplomacy has always rested on tensions in both Europe and Asia had almost com-
the awareness that it takes two to tango, even pletely destroyed international law. In Renaissance
Diplomacy (New York: Dover Publications, 1988
if one partner sometimes leads. International
[1955]), Garrett Mattingly argues that the break-up
law, too, rests on an acceptance that inter- of Christendom and the wars of religion did much
national life does not recognize one party the same to the diplomatic institutions that had
who is to command (no matter how valid or been evolving since the fifteenth century.
7 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 19191939: 18 See for example Alexander George, Forceful
An Introduction to the Study of International Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative
Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964 to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute
[1939]), p. 206, quoting Shaw, John Bulls Other of Peace Press, 1991); Robert Art and Patrick
Island, Preface. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy
8 See the summary of Morgenthaus argument (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
in Edwin Egede and Peter Sutch, The Politics Press, 2003).
of International Law and International Justice 19 Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), States (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of
pp. 21819. Human Issues, 1986), pp. 4051.
9 Nicholas Murray Butler, The Humane Work of the 20 Andrew Jacovides, International Law and Diplo-
League of Nations, in The Path to Peace: Essays macy (Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2011), pp. 232, 234.
and Addresses on Peace and its Making (New 21 Ian Hurd, Law and the Practice of Diplomacy,
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1930), pp. 2333. International Journal (Summer 2011): 58196
10 Butler, A League of Nations (1918), in Is America (586, 588, emphasis in original). A similar point
Worth Saving? Addresses on National Problems may be found in Antje Wieners essay, Cultural
and Party Policies (New York: Charles Scribners Validation: Examining the Familiarity Deficit
Sons, 1920), p. 128. of Global Governance, in Cornetial Bjola and
11 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to Markus Kornprobst, New International Relations:
International Law, 6th ed. (London: Allen & Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld
Unwin, 1987), pp. 24055 [252]. and Shared Reasoning (New York: Routledge,
12 Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 2011), pp. 10316.
2 vols., reprint ed. (New York: Cambridge Uni- 22 Ibid., p. 587.
versity Press, 2011 [1917]). In his introduction, 23 Michael Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law
Oppenheim stated, The intention was to pro- (Manchester: University of Manchester Press,
duce a work which would be of service alike to 1968), p. 4.
the international lawyer, the diplomatist, and the 24 See Charles Chatterjee, International Law and
student of history (Satow, I: v). Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2010) for a
13 The use of the term forms here is taken from compendium of treaties, conventions and judi-
Tocquevilles argument that the usages and the cial opinions that deal with or govern various
turn of ideas commonly understood among law- aspects and activities of diplomacy. Interspersed
yers (though often not among the general public) among these sections, however, are several
gave to the members of the legal profession a essays on topics related to both international law
common identity that in turn made them a col- and diplomacy, such as the historical background
lective influence for order in political and social of diplomatic relations, ethics in diplomacy,
life in the United States and a bulwark against the concept of bargaining power, and recent
despotism. (See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy changes in the participants in and the agenda of
in America, 2 vols., Harvey Mansfield and Delba diplomacy.
Winthrop, eds. and trans. (Chicago: University of 25 Watson, op. cit., p. 41.
Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 252, 256, 258, 66970.) 26 This point comes out with particular clarity in
14 Francois de Callieres, The Art of Diplomacy, Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International
H.M.A Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer, eds. Law in Globalized Relations (New York: Springer,
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983 [1716]), p. 169. 2007). Bolewski sets out two main themes.
15 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: A Study The first is that diplomacy is being transformed
of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: through the increasing involvement of non-state
Columbia University Press, 2002 [1977]), actors, while the conduct and discourse of these
pp. 13436, 16366. entities can also reshape both customary inter-
16 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three national law and changing conceptions of jus
Traditions, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds. cogens. The second theme is that diplomacy is
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), pp. 137205, highly regulated not only by international law
23358, passim. but also by the domestic law of states, especially
17 Eugene V. Rostow, The Ideal in Law (Chicago: domestic constitutional and legal enactments
University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 26870. allocating control over various diplomatic activi-
Rostow himself interrupted his career as a profes- ties (such as granting or withholding diplomatic
sor of international law with periods of service in recognition) among agencies or branches of
the United States State Department and the UN major Western countries. The two themes are
Secretariat. connected in that as non-state actors become
more involved in negotiations across state bound- conducts what diplomatic activities on behalf of
aries, they also have access to national courts in those non-state entities.
these cases, but such non-state actors lack corre- 27 See David Armstrong, Revolution and World
sponding judicial institutions that would impose Order: The Revolutionary State in International
a settled and authoritative decision on who Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
16
Diplomatic Immunity
Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey
From ancient times to the present many civili- and international treaties codified these privi-
zations, whether in the Americas, Europe, the leges (Frey and Frey, 1999) (see Chapters 14
Middle East, or Africa, have respected the and 15 in this Handbook).
inviolability of envoys. Necessity forced most Because the establishment of resident
cultures to accord envoys basic protections envoys is a Western development and because
because only then was intercourse between the expansion of European power across the
peoples possible. Without such protections, no globe brought in its wake European interna-
international system could exist. Rooted in tional law, there is a distinct Western tradition
necessity, immunity was buttressed by reli- on the inviolability of envoys. Although every
gion, sanctioned by custom, and fortified by international system recognized the inviola-
reciprocity. The rules and conventions govern- bility of envoys, different rules shaped their
ing diplomatic immunity have been histori- practice and governed relations with states
cally shaped and conditioned and continue to outside the system. Thus the Chinese (one
evolve. As the essential foundations of immu- could substitute the Japanese, the Greeks,
nity shifted from religious to legal, what had the Romans) treated barbarians differently,
once been an expedient became over time a just as the Christians (one could substitute
precedent. Subtly, acquiescence in small the Muslims) did the infidels, because each
changes led unintentionally to the creation of system developed exclusive and culturally
precedent. Courtesies hardened and over time specific principles. For the Greeks, the com-
became rights. When expedients evolved into mon bonds were language and religion; for
precedents and earlier courtesies into rights, the Chinese and Japanese, culture; and for the
the issue of whether and under what circum- Muslims, religion. What distinguished the
stances envoys were entitled to immunity European system from others was its stress on
became a legal one. Ultimately, national laws the equality and sovereignty of states within
it and sometimes, but not invariably, outside Key Points

of it. In contrast, the Chinese emperor, as the
Pre-literate societies regarded envoys as sacred.
son of heaven, acknowledged other states,
This sacrosanctity may stem in part from early
even those within the system, only as vas-
mans attitude toward strangers and the traditional
sals. Envoys also fared better in a multipolar code of hospitality.
system, such as Ancient Greece, than they
did in a hegemonic system, such as Ancient
China. All civilizations have recognized the
importance of protecting envoys from harm. ANCIENT WORLD
The degree of protection, however, varied
with each culture. Over time, the position of In spite of a common foundation in which
the envoy deteriorated in some civilizations, divine sanctions reinforced inadequate human
especially those that became hegemonic and deterrents, the protections accorded envoys
harbored universalistic pretensions and those varied greatly. In Ancient Greece, heralds
that regarded the others as barbarian. (kerykes), not envoys, possessed diplomatic
The concept of according envoys invio- inviolability, for the Greeks regarded heralds
lability may stem in part from early mans as the descendants of Hermes, the messenger
attitude toward strangers and the traditional of the gods. The ancient epics give some idea
code of hospitality. The ancient Greeks and of the religious dimensions of the envoys
Romans considered it impious to injure a role. In the Iliad, Achilles, understandably
guest, as did the Celts, Gauls, and Teutons enraged when Agamemnon demanded that he
(Numelin, 1950: 117). Although strangers turn over his beautiful captive, Briseis, never-
were sometimes welcomed, they were also theless did not harm the terrified envoys sent
feared. Early man insisted on disarming or rit- to take the girl. Instead he greeted them as
ually purifying anyone who might have magi- messengers of Zeus and of mortals and
cal, potentially harmful, powers. Envoys, like handed Briseis over to them (Homer, 1962:
strangers, were feared but also protected. 339). Heralds enjoyed then a powerful, pro-
The sacred status of messengers and heralds tected position. They carried a staff or cadu-
seems partly ascribable to their allegedly ceus that symbolized their sacrosanctity and
supernatural powers. Insulting, injuring, or served as an insignia of office. Public opinion
killing an envoy incurred the death penalty. and customary law also guaranteed the safety
The custom of regarding envoys as holy of heralds, who carried formal messages,
and an attack on them impious may originate announcements, or requests. Although envoys
from the practice of employing priests as were orators and politicians, usually senior
envoys as they did, for example, in Ancient men of some eminence, they had to rely on
Kerala and Ancient Rome. Envoys may safe-conducts secured by heralds who pre-
also have been regarded as holy because of ceded them. Because it was not customary to
the vital role they played in bringing peace, extend immunity to envoys, truces and treaties
or in Herods words, reconciling enemies often included stipulations for such protec-
to one another (Josephus, 1975, 2:275). tion. In spite of these precautions, envoys, on
Throughout the world, whether the Iroquois occasion, were mistreated, abducted, or even
in North America, the Wiradjuri in Australia, killed (Adcock and Mosley, 1975). Throughout
the Maoris in Oceania, or the Tonga in the the Near and Far East envoys were respected
South Seas regarded messengers, heralds, and and their importance acknowledged. In
envoys as inviolable. In preliterate societies Babylonia envoys were both inviolable and
these individuals carried (e.g. a coconut) or accountable. Envoys did not enjoy immunity
wore a highly visible sign of their status (e.g. for crimes committed during their missions.
a sacred staff, a red hair net, a nose peg). In Ancient India as well envoys could not be
Diplomatic Immunity 199
killed but they could be punished: branded, and those exempt from military service.
maimed, or detained. In Ancient China, with Legacies are often ambiguous and Romes
its hegemonic view of the world, envoys had was no exception. During the early republic
less protection and were regarded more as Rome had respected the rights of diplomats
messengers than as personal representatives. but later, during the imperial republic and
Nonetheless, most diplomats, even of tribu- empire, had transgressed that rule as the ear-
tary states, remained inviolate because of lier rationale, personal restraints, and societal
imperial benevolence and a deep rooted prag- constraints disappeared. While in practice
matic conviction that envoys be well treated. Romans violated the earlier standard, ironi-
The status of envoys in Burma and Siam mir- cally, in practice Roman legalists and philos-
rored that of China. Throughout the ancient ophers strengthened it.
world, third parties typically did not respect
the inviolability of envoys. Nor did diplomatic
practice evolve; it remained rudimentary as Key Points
diplomatic relations remained ad hoc.
In Ancient Rome, in the early republic, Across the ancient world the immunity accorded
the practices of diplomacy, predicated on to diplomats varied widely.
the idea of reciprocity, ensured the immu- In ancient Greece only heralds enjoyed such status.
In Ancient Rome their sacred status was based
nity of diplomats. Common fetial institu-
on fetial law. In other cultures a deep-rooted
tions coupled with the predominance of pragmatism dictated that envoys be well treated.
Indo-European dialects meant that a feeling
of community could develop (Watson, 1993).
War, however, transformed Rome. As fetial
law became mere ritual, diplomatic immu- MIDDLE AGES
nity was increasingly violated, especially on
the barbarian fringe. When Rome became a During the Middle Ages, immunity contin-
multicultural empire the ties that bound were ued to mean that an envoy should be able to
secularized. The violation of a diplomats come and go in safety. Not only he but also
immunity, once an offense against divine his goods and entourage were inviolable.
prescription, now became an assault on the Whether in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia,
state as civil law replaced religious injunc- principals, that is, those who sent another,
tion. Rome established a secular rationale for looked to custom, law, religion, and the threat
the idea of diplomatic immunity that, in con- of reciprocal action to safeguard their emis-
trast with Greek practice, was not depend- saries. Third parties were not, however,
ent on common cultural traditions. Romes expected to respect a diplomats status unless
achievement lay in forging an empire not he had procured a safe-conduct from them.
only through military might but also through Any privileges, such as the right to bear arms,
law. Rome passed on the ideal of diplomatic were just that. In the medieval, as in the
immunity, an ideal universally acknowledged ancient world, a diplomat was not answera-
in the ius gentium. Sanctioned by custom, ble for crimes committed before his embassy
reinforced by law, diplomatic immunity but he was for crimes committed during as
became part of the Roman legacy. The word were the those of his suite. As members of
immunity itself comes from Rome. Munera the Christian commonwealth, diplomats were
meant public services or charges that eve- answerable to God as well as their fellow
ryone was obliged to perform or discharge. man. When diplomats committed a crime
Immunitas was granted as a personal privi- they were punished for it. As society became
lege to certain individuals. The immunes more literate, principals tended less to rely on
included those exempt from those charges customary and religious safeguards and more
on juristic ones to protect their envoys. Both faith, increasingly were viewed as the enemy
church and state continued to stress the within. In civil disputes, especially that of
necessity of an inviolate social order and to debt, practice meshed with Roman theory that
recognize the existence of a common body of envoys were responsible for debts contracted
international law, the essential core of which during their embassy. In criminal cases, theo-
was the sacred status and fundamental rists often argued that an envoy had forfeited
accountability of envoys (Queller, 1967). his privileges by his actions but expediency
triumphed and ambassadors escaped punish-
ment. Despite the protests of theorists, such
Key Point as Gentili and Hotman, a disjunction between
theory and practice persisted. In theory
In the Middle Ages principals looked to custom,
ambassadors were not immune, but in prac-
law, religion, and the threat of reciprocal action
to safeguard their emissaries. tice they were. Expediency became practice
and practice became precedent. Governments
gradually adopted the fiction of extraterrito-
riality. They did so to justify the burgeoning
EARLY MODERN ambassadorial exemption from both civil and
criminal law. Earlier, when an ambassador
The development of resident embassies in the was subject to personal law, the law that a man
Renaissance ultimately entailed an expansion took with him wherever he went, an ambas-
not only of the number of envoys but also of sadors exemption was obvious. Personal
their entourages as well as an explosive growth law coupled with limitations on where the
in the attendant immunities. The Renaissance royal writ ran paved the way for the idea of
did not initiate a new era in diplomatic immu- extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality was as
nities but only marked the threshold of one. At much a legal survival as it was a legal fic-
first the establishment of resident embassies tion (Adair, 1929: 29). In the chrysalis of the
had no effect on the practice of diplomatic emerging territorial state, extraterritoriality
immunity, in part because ad hoc embassies conformed rather than conflicted with many
not merely continued but increased in number. existing practices (Ogdon, 1936: 164). It is
Though the resident envoy differed function- not surprising then that the theory of extra-
ally from the ad hoc envoy, he initially enjoyed territoriality appealed to many scholars and
no more protection. Envoys continued to be practitioners of the diplomatic craft in an age
regarded as inviolable but only by the of virulent religious conflict and sectarian
receiving state. As in the past, custom, law, agenda. Although the idea of extraterritorial-
and religion protected them. Other powers, ity predated Grotius, he coined the term when
however, continued to regard them as private he noted that ambassadors should be treated
individuals who had no protection unless their as quasi extra territorium (as if outside the
principals had procured a safe-conduct for territory). On accepting an ambassador,
them. Only after resident envoys became the receiving states implicitly recognized the
widespread and only after a time lag when the attendant immunities. On the premise that
effects of and problems involving permanent the ambassador was still legally, although
residents, such as the inviolability of embassy not physically, present in his own land, the
grounds, became apparent did practice adapt ambassador was not subject to the criminal
and change (Mattingly, 1971). or civil laws of the host country. No matter
During the Early Modern period, the what the crime, the receiving state could only
Reformation fractured Christendom and send the ambassador back to the sending
challenged the practice of diplomatic immu- state with the demand that he be punished.
nity; envoys, especially those of a different The ambassador was inviolable because
he represented a sacrosanct sovereign and allegedly innate ideas of justice, the histori-
because his business was vital. In this period cal or positivist school sought to delineate
the chapel question probably created the most the guidelines adopted by most states. For
acrimony because it often involved a volatile positivists, the resolution of disputes involv-
combination of conspiracy, treason, and her- ing envoys and their entourages revealed the
esy. The question revolved around whether a practice of nations. Positivists were guided
forbidden rite, often associated with political by a presumption of continuity and by the
dissidence, should be tolerated even when implicit, though often unarticulated, assump-
hidden behind an embassy compound. The tions that prescription legitimized a right. The
performance of such rites often triggered mere existence of a convention was presump-
the debate over ambassadorial privileges as tive in that it gave reasonable grounds for its
whole. Confessional differences forced a continuance. The positivists tended to appeal
reexamination and ultimately a reaffirmation to what was, to rely on cases and precedents,
of the necessity for diplomatic immunity. not what should be; the accumulation of prec-
Such controversies triggered an outpouring edents only strengthened their hand.
of literature as theorists such as Jean Jacques
Burlamaqui, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch
Spinoza, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Key Points
von Wolff, and Emerich de Vattel grappled
The Early Modern period witnessed the estab-
with the question of diplomatic immunity lishment of resident embassies and occasioned
and relied on the law of nature to justify their a new debate over the immunities of diplomats.
positions. Vattel, the most popular theorist In theory (according to some, such as Gentili and
of his day, in part because of both the ele- Hotman) ambassadors were not immune, but in
gance and simplicity of his style, based inter- practice they were.
national law on the law of nature. For him Although the idea of extraterritoriality predated
ambassadorial immunity was not an artifi- Grotius, he coined the term when he noted that
cial or arbitrary construction agreed upon by ambassadors should be treated as quasi extra
various states. The importance of embassies territorium ( as if outside the territory).
made the ambassador both sacred and invio- Some theorists, such as Vattel, based their defense
of immunity on the law of nature but they were
lable. The immunities of an ambassador were
increasingly being challenged and undermined by
based on functional necessity; an ambassa- the positivist school, who based international law
dor must be exempt from civil and criminal on the implicit or explicit consent of states.
jurisdiction because he must have nothing to
hope, nothing to fear from the sovereign to
whom he is sent (Vattel, 1982: 452).
The natural law theorists were gradually MODERN ERA
being undermined in the seventeenth and
later eighteenth centuries by positivists such From the French Revolution to the present,
as Richard Zouche, Samuel Rachel, Johann the international order changed dramatically.
Wolfgang Textor, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
Johann Jakob Moser, and Georg Friedrich von turies, the European law of nations collided
Martens. These positivists based international with other mutually exclusive, imperial and at
law on the implicit or explicit consent of states. first fundamentally irreconcilable geopolitical
The balance shifted in their favor because systems. The European system was predicated
they dispelled the earlier confusion between on the equality of nations, whereas others,
international morality and international such as the Chinese, was based on hegemony.
law so prevalent in the natural law school. Admittedly, the European insistence on cer-
Whereas the natural law school appealed to tain privileges such as diplomatic asylum in
barbarous or semi-barbarous countries ineluctability of progress, the primacy of jus-

privileges that Europeans would not tolerate tice, and the rights of the individual (Laurent,
within their own countries revealed the 1880: 3: 10, 14, 50). His views were endorsed
limits of that norm of equality. In expanding by Silvestre Pinheiro-Ferreira, who leveled
across the globe, the West exported permanent much of his criticism at extraterritoriality
embassies and with them international law as naught but a sterile fiction. Other promi-
and its attendant advantages, including the nent theorists such as Pasquale Fiore, Pietro
pretense of equality and a mechanism for Esperson, and Giuseppe Carnazza-Amari
maintaining order. With diplomatic relations advocated the restriction, if not the aboli-
came diplomatic inviolability. tion of basic diplomatic privileges, and the
Nonetheless, in the nineteenth, twentieth, adoption of a more functionalist approach.
and twenty-first centuries, diplomatic privilege Although they did not succeed in eliminating
was assailed on many fronts. First and fore- diplomatic immunities, they did restrict dip-
most, the attack on privilege and on the diplo- lomatic rights, eliminating flagrant abuses,
mat dates back to the Enlightenment and the and forcing a reconsideration of the ration-
French Revolution. The French Revolution, ale for such privileges. Although jurists
even more than the Reformation, constituted remain sharply divided over the extent of
an unprecedented challenge to the system and and necessity for diplomatic privileges, they
the practice of diplomatic immunity. did defend the age-old concept of diplomatic
For the French, rights based on sover- inviolability which encompassed freedom
eignty transcended those based on treaties. from physical and verbal attack and immu-
Diplomatic privilege survived in spite of the nity from criminal and civil jurisdiction.
virulent attack on privilege in general because Municipal law, however, differed markedly
a Europe at war dispatched few envoys and on questions as basic as the duration of an
because both sides acknowledged the neces- envoys protection. In the nineteenth cen-
sity of diplomatic inviolability. The French, tury, governments uniformly recognized an
who during the early years of the Revolution envoys exemption from criminal jurisdic-
also feared diplomatic isolation and wanted tion. The states only remedy was to expel
to retain the few allies they had, found them- him or request his recall. No universal norms
selves defending the old diplomacy and one prevailed on an envoys exemption from civil
of its principle tenets, diplomatic inviolability. jurisdiction. A consensus did emerge on the
The revolutionary challenge, however, liability of the envoys family as well as his
lived on in the nineteenth and twentieth official suite; most agreed that the criminal
centuries, particularly in the Italian and and civil exemption of the envoy extended to
Belgian schools of jurisprudence. For both. Practice, however, varied widely on the
them diplomatic immunity meant diplomatic liability of the unofficial suite. Governments
impunity, a denial of justice. Many jurists increasingly demanded that diplomats submit
in the nineteenth century saw diplomatic the names of both their official and unoffi-
privileges as too extensive. They regarded cial suite. The remarkable divergence in and
such privileges as detritus from the past, a variation among states over the question of
deadly legacy from the Roman law and the diplomatic privilege stands out as a striking
barbarian ages (Sinner, 1906: 137). One of feature of nineteenth century jurisprudence.
the foremost critiques of the existing system European governments granted an envoy an
was Franois Laurent. His central argument exemption from criminal jurisdiction and
that diplomatic immunities were no longer recognized a diplomats exemption from the
necessary rested on the premise that the droit countries through which he passed. Both had
des gens was not eternal and immutable. been common practice. But they agreed on
Rather, the droit des gens should reflect the little else. Some governments limited the
exemption of domestic servants. In the nine- VIENNA CONVENTION

teenth century, the functionalists who wanted
to limit diplomatic privilege prevailed. Those Necessity more than anything else ultimately
who defended the theory of extraterritoriality helped to ensure the passage and acceptance
found themselves in an increasingly unten- of a new code on diplomatic privileges and
able and ultimately indefensible position. immunities. The Vienna Convention of 1961
The burgeoning nationalism of the nine- succeeded because it focused on permanent
teenth and twentieth centuries accelerated envoys and did not deal with other interna-
the trend underscoring the sovereignty of tionally protected persons, such as ad hoc
the state and repudiating any privileges that envoys and representatives to and officials of
derogated from its authority. The growing international organizations. The Convention
acceptance of the concepts of equality and also avoided controversial issues, such as
democracy also undermined the belief in diplomatic asylum, that might have provoked
privilege. In addition, the explosive growth of prolonged and contentious debate. For exam-
the diplomatic corps and their attendant staffs ple, no consensus existed on the problematic
prompted a reconsideration of the privileges issue of diplomatic asylum. Its restrictive and
accorded diplomats and their retinues. functional approach to diplomatic privileges
Before the adoption of the Vienna guaranteed its acceptance by many nations
Convention a diplomats privileges varied committed to restricting diplomatic privi-
greatly, dependent on where he was stationed. leges and reducing the number of individuals
Generally, the United States and Great Britain who enjoyed them.
granted diplomats the most extensive, while At the Convention, function determined
Italy, Greece, the USSR, and Argentina the privilege. Functionalism underlay stipula-
least. The confusing welter of widely diverse tions (Articles 22, 24, 27, and 30) that the
practices predictably caused problems; it often premises, archives, documents, and official
enmeshed diplomats in disputes that deflected correspondence of the mission and private
them from their main goals and raised substan- residence of the diplomat were inviolable
tive issues of reciprocity and justice. These and that the receiving state had a special
often fundamentally divergent principles and duty to protect the residence and mission.
policies obstructed diplomatic negotiations Article 26 provided that the receiving state
and soured, if not embittered, relations. By the should ensure freedom of movement and
l950s, a basic consensus had emerged on the travel except in areas restricted for reasons
privileges accorded to the head and the official of national security. The most fundamen-
staff, but even here differences emerged over a tal provisions of the convention reduced the
diplomats exemption for private acts. occasions when immunity could be claimed
and drastically reduced the army of privi-
Key Points leged individuals. A diplomat and his fam-
ily, provided they were neither nationals nor
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as permanent residents of the receiving state,
resident embassies, and with them international enjoyed immunity from criminal as well as
law, expanded across the globe, the number of civil and administrative jurisdictions with
envoys and their entourages increased expo-
notable exceptions: (1) a real action relating
nentially and occasioned new debates over the
immunities of envoys.
to immovable property in the territory of the
Practice varied widely among states. Generally, receiving state (unless the individual held it
however, the functionalist view of the Italian and on behalf of the mission); (2) an action relat-
Belgian schools, which strove to limit privileges, ing to succession in which the diplomat acts
prevailed. as executor, administrator, heir, or legatee;
(3) an action related to a professional or com- the issue of ad hoc envoys or the growing
mercial activity outside his functions; (4) a body of international officials. At present,
court action initiated by either a diplomat or a governments who extend special privileges to
member of his family. Even more significant, ad hoc envoys do so because of international
the technical and administrative staff and amity and courtesy, not legal obligation.
their families, who were neither nationals nor
permanent residents of the receiving state,
enjoyed full immunity from criminal jurisdic- Key Points
tion. Immunity from civil and administrative
The Vienna Convention of 1961 succeeded in part
jurisdiction only covered acts performed in because it defined what had become customary
the course of their official duties. Members practice and because a generally functionalist
of the service staff, who were neither nation- view prevailed among the receiving states.
als nor permanent residents of the receiving It prevailed as well because it avoided contro-
state, were only immune for acts performed versial issues such as asylum and only dealt with
in the course of their duties. Private servants permanent envoys and their staffs.
enjoyed no immunity. In a few instances a
more liberal interpretation prevailed. The
Convention granted a diplomat inviolability
and jurisdictional immunity when in transit INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
to and from his post as long as the third state ORGANIZATIONS (IGOS)
granted him a visa. Even this provision could
be defended on the basis of functional neces- Just as the number of states burgeoned, so
sity and was not a total departure from dip- too did the number of international organiza-
lomatic law. Both the United States and the tions. From 1815 to 1819 there was just a
United Kingdom had previously observed this single IGO, by 1985 there were 378. The
proviso. Other provisions that passed, such as privileges and immunities traditionally
exemptions from custom duties, were clearly granted to diplomats were extended to the
not based on functionalism but on reciprocity personnel and representatives of interna-
and courtesy. Because of the often significant tional organizations. Although no consensus
disparity in exemptions, many governments existed on the privileges international offi-
based their fiscal policies on strict reciprocity. cials should enjoy, a convention was con-
The representatives from the 81 states were voked in Vienna in 1975. Although all states
able to reach a consensus on so many issues were invited, only 81 came and two sent
because the Convention essentially defined observers. The sessions quickly became
customary practice that had developed since polarized between the host states, most of
the Early Modern period. By 1985, 145 them affluent Western ones, and the majority.
nations had ratified the convention, though Unlike the previous convention, this one was
admittedly some made reservations. The bitter and divisive. Because most states were
Vienna Convention of 1961 demonstrated sending, not receiving states, they wanted to
that states increasingly relied not on custom- expand the privileges. The draft granted
ary protection for their diplomats but positive more privileges and immunities to interna-
law. Attempts to restrict diplomatic immunity tional officials and their families as well as
more have failed because of the difficulties of their administrative and technical staff. The
reaching a consensus. The Vienna Convention draft also limited the power of the host state,
had not resolved especially problematic issues for example in declaring an individual per-
such as automobile accidents, smuggling, and sona non grata. Unlike the earlier meeting at
compensation for victims injured by diplo- Vienna this convention failed. The IGO issue
mats. The Convention also did not deal with has remained problematic. IGOs obtain their
privileges in a variety of ways: first from most basic, that of diplomatic inviolability,
their constitutions. When states join an came under attack from terrorists. Before the
organization they have an obligation to twentieth century, attacks on diplomats were
accept its constitution. Second, member the exception. No longer. In the last half of
states often adopt a general instrument to the twentieth century, terrorists, often with
which they make explicit reservations. Third, the support of their governments, flaunted
privileges and immunities are often deter- their disregard of the most fundamental pre-
mined by an agreement between the organi- cept of international law, the inviolability of
zation and a government or governments. envoys. The Iranian governments complicity
Fourth, headquarter agreements between the in and sanction of the seizure of American
host and the organization provided for cer- diplomats and the international orders fail-
tain immunities and privileges. Fifth, bilat- ure to enact meaningful sanctions were
eral agreements, such as the Mexican Water symptomatic of the disintegration of the
Treaty (1945), which created the International world order. Finally, the transformation into a
Boundary and Water Commission, stipulated worldwide diplomatic framework did not
the privileges and immunities accorded to enhance the position of the diplomat. In the
personnel. Questions about international twentieth century two world wars and several
privilege understandably have become part revolutions, coupled with the growth in the
of the debate about the necessity of limiting number of new states, undermined the tradi-
diplomatic privilege. The growing number of tional international society (Craig, 1990:
individuals who enjoyed such status has 2016). The position of the envoy deterio-
made the issue controversial (Wilson, 1967: rated because of the vaunted growth of that
5767). Jurists question whether it is neces- world order, which destroyed the old, admit-
sary to extend diplomatic privileges to the tedly Eurocentric community of nations.
members of IGOs, such as the Inter-American States no longer shared common values or
Tuna Commission. The contentious, often interests or felt bound by common values
acrimonious, debate over the codification of (Bull, 1977). The breakdown of internal
the privileges of international officials homogeneity and the expansion of the inter-
reflected not a world united but one divided. national community coupled with the enor-
mity of socioeconomic changes and the
virulence of ideological conflict has triggered
Key Point a revolution and made the diplomats position
more precarious than ever. Revolutionaries,
The Vienna Convention of 1975 failed because no
in particular, ignored basic precepts of inter-
consensus existed between the receiving states
national law and destabilized the system.
(generally wealthy and Western) and the sending
states on the status of the personnel of IGOS. They dehumanized the enemy (Wight, 1978:
36). Revolutionaries, whether Jacobins, com-
munists, or Iranian students, could not
extend the ties that bind. Revolutionary
EPILOGUE powers are morally and psychologically at
war with their neighbors because of their
Some within the diplomatic corps also under- mission to transform international society by
mined the position of the envoy. Terrorists conversion or coercion (Armstrong, 1993).
who masqueraded as envoys brought the They seek to destroy or subvert. In part
profession into disrepute, as did diplomats because of such ideologues, the indivisible
who routinely abused their privileges, includ- community of interests, albeit in a limited
ing their customs exemption, notably the framework, no longer exists. That world is
diplomatic bag. All the privileges, even the gone.
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Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971.
Adair, E.R. The Extraterritoriality of Ambassa- Numelin, Ragnar. The Beginnings of Diplo-
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Centuries. New York: Longmans Green, International Relations. London: Oxford Uni-
1929. versity Press, 1950.
Adcock, Frank and Mosley, D.J. Diplomacy in Ogdon, Montell. Juridical Bases of Diplomatic
Ancient Greece. London: Thames and Immunity: A Study in the Origin, Growth and
Hudson, 1975. Purpose of the Law. Washington DC: John
Armstrong, David. Revolution and World Order: Byrne, 1936.
The Revolutionary State in International Queller, Donald. The Office of Ambassador in
Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. the Middle Ages. Princeton: University Press,
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of 1967.
Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, Sinner, U. de. LImmunite judiciare civile des
1977. agents diplomatiques trangers. Lausanne:
Craig, Gordon. Force and Statecraft, Diplomatic Ch. Viret-Genton, 1906.
Problems of our Time. New York: Oxford Vattel, Emerich de. The Law of Nations or
University Press, 1990. Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to
Frey, Linda S. and Frey, Marsha L. The History of the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and
Diplomatic Immunity. Columbus, Ohio: The Sovereigns. 1863. Reprint. New York: AMS
Ohio State University Press, 1999. Press, 1982.
Homer, The Iliad. Translated by Richmond Watson, Alan. International Law in Archaic
Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Rome: War and Religion. Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1962. Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Josephus, Flavius. The Works of Flavius Wight, Martin. Power Politics. Leicester:
Josephus. Translated by William Whiston. University Press, 1978.
New York: A.L. Burt, 1975 [1901]. Wilson, Clifton E. Diplomatic Privileges and
Laurent, Franois. Droit civil international. Paris: Immunities. Tucson: University of Arizona
Marescq, 1880. Press, 1967.
17
Diplomacy and Negotiation
I. William Zartman
Diplomacy, writes Sir Harold Nicolson of exchange of offers/demands within a

(1939/1963: 45; also de Martens 1866) in threefold decision choice (yes, no, continue
his authoritative work on the subject, is the talking) (Ikle 1964).
management of international relations by Negotiation is giving something to get
negotiation; the method by which these rela- something, so it involves moves from open-
tions are adjusted and managed by ambassa- ing positions by both/all sides, although not
dors and envoys; the business or art of the necessarily to an equal degree. A negotiated
diplomatist. Negotiation is the process of agreement is a positive-sum outcome, in that
combining divergent positions into a joint no party would agree to the outcome unless
decision (Zartman and Berman 1982;
it feels itself to be better off than without an
Hopmann 1996; de Callires 2000 [1716];
agreement (its security point). To be sure,
Druckman 2001; Odell 2000; Mansbridge
this positive sum element can be artificially
and Martin 2013). Whether in interpersonal
created by a stronger party by threatening
dealings to buy a used car or to prevent or
end a world conflict, negotiation has certain sanctions (worsening the security point) if
characteristics that distinguish it from the the other party does not sign, where it is the
two other basic types of decision-making, release from the threat of sanctions that cre-
voting (coalition) and adjudication (hierar- ates the positive sum, as in the Iranian nuclear
chy) (Zartman 1978; Dahl 1955, 47; Carr proliferation negotiations. Thus, power in the
1939/1946: 218; Lewicki et al. 2010: 46): process lies not in numbers (as in voting) or
unanimity as the decision rule, formal equal- in authority (as in adjudication) but in alter-
ity of parties (right of veto), mixed motives natives (security point) and in persuasion
(common and conflicting interests), process (Shell 1999; PON 2014).
Negotiation may be used to pursue rela- diplomatic incidents to global multilateral

tions in order to bargain for advantage or regime-building conferences. Parties turn to
to prevent conflict from escalating or from diplomatic negotiations when they have a
turning violent; it may be used to manage problem or conflict to be resolved that they
relations i.e. de-escalate the means of their cannot handle unilaterally. Smaller issues
pursuit from violence to politics; or it may are the daily bread of diplomats at home and
be the means to actually resolve the basic abroad, often treated in informal and ongoing
incompatibilities of positions or to trans- negotiations, whereas regimes are recursive
form them into cooperative relationships. negotiations continually adjusting broad inter-
Conflict here refers not just to violence but to national agreements (Spector and Zartman
any active incompatibility of positions on an 2003). Negotiation has led to the establish-
issue or problem. ment of a growing web of international
Since World War II, negotiation to produce regimes, beginning with the security regime
a peace agreement has accounted for a quar- in the UN itself (1945), and going on to the
ter of the serious conflicts managed with a Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
ceasefire or resolved, together accounting (1982), the General Agreement on Trade and
for about the same number as those termi- Tariffs (GATT) (1947) and then the World
nated by victory of one side over the other. Trade Organization (WTO) (1995), the Ozone
There has been a burst of activity since the Treaty (1987) and Framework Convention
end of the Cold War to reduce violence on Climate Change (1995), the Convention/
through negotiated ceasefire agreements and Organization on Security and Cooperation in
about two-thirds of them contain some move Europe (C/OSCE) (1975/1992), and a myriad
toward conflict resolution, although about other regimes. These figures and instances
half of the management efforts still await show a significant increase of the use and
translation into full resolution. degrees of success of negotiation since
These figures, however, concern only a the end of the Cold War. However, figures
small if uncalculable part of the activ- since 2010 would show the rise of revolu-
ity of negotiation, which ranges from small tionary religious fanatical conflicts and the
Table 17.1 Conflict Outcomes over time, 19462010

Victory Peace accord Ceasefire Low activity Total ended Unresolved
194650 17 3 0 9 29 41
195155 6 4 1 4 15 27
195660 8 5 1 9 23 36
196165 11 4 4 6 25 47
196670 11 3 3 10 27 47
197175 11 4 4 7 26 51
197680 11 1 1 4 17 52
198185 9 1 1 10 21 59
198690 12 4 4 22 42 79
199195 14 14 12 30 70 96
19962000 6 7 10 21 44 75
200105 4 7 6 16 33 66
200610 3 1 22 15 41 66
All episodes 123 58 69 163 413 742
Source: Kreutz (2010)

Diplomacy and negotiation 209
breakdown of major cooperative regimes, 2000). Asymmetrical parties know their roles
posing new challenges to negotiation (see and goals and seek absolute gains, whereas
also Kissinger 1964: 23). rivals at any level of the totem pole contest
The negotiation process operates under each others position and seek relative gains
a loose bundle of norms that can be termed at the others expense (Powell 1991). Weaker
the Ethos of Equality (Faure 2003), the parties have a potential array of means at their
notion that equal status, equal treatment, and disposal to reduce the degree of asymmetry, by
fair and equitable results are the defining borrowing power from third parties, opponents,
characteristics of negotiation. Like any norms, context, and process (Deutsch 1973; Zartman
this notion is present more strongly in spirit and Rubin 2000). Smaller parties tend to
than in letter. Although it may be breached in concentrate on a single issue whereas larger
detail, its influence is still felt in concept and parties are burdened by many issues and are
action in negotiation. The formal structural easily distracted; the latter focus on setting the
equality of the parties is derived from the fact formula for a solution at the beginning of the
that decision unanimity means that each party negotiations, leaving the smaller partner to win
has a veto over any agreement and therefore back initial losses in the detail phase (Crump
should grant each other recognition with and Zartman 2003). In intrastate conflicts,
equal standing in the negotiations. A sense the government has the structural advantage
of equality, or symmetry, is beneficial to the but the conditions and tactics are the same,
efficient and effective achievement of results, as the rebellion emphasizes commitment
and negotiators are well advised to cultivate and concentrates on recognition formal
that sense so they can move from tending the symmetry as its goal and the key to its
atmospherics to resolving the problem, even equality (Zartman 1995). The role of imperfect
though, in fact, full symmetry does not exist information in conflict decisions between
in the real world. The ethos then extends to asymmetrical parties is currently the subject
the process, where requitement the sense of a surge of rational choice literature, but it
that concessions will be reciprocated is ignores negotiations, assuming bargaining
expected, and when not practiced, parties failure instead of analyzing how to prevent it
can cry foul. International law holds that (Fearon 1995; Kydd 2005).
agreements made under duress are invalid, While the overarching principles of any
although in fact power inequality is always agreement, or its formula, are the primary
present and conditions negotiating behavior subject of any negotiation, they always refer
(Zartman and Rubin 2000). to some mutually agreed notion of justice, the
All negotiations are asymmetrical, to a basis of which is equality or equalizing, what-
greater or lesser degree; there is no absolute ever the specific referent (Zartman etal. 1996;
equality in the real world. While symmetry Kolm 2002; Albin 2001). If negotiations were
has long been thought to be the most a one-shot affair, parties could drive the hardest
favorable situation for efficient and effective bargain possible, sign, and run. But diplomacy
negotiations, both social psychology and is the business of managing relations, that is,
political science have recently shown that its ongoing ties and contacts among states. Even
real-world equivalent, near-symmetry (small if a party feels it needs to prevail in a particu-
asymmetry), is the least productive structure lar diplomatic negotiation, it is under pressure
because the parties will spend most of their to do so in such a manner that the outcome
time and effort in position politics, seeking does not impel the other party above all to
to maintain or upset (and therefore counter- seek revenge (Shell 1999). Diplomacy, said
maintain) the near-symmetry (Hornstein Cardinal Richelieu (1637), should aim, not at
1965; Hammerstein and Parker 1982; Pruitt incidental or opportunistic arrangements, but
and Carnevale 1993; Zartman and Rubin at creating solid and durable relations.
Key Points their negotiations, a pull factor that comple-

ments the push factor that impelled them into
Negotiations are the basic means to pursue,
diplomatic discussions. The notion of a MHS
prevent, manage, resolve, and transform conflicts
is readily understandable in matters of con-
among states (and other parties), including con-
flicts on how to overcome problems and install flict, where rising costs of continued conflict
cooperation. and falling chances of a favorable unilateral
Negotiation operates under an unspoken Ethos outcome impel the parties to seek a negoti-
of Equality, the notion that equal status, equal ated solution. But it also applies to problems
treatment, and fair and equitable results are its requiring two or more states to pool their
defining characteristics. efforts in cooperation when unilateral efforts
Negotiation has increased significantly in the to handle the problem fail and the costs of
last quarter century (since the end of the Cold that failure rise. As a result, parties negotiate
War), but faces new types of challenges beyond trade agreements, set rules to handle nuclear
its efficacy in fanatical ideological conflicts and
proliferation, and seek to regulate climate
worn out cooperative regimes.
change. Ripeness is a matter of perception, a
subjective appreciation strengthened by but
independent of objective evidence. So states
may well need help in perceiving the need
STRUCTURE and opportunities for negotiation, and diplo-
macy involves not only resolving ones own
Merely an unresolved problem or conflict is conflicts and problems but also helping others
not enough to drive parties to negotiate; our to do so. The fact that a MHS and WO are
lives abound in problems and conflicts we subjectively perceptional opens the door to
cannot settle by ourselves. In addition, the the efforts of a mediator to ripen the conflict/
stalemate must be painful to the parties; if problem; otherwise, diplomats would just
they can bear irresolution, there is no need to have to sit and wait until the parties felt hurt
engage in the compromises that bi- or multi- and stalemated on their own (Zartman and
lateral resolution necessarily requires. And Touval 2007; Zartman and de Soto 2010).
these feelings of discomfort and impasse Ripeness was seized in the mediated
must be felt to some degree by all parties negotiations that resolved the South West
involved for them to turn to bi- or multilat- African conflict (1988) (Crocker 1992), the
eral methods for dealing with the situation. Salvadoran conflict (1989) (de Soto 1992),
This situation is termed a mutually hurting and the Mindanao conflict in 2015, and in the
stalemate (MHS); when combined with the direct negotiations in South Africa in 1990
perception that the other side is willing to 94 (Sisk 1995) and in Colombia in 2015. It
look for a negotiated outcome, termed a way was carried through to a minimal outcome
out (WO), the situation has achieved ripe- (agreeing formula) in Nagorno Karabagh
ness, the necessary but not sufficient condi- (Mooradian and Druckman 2003) and to
tion for the beginning of negotiations (Zartman more or less resolving formulas in Dayton
1989, 2000, 2007; Mitchell 1995; Pruitt and (1993) (Holbrooke 1996), in the Israeli disen-
Olczak 1995; Ohlson 1998). Ripeness is a gagements (197375) (Rubin 1982), and the
situation where both/all parties feel their IsraeliEgyptian Washington Treaty (1979).
security point (or BATNA best possible Ripeness was absent in the failed Carter
alternative to a negotiated agreement) to be mediation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
significantly low. For the negotiations to (1990) (Ottaway 1995) and the Clinton and
arrive at a successful conclusion, the parties Kerry mediations between Palestine and
must seize the MHS and turn the WO into a Israel (2000, 2014) (Enderlin 2002), and was
mutually enticing outcome (MEO) through at least objectively present but not seized in
Liberia in 1990 or Lebanon in 1976 (Zartman negotiating parties need also negotiate with
2005). Its absence in the Syrian uprising in their home constituencies and reach an agree-
201115 explains the inability to get negotia- ment at the domestic level that corresponds to
tions going (Hinnebusch and Zartman 2016). the parameters of an agreement on the inter-
The cost/benefit value of what a party can party level is as applicable to conflict negotia-
obtain without negotiating has many names, tions as to cooperation. The negotiations in the
including security point, best/worst alter- Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt,
native to a negotiated agreement (BATNA/ involved a new dimension that may be termed
WATNA), reservation price, threat point, vertical negotiations, where civil society, in
and others, and is the most important refer- tacit negotiations or in dialog fora, supple-
ence point in understanding and conducting a mented the struggling horizontal negotiations
negotiation (Pillar 1983; PON 2014). A com- on the new constitution (Zartman 2015).
parison of what each party can gain without an
agreement is the source of relative power and
determines whether a party can play it tough Key Points
or soft in negotiating (tough, if the security
point is close to the expected outcome; soft, A perception of a mutually hurting stalemate
if the gap is great and there is much benefit to (MHS) and a way out (WO) define a ripe moment,
gain or much loss to be protected) (Kahneman necessary but insufficient for the initiation of
negotiations.
and Tversky 1979, Zartman 2006).
Although parties are never equal in power, a sense
Power structures also operate within of equality is helpful to productive negotiation.
institutional structures, which can have Negotiations are conducted between parties but
important effects on power relations. States also within parties (horizontal), and in addition
institutionalize their relations into interna- between civil society and elites (vertical).
tional regimes, informal and formal, in order
to reduce transaction costs, and such regimes
both expand and limit their negotiating possi-
bilities (Hasenclever etal. 1997; Jnsson and PROCESS
Talberg 1998; Spector and Zartman 2003).
Regimes provide information, monitor pro- Pioneering work by economists introduced
gress, expand linkages, establish agendas, process analysis in the early twentieth cen-
and generally reduce uncertainties and regu- tury, but, while theoretically elegant, it was
late expectations; but they also limit options hampered by two assumptions: fixed initial
and strategies (Odell 2000). In this they tend positions and constant concession rates
to equalize member parties and reduce asym- (Edgeworth 1881, Zeuthen 1930). Now it is
metries. Multilateral bargaining (and analy- understood that negotiation typically goes
sis) also depends largely on the formation of through its own process involving a number
temporary, informal institutions such as party of stages and turning points (Zartman and
and issue coalitions, involving some very Berman 1982; Bendahmane and McDonald
distinct strategies, typologies, and negotia- 1986; Druckman 1986, 2001; Hopmann
tions (Hampson 1994; Zartman 1994, 2006; 1996). These may overlap and parties may
Sebenius 1996; Bottom etal. 2000; Narlikar backtrack; their passage may be explicit or
2003; Crump and Zartman 2003; Odell 2000). implicit; but their functions need to be
Another form of structural analysis con- observed or else the negotiations will fail or
cerns the negotiatory relation between the produce an incoherent result.
negotiator and their domestic constituen- The first stage is diagnosis. Parties need to
cies in two-level games (Druckman 1978; answer such questions as: What are my real
Evans etal. 1993; Putnam 1998) The idea that interests in this problem/conflict, as opposed
to stated positions (Fisher and Ury 1985)? Although diplomats may assume that such
What is my security point? What is this prob- preparation is natural to negotiation, it is fre-
lem/conflict like? How were other similar quently neglected. A comparison of President
conflicts handled? Is there a zone of possible Carters (1979) and President Clintons
agreement (ZOPA) where the parties posi- (2000) preparation for their Camp David
tions overlap, and where? And then similar Mideast negotiations goes far to explain the
questions need to be ascertained from the relative success of the first and the failure of
other sides point of view. Parties must also the second. Rebel groups often need training
separately or jointly establish preparatory in negotiation, beginning with the diagnosis
understanding covering parties to be included phase, as the painful experiences of Renamo
and issues to be covered in negotiation; risks in Mozambique leading up to the 1990
and costs incurred in negotiating; support for negotiations, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
resolving rather than pursuing the conflict; leading up to the 2005 ceasefire, the Lords
and preliminary contacts (Stein 1995). Resistance Army in Uganda leading up to the
Parties and issues are some of the most 2006 negotiations, and the Darfur rebels at
difficult pre-negotiation problems (Talberg Abuja (2006) and Doha (2010) negotiations
2003; Zartman 2009). While negotiations all show, among others.
among both sides moderates only are likely The second phase is one of formulation.
to leave the mass of the opponents outside Negotiators do not immediately start estab-
the agreement, scholarship and practice are lishing a meeting point from fixed positions;
still out on whether to include diehard spoil- implicitly or explicitly, they first establish a
ers in the hopes of carrying them along in the formula for their agreement, consisting of
momentum of the negotiations or to leave a common definition of the problem and its
them out in marginalized isolation, the critical solution (emerging directly from the diagno-
variable being the weight that they command sis components), a common sense of justice,
within the rebellion or the problem (Stedman and/or an agreed set of terms of trade. This
2000; Zahar 2006). Whether the hardlin- set of principles serves as the basis for the
ers (the akazu) and the Committee for the subsequent allocation of details. Establishing
Defense of the Republic (CDR) should have a satisfying formula is the key to a subsequent
been included in the Arusha negotiations on agreement, and if it is not done, the resolu-
Rwanda in 1993 is a question that will be long tion of the conflict will be slower, less coher-
debated and never settled (Jones 2001; Leader ent, and less satisfactory (Narlikar and Odell
2001). But the absence of the IRA on one side 2006). While since Aristotle people have
and the DUP and the UKUP on the other made looked for a single overarching notion of jus-
the Good Friday Agreement possible in 2003 tice governing negotiated outcomes (Rawls
(Curran and Sebenius 2003). In between, 1971; Barry 1986) and others have held that
excluded parties at the Arusha negotiations justice has no place at all in negotiation, it
on Burundi after 2000 were gradually brought has been found that justice is an important
in as the agreement evolved. Similarly, the element in the search for a formula but that
question of what issues to include without the particular version of justice to be applied
breaking the back of an agreeable agenda is is negotiated between the parties before they
also crucial; it is unlikely that the Jerusalem can move on to the disposition of specific
question could have been included at Oslo or items in dispute (Gauthier 1986; Elster 1992;
the Kosovo question at Dayton, but the deci- Zartman et al. 1996; Albin 2001, 2003).
sion to put off a resolution of Brcko at Dayton Formulas abound. The ArabIsraeli disputes
(1994) and of the Panguna mine at Arawa were handled on the basis of the UNSCr
(2001) were the keys to the last lock on the 242 formula of Territory for security in the
Bosnian and Bougainville agreements. IsraeliEgyptian Washington Treaty (1979),
the IsraeliJordan Treaty (1995), and the distributive allocation of the disputed good so
Oslo Accords (1993), and were not managed that each party gets some of it (Dupont 2006).
or resolved with Syria or Palestine because The movement would be zero-sum (what
the formula was not applied. Philippine one party gets, the other loses) if it were not
negotiations pursued the formula peace for accompanied by the shared value of ending
autonomy and the Colombian negotiations the conflict. It is initiated by the establishment
pursued peace for participation. of a range where the potential positions of the
There are two different types of formu- parties overlap, termed the bargaining range or
las: a minimal agreeing formula that ends zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), absent of
or suspends the violence without touching which agreement is not possible (Pillar 1983).
the basic conflict issues (conflict manage- The Zairean conflict in 1996 or the Caricom
ment), and a resolving formula that takes proposal for resolution of the Haitian conflict
on the more difficult challenge of managing in 2004 involved concessions from opposite
both the original issues, the complications positions favoring removal of the president vs
that have arisen during the conflict, and a those favoring his maintenance in power, with
mechanism for dealing with old conflict that the middle point maintenance in position but
may re-emerge and new conflicts that may with power diverted to the prime minister
arise (conflict resolution). The distinction the basis of the compromise, adopted in the
raises a major dilemma in negotiated conflict Zairean case and finally rejected in Haiti. In
resolution: should peace be achieved, even the prolonged negotiation over Aceh, mediator
if through a minimal agreeing formula that Martti Ahtisaari successfully proposed self-
may leave issues unresolved and grievances government as the midpoint resulting from
unaddressed, or should negotiation focus on concessions from Indonesias discredited
the achievement of a final resolving formula, autonomy and the Acehnese independence
even if the search prolongs the violence and (Kingsbury 2006). The Communist states and
killing that come with the struggle for jus- the West divided the Korean peninsula along
tice (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005)? The the 38th parallel in 1945 and Vietnam along
optimal strategy involves sequencing, focus- the 17th parallel in 1954, the government
ing first on conflict management and the favored by each side getting half of the coun-
reduction of violence and then turning to the try; 70 years later, and less equally, Russia and
search for the ingredients of a just, resolving the Ukrainian government divided Ukraine so
formula, recognizing that conflict manage- that a pro-Russian autonomous region was
ment both undermines and promises con- created in the east, the anticipated added value
flict resolution since it reduces pressure for being the end of the armed conflict.
a solution (a less hurting stalemate) but also Compensation refers to an exchange of
implies subsequent attention to underlying concessions on different matters, one partys
causes lest they return to bring back the con- paying for a favorable outcome in one mat-
flict. It is then only after the first two stages ter by granting the other party a favorable out-
that negotiators turn to details. Optimally, come on another matter. It can be achieved by
they can find the specifics that translate and establishing differential values, referring to
implement the formula; if not, they have to the fact that parties tend to value stakes differ-
go back and reformulate. ently and can use them for trade-offs. Homans
Parties can achieve positive sum agreements (1961: 62) maxim, the key to much success-
either through concession, compensation, or ful negotiation (and also the basis of the Nash
construction (or reframing) (Pruitt and Olczak [1950] Point in game theory), states that the
1995). Concession involves mutual move- more the items at stake can be divided into
ment from initial positions on a single item to goods valued more by one party than they
a meeting point somewhere in the middle, a cost to the other and goods valued more by
the other party than they cost to the first, the poor and isolated region in contest rather than
greater the chances of a successful outcome. on the legalisms of their contending claims
Under these conditions, parties can compen- (Simmons 1999; Herz and Nogueira 2002).
sate each other in order to purchase what Territorial distribution and borderlines still
matters most to them. Agreement to end the had to be assigned, but the positive spirit cre-
conflict in Namibia and Angola was reached ated by the common goal made the task much
by pairing a withdrawal of South African easier and susceptible to creative solutions.
troops from Namibia (and its consequent Construction can also make agreement pos-
achievement of independence) with the with- sible through a re-evaluation of the end goal.
drawal (of a coincidentally equal number) In Ulster, the redefinition of the conflict by
of Cuban troops from Angola in 1988, thus the mediator into three strands intra-Ulster,
achieving a full realization of both parties UlsterEire, EireUK took it out of a dis-
goals. Negotiations looking for concessions tributive, zero-sum confrontation. Parties can
to a midpoint between zero and 50,000 for also hold on to their goal but change their
either troops would have been meaningless, means to attain it. The FARC in Colombia
but using each proposal as compensation for kept its goal of reforming society but gave
agreement on the other, as the US media- up military means for electoral politics to
tor got the parties to do, produced a highly attain it when the government assured them
positive-sum agreement with relatively bal- that political means were indeed available.
anced terms and Namibian independence as The most radical would be to consider the
well. Similarly, the National Party retained worst outcome as deadlock (mutual defection
its goal of social and economic privilege in or security point) rather than giving into the
South African negotiations with the African opponent (Better Red than dead). Here there
National Congress (ANC) but saw that it is no determinate outcome but two Nash equi-
could only be achieved with the cooperation libria favoring each party in game theoretic
of the ANC, in exchange for political control. terms, respectively, creating a coordinating
Developed countries sought to compensate rather than a collaborating problem (Snyder
developing countries for development losses and Diesing 1977; Stein 1983; Wagner 1999).
in adhering to the Kyoto Protocol on slowing This represents the tactic used by the US under
climate change but the sums were deemed President Kennedy to end the Cuban Missile
insufficient. Of course, not all collections of standoff (1962) and by President Reagan to
stakes are Homans-divisible, still leaving a end the Cold War (1989) (Brams 1990).
distribution problem in many cases.
Construction, sometimes termed integra-
tion or problem-solving, refers to a redefini-
Key Points
tion of the issues in conflict, so that parties
can focus on common concerns rather than Negotiations pass through the overlapping
on issues defined distributively (Follett 1952: phases of diagnosis, formulation, and detailing
147). It is unlikely that construction can to create a coherent agreement.
totally recast the stakes to the elimination Agreements are reached through the use of
of all distributive concerns, but it can pro- concessions, compensation, and construction
(reframing).
vide superordinate goals and a cooperative
Negotiations over conflicts can aim at conflict
atmosphere, in addition to reframed stakes, management, which ends violence, or for the
so that distribution becomes less contentious. fuller goals of conflict resolution, which settles
The PeruEcuador border dispute reached the issues of the conflict; negotiations over a
a settlement in 1999 when the Guarantor problem have only the second goal to aim for.
Countries (mediators) focused the conflicting Conflict management contains the promise for
parties attention on the development of the resolution but removes the pressure to attain it.
Current scholarship and practice have devel- Cohen, Raymond 1997. Negotiating Across
oped a better understanding of the process Cultures. USIP.
and requirements of negotiation, yet the chal- Coser, Lewis 1956. The Functions of Social
lenges of different types of conflicts and Conflict. Free Press.
problems continue to rise to test that knowl- Cross, John G 1969. The Economics of
Bargaining. Basic.
edge as it comes from a range of experiences.
Curran, Daniel, Sebenius, James, and Watkins,
The new challenges range from negotiations Michael 2004. Two paths to peace: contrasting
on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, George Mitchell in Northern Ireland and
and broadened trade to negotiations with Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
rebel and terrorist groups, with interstate Negotiation Journal 20 (4): 51338.
aggressors, and with true believers on abor- da Conceio-Heldt, Eugenia 2006. Integrative
tion and capital punishment. Two and a half and distributive bargaining situations in the
centuries ago, one of the first encyclopedia European Union, Negotiation Journal 22 (2):
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Elgstrm, Ole and Christer Jnsson, eds., 2005.
In common usage, negotiation means the art of European Union Negotiations: Processes,
handling the affairs of state However, nego- Networks and Institutions. Routledge.
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takes place everywhere there are differences to Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International
conciliate, interests to placate, people to per- Conflict. University of Michigan.
suade, and purposes to accomplish. Thus, all life
Fortna, Page 2004a. International intervention
could be regarded as a continual negotiation.
(deFelice 1778).
and the duration of peace after civil war,
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Fortna, Virginia Page 2004b. Peace Time:
Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of
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18
Diplomatic Mediation
Karin Aggestam
INTRODUCTION Furthermore, the chances of a successful

outcome in the form of an agreement are six
The history and practice of diplomatic medi- times higher when mediators facilitate peace
ation is as long as the existence of conflicts negotiations (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006;
and wars. It is also visible and present in Bercovitch and Jackson 2012; Wallensteen
most regions and cultures. Over time, media- and Svensson 2014). The overarching ration-
tion has become an integral part of the diplo- ale of diplomatic mediation is to strengthen
matic institution, reflecting a set of norms, the diplomatic window of opportunity and
rules and practices. Diplomatic mediation peace negotiations so that they can lead to a
was institutionalised by the Congress of settlement. As such, diplomatic mediation can
Vienna and later within the UN Charter be viewed as a normative practice intended
under Article 33. Recently, a number of to manage and resolve conflict by achieving
regional organisations have underlined the durable peace agreements (Constantinou and
importance of mediation as a preventive tool Der Derian 2010).
of conflict management. In short, diplomatic This chapter seeks to illuminate the diver-
mediation plays a vital role in the historical sity of perspectives and practices of dip-
and cultural reproduction of international lomatic mediation. The overarching aim
society (Jones 1999: 29; Jnsson and Hall is three-fold: (1) to provide an overview of
2005; Sharp 2009). some of the theoretical and methodological
Diplomatic mediation is today one of the approaches in the field; (2) to identify conten-
most common practices of managing con- tious issues in research and key challenges to
temporary conflicts. It occurs in sixty per cent the practice of mediation; and (3) to explore
of all international and intrastate conflicts. some new avenues for research.
Diplomatic mediation 221
DELIMITING THE FIELD OF RESEARCH THE STUDY OF DIPLOMATIC

MEDIATION
Diplomatic mediation is part and parcel of
peace negotiations and touches upon the core While the practice of mediation has a rich
of diplomatic practices, such as representation, history, the field of study is much more
communication and negotiation (Berridge recent (Stenelo 1972). In the last decades,
2010; Jnsson and Hall 2005; Sharp 2009). At research has expanded dramatically and
the same time, it is distinguished by the brought new theoretical and empirical knowl-
presence of a third party, which alters the edge, which underlines the contingent nature
dynamics of direct negotiations. This broad of international mediation (Bercovitch and
range of practices includes acting as a Jackson 2009; Zartman 2015).
go-between; improving communication Some studies have the explicit ambition
channels; designing negotiation processes; to prescribe what is considered the most
facilitating negotiation milieus; deciding on effective strategy of mediation. Based on an
the inclusion/exclusion of negotiating parties; appropriate diagnosis of the conflicting situ-
framing and reframing agendas; suggesting ation, mediation strategies can be matched
workable formulae for agreements; and to a specific phase of conflict. Such studies
influencing the parties preferences towards focus more on process than outcome and
compromise by persuasion or the use of threats are reflected in the number of handbooks on
and rewards (Bercovitch 2002; Greig and conflict analysis and conflict resolution (see,
Diehl 2012). While power is used as leverage for example, Fisher et al 1997; Fisher 2009).
to reinforce the parties incentives to negotiate They also tend to argue for problem-solving
and preferences to reach an agreement, this and integrative mediation strategies as a way
type of manipulative mediation is still to resolve conflicts. Other studies underline
distinct from other more forceful international the need for mediators to act in a specific nor-
practices, such as arbitration and the use of mative direction where the aim is the promo-
force, because the mediation process is guided tion of some specific outcomes, such as the
by and dependent on the voluntary participation satisfaction of human needs or restorative
of the parties (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). justice (Rigby 2001; Kelman 2004). Finally,
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to do empirically oriented studies, which in recent
justice to all the diverse practices of mediation, years have come to dominate the field, have
but in order to demarcate the contents some shifted the set of research problems away from
clarifications on mediation are required. First, how (prescription) and should (normative)
diplomatic mediation and international towards why. The overarching ambition
mediation are concepts that will be used seeks to explain why actors behave the way
interchangeably below. Second, both formal they do without trying to change or moralize
and informal processes of diplomatic mediation about such behavior (Bercovitch and Gartner
are addressed, but the focus is primarily on the 2006: 319). These three strands of research
interactions between these different tracks of not only reflect the existence of different
diplomacy that are here referred to as Track theoretical perspectives and methodological
1 (official), Track 2 and Track 3 (unofficial). approaches in the field, but also shed light on
Third, research on mediation is studied more the distinct epistemological and ontological
broadly in a number of disciplines, such as assumptions held by scholars about conflict,
political science, history, sociology, psychology peace and mediation (Kleiboer 1998).
and economics, as well as within diverse Since most scholars recognise that inter-
empirical contexts. Yet, the focus is here limited national mediation is a contingent practice,
to peace mediation as this chapter is primarily where context matters greatly, theoretical gen-
concerned with international conflicts. eralisations have been limited. The research
field is therefore devoid of grand theorising and ranging from low to high intervention (see
focuses instead on generating policy-relevant also Bercovitch and Houston 1996: 2930).
and middle-range theory, for instance, on With communication-facilitation strategies, a
strategic interaction, motives, roles, functions, mediator acts as a channel of communication
strategies, resources, favouring conditions and or go-between for the parties, but does not
outcomes (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). Key intervene directly in the negotiation process
problems that have been addressed by schol- or provide any substance to the negotiating
ars are why mediators are mediating; why text. Procedural strategies are located where
adversaries are seeking third party assistance; a mediator has more formal control over the
what are the distinct conditions of mediation; negotiation process (agenda, number of
what constitutes successful mediation; to what meetings, the mediation environment, distri-
extent mediation practices are generalisable; bution of information, resources to the par-
what is the appropriate moment to enter as ties). The most direct and assertive form of
mediator; how distinct mediation strategies mediation is the use of manipulating strate-
can be matched to specific phases of conflict; gies where the mediator is heavily involved
and how the effectiveness of mediation can be with the content and substance of the nego-
improved. tiations. A mediator attempts to influence
These research questions have been the process by providing incentives, offering
addressed by the use of a broad range of rewards and punishments, issuing ultimatums
theoretical applications and methodologi- and introducing new proposals.
cal approaches. A large number of empirical
single case studies and structured focused
comparisons have been pursued, but in recent Principal and pure mediation
years a noticeable quantitative turn1 has come
to dominate the field where large N-studies Two approaches, pure and principal mediation,
and global longitudinal datasets are used to are often mentioned for comparison in the
identify generalisable global patterns (see, literature (Princen 1992; Beardsley 2011;
for example, Bercovitch 2002; Regan and Heemsbergen and Siniver 2010; Greig and
Allan 2006; Greig and Diehl 2012). Diehl 2012: 89). Principal mediation illumi-
nates the formal and official dimensions of
Track 1 mediation, whereas the second also
Key Points includes the informal and unofficial settings
and dynamics (Tracks 13). The two modes
Mediation is part of a diplomatic institution that of mediation highlight distinct understand-
reflects a set of norms and practices. ings about goals, skills, capabilities and
The practice and outcome of diplomatic media- strategies.
tion are highly contingent on context.
The analysis of principal mediation draws
The research field is relatively young and focuses
upon a power-political framework of realism,
on policy-driven and middle-range theories.
which underscores the importance attached
to leverage and manipulating mediation
strategies, which mediators use to influence
DIPLOMATIC MODES OF MEDIATION the parties preferences towards a negotiat-
ing settlement. Leverage and the resources
There are a large number of typologies for of a mediator are therefore considered more
describing mediation strategy and behaviour. important to bring to the table than striv-
One of the most frequently used is the one ing towards neutrality and impartiality.
advanced by Zartman and Touval (1985), Moreover, mediators are assumed to have
who conceptualise mediation strategies their own interests, agendas and relations
with the parties, which can include allies conflict, facilitate a confidential framework
(Greig and Diehl 2012: 912). The ration- and milieu of negotiation that can improve
ale leading the parties to accept this type of diplomatic channels of communication and
mediation is often driven by an expectation (re)frame as well as enable recognition of
that principal mediators may be able to trans- common interests. Hence, the strength of the
form the bargaining process and affect the mediators reflects their content and process
distribution of power in their favour. Hence, skills of understanding the conflict and the
third-party intervention concerns the direct parties perceptions and concerns (Rubin
negotiations between the mediators and 2002). For instance, the facilitation of the
the parties and how mediators can utilise a secret talks between Israel and the PLO in
wide range of political, economic and mili- 199293 by the Norwegian non-governmental
tary sources of leverage. Using coercive and organisation FAFO was primarily centred on
rewarding strategies, mediators are assumed providing the parties with a secret negotiation
to influence the parties way of framing their milieu away from the media spotlight and
gains and losses, which enhances the pros- reliable communication channels between
pects of a favourable negotiated outcome the negotiation sessions.
(Princen 1992: 1925). Isak Svensson (2009) has compared these
Principal mediation is often applied in the two modes of mediation and found that prin-
case of deadlock or crisis situations, where cipal mediators generally outperform pure
hostility and mistrust between the conflict- mediators in achieving peace agreements.
ing parties are running high. It is a method Yet, he also underlines that pure mediators
mostly considered in conflicts where the par- tend to be more effective in reaching territo-
ties express low willingness and motivation rial and political power-sharing provisions.
to negotiate. In such situations, the adversar- At the same time, such comparison may be
ies tend to stand firm on their original nego- less suitable since the two modes of media-
tiation positions. To persuade the parties of tion differ greatly in capabilities, goals and
the necessity to compromise, the mediators interests as well as in the focus of intervention
may therefore use threats and rewards as a (Princen 1992: 30). First, principal mediation
mediating tactic. For instance, side-payments is mostly performed by great and super pow-
may be attached as an inducement to the ers with global objectives and extensive influ-
acceptance of a specific proposal advanced ence in several regions where conflicts take
by the mediators. The Camp David negotia- place. In comparison, small states and inter-
tions between Israel and Egypt in 1979 are national organisations, such as the United
often used to illustrate how a mediator, here Nations and Red Cross, primarily tend to
the American president Jimmy Carter, was hold what is called information and expertise
able to persuade the parties to accept a nego- resources and utilise pure mediation strate-
tiated outcome by attaching material incen- gies because they lack any direct interests in a
tives (military and economic aid to Egypt) conflict (Rubin 1992: 265). Second, principal
and security guarantees (to Israel). mediation focuses on coercive and rewarding
In contrast, pure mediation focuses mostly strategies as a way to affect the pay-off struc-
on the ability to persuade and communicate ture of a likely outcome of a negotiated agree-
effectively with the negotiating parties. It ment. Pure mediation, in contrast, emphasises
is a non-coercive form of mediation, which the need to improve the interaction between
is often applied when conflicting parties the parties through facilitation, communica-
express a political willingness to negotiate, tion and problem-solving strategies that can
but require third-party assistance to reach enhance the prospect of win-win outcomes
an agreement. In this capacity, the mediator (Fisher 2009). In sum, the two approaches
may suggest various formulae to resolve the differ in their emphasis on distributive and
integrative dynamics of mediation. As a con- Resistance to negotiation and

sequence, impartiality is of much less concern mediation
for principal and biased mediators than for
pure mediators who strive to interact with the The optimism about efficient diplomacy
conflicting parties in a more equal manner. and peace-making following the end of the
The differences between the two Cold War has today been replaced by
approaches reflect the continuous debates, increased pessimism because of the current
among practitioners and academics alike, turmoil in global politics. The repeated but
about what kind of resources mediators should failed attempts at peace mediation in the
utilise during intervention and what relation- protracted Syrian civil war provide only
ships they should have with the negotiating one of several illustrations (Aggestam and
parties. Bias challenges in many ways the Dunne, 2016). In many ways, contempo-
long-held assumption about impartial media- rary conflicts seem to defy negotiated set-
tors as a prerequisite for diplomatic media- tlements. Some argue that we are witnessing
tion. However, Saadia Touval (1982), in his new forms and patterns of violence. While
seminal work, began to question the assump- interstate wars have been in constant
tion about impartial mediators. He argues that decline over the last century, intrastate
leverage and the ability to influence the par- wars have waxed and waned unevenly in
ties positions are more dependent on the use regions more recently (Kaldor 2012;
of the mediators resources and special rela- Themnr and Wallensteen 2013). Others
tionships with the disputing parties than on argue that these conflicts defy Western
holding neutral or impartial ground in prac- notions of international norms and diplo-
tice. Since then Touvals work has triggered matic rules (Bercovitch and Jackson 2012:
a large number of studies and in recent years 32). One reason for this may be that a large
data sets have been constructed to analyse number of state and non-state actors are
when biased mediators can be effective (see, involved in them. Deeply contested issues
for example, Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007). about representation and leadership that
are related to international legitimacy need
to be resolved before peace negotiations
Key Points can get started.
Another distinguishing characteristic of
Diplomatic mediation ranges from low to high contemporary conflicts is that they are highly
forms of intervention. asymmetrical in power relations as well as in
Mediation strategies include communication, judicial terms since both state and non-state
facilitation, formulation and manipulation of the actors are involved. Research points to asym-
negotiating parties preferences.
metry as constituting one major barrier to
There are two dominant and contrasting modes
of mediation: principal vs pure mediation.
effective negotiations, since stronger parties
are inclined to persist with unilateral military
actions while weaker parties tend to strive on
an existential commitment to continue with
CHALLENGES TO DIPLOMATIC violent resistance (Habeeb 1988; Zartman
MEDIATION 1995; Aggestam 2002). As such, power-
ful parties attempt to impose conditions on
Since context and process variables2 matter weaker actors rather than to negotiate them.
greatly, in both theory and practice, I will Also the discrepancy in expectations of medi-
elaborate on three salient challenges that ation between strong and weak parties tends
international mediation faces in contempo- to lead strong parties to reject or lay down
rary global diplomacy. irreconcilable conditions for diplomatic
mediation, whereas weaker parties often Timing intervention and

make appeals for forceful third-party inter- defining success
vention (Zartman and Rubin 2000; Fixdal
2012a). The quest for timing and the right moment to
At the same time, there are groups, so- intervene as a mediator seems to be a per-
called peace spoilers, who are excluded or petual question that both scholars and practi-
choose to opt out of the process and thus tioners have pondered at length because it is
attempt to derail the peace negotiations closely associated with effective mediation.
(Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman The seminal work of William Zartman (1986,
1997). This has led a number of scholars to 1989, 2007) on ripeness of conflict has trig-
question the traditional modes of diplomacy gered a large number of studies in the field
and mediation. For instance, Mary Kaldor (see, for example, Aggestam 2005; Greig
(2012) underlines that peace negotiation 2001; Pruitt 2005). He identifies a ripe
and mediation have proved limited at best moment for mediation and negotiation as that
and counterproductive at worst. She argues of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). It
that these attempts at elite-based nego- relates to a painful and costly deadlock in
tiations have generated several unfortunate which the parties have recognised the limits
outcomes where, for instance, mediators of unilateral strategies and therefore perceive
have allowed war criminals to participate. a negotiated settlement as the only way to
Their inclusion has given public legitimacy de-escalate the conflict.
to individuals who are responsible for seri- Several scholars have attempted to advance
ous human rights abuses. Furthermore, the the concept of ripeness both theoretically
formulae promoted by several international and empirically (see, for example, Greig and
mediators have been based on particularistic Regan 2008; Walch 2016). The identification
grounds, which according to Kaldor inhibit of an enticing opportunity (Mitchell 1995)
the construction of stability and long-term and motivational ripeness (Pruitt 2005) has
sustainable settlements. been suggested, which underlines the impor-
Finally, a number of the peace agree- tance of perceptions and political willing-
ments that are reached encounter great ness among the parties to manage and settle
obstacles in the implementation phase, conflict. Still, there is no consensus on what
which impact negatively on the public constitutes a ripe moment in conflict and to
legitimacy of the peace that is being deliv- what extent such a situation can be identified
ered (Paris 2004). For instance, there are before mediation takes place. Hence, there
few peace agreements that contain a man- is a risk of tautology because the concept is
date to enforce the rule of law, so when closely associated with successful outcomes
violence and human rights abuses spill over (Kleiboer 1996). Also a mutually hurting
in the post-agreement phase, the overarch- stalemate is less likely to evolve, as Zartman
ing peace process may be at risk (Stedman (1995: 910) rightly points out, in intrastate
2002; see also Kydd and Walter 2002). and asymmetrical conflicts since stronger par-
Consequently, the old dictum of pacta sunt ties are inclined to use their power superiority
servanda (parties are committed to signed to continue unilateral actions, whereas weaker
agreements) seems to be less adhered to. parties mobilise strength through strongly
Because of the lack of prerequisites for held commitments to resist domination and
diplomatic mediation, some scholars there- exclusion by means of violent struggles.
fore argue that we need to pay much more Closely related to the notion of ripeness
attention to the notion of timing and the and the timing of mediation is the operation-
conditions when or when not to intervene alisation of success and failure (Gartner and
in a conflict (Haass 1990). Melin 2009). A common distinction is made
between subjective and objective definitions Peace negotiations are often stalled because
(Bercovitch 2002: 17). A subjective approach recognition needs to be resolved before any
originates from the perceptions held by medi- meaningful progress can be made in the nego-
ators and the parties assessment of third- tiation process. As Oliver Richmond (2006:
party intervention. An objective definition 68) underlines, non-state actors fight for their
focuses on some specific empirical indicators lack of recognised status while governments
and observable outcomes, such as ceasefire, reject claims for proto-political status. The
or partial or comprehensive agreements that quest for inclusion of a representative lead-
are associated with success. Another way of ership or valid spokesperson in the negotia-
assessing the success and failure of interna- tion process is a major hurdle to overcome
tional mediation is to analyse the efficiency because one side may withhold recognition
of one particular strategy applied to a specific as a way to undermine the other sides posi-
phase of conflict (Bercovitch and Houston tion or simply because it does not benefit its
1996). Yet, the risk of such an approach is own long-term interests. Many of the claims
that it depicts conflict as one-dimensional to recognition originate from Westphalian
and linear, and tends to ignore the transform- norms of diplomatic recognition (visibility),
ative dynamics and complexities (Lederach equal sovereignty (respect) and non-interfer-
2005). Finally, an alternative understand- ence, which concern the quest for respect and
ing of success and failure is to analyse the normative expectations of being recognised
quality and durability of peace agreements. as member of a community. In this way, rec-
The implementation phase has gained more ognition is strongly linked to international
attention in recent years (Stedman et al norms and justice, which if denied may incite
2002), but few studies combine the quality of violence that is seen as a justified option
a mediated peace agreement with durability due to the perceived denial of recognition
(Aggestam and Bjrkdahl 2013; Druckman (Lindemann 2012: 21314). There are today
and Albin 2011; Fixdal 2012b; Wallensteen a growing number of studies in International
and Svensson 2014). For instance, to what Relations that focus on the struggle for rec-
extent does a mediated peace agreement con- ognition and its causal linkages to the causes
tribute to negative, positive or durable peace? of war and conflict (Lindemann 2010;
Lindemann and Ringmar 2012). A number of
other studies also problematise such issues as
Devious objectives and inclusion/exclusion in peace processes (see,
for example, Darby 2001; Paffenholz 2014).
international recognition
However, few studies specifically explore the
If one challenge for mediators is to get the par- interplay between recognition and diplomatic
ties to the table, another concern is the pres- mediation (Aggestam, 2015).
ence of parties who hold devious objectives.
Hence, their acceptance of mediation may be
less related to willingness to negotiate and Key Points
compromise than to the fact that internationally
sponsored peace negotiations provide opportu- Several contemporary conflicts, which are dis-
tinguished by highly asymmetrical power rela-
nities to gain wider legitimacy and recognition
tions, seem to defy negotiated and mediated
as international actors (Richmond 1998; Pillar settlements.
1983). Consequently, a major challenge for The quest for timing diplomatic mediation is a
mediators is how to nurture and sustain good conundrum that scholars and practitioners have
faith negotiations, based on commitment, good pondered at length.
intention and willingness to reach a negotiated A major challenge for a mediator is how to nur-
settlement (Aggestam 2012). ture and sustain good faith negotiations.
NEW STRANDS OF RESEARCH from peace negotiations and grossly under-

represented as mediators since their inclusion
As discussed above, the study and practice of would break with rigid gender norms. Despite
international mediation is complex and UN resolution 1325, there are still few women
diverse. At the same time, two distinct para- appointed to senior positions even within the
digms have come to dominate the field, UN and regional organisations. With more
namely the power-political and problem- systematic and theoretically driven studies,
solving. In more recent years, we can also research on diplomatic mediation has great
observe a quantitative turn, which has gener- potential to make significant contributions,
ated a number of useful databases for statisti- which can move beyond the present state-of-
cal correlations and regional comparison. the-art in the field.
Despite the growth of normative and critical
perspectives in the discipline of International
Relations, with focus on international ethics
and human rights in global politics, no simi- NOTES
lar development has occurred in the study of
international mediation (Jones 1999). 1 This is reflected in the large number of articles
published in the main leading international
However, if we are to take the analysis of
journals, such as Journal of Peace Research and
mediation and the quality of peace agree- Journal of Conflict Resolution.
ments seriously, as several scholars argue 2 Context variables refer to the characteristics of the
(Druckman and Albin 2011; Wallensteen and parties and the nature of the dispute as well as the
Svensson 2014), the study of international mediator. Process variables concern the initiation
of mediation, the environment and strategies.
mediation needs to engage more with norma-
tive and critical approaches. Its inclusion
might move the research agenda forward and
spur new creative diplomatic practices of
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Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe
19
Diplomatic Summitry
David Hastings Dunn and Richard Lock-Pullan
Summit diplomacy is the meeting of political not prohibitive then the sensitivities of venue
leaders at the highest possible level. Although were often difficult to manage. Napoleon met
this practice dates back to the earliest days of Tsar Alexander I after the battle of Friedland
diplomacy it was rare for the rulers of power- in 1807 on a raft placed precisely in the
ful states to meet in person until the nineteenth middle of the Niemen River with the doors
century. Now, however, summits are frequent facing either bank (Chandler 1967: 5856).
and have superseded many more traditional There was also the question of the security
forms and methods of diplomacy (Eban 1983: of the participants. Stalin was not willing to
359, Dunn 1996). The diaries of world leaders leave territory that he controlled, resulting,
are now blocked out years in advance for pre- famously, in Churchill and Roosevelt travel-
scheduled meetings of various international ling thousands of miles for their summit meet-
organisations such as the G20, NATO, ings with him during the Second World War.
Commonwealth and Organization of American The 2005 G8 Summit took place in the iso-
States summits. lated Gleneagles resort in Scotland, showing
Until the modern era, summits were diffi- that the concern with security has resurfaced
cult to hold because there were huge issues and been combined with the increasing use
with the logistics of travelling to meet in of convivial surroundings to aid negotiations.
distant kingdoms. It took Tsar Alexander 11
days to get from Moscow to Vienna for the
Congress of 1814 (Zamoyski 2007: 276).
Not until 1919 did a US President meet a THE EVOLUTION OF SUMMITRY
foreign head of state abroad, when Wilson
travelled to the Paris peace conference at the Given the range of problems involved with
end of the First World War. If logistics were having a summit of leaders, it is little wonder
that negotiations until the fifteenth century Before the French Revolution there were
were conducted by correspondence, as ten congresses. All were convened to end
Goldstein shows in his history of summitry wars of a particularly complex nature, allow-
(1996). If verbal negotiation was required ing the resolution of further issues to be
then an emissary could be dispatched, though addressed. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia
with such enormous and costly ceremony they coming from the linked meetings at
were a rare occurrence. Thomas Becket went Osnabruck and Munster is both the first and
to Paris in 1158 with a huge retinue (Barlow the most emblematic, though it was carried
1986: 56). On arrival in Paris he had to pro- out by correspondence. It was the Congress
cure rations for the 1,000 men in his entou- of Ryswyck in 1697 that introduced the
rage. Little wonder the astonished inhabitants round table, though much of the work was
exclaimed what a wonderful king he must be done away from it in private talks outside.
to have such a great chancellor! precisely However, though useful to end wars, the
the effect Becket and Henry II aimed for. Congresses were too cumbersome for more
Ambassadors were seen as the representative, general settlements, which were dealt with
indeed the personification, of their sovereign. bilaterally through the rapidly developing
This meant that their meetings can be seen as institutional diplomacy.
summit diplomacy by proxy (Goldstein The end of the Napoleonic wars saw new
1996: 25). These rather intermittent relations diplomatic tools developed as Metternich, the
stabilised with the development of the resi- Austrian Chancellor, instituted the Congress
dential embassy, firstly amongst the Italian System. This was to maintain ongoing dis-
city states and by the end of the sixteenth cussions through regular summits, of which
century across Europe, which led to the grad- there were eventually four. After Great
ual establishment of specialised ministries of Britain pulled out, from 1822 the Congress
foreign affairs (Hamilton and Langhorne worked through ad hoc conferences dealing
1995). By the end of the eighteenth century all with matters of international concern, led by
the major states possessed such ministries and residential ambassadors of the Great Powers.
the centralised states formalised bureaucracy The Foreign Minister of the host Country
was the regular channel of communication presided. Congresses themselves were used
between states. The art of negotiation became three times Paris 1856, and Berlin 1878
a permanent activity. For extraordinary cir- and 1885. All dealt with complex issues on
cumstances, such as the ending of wars, the periphery of Europe, namely Crimea,
irregular means were still needed. the Balkans and Africa. In this period of
The seventeenth century congress was the increased instability, bilateral summitry
novel mechanism from which the modern became far more frequent till the great pow-
summit evolves. The church was the model ers lined up in two blocks at the outbreak of
for this format of handling international the First World War.
disputes as it had had great Ecumenical The end of the First World War led to a
Councils (325787 CE) to resolve theo- revival in diplomacy by conference. Rather
logical disputes plaguing the Empire (Davis than relying on diplomats, the democratically
1983). The conclusions reached were delib- elected leaders rather like the unelected
erately shaped to bring political stability to Emperors in the Three Emperors League in
Emperor Constantines areas of responsibil- 1872, for example were to meet and settle
ity. The aspirations and success of the seven the issues themselves. The Paris Conference
councils gave a model for the diplomats to was the single greatest mass of summitry
follow as the format resolved conflicts, gen- in history, with 1141 delegates (Goldstein
erated agreements and norms and provided 1996: 30). Little wonder Margaret Macmillan
legal frameworks for future practice. sees it as the worlds government, its court of
Diplomatic Summitry 233
appeal and parliament (Macmillan 2001: 1). to dinner to discuss matters (Seton-Watson
President Wilson believed in the force of 1935: 448). The summit meetings with
personal meetings and, incredibly, stayed Hitler were notable for being the first time
for all but one of the six months of meetings. that a Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain,
French President Poincare opened the con- flew, marking a new stage in the evolution
ference as Head of State, but Prime Minister of summitry. His successor Churchill flew
Clemenceau chaired the working sessions. frequently, though the first summit between
The three Great Power leaders met daily, allies saw him and Roosevelt meeting off
often morning and evening (Macmillan 2001: the coast of Newfoundland (1941) on war-
44). Wilson as Head of State did not push for ships, a setting reminiscent of earlier lead-
precedence and so the conference marked ers meetings. There was also the novelty of
a greater informality to such meetings in the Atlantic Charter being part of the press
contrast to the 1699 Congress of Carlowitz, release, starting the trend to release conclu-
for example, where none were prepared to sions in the final communiqu. Later trilat-
concede precedence, so four doors were con- eral meetings took place in Tehran, a territory
structed, allowing all the sovereigns to enter Stalin controlled, beginning a process of
the room simultaneously. The presence of EastWest summitry that predated the Cold
Wilson also meant that the language of diplo- War and was to be a feature of it from the late
macy was no longer exclusively French, as 1950s onward, with Reagan and Gorbachevs
now two Great Powers spoke English, so series of summits in the 1980s culminating
it had dual status, as it still does at the UN with Gorbachev and H.W. Bushs summit in
today. Malta in December 1989, ending the Cold
Not all summits met with success. The War (Reynolds 2007).
rapidly planned meetings between Hitler Summitry continues to be used, even
and Chamberlain in 1938 have left a legacy though the United Nations provides a forum
to this day (Goldstein and Lukes 1999). The for negotiations. Great powers turned to it
summits were necessary as the mechanism only when international problems appeared
of the League of Nations could not be used. too intractable or insoluble by other means
Germany and Italy had left it and the US (Lauren 1994). In 1950, Churchill spoke of
never joined. Chamberlain relied on personal meetings at the highest level and called for
diplomacy, meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden, a parley at the summit, a point reiterated in
with Hitlers interpreter being the only other 1953 after the death of Stalin when he called
person present. It was only at the following for a summit of nations to work for peace
meeting at Godesberg that Chamberlain was between the Great Powers (Gilbert 1988:
even accompanied by a British note taker 510, 831). It was the year in which Everest,
(Gilbert and Gott 1963: 144, 152). It is lit- the highest summit, had been conquered.
tle wonder that professional diplomats in the (Those who prepare the ground for summits
modern era have consistently resented the use are still known as sherpas.) Implicit in this
of summitry as they fear similar diplomatic call is an understanding of summitry that, at
naivety by political leaders relying on the the highest level, brings together rivals to dis-
force of personality over established process. cuss issues of high politics that have global
The increased ease of travel facilitated the consequences. Summits of this nature began
growth of summits. Disraeli had travelled in 1955 but met infrequently till the 1970s. As
by train to Berlin for the Congress of 1878. the number and purpose of high-level meet-
He went on to use it as a bargaining tool by ings have increased in the post-war period,
ordering a special train to be made ready so Churchills understanding of summitry has
he could leave prematurely. It worked. An become too narrow, as the term now covers a
alarmed Bismarck immediately invited him variety of high-level meetings.
Key Points and terrorism, are often addressed either by

international summits such as Rio de
Historically, summits were infrequent due to the
Janeiro in 1992 and Copenhagen in 2009 or
difficulty of travel and the concerns with security.
by hosted summits such as President Obamas
Congresses developed as a means for the Great
Powers to manage crises. 2015 Summit on Countering Violent
The Paris Conference in 1919 was a turning Extremism in the White House.
point, as democratic politics became a model for The increased need for summits has been
summit processes. matched by the declining logistical difficul-
ties of bringing leaders together rapidly.
Technology allows summits to be arranged
far more swiftly and with the minimum of dis-
MODERN SUMMITRY ruption to other business. Where embassies
with ambassadors holding plenipotentiary
With the dawn of the nuclear age, a new powers had been established out of neces-
motive arrived for summit diplomacy, espe- sity rather than choice, the development of
cially as the issue was considered too impor- air travel collapsed the time required to travel
tant to be left to the diplomats. The frequency and meet. The development of crisis man-
of summits was initially due, as Churchill agement as a discrete activity, separate from
envisaged, to the nature of political crises that regular diplomatic dialogue, is also accentu-
required a speedy conclusion to grave inter- ated by this trend. At the emissary level, the
national questions. Politicians thus became shuttle diplomacy of Dulles, Kissinger and
far more involved in the detailed process of Haig are further examples of this trend, as are
international dialogue. As the number of the contemporary travels of Hilary Clinton
nuclear states proliferated, so did the need for and John Kerry.
summits to either ease tensions with long The developments in communication tech-
term negotiations SALT I took three years nology have altered the nature of diplomacy.
to be agreed or to address immediate crises, Over the last two centuries, innovations such
such as between India and Pakistan when ten- as the wireless have allowed faster com-
sions reached an apogee as both held nuclear munication between the embassy and the
tests in May 1998. The Lahore Summit in capital (Nickles 2003) Kennans Long
1999, with its resultant declaration, was seen Telegram probably the most famous, and
as a watershed agreement, but the following the Zimmerman Telegram one of the most
Agra Summit in 2001 failed to reach agree- dangerous but it also meant greater cen-
ment. However, the atmospherics of the tralisation of diplomacy evolving into leaders
negotiation and engagement were themselves communicating directly, increasing the con-
progress in a bitter, nuclear relationship tact between leaders and their involvement in
(Baral 2002). Other summits between nuclear foreign policy matters. Being more familiar
powers had more tangible and immediate with the issues and their opposite numbers
results, particularly Kosygin and Zhou Enlais has also encouraged this growth. Political
summit in Beijing in 1969, which halted the leaders now regularly bypass formal diplo-
fighting on their border that had already matic channels. President Carter, for exam-
killed 3,000 troops. They then resumed ple, happily reached for the telephone to the
border negotiations, begun earlier in 1964, Prime Minister of the UK or the Chancellor
and continued them at deputy foreign minis- of West Germany, often not even bothering
ter level without much pro gress till the to tell the resident ambassador (Jenkins and
summit of Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping in Sloman 1985: 129). President George H.W.
1989 (Wang 2003: 399401). New global Bush largely built the international coalition
concerns, such as the environment that fought the 1991 Gulf War by extensive
personal diplomacy, conducted largely over economic issues, which are increasingly
the telephone, with numerous heads of gov- global in nature. President George W. Bush
ernment (Freedman and Karsh 1994: 107). called a summit in November 2008 of the
The same type of technology allows constant G20 nations, rather than the G8, as the scale
communication between a leader and his del- of the financial crisis became apparent.
egation and the wider field of advisors back Economic management has become part of
home, something particularly useful for pro- a more explicit global governance concern
tracted talks. of political leaders. Direct commercial diplo-
Summitry has also developed as a conse- macy has also become a growing feature of
quence of the expansion of the international international politics. Prime Minister David
community with decolonisation, and the Camerons visit to China in December 2013
regional and international requirements they was a trade mission where he met President
have generated. The increase of economic Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. For this
and defence issues has been a feature of the trip he was accompanied by three Secretaries
post-1945 era. These groupings range from of State, whilst the Foreign Office was only
the comprehensive and well established, such represented at the lower ranked Minister of
as the EU and NATO, to the younger issue- State level (Gov.uk 2014). The increasing
specific Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation role of governments in business promotion
forum (APEC). Most groupings are geograph- will lead to an ever greater number of bilat-
ical, whilst others, such as the Organization eral summits, with the continual downgrad-
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), ing of the foreign ministry over the trade
are single issue, or based round specific department.
identities, such as the Arab League. For such As the needs and opportunities for summits
organisations the participation of the heads increase so does the motive for them. They
of government is necessary, thus generat- are very much the product of the democratic
ing further summits. The EU, with its aspi- age where leaders of avowedly open and
rations towards supra-national sovereignty, accountable governments meet. For domestic
points to a further development as the heads purposes, such a meeting has tangible ben-
of government attend summits in a substan- efits as it gives status as state leaders meet as
tive role, but this leads to a further blurring equals, boosts popularity and generates legit-
of the line between foreign and domestic imacy for the leader. Publically, the method
policy. European affairs are now such a cen- of domestic politics with its open debate and
tral part of domestic policy and politics for negotiated settlements is replicated at the
European countries that leaving European international level. The Paris Conference was
business in the Foreign Office is, in the words the start of the new era as the old formula of
of Tony Blairs Chief of Staff, an anachro- the authority of Great Powers in conference
nism (Powell 2010: 245). Furthermore the became rather awkwardly combined with the
annual ChinaEU summits, attended by the American emphasis on consent and the prin-
President of China and the Presidents of ciple of the equality of all parties, in this case
the Council and the European Commission, states (Otte 2001: 170). The UN is a continu-
show a further stage in the evolution in sum- ation of this unhappy amalgam. Increasing
mitry as a state formally meets and negotiates understanding is also seen as good in its own
with a regional multi-national body. China is right and the importance of the atmospherics
well ahead of the US in this practice, with, of the summit cannot be underestimated in its
for example, the Forum on ChinaAfrica importance for domestic status, especially
Cooperation meeting since 2000. once television and wider media became
Post-war developments have led to gov- dominant in domestic politics. Summits
ernments being more directly involved in are also opportunities to signal displeasure
for a domestic audience Japanese Prime laid back generalists from the Foreign Office
Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi were let alone the ministerial muddlers in charge
photographed having a very icy handshake of them (Thatcher 1993: 464). When deal-
in November 2014 when they formally met ing with an authoritarian regime, personally
on the sidelines of the APEC summit in meeting the leader makes tremendous sense,
Beijing (BBC 2014). Summits can also exac- but more generally the rising influence of
erbate domestic political problems. When political advisors, namely individuals out-
Gorbachev arrived for his summit with Deng side of the formal government bureaucracy,
Xiaoping in May 1989, tens of thousands leads to leaders themselves taking the ini-
of students were in Tiananmen Square pro- tiative and managing the process. These
testing against the government. Many were changes sit atop the fault-line that has always
holding banners in support of Gorbachevs existed between politicians and diplomats as
reforms (Westad 2012: 4268). to who represents the country best. Political
The problem with relying on a domestic leaders stress the importance of their elec-
model of open, reasoned debate between lead- toral mandate and that they are more in touch
ers is shown most clearly by Chamberlains with the wishes and interest of the electorate.
Munich meetings, but the tradition continued There is a deep suspicion among politicians
as with Reagan in 1986 in Reykjavik where of diplomats going native and being out of
the two leaders were unaccompanied and touch domestically, having spent so many
drew up a series of tentative proposals that years abroad. In principle there does not need
caused great alarm to the Presidents foreign to be a tension, but in practice there often is.
policy advisors and NATO ally leaders alike Different political cultures generate differ-
(Williams 1987). This approach and the pub- ent tensions; for example, in 1991 Raymond
licity generated stoked expectations of the Seitz was the first professional US diplomat
superpower leaders that they could individu- to be appointed Ambassador to the UK; prior
ally address the overwhelming concern with to that it had always been an appointment of
war and peace in the world. a political supporter of the President (Seitz
There is often a distrust of diplomats by 1998). British Prime Ministers have done
politicians, which encourages them to bypass the reverse, with Jim Callaghan appointing
them and hold summits. For one, professional his son-in-law to the Washington embassy
diplomats had not been quite as successful as and Margaret Thatcher later pulling Nicholas
they often believed, as they became a byword Henderson out of retirement to appoint him
for caution and inactivity as they awaited to be her man in Washington. The tensions
instructions from their political masters between the political leadership and the dip-
along laborious communications channels lomatic service have, of course, been further
(Eban 1983: 358). Furthermore, diplomats exacerbated by the growth of supra-national
who serve modern political leaders often diplomatic missions such as the EUs diplo-
come from different personal, professional matic service (The European External Action
and educational backgrounds. Professional Service, EEAS), a symbolic if not a material
diplomats have linguistic expertise, training challenge to traditional layers of guidance,
and extensive knowledge of the country in developing a hybrid form of diplomacy and
which they serve. Politicians, in the main, bringing a further level of tension for national
do not. Ernest Bevin once remarked that the diplomats (Adler-Nissen 2014).
only job he could hold in the Foreign Office The centralisation of modern politics
was that of Foreign Secretary as he had not not only undercuts the role of the diplomat
passed the requisite exams in history and but also weakens the position of the for-
French (Eban 1983: 366). Margaret Thatcher eign minister. In previous times, delega-
famously felt that she could not rely on the tion of the responsibility for foreign affairs
was willingly given, whereas now the was that while telephone conversations might
Prime Minister guards it jealously. The ten- be long and substantive, in content they do not
sion between Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign involve the same commitment of political
Secretary, and his Prime Minister, Margaret capital and thus political risk, time and energy
Thatcher, is a case in point. He complained as of an actual face-to-face meeting. A useful
she continually played second fiddle as approach is to look in more detail at the actors
well as first (Howe 1994: 394). The tension or agents involved in summits, and the activity
can lead to the appointing of weaker politi- that takes place.
cians as Foreign Minister so that the Prime Plischke emphasises summitry as an execu-
Minister stays in charge, which then becomes tive practice:
a reinforcing cycle. Tony Blairs appointment
of Margaret Becket as Foreign Secretary is Simply stated it is diplomacy engaged in by politi-
often suggested as a modern a case in point. cal principals above cabinet or ministerial rank,
including participations of state, heads of govern-
ment, a few others who qualify by virtue of their
official positions (such as presidents-elect, crown
Key Points princes, and the ranking officers of international
organisations), and certain agents of heads of
Nuclear weapons and economic issues have cre- government who genuinely represent them at
ated a growing need for summits. their level. (Plischke 1979: 170)
Improved communications have increased the
opportunity for summits.
The domestication of foreign policy has increased For Plischke the key feature of summitry is
the role of politicians in diplomacy. the notion of executive agency. As long as
they take place explicitly on behalf of the
political principal of the state they are sum-
mits. There is the difficulty of how far down
DEFINING SUMMITRY the chain representation goes. Are ambassa-
dors genuinely engaged in summitry? A way
The frequency and purposes of summitry, as round this is to limit the definition to meet-
has been shown, have expanded rapidly from ings where there is political presence. But it
the time of Churchills call for a summit of is not easy to make the division between
great powers. Furthermore, the use of the political and diplomatic in cases where the
term in journalism has also broadened to diplomatic appointment is explicitly political,
such an extent that there is a need to define as with the case of the US ambassadors to the
the concept rather more closely. Applied in UK and elsewhere already cited. Secondly,
this way, the concept justifies George Balls there is the additional problem concerning
criticism that: executive agency, in the sense that even heads
of government may lack full power as they
Today the word summitry is used without distinc- require domestic political bodies to ratify
tion to describe any occasion in which chiefs of agreements made at summits, as the separate
state or heads of government get together bilater-
ally or in large meetings. It has, as a result, become cases of Brezhnev and Carter negotiating the
so vague in meaning as to be not only useless but SALT II Treaty in 1979 shows. Although
downright misleading. (Ball 1976: 34) Carter signed the treaty the US Senate failed
to ratify it, so it never had the force of law.
The strength of this point is brought home However, a summit is different to other dip-
further when the above definition is applied to lomatic or political activity if it involves the
exclude telephone conversations between primary executive of a state, be they the head
leaders, however substantive, from the category of state, the head of government or the leader
of summits. The rationale for this distinction of the ruling party in appropriate cases, as with
Stalin and Mao who were general secretaries In analysing this, it is not necessary to
of their respective communist parties. The key demonstrate that such courtesy meetings
element thus becomes the executive participa- are devoid of worth. They can still be useful
tion. They may differ on their ability to deliver without necessarily being defined as summits.
on the agreements reached, but by virtue of Indeed, they clearly still have diplomatic sig-
their position they are not able to be contra- nificance, especially for the minor party who
dicted by any other individual. Summit meet- often initiates such meetings. Indeed, they
ings are thus distinguished by their form of are a level and form of bilateral engagement
personal contact and the level of the meeting that would be absent was the opportunity not
that takes place rather than by the importance available for such one-to-one contact. They
of the issues discussed or the results obtained. often allow sustained conversations between
Where the head of government is in a dis- leaders.
pute that lies outside the constitutional frame- However, if the mere value of meeting
work, such as a civil war, then a meeting of another head of government for its own sake
the leaders of various factions is a summit. An is no longer sufficient in and of itself to jus-
example is the Lancaster House Conference tify being dignified as a summit meeting,
on the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia where then the term itself may need to be refined.
the negotiations were conducted at the high- An interesting variation on the definition of
est level. However, the leadership is not just summitry is offered by Geoff Berridge and
of states, as leaders of organisations such as Alan James in A Dictionary of Diplomacy.
NATO, the UN and the EU can also partici- They suggest that summitry is The use of
pate in summits with heads of government meetings of heads of state or government
and state. for diplomatic or propaganda purposes
Whether bilateral or multilateral meet- (Berridge and James 2001: 229). Thus the
ings of executive leaders, the purpose of the simple act of meeting would not constitute
meetings needs addressing, especially as the a summit in itself as far as they are con-
purpose and nature of summit meetings var- cerned; it would need to have an instrumental
ies greatly. Prime Minister Edward Heath said element.
that leaders meetings should be held for a Defining a summit by the specific activity
specific purpose, agreed beforehand, and involved, apart from a face-to-face meeting,
that planning them months in advance for a is certainly no easy task. How purposeful
general chat, is, in fact, meaningless. For the diplomacy can be defined is obviously not
scholar, however, the question raised is differ- objectively measurable, and what might be
ent: rather, if such a meeting is not purposeful, purposeful for one party might be trivial
is it still a summit (Young 2006; Dunn 2007)? for another. Other criteria that might be
Of course, if the practice of meeting now considered such as the requirement for
excludes routine courtesy meetings because advanced preparation, documentation of the
they are too burdensome for their relative meeting, mutual purposefulness, being part
benefit, it could be argued that this negates of a wider diplomatic process to which they
the need to define them out of the defini- add momentum, occupying a considerable
tion of summitry. In response to such a line, period of time, ranging across a number of
however, it needs to be pointed out that insti- interlinked subjects, the summit being the
tutional meetings, such as multilateral sum- primary motivation for travel, or it simply
mits, invariably also involve lots of bilateral being a significant international event all
meetings that can best be described as cour- also pose difficulties for a workable definition.
tesy meetings. For their participants, these Early summits, as expressed by Churchill,
are seen as valuable for symbolic purposes were exceptional as they were substantive,
even if they are devoid of substantive content. multi-issue meetings that allowed business to
be concluded in a timely and secure manner. meetings, however, how useful any of these
This distinction has more recently become divisions are to our understanding of summitry
rather less clear. With the advent of mass com- is another matter. They are certainly of limited
munication, summit communication begins value to the actual definition.
to be indistinguishable from other routine It may even be appropriate to develop an
communications between one chief executives entirely new concept, that of executive diplo-
office and anothers. For Churchill, the highest macy or leadership diplomacy, which would
level did not just refer to the rank of the indi- incorporate summitry but also include the pan-
vidual or the states taking part, but at least in oply of diplomatic activities in which political
some sense to the highest purpose of statecraft. chief executives engage. This would simulta-
While this originally also implied gatherings of neously remove the excessive and distorting
the Great Powers to discuss matters of war and focus on meetings in and of themselves, while
peace, there is a general acceptance that this at the same time allowing greater considera-
was too exclusive a meaning for the term. But tion of the role of leaders outside the formal
should the notion that summits are for purpose- confines of summits and in isolation. The use
ful diplomacy also be abandoned? of private audio-visual conferencing technol-
A useful answer to this question might be ogy that now exists between, for example,
to look again at various definitions of sum- the UK Prime Minister and the US President
mitry and the categories used to think about needs to be considered in this context, as with
this notion. In this respect, Berridges cat- the role of personal communication between
egorisation of summits into regular serial Prime Minister Blair and President Bush over
summits which are part of a regular series the run up to the Iraq war. As a result, despite
of meetings; one-off and often specific-issue- the trend towards greater personal communi-
focused ad hoc summits which might be cation through other means, the private face-
the first of a regular series of meetings; and to-face meeting at the summit may be the only
the shorter, less formal, residual category of way to ensure the conduct of truly and endur-
exchange of views remains useful (Berridge ing confidential communication at the highest
1995: 83). That said, these categories are also level on substantive issues.
limited in our exploration of what constitutes
summitry, since their primary purpose is the
identification of patterns of activity within Key Points
the practice of such meetings. As such, they
are primarily focused on the structural con- Summits have moved from Great Powers address-
text of the meetings within the diplomacy in ing substantive issues to leaders of all nations
which they take place, rather than the signifi- meeting for a wide range of purposes.
Summits have increasingly become institution-
cance or otherwise of the encounters.
alised.
Young suggests that Berridges categories Executive diplomacy is increasing as the growing
can be usefully subdivided, further arguing number of international issues are managed by a
that there needs to be further division between rapidly centralising domestic political leadership.
bilateral and multilateral meetings, with multi-
lateral further divided into global and regional
(Young 2006: 285). To this list one might
add the further subdivisions of institution- CONCLUSION
ally linked summits which most, but not all,
serial summits are and further subdivisions The role of heads of government in diplo-
for functional, identity or geographic-based macy has gone full circle, from the earliest
meetings. While these are all plausible ways participation of Kings and Princes, through
of subdividing the different possible types of the period of delegated representation to
Ambassadors and diplomats, back to the Berridge, G.R. (1995) Diplomacy: Theory and
globally connected ministries and palaces of Practice. London: Prentice Hall/Harvester
modern leaders. The result is that modern Wheatsheaf.
summitry has re-emerged in the post-war Berridge, G.R. and James, A. (2001) A
period for a number of interrelated but pow- Dictionary of Diplomacy. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
erful reasons. Communication technologies
Chandler, David (1967) The Campaigns of
and the means of transportation have Napoleon. London: Weidenfeld and
increased the ability to hold summits, whilst Nicholson.
the processes of democratisation and cen- Davis, Leo D. (1983) The First Seven Ecumenical
tralisation of foreign policy have shaped their Councils (325787): Their History and
nature, and the increase in the number of Theology. Wilmington, DE: Glazier.
states, international organisations and the Dunn, David H. (ed.) (1996) Diplomacy at the
growing need to address global issues, espe- Highest Level: The Evolution of International
cially economic ones, have had a particularly Summitry. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
large influence on the modern need for sum- Dunn, David H. (2007) Summit diplomacy:
mits. The nature and frequency of summits high-level meeting or courtesy call? A
Response to John Young, The Hague Journal
has expanded due to the contraction of diplo-
of Diplomacy 2, pp. 14760.
matic means concurrent with an increasing Eban, Abba (1983) The New Diplomacy:
volume of international issues. For our pur- International Affairs in the Modern Age.
poses the key element of summitry is execu- New York: Random House.
tive participation in diplomacy at the highest Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh (1994)
possible level. The growing range of the The Gulf Conflict. London: Faber and Faber.
purposes of these meetings means that a Gilbert, Martin (1988) Never Despair Winston
wider understanding of summit activity is S. Churchill 19451965. London: Heinemann.
needed as high-level diplomacy becomes Gilbert, Martin and Richard Gott (1963) The
more dominated by the Executive. In sum- Appeasers. London: Weidenfeld and
mary, summits are more than confidence Nicholson.
Goldstein, Erik (1996) The origins of summit
building exercises or informative meetings,
diplomacy, in Dunn, David H. (ed.) Diplomacy
they are a place of substantial and personal at the Highest Level: The Evolution of
negotiation between state leaders. International Summitry. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, pp. 2337.
Goldstein, Erik and Lukes, Igor (eds) (1999)
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20
Diplomatic Language
Donna Marie Oglesby
Strand One. Strand Two. Strand Three. None of the and values creating possibilities for agreement
strands yet set in stone. The incredible weave of and allegiance. To create authority, words
language. All the little tassels still hanging down.
are played like strings to hold the tensions
The tiniest atoms. The poorly tied knots. There is
the possibility of an annex. The rumor of a rewrite. between parties until each resonates to the
The suggestion of a delay. (Colum McCann, 2013) text at its own native frequency, creating har-
mony. Because language is a social instrument
and diplomacy is, in essence, intercultural
political communication, Raymond Cohen
SETTING THE STAGE (1997) contends that achieving this cultural
resonance in the management of international
Irish novelist Colum McCann (2013, Book relations requires linguistic agility and other
One) imagines United States envoy for diplomatic skills.
Northern Ireland George Mitchell suspended One instrument developed over centuries to
between the British and their words and overcome the natural dissonance arising from
the Irish and their endless meanings two different semantic assumptions and frames
years into negotiating the 1998 Good Friday of reference expressed in the vernacular
Agreement in Belfast. All he wants, languages of varying states is a constructed
McCann writes, is to get metal nibs striking diplomatic style. Marked by restraint, subdued
against the page. tone, moderated vocabulary, and refined con-
The pens that diplomats wield can only be trol over nuances in the meaning of words, a
mightier than swords when words are found Diplomatic Language is one established norm
to bridge the differences between interna- within the transnational diplomatic corps
tional parties to a dispute. Words span across (Stanko, 2001: 44). So strong is the norm of
the divide of contesting interests, intentions civility among diplomats that an inadvertent
Diplomatic language 243
verbal transgression can create an interna- of diplomats as typical of high-context com-

tional incident, and an intentional viola- munal cultures where dignity and honor must
tion sends a pointed message. For example, be maintained during constant interaction.
as Henry Kissinger writes in his book More recent scholars would point to the logic
Diplomacy (1994), Bismarck succeeded in of appropriateness as a way to understand the
provoking Napoleon III to declare war sim- speech codes by which diplomats practice
ply by editing Prussian King Wilhelms Ems their profession in mutual recognition (Bjola
Dispatch to indicate that the customary cour- and Kornprobst 2013: 104). More classical
tesies had not been extended to the French scholars like Callieres (as quoted in Sofer,
envoy and then leaking it to public uproar in 2007: 35) would recognize the diplomatic
France. habits of self-interested political friendship
Framing and reframing arguments to find to be those advocated by Aristotle.
the convergent wavelengths, diplomats tra- Diplomats, as political actors, are deeply
ditionally engage in a particular diplomatic embedded in a social context that privileges
discourse that G.R. Berridge (2003) char- careful, controlled and cautious behavior.
acterizes as typically mild, euphemistic, Their language is an expression of their prac-
and circumlocutory. Diplomats, above all tice. The fact that a Diplomatic Language,
else, are focused on the process of forming in a sociological sense of shared codes and
and maintaining relationships with those conventions, has been constructed to moder-
who manage international relations. The ate official international political speech is
aim, as political philosopher Danielle Allen one indication that diplomats, wherever they
(2004: 87) writes in Talking To Strangers, serve, may constitute a global epistemic com-
is to develop practices that support vigor- munity with their own expertise and domain
ous argument about political disagreements of knowledge (Davis Cross, 2007: 225). Their
by sustaining the relationships that make it general knowledge of diplomacy is, however,
worthwhile to argue with others in the first always situated knowledge that derives from
place. and is applied by practice.
Without those relationships, diplomats Mesopotamian clay tablets may give way
would find it more difficult to achieve their to digital texts thumbed by diplomats search-
political objectives or manage crises that may ing for the right words to end an impasse, but
arise over time. To keep the channels of com- the function of Diplomatic Language is the
munication open even in times of hostility, same throughout time: to lubricate the great
diplomats require a non-abrasive manner of and smaller gears enmeshing separated polit-
communicating that lubricates, rounds-off ical communities into a single international
the sharp edges, and creates the space for system. By default, diplomats want to reduce
saving face and creating possibility. In their friction and maintain civility in external rela-
quest for such a language and their ability tionships through continuous dialogue while
over time to construct an arbitrary set of sig- they represent, negotiate and communicate
nals, codes and conventions that serve their internationally. Diplomatic Language is
purpose, theorist Christer Jonsson (2012: therefore an instrument of diplomatic soci-
21) considers diplomats to be intuitive ety designed to minimize misunderstandings
semioticians. and miscalculations that give rise to conflict.
Constructed slowly, conscientiously, delib- It is not an end in itself. It does not contain
erately, and with great subtlety, the concrete magical incantations with the power to con-
might appear to melt into the abstract, as vert war into peace. Nor is it used for internal
George Orwell (1946) complains of political communication within a government where
speech. Yet, E.T. Hall (1973) would recognize speech acts are grounded by the weight of
the allusive mode of expression characteristic shared thought, history and culture.
Key Points time, the word brother is used seven times

in the brief second millennium BCE text. An
Diplomatic Language is instrumental: it was
emissary who would carry the written mes-
constructed over time to overcome the natu-
sage to a most likely illiterate king would have
ral dissonance arising from different semantic
assumptions and frames of reference expressed expanded on the message orally in a formal
in the vernacular languages of varying states. audience according to protocol. The receiv-
Diplomatic Language is an arbitrary set of ing kings advisor would have interpreted the
signals, codes and conventions that lubricates, message into the kingdoms native language
rounds off sharp edges, and creates the space and facilitated an oral exchange of views to
for possibility. be followed by a written reply carried by king
Diplomatic Language is an instrument of inter- Bs emissary back to kingdom A.
national society designed to minimize misun- What was said might have deviated in
derstandings and miscalculations that give rise nuance from the written messages as the
to conflict.
important continuous bilateral dialogue
ensued. Potentially provocative or embar-
rassing communications often remained
oral to keep any edges in relationships from
THE BACKSTORY being etched in clay. Even written disagree-
able messages conveying threat or displeas-
The first known diplomatic letter was written ure would have been delicately woven into
4,300 years ago in cuneiform on a baked clay the verbal fabric of the lingua franca in ways
tablet excavated in present day Syria (Podany, that could be reworked when passions cooled
2010). Written in Akkadian, the lingua franca and needs changed. This pattern, while wide-
of the Ancient Near East, the diplomatic spread, was not universal among the ancients
letter between the King of Ebla and the King given differing cultural and historic contexts.
of Hamazi in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) The Greeks had a preference for oration
demonstrates the essence of diplomatic mis- before public assemblies using heralds as
sives throughout time and place. diplomatic envoys and conducting negotia-
At its core, the first known diplomatic let- tions orally. The Chinese, on the other hand,
ter is a simple bilateral transaction. Kingdom conducted diplomacy primarily by written
A wants something from kingdom B. That text in accord with their particular mode of
message of want and willingness to give in sensibility.
exchange is written in a lingua franca, a neu- In general, however, shared meanings were
tral language identified with neither kingdom. constructed by diplomatic use, trial and error
Diplomacy makes systematic use of such des- as words were translated into and out of the
ignated bridge languages to facilitate commu- lingua franca. Given the cross-cultural local
nication between political communities not contexts of international communication,
sharing a native tongue. In this instance, the lin- diplomats required sophisticated linguis-
gua franca of the region was Akkadian, which tic skill to ensure that the message sent was
after 2,000 years gave way to Aramaic. In the the message received in a particular locale.
European system it was Latin and then French. The initiated both constructed and knew
Today, reflecting the dominant power, the the diplomatic code designed to soothe and
world Diplomatic Language is global English. smooth international relationships grinding
The kernel of the transactional message in through cycles of cooperation and conflict in
this first known diplomatic letter is encased an ever-expanding international system. The
in stock phrases of comity and good will. cognoscenti, then as now, know how to read
Podnany (2010) notes that in accord with kin- between the lines of constructed Diplomatic
ship terms employed diplomatically at that Language that purposefully removes affect
and carries softened signals over rougher the foundations of that order open to rational
patches, deeper troughs and higher peaks in debate.
the political landscape. They know too the Other scholars (like linguists Scott, 2001
supplementing silent language of gesture and and Oliver, 2003) argue that the greater the
signal integral to the performance of diplo- publicity the more the ambiguity in diplo-
macy on the world stage (Cohen, 1987). matic speech. The conference diplomacy
As the brotherhood of kings evolved into a context, in particular, causes diplomats to
community of states, the diplomatic method code shift from more precise private diplo-
solidified, settling on terms, expressions and matic talk, to more ambiguous speech. The
semantic conventions designed to minimize linguists findings in some way echo the
misunderstanding and maintain orderly dis- observation by journalist Walter Lippmann
course. Classical Western diplomatic meth- (1922: 126), who characterized the ensuing
ods, including the restrained manner of rhetoric as so many hot air balloons:
speech of the professionalized diplomatic
As you go up in the balloon, you throw more and
corps that evolved during the seventeenth and
more concrete objects over board, and when you
eighteenth centuries in Europe, were, accord- have reached the top with some phrase like rights
ing to Paul Sharp (2009: 44), all elements of of humanity or the world made safe for democracy,
a system that imposed restraints on the con- you may see far and wide but you see very little.
duct of the sovereigns themselves.
Influenced by Enlightenment thinkers, As states democratized, their internal work-
diplomats saw their role as one of tamping ings became ever more transparent to foreign
down emotions and contributing reasonable- emissaries. The impulse to speak in the ver-
ness and rational thought to the process of nacular to the people on the wall of Judea
communication between states. In Sharps from Biblical times, well documented by
understanding of the rational tradition, diplo- Cohen (2013: 18), became a practice now
mats were civilizing influences both on their known as public diplomacy. Speaking to the
sovereigns and the emerging international galleries over the heads of the players on the
society. Their restrained linguistic style diplomatic stage requires a different kind of
reflected an understanding of their shared affect-tinged political speech in the vernacu-
responsibility to make collective decisions to lar. Diplomats have to develop a stage voice
advance and protect the system as a whole, to complement the clubhouse voice that
while advancing the interests of their sover- soothes relationships within the diplomatic
eign state. Diplomatic Language reflects the community. They also need to share the
mode by which diplomats both recognize stage, and the clubhouse, with political actors
each other and reason together. visiting from the domestic realms who have
Scholars disagree on the effects acquiring brought culturally contingent styles usually
an audience has had on Diplomatic Language too hot for the cooling saucer of diplomacy.
and whether conference diplomacy has led to
the creation of an international public sphere
in which deliberation is possible. Informed Key Points
by her case study of the Concert of Europe
Diplomacy makes systematic use of designated
in 1814, Jennifer Mitzen (2005: 415, 407)
bridge languages, known as lingua franca, that
argues: Forum discussion among states miti- facilitate communication between communities
gates the problem of violence by generating not sharing a native tongue.
a structure of public reason. Assuming a Although the essence of Diplomatic Language
thick notion of international society and pub- was constant, the ancients used varying oral and
licity, she contends: [Diplomatic] talk in a written forms given their different cultural and
public forum produces order while keeping historic contexts.
Diplomatic Language reflects the mode by which by expressing a vehement and overt state-level
diplomats both recognize each other and reason display of anger in response to a perceived
together. insult. On the receiving end of Chinas orches-
Given the need to speak to the galleries, diplo- trated expressions of indignation, American
mats have also needed to develop a stage voice Ambassador Stapleton Roy diplomatically
to complement the clubhouse voice that soothes
said, What the Chinese response in 1995
relationships within the diplomatic community.
did is it restored understanding in the Clinton
administration about the sensitivity of this
issue.
The socialization of diverse international
INGATHERING ON THE STAGE players into the United Nations was made
possible by using French and English as
The rapid expansion in the number of inde- working languages and recognizing six offi-
pendent states in the latter part of the twenti- cial languages: Arabic, Chinese, English,
eth century brought a heterogeneous array of French, Russian and Spanish. Given the
countries into the international system of shifting political demographic, some sug-
states and diversity into the diplomatic com- gest Spanish, English and Chinese would be
munity. Diplomatic Language lubricated the more appropriate working languages in this
culturally contingent gears of the old and century. As helpful as lingua franca are, the
new states comprising the increasingly com- best diplomats know that mastering the native
plex international order. The skin of tongues of those with whom they deal is the
Diplomatic Language might fit some repre- only sure way of understanding them. As
sentatives with difficulty given their own George Steiner (2013: Preface to second edi-
historical, cultural, political and social con- tion) reminds us, each tongue construes a set
texts. Still, new diplomats could acquire the of possible worlds and geographies of remem-
established diplomatic style to smooth their brance. Less poetically, languages also often
socialization into unfamiliar roles by con- lack comparable concepts and words, making
stant adjustment, learned through interaction translation a diplomatic challenge.
with other diplomats. Revolutionary powers that did not share in
Even the diplomatic emotional repertoire the collective intentionality of the diplomatic
could be learned by exposure to the corps corps could choose to resist co-optation by
embodied emotional displays: its silent lan- the matrix and disrupt the process of incorpo-
guage. For example, Cohen (1987: 1056) ration. One of the most famous examples of
maintains that diplomats do not usually display disruption occurred in the 1960 UN General
fear, disgust, surprise and sadness because they Assembly meeting when Soviet Premier Nikita
are too personally revealing. But, he argues, Khrushchev banged his shoe on the table in
culturally appropriate somatic expressions are reply to a Philippine assertion that the Soviet
used to show agreement, displeasure, equa- Union had swallowed up Eastern Europe.
nimity and anger because they can be effective Later Khrushchev was reported to say:
and do not sever political bonds.
Political actors, including diplomats, are It was such fun! The U.N. is a sort of parliament,
you know, where the minority has to make itself
socialized into the norms and identities of a known one way or another. Were in the minority
community by participation in a circulation for the time being, but not for long. (Romero, 2008)
of affect (Ross, 2013). Civility is the diplo-
matic norm, but occasionally, as T.H. Hall Sharp (2009) explains this undiplomatic
(2011: 5512) reminds us in a USChina behavior in his discussion of the radical tra-
case study on the Taiwan Straits, a state may dition of diplomacy with its intent to liberate
choose to violate the norm and make a point and subvert international society from within.
In order to achieve their broader goals, how- anti-diplomacy prior to the 2003 Iraq War;
ever, diplomatic representatives of revolu- but a decade earlier in 1991, prior to the first
tionary societies have learned to make full Gulf War, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
use of diplomatic forms and conventions to refused a letter from President H.W. Bush
protect their sovereignty and advance their demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait
interests within the system they intend to to avoid war. President Bush wrote, to elimi-
transform. Ironically perhaps, while many in nate any uncertainty or ambiguity that might
the West now find and seek the erosion of exist in your mind about where we stand and
state sovereignty as the basis for global soci- what we are prepared to do. According to
ety, non-Western states seek refuge in the Thomas Friedman (1991) writing in the New
sovereign equality of states that is the organ- York Times:
izing concept of the Westphalian order once
I told him I am sorry, said Mr. Aziz, I cannot
imposed on the rest by the West. Diplomatic
receive such a letter. The language in this letter is
Language is an instrument suited to that pur- not compatible with the language that should be
pose because rhetorical displays of sovereign used in correspondences between heads of state.
equity have been constructed. When a head of state writes to another head of
Reflective of new Western thinking, critical state a letter and he really intends to make peace,
he should use polite language.
scholar James Der Derian (1987) draws on
Foucault and uses the term anti-diplomacy
Much as theyd incline toward the latter, dip-
to characterize those practices that challenge
lomats are tasked with managing relation-
diplomatic authority by scrutinizing its language
ships of enmity as well as friendship (Bjola
and practice. From this alternative genealogical
and Kornprobst, 2013). Diplomatic Language
perspective, anti-diplomacy is the ideological
cannot always be language that sits on the
and political doppelganger twinned with
fence as Oxford linguist Biljana Scott (2012)
classic diplomacy at birth. Der Derian (1987:
defines it. When it does, as Ambassador
135) writes, diplomacy is negotiation between
Glaspie learned from her now infamous con-
states, while anti-diplomacy is propaganda
versation with Saddam Hussein prior to the
among peoples its aim is to transcend all
1990 invasion of Kuwait, there can be unin-
estranged relations. A utopian impulse, anti-
tended consequences. Ambassador April
diplomacy aligns with universalistic forces in
Glaspie had made a perfectly diplomatic
counterpoint to the particularistic force field of
statement according to her instructions:
geographically bound states.
[W]e have no opinion on the ArabArab
Activists and scholars who believe that
conflicts, like your border disagreement with
the state is the obstacle to be overcome use
Kuwait. Three days later, Iraq invaded
the grammar of diplomacy to undermine it,
Kuwait much to American surprise. Finding
precisely because diplomats embody states and
verbal formulations to signal deterrence that
organizations created by states. Anti-diplomacy
are both precise and avoid giving offense
wants to disturb this unjust order, and digital
requires consummate diplomatic skill.
information technology is thought to empower
it to do just that (Der Derian, 2009). Language
games, designed to jolt the staid status quo, are
key to anti-diplomatic practice. Key Points
Paradoxically perhaps, practitioner scholar In the twentieth century, Diplomatic Language
Geoffrey Wiseman (2011) contends that the lubricated the culturally contingent gears of the
United States, the current preeminent power old and new states comprising the increasingly
in the international system, is itself anti- complex international order.
diplomatic because it wilfully violates diplo- Activists and scholars who believe that the state
matic culture. Wiseman was reflecting on US is the obstacle to be overcome use the grammar of
diplomacy to undermine it by employing language which some rhetorical differences and slight
games designed to jolt the staid status quo. openings on one board lead to realignment on
Diplomats must manage relationships of enmity the other, enabling achievement of otherwise
as well as friendship, and finding verbal formula- unattainable objectives. In a specific exam-
tions to signal deterrence that are both precise ple of the 1980s Intermediate Nuclear Forces
and avoid giving offense requires consummate
(INF) language game, Gavan Duffy et al.
diplomatic skill.
(1998: 271) demonstrate that the superpower
parties to the negotiations on INF in Europe
eventually transformed a security regime
BETWIXT AND BETWEEN through explicit and implicit discourse that
led to a Soviet reconceptualization of the
Indirect though it may be, the best diplomatic Cold War insecurity dilemma.
verbal construction, like a suspension bridge, is By their habit of using ambiguity to cre-
precisely anchored in bedrock on each side. For ate the space for international agreement and
all its fragile appearance, its strength lies in room to maneuver politically at home and
cabled strands of language supporting the abroad, diplomats open themselves to the
weight of political traffic traveling between and charge of duplicity and theatrical play by
below the textual towers. Whatever the medium, critical scholars investigating their threshold
the twisted grass of sixteenth century Incan practice. Constantinou (1996: 152) compares
mountain passes or modern steel, suspension the liminal, or boundary spanning, practice
bridge engineers employ the same principles to of the diplomat to the games of the mytho-
make them strong yet flexible. So it is with logical Trickster. He expands the metaphor
diplomats and their language. Diplomats may in an insightful discussion of how the patron
speak in the lingua franca of the time, through god Hermes, who is at one a medium, a
interpreters or in the languages of those message, and an interpreter, represents dip-
whom they wish to engage. Whatever the lomatic representations.
tongue used, the manner of speech is designed Other post-positivist scholars, taking the
to bridge disagreement and maintain connec- same linguistic turn, use Diplomatic Language
tion through continual interaction in a pluralis- against itself (deconstruct) often making it
tic external world that exists independently of appear strange and silly. Because diplomacy
diplomatic representations of it. The moorings is a practice where the textual plays a key role
and constraints of external realism and the it attracts Derridean analysis (Neumann 2012:
context of power underlie diplomatic speech 24). Such critical scholars parody diplomatic
even when they seek to transform the way discourse because diplomats embody the state
things are through words (Searle 2008: 19). in an international system that they contend
Words are chosen to be precise enough to is thoroughly opaque and unrepresentative of
communicate clearly to diplomatic interlocu- marginalized sectors of global society.
tors yet elastic enough to plausibly suggest Whether Diplomatic Language civilizes or
the alternative meanings the diplomats polit- deceives, as contesting scholars posit, speech
ical masters need to manage their domestic act theory advanced by philosopher John R.
politics. If the diplomats engaged in negotia- Searle (2010) would help explain how the
tions do not truly represent the parties to the international state system beginning in 1648
dispute and cannot manage their domestic was linguistically created and linguistically
and alliance politics, the negotiated text will constituted and maintained by diplomats.
not find the necessary purchase in political The international states system exists as a
reality to succeed in transforming it. social reality because we believe it exists and
In behavioral terms, Robert D. Putnam we act accordingly. By their accreditation as
(1988: 434) calls this a two level game in representatives of sovereign states, diplomats
have had the collectively recognized status to world perspective. For example, follow-
to create the reality they represent. As Searle ing a lengthy linguistic and legal compara-
(2010: 84) writes, once you have the capac- tive analysis between UN resolutions and US
ity to represent, you already have the capacity congressional documents, Giuseppina Scotto
to create a reality by those representations, a di Carlo (2012) contends that intentional and
reality that consists in part of representations. strategically vague language in UN resolu-
Searle (2010) is clear that this deontologi- tions contributed to the 2003 Iraq War. Game
cal power only exists when the declarations theorists would not be surprised that delib-
by those in authority have the double direc- erately vague UN wording allowed the US
tion of fit: their representations correspond to build its own legislation with a personal
to the world as it is and also are believed to interpretation implying that the UN did not
transform it. For example, the creation of the impede military action (2012: 507). Scotto
United Nations at the 1945 San Francisco di Carlo, however, believes that had the inter-
Conference both reflected prevailing power national community chosen the right binding
relations and transformed them by creating a words there would have been diplomatic
venue for institutionalized multilateral diplo- solutions to the Iraq crises (2012: 508). Such
macy. Increasingly, most diplomatic speech a contention belies the political realities of the
acts do not fall into that rare category because, United Nations Security Council. Neither the
given the diffusion of global and regional US nor the UK, both permanent members of
power and the consequent evaporation of the UNSC, would have agreed to words pre-
authority, collective acceptance of diplomatic venting the use of force, given the post-9/11
declarations often cannot be achieved. context, because of what they intended to do.
As the number of sovereign states has
grown, many smaller and middle range states
can no longer afford resident missions in Key Points
all recognized states. They use the United
Nations as a site of contact with other states, Diplomats choose words to be precise enough to
changing the nature of their diplomacy. communicate clearly to diplomatic interlocutors
Indian scholar-diplomat Kishan Rana (2001: yet elastic enough to plausibly suggest the alter-
native meanings the diplomats political masters
112) points to opportunity cost in effective
need to manage their domestic politics.
diplomatic action when, infatuated by words, Critical scholars, investigating the diplomatic
the Global South waste time and effort in pro- habit of using ambiguity to create the space for
ducing a multitude of UN General Assembly international agreement and room to maneuver
resolutions that have little intrinsic value and politically at home and abroad, see in Diplomatic
no legs in the world as it actually is. The UN Language proof of duplicity and theatrical play.
General Assembly is just one among thirty Speech act theory explains how the international
thousand international organizations of vary- states system was linguistically created and linguis-
ing significance available to generate the tically constituted and maintained by diplomats.
texts that international political actors choose
to accept. As international relations theorist
Randall Schweller (2014) points out, from
this world to word forum shopping perspec- EXPANDED CAST, CONTESTED
tive, representatives of a shifting international SCRIPTS
system write a multitude of ambiguous agree-
ments that can only reproduce its pluralism. Although questions of war and peace are
Still, some idealistic scholars, believing dramatic, everyday diplomatic practice rarely
that language creates its own reality, analyze concerns the need to signal deterrence while
diplomatic speech from an alternative word reassuring amity on the eve of war. Diplomats
conduct considerable routine business bilater- solutions to problems that seem borderless.
ally and multilaterally. They keep the interna- The expansion of international trade, the
tional watch works moving with small growth in citizen travel abroad and the inten-
communicative oscillations: oral statements, sification of transnational flows, virtually and
remarks, speeches and conversations layered physically, amplify the work of diplomats
with written communiqus, demarches, notes, by altering the context within which they ply
non-papers, readouts, and press releases. their craft.
Theirs is a practice of nearly imperceptible In the new global media ecology, dip-
verbal adjustments learned by acquired feel lomatic dialogue has been disrupted and
from the doing. Their verbal craftsmanship taken on a less scripted, less decorous tone
requires policy orientation wrapped in politi- as chirp exchanges between the Russian and
cal sensitivity, fine-tuned to the local context, American ambassadors to the UN clearly
nested in the larger regional, and then inter- demonstrate (Oglesby, 2014). Diplomats
national, whole. Diplomacys elaborate, need to adapt to the acceleration of commu-
time-consuming speech-works mechanisms nication enabled by digital technology with-
appear as anachronistic as a seventeenth cen- out losing their sense of purpose: to maintain
tury mechanical watch to those accustomed perpetual systematic relationships with rep-
to electronic movement. resentatives of states and the international
Employing practice theory, I.B. Neumann organizations created by them, in order to
(2007) conducts a vivisection of the produc- maintain a space for politics in the interna-
tion of a diplomatic speech and pronounces tional political realm. One of the key prob-
the process within a foreign ministry to be lems diplomats face in the social media age
ceremonial, mundane and incapable of cre- is the difficulty of calming things down, and
ating any daring innovation without political moving forward slowly toward consensus, in
intervention. Neumanns ethnography raises competition with the roar of 140 character
critical questions about whether Diplomatic instant reaction.
Language is a living membrane capable of Significantly, Western diplomats, in par-
new feeling and renewal. Or whether, as ticular, conduct their diplomacy in a chaotic
George Steiner (2013: Chapter 1) writes of environment with a range of actors, from
dying language systems, it is imprisoned in domestic government bureaucracies and pri-
a linguistic contour which no longer matches, vate sector entities, who do not share the codes
or matches [only] at certain ritual, arbitrary and conventions of Diplomatic Language.
points, the changing landscape of fact. It The increased use of summit diplomacy also
may be that Diplomatic Language conserves, marginalizes the professional diplomatic
rather than innovates, but it also codifies and corps and gives control over speech acts to a
summarizes mastery of diplomatic practice. different set of political actors (see Chapters
Without the ballast of diplomatic speech, 14 and 19 in this Handbook). For all diplo-
official international political rhetoric could mats, the parallel rise in conference diplo-
fly out of control and contribute to further macy, according to the late Norman Scott
disorder. (2001: 153), requires new blends of precision
In the liberal West, political intervention and ambiguity in negotiated texts on a whole
has come by choice, as the democratic states range of complex issues. Any diplomatically
prefer open government with active engage- worded agreement is buttressed by kilos of
ment of private players. It has also come as contesting addenda spelling out what parties
once domestic policy issues and the politi- to the agreement really mean.
cal actors who swarm around them push The interface between diplomacy and gov-
themselves across domestic/foreign bounda- ernance is populated by a range of actors per-
ries and onto the global stage in search of forming in different languages from different
scripts, for different audiences and with vary- knowledge of the real world that presumes
ing intent. They both collaborate with dip- to lock in only certain courses of action for
lomats and challenge them as rival centers international policy consideration. What sci-
of authority and legitimacy to the state on a entists lack, as James C. Scott (1998) argues,
range of economic, environmental and other are precisely the practical and political skills
technical issues (Hocking etal., 2012: 34). required to craft and implement any complex
Many of these voices argue for replacing the international policy involving cross-cultural
instability of interstate politics conducted social interaction.
by diplomats, with a new order grounded in Additionally, representatives of non-
presumed universal principles. They want governmental organizations (NGOs), used to
prescriptive rules drawn from positive law at raising public awareness and support through
the international level, technical expertise, or a kind of morally imperative brochure
moral imperative. talk, chafe at the neutrality of customary
With the expansion in the scope of inter- Diplomatic Language. Brochure Talk
national law, particularly human rights law, is a useful term coined by scholar Sinead
challenging the plural legal traditions of the Walsh (2014: 14) to describe the way in
various states, lawyers bring in their legal which practitioners in the aid sector give
verbal conventions to compete in writing public relations-type descriptions of their
the rules and standards to order international work, as might be read in a brochure even
relations (see Chapter 15 in this Handbook). though the reality of implementation in the
Their purpose is to avoid the equivocal out- field falls short. Dr Walshs exploration of
comes accepted by diplomats operating the disjuncture between the ideal and the
politically, and to compel compliance under field reality in NGO speech acts stimulates
an international rule of law. Legal rules of thinking about the struggles over the
appropriateness require a very different pre- representations of reality diplomats will
scriptive language that is precise, consistent, increasingly face as they share the black box
obligatory and legally binding (March and theater with a mixed company of actors, and
Olsen, 2009: 21). The European Union is a a newly interacting audience, working from
legally integrated political community and its contested scripts.
representatives on the broader global stage, in While most actors on the diplomatic stage
particular, are accustomed to this shift in both want to influence global outcomes in the
concept and rhetoric. Rising non-Western form of international treaties, resolutions
powers that do not share this experience, and political action, increasingly some use
and find it threatening to their sovereignty, the stage as a springboard to rally their
take refuge in customary and indeterminate constituents and impact their home domestic
Diplomatic Language that respects the right politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Unlike
of sovereign difference. the diplomatic corps, these political actors
Scientists seeking to inform and influ- have a different purpose and audience,
ence policies on issues ranging from cli- and therefore their language is focused
mate change to nuclear proliferation bring on building and maintaining relationships
their own language conventions onto the within an issue network of their specific
diplomatic field. While suitably formal to concern. Their networks may well be
diplomatic ears, scientific language insists global, but they work in issue specific silos
on terminology with fixed meanings and within particular languages, as disciplined
greater specificity than that customarily academics might well understand. They are
used by diplomats. It challenges diplomatic not focused on maintaining clear channels
representations of political reality by insist- of communication between states and the
ing on scientifically determined objective organizations created by them as those
of diplomats are. They are therefore less Key Points

capable than diplomats of finding cross-
Diplomats conduct considerable routine business
binding solutions to wicked global problems
bilaterally and multilaterally with small com-
when they arise.
municative oscillations: oral statements, remarks,
Rana (2001) contends that Western states speeches and conversations layered with written
dominate the new more public diplomatic communiqus, demarches, notes, non-papers,
discourse with phrases like fair trade and readouts, and press releases.
social standards because they are reinvigor- In the new global media ecology, diplomatic
ated by the supplementing voices of private dialogue has been disrupted and taken on a less
actors competing to frame issues. They are scripted, less decorous tone.
sharper at shaping these [code] words, and The interface between diplomacy and govern-
in capturing the deeper concepts behind ance is populated by a range of actors perform-
them and therefore seize the high ground in ing in different languages from different scripts,
for different audiences and with varying intent.
debates (2001: 112). Writing from a Chinese
perspective on interpretations of rule of law
concepts, Yang Mingxing agrees, arguing
international public opinion is a discourse AFTERWORD
system overwhelmingly dominated by the
Western countries and only by paying care- For some critics it would seem Diplomatic
ful attention to the interpretation of Chinese Language is, like oysters, an acquired taste.
concepts in language that resonates with the They mistake a certain order inducing pre-
international community can misunderstand- dictability and regularity in Diplomatic
ing and suspicion be avoided (Mingxing, Language with unchanging rigidity. In fact,
2012: 9). At a Meta level, some scholars the speech of diplomats is fluid and variable
(like Steiner, 2013) speculate that computer across time and place because the practice of
languages themselves reflect and reinforce diplomacy itself adapts to changing local
this Western, particularly Anglo-American, conditions and to the international environ-
hegemony. ment that it has helped create.
Journalists covering it all with increasingly Young diplomats, who distend their
fast, bright lights of new information technol- thumbs in an effort to understand, inform
ogy dislike bland, decorous, diplomatic dis- and influence global public opinion through
course that they feel disguises what is really short, fast bursts of digital speech, should
going on behind the scenes. They want words cast one wary eye back to the cautionary tale
with edges to mark the conflict that provides of The Walrus and the Carpenter. Remember:
a hook for stories that make news. In the age the purpose of diplomacy is to engage in
of WikiLeaks, the conflict that makes news is vigorous argument about political disagree-
consequently sometimes found when candid ments by sustaining the relationships needed
internal diplomatic reporting is leaked to the to order the international system. Remember:
public and juxtaposed with official represen- the interstate public sphere is a babel of bod-
tations composed in Diplomatic Language. ies politic not one Public Opinion.
The diplomats intent to create the space for Lets give Lewis Carroll (1871) the final
possibility by saying no more and no less metaphoric word on Diplomatic Language:
than is necessary, while maintaining external
relationships in continuous dialogue, is then O Oysters, said the Carpenter,
Youve had a pleasant run!
read by those, unaccustomed to diplomatic
Shall we be trotting home again?
practice, as a cunning effort to obfuscate and But answer came there none
deceive. Sometimes it is, even if much, much And this was scarcely odd, because
more is going on. Theyd eaten every one.
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PART III
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
21
Diplomatic Relations
between States
Alan James
DISTINCTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE relations does not imply the withdrawal of

recognition.
Diplomatic relations must be distinguished Second, diplomacy in the sense of the struc-
from several related phenomena. First, being tures and understandings which permit states to
in diplomatic relations has nothing directly to conduct relations with each other through the
do with the doctrine of recognition, a distinc- medium of accredited representatives is not
tion which has been particularly muddied by identical with diplomatic relations. Rather, it is
the occasional use of the term diplomatic (as it were) a step above it. For diplomatic rela-
recognition. When one state recognizes tions is the pre-condition for unhindered diplo-
another which is a unilateral act what that macy, the handle which opens the door to the
first state does is formally acknowledge that establishment of embassies, both resident and
the other entity possesses the characteristics non-resident, to the easy despatch of special
of sovereign statehood. Theoretically, recog- missions, and hence to all the activity in which
nition is a pre-requisite for the establishment diplomats commonly engage.
of diplomatic relations. But as a practical Nor, third, is diplomatic relations identical
matter states sometimes associate the two, with foreign policy, which is two steps away
swiftly following up recognition with the from diplomatic relations (with diplomacy
establishment of diplomatic relations, com- coming between the two). Foreign policy is
bining the two in a single announcement, or the flesh which is put on the procedural bones
even just letting the establishment of diplo- of diplomacy, the content which is placed in
matic relations with a new state carry with it the in-trays of a states diplomatic missions,
the implicit recognition of that state. But the which it is the task of that states diplomats
two are distinct phenomena, as is evident to advance and defend. Nor, fourth, is
from the fact that a breach of diplomatic diplomatic relations identical with the whole
range of inter-state relations. Rather, the latter THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF 1961
are chiefly the product of states cooperative
and competing foreign policies and so are During the last 50 years the conduct of rela-
three steps away from diplomatic relations. tions between sovereign states through the
States, although commonly spoken of as medium of accredited representatives has
persons, are not human beings. They cannot taken place within an almost universally
communicate with each other in the manner accepted legal framework, set out in the 1961
of humans. They are notional persons only. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Other notional persons, such as a univer- Relations. It might therefore be supposed
sity, a business corporation or a tiddly-winks that that term has an important and special-
club, communicate externally through their ized meaning which is defined and elabo-
official representatives the vice-chancellor, rated in the Convention. Another supposition
chief executive officer, chairman (and those would reasonably follow: that writers on
subordinate to them). States, too, need to diplomatic law and diplomatic practice had
communicate externally, for this is the over- paid and would continue to pay close atten-
whelming way in which, directly or indirectly, tion to the term. Such assumptions receive
they advance and defend their foreign poli- support from the fact that states not uncom-
cies: advising, explaining, urging, bargaining, monly refer to being (or not being) in diplo-
warning, threatening and so on. To engage matic relations. The concept referred to by
in such communication states must, like all the term would therefore appear to hold a
notional persons, use official representatives. central place on the diplomatic canvas.
And as most of a states external interests and Be that as it may, these suppositions are virtu-
concerns which generally are multitudinous ally groundless. The term diplomatic relations
impinge in one way or another on those of is not mentioned in the Vienna Conventions
other states, a system which enables state rep- Preamble; nor is it among the nine terms which,
resentatives to communicate regularly with because of their appearance in the Convention,
each other is required. That need is met by the are defined in its first article; and only in two of
diplomatic system, by the world-wide network its 53 articles is the term used. Article 2 says that
of embassies and allied arrangements, staffed the establishment of diplomatic relations
by a host of diplomats. But to get smooth com- takes place by consent; and Article 45 speaks
munication going between any two states a of certain consequences if diplomatic relations
starting motor has to be operated. The engine are broken off. But neither in these articles nor
to power this particular diplomatic relation- anywhere else in the Convention is there even
ship has to be brought to life. Diplomatic rela- a hint as to what the term means. The explana-
tions is the requisite key. Only if it is used can tion for this strange state of affairs seems to lie
a pair of states be on easy and straightforward in the decade-long discussions which preceded
speaking terms. Hence it is an essential ele- the Convention. The focus of attention was then
ment in the whole inter-state set-up. generally described as being on diplomatic
privileges and immunities, and less often on
diplomatic practice both of which are dealt
Key Points with in some detail in the Convention with the
content of the term diplomatic relations being
Diplomatic relations is distinct from recognition.
totally neglected. It was also neglected at the
Diplomatic relations is distinct from the day-to-
day conduct of diplomacy, from foreign policy,
Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse
and from inter-state relations. and Immunities which negotiated and adopted
Diplomatic relations is the key which opens the Convention. There, following Britains late
the door to easy and straightforward inter-state discovery that the title of the Conference would
contact. not do for that of the Convention, on account of
Diplomatic Relations between States 259
the indelicacy (in the English text) of the term single family, and at many of them a business
intercourse, the term relations was substi- of one kind or another is based. The satisfac-
tuted for it. Possibly the consequential disjunction of each familys needs and desires,
tion between the title and the content of the together with the establishment of guidelines
Convention reflected a rush to get it finished; about a gamut of village arrangements, nec-
possibly, too, it was taken for granted that eve- essarily leads to much interaction between
ryone knew what diplomatic relations meant. the families and their individual members.
It may indeed have been the case that diplo- That is to say, the villagers are on speaking
mats were in this respect fully cognizant. But it terms with each other. But in the nature of
has to be said that, judging from a range of ear- human things, some of their contacts do not
lier twentieth century writing about diplomatic go smoothly. There is an undercurrent of
procedures, the term diplomatic relations and competition, and from time to time overt
its content had made little impact on the wider antagonism between certain families, not
world, as it receives no prominence at all. Nor least neighbouring ones. Occasionally things
does this situation appear to have been altered get to such a pass that one person or family
by the arrival and widespread acceptance of decides not to be on speaking terms with
the Convention. For in subsequently published another. In consequence, professional and
books on diplomatic law which this writer social contact with the targeted individual or
has noted, substantive references to the term group will henceforth be avoided.
are rare, and unaccompanied by any sustained The phrase speaking terms indicates the
indication of its nature or significance. And essence of diplomatic relations. What an
when international relations experts wrote on instance of such a relationship connotes is
diplomacy they too evidently felt no need to put that the two states involved have indicated
the term under their microscopes. Certainly, in their mutual willingness to engage in direct
both authorial categories and especially the communication, the routine channel for that
former the Convention was noted and its pro- communication being their diplomatic ser-
visions received due attention. But it is as if vices. Hence, when a pair of states has estab-
its title was of little independent weight lished diplomatic relations there is no formal
composed, maybe, only with a view to catch- obstacle to either of them getting in touch
ing (and not offending) the eye. Can there with the other, no need for a specific check
really be nothing more to it than that? (see as to the acceptability of an official contact
also Chapters 15 and 16 in this Handbook). and the means whereby it is to be executed.
The two states may freely relate to each
other, they may agree to exchange diplomatic
Key Points missions, each may express to the other by
written or oral means its view about this or
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that, their representatives may mingle at mul-
(1961) did not define diplomatic relations.
tilateral assemblies and on social occasions,
Writers on diplomacy appear not to have defined
and the two may establish bilateral legal ties.
or discussed diplomatic relations.
Nonetheless the term is frequently used in diplo- All such things tend often to happen. Thus,
matic interchanges. being in diplomatic relations enables states
to behave towards one another in what is
regarded as the normal international way.
This pattern differs from that in a village in
CONCEPT one important respect. In the latter the prevail-
ing, implied assumption is that each member
Imagine an isolated, self-sufficient village of is on speaking terms with all the others. In the
about 200 dwellings. Each is occupied by a international society of states, too, that was
probably the basis on which relations used to relations with the United States, and a diplo-
be conducted. For until about a century or so matic mission in Washington, notwithstand-
ago states tended to have a lot in common, ing the fact that that state was overtly giving
there were not very many of them, and their considerable aid to the group which was
number was fairly stable. At the same time, seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan gov-
multilateral conferences were highly infre- ernment. Even more remarkably, it appears
quent, the despatch of diplomatic missions that Iraq maintained a diplomatic mission in
by no means automatic, and the transmis- Iran for much of the Gulf War between them
sion of messages between states was time- (19801988). Such instances underline the
consuming and arduous. In that context the point that the establishment and maintenance
idea that communication with another state of diplomatic relations may connote nothing
could only occur in the presence of an agree- more than that each party wants to enjoy the
ment to do so would have seemed an unnec- convenience of easy communication.
essary encumbrance. Instead, the concept of An agreement to establish diplomatic rela-
being in diplomatic relations essentially con- tions may be reached through the good offices
noted nothing more than the despatch to or of a third party. More usually, however, the
acceptance from a second state of a resident two states concerned make a joint decision
diplomatic mission; and the absence of such (although some of the earlier soundings
an arrangement was not usually indicative of towards that goal might well have involved
poor relations between the two. Only if they an intermediary). It may take the form of an
were at war would that certainly be so, as its exchange of notes between foreign ministers,
outbreak was always accompanied by the or between ambassadors stationed in a third
hasty (but ordered) departure of any diplo- state or at an international organization; or
matic missions which the now-hostile states there may be a simultaneous announcement
had sent to each other. in the capitals of the two states; or a com-
However, since the end of the First World muniqu may be issued following a meeting
War the number of sovereign states has sub- of foreign ministers. Especially in the case
stantially increased, as have the opportuni- of a new state, an existing state can simply
ties for them to become busily engaged in announce its willingness to establish diplo-
diplomatic contact on a variety of fronts. At matic relations, leaving it to the newcomer to
the same time the ideological and cultural respond positively if it so wishes.
differences between them have become a Accordingly, over the past hundred years
lot deeper. In this much-changed milieu, the it has often become possible to give a pre-
practice emerged of requiring pairs of states cise date to the establishment, or re-establish-
who were not in some form of regular dip- ment, of diplomatic relations between a pair
lomatic contact, and who wished to be on of states. But not always. For there is some
speaking terms with each other, to establish evidence to suggest that since about the mid-
diplomatic relations through an agreement dle of the twentieth century new and smallish
to that effect. By no means did this necessarily states do not always formally establish dip-
imply that they were on good terms with each lomatic relations with states with which it is
other, and from time to time pairs of states improbable that they will have a great deal to
in diplomatic relations get along very badly. do states, perhaps, which are distant in both
Indeed, there is evidence from recent decades a geographical and a political sense. Yet when
to suggest that even the existence of some a state which has chosen to behave in this way
form of armed conflict between two states is comes into contact with one with which it has
not always seen as requiring a breach of dip- not formally opened relations at the United
lomatic relations. Throughout the 1980s, for Nations for example it tends nonetheless to
example, Nicaragua maintained diplomatic act as if it had in fact done so, and seemingly
is rarely rebuffed. In other words, such a diplomatic missions in just ten of them; and
state takes normal diplomatic intercourse for in its capital, Male, it received missions from
granted unless it has explicitly decided not only five. (Maldives also had permanent mis-
to have diplomatic relations with a particu- sions to the United Nations, in both New York
lar country. The writer has been told that the and Geneva, and to the European Union.) If,
thinly-populated southern African state of however, a state wishes to establish a mission
Namibia took this approach on its establish- in the state with which it is in diplomatic rela-
ment in 1990. This would appear to give rise tions, it is customary for the proposed receiv-
to a category of diplomatic relations based on ing state to agree. But the would-be sending
an implied rather than a specific agreement. state has no legal right to demand the accept-
But of course it remains open to a new state ance of a mission, and correspondingly the
to decide that it does not want to be in such a intended receiving state has no legal obliga-
relationship with a particular state. Equally, a tion to assent to the request.
state treated in the above-mentioned taken-for- Where a resident mission is not established,
granted manner may reject such an approach, an alternative way of keeping in direct
and insist that any establishment of diplomatic diplomatic touch is through the accreditation
relations be done in the orthodox way. by the sending state to the receiving state of a
head of mission who is already accredited to
and/or ordinarily resident in another state. In
Key Points this way a non-resident mission is established.
These days, its head will almost always hold
If two states are in diplomatic relations they are the rank of ambassador (or, in the case of a
thereby on straightforward speaking terms with mission from one Commonwealth state to
each other.
another, high commissioner), who may or
During the last hundred years it has become
may not have supporting diplomatic staff.
common for diplomatic relations to be estab-
lished through a formal bilateral agreement. In 2015 Britain had getting on for 50 non-
However, there seem to be cases where agree- resident diplomatic missions, reflecting the
ments to that effect are implied rather than specific. closure in recent years not least for financial
reasons of a number of resident posts, of
which about 150 remain. The United States
had in the region of 165 resident embassies,
MODES and non-resident diplomatic representation in
about two dozen capitals.
It is often suggested that the establishment of A non-resident mission can arise in several
diplomatic relations between two states ways. In the first place, the individual desig-
requires or even consists of the exchange of nated as head of mission may be the sending
resident diplomatic missions. Such exchanges states ambassador to a second state very
do indeed often occur. But it must be empha- probably a geographically-convenient one
sized that there is no necessity for the exist- provided there is no objection to this by either
ence of diplomatic relations to be so marked. of the two receiving states. And, as happens
It may be that only one of the two states not infrequently in this kind of situation, an
concerned will set up a resident mission in the individual ambassador can be accredited non-
capital of the other, there being no obligation residentially to more than one state. Secondly,
of reciprocity in the matter. And it is not an ambassador to an international organiza-
uncommon for neither to do so. Thus in tion may also be accredited to a nearby capi-
January 2015 there were many states with tal, possibly the capital of the state in which
which the tiny Indian Ocean state of Maldives the organization is located. A third possibil-
was in diplomatic relations, but it had resident ity (although seemingly a rare one) is that an
official of appropriate seniority in the send- relations may communicate with or other-
ing states foreign ministry may be accredited wise protect its interests in that state. First,
non-residentially to the receiving state. they may both be represented in the capital
In any event, what is established in these of a third state, or both be members of a par-
various circumstances is a non-resident dip- ticular international organization. If that is
lomatic mission. And when that non-resident so, the absent state can use the regular dip-
representative is on official business in and in lomatic contacts which arise in such a loca-
relation to the receiving state, he or she is as tion or venue to send both written and verbal
much an ambassador as the ones who reside messages to the other state. Given that virtu-
permanently in its capital, and hence receives ally all the worlds states are members of the
all the privileges, immunities, and courtesies United Nations (in January 2015 there were
to which an ambassador is legally and cus- 193 of them), and also accredit permanent
tomarily entitled. Furthermore, and again representatives to the Organization, it is prob-
provided the receiving states do not object, able that most instances of communication
some or all of the lesser members of the send- between states who are not represented in
ing states mission in another capital or capi- each others capitals occur via their missions
tals, or to an international organization, may to that body. Second, it is possible that the
also be designated as members of the sending absent state has a consulate in the other (con-
states non-resident mission to the receiving sulates are not diplomatic missions), and with
state. And they too, when on official business the consent of that state the consular mission
in and in regard to the receiving state, enjoy may be empowered to perform diplomatic
privileges and immunities which are identical acts. This is not a very likely scenario. But
to those held by resident diplomats. if a large number of a states nationals live
As is hinted by the number of non-resident and work in another state with which there is
American and British missions, such mis- little need for regular diplomatic contact, the
sions are more likely to be appointed by consular option could come into play.
larger and wealthier states than smaller and Third, a state may resort to special mis-
poorer ones. For where a state of the latter sions. At the beginning of the modern inter-
sort does not have many interests to advance national system, in the fifteenth and sixteenth
and protect in a state with which it is in dip- centuries, such missions were the usual
lomatic relations, it may well decide not to means through which diplomatic business
go to the bother and expense of accrediting was done. But gradually they were edged
a non-resident mission to that state. Such out by the growth in the number of resi-
a decision is all the more likely where, as dent missions, and came to be used almost
may well be the case, the lesser state has no only on occasions of special ceremonial or
geographically-convenient diplomatic mis- substantive significance, such as some wed-
sion, and especially so if the larger state has dings and funerals, and the negotiation and
accredited a mission to the lesser state, as the signing of certain treaties. However, over the
latter can then use that mission as one way last hundred years, and especially since the
of communicating with the former. However, end of the Second World War, their number
it is not the ideal diplomatic procedure, as has considerably increased facilitated, of
the absence of a representative accredited to course, by the speediness of international
the capital of the state to which a message is travel. The advantage taken of this device
sent means that it may not be presented in the reflects two further developments. One is
most advantageous way. the considerable growth in the number of
There are four other ways in which a state states which do not appoint a large number
lacking any kind of diplomatic mission in of resident or even non-resident missions, as
another state with which it is in diplomatic such states find special missions particularly
useful when some matter arises which is respect of the other must be cancelled. In
deemed sufficiently pressing to require direct principle the two states concerned are no
bilateral attention. The other is the greater longer on speaking terms. It is as if they are
complexity of the international agenda, as boycotting each other.
this often results in expert delegations being It follows that in third states the normal type
despatched from home by both larger and of diplomatic contact will not occur between
lesser states to engage in negotiation. the missions of two states not in diplomatic
Finally, there is the use of a protecting relations. In general, the members of the two
power a state which, through its mission missions will not communicate or do direct
in a particular state and with the consent of business with each other, or engage in social
that state, undertakes to protect the interests interchange. Equally, hosts will not know-
(or maybe certain specified interests) in the ingly invite the representatives of two states
receiving state of an absent state. In one guise not in diplomatic relations to relatively inti-
this too can be identified as having existed mate social events unless, perhaps, trying
in the early years of the modern international to provide an opportunity for the two states
system. But it is in the latter part of the twen- representatives to talk to each other nor to
tieth century, and in a different context, that larger ones at which a representative of one
a particular form of the device has come into such state is guest of honour. Should, none-
its own as will be explained later. theless, the representatives of states not in
diplomatic relations find themselves together
at a small event, or seated near or next to each
Key Points other at a larger one, it appears that they do not
necessarily feel under an obligation to object
Two states in diplomatic relations are not obliged or leave. Instead, as a matter of courtesy, they
to establish resident diplomatic missions in each may just treat each other as distant colleagues.
others capital.
On other occasions when the representatives
In the absence of such a mission there are other
of two such states happen to come across each
means of keeping in direct touch.
other, a bow of the head might be deemed an
appropriate response. However, when rela-
tions between the two states are very difficult
BREACH and especially if they are fighting each other
it is not unknown for their representatives
There is no obligation on a state to establish pointedly to ignore each other.
diplomatic relations with another. And, once A somewhat different situation arises in a
established, either party to such a relation- third state where the doyen of its diplomatic
ship can bring it to an end by making an corps represents a state with which one or
announcement to that specific effect, adding more of the other states represented there are
such attendant publicity as it deems fit. Thus not in diplomatic relations. In this circum-
a relationship which has to be set up bilater- stance a distinction is drawn between the role
ally can be broken unilaterally. A breach of the ambassador in question as doyen and as
does, however, have consequences for both head of a diplomatic mission. When acting as
sides. Most immediately, if the state initiat- doyen he or she may speak to the representa-
ing the breach has a resident diplomatic mis- tives of states which are not in diplomatic rela-
sion in the state it is targeting, it must be tions with his or her state. Correspondingly,
withdrawn, as must any diplomatic mission the representatives of those states may speak
of the target state in the initiating state. to the doyen when he or she is acting in that
Likewise, any non-resident representation capacity, and attend meetings of the local
which has been established by either state in corps called and chaired by the doyen.
At international organizations the under- in diplomatic relations for a long while. A

standings which prevail in third states regard- notable instance is that of Cuba and the United
ing contacts between the representatives of States, the latter having broken off diplomatic
two states not in diplomatic relations undergo relations in 1961, creating a situation which
some relaxation. Thus there is no objection lasted until 2015. A breach of diplomatic
to their representatives being present at the relations does not necessarily mean that the
same plenary meeting, sitting on the same states concerned are unable to get in touch
committee or sub-committee, addressing (as will be seen below). But any moves or
each other on such occasions, and working arrangements towards that end may well
with each other in their common capacity as encounter difficulties thus signifying the
members of the same body. The actual degree absence of a normal diplomatic relationship.
of contact and cooperation which develops,
however, will depend on the precise state of
political relations between the two states, and Key Points
to a lesser extent on the personalities of the
relevant representatives. But the latter do well Either of a pair of states in diplomatic relations
to take care. In the 1980s a Foreign Ministers may terminate that relationship.
Such an act has repercussions where both such
removal from office followed, in point of
states are represented in third states and although
time, some informal contacts he had had at to a lesser degree in international organizations.
the United Nations with the Ambassador to The initiative for the resumption of diplomatic
the Organization of a state with which the relations is expected to come from the state
first state was not in diplomatic relations. The which terminated them.
reasons for his downfall were extensive and
complicated. But his incautious behaviour
seems to have been a pretext for his sacking,
and was believed by some to have been a sub- ALTERNATIVES
stantive factor in the case.
When diplomatic relations have been It has been mentioned that the absence of
broken, the initiative for their restoration diplomatic relations does not mean that there
is expected to come from the state which cannot be any kind of contact between the
instituted the breach. In political terms this two states concerned. In these circumstances
may be less easy than it sounds, as a state there are a number of ways in which such a
would look, or could be made to look, rather state may communicate with the other
silly if after breaking relations it soon sought provided always that both agree to ignore the
to get them back. Heated statements on the restrictions which customarily apply to states
occasion of the breach may also prove an in their situation. The first four are counterparts
obstacle to their resumption. Moreover, once to the devices which a state in diplomatic
relations have been broken, further problems relations with another may use when it has
in the relationship may complicate any not accredited either a resident or a non-
move to restore them, even if in themselves resident mission to the second state. First,
such problems might have been unlikely to communication could occur, probably
provoke a breach. A resumption of relations through an intermediary (at least in the first
carries a certain symbolism which the actual instance), in the capital of a third state where
state of relations may be deemed too fragile both states have diplomatic missions. A well-
to bear, especially if the question of contact known example of this tactic is the on and off
with the other state is a source of lively talks which went on in Warsaw in the late
domestic controversy. Thus it is possible 1950s and throughout the 1960s between the
that a pair of states may find themselves not ambassadors of China and the United States
to Poland. In terms of hard outcomes they interests section: the presence as part of a
achieved very little, but they were a valuable protecting powers embassy (but not neces-
point of contact between two states whose sarily in the same building) of diplomatic
relations were often at a critical juncture. personnel from the protected states foreign
(Such contacts could also, of course, be ministry. And where it suited all concerned
arranged anywhere, and the Warsaw meetings the receiving state, the protecting state and
were in fact a continuation of talks in Geneva the protected state some interests sections
between conveniently-located ambassadors.) came to act almost as if they were independ-
Likewise, meetings can be arranged at the ent embassies. A good instance of this is the
headquarters of an international organization United States interests section in Cuba, which
to which both belong, either through their within two years of its establishment in 1977
permanent missions to the organization or had become the largest non-Communist dip-
their delegations to its plenary meetings lomatic mission in Havana, dwarfing its par-
although here it is possible that if an ent entity, the Swiss embassy. Occasionally
intermediary is involved he or she may be a it even happened that its head walked out
senior member of the organizations of meetings at which the United States was
secretariat. Furthermore, at a locale in which insulted, notwithstanding the fact that his
two such states are represented it is always technical superior, the Swiss Ambassador,
possible for them to make informal contact, remained seated.
maybe with intent but maybe, too, in an Additionally, there are three, formally non-
entirely accidental way. (At a serious stage of diplomatic, ways in which states not in diplo-
the Cold War, there was what was said to be a matic relations may make contact with each
fortuitous and fruitful meeting in a gentlemens other. First, one party may, with the receiving
lavatory at the United Nations between the states consent, establish in the latters capital
representatives of the Soviet Union and the a mission which is not of the sort referred to
United States admittedly states in diplomatic in the Vienna Convention. In 1990, for exam-
relations, but ones then having very little to ple, China and Israel exchanged supposedly
do with each other.) Second, as two states not non-diplomatic offices, Chinas being termed
in diplomatic relations may at the same time a travel agency and Israels a liaison office
be or remain in consular relations, a state with of her Academy of Sciences and Humanities.
a consulate in another could use it to transmit A popular name for such an arrangement
a message to that state. Third, a special is representative office. It is also a device
mission could be sent, perhaps a relatively which may be used by a sending entity whose
high-powered one, possibly despatched to claim to sovereign statehood has not been
discuss the establishment or re-establishment recognized by the receiving state. In either
of diplomatic relations. circumstance, if the receiving state does not
Fourth, the device of the protecting power object such a mission may, in the manner
could be brought into play, nowadays prob- of some interests sections, come to behave
ably through its offshoot, the interests rather as if it were a fully-fledged embassy.
section. Especially where a breach of diplo- Second, states not in diplomatic relations
matic relations occurs between states which particularly contiguous ones may set up
had had a lot to do with each other, the tra- formally non-diplomatic local arrangements
ditional protecting power relationship can be to deal with continuing bilateral issues. East
less than satisfactory. The protecting power and West Germany did so in the 1950s and
may well find it onerous, and the protected 1960s. Cyprus and the (unrecognized) state
power probably itches to have a more direct of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
role in safeguarding its interests. This led, have for a long time cooperated in the
in the mid-1960s, to the emergence of the solution of problems regarding the supply
of electricity and water from one part of the be expected (or not expected) from them.
island to another. And it is even the case that Reliable assumptions can be made about how
there has been some ongoing cooperation all concerned will proceed. This is particu-
between the intelligence services of Israel larly important for states, in that it more or
and the Palestinian Authority. Such devices less ensures uniformity of conduct by and
can, of course, be used as a means of com- towards their numerous and geographically-
municating on broader matters than their out- scattered official representatives.
wardly technical remit. The last remark points to the crucial differ-
Finally, there is what has become known ence, in this regard, between the contemporary
as signalling (which may also be used by society of states and a village of about two
states already in diplomatic relations, espe- hundred families. Communication in the lat-
cially when their political relationship is ter is simply a matter of one individual (or the
poor). Typically, this may consist of subtle members of one family) speaking to another
hints dropped in leaders speeches, which is face-to-face. If any one individual or family is
one reason why such statements are closely not on speaking terms with another, that will
scrutinized for any unusual nuances or quickly become obvious. But in a world where
emphases. A signal may also be given by foreign services employ from less than a hun-
a change in voting behaviour on a matter dred to many thousand of individuals, where
which regularly comes before the General states foreign postings number between a
Assembly of the United Nations. It is then up handful and approaching a couple of hundred,
to the state to which the signal is directed to where there is an abundance of inter-state
decide whether to make a positive response, organizations, and a multitude of ad hoc inter-
possibly with a signal of its own. state meetings and conferences, resulting in
almost an infinity of face-to-face contacts in
a highly protocol-conscious environment, it is
Key Point very important that precise knowledge about
who is on speaking terms with whom, and who
If two states not in diplomatic relations both is not, should be generally available. In other
wish it, contact can be made and maintained in
words, some such device as that offered by the
various ways, through both regular diplomatic
concept of diplomatic relations is definitely
personnel and by way of formally non-diplomatic
devices. needed.
In its absence, states would find that even
the mere making of diplomatic contact would
not necessarily be smooth and straightforward.
CONCLUSION And ongoing contact would take place within
an uncertain and therefore messy procedural
The variety and ingenuity of the arrange- context. Obstacles to easy communication
ments discussed in the last section must not would appear. But the universal adoption of
lead to the assumption that it matters little the concept of being in diplomatic relations
whether or not two states are in diplomatic enables day-to-day interactions to occur with-
relations. The value of this device, like any out let or hindrance between those who enjoy
established practice (such as one enjoined by this relationship which is its whole point.
protocol), is that it enables those to whom it If the concept did not exist, it or something
applies to know exactly where they stand on exceedingly like it would almost certainly
the matter in question, in that each partici- have to be invented. It is indeed the rock on
pant knows what behaviour will be entirely which the whole inter-state diplomatic sys-
acceptable (or unacceptable) to the others tem is built (see also Chapters 46, 1214 and
and, by the same token, what behaviour can 53 in this Handbook).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT James, Alan: Diplomatic relations and

contacts, British Yearbook of International
Law 1991 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
I warmly thank Lorna Lloyd for her comments
1992, pp. 347387).
on the draft of this chapter.
Newsom, David D. (ed.): Diplomacy under a
Foreign Flag (Washington, DC: Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown
University, 1990).
FURTHER READING Numelin, Ragnar: The Beginnings of Diplomacy.
A Sociological Study of Intertribal and
Berridge, G.R.: Talking to the Enemy. How International Relations (Oxford: Oxford
States without Diplomatic Relations University Press, 1950).
Communicate (Basingstoke: Palgrave Roberts, Sir Ivor (ed.): Satows Diplomatic
Macmillan, 1994). Practice, 6th edition (Oxford: Oxford
Cohen, Raymond: Theatre of Power. The Art of University Press, 2009).
Diplomatic Signalling (London: Longman,
1987).
Geldenhuys, Deon: Isolated States. A
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
22
Great Power Diplomacy
Cornelia Navari
DEFINITIONS the availability of a great power structure to

channel agreements, and to back up agree-
A Great Power is a sovereign state that exerts ments (Craig and George, 1995: 285287).
influence on a global scale. Great Powers pos- The Brahimi Report of the Panel on UN Peace
sess military and economic strength, as well Operations in 2000 stressed the importance of
as diplomatic and soft power sufficient to great power resources to peace-keeping.
cause minor powers to consider the positions The term great power entered the for-
of Great Powers before taking actions of their mal language of diplomacy during the
own. They have dominated the peace confer- peace negotiations to end the Napoleonic
ences following major wars, and assumed Wars. Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign
special rights and obligations in any formal Secretary, first used it in a diplomatic context
machinery created to preserve international in a letter of February 13, 1814: It affords
peace and security (Berridge and Lloyd, me great satisfaction to acquaint you that
2012: 172). Great Powers may consider them- there is every prospect of the Congress termi-
selves, and are expected by others, to demon- nating with a general accord and Guarantee
strate resolve or reassure allies or protect between the Great powers of Europe, with
credibility or show leadership and to have a determination to support the arrangement
special responsibilities for the maintenance of agreed upon (Webster, 1931: 307). Their
international peace and stability. A viable formal position was anticipated in the 1815
peace system has been identified by Gordon Treaty of Chaumont, intended to turn the
Craig and Alexander George as requiring quadruple alliance of Britain, Prussia, Russia
agreement among a majority of states on its and Austria-Hungary into a long-standing
major aims and objectives, a framework of alliance in the event that France rejected their
norms, rules, procedures and institutions and peace terms. (Each agreed to put 150,000
Great Power Diplomacy 269
soldiers in the field against France and to abroad. The European Geostrategy website
guarantee the European peace against French calls for a wide international footprint and
aggression for twenty years.) It was extended [the] means to reach most geopolitical thea-
by the 1818 Treaty of Aix la Chapelle guaran- tres, particularly the Middle East, South-East
teeing the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, Asia, East Asia, Africa and South America
which contained a secret protocol confirming (Rogers et al., 2014). On the input side, the
the Quadruple Alliance and a public declara- classic list established by Organski in 1958
tion of the intention of the powers to main- is military, economic and political capacity
tain their union strengthened by the ties of (Organski, 1958). Kenneth Waltz, the founder
Christian brotherhood whose object was the of the neorealist theory of international rela-
preservation of peace on the basis of respect tions, elaborated these in terms of five sources
for treaties, to which France was invited to of power: population and territory, resource
adhere (Philips, 1920: 1769). This was the endowment, economic capability, politi-
formal basis of the Concert of Europe, which cal stability and competence, and military
met periodically through the rest of the cen- strength (Waltz 1979: 131). The states that
tury whenever the provisions of the Vienna have the most of these relative to others will
Treaty were threatened or needed adjustment. be candidates for great power status.
Of the five original Great Powers recog-
nized at the Congress of Vienna, only France
and the United Kingdom have maintained
that status continuously. Prussia (as part of HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
the newly formed German state) experienced
continued economic growth and political In practice, great power diplomacy first took
power but fell out of the rank with Germanys the form of an on-going alignment between
defeat and division in 1944. Russia and Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary to con-
Austria-Hungary stagnated. At the same time, trol post-Napoleonic revolutionary efforts,
largely through the process of industrializa- taking advantage of the congress system. At
tion, Japan emerged as a great power after Aix, Russias Alexander I, urging collective
the Meiji Restoration and the United States security, had suggested the idea of an inter-
after its civil war, both of which had been national (in reality joint) military force that
minor powers in 1815. By the dawn of the would be available to suppress revolutions
twentieth century the balance of world power wherever they appeared. The British foreign
had changed substantially, represented by minister Viscount Castlereagh vehemently
the Eight Nation Alliance, a belligerent alli- opposed the idea but could not prevent the
ance against the Boxer Rebellion in China. others going ahead. At the Congress of
Formed in 1900, it consisted of the five Troppau in 1820, called by Metternich to
Congress powers plus Italy, Japan, and the forestall the collapse of the government of
United States, indicating the Great Powers at Naples, Austria, Prussia and Russia insisted
the beginning of the twentieth century. on restoring the king of Naples. The Congress
The power wielded by Great Powers is of Verona, 1822, called again by Metternich
variously identified in terms of both inputs in reaction to the weakening position of the
and outputs. On the output side, note the Bourbon government in Spain and the grow-
historian A.J.P. Taylor (1954: xxiv): The ing activism of Greek nationalists against the
test of a great power is the test of strength Ottoman Empire, allowed France to send an
for war. A recent discussion of USChina army into Spain to suppress the revolt, fol-
relations associates US great power in lowing which Britain (represented by
peacetime with its alliances, its trade rela- Canning) withdrew. Only Austria, Prussia and
tionships and the deployments of US forces Russia met at St Petersburg in 1825, the date
usually used to mark the end of any prospect established on the Niger and Congo Rivers,
of a wider collaboration on Metternichs but it endorsed Frances pre-eminent posi-
terms. tion along the Congo River, compensating
But the Great Powers continued to meet, Britain by recognizing Britains dominant
and to agree on the management of some of position on the Lower and Middle Niger.
Europes most critical affairs. In 1827, three Germany also emerged as a major winner
(Britain, France and Russia) joined in the with little previous presence in Africa, the
Battle of Navarino to defeat an Ottoman fleet Congress ratified Bismarcks declaration of
threatening to put down Greek rebels. At a protectorate over the East African territory
meetings in London in 1830, 1832 and 1838 that would become Tanganyika, confirming
39, Britain and France secured agreement Germany as a major player in international
on independence for Greece and Belgium affairs.
(in 1830 and 1831). In 1840, the powers Concerting suffered a halt as the rival alli-
(except France) intervened in defence of the ances that would fight the First World War
Ottoman Empire (despite their previous sup- took shape. Bismarck worked the German
port for Greek independence) to end Egypts Austro-Hungarian Alliance in 1879; France
eight-year occupation of Syria. They fell out allied with Russia in 1894. Britain held out,
over Russias claims of a protectorate over hoping to act as the balancer to keep the
Christians in the Ottoman Empire, leading to peace, but its hesitancy may have actually
the Crimean War (185456), in which Britain encouraged Germany to mobilize, and it was
and France confronted Russia; they also fell finally forced to declare war on Frances side
out over the claims of nationalism leading to to prevent a German hegemony in Europe.
the Italian War of Independence (1859, also In the event, the destructiveness of that war
called the Franco-Austrian War), the Austro- and its catastrophic political consequences
Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian the dissolution of the Ottoman, Austro-
War (187071). But concerting did not die out. Hungarian and Russian Empires, and the
The 1878 Congress of Berlin, called by the Russian revolution produced the idea of
German chancellor Bismarck to settle ques- the war to end all wars and a movement for
tions raised by the Russian victory in the a league of peace. The idea was taken up
Russo-Turkish War (187778) was the high by the United States: on January 8, 1918,
point since Vienna. It established a commit- President Woodrow Wilson enumerated the
tee to oversee the finances of the Ottoman last of his Fourteen Points to Congress, call-
Empire, in debt to the European Powers, ing for a general association of nations
and ceded Cyprus to Great Britain, Bosnia formed on the basis of covenants designed
to Austria, and recognized Montenegro, to create mutual guarantees of the politi-
Serbia and Romania as independent states. cal independence and territorial integrity of
The 1888 Congress of Berlin, again called by States, large and small equally. Both Britain
Bismarck, this time to sort out rival claims and France seized on the idea to continue
over the Congo basin, laid down the rules allied collaboration into the interwar period,
that would govern the European conquest of raising schemes for a council of great powers
Africa. After signing the Berlin Act, a colo- that would revive, legalize and make perma-
nial power could no longer raise a flag on the nent a concert of powers.
African coast and claim everything that lay The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour,
behind it. Instead, it had to physically back its commissioned the first official report in early
claim with troops, missionaries, merchants 1918, drafted by the Phillimore committee.
and even railroads. Britain got most of what Drawing on the experience of the Concert,
it wanted European recognition of its it initially aimed to limit a league to the
claim in Egypt. Freedom of navigation was victorious powers. It proposed a conference
of allied states that, in the words of historian in relation to Poland and Czechoslovakia,
Mark Jarrett, might have been taken straight as well as the aim of overturning the peace
out of the Quadruple alliance holding terms. Britain and France fell out over the
its meetings as occasion required (Jarrett demilitarization of Germany and the exploi-
2013: 370). The French drafted a much more tation of the Ruhr basin. America and France
far-reaching proposal in June of that year, fell out over the terms of the Dawes plan for
advocating annual meetings of a council to financing German reparations. None agreed
settle all disputes, as well as a true international on the general aims of concerting or on the
army to enforce its decisions. Neither idea was basic norms of international conduct.
welcomed by the United States, following Some common rules promised to emerge.
which, in November, Lord Robert Cecil, a In 1921, US Secretary of State Charles Evans
member of the Phillimore commission, put Hughes invited nine nations to Washington
forward a compromise that would form the to discuss naval reductions and the situation
blueprint of the eventual League of Nations. in the Far East. Three major treaties emerged
Drafted by Jan Smuts (prime minister of out of the Washington Conference. The first
South Africa and a prominent Commonwealth set a ratio for how far the four League pow-
statesman), the relevant articles proposed a ers and the United States could set their
permanent council of great powers to serve naval strength; by the terms of the second,
with a non-permanent selection of minor the United States, France, Britain and Japan
states. The League would be made up of a agreed to consult with each other in the event
General Assembly (representing all member of a future crisis in East Asia before taking
states), an Executive Council (with permanent action. A nine-power treaty promised that
membership limited to major powers) and a each of the signatories the United States,
permanent secretariat. The Councils first Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the
four permanent members were Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and China would
France, Italy and Japan. (The first four non- respect the territorial integrity of China
permanent members, elected by the Assembly while recognizing Japanese dominance in
for a three-year term, were Belgium, Brazil, Manchuria. But none of the treaties provided
Greece and Spain.) The League held its first for any reinsurance and called only for con-
meeting at Executive Council level in Paris on sultations. It was also clear that Japan did
January 16, 1920, six days after the Versailles not look upon the treaties as curbing its aspi-
Treaty and the Covenant of the League of rations in the Pacific. Both Italy and Japan
Nations had come into force. embarked on imperial adventures, in the late
But unlike the Concert, the League Council 1920s and early 1930s, and Germany began
had few clearly defined responsibilities. The a rearmament program in 1935, their respec-
Concert powers had pledged to maintain the tive ambitions forming the basis of the Axis
Vienna Treaty, and by implication common bloc and a joint determination on war to pro-
agreement on any changes, with the promise tect their gains.
of military action if any broke the agreement. In 1944, in a work written just as the
But the powers at Versailles refused to guar- Second World War was closing, William T.R.
antee the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Fox coined the term superpower to charac-
much less promise military action, while the terize the three powers that were securing vic-
treaty became subject to multiple claims for tory over Germany, famously Britain, Soviet
adjustment, not least on the part of the Great Russia and the United States (Fox, 1944).
Powers themselves. The Locarno Pact of Defeated, under occupation, with their econ-
1926 secured Germanys western borders omies in ruins, Germany and Japan fell out
but did not touch the question of its east- of the ranking. As for France and China, they
ern borders, where Germany had ambitions had been defeated victims of war, qualifying
their positions as Great Powers, but each had provision to raise an army. Each had a veto
considerable potential weight and would be over final resolutions, but none could prevent
invited to join the superpowers in essential discussion. A position of Secretary General
aspects of peace-making. At the Yalta con- was created, empowered to call the attention
ference in February 1945, the three set the of the Security Council to potential threats
terms for post-war collaboration, including to the peace. Responsibility for preventing
permanent association in a United Nations future war was conferred upon the Great
organization and an invitation to China to Powers by all signatories to the Charter, giv-
join them (US president Roosevelts idea). ing them a legal as well as political respon-
They also offered France an occupation zone sibility for the management of international
in Germany, the forerunner of its eventual order, which they were to have in perpetuity.
placement on the Security Council, urged Gerry Simpson has characterized the new
by the British Prime Minister Churchill. system as legalised hegemony, which he
(France under General de Gaulle would turn defines as:
all its efforts in the post-war period toward
The existence within an international society of a
confirming its seat at the top table, includ- powerful elite of states whose superior status is
ing acquiring a nuclear capability.) They also recognized by minor powers as a political fact
agreed central aspects of how they would giving rise to the existence of certain constitutional
work together, including the limits of the veto privileges, rights and duties and whose relations
with each other are defined by adherence to a
power that had been insisted upon by Soviet
rough principle of sovereign equality. (Simpson,
leader Stalin. 2004: 68)
The United Nations was originally the
official term for the Allies; to join, countries Peace treaties have been a permanent instru-
had to sign the 1941 Declaration of the United ment of great power diplomacy since the
Nations, drafted by President Roosevelt, and modern period, setting the architecture of
to declare war on the Axis. The 1945 San each post-war settlement, whose terms
Francisco conference convened to draft the become potential diplomatic assets. So, for
UN Charter was open only to states that had example, the interim peace with Germany
declared war (46 did, some retroactively). that ended the Second World War in Europe
Stalin had accepted the idea of a United placed Germany under the constraint of four-
Nations organization at the 1943 Moscow power control, relieving France of the burden
Conference (in return for promises on open- of containing Germany alone or dependent
ing a second front in the war). The basic on uncertain allies. Directing a peace process
structure was determined by the superpowers is a major objective of great power diplo-
and China, whose representative met at the macy, and France was noted for its success in
Dumbarton Oaks Conference from August to achieving the status of one of the four occu-
October 1944 in Washington, DC, the final pying powers of Germany after the Second
powers of the Security Council to be agreed World War.
at Yalta. The new format was to be a League Participation generally demands strategic
of Nations with teeth. There was to be a contribution to the enemys defeat. The latter
General Assembly, but denuded of all power involves more than feet on the ground or con-
to inhibit Great Power action; there was to be trol of the skies, and may include variously,
a Security Council of eleven members, five and with reference to specific context, mar-
of which were to be permanent besides the ket power, financial resources, geographical
three superpowers it would include China access and governing capacity. France gained
and France. Together, they had the power to a position on the Control Council, despite its
determine aggression and threats to the peace defeat, because its large material and politi-
and to act in the event of either, and there was cal capacity would be required to contain
Germany in the future. There is also fungibil- Atomic diplomacy refers to attempts to
ity, the ability to turn one sort of resource into use the threat of nuclear warfare to achieve
other resources. America has retained its role diplomatic goals. After the first successful
as pre-eminent Great Power since the Second test of the atomic bomb in 1945, US officials
World War, and continues to dominate the considered the potential non-military ben-
terms of peace processes, not only because it efits that could be derived from the American
is a large power with plenty of resources, but nuclear monopoly. In the event, the US pos-
because it is able to quickly turn one relevant session did not soften Soviet resistance to
power asset into others. American proposals for free elections in
Eastern Europe or reduce Soviet control over
the Balkans. But the fact of the nuclear bomb
was useful in ensuring that Western Europe
United States
would rely on the United States to guarantee
In the immediate post-war period, the criti- its security rather than seeking an accom-
cal aspect of Americas power was its finan- modation with the Soviet Union, because it
cial capability. Despite the highest national could protect the region by placing it under
debt in its history, a rapid post-war recovery the American nuclear umbrella. The US
provided it with financial resources at a time insistence on hegemony in the occupation and
when its debt-ridden European allies econ- rehabilitation of Japan also stemmed in part
omies were in ruins and when they had no from the confidence of being the sole nuclear
resources for reconstruction or to reward power and in part from what that nuclear
their citizens for their war-time efforts (or power had gained: Japans total surrender to
face a feared social upheaval) Britain in US forces. But the US nuclear monopoly was
particular was desperate for the post-war not of long duration; the Soviet Union suc-
loan that would allow it to begin reconstruc- cessfully exploded its first atomic bomb in
tion. The distribution of Marshall Aid 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France
credits to fourteen European countries plus in 1960 and the Peoples Republic of China
Turkey was one of the main instruments in 1964.
ensuring their cooperation in the process of By contrast, its conventional military
confronting an increasingly intractable capability has proved of enduring relevance.
Soviet Union. The largest military spender though the entire
Dollar diplomacy was initiated by of the period since the Second World War, at
President Taft in the form of private bank the height of the Cold War the United States
lending, primarily to Latin America to had military alliances with over 100 countries
encourage capitalist development during the aimed to contain the Soviet Union and limit
1920s and 1930s. It was overtaken by the offi- its or its Chinese allys potential for politi-
cial issuing of credits through the State and cal and/or military movement. The alliances
Commerce Departments who administered channelled military aid to defence ministries,
Marshall Aid, which in turn was eventually encouraging military-backed anti-communist
overtaken by the Treasury Department, who governments and ensured adherence to
administer economic sanctions. The first Cold Americas Cold War goals. The policy of
War sanctions imposed by the United States containment evolved to entail military and
were against North Korea in 1950, as a prel- covert interventions across wide areas of the
ude to the Korean War; the second and long globe, wherever credibility was challenged.
standing were against Cuba in 1960 to isolate Expected to decline in significance with the
Central America from the contagious effects collapse of the Soviet Union, its military
of the Cuban Revolution, and against Iran in has been repeatedly called upon in the post-
1979 in response to the Iranian Revolution. Soviet period, first in securing Bosnia from
being divided between Serbia and Croatia protective zone of the Warsaw Pact, however,
in the wars that followed the dissolution of its conventional forces were much more rele-
Yugoslavia; in the Iraq Wars of 1991 and vant. Its large land army, with 3000 tanks,
2003 to push Iraq out of Kuwait and to unseat ended the war in occupation of a large swathe
Iraqs tyrannical president Saddam Hussein; of central Europe, including Poland, East
in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban; in Libya Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania,
to secure the resistance to Colonel Qhaddafi; eastern Austria, and Bulgaria. Moscow con-
and in coercive diplomacy against Syria from sidered Eastern Europe to be a buffer zone for
2013. The Obama administrations decision the forward defence of its western borders,
to fly B-52s through the air defence identi- and ensured control of the region by trans-
fication zone announced by China in 2014 is forming those countries into subservient allies.
the most recent example. Soviet troops crushed a popular uprising and
The United States supplemented its mili- rebellion in Hungary in 1956 and ended insub-
tary alliances with market power, derived ordination by the Czechoslovak government
from the size of its consumer market and the in 1968. Soviet control in Eastern Europe
administrations right to open or close it. The came to an end in 1990 when Prime Minister
reconstruction of Japan into a stable democ- Gorbachev refused to permit Soviet troops to
racy with a developed industrial sector was put down the popular uprisings in East
powerfully aided by opening the American Germany and Czechoslovakia.
market to Japanese goods initially the occu- Soviet military strength was buttressed
pation goods sold in America to earn dollars by popular front movements. Originating
which helped finance the occupation, but in the Communist International (Comintern)
then increasingly innovative industrial goods set up by Lenin to export revolution to the
turned Japan into one of the worlds foremost rest of Europe and Asia, the Soviets encour-
industrial economies. The policy tied Japan aged Communist uprisings in Germany and
into a permanent alliance with the United saw Bla Kun briefly establish the Hungarian
States the cornerstone of Americas Pacific Soviet Republic in the immediate aftermath
security policy. South Korea was also turned of the First World War. Stalin followed with
into a reliable ally through a development the United Front tactic in which foreign
policy that depended on external earnings Communists were urged to enter into alli-
from a developed industrial market. ances with reformist left-wing parties and
national liberation movements of all kinds.
The high point of the United Front was the
partnership between the Chinese Communist
The Soviet Union and Russia
Party and the nationalist Kuomintang, a
In the final stages of the war, the Soviet policy that effectively crashed in 1927 when
Union determined on nuclear possession, Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek mas-
primarily to ensure that it would be immune sacred the native Communists and expelled
from the sort of surprise attack it had suffered all of his Soviet advisors. But Stalin revived
from Germany in June 1941. It made one the policy in the Soviet occupied territories
major excursion into nuclear diplomacy in of Eastern and Central Europe after the war,
1962 when it placed nuclear armed missiles in where progressive parties were encouraged
Cuba, creating a nuclear facility 90 miles off to join with local communists in fight-
the American coast. (Most analysts agree the ing the first post-war elections, serving
aim was to increase diplomatic pressure on with them in governments, and effectively
the allies to leave Berlin and to recognize seizing power from within. When French
East Germany.) If the aim was to support the prime minister Ramadier fired the Reds
in 1947, he demonstrated that France was Britain

immune to the tactic, but, backed by Soviet
troops, it was successful in the Soviet areas In the long aftermath of the Second World
of occupation. War, Britains power was sourced primarily
The Soviet Union also practiced peace- in its global reach its imperial and post-
ful coexistence government to govern- imperial resources in Africa, the Middle East
ment relations exploiting the ordinary rules and the Far East, and its high governing
of diplomacy. The new policy was initiated capacity. Americas key Second World War
under Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar ally on the basis of its determination, its
for Foreign Affairs between 1930 and 1939, geography (the US still enjoys access to five
who concluded alliances with France and military bases in Britain) and its governing
Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union joined the capacity, it won control of Germanys Ruhr
League of Nations in 1934 and was active in industrial zone, offering the latter to the US
demanding action against imperialist aggres- to form the bi-zone, and eventually the
sion, a particular danger to it after the 1931 Federal Republic of Germany, in exchange
Japanese invasion of Manchuria (which for Americas agreement to act as guarantor
eventually resulted in the SovietJapanese of German good behaviour for the foreseea-
Battle of Khalkhin-gol, 193839). During the ble future. As one of the Big Three, it natu-
post-war period, the Soviets made particu- rally had a seat on the Security Council.
larly effective use of their seat on the Security Britain has the fourth highest defence
Council, using the veto 109 times up to 1973, budget in the world, $61 billion, behind
by which time the Western domination of the the US ($683 billion), Russia ($91 billion)
UN had weakened. The high spots were the and China ($166 billion). Among the larger
1950 veto against action in Korea, the 1956 European economies, France and the United
veto in respect of condemning Israels Suez Kingdom are the only significant spenders on
adventure, the 1974 veto against a resolution defence. It has retained substantial overseas
condemning the Turkish invasion of Cyprus base facilities at Gibraltar, Diego Garcia and
and the 1980 veto in reference to the protec- Cyprus (Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri
tion of Afghanistans sovereignty. During and Dhekelia) and smaller facilities at Brunei,
the post-Soviet period, Russia, together with Kenya and Sierra Leone. British forces have
China, refused to allow resolutions author- key enabling capabilities (command and
izing Western intervention into the domestic control, intelligence, strategic transport),
affairs of Syria. and Britain has the ability to operate at long
When Putin came to power in the newly range. In a straight fight, the UK would out-
formed Russian Federation, he determined match even China in an equidistant location
to reconstruct a Russian sphere of influence (such as the Gulf), according to the Royal
among some of the former Soviet territo- United Services Institute (Lubin, 2014).
ries. The major diplomatic instruments were Britain has made that capacity available
Russias oil and natural gas reserves. It was to the United States repeatedly, beginning
not a novel policy the Soviet Union had in 1948, when Britain offered to lead a
controlled Eastern European states through European military resurgence to secure
its ability to supply or withhold vital natu- German rearmament. In January 1991, the
ral resources. Putin also exploited Russias United States and Britain provided the two
membership of the Security Council to pro- largest forces respectively for the coalition
tect its gains in respect of both Georgia and army which liberated Kuwait from Saddam
the Ukraine. Husseins regime. British forces participated
in NATOs war in Afghanistan, and British role in Europes integration processes to

Prime Minister Blair took the lead (against keep the emerging German sovereign state
the opposition of France, Canada, Germany, firmly tied to European structures in which
China and Russia) in advocating the invasion the French had a determinate say. The most
of Iraq in 2003. (Britain was second only to recent and critical parlay of this sort was its
the US in sending forces to Iraq.) It has also refusal to accept German reunification in
offered its military assets to its European 1990 unless Germany agreed to widening
partners. The 1998 UKFrance summit at European integration. The Maastricht Treaty
St. Malo, Normandy adopted a declaration establishing a tightened European Union
which laid the basis for a European Union was the price Germany had to pay for
defence policy (Atlantic Community French acquiescence. The resultant
Initiative, 1998). partnership developed into a key foreign
As de-colonization proceeded, Britain policy asset, particularly after the new united
took care to develop other institutional assets, Germany became the major European Union
not only in the United Nations where it was paymaster and the major influence on EU
one of the architects of peacekeeping, and policy.
in NATO with reference to its command France made probably the most successful
structure, but also in the European Union, use of atomic diplomacy. Under de Gaulle
which Britain determined to join from 1962. and subsequent to him, it retained independ-
Britain has led the development in both the ent use of its nuclear capability and deployed
range and versatility of EU instruments for it to ensure that the other Great Powers had
foreign action: the British Presidency of the to coordinate policies with France, and to
EU in 2005 saw the launch of six security stop its NATO partners going ahead with a
and defence missions to help manage crises defence strategy or negotiations with which
around the world. Its roles in the EUs for- it did not agree.
eign policy structures are designed to ensure France has never been in any doubt
that NATO remains the primary European that military capability is the key to great
and transatlantic defence organization and power diplomacy. Possessing an independent
that EU efforts are in line with British pri- nuclear deterrent capability since the early
orities and joined up with the efforts of the 1960s, only France, Britain and Greece,
wider international community, especially in Europe, annually spend more than 2 per
those of the US. cent of gross domestic product on the mili-
tary. It also maintains garrisons and naval
bases around the world, with a concentra-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa. In the aftermath
France of the Cold War, France undertook a major
Institutional resources have been central to restructuring of its armed forces to develop
post-war French diplomacy, particularly its a smaller professional military, more rap-
hard won position as one of Germanys idly deployable and tailored for operations
occupying powers and a member of the four distant from France. Key elements included
power control group. After initially trying phasing out conscripts by 2002 in favour of
to dismember Germany through non- an all-volunteer, technologically more inten-
cooperation with Britain and the United sive military force. France deployed military
States, France changed its strategy, Prime forces to Cte dIvoire in 2002, to the Central
Minister Schuman proposing the Schuman African Republic in 2003, and, with EU part-
plan for the integration of Germanys coal ners, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and steel sector into a common management in 2003. In 2004 it deployed military forces to
structure. Thereafter, France used its key monitor the ChadSudan border.
China EMERGING TRENDS IN THE PRACTICE

OF GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY
China enjoys a military force of 2.2 million
frontline soldiers and 9000 tanks, without During the Cold War, immediate communica-
much advanced technology, and a small navy tion became a practice among the nuclear
with only one aircraft carrier, not able to powers following the establishment of a hot
project much power relative to even Britain, line, a direct telephone link between the offices
reflecting its defensive strategy toward its of the US president and the Soviet head of state
western neighbours. Its major peacetime to avoid mistaken signals that might unleash
diplomatic instrument is its $3.3 trillion in a nuclear weapon. Direct telephone communi-
reserves and small external debt (compared to cation between heads of state has become a
common feature of crisis diplomacy.
the US reserves of $150 billion and its external
From 1975, the leading industrial democ-
debt of $15 trillion). It has used those reserves racies began to meet annually at summit;
to shore up the US debt, ensuring a hands-off that is, head of state level, and in a separate
policy on the critical question of Chinas cycle of meetings during the year at finance-
human rights record; to invest heavily in minister level. Leaders caucus before the
Africa (primarily for commodity exploitation); September meetings of the IMF and World
and to shore up its image as a peaceful and Bank. Proposed by Frances president Gisgard
responsible power, particularly in East Asia dEstaing, the original Group of Six were
where it is creating a free trade area. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, the United
States and Italy. (They became the Group of
Chinas new neighbour policy relies
Seven with the addition of Canada, and the
heavily on leader and summit meetings Group of Eight after the Russian Federation
(President Hu Jintao went to Africa six times was invited to join in 1998.1) The intent was to
between 1999 and 2009), demands no politi- discuss current world issues (dominated at the
cal strings in trade and aid (except the One- time by the oil crisis) in a frank and informal
China policy), and avoids confrontation with manner. The Plaza Accord agreed by the G7
other Great Powers. (It tends to slipstream Ministers of Finance in Paris in 1987 depreci-
behind Russia on opposing foreign inter- ated the US dollar in relation to the Japanese
ventions and other confrontations with the yen and German deutsche mark, held at arti-
ficially high levels since the war to aid recon-
West.) It participates in selective multilateral
struction. It has emerged as a global economic
organizations, the first being the Shanghai
concert to defend the essential minimum of
Cooperation Organization founded in 2004 international order, as well as its great power
with Russia and the central Asian Republics, guarantors, against major economic shocks.
following the Iraq war, to prevent conflicts Summits have been supplemented by insti-
that might invite American intervention on tutionalized meetings of the European for-
its peripheries. In 2008, it sent a naval contin- eign ministers within the framework of the
gent to help with Somali pirates, the first time European Union: a practice has emerged for
a modern the Chinese navy had left its near heads of state to meet before foreign minis-
ters, as required, and usually on a bilateral
waters. A special relationship is developing
basis, to set the terms of the foreign ministe-
with Russia, China committing some of its
rial meetings. The practice began in earnest
reserves to the purchase of Russian natural with the conclusion of the Elyse treaty in
gas following the Wests sanctioning of some 1963 between French President de Gaulle and
Russian assets and the fall of world oil prices German Chancellor Adenauer. A diplomatic
in 2014. pattern soon became evident in alternative
meetings between Germany and Britain, who judge how the game is being played; and
Britain and France, and Germany and France. finally the judges who consider the game
Collective economic sanctioning became itself and its relation to the social whole (Aron,
a major instrument of great power diplomacy 1966: 89). The first is the domain of the his-
against states that were deemed to threaten torian, who recounts who did what in the field
the peace, arising from Article 41 of the UN of play; the second is the domain of the politi-
Charter, which in effect requires economic and cal scientist who detects the pattern behind
other sanctions before Security Council mili- the moves and the implicit rules (or absence
tary action can be legally entertained (called thereof); the third is the domain of normative
mandatory sanctions). The major mandatory analysis, which judges the players and the
sanctions authorized by the SC were against teams that persistently break the rules; and
South Africa (196191), Iraq (19902003) the fourth is the domain of critical theory
and Cuba (1962present). The perceived inef- and the interpretive sociologist, who reflect on
fectiveness of general sanctions to change the institution of diplomacy and its wider
state behaviour, as well as the growing threat social purpose. Individual commentators may
to the Great Powers since 2001 from non-state move between these fields but it is helpful to
groups, led to the increasing use of targeted distinguish them, as each has something
sanctioning aimed at individuals, specific important to say concerning diplomacy in gen-
companies and groups. Targeted sanctions eral and great power diplomacy in particular.
were first directed in 1993 against Yugoslav The classic historical account is A.J.P.
President Milosevic, in respect of acts of Taylors Struggle for Mastery in Europe
aggression in Kosovo; American President (Taylor, 1954). Gordon Craig, the eminent
Clinton from 1995 used them against indi- American historian, called it the best study of
viduals and companies associated with the European diplomacy since W.C. Langers
narcotics trade in Latin America; and from for Taylors account of the policies and ambi-
2001 they have been used regularly against tions of individual powers; Taylors biographer
individuals and entities suspected of financing points to his eye for the dance of the balance
terrorist groups. The US Treasury Department of power (Burk, 2000: 275). Rene Albrecht
has been in the forefront of tracking financial Carries A Diplomatic History of Europe Since
flows to terrorist groups, presenting evidence the Congress of Vienna places the focus on
to the Security Council which can authorize Germany and its critical role, through to the
collective sanctioning (Zarate, 2013). The structuring of the Cold War. The standard con-
UN maintains an official list of all individuals temporary accounts are Norman Richs Great
and entities subject to sanctioning, along with Power Diplomacy 18151914 and Great
advice on how to be removed from it.2 Power Diplomacy Since 1914. Rich keeps the
focus on the interests of each individual power.
The first political scientist of diplomacy
undoubtedly was Machiavelli, who advised
THROUGH DIFFERENT THEORETICAL princes that, if forced to choose, it is better
APPROACHES UNDERSTANDING to be feared than loved and, while he had a
GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY thorough comprehension of the uses of soft
power, doubted that it could ever displace
There is not one single mode of understanding hard power. Traditionally, political realists
Great Power diplomacy. Four approaches have dominated the scientific study of diplo-
were distinguished by Raymond Aron in his macy, the latest being John Mearsheimers
1966 classic, Peace and War. He identified The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He dis-
them as, respectively, the moves on the chess- tinguishes between unbalanced multipolarity,
board; the rules of the game; the referees a system that generates most fear and is the
least stable because rival powers assume the Power management as a central institution of
worst, and balanced multipolarity a system international order and judges Great Power
with some power asymmetries, but which diplomacy in terms of its contribution to order.
generates less fear than an unbalanced sys- The approach was first laid out by Hedley
tem (Mearsheimer, 2001: 445). Charles Bull in his 1977 Anarchical Society, where
Doran has provided a process model of Great he argued that Great Powers were critical to
Powers roles in the international system, guaranteeing international order, which
called power cycle theory, which emphasizes they maintained primarily by managing their
their role ascription; that is, the roles that relations with one another (Bull, 1977: 217).
they assign to themselves within the general The first interpretive study of great power
structure of the international system at any diplomacy was Fritz Fischers 1969 book Kreig
one time (Doran, 1991: 3640). He argues der Illusionen; a detailed study of German pol-
that when the future role projection of a itics from 1911 to 1914, it put forward a Primat
Great Power changes abruptly, the system der Innenpolitik (primacy of domestic politics)
goes adrift, increasing uncertainty. analysis of German foreign policy.3 He argued
Realist analysis has been enhanced that Imperial Germany saw itself under siege
and in some respects supplanted by more by rising demands for democracy at home and
recent developments in liberal institutional looked to a policy of aggression to distract
approaches. The classic text is Robert democratic strivings. For Fischer, German for-
Keohanes After Hegemony. Keohane argued eign policy before 1914 was largely motivated
that modern diplomacy was not simply a by the efforts of reactionary German elites to
fact of each states power, military or oth- distract the public from casting their votes for
erwise. He argued that modern diplomacy the Social Democrats by making Germany the
takes place within a web of institutions and worlds greatest power at the expense of France,
regimes, which reflect prevailing expecta- Britain and Russia. On a wider canvas, Edward
tions and practices as well as distributions Keene has explained the expansion of interna-
of power. Regimes perform important functional society into a global system in terms of
tions in relation to diplomacy such as citing a double movement: the Great Powers were
the normative code, framing the diplomatic recognising an equality among themselves at
agenda and providing reinsurance. According the same time that they were subordinating
to Keohane, Great Powers act within such much of the rest of the world through colo-
regimes, altering their policy preferences. nialism (Keene, 2002). Among an abundance
The best known referees of diplomacy are of works defending the continuing relevance
E.H. Carr for his defence of appeasement of the Great Powers to world order, Benjamin
(Carr, 1939), and presently Henry Kissinger, Millers When Opponents Cooperate (1995
who most recently offered a critique of the and 2002) is notable; Nick Bisleys Great
Wests reactions to Crimeas accession to Powers in the Changing International Order
Russia. (In the Washington Post of March 5, (2012) argues the contrary case.
2014, he noted that Ukraine and Russia were
one country for a long time, that Russia was
important to the West in the critical questions
of Irans nuclear capacity and building a stable NOTES
Middle East system each more important to
1 But it participated effectively from the Naples
international order than the status of the Crimea,
summit of 1994; see Kokotsis (1999: 23235).
and that sanctioning Russia was a mistake.) 2 www.un.org/sc/committees/list_compend.shtml
They share the approach of the English School 3 It was published in English as War of Illusions in 1975,
of international studies, which regards Great translated by Marian Jackson and Alan Bullock.
REFERENCES Kokotsis, E. (1999) Keeping International

Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and
Aron, R. (1966) Peace and War. New York: the G7, 19881995. Abingdon: Routledge.
Doubleday. Lubin, G. (2014) Heres why Britains military could
Atlantic Community Initiative (1998) Franco- beat China, Business Insider [online], January 3,
British Summit, Joint Declaration on available at: www.businessinsider.com/
European Defence [online], December 4, why-britains-military-could-beat-china-
available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/ 2014-1?IR=T.
uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great
Berridge, R. and Lloyd, L. (eds) (2012) Macmillan Power Politics. New York: Norton.
Dictionary of Diplomacy. Basingstoke: Miller, B. (1995) When Opponents Cooperate.
Palgrave Macmillan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Bisley, N. (2012) Great Powers in the Changing Organski, A.F.K. (1958) World Politics. New
International Order. Boulder CO: Lynne York: Knopf.
Reinner Philips, W.A. (1920) The Confederation of Europe:
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study A Study of the European Alliance, 18131823.
of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
p. 217. Rich, N. (1991) Great Power Diplomacy 1815
Burk, K. (2000) Troublemaker: The Life and 1914. New York: McGraw Hill.
History of A.J.P. Taylor. London: Yale Rich, N. (2002) Great Power Diplomacy Since
University Press. 1914. New York: McGraw Hill.
Carr, E.H. (1939) The Twenty Years Crisis. Rogers, J., Simn, L. and Fiott, D. (2014)
London: Macmillan. European Geostrategys Audit of Major
Carrie, R.A. (1973) A Diplomatic History of Powers: the worlds fifteen most powerful
Europe Since the Congress of Vienna. New countries in 2014, European Geostrategy
York: Harper Collins. [online], January 7, available at: www.
Craig, G. and George, A. (1995) Force and e u r o p e a n g e o s t r a t e g y. o r g / 2 0 1 4 / 0 1 /
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Time. european-geostrategy-audit-major-powers-
Oxford: Oxford University Press. worlds-fifteen-most-powerful-
Doran, C.F. (1991) Systems in Crisis: New countries-2014/.
Imperatives of High Politics at Centurys End. Simpson, G. (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw
Cambridge: Cambridge University. States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International
Fischer, F. (1975) War of Illusions, trans. M. Legal Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Jackson and A. Bullock. London: Chatto & Taylor, A.J.P. (1954) The Struggle for Mastery in
Windus. Europe 18481918. Oxford: Clarendon.
Fox, W.T.R. (1944) The Super-powers: The United Nations, General Assembly, Security
United States, Britain and the Soviet Union: Council (2000) Report of the Panel on United
Their Responsibility for the Peace. New York: Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)
Harcourt Brace. A55/305. S2000/809, un.org/documents/ga/
Jarrett, M. (2013) The Congress of Vienna and docs/55/a55305.
Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International
After Napoleon. New York: I.B. Taurus. Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Keene, E. (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society: Webster, C. (ed.) (1931) British Diplomacy,
Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World 18131815: Selected Documents Dealing
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University. with the Reconciliation of Europe. London:
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony. Princeton: G. Bell and Sons.
Princeton University Press Zarate, J. (2013) Treasurys War. New York:
Kissenger, H. (2014) Henry Kissinger: To Settle Public Affairs.
the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End [online].
Washington Post, March 5, available at:
w w w. w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / o p i n i o n s /
henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-
start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/
23
Middle Power Diplomacy
Yo l a n d a K e m p S p i e s
INTRODUCTION transcends a mechanical ordering device.

Qualitative interpretations have, however,
The interplay between diplomacy and state rendered the concept of middle power diplo-
power has fascinated scholars and practition- macy more equivocal, and some scholars even
ers since ancient times. Thucydides compel- question its usefulness as an analytical tool.
ling account of this diplomacypower nexus The chapter will begin with an historical
during the Peloponnesian War in the fifth account of the scholarship on middle power
century BCE left us the maxim: the strong do diplomacy, explaining the concepts origins
what they can [what they have the power to in political theory and discussing some of
do] and the weak accept what they must [have the diplomatic methodologies and the issues
to accept] (Thucydides 1954: 118). From this that traditional middle powers tend to engage
perspective diplomacy is a utilitarian rather with. From this examination it will be sug-
than normative practice, indeed it appears to gested that, notwithstanding considerable
be inversely proportionate to a states power. debate about the defining characteristics of
At first glance, the idea of middle power middle powers, these states tend to prioritise
diplomacy suggests that there are states in the normative principles (and diplomacy per se)
international system that are neither great nor in their international conduct. The chapter will
weak powers, rather they occupy a space in the then turn to a recent development in the mid-
middle as intermediate powers (see Chapters dle power diplomacy debate, namely a focus
22, 24 and 34 in this Handbook). This ranking on the diplomacy of emerging powers that
element presupposes quantitative comparisons inhabit the new middle in the international
and relativities within a theoretical hierarchy system. These states conduct diplomacy that
of power, but as will be argued in this chap- is reminiscent of traditional middle power
ter, the concept of middle power diplomacy diplomacy, yet differs in fundamental aspects.
Key among these, and informed by their expanded by the acclaimed military theorist
straddling the developeddeveloping divide, Carl von Clausewitz in his nineteenth-century
is their rejection of Western hegemony in writing on war and morality. Drawing on
international society. Their dynamic presence European examples, Von Clausewitz applied
in the diplomatic arena will be considered in the term to states that were geographically
order to determine whether or not analysis of lodged between great powers, and navigated
their diplomacy can add value to the global their precarious geopolitical situation with
discourse on middle power diplomacy. diplomatic skill. In order to qualify as a mid-
Finally, the chapter will reflect on the role dle power, a state would have to be reason-
of national interest in the ostensibly norm- ably strong itself at least able to defend
driven diplomacy of middle powers, both itself or offer substantive assistance to others
traditional and new. The dynamics of the and would require a reputation as friendly
diplomacypower nexus, which underpins and reliable (Holbraad 1984: 23).
the middle power concept, will therefore be Further evolution of middle power theory
a guiding theme throughout. and the interplay between diplomacy and
power is evident in the early and middle
periods of the twentieth century, particularly
during times when the distribution of global
MIDDLE POWER THEORY power was in flux. Following the First World
War, the architecture for the unfolding world
The nebulous parameters of the middle power order was addressed by South African states-
hypothesis make it difficult to determine its man and political philosopher, Jan Smuts.
intellectual genesis. Some commentators have During 1918, in his pioneering draft propos-
detected this type of theoretical construct in als for a League of Nations, Smuts differenti-
the classical writing on international politics ated among great powers, middle powers and
by Aquinas and Machiavelli. Its apparent use small powers, and noted the potential signifi-
has even been traced as far back as classical cance of the intermediate category at broker-
antiquity, in the work of Kautilya (Evans ing a peaceful post-war world order (Evans
2011; Gilboa 2009: 22). There is more clarity 2011). The same sense of a new beginning in
on its analytical application since the sixteenth global order followed the end of the Second
century. In 1589, Italian scholar-practitioner World War. In the course of the war, during
Giovanni Botero philosophised about interna- 1942, Canada was the first country ever to
tional order at a time when (unbeknownst to identify itself as a middle power (Chapnick
him and his contemporaries) the Westphalian 2000: 189). During subsequent negotiations
state system was a mere 50 years away from on the structure of the envisaged UN Security
being established. Heavily influenced by his Council, Canada put forward the condition
experiences in the diplomatic courts of of what might be called middlepowerness
Europe, he described the international system as a key criterion for states election to non-
of the time as comprising of three types permanent seats on the Council. This notion
of states grandissime (empires), mezano of middlepowerhood, as Adam Chapnick
(middle powers) and piccioli (small powers). (2000) refers to it, has been embraced in
Middle powers (those states that had the Canadian foreign policy ever since, with
strength and authority to be self-sufficient) Australia following suit. The Scandinavian
were, according to Botero (1956 [1589]: 8), countries, Japan and the intermediate pow-
the most resilient of states, as they suffered ers within Western Europe were similarly
neither the constant assaults weaker states attracted to seeking ways to ensure that for-
were subjected to, nor the envy that great eign policy would be guided by normative
powers provoked in others. His thesis was considerations (for example insistence on
Middle Power Diplomacy 283
good governance and human rights, as done at a Duvall 2005: 39). Fixed identities and inter-
domestic level) in their state-to-state relations. ests are not assumed, and the nature of inter-
These policy positions demanded diplomatic national society is seen to be subjective and
dexterity during the Cold War period, when the conjectured. This society therefore hinges
arbitrary dictates of superpower competition less on the structure of the international sys-
left little space (and tolerance) for independent, tem and more on the practice and recogni-
principled positions by lesser powers. tion of shared social norms and traditions
In the course of the Cold War, and notwith- (Acharya 2011; Bellamy 2004; Finnemore
standing enduring Realist dominance in IR, and Sikkink 1998, 2001). Like any other
more nuanced theoretical constructs of the manifestation of society, it has to have its
diplomacypower nexus were developed. For values and norms continuously reaffirmed, to
example, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz address what Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014:
(1962) argued that state power can also extend 149) calls its ontological insecurity. The
to a restrictive capability, translating into manner in which states and their official
the diplomatic ability to set the agenda for representatives diplomats are socialised by
international relations. In the latter half of the and into this international society is therefore
Cold War the English School premise of there of special interest because ideas of socialisa-
being an international society of states, bound tion allow for diplomats to have agency.
by common rules, shared values and inter- Constructivists were also helpful in re-
ests expressed through common institutions, evaluating state diplomacys systemic role,
gained some momentum (albeit in the UK and when at the end of the Cold War seismic
Europe rather than in the US) (Bull 1977: 13, changes in world politics once again necessi-
172; Sofer 1988: 207). Theorists in this tradi- tated evaluation of how power in the interna-
tion highlight the crucial role of diplomacy in tional system is and should be best managed.
the maintenance of global order and the sta- With the vertical, hard-power defined polarity
ble distribution of power, and contemplate of the international system challenged by global
the prominence and credibility of states that interdependence and the concomitant growth
seem to be specialists at conducting diplo- of global governance, the evolving polarity
macy. The more recent incarnations of liberal of the system inspired various labels includ-
thought (always sanguine about prospects for ing nonpolar (Haass 2008) and polypolar
international cooperation) sought explana- (Spies 2010).1 Richard Haass (2008) explains
tions for state power that is qualitative rather that the principal characteristic of the evolv-
than quantitative, in other words power that is ing diplomatic arena is a situation of diffusion,
rooted in ideational clout rather than military where power and influence are no longer auto-
and economic assets. Joseph Nye (1990) labels matically linked. The idea that power can be
it soft power: the ability to attract others to situational speaks to the new emphasis within
your way of doing things. The term soft power the discourse of middle power diplomacy, on
is increasingly a leitmotiv in the discourse on state behaviour rather than state attributes in
middle power diplomacy, precisely because it other words the performative aspects of power
steers clear of the unilateralism that hard power (Cooper etal. 1993: 19; Guzzini 2005).
implies (see Chapter 1 in this Handbook).
The notion of state power is further prob-
lematised by constructivist social theory.
Constructivists recognise an inter-subjective Key Points
discourse where power is the production, in The middle power debate is ancient but it only
and through social relations, of effects that started to gain momentum with the advent of
shape the capacities of actors to determine the modern state system and examinations of the
their circumstances and fate (Barnett and power of states.
The distribution of power in the international international society order, peace and rule
system, including the diplomatic role of middle of law and are driven by a sense of moral-
powers, is an important dynamic, especially when ity, regardless of who wields, wants or woos
global order (polarity) is in flux. hard power. The objective of their diplomacy
Constructivist theory challenges some of the is well illustrated by the former Australian
structural arguments about state power and
foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who, when
contributes to a greater understanding of the role
of norms, identity and agency, including that of
speaking about Australia as a middle power,
diplomats, in inter-state behaviour. said that what countries like ours, who are
never going to have enough political, mili-
tary or economic clout to force our will or
preferences on others, can do [is] to make
TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWER the world a better place (Evans 2011). For
DIPLOMACY some this may appear to be a dubious objec-
tive because, as Andrew Cooper (2009: 30)
The traditional understanding of a middle notes, it could resemble explicit claims of
power is that such states are established moral superiority.
democracies, industrialised and affluent in Another approach to diplomacy that middle
comparison to most other countries. Their powers share, which comes out of their nor-
societies embrace egalitarian domestic dis- mative focus, is an altruistic instinct to sup-
pensations and are managed by efficient port official development assistance (ODA) to
public bureaucracies with a low incidence of countries that are struggling economically. In
corruption. Politically, it could be said that this regard the worlds great powers have been
these states are reassuringly boring, insofar out-aided by states with far fewer resources.
as they adopt functional rather than dominant Since the 1970s the only states that have con-
behaviours towards their geographical sistently met the Organisation for Economic
neighbourhoods. Co-operation and Developments ODA tar-
Middle powers appear to share similar get of 0.7% of Gross National Income, are
approaches to diplomacy. Ungerer (2007: four middle powers Sweden, Norway, the
539) claims that one approach, and Australia Netherlands and Denmark (OECD 2010).
is an example, is to make declaratory state- Another defining tenet of middle power
ments about their middle power status, diplomacy is multilateralism the normative
employing a type of shorthand for a pre- predilection for inclusive, transparent and
defined and generally agreed set of foreign cooperative diplomacy to address interna-
policy behaviours. These behaviours are tional problems. Middle powers are proactive
derived from sharing an international iden- coalition-builders, rallying other states into
tity that is based on normative expectations value-based coalitions, rather than going it
which, according to Risse et al. (1999: 6), alone (Cooper etal. 1993: 19; Ungerer 2007:
creates impetus for behaviour consistent 538). When nuclear disarmament efforts lost
with the belief. In this sense a middle pow- momentum in the immediate post-Cold War
ers diplomacy is often considered transpar- era, it was a group of middle powers (cur-
ent and predictable because it adheres to a rently comprising of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
pre-existing, normative script. Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa) that
Among the normative expectations of mid- established the New Agenda Coalition. Since
dle powers is liberal internationalism, result- its establishment in 1998 it remains the only
ing in diplomatic behaviour that supports a state-based group that continues to pressure
proactive and reformist approach to the main- the nuclear weapon states to implement the
tenance of international society. Traditional commitments they made in the 1970 Non-
middle powers reify the core principles of proliferation Treaty (New Zealand 2014).
Traditional middle power diplomacy is under Soviet pressure to resign, he famously

also focussed on efforts to strengthen the declared:
interstate system. Enthusiastic participation
within IGOs, where they are seen as active, It is very easy to bow to the wish of a big power. It
is another matter to resist it. If it is the wish of
loyal and collegial members not likely to dis-
those nations who see the organization their best
rupt the organisational ethos by, for instance, protection in the present world, I shall do so [stand
withholding membership fees is common. up to the big powers and provoke their ire] again
So too are efforts to legitimise global public (UPI 1961).
policy through socialising other members
of the same organisation. New Zealand, for Middle power diplomacy is known for
example, has consistently worked to fos- placing a premium on international peace.
ter support for the UN system, inter alia by Diplomatic flexibility and commitment to
compiling and distributing an annual United finding compromise positions in international
Nations Handbook. Secretary-General Ban disputes supports offers of good offices
Ki-Moon hails the initiative, which began in to hostile parties, as Switzerland has done
1949, as yet another sign of New Zealands for the United States and Cuba since 1960.
dynamic presence in the world organisation Norways long-standing role in the Middle
(New Zealand 2011/2012). East and Sri Lanka shows how such bridge-
Middle power diplomacy is often equated building instincts find expression in media-
with being a good international citizen tion as a diplomatic specialization (Cooper
(Cooper et al. 1993: 19). The common 2009: 32). Moreover, middle powers often
national attributes of middle powers reward others for pursing peace: witness the
domestic orderliness and adherence to human Norwegian sponsorship of the prestigious
rights, democracy and good governance Nobel Peace Prize.
also make them international role models for In the pursuit of peace, middle powers
many other states in the diplomatic arena. commit many of their military resources to
This often takes on an activist dimension international peace-building efforts. This
when states are described as punching above also inclines them to coalesce around mat-
their weight (Spies 2010: 88; Ungerer 2007: ters related to arms control. Australia is
548). The analogy is clear: even without the well known for its leading role in fight-
material power to impact decisions in inter- ing the export of chemical and biological
national institutions, they manage to exert weapons, through its founding of the multi-
authority and display leadership. A case in lateral Australia Group. By the same token,
point is the election of the UNs Secretary- Canada provided leadership in the Ottawa
General, the worlds most influential bureau- Process that culminated in the 1997 Ottawa
crat. Candidates from states with mediating Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
diplomatic credentials have historically been Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
most likely to succeed, because nominees Antipersonnel Mines (Gilboa 2009: 25;
for the position must enjoy not only majority Ungerer 2007: 547).
support from the General Assembly but also Middle powers lack superpower capacity
acceptance by the P-5 of the Security Council. and therefore, in order to have global reach,
Many of these individuals have shown states- condense their diplomatic resources through
manship that mirrors the diplomatic profile of selective specialisation known as niche diplo-
their country. Dag Hammarskjld, renowned macy. In this way they maximise diplomatic
for his mediation efforts at the height of the impact in areas where they enjoy comparative
Cold War, personified Swedish diplomacy by advantage. In the case of Canada, human secu-
taking up the cause of smaller and weaker rity has often been at the forefront of foreign
states, and to speak truth to power. In 1961, policy and public diplomacy (Chapnick 2000:
203; Cooper 2009: 31). Norm entrepreneur- ban. Canada rallied a coalition of like-minded
ship in this regard was demonstrated when the states and facilitated unprecedented accom-
Canadian Government sponsored the estab- modation of NGOs in the actual negotiations.
lishment of the International Commission on Julian Davis (2004: 1) refers to its delivery of
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). a comprehensive treaty, in record time, as a
The Commissions 2001 report on the diplomatic tour de force.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) transformed Transnational networks understand the
the international discourse on humanitarian importance of having their causes cham-
intervention. Canadas subsequent campaign pioned by states, and middle powers have
to socialise other states into R2P adherence proven to be their most reliable recourse. The
has been matched by Australia, which heavily Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) does exactly
invests both diplomatically and otherwise in this: it is a coalition of eight international
this quest (Bellamy 2010: 436). NGOs that pool resources with middle pow-
Middle power diplomacy involves a prag- ers to build momentum for nuclear disarma-
matic instinct towards inclusivity (Cooper ment (Evans 2009; MPI 2014). The MPI was
2009: 30; Jordaan 2003: 1701). In the con- particularly active in the preparation phase
temporary diplomatic arena, transnational for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and
networks of states and non-state actors that thereafter assisted with the implementation
rate highly accountability and transpar- of the commitments made by states.
ency are increasingly common. In line with
their domestic emphasis on participatory
democracy, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Key Points
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have
a long-standing tradition of including parlia- Constitutively speaking, traditional middle
mentarians and civil society representatives powers are stable, developed, democratic and
in official diplomatic delegations to the UN egalitarian societies which, unlike the new
middle powers, are not regionally distinct.
General Assembly. Their pioneering involve-
Middle power diplomacy has a normative inclina-
ment in symbiotic publicprivate partner- tion and tends to be based on several aspirations:
ships has set a precedent in international liberal internationalism and a reformist, nurturing
diplomatic practice and is now widely emu- approach to international society; multilateral-
lated. In diplomatic theory it has contributed ism; good international citizenship; norm entre-
to the categorisation of a new diplomatic preneurship particularly in conflict resolution;
mode, what Geoffrey Wiseman (2010: 32) niche diplomacy; and inclusivity.
refers to as polylateral diplomacy.
Canada is a prime example of a middle
power that harnesses the legitimising effect
of transnational networks on the delivery of THE NEW MIDDLE POWERS
public goods. When, during October 1996, DIPLOMACY
it hosted an international conference on the
banning of anti-personnel landmines, the Over the past two decades, the middle power
participants included about 50 states, hun- discourse has developed to include analysis of
dreds of NGOs and many UN agencies a diverse group of actors, specifically emerg-
(Gilboa 2009: 25). As Eytan Gilboa (ibid.) ing powers. These states display distinct (if
explains, the natural forum to deal with the somewhat unconventional) middle power-
issue of landmines would have been the UN type behaviour, notably norm-entrepreneurship
Conference on Disarmament. The latter was and multilateralism. South Africa is a case in
hamstrung, however, by the unwillingness point. Since its transition to democracy in
of key actors, including the P-5, to enforce a 1994, it has rallied other developing states
into supporting major normative agreements, to the rest of the South American continent,
such as the indefinite extension of the Nuclear impart on it a dominant, hard power status.
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, establish- As in the case of traditional middle powers,
ment of the International Criminal Court however, emerging middle powers use diplo-
in 1998 and adoption of the Millennium macy to emphasise their soft power, and the
Development Goals in 2000 (Geldenhuys latter reaches far beyond their immediate
2006). In Latin-America, Mexico is tran- regions. Indias Bollywood and Nigerias
scending its history of isolationist foreign Nollywood have an undisputed impact on
policy to embrace a more dynamic role in the global entertainment industry, and dem-
global governance. Its activism in the WTO, onstrate how non-Western culture is exported
membership of the OECD and championing with unprecedented confidence. The new
of issues like migration, are just a few exam- group of middle powers have become hubs
ples of its normative internationalism. In the for world summits (see Chapter 19 in this
Middle East, Qatar is turning itself into a Handbook) on issues ranging from climate
nodal point for multilateralism (Cooper 2009: change to human rights and outbid Western
30, 33). It is carving a diplomatic niche in countries to host prestige sporting events such
mediation and the hosting of multilateral trade as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup (see
negotiations. Its willingness to help imple- Chapter 50 in this Handbook).
ment Security Council Resolutions (such as Emerging middle powers share some
Res. 1973 on Libya) confirms that it is posi- important international behavioural traits of
tioning itself as a global diplomatic actor. their Western counterparts, including activ-
Some of the differences between these ism on behalf of smaller actors. But their
emerging middle powers and their traditional diplomacy takes on an ideological tenor,
counterparts are identified by Eduard Jordaan and their high profile multilateralism allows
(2003: 165). He argues that their democratic them leadership roles as representatives of
status, in most cases, is only recently obtained, the global South. Their behaviour can be
and in some instances, unconsolidated. At the explained by using the IR lenses of struc-
domestic level, they battle deep structural ine- turalism and international political economy
qualities and acute developmental challenges. (IPE) that account for the hegemonic con-
This is also true of their international position. straints of the capitalist world system on the
Their semi-peripheral, almost ambiguous, behaviour of states outside the great power
identity in the global economy allows them to clubs (Cox 1989; Rodney 1972; Strange
act as intermediaries between industrialised 1988). In this system, traditional middle pow-
states and the peripheral, developing states ers constantly mitigate conflict to prevent the
that are the numerical majority (Alden and Le system from being destabilised. But the new,
Pere 2009: 147; Flemes 2007). Importantly, non-Western middle powers, most of whom
Jordaan (2003: 167) notes that emerging have a history of being colonised, take issue
middle powers are regionally dominant in with the status quo. They act more like trade
terms of hard power, an attribute that distin- union leaders, acutely aware of the paral-
guishes them from their traditional counter- lel universes (Rothgeb 1995) they have to
parts. Traditional middle powers such as the contend with. They shun the concessionary
Netherlands, Sweden and Canada wield great attitude approach of their traditional peers,
influence in their respective geographical and instead push for substantive reform of
regions, but are not (nor seek to be) regionally global institutions that are unrepresentative
dominant through the accumulation of hard of the demographics of the inter-state sys-
power. On the other hand, the sheer economic tem (Jordaan 2003: 167).
and military capabilities of an emerging It is perhaps par for the course that their
middle power such as Brazil, in comparison diplomacy is more confrontational than that
of middle powers from the developed world. Traditional and emerging middle powers
Donald Puchala (1998) explains that the overlap in important aspects of their interna-
diplomacy of states that see themselves at an tionalist agenda, and in some ways they chal-
historical structural disadvantage tends to be lenge the existing distribution of global power.
more robust and vocal. Their foreign policy One of the most dramatic changes has been
leaders play to the international audience the establishment of the G20, which since
as much as to their own domestic constitu- 2009 has effectively replaced the G7/8, the
ency, and their diplomatic rhetoric tends to be traditional collection of powerful countries
strident in tenor edgy, as Cooper (2009: leading the global economy. The G20, with
33) says of Malaysias wilful diplomacy. membership dominated by middle powers,
Cooper observes that democratic Malaysia, assumed this role even against the ostensible
rather than meekly bowing to the collective will of some of the [worlds] most powerful
will of multilateral organisations like the leaders as Jorge Heine (2010: 2) notes.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) The multilateral engine of the global econ-
forum or the Association of Southeast Asian omy is thus, for the first time ever, comprised
Nations (ASEAN), has sought to assert its of Western as well as non-Western actors.
will where possible. This raises questions about the institutional
Indeed, the multilateralism of emerging norms that will prevail, change or develop, not
middle powers involves a strong rejection of only in this specific forum of global govern-
hegemony in international affairs. Eduardo ance but also elsewhere, as diplomats engage
Brigidi de Mello (2014: 251), writing about in norm socialisation. The increasingly
Brazils return to Independent Foreign Policy confident emerging powers who challenge
under the charismatic leadership of President Western dominance take issue with the con-
Lula da Silva, notes that the countrys foreign ventional assumption that the good norms
policy manifests as globalist protagonism. of international society are based on liberal
The implied insistence on the value of global Eurocentric values and codes of conduct, and
equality (global social justice) and rejection that the importers of these diplomatic norms
of the global Norths dominance is therefore (non-Western societies) are passively social-
akey variable of Brazils foreign policy. ised into international society. Aye Zarakol
The rejection of structural hegemony is (2014: 312) warns that ethnocentric models
often reflected in the amount of diplomatic of norm-diffusion tend to conflate internali-
activity by leaders of emerging middle pow- sation with socialisation, and the latter with
ers, who strategically raise their countries compliance without taking into account the
visibility at an executive level. They do so lingering impact of the messy history of the
symbolically as well as practically through international system. The patronising idea
well-publicised visits abroad, and the hosting that bad behaviour is exported only through
of reciprocal visits by world leaders. During non-Western agency is challenged by the
the eight years of the Lula Administration, for fact that the 19th century European system
example, Brazil received 904 visits from 137 expanded itself through mercantilism, con-
countries or organisations; the President made quest and colonisation (Adler-Nissen 2014:
259 visits to 83 countries, while the Chancellor 150; Zarakol 2014: 312).
travelled 467 times to 101 countries (de One effect of the growing influence of the
Mello 2014: 252). In the case of South Africa, new middle powers is that international soci-
between 2000 and 2008 its globe-trotting ety is now more diverse, its normative foun-
President Thabo Mbeki attended more G8 dations are being questioned, and as a result
summits (every single one of them, in fact) achieving diplomatic consensus is becoming
than the most senior G8 leader, US President more elusive. The normative doctrine of R2P is
George W. Bush (Shaw etal. 2009: 37). an example. Despite unanimous endorsement
(expressed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the saw the country shielding odious regimes
World Summit Outcome Document) of R2P in Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan against
principles by world leaders at the 2005 World punitive international action. Its seemingly
Summit, it subsequently became obvious that irrational behaviour recalls the labels that
there was little agreement on its operation- have been attached to Brazils diplomacy:
alisation. This prompted the formation of the comrade diplomacy and Third-Worldism
Group of Friends on R2P, an informal group (de Mello 2014: 251). Mexico has adopted
of some thirty mostly middle power states, a similar form of solidarity diplomacy. The
to advance consensus on the norm within the danger with middle powers defaulting on their
UN community. In the wake of the controver- domestic and international obligations is that
sial implementation of UN Resolution 1973 their power and global clout suffers (Cooper
(2011) on Libya, Brazil offered a major con- 2009: 33) and the meaning of the concept is
ceptual contribution to the debate, namely muddied even further.
the thesis of Responsibility While Protecting A major difference between traditional and
(RwP). It addressed one of the major weak- emerging middle powers is that the latter are
nesses in the R2P doctrine: the matter of dominant actors in their respective regions.
accountability of those actors in the interna- This is arguably a function of their regions,
tional community mandated to implement an which are often rife with unresolved conflict
intervention (Brazil 2011: 1). and /or underdevelopment. For example, South
Developing middle powers, like traditional Africas military capacity dwarfs that of its
middle powers, project their domestic nor- neighbours and its GDP is almost triple the
mative inclinations onto global diplomatic combined GDP size of its nine fellow southern-
arenas. As de Mello (2014: 2456) explains, African states.2 The hard power such emerging
Brazils diplomacy reflects the democratic powers have vis--vis their neighbours has
mirror, whereby the new pride in achieve- hegemonic implications because in a micro-
ment of national democracy finds resonance cosm of global structural power, the regional
in calls for global multilateralism and equita- giant assumes the role of a superpower. Where
ble global governance that level the playing such states are involved in a regional integra-
field between rich and poor. South Africa is tion scheme, as is the case with South Africa
another example. Following its much-lauded within the Southern African Development
transition to democracy, the country embarked Community (SADC), they are usually in a piv-
on a campaign to counter hegemony within otal position, i.e. they have a disproportionately
multilateral institutions. The states domestic large influence on the terms of integration.
history of struggle was thereby extended to a
global struggle for the liberation of marginal-
ised states (Spies 2010:76). Key Points
In the case of emerging middle powers,
their networks of like-minded states include The new middle ground in the international system
not only those with a normative international is inhabited by emerging powers which, although
agenda but also states with a similar ideological often growing economically, have serious domes-
outlook. Their diplomacy is typically explic- tic and regional developmental challenges.
These emerging powers share the multilateral-
itly aligned with SouthSouth Cooperation.
ism and norm-driven approaches of traditional
But empathy with errant developing peers can middle powers, but their diplomacy is marked
be controversial when it clashes with the lib- by counter-hegemonic objectives and ideological
eral principles enshrined in the constitutions solidarity, and they are often dominant regional
of the emerging middle power. South Africas players. Demonstrative ideological solidarity and
first ever tenure as a non-permanent mem- regional dominance can undermine the middle
ber of the UN Security Council (2007/2008) power credentials of these states.
THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND global order and seek reform only where they
POWER IN MIDDLE POWER can shift the balance of power to their own
DIPLOMACY advantage. Regional hegemons like South
Africa also exploit their geographical gate-
Although middle powers highlight their way status to legitimise their representative
normative agendas, scholars emphasise that leadership in the global order and to consoli-
national interest and the dynamics of the date their own prestige and influence in the
diplomacypower dynamic are evident. Adam regional arena. South Africas moral leader-
Chapnicks (2000: 203) critique of Canadas ship was, however, somewhat overshadowed
efforts to brand itself as a middle power in 2009 when President Obama made his first
points out that it suits certain states to project state visit to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and
themselves as middle powers because it chose Ghana as his only destination. The
endows them with a certain authority and diplomatic message was clear: Ghana, rather
level of influence and power that they do not than South Africa, was considered the most
necessarily have in practice. This raises the upright citizen of SSA.
question of whether or not the idea of mid- It is clear from new middle power diplo-
dlepowerness is a carefully constructed image macy practices that there is a connection to
to support nation-branding projects that serve national interests and power. The debate
national interests more than genuine norma- about Security Council reform illustrates the
tive internationalism. diplomacypower nexus. Whereas traditional
Ungerer (2007: 540) argues that the diplo- middle powers have limited their aspirations
macy of middle powers is as utilitarian as to competition for the ten non-permanent
that of any other category of states. He notes seats on the Council, the states in the new
that the self-interest of these states is filtered middle are much more assertive. Brazil, India
through the practical consideration of when and South Africa to name just a few are
and where middle-ranking states can achieve enthusiastic candidates to join the exclusive
successful diplomatic outcomes in pursuit of permanent core, and use every opportunity to
national interests. Gareth Evans referred to remind the world that they are waiting in the
the normative but very pragmatic approach of wings. Several states in the new, expanded
middle powers as enlightened self-interest middle are not shy about wielding the hard
(Ungerer 2007: 551). power of military force. Indias acquisi-
The utilitarian and self-interest objectives tion of nuclear arms is clearly an anathema
of middle powers are evident elsewhere. to the aversion traditional middle powers
When South Africa was unexpectedly invited have towards the arms race. Qatar, joined by
to join the BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) Egypt, was quick to bomb militants in Libya
group of powerful emerging economies dur- during August 2014, to the surprise of the
ing April 2011, South African President United States. South Africa, even during the
Jacob Zuma (2011) used his first address to iconic presidency of Nelson Mandela, inter-
the new BRICS summit to proclaim We are vened militarily in neighbouring Lesotho.
now equal co-architects of a new equitable These states would be wise to recall Giovanni
international system. On the surface, this Boteros (1956 [1589]: 8) sage advice (no
sounds like a middle powers projection of a doubt drawing on the wisdom gained from
normative global objective. But it also raises his combined Jesuit and diplomatic back-
the spectre of a state with a power-hungry dip- ground) that the leaders of middle powers
lomatic agenda. Jordaan (2003: 167) claims could also be tempted by aspirations to great
that emerging middle powers actually have a power status something that would place
stake in maintaining the broad status quo of their states at grave risk.
Key Points contemporary middle power classification

with elasticity, inconsistency, and subjectiv-
A carefully constructed image of middle power
ity, as David Cooper (2011: 319) alleges.
status supports nation-branding and soft power
What is undisputed is that the new middle
and can serve the national interest.
The diplomacy of traditional and new middle is changing the contours of the diplomacy
powers can be both normative and utilitarian. power nexus. Their developmental challenges
New middle powers are less reticent about and historical sense of structural marginalisa-
seeking relative power in the diplomatic forums tion infuse the diplomacy of these states with
where they wield influence. ideological vigour, as they challenge the struc-
tural hegemony of the international system.
All middle powers are astute diplomatic
CONCLUSION actors and few commentators would deny that
they pursue their national interests. Emerging
Certain states outside of the great power cat- middle powers seem to have particularly
egory and located somewhere in the middle ambitious foreign policies, and their agita-
of the international system leave a very large tion for reform of global governance struc-
footprint in the diplomatic arena. Their inter- tures arguably masks aspirations to join the
national norm-entrepreneurship, penchant elite clubs of great power politics. Ironically,
for multilateralism and dedication of diplo- they reproduce structural hegemony in their
matic resources to international peace and various geographical regions. At all levels of
stability earn them the label of middle diplomatic engagement, however, they dis-
powers. The parameters of the category, play the irreducible characteristic of middle
however, are nebulous and the variation in powers, in the sense that diplomacy is their
interpretations attached to the label makes it most-favoured instrument of foreign policy.
difficult to compile a consistent set of criteria Perhaps not surprisingly, the body of mid-
by which to identify middle powers. dle power theory is nurtured by scholars
Constructivists remind us that state iden- from states that self-identify as middle pow-
tity is not fixed, but constructed, which means ers. The fact that these scholars also happen
that states can become, or cease to be, mid- to dominate the domain of diplomatic theory
dle powers, based on patterns of behaviour. more generally is not a coincidence: they
Whether strategically projected by the state take diplomacy very seriously. Moreover, as
in question, or assigned by other actors, mid- the middle power pool stretches to include
dle power identity is highly contextual and states from the developing world, so does the
linked to roles the particular state performs concept of middlepowermanship. The corol-
in the diplomatic arena. Indeed, it is a funda- lary is more diverse scholarship, which can
mental prerequisite for middle power status only be beneficial to the study of an enduring
that it has to be constantly earned through and universal phenomenon: the diplomacy
consistency and persistence in diplomacy it power nexus.
cannot be an ad hoc or one-off achievement.
If the middle power category has become a
contested space, it is also a congested space.
The discourse has recently taken on board NOTES
analyses of certain emerging powers that
1 A polypolar world implies not simply a multi-
emulate middle power behaviour, yet consti-
tude of poles but indeed a certain fluidity and
tutively seem to be the opposite of their tradi- transience in the global power constellation. It
tional, Western counterparts. Their inclusion is marked by overlapping poles, nascent/fluid
in the discourse has arguably burdened the identities, and transnational interdependence.
2
In terms of African Union classification, South- Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study
ern Africa is comprised of ten countries: Angola, of Order in World Politics. New York:
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Columbia University Press.
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Chapnick, A. (2000) The Canadian middle power
Note that reliable statistics for Zimbabwe were not
myth. International Journal, 55 (2): 188206.
available as of January 2015. However, it is well-
Cooper, A.F. (2009) Middle powers: squeezed
known that the countrys economy has been in
meltdown for more than a decade, as a result of out or adaptive? Public Diplomacy Magazine
political turmoil and foreign-imposed sanctions. 2 (Summer): 2934.
Cooper, A.F., Higgott, R.A. and Nossal, K.R.
(eds) (1993) Relocating Middle Powers.
Vancouver: UBC Press.
Cooper, D.A. (2011) Challenging contemporary
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24
Small State Diplomacy
B a l d u r T h o r h a l l s s o n a n d A l y s o n J . K . B a i l e s 1
INTRODUCTION are formalized in the Vienna Convention and

frameworks for multilateral cooperation exist
Small States in the World System at many levels from the UN downwards,
has set certain common parameters for their
Over half the member states of the United functioning. The environment is certainly
Nations are small according to the simplest more propitious than ever before, not just for
numerical yardstick (fewer than 10 million citi- their survival, but for their chances of having
zens), and to other, less simple, definitions their voice heard in international society. At
addressed below. Moreover, a very high pro- the same time, the individual circumstances
portion of the smaller states have joined the UN of small states vary as much as those of
after its inception, meaning that their sover- states in general. They include some of the
eignty was recognized as part of the twentieth- worlds richest and most peaceful countries
century process of de-colonization and/or after (Luxembourg with GDP of US$ 111,162 per
the dismantling of larger state entities. They are capita), and some of the poorest and most
not only small but new states, and building conflict-scarred (Liberia with US$ 454 per
up a national foreign policy and diplomatic capita) (World Bank, 2014). Their existen-
apparatus has been a new challenge for them. tial challenges depend greatly on where they
The fact that so many of todays small lie: among friendly larger neighbours, among
actors gained statehood in a modern inter- threatening larger neighbours, or in constel-
national setting, where the rules of diplomacy lations of equally small entities (e.g. in the
Caribbean and West Pacific). Particularly
This Chapter is dedicated to the memory of Alyson
important for their security and welfare is
J.K. Bailes, a devoted teacher, exceptional scholar, the existence or absence of well-functioning
and dear friend. She is deeply missed. regional organizations as discussed below.
Small State Diplomacy 295
Any generalizations about small states should first experiment in global collective security
thus be made with great caution. It is easier to raised the question of equality for small
identify certain common challenges they all participating nations (Rappard, 1934)
face, and a finite set of options for respond- an issue that would surface again with the
ing, than to predict or explain exactly how United Nations after the Second World War,
each small state will frame its diplomacy. to be handled notably through the stipulations
for Security Council membership. The UN
also created a Trusteeship Council in 1945
Evolution of Small States to protect 11 small territories whose status
Presence and Role neither allowed for inclusion in another state
nor for full independence at the time (United
The prevalence and importance of small state Nations, n.d.). Other new small nations
entities has varied over both space and time. continued to come into being primarily as a
The account by Thucydides of conflicts consequence of de-colonization: sometimes
among ancient Greek city-states is credited peacefully, sometimes after wars of national
with providing the first foundation of real- liberation and/or civil conflicts. Starting with
ism as a philosophy of international affairs 51 members, the UN doubled in size between
(Morgenthau and Thomson, 1985). The 1964 and 1965 and had 159 members by 1990.
modern craft of diplomacy owes much to Currently, it has 193 members following
ideas and practices developed among the upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
small city-states of Italy during the later Yugoslavia neither of which processes can
Middle Ages and Renaissance (Machiavellis safely be said to be complete today.
environment). From the sixteenth century The next part of this chapter discusses
onwards, as some of the worlds larger states definitions of smallness and introduces the
began to build overseas empires, they encoun- concepts and findings of small state studies,
tered similarly large counterparts like now an established branch of International
China in some parts of the world and much Relations (cf. the categorization of middle
smaller, disaggregated political communities powers in the chapter by Spies). The fol-
in others. The impact of imperial expansion lowing sections deal with three levels of
again varied between cases where such small diplomatic activity where the special chal-
units were combined into large ones (like lenges of small states and ways of tackling
British India), and cases where they kept a them can be observed: traditional diplo-
more separate identity as with the Caribbean, macy; small states roles at the UN and
East Indian and Pacific islands. In the Northern small states relations with the EU, as the
hemisphere, however, the clear trend up to the most highly-evolved example of a regional
end of the nineteenth century was for aggrega- organization. The conclusions briefly
tion, as seen in the creation of a united Italy, address the way ahead for small states role
united Germany, and the southward and east- in international affairs (see also Chapter 3 in
ward expansion of Imperial Russia. this Handbook).
The twentieth century by contrast was a
time of small state proliferation, in several
distinct waves. The first flowed from the
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Key Points
Turkish Empires around the end of the Small states have multiplied in the twentieth to
First World War, although many of the twenty-first century world and, in some ways,
resulting new or re-constituted states are now find it easier to survive.
considered more medium-sized than small. However, small states still vary hugely in terms of
The creation of the League of Nations as a security and economic wellbeing.
DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL The other option available to a small state,

APPROACHES to compensate for its inherent weakness, is
to find a protecting state or join an alliance
The fundamental challenge for a small state (Keohane, 1969). Small entities have always
is its greater vulnerability in the face of larger sought protection by larger neighbours, and
neighbouring states, together with a lack of the post-Second World War order offered
means to influence the international system small states the new alternative of seeking
more generally. Today, these relational protection through membership of regional
weaknesses and the way they can shape a and multilateral institutions. After a period
states self-image are often seen as equally when some observers stressed small actors
important with any simple arithmetical meas- flexibility and similar advantages, the 2008
ure of smallness. The literature has shifted its international financial crisis has again under-
focus from trying to come up with a precise lined that a complete escape from smallness
definition of what constitutes a small state, is unrealistic. It has drawn attention afresh
concentrating instead on the ability of small to the importance of political, economical
states to govern themselves, become eco- and societal shelter, for small states and by
nomically prosperous and defend themselves extension for other small populations in semi-
from hostile attacks (see e.g. Archer and independent regions. The viability of small
Nugent, 2002). Starting out with inescapable states such as Ireland and Iceland has again
structural weaknesses linked to their small been called into question (Thorhallsson and
population (human resources), size of econ- Kirby, 2012; Thorhallsson and Kattel, 2013).
omy and territory, and limited diplomatic, For instance, in the run-up to the crash,
general administrative and military capacity, Iceland lacked the administrative capacity
small states are seen in the literature as having to deal with its new, massive and complex
two broad options for trying to compensate. financial sector; it would have benefited
First, small states need to make certain from stricter supervision from regional and/
domestic arrangements in order to tackle or international organizations, and greater
their potential volatility. Katzensteins (1984 domestic willingness to accept external
and 1985) democratic corporatism is one of advice. Small states and entities may have
the best frameworks yet developed to iden- to accept that they are not able at least
tify how small states have adopted domestic not in the short run to acquire knowledge
buffers to ease the constraints of a fluctuat- and develop the capacity to deal with com-
ing international economy. According to pound structures such as the international
Katzenstein, democratic corporatism in seven financial sector. As an alternative solution,
small European states (Norway, Sweden, small non-independent entities/nations such
Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria as Scotland and Greenland are effectively
and Switzerland) provides two things: fast- sheltering within the boundaries of larger
paced change and flexible adaptation, which states (Bailes et al., 2013). In sum: realist
is secured through short decision-making logic still demands special small-state tech-
chains and corporatist, consensual decision- niques both for dealing with neighbouring
making; and a capacity to socialize risk by states and potential protectors and exploring
developing a comprehensive welfare state less traditional routes to safety and influ-
and active labour-market policies. Another ence based on sheltering within regional and
form of domestic buffer is administrative international institutions (Bailes, 2009). The
capacity. Small states need to develop a capa- presence of such options in any case depends
ble public administration that can engage in on what the given region has to offer small
decisive and independent policy making (see, states must still adapt to conditions created
for instance, Thorhallsson, 2012a). by others.
Membership of bodies such as the UN and Key Points

the EU does, however, provide small states
Small states are best defined by a lack of relative
with an opportunity to influence the interna-
power, rather than any simple yardstick.
tional system. Prosperous small states, with
In modern times, they can alleviate their situation
financial and administrative means and good both by domestic buffering and by seeking external
ideas that are seen to be beneficial to the shelter from larger states and/or institutions.
wider world, can become norm entrepre- Some small nations enjoy high normative standing
neurs (Ingebritsen, 2002): the Nordic nations, and influence in international society.
Switzerland and New Zealand are among
well-known examples of this. Small develop-
ing nations may also gain a certain prestige
or model image if they, for example, avoid SMALL STATE PREOCCUPATIONS
conflict in an otherwise turbulent part of the AND PRACTICES: TRADITIONAL
world (Namibia, Bhutan); transform them- DIPLOMACY
selves after conflict (Liberia); and/or achieve
what is widely seen as a deserved independ- This section first addresses the typical imper-
ence after oppression (Timor-Leste, South atives and goals of small state diplomacy,
Sudan). Administrative competence, the abil- and then some practical questions about how
ity to convince others on a given issue (itself a they are pursued.
core diplomatic skill), and adequate peer rec-
ognition are of key importance, as discussed
further below. Imperatives and Generic Solutions
To summarise: small state success depends
both on external diplomacy and internal gov- The theoretical analysis provided above and
ernance, although theory so far has focused everyday experience both suggest that
little on the links between them. The idea of a approaching international relations without
domestic buffer for external fluctuations (e.g. the risk and expense of using force and pref-
democratic corporatism) seems to hold good, erably without causing resentment (the defi-
but the other factors making for good or nition of diplomacy in the Encyclopaedia
bad internal governance, economic manage- Britannica, 2015) is especially pertinent for
ment and external policy forming are probably small states. They typically have few, or no,
not so different from those in any other state. military means to physically defend their
Small states show examples both of consen- own territory (of the 20-odd UN member
sual, coordinated external action, and of divi- states with no standing army, Costa Rica is
sion, confusion and misjudgement including the largest with a population of 4.58 million
complicity in conflict. For a small player to and the others are all under 1 million2), and
piggy-back on someone elses (national or little prospect of getting what they want by
institutional) diplomatic agenda might seem coercion. Nor can it ever make sense for
a quick fix for weak strategy forming, but it them to aim at autarky. Their primary aims of
risks general mal-adaptation and also an elite/ survival, independence, economic viability
people cleavage. In the last resort, a small and preservation of identity, and their sec-
state needs both an external diplomatic strat- ondary aims of influence, image and status,
egy realistically adapted to its situation, and depend alike on effective communication and
a domestic strategy providing a buffer, in interaction with the outside world.
order to succeed in its diplomatic relations. The first function of small states diplomacy
Practical problems and potential solutions in is to serve these primary goals of survival
this connection will next be explored (see also and wellbeing. Beyond these essentials, there
Chapters 4, 22 and 23 in this Handbook). are certain paths that it would be pointless
for small states diplomats to try to follow. small nations have all or part of their terri-
They cannot claim to be global powers, even tory recognized as de-militarized and/or neu-
if they share in global governance notably tralized, including Finlands land Islands
at the United Nations. They are unlikely to and the Norwegian sovereign territory of
develop distinctive policies of their own on Svalbard (Spitsbergen). Such statuses pro-
regions beyond their own neighbourhood; vide a good starting-point for norm entre-
and when they join organizations (like the preneurship including mediation, but classic
EU) that have collective policies on such neutrality is becoming more unusual among
matters, they will normally leave the lead to the UNs members today.
larger and more experienced states, though
possibly intervening to help foster consensus.
Yet there are several international roles The Diplomatic Process
for which smallness is no disqualification,
and often an advantage. The possibility has We have seen above how important a small
already been mentioned for small nations states internal arrangements, including polit-
to make constructive, innovative proposals ical culture and attitudes as well as capacities,
as norm entrepreneurs. The harmless and can be for the quality of its external policies.
impartial image that makes them credible also As also noted, small states performance is as
makes their most able diplomats and states- diverse in this respect as in anything else; but,
men attractive candidates for international generally, external affairs will loom larger in
fact-finding missions, investigative commis- public consciousness in small nations given
sions and attempts at mediation. In most insti- their high levels of dependence. Larger por-
tutional frameworks where small states assist tions of the national elite, including commer-
in peace missions the UN, EU and regional cial, academic and cultural actors, will be
groupings elsewhere their representatives exposed to external issues and activities. As a
are frequently selected as mission command- practical point, small state leaders often have
ers/leaders to signal the good intentions of the to learn one or more foreign languages merely
enterprise. For example, three out of five of the to communicate abroad, unless they belong to
first commanders of UN peacekeeping forces a wider language community like the British
in the Congo (ONUC, 19601964) came Commonwealth or la Francophonie.
from the small European non-allied states of Other characteristics of small state diplo-
Ireland, Norway and Sweden. Small states macy flow directly from lack of resources
have further opportunities to play such roles (of all kinds). Foreign Ministries, diplomatic
and raise their profiles when they take a turn service personnel and the Embassy network
as the Presidency/Chairmanship in regional abroad will all be limited in size. The single
and functional organizations, and when host- largest risk this entails is the capture of a
ing multilateral meetings on their territory. small states external policy and diplomatic
They can create their own international group- apparatus by ill-intentioned actors either
ings for specific small-state causes: vide the inside or outside the state. This can happen
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) cre- when it is subjugated by a powerful neigh-
ated in 1991, whose 44 current members all bour, when the government is taken over by
face grave consequences from climate change. corrupt and criminal interests, or after some
Small states not wishing, or able, to ally other form of coup (e.g. terrorists, mercenar-
with protectors often chose neutrality as an ies). The US invasion of Grenada in 1983
alternative during the Cold War, and some was, for example, triggered by concern about
relatively influential smaller states such as government capture by revolutionaries,
Sweden, Finland and Costa Rica still hold while a famous example of a non-state coup
this or a similar status (Karsh, 1989). Other was the failed attempt by mercenaries led by
Mad Mike Hoare in the Seychelles in 1981. (covered below). In a small diplomatic ser-
A milder alternative is for small states to sell vice, for instance, the Ambassador at Moscow
their vote by allowing an external actor, may be the countrys only, or leading, Russia
often an aid-giver, to dictate the position expert and will probably be left much leeway
they take on some specific international issue by his/her capital to act as he/she thinks best.
where they have voting rights. There have, Rotation practices also tend to be more flexible
for instance, been extensive debates over so that a small-state diplomat may stay longer
vote-buying in the International Whaling in a given state or organization, accumulating
Commission, where anti-whaling activists experience that others respect and increasing
from Sir Peter Scott of the World Wildlife the chance of easy access to decision mak-
Fund onwards have encouraged small nations ers. The non-threatening image of many small
to join in order to vote against commercial states which, as noted above, makes them
whaling, and pro-whaling nations like Japan popular choices for mediation missions and
have been accused of using aid as an incen- peacekeeping commands also helps their
tive for them to switch votes. representatives get closer to policy shapers of
A small diplomatic apparatus cannot all kinds. In practical terms, the limited size
indulge in specialization but must keep the of their home-based staffs should reduce the
overall interests of the state in view. Its mem- time spent on internal management and often
bers will be generalists with little chance increases their reliance on local employees
to delve deeply into issues, also because of also a help in penetrating the local environ-
lack of national research capacity and access ment, provided they are well chosen (see also
to classified intelligence. When abroad, they Chapters 5, 6 and 12 in this Handbook).
will typically be multi-accredited to a set of
neighbouring states or states plus institutions,
making their attendance in any one place or Key Points
series of meetings sporadic. Small states have,
however, a number of ways of compensating Lacking coercive power and exposed to hostile
take-overs, small states rely more than average
for such difficulties, including making pro-
on (peaceful) diplomacy and successful com-
portionally greater use of honorary consuls munication.
and other non-career appointments (Stringer, Their diplomatic systems are small and mainly
2013). They can hire both national and for- non-specialized, but may draw upon strengths
eign experts for ad hoc tasks. They may draw from different sectors and profit from skill, expe-
talents and personalities from outside the dip- rience and a non-threatening profile.
lomatic service into their representative work,
including cultural figures for image-building
or business experts for promoting trade.
Newly (re-)created small states may also sig- SMALL STATES IN REGIONAL AND
nal a break with past rgimes by seeking their INTERNATIONAL SETTINGS
representatives from untypical backgrounds.
In the Baltic States in the early 1990s, return- In this section we examine how small states
ing emigrs and young, untainted people can utilize their small public administrations,
were deliberately given many prominent and small diplomatic services, to defend their
posts including in diplomatic work. interests and have a say within one global
Given good individual diplomatic skills, (the United Nations) and one regional (the
even of a generalized kind, a small-state rep- European Union) organization. Can small
resentative can often achieve considerable states overcome their limitations structural,
personal status and impact in traditional as human, financial to become active partici-
well as in multilateral/institutional diplomacy pants in the international system and
specifically, to influence decision-making in Small states in the UN system

such organizations? What tools and means
can they use? As a starting-point, they must UN decision-making is dominated by the five
acknowledge their limitations in military, permanent members of the Security Council,
economic and administrative capacity, and although all member states enjoy one vote
build on particular characteristics of small each in the General Assembly. Small states
public administrations such as greater infor- have had to fight for their equal membership,
mality, flexibility and officials freedom of and there are real inequalities in states abil-
manoeuvre. By practising correct prioritiza- ity to influence UN decisions. For instance,
tion, tactical bargaining, and cultivating none of the 28 countries with less than
expertise in institutional rules and dynamics, 500,000 inhabitants, and only four countries
they may pass beyond the mere defence of with populations of between 0.5 and
core national interests to wield positive influ- 0.99 million, have been elected to the
ence and provide services to the whole insti- Security Council (Thorhallsson, 2012b).
tution in such forms as consensus-forming, Table 24.1 shows the size of mission of a
policy innovation and figure-heading external selected number of small states at the UN.
initiatives. The precise openings available to The International Relations literature
them will naturally differ from one institu- accepts that many small states have to forge
tion to another, as the following examples alliances, cooperate on a range of issues and
show. lobby for particular, favourable solutions.
Table 24.1 Selected small states in the UN: economic capacity and size of mission
Country Population in thousands (2014)1 GDP per capita (PPP) (2013)2 No. of people in UN mission (2014)3
105 million
Belarus 9,608 16,100 10
Switzerland 8,062 54,800 33
Jordan 7,930 6,100 9
Nicaragua 5,849 4,500 7
Kyrgyzstan 5,604 2,500 6
51 million
Georgia 4,936 6,100 8
Liberia 4,092 700 7
Jamaica 2,930 9,000 8
Namibia 2,198 8,200 8
Estonia 1,258 22,400 7
1 million
Djibouti 810 2,700 6
Guyana 736 8,500 4
Brunei 423 54,800 8
Seychelles 92 25,900 3
Tuvalu 11 3,500 4
1Population2014 estimates
2 GDP per capita in US dollars (PPP) 2013 estimates
3 Numbers from member state country websites
Sources: CIA (2014a); CIA (2014b); United Nations (2014)

While analysts disagree on how far they in negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia
directly influence UN decisions (Keohane, where the Norwegians took leadership in
1969; Waltz, 1986), research has illuminated the EritreaEthiopia Committee during their
the approaches most likely to help them suc- UNSC term (Kolby, 2003). Liechtenstein,
ceed in international negotiations. one of the smallest UN members in terms of
First, small states need to prioritize and focus inhabitants, has built up a reputation regard-
their administrative and financial resources on ing knowledge and expertise through initia-
their key interests. A clear focus on a particu- tives such as the Princeton University-based
lar issue or issues within a specific policy field Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination
gives more hope of success than an ambitious with direct links to the Permanent Mission
plan to alter the whole sector. For instance, the of Liechtenstein at the UN (Buhaug and
Nordic states have prioritized womens rights Voldhagen, 2001). Hence, the long-serving
within the UN bodies dealing specially with officials at the Liechtensteins Permanent
human rights. Irelands 20012002 member- Mission have built up capacity to take an
ship of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was active part in discussion on issues such as
considered a success because of its pragmatic Civilians in armed Conflict (United Nations,
approach to prioritizing workloads. Its recog- 2005) Women, Peace and Security (United
nized achievements included its robust stance Nations, 2000) and Post-conflict Peace-
against the proposition to lift the relevant arms building within the UNSC (United Nations,
embargo when combatants in the Ethiopia/ 2008). Finally and as noted above, during its
Eritrea conflict had reached an agreement, a UNSC membership Ireland proved the value
position that eventually won the support of of skilful negotiation tactics, competence and
other UNSC members (Gillissen, 2006). autonomy of officials and informality typi-
Secondly, a small diplomatic service needs cal features of a small public administration/
to develop administrative competence in delegation. In the aftermath of 9/11, when the
areas such as knowledge and initiative and United States showed signs of uncertainty
coalition and leadership skills. These are of about carrying the issue of the terrorist attacks
utmost importance in order to have a say in to the UNSC, the Irish delegation informally
the complex structure of formal and infor- managed to persuade it to do so (Gillissen,
mal channels of decision-making within the 2006), thus strengthening the institution.
UN (Thorhallsson, 2012b). For instance, Thirdly, a small state requires a positive
Swedens preparatory work for its 19971998 image in order to be respected and influen-
Security Council period included the construc- tial in a particular policy field. Recognized
tion of a database of the issues on the agenda, impartiality or a reputation as a norm entre-
noting the positions of different members. preneur in the field is of fundamental impor-
Subsequently, the knowledge compiled in tance. For instance, as already noted, four of
the database was used to construct mini-sem- the Nordic states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark
inars for the Swedish delegation (Rydberg, and Finland) have used social power by act-
1998). Another successful strategy is evident ing to promote a particular view of the good
in Norways preparation for membership of society. They are seen as norm entrepreneurs
the Security Council, which included close in fields of human rights, womens rights,
cooperation with its knowledge institutions, participation in peace operations, humani-
such as universities, research institutes and tarian efforts and environmental protection
non-governmental organizations (Buhaug (Ulriksen, 2006). They have a remarkable
and Voldhagen, 2001). This groundwork track record in supporting the UN, providing,
helped Norway to develop skills as a media- for example, 25 per cent of all military per-
tor in the Middle East and Sri Lanka and, sonnel deployed in UN peacekeeping opera-
more specifically, to play a constructive role tions during the Cold War (Jakobsen, 2005).
Moreover, the Nordic states have used their administrative resources these include fewer
positive image and good track record to fill votes in the Council and the European
important posts within UN bodies. Parliament, and limited ability to offer side-
To conclude: by applying such features and payment compared with the larger states.
exploring such options, small states can move They are regarded as less valuable coalition
beyond being merely reactive participants members (Panke, 2010). Small states must
in the international community. Beyond the face up to these and other administrative
basic economic and administrative resources limitations in order to find the best ways to
needed, however, they must also have politi- guarantee their interests. One of the main
cal incentives and the ambition for an active challenges small states face when joining the
role in the UN. They must be willing to spend Union is to figure out how their small national
time, effort and money on working within the administration, delegation in Brussels, and
UN institutions, and on finding their niches. foreign service in general should work within
Some states simply lack ambition to do so. the EUs decision- making processes. Most
Meeting all these criteria is clearly easiest EU member states other than Germany, the
for rich, Western small states, and the best- United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and
known examples of developing states making Poland can be considered small, though
similar impacts come from medium-sized to their sizes differ enormously. Table 24.2 indi-
large ones such as South Africa and Mexico. cates the capacity of a selected number of
It is noteworthy that in the Global Peace Index small states within the EU.
(Vision of Humanity, n.d.) which measures A small states diplomats and public offi-
positive international contributions as well as cials dealing with European affairs play a
non-violence, only three small(-ish) develop- central role in adapting to the new reality of
ing nations appear in the top 40: Bhutan (no. life in the EU: negotiating on a daily basis,
16), Mauritius (24) and Laos (38), while all on issues traditionally viewed as domestic
five Nordic states are in the top 11. However, affairs, with 27 member states and work-
diplomats from smaller developing states can ing within the Unions different institutions.
stand out through their individual prestige For instance, Ireland did not start to benefit
and achievement, such as President scar decisively from EU membership until it was
Arias of Costa Rica, a Nobel Peace prize administratively prepared to work efficiently
winner for his mediation in Guatemala. Non- within its decision-making processes. Greece
Western small states can also create their has not reached this stage yet, but that has
own influence networks aimed mainly or more to do with its history and tradition than
partly at coordination within the UN, such its size (Thorhallsson, 2000; Hibou, 2005).
as AOSIS (already mentioned), the group of On the other hand, there are some features of
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the EU-style integration that directly compensate
105-member Forum of Small States (FOSS) for some of the limitations of a small-state
created by Singapore as an engine of its proac- diplomatic service. Small-state citizens ben-
tive diplomacy (Foreign Ministry of Singapore, efit from EU consular cooperation which
n.d.) (see also Chapter 40 in this Handbook). offers them help (up to and including emer-
gency evacuation) in states where their own
country cannot maintain an embassy. The
Small states and the European work of the EUs own delegations abroad
benefits all members large and small. EU
Union
national embassies in each capital meet regu-
Small member states of the EU face struc- larly to exchange information and draw up
tural disadvantages within its decision- assessments, from which the smallest staff
making system. Besides their smaller may have more to learn than others. When
Table 24.2 Selected small states in the EU: economic capacity, size of foreign service and EU
delegation
Country Population in thousands Total GDP (PPP) in million Size of foreign service No. of people in EU
(2014)1 US$ (2013)2 (2001)3 mission (2014)4
Malta 413 11,220 256 50
Luxembourg 521 42,670 206 40
Estonia 1,258 29,940 479 51
Ireland 4,833 190,400 820 60
Finland 5,269 195,500 1642 62
Slovakia 5,444 133,400 931 64
1 Population 2014 estimates
2 GDP (PPP) 2013 estimates
3 Foreign service personnel excluding personnel employed locally by missions abroad. Information collected in Foreign
Ministries in April 2001

4 Number of personnel in permanent representation of member states
Sources: CIA (2014a); CIA (2014b); European Union (2014); Thorhallsson (2004)
serving in the EU Presidency, or appointed do so given their small administrations and

as Special Representatives or for other limited economic room for manoeuvre.
ad hoc functions and missions small-state Officials in the EU delegations of small
diplomats benefit both from the chance to states in Brussels play a much wider role
raise their profiles and reputations, and from than their counterparts in the large states
experiences that might never be open to their due to the smallness of the bureaucracy.
homeland in the normal way. They make domestic policies in Brussels
Interestingly, the number of people work- and participate in domestic policy-making.
ing in foreign services of small states is pro- They operate using a horizontal approach
portionally no higher than in the larger states within their national administration and are,
(Thorhallsson, 2004). This underlines why for instance, in direct contact with the main
small states must capitalize on qualitative policy-makers situated at the highest level
features such as informal communications, within the administration. They negotiate
flexible decision-making, and the autonomy on behalf of their states, while large states
of officials achieved by giving guidelines more often send negotiators from ministries.
rather than instructions to negotiators (except They need deep knowledge on their key
when dealing with important issues). As also national issues, but at the same time with
noted for the UN, they must prioritize a few such small delegations must be generalists
policy fields and a few precise issues within with a good oversight of EU policies. They
these sectors. For instance, Luxembourg has must often find their own way of participat-
placed most of its effort on securing good ing in the EU decision-making, managing
deals for its financial services (Thorhallsson, without constant guidance from ministries.
2000); the Baltic States have done their A certain amount of trust seems to be built
utmost to adopt the euro and consolidate into the small administration because of
their security within the Union in response to close networks, and officials in the EU del-
a possible threat from the East (Rublovskis egation are often given unofficial autonomy
et al., 2013). Arguably, small states can to take decisions. All these features allow
afford to select and prioritize due to their nar- quicker and more efficient decision-making,
rower range of interests compared with larger and help small states cope with the increased
states. In practice, they have no choice but to burden of EU membership. Moreover, they
make small states attractive partners for other initial stand as any others, bidding for an
members, and the European Commission early compromise, in order to avoid being
finds them easier to deal with than the larger pushed into a corner where they would not
states with their complex bureaucracy. Thus be regarded as having the same veto right
a single official from a small state, dealing as the big players. They use different, more
with a particular issue/proposal, may partici- flexible tactics on issues not of direct interest
pate in domestic policy-making, take part in to them. Here they prefer so-called package
policy-making in the Commission, negotiate deals where they can play off their support
on behalf of his or her state within different in return for beneficial solutions in their
EU institutions in Brussels, take part in the own fields of interest (Thorhallsson, 2000;
final decision-making in a working group in Panke, 2010). This happens, for instance,
the Council, advise his/her minister in the during the annual deals within the CAP, and
Council itself, decide the criteria for imple- in long-term policy planning within the EUs
mentation in the comitology structure of the Regional Policy (Thorhallsson, 2015).
Commission, and advise on the implementa- To summarize: small states have had to
tion of the directive at home. There is a much enhance particular features of their national
clearer division between policy-making, administration and diplomatic service in
negotiation and implementation in larger order to succeed within the complex struc-
states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and ture of EU decision-making. They face par-
Spain) (Thorhallsson, 2000). Interestingly, in ticular structural disadvantages due to their
the late 1990s, the Netherlands (the largest of smallness, but have found ways to limit the
the smaller member states at the time) made effects and to secure their interests within
a special attempt to adapt to these working the Union (see also Chapter 25 in this
practices of the other small members. Small Handbook).
states successes include their ability to secure
beneficial deals and manage and implement
the EUs most complex and time-consuming Key Points
policies, the Regional Policy and the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Despite resource constraints, small states can
Small states try to cooperate with the gain influence as well as protection in multilat-
Commission and influence the initial stages eral institutions by correct prioritization, personal
skills and adaptability, flexibility and holding
of drafting proposals. They are in greater
institutional posts where available.
need of having the Commission on their side This is more difficult, but not impossible, for small
during negotiations in the Council, while developing states.
larger states tend to be more confrontational
towards the Commission (Thorhallsson,
2000; Grn, 2014). At present, the President
of the Commission and six out of seven of CONCLUSION
its Vice-Presidents come from small states
(see homepage of the Commission). This Small states start with disadvantages that
places them in a pivotal position within require them to combine internal strengths
the Commission, but does not mean the with external skills merely in order to sur-
Commission automatically favours them vive. Except in the worlds most peaceful
when mediating between competing inter- regions, they must expend considerable effort
ests within the Union. Small states must still just to build the relationships that lend them
fight their corner with the Commission on strategic, economic and political shelter. For
specific issues, as described above. In the external success in such basic tasks, and even
Council, small states can take as firm an more if seeking positive international
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25
European Union Diplomacy
Michael Smith
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN through the mechanism of European Political

UNION DIPLOMACY Cooperation (EPC), which had originally
been a purely informal process of consulta-
From the very beginning of the European tion but which was progressively expressed
integration project in the 1950s, there was a more formally, in particular in the Single
need for external representation and the European Act (SEA) of 1986 (Nuttall 1992).
development of quasi-diplomatic practices. The situation was further consolidated with
Thus the European Coal and Steel Community the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (entering into
developed representation in relation to major force in 1993), which established the frame-
international partners such as the United work of a Common Foreign and Security
States and, following the Treaty of Rome in Policy (CFSP) and even the potential for
1957, the emerging European Economic a common defence policy. The Treaties of
Community was inevitably required to initiate Amsterdam and Nice (1997 and 2001) further
systems of representation and external action developed the position, especially in the case
in areas of international trade and economic of Amsterdam, which established the new
action more broadly (Spence 2006a, 2009; role of High Representative for CFSP and
Smith M. 2006). With the establishment in also regularised the budgetary provisions
the 1960s and 1970s of a wide-ranging EEC without, however, establishing an independ-
development policy, there was also a need for ent foreign office to support the HR. In this
new forms of representation, communication period as well, the EU developed a growing
and negotiation in relation to developing network of Special Representatives to deal
countries, in the framework of the Lom with particular regions of conflict, for exam-
Conventions. At the same time, Member State ple the Great Lakes region in central Africa
diplomacies had become more coordinated and the Middle East. The growing network of
European Union diplomacy 309
delegations remained firmly under the control Treaty. Although there had been proposals
of the Commission, and focused particularly in the Constitutional Treaty for a European
on economic, commercial and development Foreign Minister, this was amended in the
diplomacy (Bruter 1999). After the Nice Lisbon Treaty to become a strengthened
Treaty, the Convention on a Constitutional High Representative, who would not only be
Treaty for Europe spent three years and a lot the leader of the European External Action
of time and effort on the development of new Service (EEAS) but would also serve as a
proposals for external action on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission, thereby
Union, including the creation of an External linking two of the key dimensions of EU
Action Service and the further consolida- diplomacy. Whilst the HRVP was to be
tion of the position of High Representative; the day to day face of EU diplomacy, and
although the resulting Constitutional Treaty the key source of proposals for diplomatic
was defeated in 2005 by referenda in France action, the new semi-permanent President
and the Netherlands, many of its proposals of the European Council (PEC) was to rep-
were carried forward to the eventual Lisbon resent the EU at his or her level (for exam-
Treaty, ratified in 2009. ple, at summit meetings with heads of state
The result was a hybrid system of delib- or government). When this was added to the
eration, representation, communication and existing external representation role of the
negotiation. In areas of economic, commercial President of the European Commission, and
and development diplomacy, there was a well- the residual role of the rotating Presidency of
established and sophisticated framework for the European Council of Ministers, there were
the conduct of a wide-ranging Community potentially several voices entitled to speak
diplomacy, controlled by the Commission. on behalf of the Union one of the issues was
In areas of high policy, encompassing the clearly whether they would speak in concert.
CFSP and then the Common Security and The formal Decision establishing the EEAS
Defence Policy after the Treaty of Nice, the had to be agreed not only by the Council and
Member States were supreme, and only the Commission but also by the European
admitted the Commission on matters where Parliament; arguably, the Parliament ended
economic sanctions or similar measures were up with leverage over the EEAS that went
contemplated (Spence 2006b, 200910). Even beyond any enjoyed by a national parliament,
in the CFSP/CSDP framework, the Member in particular in relation to personnel and budg-
States confined the role of European diplo- etary matters (Missiroli 2010; Raube 2012).
macy to what were seen as second order The EEAS itself was to be composed
issues (Hyde-Price 2007). But in a way this of three elements. The first was person-
belied the reality, which was increasingly that nel transferred from the External Relations
of a multi-stakeholder and multi-institutional Directorate-General of the Commission and
process in which European institutions and from other relevant areas (for example, the
Member States were both entangled over an development Directorate-General, since the
increasing range of international issues. Not EEAS would have responsibility for the stra-
only this, but processes of Europeanisation tegic aspects of development policy). The sec-
in the national foreign ministries of Member ond consisted of personnel transferred from
States increasingly meant that the boundary the relevant parts of the Council Secretariat
between what was European and what was (which had been the source of support for
national had become fuzzy and indistinct the HR in previous years, reflecting an inter-
(Balfour et al. 2015; Btora and Spence 2015; governmental as opposed to a supranational
Davis Cross 2007; Hocking and Spence 2005). perspective). The third was a new element:
These processes and pressures were diplomats from national foreign ministries
reflected in the provisions of the Lisbon assigned to the EEAS for a defined period.
The HRVP post itself was filled by (Baroness) and human rights in China were also firmly
Catherine Ashton, who had previously served on the agenda. Catherine Ashton compared
for a short while as Commissioner for Trade, the challenge to that of flying a plane while
but who had little experience of diplomacy the wings were still being bolted on, and it is
in general. Although it shared some of the clear that the EEAS faced a major existential
organisational features of the Commission, challenge from both within the Union and out-
the EEAS was not like a Commission DG side in its first three or four years (Smith M.
and for that matter, not like most national 2015). As noted later, Ashtons successor
diplomatic services. It encompassed not only as HRVP, Federica Mogherini, attempted to
elements of development policy, but also the strengthen the position of the EEAS and its
Common Security and Defence Policy struc- role in coordinating EU external action.
tures, including a Military Committee and a
Military Staff.
Although the EEAS had responsibility for Key Points
the external action of the Union, this did
not include trade diplomacy, which was left The development of European Union diplomacy
securely in the Commission and which of has created a hybrid set of institutions, which
course constituted a large proportion of the reflect the provisions of successive treaties as
well as the impact of external demands and
concrete diplomatic activity of the EU. Other
processes of international change.
areas, such as environmental diplomacy, were The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009,
the subject of blurred lines of responsibil- made provision for a more unified system of
ity, which expressed themselves in a number external action, through the European External
of early disputes over who should represent Action Service and the High Representative for
Europe in international negotiations. The exam- Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President
ple of development policy, as already noted, of the Commission, but it also gave rise to
was central and contentious, since it expressed competition and tensions in relation to the rep-
not only an uneasy division of responsibility resentation of the Union and the allocation of
and resources, but also divergent views of the resources.
aims of development policy itself was it con-
cerned with a holistic model of development
and sustainability, or with the political and
security dimensions that might lead in very dif- THE NEW EU DIPLOMACY:
ferent directions (Smith M. 2013)? DIPLOMATS AND PRACTICES
At the same time as the EEAS was estab-
lishing itself in the face of internal challenges, As already noted, one of the key areas in which
it was faced by a series of external crises. In the EEAS represented a diplomatic innovation
early 2011, the eruption of the Arab Spring was in its personnel. With the eventual aim of
in North African countries challenged the EU balanced composition between ex-Commission
in an area where it has strong historical and personnel, ex-Council Secretariat staff and
material interests, but also as it transpired in national diplomats on attachment, the EEAS
areas of civil unrest and conflict that exposed went beyond even the provisions of many
its lack of hard power to back up any diplo- established international secretariats and it
matic initiatives. Increasing tensions in cen- was not long before the European Parliament
tral and eastern Europe, culminating in the was advocating the opening up of the service
Ukraine crisis of late 2013 onwards, also sub- to its own officials, with eventual success. Two
jected EU diplomacy to new challenges in its factors especially conditioned this process:
neighbourhood, whilst long-standing issues first, the EEAS was being established in a
such as those over Irans nuclear programme world where national foreign offices (and of
course the existing Brussels institutions with diplomatic practices, and a clear need to insert
foreign policy aspects) had not disappeared; themselves into the process of deliberation
and second, that as agreed during the and agenda setting within the Unions exter-
establishment of the service in 200910, the nal policies (EEAS 2013; Hemra etal. 2011;
aim was to do this within an assumption of Lehne 2011; Spence 2012; Vanhoonacker et al.
budget neutrality. As a result, the HRVP and 2012; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013).
the service as a whole had to fight to obtain There was already a well-established process,
recognition of their needs for infrastructure based in the Commission, of inter-service
and equipment as well as for personnel and consultation, but the HRVP had a major task
for expertise in appropriate areas. This had in firstly proving her credentials and secondly
inevitable effects on the attitudes and culture asserting her priorities against those of exist-
of the organisation, creating a defensive ing authorities. This was underlined by the
stance which only gradually produced a need for the Service to establish its own cre-
genuine esprit de corps (Carta 2012; Juncos dentials in terms of information gathering and
and Pomorska 2013, 2014). reporting (which in turn linked to the problems
A specific personnel, organisational and of the delegations outlined above). As a result,
cultural issue was focused on the EU delega- in her period of office Catherine Ashton had a
tions (Carta 2013; Drieskens 2012; Maurer distinctly mixed record of establishing her sta-
and Raik 2014). These (see above) had devel- tus and gaining the attention of those involved
oped as Commission outposts, staffed by in the internal negotiations which precede any
Commission officials concentrated in areas external initiatives although she had some
such as trade and development policy (Bruter success in coordinating her position with that
1999; Spence 2006a). The Lisbon Treaty re- of DG Enlargement in dealing with the EUs
assigned them to be controlled by the EEAS, neighbourhood, and in outlining the need for
but given the terms of service of existing attention to the EUs strategic partners, there
staff and budgetary limitations, there was no was much less in developing mechanisms of
prospect of them being turned immediately crisis management and making the case for
into embassies covering the full spectrum new EU missions in areas of conflict. The
of foreign policy concerns. Important parts overall focus, as Sophie Vanhoonacker and
of the activities, and of the budgets, con- Karolina Pomorska have pointed out (2013),
trolled by delegations were also still subject was on the EU as a soft power and the kinds
to Commission rules and controls. Not only of deliberative policy-making that followed
this, but in many capitals there was a need from that position. In many ways this was a
for the delegations to coordinate the activi- continuation of the trends established under
ties of a number of Member State embassies, CFSP over the previous twenty years.
a process to which at least some embassies The post-Lisbon situation saw continuing
were likely to be resistant. As a result of tensions over the external representation of
the kinds of problems outlined above, there the EU, although the Treaty was supposed to
was a strong need from the outset to provide have addressed at least some of the problems.
training for all of the EEAS personnel not At the summit level there was greater coher-
simply to inculcate new and necessary skills, ence, with the President of the Commission,
which was the dominant target, but also to the President of the European Council and the
begin to build a more homogeneous institu- HRVP representing the Union in many con-
tional culture among the new EU diplomats texts, joined as appropriate by the Presidency
(Davis Cross 2011; Duke 2009, 2012), both of the Council of Ministers and by the
in Brussels and in the delegations. President of the European Parliament. But
The EEAS and the HRVP began their work beyond this elevated level, there remained
in 201011 with a focus on innovation in a quite strongly differentiated pattern of
representation, depending on the issues at there have been indications that when negotia-
stake, the location of any event and the per- tions also involve more direct methods of coer-
ceived allocation of competences as well as cion, the EU can be sidelined.
the simple credibility of the EEAS and the These conclusions were borne out by the
HRVP. transition in 2014 from Catherine Ashton as
This mixed picture extended also to com- HRVP to her successor, Federica Mogherini.
munication. Catherine Ashton came into her Mogherini addressed the issue of fragmenta-
post promising many voices, one message, tion and competition between different ele-
thus yielding to the reality that the EEAS ments of the EUs external diplomacy by
could not hope to channel all of the commu- locating herself at the centre of a cluster of
nications emerging from the Unions institu- externally oriented directorates-general in the
tions and the Member States. The EEAS was Commission, encouraged by the new President
able to assert itself through the reporting and of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and
analysis functions performed by the new by establishing her office in the Commission
EU delegations, but in some cases traditional building. At the same time, she initiated a
reporting patterns were difficult to disrupt (for major review of the EUs external strategies,
example in areas of trade and development calling for a strengthening of coordination
policy). Nonetheless, early evidence showed and joined up policy-making, to remedy pre-
that the EEAS was becoming the major infor- cisely the ailments identified in this section.
mation and reporting hub in the EU system
(Bicchi 2012). On the output side, there was
clearly a benefit from the existence of a sin- Key Points
gle voice on many matters of diplomacy, and
coordination between the EEAS and other The post-Lisbon diplomatic structures in the EU
institutional actors (the PEC, the relevant were innovative in respect of the composition
Commission DGs for enlargement and for of the EEAS and the ways in which it could
related areas) was a significant net gain. enter into the diplomatic process. In the early
days of the EEAS, this led to problems of imbal-
Finally, it is clear that processes of nego-
ance between personnel originating from the
tiation surrounding EU diplomacy continued Commission, the Council Secretariat and member
to demonstrate their multi-level character. Thus State diplomatic services.
(not uniquely, but uniquely consistently) the As diplomatic practices evolved and experience
EUs external negotiating positions are a reflec- was gained, a greater unity and the beginnings
tion of an internal negotiation not just about the of a diplomatic culture emerged, but this did
aims, but also about the scope and the method- not eliminate tensions and gaps in the EUs
ologies of the process. Increasingly, not only the system of diplomacy, nor did it prevent the EU
Commission and the Member States but also the from being marginalised in situations of conflict
European Parliament are key actors in this pro- or coercion.
cess. Given the continuing focus of very large The new HRVP appointed in 2014, Federica
Mogherini, initiated a number of changes
parts of the EUs external policies on economic
intended to address this situation.
and commercial issues, it is also clear that many
of the most material and influential negotiations
are not undertaken by the EEAS or the President
of the European Council, but by parts of the
Commission. The EEAS and the HRVP have THE DIRECTION AND IMPACT
demonstrated in a number of cases (the Iranian OF EU DIPLOMACY
nuclear question, relations with Serbia) that
they are capable of handling extended, complex At least part of the underlying direction of EU
and politically charged negotiations, but equally diplomacy arises from the Unions desire to
make itself felt in the world arena and thus of the EUs status and of the coordination
from what might be termed a process of self- of EU diplomacy (Koops and Macaj 2015).
realisation or identity construction. In a First, there is the arena of EU enlargement
number of areas, such as development policy and accession diplomacy, which deals
or international human rights, the EU has pro- with those countries deemed suitable for
jected itself as a different type of power, and eventual membership (Smith K. 2011).
one with a model to promote a model that This often overlaps with neighbourhood
arises out of its origins as a process of regional diplomacy the pursuit of partnerships
integration and as a civilian power. This has with those countries surrounding the EU
not changed in essence with the development which may never be members, but which
of the new EU system of diplomacy after (especially in Eastern Europe and the
Lisbon; indeed, one of the first messages to be Southern and Eastern Mediterranean) have
put out by the EEAS was its intention to do the capacity to generate a ring of friends
diplomacy differently, by utilising the EUs or a ring of crises for the Union. In turn,
experience as a process of deliberation and neighbourhood diplomacy can intersect
integration and its character as a normative with a key focus of EU diplomatic activity
power (Smith M. 2015). Despite this declared the generation of stable partnerships with
intention, many key types of EU diplomatic major established or emerging powers. In the
action would be familiar to students of national case of Russia, this dimension of diplomatic
diplomacies. The EU has pursued strategic strategy and strategic partnership has come
diplomacy with the intention of positioning under immense strain as crises in Georgia,
itself within the world arena and managing its the Ukraine and elsewhere have erupted
relationships with major partners (Smith M. (Casier 2015; Smith K. 2011). The EU also
etal. 2015: Part III). It has pursued structural pursues partnerships with strategic regional
diplomacy with the intention of effecting actors, for example with the Association of
change in the legal, institutional and even the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the
cultural systems of other partners (for exam- Andean Group in Latin America (Hardacre
ple in sub-Saharan Africa) (Keukeleire et al. and Smith 2009). And finally, EU diplomacy
2009; Smith M. et al. 2015: Part IV). Not is to be seen in the context of multilateral
surprisingly, it has continued to pursue com- bodies, most obviously the UN, but also
mercial and economic diplomacy, which especially in those with an economic
many would see as being the essence of its commercial or environmental focus, such as
status as an international actor (Woolcock the G-20, the WTO or the UN Framework
2012). Increasingly, since the Maastricht Convention on Climate Change (Jrgensen
Treaty, it has pursued diplomacy aimed at and Laatikainen 2013; Laatikainen and Smith
conflict prevention or crisis management at 2006). There is thus a constant need for
stabilising situations that might threaten other effective coordination in EU diplomacy, not
EU interests in international stability or com- only within the Brussels institutions but also
merce (Whitman and Wolff 2012). Finally, it as noted earlier with the Member States,
has pursued a very wide range of diplomatic who have not relinquished their national
efforts aimed at enhancing global governance, interests and diplomatic strategies.
which many have seen as reflecting its under- What does this mean for the impact of EU
lying character as a governance system as diplomacy, both in specific arenas and in
well as its interests in the promotion of inter- terms of world order? As noted above, the EU
national regulation and institutions (Jrgensen has promoted itself as a force for good and
and Laatikainen 2013). as a different type of diplomatic power. But
These diplomatic efforts have been pursued it comes up against the contradictions inher-
in a variety of diplomatic arenas, raising issues ent in the quest for a distinct and distinctive
EU diplomatic personality. Its dedication to a have been deployed in order to understand

wide range of international norms can collide and explain it. In this final section, four such
with its more material interests in economic approaches are outlined: institutionalist
or commercial advantage. Its desire for a dis- approaches; approaches focused on actors,
tinct EU diplomatic presence has to contend stakeholders and roles; approaches based on
with the continued vitality of national diplo- power, persuasion and norms; and approaches
macies within the Union. And its desire to focusing on globalisation and Europeanisation.
be recognised as a power alongside estab- These are not of course hermetically sealed
lished and emerging powers within the world categories; rather they represent a spectrum of
arena comes up against the limitations inher- ideas that can be used to explore a complex
ent in both its role as (still) a civilian entity phenomenon reflecting not only the dynamics
and the constraints exercised by the internal of the EU itself but also those of contempo-
diplomacy among member States and insti- rary diplomacy more generally (Hocking and
tutions. The questions raised about the EUs Btora 2009; Hocking and Smith 2011; Smith
international credibility by major events such M. etal. 2015).
as the sovereign debt crisis and the conflicts Many scholars working from a base in
in Eastern Europe only add to this impression. EU studies have inevitably adopted a range
As noted by Hill and Smith (2011: Chapter of institutionalist perspectives. These range
19), the EU is both a system of international from explicitly historical institutionalist
relations in itself, a part of the general pro- approaches focusing on the ways in which
cess of international relations and a (partial) successive institutional bargains have shaped
power in international relations, and this the development of institutional practices,
has inevitable implications for its impact on through those that emphasise processes of
the world arena through diplomacy. rational choice reflecting the positions and
preferences of key participants and the links
between principals and agents, to more
Key Points sociological approaches showing the ways
in which institutional actors develop under-
The EU is often presented - and presents itself - standings of the context and seek to behave
as a distinctive type of diplomatic actor, pursuing appropriately within it (Adler-Nissen 2009,
distinctive aims and ambitions. 2013; Duke 2011; Smith M.E. 2013). There
It has developed a range of diplomatic frame-
is also space here for approaches rooted in
works based on `strategic and `structural diplo-
bureaucratic politics, which show the ways
macy, and applies these in a variety of arenas.
This produces problems of coordination and in which bureaucratic actors compete for
`voice for the Union. It also produces tensions influence within a broader organisational
between the EUs normative aims and the mate- and political context. Much of what has
rial reality of diplomatic bargaining in a number been said above about the emergence of suc-
of linked arenas - bilateral, inter-regional and cessive stages in EU diplomacy, and then
multilateral. the tensions created by the establishment
of the post-Lisbon institutions, falls well
within the purview of these approaches.
Alongside these institutionalist approaches,
EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING and often linked to them, may be found
EU DIPLOMACY approaches centred on actors, stakeholders
and roles. As noted at the outset, the EU can be
The diplomatic system of the EU remains a seen as a classic example if not the original
work in progress, but it is possible to outline example of multi-stakeholder diplomacy,
some of the key theories and approaches that and of the kinds of diplomatic environments
that foster a need for integrative diplomacy capacity over a limited part of the spectrum,
but as we have seen, these processes are not and this is bound to affect its diplomatic pro-
always trouble-free in a complex institutional cesses. The EU has also been cast as a nor-
and political environment (Hocking and mative power, gaining influence because of
Smith 2011). When it comes to actors in the the ways in which it expressed a distinctive
process, ideas of political or organisational view of the good world; when it comes to the
leadership, of what has been described as processes of diplomacy, this encapsulates
entrepreneurship (Hemra et al. 2011) and a long term and sometimes rather abstract
of the dispersal of agency can be highly rel- view of the EUs status, which is sometimes
evant, providing not only a means of analysis difficult to marry with the exigencies of dip-
but also a means of policy evaluation. The lomatic life, but which undoubtedly affects
extent to which the EEAS has established the ideational context for EU diplomats
itself as a credible or useful interlocutor (Whitman 2011).
not only within but also outside the Union is Finally, the evolution of the EUs system
strongly related to this set of approaches, and of diplomacy is inseparable from processes
these in turn link to broader considerations of of globalisation and Europeanisation. At
legitimacy which have not been resolved by the global level, the EU system itself can be
the early years of the post-Lisbon structures, seen as responding to the increasing scope,
as well as to the issue of esprit de corps iden- scale and variety of diplomacy itself; as
tified earlier (Adler-Nissen 2013; Juncos and noted earlier, the EU is in itself a system of
Pomorska 2014). intensive and continuous diplomacy among
If we broaden the focus rather more, the Member States and other actors, but it
to highlight issues of power, persuasion is also deeply embedded in a global system
and norms in EU diplomacy, a range of of diplomatic ideas, practices and structures
approaches to diplomacy enter into the equa- (Btora 2005). In a way, the hybrid status
tion. Within a framework centred on power, of the EEAS and the post-Lisbon structures
it has been argued by structural realists that more generally can be seen as an attempt
the EU is essentially a repository of sec- to create a state-like diplomacy in a world
ond order priorities on the part of Member where the EU itself has gone beyond that, let
States, who remain in control of the EUs alone other international actors. In this way, it
diplomatic system (Hyde-Price 2007). But is a reflection of the extent to which Member
it is clear that there are differences between States and other actors are willing to delegate
Member States in terms of their capacity or not only legal competence but also ideational
willingness to redistribute power within the autonomy to the EU system, creating what
system, and that these matter when it comes Jozef Btora has described as an interstitial
to issues of delegation and legitimacy (see organisation (Btora 2013; Emerson et al.
above). The EU is consistently classed as a 2011; Wessel and van Voeren 2013; Wouters
repository of soft power (Davis Cross and and Duquet 2012). At the same time, processes
Melissen 2013) when it comes to interna- of Europeanisation have affected not only
tional action, and there is no doubt that its the creation of the EUs diplomatic system,
capacity to attract and reward has played but also the (re)shaping of national foreign
a major role in processes of enlargement offices and diplomatic services in the EU
but there is clearly also a sense in which a powerful analysis of the impact of the EU
the EUs diplomacy is limited by its inabil- system can be shaped on the basis that its key
ity to coerce (except by economic means). impacts have been on the national systems of
If diplomacy is viewed as the capacity to Member States as much as on the European
muster, manage and exert state functions in level, and that this is where we need to look
the world arena, then the EU only has this for understanding (Balfour etal. 2015).
A number of approaches can be taken to governance, Journal of Contemporary

the analysis and evaluation of EU diplomacy. European Research, 9 (3): 40633.
These can focus first on institutions and their Casier, Tom (2015) The EU and Russia: a
evolution, second on actors, stakeholders and marriage of convenience, in Smith, Michael,
roles, third on power, persuasion and norms, Keukeleire, Stephan and Vanhoonacker,
Sophie (eds) The Diplomatic System of the
and finally on processes of globalisation and
European Union: Evolution, Change and
Europeanisation. No one approach can cap- Challenges. London: Routledge.
ture the full range and implications of EU Davis Cross, Maia K. (2007) The European
diplomacy, which provides perhaps the origi- Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International
nal example of multi-stakeholder processes. Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Davis Cross, Maia K. (2011) Building a
European diplomacy: recruitment and
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26
American Diplomacy
Alan K. Henrikson
Diplomacy is the conduct of the external virtues and vices, is nonetheless an American
affairs of a state or, more strictly, of its gov- exemplar a model for the citizen-statesman-
ernment. American diplomacy is different diplomat as well as inventor and sage.1 He
from that of most countries. The whole of was the American Self abroad. As Thomas A.
American society the nation is in prin- Bailey has written in A Diplomatic History
ciple involved in it, both as the source of the of the American People, Every citizen in a
interests and the ideas on which the countrys democracy like the United States is a diplo-
policy toward others is based and even as the mat, whether he knows it or not.2
body that most authentically expresses it. Diplomacy is not a role, however, that
Through the individual and collective activ- many Americans are familiar with. They
ity of its members, it even helps to imple- may even oppose it. Diplomacy is not for
ment it. Diplomacy, for Americans, thus is Americans, despite Franklins prime example,
not peripheral. Nor is it central in their lives, a typical profession. It is one that is viewed
however. with suspicion as elitist, pseudo-aristocratic,
The first American diplomat the wily and oversophisticated. Its practitioners have
and worldly Benjamin Franklin, a former been looked upon as deracinated and effete,
colonial agent in London no longer rep- and, most damagingly, even as disloyal.
resented his former monarch, George III, The charges made against the US State
but instead a sovereign citizenry, the new Department, particularly its China hands,
American people. When in Paris negotiating by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Republican,
the French alliance and eventual independ- Wisconsin), who feared communist influence
ence for the United States, he made the most in American foreign policy, reflects what has
of Americans actual and perceived plain been called the recurrent paranoid strain
republican qualities. Franklin, unique in his in American politics. That was in the early
Cold War years. The tension between pro- and indeed, through its influence, much of
fessional diplomacy and populist democracy the rest of the terrestrial globe. The specific
has persisted, however. Not only conservative role of diplomacy as a contributor to such
groups such as the Tea Party but also advo- hegemony is not fully apparent or sufficiently
cates of radical change harbor suspicions acknowledged. Rather, the causes of the
of the Corps diplomatique. Ambassador nations growth and influence are most often
Stephen W. Bosworth, speaking as the retir- seen to lie in the abundance of its resources,
ing dean of The Fletcher School of Law and the increase of its population, its laissez-
Diplomacy and reflecting on the history of faire economy, its technological inventive-
US diplomacy and his own decades of ser- ness, and, perhaps above all, the force of its
vice in it, observed that diplomacy does not military and naval arms. It was these factors,
come easily to a democracy at least to this demonstrably, that supported the interna-
one. tional leadership that the United States of
Unlike most European and many other America exercised in the several decades
countries, the United States does not have following the Second World War. With such
a well-defined, well-established diplomatic strengths, it could be assumed, diplomacy
tradition. It has been suggested that it even was not really needed.
has an anti-diplomatic culture, held while The diplomatic factor in American history
at the same time accepting in practice many is in truth difficult to isolate, and therefore
diplomatic norms and practices.3 Among to weigh and to assess. Part of the problem
the contributing factors to this duality of is conceptual the lack of a clear distinction
world outlook are the countrys geographi- between diplomacy and foreign policy.5
cal remoteness, its revolutionary heritage, The former, in the view of George F. Kennan
its immigrant composition, and also its sin- and many other American diplomats, perhaps
gular nationalism or exceptionalism, as especially older ones and those steeped in
it is nowadays often called by admirers and European diplomatic tradition, is the proper
critics alike. Most profoundly, it can be seen function indeed the dedicated province
and here will be explained, American diplo- of a professionally trained career service
macy is shaped by the countrys democratic knowledgeable, expert, meritocratic, and,
character. frankly, exclusive.6 The latter, the substance
The challenges that democracy, in general, of foreign policy, is considered the respon-
faces in conducting external relations have sibility of a government which, whatever
long been recognized. Alexis de Tocqueville political party may be in control, establishes
in Democracy in America (1835) posited that the goals, decides upon the strategy, and must
only with difficulty can democracy coordi- raise the resources for a countrys undertak-
nate the details of a great undertaking, fix ings abroad. Against this conventional view,
on a design, and afterwards follow it with that diplomats shouldnt and dont make pol-
determination through obstacles. Moreover, icy, there is the growing realization, shared
democracy cannot plan discreetly. It is by many diplomats serving abroad today, and
hardly capable of combining measures in perhaps consular officers among them most
secret and of patiently awaiting their result. of all, that, especially in the absence of well-
Its qualities are the opposite of those that in articulated, overarching national strategy and
the long term make a people, like an individ- in a globalizing world, they in their constant
ual, in the end dominate.4 interaction with foreign citizens make for-
Yet, as a historical fact, the United States eign policy every day.7
did surely come to dominate by stages, In the United States, both diplomats in the
the North American continent, the Western field and officials working administratively
Hemisphere, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at home are subject to democratic control.
American Diplomacy 321
The peoples will is normally exercised Public opinion, and active democratic involve-
indirectly, through the federal government ment, is the very foundation of US diplomatic lev-
machinery, and, more remotely, through the erage. Without it, American diplomacy is weaker.
electoral system. But it also can be felt very
immediately, as in situations of national emer-
gency the aftermaths of the Japanese bomb-
ing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 or the STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES
Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center
and Pentagon in September 2001, for exam- The constitutional framework of the United
ple. Public opinion emotion as well as con- States makes the determination of foreign
viction is a powerful influence in the making policy and the management of diplomacy
of US policy, including the way the countrys uniquely exceptionally difficult. Its
representatives carry it out. The national checks-and-balances arrangement, with
mood, with its longer-term swings between authority divided (shared) between the exec-
isolationism and interventionism, as well as utive branch and the legislative branch, can
sudden shifts of attitude, therefore contribute produce either positive consensus or complete
to American diplomacy too, along with the deadlock. As legal scholar Edward S. Corwin
government establishment.8 Diplomats need famously observed, the US Constitution, with
always to be mindful of their ultimate master, regard to control over Americas foreign rela-
the American people and the vox populi. tions, is an invitation to struggle.9 Article II,
Their focus therefore has to be inward section 2, of the Constitution recognizes
as well as outward. Consuls, appropriately, the President as Commander in Chief of the
provide citizen services for traveling armed forces and gives him authority, with the
Americans. Ambassadors, when on home advice and consent of the Senate (a two-thirds
leave, now are encouraged to speak to local majority vote required), to make treaties, and
audiences. For Kennan, the demanding also to appoint ambassadors, ministers, and
American public was an unwelcome pres- consuls all needing Senate approval. Article I,
ence and at best a distraction. For others with section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress
a longer and wider, a more historical view, as a whole a partial successor to the
including Thomas Bailey, democratic interest Continental Congress which had authority
is the very source of diplomatic legitimacy over all policy the power to collect taxes,
and, because of the publics involvement, regulate commerce, control naturalization,
American diplomatic leverage. define and punish piracy, declare war, raise
and support armies, provide for and maintain
a navy, call for a militia, and suppress insur-
rections and repel invasions. The Founding
Key Points
Father James Madison considered Congress to
American diplomacy arose from the nation be at the helm of the ship of state. He himself
rather than from the state hence citizens as served in the House of Representatives, where
well as diplomats may be involved in it. All bills for raising Revenues shall originate
There remains a tension between the elite and (Article I, section 5). The chamber holds the
meritocratic tradition of professional diplomacy
key power of the purse, and thus also can
and an anti-diplomatic populist tendency in
assert itself fiscally against the Presidency as
American culture.
The American lexicon does not sharply distinguish it did in the 1790s during the struggle over
between diplomacy and foreign policy. US ratification of the commercial treaty that Chief
diplomats, including consuls, in fact sometimes Justice John Jay negotiated with Great Britain.
make as well as simply carry out foreign policy The separation of powers is just one
in their daily work abroad. structural complication. The federal system,
with powers distributed between the central of these departments and agencies overlap,
government and the fifty states that now make as they frequently do, a process for sorting
up the United States, is another. Article X of out roles and responsibilities is required.
the Bill of Rights the Tenth Amendment Centralization is an inevitable result. When
declares: The powers not delegated to competing bureaucracies disagree, control
the United States by the Constitution, nor tends to gravitate to the President and White
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to House, whose own bureaucratic structure and
the States respectively, or in a provision staffing and also international roles have
never to be overlooked to the people. expanded considerably.
Although the right of the national government In the national security field, the central
in Washington to conduct the foreign relations coordinating mechanism is the National
of the United States is clear, and generally Security Council (NSC), established by act
unchallenged, there are many ways, short of Congress in 1947. The National Security
of negotiating treaties and addressing war Advisor, located in the White House and
and peace issues, in which individual states reporting directly to the President, over-
and even municipalities as well as their sees a multi-layered system of committee
citizens can, and increasingly do, become work that of the Principals Committee at
involved in Americas international the Cabinet level and, just beneath it, that
transactions and associations. These have of the Deputies Committee where much of
included twinning relationships with the preparatory work is done. At lower lev-
foreign provinces or cities and towns, cultural els there are numerous inter-agency working
and educational exchanges, and, especially, groups dealing with particular assigned tasks.
business development activities, including the Moreover, although this process is organiza-
opening of trade-and-investment promotion tionally confined to the executive branch, it
offices abroad. Subnational authorities also is subject, at almost every level, to outside
have taken positions on policy issues, with influences from congressmen, lobbyists,
official though non-binding resolutions and also foreign diplomats whose countries
regarding controversial matters ranging interests may be affected.12
from nuclear weapons to immigration and The prominence of the National Security
climate control. Increasingly, their activities Council has been enhanced by its increased
and expressions, even if contrary to or responsibility for foreign economic policy
well in advance of national policy, are along with its statutory responsibility in
tolerated.10 the defense field a steady growth that has
Within the federal administration in suggested to theorists the prevalence in the
Washington itself, there is the complicating United States of a national security culture,
fact of an elaborate inter-agency process. nourished by the resources of the military-
There now is a vast multiplicity of govern- industrial complex. The undoubted increase
ment departments and agencies dealing with of military considerations in US policymaking
all aspects of foreign policy, and of diplo- strongly conditions the organization and
macy. Besides the Department of State, also the decision-making processes of
these include the US Trade Representative, American diplomacy. The challenges of the
the Department of Defense, the Central Second World War followed by the onset of
Intelligence Agency and also, on vary- the Cold War, with the Korean War and a
ing occasions, the Treasury, Commerce, continuing conflict in Indochina, and in 1962
Agriculture, Labor, Justice, Energy, and the eyeball to eyeball showdown with the
Homeland Security departments as well as Soviet Union over its shipment of nuclear
the all-reviewing Office of Management and missiles to Cuba, placed a premium on crisis
Budget.11 Especially when the jurisdictions management and decision making in
the White House.13 During the Vietnam itself assure stability and continuity, if not
War, critics decried the rise of an Imperial necessarily comity.
Presidency, and a correlative decline of Even in a difficult field such as interna-
Congress, which sought, with only partial tional trade policy, consensus is achievable.
success, to restore a constitutional balance Congress, exercising its power to regulate
with the War Powers Resolution (1973).14 commerce, in June 2015 finally gave the
The executivelegislative struggle that executive branch Trade Promotion Authority
Corwin described is not yet resolved. (TPA), enabling the administration of
Furthermore, the struggle takes place in President Barack Obama to negotiate trade
an increasingly embittered political context. agreements a Trans-Pacific Partnership
American elections are regular and frequent, (TPP) and a Transatlantic Trade and
with nation-wide elections for the presidency Investment Partnership (T-TIP) that can-
occurring every four years and elections not be modified, after the diplomacy is done,
for Senate seats (six-year terms) and House by legislative amendments. That does not
of Representatives seats (two-year terms) resolve the problem of determining what the
occurring every two years. At all levels, if actual substance of US trade policy demands
not in every jurisdiction, there is partisan- should be, however. Although the executive
ship, which can carry over into international branch is generally regarded as the more
relations when foreign policy matters are dis- efficient part of the bifurcated American
cussed. President George Washington in his governmental system, in a complex area
Farewell Address (1796) warned against the such as trade, where diverse interests must be
spirit of party and with particular empha- accommodated, bureaucratic politics rather
sis on the dangers posed by foreign influence than central direction and rational planning
and undue popular involvement with exter- may determine the bargaining positions that
nal issues. By tradition, American politics is Trade Representative Michael Froman and
supposed to stop at the waters edge. After his team of negotiators may take.
the Second World War, an explicit doctrine
of bipartisanship in foreign policy devel-
oped. In recent years, however, partisan Key Points
RepublicanDemocratic discord in Congress
The US Constitution, which separates executive
has threatened the reaching of agreement
and legislative powers, is an invitation to strug-
even on basic matters such as the national gle over American foreign relations.
budget creating an incentive for independ- The federal system the Tenth Amendment
ent action by the president, presuming to act reserves to the states and people opportunity for
with popular support. direct international involvement.
So extreme has the separation of the leg- The multiplicity of federal departments and agen-
islative function and the executive function cies necessitates inter-agency coordination, a
become that legal scholar Michael J. Glennon result of which is increased centralization under
has posited the emergence in the United the National Security Council and management
States of double government: a hyperpar- by White House presidential staff.
tisan, dysfunctional Congress remote from a Partisan discord between Republicans and
Democrats in Congress has increased incentives
security-conscious, centralizing Presidency
for independent foreign policy action by the
the one irresponsible, the other unaccount- president.
able.15 Surely neither anarchy nor autocracy The framework of the Constitution, upheld by the
will result, however. The formal structure of judiciary, and the reality and mutual balance of
the Constitution, upheld by the federal judi- diverse interests in the United States, and within
ciary, and the perdurance and balancing of the federal bureaucracy itself, constrain as well
economic and other interests in the country as inform American policy and diplomacy.
POLICIES AND STRATEGIES Thomas Bailey characterizes as traditional

or fundamental American foreign policies.
There never has been an overall American Along with these must be included the Monroe
foreign policy or all-encompassing grand Doctrine (1823), the hands off warning to
strategy. However, there are certain basic Europeans against interfering with the nations
dispositions of the United States in its rela- of the Western Hemisphere, with whose move-
tionships with the world that still shape what ments the United States is more immediately
its statesmen, and its ordinary citizens, think connected. They should include as well the
should be done and not done abroad. A Open Door Policy seeking a fair field of
philosophical distinction often is made between competition for American businessmen, par-
Realism and Idealism that is, between the ticularly in China.
defense of American interests through the exer- With the SpanishAmerican War came a
cise of power and the promotion of American shift from a predominantly Realist foreign
values by reason and moral example. The policy to a more Idealist one. American power
by then was greater, which made American
Founding Fathers, concerned about the very
moral goals seem more achievable. The US
survival of the new state, were by conviction
intervention in 1898 in Cuba, weakly held by
and of necessity realists, even while imagining,
Spain, was motivated by popular humanitarian
as did Thomas Paine in Common Sense (1776),
feeling as well as by strategic calculations
that Americans, in their remote and favored
notably those of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan
situation, might begin the world over again.
and those of Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant
President Washington, in the Farewell
Secretary of the Navy. Roosevelts suggestion
Address, commended to his fellow country-
of exercising an international police power,
men the Great Rule of conduct for us, in
made with regard to the Dominican Republic
regard to Foreign Nations, that in extending when he later became president, had idealistic
our commercial relations to have with them as as well as realist elements in it. The apogee
little political connection as possible. Thomas of idealism in American foreign policy came
Jefferson, in his first inaugural address (1801) with the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, who
as president, epitomized this as Peace, com- expressly sought to replace the balance of
merce and honest friendship with all nations power with a community of power and to
entangling alliances with none. Washington, rely primarily on the organized opinion of
fearful of a risk to the American identity, had mankind to uphold the new world order he
been concerned that a people that delivers envisioned, and articulated in the Covenant of
itself to habitual sentiments or love or of hatred the League of Nations.
toward another becomes a sort of slave to Both the Realist school and the Idealist
them. Jefferson, equally cautious, introduced school of American thought have increasingly
a further maxim of US policy that of recip- taken account of international institutions, the
rocal obligation: That Americans ought never former having a skeptical and mainly instru-
to demand privileges from foreign nations in mental view of their utility and the latter
order not to be obliged to accord them them- seeing them as embodiments of universaliz-
selves. As Tocqueville observed: These able principles, even as proximate systems of
two principles, whose evident justice easily global government. Realist thinking and ide-
puts them within reach of the crowd, have alist thinking both have, to use the political-
simplified the external policies of the United scientific term, constructivist implications.
States extremely.16 The principles underlie President Franklin D. Roosevelts concept
American thinking about the world to this day. of the Four Policemen (America, Britain,
Trade expansion and political non- China, and Russia) working together within
entanglement are what the diplomatic historian the United Nations wartime coalition to
maintain international peace and security and of diplomatic approach have at different times
then to go on to promote human rights, justice, been preferred. Even in the field of human
and progress in the postwar period combined rights, where commitments tend to be univer-
realist and idealist approaches. The result was sal and absolute, there can be considerable
a constructive achievement: a still-functioning variation in strategy and tactics, ranging from
world organization, the United Nations. international legal action to naming and sham-
President Richard Nixons and Henry ing, to quiet diplomacy, and to the silent use
Kissingers later triangular diplomacy, of economic and other forms of leverage. In the
which was premised more realistically on foreign policy and the diplomacy of the admin-
the self-equilibrating rivalries of the United istration of President Obama, which can broadly
States, Peoples Republic of China, and be described as engagement, implementing
Soviet Union, made possible greater control steps of many kinds have been taken not just by
of Cold War relationships, including the vital the US military or even only by the government
strategic nuclear-weapons balance. Ideally, it itself but also by private persons and organiza-
laid a diplomatic foundation for a new struc- tions operating under government contract and
ture of peace.17 Jimmy Carter and, more dra- also individuals and groups acting voluntarily.
matically, Ronald Reagan as US presidents Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called this
proposed not just the limitation, or deep reduc- whole-of-society approach Civilian power.21
tion, of nuclear weapons but their total elimi-
nation. President Reagans Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), and his adamant defense of Key Points
it as a more rational and humane alternative
to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) dur- US foreign policy has been a combination of
ing the Reykjavk Summit in October 1986, Realist, or interests-based, approaches and
contributed, as even Soviet leader Mikhail Idealist, or values-based, approaches, with the
latter being expressed more fully and frequently
Gorbachev subsequently acknowledged, to
as American power has increased.
the ending of the Cold War.18 Washingtons Farewell Address, the Monroe
The US governments Cold War era policy Doctrine, and the Open Door Notes are tradi-
of containing Soviet and also Chinese tional or fundamental policy statements that
communist expansion allowed for varying continue to have influence; implementing poli-
strategies or implementing policies, cies, with their associated strategies and tactics,
as Bailey characterizes the governments are designed by presidential administrations to
designs for carrying out more fundamental carry out such fundamental policies.
policies.19 John Lewis Gaddis, in Strategies of The Cold War national security policy of contain-
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar ment, with its alternating symmetrical (direct)
American National Security Policy during the and asymmetrical (indirect) strategies of opposi-
tion to aggression, allowed US diplomacy as well
Cold War, demonstrates how, on the basis of
as to shift focus from place to place.
differing perceptions of the Soviet threat and The Obama administrations engagement policy
also differing assessments of the strengths of draws upon societys civilian power as well as
the United States itself, containment strategy the governments own personnel and resources.
shifted between symmetrical, or site-specific
and direct, and asymmetrical, or non-site-
specific, and more indirect.20
There have been wide alternations of strat- PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS
egy and tactics in other areas of American
foreign policy as well. In the fields of develop- Foreign affairs are conducted not just by
ment assistance and trade-policy negotiations, diplomats that is, by delegated representatives
for instance, bilateral or multilateral lines of governments. Leaders the policymakers
themselves increasingly also are involved. and uniform set of guidelines for its repre-
The interrelationships of diplomats and sentatives abroad until well into the decade
policymakers agents to principals and vice of the 1890s.23
versa is inherently ambivalent, reflects Gradually, the numbers, and also the sta-
Ambassador Monteagle Stearns, a US diplo- tus, of American citizens appointed to foreign
matic veteran. Diplomacy is both servant to posts grew. The majority still were consuls,
and master of foreign policy: servant because many of them party spoilsmen. The earli-
the diplomats role is to carry out the instruc- est US legations, headed by ministers, were
tions of political policymakers, master established in France (1779), the Netherlands
because what the diplomat cannot accom- (1781), Spain (1783), the United Kingdom
plish, policymakers will usually have to do (1785), Portugal (1791), Prussia (1797),
without.22 Diplomats are on the spot, and are Russia (1809), Sweden (1818), and Mexico
in the best position to judge what will work (1825). Occasionally, high-level political
and what will not. envoys also were dispatched. When President
For generations, a widespread assump- Jefferson in 1803 began negotiations leading
tion among Americans was, as noted, that the to the eventual purchase of Louisiana, he did
country did not need a cadre of professional so by sending his fellow Virginian and friend,
diplomats at all. Partly this was because of James Monroe, as a special envoy to assist
the Revolutionary inheritance: the break Robert R. Livingston, the regular American
from the European states-system, includ- minister in France. The country of Italy, fol-
ing its social institution of diplomacy. The lowing its unification, received a US minister
WashingtonJefferson policy of keeping in 1861. Bostons Charles Francis Adams, the
political connections to a minimum contrib- American representative in Britain during the
uted to this anti-diplomatic bias. The idea Civil War, was formally Envoy Extraordinary
of US diplomatic representation in European and Minister Plenipotentiary. There were no
capitals was, therefore, almost un-American, US ambassadors with that rank and title at
especially as profitable trading relationships, all until 1893, when former Secretary of State
it was believed, could be developed without Thomas A. Bayard was sent as Ambassador
formal representation or with the assistance Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the
only of consuls located in a few foreign ports Court of St Jamess. The administrative
and commercial centers. establishment of the Department of State in
The early American consuls represented Washington, DC, itself was tiny, as was its
business (and themselves) perhaps more than budget especially in relation to that of some
they did the US government in their substan- other departments even then.
tive work, even though they were politically Many American presidents including
appointed. Generally untrained and also Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and
poorly compensated, they relied mostly on Abraham Lincoln in the nineteenth century
fees they could collect. Most importantly, have conducted diplomacy themselves. They
they were very loosely supervised. Like have done so especially from the time of
Americas diplomats, even fewer in number, President Theodore Roosevelt, whose White
consuls functioned in the absence of over- House was a veritable court.24 The new cen-
all strategic direction or a comprehensive, trality and prominence of the American presi-
spelled-out national policy. Their decisions dency in international affairs, though partly a
were largely ad hoc. The historian Robert product of personality, was more fundamen-
Beisner in a compelling essay, From the Old tally a result of the rise of the United States to
Diplomacy to the New, has argued that the the position of world power.25 Henceforward
United States did not even have a foreign it was easier for American leaders not only
policy, in the sense of a forward-looking to express the countrys ideals and protect its
interests through their words and decisions president and other selected principals partici-
but also to be much more active in, person- pate. There also are many bilateral summits,
ally, promoting them. including the annual USEuropean Union
President Woodrow Wilson marked a fur- Summit. There is now an annual trilateral
ther new phase of American diplomacy get-together of the US President with the
departing from Washingtons Great Rule Prime Minister of Canada and the President
and, some critics thought, even the frame- of Mexico. The largest Summit in history was
work of the US Constitution by traveling to the 2000 Millennium Summit held in New
Europe in 1919 to participate directly in the York at UN Headquarters during the presi-
Paris Peace Conference. A generation later, dency of Bill Clinton. Even Fidel Castro was
President Franklin Roosevelt, as Commander- present and in the group photograph.
in-Chief in wartime, traveled for meetings in The direct involvement of American
Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta in order presidents in diplomacy has significantly
both to concert allied war plans and to discuss increased the international functions of
postwar aims. Had Roosevelt lived, he would White House staff members, some of whom
have attended the Conference on International themselves have become agents in presi-
Organization in San Francisco, at which the dentially authorized special missions. The
United Nations Organization was born. His most famous such mission of all was the
successor, Harry Truman, went to Germany secret trip made to Beijing in 1971 by Henry
after its surrender to join with Marshal Joseph Kissinger, when National Security Advisor,
Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in order to prepare the way for President
replaced by his Labour Party successor Nixons journey to China the following
Clement Attlee, at the Potsdam Conference. year.27 Historically, other presidents too have
These meetings were the origins of Churchills given personal advisers diplomatic roles
term, summits for meetings atop the high- notable cases being President Wilsons use of
est peak of the global power range26 (see Colonel Edward House and, a quarter century
Chapter nineteen in this Handbook). later, President Roosevelts reliance on Harry
Since that time, particularly following Hopkins as his surrogate.28
the 1955 Geneva Summit at which General Today, the position of Special Represent
Dwight D. Eisenhower as US President atives and of Special Envoys, chosen to deal
was present for the United States, presiden- with particular situations or issues, has become
tial engagement in summit diplomacy has more formalized. The late Richard Holbrooke,
become almost commonplace. Diplomats, negotiator of the Dayton Accords ending the
generally less prominent than before, do serve violent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, subse-
in key advisory and supporting roles, includ- quently was appointed Special Representative
ing that of summit sherpas. Other American for the AfghanistanPakistan region. When
principals the Secretary of State and often not at work in the field, he was ensconced in
the National Security Advisor as well as the a first-floor State Department office with a
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the large staff. No longer are such envoys referred
Treasury, and other Cabinet members too to as troubleshooters as earlier were, for
more and more engage in high-level interna- example, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, an
tional meetings on a range of policy subjects experienced businessman-diplomat, or Philip
for which they are responsible. Habib, a versatile LebaneseAmerican career
Summits themselves are variable. They diplomat who worked in Central America and
can include both friendly and unfriendly elsewhere.
countries. There is the Group of Eight The distinction between principals leaders
without Vladimir Putin and Russia, again and department heads and agents, including
the Group of Seven in which the American resident ambassadors and other emissaries is
increasingly difficult to draw. The constella- democratic effect of the 1980 reform overseas.
tion of American diplomacy has expanded. Today there are approximately 13,000 Foreign
An ambassador in the age of Louis XIV per- Service employees working in positions at
sonally re-presented a sovereign, and was home and abroad. All is not well in the depart-
expected to fill the part with appropriate dig- ment, however. It remains hierarchical, bureau-
nity. A representative of the United States of cratic, and micromanagerial irrespective of
America today is a stand-in for a whole people its size.31 For the Foreign Service itself, there
as well as its political leadership.29 American is considerable, fully understandable concern
diplomats, though diverse, are not yet fully about the politicization of the Department
reflective of American society. The Rogers the increase in the number of short-term politi-
Act of 1924 brought together diplomats and cal appointees at high level, the use of more
consuls (today in a consular cone), hith- and more special representatives and coor-
erto in completely separate services, to form dinators, and a general loss of respect for
a single, examination-based Foreign Service professionalism including language skills,
of the United States. Until then, and for some technical knowledge, and field experience.
time afterward, American diplomacy had a Homogenization the breakdown of barri-
distinctly upper-class character. For many ers between the examination-based Foreign
ambassadorial posts, private wealth was a Service and Civil Service resulting from the
prerequisite. This still is a reality for some Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
positions. There was an assumption of famili- Review (QDDR) of 1980 is also a concern
arity. The interwar, mostly-male US Foreign of the career professionals. The underinvest-
Service has been described aptly, and some- ment of the United States in the people and
what nostalgically, as A Pretty Good Club.30 the training needed to maintain the front line
The US entry into the Second World War of the countrys defenses abroad has placed,
significantly enlarged the circle of Americans, in the judgment of the American Academy of
both men and women, involved in international Diplomacy, its diplomacy at risk.32
work. This factor, along with the democratic In comparison with other US govern-
purpose of the US war effort itself, consider- ment departments, above all the Defense
ably liberalized the Foreign Service. A prin- Department but also the total membership of
cipal goal of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 the intelligence community, the number of
was to reduce the distinction between Foreign State Department personnel is very small, even
Service Officers (FSOs) and civil service staff with the employees of the semi-autonomous
working for the department. The Act cre- US Agency for International Development
ated a Foreign Service Institute for language (USAID) added. Secretary of Defense Robert
and other professional training of all person- M. Gates, knowing the inadequacy of military
nel, which raised but also equalized skill lev- measures taken by themselves and, like his
els. In 1954, Henry M. Wriston, president of Cabinet colleague Hillary Clinton, appreciat-
Brown University, recommended in a major ing the importance of the civilian compo-
report the integration of many Civil Service nent of the US presence abroad, spoke out,
employees into the Foreign Service itself remarkably, in favor of increased funding for
Wristonization, the process came to be called. the Department of State. He even made some
The Foreign Service Act of 1980 created a Defense Department money available for the
limited-membership Senior Foreign Service State Departments use. To illustrate his point,
modeled on the military hierarchy. With its up he frequently commented that there were
or out imperative, it opened up more space, more personnel in military marching bands
and opportunity, at lower ranks. The Act fur- than there were in the US Foreign Service.33
ther made Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) The requirements of expeditionary diplo-
members of the Service, thus extending the macy, including work in the dangerous areas
of Iraq and Afghanistan, have required a society, however, that surely does circumscribe
whole-of-government approach, as well as and even inform US diplomacy in general and
involvement of the private sector and help also specific ways. The multi-talented Benjamin
from civil society. In such situations, the mil- Franklin set the pattern. Lack of pomp was a
itary dominates. A Foreign Service officer in keynote. Thomas Jefferson as president even
them often is a Diplomat Among Warriors, wrote his own Rules of Etiquette which, he
as the legendary American diplomat Robert hoped, would guide social behavior in the new
M. Murphy was in North Africa and Europe capital, Washington, DC, and also throughout
in the Second World War era.34 So also, more the country. When brought together in society,
recently, was the diplomat Ryan Crocker in all are perfectly equal, whether foreign or
Baghdad and Kabul although General David domestic, titled or untitled, in or out of office,
Petraeus false-modestly characterized him- he wrote, allowing just one exception: Foreign
self as Ambassador Crockers military wing- ministers, from the necessity of making them-
man. Nearly all the development-oriented selves known, pay the first visit. Otherwise, no
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in one should come before others. No title being
Iraq and Afghanistan have been headed by admitted here, those of foreigners give no prec-
military commanders. CIA officers, too, often edence. Common American social practice
have had major, usually clandestine roles in rather than European diplomatic protocol
those places. The agents of American diplo- should prevail. This was illustrated by his final
macy today have many faces, some of them rule: the principle of equality, or of ple
helmeted and some of them masked. mle in order to
prevent the growth of precedence out of courtesy,

Key Points the members of the Executive will practice at their
own houses, and recommend an adherence to the
Policymakers and diplomats principals and ancient usage of the country, of gentlemen in
agents have an ambivalent relationship, with mass giving precedence to the ladies in mass, in
those in charge depending on those who report passing from one apartment where they are
to them for their success. assembled into another.36
For much of US history, it was commerce consular
work rather than high politics diplomacy that The rule of ple mle was demonstrated
was the focus of American official activity abroad.
when the British minister, Anthony Merry,
Presidents themselves, along with their advisers,
and his wife, expecting to be seated as the
increasingly have engaged in diplomacy, notably
at summit meetings. guests of honor at a White House dinner,
The Foreign Service of the United States has been were shocked when, in moving from the
steadily democratized, though also somewhat drawing room into the dining room, President
homogenized through a politically motivated Jefferson offered his arm not to Mrs Merry but
blending with the Civil Service. to Dolley Madison, seating her on his right.
American representation abroad is today is Others had to take places on their own any
much more inclusive, with civilian experts, military seat, first come, first served. So offended were
commanders, and intelligence officers working the Merrys that they never entered the White
alongside and sometimes in front of diplomats. House again. The writer Tom Wolfe, recount-
ing the Jefferson story, finds psychological
genius in the cosmopolitan presidents act
STYLES AND METHODS and emphasizes its lasting symbolic impor-
tance. It exploded the notion, prevalent in
It is rarely commented today that there is an Europe, that a certain class of people were
American national style.35 There remains predestined to dominate, and that ordinary
a basic democratic character of American citizens must live their lives accordingly.
In clear contrast: America remains, as it has the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as rep-
been from the very beginning, the freest, resenting The Failure of Diplomacy.40 The
most open country in the world, encouraging US government, supported by the British
one and all to compete pell-mell for any great government of Tony Blair, short-circuited
goal that exists.37 American diplomacy bears the process of multilateral deliberation
the imprint of these social and also presiden- at the United Nations and the inspection
tial origins. efforts of the International Atomic Energy
The subsequent history of White House Agency (IAEA). That those efforts would
entertaining during the more contempo- ultimately have succeeded cannot, of course,
rary presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Ronald be proven. The contrasting willing-to-engage
Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, for approach of the Obama administration,
example shows a familiar naturalness, if though subjected to withering criticism as
not the overt simplicity, of Franklins and tantamount to appeasement, eventually
Jeffersons time. The US Foreign Service produced at least short-term results, includ-
Institute manual, Protocol for the Modern ing restoration of diplomatic relations with
Diplomat, shows the straightforward and the Republic of Cuba on June 20, 2015,
unpretentious style carrying over into and, of greater strategic importance, the
American diplomacy today, with due prag- negotiation led by Secretary of State John
matic acceptance of current international Kerry, together with the foreign ministers
norms.38 Subsequent American presidents of China, France, Germany, Russia, and the
have, of course, differed markedly in the United Kingdom and the European Unions
ways they conduct themselves, and also in High Representative for external affairs, of
how they make foreign policy. Ambassador a nuclear deal with revolutionary Iran: the
Ryan Crocker, when asked what impact Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed
changes in administration had on his work as in Vienna on July 14, 2015.
a career diplomat, replied: Each administra- The actual implementation of the US gov-
tion has its own priorities and style.39 ernments policy of engagement requires
More profoundly, presidencies may differ multi-faceted and sustained diplomacy, as
in the respect they accord to the factor of diplo- well as navigation of the shoals of executive-
macy itself. There has been a marked con- legislative relations and electoral politics. The
trast between the initial attitude of President formation and conduct of American foreign
George W. Bush, expressed in his September policy is always a two-level game external
20, 2001, address before a joint session of and internal requiring political acrobatics
Congress in which he declared, Either you from a negotiator who must jump between the
are with us or you are with the terrorists, diplomatic and domestic tables.41 For high-
and President Barack Obamas saying in his level negotiators such as Secretary Kerry, who
January 20, 2009, inaugural address: To himself served in the Senate and chaired its
those who cling to power through corruption Committee on Foreign Relations, performing
and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know the trick is not necessarily easier. To find the
that you are on the wrong side of history, but right way to talk persuasively abroad and at
that we will extend a hand if you are willing home requires great sensitivity and skill.
to unclench your fist. American speech, including its lexicon,
The importance of differences in presiden- reflects broad cultural but also some very
tial style can be exaggerated, for US foreign particular cultural and social influences. Its
policy and administrative behavior have been elements come from Christian doctrine, legal
remarkably continuous. However, the mem- training, business practice, scientific work,
ory remains of the Bush administrations military experience, and even sports enthu-
launching a war in March 2003 to overthrow siasm (resulting in even diplomats using
phrases like step up to the plate). With The United States, too, intervenes locally
the professionalization of the US Foreign where countries will allow it or cannot
Service, some of whose members come prevent it. Lobbying and advocacy are
in with postgraduate degrees, specialized becoming almost universal diplomatic meth-
academic terms also have entered into the ods. To the extent that they are extrapolated
American diplomatic vocabulary terms like from US domestic politics, they represent
smart power being somewhat vague popu- an Americanization of international diplo-
larizations thereof. macy.44 Condoleezza Rice, when serving as
US diplomacy has been accurately described Secretary of State, boldly espoused what she
as direct, practical, and results-oriented, rather called transformational diplomacy, which
than high-context or relationship-minded. would reach far beyond the capitals of other
The impatience that American negotiators countries. She intended progressively to shift
frequently show, it should however be recog- US diplomatic assets out of traditional dip-
nized, often has organizational-institutional lomatic centers (mainly away from Europe)
rather than sociological causes: not just the to large developing countries such as Nigeria,
regular elections cycle, the two-term-limited Egypt, India, and Indonesia in other regions.
presidency, a party-divided Congress, and Some FSOs would be assigned to estab-
the inter-agency process but also the insist- lish one-person American Presence Posts
ent demands of the State Department bureau- (APPs) in selected large noncapital cities.
cracy itself. Because they may be the complex The repositioning would foster democracy
results of an internal consensus, laboriously and it would also contribute to world stability.
arrived at, US proposals sometimes are pre- By reaching out directly to the broad popula-
sented on a take it or leave it basis.42 tions of countries, influence could be brought
The American policy- and decision-making to bear on their governments to behave more
process can even affect the styles and methods responsibly, externally as well as internally.
of countries that deal with the United States. Security considerations were not overlooked
The effect is almost systemic. Many govern- but they were secondary. Events changed this.
ments have learned that in order to be suc- Particularly sobering was the attack on an
cessful in negotiating with the United States American diplomatic outpost in Benghazi on
they must engage, early, in what elsewhere September 11, 2012, in which J. Christopher
may be viewed as outright interference Stevens, a career diplomat then serving as US
even a violation of the Vienna Convention on ambassador to Libya, was killed.
Diplomatic Relations (1961) by speaking
out publicly and by lobbying. Sometimes they
must even pressure state and local govern-
Key Points
ments. All politics is local, as Speaker of the
House of Representatives Thomas P. ONeill The American style of diplomacy, shaped by the
liked to say. Many embassies in Washington countrys social character, is illustrated by Thomas
know that and now act accordingly. The Jeffersons egalitarian diplomatic rule of ple mle,
Canadian government has carried this under- with US protocol standards pragmatically evolving
standing the furthest, with its Advocacy with respect for international norms.
While the styles of individual US presidencies
Secretariat in Washington and, through an
(those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama,
Enhanced Representative Initiative, some for instance) differ, American foreign policy and
sixteen offices, including trade offices, dis- diplomatic behavior, including the vocabulary
tributed throughout the United States. The used, reflect long-term and broader and cultural
Canadian strategy is to intervene quickly, as well as educational influences.
when and where issues originate, before they The methods of US diplomacy, and of countries
end up in the Washington gridlock.43 dealing with the United States, increasingly
include lobbying and advocacy derived from The coverage is physically almost global.
American domestic politics and suggesting the The communications technology itself is
Americanization of international diplomacy. intended to be democratizing, as it is inter-
The idea of using diplomacy to transform other active and it allows for mass participation.
societies by shifting diplomatic assets from capital Virtual Presence Posts internet sites man-
cities to large urban centers outside capitals, in
aged by computer-adept officers, mostly
order to stimulate wider popular participation in
government, may have a democratizing effect,
younger staff give the State Department
but it also exposes diplomats to increased conversational access to persons for whom
security risks. US embassies may be geographically and
also politically impossible to approach. Not
all countries, it should be noted, even have
US embassies that are open for business. In
GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY, AMERICAN the case of Cuba, with its large US Interests
DIPLOMACY, AND WORLD Section under the protection of the Swiss
DEMOCRACY Embassy now restored to Embassy status,
access for Cuban citizens should in time
In recent years the communications aspect of increase. Relations with Iran, despite the con-
American foreign policy, in part because of clusion of the nuclear deal, remain problem-
the greater insecurity that diplomats in the atical. The Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran
field experience, has become almost its most nominally represents US interests. To main-
salient characteristic. Strategic communica- tain some contact at the popular level, the
tions has come to rival foreign policy strategy State Department posts statements and mes-
itself. From President Franklin Roosevelts sages on a Virtual Embassy of the United
fireside chats, which were broadcasted by States Tehran, Iran (iran.usembassy.
short-wave radio to audiences overseas, to gov). However, some terrorism-supporting
the Obama administrations multi-systemed countries Syria as well as Iran and North
engagement with populations elsewhere, Korea have for that fundamental reason
communicated via satellite television and been shunned, as well as subjected to sanc-
social media as well as through regular dip- tions and even military pressures and probably
lomatic representation, American messages also cyber measures.
of democracy, anti-terrorism, and world Americas interests and values from its
order are being brought to mankind nearly early days have never permitted the estab-
everywhere. lishment of a completely universal system of
The organizational machinery, like the formal diplomatic representation, even though
actual technology used, is impressive. The Thomas Jefferson as president followed a real-
State Departments Office of International istic policy of dealing with the regimes actu-
Media Engagement has six Regional Media ally in power, if they appeared to be formed
Hubs that serve as overseas platforms by the will of the people. The inherited policy
for reaching audiences around the world: of de facto recognition was changed by the
the USEuropean Media Hub, Brussels; the more idealistic Woodrow Wilson, who refused
Dubai Regional Media Hub; the London to recognize the usurper regime of General
Regional Media Hub; the Media Hub of Victoriano Huerta in revolutionary Mexico.
the Americas; the African Regional Media Even without having functioning embassies
Hub; and the East Asia and Pacific Media everywhere, however, Americas access to
Hub. The facilities appear to be located in the minds of the worlds populations today is
the right places, with the Middle East and extensive. How effective this potential contact
Asia being areas of particular concern. is, however, another matter.
We live in a time of widespread connectiv- NOTES AND REFERENCES

ity, observes Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for
Innovation to Secretary of State Clinton and 1 Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American
the steward of the Departments 21st Century Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).
Statecraft agenda. Much of the worlds pop- 2 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People, 9th edition (Englewood Cliffs,
ulation is and with amazing speed joining NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), vi.
in a common network, he projected.45 Digital 3 Geoffrey Wiseman, Distinctive Characteristics
diplomacy, operating within the web, has of American Diplomacy, The Hague Journal of
become a powerful complement to Americas Diplomacy 6, nos. 34 (2011): 238. See also Paul
traditional diplomacy. The scholar-diplomat Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds, American
Diplomacy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
Jorge Heine has even suggested that the 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
new network diplomacy could replace the trans., ed., and with an intro. by Harvey C.
old ministry-to-ministry club diplomacy.46 Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: The
Human networking, facilitated by technol- University of Chicago Press, 2000), 219.
ogy, does reach hitherto unreached audiences, 5 David Clinton, The Distinction between Foreign
Policy and Diplomacy in American International
especially youth and women. Moreover, it Thought and Practice, The Hague Journal of
enables peoples to communicate with each Diplomacy 6, nos. 34 (2011): 26176.
other to interconnect. Technology, a neu- 6 George F. Kennan, Diplomacy Without
tral value, does not by itself cause revolu- Diplomats? Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September
tions, Ross has to acknowledge. People do. October 1997): 198212.
7 Michele Thoren Bond, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Nonetheless, the US governments vaunting of Consular Affairs, US Department of State,
and support for internet freedom, while not address delivered at the international conference,
implicitly rooted in regime change, can help The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
people to exercise rights for their own social, (1963) at Fifty And Beyond, held at The Fletcher
political and economic purposes.47 School of Law and Diplomacy, January 17, 2013.
8 Frank L. Klingberg, Cyclical Trends in American
Will the new US diplomacy its struc- Foreign Policy Moods (Lanham, MD: University
tures and processes, its policies and strate- Press of America, 1983).
gies, its principals and agents, and its styles 9 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and
and methods become the diplomatic pattern Powers, 17871957, 4th rev. edition (New York:
for the world? Will it have the democratiz- New York University Press, 1957), 171.
10 Richard J. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities
ing effect that has become a central purpose in Foreign Relations, The American Journal
of American foreign policy, reflecting the of International Law 83, no. 4 (October 1989):
democratic character of the United States 82139.
itself?48 Diplomacy, arguably, is itself a form 11 James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy &
of democracy. It is premised, as Thomas Process, 6th edition (Boston: Wadsworth Congage
Learning, 2014), 339438.
Jefferson appreciated, and Tocqueville noted, 12 John Newhouse, Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence
on the principle of equality and the recipro- of Lobbyists on U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign
cal consideration of others indeed, the sov- Affairs 88, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 7392; Alan
ereign exchange of all persons involved in K. Henrikson, The Washington Diplomatic
it. The same applies to the worlds citizenry. Corps: The Place, the Professionals, and their
Performance, The Diplomatic Corps as an
Through technology, citizens everywhere are Institution of International Society, ed. Paul Sharp
being empowered to think, to decide, to act. and Geoffrey Wiseman (Houndmills, Basingstoke,
And to interact. American diplomacy, and UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4174.
the message of democracy it carries, albeit 13 Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence
sometimes by force and subterfuge as well of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: Longman, 1999).
as through expressions of reason and truth, 14 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency
offers the world a choice. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973);
Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 31 Joseph Cassidy, 10 Ways to Fix Americas Ailing
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). State Department, Foreign Policy (July 20, 2015),
15 Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/20/state-
Government (New York: Oxford University Press, department-kerry-obama
2014). 32 American Diplomacy at Risk (Washington, DC:
16 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 21718. American Academy of Diplomacy, 2015), www.
17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/ADAR_
and Schuster, 1994), ch. 28 Foreign Policy as Full_Report_4.1.15.pdf.
Geopolitics: Nixons Triangular Diplomacy. 33 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon
18 Ken Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight and Schuster, 2014), 24. See also Robert M.
Hours that Ended the Cold War (New York: Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New
Broadside Books, 2014). York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).
19 Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 34 Robert M. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors
People, 3. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976).
20 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 35 The American National Style, Daedalus: Journal
Critical Appraisal of American National Security of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
Policy during the Cold War, rev. and expanded 87, no. 2 (Spring 1958).
edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 36 Thomas Jefferson, Rules of Etiquette, in The
21 Alan K. Henrikson, United States Contemporary Works of Thomas Jefferson, collected and edited
Diplomacy: Implementing a Foreign Policy of by Paul Leicester Ford, Vol. 10 (New York: The
Engagement, in Diplomacy in a Globalizing Knickerbocker Press, G.P. Putnams Sons, 1905),
World: Theories and Practices, ed. Pauline Kerr 47.
and Geoffrey Wiseman (New York: Oxford 37 Tom Wolfe, Pell-Mell, The Atlantic (November 1,
University Press, 2013); Hillary Clinton, Leading 2007), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
Through Civilian Power: Redefining American 2007/11/pell-mell/306312
Diplomacy and Development, Foreign Affairs 89, 38 Protocol for the Modern Diplomat (Washington,
no. 6 (November/December 2010): 1324. DC: Foreign Service Institute, US Department of
22 Monteagle Stearns, Talking to Strangers: State, last reviewed July 2013), www.state.gov/
Improving American Diplomacy at Home and documents/organization/176174.pdf
Abroad (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 39 Q&A with Ryan Crocker 71, U.S. Ambassador to
1996), xiii. Iraq, Whitman Magazine (March 2007): 1415.
23 Robert L. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the 40 The Failure of Diplomacy, Frontline, www.pbs.
New, 18651900 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blair/etc/cron.
Davidson, 1986). html
24 Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: 41 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic
Random House, 2001). Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,
25 Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer
Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The 1988): 42760.
Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). 42 Nigel Quinney, U.S. Negotiating Behavior, Special
26 David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings that Report 94, United States Institute of Peace,
Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Washington, DC, October 2002, www.usip.org/
Books, 2007). publications/us-negotiating-behavior.
27 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week 43 Colin Robertson, Getting Noticed in Washington:
that Changed the World (New York: Random The Hard Part of Canadas Job, Policy Options/
House, 2007). Options Politiques (November 2005): 4650,
28 Henry M. Wriston, The Special Envoy, Foreign http://policyoptions.irpp.org/issues/canada-us-
Affairs 38, no. 2 (January 1960): 21937. trade-tensions/getting-noticed-in-washington-
29 Alan K. Henrikson, Sovereignty, Diplomacy, the-hard-part-of-canadas-job
and Democracy: The Changing Character of 44 Alan K. Henrikson, Diplomacys Possible Futures,
International Representation from State to The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 1, no. 1 (2006):
Self? The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Special 327, especially pp. 206.
80th Anniversary Edition, 37, no. 3 (2013): 45 Alec Ross, Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign
11140, www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/ Policy, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, nos.
uploads/2013/09/Henrikson.pdf 34 (2011): 4515. See also Eric Schmidt and
30 Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping
Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: the Future of Peace, Nations and Business (New
W.W. Norton and Company, 1978). York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013).
46 Jorge Heine, On the Manner of Practising the 47 Ross, Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy.
New Diplomacy, Re-Shaping Diplomacy, Working 48 Tony Smith, Americas Mission: The United States
Paper No. 11 (Waterloo, ON, Canada: The Centre and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy,
for International Governance Innovation, October expanded edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
2006). University Press, 2012).
27
Russian Post-Soviet Diplomacy
Ta t i a n a Z o n o v a
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF At the beginning of the twenty-first cen-

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY tury a new rapprochement can be observed
between the Russian State (looking for a
Historically, the initial formation of the unifying national idea) and the Russian
Russian model of diplomacy was character- Orthodox Church (looking to recover its
ized by the Byzantine tradition of symphony past prestige) for the sake of mutual support.
Russian diplomatic institutions also empha-
or harmonization of power between the secu-
size their support for the Churchs politics
lar and ecclesiastic authorities.1 From Tsar
which corresponds to one of the oldest and
Peters era onward a gradual rapprochement
most profound traditions of our diplomacy.2
with the Western diplomatic system can be
Armed conflicts, the proliferation of
observed. However, the Byzantine messianic
weapons of mass destruction and the spread
spirit appeared now and again in both of international terrorism have all put dip-
Orthodox and Soviet forms. Even under lomatic institutions to a severe test. In this
Soviet-imposed atheism, diplomacy was framework there are certain limits to what
viewed as a tool for a new revolutionary uni- diplomacy can achieve, while power politics
versalism expressed in terms of proletarian and military actions often replace it.
internationalism. Dramatic events at the turn The historical record suggests that frequent
of the end of the 1980s placed an urgent need changes of Ministers of Foreign Affairs occur
for a new type of diplomacy on the agenda. during periods of high political instability. On
Under glasnost and perestroika, the last the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union the
Soviet leader, Gorbachev, attempted to assure domestic situation was marked by extreme
greater openness and some de-ideologization instability. Once Foreign Minister Eduard
of diplomacy. Shevardnadze resigned in December 1990, the
Russian Post-Soviet Diplomacy 337
new Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh was Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative
appointed only by the middle of January 1991. Socialist Republic (RSFSR) headed by
During the August coup he also stepped down. Minister Andrei Kozyrev was renamed the
On August 28, the Soviet Ambassador to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Czechoslovakia, Boris Pankin, was appointed Federation.5 Boris Yeltsin planned a signifi-
Minister of Foreign Affairs; he was the only cant personnel downsizing both in the center
ambassador who had publicly condemned the and abroad. More than 1,000 diplomats were
coup leaders during the coup. Under his lead- supposed to resign. However, many young
ership, on September 9, 1991, and for the first and active diplomats who were able to find
time in its history, the Kolleghiya (collective more profitable jobs in commercial structures
board) of the Ministry announced its volun- abandoned the Ministry, while the major and
tary dissolution and the new Minister under- better remunerated diplomats continued their
took the formation of a new body. Pankin also careers. Over time, the situation has stabilized.
publicly announced the expulsion of KGB Currently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(secret service) officers from the Ministry and (MFA) has around 12,000 personnel. Among
its foreign missions.3 Further reforms of the them there are about 4,500 professional dip-
diplomatic service envisaged the abolition of lomats, of which approximately a quarter are
trade missions and significant staff reduction young people under the age of 30 years.6
in order to allocate quotas for diplomats repre- In the post-Cold War period, the Russian dip-
senting 15 Union republics. lomatic service registered a growing number of
In the course of the transition to market- what are widely known as functional depart-
oriented reforms, the State Council decided ments. In particular, there emerged depart-
to merge the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with ments of new challenges and threats, human
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. rights issues, economic cooperation, and a
After a friendly phone conversation crisis management center. In addition, a new
between President Gorbachev and British department dealing with the Commonwealth of
Prime Minister John Major,4 Pankin was Independent States (CIS) and a department for
appointed Soviet ambassador to the UK, and relations with the Subjects of the RF,7 the parlia-
Shevardnadze became head of the Ministry ment, and public organizations was established.
of External Relations, in office until the col- The foreign policy decision-making process
lapse of the Soviet Union. was also changed. According to the Russian
Constitution, the President determines the
guidelines of foreign policy. The Presidential
Key Points Administration, the Federal Assembly
(Russian legislature) with its Committees on
Historically, Russian diplomacy tended to be to a con- Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministries (the
siderable extent ideologized, both religious and laic.
Government), as well as the Security Council
Periods of political instability bring on drastic struc-
vigorously intervene in the policy-making and
tural reforms of the Russian foreign service, which
sometimes do not seem to be thoroughly elaborated. decision-making process. So the MFA faces the
challenge of coordinating foreign policy and
foreign economic activities between various
ministries, agencies, and public institutions.8
THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIPLOMATIC STRUCTURES IN THE
NEW RUSSIA
Key Points
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union on The President determines the guidelines of
December 8, 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Russian foreign policy.
Other bodies taking part in the policy-making and an agreement with the American administra-
decision-making process include the Presidential tion of President Clinton in order to create a
Administration, the Federal Assembly, the Council RussianAmerican Commission on Economic
of Ministries, and the Security Council. and Technological Cooperation, known as
The MFA faces the challenge of coordinating the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. At the
foreign policy and foreign economic activities
same time, the Russian media noted that an
between various ministries, agencies, and public
institutions.
equal partnership with the US which Russian
leaders considered as partnership of the two
great powers could be difficult because
President Bush had insisted on claiming an
American victory over Russia in the Cold War.
NEW TRENDS IN THE RUSSIAN In 2009 the USRussia Bilateral Presidential
FOREIGN POLICY AS A FRAMEWORK Commission was set up with around 20 work-
FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY ing groups aimed at improving cooperation in
various areas.10
The very first Foreign Policy Concept (1992) In 1994, the President of the Russian
reiterated its commitment to ensure favora- Federation for the first time took part in a
ble conditions for the development of the meeting of the G-7 in Naples. The summit
country.9 Other stated goals coincided with led to the formation of the G-8. A special
the foreign policy objectives carried out in Russian envoy, appointed by the Russian
the USSR during the perestroika period President, had to coordinate preparation for
for example, ending the Cold War, agree- the summit. He was assisted by a Deputy
ments on arms reduction, openness to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and junior officials
West, the establishment of relations with from various federal agencies. The Russian
NATO and the European Union, and acces- Interagency Commission on Cooperation
sion negotiations with the International with International Financial and Economic
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Organizations was also involved in those
Russian leaders needed legitimation and activities, and the Russian draft document
the approval of ongoing reforms by the US, was necessarily coordinated with other con-
members of the European Community, and cerned Russian agencies. The Russian Foreign
other industrial states. Russian diplomacy Minister once a year participated in the meet-
tried to harmonize its actions with Western ing of foreign ministers of the G-8 around
politics. From the mid-1990s, the idea of the time of the opening of the UN General
creating a multipolar world and maintaining Assembly.11 Russian officials several times a
relationships based on effective multilateral- year went to meet their colleagues in the capi-
ism started to become more and more impor- tal of the state which would host the summit.12
tant for Russias foreign policy. That is why In accordance with the Agreement on
particular attention was paid to the Russian Partnership and Cooperation between Russia
diplomatic presence in multilateral organiza- and EU in 1994, they established a mecha-
tions and fora. nism of political and diplomatic cooperation.
In 1998 Russia established its diplomatic mis- A key role was played by 1 + 2 summits: the
sion to NATO in Brussels. Permanent Missions Russian President, on the one side, and the
of Russia were accredited also to the UN, the Presidents of the European Council and the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in European Commission, on the other.13 Their
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and meetings were held twice a year. Other bod-
other international organizations. During his ies for the implementation of the Agreement
visit to Washington in September 1993, Viktor were the Council at the ministerial level,
Chernomyrdin, then Prime Minister, reached the Committee of Senior Officials, as well as
the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Russia, as an integral and organic part of

The RF Government established a governmen- the Asia-Pacific region, is also strengthening
tal Commission for cooperation with the EU, its presence there as a major precondition for
which coordinated the activities of Russian securing continued national, social, and eco-
ministries and agencies involved in the part- nomic development especially in Siberia and
nership with the EU. Russia established its the Far East. The increasing engagement of
diplomatic mission in Brussels headed by a full Russia with inter-governmental organizations
Ambassador. As well as diplomats, the staff of and dialogue mechanisms the Shanghai
the mission was composed of representatives Cooperation Organization, the BRICS forum,
(mostly with basic economic and scientific the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Conference
education) from some other ministries.14 on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Relations with the former Soviet republics Measures in Asia, the Asia Cooperation
officially occupied a dominant place. Since Dialogue, the RussiaIndiaChina format,
1992, Russian leaders have said that the for- the East Asia Summit, and the AsiaEurope
mation of a new, equal and mutually benefi- dialogue is considered to be of key impor-
cial relations between Russia, Community tance in shaping a strong regional and inter-
of Independent States countries and other national network of relations.
countries of the near abroad were among
the priorities of the Russian foreign policy.15
However, in practice the policy towards the Key Points
near abroad was incoherent. From the very
beginning the relations with those countries Initially, modern Russian diplomacy tended to be
provoked disagreements within the ruling focused on relations with Western countries, i.e.
elite. However, the idea of the specifically the US and the EU.
At the same time, interstate cooperation with
economic re-integration of post-Soviet space
former Soviet republics and CIS countries car-
did gain ground. At the turn of the century a ried a lot of weight in the Russian foreign policy
gradual integration strategy took precedence. agenda.
The agreement on the establishment of a cus- Successively, as modern Russian diplomacy was
toms union, signed by the leaders of Belarus, evolving, its Eastern vector as well as engage-
Kazakhstan, and Russia, was the first step ment in projects run by multilateral organizations
in this direction, followed by agreement on and fora started to gain ground.
the RussiaBelarus Union and on the Euro-
Asian Economic Union (EAEU). In the opin-
ion of its founders, being an organization of
regional economic integration and the subject RUSSIAN NETWORK DIPLOMACY
of international relations, the EAEU was to
become an equal partner of the European In 2008, a new Foreign Policy Concept of the
Union in the framework of the EuroAtlantic RF was issued.16 The Concept set a task to
security space, aiming thereby at forging a create [a] favorable external environment for
link between Europe and the Asia Pacific. As the modernization of Russia. The authors
noted above, armed conflicts, the prolifera- stated that traditional cumbersome military
tion of weapons of mass destruction, and the and political alliances can no longer counter-
spread of international terrorism has put dip- act the whole range of modern challenges and
lomatic institutions to a severe test. To face threats which are transnational in their nature.
the challenges, a Collective Security Treaty In the past, Soviet and Russian diplomacy
Organization was established by Russia and had tried improving the former and creat-
some CIS countries as a military defensive ing new diplomatic structures for multilat-
alliance on May 14, 2002. eral interstate cooperation. Over the years,
permanent missions have been accredited Ministry stated that it was willing to create
to the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, favorable external conditions for the devel-
NATO, IMF, and other international organi- opment of the national economy, to protect
zations to which Russia belongs. In 2006 the national interests in foreign trade and the
in this multilateral context, Minister Sergey economic security of the country. In this con-
Lavrov introduced a new concept of network text, priority was given to the progressive
diplomacy. In his words, network diplo- integration of Russia into the world econ-
macy should be conducted towards alliances omy. Economic diplomacy provided compre-
with variable geometry and provide flexible hensive assistance to the Russian business
forms of participation in multilateral struc- community in matters of foreign economic
tures.17 Primarily, this diplomacy suggested activity, contributed to the formation of a
flexible forms of interaction between dif- positive image of Russia abroad, and attracted
ferent groups of countries in order to ensure foreign investments.18
compliance with the general interests. Thus, Russian governmental structures such
network diplomacy should require from as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its
political elites of all states the reformulation Department for Economic Cooperation, have
of national interests so that they are compat- stepped up their activities in the field of eco-
ible with those of the partners and the various nomic diplomacy. All geographic departments
interests of the international community. of the Ministry devote about half of their
Recently the principles of network diplo- activities to matters of trade exchange and
macy have found practical application in investments. At the beginning of the 1990s,
different areas of Russia foreign policy, for some steps were made towards abolishing
example, the development of cooperation Trade Representations (which were part of
within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, the Soviet embassies abroad) because they
China, and South Africa) countries and the were considered to be the result of the Soviet
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. state monopoly on foreign trade.19 However,
despite this, Russias Trade Representations
continue to function in most countries. Being
Key Points an integral part of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation, they are subordinated directly to
Since 2006 network diplomacy can be regarded
the Ministry of Economic Development.20 At
as part and parcel of Russian foreign policy, both
the same time, economic diplomacy is coor-
in theory and practice.
One of its chief proponents is the incumbent dinated by the MFA Department of Economic
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Cooperation and there are six other ministries
Lavrov. that have the right to direct accession to the
international arena. With the MFA partner-
ship are business clubs, numerous confer-
ences, and round-table discussions that bring
RUSSIAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY together businesspeople seeking to enter the
global market. However, in this area there
The authors of the foreign policy documents remain large, untapped reserves.
emphasized that effective economic diplo- Decision-making processes include the
macy contributed to the success of market participation of the embassies and consu-
reforms in Russia, strengthening its position lates, as these institutions have a unique
in foreign markets, expanding Russian par- opportunity to provide a qualitative assess-
ticipation in global and regional trade, and ment of the socio-economic impacts of large-
economic, monetary, financial, and invest- scale projects and some specific information.
ment cooperation. The Russian Foreign Of course, a certain amount of information is
contained in data banks, but the most valu- Key Points

able information concerning the particular
Economic diplomacy is an essential part of the
piece of the market, its strategy and pros-
modern Russian foreign policy, with the MFA
pects, diplomats collect on the spot, espe-
playing a coordinating role in this field.
cially in countries with rare languages. The two key instruments of Russian economic
Much attention is paid to Russian par- diplomacy are stimulating foreign trade (especially
ticipation in multilateral economic struc- exports) and attracting foreign direct investments.
tures. Russia has joined the World Trade Respective measures are realized both on a bilat-
Organization (WTO), moving from the status eral and multilateral basis, including frameworks of
of an observer to fully fledged member. It is international and regional economic organizations.
important that the principles of the WTO are
applied to the regulatory framework of the
Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan. With the support of the RUSSIAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Russian
businesses developed cooperation with the Energy diplomacy is one of the priorities of
Asia-Pacific region. The largest regional forum the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. It
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation became a significant factor in bilateral and
(APEC) held its Forum in Russia in 2006, multilateral diplomatic relations. Energy
and in 2012 Russia was the President of this diplomacy involves the MFA, the Ministry
Forum. The Russian National Committee for for Economic Development, and energy
Pacific Economic Cooperation (RNCPEC) is agencies. Together, and with national energy
the only Russian organization with the status companies, they carry out Russian external
of an internationally recognized representa- energy policy aimed at the protection and
tive of the Russian Federation in international defense of national interests in the field of the
organizations operating outside the UN sys- production, transportation, and consumption
tem.21 Russia attaches great importance to of energy. With the direct participation of the
the development of regional dialogue with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they try to ensure
the Association of South-East Asia Nations favorable conditions for Russia in world oil
(ASEAN). In Moscow, a Committee of markets and strengthen the countrys position
ambassadors of ASEAN countries in Russia in the global energy community. Russian dip-
holds quarterly meetings with the leadership lomats have also developed cooperation with
of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Russia has the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
also joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Countries (OPEC), independent oil exporters,
forum Asia-Europe (ASEM), and partici- and the International Energy Agency, partici-
pates in the Baltic Forum. Russian economic pating in the global energy dialogue and in
diplomacy was also brought forward within the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in order
G-8. The core objective of Russia within the to exchange experience, information, and
G-20 was developing a set of measures aimed coordination in energy-related matters.24
at boosting sustainable, inclusive and balanced The MFA assists bilateral and multilat-
growth and jobs creation around the world.22 eral cooperation within the framework of the
Despite his quite controversial reception at the Community of Independent States, includ-
Australian summit in 2014, Putin said that the ing the CaspianBlack Sea region, and the
G-20 is a good platform to meet each other, development of energy cooperation within
discuss both bilateral relations and global the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. At
problems, and develop at least some sort of the same time in the framework of energy
common understanding of what this or that diplomacy, great importance is attached to
problem is all about, and how to resolve it.23 the development of energy cooperation with
Ukraine, the EU countries, and the US. Since should be based on pragmatism. However,
2011, Russian diplomats have participated in pure pragmatism is not effective. In this
negotiations with China about Russian gas, framework the promotion of Russian culture,
and a major agreement was signed in 2014. language, and traditional values were consid-
Other agreements about cooperation in the ered to be soft power tools and to shape an
energy sector have been signed with Cuba, objective image of Russia. The support for
Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil. the Russian compatriots living abroad was
Steps were taken to support the Russian proclaimed to be one of the most important
public, private, and mixed companies in the policies of the State.26 Yet in May 1999 the
large-scale investment projects in the energy Federal Law On the state policy of RF in
sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed respect of compatriots abroad entered into
a cooperation agreement with the Union of Oil force.27 Russia guaranteed to provide support
and Gas Producers of Russia, which provides to its compatriots so that they could enjoy
for the creation of conditions for the exchange equal rights in foreign states. The concept of
of information and analytical materials on Russian world became part of state policy.
international energy cooperation, including the In 2006, Putin made a call to unite all
improvement of the concept of external energy people who cherish the Russian language and
policy and the development of Russias Energy culture wherever they live in the framework
Strategy for the period up to 2030, as well as of the Russian world and to protect [the]
joint seminars and conferences. The MFA, rights and legitimate interests of the Russian
together with the Russian Agency for nuclear citizens and compatriots living abroad on the
energy, signed another agreement for Russian basis of international law and effective bilat-
accession to the Nuclear Energy Agency under eral agreements.28 Also, the subsequent
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Concepts of Foreign Policy (2008, 2014) and
and Development.25 other official documents reiterated such state-
Increasing information flows, and increas- ments. On April 11, 2015, on the upcoming
ing demands for analytical work in the energy reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church
sector, requires close cooperation between with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russian Russia, Minister Lavrov said that support to
embassies abroad with governmental and compatriots living abroad, with the aim of
non-governmental gas, oil, and electric power strengthening their ties with the Homeland
companies, and directly with industries with and protecting their religious rights, consti-
interest in the energy segment of the economy. tuted the ground for the joint efforts of
Russian diplomacy, Russian Church, and
other Russian religious organizations.29
Key Points Public diplomacy (the term appeared in the
Energy diplomacy is a matter of utmost importance Foreign Policy Concept of 2008) was consid-
for Russia, being a large exporter of oil and gas. ered particularly important to effectively pro-
The Russian MFA makes efforts to coordinate mote the foreign policy interests of Russia, as
the actions of various public and private national well as to create abroad a favorable political
actors in this area. and business climate for Russia. Russian cul-
ture, its famous traditions, and the large num-
ber of compatriots living abroad (mainly in the
RUSSIAN CULTURAL AND PUBLIC former Soviet republics) became a significant
DIPLOMACY factor in the formation of the image of Russia.
Yet in 2007 the MFA issued its first Survey
According to Russian leaders, foreign policy of Russian Foreign Policy. In particular, it
should be free from ideological clichs and voiced the need to diversify the foreign policy
tools, and underscored the increasing role of missions of Rossotrudnichestvo around the
soft power. In September 2008, the Federal world. The Agency favors the recruitment of
Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent foreign students willing to study in Russian
States, Compatriots Living Abroad and universities, and it keeps in touch with more
International Humanitarian Cooperation than 500,000 alumni all over the world.32
(commonly known as Rossotrudnichestvo) Together with the MFA, Rossotrudnichestvo
was set up by President Medvedev with the prepared a draft of the state program (with a
aim of maintaining Russias influence in the focus on CIS countries) aimed at promoting
Commonwealth of Independent States, and study tours in Russia for promising young
to foster friendly ties for the advancement of representatives of political, business, com-
Russias political and economic interests in munity, and academic circles.
foreign states.30 The Agency is an autonomous Rossotrudnichestvo interacts with non-
government agency under the jurisdiction of governmental organizations such as the
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its representa- Russian Association for International
tives abroad are Russian Centers of Science Cooperation, the Foundation of St Andrew, the
and Culture and their branches, which act as Library Fund Russian abroad, the Russian
part of the diplomatic missions of the Russian Culture Fund, the International Council of
Federation, but without inclusion in the list of Russian Compatriots, and many others. Its
the staff of diplomatic missions. media partners include ITAR-TASS, RIA
For the time being, the representations of NOVOSTI, TV channels Russia Today,
Rossotrudnichestvo have been set up in 89 MIR, Voice of Russia, and others.33
countries.31 Geographically, they cover terri- Building trust is not easy, even for professional
tory from America to Japan and from Finland diplomats, who are restricted by the instructions
to Argentina. In the near future, along with the of their departments. In Russia, there are nearly
opening of new offices and cultural centers, the a thousand NGOs engaged in politically sig-
MFA plans to make greater use of the so-called nificant activity who play an important role in
regional principle when a major cultural the world. Non-governmental actors in public
center will extend its activities to neighboring diplomacy are in a more advantageous position
countries, where there are no Russian cultural in order to present an objective image of Russia
centers. However, for Rossotrudnichestvo the and its national and cultural values. They are
priority is the Commonwealth of Independent able to embrace the entire spectrum of politi-
States. cal life of their country, not only translating
Mass-media, social networks, and dia- official data, but the oppositions sentiments as
logue platforms are also widely used as tools well. Public diplomacy carried out by the State
of public diplomacy: the radio station Voice institutions should become a catalyst for activi-
of Russia broadcasts in 38 languages; the ties carried out by non-governmental actors.
TV channel Russia Today broadcasts in And this synergy is very important. A new
English, Arabic, and Spanish; the newspa- Public Council on International Cooperation
per The Moscow News is also published in and Public Diplomacy has been set up under
English and Arabic; and the international dis- the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation.
cussion club Valdai gathers prominent rep- Recently, some other NGOs appeared, such
resentatives of the world expert community. as the Russian International Affairs Council,
Rossotrudnichestvo undertakes efforts the Public Diplomacy Foundation named after
in order to promote Russian educational Alexander Gorchakov, Russian World Fund,
services and develop cooperation with edu- and others. At present, many NGOs have
cational institutions in foreign countries. consultative status with the UN Economic
Thousands of people, especially young and Social Council (ECOSOC). The partner-
people, study the Russian language in the ship relations of these organizations with the
UN suggest, in particular, the mobilization of The development of regional and cross-

public opinion and political pressure through border cooperation is an important element
campaigns, as well as co-financing of the UN of bilateral relations between countries and
programs and funds. their regions in trade, investment, humani-
tarian issues, and other fields. For this pur-
pose, a practice (once the tsarist and then the
Key Points Soviet one) of appointing representatives of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a num-
Promoting public diplomacy and working with the ber of major cities has been preserved and
Russian diaspora abroad became one of the key pri- expanded. In the MFA there have also been
orities of Russian foreign policy in the early 2000s. discussions about the idea of appointing
Rossotrudnichestvo, an autonomous government
diplomatic representatives to each regional
agency under the jurisdiction of the MFA, was
governor, to create some sort of International
established in 2008 and is now regarded as the
key public diplomacy actor. office in all regions.
Alongside Rossotrudnichestvo there is a great The Act of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
diversity of non-governmental public diplomacy (approved on March 14, 1995) gave the MFA
actors, including mass media companies, and the responsibility of coordinating the inter-
foundations, as well as other NGOs. national relations of the Subjects, examin-
ing regional agreements and other matters,
and sharing with them all necessary infor-
mation. The Advisory Council conducts an
PARADIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSIAN expert review of draft regulations governing
SUBNATIONAL ENTITIES the activity of the Subjects, prepares recom-
mendations, and summarizes the experience
In the domain of international affairs, Russia accumulated by regional authorities.
has also to deal with such new topics as There is also regulation on the representa-
regional policy and the relationship between tion of the RF Subjects abroad and on rela-
the Central authority and the Subjects tions with foreign partners. The Russian
(Constituent Members) of Federation.34 The Constitution has a threefold level of author-
85 Subjects of the Russian Federation are ity: federal; joint jurisdiction (Federation and
supposed to develop their international rela- the Subjects); and the Subjects authority.36
tions in accordance with the Constitution and The Russian Foreign Ministry has decided to
the Federal Law On the coordination of provide assistance to the regions to establish
international and foreign economic relations and develop their international relations. It
of the Subjects of the Russian Federation has defined the framework of regional inter-
and other legislative acts.35 The Russian national agreements (such agreements are
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its Department not considered treaties). Such agreements
of the relations with the RF Subjects, and should be concluded only on matters that
other federal bodies of executive power assist are within the competence of the Subjects.
Subjects of Russia in the implementation of The international and foreign economic rela-
international and foreign economic coopera- tions of the RF Subjects are governed by
tion, in strict respect for the sovereignty and their own constitutions and regulations. Most
territorial integrity of Russia, using for this of them determine that the participation of
purpose the Council of Heads of the Russian the Subjects in the implementation of inter-
Federation Subjects and the Federal Advisory national treaties signed by the Federation,
Council on international and foreign eco- and the coordination of their international
nomic relations which operate under the and economic relations, are matters of joint
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. jurisdiction between the Federal center and
the Subjects. Low-quality investment pro- encountered significant obstacles of various

jects which often do not comply with gen- kinds. One way to overcome these obstacles
erally accepted international standards and and accelerate economic integration and solve
requirements and which lack knowledge problems of a humanitarian character is seen
of foreign market conditions create serious in the large-scale involvement of the Russian
difficulties and entail economic, and some- Subjects in the regional and cross-border
times political, losses. It is obvious that any cooperation with their partners from the CIS.
lack of coordination between the center and
regions and, even more, any dissonance
between them, hurts the interests and prestige Key Points
of the country. That is why regulations that
are in conflict with federal regulatory norms In line with current legislation, Russian subnational
are revised in accordance with the decision entities can take an active part in international
relations.
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
However, the scope of such an activity is limited
Federation.37 by the competences of the above actors, whereas
The bill On cross-border cooperation is the MFA plays an important role in monitoring
currently being debated by the Parliament. and sometimes intervening in these processes.
It is difficult to overestimate its importance, Regional and cross-border cooperation is gradu-
given that the length of the borders of Russia ally gaining ground, especially with partners from
is more than 60,000 kilometers. For the first the CIS.
time, this law will grant local governments
the right to cross-border cooperation and the
Subjects of the Federation will be trained
to coordinate this activity. The Subjects RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY VS GENDER
closely monitor developments in Europe in PROBLEMS
the framework of inter-regional cross-border
cooperation. They also follow the decisions Traditionally, in Russia and many other
of the Council of Europe on regional issues. countries, the diplomatic service was meant
In recent years, representatives of nearly 80 to be a kind of civilian army which was fight-
Subjects took part in actions promoted by ing against the adversary on the field of
the Council of Europe, establishing a con- negotiations and diplomatic stratagems. In
structive dialogue with their European coun- the Soviet Union and now in Russia, offi-
terparts and exchanging views on issues of cially any formal gender barriers are forbid-
federalism.38 In particular, much attention den. However, when the Moscow State
is paid to the coordination of the activities Institute for International Relations was set
of representatives of RF Subjects and local up in 1944 in order to prepare professional
authorities in the Congress of Local and diplomats, only men could study there. Later,
Regional Authorities of Europe. Due to the women were also accepted, but there were
recent acute financial crisis, regional con- very few of them. It was obvious that a
flicts, the spread of corruption, and rampant woman could become an ambassador only as
terrorism such cooperation has acquired spe- a political appointee.39 President Vladimir
cial meaning. Putin said in 2002:
It can be expected that the integration pro-
cesses in the CIS will increase cross-border Still women are underestimated in diplomacy. Now
a considerable number of women civil servants
contacts, transforming them in accordance
have appeared not because of the choice from
with this important trend in international among so called nomenclature but because of
regional activity. It is well known that the the everyday reality which gave us many qualified
process of integration within the CIS has and competent women civil servants. We should
understand that the absence (unlike in many other 5 In the USSR, the republican ministries appeared
countries) of so called fair sex representatives in in 1944, when on the eve of the creation of
Russian diplomacy can become a weak point in the United Nations Stalin decided to establish
our external political service.40 foreign ministries in all Union republics in order to
have the maximum possible number of votes in
the UN.
In 2004, 54 percent of 189 newly hired civil
6 Interview by A. Nesterenco, official representative
servants were women. of the MFA. http://www.chile.mid.ru/rus/mre09/
Nevertheless, there is considerable room r09_072.html
for improvement. Currently, of the top man- 7 According to the Russian Constitution,
agement of the MFA, the minister, his ten constituent members of the Russian Federation
(republics, provinces, territories, autonomous
deputies, and the heads of 38 departments
districts, and federal cities) are named Subjects of
are men. Only two departments are headed the Federation.
by women. There are no women among the 8 Anatoly V. Torkunov and Alexander N. Panov
full-rank ambassadors. (eds), Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (in Russian).
Women now represent about one-third of Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2014, pp. 5161.
9 Tatiana Zonova and Roman Reinhardt, Main vectors
graduates participating in the annual compe-
of Russian foreign policy (19912014), Rivista di
tition for places in the MFA (usually gradu- Studi Politici Internazionali, 81 (4) (2014): 501.
ates from about 30 Russian universities take 10 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/usrussiabilat/
part in the competition). As a result, in recent index.htm
years the percentage of women-diplomats 11 http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/
12 In response to Russian involvement in the 2014
has risen to 15 percent. But this is not an
crisis in Ukraine, the United States has temporarily
easy process. Old patriarchal habits die hard. suspended several projects planned under the
Many young women in the early years of their auspices of the USRussia Bilateral Presidential
career face both a distrustful attitude towards Commission and the activity of working groups
them and a clear personnel office preference was frozen. Russia was also excluded from G-8
and because of sanctions Russia was proclaimed
to promote male staff. For the time being,
not to be a partner of the European Union.
women will still find it hard to advance their 13 http://www.russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-
careers in the face of old attitudes. Despite relations
a considerable improvement in recent years, 14 http://www.russianmission.eu/ru/diplomaticheskii-
some young women in the early years of their sostav
15 Konzepzia vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federazii,
career still face a distrustful attitude towards
in Foreign Policy and National Security of
them. The numbers of Russian women diplo- Contemporary Russia 19912002. Anthology in
mats shows an upward trend, but not amongst four volumes. Volume 4: Documents. Moscow:
the top officials of the MFA. Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(University); Russian International Studies
Association; ISE-Center, 2002, p. 23.
16 h t t p : / / a r c h i v e . k r e m l i n . r u / e n g / t e x t /
NOTES AND REFERENCES docs/2008/07/204750.shtml
17 http://izvestia.ru/news/320459
1 Tatiana V. Zonova, Diplomatic cultures: comparing 18 Evgeniy M. Astakhov and Roman Reinhardt.
Russia and the West in terms of a modern model Cosudarstvennaja podderzhka nacionalnogo
of diplomacy, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, biznesa na vneshnih rynkah (in Russian). Moscow:
2 (2007): 123. MGIMO-University, 2015, pp.1018.
2 https://mospat.ru/archive/page/church-and- 19 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/28006
society/30441.html 20 http://www.rustradeusa.org/eng/253/
3 In Soviet times party branches in the embassies 21 http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dipecon.nsf/a591a
were called trade-union cells. 1e97b9a36ce43256a0c003fb95e/43256a0c003
4 h t t p : / / ro y a l l i b . c o m / re a d / m l e c h i n _ l e o n i d / 3bf7a43256d9c002bcbaa!OpenDocument
mid_ministri_inostrannih_del_vneshnyaya_ 22 h t t p : / / e n . g 2 0 r u s s i a . r u / d o c s / g 2 0 _ r u s s i a /
politika_rossii_ot_lenina_i_trotskogo__do_ outline##3
putina_i_medvedeva.html#20480 23 http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23236
24 http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/co-operation/ (eds) Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic

http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/present_ Networks and Optimizing Value. Geneva-Malta,
es.htm 2007, pp. 10919.
25 http://www.atomic-energy.ru/video/34111 37 Ibid.
26 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16719 38 Tatiana Zonova, Diplomatia: Modeli, Formy,
2 7 http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi? Metody. Aspekt Press, 2014, pp. 33940.
req=doc;base=LAW;n=150465 39 The first one was Aleksandra Kollontai, a Russian
28 http://kremlin.ru/acts/785 revolutionary and member of the Bolshevik party,
29 http://www.taday.ru/text/39498.html who in 1923 was sent to Norway as the Soviet
30 http://rs.gov.ru/about ambassador.
31 http://rs.gov.ru/missions 40 www.In.mid.ru
32 http://5top100-ru.1gb.ru/files/File/inostrannye_
stydenty.pdf
33 http://rs.gov.ru/node/307
34 Constituent members of the Federation called
Subjects are republics, provinces, territories, INTERNET RESOURCES
autonomous districts, and federal cities.
35 http://base.garant.ru/179963/ www.kremlin.ru
36 Zonova Tatiana, Russian diplomacy: facing regional www.mid.ru
challenges, in Kishan S. Rana and Jovan Kurbalija
28
Chinas Diplomacy
Zhimin Chen
INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL directly ruled a small heartland of present-

CONTEXT day China, and many of its territories were
ruled by feudal lords. During the first period
As one of the longest continuous civilizations of the Zhou dynasty, diplomacy was seen as
in world history, China has rich experiences the prerogative of Zhou kings feudal enti-
in managing its relations with the outside ties were not allowed to engage with foreign
world. Importantly, these experiences con- entities directly without the permission of
tinue to shape contemporary Chinese diplo- the Zhou kings. As the Zhou dynasty entered
macy, with regard to questions about which the Spring and Autumn periods (770475
actors conduct foreign relations, how diplo- BC) and especially the Warring States period
macy is conducted, and what the central (475221 BC), these feudal entities became
purposes of Chinese diplomacy are. much stronger and acquired de facto inde-
The idea of China as the Central Kingdom pendent statehood themselves. Inter-state
was articulated most explicitly by the Zhou diplomacy among multiple feudal states of
dynasty (1046 BC256 BC) (Cohen, 2000: more or less equal powers dominated the dip-
5). This notion, which had a long-lasting lomatic stage in China. These states engaged
impact on Chinas later diplomatic prac- in constant alliance-building, deceptions, and
tices, envisaged a hierarchical world system conquering through military force. In the
with China sitting at the center. As the high- end, one of the feudal states, the Qin king-
est developed culture within that system, dom, finally conquered China in 221 BC.
the Chinese King, perceived as the Son of The arrival of the Qin dynasty (221 BC207
Heaven, had the mandate of Heaven to rule AD) marked a turn in Chinese history. It
the Tianxia (All-under-Heaven) (Zhang, finally established a vast unified empire with
2001: 53). In reality, the Zhou dynasty only a population in the vicinity of fifty to sixty
Chinas Diplomacy 349
million (Cohen, 2000: 5) which was admin- exchanging gifts during a tributary mission
istered by a central authority. Since then, to China. That is, they offered generous eco-
although there have been periods when China nomic benefits to maintain the attractiveness
became divided and chaotic, as happened of the tributary system to neighboring states.
in the famous Three Kingdoms period (220 In principle, though not always honoring its
AD280 AD), in general, subsequent unified obligations, China committed itself to dip-
Chinese dynasties maintained their status lomatic practices that maintained peaceful
as the overwhelmingly dominant power at order among the tributary states.
the center of the Asian hierarchical interna- While this China-centered hierarchical
tional system. The diplomatic institutional international order in East Asia yielded sub-
expression of this Pax Sinica was the tribu- stantial stability, as compared with Europe in
tary system that emerged in the Han dynasty the same period (Kang, 2007: 43), the very
(202 BC220 AD), after the short-lived Qin foundation of this system the preponder-
dynasty. The defining feature of this tributary ance of Chinese power and the isolation of
system was its hierarchy. The Chinese emper- Asia from the rest of the world disappeared
ors, as the rulers of the most powerful and in the nineteenth century. With the arrival in
developed state, expected the neighboring Asia of Western colonial powers, strength-
barbarian tribes and kingdoms to accept and ened with modern technology from the indus-
show their diplomatic submission through trial revolution, including advanced military
regular tributary missions to China. In return, forces, the ailing Chinese dynasty had to
the Chinese emperors granted their approval cope with the gradual loss of its centrality in
for the rulers to be seen as legitimate, through Asia (see also Chapter 3 in this Handbook).
a process known as Cefeng (investiture). Starting with the first Opium War (184042),
Through the production and reproduction of China experienced repeated defeats in its con-
this hierarchical relationship, Chinese emper- flicts with Western powers. It was forced to
ors showcased their dominating influence in cede trading and extraterritorial rights, even
East Asia, so as to enhance their domestic territories to colonial powers, and its tribu-
political legitimacy. At the same time, the tary states fell into the hands of old and new
endorsement from Chinese emperors helped imperial states. In 1894, China was crushed
neighboring rulers to establish their political in the war with Japan, a former tributary state
legitimacy at home. in the China-dominated system. In 1911, a
There were three other features of the trib- republic revolution broke out in China, end-
utary system that benefitted neighboring ruling the Qing dynasty and replacing it with the
ers: self-autonomy; larger material rewards Republic of China. However, that did not end
from the Chinese emperors; and Chinas Chinas miseries. Although a victorious state
obligation to safeguard the national security in the First World War, the German settle-
of the tributary states (He Fangchuan, 1998: ment in Shandong province was grabbed by
41). While the tributary states were expected the more powerful Japan, instead of returning
to acknowledge their political inferior status to China. In the 1930s, Japan invaded China,
to China, Chinese emperors on most occa- occupying almost half of Chinas territory.
sions refrained from exerting direct control The Chinese government attempted to rally
of these states, rather they left local rulers international support in its war with Japan but
to govern autonomously. Since the central without much success. The tide did not turn
purpose of Chinese emperors in building this until the United States declared war against
tributary system was to enhance their politi- Japan, following the Japanese attack on Pearl
cal legitimacy at home, Chinese rulers tended Harbor in 1941.
to follow the principle of Houwangbolai The fall of China from a Central Kingdom
(giving more and receiving less) when into a century of humiliation unleashed a
nationalistic movement aspiring to save the diplomatic rapprochement during President

state of China, if not the empire (Chen, 2005). Nixons 1972 visit to China. At the beginning
Eventually, the Chinese Communist Party of the 1970s, China finally established diplo-
(CCP), combining its communist appeal with matic relations with most Western countries,
the nationalist agenda, became the winning and regained its seat in the United Nations,
force in the war against Japan and in the fol- including the permanent seat in the Security
lowing civil war. The Peoples Republic of Council in 1971, after the General Assembly
China (PRC), founded in October 1949, once of the United Nations decided to expel the
again built a strong central government, able Republic of China in Taiwan.
to exert direct control over the vast land in A further major diplomatic shift came
the mainland of China. Mao Zedong, assisted after Deng Xiaoping rose to the leadership
by Premier Zhou Enlai, developed a very position in the post-Mao era. Under Deng,
personalized and centralized Chinese diplo- the Chinese leadership decided in 1978 to
macy. The new red China adopted a leaning shift its central task to economic develop-
towards one side approach in the EastWest ment through reform and opening-up. As a
Cold War rivalry, by signing an alliance treaty result, Chinese diplomacy changed: national
with the Soviet Union in 1950, and entered interests and economic interests in particu-
the Korean War in direct military conflict lar triumphed over geopolitical calculations.
with the United States and its Western allies Throughout the reform era, Chinese diplo-
in 1950. While China was denied diplomatic macy was tasked by the new leadership to cre-
recognition from most Western powers, in ate a peaceful international environment for
1954 it co-initiated with India and Myanmar economic development, to bring in foreign
the famous Five Principles of Peaceful investment, and to secure foreign markets
Co-existence, attempting to rally diplomatic for an export-oriented economic develop-
support from the developing world. However, ment strategy. Since then, pragmatism has
with the start of Cultural Revolution in 1966, dominated Chinese diplomacy, with its key
Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy priority to avoid unnecessary confrontations
were radicalized further, calling for world with other countries, and to ensure a stable
revolution modeled on a Chinese version to and conducive international environment for
challenge all the status quo powers around domestic modernization.
the world. Amid this radicalization, Chinas In 2010, after more than three decades of
relations with the Soviet Union also deterio- rapid economic development, China once
rated. China and the Soviet Union engaged in again became the biggest economy in Asia,
border military conflicts in March and August overtaking Japan. For China, it was an his-
of 1969, which effectively ended the alliance toric moment, particularly when the West was
between the two communist giants. In April experiencing its worst economic crisis in dec-
1971, under invitation from the Chinese gov- ades. Feeling the newly gained strength and
ernment, a delegation of American ping-pong global influence, and under new leadership,
players visited China, and effectively reo- China is now formally embarked on a path
pened people-to-people exchange between towards great power diplomacy, officially
the two long-time hostile enemies (see entitled as major-country diplomacy with
Chapter 50 in this Handbook). This Ping- Chinese characteristics (Wang Yi, 2013).
Pong diplomacy (Kissinger, 1979) sent out Throughout its long history, China has
a strong signal to the governments and peo- experienced four kinds of diplomacy. The
ple of the two countries that they were will- first is the diplomacy among multiple states
ing to break the ice in the relationship based in a divided China, such as in the Spring
on their mutual interests in containing the and Autumn periods, and the Warring States
Soviet influence, and paved the way for a period, where a number of autonomous
states competed with each other. This diplo- of the country. Since the end of the Cold War,
macy has many features reminiscent of the an institutional change in line with the con-
diplomacy in a modern multi-state system. stitution installs the party leader concurrently
The second is the diplomacy of maintaining as the military leader as well as the head of
a tributary system around a unified China. the state. With the constitutional amendment
Under this kind of diplomacy, China devel- of 2004, the president of China, as head of
oped a hierarchical diplomatic system around state, can conduct state affairs, in addition
itself in East Asia, short of direct rule of to having a more symbolic diplomatic role as
neighboring countries. With the arrival of specified in the 1982 constitution, such as
modern Western powers in Asia, China was receiving foreign diplomatic representatives
drawn into a global system of diplomacy on behalf of the PRC. Moreover, in pursuance
among sovereign states, and not only lost its of the decisions of the Standing Committee of
past preeminence in a geographically isolated the National Peoples Congress, the president
Asia, but also succumbed to wills of the new appoints or recalls plenipotentiary representa-
great powers. As a result, China had to con- tives abroad, and ratifies or abrogates treaties
duct a third kind of diplomacy: diplomacy and important agreements concluded with
of an inferior semi-sovereign state. Through foreign states.1
various strands of revolutions in the twentieth The Chinese premier, as head of the gov-
century, China finally fully reestablished itself ernment, is the second most important figure
as a strong sovereign state. Starting from that in Chinas diplomacy. In the earlier years of
position, its economic diplomacy from the the PRC, Premier Zhou was also Chinas for-
1970s paved the way for its reemergence as a eign minister, according great weight to the
great power in the world (see Chapters 22 and Foreign Ministry in the Chinese government
45 in this Handbook). What is unfolding is the system. In Dengs reform era, Vice Premier
fourth kind of Chinese diplomacy: diplomacy Qian Qichen also acted as Chinas foreign
of a reemerging power in a global system. minister. However, after Qian, a state coun-
cilor is now usually responsible for diplo-
matic affairs and no longer enjoys a position
Key Points in the powerful party leadership core, the
politburo. A state councilor is a lower rank-
From about 770 BC and up to the twentieth century,
ing official than other vice premiers in the
China practiced three different forms of diplomacy.
politburo. Moreover, these state councilors
In the twenty-first century, Chinas fourth form
of diplomacy is that of an emerging great power. do not at the same time hold the position
of foreign minister of China. This position
is now occupied by professional diplomats
who enjoy an even lower political ranking in
CHINAS DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONAL the Chinese system. The foreign ministers
FEATURES power base within the CCP has continuously
declined, even though Chinas international
In contemporary China, the Chinese role is expanding and global issues are grow-
Communist Party leads every aspect of state ing in complexity. As a result there is a pro-
affairs, including foreign affairs. Although liferation of foreign policy decision-making
leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping entities and the Foreign Ministry must often
did not occupy a leading government position, rely on other agencies for expertise while at
but rather held positions as party/military the same time competing with them for influ-
leader (Mao) or merely military leader ence (Jakobson and Knox, 2010: 8). Overall,
(Deng), they were the final decision makers the head of state has a greatly expanded
in Chinas diplomacy and the chief diplomats role in Chinas diplomacy, while the foreign
minister and the designated superior in the other functional ministries, including the
State Council have lost substantial political Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Commerce,
and government standing since the reform era. Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry
Meanwhile, as part of a trend towards cor- of Education, and Ministry of Culture, also
porate pluralization (Lampton, 2001: 12), send their staff to embassies, and although in
other functional ministries play increasingly charge of functional affairs, they are subject
salient diplomatic roles. The Ministry of to the overall leadership of the ambassadors
Commerce is the main player in Chinas eco- from the Foreign Ministry. There are a few
nomic diplomacy. It is responsible for mak- exceptions, such as the Chinese delegation to
ing Chinas trade and investment policy and the WTO, which is appointed and staffed by
negotiating various bilateral and multilateral the Ministry of Commerce, and the Chinese
economic agreements with foreign parties. It delegation to UNESCO, which is appointed
is also the ministry which takes the leading and staffed by the Ministry of Education.
role in making and implementing Chinas Increasingly, Chinese diplomacy is
aid policy towards other countries. The becoming a comprehensive diplomacy
Defense Ministry is also proactive in con- (Zongti waijiao), aiming to mobilize vari-
ducting Chinas military diplomacy, develop- ous actors outside of the central government
ing relations with foreign military forces and and to advance Chinese foreign policy and
conducting joint exercises and non-combat diplomacy. The National Peoples Congress,
military operations around the world, includ- the parliament in the Chinese system, con-
ing participating in UN-led or UN-authorized ducts parliament diplomacy, both through
peace-keeping operations (see Chapter 48 in its constitutional power in deciding the dip-
this Handbook). The National Development lomatic budget, appointing senior leaders
and Reform Committee (NDRC), nicknamed and ambassadors, and ratifying international
the mini state council due to its larger power agreements and treaties. It also engages with
in overall economic planning in China, plays foreign parliaments. The Communist Party
a leading role in Chinas climate change performs party diplomacy, through its large
diplomacy. The Education Ministry oversees International Liaison Department. The CCP
the rapidly growing number of Confucius now has regular relationships with govern-
Institutes around the world and is becoming ing parties as well as opposition parties in
the key player in Chinas cultural or public foreign countries, which allows the CCP
diplomacy. The diplomatic importance of leaders to maintain contacts with incum-
the Finance Ministry, the Public Security bent or future leaders in foreign countries.
Ministry, and the Ministry of Science and In Chinas relations with North Korea, the
Technology in their respective functional CCPs party diplomacy usually plays a more
areas is another indication of the corporate important role than state-to-state diplomacy.
pluralization trend in Chinas diplomacy. Chinas local governments, including the cit-
Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry does ies, are active players in Chinas international
maintain its overall leadership of Chinas engagements. As non-sovereign govern-
representations abroad. By the end of 2011, mental actors, local governments and cities
China had diplomatic relations with 172 command sizable resources to support inter-
countries around the world. Some 22 small nationalization strategies to promote local
countries still have diplomatic relations economic and social development. They
with the Republic of China in Taiwan. also act as agents of the central government:
In the Chinese embassies and delegations developing relations with foreign countries
to international organizations, most of the when an inter-state relationship is absent
ambassadors and diplomats come from the or is in difficulties, or financing and host-
Foreign Ministry. In addition, a number of ing major international events, like the 2001
Shanghai APEC Summit or the 2008 Beijing policy with security implications. How it will
Olympic Games. People-to-people diplo- work with the FALSG is still to be seen.
macy has a longer tradition in China. When
most countries had not established formal
diplomatic relationships with China, China Key Points
adopted a promoting official relationship
through unofficial ties (yiminzuguan) strat- Reflecting a long Chinese tradition and stipulated
egy, through cultivating people-to-people ties by the socialist political system, contemporary
and unofficial economic relations in order Chinese diplomacy is highly centralized in the
hands of the party leadership. This allowed China to
to pave the way for diplomatic normaliza-
make use of strategic policy-making and implemen-
tion with countries, for example Japan (Xie tation of Chinese diplomacy, such as the dramatic
Yixian, 1999: 94102) (see Chapter 42 in this shifts in its diplomacy in the 1970s, either to repair
Handbook). its relationship with the United States or shift its
With more actors involved, overall leader- central diplomatic objective from preparing for the
ship of Chinas diplomacy becomes an issue, third world war to assist domestic development.
even though China is a very centralized state. As China engages the world in all aspects of
In 1958, a Foreign Affairs Leading Small functional affairs in a globalized world, segmen-
Group (FALSG) of the Chinese Communist tation also arises in China as in other countries.
Party was established within the party to With the arrival of new leadership under President
supervise foreign affairs. It is chaired by Xi Jinping, new efforts are being made to recen-
tralize policy-making for the implementation of
the president, with the vice president as the
Chinese diplomacy, to support a more proactive
deputy chairman. It includes key ministers great power diplomacy.
involved in various functional affairs related
to foreign policy. The FALSG is supported
by a permanent office, headed by the vice
premier/state councilor in charge of foreign PATTERNS IN CHINAS DIPLOMATIC
affairs and it conducts routine coordina-
BEHAVIOR
tion work. But the FALSG is not the only
major party organ to exercise leadership over
During the reform era at least four main
Chinas diplomacy. The establishment of the
patterns in Chinas diplomatic behavior can
new Central National Security Commission
be discerned:
(CNSC) of the Chinese Communist Party at
the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central 1 Partnership bilateralism
Committee in November 2013, blurs the gen- 2 Pragmatic and strategic multilateral diplomacy
eral leadership picture. While the CNSC is 3 Attractive and coercive use of power
tasked with domestic security issues, it also 4 From reactive diplomacy to proactive major
deals with international security affairs. It has power diplomacy
a much higher political power ranking than
the FALSG, since it includes at least three
out of seven members of the most power- Partnership Bilateralism
ful Standing Committee of the Politburo of
the CCP, whereas the FALSG only has one As Wu Jianmin points out, since the founding
member. The CNSC is headed by President of the new China, for a fairly long period,
Xi Jinping, with Premier Li Keqiang and Chinese diplomacy was mainly a bilateral
Chairman of the National Peoples Congress one, while multilateral diplomacy played a
(NPC) Standing Committee, Zhang Dejiang, very limited role in the conduct of Chinese
as deputies. Obviously, the CNSC is going to diplomacy (Wu, 2006: 10). Two main reasons
exert more influence in the making of foreign explain why bilateralism, rather than
multilateralism, occupied the central place. traditional diplomatic strategy of sovereign

First, starting from the sovereignty principle states, including China. To cope with the
on which Chinese foreign policy has been globalization challenges, Chinese diplomacy
based since the founding of the PRC, China has gradually embraced a multilateral com-
has been reluctant to engage in sovereignty- ponent, which aims to establish multilateral
eroding multilateral institutions, insisting on rules and norms through the consent of the
consensus as the most preferred method to relevant states, based on respect for each
reach international agreement. Second, states sovereignty.
Chinas bad experience of being denied mem- Pragmatic multilateralism has been the
berships in the multilateral institutions in the defining feature of Chinas multilateralism
1950s and 1960s left it no choice but to pursue in the twentieth century since China returned
bilateral diplomacy. From the early 1990s, to the United Nations in 1971. During this
Chinese bilateral diplomacy developed a very period, China made efforts to gain member-
distinctive feature, in the sense of building ships in the existing multilateral institutions,
bilateral partnerships with all the major states, particularly those institutions which could
neighboring states, and developing states. So offer China recognition and benefits for its
far, China has established strategic partner- domestic development. Chinese participa-
ship relationships with more than 30 states tion in these multilateral settings is seen as
and regional blocs, in addition to numerous essential for China to regain international
cooperative partnerships with other coun- recognition and support for its economic
tries, with the former being attached greater developments, even though their rules are set
priority in Chinas diplomacy and being more by other states and are not always favorable
comprehensive in terms of cooperation. The to China and other developing states. This
key point to be noted is that a partnership is pragmatism means Chinas multilateralism
not alliance. Even with its closest partner, is a selective one: it is willing to join those
Russia (which enjoys a strategic partnership institutions which promote cooperation
of coordination with China), China does not based on strict sovereignty principles and
intend to upgrade the relationship into a can offer resources for supporting Chinese
mutual security alliance (see Chapter 27 in development, while it is reluctant to join
this Handbook). While in China there is a those institutions which regulate domestic
growing call for building Chinas own alliance behaviors of the member states, like human
networks, as all Western powers do (Yan rights regimes. Western observers thus tend
Xuetong, 2013), the mainstream view is still to lament this selective attitude of Chinas
in favor the non-alliance principle. For China, multilateral diplomacy, with some saying
bilateral partnerships can develop cooperation that Beijing sought many of the rights and
among the states, but can avoid security obli- privileges of a great power without accepting
gations which might jeopardize Chinas sover- most of the attendant obligations and respon-
eignty, independence and autonomy. sibilities (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003: 24).
Since the end of the twentieth century,
having joined most of the existing institu-
Pragmatic and Strategic tions, Chinas multilateral diplomacy devel-
oped a strategic dimension. China started
Multilateral Diplomacy
to initiate new multilateral institutions, like
In the present era of globalization, a growing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
number of issues are becoming regional, the Six-party talks over the North Korean
global, or involving multiple stakeholders, nuclear issue, the China-ASEAN Free Trade
and thus require multilateral solutions. A Area, a new BRICS New Development Bank
demand of this kind poses challenges to the (NDB) based in Shanghai from 2015, and
a new Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure to encourage foreign trade and investment

Investment Bank (AIIB) from 2016. Such led developed countries to have a huge inter-
strategic multilateralism is seen as a major est in entering the Chinese market and
platform to reconcile the different interests prompted Western countries to maintain at
of the like-minded countries, and to seek least working relations with China even after
through consensus joint solutions to common the end of the Cold War. After 2010 when
problems. By initiating and supporting these China became the second largest national
institutions, China can also secure its own market, its attractive market power is increas-
interests and status in the world. ingly seen as an instrument for expanding
Chinas strategic multilateralism also aims Chinas global influence. In the words of
to reform the existing international institu- Chinese President Xi Jinping, it is a ballast
tions. For example, China doesnt intend to stone to stabilize the competitive relation-
join the G-8 because it believes that it can- ship between China and Western powers,
not deal with developing countries on equal particularly between China and the United
footing and it cannot promote international States.2 China has turned itself from a
democracy both, goals of Chinese diplo- receiver of foreign aid and investment to a
macy. However, during the global financial rapidly growing aid donor and investor in the
crisis China actively supported the convening world and its neighborhood. It can use aid,
of G-20 meetings where developing states low-interest loans, and investment to support
have a fair representation. China has also economies around the world, no matter devel-
voiced its support for including more developed or developing, or to devote financial
oping states in the UN Security Council, and contributions to strengthen the mainstream
demanded a greater voice for the developing international institutions, like the IMF, as
states in the World Bank and IMF. Witnessing well as creating new institutions, like the
the long delay of the Congress of the United BRICS New Development Bank and the
States to reform the IMF and World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
China is more determined to push new finan- With regard to the non-material power of
cial institutions, such as the NDB and AIIB, attraction, Chinese researchers were quick to
on the one hand, to generate new resources pick up Joseph Nyes term of soft power,
for regional and global governance and, on arguing that soft power should be a key instru-
the other hand, to exert greater pressures on ment for Chinese diplomacy (see Chapter 35
dominating powers in the existing global in this Handbook). In 2007, then Chinese
institutions to reform. president Hu Jintao formally proclaimed that
China should make more efforts to boost
Chinese cultural soft power (Hu Jintao,
Attractive and Coercive 2007). Learning from the cultural promotion
practice of the Europeans, like the British
Use of Power
Council and the Goethe Institute in Germany,
Since China shifted its diplomatic priority to China launched the Confucius Institute ini-
secure a favorable international environment tiative in 2004. In just a decade, in terms of
for domestic development, Chinese diplo- the total number of these institutes and their
macy has mostly relied on the attractive use geographical coverage, China has already sur-
of its economic power. As a poor developing passed its European teachers. By the end of
country in the earlier years of the reform era, 2013, China had established 440 Confucius
Chinas immense untapped domestic market institutes and 646 Confucius classrooms
and its vast low-cost labor force were the around the world. Confucius institutes are
main sources of attraction to foreign inves- located in 115 countries: 93 in 32 Asian coun-
tors and developed countries. Chinas policy tries; 37 in 27 African countries; 149 in 37
European countries; 144 in North and South coercive diplomacy is its maritime disputes
America; and 17 in 3 Oceania countries.3 with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
They are focal points for promoting Chinese Since 2010 China has more frequently used
language, cultural, and two-way exchanges. its civilian law enforcement forces, such as
The Chinese government also set up scholar- civilian coast guard ships, to exert its terri-
ship funds to encourage foreign students to torial claims in the East China Sea and the
study in China, and effectively quadrupled the South China Sea, in addition to implicit eco-
number of foreign students studying in China nomic sanctions against these countries.
since 2003.
Combining the attractive power of both
economic (material) and cultural (non- From Reactive Diplomacy to
material) resources, China has cultivated its Proactive Major Power Diplomacy
soft power influence, particularly among
developing countries (Kurlantzick, 2007). To concentrate on Chinas domestic develop-
This approach demonstrates a Chinese view ment in a Western-dominated post-Cold War
on soft power: that soft power does not exist world, Deng Xiaoping in 1990 cautioned
in the nature of certain resources of power Chinese leaders to keep low profile and then
but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft do something in diplomacy. As a result
use of power (Li Mingjiang, 2009: 3). Soft China refrained in most cases from confront-
power does not just come from the attrac- ing the major powers and tried to put aside its
tion of non-material resources, like culture, territorial disputes with its neighbors. China
political values and appealing foreign policy, most often reacted to international events,
but also come from the attraction of material rather than seeking to directly shape the out-
interests, such as a profitable market or provi- side world. This diplomatic passivity
sion of foreign aid. reflected a new priority for domestic devel-
While attractive power still occupies the opment, but it also revealed an unique view
central place in Chinas diplomacy, coercive of Chinas role in the world in the early stage
diplomacy is more frequently used than in the of the reform era: namely, that developing its
past, mostly in ways of using non-military own economy and achieving the rapid
means to enforce Chinese interests or force enhancement of the welfare of the Chinese
others to change their specific policies (see population (a quarter of the worlds popula-
Chapter 38 in this Handbook). China is using tion) would be a true contribution to the
economic sanctions to inflict economic costs human kind (Deng Xiaoping, 1993: 224).
for those countries which are perceived to With the enhancement of Chinese power
lend support for the separatist movements and global influence, demands for a more
in China, like those in Taiwan, Tibet and proactive diplomacy are on the rise within
Xinjiang. For instance, in recent years, China China, as well as outside of China, as coun-
has taken measures to curb economic rela- tries around the world are pressing China to
tions with countries whose highest leaders undertake more international responsibili-
received the Dalai Lama, the exiled religious ties. China started to embrace the concept of
leader of Tibetans who, from Chinas per- a responsible state from the 19961997
spective, has an intention to separate Tibet Asian financial crisis, when China decided
from China. One study shows that, during not to devalue its currency in the context of
the Hu Jintao era, countries officially receiv- region-wide currency collapse in East Asia,
ing the Dalai Lama at the highest political and furthermore, to lend emergency loans to
level were punished through a reduction of those crisis-hit countries (Xia Liping, 2001).
their exports to China (Fuchs and Klann, In the 2005 UN special summit meeting, then
2013). Another example of Chinas recent Chinese President Hu Jintao laid out a more
proactive foreign policy strategy, calling for revolutionary legacy of the twentieth century.
the building of a harmonious world, where This nationalist-socialist revolution left a
states can be equal and have mutual trust, nationalist legacy on contemporary Chinese
where common security can be achieved, diplomacy: to obtain and maintain a strong,
where win-win cooperation leads to common independent sovereign state after being
prosperity and where the diversity of civiliza- humiliated by colonial powers for a century.
tions could be maintained. Although sovereignty is an imported idea
With the arrival in 2013 of the new leader- from Europe, with the establishment of the
ship under President Xi Jinping, proactive great PRC, China became one of the strongest pro-
power diplomacy is proclaimed as the central ponents of sovereignty in the world, seeing
feature of Chinese diplomacy. In the words of the value of the sovereignty principle in pro-
the current Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, tecting weaker countries from interference by
Chinas diplomacy in the new era has taken on the strong and rich countries. Since national
a more global perspective with a more enter- unification with Taiwan is not finished, and
prising and innovative spirit (Wang Yi, 2013: national unity is still challenged in Tibet and
6). Clearly, the sense of rising Chinese power Xinjiang, sovereignty matters will continue to
gives Chinese leaders new confidence in pur- have a high priority in Chinese diplomacy.
suing proactive diplomacy, which is backed The socialist legacy matters in at least
up by a recentralized decision-making struc- three ways. First, socialism led by the
ture centered on the newly created Central Chinese Communist Party created a central-
National Security Commission (CNSC), the ized country, which also implies a Chinese
combined use of hard and soft power, clearer centralized diplomacy. With the key foreign
strategic guidelines, and more forceful pursuit policy decision-making and implementation
of Chinas national and global interests. power being wielded by the government and
its party leadership, it means that Of all the
large countries, China has had the greatest
Key Points freedom to maneuver, act on grand strategy,
shift alignments, and conduct a strategic for-
Chinas diplomacy is becoming proactive, but eign policy in the rational pursuit of national
still with its distinctive features: as a sovereign interest (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 14). The
country, China favors bilateralism, in the form of second impact is that China has developed
partnerships, not alliances.
its solidarity with other developing countries,
As a globalizing state, though a late comer in
believing that it shares features with them:
multilateral diplomacy, China is now a major
player in existing multilateral institutions, and for example, the similar experience of coloni-
also a new driving force of new institutions. alism or semi-colonialism; a similar priority
As a growing power, China is also attempting to in development and upholding sovereignty;
develop its smart power strategy in its diplomacy, and opposing foreign interference in domes-
by cultivating its own version of soft power while tic affairs (see also Chapters 3 and 24 in this
opening up to the role of hard power. Handbook). Third, with regard to the exist-
ing international system, which was created
mostly by the Western powers after the end
of Second World War, China has a revision-
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CHINAS ist intention to reform the system in order to
DIPLOMATIC TRANSFORMATION better secure its own interests and those of
fellow developing countries.
To understand Chinese diplomacy in the past Chinas diplomacy of the past and the
and the future, there are three angles that future can be seen from a second angle: the
deserve our attention. The first is the developmentalist legacy from the reform era.
The reform and opening-up process initiated To understand Chinas future diplomacy,
by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s brought each of the three angles cannot be ignored,
China into an international system created and the configuration of their confluence
mostly under the auspices of the Western will shape the unfolding future path. Many
powers. China reversed some of its past of the guiding principles for future Chinese
oppositions to the principles and codes of diplomacy would still be derived from the
conduct of that system, for example, accept- revolutionary legacy: sovereignty, non-
ing freer trade under the WTO, peace keeping interference, bilateralism, and solidarity with
and non-proliferation. Rational calculation of developing countries. From the develop
economic interests in a globalized economy, mentalist legacy, it is anticipated that China
as argued by liberalism and the socialization will still devote most of its efforts to domestic
of China in the international system, as artic- development, to addressing the income
ulated by constructivism, do make sense in inequality in the society, to cleaning its
explaining Chinas search for integration into environment and to enhancing national unity.
the global economy, cooperation in bilateral To achieve that, following the past successful
relations, and more responsible involvement diplomacy of cooperation and integration will
in global governance. As Chinas develop- be the most natural choice for China.
ment agenda is far from accomplished, this Under the present new great power diplo-
legacy will continue to be one of the main macy, China is expected to seek a much more
shaping forces for future Chinese diplomacy. enhanced status in global diplomacy, sup-
The third angle is the Central Kingdom ported by its growing hard and soft power
mentality, which is being revived as Chinas resources and the attractive and coercive use
power rises. In the twentieth century, China of them. Nevertheless, this great power diplo-
sought to create a state strong enough to pro- macy in general may develop on the basis of
tect it from the bullying of the colonial pow- the other two legacies the revolutionary and
ers. As it enters the twenty-first century, China the developmental rather than be a funda-
is quickly finding that it is finally rising to a mental departure from them. Such a scenario
great power status: it is the biggest economy would entail that a status-seeking China
in Asia; it has the largest foreign currency would not abandon its sovereignty and non-
reserve in the world; it is a veto-wielding per- interference principles in general, and would
manent member of the Security Council of resist the temptation to rebuild a modern ver-
the United Nations; and a recognized nuclear sion of a tributary system around it in Asia.
power. This sense of Chinese power is revealed Rather it would seek to enhance its influence
in a speech on May 4, 2014 by the Chinese through the provision of new public goods
President, Xi Jinping, at Beijing University, in and so-called creative involvement (Wang
which he states, We are, more than any time Yizhou, 2011) and more proactive involve-
in the history, closer to [realizing] the aim of ment in inter-state and intra-state conflict res-
great rejuvenation of [the] Chinese nation; olutions while respecting sovereignty of other
and more than [at] any time in the history, countries. Partnership bilateralism will be
we have the confidence and capacity to real- pursued in a more strategic way, and some of
ize this aim.4 This shift of mind could explain these partnerships may be upgraded to a very
Chinas changing diplomatic behaviors, such high level, but China will refrain from build-
as more forceful defense of its territorial and ing a security alliance network. China will
maritime interests, and greater efforts to use its not attempt to overthrow the existing interna-
resources to create new international institutional institutions, but will create new insti-
tions, like BRICS Development Bank, which tutions to suit its own interests, while using
have the potential to challenge the existing them to press for reforms within the existing
mainstream global and regional institutions. institutions. It will mostly rely on attractive
power in its diplomacy rather than coercive Wang, 2012) and a worry that the US is stag-
power, even though the latter will be avail- ing containment diplomacy towards China.
able more often than in the past. Therefore, in the coming formative years of
Chinas new great power diplomacy, smart
diplomacy is what every country needs to
Key Points adopt to ensure that the world can adapt to
a remerging China, and China can be a force
Chinas past and present diplomacy can be for development, peace and cooperation.
understood from three angles: the nationalist- For China, the central challenges are how to
socialist revolutionary legacy of the twentieth develop a new balance between its desire to
century; the developmentalist legacy of the late
become a leading world power and its adher-
1970s reform era; and the Central Kingdom
ence to the sovereignty principle, and how
mentality that partly informs Chinas present
diplomacy as an emerging great power. to mainly focus on its attractive power while
To understand Chinas future diplomacy these coercive diplomacy is becoming a more viable
three angles cannot be ignored. instrument for its diplomacy.
CONCLUSION NOTES
The return of China as a great power is one of 1Article 81, Constitution of the Peoples Republic
the defining feature in todays global diplo- of China, Full text after amendment on March 14,
macy. Having its experiences in an ancient 2004. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372966.htm
multi-state system, a China-centered hierar- 2President Xi Jinping meets with U.S. presidents
chical system and a West-centered hierarchi- special representative and treasury secretary Jacob
cal system, China finds itself as a reemerging Lew, urging both sides to promote China-U.S.
power in a globalized multi-state system. It economic relations through respect and win-
has no chance to rebuild a China-centered win cooperation, March 19, 2013. http://www.
chinaembassy.se/eng/xwdt/t1023474.htm
world as it did before, it also has managed to 3http://www.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/
lift itself from an inferior status in a West- node_10961.htm. Accessed on March 26, 2014.
dominated world. As a reemerging power in 4Renmin Ribao [Peoples Daily], May 5, 2014.
a globalized multi-state system, China is http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0505/c1001-
becoming both a rule-shaper and rule-taker at 24973097.html
the same time. With its distinctive diplomacy,
its centralization of policy-making and its
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29
Diplomacy in East Asia
Pauline Kerr
INTRODUCTION extra-regional political entities, bilaterally and

multilaterally. In the latter case, any collective
There are many analyses of European identity is in reality a coalition of individual
diplomacy1 but few of East Asian diplo- national interests, not supranational interests,
macy.2 One reason for this is that the Asia- as the Association of South East Asian Nations
Pacific is a geographic construct whereas (ASEAN), the most advanced regional multi-
Europe is both a geographic and an institu- lateral arrangement, demonstrates.
tional construct centred on the European Union If we cannot meaningfully refer to an East
(EU). EU diplomacy is characterised, among Asian diplomacy in a supranational sense then
other things, by a trend towards supranational the question is, what are some of the main
diplomatic practices and away from national characteristics and trends in the diplomatic
practices (Spence, 2009) (see Chapter 25 in approaches of the individual countries and
this Handbook). The establishment of the what are the different and similar approaches
European External Action Service (EEAS) is of these countries that could support theo-
part of this trend. Diplomacy in East Asia retic generalisations about diplomacy in East
(and the Asia-Pacific) is characterised more Asia? The question is important in the light
by national rather than supranational practices of claims that the twenty-first century is the
(and interests and identities), with little evi- Asian Century, that many of the countries in
dence of substantive change. East Asia are the economic foundations for
There is little point then in trying to analyse that claim, and that today economics is high
diplomacy in East Asia in terms of suprana- politics alongside political and security issues.
tional practices. Rather, it would be more use- Its a difficult question to answer.
ful to focus on the diplomatic practices of the Surprisingly, there are few comprehensive
individual countries with other regional and and rigorous studies of diplomacy in the
region that support generalisations.3 There (2014). Likewise, Corneliu Bjola points out
are numerous studies of the regional context that there is no common understanding yet
and the foreign policies of East Asian coun- about how the rise of China should be dip-
tries but these tend to conflate events and lomatically addressed (2013: 17). Yet again
policy with diplomacy. That is, the latter tend these types of calls continue in the main to
to gloss over the distinction between foreign be unanswered. How then to proceed with an
policy as an outcome of foreign policy mak- examination of diplomacy in East Asia?
ing processes and the diplomatic processes In the absence of comprehensive and
involved in policy implementation and, to robust research on diplomacy in East Asia
a lesser degree, the diplomatic reporting that would support a proper evaluation of the
required for policy formulation and adjust- practice, the aim of this chapter is necessar-
ments. Even the intricacies of foreign policy ily limited to examining informed commen-
making for example, detailed analyses of tary. Much of this commentary is about two
domestic and international factors that help types of regional diplomacy multilateral
explain the policy outcomes and positions of economic diplomacy and multilateral secu-
East Asian states seem under-investigated in rity diplomacy. An examination of these two
the academic literature. Those studies that areas of diplomatic practice can be thought
do focus on diplomacy often concentrate of as case studies that have the potential to
on a particular type of diplomacy, recently produce general hypotheses for further stud-
for example, public diplomacy (Melissen ies that compare and contrast other types of
and Sohn, 2015). There are few studies that diplomacy that regional countries practice.
adopt a comprehensive analysis of the many The focus on regional multilateral diplo-
different types of diplomacy (consular, com- macy is useful because it involves most regional
mercial, summit, digital, sport, environmen- countries (and others) and shows how a variety
tal, and so on) at play in the region and that of countries practise this type of diplomacy,
compare and contrast these practices in terms plus it highlights the fact that multilateral
of diplomatic processes, structures, instru- diplomacy is a major innovation in East Asia
ments, actors, drivers and effectiveness. since the end of the Cold War, and finally it is,
The question is also perplexing. If this is maybe, possible to analyse it in within a short
the Asian Century then there should be stud- chapter. The focus has its limitations of course.
ies that explain the diplomatic processes Like any other single issue focus, any generali-
behind it, just as there are numerous stud- sations to other types of diplomacy will need to
ies that help to explain other momentous be treated with care. But its a start.
events, such as the rise and fall of the Roman The chapter first provides a brief account
Empire and the Cold War. Yet, such analyses of how the history of diplomacy in East
of the diplomatic processes, instruments, Asia is commonly depicted, to provide some
structures and actors behind the evolution background to the present situation, particu-
of the Asian Century are hard to find, at larly with regard to multilateral diplomacy.
least in English. The question is perplex- Second, it focusses on two regional eco-
ing too because scholars consistently call nomic mega negotiations, the Trans Pacific
for more and better diplomatic practices Partnership (TPP)4 and the Asian Regional
and more studies of diplomacy to address Comprehensive Economic Partnership
some quite dire problems in the region. For (RCEP), to identify some characteris-
example, Douglas Paals critical review of tics of diplomacy in this arena. Third, it
diplomacy in Northeast Asia argues that focusses briefly on multilateral security
Responsible officials should be deputized diplomacy, noting two security forums, the
and timetables established to stabilize and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the
ultimately normalize the regions diplomacy ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
Diplomacy in East Asia 363
(ADMM-Plus), again to identify characteris- In many respects the domination of diplo-

tics of diplomacy. Finally, it summarises the macy by powerful political entities, be they
findings and discusses their potential for gener- kings, emperors or leaders of modern nation
alisations and hypotheses for further research. states, is reflected throughout most of the
The chapter argues that from an exami- evolution of diplomacy in East Asia. The
nation of these types of diplomacy several Chinese empires tribute system, which oper-
general observations about multilateral diplo- ated as far back as the Han dynasty (206 BCE
macy in East Asia can be made which poten- 220 CE), had both ceremonial and functional
tially inform hypotheses for further research diplomatic objectives for regulating foreign
on other types of diplomacy in East Asia. relations between China and countries either
bordering or near China. The tributary coun-
tries followed protocols that appeared to pay
Key Points public deference to the emperor, who in return
provided some economic and other material
Unlike European diplomacy, East Asian diplo- goods and some autonomy and security.
macy is more concerned with national rather The decline of the tributary system in the
than supranational practices.
nineteenth century and the rise of a European
Despite the claim that the twenty-first century is
diplomatic culture based on sovereignty,
the Asian Century, there is little comprehensive
and rigorous analysis of diplomacy in East Asia. the nation-state, the treaty system, and diplo-
This chapter examines two areas multilateral matic law in principle lessened the regions
economic and security diplomacy which could hierarchical diplomatic structures. However,
be the basis of generalisations for hypotheses in reality it had both positive and negative con-
about the characteristics of diplomacy in East Asia. sequences. On the one hand, some semblance
of equality under international law became
embedded in the region which in later years
facilitated the decolonisation of many states.
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF On the other hand, diplomacy was used to
DIPLOMACY IN EAST ASIA entrench the interests of strong colonial pow-
ers over weaker states. For example, imperial
Many references to diplomacy in East Asia Japan during the late 1800s negotiated legal
start with acknowledgement that it has treaties with China and Korea that resulted in
ancient regional origins which are equally zero-sum outcomes in Japans favour.
important to, though less well known than, Diplomacy during the Cold War period
those in Western diplomatic histories. The continued to be dominated by balance of
latter tend to find the antecedents of modern power dynamics between the powerful states.
diplomacy in the hierarchical and religious The diplomatic metaphor that depicted
practices of kings of tribes in the Near East Chinas big power diplomacy was leaning
thousands of years ago or in the communica- to one side. It was manifest in Chinas 1950
tions of rulers and merchants in the Italian Treaty of Friendship with the communist
city-states of the fifteenth century. Accounts Soviet Union and its support for communist
of East Asian diplomacy, while not making North Korea in the Korean War. But China
claims to be the antecedents of modern diplo- by the late 1960s, following various disagree-
macy, also go back over a thousand years, for ments and its 1969 border war with the Soviet
example to the Zhou dynasty (1100221 Union, was leaning diplomatically towards
BCE) when Chinese emperors ruled under another great power relationship, this time
a mandate from Heaven (see Chapter 28 in with the US. On 6 April 1971, China invited
this Handbook), just like the kings of an American ping-pong team visiting Japan to
Mesopotamia (now modern Iraq). visit China. This event was the start of what
became known as ping-pong diplomacy The most cooperative arena of multilateral

and an example of successful public diplo- diplomacy, particularly within the last five
macy which helped thaw both Chinese and years, is economic diplomacy, focussed on
Western public opinion (see Chapter 35 in trade and investment negotiations.7 In addition
this Handbook). Not until the end of the Cold to the several quite long standing economic
War, however, did diplomacy in East Asia arrangements (see note 5), there are two new
begin to become less dominated by big power mega trade and investment multilateral nego-
dynamics and bilateralism and more amend- tiations now underway: the Trans Pacific
able to multilateral diplomacy. Partnership (TPP), which started in 2008, and
the Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), which was established in
Key Points 2012. These new mega regional negotiations
are driven by several concerns, among them
Diplomacy in East Asia, like diplomacy in many
the incompletion of the Doha Round and the
other regions such as the Middle East and
inadequacy of the numerous bilateral prefer-
Europe, has ancient origins.
For much of East Asias history, diplomacy has ential trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific
been dominated by the big powers. for addressing the new cross-regional and
Not until the end of the Cold War did multilateral multilateral trade issues, such as the growth
diplomacy take hold. of production networks (Drysdale, 2013).
On the one hand, the two sets of negotia-
tions are encouraging efforts to foster coop-
erative economic diplomacy between the
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF respective members. The TPP, comprising
CONTEMPORARY MULTILATERAL 12 members8 from both sides of the Pacific,
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN EAST is an exceptional trade agreement in its
ASIA ambitious coverage of issues and the empha-
sis on new regulations (Palit, 2013). On the
One of the defining characteristics of East other hand, the TPP negotiations also involve
Asia since the end of the Cold War is the considerable competition between countries
growing number of multilateral arrange- around a number of issues. For example,
ments.5 Some twenty years ago, with the around WTO plus and WTO extra issues
exception of the Association of Southeast as well as the measures for new regulatory
Asian Nations (ASEAN), this was not the convergence, for example domestic behind-
case. At that time regional multilateral diplo- the-border obstacles.9
macy, that is processes supporting interaction The other major negotiation underway,
between more than two countries, was some- the RCEP, signals an impressive Asian-track
thing that diplomats practised infrequently. effort by some 16 member countries10 to
Today the situation is quite different. establish a comprehensive and cooperative
Although bilateral diplomacy is still the more approach to regional trade and investment.
common practice,6 nonetheless regional dip- Its aim, which is less ambitious in terms of
lomats spend a lot of their time attending the standards than the TPP, is not to replace exist-
economic, security and political meetings ing ASEAN FTAs but rather to improve and
connected to the numerous regional multilat- coordinate them. Like the TPP, the RCEP also
eral arrangements. Today, leaders summits, faces strong competitive dynamics among
meetings of economic, foreign and defence its members. For example, countries that
ministers as well as preparatory senior offi- support the harmonisation of all the exist-
cials meetings (SOMs) are routine events (see ing bilateral FTAs are reluctant to agree to
Chapter 19 in this Handbook). integrating politically sensitive flexibility
clauses for the least developed ASEAN suits China and many other Asian countries.
member states (Menon, 2013). It is non-binding and voluntary and better
Looking beyond the internal coopera- accommodates the different development
tive and competitive diplomatic dynamics stages of Asian economies which have less
of each mega regional negotiation, of more emphasis on the WTO plus and WTO extra
concern is that both are driven by external issues. Thus, this template enables China to
competitive geostrategic and economic stra- work with the ASEANs as a regional partner
tegic dynamics, not least those between the rather than be seen as a threat. It is therefore
US and China. The TPP is strongly supported an asset for Chinas public diplomacy strate-
by the US. China is not a member. The RCEP gies towards ASEAN audiences and its soft
is strongly supported by China, and the US power attractiveness. A third option is that the
is not a member. Many in China consider the RCEP better supports Chinas need for essen-
TPP to be the economic dimension of the US tial supply chains to Japan and South Korea,
military pivot to Asia. Chinas reliance on as well as ASEAN. Through these networks
foreign trade and investment for its growth, China imports large amounts of intermedi-
notwithstanding the recent shift to a new ates, parts and components which are pro-
five year plan with more focus on a domes- cessed and assembled in the mainland, and
tic consumer and services economy, causes exported to third country markets such as the
many Chinese to see the TPP as a competi- US and Europe (Palit, 2013).
tive dynamic by the US and Japan to curtail The two mega economic negotiations show
Chinas future growth and therefore its power that multilateral and bilateral diplomacy,
(Richardson, 2013), in effect to diplomati- while often seen to be different, proceed
cally and structurally restrain China. simultaneously and influence each other.
From the US perspective, the TPP ensures For example, the multilateral RCEP aims
its comparative advantage in trade and invest- to harmonise the bilateral FTAs. Both mega
ment by cementing US interests in advancing negotiations have an effect on other types
WTO plus issues and WTO extra subjects of diplomacy. The US-led TPP, for exam-
(Palit, 2013). These US economic objectives ple, influences trilateral FTA negotiations
do not complement Chinas present objec- between China, Japan and South Korea. Once
tives. China puts less emphasis on WTO plus it became clear that Japan intended to join the
issues and its domestic regulations would not TPP China became more flexible on a trilat-
meet many of the TPPs gold standards. The eral investment agreement. The negotiations
TPP helps the US to promote its own template are an important focus of summit diplomacy
of economic diplomacy, economic rules and between leaders and are seen as important
norms: not just for the Asia-Pacific, but also symbols of future diplomatic leadership in
for other regional agreements (see Chapter 45 Asia. As Barfield argues, the TPP is now not
in this Handbook). The US template competes just a trade agreement: it has huge diplomatic
with Chinas present, less liberalised eco- and security implications for US forward
nomic diplomacy template and it challenges strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Barfield, 2014).
Chinas ambition to exert some diplomatic The mega negotiations show that the
leadership in global economic governance. choice between adopting different types of
In comparison to the TPP, the RCEP gives diplomacy usually has more to do with prag-
China several favourable options. One is to matism than principle, whatever the lofty
counterbalance some of the geostrategic and declarations of practitioners and academics.
economic strategic competitive dynamics For example, Vietnam, which traditionally
associated with US dominance of the TPP. A has had close bilateral economic and politi-
second option is that the RCEP offers a nego- cal diplomatic relations with its communist
tiating template that, unlike the TPP, presently partner China, is pursuing omnidirectional
diplomacy, participating in both the China- advice. For example, the Pacific Economic
led RCEP and the US-led TPP (Huong, 2014). Cooperation Council (PECC) established
Given the great difficulties Vietnam has com- in 1980 comprises academic, business and
plying with the TPPs more demanding gold industry participants plus government offi-
regulatory standards, its choice to join the cials in their non-official capacity. Newer
TPP has less to do with principles of mul- track-two economic groupings include the
tilateralism and more to do with pragmatic Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT)
calculations. A closer diplomatic relationship established in 2003, the Council on East
with the US gives it more diplomatic options Asian Community established in 2004 and
and is a possible form of preventive diplo- the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN
macy in its tense relationship with China over and East Asia (ERIA) established in 2008
their respective maritime claims in the South (Kerr and Taylor, 2013).
China Sea/Paracels Islands. Pragmatic con- However, the diplomatic actors who exer-
siderations are driven in part by the linkages cise most power and influence in economic
between issue areas, in this case economic, diplomacy in East Asia are state officials.
security and political issues, rather than the The primary function of the track-two group-
virtues of multilateral diplomacy. ings is to support or at least not to challenge
These types of political sensitivities state-centric interests and to serve industry
between regional countries are often reflected and encourage public-private partnerships.
in diplomatic metaphors. In Vietnams case, As Yasumasa Komori suggests in his study
reference is made to its clumping bamboo of regional economic track-two diplomacy,
diplomacy. According to a distinguished The relationships between track-one and
Vietnamese diplomat, the logic is that the track-two are more hierarchical than horizon-
more interdependent ties we can cultivate, the tal in the sense that states remain the primary
easier we can maintain our independence and actors in shaping the Asia-Pacific regional
self-reliance, like an ivory bamboo that will governance mechanism (2009: 328).
easily fall by standing alone but grow firmly Overall, economic diplomacy involving
in clumps (Do, 2014). Metaphors rather than the two multilateral mega negotiations is
explicit statements might be seen as part of the having a profound effect on the region and
smoke and mirrors diplomacy in East Asia. beyond. As Palit argues, the progress on the
The diplomatic actors involved in the mega TPP negotiations, and the counter-response
negotiations are quite diverse. For exam- produced through the RCEP, are reorganizing
ple, with regard to the RCEP, at one level it the trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific into
involves the leaders of the 16 participating distinct blocs based on specific negotiating
countries, who launched the negotiations on templates. These blocs are also reflecting the
the sidelines of the East Asia Summit on 20 strategic economic interests of the US and
November 2012. The next levels of actors China (Palit, 2013). Moreover, the effect of
are the economic and trade ministers, gov- the two negotiations goes beyond the Asia-
ernment officials from different departments Pacific. With three mega trade and investment
(trade, finance, treasury, foreign affairs and liberalising blocs now on the agenda the
others) who, depending on the issue, bring in TPP, RCEP and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade
a variety of non-state actors for example, and Investment Partnership) competition
from the business, scientific, legal, think-tank, to conclude and ratify the first agreement is
research institutes and academic communi- strong. If there is insufficient robust WTO
ties. These communities in East Asia (and the governance then whoever finalises a bloc first
Asia-Pacific) often operate within respected will dominate economic diplomacy by setting
track-two economic organisations that pro- key rules and standards for global commerce
vide valuable economic research and policy in the 21st century (Richardson, 2013).
Key Points and other ASEAN claimants in the South

China Sea that dialogue and negotiation on
Economic diplomacy, in particular trade and
the issues are unlikely to involve concessions
investment, is the most active arena of multilat-
from China. At the same time, Chinas early
eral diplomacy and negotiation in East Asia.
The two mega negotiations on trade and invest- removal of the platform was, among other
ment, the TPP and RCEP, demonstrate that East things, a signal that it is aware of Vietnams
Asian economic multilateral diplomacy has sev- clumping bamboo diplomacy and does not
eral characteristics, suggestive of generalisations wish to see its broader diplomatic relation-
for informing hypotheses. These are discussed ship undermined by Vietnams improving
later in the chapter. diplomatic relationship with the US. The
cycle of dialogue and warning signals is
likely to continue.
Hence in the security arena there is much
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF less actual meaningful multilateral cooperation
MULTILATERAL SECURITY/POLITCAL than in the economic area. States in the region
DIPLOMACY continue to have limited trust in each other.
Many are rapidly modernising their defence
Although national interests and identities are capabilities. There are signs of competitive
dominant, there is explicit emphasis on dip- arms racing dynamics underway in North East
lomatic dialogue in East Asia and this is true Asia around maritime force structures, such as
of a very contentious regional issue: multi- submarines. Many argue that regional multilat-
lateral security diplomacy. The aim is to eral security forums, like the ASEAN Regional
keep communication channels open and Forum (ARF), are failing to sufficiently curb
facilitate a very Asian process of getting-to- traditional state-to-state competition, for
know the other, of socialisation, which example between the US and China, China and
takes place independently of or prior to Japan, and between countries involved in mari-
negotiation processes. Nonetheless, while time disputes in the South China Sea.
there is an explicit emphasis on the impor- The ARF, which in 1944 was the first
tance of diplomatic dialogue, the practice and is thus the longest standing region-wide
itself waxes and wanes. For example, the Six multilateral security arrangement, contin-
Party Talks on North Koreas nuclear pro- ues to focus on dialogue rather than evolv-
grammes are an offon forum for dialogue. ing towards its original agenda to establish
Likewise the Japanese and Chinese meetings concrete practical confidence building meas-
on maritime issues, including the Senkaku/ ures and preventive diplomacy mechanisms.
Diaoyu islands dispute, stop and start Despite some limited progress, such as
depending on security and political incidents incorporating the functional benefits of the
in both countries. ASEAN Secretariat and having back-to-back
Furthermore, notwithstanding the explicit meetings with the regional track-two body,
emphasis on diplomatic dialogue, there is the Council for Security Cooperation Asia-
implicit stress on diplomatic signals and on Pacific (CSCAP), there is continuing resist-
vary degrees of threats that warn of foreclo- ance to deepening the quasi-institutional
sure on compromise, concessions and win structure of the ARF.
win outcomes if these weaken national or Nonetheless there are indications that
identity interests. For example, Chinas 2014 multilateral security diplomacy is an ongo-
unprecedented deployment of a mega oil- ing objective in East Asia. There are growing
drilling platform in disputed waters within formal networks and meetings at the military
Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) level, between regional defence ministers
was, among other things, a signal to Vietnam and military personnel. The 2006 annual
security dialogues between ASEAN defence DEVELOPING GENERALISATIONS

ministers in the ASEAN Defence Ministers AND HYPOTHESES?
Meetings, the ADMM, was followed in 2010
by the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting From this brief analysis of economic and
Plus, involving ASEANs dialogue partners, security multilateral diplomacy in East Asia
among them the defence ministers from the it is possible to discern that it has several
US and China.11 Subsequent meetings have characteristics. To organise these characteris-
been held. The Shangri-La dialogue, a semi- tics into generalisations which could serve as
official (or track 1.5) meeting, is another meet- hypotheses about diplomacy more generally
ing of defence and other government officials in East Asia it is useful to consider some
and non-officials. As See Seng Tan points out generic terms commonly used in diplomatic
in his chapter on military diplomacy in this studies as frameworks for analysis, such as
Handbook, military diplomacy has a pragmatic diplomatic processes, structures, instru-
and conservative culture of capacity building ments, actors and drivers.
and Arguably, what the capacity arrangements Most of the key characteristics below
within the ADMM-Plus have enabled is appear to be connected to diplomatic pro-
an embryonic regional capacity in preven- cesses, and include the following:
tive diplomacy ironically, the very thing
the ARF has not been able to implement
Diplomacy is more concerned with national
(Chapter 48, page 597).
rather than supranational practices, interests and
However, critics note that in the main identities.
these meetings presently focus on non- Diplomacy exhibits cooperative and competitive
traditional security issues, such as humanitarian dynamics, though the latter is probably more
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and common both between regional countries (par-
counterterrorism, rather than traditional ticularly between China and Japan) and the US
state-to-state tensions, for example between and China.
the US and China, and between regional Diplomacy between the US and China is most
countries involved in the East China Sea and often driven by economic and geostrategic com-
the South China Sea disputes. This suggests petition, showing that each countrys preference
that there is a continuing deficit of strategic is to have diplomatic leadership over the rules
and governance of global economic diplomacy
trust among the major powers and, more
and the regional security architecture.
generally, many regional states. Diplomacy is influenced strongly by the roles of
the major powers, just as it has been historically.
Diplomacy is guided more by pragmatic rather
Key Points than principled approaches; pragmatism is partly
due to diplomatic linkages between issue areas,
Although diplomatic dialogue around issues of such as economics, security and political issues,
security is explicitly emphasised, in practice it and partly to a conservative outlook that aims for
waxes and wanes and is challenged by dip- capacity building outcomes.
lomatic signals and warnings that diplomatic The choice between bilateral and multilateral
concessions that affect national interests and diplomacy is guided by pragmatic considerations
identities are unlikely to be forthcoming. and the two processes often run in parallel
The key characteristic of security multilateral and influence each other and other types of
diplomacy is its national, state-centric focus and diplomacy.
competition in varying degrees. Within these Negotiated multilateral agreements aim for non-
boundaries, military diplomacy is a relatively new binding and voluntary outcomes, thus enabling
and encouraging development, but it is presently states to have control over outcomes, avoid rigor-
mostly concerned with non-traditional security ous implementation and withdraw if conditions
issues. dont suit them (as North Korea does frequently).
Multilateral negotiations usually result in a vari- CONCLUSION

ety of arrangements, none of which at the
moment replicate institutions like the EU. Rather, The generalisations above are just the begin-
there are: ad hoc arrangements focussed on par-
ning. Even in the areas under discussion, each
ticular issues, such as the Six-Party Talks (6PTs)
and the negotiations on a Code of Conduct generalisation suggested needs further research
(COC) for the South China Sea; informal and and elaboration. For example, much more
most likely long standing arrangements, such as needs to be known about the power and influ-
the East Asian Summit (EAS); quasi-institutional ence of different diplomatic actors in multilat-
arrangements such the ASEAN Regional Forum eral economic and security diplomacy in the
(ARF); and stronger institutional arrangements digital age: that is, who has what type of
like ASEAN. Moreover, the membership of these power, over what issues, and under what condi-
forums is relatively small. tions. Then after that comes the refinement of
The process of security diplomatic dialogue is hypotheses and their operationalisation. There
explicitly endorsed as a regional norm; however, is a vast, important and exciting research pro-
its actual practice varies and it is often accompa-
ject waiting for scholars. Unless the challenge
nied by diplomatic signals of implicit threats and
diplomatic metaphors, all of which suggest that is taken up and more is understood about diplo-
diplomacy in East Asia can involve smoke and macy in East Asia, the rise of the Asian Century
mirrors dynamics. may be followed unnecessarily by its fall.
Depending on the issue area, diplomacy involves
a variety of diplomatic structures and diplomatic
actors. Economic multilateral diplomacy involves
several ministries, particularly trade and finance, NOTES
the business communities and some other non-
state actors such as economic policy experts from 1 See Chapter 25 in this Handbook.
universities, track-two organisations and think- 2 East Asia comprises countries in Northeast Asia
and Southeast Asia.
tanks. Security multilateral diplomacy in its tradi-
3 Among the few exceptions are Brian Hocking
tional military guise involves defence departments (ed.) (1999); Kishan Rana (2008); and studies on
and foreign ministries and, in its non-traditional the ASEAN Way as a diplomatic code of conduct;
form, defence and foreign ministries and non- Matthew Davies (2016).
state actors expert in the particular issue, such 4 Although the Trans-Pacific Partnership
as environmental degradation or disaster and negotiations reached agreement on 5 October
humanitarian relief. Overall, non-state actors act 2015 (after this chapter was written), the
as consultants to governments rather than being diplomatic and political dynamics described in the
key players in active policy making processes, chapter continue to inform analysis of multilateral
which are dominated by officials. Nonetheless, economic diplomacy in East Asia.
5 Regional economic arrangements are the most
new technologies, such as ICT and Internet, and
numerous. Among the most important are APEC,
Sina Weibo (a Chinese mobile social media plat- ASEAN plus China, ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan
form) provide citizens with a diplomatic instru- and South Korea), ASEAN plus other dialogue
ment to voice their ideas and concerns to officials partner states and, recently, two new possible
who more than ever have to manage domestic multilateral arrangements: the Trans Pacific
and international audiences. Likewise, these new Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive
technologies are generating stronger public diplo- Economic Plan (RCEP). Multilateral security
macy strategies among East Asian states. arrangements include the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting (ASEAN DMM),
These generalisations, extracted from the ASEAN Plus Defence Ministers Meeting, Six Party
Talks (SPT), the Five Powers Defence Arrangements
examination of multilateral economic and
(FPDA), the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) and the
security diplomacy, potentially inform Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Finally there
hypotheses for further research on East Asian are arrangements that include a mix of economic,
diplomacy. security and political issues, such as the East Asian
Summit (EAS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation a diplomatic approach, Hague Journal of

(SCO), ASEAN/Europe Meeting (ASEM) and talks Diplomacy, 8: 120.
around the Declaration of Parties in the South Davies, Matthew (2016) A community of
China Sea (DOC) and the Code of Conduct in practice: explaining change and continuity in
the South China Sea (COC) between ASEAN and
ASEANs diplomatic environment, The
China. Of course many of the other arrangements
mentioned earlier involve this mix of economic,
Pacific Review, 29 (2): 211233.
political and security issues to varying degrees. Do, Thuy T. (2014) Vietnams bamboo
6 In the economic field, numerous bilateral Free diplomacy threatened by pandas, East Asia
Trade Arrangements (FTAs) have been negotiated Forum, 3 April (http://www.eastasiaforum.
and others are in the pipeline. Plus there are org/2014/ 04/03/is-vietnams-bamboo-
long-standing security bilateral arrangements, diplomacy-threatened-by-pandas/).
such as the separate treaties that the US has with Drysdale, Peter (2013) Breakthrough for
Australia, Japan and South Korea, all of which are Asian integration, East Asia Forum, 24
presently being strengthened as part of the US June (www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/24/
pivot to the Asia-Pacific.
a-breakthrough-for-asian-integration/).
7 As Stephen Woolcock explains, Economic
diplomacy should be understood as decision making
Hocking, Brian (ed.) (1999) Foreign Ministries:
and negotiation in core issues of international Change and Adaption. London: Palgrave
economic relations (Woolcock, 2013: 210). Macmillan.
8 The TPP includes the United States, Australia, Huong, Le Thu (2014) Vietnams precarious
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, strategic balancing act, East Asia Forum,
Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. 7 May (http://www.eastasiaforum.
9 There are different positions on WTO plus org/2014/07/05/vietnams-precarious-
issues, such as wider and deeper elimination of strategic-balancing-act/).
tariff barriers and removal of technical barriers Kerr, Pauline and Taylor, Brendan (2013) Track-
to trade (TBT), to name just a few (Palit, 2013).
two diplomacy in East Asia, in Pauline
Equally competitive will be negotiations over
WTO extra subjects, those that go beyond the
Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds), Diplomacy
WTOs current mandate (Palit, 2013). These in a Globalizing World. Theories and
include environmental and labour standards, Practices. New York: Oxford University Press,
government procurement, and competition pp. 22643.
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strong is the TPPs aim to establish new regulatory Asia and the Asia-Pacific, East Asia: An
convergence among its members: such as, International Quarterly, 26 (4): 32141.
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in domestic regulations that are behind the Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia.
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10 The RCEP includes ASEAN +6 (i.e. the 10 ASEANs Menon. J. (2013) The challenge facing Asias
plus Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea regional comprehensive economic
and New Zealand). partnership, East Asia Forum, 23 June
11 Apart from the ten ASEAN countries, other (http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/23/
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30
Latin American Diplomacy
S e a n W. B u r g e s a n d F a b r c i o H . C h a g a s B a s t o s
INTRODUCTION post-Cancun rhetorical fracas and amplify

them through reference to other cases and the
After the close of the 2003 World Trade conceptual thinking of scholars and analysts
Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in based in the region. The approach we take in
Cancun, Mexico, United States Trade our analysis of Latin American diplomacy is
Representative Robert Zoellick unleashed a predominantly at the state level, examining
the patterns and habits of interaction exhib-
stinging attack on Brazil and its Latin
ited by governments in the region.
American partners in the G-20 trade negoti-
ating coalition. Lamenting the failure to
reach agreement on the US/EU proposal to
conclude the Doha round, Zoellick (2003) CHANGING TRADITIONAL VIEWS:
bemoaned Brazils tactics of confrontation, LATIN AMERICA IS NOT A
refusal to compromise and insistence on a HOMOGENOUS ENTITY
massive list of required changes to the
chairpersons discussion text. These tensions Perhaps the cleverest element of Zoellicks
between the Brazilian-led G-20 negotiating blast against Brazil was the emphasis on how
coalition and the US offer a highly illustra- the G-20 not only violated pan-Southern soli-
tive entry point to understanding the key ele- darity by rejecting a text from the Thai WTO
ments of contemporary Latin American Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi, but
diplomacy, the subject of this chapter. In also abrogated the supposedly entrenched
order to grapple with the practice and pre- idea of intra-Latin American unity. As
cepts of Latin American diplomacy we will Zoellick highlighted, the text blocked by the
draw out five points embedded within G-20 was drafted by the WTOs General
Latin American Diplomacy 373
Council chairperson Carlos Prez del Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica or Mexico. Even
Castillo, Uruguays ambassador to the organ- the regional organizations spanning the hemi-
ization. The meeting itself was chaired by sphere, such as the Organization of American
Mexican foreign minister Luis Ernesto States, have been seen as opportunistic tools
Derbez, who attempted to broker an agree- for Washington, not forums within which to
ment between the contending parties. engage in serious problem-solving or issue
In his ire, Zoellick appeared to be assum- management. Per the tradition initiated with
ing Latin America can be viewed as a homo- the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, Latin America
geneous unit with consistent shared interests has remained a question of bilateral manage-
and attitudes. The region is instead comprised ment and control for Washington that holds
of countries possessing a wide range of geo- little interests absent crises requiring atten-
graphic, demographic, economic and histori- tion from the highest level of policy makers, a
cal characteristics impacting their independent situation amplified since the 9/11 attacks and
foreign policy positions. Latin America as a launch of the War on Terror (Hakim, 2006).
unity is itself an externally devised notion In some respects such simplification makes
floated by the French in the 1830s in an effort sense to US policy makers preoccupied with
to create an implicit sense of alliance between Islamic radicalization and the spread of
the region and Romance-language European weapons of mass destruction. With intra-con-
countries engaged in a struggle with their tinental war in the Americas highly unlikely,
Anglo-Saxon and Slavic neighbours. the security concerns dominating policy are
The French idea of Latin America as a of a non-traditional variety such as narcotraf-
contiguous unit did stick in the Washington ficking, transnational criminal networks, and
policy consciousness during the 1800s when migration, all areas that receive more of a
gunboat diplomacy undergirded US efforts to policing response from Washington than seri-
establish the Western Hemisphere as its exclu- ous multilateral security engagement. South
sive zone of influence. Repeated iterations of Americas states implicitly recognize that, far
US policy towards the Americas took a rather from being outside of Washingtons geopo-
simplified approach to exerting hegemony litical concerns, they are, on the contrary, a
over the region through approaches such as preferential area for the United States pre-
the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the Big Stick ventive, and perhaps even hasty, unilateral
policy (1901), the Good Neighbour policy interference (Villa et al., 2015). Frustration
(1933), the Alliance for Progress (1961) and with the simplistic approach to regional secu-
the Enterprise for the Americas initiative rity issues from the US has combined with
(1990) (see also Chapter 26 in this Handbook). commodity boom-fuelled economic inde-
In aggregate these initiatives reinforced belief pendence to further feed a differentiation of
in US dominance over the region, an analytical foreign policies in the Americas and a sus-
assumption that remains predominant in much tained drift away from reliance upon the US.
English-language work on Latin American Northern tendencies to reduce the varied
foreign relations (for example, Hakim, 2006; countries of Latin America to a single stereo-
Oppenheimer, 2007). While attractive for type is in part explicable by three important
the US, regional countries found themselves characteristics of the regions foreign relations
somewhat marginalized and were left feeling and integration into the international system.
alternately undervalued, left out or bullied. First is a geographic consideration, namely
While there has been important variation that Latin America is a long way from the most
in how Washington has attempted to man- active laneways of US and European history
age the different countries, the general tone over the last two centuries: the North Atlantic
and approach has started from a remarkably and the Middle East. Married to this is the
similar place whether the US counterpart was second factor, which is the decidedly limited
ability, let alone desire, of any country in the in 2007 (Starbroek News, 2007). Costa Rica
region to project power into other parts of the and Nicaragua continue to bicker over dis-
world. The Second World War saw only one puted border territory and had entered into
regional country Brazil actively enter the arbitration in The Hague in 2010.
hostilities, and this at the last moment and just If we expand the list of territorial disputes
in time to join the invasion of Italy (Lochery, in the region to include trade disagreements,
2014). In more contemporary times Latin political contretemps, historical misunder-
American countries have either stood out for standings and other forms of regional rivalry
their refusal to be drawn into foreign entangle- we end up with a fairly extensive catalogue of
ments Chile was severely politically casti- dissent and discord in Latin America. Indeed,
gated by the US for dissenting in the UNSC simply keeping track of the intra-Mercosur
on the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Muoz, 2008) disputes between Argentina and Brazil along
or limited themselves to generally modest with the related attempts at bilateral relation-
peace-keeping contributions, often in coalition ship management has resulted in a substan-
with other regional countries (Kenkel, 2013). tial sub-discipline in the fields of regionalism
Bellicosity would thus seem to be outside the and Latin American studies. What matters for
Latin diplomatic character, a factor rein- understanding Latin American diplomacy is
forced by the notable shortage of major inter- that these very real disagreements have a ten-
state armed conflicts in the region, with the dency to become of second-order importance
most recent serious one being the 193235 War to regional diplomats when faced with the need
of the Chaco between Bolivia and Paraguay. to unify in the face of pressure from a US or
The combination of somewhat comparable Europe that either dismissively tries to aggre-
histories of Iberian colonization, geographic gate the region into a single, easy to manage
continuity on a common continental land unit, or pursues a strategy of divide and conquer
mass, and similarities in language Brazilian to maintain implicit and explicit dominance.
diplomats speak fluent Spanish combines This pressure has had a major influence on
with an absence of serious inter-state armed how Latin American countries approach diplo-
conflict to help build a sense that the region macy and how they self-consciously exploit the
is harmonious and relatively homogenous. externally created identity of Latin America.
Overlooked in this surface-level sketch is the
persistence of entrenched tensions and con-
flicts in the region. Brazil and Mexico have Key Points
soft contending ambitions for regional lead-
ership, with Argentina often staking its own Latin America is a region of heterogeneous coun-
claim as well. The Bolivian armed forces tries, each with important differences in history,
are led by an admiral as a sustained note culture, geography, economics and society.
The US has a historical tendency to treat the
of protest against what it claims as Chiles
region as a homogenous bloc, a habit repeated
illegal seizure of its coastal provinces dur- by other extra-regional actors.
ing the 187983 War of the Pacific. Peru, Latin America stands out for the absence of war
too, has border complaints against Chile as a dispute resolving mechanism.
from that nineteenth century war and only
recently settled an additional border conflict
with Ecuador in 1998, a dispute which dated
from 1942 and saw a series of skirmishes and NOT QUITE UNITY, NOT QUITE
casualties throughout the twentieth century. COALITION
Venezuela has ongoing border disagree-
ments with its littoral neighbours and went As events at the 2003 Cancun WTO ministe-
so far as to bomb Guyanese dredging barges rial and the subsequent round of defections
and new memberships in the G-20 negotiat- border dispute and Bolivias complaints that
ing coalition demonstrated, there is an active Chile illegally seized Antofagasta during the
recognition amongst Latin American coun- 187983 War of the Pacific, resolution is
tries that from time to time there will be sig- consistently sought through negotiation and
nificant policy differences in international arbitration, not armed invasion. Even when
affairs. Where the region differs significantly conflict has erupted, such as the brief periods
from other areas of the world is that episodic of shooting between Ecuador and Peru in 1995
or even lasting differences on a particular or Venezuelas muscular approach to disputed
foreign policy issue are not seen as a source territories with Colombia and Guyana, the ten-
of crisis or harbinger of collapsing bilateral sions appear reluctant and are quickly brought
relations. Linguistic similarities and a certain to the negotiating table by other regional coun-
degree of cultural affinity across the region tries. This sort of accommodative approach to
have combined with a sense of ever-present potential disputes has a long historical tradi-
pressure from the US to create if not agree- tion, extending as far back as the 1494 Treaty
ment amongst the regions actors, at least a of Tordesillas, which saw Portugal and Spain
habit of speaking before leaping. The result peacefully accept Papal mediation to divide
is certainly not a unity in diplomatic practice the New World. While the intervening actors
or an absence of conflict, but rather the rise have subsequently changed and the process
of something unique to the cultural and has become more regularized over the last
political circumstances of Latin America. fifty years, the fundamental tendency to avoid
Having just suggested it is a mistake to view armed conflict remains.
Latin America as a homogenous unit, there are Perhaps the best theorizing of the lack of
a number of cultural, historical and linguistic inter-state armed hostility with Latin America
characteristics that nevertheless make it consid- can be found in the concertacin approach
erably easier for the regions leaders to commu- to diplomatic management advanced by
nicate quickly and fluently. Married to this are Argentine scholar Federico Merke (2015).
a combination of regional force balance and the The term concertacin has no simple trans-
geographical isolation of border areas to make lation into English, being a reflection of an
traditional notions of bandwagoning and bal- Ibero-American tradition of managing differ-
ancing from the Realist school of International ence and dissent in politics such that it can
Relations unusual diplomatic strategies in the become a strength rather than source of dis-
region (Flemes and Wehner, 2013; Schenoni, cord. At the heart lies an informally institu-
2014). In place of these US and European- tionalized process of summitry and discussion
informed approaches to the creation of order is in lieu of power politics (see Chapter 19 in
a more legalistic approach emphasizing nego- this Handbook). Escalation in Latin American
tiation and an almost juridical approach to the terms means the convocation of presidential
management of international affairs. diplomacy to discuss the matter of dissent, not
Thanks to an accommodative and legalis- the deployment of military forces to border
tic predilection for talking through disagree- regions. More significantly, it is often not just
ments, Latin America has become notable for the presidents of the directly affected coun-
the absence of inter-state conflicts. The 1932 tries that meet, but rather the regions leader-
35 Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia ship or a delegated sub-grouping of ministers
dates as the last significant inter-state war or national presidents.
in South America, far outmatching in seri- Although there are a series of semi-regular
ousness the 1969 Football war between El presidential summits through groupings such
Salvador and Honduras (Cable, 1969; Farcau, as Unasur, Mercosur, CELAC and so on, the
1996). Although there are unsolved disputes concertacon process is not entrenched in a
in the region, like the ChilePeru maritime formalized framework, but rather exists as a
convention embedded in the regions shared concerns. For example, replacing and upgrad-
legalistic approach to international affairs (see ing old weaponry is explicitly framed by coun-
Chapter 15 in this Handbook). Chief amongst tries such as Brazil as an avenue for building
the legal norms driving concertacin are the the national industrial base and accelerating
interlinked principles of sovereignty and non- domestic technological mastery in key fields
aggression. Although precise interpretations such as engineering and information technol-
are debated, there is cross-national agreement ogy (Ministrio da Defesa, 2012).
in Latin America that respect of international A central example of how the concertacin
law is essential for mutual security and that mechanism works to defuse disagreements
great emphasis should be placed upon setting and prevent escalation to serious conflict
and observing the rules. Two interrelated fac- came in July 2010 when the Colombia armed
tors play a role in this preference for talking forces, acting on intelligence from the US,
through conflict rather than fighting it out. crossed over the border with Ecuador to bomb
First is the comparative weakness of the armed a base set up by the Colombian FARC insur-
forces throughout the region. Although indi- gent movement. Ecuador was understandably
vidually capable, none of the regions armed incensed with the violation of its sovereignty
forces have received the sort of investment and president Rafael Correa made his feelings
necessary to make them a viable expedition- clear to his Colombian counterpart Alvaro
ary force, a factor reflected in global military Uribe. Bolivian president Evo Morales voiced
power rankings. Moreover, there is no popu- his disapproval and expressed strong sup-
lar or political desire to engage in this kind port for Ecuador. Venezuelan president Hugo
of expenditure, particularly in the face of the Chvez, who was never on a particularly
still considerable poverty challenges found in friendly basis with Uribe, fulminated and went
each regional country. Layered on top of this so far as to order his military to the border.
is a more cultural factor that points towards a At this point the concertacin institution
general desire to find an amicable solution to was activated through a meeting of Unasur for-
disagreements. eign ministers in Quito. Pressure to avoid a war
The depth of concertacin strategies of no one in the region wanted came swiftly from
avoiding military conflict have been high- countries as ideologically varied as Brazil,
lighted over the last fifteen years as sub- Chile and Peru, and extensive dialogue was ini-
stantial increases in military expenditure tiated. The result was a rapid reduction in ten-
by many regional countries have resulted in sions and the path towards a South American
increases in mutual confidence, not a rise of presidential summit where Ecuador and
distrust-fuelled arms races (Villa and Weiffen, Colombia agreed on a way forward for dealing
2014). According to the 2015 edition of the with the FARC and the most vocal protagonists
Stockholm International Peace Research in the dispute Uribe and Chvez duly, if
Institutes (SIPRI) Military Expenditure reluctantly, gave each other a grande abrazo to
Database, Latin American countries col- officially set the unfortunate event in the past.
lectively spent US$694 billion from 2005 The concertacin mechanism functions
to 2014, led by Brazil at US$337 billion, effectively in part because it is undergirded
Colombia at US$105 billion, and Mexico at by a busy agenda of presidential and ministe-
US$59 billion (SIPRI, 2015). Significantly, rial meetings every year, including those for
this expenditure has not been driven by the well-known regional groupings like Mercosur,
rise of pressing external threats, but instead Unasur, CELAC and the OAS in addition to
by a set of complex internal conflict-related whatever bilateral visits and consultations
and non-conflict-related motives connected to may be scheduled. While these frequent meet-
the new security challenges side-lined by US ings do not always result in shared positions
policy makers as well as national development or consensus on what the region should do,
it does mean the different countries in the Extending the idea of cordialidade to Latin
region are aware of each others respective American international relations, the concept
positions. Moreover, when a decision is made provides an emotionally grounded explana-
to take a collective position forward it often tion for the solidity of Merkes concertacin
caries extra weight in global forums because process of diplomatic management. In practi-
it is grounded in a regional reconciliation of cal terms it can quite literally result in regional
the same sorts of competing interests found at presidents being encouraged by their peers to
the international level. This was precisely the step back from the brink to hug it out. Thus,
process that caused Zoellick so much angst in cordialidade as an attribute of presidential
Cancun. The G-20 position was not reached leadership is not a mere gesture of politeness,
in an ad hoc manner at Cancun, but instead but a political tool to mediate and approxi-
stemmed from extended discussions over the mate distant or extreme behaviours with a
six months prior to the ministerial meeting familial mediation quietly conducted behind
with India and Brazil organizing the mem- closed doors, not aired in public. As for-
ber countries around the discussion of alter- mer Brazilian president Fernando Henrique
nate positions. Similar approaches were seen Cardoso recounts in his memoires, the 1999
in the Free Trade Area of the Americas talks Ibero-American Summit in Havana saw this
when the Mercosur countries and increasingly process in action when successive Latin
the rest of South America worked to coordi- American leaders bluntly warned Castro he
nate positions before heading to negotiat- needed to liberalize political and economic
ing sessions with the US and Canada. Since life on the island or risk losing all his regime
the mid-2000s there has been a rise in intra- had accomplished. Tellingly, these warnings
South American security coordination through were delivered at the closed-doors dinner
the South American Defence Council. While amongst the leaders and not repeated in any
not extending to become a classical security of the public events related to the Summit
community arguably something not neces- (Cardoso, 2006: 6403).
sary in South America or a NATO-like entity,
regular meetings, consultations, and joint exer-
cises and training by the regions armed forces Key Points
are further building mutual confidence in an
area which is seeing significant increases in An informally institutionalized habit of frequent
presidential summits facilitates the concertacin
defence spending by a number of countries.
process, which allows the resolution of disagree-
Another important trait of Latin American ments before they become serious conflicts.
diplomatic culture underpinning the concert- The international legal principles of sovereignty
acin process is what Brazilians call cordiali- and non-aggression are the cornerstones of
dade. Presented by Brazilian historian Sergio the common normative framework underpinning
Buarque de Holanda (2012), the concept is Latin American diplomatic practice.
explained as being something of an opposi- Parallel legal and cultural histories contribute to
tion to Anglo-Saxon rational culture, sug- a foreign policy habit of talking until consensus
gesting instead that Brazilians think with is reached rather than engaging in unnecessary
the heart resulting in marked preference to high stakes brinkmanship.
avoid conflict and instead find a mutually
amicable solution to problems (Cervo, 2008;
Kern, 2013). Advancement of personal and
national interests is by no means discarded. AUTONOMIST COLLECTIVIZATION
Instead, greater effort is devoted to searching
out space where contending desires can be There is certainly space for forgiving casual
aligned, not cast in opposition. observers of Latin American foreign policy
who insist on seeing the region as a single attractive engagement option with ministers
entity despite its heterogeneity. Although it is from all sides of the political spectrum.
very difficult to successfully argue there is a Both the concern with protecting national
common approach to foreign policy through- autonomy and collectively acting on an ad
out the Americas (Hey, 1997, 1998; Mora and hoc basis to secure it have very strong intel-
Hey, 2003; Gardini and Lambert, 2011), we lectual roots in the region, particularly in the
can usefully talk about one large shared con- dependency analyses stemming from the hard
cern. Irrespective of how a specific country in empirical research conducted by the United
Latin America goes about framing its foreign Nations Economic Commission for Latin
policy strategies, an underlying concern is America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the
with the preservation of autonomy. The pat- 1950s and 1960s. The path-breaking research
tern of US foreign policy towards Latin by Ral Prebisch (1951) published in the first
America briefly outlined above carries with it ECLAC economic survey of the region set out
a long tradition of either directly intervening the problem of declining terms of trade, which
in the region or bringing enormous pressure to meant the regions natural resource export-
bear on regional countries, which in turn pro- ing countries would constantly have to sell
vides some of the rationale underpinning the increasing volumes of product to maintain the
turn to a habit of concertacin in the region. same income. Compounding the challenge
The repeated response from Latin American of constantly declining values of national
countries to these pressures has been to col- exports was the need to rely on areas like the
lectivize positions through ad hoc groupings. US and Europe not only for the capital needed
Whether in trade talks such as the WTO and to develop, but also for the technology to keep
FTAA, inter-American political forum such pace economically. Pushing the analysis fur-
as the OAS, or international organizations ther, the more critical elements of the depend-
such as the UN, it is not unusual to see groups ency school put forward arguments that the
of like-minded Latin American countries Northern core countries were engaged in an
picking from the panoply of regional group- almost calculated set of policies to ensure
ings to not only add density to their position, Latin American countries would remain
but also gain political shelter through col- dependent and underdeveloped.
lectivization. An insightful case in point was Arlene Tickner (2014) has translated the
the 2005 Organization of American States essence of Prebischs declining terms of trade
General Assembly, where the almost forgot- argument into foreign policy practice, argu-
ten ALADI trade grouping was revived to kill ing that an autonomist strategy permeates
the host USs proposal to turn the OAS into the region. The central challenge she high-
a type of hemispheric democratic policeman. lights for regional foreign policy planners
Joint action is also seen on a more localized is one of maintaining a degree of national
level. In Canberra the Latin American dip- policy autonomy to purse the domestic and
lomatic community has informally become international goals of the country in ques-
known as the wolf pack because of its will- tion. Three factors are central to the common
ingness to join forces in search of access to problmatique faced by most Latin American
the Australian Government that might other- diplomats. The first relates to economic
wise be impossible. For example, where the power and the challenges countries in the
Australian foreign minister might be reluc- region have historically faced with growing
tant to meet individually with the ambassador the economy while managing precarious debt
from El Salvador, Colombia or even Brazil, levels and unstable financial systems. This
the prospect of covering an entire region automatically restricts the room for manoeu-
with a single meeting combining the Latin vre and effectively limits the range of open
American diplomatic corps has proven an foreign policy options.
Second is a straightforward question of rules written in international institutions will

policy independence. Autonomy as con- place unwanted restrictions on the national
ceived by Max Weber (1978) assumes that autonomy of regional countries and further
there is a difference between a mere freedom marginalize their position at global decision-
of contract and the privilege of regulating making tables. Here the habit of concertacin
his relations with others by his own transac- has proven particularly useful for working
tions. This differentiation is central to under- not only collectively to protect the autonomy
standing Tickners (2003) characterization of of Latin American governments, but also for
a Latin American view of the world, what collaborating with governments from other
she calls the Latin America hybrid approach, regions to advance shared concerns. Married
drawing on elements of dependency theory, to this has been an attitudinal shift through-
classical realism and complex interdepend- out the Americas in the 2000s that has seen
ence. Under the Latin American hybrid a dramatic rise in the self-confidence of vari-
approach, hierarchical relations of domina- ous regional countries to pursue independent
tion and interdependence characterize the foreign policies (Burges, 2005). Examples
international system. The state, viewed in include Venezuelas hard turn to the left with
relatively non-problematic terms, becomes its Bolivarian initiatives, Brazils push to
the principal actor in the international sphere, expand SouthSouth linkages with a major
followed by other types of economic actors emphasis on Africa, and the formation of
such as multinational corporations. the Westward-oriented Pacific Alliance by
The twentieth century contains many Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. In each
examples of the US exerting enormous of these examples the new direction has been
political pressure on countries in the region followed without any apparent need for US
to follow specific domestic and international approval, be it passive or active.
policy tracks. While the directness of this The rising sense of self-confidence and
pressure has certainly varied from de facto willingness to proactively advance national
invasion in parts of Central America to sup- foreign policy priorities is also found amongst
portive backroom whisperings to the gener- the traditionally minor international players
als of 1960s Brazil, what remains common in the region. A case in point is Paraguays
is the existence of a persistent external lobby active involvement within the WTO as a vocal
on national governments. Much of the anti- protagonist in the small land-locked states
American bluster of 2000s foreign policy movement during the 2000s. In addition to
discourse in countries as varied as Venezuela, consistently raising the challenges faced by
Argentina, Ecuador and Brazil has been a land-locked countries within the WTOs global
direct response to the history of direct and trading regime, the otherwise diplomatically
indirect US infringement of national auton- near-silent Paraguay went so far as to convene
omy in the region. Significantly, the heated a meeting of thirty-one land-locked countries
rhetoric has frequently proven to be little in Asuncin in 2005 to articulate a series of
more than a smokescreen for public con- shared concerns and search for common
sumption while bilateral cooperation contin- approaches to shared Doha round concerns
ues to grow quietly in the background. (Oxford Analytica, 2005).
Both of these first two elements are
reflected in the third factor, which is a general
political, economic and military weakness on Key Points
the global stage, which creates serious chal- Repeated pressures from the US have created
lenges for many regional countries seeking to a habit in Latin America of looking for collec-
advance and protect their national interests. tive solutions and seeking strength in numbers
The danger here is that agreements framed and behind common positions.
Collective Latin American positions in inter- predominantly North Atlantic-driven focus

national forums are often the result of intra- that sidelines the serious questions of socio-
continental negotiations that mirror the sorts of economic development that are the main pub-
tensions found globally. lic policy concern in Latin America, but an
A central, unifying goal of Latin American foreign esoteric philanthropic foreign aid endeavour
policy is maintenance of domestic policy autonomy.
for Northern governments.
Regional countries happily collaborate when nec-
essary, but are equally content to independently
Latin American diplomacy is consequently
pursue their core diplomatic agenda. focused tightly on what Susan Strange (1994)
would have called questions of structural
power, aiming to redirect not just the terms
of debate in the international system, but also
STRUCTURAL, NOT RELATIVE POWER
how international institutions operate. The
GAMES result is an apparent focus on multilateralism
and the development and activation of inter-
Paraguays attempts to coordinate an issue- national regimes and organizations. In part
specific negotiating coalition within the WTO this is necessary because even if the largest
share a significant conceptual similarity with regional countries like Brazil and Mexico
the Cancun ministerial meeting story at the had the inclination, they lack the material and
start of this chapter. Much of mainstream political resources needed to advance their
North American International Relations theory agenda by wielding relative power differences
is focused on questions of relative power and to impose their will. Attention is consequently
capability. Indeed, foreign policy analyses and turned to contesting and reinterpreting inter-
the investigation of diplomatic strategies are national norms and the institutions enforcing
focused on motivations crossed with capaci- and supporting them. While this can create
ties to pursue specific goals. The focus conse- an impression that various Latin American
quently becomes one of having enough power countries are at times being obstructionist
to compel the action of another actor to pro- or wantonly destructive, reality is somewhat
ceed in a manner it might not otherwise more complicated. Engagement with global
choose. While questions of relative power are governance structures is underpinned by an
not absent from Latin American diplomatic abiding desire to maintain the current inter-
practice, the underlying autonomist impera- national system, but in a form that is more
tive and the practice of concertacin have inclusive and democratic. After all, the
shifted practical focus from questions of rela- existing normative and institutional frame-
tive power to those of structural power. work provides an effective security blanket
One of the common foundational chal- and clear set of rules within which to pursue
lenges Latin American diplomats have histor- national development goals.
ically had to address when seeking to engage What is contested is the undemocratic
a new issue on the global stage is how they nature of some of the global governance
would obtain not just access to the discussion frameworks, which are seen to be exces-
process, but also a voice at the table bringing sively captured by Northern interests. One of
some impact on the end result. Drawing on the recurrent examples highlighted by Latin
the autonomist principles outlined by Tickner American countries are the Bretton Woods
(2014), the recurring problem diplomats from Institutions, which have an entrenched voting
nearly all regional countries lament is the pattern that ensures US and European eco-
extent to which the nature of the international nomic interests will continue to prevail irre-
system the structures of global governance spective of shifts in global economic power.
actively marginalize all but a handful of core The response from the region is not disen-
countries. Magnifying this challenge is a gagement with these institutions, but rather
the erection of parallel systems that offer problem facing Latin America has been struc-
alternatives. In this context most analysts tural in that the terms of reference for interna-
would immediately point to the rise of the tional debates and negotiations either do not
BRICS Bank and its enthusiastic embrace by include the regions legitimate developmental
many Latin American countries. More telling concerns or assumes they are historical curi-
are small institutions, such as the Banco del osities of little concern to serious countries.
Sur, which is a sort of mini Inter-American The persistent challenge has thus been to get
Development Bank intended to advance past a preconceived notion of Latin American
regional infrastructure investment. On a tech- countries as being financial basket cases or
nocratic level, the ALADI Reciprocal Credit banana republics condemned to the role of
Convention offers an avenue for bypassing commodity producer.
Northern financial intermediation by facilitat- One of the strategies Latin American coun-
ing direct currency transfers between member tries have pursued in an effort to accelerate
countries via Central Bank swaps that avoid domestic socio-economic development has
the need to translate transactions into US dol- been the formation of regional blocs. While
lars. The point to these examples is not that this tradition extends back to the 1960s, it is
they seek to challenge or overturn the exist- only after the lost decade of the 1980s that
ing global economic governance system, but region formation in Latin America appears
rather that they look to broaden it and thus to have taken effective form. Where previ-
improve the structural insertion of regional ous attempts at economic regionalism were
countries, which in turn works to vouchsafe a marked by high levels of protectionism and
bit more autonomy and independence. internal squabbles about the distribution of
industrial production sites, the wave of blocs
formed from the 1990s represent a different
Key Points type of endeavour explicitly aiming to collec-
Latin American diplomacy is predominantly con- tively achieve enhanced insertion in the post-
cerned with questions of structural power relat- Cold War globalized economy as a new route
ing to the rules and norms of the international to national development.
system, not relative power concerns about forc- The turn to the new regionalism in the
ing action by other countries. 1990s also combined with the regions tran-
A shared perception in the region is that Latin sition to democracy, interweaving processes
American interests are structurally excluded of economic and political liberalization such
from global governance regimes reflecting North that domestic reforms were buttressed by a
Atlantic priorities. regional environment not only conducive to
Many global governance institutions such as
change, but actively supportive of it.
the World Bank are perceived throughout Latin
In the first half of the 1990s, the Andean
America as being fundamentally undemocratic in
nature and operation. Pact (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and
Venezuela) intensified integration through
an Open Skies policy and established a
free trade zone and a common external tar-
DEVELOPMENT AS PRIORITY iff. Similarly, negotiations extending back
into the early 1980s led directly to 1990 talks
For over a century Latin American foreign to form a common market between Brazil
policy has focused on the dream of develop- and Argentina, which resulted in the 1991
ment, seeking to modernize the regions pre- Treaty of Asuncin joining those two coun-
dominantly rural, enclave economies and tries as well as Paraguay and Uruguay into
transform them into industrialized, high con- the Common Market of the South, Mercosur.
sumption societies. In diplomatic terms the Both the Andean Pact and Mercosur followed
a broadly neoliberal agenda focused on open- central to this section of the chapter. Latin
ing markets and behaving well, economic American countries have adopted integra-
strategies used by diplomats to establish tion processes as an expression of their
the region internationally as one of serious, need to grow, be recognised, and deal with
politically and economically stable countries their global governance demands. Although
worthy of investment and inclusion in global Unasur lacks economic substance, it has
governance councils. Perhaps the ultimate made great strides in health policy coordina-
expression of this came with Mexicos for- tion (Riggirozzi, 2014) and confidence build-
mation of NAFTA with Canada and the USA ing amongst the regions military forces.
in 1994. The combined effect of these differ- Mercosurs apparent unending economic ten-
ent processes apparently had some serious sions create serious challenges for the respec-
impact on US attitudes towards the region, tive member-state presidents, but also compel
prompting the Clinton presidency to propose frequent high level meetings to coordinate
the formation of a Free Trade Area of the international negotiating positions as well as
Americas at the 1994 Miami Summit of the the sharing of expertise in more prosaic areas
Americas (Arashiro, 2011). of public policy such as phytosanitary con-
A decade into the twenty-first century, much trols in the cattle industry or the cross border
of the economic steam appeared to have gone provision of health and education services in
out of the regional projects launched in the remote areas. On a scholarly level, academ-
1990s. Squabbles over market access marred ics have begun referring to the persistence of
the most successful example, Mercosur. regional cooperation in the Americas as the
Notions of expanding the Southern Cone rise of post-hegemonic regionalism, mean-
bloc into a wider Union of South American ing inter-state cooperation and coordination
Nations, Unasur, appeared to lack the neces- driven by something other than neoliberal
sary economic fundament, particularly if a economic principles (Riggirozzi and Tussie,
hard look was taken at intra-South American 2012). While the aptness of this characteriza-
trade. Matters are further confused if attention is open to debate, the sense that region-
tion is turned to the institutional frameworks alism is offering non-fungible development
for these regional projects. Mercosur has goods, and that these are central foreign
yet to make effective use of its internal dis- policy goals in Latin America, is a considera-
pute resolution system and the blocs parlia- tion to keep in mind when treating with Latin
ment remains something of a toothless kitten American diplomatic agendas.
(Malamud and Dri, 2013). On a continental
level Unasur lacks any substantive decision-
making power and one of its most interest-
Key Points
ing ventures, the South American Defence
College, has yet to begin actual pedagogical National socio-economic development remains
operations. Even the most expansive Latin the overriding public policy priority throughout
American venture, the Community of Latin the region and has a major influence on diplo-
American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC), matic practice.
has neither a permanent home, nor an institu- The formation of regional blocs has emerged
as one strategy for attempting to accelerate
tionalized secretariat.
national development and collectively enhance
Despite the myriad challenges facing the influence internationally.
various regional groupings throughout Latin While regional integration may seem to be ques-
America, the turn to regionalism persists. A tionable as an economic success in the region, it
significant factor contributing to the persever- has offered significant benefits in terms of capac-
ance of the regionalist ethos in Latin America ity building and the sharing of best practices in
lies in the very developmental prerogatives social and development policy.
CONCLUSION driven development and shifts in global

power patterns increase the range of options
As we have argued in this chapter, there is a that countries see open. The extent to which
mistaken tendency to view Latin America as a this will result in significant changes in the
near-homogeneous whole with shared foreign patterns of diplomatic behaviour mapped out
policy priorities. The confusion stems from a in this chapter remains to be seen.
double movement in regional diplomacy that
sees simultaneous coordination and fragmen-
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31
Middle East Diplomacy
Stephan Stetter
INTRODUCTION anxiety understood as the discursive battle-

ground of Middle East diplomacy; popular,
This chapter examines Middle East diplomacy, transnational and cultural diplomacy as key
being informed in particular by historical arenas; and sublime diplomacy as the site at
sociology, global history and social theory. which the social purpose of diplomacy is
The first two perspectives historical sociol- constantly re-constructed.
ogy and global history direct attention
towards the longue dure (Braudel 1996)
shaping Middle East diplomacy over the last DIPLOMACY AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
millennia in general and since the nineteenth
LONGUE DURE AND WORLD SOCIETY
century more specifically. The latter social
theory highlights the changing social and
History of Middle East Diplomacy
political environment within which Middle
East diplomacy unfolds. These are in particu- As the editors of this Handbook explain,
lar the credentials of modern world society/ diplomacy, broadly conceived, concerns the
culture, on the one hand, and a global politi- representation and advocacy of positions and
cal system characterized by considerable interests, the implementation of policies, and
underlying hierarchies both in colonial and the regulation of relations between political
postcolonial environs, on the other. Both identities, including both state and non-state
dimensions are discussed in the second sec- actors (see Introduction). Diplomacy in other
tion. Departing from this understanding, the words relates to the professionalized practice
third section discusses three major sites of of conducting international relations by shap-
Middle East practice/struggles in this context ing imaginaries of the Other and the Self
of modern world society namely diplomatic (Der Derian 1987), both contemporary and
historically and with a view to possible States to forge broad coalitions including
futures. And at the heart of this professional- Arab and other Middle Eastern states in the
ized practice is communication, verbal and first and second Iraq war as well as in the so-
nonverbal, intentional or unintentional so called war on terror against Al-Quaeda since
that diplomacy may be described as a uni- 2001 and the war against ISIS since 2014. We
versal communications network, in which also see a millennia-old centrality of trade in
the exchange of signals is a professional Middle East diplomacy, from Amarna, to the
preoccupation (Jnsson 1996: 191; Albert trans-regional trading system managed by
etal. 2008). the Nabataeans up to the emergence and evolu-
There could, from this perspective that high- tion of global energy diplomacy, ever since the
lights communication, professionalization and Anglo-Persian Oil Company discovered the
identity, hardly be a world region better suited first major oil fields in Persia in 1908 (ibid.).
to the study of diplomacy than the Middle Legal problems are also an infinite diplo-
East. As the ancient Amarna letters testify, the matic concern, such as legal struggles over the
Middle East constitutes one of the early sites application of international law in the context
of broadly documented professionalized dip- of the UN Hariri Tribunal or the acceptance
lomatic communications and identity-based of Palestine, in 2015, as a state party to the
encounters in human history. In the case at Rome Protocol, i.e. the International Criminal
hand this is the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty Court (ICC). So, has at least marriage ceased
and other states of the ancient Near East in to be important in Middle East diplomatic
the mid-fourteenth century BCE (Cohen and practice? Not really. The marriage between
Westbrook 1996: 1). The Amarna letters as Jordans King Abdullah II and his wife Rania,
well as other texts of that period, such as the a Palestinian, was widely received not only as
Hebrew Bible, cover a wide range of diplo- a love affair aka celebrity diplomacy (see
matic relations between Middle Eastern great Chapter 43 in this Handbook) in which the
powers, independent and vassal states and yellow press took considerable interest. It was
non-state units of the day. And the letters pre- simultaneously understood that this is a mar-
sent to us the various practices of international riage that carried a great deal of diplomatic
relations these entities engaged in, including symbolism in re-inscribing Jordans symbolic
dynastic questions, particularly marriage, the power over the Holy Sites in East Jerusalem,
exchange of gifts, alliance and strategic mat- which are Occupied Palestinian Territory
ters, trade, legal problems, the mechanics of under international law, annexed by Israel in
diplomacy (ibid.). 1967, but for which Jordan remains a custo-
Three and a half thousand years later these dian. This marriage was also widely perceived
practices do still characterize the universe of as a signal of reconciliation directed towards
Middle East diplomacy. One difference with Jordanian society, a diplomatic micro-cosmos
current times, however, concerns how the in which Palestinians are the majority in num-
universal communications network underpin- bers but second to the local Bedouins as far
ning Middle East diplomacy has, geographi- as political influence in the royal system of the
cally speaking, a global rather than primarily Hashemite monarchy itself originating from
regional outlook. Yet, also in the twentieth and the Hejaz region in the Arabian peninsula is
twenty-first centuries, dynastic issues, such as concerned.
the succession from father to son in republi- Thus, even when studied over the course
can and monarchic Arab states, shape Middle of millennia, investigating Middle East
East diplomacy. And so do alliance-building diplomacy confirms the observation made by
and strategic matters as in policies by Middle Iver B. Neumann that the tasks of diplomacy
East states (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2002), do not really offer much in terms of newness
as well as the various attempts by the United there are no ongoing tectonic shifts in
Middle East Diplomacy 387
diplomatic practices (Neumann 2013: 3). identity, whereas recourse to ancient Egyptian
Yet, at the same time something is changing. civilization is part of modern Egypts domes-
That change pertains not so much to internal tic and diplomatic identity. Yet, also such
features of diplomacy still revolving around diplomatic practices can hardly be conceived
communication, identity and professionaliza- of without taking recourse to broader world
tion. Instead, change is relevant insofar as the societal horizons in modern diplomacy, such
political and social environment to which dip- as the idea of regional integration as far as
lomatic practice relates undergoes transfor- pan-African identity is concerned or the
mations (see also Sharp 2009; Constantinou importance of respect and tradition in stabi-
and Der Derian 2010; Constantinou 2013). lizing modern identities (and claims to be a
proper nation-state) when ancient heritage in
Egypt comes into play.
Diplomacy and the Social and The nineteenth century is highlighted in
Global History and Historical Sociology as
Political Horizons of World Society
an age of major societal and political trans-
As I discuss in greater detail below, by formation on a world-wide scale (Hobden and
addressing some key sites of Middle East Hobson 2002). This transformation is marked
diplomacy, the major change in the general by at least three processes that also underpin
political and social fields that surround diplo- transformations of Middle East diplomacy,
macy (Neumann 2013: 3), including Middle namely the rise of a modern world culture,
East diplomacy, has been the emergence of a the pervasiveness of modern governmentali-
globalized world culture and forms of global ties and, lastly, the predicaments of a stratified
governmentality since the mid-nineteenth global political system. Firstly, on a societal
century. It is, in other words, the structural level, we observe the emergence and global
embedding of the Middle East in modern diffusion of modern world culture defined on
world society (Stetter 2008) based on an the basis of rationalization, universalization
ever-increasing density of global life [that] and scientization. This modern world culture
keeps changing the old, familiar diplomatic engenders inter alia new and powerful ideas
sites and creating new ones by bringing in about individual subjectivities and social
agents, bringing on new procedures and dis- agency, i.e. models of legitimized actorhood
mantling old ones (Neumann 2013: 3). In (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). In the Middle
short, studying Middle East diplomatic prac- East this can, for example, be studied with
tice requires hooking up this analysis with a view to the emergence of political Islam.
historically informed social theories that Political Islam is, as Dietrich Jung (Jung 2011)
address changing social and political hori- highlighted in a study of the Islamist reformer
zons. As far as the former is concerned I refer Muhammad Abduh, a distinctively modern
primarily to the emergence and evolution of phenomenon based on newly emerging imagi-
modern world society; as far as the latter is naries of social purpose and the role of indi-
concerned I address the underlying hierar- vidual and collective groups in transforming
chies in world politics, both in colonial and society and this includes ideas about con-
postcolonial environs and, possibly, their ducting trans-boundary relations within the
dialectical synthesis into a global post-post- Islamic world and towards the West (ibid.).
colonial worldwide liberation geography Modern world culture also underpins the rise
(Dabashi 2012: 11). This is not to argue that of nationalism during the nineteenth century
encounters with temporal or geographical in Egypt, amongst pan-Arab nationalists,
Others can be entirely reduced to the notion Maronites in Lebanon or the Zionist move-
of global social horizons. Thus, Muammar ment in Palestine, which all claimed ethnic/
Qaddafi invoked ideas about pan-African national self-determination and engaged in
various diplomatic practices geared towards as the Middle East, that were either construed
domestic constituency as well as regional and lacking such standards or at least had to be
global powers in order to foster this goal. educated and guided by Europeans in order to
Secondly, this process goes hand in hand acquire this status one day. Arguably, this ine-
with the spread of modern, global govern- quality and the perception thereof also under-
mentalities (Larner and Walters 2004), result- pin much of the nervous diplomatic practice
ing amongst others in a massive expansion of surrounding the diplomatic negotiations
policy areas in which political engineering between the P5+1 powers and Iran. These
and biopolitical control of populations by both negotiations have as much to do with shifts in
nation-states and international bodies are now the regional balance of power feared by some
considered necessary for ensuring societal (Arab states, Israel) and aspired to by others
progress, e.g. in education, agriculture, health (Iran) as with an underlying debate about the
policy or economic development. It thus under- future role of the US in regional politics, i.e.
pins the reform and growth of state bureaucra- a perception of a deeper structural inequality
cies and international organizations since the in world politics that continues to turn extra-
mid-nineteenth century, both in Europe and regional support into a premium objective in
the Middle East (for Egypt see Jacob 2011). contemporary Middle East diplomacy.
This includes the reform of military and diplo-
matic services in the region, a famous example
being the way the Ottoman Empire adapted Key Points
both domestically and in its foreign relations A benchmark date in Middle East diplomacy is
to broader societal transformations associated the nineteenth century, when the (diplomatic)
with bureaucratization, capitalism, functional encounter between the West and the Middle
differentiation, legal positivism, urbanization, East intensified, in particular in the context of
individualization and others. Modern govern- colonialism and anti-colonial opposition to this
mentalities are also visible in the manifold stratified global political order.
multilateral activities of regional and inter- At the same time, and based on isomorphism,
national organizations, in particular since the this sparked the setting-up of modern profes-
sionalized diplomatic services, often trying to
establishment of the UN and the Arab League,
prevent or overcome colonialism by emulating
that deal with a broad range of policy-issues ideas about modern diplomacy, e.g. in Egypt,
such as regional security, peace-building, edu- Iran and the late Ottoman Empire as well as in
cation, development and others. postcolonial states in the region.
Yet, and thirdly, what distinguished the
Middle East and other non-Western regions
such as the Balkans, East Asia or sub-Saharan
Africa from the West was the linkage of this SITES OF MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY
social transformation with a political hori-
zon shaped by a great degree of stratification Departing from this understanding of diplo-
(Albert etal. 2013), aka Western dominance, macy being embedded in larger historical,
in particular Great Britain at the time. In social and political horizons, I will in the fol-
short, the underpinnings of nineteenth century lowing address three major sites of Middle East
world political order were based on colonial- practice/struggles in this context of modern
ism as one of international societys key pri- world society: diplomatic anxiety understood
mary institutions (Buzan 2004; Keene 2002), as the discursive battleground of Middle East
thereby justifying relatively persistent pat- diplomacy; popular, transnational and cultural
terns of stratified inequality between the West diplomacy as key arenas; and sublime diplo-
as the self-proclaimed standard-bearer of civi- macy as the site at which the social purpose
lization vis--vis the rest of the world, such of diplomacy is constantly re-constructed.
Diplomatic Anxiety The visit of Sultan Abdlaziz at the World

Fair in Paris in 1867 is a case in point for these
This double embedding in a rapidly trans- key features of Middle East diplomatic anxi-
forming societal order and in a hierarchical ety (see Bilgin 2014). On the one hand, and in
international political system has posed a breaking with entrenched beliefs of the High
major challenge regarding the place of the Porte about its supreme status, the Sultan and
Middle East in modern world society, his diplomatic corps engaged in modern dip-
although it needs to be acknowledged that the lomatic practice; a total of 41 national delega-
Middle East is not the only world region tions were present at the fair and this was the
struggling with these predicaments of moder- first foreign state visit of a Sultan to the West
nity. Note that the emergence of modern outside the context of warfare, a crash course
world society has also been a major challenge in modern bilateralism (with France) and
in the West (Alexander 2013). This double multilateralism (in relation to the other states
embedding nevertheless had its direct reper- being present). On the other hand, however,
cussions on Middle East diplomacy, more this engagement with modern diplomacy did
precisely on what Pinar Bilgin has defined as not happen from a position of strength. Thus,
Middle East anxieties (Bilgin 2012). the Ottoman Empire was already at this time
Diplomatic anxiety constituted a twofold under great pressure to maintain its politi-
challenge for Middle Eastern states and for cal status in international society. Its decline
those entities that aspired and still, like for was visible first and foremost in the loss of
example the Kurds, aspire to statehood. On territorial possessions in Europe, the increas-
the one hand, it entailed the adaptation of ing dependence on European advisors in the
diplomatic structures to emergent global context of Ottoman military and economic
expectations about how a modern diplo- reform and, finally, the growing influence of
macy looks and operates, e.g. in relation to European powers within the Sultans realm.
attire, etiquette and various practices of con- The latter happened in particular through
ducting proper bilateral and multilateral the diplomatic practice of offering so-called
relations. Thus, the Ottoman Empire and Capitulations to Europeans. While this has
Persia in the late nineteenth century and then, been an old diplomatic practice, it changed
in the early twentieth century, the Jewish self- its character during the nineteenth century in
administration in Palestine and various Arab that Capitulations were no longer a privilege
nationalist movements established diplomatic granted by the Sultan to foreign representa-
services that allowed these states and would- tives in an autonomous manner. Capitulations
be-states to play the game of sovereignty instead increasingly became a power tool in
(Aalberts 2010) by maintaining bi- and mul- the hands of the West through which, since
tilateral relations with other entities, primar- the 1870s, states such as Austria-Hungary,
ily states and international bodies. Yet, on the Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia
other hand, Middle East actors engaged in forged diplomatic relations with local, often
this already quite challenging organizational Christian constituencies, thereby furthering
transformation under immense distress. They the internal fragmentation of the Ottoman
were anxious to avoid being colonized or Empire in this age of nationalism. In some
exploited by Western powers. This is what the places, such as Jerusalem, formally and until
Ottoman Empire and, later, the Republic of 1917 an Ottoman Sandak (i.e. Ottoman
Turkey as well as Persia/Iran feared, and what administrative province), it was now European
defined the fate of Arabs that sought inde- ambassadors that effectively governed the
pendence and self-determination after Britain place and competed for influence, conduct-
and France took over former territories of the ing a war of the consuls (Wasserstein 2001:
Ottoman Empire following World War I. 1444), with Ottoman authorities being on the
retreat. With the formal establishment of the that, if we add that the Ottoman practices
Republic of Turkey in 1923 this diplomatic owed much to Byzantine ones, it would cer-
anxiety did not fade away. Although formal tainly be correct to view modern diplomacy
colonization no longer constituted an imme- as an Ottoman-European hybridisation.
diate threat, the fear of a Western-sponsored Take the example of Sultan Abdlazizs
plan to disintegrate Turkey endured. The so- state visit to Paris. The fact that many
called Svres-syndrome, named after the city Europeans were surprised about the mod-
in which the Ottoman Empire had to accept ern appearance of the Sultan and his dip-
far-reaching territorial and sovereignty- lomatic corps (Bilgin 2014) attests as much
related concessions dictated by the victorious to these shared EuropeanMiddle Eastern
powers of World War I, penetrates postcolo- roots of modern diplomacy as to the under-
nial diplomatic anxiety in Turkey until today lying Orientalist imaginaries in the West
(Bilgin 2012). about the Middle East, both historically and
This oscillation between adaptation of contemporary, that gave rise to Middle East
diplomatic structures, on the one hand, and diplomatic anxiety in the first place, but also
an underlying diplomatic anxiety in relation to the perception (and anxiety) in Western
to actual or potential colonial aspirations or diplomatic discourse about the Middle East
a fear of being merely a pawn in a basically being a perennial conflict site that had to be
Western game of power, on the other, not governed, managed and contained. While
only shaped Ottoman and Turkish politics. the status of colonialism as a primary insti-
It also underpinned Persian diplomacy and tution of international society crumbled,
the diplomatic conduct of entities such as the postcolonial underpinnings of the contem-
short-lived Arab National Congress and the porary global order inform Middle East dip-
Zionist movement in Palestine, which were lomatic anxieties until today. Thus, formal
striving for self-determination through a mix and informal hierarchies in international
of various forms of resistance and sophisti- society, often privileging the West, continue
cated diplomatic action meant to garner not to shape in/securities in the Middle East,
only domestic but also intra-regional and e.g. in the context of contemporary Iranian
Western support for independence and a or Turkish diplomacy. Similar observations
simultaneous fear of falling prey to politi- can be made with a view to Egyptian anxie-
cal or economic interests of the West. One ties about foreign plots meant to undermine
word of caution, however, is at place here. Egypts stability, Iranian anxieties about being
For it would be incorrect to regard this turn encircled by the US and its Sunni allies a
to modern diplomacy as an imposition of fear nurtured by the historical experience
foreign practices. Modernity, including mod- with the US-sponsored coup dtat against
ern diplomacy, is not a Western innovation Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 as
but a global transformation that has a deep well as Israeli anxieties about the Jewish
history (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011: 7) in states survival (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami
regions beyond the West, including the vari- 2002). It would, however, be wrong to
ous encounters with the modern condition in regard diplomatic anxiety as nothing but a
the Middle East. As the case of the High Porte reactive force that solely leads to geostrate-
makes clear, the diplomatic culture of interna- gic alliance-building, realist policies and
tional society in the nineteenth century owed military action. There is also a productive
as much as to new diplomatic practices side underpinning diplomatic anxiety. Thus,
as it did to old Byzantine elements, many Middle East diplomatic anxiety also engen-
of which were cherished by the Ottoman ders new modern forms of multilateral
Empire (see below on sublime diplomacy). organization meant to strengthen the Middle
That is why Neumann (2013: 26) concludes Easts collective weight in world politics, a
prominent example being the establishment diplomatic encounters attest for the time
of OPEC through which the oil-exporting being to Wallersteins (1990) observation that
countries in the region not only fostered their indeed identity is the cultural battleground
status in relation to importing nations in the of modernity, including modern diplomacy.
West but also increased their diplomatic sta- Given the deep perturbation of Middle East
tus as responsible actors on a global scale politics at global, regional, national and local
(Richert 2014). Diplomatic anxieties of that levels by logics of conflict (Stetter 2008),
sort also informed the game of Arab poli- diplomatic anxiety is, thus, as much a con-
tics (Barnett 1998: 7) in the years after Arab sequence of a strong antagonization of iden-
nations gained independence. Thus, this tities in Middle East diplomatic encounters
game was not only taking place on a bilateral as it is about reifying such notions of the
level but was mitigated, after the failure of Self and the Other in everyday diplomatic
the Baghdad Pact (ibid.: 10820), through a practice.
newly founded regional multilateral organi-
zation, namely the Arab League. Back then,
and to some degree still today, Arab identity Popular, Transnational and
politics revolved around the defining issues Cultural Diplomacy as Key Arenas
of Arab states relationship to [Arab] uni-
fication, the West, and confrontation with Diplomatic anxiety stands in a close interre-
Zionism (ibid.: 17). Anxieties, however, lation with what can be termed Middle East
not only related to extra-regional (West) and popular diplomacy. Popular diplomacy is a
intra-regional (Iran, Israel, at times Turkey) distinctively modern practice insofar as it is
outsiders, but shaped intra-Arab diplomatic based on a direct, symbiotic relationship
practice too. More precisely, Arab lead- between rulers and modern subjects. It is not
ers of the 1950s and 1960s feared Egyptian about a diplomatic game that largely takes
President Gamal Abd-El Nasrs actual or place in and between royal courts and foreign
potential interventions in domestic politics ministries or only about soft power instru-
in Jordan, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. Also ments used in foreign policy to win the hearts
today, the game of Arab/Middle East politics and minds of Others (Nye 2008), but one that
is characterized by such diplomatic anxie- stresses the centrality of public opinion and
ties that revolve around the alleged or real the need for decision-makers to ensure that
destabilizing impact of the Shiite crescent their policies are supported by a wider
(as Abdullah II named it) or around the desta- national and international audience. In con-
bilizing impact of powerful regional actors trast to public diplomacy, these Others are not
such as Saudi-Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and oth- conceived of as objects to be targeted but,
ers on the situation in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, e.g. by invoking mass mobilization and lob-
Palestine and Syria. bying, as active and at least semi-autonomous
What is central about diplomatic anxiety subjects to engage with. Popular diplomacy
is, thus, that this practice is deeply entangled has strong historical roots in the modern
with the underlying hierarchies of Middle Middle East, and in other non- Western
East politics. It remains to be seen if the dia- regions, due to the importance liberation and
lectic between Western and Middle Eastern independence movements attributed to the
postcolonial anxieties will any time soon fostering of national identities and mass
synthesize into a cosmopolitan worldli- mobilization in support of their diplomatic
ness (Dabashi 2012: 11) based on some strive for self-determination and sovereignty
kind of Habermasian post-ethnical/world- (Reus-Smit 2011).
ethical diplomacy. Notions of the Self and But popular diplomacy is not only about
Other constructed and reified in Middle East the practice of mobilizing national opinion,
e.g. how the Arab street has been used and, society, e.g. the role of the non-governmental
simultaneously, constrained by various auto- pro-Palestinian BDS (aka boycott, divest-
cratic Arab rulers. Popular diplomacy has a ment, and sanctions) movement, directed
distinctively international dimension too. For against Israel/Israels occupation, in con-
example, Nasrs policy of using Saut Al-Arab structing Global Palestine (Collins 2012).
[The Voice of the Arabs], an Egyptian radio As Neumann (2013: 14) observes, the
station broadcasting throughout the Middle number and kinds of sites where diplomacy
East, was a powerful diplomatic tool that plays out seem to be mushrooming. And this
allowed Nasr to transmit his political ideas is also the case in Middle East diplomacy,
into other Arab states, forging pan-Arab where sub-state actors such as Hezbollah or
identities and side-lining other Arab lead- the Kurdish autonomous government in Iraq
ers (Barnett 1998). Similar arguments are engage in diplomatic practice and conduct
made today about Qatari popular diplomacy, diplomacy autonomously from the nation-
namely the role of the satellite TV station states within which they are based. It also
Al-Jazeera, based in Doha, and its role in relates to domestic groups that play a promi-
augmenting Qatars diplomatic status and nent role in limiting the manoeuvring space
political influence throughout the region, of national governments in relation to their
e.g. in the context of Al-Jazeeras role in diplomatic conduct, e.g. Islamist organiza-
de-legitimizing autocratic rulers such as tions in Jordan that put pressure on the gov-
Mubarak, Assad or Ben Ali (but of course not ernment to limit diplomatic relations with
the Emir of Qatar himself) in the context of the Israel after the 1994 peace treaty between
Arab uprisings since 2011. Another example Israel and Jordan, or the Yesha council of
is Israeli and Palestinian popular diplomacy. Israeli settlers that mobilizes public opinion
Both sides invest considerable resources in in Israel against a freeze of settlement activi-
reaching out in particular to Western publics. ties, a key diplomatic demand raised rou-
Hasbara (Hebrew for public diplomacy) even tinely by the international community.
is a formally recognized pillar of Israeli for- The most prominent site of transnational
eign policy (Cummings 2012) a practice diplomacy then arguably is the role of non-
diligently exercised as well by the PLO, both governmental organizations (NGOs), in par-
in its early-years populist diplomacy (Matar ticular in relation to peace building. Note that
2013) as well as the more recent forms of the Oslo process between Israel and the PLO
popular diplomacy pursued by the Palestinian was, on the Israeli side, not initiated by the
Authority, e.g. when attempting to mobilize state. In fact, maintaining contact with PLO
in particular Western publics in support of representatives was a criminal act in Israel
Palestines statehood bid at the UN. prior to the Oslo Agreements. Yet notwith-
Popular diplomacy thus attests to the standing this policy, it was an Israeli NGO,
transformation of diplomacy in light of major namely the Economic Cooperation Foundation
societal changes that render the wider public (ECF), that held the first secret talks with
an integral and active subject of diplomatic the PLO, only then cautiously informing the
practice. This wider public is, thus, not a pas- Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres about
sive or at least reactive site of diplomacy as the positive signals for a peace agreement
implicitly implied by notions of public diplo- between both sides (Hirschfield and Roling
macy, which assume that state bodies still 2000). On a much broader scale, NGOs such
tend to take the lead. It also legitimizes and as the transnational International Crisis Group
gives rise to what can be referred to as trans- (ICG) have become part of the globalized
national diplomacy, the participation of a site of transnational diplomacy in the sphere
growing number of actors that actively shape of conflict governance (Nabo and Stetter
new sites of diplomacy beyond international 2012) by gathering information about the
interests of conflict parties, proposing realis- Moreover, engaging in cultural dialogue, in

tic and rational scenarios for conflict reso- particular dialogue between religions, has
lution and, more generally speaking, forging become a standard practice of diplomacy,
knowledge about the various conflicts in the Middle East occupying a central place in
the Middle East and how to properly address that regard (Abu-Nimer etal. 2007). In 1967
them (ibid.). the Vatican set up its Pontifical Council for
One of the key functions of modern diplo- Interreligious Dialogue. However, Middle
macy, formally organized in the context of East actors play a particularly prominent role
the United Nations and symbolized through in contemporary inter-religious dialogue as a
ideas such as a shared human heritage and diplomatic practice, in particular Arab monar-
the equality of people, is to engage in dip- chies, e.g. the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
lomatic rituals of cultural dialogue that cel- This is actually one example of the roots of
ebrate humanity (Stetter 2005; for a related modern diplomacy in the Middle East, other
perspective see Constantinou 2013). Cultural examples being the ability not least of Arab
dialogue is a diplomatic site that is based on nations to render the Israel/Palestine con-
an understanding of a shared, yet fragmented, flict a key component in the development of
global order in which as a result of globaliza- international law (Stetter forthcoming). Thus,
tion civilizations have to find ways of peace- while religion is often sidelined in profes-
ful co-existence that leave their (imagined) sionalized Western diplomatic discourse, it is
traditions intact (see Anderson 2006). As firmly established as a tool for peace-building
Dietrich Jungs study of cultural encounters and coexistence on a global level not only but
between European and Muslim intellectu- also through the active agency of Middle East
als shows, such cultural encounters and joint diplomacy, thereby globalizing some of the
dialogues about co-existence in a rapidly positive experiences (or rather myths about
globalizing world in which traditions have to what is perceived to be positive) of religious
be valued and cherished is a diplomatic prac- co-existence that existed in the Middle East
tice that dates back to the nineteenth century for centuries.
(Jung 2011). Today, states often market this
idea by highlighting their nations unique
placement between tradition and modernity Sublime Diplomacy
in order to attract foreign visitors. Tourism
has become a key site of cultural diplomatic A final site to be discussed here is what Iver
practice, and this is also the case throughout Neumann refers to as sublime diplomacy,
the Middle East (Hazbun 2004). namely the set of aesthetics (Neumann 2013:
As a (non-military) response to the attacks 143) any diplomacy needs. The sublime ele-
by Al-Quaeda on the US on 11 September ment of diplomacy defines its social purpose:
2001, cultural dialogue has become an even that its aesthetics, if successful, will alter the
more prominent playing field of Middle East state of the opposite numbers and in so doing
diplomacy. The EU promotes cultural dia- mentally knock them off site (ibid.). Diplomacy
logues in its relations with the Middle East and is as much about creating impressiveness and
has set up the Alexandria-based Anna-Lindh- about the indirect power resting with configu-
Foundation to promote this idea of cultural rations of the sublime as it is about information,
dialogue as a cornerstone of EU foreign policy negotiation, threats and compromise. It is worth
in the context of the European Neighbourhood thinking about the effects the display of
Policy (ENP), in addition to the manifold aesthetics produces on others, the extravagan
technocratic diplomatic linkages the EU cies of Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi,
maintains, mainly between the European who resided in his own desert tents protected
Commission and Middle East governments. by well-dressed female officers during
diplomatic visits, being a particularly glamor- East Quartet in relation to their attempts to
ous example. redeem local populations and humankind
Neumann suggests a genealogy of three from the grievances of the Syrian civil war or
layers of modern sublime diplomacy. The first the IsraelPalestine conflict.
layer relates to inducing effects through the Of course, in modernity, diplomacy has lost
display of (manipulative) grandeur (ibid.), a much of its mystical appeal and, therefore,
practice originating particularly in Byzantine Neumann rightfully highlights a third layer
diplomacy, thereby attesting to the aforemen- of sublime diplomacy, its mundane and noble,
tioned argument that modern diplomacy is a yet never-ending, role in fostering global
global mlange (Pieterse 2009) of European goods. The aesthetics of diplomacy rely on
and Middle Eastern practices. One only its irretrievability. The globe is a space to be
needs to think here of the grandeur displayed governed, and diplomacy is a cornerstone of
by Gulf state monarchies e.g. in dress code, global governmentality. This is because:
architecture, and rituals such as falconry and
how this used to impress others in diplomatic the world is in constant need of mediation. The
encounters, with the objective to turn states demand for the good offices of diplomats never
stops it is infinite. There is always more diplo-
such as Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab
matic energy to spend. Perhaps diplomatic practice
Emirates from peripheral states into (urban) cannot be said to be sublime but the task at
centres of world society in which humanity which it is directed, the upkeep of social peace and
celebrates itself, e.g. at Formula One races, the industry of the worlds subjects, certainly is.
the FIFA World Cup, or at museums and (Neumann 2013: 1423)
campuses that mirror both the diversity of
cultures and the shared beauty of humankind This third layer of sublime diplomacy thus
unified through art and education. not only relates to mediation in terms of
A second layer of sublime diplomacy and peace-building, such as the diffusion of
one that originated in early modernity with models like transitional justice (e.g. the Hariri
the formation of a public sphere (Neumann Tribunal) or peacekeeping operations to the
2013: 144) is the mystique of diplomacy. Middle East. These are some of the good
Diplomacy became part of social dialogues, offices diplomatic actors leaders, NGOs,
but it was largely watched by the public from international organizations, judges offer
a distance at this layer, and on a global conflict-ridden societies in the Middle East.
scale, people still follow and guess what is Probably even more important though, the
going on in diplomacy and they feel suitably third layer of sublime diplomacy comprises
relieved when terror has been kept at bay a much wider range of biopolitical interven-
(ibid.) thanks to the disinterested services tions meant to render Middle Eastern societies
of leaders and professional diplomats. The more compatible with modern world culture
orchestration of strong leadership as a bul- and bringing about inner-worldly redemption
wark against terror and insecurity by lead- from societal ills. Such sustainable diploma-
ers such as Mubarak and Al-Sissi in Egypt, cies (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010:
Netanyahu in Israel or Erdogan in Turkey, 7) are, for example, the rationale underpin-
as well as the display of shuttle diplomacy ning the Arab Human Development Reports
by professional diplomats such as Henry (AHDR), which originated from diplomatic
Kissinger, Joschka Fischer, John Kerry and encounters coordinated by the UNDP, and
Mohammad Javad Zarif, draws from this which came up with a long list of prescrip-
mysticisms of the sublime, as does the hope tions for how to overcome what was sketched
invested, rather counterfactually, in figures in these reports as a self-inflicted, self-Ori-
such as UN mediator Lahman Brahimi or entalizing lack of progress in Arab nations.
Tony Blair, the Representative of the Middle They also figure prominently in the education
activities of the UNRWA in Palestinian refu- also, and even in a conflict-ridden region such
gee camps, the water sanitation policy of the as the Middle East much more than, the art of
WHOs Eastern Mediterranean Program in alliance building. Middle East diplomacy, as
Lebanon, or the refugee policy of the UNHCR diplomacy on other referent objects, is first of
in Libya. There is always a crisis somewhere all a process of social imagination in this
a conflict, water quality, educational injus- case rendering this region, or parts thereof, a
tices, exclusion, economic distress and the locale that requires political intervention and
most sublime task of Middle East diplomacy the good offices of professionalized and eve-
is to spend its energy tackling these problems. ryday, public diplomatic practice. The Middle
East is such a locale at which crises and spaces
of intervention are identified. Then, and in
Key Points order to manage and solve these problems,
various forms of global governmentalities are
Middle East diplomacy is deeply embedded in set in place. Peace-building, human develop-
discourses and practices of postcolonial diplo- ment, neo-liberal economics, inter-religious
matic anxieties. This shapes policies to ensure dialogue and humanitarian refugee policies
independence and autonomy from the West in
are only some examples of such modern
the region, and fears of the Middle East as a cha-
prescriptions meant to remedy at least some of
otic and conflictive realm of danger in the West.
Middle East diplomacy has moved from the level the symptoms of crisis. The diplomat in the
of high politics to what I call popular diplomacy form of the politician, the bureaucrat, the reli-
that relies on and imagines everyday practices gious leader, the NGO campaigner, the sol-
and individuals not as objects of diplomacy but dier, the developmental worker or simply the
as potentially active subjects. This also underpins sensitive tourist or any other individual is the
transnational diplomacy (involvement of sub- modern subject that is called upon to actively
state political actors) and cultural diplomacy contribute to bettering the worlds fate in
(invoking tradition and practices of religious/ countless popular diplomacy dialogues that
cultural dialogue). engender diplomatic actorhood for states,
Finally, sublime diplomacy gives purpose to tra-
leaders, NGOs and individuals.
ditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy by
At the same time, however, this post-
giving it an aura of grandeur and, increasingly,
a technocratic, problem-solving outlook. Middle postcolonial cosmopolitan worldliness
East diplomacy has to reconcile the grandeur (Dabashi 2012: 11) remains, for the time
of states, leaders and families with displays of being, entangled with deeper structures of
sustainability, e.g. showing that Middle East diplo- inequality, hierarchy and stratification in
macy cares about the need of individuals in wel- world politics that reify this region and its
fare, education, etc. and not just in grand games. people as a site of problems and intervention
rather than solution to the worlds problems,
the aftermath of the Arab Spring arguably
reinforcing this imaginary. The Orientalist
CONCLUSION: SPACES OF imaginary of the Middle East as a zone of
INTERVENTION AND DIPLOMATIC conflict and backwardness, thereby justifying
SITES all sorts of interventions by states, alliances,
NGOs and international organizations from
As I have highlighted in this article, Middle the region and beyond, attests to this. Attesting
East diplomacy comprises much more than to the hybrid nature of modern diplomacy as a
the shuttle diplomacy of politicians from mlange of Western and non-Western sources,
Henry Kissinger to John Kerry, who present Middle East diplomacy is, notwithstanding
themselves and are presented by others as these hierarchies, today unimaginable without
effective mediators and peacemakers. It is the highly legitimized input from actors and
ideas from the region, and not only because Anderson, Benedict (2006) Imagined
Arabic is one of the six official languages Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
of the UN. This confirms the argument that Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso.
for postcolonial diplomacy to be a credible Barnett, Michael N. (1998) Dialogues in Arab
proposition, it must appear to be inclusive Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order.
Princeton, NJ: Columbia University Press.
of non-Western diplomatic norms as well
Bilgin, Pinar (2012) Globalization and In/
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UN resolutions and international law and Bilgin, Pinar (2014) The International in
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32
African Diplomacy
Asteris Huliaras and Konstantinos Magliveras
DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA: FROM PRE- The dispatch of dignitaries, often referred

COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL TIMES to as messengers, linguists or heralds,
was common in pre-colonial Africa (Smith
African diplomacy has a long history. As early 1976: 727; Adjaye 1996). These individuals
as the sixteenth century many centralized and their possessions often enjoyed a meas-
states of pre-colonial western and eastern ure of immunity. They also carried something
Africa had developed sophisticated diplomatic similar to diplomatic credentials. For exam-
practices. These practices were based on cus- ple, representatives of the Asante kingdom
tomary law and, for some historians, could be carried a staff that was topped by the figure
regarded as the first steps to a permanent or of a hand holding an egg. This image was
continuous diplomacy (Smith 1976: 9). designed to convey the warning that neither
Pre-colonial African diplomacy linked the the king nor his representative should press a
coastal and forest states of West and East matter too hard nor treat it too lightly (Smith
Africa with the savannah lands to the north. 1976: 12). In some African states, gradually
It also regulated contacts of these states with a class of officials emerged who were spe-
the Arab world and the Ottoman Empire cialists in the conduct of foreign relations and
as well as with a variety of European trad- may fairly be described as professional diplo-
ers, missionaries, hunters and travellers. matists (Irwin 1975: 82).
Diplomatic activity in pre-colonial Africa A practice that resembles contemporary
exhibits several similarities to that developed diplomacy was the deliberate and tortu-
in feudal Europe: in Africa treaties were ous pace of negotiations (Smith 1976: 16).
negotiated, frontiers (of trade and authority As Irvin (1975: 83) notes:
more often than of territory) were delimited, the literature of African exploration is full of the
past disputes were settled, and potential cri- exasperated comments of travelers held up by
ses argued away (Irwin 1975: 83). what seemed to them unwarranted delays and
African Diplomacy 399
exactions. The more perceptive of these travelers Arabs or the Europeans meant: though they
came in time to see method in what they had early could not read, they memorized the terms and,
regarded as bloody-mindedness.
if its clauses were not kept by the co-signed
party, they resorted to war (Irwin 1975: 84).
Public flattering and exchange of gifts were European penetration to Africa in the
common practices. A West African custom nineteenth century was initially slow.
was the eating of kola nuts, a stimulant that However, in the late 1870s it began to escalate
allowed negotiators to stay awake throughout into a fierce scramble for territory. The Berlin
the night. The mutual breaking of kola nuts was Conference (18845) signified the beginning
also the usual sign of peace (Smith 1976: 18). of Africas partition. There had been a
Nevertheless and despite similarities with variety of motives for European colonialism.
medieval Europe, African pre-colonial diplo- Geopolitical calculations and economic
macy differed in two important aspects: there interests were among the most important.
was neither a single religion as Christianity However, European statesmen did not always
nor a powerful and respected institution com- control imperial expansion. Private interests
parable to the papacy that could help organ- also played a role for example, British
ize international relations at the highest level. missionaries and traders pressurized their
Thus, in contrast to medieval European rulers home governments to extend the colonial
that met one another frequently to settle dis- boundaries inland.
putes, African leaders rarely if ever, met face Resistance, negotiation and adaptation
to face (Irwin 1975: 83). were the means by which Africans sought to
Despite a diplomacy that aimed at pre- defend their societies. Constrained by mili-
venting conflict and promoting cooperation, tary inferiority, the leaders of the continent
pre-colonial Africa was far from peaceful. had to decide whether to fight or negotiate
Warfare was considered as a legitimate for- with invaders seeking to convert their paper-
eign policy tool to satisfy both political and partition into power on the ground (Iliffe
economic ends (Ajayi and Smith 1971). For 1997: 193). Amidst complex calculations
example, in the eighteenth century, the lead- (ranging from domestic rivalries to maintain-
ers of the Oyo Empire pursued war as an ing sources of income like slave trading) of
annual or bi-annual exercise. how to react to European conquest, African
Pre-colonial African diplomacy was heav- polities were deeply divided between war
ily influenced by Islam and contacts with the and peace parties. In Buganda, the weaker
Europeans (Smith 1973). The first contrib- Protestant party used the British forces as
uted literacy and led, at least in the Islamized allies to secure its predominance over Roman
states of West and East Africa and Asante, to Catholic, Muslim and traditionalist parties
the evolution of chanceries. For example, the (Iliffe 1997: 194). In Sokoto, a minority
Bornu state maintained official relations with fought to the death, while others preferred
the Ottoman Empire for almost three centu- withdrawal, departing eastwards towards
ries. The second influence, though facilitating Mecca (Iliffe 1997: 194). Zaira, another pol-
communication between Africa and the rest ity on poor terms with Sokoto, opened its
of the world through the spread of European gates. On the contrary, Kano strengthened its
languages, did not have an immediate impact walls but completely failed to stop invading
on African diplomatic practices. Thus, the British forces. Locally dominant, militarized
resident embassy of sixteenth century Europe polities were not the only ones dominated
did not spread in the continent until the nine- by hawks. Stateless people who lived amidst
teenth century. Nevertheless, from very early continuous inter-village warfare and cher-
on, the natives in West and Central Africa had ished their own notions of honour, also vio-
a very clear idea of what a treaty with the lently resisted European expansion (Iliffe
1997: 195). However, it soon became clear Central Africa often enjoyed a high level of
that it was impossible to hold out against the autonomy. Thus they became masters in nego-
superior European forces. It was African mil- tiating with colonial authorities. Church lead-
itary incapacity rather than poor diplomacy ers, army commanders and trade unionists
that made the European partition possible. created a bottom up African diplomacy that
Colonialism in Africa lasted for less than was informal, elaborate and flexible but which
a century. Throughout these years the repre- also remained largely unrecorded in the con-
sentation of Africans was the prerogative of tinents history. As a result, its important suc-
European capitals. There was much diplo- cesses are fragmented in hundreds of individual
macy about Africa but little African diplo- stories, personal biographies and anthropologi-
macy, at least at the official level. Only when cal studies and the full picture of its impact on
the states of the continent became formally colonialism but also on post-colonial foreign
independent mainly in the 1960s did policies (as many of these individuals occupied
the era of modern African state diplomacy government positions) remains rather unclear.
begin. A well-known exception is Ethiopian However, this hidden diplomacy was defi-
diplomacy in the League of Nations. In nitely more present in British colonies where
April 1923, Ras Tafari, the heir to the throne colonial rule was usually less direct.
of Ethiopia, submitted an application for The diplomacy of most independent
his countrys membership to the League of African countries had two objectives: first,
Nations. Britain opposed the application on ensure state survival and second, safeguard
the grounds that Ethiopia was not yet suf- domestic regimes. As the common experience
ficiently civilized and politically cohesive in post-colonial Africa (with very few excep-
to warrant it (Iadarola 1975: 601). However, tions) was that territories came first, and the
thanks to the support of France, Ethiopia state was established inside them (Clapham
became a member of the League. It was there 1996: 47), securing territorial integrity
that Ras Tafari, subsequently Emperor Haile became the main priority. The problem was
Selassie, delivered in 1936 his famous speech the arbitrariness of African boundaries inher-
condemning the use of chemical weapons by ited from the colonial era: 44 per cent were
Italy in the second Italo-Ethiopian War. straight lines, most countries had only a lim-
The attack on Ethiopia by Mussolinis ited ability to defend them and there were
forces mobilized a new actor in African diplo- many groups that would welcome whole-
macy: the former slaves in the New World. sale challenges to them (Herbst 1989: 676).
For the African diaspora, Christian Ethiopia To ensure their territorial integrity, African
had become the heart of African civiliza- states formed the Organisation of African
tion, the place, the symbol, the idea and the Unity and decided as early as 1964 to respect
promise (Cohen 1997: 37). In 1935 some the borders existing on their achievement of
20,000 Afro-American protesters, some bear- national independence (Herbst 1989: 676). In
ing Ethiopian flags, marched in a 1935 rally to the decades that followed, African bounda-
New Yorks Madison Square. Others attacked ries were more stable than those of any other
their Italian neighbours (Cohen 1997: 39). continent. The emergence of Eritrea in 1993
It was the first sign of a politicization of and to a lesser extent South Sudan in 2011
the African diaspora that would become an did not seem to contravene the OAU bound-
important actor in African diplomacy in the ary doctrine. In fact, both cases were more a
1970s and the 1980s (Akyeampong 2000). return to colonial boundaries.
In Africa itself, throughout the colonial Morocco and Somalia questioned the sanc-
years, there were also important non-state dip- tity of colonial boundaries in the 1970s by
lomatic actors. Traditional rulers in Nigeria, respectively invading Western Sahara and the
notables in East Africa and tribal leaders in Ethiopian Ogaden. At different times, some
African leaders supported secessionist attempts Post-independence African diplomacy

in Congo, Ethiopia, Angola, Ghana and Nigeria reflected deep fears of exploitation from both
(Neuberger 1986: 801). Tanzanias Nyerere the West and East and emphasized the need to
even criticized his Organisation of African reduce the penetration of both the superpow-
Unity colleagues for not recognizing Biafra ers and the former colonial powers (Harris
(Mwakikagile 2010). However, the majority of 1970: 6082). Ideology played a crucial role.
African governments rejected the possibility of African foreign policies were often overly
secession and the territorial integrity norm was discursive. References to the slave trade,
kept as a sacrosanct dogma. African diplomacy the crimes of colonial powers, the plunder
cherished the two aspects of negative sover- of African resources and economic exploi-
eignty (Jackson 1990): respect of existing tation were common themes in African
frontiers and non-interference in the internal leaders speeches in multilateral fora. Neo-
affairs of other states (see also Chapters 3 and colonial attitudes and neo-imperialism
5 in this Handbook). were castigated. Ian Smiths Rhodesia and
South Africas white-dominated regime were
considered as internal enemies that were
Key Points supported and sustained by non-African
powers. African diplomacy also regarded
African diplomacy has a long history that is international developments through a conti-
recorded back to the sixteenth century. nental lens. For example, one of the reasons
Colonialism created new non-state diplomatic why Africans supported the Palestinian cause
actors.
was that they saw significant similarities
The main challenge for African diplomacy at
between apartheid and Israeli policies in the
independence was the arbitrariness of colonial
boundaries. occupied territories (Mazrui 1977).
However, as the high expectations of the
benefits that the end of colonialism could bring
waned and the Cold War rivalry escalated,
TAKING SIDES: AFRICA IN African leaders were forced to choose sides,
THE COLD WAR forming alliances with one of the two super-
powers or strengthening their ties with their
African foreign policies also reflected state former colonial powers (especially France).
elites desire to defend their regimes against Economic considerations (attracting
domestic opposition. Regime survival investment and aid) were crucial in African
became the main objective of African diplo- alignment decisions. Resources were crucial
macy in the Cold War era, a period which in helping regimes stay in power. Gradually,
posed new challenges to African security. At an international patronclient relationship
first glance, Africa had no reason to be emerged. Smaller and more vulnerable states
caught in the superpower rivalry. The conti- were obviously more likely to opt for a cli-
nent was too poor and too peripheral to trou- ent role. But they were not alone: all African
ble Cold War warriors. However, as the elites faced the same multiple constraints
United States and the Soviet Union became of poverty, disunity, domestic expectations
locked in a nuclear stalemate in Europe, and external penetration (Clapham 1977:
Africa became a territory of strategic compe- 79). Not unexpectedly, internal calculations
tition. The critical question for Africans was affected the foreign policies of every single
whether to opt for alignment or non-align- country of the continent.
ment. For the most secure leaders, like Steven David (1991) has argued that many
Tanzanias Nyerere, non-alignment initially African decision-makers, presiding over
appeared as the most gratifying choice. fragile regimes that faced serious domestic
opposition, were forced to omni-balance Private interests including mercenaries, min-

between external and internal pressures. ing companies and diasporic communities
For example, the Emperor Haile-Selassie of helped create a complex insurgency diplo-
Ethiopia was firmly aligned with the United macy. External resources (ranging from ille-
States but also used contacts with the Soviet gal external trade to the control of access to
Union to weaken communist support for resources) were critical for rebel movements,
Eritrean secessionists (Clapham 1996: 64). giving rise to a non-state economic diplomacy
Attempting to balance external and domes- with insurgency leaders controlling diamond
tic needs, many African elites faced potential sales and delivering stolen foreign aid.
contradictions. If the primary threat was inter- The African diplomacy of the bipolar era
nal, as was often the case, regimes aligned has rarely attracted more than a passing refer-
with an external power to get resources and ence in most histories of the Cold War that
assistance. But governments were not the usually focus on conflicts in Korea, Vietnam
only actors. Various armed groups, usu- and the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, eco-
ally originating in the countryside and often nomic scarcity and political fragility made
attacking across state frontiers, were con- African regimes extremely dependent on for-
testing incumbent regimes. These groups eign support with limited ability to influence
largely relied on outside support. In the pre- local and regional developments. But this does
independence period, insurgencies were not mean that African governments were nec-
associated with the cause of liberation and essarily or always the puppets of foreign pow-
were supported by the Soviet Union and its ers. As the superpowers and their allies acted
allies. In the Cold War era, several new types competitively, African actors have been able
of insurgencies emerged: separatist, reform to retain at least some margin for manoeu-
and warlord groups searched for external sup- vre. In many cases, the obvious existence of
port. In Southern Africa, right-wing insurgen- patronclient relationships did hide the often
cies trying to destabilize Soviet clients (e.g. important role of African agency. African
Angola and Mozambique) found support in governments, in return to access to strategic
South Africa and Rhodesia. In other cases sites and minerals, demanded concessions
insurgencies were linked to pre-colonial fault from foreign powers. If the material resources
lines that were exacerbated by government given were considered inadequate, regimes
policies (e.g. Sudan) and were supported by used their sovereign power to play one patron
other regional governments in a logic of tit- off against the other. For example, during his
for-tat. In Central and later western Africa 30-year reign, Zaires President Mobutu Sese
(e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone) rebels were Seko became an expert in manipulating for-
involved in extensive looting of mineral eign patrons, including the CIA, Belgium,
resources which they would sell abroad. The France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia and even
international connections of all these armed China and the IMF (Thomson 2000: 149).
groups extended from neighbouring states Even the smaller and weaker states found
whose regimes [we]re hostile to the govern- ways to manipulate their patrons, securing
ment of the target state against which the military and development aid, cheap loans,
insurgency [wa]s directed, to the global alli- technical assistance and external military
ance structures which dominated interna- interventions to keep incumbents in power.
tional politics (Clapham 1998: 15). Regimes For example, the Major Mathieu Kerekou
such as those in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda regime in Benin, one of the poorest countries
and Rwanda that had gained power through in Africa, first approached the Soviet Union,
insurgency did not refrain from supporting but was later flexible enough to restore rela-
movements which they readily equated with tions with Benins former colonial master,
their former selves (Clapham 1998: 16). France, receiving aid that allowed his regime
to remain in power for 18 years (Decalo 1997). naval piracy). However, probably the most
And Congo-Brazzaville, even more surpris- important factor was Chinas involvement in
ingly, was successful in maintaining simulta- African affairs. In the twenty-first century,
neously excellent relations with both Moscow the growth of ChineseAfrican relations
and Paris, combining a socialist state with has been both unprecedented and impres-
a privatized economy (Clark 1997) (see also sive. Trying to secure raw materials and open
Chapters 4 and 22 in this Handbook). new markets, China has not only become
Africas most significant trade partner, but
also an important investor and a generous
Key Points donor. Chinese aid came with no political or
economic conditionalities. This gave African
African diplomacy in the post-independence era diplomacy greater freedom than it had before
aimed at securing regime survival. (Alden 2007).
The proliferation of armed groups in the Cold After independence, the executive branches
War era led to the development of an insurgency
have maintained a considerable amount of
diplomacy.
autonomy in foreign-policy decision making
in Africa. Even within the executives, it was
the presidents and their collaborators that
RISING AFRICA: CHINA, ECONOMIC have defined the national interest. In many
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF countries the legacy of neopatrimonialism
NON-STATE ACTORS led to a diplomacy that privileged presidential
rule with no competition from countervailing
The end of the Cold War had a negative impact institutions. Interest groups like big business,
on the geostrategic importance of Africa. For media, political parties and legislatures had
almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet very limited influence. The publics remained
Union, Africa was a marginal region for inter- largely uninterested in foreign policy even in
national politics (Taylor and Williams 2004). countries with democratically elected govern-
Foreign embassies and military bases were ments. In general, there was very little domes-
closed and aid declined. The withdrawal of tic pressure to change foreign policy priorities.
superpowers gave more freedom for manoeu- However, African diplomacy has evolved
vre to African foreign policies. However, this from its initial idealistic post-independence
freedom was distributed unequally. Regional period to a more security-oriented agenda
powers, such as Kenya, Nigeria and South in the Cold War period and, finally, to com-
Africa, found more scope to develop a stronger plex objectives and elaborate tactics in the
regional presence. Conversely, weaker states post-bipolar era. It has shifted in terms of
that previously had little influence beyond actors (from states and presidents to multiple
their regions, had fewer opportunities for more players), issues (from strategic to economic
autonomous foreign policies in relation to themes) and levels (from national and regional
their more powerful neighbours. to global) (Shaw and Nyangoro 1999). For
But this era of marginalization did not many African states the emphasis is now on
last for long. Since the turn of the century, low and not on high politics, with issues
global interest for developments in Africa like debt and conditionalities dominating for-
has considerably increased. Several factors eign policy agendas. African foreign policies
explain this change of Africas role in global became less state- or strategic-centric. African
politics, including higher economic growth diplomacy is not any more the monopoly of
rates, a democratization trend and threats the state and African foreign relations have
to international security emanating from become increasingly economic in content and
Africa (including terrorism, drugs trade and transnational in character. Foreign aid has
shifted from a largely bilateral engagement reject those who run counter to the declared
with the former colonial powers to increased developmental goals of the post-Seattle Doha
multilateral interactions with a wide array of Development Round (Brown and Harman
donors, ranging from international financial 2013: 6). In short, the good governance
institutions to non-governmental organiza- agenda seemed to complement rather than
tions. Individual celebrities, religious groups antagonize African diplomacy. Quite the
and ad hoc alliances of private actors (like the contrary: it gave new impetus into diplomatic
Save Darfur Coalition) have de-nationalized relations within Africa through, for example,
African diplomacy that is now faced with the NEPADs Peer Review mechanism.
new challenges and opportunities to promote Nevertheless, there is also continuity in
foreign investment, attract aid and solve con- African foreign policy decision-making. In
flicts through mediation and peacekeeping. general, individual leaders still hold consid-
From a post-colonial point of view, African erable sway over policy decisions, though in
diplomacy seemed to internalize the Wests a few countries like South Africa career dip-
new views on development. In the early lomats, various ministries and business inter-
1990s, multilateral institutions like the World ests increasingly influence policy outcomes
Bank (1989: 60) started to promote the idea (Siko 2014).
that good governance is a necessary condi- Democratic consolidation has also affected
tion for sustainable economic development. African diplomacy. When Nelson Mandela
As most bilateral donors followed the new was elected President in South Africa, he
mantra, African governments faced strong promised a foreign policy based on the pro-
pressure to combine democratic reforms motion of human rights (Mandela 1993).
with neo-liberal economic policies. Despite However, both Mandela and his successor,
its many shortcomings (ignoring alternative Thabo Mbeki, did not implement fully the
conceptions of democracy and shielding the new principle. South Africa asked for sanc-
West from democratic scrutiny), the good tions on Sani Abachas Nigeria and supported
governance discourse construct[ed] democ- the creation of the International Criminal
racy as relevant only within countries and Court (Barber 2005). However, at the same
not within international institutions and rela- time, Pretoria developed close relations with
tions (Abrahamsen 2003: 203). the brother leader Muammar Qadhafi of
Thus, the good governance agenda threat- Libya and sided with Russia and China in the
ened to undermine and sideline the global Security Council on the issue of Myanmar.
aspirations of African diplomacy. The fact Thabo Mbekis silent diplomacy towards
that many African institutions adopted the Zimbabwe in sharp contrast to Londons
new discourse could endanger the structural policy seemed to reflect the support that
idea that Africas problems stemmed from Mugabe had offered the African National
external rather than internal deficiencies. Congress in the apartheid years (Lipton
However, African diplomacy proved more 2009). Under Jacob Zuma, Mbekis succes-
dynamic than many have expected. In the sor, South African foreign policy appeared
United Nations, where Africa forms the larg- to be even more contradictory: South Africa
est regional block of countries (one quarter refused to give a visa to the Dalai Lama for
of the General Assembly), African diplomats participating in a meeting of Nobel Peace
were very active in promoting institutional Laureates while it welcomed Omar al Bashir
reform (especially in world trade). And in of Sudan who faces an indictment by the
the WTO, Africans have moved from play- International Criminal Court for crimes
ing a relatively passive role to engaging against humanity (The Economist 2015).
in a concerted effort to increase influence, Clientelism is probably the more persistent
build capacity to scrutinize proposals and to characteristic of almost all African diplomatic
services throughout the post-colonial period. Assembly, able to pass resolutions even if
In almost all countries, there is fierce com- they were opposed by the powerful Western
petition and pressure on political patrons states. African members have used UN reso-
for the best diplomatic jobs (London, Paris, lutions, inter alia, to have sanctions imposed
Washington, Brussels, Berlin, etc.). As Ian against Southern Rhodesia, to have an arms
Taylor (2010: 4) observes, in many African embargo ordered against South Africa, and to
countries, those who hold the highest diplo- recognize SWAPO as the legitimate repre-
matic ranks are not the best qualified they sentative of the Namibian people. They also
are just the best connected. This continues promoted fresh ideas, such as the call for a
to have an obviously negative impact on the New International Economic Order (NIEO).
effectiveness and efficiency of African diplo- Finally they were instrumental in augment-
macy. For example, the diplomatic corps of ing the scope of human rights protection by
Nigeria has seen numerous appointments of adding economic and social rights.
political hacks and discarded military offic- Africas diplomatic presence on the interna-
ers (Taylor 2010: 4) (see also Chapters 28, 45 tional plane has been principally undertaken
and 46 in this Handbook). by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
and, after its demise in 2002, by the African
Union. When the OAU was established in
Key Points 1963, it had three principal goals. First, by
transcending ethnic and national differences,
In the post-Cold War era, Africa diplomacy faced to promote pan-Africanism as a mode of coop-
the marginalization of the continent in interna- eration among all Member States in response
tional affairs. However, higher economic growth to the aspirations of their peoples for brother-
rates and the rise of ChineseAfrican trade led
hood and solidarity. Second, to safeguard and
to a renewed international interest for the conti-
consolidate the hard-won independence, and
nent. This gave African diplomacy more freedom
to manoeuvre. to assist the remaining lands under colonial
Despite a new development discourse that empha- rule to become sovereign states, even if that
sized domestic politics, African diplomacy was entailed the use of force. Third, to eradicate
active in fora like the UN and the WTO, asking for racial discrimination and apartheid. Equality,
reform of the international economic architecture. justice and dignity were the legitimate aspi-
rations of African peoples. It soon became
obvious that the latter two goals would be
materialized only if they were international-
FOSTERING MULTILATERALISM: FROM ized. To that extent, the assistance offered by
THE OAU TO THE AFRICAN UNION other transnational institutions would be of
crucial importance. Thus, from a very early
Multilateralism has played a very important stage on, African states realized the diplo-
role in African diplomacy in both the bipolar matic advantages of acting in a uniform man-
and the post-bipolar era. As many states of ner and, particularly, in the General Assembly
the continent had limited means for diplo- of the United Nations (UNGA), where they
matic representation, they found the United expected to find other states sympathetic to
Nations system to be an indispensable frame- their goals (e.g. the non-aligned countries).
work. At its inception, the UN had only four The African Group of Members was estab-
African members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia lished in the UNGA in the mid-1960s; it cur-
and South Africa). However, after the 1960s, rently numbers 55 states.
tens of independent African states joined In addition, African states saw the diplo-
their Asian and Latin American counterparts matic potential of joining forces on the interna-
to form a very large majority in the General tional plane specifically with the Arab world.
Their aim was to pursue mutual positions in in finally bringing racial discrimination to
matters of shared interest in the anticipation its attention. The OAU was always looking
that they will be succoured by the countries for the right moment to have the Republic of
participating in the Arab League, which had South Africa (RSA) expelled from the UN on
been established in 1945. The First Afro-Arab account of its official policy of apartheid. It
Summit, an initiative of the OAU, was held in was partly achieved in November 1974 when
Cairo in March 1977; the choice of venue no the RSA was ostracized from the UNGA
doubt showed the prominent diplomatic posi- Twenty-Ninth Session; the fact that the cur-
tion that Egypt had in both intergovernmental rent Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
institutions. On account of the AfricanArab was President of that Session no doubt played
rapprochement it is not surprising that Africa a role.4 The RSA was also excluded from
has consistently been most supportive of the subsequent sessions, forcing it to take the
Palestinian cause and its claim to statehood. decision to suspend its participation in the
Indeed, Palestine has always been regarded UN (Magliveras 1999: 20922).
as an African cause: already in 1970, the Undoubtedly, isolating the RSA from
OAU set up the African Committee on the the UN was a major diplomatic victory for
Question of Palestine to support its struggle the OAU, which, with the invariable help of
to end the Israeli occupation. Five years later, Arab countries, had orchestrated it for a long
the OAU Assembly adopted, together with period of time. It had started in 1964 when
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the World Health Organization voted over-
a strategy for liberating Palestine from the whelmingly to have the RSA suspended from
Zionist racist colonialism.1 Africas intense membership.5 Although Africas diplomatic
diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause efforts concentrated on the RSA, the OAU
has continued until today. In November also attacked Portugal and South Rhodesia
2012, it was instrumental in securing that for their apartheid-related policies. Thus, in
the UNGA upgraded the status of Palestine October 1966 the African Group was suc-
to that of non-Member observer state by vir- cessful in carrying on a decision at the 14th
tue of Resolution 67/19. In June 2015, the Session of the UNESCO Conference author-
AU called upon all countries (and not only izing the Director General not to invite their
its Member States) to recognize the State of governments to participate in future confer-
Palestine and support its admission in inter- ences and activities until they had abandoned
national institutions (a move which, at least racial discrimination (Osakwe 1972: 1468).
diplomatically, is tantamount to regarding Africas diplomatic initiatives were not
Palestine as a sovereign independent state) restricted to excluding those states practising
as well as to boycott Israeli products from apartheid and/or striving to maintain their col-
the occupied territories.2 Similarly, the AU onies from international fora where diplomacy
has often asked the USA to lift the unjus- is practised. They were additionally geared
tifiable economic, commercial and financial towards persuading the international com-
embargo against Cuba.3 munity that these practices, while being con-
As more and more African states have demned as ethically unacceptable, must also
gained independence, the impact of the be prohibited and made international crimes.
African Group in transnational fora has also These efforts culminated in a number of instru-
grown (Mathews 1988). The struggle against ments which were adopted by the UNGA
apartheid, which was organized and directed with wide-ranging consequences for both
by the OAU, intensified on the world arena. international relations and international law.
In 1968, Cameroon argued before the Second Moreover they were manifested during global
Committee of the UNGA that the admission of events, e.g. at the first International Conference
a large number of African states had resulted on Human Rights (1968), where apartheid was
condemned as a crime against humanity.6 fields (Don Nanjira 2010: 240). From the
The most important UNGA instruments are outset, the AU was given a demanding for-
the following three: Resolution 1514(XV) of eign policy agenda: to establish the necessary
14 December 1960 containing the Declaration conditions enabling Africa to play its rightful
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial role in the global economy and in interna-
Countries and Peoples, which regarded colo- tional negotiations. Moreover, it was asked to
nialism as a denial of fundamental human encourage international cooperation within
rights; Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October the confines of the UN Charter and to work
1970 declaring that colonialism in all forms with international partners in the eradica-
and manifestations is a crime; and Resolution tion of diseases and the promotion of good
3068(XXVIII) of 30 November 1973 approv- health. Thus, whereas during the OAU era the
ing the International Convention on the talk was on eradicating apartheid and alien
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of domination, the talk now was on eradicating
Apartheid. The latter currently has 109 con- contagious illnesses and viruses in conjunc-
tracting parties and the last country to ratify it tion with the so-called international part-
was Palestine in April 2014. For the success- ners, a term which has been rather over-used
ful adoption of these instruments Africa relied in AU parlance. While good relations with
again on the diplomatic support of the Arab the international partners is an indication of
Group. advanced diplomatic capabilities by the AU,
Future events showed rather clearly that it is submitted that the latter has over-relied
a diplomatic quid pro quo relationship had on the former (Magliveras and Naldi 2014:
existed between African and Arab coun- 6970).
tries. Thus, not long after Africas success In recent years, more than half of the
in turning colonialism and apartheid into annual AU budget has been covered by the
international crimes, the Arab world, tak- international partners (an unprecedented
ing cue from it, demanded that the global state of affairs in intergovernmental organiza-
community treat Zionism in the same way tions); characteristic AU activities such as the
as apartheid. In November 1975, and with New Partnership for Africas Development
the full backing of the African Group, Arab (NEPAD) would not have survived had it
Member States comfortably passed UNGA not been for their contributions. For the
Resolution 3379(XXX) determining that 2016 Financial Year, of the total AU budget
Zionism is a form of racism and racial dis- of US$416,867,326, only US$169,833,340
crimination (72 votes in favour to 35 against will be granted from Member States and the
with 32 abstentions). However, due to a dif- remaining will be secured from international
ferent constellation in inter-state relations at partners.7 This poses a real dilemma to
the time, the Arab diplomacy was unsuccess- African diplomacy because these partners
ful in expressly branding Zionism as an inter- include the former (and distasted) colonial
national crime. powers and their multilateral institutions,
While the OAU was not particularly suc- primarily the European Union, as well as
cessful in tackling internal African problems new(ish) partners, such as China, the long-
and scourges, on the international diplomatic term consequences of whose involvement in
front it could boast many and significant the continent have not been fully evaluated.
achievements. In July 2002 the OAU was Even though after a long period of inac-
finally laid to rest and with it the quest for tion the AU has promised self-reliance in
pan-Africanism. The African Union (AU) its funding,8 it is submitted that the actions
took over as the new, fresh and dynamic pan- it plans to promote will not bring about the
African institution well-endowed to be active desired effects. The handling of such com-
in the political, socio-economic and security plicated matters, which form part of the
African solutions to African problems rhet- coups dtat, etc. have taken place resulting
oric, requires a different kind of diplomatic in massive loss of human lives, it has not
approach. However, it would appear that been possible for African diplomacy to over-
the era of African leaders with a continental come the ankyloses of the past and intervene.
vision, including Thabo Mbeki (the inaugural At some stage, African leaders should uphold
AU President) and Muammar Qadhafi (the the lofty principles to which they have been
AU President in 200910), has come to an end paying lip service. The AU has the diplomatic
and ground-breaking ideas and forward think- tools to assist them.
ing are rather in short supply. Carrying on from the twentieth century, dur-
Another aspect of African diplomacy radi- ing our century African diplomacy has con-
cally amended with the advent of the AU was tinued to be heavily drawn into the question
the abandonment of the sacred principle of of reforming the UN, including the Security
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Council (UNSC). Already in 1997, the OAUs
Member States. This was a principle to which common position advocated that Africa ought
the OAU had slavishly adhered. It was often to be given two permanent seats in any future
invoked to avoid interfering and preventing UNSC enlargement.9 2005 was a seminal
crimes against humanity, acts of genocide year. Not only did the AU revive the discus-
and other grave violations of humanitarian sion on UN reform and seek ways to secure
law (Burundi in the 1980s and Rwanda in the to the continent a voice in multilateral nego-
1990s are examples). Thus, Article 4(h) of the tiations and institutions10 but, once again, the
AU Constitutive Act endows it with the right African Group of States showed that it was
to intervene in a collective fashion when grave capable of pushing its proposals through the
circumstances understood as war crimes, UN. Thus, African diplomacy was successful
genocide, crimes against humanity and seri- in shifting a new UN entity, the Peacebuilding
ous threats to a legitimate legal order are Commission, closer to the UNGA and away
present in a Member State and it is necessary from the UNSC, which was to have the cen-
to restore peace and stability (Kuwali 2009). tral role as advocated by the European Union,
The AU is probably unique among intergov- Russia, China and others.11 Finally the
ernmental organizations to be granted a right Fourth Extraordinary AU Assembly Session
of intervention in such express terms. entrusted the promotion of the African posi-
Moreover, Article 4(j) contains a second tions on UN reform to a Committee of Ten
instance of interference in domestic affairs, Heads of State and Government.12 The fact
albeit voluntary in nature. It refers to the that the Committee has not achieved any tan-
Member States right to request the AU to gible results but has rather recycled existing
intervene in order to restore peace and secu- proposals arguably shows the limitations in
rity. This provision raises a crucial point of pursuing complex diplomatic goals at a mul-
interpretation: may intervention be demanded tilateral institution (namely the UN) where
only by those Members affected by breached too many vested interests intermingle.13
peace and security or by any Member State? The AU has constantly attempted to pro-
In other words, do all Members have a legiti- mote common African positions in a series of
mate interest to ask the AU to intervene even global conferences and deliberations. In the
if they might not be in the least affected? summer of 2015 it urged the African group
Although the latter interpretation has been of negotiators in the climate change delibera-
supported (Kioko 2003: 817), it presupposes tions to maintain their unity and continue rep-
supranational elements, which the AU argu- resenting African interests in the current UN
ably does not currently possess. It is a matter Framework Convention on Climate Change
of considerable regret that, despite the many process, which culminated in a summit meet-
situations where civil strife, internal wars, ing in Paris in December 2015.14 The relevant
practice shows that the AU Assembly estab- The European Union has contributed signifi-
lishes ad hoc bodies to devise common posi- cantly to the financial upkeep of the ASPA
tions vis--vis global initiatives of specific through the African Peace Facility (APF),
interest to Africa. These bodies do the ground- which constitutes the main source of fund-
work and report to the Assembly, which usu- ing to support the AU and RECs efforts in the
ally rubberstamps their propositions, while area of peace and security: almost 2 billion
the actual promoting of the agreed positions is has been allocated to the APF since 2004. The
undertaken by the so-called African Group of PSC has been praised for its hand-on approach
Negotiators (AGN). Depending on the subject to address conflicts as they unfold. The wide
matter of the discussions, this task may addi- use of sanctions as well as its mediation espe-
tionally be undertaken by the Member States cially in coups dtat has resulted in diplo-
themselves. For example, in relation to the matic successes. However, the participation in
UN Summit on the adoption of the Post-2015 it of Member States not meeting the standards
Development Agenda, which took place in of rule of law and human rights protection is
September 2015, the Assembly had asked the problematic (Vorrath 2012).
AGN in New York to remain engaged insist- The relationship between the AU and
ing, at the same time, that individual Member the RECs is delineated in Article 16 of the
States should attend it at the highest political Protocol creating the PSC, concluded in
level.15 2002. It provides that the RECs are part of
Another characteristic aspect of African the overall AU security architecture but the
diplomacy is the centralized system of deter- AU has the primary responsibility for pro-
mining which candidatures (whether Member moting peace, security and stability in the
States or African dignitaries) will receive col- continent. Therefore, the AU harmonizes
lective AU support to be elected in the organs and coordinates the activities of the RECs
of international institutions. Thus, in early to ensure consistency with its own objec-
2015, Senegal and Egypt were endorsed for the tives and principles. Despite the AUs posi-
post of non-permanent members in the UNSC tion of primacy, the RECs have had a quite
for the period 201617.16 The election was distinguished experience in peacekeeping
held on 15 October 2015 during the 70th ses- already from the OAU era. In December
sion of the UNGA in which Senegal secured 1989, the Economic Community of Western
the impressive number of 187 votes (out of the African States (ECOWAS) created a peace-
193 UN Member States) and Egypt 179 votes. keeping force, the Economic Community
It is a well-known fact that Africa continues Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which, at an
to be plagued by inter-state and, particularly, international level, attracted favourable atten-
intra-state armed conflicts. Since the advent tion for its involvement in the civil wars in
of the AU their number appears to have been Liberia (19902005), in Sierra Leone (1997
contained. This could be explained by the dip- 2005), in Guinea-Bissau (19989) and in
lomatic prevention mechanisms which have Cte dIvoire (200510). Other RECs with
been created. Collectively they form the so- a peace and security dimension include the
called African Security and Peace Architecture Southern African Development Community
(ASPA), which was established by the AU (SADC), the Economic and Monetary
in collaboration with the African Regional Community of Central Africa (CEMAC),
Economic Communities (RECs) with terms and the Economic Community of Central
of reference the prevention, management and African States (ECCAS). The latter adopted
resolution of conflicts in the continent. These in February 2000 a Protocol establishing a
mechanisms include a very active and power- Council for Peace and Security in Central
ful Peace and Security Council (PSC), a Panel Africa (COPAX), whose components resem-
of Wise Men, and an African Standby Force. ble those of the ASPA.
Notwithstanding the AUs overall coordi- programmes and actions often fail to reach
nation of the RECs activities, the latter, both the intended recipients (see also Chapter 40
collectively and individually, have promoted in this Handbook).
their own diplomatic efforts on the interna-
tional plane. A recent characteristic example
is the High-Level briefing on the so-called Key Points
Agenda 2063, which was presented in New
York to the UN Member States in October The OAU and the AU have successfully promoted
2014. Agenda 2063, lodged by the AU at its their agendas on the international plane.
50th Anniversary in May 2013, is meant to There have always been strong diplomatic
relations between Africa and the Arab world.
be the vehicle assisting Africa in expanding
Africa relies considerably on international partner-
the achieved progress, exploiting all possible ships to support national and regional projects.
opportunities and ensuring its future socio- Apart from the AU, the Pan-African diplomacy is
economic transformation. The RECs used also shaped by the African Regional Economic
this event as a global platform to discuss their Communities.
respective roles in the realization of Agenda
2063, and how to strengthen their collabora-
tion with the AU.17 Indeed, the Framework
Document on Agenda 2063, which was circu- CONCLUSION
lated by the UN Commission on 15 September
2015, talks about the need for all Member It is clear that the main factor that determined
States to harmonize their policies on interna- changes in African diplomacy has been the
tional relations and to speak with one voice so end of the Cold War. However, domestic fac-
as to ensure better gains on the global arena. tors (democratization and economic reform)
Another area where the AU has been pro- have clearly affected its development. The
moting a specific agenda at a continental emergence of new non-state actors in Africas
level and the RECs have pursued their own international relations, the rise of multilateral-
diplomatic efforts is free trade and the quest ism and a move from security to economics
for economic integration. Thus, while at its are the main trends in twenty-first-century
25th Ordinary Session (June 2015) the AU African diplomacy. Future developments will
Assembly, after considerable delay, launched very much depend on the future of African
the negotiations for a Continental Free Trade Union and sub-regional institutions. There
Area,18 a week earlier the Common Market has been much progress in recent years on
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), regional integration, but African multilateral
the East African Community (EAC) and the diplomacy continues to remain weak. The
SADC had signed a declaration launching ability of the AU to articulate a collective
their own Tripartite Free Trade Area.19 From voice depends to a large extent on the ability
a diplomatic perspective, the fact that there is of its two strongest Member States, South
an overlap of membership among the RECs Africa and Nigeria, to operate in concert. In
and, at the same time, all their Member States 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian rule,
also participate in the AU may not be a prob- the two states cooperated closely and Africa
lem, because it offers RECs a dynamic in enjoyed a golden age of diplomacy
addressing common problems and challenges (Landsberg 2012; Abegunrin 2009). However,
not only in economic development but also the collapse of this cooperation leads us to the
in politics and security, social and human conclusion that the dynamism of the late
development, natural resources, health, 1990s has largely waned and African diplo-
food security, etc. This dynamic could also macy continues to suffer from fragmentation
affect the AU positively considering that its (see also Chapter 33 in this Handbook).
NOTES 16 AU Executive Council, Decision on the African

Candidatures within the International System,
EX.CL/Dec.872(XXVI), 27 January 2015.
1 OAU Assembly, Resolution on the Question of
17 See Concept Note for the Briefing by African
Palestine, AHG/Resolution 77(XII), 1 August
Regional Economic Communities to the Member
1975. All OAU/AU documents are available at
States of the United Nations on The Role of
www.au.int
Africas Regional Economic Communities in
2 AU Assembly, Declaration on the Situation in
Consolidating Peace, Security, Governance and
Palestine and the Middle East, Assembly/AU/
Development in the Context of Agenda 2063,
Decl.4(XXV), 15 June 2015.
1 October 2014, UN Headquarters, New York,
3 Lastly under AU Assembly, Resolution on Recent
available at: http://www.un.org/
Developments in Cuba-United States of America
18 AU Assembly, Decision on the Launch of
Relations, Assembly/AU/Res.2(XXIV), 31 January
Continental Free Trade Area Negotiations,
2015.
Assembly/AU/569(XXV), 15 June 2015.
4 Cf. OAU Council of Ministers, Resolution on the
19 Communiqu of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC
Expulsion of South Africa from the Twenty Ninth
Tripartite Summit, Vision: Towards a Single
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,
Market, Theme: Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC
CM/Res.392(XXIV), 21 February 1975.
Integration, 10 June 2015, Sharm El Sheikh,
5 WHO, World Health Assembly, Resolution 17.50,
Egypt, available at http://www.sadc.int/
19 March 1964.
6 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the
International Conference on Human Rights,
AprilMay 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41.
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33
Southern African Diplomacy
Stephen Chan
Diplomatic overtures were made towards to most of its possessions, sought a moral
sub-Saharan Africa well before the inde- high ground for diplomatic effect as well as
pendence process began. The 1955 Bandung out of genuine concern. UK Prime Minister
Conference, which was the ideological pre- Harold Macmillans 1960 Wind of Change
decessor of the Non-Aligned Movement speech in the apartheid South African parlia-
(NAM), saw Chinas Chou En Lai deliber- ment was one of the great political speeches
ately court the future continent. Other NAM of his era, but it had a very determined dip-
actors, such as India, also assured goodwill lomatic agenda which was to maintain and
was extended to the new states so that, when cultivate, for reasons of trade and mineral
Zambia became independent in 1964 with exploitation, the new black-ruled states.
only 100 university graduates, many of the But all these interventions and initiatives
emerging political elite were given scholar- involved senior political figures Chou,
ships to achieve Indian degrees. From the Nkrumah and Macmillan were all Prime
very beginning, the new states sought a uni- Ministers and this characterised relations
fied political voice and diplomatic presence with Africa, particularly diplomatic relations
in world affairs. This proved to be more rhe- within Africa, for most of the years of inde-
torical than real, but the first Prime Minister pendence and, to an extent, still does today.
of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, in 1963 The role of foreign ministries, and e.g. their
achieved his vision of an Organisation of research departments, has always been sec-
African Unity where, at the very least, it was ondary to foreign policy initiatives proposed
hoped that, together, African states could and conducted above their heads. Even in
punch above their individual weights. a well-developed state, in apartheid South
The United Kingdom, as a major colonial Africa, at the height of its militarised desta-
power, on the eve of granting independence bilisation operations against the surrounding
Southern African Diplomacy 415
black-ruled frontline states from 1976 to neighbouring countries had shared some
1988, the foreign ministry had no research colonial history, but this meant that almost all
department or capacity devoted to the study the road and rail routes led from Zambia,
of other African states. As apartheid entered through Rhodesia, to South African ports. As
its final phase, on the eve of the release of Rhodesia militarised itself to resist a (dis-
Nelson Mandela and the beginning of a tantly) possible British invasion, Zambias
4-year cycle of negotiations, the new South Kenneth Kaunda pondered his options. He
African President F.W. de Klerk travelled could easily be economically squeezed by
to Victoria Falls to meet Zambian President Rhodesia. His fledging army was no match
Kenneth Kaunda; the agenda included the for a Rhodesia backed by apartheid South
unbanning of the ANC, but Kaunda went into Africa. Kaunda himself had been schooled in
those talks without any briefing materials on Ghandian pacific doctrines, so he attempted
de Klerk, because neither his own office nor diplomacy both to ease the plight of his own
his foreign ministry had any. country and to seek a settlement to the quar-
The existence of racism and systems of rel between black and white next door.
racial discrimination in the south of the con- Simultaneously, he had no choice but to
tinent exercised African diplomacy for many lend support to those black groups in Rhodesia
years. This was a concern for all of Africa, who sought to resist white rule. Those groups,
but particularly those states near South however, were divided. Different groups
Africa, who grouped themselves together as attracted different foreign support in those
the frontline states. This political group- Cold War years. Kaunda and Tanzanias Julius
ing paralleled the economic grouping that Nyerere favoured different factions, as did the
became first SADCC (Southern African Soviet Union and China. Keeping a common
Development Coordination Conference), and purpose among friends and different resist-
then SADC (Southern African Development ance groups, while resisting pressure from the
Community). There were deep concerns over white south, became major diplomatic preoc-
the situations in Rhodesia and South Africa. cupations for Kaunda.
Curiously, the Portuguese colonies were The Chinese entered the picture in 1970,
never the subject of extensive diplomatic ini- with the beginning of the construction of a
tiatives from within Africa until after their railway linking Zambia to the Tanzanian port
independence. Accordingly, this chapter proof Dar es Salaam. This was a 5-year project
ceeds to discuss illustrative case examples hoping to ease the transport and economic
from the diplomatic history of the Southern stranglehold Rhodesia and South Africa
African region as it concerns Rhodesia and held over Zambia. At the same time, and this
South Africa, before extending it to African became most apparent by the mid-1970s, the
Union diplomacy and the great issues ahead. Soviet Union was falling behind the liberation
faction led by Joshua Nkomo, which was also
favoured and hosted in Zambia by Kaunda.
China threw support behind the faction that in
THE RHODESIAN ISSUE AND 1976 came to be led by Robert Mugabe. But
THE ROLE OF ZAMBIA the accession of Mugabe to the leadership of
that faction came only after the 1975 assas-
Zambia gained independence in 1964 and, sination of his predecessor, Herbert Chitepo,
only a year later, white-minority-ruled and Mugabes brief imprisonment by Kaunda,
Rhodesia made a Unilateral Declaration of before escaping to Mozambique.
Independence (UDI) from Great Britain China had also supported the liberation
rather than accept the wind of change blow- movement that achieved independence for
ing towards black majority rule. The two Mozambique in 1975, but it was in Angola
where the Cold War became spectacularly be said that someone who was not President
hot, with both the Soviet Union and Cuba sid- Kaunda was in the diplomatic limelight and
ing with the eventually victorious Marxist fac- vitally necessary to the settlement of a key
tion against those favoured by the USA and diplomatic issue.
China. This victory was secured in 1976, with At the CHOGM, Kaunda was chairman,
Cuban troops playing a critical role. It was but the lobbying of Margaret Thatcher was
against the imminent intervention of the great orchestrated by Commonwealth secretary-
states in surrounding countries that Kaunda general Shridath Ramphal, and involved
and South Africas Prime Minister Vorster Julius Nyerere, Jamaicas Michael Manley,
convened the Victoria Falls Conference in and Australias Malcolm Fraser. Kaunda
August 1975 to seek a way forward over thus became involved as a key figure in a
Rhodesia. They sat in a train carriage parked multilateral movement at head of govern-
on the tracks across the Knife Edge Bridge ment or head of state level. The resulting
that linked the two sides of the Falls. On the negotiations among all Rhodesian parties
Rhodesian side, Vorster and his delegation at Londons Lancaster House towards the
sat, and Kaunda and the liberation parties end of 1979 saw Carrington now as chair-
temporarily unified for these talks sat on the man, but Ramphal again orchestrating the
Zambian side. A line on the bridge outside tactics of the guerrilla parties, with Nyerere
demarcated the border. and Mozambiques president Machel acting
Although these talks were unsuccessful, with Ramphal to direct Mugabes negotiating
they inaugurated a series of talks brokered line; and Kaundas working with Ramphal to
by the great powers. The Geneva talks in direct the negotiating line of the other major
1976, involving US Secretary of State Henry guerrilla partys leader, Joshua Nkomo. In
Kissinger, were followed by the 1977 Anglo- fact, Mugabe and Nkomo sat as a unified bloc
American initiative led by the USs UN in the negotiations, but remained often sepa-
ambassador Andrew Young and British foreign rately advised. Kaunda could therefore claim
secretary David Owen. Throughout, Kaunda to have been a major diplomatic force in
maintained an active interest and his stand- the subsequent independence of Zimbabwe
ing and efforts were rewarded when, in 1979, as a majority-ruled country in the wake of
the Commonwealth Heads of Government white-ruled Rhodesia. He began as a solitary
Meeting (CHOGM) was held in Lusaka, Zambian diplomatic actor, later worked in
Zambia, with Rhodesia as the most contentious tandem with Mark Chona, and finally worked
issue under discussion, and with a seemingly within a multilateral framework.
intractable British prime minister, Margaret
Thatcher, determined to resist Commonwealth
pressure to increase the British role in forc-
ing majority rule upon the breakaway colony. Key Point
In fact, behind the scenes, Thatchers foreign Zambian diplomacy was essential in fostering
secretary, Lord Carrington, and his people, African alliances on the Rhodesian issue and
particularly Sir Anthony Duff, had been franti- negotiating the independence of Zimbabwe.
cally busy seeking both US and wider African
agreement over diplomatic ways forward.
Simultaneously, Kaundas foreign policy advi-
sor, Mark Chona, was similarly engaged in ZIMBABWEAN DIPLOMACY
a frantic shuttle diplomacy between African
capitals, seeking to gather support for a more The new country immediately faced the prob-
forceful way forward. This represented the lem of apartheid South Africa on its borders
first time in Zambian diplomacy when it could and, from 1982, an up-scaled South African
plan to destabilise the surrounding countries. Negotiating for food stuffs to be brought in
This was named Total Strategy and, in 1982, via South Africa and using South African rail
South African commandos destroyed the wagons seemed the only viable solution to a
Zimbabwean airforce. It also increased sup- dire situation. Mugabe could not bring him-
port for rebel groups in the region. In self to initiate discussions with a regime that,
Mozambique, it sponsored the RENAMO even though it had freed Nelson Mandela,
(Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) insur- unbanned the ANC, and was involved in pro-
rection, which both used child soldiers and tracted negotiations over its future, was still
seriously weakened the recently independent officially a white-minority-ruled state. He
country. In 1986, Zimbabwe hosted the used the death of his wife, Sally, as a reason
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. to absent himself for a protracted time from
Indias Rajiv Ghandi spoke of a combined the country as he mourned her at a country
non-aligned military force marching on retreat in Ireland. The government, left in the
Pretoria, and Zimbabwean troops entered caretaking hands of Joshua Nkomo, imme-
Mozambique in strength to win back territory diately began discussions with the South
for the government of President Machel, and Africans and food was shipped in but
to secure transport networks eastwards to these discussions would not have started had
avoid dependency on the networks that went Mugabe stayed in place and, perhaps know-
through South Africa. It meant the diplomacy ing that, he deliberately absented himself to
of the young state of Zimbabwe was born allow a distasteful foreign policy decision to
from conflict. be taken by others.
Two things should be said here. Unlike The second was the negotiations over a set-
Zambia up to 1979, the Zimbabwean diplo- tlement in Mozambique between the govern-
matic efforts were multilateral, through the ment and the RENAMO rebel movement that
NAM; and the foreign ministry as well as the had been sponsored and supported by South
defence ministry were much more involved Africa. Negotiations had begun under the
than their counterparts were in Zambia. Even auspices first of the Catholic Bishop of Beira,
so, events in the early 1990s began to show- then the Santo Egidio monastery in Italy, the
case President Mugabe. This was less the Vatican and finally the Italian government.
case in terms of economic diplomacy and But critical and huge gaps remained between
negotiations with the IMF, in which eco- the two sides and, although the Zimbabwean
nomic planning minister Bernard Chidzero government had been involved in the talks, as
was prominent. But even at the 1991 had private individuals such as Tiny Rowland,
CHOGM, held in Harare to celebrate just heading the huge multinational Lonrho, and
over 10 years of independence secured partly Mozambican delegations from both sides
by Commonwealth efforts, Mugabe was the had visited Harare, it took a face-to-face
star of what was meant to have been a multi- meeting between Mugabe himself and the
lateral show. A retrospectively ironic Harare rebel leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, in Malawi
Declaration on Human Rights was launched before a real breakthrough occurred, leading
under his chairmanship, and this has, some- to a settlement in Rome. In those Malawian
times less effectively than others, moderated talks, Mugabe was not accompanied by his
Commonwealth membership and acted as foreign minister and, in fact, the talks had
a yardstick of acceptable basic governance. probably been arranged by the CIA. At the
Two things occurred in 1992, however, that discussions, it was a solo Mugabe effort and
revealed in different ways the centrality of it was fair that he was accorded a privileged
Mugabe to foreign policy. position of centrality at the signature of
The first was the huge drought that swept the peace accords. The years 1990 to 1992
the country and threatened food supplies. probably saw Mugabe at the height of his
diplomatic influence, which had begun with Cuanavale in Angola leading to South African
the NAM summit in 1986. It did not trans- military withdrawal from both Angola and
late into economic diplomacy as he failed Namibia.
to secure donor backing for a land buy-out But the beginnings of meaningful diplo-
package from white farmers in the aftermath macy over South Africa began in Lusaka
of the drought thus storing up tensions that not with an official Zambian government
exploded with the land grabs in 2000. But, as involvement, or any intervention by Kenneth
an international actor in political diplomacy, Kaunda. It came about in 1984 as a curi-
Mugabe was both a solo star and someone ous Track Two diplomatic effort, probably
who featured multilaterally, and was then encouraged by Pretoria, and recognised as
seen as a diplomatic ally of both China and no ordinary Track Two effort by Lusaka. It
the US. Sometimes his foreign ministry was involved the visit to the ANC in Lusaka by
involved in events, and sometimes not. It was a South African Academic, Professor H.W.
a complex balancing act which has since van der Merwe, and newspaper editor, Piet
come undone. Muller. These two met the ANC and reported
back to Pretoria that, in their opinion, offi-
cial talks could be fruitful. There followed,
Key Point over the next five years, a series of Track Two
encounters, one in Dakar, Senegal, involving
Zimbabwean diplomacy was a complex balancing business leaders, before Track One meetings
act with regard to developments in South Africa were held in the UK.
and the civil war in Mozambique. Proponents of Track Two diplomacy make
much of these meetings but, without the
1988 South African military defeat at Cuito
Cuanavale, and the consequent end of Total
ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND CHANGES Strategy, it is doubtful that diplomatic efforts
IN SOUTH AFRICA of any sort could have borne fruit. Even so,
they represented the first time Track Two
The eventual release of Nelson Mandela in was used to even tangential effect in a multi-
1990 did not come without much protracted nation African conflict. Defeat, at the hands
preparatory work. Again, this involved of Cuban-led forces with Soviet aircraft and
Zambia, particularly as the ANC (African Soviet pilots, led to the fall of South African
National Congress) had its exile headquarters President Botha, and it was this, together
in Lusaka, as did the Namibian liberation with his replacement by F.W. de Klerk,
group, SWAPO (South West African Peoples that led to a surprise 1989 summit between
Organisation). Zambia devoted little time to de Klerk and Kaunda beside the Victoria
SWAPOs affairs, but much to the ANCs. Falls. There was no railway carriage this
Both the ANC and SWAPO shared a common time astride a border line, but de Klerk was
problem and that was the apartheid govern- firmly on Zambian soil, and the diplomatic
ment in Pretoria, so Lusaka and Pretoria symbolism of that was immense. Both sides
became a pair of diplomatic poles in the denied that Mandelas release was an agenda
struggle for the region. Lusaka played almost item, but in the following year Mandela was
no important role in the independence of released and the ANC unbanned, and inter-
Namibia. That was a diplomatic effort nal negotiations began about a majority-
chaired by the US Assistant Secretary of ruled South Africa. For this, Kaunda could
State, Chester Crocker, after Cuban forces claim some credit, especially as other front-
had once again turned the tide of war against line Presidents, such as Nyerere, had warned
the South Africans at the 1988 battle of Cuito against the meeting. However, it was not the
only activity involving Zambia as the host of SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

the ANC that was involved.
Here, the diplomatic intervention of the With the advent of majority-rule in South
Commonwealth, by now led by Secretary- Africa, it was natural that the country would
General Emeka Anyaoku from Nigeria, was act in diplomatic affairs. It established itself,
of great importance. The convening of the with Nigeria and the AU, as part of the big
1986 Commonwealth Eminent persons, led three troika of African diplomacy. Kaunda
by Australias Malcolm Fraser and Nigerias had been defeated in elections in 1991, and
Olusegun Obasanjo, two former national Zambia no longer had a person of his inter-
leaders, and their visit to South Africa pending national stature to insert into any diplomatic
a decision to impose Commonwealth sanctions equation. However, Nelson Mandela proved
on South Africa, was key to a multinational not adroit at diplomacy. His well-meant and
sanctions effort. Although Margaret moral intervention at the 1995 Auckland
Thatchers UK refused to introduce sanctions, CHOGM about the fate of Ken Saro Wiwa in
the Eminent Persons report was highly Nigeria was seen as diplomatically clumsy.
influential in the decision of other European And it was on his watch in 1998, but when he
states to do so. The economic pressure this was absent from the country, that South
introduced into the South African situation in African military forces invaded Lesotho to
the two years leading up the military defeat disastrous effect, not just for the Lesothans
at Cuito Cuanavale was a necessary part of but for the reputation of the newly integrated
cumulative pressure on the apartheid state South African forces. It was a botched opera-
leading to its decision to enter negotiations tion. However, Jacob Zuma was despatched
with the ANC. The Eminent Persons was a sort by Mandelas successor, Thabo Mbeki, to
of political variant of groups like the Brandt seek to restore some sense of peace and order
Commission of 1980, whereby esteemed in the ethnic conflicts of Burundi in 2004 to
and senior retired political figures brought good effect. But South African diplomacy as
their collective wisdom to bear on delicate a fully credible, if controversial, force had to
and seemingly intractable problems. The await the personal interventions of Thabo
latter-day Elders group that formed originally Mbeki.
around the retired Nelson Mandela is only a The advent of Mbeki diplomacy also
latest incarnation of the formula. The role of saw for the first time in Africa a consist-
Obasanjo in the Eminent Persons was of great ent ethos behind diplomacy. Mbeki is best
importance as, on the groups visit to South known for his mediation after the disputed
Africa, he effectively became the first truly 2008 Zimbabwean elections. He was not
senior African statesman to be received in an the first senior figure to mediate in the pro-
apartheid environment. This was a first fully tracted Zimbabwean crisis that began after
fledged outing for Obasanjo into diplomatic the seizures of white-owned farms in 2000.
activities beyond Nigeria, and he was to Obasanjo, as part of a Commonwealth effort
engage in more such activities, both when he in the early 2000s, earned himself the oppro-
became President again, and as an individual. brium of both Mugabe and the opposition
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. Nor was the
power-sharing formula that Mbeki used in his
Key Point 20089 mediation at that stage original. Kofi
Bilateral, multilateral, Track Two and Eminent Anan, no longer UN secretary-general, but
Persons diplomacies were employed to different an elder global figure, had forced through a
degrees in settling the Angolan, Namibian and power-sharing compromise after the disputed
South African conflicts. 2007 Kenyan elections one with a sting in
its tail to do with future indictments before contest and its outcome as a popular prefer-
the International Criminal Court for those ence was lost. The fact that the power-sharing
behind the intensity of the electoral violence. arrangement did in fact stabilise the turmoil
It was Mbeki who had pioneered the formula that had become the Zimbabwean economy
of extensive power sharing in the Democratic is incidental. The Mbeki formula was not
Republic of Congo where, in 2002, to defuse only a mediation between claimants to power
the antagonisms of regional barons and war- but also a hierarchical arrangement of values.
lords against one another and centralised
government as a whole, he instituted a series
of regional administrations and a form of pro-
portional rule within the Cabinet. All claim- Key Point
ants to power had a place at the central seat Post-apartheid South Africa has acquired a lead-
of power as well as their own regional seats ing role in African diplomatic affairs, particularly
of power. It was this ethos of inclusivity that with regard to the mediation of conflicts.
he brought to Zimbabwe.
The ethos is in many ways laudable. It
reasons that much of the political violence in
African jurisdictions is because of a winner- THE AFRICAN UNION AND
takes-all form of electoral process. Those THE GREAT ISSUES AHEAD
who lose are left with nothing. Being in
the political wilderness also means a lack African Union efforts in Darfur to find a last-
of access to means of patronage and forms ing diplomatic solution have been led by
of corruption. If any electoral winner was former South African President Thabo Mbeki
required also to accommodate the losers (200914) and Mbeki sought to instigate a
in some proportional scheme, no one would version of the power-sharing formula he had
ever feel they had lost everything and could pioneered in both the Democratic Republic
have the means to placate their constituencies of Congo (2002) and, contentiously, in
until the next electoral contest. The problem Zimbabwe (20078) but these have been
with this ethos, with inclusivity and discour- unsuccessful. President Jacob Zuma of South
agement of political violence at its core, and Africa briefly attempted the same inclusive-
with a genuine democratic value to do with, ness peace formula in the Libyan crisis in
e.g. those who had achieved 49 per cent of the 2011, again under AU colours.
vote against the victors 51 per cent receiving Norms such as the responsibility to pro-
49 per cent of the political offices available, tect have had a hard time gaining unani-
is that, in operational terms, it encouraged mous adherence within the AU. Slowly,
the proliferation of often duplicate or mean- however, the norm is gaining traction and
ingless Cabinet positions in order to give the this owes somewhat to deliberations within
losers their rightful proportion. In larger the AUs Peace and Security Council (estab-
terms, it meant in the case of Zimbabwe the lished 2004), which has the African Standby
prioritisation of inclusivity as a value over Force as an associated programme. In fact
electoral democratic preference. Morgan the Standby Force is a series of regional
Tsvangirai, by the estimation of most observ- such forces, and it was the SADC (Southern
ers, had won the Presidency. In the protracted African Development Community) mili-
mediation led by Mbeki afterwards, he was tary initiative, involving South African and
awarded only a specially created Prime Tanzanian troops, that engaged the Congolese
Ministership, and Robert Mugabe retained the M23 rebels in 2013. Their success, under both
Presidency. Peace and inclusivity were vic- SADC and UN Security Council resolutions,
tors, but the actual meaning of a democratic was treated as a military victory, but owed
greatly to sustained diplomatic pressure on who preside over foreign policy, often inex-
Rwandas President Kagame from the UN. pertly. Multilateral and intergovernmental
The AU as a whole requires the development organs can be disregarded or overruled by
of its diplomatic and peacekeeping capaci- powerful governments. The 2010 suspen-
ties. Rapid deployment forces, or standby sion of the SADC tribunal at the insistence
forces, are still in their infancy, and there are of Zimbabwe, when compensation claims for
huge question marks over the exact relation- seized lands were brought before it, is a case
ship between the AU and the US AFRICOM. in point. If African organs have no cohesion
It was French forces that intervened in Mali and adherence, then in a field like diplomacy
against Islamic insurgents in 2014, because an it would be finally futile to talk of African
AU force could not be mustered in time. or Southern African diplomacy as opposed
On the electoral issue front, it is still unclear to the diplomacy of separate states.
as to the exact mechanisms that exist between South Africas membership of the BRICS
the AU and NEPAD (New Partnership for group and the G20, and the competition
Africas Development), where foreign funds between South Africa and Nigeria for a seat
reward good electoral practice but where the on any reformed UN Security Council, might
AU has no real intervening voice. AU elec- indicate that the most powerful African states
toral observation missions do not and by and see diplomatic futures for themselves of
large have not attempted the extensive out- both an economic and political kind that is
reach attempted by groups such as the Carter divorced from resolutions of the AU and a
Center. sense of the continent as a whole.
It is unclear how the AU, or indeed African Although there is much confusion often
governments individually, can deal with the in the foreign policy formulation in many
advent of business-led diplomacy. Powerful African states, and still much deference
oligarchic figures with vast international within the Francophonic states to the foreign
connections and dealings can conduct diplo- policy emphases of France, it must be said
macy entirely independently of governments. that foreign policy and high-level diplomacy
Tiny Rowland of Lonrho could do this. The remain by and large within the hands of
Oppenheimer family could do this. Nigerias presidents. What Kaunda foreshadowed, and
Aliko Dangote can do this. It may take such which was the kind of mantle taken up by
figures to negotiate variations in the Chinese Obasanjo and Mbeki, is very much the case
investment model in Africa something of others without their skills. In that sense,
the AU has no capacity to do but which Graham Allisons rational actor model is the
both businessmen and governments such as key model pertaining to African diplomacy
Angola are now being able to do. Someone even if the game is often to discern the long-
like South Africas Moletsi Mbeki, who uses term rationality of diplomatic movements
South African capital to ranch-raise cattle in designed or even extemporised as manoeuvres
Sudan, for export to China, exemplifies the for short-term benefit.
sort of transnational operation that is outside Track Two diplomacy has not had huge
the capacity of the AU. successes. There has never been an African
Certainly the AU needs to clarify its deal- Oslo breakthrough as occurred over
ings with the International Criminal Court Palestine. There are, however, the continu-
and upgrade its capacity to represent its ing efforts of South Africas Brenthurst
members in the G20 and with the EU. Foundation to establish a series of in princi-
As for individual countries, there is still ple agreements on intractable issues, involv-
no common template for diplomatic and for- ing former heads of state and other senior
eign ministry training, and foreign ministries African figures. However, the advent of elec-
remain routinely disregarded by presidents tronic media means that ordinary citizens can
themselves be diplomatic actors in petitioning Declaration of Independence 19651966.

the outside world of abuses within their own Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
states. The story of African diplomacy may, Chan, Stephen (2011) Southern Africa: Old
in many ways, a little more than 50 years after Treacheries and New Deceits. New Haven
the wave of sub-Saharan independence, be and London: Yale University Press.
Landsberg, Chris (2010) The Diplomacy of
just beginning (see also Chapters 3, 32 and
Transformation: South African Foreign Policy
40 in this Handbook). and Statecraft. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
van der Merwe, H.W. (2000) Peacemaking in
South Africa: A Life in Conflict Resolution.
Cape Town: Tafelberg.
FURTHER READING Williams, Paul D. (2007) From non-intervention
to non-indifference: the origins and
development of the African Unions security
Anglin, Douglas G. (1994) Zambian Crisis
culture, African Affairs, 106 (423): 253279.
Behaviour: Confronting Rhodesias Unilateral
34
Developing States Diplomacy
Stephen Calleya
INTRODUCTION their disposal and the geo-political regional

framework they operate in. Certain questions
According to the United Nations, the world that immediately need to be addressed in
today consists of 193 states.1 A number of such a study include:
these states are small developing states. The
number of small states proliferated in the What are the strategic mechanisms that small
aftermath of the Second World War. This was developing states employ?
What are the primary motivations that guide
most evident during the decolonisation
developing states diplomacy?
period which lasted from the late 1940s to How do small developing states pursue their
the late 1960s. Many of these countries strategic mechanisms in order to achieve their
emerged as newly independent states having objectives?
gained their independence from former Since they have limited resources in their Foreign
European colonial empires. Service, what are the strategic selective decisions
This chapter aims to focus on small devel- that small developing states choose?
oping states. Hence, countries such as China,
India and Brazil, while still considered devel- The objective of this chapter is to identify the
oping countries, cannot be included in such challenges that small developing countries
an assessment due to the large size of their face and trends in their foreign policy
population, landmass and natural resources. decision-making track record. After examin-
The small developing countries are those ing the challenges that they must address, the
countries that have limited resources. Their chapter also aims to assess how their foreign
foreign policy agenda is significantly influ- policy is devised in order to tackle those
enced by their geographic size and location, challenges and thus remain relevant in the
the limited human and natural resources at international society of states. This analysis
will also explore future options available to This use of size also creates differences
small developing states to help them maintain because size is not an absolute concept but a
a relevant stance in an ever changing interna- relative one. Size can refer to the landmass
tional system of states. Before doing this, it is and population.
important to first discuss the definition of The figures set for defining population size
small developing state and what constitutes vary. David Vital sets an upper limit of around
such a state. 2030 million inhabitants for the population
of a small developing state.7 Simon Kuznets
sets the upper limit to 10 million people8. In
Definition its overview of small states, the World Bank
states that more than a quarter of its member
The issue of defining a small state is a com- states have a population of 1.5 million inhab-
plex one. In recent decades, numerous schol- itants or less.9 In its publication, A Future
ars have proposed different definitions. for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability,
However, no common theoretical definition the Commonwealth also used the 1.5 million
had been established and there is no universal threshold and this comprised 49 countries (at
consensus on even the developing part of the time publication), 42 of which are devel-
the phrase. Moreover, although International oping countries.10
Relations scholars as a rule tend to speak of When it comes to identifying developing
states, despite some difference of connota- states, the World Bank in 2014 listed 145
tion, the term is interchangeable with coun- developing countries, including EU mem-
tries and even small powers.2 bers such as Bulgaria and Romania, while
Roderick Pace states that a satisfactory def- the WTO allows its members to subscribe to
inition of small state has still not been found.3 the group of either developed or developing
Milan Jazbec is also of the same thought and countries. UNCTAD considers developing
he cites two reasons from the scholar Niels countries to number around one hundred.11
Amstrup for this; first, the concept of size is
still unclear as a defining feature; and sec-
ond, since the definition has been almost
totally focused on the independent variable CHALLENGES TO SMALL
of size, the quest for defining a small state DEVELOPING STATES
has ignored the dependent variable, which is
behaviour.4 When one focuses on the challenges to small
From a review of literature, Jeanne A.K. developing states, the term vulnerability is a
Hey identifies three types of small states very important one. Vulnerability is defined as
which include: being especially susceptible to risk of harm.12
All states face vulnerability, but for small
microstates, which have populations which are states, it is inherent vulnerability because
below the 1 million mark; small states do not have large populations and
developed small states such as The Netherlands,
their economic capacity is limited.13
Austria, Belgium and Switzerland;
The inherent vulnerability is derived from
Third World5 small states, which include the
newly independent states from Africa, Asia and security challenges faced by the small states.
Latin America that achieved their independence While post-Cold War security challenges are
from the former European empires during the no longer as geopolitical in nature as they were
decolonisation period.6 during the Cold War at the time of intense
superpower rivalry between the United States
Size has been often been used as a criterion of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet
when trying to define what a small state is. Socialist Republics (USSR), some small
Developing States Diplomacy 425
states continue to be directly influenced by imports, a non-diversified economy and high

great power geopolitical rivalry, as high- exposure to international markets which can be
lighted by the proxy war in and around Syria beneficial in terms of trade but damaging if an
since 2011 and the military clash in Georgia/ economic crisis hits.
South Ossetia/Abkhazia in 2008. Accidents and natural hazards such as severe
earthquakes, pandemics and, even more severe
Even during the later stage of the Cold War,
for Small Island Developing States (SIDS), the
during the 1980s, small states started becom- rise of sea water levels due to global warming.17
ing aware of their enhanced vulnerability and
this is exemplified in the US intervention in
The above four categories of security vul-
Grenada.14 More recently, reference to the
nerability should not necessarily be seen in
new concept of Small Vulnerable Economies,
isolation but can also be present in combi-
as used by the WTO and other international
nation of some or all, thus aggravating the
Organisations, has also become the norm.15
security situation to a genuinely precarious
Post-Cold War security is multidimen-
situation.
sional in nature and transnational. This is
Economic vulnerability is also a very
the broad multifunctional approach, which
serious issue. Lino Briguglio outlines the
is characterised by: (1) the shift from tradi-
Economic Vulnerability Index, which con-
tional threats to security to new threats such
sists of criteria such as: (a) openness in the
as internal conflicts, civil wars, transnational
economy; (b) concentration on exports;
terrorism, genocide, climate change and nat-
(c) dependence on imports of high strategic
ural disasters; (2) the acceptance that these
value such as food and fuel; and (d) small
threats are of an international nature and that
states being peripheral.18
there should be a collective effort in dealing
The report Small States: Meeting Challenges
with them; (3) the emergence of non-state
in the Global Economy lists the factors that
actors and possible effects on the capabilities
are brought about by small size and which can
of states and asymmetrical violence; and (4)
have negative effects on the economy of small
the rise of international and regional institu-
developing states, including:
tions role in dealing with peace and security,
which is due to the broadening of the defini- Remoteness and insularity;
tion of security.16 Susceptibility to natural disasters;
Security is an issue of great concern for Limited institutional capacity;
small developing states. Security threats to Limited diversification;
small developing states can take the form Openness;
of either political/military or economic and Access to external capital;
environmental challenges. Bailes et al. divide Poverty.19
security vulnerability to small developing
countries into four categories: Remoteness and insularity refers to the

location of small developing states away
Military, hard security, which includes military from the centres of commerce.20 Due to this,
invasion, being caught in crossfire, blackmail, small developing states in particular have to
economic blockade, external subversion through pay higher costs for transporting goods for
political coups and the fomenting of internal
exports than larger states that may be in a
conflict.
similar geographical position. Small Island
Non-state violence being done by non-state
actors such as terrorist groups, smugglers and Developing States (SIDS) face particularly
organised criminal networks. high costs because they are more insular and
Economic security where vulnerability is evident small.21 This, in turn, places SIDS in a disad-
in the limited resources of small developing states vantageous position when it comes to attracting
which makes the economy highly dependent on Foreign Direct Investment.22
Income volatility is also an issue for small of those states where they do not have dip-
states because of their dependence on inter- lomatic missions, a trend some of the other
national trade and markets which can affect larger countries have subsequently adopted
income negatively if economic crises or natu- in an effort to curtail costs (see chapter 24 in
ral disasters strike.23 this Handbook).
Susceptibility to natural disasters and Another important perspective to take into
environmental change adds to the vulner- consideration when it comes to the participa-
ability of small developing states from the tion of small developing states in international
point of view of environmental security the organisations is the fact that the inherent
consequences of such disasters include seri- challenge of budgetary limitations of some
ous damage to the infrastructure and the high of these states often leads to their inability to
costs to repair it.24 Global warming brings pay annual international organisation mem-
with it the threat of a rise in sea water levels bership fees, which results in them being
which would have a direct impact on SIDS, deprived of the right to vote. Several newly
even extinction.25 Other serious consequences independent small states that have rushed
of climate change include pandemics, putting to reinforce their international positions by
pressure on freshwater resources, and a nega- joining such international organisations have
tive impact on food security in terms of pro- soon found their enthusiasm restricted by
duction.26 Former President of the Maldives, their inability to meet membership fees.
Mohamed Nasheed, highlighted the severe Among the challenges confronting the
threat posed by global warming to SIDS such Foreign Service of small developing states
as Maldives and under his administration and one must also include the difficulty for
initiative the Climate Vulnerable Forum was Consular Services of addressing the ever-
founded in November 2009 just prior to the increasing needs of their citizens as a result
Copenhagen Summit27 (see Chapter 49 in of both rising population mobility and higher
this Handbook). expectations for improved and faster service
Limited institutional capability is a tough and in times of crises. Scarce resources and
challenge for small developing states. This skeleton staffs require smaller states to have
refers to the limited resources of small states, to be able to mobilise their resources quickly
which in turn means that small states do not and exert more efforts in order to be pre-
have the resources needed to support the pared to meet the changing nature of citizen
functions of government, for example provid- demands.
ing services such as education, health care, One factor that can assist in raising the for-
justice, combatting corruption and having a eign policy profile of small states is the exist-
fully-fledged Foreign Service.28 The sover- ence of organised and influential Diasporas.
eignty of the small developing states, hence, Several small states have sought to utilise
becomes a limited one. They also do not have Diasporas by creating government depart-
enough resources to train personnel. ments or ministries for Diaspora and also by
The latter, i.e. the Foreign Service, is par- sharing such experiences with countries in
ticularly important for this chapter because similar situations.
this means that small developing states have Limited diversification is related to the
to concentrate their diplomatic resources smallness of the states being discussed in this
where they are most needed, especially chapter. The economies of small states are
when it comes to their diplomatic missions mostly dependent on a single export, which
in International Organisations. As a result, brings with it an unhealthy dependency; also,
small states have regularly made use of their small states are more often than not dependent
respective missions at the United Nations on strategic imports such as energy supplies
to deal with bilateral issues with missions and industrial materials.29
Openness has its advantages and disad- Proactive participating in international co-
vantages. The advantages include the crucial operative schemes such as international organi-
interaction in the international economy and sations, regional initiatives and partnerships.35
world trade which has the benefit of enabling
access to a variety of products and cheaper In the interdependent world, the defensive
prices.30 On the negative side, while expo- option would lead to isolation while the second
sure to international trade has its benefits, the gives an opportunity for small developing
same exposure leads to increased economic states to engage in the international system.
vulnerability in the wake of bad worldwide In order to preserve their national security
economic situations.31 from external military attacks or threats from
Access to external capital is available to larger states, small states often opt for any
small developing states in the form of Official of the following three options: (a) military
Development Assistance (ODA), official aid, protection from a neighbouring large state;
and importantly, Foreign Direct Investment (b) military protection from a remote power;
(FDI), all of which are very important sources and (c) alliance with other states, i.e. balanc-
of capital flows.32 Foreign companies can ing.36 The first two options are associated with
help nourish the private sector in the small bandwagoning while the third is associated with
developing state and bring expertise. multilateralism. The following case study is
Poverty remains a serious hurdle for small about bilateral co-operation with a great power
developing states to tackle, although one as a means to ensure security and survival.
has to note that in the case of many small
developing states, the education and health
indicator are better than those of the larger
developing states.33 CASE STUDY: PARTICIPATION OF
PACIFIC MICROSTATES IN OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM IN 2003
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES The four Pacific microstates that participated

OF SMALL DEVELOPING STATES: in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were the
REMAINING RELEVANT IN THE Marshall Island, the Federal States of
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Micronesia, Tonga Palau and the Solomon
Islands.37 Why would these small island states
In this section, the main objective is to exam- participate in a military operation in a faraway
ine the strategic mechanisms and the selec- region? Anders Wivel and Kajsa Ji Noe Oest
tive strategic choices that small developing provide an explanation. The motivations for
states choose in order to mitigate the weak- participating with the USA were based on the
nesses posed by their inherent vulnerability belief held by microstates that participation in
and remain relevant in the international soci- coalitions of the willing would help in
ety of states. Hence, while in the previous enhancing their own security and help in gain-
section the lens was focused on the vulnera- ing them economic rewards.38
bility of small developing states, in this sec- Such strategic choices are based on the
tion the focus will be on their resilience. theory of Realism. Microstates do not have
Why and how do small developing states the capacity to have their own defence forces,
pursue such mechanisms? Small developing so bandwagoning with a foreign power such
states face two strategic choices: as the USA helps in reassuring their physical
survival, and also possibly balances against
Defensive the focus is on achieving autonomy domestic threats.39 It is also important to
and an avoidance of foreign entanglements.34 notice that four of the five microstates that
participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom had provide small developing states is the reason
signed defence agreements with the USA, why such states seek to raise the profile and
and the most relevant one was the Compact of authority of such entities. Raimo Vyrynen
Free Association (CFA) under which the sig- states that Usually, international institutions
natories Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall are the best friends of small states.45 Being
Islands allowed the USA full authority and integrated into international organisations
responsibility for security and defence.40 gives small developing states the opportunity
While the microstates had the right to conduct to reduce the insecurities stemming from
their foreign policy, the CFA obliged them vulnerability and allows them to participate
to not make foreign policy decisions which in the processes occurring within the interna-
contradicted US security and defence respon- tional organisations.46
sibilities.41 This agreement demonstrates the The universal international organisation,
dependence the participating microstates have the United Nations is based, like many oth-
on US security guarantees. This also demon- ers, on the one nation, one vote principle.
strated how bilateralism is one of the strategic This gives the smaller members of the inter-
mechanisms of small developing states. national community a higher level platform
The Marshall Islands, Palau and Micronesia that they would otherwise be unable to attain.
are also very much dependent on US bilateral The diverse and large nature of the United
aid when it comes to their economies, another Nations provides small states with a condu-
motivation for joining the coalition of the will- cive context within which they are able to
ing.42 They also use the US dollar as their cur- forge alliances in a more flexible manner
rency.43 Historically, the Pacific microstates than would otherwise be the case.
were exchanged between various European In this context it is important to clarify that
colonial empires and, later, Japan. After the while the principle of one nation, one vote
Second World War, the five microstates that applies to the General Assembly, decision-
participated in the ousting of Saddam Hussein making is different in the Security Council,
followed a policy of alliance with the USA in which is authorised to pass decisions on
exchange for a security guarantee, a policy that important matters of peace and security, and
became known as strategic denial.44 is the only global international body where the
decisions taken are binding for all members.
Small developing states are unlikely to ever
have the opportunity to manoeuvre at the UN
SMALL STATES AND security Council, even if they succeed in mak-
MULTILATERALISM ing it there, as the big five permanent mem-
bers can always exercise their right of veto.
Another strategic mechanism in the foreign In contrast, the United Nations Conference
policy of small developing states is multilat- on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is
eralism. This is seen in the importance of one specific sector where small states seek to
international organisations for small states. advance their interests on a regular basis by
Legally speaking, all states in the interna- aligning themselves with other like-minded
tional system are considered equal. However, states, given the fact that UNCTAD provides
at a political level the international commu- support to developing states when it comes to
nity of states is not a level playing field. negotiation of trade agreements.47
Hence, international organisations are At the end of the first session of UNCTAD,
regarded as useful vehicles where small on 15 June 1964, developing countries formed
states, especially the underdeveloped ones, the Group of 77 (G-77) and this development
can amplify their voices. The comparative took place with the Joint Declaration of
advantage that international organisations the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries.48
The objective behind the formation of the d) expansion of trade and economic relations with
G-77 was to provide developing countries third States;
with the tools to to articulate and promote e) enhanced levels of international competitiveness;
their collective economic interests and f) organisation for increased production and pro-
enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all ductivity;
g) the achievement of a greater measure of economic
major international economic issues within
leverage and effectiveness of Member States in
the United Nations system, and promote dealing with third States, groups of States and
South-South cooperation for development.49 entities of any description;
Throughout the 1970s, the structure of the h) enhanced co-ordination of Member States for-
world economy was debated, and developing eign and [foreign] economic policies; and
countries criticised the post-Second World i) enhanced functional co-operation, including
War economic arrangement known as the i. more efficient operation of common services
Bretton Woods system.50 There was general and activities for the benefit of its peoples;
consensus among small states that the rules of ii. accelerated promotion of greater understand-
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ing among its peoples and the advancement
(nowadays, the World Trade Organization) of their social, cultural and technological
development;
were not helping them tackle their needs.51
iii. intensified activities in areas such as health,
Other international institutions which have education,transportation,telecommunications.53
been of major importance to developing coun-
tries include the World Trade Organisation, the In 2001, there was further progress toward
World Bank and the International Monetary integration with the Caribbean Single Market
Fund. and Economy (CSME), and the objectives
behind CSME included:
free movement of goods, labour, services and capital;

Regional Integration common external trade policy;
harmonisation of tax regimes;
For small states, and even more, the micro- creation of a monetary union;
states, regional integration provides many establishment of a single currency.54
benefits. In recent decades there has been a
proliferation of Regional Integration As a Regional Integration Agreement,
Agreements (RIA). CARICOM was instrumental in bringing
The case study highlighted here to illus- together the Caribbean microstates, which
trate this benefit is the Caribbean Community has strengthened their position in interna-
and Common Market (CARICOM). tional negotiations.55
CARICOM came into effect on 1 August
1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramas.52 This
agreement between this grouping of coun-
tries was the culmination of years of work CASE STUDY: MALTA AND ITS
dedicated to promoting regional integration FOREIGN SERVICE
in microstates formerly known as the West
Indies. CARICOM consists of 15 members.
With a population of 420,000, Malta is often
CARICOMs objectives include:
classified as a microstate. Like other small
a) improved standards of living and work; states Malta must seek to maximise opportu-
b) full employment of labour and other factors of nities in international relations if it is to realise
production; its foreign policy strategic objectives. Maltas
c) accelerated, co-ordinated and sustained eco- Representations Overseas (MROs) include 21
nomic development and convergence; Embassies, four Permanent Representations,
three High Commissions, five Consulates- gained EU membership, Malta has continued
General, one Commercial Office/Consulate to accelerate reforms related to good gov-
and one Representative Office.56 Although, ernance. Maltas competitiveness has been
traditionally, MROs are concerned with politi- significantly strengthened since joining the
cal and consular work, MROs have also been European Union in May 2004, given that
successfully involved in facilitating business it has fully adhered to the EU acquis com-
and commerce, promoting tourism and cul- munitaire. Improving good governance is a
tural exchanges.57 Commercial and economic prerequisite for small developing countries
diplomacy are very important for the econ- seeking to play a more influential role in
omy of Malta, in particular for the attraction international organisations.
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Malta has also been active in the United
In a recent report the Ministry of Foreign Nations. The most important contribu-
Affairs of Malta has been advised to pro- tion was on 17 August 1967, when the then
vide continuous training to its diplomats, Ambassador of the Republic of Malta to the
especially those to be posted overseas in the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, presented a
field of economic diplomacy.58 The idea of memorandum to the UN Secretary-General
appointing Roving Ambassadors who would which requested for the following item to
seek to identify opportunities for developing be inserted in the agenda of the Twenty-
commerce and economic relation with coun- Second Session of the General Assembly:
tries and regions where there are no MROs Examination of the question of the reserva-
was also proposed.59 To assist in the task of tion exclusively for peaceful purposes of the
attracting more FDI, the number of Honorary sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub-soil
Consuls in important international business thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the
hubs should be increased.60 It was advocated limits of present national jurisdiction, and
that Malta should also redouble its efforts to the use of their resources in the interest of
strengthen economic relations with emerging mankind.64
economic powers such as China and India, On 18 December 1967, the UN General
as well as in the Arabian Gulf with countries Assembly unanimously approved a resolu-
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United tion which in three years led to a Declaration
Arab Emirates.61 The report also recom- of Principles that was also unanimously
mended that there should be more engage- approved.65 In this Declaration of Principles,
ment with the Maltese Diaspora in order to it was accepted that the sea-bed and ocean
assess what commercial and business oppor- floor, and the sub-soil thereof, beyond the lim-
tunities may be promoted.62 its of jurisdiction as well as the resources
A report by the International Monetary of the area are THE COMMON HERITAGE
Fund (IMF) acknowledged that Malta has OF MANKIND.66 From this emerged the
been able to counter the impact of the inter- Third United Nations Conference on the Law
national economic downturn since 2008 of the Sea (UNCLOS) and on 30 April 1982,
and praised its macroeconomics policies. the final text of the new Convention was
However, the IMF also stressed that Malta adopted with 130 votes in favour, four against
had to carry out a more ambitious reform and 17 abstentions.67 During the Final Act of
initiative including policies aimed at enhanc- the Conference in December 1982, there was
ing female participation in the workforce, approval by consensus and 117 states put
attracting higher levels of FDI, increasing their signature to the Final Act.68
investment in Research and Development, In 1969, the Maltese delegation at the
and introducing legislation that strength- UN General Assembly formally brought
ens transparency and accountability in the to the agenda the issue of the ageing and in
business and judicial sectors.63 Ever since it 1971 Malta introduced the resolution on the
Question of the Elderly and the Aged.69 review of the main factors that determine the
Maltas initiative helped to increase the atten- role that small states can play in contempo-
tion the United Nations gave to the elderly rary international relations. In addition to
and this was demonstrated in Vienna in 1982, basic attributes such as geographic size, nat-
when the World Assembly on the Aging con- ural resources and the system of education
vened.70 During this Assembly, the Vienna and health care available, other factors such
International Plan of Action on Aging was as remoteness, insularity, limited institu-
adopted and it focused on issues related to tional capacity, limited diversification of
elderly people as well as the long-term impli- resources and access to private sector invest-
cations of having ageing populations, be they ment have also been examined.
social and economic.71 When one looks at An effort has also been made to identify
countries facing serious demographic chal- what distinguishes the diplomacy of small
lenges related to an ageing population, one developing states in comparison to other
can observe Maltas foresight. Maltas ini- states in the international system and which
tiative on the ageing led to the Agreement to factors influence their strategic planning and
establish in Malta the International Institute guide their decision making process. Which
on Aging, and this agreement between the specific challenges must small developing
UN and the Government of Malta took place states overcome when implementing their
on 9 October 1987.72 The UN Secretary- respective diplomatic initiatives?
General officially opened the International The geostrategic realities that influence
Institute on Aging in April 1988. small developing states dictate that such
At the UN, Malta has also been vocal on states focus at a global level on multilateral
climate change. On 9 September 1988, the diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy enables
Government of Malta made a request to such states to maximise their influence by
the UN Secretary-General for the inclusion articulating policy positions that are of strate-
of an item to the agenda of the Forty-third gic relevance in their respective region, such
Session of the General Assembly which was as the transnational security challenges of cli-
named Conservation of Climate as part of mate change, organised crime and terrorism.
the Common Heritage of Mankind.73 This Apart from situations where it is clear that
was followed by a draft resolution by Malta a small state is acting as a proxy of a larger
which was adopted by unanimity by the UN power, small developing states also have the
General Assembly and it became Resolution comparative advantage of not being automat-
43/53 with the title Protection of global cli- ically perceived by other states in the inter-
mate for present and future generations of national system as having an ulterior motive
mankind.74 This resolution described cli- when raising the profile of sensitive issues in
mate change as the Common Concern of international relations.
Mankind.75 The result of this initiative, and
hence the resolution, was that the mandate
on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was strengthened.76 NOTES
1 United Nations, UN at a Glance, http://www.un.org/

en/aboutun/index.shtml [accessed 26 August 2014].
CONCLUSION 2 McKercher, B.J.C. (ed.), Routledge Handbook
of Diplomacy and Statecraft, Routledge, 2012,
p. 274, xxvii.
This assessment provides an overview of the 3 Pace, Roderick, in Gower, Jackie and Redmond,
main factors that influence the diplomacy of John, Enlarging the European Union: The Way
small developing states. This includes a Forward, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000, p. 107.
4 Jazbec, Milan, The Diplomacies of New Small 23 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global
States: The Case of Slovenia with Comparison Economy, op. cit., p. 9.
from the Baltics, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 24 Ibid. p. 11.
2002, pp. 389. 25 Ibid. p. 12.
5 The term Third World refers to the developing 26 Gillespie, Alexander, in Commonwealth Small
countries. States: Issues and Prospects, op. cit., p. 11.
6 Hey, Jeanne A.K. (ed.), Small States in World 27 The Climate Vulnerable Forum, Brief History of
Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, Lynne the CVF, http://www.thecvf.org/web/climate-
Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 2. vulnerable-forum/brief-history-of-the-cvf/
7 Vital, David, in Ingebritsen, Christine etal. (eds), [accessed 28 August 2014].
Small States in International Relations, University 28 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global
of Washington Press, 2006, p. 81. Economy, op. cit., p. 17.
8 Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat and World 29 Briguglio, in Commonwealth Small States: Issues
Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, Small States: and Prospects, op. cit., pp. 1023.
Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy, 17 30 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global
April 2000, http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/ Economy, op. cit., p. 9.
meetingchallengeinglobaleconomyl.pdf [accessed 31 Briguglio, in Commonwealth Small States: Issues
27 August 2014], p. 3. and Prospects, op. cit., p. 102.
9 World Bank, Small States Overview, http:// 32 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global
www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates/ Economy, op. cit., p. 15.
overview#1 [accessed 26 August 2014]. 33 Ibid. p. 16.
10 Commonwealth Advisory Group for Updating 34 Bailes, Rickli and Thorhallsson in Small States and
the 1985 Vulnerability Report, A Future for Small International Security: Europe and beyond, op.
States: Overcoming Vulnerability, Commonwealth cit., p. 32.
Secretariat, 1997, p. 9. 35 Ibid. p. 32.
11 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country- 36 Ibid. p. 35.
classifications/country-and-lending-groups; 37 Wivel, Anders and Oest, Kajsa Ji Noe, Security,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/ profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the
d1who_e.htm; https://www.wto.org/english/ security strategies of microstates, Cambridge
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3,
12 A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, 2010, p. 429.
op. cit., p. 13. 38 Ibid. p. 430.
13 Ibid. p. 13. 39 Ibid. p. 436.
14 Ibid. p. 2. 40 Ibid. p. 437.
15 Rana, Kishan, 21st Diplomacy: A Practitioners 41 Ibid. p. 437.
Guide, Bloomsbury Academic, 2011, p. 61. 42 Ibid. p. 441.
Meyer, Matthias and Lunenborg, Peter, The 43 Ibid. p. 443.
evolution of special and differential treatment 44 Ibid. p. 448.
and aid for trade, Ch. 18, in Heydon, Kenneth 45 Milan, The Diplomacies of New Small States, op.
and Woolcock, Stephen (eds), The Ashgate cit., p. 56.
Research Companion to International Trade 46 Ibid. p. 56.
Policy, Ashgate, 2012. 47 UNCTAD, About UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/
16 Bailes, Alyson J.K., Rickli, Jean-Marc and Pages/AboutUs.aspx [accessed 30 August 2014].
Thorhallsson, Baldur, in Archer, Clive etal. (eds), 48 The Group of 77 at the United Nations, About the
Small States and International Security: Europe Group of 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/ [accessed
and beyond, Routledge, 2014, pp. 2930. 30 August 2014].
17 Ibid. pp. 324. 49 Ibid.
18 Briguglio, Lino, in Kisanga, Eliawony and Danchie, 50 Brandt, Willy, North-South: A Program for
Sarah Jane, Commonwealth Small States: Issues Survival, MIT Press, 1980, p. 39.
and Prospects, Commonwealth Secretariat, 51 Ibid. p. 39.
2007, p. 103. 52 Caribbean Community Secretariat, History of
19 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), http://
Economy, op. cit., p. 5. www.caricom.org/jsp/community/history.
20 Ibid. p. 6. jsp?menu=community [accessed 01 September
21 Briguglio, in Commonwealth Small States: Issues 2014].
and Prospects, op. cit., p. 103. 53 Caribbean Community Secretariat, Objectives
22 Ibid. p. 103. of the Community, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/
community/objectives.jsp?menu=community 61 Ibid. p. 16.

[accessed 01 September 2014]. 62 Ibid. p. 23.
54 International Labour Organization, Economic 63 International Monetary Fund, Malta: 2013
Integration in the Caribbean: The Development Article IV Consultation, Washington DC, July 2013,
Toward a Common Labour Market, http://www. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_protect/ cr13203.pdf, p. 24.
protrav/migrant/documents/publication/ 64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malta, Malta at
wcms_201611.pdf, p. 10. the United Nations, Interprint Limited, 1990,
55 The World Bank, Regional Integration in Devel- pp. 301.
oping States, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/ 65 Ibid. p. 31.
pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2797, p. 12. 66 Ibid. p. 31.
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta, Executive 67 Ibid. p. 31.
Summary and Recommendations on the Com- 68 Ibid. p. 31.
mercial and Economic Diplomacy Role of Maltas 69 Ibid. p. 32.
Representations Overseas, June 2013, http:// 70 Ibid. p. 32.
www.mfa.gov.mt/Library/PDF/Ececutive%20 71 Ibid. p. 32.
Summary.pdf [accessed 31 August 2014], p. 1. 72 Ibid. p. 32.
57 Ibid. p. 1 73 Ibid. p. 32.
58 Ibid. p. 2. 74 Ibid. p. 33.
59 Ibid. p. 12. 75 Ibid. p. 33.
60 Ibid. p. 13. 76 Ibid. p. 33.
PART IV
TYPES OF DIPLOMATIC
ENGAGEMENT
35
Public Diplomacy
Ellen Huijgh1
INTRODUCTION as comprising several conceptually related

stages: traditional diplomacy; new diplomacy;
Public diplomacy is a term, concept, practice and another stage that appears to present a more
and multidisciplinary field of study. As a integrative approach. Perhaps controversially,
diplomatic practice, which preceded its con- it also argues that there is a domestic dimen-
ceptual and scholarly foundations, it centers sion to public diplomacy (directed to domestic
on diplomatic communication between polit- civil society as publics, partners and actors),
ical entities (kings in ancient times and and that several governments conceptualiza-
nation-states today) and people (that is, pub- tions, which emphasize international publics,
lics), usually in foreign countries but, accord- often contrast with their practices, which
ing to some accounts, also domestic publics. emphasize interaction with domestic publics.
Like many other tools of diplomacy, public This more comprehensive approach sees pub-
diplomacy continues to evolve in response to lic diplomacys international and domestic
societal changes such as democratization, dimensions as stepping stones on a continuum
globalization and the communications revo- of public participation that is central to inter-
lution, and it may well influence some of national policymaking and conduct. Finally,
those changes (see also Chapter 44 in this given the recent evolutions of public diplo-
Handbook). As a multidisciplinary field of macy mentioned above, the future of public
study that inspires multiple definitions and diplomacy, especially its integrative evolution,
practices that often go beyond those associ- is hard to predict without more theoretical and
ated with diplomacy and diplomatic studies, empirical research. This chapter thus traces
public diplomacy is a blooming area of the evolution of public diplomacy through its
scholarship and practice. different stages (see Table 35.1) and concludes
This chapter argues that the evolution of with some suggestions for future research on
public diplomacy can be usefully understood the integrative public diplomacy approach.
ORIGINS century, when practical implementations of

participatory democracy began again (such as
One of the first uses of the term public diplo- its promotion and use as a major theme by the
macy was in an 1856 edition of The Times, American Left in the 1960s) (Miller, 2011).
where it was employed as a synonym for Public diplomacy, understood as the prac-
civility to contrast that behavior with what tice of states one-way communication with
might be seen as the less-than-civil posturing foreign publics, appears partly to coincide
of US President Franklin Pierce (The Times, with the evolution of twentieth-century par-
1856: 6; Cull, 2008a: 1924). This type of ticipatory democracy, especially in North
usage, however, fails to reflect the rich history America. It is also associated with another
of practice behind the term. The earliest evi- twentieth-century development, the two world
dence of public diplomacys practice can be wars. During the Great War of 191418, public
found in public discourses from before the diplomacy was often used to inform popula-
state became the primary geopolitical actor. tions about the war and influence foreign pub-
For example, diplomatic messages and trea- lics. The term was adopted as a more modern
ties dating back to 2500 BC have been found mantle and alternative to the by then discred-
in the Middle East, with royal envoys exchang- ited term propaganda, which was seen as sys-
ing gifts and kings promoting relations via tematically manipulating peoples cognitions
early city diplomacy, as well as cases of and behavior to serve the intent of the propa-
ancient Greeces negotiations of treatments, gandist (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2013).
and Roman diplomacy imposing its objectives Modern use of the term of public diplo-
on, client states (Cohen, 2013: 19, 23). macy is associated with the United States,
Understanding the origins of public diplo- even though it is clear that it has earlier ori-
macy practice, however, is determined more gins. Scholars continue to associate the term
by recognizing that it is an intrinsic part of with the description coined in 1965 by Dean
the ongoing democratization of interna- Edmund A. Gullion of Tufts Universitys
tional policymaking and conduct, rather Fletcher School as the transnational flow of
than by trying to find an exact point of ori- information and ideas and his view that:
gin. Democratization processes often move
from more indirect (for example, electing [] public diplomacy deals with the influence of
public attitudes on the formation and execution of
representatives and parliamentary represen- foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of
tation) to more direct forms of participation international relations beyond traditional diplo-
by people. Although it is often forgotten that macy; the cultivation by governments of public
public diplomacy has non-democratic ori- opinion in other countries; the interaction of pri-
gins too (including Soviet practices after the vate groups and interests in one country with
those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs
revolution, or powers with non-democratic and its impact on policy; communication between
features such as China investing heavily in those whose job is communication, as between
public diplomacy),2 it thrives in a context diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the
of participatory democracy that emphasizes processes of inter-cultural communications.3
widespread constituent participation in gov-
ernmental systems and policymaking. Yet Use of the term, however, did not come about
despite participatory democracys past mani- without hiccups. For some, putting public
festations, such as the Iroquois Confederacy, and diplomacy together seemed contradic-
Athens civic gatherings (albeit limited by tory. The vision of diplomacy as the relation-
the exclusion of women and slaves) and ships between governments, with only states
the Swiss Cantons of the Middle Ages being diplomatic actors and non-state actors
(Roussopoulos and Benello, 2015), concrete roles being largely ignored, was certainly not
practices were not evident until the twentieth conducive to public diplomacy. The 1961
Public Diplomacy 439
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations rather than by trying to find an exact point of
confirmed that diplomacy had little to do origin.
with interacting with the ordinary public Although having earlier origins, public diplo-
(United Nations, 2005). macy is associated with the United States and
particularly the Edward R. Murrow Center of
Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, and
encompasses dimensions of international rela-
Key Points tions beyond traditional diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is a practice, term and field
of study. Its practice as diplomatic engagement
with people naturally preceded the term and
studies on it.
TRADITIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Understanding the origins of public diplomacy
practice is determined more by recognizing that Traditional diplomacy evolved in several
it is an intrinsic part of the ongoing democratiza- stages. In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tion of international policymaking and conduct, tury, public diplomacy was seen as an offshoot
Table 35.1 Summary of the stages in public diplomacy

Traditional PD: twentieth century B New PD: twenty-first century
E
Clear boundaries between foreign and Permeable and non-existent boundaries, power
Y
domestic, states and civil society diffusion
O
State-to-state diplomacy Polycentric diplomacy: above, below, and beyond
N
the state
D
Established rules and norms Emerging rules and norms
Fewer diplomatic actors, fewer people, N More diplomatic actors, more people,
fewer issues E more issues
Industrial age technologies: print, radio, W Digital age technologies: traditional and
television social media
=
Hierarchical, state-centered, top-down Networked, horizontal
Information dissemination, message I Relational, collaborative:
design and delivery N message exchange, dialogue and mutual
T understanding, and collaborative policy networks
One-to-many (unidirectional) E Many-to-many (multidirectional)
Less information, more attention G More information, less attention
Foreign ministries: gatekeepers, primary R Whole-of-government diplomacy: foreign ministries
actors in foreign affairs A as subsets, important but not primary
War on the battlefield: T Armed conflict among the people: between state
between state-actors I and non-state actors
Cultural barriers V Incorporate cultural diversity
Public diplomacy is episodic and E Public diplomacy as enduring and central
peripheral to diplomacy to diplomacy
Government-to-people public PD Many state, regional, sub-state and civil-society
diplomacy actors in public diplomacy
Passive audience (indirect participation) = Active audience (direct participation)
Foreign publics The best of both Foreign and domestic actors as publics, partners,
independent actors
Persuade by wars of ideas: meta-narratives Complementarities Understand, influence, engage and collaborate in
instead of global public spheres: multiple narratives
Contradictories Understand what others perceive, co-created and
Get the message right, pre-formed and
static message dynamic
Shaping images of the sender Influencing policy agendas by shaping policy attitudes
Dominated by US and UK experiences US, European and (later) non-Western experiences
Sources: Gregory (2014: 29); Zaharna (2010: 113); Cull (2009: 14)
of diplomacy and by some as a less-biased Information Agency (USIA) from 195399.

type of propaganda. During the world wars, it For example, USIA undertook a wide range
amounted to one-way dissemination of infor- of overseas information programs and aimed
mation mainly aimed at influencing domestic to promote mutual understanding between
and foreign publics, and disinterested in dia- the United States and other nations by
logue or relationship-building. As well as the conducting educational and cultural activities
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany propagating (of which the best known are the Fulbright
their respective ideologies, public diplomacy exchange program and International Visitors
was largely dominated by the United States program) (Cull, 2008b).4
(Committee on Public Information) and Great Traditional public diplomacy in the
Britain (British Propaganda Office). These late twentieth century thus incorporated a
agencies were created with the aim of influ- wide variety of practices, such as informa-
encing and mobilizing domestic publics via tion management and cultural promotion.
available media about American and British Cultural institutes across Europe (such as
participation in the First World War, creating Germanys Goethe Institut, the UKs British
enthusiasm for the war effort and enlisting Council and Frances Alliance Franaise)
public support against foreign attempts to organized cultural events and exchange pro-
undercut American and British war aims (see grams. European countries, in contrast to
Arndt, 2005; Taylor, 1999). the United States, developed a more proac-
Public diplomacy flourished during the tive and geographically and thematically tar-
second half of the twentieth century, includ- geted style of public diplomacy. The aim was
ing during the Cold War (194791). Both the to promote international cultural relations,
United States and the Soviet Union (Caute, mutual understanding and knowledge in a
2004) supplemented their own programs less heavy-handed manner.
through support of their respective proxies in An important conceptual development
the developing world (Africa and Asia). The with policy implications was made in the
intent of public diplomacy was not only to 1980s by US academic and former official
inform and justify actions to both publics, but Joseph Nye. Nye coined the concept soft
also to convince the enemy of their ideologi- power, contrasting it with hard power (that
cal, economic and political convictions. is, the use of coercive diplomacy, threat of
Public diplomacy gradually adopted new military intervention, or implementation of
methods and forms of media, such as cultural economic sanctions). Nye later developed the
and broadcasting activities, and involved concept in greater detail, when in the Preface
new although still state-sponsored of his 2004 book he suggested that
stakeholders. As well as the most listened to
international radio stations in the world such [Soft power] is the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or pay-
as the BBC World Service, Voice of America,
ments. It arises from the attractiveness of a coun-
Radio France Internationale and Deutsche trys culture, political ideals, and policies. When our
Welle the English version of the Russian policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others,
political newspaper Pravda was notorious our soft power is enhanced (Nye, 2004: x).
in the West as the official mouthpiece of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Public diplomacy practice and literature have
Western nongovernment actors, such as been significantly inspired and shaped by
former practitioners and scholars, contributed Nyes writings on the connections between
to a broadening of knowledge about public public diplomacy and soft power, as public
diplomacy, and additional expertise was diplomacy is seen as one of soft powers key
derived from the range of promotional instruments. Annual soft-power surveys, such
activities undertaken by the United States as by Monocle magazine, are nowadays
much in demand, with Germany apparently countries advanced public diplomacy prac-
leading the pack in 2013. In Asia there is tices. The Canadian government, for instance,
much interest in soft power and public diplo- had been influenced by the 1997 International
macy. In Europe, EU leaders and academics Campaign to Ban Landmines, led by non-
are keen to use the concept in describing how state actors and domestic civil society, to
the EU used a soft (normative/ethical) support an international treaty banning
approach to enlargement, handling its inter- landmines.
national relations and solving (internal) differ- In European public diplomacy relative new-
ences (see Landaburu, 2006; Manners, 2002). comers, such as the supranational institution
Globalization and the communications of the European Union (EU) and sub-states,
revolution were the most important twentieth- challenged traditional practices, for example
century developments affecting the practice through their introspective focus on domestic
of traditional public diplomacy. Technological audiences and not just international publics.
advances in communications such as digital To a certain extent, they forced nation-states
technology and its far-reaching variety out of their comfort zone. For example, sub-
of applications substantially influenced states public diplomacy can aim to create
thinking about the methods, risks, promise and a distance from the main state and build a
limitations of traditional public diplomacy. In different even competitive perception
reaction to the vicissitudes of the twentieth abroad, especially if independence referenda
century, there was further growth in public are on the horizon. The Public Diplomacy
diplomacy practice with these technologies Council of Catalonia (previously the Patronat
and methods coming into play, which became Catalunya Mn), for instance, is a publicpri-
internationally known as the new public vate consortium set up by the Catalan govern-
diplomacy. ment to promote international awareness of
Catalonia and especially its distinctiveness
from Spain through economic, digital and
citizens diplomacy with other countries. The
NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND EUs public diplomacy may differ in scope,
BEYOND THE NEW purpose and complexity from its members
(Cross and Melissen, 2013) and its drive for
Twenty-first-century public diplomacy, or unity and a collaborative image abroad may
what is now called new public diplomacy, seem threatening to nations if this chips away
has several origins. Many in the academic at members sovereignty. However, some
community called for governments to update sub-national governments, such as California
public practices in light of societal changes. and municipalities in Asia, have shown that
European scholars joined the US-dominated collaboration on public diplomacy with
debate about such issues as the impacts of nation-states is within reach (such as on cli-
globalization, increased online and offline mate change and new security issues) (see
mobility, the growing number of diplomatic Wang, 2006). Moreover, apart from the EU,
actors and the insertion of domestic publics other international organizations with a large
into an area typically reserved for officials. public diplomacy department, such as the
The call for change was also partly a counter- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
reaction to US diplomacy and public diplo- are laboratories for collaborative and multi-
macy, which had been forged in the heat of actor public diplomacy. Seib argues that
the 9/11 war on terror and was dominated supranational institutions have potential if
by considerations of national security. It was they can continue to deliver benefits to their
also inspired by forward-looking studies by a members while respecting their distinctive-
new generation of academics and by some ness (Seib, 2014).
The new prefix for public diplomacy has role of individuals, including Nelson Mandela
rapidly achieved traction, and it has helped (after leaving office) and Martin Luther King.
the field and practice of public diplomacy to Unintentional or not, this emphasis on the
bloom and crystallize twenty-first-century role of non-state actors in public diplomacy
public diplomacys key normative charac- has divided the governmental and nongov-
teristics. Contemporary public diplomacy ernmental spheres, because it has pushed
needs to or should encompass at least non-state actors onto the main stage and has
two features: first, a multi-actor approach, challenged the legitimacy of states and their
with many actors above and below the level outdated structures, methods and techniques
of national government and different types of (Bieler, 2000; Sending and Neumann, 2006;
nongovernmental actors at home and abroad; Hocking, 2012).
and second, the formation of relations Another approach that stimulated the role
between them through dialogue and network- of non-state actors in new public diplomacy
ing activities. With regard to digital applica- is the broader notion of polylateralism, set
tions that need to be incorporated into new in motion by Geoffrey Wiseman (Wiseman,
public diplomacy, this concerns the internet 2004 and 2010). Polylateralism refers to a
moment in international policy, involving an third dimension in diplomacy, in addition to
amalgam of digital diplomacy applications, bilateralism and multilateralism. It involves
some more effective than others. The United the conduct of relations between official
States invests heavily in what it terms twenty- such as a state, several states acting together, or
first-century statecraft, with multi-language a state-based international organization and
Twitter feeds, Facebook accounts and partici- at least one unofficial non-state entity. In this
pation in other social media networks, com- view, state and non-state actors develop regu-
bined with many other actions, such as the lar diplomatic relations, including reporting,
Civil Society 2.0 initiative.5 A dark side also communication, negotiation and representa-
exists to digital communication, as shown tion activities, without mutual recognition as
by Islamic State extremists whose members sovereign, equivalent entities being necessary
medieval brutality is equaled only by the (Wiseman, 2010: 27).
sophistication of their communications. They Considering non-state actors as public
have mastered the use of state-of-the-art vid- diplomacy actors is widely accepted when
eos, ground images shot from drones and governments consult them and develop part-
multilingual Twitter messages intended to nerships with them. The idea that they operate
appeal to youths, recruit fighters and intimi- independently from states as public diplo-
date enemies (Shane and Hubbard, 2014). macy actors remains contested and the subject
As well as by increased digitalization, a of debate among scholars and practitioners.
new public diplomacy approach is reinforced Non-state actors are generally categorized as
by the involvement of non-state actors: reli- diplomatic actors if they act as an agent or
gious actors; sub-state units; international, on behalf of a government. If they act inde-
multinational and nongovernmental organiza- pendently (without the government), they are
tions; multinational corporations; and individ- often considered governance actors serving
uals. The idea of non-state public diplomacy public interest (Gregory, 2016: 813,18,19).
is encouraged by academic work that reflects Other less actor and goal-oriented criteria are
governance tendencies to include civil society process-oriented, implying that whether the
(Edwards, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2012; Hochstetler, actor performing public diplomacy is or is
2013). This work is reinforced by examining not a state is less relevant than the legitimacy
the role of non-state organizations such as and effectiveness of any given actor serving
Greenpeace, Amnesty International and the (inter)national public interests (Cooper etal.,
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the 2008; La Porte, 2012).
Non-state diplomacy has largely become thus consolidating overall credibility, legiti-
integrated into the new public diplomacy macy and efficiency at home and abroad.
approach and is challenging traditional diplo- Among the examples are the popular speaker
macys boundaries. This is most obvious in programs (the Dutch In Dialogue with the
the proposition of a public diplomacy for and MFA, Indias distinguished lecture series and
by the public, often referred to as people-to- Indonesias Foreign Policy Breakfast Forum).
people or citizen diplomacy (Mueller, 2009) Including a domestic dimension in public
(see Chapter 42 in this Handbook). This is diplomacy does not separate the domestic and
often considered an advanced stage of new international components; rather, it highlights
public diplomacy, as it is closely related to that there is a holistic/integrative approach
long-term relationship-building and intercul- to public involvement at home and abroad.
tural relations, with the role of government In this more comprehensive approach, pub-
less clearly present (Huijgh, 2011a). However, lic diplomacys international and domestic
investments in people-to-people initiatives dimensions can be seen as stepping stones on
remain fragile. For example, despite attempts a continuum of public participation (includ-
by some Israeli and Palestinian citizen groups ing traditional and new practices imple-
to bridge differences, military conflict can mented at varying speeds) that is central to
override people-to-people efforts. international policymaking and conduct. The
As the new public diplomacy approach and degree to which specific publics (through
people-to-people focus become more preva- their expertise, effectiveness and legitimacy)
lent, awareness of domestic citizens roles can become important governmental partners
surfaces. The domestic dimension of public prevails over whether they are international
diplomacy must be understood within this or domestic (Huijgh, 2012).
broader context and public diplomacys evo- Another aspect of new public diplomacy is
lution over time (Huijgh, 2011b and 2012). An the multidisciplinary embracing of the term.
initial aversion to including domestic citizens As well as diplomatic studies, communica-
in the conception of public diplomacy remains, tion science scholarship has helped to shape
however, because of the (US-influenced) tra- the study of public diplomacy by providing
dition and now outdated definition of public insights into the characteristics of its practice,
diplomacy as directed toward foreign publics including evaluation, engagement, advocacy
only, even if public diplomacy practices in and opinion research. Earlier groundbreak-
these countries show involvement by domes- ing conceptualizations such as Walter
tic non-state actors. In the virtually connected Lippmanns public opinion (1997 [1922]),
and interdependent world of today, this view Jrgen Habermass public sphere (1962) and
is thus open to challenge. Some newcomers, Manuel Castells network society (1996)
such as supranational organizations, sub- had provided a broader perspective and
states and Asian countries, that have learnt foundation for public diplomacy research on
from predecessors pitfalls, have had less dif- bottomup dialogic models of engagement,
ficulty than Western nation-states including a networks and global civil societys role.
domestic dimension in public diplomacy. Furthermore, public diplomacy scholarship
Despite the risk of involving domes- now investigates a series of sub-categories,
tic publics in public diplomacy action as a such as public relations, strategic communi-
purely political tool or for electoral gains, cation and nation-branding (Gregory, 2008:
the benefits are clear: namely, creating pub- 27490; Huijgh etal., 2013). Communication
lic understanding and support for a govern- studies influenced thinking about public
ments international policy, substantiating diplomacy to such an extent that academics
a governments outreach to foreign publics from this discipline sometimes equate public
and increasing its outside knowledge; and diplomacy with communication, or consider
it as an end in itself. In contrast, diplomatic is built upon the idea of the formation of rela-
studies scholars usually consider public diplo- tions through dialogue and networking activities
macy as one of many communication tools by many actors above and below the level of
for achieving the goal of international policy national government and different types of non-
cooperation. governmental actors at home and abroad.
As the new public diplomacy focus on the role
While diplomacy and communication stud-
of non-state actors becomes more prevalent,
ies may provide the majority of insights, other awareness of domestic citizens roles surfaces.
disciplines, such as the behavioral sciences Including a domestic dimension in public diplo-
and security studies, also mold new public macy does not separate the domestic and inter-
diplomacy. They provide seeds of thought national components; rather, it highlights that
and conceptual frameworks, but also different there is a holistic approach to public involvement
angles from which to study public diploma- at home and abroad.
cys facets. This multidisciplinary approach The beyond the new public diplomacy is a label
not only influences the body and nature of the originating in scholars reactions to the over-
literature, but also adds to the credibility and juxtaposition of traditional and new public
legitimacy of the research field. diplomacy, which stresses complementarities
over compartments.
The notion of public diplomacy that
goes beyond new public diplomacy is often
labeled as beyond the new public diplo-
macy. It originates in scholars reactions FUTURE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
to the over-juxtaposition of the new public AVENUES FOR RESEARCH
diplomacy with traditional public diplo-
macy, and attempts to find conceptual clar- In thinking about the future of public diplo-
ity and ways of thinking about the future of macy and further adjusting it to the contem-
public diplomacy (Melissen, 2013: 4402). porary context, one of the most productive
Other efforts aim at untangling the new pub- scholarly areas is the integrative/comprehen-
lic diplomacy approach from its normative sive or holistic approach, which reflects the
newness and vagueness, by providing more more fluid context wherein public diplomacy
concrete insights on networks (the structure), acquires shape today. This is partly also a
collaboration (the process) and relations reaction to the unveiling of (mis)leading
(competitiveness, and how they can be lever- assumptions influencing twenty-first-century
aged for collaboration) (Zaharna etal., 2013). diplomacy and new public diplomacy
An essential advancement is the gradual shift (Hocking, 2012: 7392), caused by categori-
from a debate dominated by the nature of cal thinking that focuses on rigid pre-existing
actors toward their relationships and pat- categories (such as hierarchies/networks, old/
terns of interaction. This recent scholarship new, domestic/foreign, state/non-state) and
recognizes that the new versus traditional highlighting differences rather than possible
categories are rather sterile, that the overlaps overlaps and commonalities, especially in
between them are largely ignored and suffer public diplomacy research. The integrative
from a strong normative judgment. approach is thought to have the potential to
temper categorical thinking in (public) diplo-
macy and promote complementarities
Key Points between public diplomacys past and present.
Twentieth-century public diplomacy, or tradi- As recently formulated by Hocking et al.
tional public diplomacy, is conceptualized as (2012: 4), it stresses the need to combine sev-
information-messaging, cultural projection and eral outlooks, including: change and continu-
international reputation management. Twenty- ity (pre-modern, modern and post-modern
first-century diplomacy, or new public diplomacy, structures and processes); old and new
elements; agendas and arenas (domestic and The first suggestion above entails the actors
international policy, development, defense and a digital dimension in integrative public
and diplomacy, and local, national and global diplomacy. Namely, alongside understand-
issues); interaction between actors (within the ing how agencies of state-based diplomacy
state, below and above, and non-state actors at are adapting to change, it is equally impor-
home and abroad); and integration within the tant to understand non-state actors commu-
diplomatic process and structures (public nication patterns and strategies in facing the
diplomacy in diplomatic practice, a whole-of- challenges posed by integrative diplomacy.
government national diplomatic system). While clearly acknowledging the impor-
Diplomatic studies adoption of holistic tance of non-state actors, analysis so far has
approaches partly aims at reinserting diplo- mainly focused on state-related diplomatic
macy, or reclaiming the practice of public mechanisms in relation to a rapidly evolv-
diplomacy and the public dimension that ing landscape where growing involvement
was emphasized by communication studies. by international non-state entities is critical
Reclaiming public diplomacy is necessary, (Hocking etal., 2013). Non-state actors can
because its usage has expanded so much that contribute to a balanced public diplomacy
it has become a generic term, without a par- strategy that integrates agenda-setting, nar-
ticular focus. Public diplomacy seems to have rative elaboration and interaction with other
become a victim of its own success. Moreover, players. In driving the development of new
for some scholars (Gregory, 2014: 67; 2016: strategies for communication and influence,
68), public diplomacy has become the heart- engagement techniques and the creation of
beat of all diplomatic actors thoughts and opportunities for dialogue, non-state actors
actions, and therefore has less value as a sepa- can in turn contribute to putting the integra-
rate term and conceptual subset of diplomacy. tive diplomacy approach further into practice,
Consequentially, it is gradually defined as although this will require further exploration.
diplomacys public dimension. While non-state actors are becoming more
While the holistic approach holds promise, influential in international policymaking,
it remains more rhetoric than reality. For it digital innovations are meanwhile revolu-
to become widespread practice rather than an tionizing the institutionalized modes of com-
ideal, scholars and practitioners need avenues munication. This is a future challenge for
to shape it further and put it into practice. state and non-state actors alike, as it demands
This chapter thus modestly suggests some a more integrative approach of the policy
of the many potential paths for exploring agenda, rules and norms, and roles and rela-
and researching the integrative approach in tionships in diplomacy. The digital dimension
the future, such as suggestions to include of public diplomacy is increasingly attracting
non-state actors and build upon the digital attention, but poses a steep learning curve
dimension in the integrative research, study the and needs further exploration that focuses on
use of applied communication and horizontal the practical applications of information and
management techniques to orchestrate an communications technology for diplomacy,
amalgam of actors, and theoretically analyze instead of worrying about the technicalities
the integrative approach in a Constructivist (Bjola & Holmes 2015; Slotman, 2014).
International Relations frame of thought. The The second suggestion is that with a myr-
chapter also encourages further exploration iad of actors involved and public diplomacy
of the integrative approach through studying employed in governmental departments other
empirical cases that of collaboration than foreign affairs (development, defense,
between the emerging powers that goes environment and health, etc.) public diplo-
beyond non-geographical groupings and macy becomes a whole-of-government
regional views. responsibility. To realize this ideal, questions
not only arise about who should lead and solve the broader riddle of public diplomacy
why, but also about how to manage all these as part of a more systematic networked future
international policy-related public involve- diplomacy, and the way in which interna-
ment activities. Insights from applied com- tional relations will be understood and prac-
munication studies can contribute to methods ticed in the years to come.
for managing the vast array of intra- and The third suggestion mentioned above is
interdepartmental public diplomacy activities to reinforce the theoretical body of the holis-
conducted at home and abroad. tic approach with theoretical insights from the
For example, integrated corporate com- discipline of International Relations, in par-
munication is one path to explore managing ticular Constructivist thought. When consider-
public diplomacy at the whole-of-government ing public diplomacy as a multidimensional
level (Van Riel, 2011 and 2012). Applied to and increasingly integrative endeavor, holistic
public diplomacy, organizational communi- constructivism is noteworthy (see Nia, 2001:
cation is useful for building long-term rela- 28283; Reus-Smit, 2001: 201; Bozdaglioglu,
tionships with foreign and domestic publics. 2007: 142). It provides a framework through
Management communication is useful for which a more efficacious and logical integrated
preventing fragmentation, by coordinating approach to the public involvement of state and
the increasing number of different state and non-state actors at home and abroad might sup-
non-state actors engaged in public diplomacy. port further research. Some Constructivist schol-
Finally, marketing communication instru- ars (Sending et al., 2011: 540) are convinced
ments and short-term management activity that how states behave and define their goals is
can contribute to the organization of infor- determined by the multiple ideational and inter-
mational messaging and gathering, although subjectively shared frameworks within which
they will be less effective in enhancing the they operate a central claim of Constructivism.
process of dialogue (Huijgh, 2011b). Over time, changes in these frameworks will
Another path to explore is holistic manage- result in the development of new organizing
ment practices. This starts from an acknowl- principles between states, potentially reshaping
edgement that organizations act within the the parameters of diplomatic practice, such as
context of both their external and internal the integrative approach is.
environments (including foreign and domestic The fourth suggestion is to investigate the
actors and policies, and broader power diffu- future of the integrative approach in more
sions). The aim is not to simplify relation- empirical settings, such as those surrounding
ships among different systems, but to fathom emerging powers that have the potential to
the complexity and illuminate opportunities collaborate beyond geographical and regional
and trouble spots. The criteria for success views. Views from other regions inform think-
depend less on structure, sequential plans, ing about the future of public diplomacy.
rules and certainty and more on adaptability, Driven by global competition for the attention
process audits, simultaneous assessment and of publics, many Asian countries in the 1990s
movement, a concentration on values, qual- began to entertain the concept of soft power
ity of interaction, managing interdependent and possible connections with its application
relationships and flexibility (Marshak, 1995; through public diplomacy. Subsequently, some
Witchel, 2003; Knight, 2004). scholars sought to delineate East Asian from
Moreover, these techniques are not only Western public diplomacy, stressing its more
useful for governments, but are also relevant strategic nature and greater recognition of the
for international non-state actors trying to regional and domestic dimension (Lee and
manage their members from various societies Melissen, 2011; Melissen and Sohn, 2015).
(the so-called whole-of-society level). Such Chinas approach to soft power and public
techniques, in essence, relate to attempts to diplomacy has overshadowed literature on
other Asian approaches, and can be character- Africa are relatively young democracies.
ized in several ways, namely: the importance Indonesia and Turkey have both preferred to
the Chinese government attaches to pub- use democratization rather than economic
lic diplomacy as an offensive and defensive growth as their dominant public diplomacy
instrument; its hierarchical, state-centered narrative at home and abroad, though this
strategic approach; its interconnection with recently changed (Huijgh 2016a, 2016b).
international policymaking and conduct; and However, increased economic growth does
its attention to both the domestic and interna- not always lead to increased public diplomacy
tional dimensions. Chinas rhetoric on rela- as an expression of democratization. China
tional public diplomacy policies does not, stresses its economic success as its dominant
however, always fit with its concrete practices public diplomacy theme, thus both attracting
at both the international and domestic levels regional and Western countries to China and
(DHooghe, 2014: 35355). raising their concerns about Chinas future
As well as regional views, public diplomacy intentions. Nevertheless, despite differences,
has also been informed recently by insights there seems to be an arguably positive rela-
from geographically disparate groupings of tionship between increasing economic per-
countries, such as the emerging powers, formance and growing investment in public
which are bound by their economic status rather diplomacy. Emerging powers increasingly
than geographic location. Several terms cover seek a greater voice and engagement in inter-
the notion of emerging powers, mainly from the national affairs, partly to support their eco-
fields of finance and economics, with the goal nomic relations with other countries, and
of creating a list of the most promising markets public diplomacy is seen as one of the tools
for investors around the world, such as BRICS for achieving this objective.
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, Yet, being part of an international grouping
coined by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim ONeill) does not necessarily result in more strategic
and acronyms including MINT (Mexico, partnerships or an increase of public diplo-
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and CIVETS macy among members, although Turkey and
(Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia sought public diplomacy alliances
Turkey and South Africa) that have followed on interfaith problems and interreligious rela-
it. Emerging powers are classified according tions. The heterogeneity of public diplomacy
to their economic performance (steady rapid styles among a grouping of emerging powers
growth in GDP, increasing foreign direct invest- need not, however, challenge unified action.
ment and trade activities), international policies The MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, (South)
in regional and international affairs (sovereignty Korea, Turkey and Australia) group of emerg-
claims, regional or global leadership, fulfilling ing middle powers, established in 2013, for
responsibilities in international affairs) and instance, aims to pursue joint public diplo-
their stage of domestic political development macy, as became clear at the first MIKTA
(democratization, civil rights movements, etc.) academic seminar in August 2014 in Mexico
(see Chapter 23 in this Handbook). City. It can be hoped that this is but the dawn
It is within this last criterion that the devel- of more empirical cases and greater study on
opment of public diplomacy as an expression integrative public diplomacy in the future.
of international policy democratization would
logically be situated. Yet within the group of
emerging powers, the degree of economic
power does not necessarily correlate with the Key Points
degree of democracy, public diplomacy and While the increasingly promoted integrative
the role of civil society. Emerging powers such approach among scholars holds promise for tem-
as Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea and South pering categorical thinking and combining past
and present outlooks, it is more rhetoric than larger theoretical body are required to vali-
reality. For it to become a widespread practice date ideals and implement them.
rather than an ideal, scholars and practitioners
need more conceptual and empirical case-study
research to solidify this approach.
Some suggestions for exploring the integrative NOTES
approach are to: (1) increasingly research the
role and contribution of non-state actors and
1 The author would like to thank the numerous public
use of digital tools; (2) theoretically analyze the diplomacy scholars with whom conversations
integrative approach in a constructive frame of on this topic provided enriching insights, and is
thought; (3) study the use of applied communi- particularly indebted to Jan Melissen and Pauline
cation and horizontal management techniques Kerr for their invaluable feedback on this chapter.
to orchestrate the amalgam of actors involved 2 The author is grateful to the reviewer for this
and put into practice the public diplomacy part comment.
of a more systematic networked diplomacy; 3 See What is diplomacy?, http://fletcher.tufts.
(4) study empirical cases of collaboration edu/Murrow/Diplomacy
among the emerging powers that go beyond 4 See http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/
factshe.htm
non-geographical groupings and regional views.
5 See more at http://www.state.gov/statecraft/
cs20/index.htm
CONCLUSION
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36
Quiet and Secret Diplomacy
William Maley
INTRODUCTION themselves establish an insuperable barrier to

the use of quiet or secret diplomacy, but they
The vast bulk of diplomatic activity goes do create the need for careful evaluation of the
unpublicised and largely unnoticed. Why, circumstances in which secret or quiet diplo-
then, should quiet and secret diplomacy be macy may or may not be deemed desirable.
singled out for special attention? The answers At the outset, it is important to clarify what
to this question are complex, but four ele- we mean by quiet and secret diplomacy.
ments stand out. First, negotiations carried out The former is perhaps the easier to pin down.
behind a veil of secrecy or under a cloak of Quiet diplomacy is simply diplomacy that
silence can result in faits accomplis from is not advertised by the participants. Those
which innocent people may be the main participants may be quite willing if quizzed
losers. Second, an alleged need for secrecy about it to admit that it has been taking place,
may be used to protect vested or sectional and perhaps to supply information about its
interests. Third, in democratic systems where content or substance, but they do not go out
ordinary people enjoy the right periodically to of their way to draw attention to it. This may
change their rulers without bloodshed, be because they think that the issues involved
informed decisions may be possible only if are arcane or technical, and of little interest
voters have full access to information about to a wider public; but it may also be because
what their rulers have been doing. Fourth, if they see some virtue in handling issues away
most diplomatic activity is carried out in from the glare of publicity. As we shall see
secret, one may lose the ability to learn les- shortly, certain types of issues can potentially
sons from past successes and failures as a way benefit very much from such discretion. The
of improving diplomatic performance in the idea of secret diplomacy is rather more
future. These factors do not in and of complex. Secrecy needs to be distinguished
from confidentiality. Almost any diplomatic the domain of foreign policy and, above all,
engagement is likely to have some elements of military policy (Shils 1956: 25, 26). Yet
which are highly confidential. Delegations until relatively modern times, information
acting on instructions from their capitals could be obtained and spread only in slow
will not share their instructions with other and laborious ways, even if it was not secret.
delegations (except by accidentally leaving Whilst the interception of documents or the
documents unsecured). This is not, how- interrogation of suspects are far from modern
ever, a manifestation of secret diplomacy. developments Sir Francis Walsingham pio-
Furthermore, that some discussions may take neered these techniques when pursuing
place behind closed doors does not of itself Papist plots during the reign of Elizabeth I
mean that secret diplomacy is occurring. (Alford 2011) it was only in much more
If this were the case, virtually all diplomatic recent periods that technological innovation,
engagement would potentially qualify as beginning with the telegraph, the telephone
secret diplomacy. Rather, secret diplomacy and the camera, provided the means by
arises when the very fact of a diplomatic which information obtained by piercing a
engagements taking place is itself concealed. veil of secrecy could be put to rapid opera-
This chapter is divided into four sections. tional use. This was of course so critically
The first offers a brief overview of secrecy important during the Second World War,
and diplomacy, noting that the very nature when automated code-breaking came into its
of the world in which diplomacy emerged own, that it is easy to forget that the preserva-
meant that most activities associated with tion of secrecy was much less of an issue
diplomacy remained hidden from most peo- until twentieth-century developments made
ple. The second looks at a range of argu- the violation of secrecy much more feasible.
ments advanced to defend secret diplomacy, With the increase in risk that secrecy
while the third canvasses arguments critical would be compromised, measures came to
of secrecy. The fourth sets out some of the be taken in both domestic and international
challenges to secret diplomacy in the twenty- spheres to underpin secrecy and confidenti-
first century. ality. In a number of states, domestic legis-
lation for the protection of official secrets
came to be enacted, legislation of which
the British Official Secrets Act 1889 was
SOME HISTORY a prototype. Furthermore, official legisla-
tion could be augmented by mechanisms
Secrecy has a venerable history, especially in amounting to self-censorship of the press; for
the sphere of international affairs. Secrecy, example, within the British Commonwealth
wrote de Vera in the seventeenth century, is there developed the mechanism of so-called
expressly recommended in all of the actions D Notices, first used in the United Kingdom
of the perfect ambassador; it is the founda- in 1912, by which the government was able to
tion of the edifice, the helm of the ship, the signal to the press that a particular issue was
bridle on the horse, and the cause of success of national security importance and therefore
in that at which one is aiming (quoted in should not be covered. D Notices were for
Berridge 2004: 91). In his famous study The the most part not legally enforceable, and in
Torment of Secrecy, Edward Shils, defining some countries it would have been difficult to
secrecy as the compulsory withholding of find any constitutional basis for their prom-
knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of ulgation; nonetheless, they proved effective
sanctions for disclosure, argued that Raison means for preserving secrecy in respect of
dtat as a barrier to publicity and a generator certain issues. Beyond domestic practices,
of secrecy obtained its maximum power in diplomatic law preserved confidentiality and
Quiet and Secret Diplomacy 453
secrecy indirectly via the immunities (see threatened if its leadership appears stable
Chapter 16 in this Handbook) granted to dip- and in control. There is thus a long history of
lomatic premises and means of communica- states going to inordinate lengths to disguise
tion that were eventually codified in the 1961 fragility at the top. On occasion this may
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. have led to major problems during diplomatic
The inviolability of diplomatic communica- crises. For example, a recent study by the for-
tions can be defended as a matter of princi- mer British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen,
ple, but even more so on the pragmatic basis who was a medical practitioner before enter-
that without such protections, much valuable ing politics, suggests inter alia that the course
diplomatic intercourse simply would not take of the 1956 Suez crisis may well have been
place. affected by the ill health of the British Prime
This is not to say that these principles of Minister Sir Anthony Eden, and even more
diplomatic law were uniformly respected so by the amphetamines with which he was
(see Chapter 15 in this Handbook). On the being treated. It was not a secret that Eden
contrary, diplomatic history is replete with had had health problems even before becom-
examples of attempts to use surreptitious ing Prime Minister; what was a secret was
mechanisms to obtain access to information the nature of the treatment he had received
subject to the protection of such principles. (Owen 2009: 138).
For example, when the Earl of Perth was On occasion, major health problems of
British ambassador to Italy in the 1930s, the leaders have been successfully kept secret.
security of his embassy was fatally breached Sir Winston Churchills June 1953 stroke
by the Italian secret service, a fact which he was concealed from the public, and the Shah
totally refused to recognize, even when Lady of Iran was a cancer patient well before the
Perths tiara vanished from the Embassy outbreak of the 19789 Iranian revolution,
safe (Watt 1989: 85). Such problems were as was French President Mitterrand from a
particularly common during the Cold War, mere six months after the commencement of
during which the United States experienced his presidency in 1981 (see Owen 2009: 191
the remarkable humiliation of constructing 249). Perhaps the most dramatic examples,
a new embassy building in Moscow which however, relate to Presidents of the United
could not then be used because it had been States (Crispell and Gomez 1988). President
riddled with Soviet listening devices during Woodrow Wilson, ironically a strong propo-
the construction period. One writer labelled it nent of open diplomacy, suffered two debili-
a stark monument to one of the most embar- tating strokes, on 25 September and 2 October
rassing failures of American diplomacy and 1919, which his wife and doctor went to elab-
intelligence in decades (Sciolino 1988). (Of orate lengths to hide. One consequence was
course, protected means of communication that he was unable to lobby effectively for the
such as diplomatic bags can also be mis- Treaty of Versailles, which in November 1919
used, a classic case being the discovery of an the US Senate declined to ratify. President
anaesthetised former Nigerian minister in a Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1943 suffered
diplomatic crate at Stansted Airport in 1984 from severe hypertension and congestive
(Kleiner 2010: 186)). heart failure that contributed to the massive
One other area of secrecy, often over- cerebral haemorrhage from which he died in
looked, deserves some attention, and that April 1945. Public comments on Roosevelts
relates to the health of political leaders. For health by his doctor, Admiral Ross McIntire,
understandable reasons, leaders have pre- were for the most part fiction, and while it
ferred to go into negotiations with an image probably goes too far to suggest that health
of robust good health; and more generally, problems compromised his performance dur-
a state may feel that it is less likely to be ing the February 1945 negotiations at Yalta
(see Ferrell 1998: 1067), in the eyes of expe- Key Points

rienced medical practitioners he was clearly a
Many states have taken steps to protect the
very ill man by that stage. Finally, President
secrecy of their own documents and negotiating
John F. Kennedy had twice received the Last
positions.
Rites of the Roman Catholic Church before Secrecy has commonly been used to hide the
he became president in 1961, a result of the frailty of political leaders charged with negotiat-
Addisons Disease from which he had long ing on behalf of their countries.
suffered, and which was kept secret from the The outbreak of the First World War did much to
American public and the wider world during damage the reputation of secret diplomacy.
his presidency.
If one seeks to identify the point at which
secret diplomacy became a matter of genu-
ine controversy, it was almost certainly at ARGUMENTS FOR QUIET AND
the time in the aftermath of the First World SECRET DIPLOMACY
War when the diplomatic processes that
had immediately preceded the outbreak of Evaluating secret diplomacy as a phenome-
the conflict were subject to a post-mortem non is methodologically complex.
examination. On the one hand, the interests Mussolinis Foreign Minister in 1930s Italy,
of the various parties to the conflict were Count Ciano, wrote in his diary that victory
extremely complex (for detailed discussions finds a hundred fathers but defeat is an
see Cassels 1984; Fromkin 2004; Clark 2012; orphan (Muggeridge 1947: 502). In secret
MacMillan 2013), as were the chains of diplomacy, however, even victory may go
causation (Lebow 2010: 93) that led to its unadvertised, or only capture analysts atten-
outbreak. This can make it somewhat unfair tion long after the events in question. For this
to lay the blame for the conflagration solely reason, it makes more sense to discuss a
at the door of secret diplomacy. There were priori the arguments for and against quiet
some extremely belligerent figures walk- and secret diplomacy than to attempt to build
ing the European stage, ranging from Kaiser some kind of data set for evaluation which
Wilhelm II of Germany to the Austrian will likely be fatally flawed.
Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad One of the more curious features of argu-
von Htzendorf to the hothead terrorists of ments in favour of quiet and secret diplomacy
the Black Hand (Crna Ruka); and the assas- is that rather similar arguments have been put
sination in June 1914 of Archduke Franz forward by writers from radically different
Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of traditions of international relations scholar-
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, brought their ship. From within the Realist tradition, the
various agendas into play. In a real sense, the diplomatist Sir Harold Nicolson was a fierce
story of the period between the assassination critic of the idea of open diplomacy, although
of the Archduke in late June and the outbreak he was strongly opposed to secret treaties and
of a general European war in early August is commitments. For Nicolson, open diplomacy
one of misperception and misunderstanding was an invitation to public grandstanding and
(Clark 1980: 1047). Yet there is no doubt ever-more secretive meetings at which the
that the reputation of diplomacy was griev- real discussions took place (see Otte 2001:
ously harmed by the war, and to the extent 164; see also Drinkwater 2005: 1028). From
that it enjoyed a peculiar mystique, that prob- within the modern school of peace research,
ably suffered irreparable damage as well. Nicolsons views were very much echoed
Secret diplomacy certainly persisted, but in by the influential writer John Burton. While
a much more sceptical environment than had Dr Burton at the outset of his career had served
earlier been the case. as Secretary of the Australian Department
of External Affairs from 1947 to 1950, his allowed Nixon to announce that he would
scholarly writings took him in a very different visit China in 1972 (see Kissinger 1979:
direction from Realism, and his comments on 684787; 2011: 23674). Nixons visit was
traditional diplomacy were extremely criti- widely regarded as a sensational diplomatic
cal (Burton 1968: 199204). Nonetheless, achievement. Certainly both Kissinger and
he was emphatic (inter alia in conversation Nixon regarded the breakthrough over China
with this writer) that peace negotiations, if as a pivotal development in international
they were to have much prospect of success, affairs, and went to great lengths to ensure
needed to take place in secrecy. What united that it encountered no stumbling blocks, one
these different perspectives was the tacit consequence being an unfortunate US silence
understanding that diplomats and negotia- over massacres by Pakistan in what was to
tors are typically entangled in complex two- become the new state of Bangladesh (see
level games, seeking to reconcile the desire Bass 2013). Secret diplomacy, even when
for a successful outcome in negotiations with very productive, can have its downsides.
a range of other pressures to which they are One of the strongest arguments against
exposed as agents and political actors (see open diplomacy is actually that of practi-
Putnam 1988). Holding negotiations in the cality, at least where issues of high policy
glare of publicity invites those who are dis- are concerned. A potent illustration of
satisfied with their trajectory to move into this can be seen from Woodrow Wilsons
aggressive spoiler mode, doing their best attempt to change the character of diplo-
to sabotage a process in its entirety. In this matic interaction. The first of his famous
sense, the ability to present a fait accompli at Fourteen Points, set out in a speech to the
the end of a process has its value as well as US Congress on 8 January 1918, referred to
its dangers. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at,
A very clear illustration of this came with after which there shall be no private interna-
Dr Henry Kissingers secret visit to China in tional understandings of any kind but diplo-
July 1971. With cooperation from Pakistan, macy shall proceed always frankly and in the
Kissinger was able to visit China without public view. The negotiations that led to the
attracting any attention. The whole issue of Treaty of Versailles saw Wilson depart from
China was an intensely controversial one this model. Nicolson, who was a participant
in US domestic politics. The establishment in the conference, wrote that the Treaty:
of a Communist regime on the Chinese
mainland in 1949 had led to furious debate was certainly an open covenant since its terms
in the US around the question of who lost were published before they were submitted to the
approval of the sovereign authority in the several
China. Richard Nixon, who by 1971 was US signatory States. Yet with equal certainty it was
President, had had no qualms in the 1950s not openly arrived at. In fact few negotiations in
in moving in Republican circles where this history have been so secret, or indeed so occult.
kind of rhetoric was a staple element of the (Nicolson 1950: 83)
political diet. For this reason, any attempt by
the United States to re-engage with main- Where quiet diplomacy is concerned, one of
land China risked domestic political conse- the strongest arguments in its favour is that it
quences, the more so because China itself can prevent the pursuit of desirable objec-
was only beginning to emerge from the polit- tives from being complicated by such issues
ical convulsions associated with its Great as fear of loss of face. States typically care
Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1965. about their reputations: as Thomas Hobbes
The last thing a US president in Nixons remarked in Leviathan, Reputation of power,
position wanted was to be publicly rebuffed is power (Hobbes 1996; see also Mercer
by the Chinese. Kissingers successful visit 1996; Walter 2009). If one state is seeking
favours or concessions from another, it pays correspondent Daniel Pearl. Minister Downer
not to insult or offend it. One area where this showed no inclination to describe the Indians
is particularly important is consular work. as marshmallows; on the contrary, he issued
This label embraces a wide range of activi- a statement on 31 December 1999 in which
ties (Dickie 2007; Lee and Quigley 2008; he stated that he was delighted by the recent
Maley 2011), but one of the most important news that there has been a peaceful resolu-
is the provision of assistance to ones nation- tion of the hostage crisis in Kandahar, and
als who find themselves at odds with the law acknowledged the role played by the Indian
of a foreign country in which they are travel- government which has led to the peaceful
ling or living. Governments often find them- resolution of this hostage situation (Downer
selves under pressure from media outlets to 1999). The literature on negotiating with ter-
react stridently in defence of such people, but rorists makes it clear that such negotiations
there is little to suggest that politicising a typically involve very different approaches
consular matter is likely to prove rewarding from those which characterise state-to-state
unless the state doing so is a powerful one. diplomacy (see Pruitt 2006; Faure 2008)
While a quiet approach will not necessarily and almost always occur quietly or secretly
resolve the situation either, it is certainly unless in the midst of a crisis provoked by
worth trying before a state moves to adopt hostage-taking or an aircraft hijacking. The
more vociferous tactics. principal reason is that of moral hazard: the
Another area where a quiet approach is fear that if terrorist tactics are seen to be pro-
likely to predominate is the vexed one of ducing rewards for terrorists, more actors
making deals with terrorists. The rheto- may be tempted to adopt them.
ric of political leaders might lead one to
believe that there is a strong norm prohibit-
ing such engagement. In the real world, the Key Points
picture is a more complex one. It is much
easier to be heroic when ones own citizens Secret diplomacy militates against comprehen-
are in no danger from terrorists than when sive analysis, since key cases (or data points) are
they are directly threatened. For example, likely to be missing.
Secrecy may serve to protect sensitive negotia-
in 2004 the Australian Foreign Minister
tions from attack by spoilers who want to see
Alexander Downer described the Philippines diplomacy fail.
as a marshmallow when it advanced the Secrecy may be important in facilitating engage-
withdrawal of its troops from Iraq in order ment with groups with whom state actors do not
to secure the release by a terrorist group of want to appear to be engaging, such as terrorists
a kidnapped Filipino truck driver, Angelo or hostage-takers.
de la Cruz. The Ministers comment pro-
voked anti-Australian demonstrations in
the Philippines, and a sharp rebuke to the
Australian Ambassador (Forbes 2004). Yet in ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUIET AND
December 1999, when an Australian citizen SECRET DIPLOMACY
was on board Indian Airlines flight IC814
that was hijacked to Kandahar after taking off While, as we have seen, there are a number of
from Kathmandu (see Misra 2000), the same arguments in favour of quiet or secret diplo-
Ministers response was starkly different. The macy, there are also strong arguments against
standoff was resolved when India released these practices. Secrecy may be exceedingly
three militants in its custody, one of whom difficult to maintain, and the consequences
was subsequently convicted in Pakistan may be dire if what has actually gone on
for the 2002 murder of Wall Street Journal becomes a matter of public knowledge.
A rather dramatic example of this came with the crisis was an understanding reached by
the 1956 Suez crisis. As has now been com- US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet
prehensively documented, Israel, the United Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev that the US
Kingdom and France at a meeting on 224 would withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey
October 1956 responded to Egypts nation- once the Soviet Union had dismantled the
alisation of the Suez Canal by plotting that missile bases that were being constructed
Israel would launch a large-scale attack on on Cuba. This was a trade that had been
Egyptian forces and that the British and proposed relatively early in the crisis by the
French governments would then demand that US Permanent Representative to the United
Egypt accept temporary occupation of key Nations, Adlai Stevenson; and which was
positions on the Canal by the Anglo-French then agreed at a meeting in the Oval Office in
forces. Astoundingly, the terms of this con- the White House on 27 October 1962. Absent
spiracy were actually committed to paper in from that meeting was US Vice-President
the so-called Protocol of Svres (Shlaim Lyndon B. Johnson, who was not an insider
1997). The Israeli attack and the Anglo- in Kennedys circle. Furthermore, it appears
French intervention proceeded exactly as that when Johnson became President of the
planned, but unravelled spectacularly in the United States following the assassination of
face of criticism of Britains action both at Kennedy in November 1963, none of those
home and abroad. Amidst wild scenes in the who had been present at the 27 October 1962
House of Commons on 1 November 1956, a meeting took steps to acquaint Johnson with
well-informed Conservative MP, William what had happened. While it is a matter of
Yates (who had a background in intelligence speculation to what extent Johnsons subse-
in the Middle East and subsequently elabo- quent behaviour with respect to Vietnam (see
rated on his conclusions in a conversation Brodie 1973) might have been shaped by
with this writer), stated that I have been to lessons of Cuba, the historian Sheldon M.
France and I have come to the conclusion Stern has argued that:
that Her Majestys Government have been
involved in an international conspiracy. This in conversations with McGeorge Bundy in late
soon became received opinion amongst 1965 and early 1966, Johnson specifically alluded
to Kennedys allegedly tough stand in October
experts: two weeks later, Sir Harold Nicolson
1962, and Bundy made no effort to set the record
wrote in his diary that I have always believed straight. Instead, Johnson went to his grave in
that there was some collusion between the 1973 believing that his predecessor had threatened
French and the Israelis to which we were a the use of U.S. military power to successfully force
consenting party. If the story gets out, I do the Soviet Union to back down. (Stern 2012: 153)
not see how the government can survive. It is
an utterly disgraceful tale (Nicolson 1968: Furthermore, in certain circumstances official
319). Faced with US opposition, the British secrecy can have the effect of encouraging
had no option but to back down in favour of the flourishing of rumours, amongst both
a UN peacekeeping force, and the architect elites and masses. When Radio Liberty in
of Britains policy, Prime Minister Eden, 1986 broadcast information that pointed to a
resigned on health grounds shortly nuclear accident at Chernobyl in Ukraine, the
thereafter. absence of any official account of what had
Secrecy may also militate against appro- happened led rumours to spread rapidly.
priate lessons being learned from diplomatic Recognition of the danger that this could
experience. A very interesting recent exam- pose seems to have been one of the factors
ple of this relates to the October 1962 Cuban underpinning Soviet General Secretary
missile crisis. It is now widely accepted that Mikhail Gorbachevs shift to a policy of glas-
one of the key contributors to a resolution of nost (candour). The problem with rumours is
that baseless claims can obtain traction and and the Palestinians that led to the establish-
contribute to the emergence of information ment of the Palestinian Authority shows that
cascades that can fundamentally reshape this is the case. But at the same time, the chal-
political behaviour (see Sunstein 2014). lenges in maintaining secrecy are more diffi-
One form of secret diplomacy that has cult now than at any time in the past, and once
maintained a reasonably good reputation secrecy is violated, information can spread
is back-channel negotiation as a form of very far indeed. It may go too far to speak of a
problem-solving. This was used by President crisis for secret diplomacy, but it would be
Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis when an unwise political figure who counted on
the US Attorney-General, the Presidents anything remaining secret for too long.
brother Robert Kennedy, was a trusted and One reason for this is the determination of
credible channel for the sending of messages investigative media. Even in countries such as
to the Soviet leadership. However, there can the United States, there was long a tradition
also be problems associated with secret back- of accepting constraints imposed on report-
channel negotiations. On occasion those who ing by political leaderships. During the time
play roles in such discussions may lack some of President Franklin Roosevelt, the broad
of the professional skills of analysis and com- rule governing reporting was that in general
munication that one associates with career anything said by the President was off the
diplomats. This can lead to confusion, and in record, and it was only with specific per-
certain circumstances even dangerous mis- mission that his words could be quoted. All
perception. In addition, back-channel nego- this changed with the Watergate scandal that
tiations, if they lead to outcomes that some engulfed the presidency of Richard Nixon
critical players find unappealing, can stimu- in 19734, leading to his resignation. Nixon
late vigorous attempts to prevent any progress had sought to use spurious claims of national
at the phase of implementation (Wanis-St. security to justify the cover-up of the bur-
John 2006). They are thus not a panacea, but glary by people close to the White House of
rather one tool that in certain limited circum- the headquarters of the Democratic National
stances may have a constructive role to play. Committee in the Watergate Hotel (see Emery
1995). After this was exposed, media were
much less inclined to show undue respect to
Key Points Presidents, let alone more junior officials.
Another factor making it difficult to main-
Secret undertakings may become known to the tain secrecy is the multiplicity of agents and
public, damaging the reputations of those who agencies that can now be involved in diplo-
sought to act secretly. matic interaction. With complex issues com-
Secrecy may prevent leaders from learning
ing up for discussion, it is more and more the
important lesson for the future.
case that participants in diplomatic engage-
Secrecy may cause rumours to spread, with
detrimental consequences for those who opted ment come not just from foreign ministries,
for secrecy. but from functional ministries and agencies
that may have expertise with respect to par-
ticular questions under discussion. When this
is the case, the prospects that at some point
CHALLENGES FACING QUIET information will leak out about what has been
AND SECRET DIPLOMACY under discussion tend to grow. Adding to this
problem is that of deliberate leaking by poli-
The era of secret diplomacy is hardly over. The ticians, which may be intended to wrong-foot
role of Norway in the early 1990s in orchestrat- their domestic opponents, but may also be
ing the secret discussions between the Israelis designed to put pressure on other parties in
the context of negotiations, or even to sabo- Peter, we protested, you just told us you lied like
tage those negotiations if they do not seem to crazy during the war. Peter laughed. Oh, well,
that was different. (Monroe etal. 1990: 111)
be going in a direction with which a party is
happy. Finally, the move towards the preser-
vation of information in digital as opposed to Indeed it was. Lying also has a long history in
hard copy form has proved a boon for those international relations (Mearsheimer 2011), but
who wish to put information in the public a diplomat who acquires a reputation for telling
domain, as the activities of WikiLeaks and lies is likely to experience a catastrophic fall in
Edward Snowden have made clear in recent credibility. It pays therefore, in conclusion, to
times (see Greenwald 2014). reflect on what kind of ethical considerations
Political developments in other countries might appropriately underpin secret diplomacy.
can also put secrecy at risk. Secret diplomacy Given that deontological ethics will likely gen-
by definition involves engagement between erate a dim view of lying, a broad temptation
agents of a number of powers, and while one for those seeking to defend quiet or secret
may be quite confident of ones ability to pre- diplomacy is to approach the issue from a
serve secrecy in the circles over which one consequentialist point of view, assessing the
has control, this is simply not the case with appropriateness of behaviour in terms of the
respect to the other participants in a negotia- consequences which flow from it. The diffi-
tion. This may be because information is sub- culty with this, however, is that what conse-
ject to disclosure through orders of a court; or quences are likely to flow from secret diplomacy
it may be because of the routine opening of as a phenomenon is far from clear: as noted
archives after a set period of time; or it may earlier, it is not possible to produce comprehen-
be because dramatic political change, such sive data sets of past experience from which
as occurred with the collapse of the Soviet conclusions for the future might be drawn.
Union, leads information to become avail- A more promising approach, therefore,
able that otherwise almost certainly would is that which has been recently defended by
have remained hidden. For political actors Corneliu Bjola, drawing on the idea of ethics
who care about their historical reputations, it without ontology. As Bjola puts it, the ethical
is worth bearing these risks in mind. theory I propose is not informed by abstract
It is easy to be cynical about quiet diplo- normative principles applicable to any cir-
macy, to see it as amounting to little more cumstances and at any time. Instead, it draws
than two ostriches having an underground on the actors own ethical beliefs and practical
conversation. It is equally easy to be sceptical experiences to probe the normative relevance
about the claims made for secrecy, especially of the arguments they propose (Bjola 2014:
since Watergate exposed how easily such 91). Taking the US extraordinary rendition
claims can be misused for domestic political program (see Grey 2006) as a case study, he
purposes. One of the reasons why observ- argues that secret diplomacy is ethically unjus-
ers may feel uneasy about certain types of tifiable when actors fail to invoke normatively
secrecy is that it may be necessary to lie in relevant principles of justification, inappropri-
order to protect that secrecy. Lying is not nec- ately apply them to the context of the case and
essarily evil or wrong. In a fascinating study when the moral reasoning process suffers from
of rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, deficient levels of critical reflection concerning
the authors offered the following story about the broader implications of the intended actions
one of the rescuers they interviewed: for diplomatic conduct. (Bjola 2014: 97). This
does not provide a magic formula to determine
We also noted that during the war our rescuers
deviated wildly from the standards they claimed to
when quiet or secret diplomacy is a good thing,
have been given by their role models. Always tell but it does suggest useful ways in which one
the truth, thats my motto! Peter told us. But, might go about exploring this question.
Key Points Bjola, Corneliu (2014) The ethics of secret

diplomacy: a contextual approach, Journal
Active media make the maintenance of secrecy of Global Ethics, 10 (1): 85100.
more and more difficult. Brodie, Bernard (1973) War and Politics. New
Secrecy is hard to maintain when many different York: Macmillan.
actors are involved in diplomatic process, and Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A
leaking information may serve their individual Study of Order in World Politics. London:
interests. Macmillan.
Secrecy is hard to evaluate ethically from either Burton, J.W. (1968) Systems, States, Diplomacy
deontological or consequentialist perspectives; a and Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University
situational approach may prove more illuminating. Press.
Cassels, Lavender (1984) The Archduke and
the Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914.
London: Frederick Muller.
CONCLUSION Clark, Christopher (2012) The Sleepwalkers:
How Europe Went to War in 1914. London:
One common usage of the word diplomatic Allen Lane.
Clark, Ian (1980), Reform and Resistance in the
implies discretion, that is, behaviour that is
International Order. Cambridge: Cambridge
tactful or subtle (Bull 1977: 163). Tact or
University Press.
subtlety rarely involve broadcasting informa- Crispell, Kenneth R. and Carlos F. Gomez
tion to a wide audience, and for this reason, (1988) Hidden Illness in the White House.
quiet or secret diplomacy is likely to retain Durham: Duke University Press.
a place in the repertoire of professional Dickie, John (2007) The British Consul: Heir to
diplomats and political leaders. In certain a Great Tradition. London: Hurst & Co.
circumstances it can be a very valuable Downer, Alexander (1999) Release of hostages
problem-solving tool. But that said, secrecy Indian Airlines Flight IC-814. Canberra: FA
is becoming increasingly difficult to main- 140, Department of Foreign Affairs and
tain in a globalised, media-dominated world, Trade, 31 December.
Drinkwater, Derek (2005) Sir Harold Nicolson
and actions that take place in the shadows but
and International Relations: The Practitioner
then fall under a spotlight may well come to
as Theorist. Oxford: Oxford University
be seen as suspect or even sinister (and some- Press.
times rightly so). For this reason, the deci- Emery, Fred (1995) Watergate: The Corruption
sion to opt for secrecy is one that should be of American Politics and the Fall of Richard
taken with considerable care. Nixon. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Faure, Guy Olivier (2008) Negotiating with
terrorists: a discrete form of diplomacy, The
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 3 (2):
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37
Crisis Diplomacy
Edward Avenell and David Hastings Dunn
INTRODUCTION many different types of threats, issues and

actors. For example the rise of the Islamic
To the casual observer perpetual crisis seems State (IS) is having far-reaching effects way
to be the dominant characteristic of the con- beyond where it began. ISs expansion into
temporary international system. The corollary Iraq is threatening that countrys very existence
of this is that crisis diplomacy is constantly in and millions of refugees are putting pressure
demand to prevent crisis leading to disaster. on the surrounding nations; foreign-born mili-
With continued globalisation and the intercon- tants are worrying their home governments,
nected nature of modern societies, crises fearful that they will return radicalised; and
everywhere are then the concern of all govern- Irans intervention is worrying Washington as
ments and international organisations. They the USA is concerned about Irans dominance
hold particular importance for policy makers, in the region. This chapter examines defini-
especially those who hold high office, for how tions of crisis and crisis diplomacy, some of
they handle crisis is often how history judges its conceptual developments, theoretical prin-
their role. The British Prime Minister, Neville ciples, practical tools (including mediation,
Chamberlain, is known more for his alleged negotiation and the use of force) and finally its
policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany future prospects. This chapter argues that cri-
than his other achievements, such as laying the sis diplomacy is a key process in International
foundations for the welfare state. Similarly, Relations. It has developed a great deal in
the American president Lyndon Johnsons recent years, taking into account the chang-
Great Society legislation is overshadowed by ing nature of the international system to
his role in escalating the Vietnam War. redefine its core theories and explore new
Crises today are not only perpetual, they are tools and techniques to help its practition-
very complex and far reaching, encompassing ers work successfully in the modern world.
Crisis Diplomacy 463
The discipline has become more context spe- facing a government would likely involve
cific, adapting to deal with new and different other states as well, thus making it an inter-
crisis. The crises the international community national crisis according to Williams defini-
faces are much more varied than they were in tion, with any other situation coming under
the past, and incorporate all manner of dif- the auspice of domestic crisis, or a national
ferent events and dangers not all of them emergency. Williams also explores the issues
military based. How to adapt and deal with associated with perspective. A crisis to one
these crises is one of the key growth areas for person or state is not necessarily a crisis to
the study and research of crisis diplomacy. another. Disparity of perspective can even
exist between two actors both involved in the
same crisis. The Vietnam War demonstrates
this: while substantial assets were committed
DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL and heavy causalities suffered by the USA, it
CRISIS did not wage the almost total war that North
Vietnam did (Williams 1976: 21).
International crises are unavoidable by- In his work, Crisis Diplomacy, James
products of the anarchic nature of the interna- Richardson explores the debate on the issue of
tional system. States have a tendency to defining a crisis. He breaks the definition down
compete with each other for power and to into three types: as an abrupt systematic change
pursue their national interests, and on occasion or turning point, a certain class of decision
this escalates into a crisis and sometimes the making, and a situation with a high risk of war
use of force. For Kenneth Waltz, force is a (Richardson 1994: 10). These three types deal
means of achieving the external ends of states with the patterns of interactions between states,
because there exists no consistent, reliable the decision makers at the heart of the crisis and
process of reconciling the conflicts of interests how they reacted to any forewarning, and how
that inevitably arise among similar units in a they cope with the pressures placed upon them,
condition of anarchy (Waltz 2001: 238). and finally the specific issues which lead deci-
Yet despite the wide use of the term interna- sion makers to believe there is a serious risk
tional crisis, it has no agreed definition (Acuto of war. Richardsons three types have pros and
2011: 521). Many definitions (Williams 1976: cons, however. Today these state-centric defi-
22, Richardson 1994: 12, Young 1967: 10, nitions have less value because interstate con-
Taeyoung 2003: 7) were proffered during flicts average less than 1 per decade (Human
periods when state-to-state conflict was the Security Report Project 2013: Figure 1.3) and
dominant form of international crisis. hence they no longer completely describe the
Phil Williams explores the problems asso- situations that modern crisis diplomacy wres-
ciated with defining a crisis in his book, tles with now or will in the future.
Crisis Management. He suggests that two Rather than interstate conflict, intrastate
separate terms be used, foreign policy crisis conflicts, and intrastate conflicts with foreign
and international crisis. He defines a foreign involvement, are currently the most common
policy crisis as an urgent problem facing a forms of armed conflict or the political ten-
single government and an international crisis sions which constitute many modern crises.
involves certain kinds of stress and strains Indeed modern crises have become increas-
in the relationship between governments ingly more complex, involving more states
(Williams 1976: 22). The term foreign policy and a wider array of non-state actors.
crisis is not commonly used in literature or Crises, however, should not only be defined
by policy makers in the way Williams defines as those situations which involve an element of
it. This may be because with a more intercon- violent conflict. The rise of globalisation and
nected international system any foreign crisis fast worldwide travel has created a situation
where dangers that were once confined to a definition of a crisis there is an equal disa-
single state can now pose global security greement about the nature of crisis diplo-
threats. Nana Poku frames the HIV/AIDS epi- macy. The concept itself comes from Robert
demic in Africa in crisis terms (Poku 2002), McNamaras comment during the Cuban
and Gwyn Prins goes further to argue that a Missile Crisis that there is no longer any
crisis is any global security concern (Prins such thing as strategy, only crisis manage-
2004). The HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the 2003 ment (Williams 1983: 144). He uses strat-
SARS, 2009 H1N1, and 201415 Ebola out- egy as a synonym for diplomacy, and implicit
breaks are four examples of global security in this definition of diplomacy, given the
crises, broadly defined. Economic crisis must context, was that crises themselves were the
also be considered. The devastating effect that common enemy and it was central to the role
economic downturns can have on the world of diplomacy to resolve the crisis and avert
was demonstrated only recently following the catastrophe. More recent scholarship, how-
Global Financial Crash of 2008, and the still ever, problematizes this approach as only
ongoing Eurozone crisis. These must also be applicable to normal diplomacy and con-
considered along with other crises, especially trasts it with more subversive or revolutionary
as they have the potential to affect many more attempts to manufacture or make crisis as a
lives than traditional conflict-based crises. way to challenge legitimacy, security or the
Mindful of the broader array of threats that status quo. Costas Constantinou cites
can constitute a crisis, Michael Acutos defini- Mahatma Gandhi and Ho Chi Ming as exam-
tion that An international crisis is the abrupt ples of crisis makers who sought radical
enhancement of disruptive relations as a result change through the manufacturing of interna-
of a perceived threat to the system or to the tional crisis (Constantinou 2015). More tradi-
lives of those who compose it (Acuto 2011: tional treatments of crisis diplomacy, however,
526) will be adopted in this chapter. use a different dichotomy but one which also
speaks to these modern interpretations.
Williams suggests there are two schools
Key Points of thought about the meaning of crisis diplo-
International crises are a constant in world politics. macy. The first has the sole objective of
They have existed in one form or another for as peacefully resolving the confrontation, and
long as states and different actors have existed. avoiding all-out war. The second sees it as
Definitions of an international crisis are evolving: an exercise in winning, with the main objec-
traditional, narrow state-centric definitions are tive being to make the enemy capitulate and
being supplemented with broader understand- back down, therefore furthering ones own
ings encompassing such threats as intrastate ambitions (Williams 1976: 28). In a sense
conflict and non-military global threats, like this second definition would embrace cri-
epidemics and economic instability.
sis makers who provoked the crisis in order
The development of instantaneous communica-
to try to win from it. These are clearly on
tion and easy access to worldwide travel has
meant that a wider array of states and actors are completely opposite sides of the spectrum,
involved in crises of all kinds. and actions taken by actors following these
schools will differ. Essentially, followers of
the first school will choose any option that
makes war less likely, with high-risk strate-
CRISIS DIPLOMACY: DEFINITIONS gies being avoided. Success is defined in
AND DEBATE terms of war being avoided and where high-
risk strategies have a greater risk of failure.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, alongside the lack of In this approach the crisis is approached as
agreement on what constitutes an agreed if it were a common enemy to be dealt with
through diplomacy rather than the process fundamental security strategies, involving
polarising the situation by characterising the both military and non-military responses to
problem as being the other party. The second security challenges, which can be military
school sees the capitulation of the other state or non-military, natural, technological or
as the primary objective, and high-risk strate- humanitarian problems (NATO 2011). The
gies are acted upon, the sole restraining factor United Nations crisis diplomacy strategy
being the ratio of gains to losses (Williams is to help parties in conflict settle disputes
1976: 27). An example here could be German peacefully (UN Diplomacy and Mediation
mobilisation in 1914, which was intended to n.d.). We agree with Williams characterisa-
coerce its neighbours into backing down and tion of crisis diplomacy:
accepting its will.
The essence of skilful crisis management lies in the
While there are some who place their defi-
reconciliation of the competing pressures which
nition of crisis diplomacy into one of these are inherent in the dual nature of crises . Crisis
two schools, there are issues with doing so. management requires that policy-makers not only
Leslie Lipson leans towards the avoidance of recognize the inherent dilemmas, but that they are
war side with her view that crisis diplomacy willing and able to make the difficult trade-offs
that are required. (Williams 1991: 146)
is reaching a solution acceptable to both
sides without resorting to force (Taeyoung
2003: 10). This underplays the conflict itself.
Key Points
Whereas William Kinter and David Schwarz
fall firmly into the winning the war school The definition of crisis diplomacy should sit some-
with their definition that crisis diplomacy is where in the middle of Williams two schools of
winning a crisis while at the same time keep- thought, winning and furthering ones own ambi-
ing it within tolerable limits of danger and tions vs ensuring peace by avoiding war at all
risk to both sides (Taeyoung 2003: 10). In cost. It should combine elements of both.
Crisis diplomacy is a vital practical strategy used
this case, Kinter and Schwarz almost ignore
by governments, international organisations and
the issue of controlling a crisis and steering it NGOs worldwide.
towards a peaceful conclusion.
We argue in this chapter that crisis diplo-
macy should sit somewhere in the middle,
combining elements of both schools. We also THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF
argue that attempts to define and frame crisis CRISIS MANAGEMENT
diplomacy that focus on state-to-state inter-
actions are too narrow and need to be sup- Crisis diplomacy is a practical tool to be used
plemented with broader definitions. Because in real-world situations. As such, contribu-
interstate conflicts are rare and intrastate tors to the field have worked to produce theo-
conflicts and threats from non-state actors retical principles which aid in its use when
are more common, the focus of crisis diplo- dealing with a real crisis. These principles
macy needs to be broadened. States still play focus on different aspects of the crisis. One
a major role in dealing with these crises and such area is the role of decision makers. They
are the primary actors in crisis diplomacy. should ensure that a system of multiple advo-
However, other significant actors, for exam- cacy is in place to provide them with infor-
ple international organisations (IOs) and mation and advice from multiple sources
non-government organisations (NGOs), are including dissenting opinions (Richardson
crucial to resolving crises. 1994: 27). They should maintain close politi-
Crisis diplomacy is more than a concept cal control over all the orders given, thus
that needs to be defined, it is a practical strat- avoiding the risk of decisions deviating from
egy. For example, NATO sees it as one of its an overall strategy (Richardson 1994: 27).
Actions and objectives should be clear to and brutally to a point where the opponent can no
their opponent, thus avoiding the risk that longer afford to experiment. (Kissinger 2014)
confusion will lead to greater risk of escala-
tion (Richardson 1994: 30). Similarly, it is As a result of such criticism it might be
important that the opponents view is under- argued that these principles should not be
stood. This is a difficult task, however, and it seen as hard rules to be applied to all crises
is necessary for decision makers to try and without fail, but more as potential guidelines.
understand how their opposite number will With the nature and definition of a crisis
respond (Richardson 1994: 29). changing to reflect the modern international
Maintaining flexible options is an important system, theories of crisis diplomacy will
principle; it means that options are not taken if have to adapt to deal with criticisms such as
they prevent another one from being used next those expressed by Kissinger. The effects of
(Richardson 1994: 28). For example, embar- a much wider range of factors and different
goes/sanctions do not rule out the possibility actors will have to be taken into account.
of future military action, but a military strike These principles are useful for an under-
would represent an escalation that would limit standing of crisis diplomacy and how it is
the effectiveness of any actions (see Chapter utilised by diplomats, and policy and deci-
38 in this Handbook). Similarly, reducing sion makers. However, like the definitions
time pressure not only is important to allow of crisis and crisis diplomacy, the appropri-
the greatest range of options to be taken, but it ate principles to use in a crisis are context
is imperative that an adequate amount of time specific. The above principles also rely on
is given for the other actor to consider and an assumption that all crises are manage-
respond without stress (Richardson 1994: 29). able and can be resolved without escalation
The overall objectives must also be con- to war. This is not the case if one side sees
sidered. Having tightly defined limited an advantage in engaging in war or sees the
objectives which avoid challenging the vital issue as so vital to their national interests that
interests of the other actor serves as a basis compromise is not an option (Richardson
for negotiation and settlement (Richardson 1994: 31). However true this may be, the
1994: 28). By focusing on specific achiev- likely outcomes of not trying to resolve the
able goals, decision makers increase the crisis are significantly more damaging, and
likelihood that both sides can come to an in the nuclear age potentially cataclysmic.
acceptable agreement. Opportunistic and less With crisis moving away from state-on-state
defined objectives risk extending the crisis situations to include a wider array of issues,
with little chance of achieving the objectives. there is a need for further research into how
There certainly is criticism of some of well suited the principles discussed above
these principles, both from academics and are when dealing with different type of cri-
policy makers. Henry Kissinger is critical of sis such as economic, health and natural. A
reducing time pressure on the basis that while further potential area of research is how these
it might actually facilitate the gradual escala- principles should be adapted to deal with
tion of the crisis. He wrote in his memoirs: the changing nature of global power and the
move to a more multipolar system.
In my view what seems balanced and safe in a
crisis is often the most risky. Gradual escalation
tempts the opponent to match every move A Key Points
leader must choose carefully and thoughtfully the
issues over which to face confrontation. He should Research into crisis diplomacy has led to the
do so only for major objectives. Once he is committed, development of several principles which should
however, his obligation is to end the confrontation guide practitioners when engaging in crisis diplo-
rapidly He must be prepared to escalate rapidly macy in a real world setting.
These principles should be used as guidelines legitimacy to defend Libyan rebels in

rather than hard and fast rules for how to deal Benghazi following Gaddafis threatened
with crisis. slaughter (Heneghan 2011). This military
With the shift away from traditional state-on- support led directly to the overthrow of the
state crisis, the increase in non-armed conflicts Gaddafi regime.
and the continuing move to a more multipolar
Some argue that the Libyan crisis has estab-
world, there is need for further research into how
crisis diplomacy will develop to meet these new
lished R2P as a fundamental practice of mod-
challenges. ern crisis diplomacy (CIC 2012). However,
many questions continue to be raised. Several
governments, including Russia (Pidd 2011)
THE PRACTICE OF CRISIS and South Africa (USA Today 2012), believe
that the NATO-led force grossly overstepped
DIPLOMACY: CONSTRAINTS AND
the original UN mandate. NATO argues that
PROBLEMS the only way to resolve the crisis was to
remove the Gaddafi regime. The fallout from
The change in the nature of international this apparent overreach is having an effect on
crises has resulted in reconceptualisations of how the international community now deals
crisis diplomacy practice. As crises have with crises.
moved away from the classical interstate The question of legitimacy to intervene is
conflicts towards those raging within states, also becoming problematic at the national
the issue of sovereignty has become an level. In 2013, the United Kingdoms Prime
important issue. It is worth noting that the Minister, David Cameron, lost a vote in his
issue of sovereignty is less prominent in eco- own parliament on the UKs possible mili-
nomic and health crises, though there are tary action against the Syrian government.
certainly situations where it is an important Such was the reticence by some British
factor. The Libyan crisis was a demonstration parliamentarians to intervene, that when
of the most radical new aspects of crisis David Cameron sought approval to join the
diplomacy, the putting into practice of the air campaign against Islamic State, this was
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). originally only approved for targets inside
R2P was conceptualised in the 2000 Iraq. Strikes against targets inside Syria
International Commission on Intervention were later approved in December 2015;
and State Sovereignty (IDRC 2001). The however, this was only after the massacre in
core principle of R2P is that: Paris in November 2015, and the downing
state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt in
primary responsibility for the protection of its October 2015.
people lies with the state itself. Where a population The Libyan crisis showed the increased
is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, importance of regional organisations in crisis
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the diplomacy. The Arab Leagues request for
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to
intervention was a crucial element in the
the international responsibility to protect. (IDRC Security Councils deliberations on whether
2001: XI) to intervene (Freeman etal. 2011). In 2002,
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said
The reconceptualisation of sovereignty fol- regional security organisations have never
lowed the UNs failure on numerous occa- been more important than today (Annan
sions to act in the face of horrific violence 2002). The rationale for this is that regional
instigated by states on their own citizens.1 organisations are better suited to act on
By enacting R2P in the Libyan case the UN crises that occur within their region. Their
gave the UK/French-led NATO force the success in this has been mixed. Depending
on their size they often have very limited UN was able to act in Suez, Congo and Korea
budgets, for example the African Unions despite heavy P5 involvement in those crises.
annual budget in 2003 was $32 million This contemporary lack of action and the cor-
(Cilliers 2008: 16). This reliance on outside rosion of legitimacy have also had the effect
funding leads to the inevitable problem of that rising and ambitious regional powers
donor interest. However, smaller regional have become more emboldened to act with
organisations have successfully lobbied for their own interests in mind. For example, in
intervention from the UN and larger bodies. the absence of firm action on Syria by the
The Economic Community of West African UN, Saudi Arabia stepped up its supply of
States (ECOWAS) successfully lobbied for weapons to the Syrian rebels in 2013/2014,
assistance in Malis Northern crisis (Melly and publically criticised the UN and the
2012). Lack of resources affects the UN Wests inaction (McElroy 2013). These chal-
as well. There have been occasions when lenges to the UNs role increase the num-
the Security Council was willing to act but ber of actors involved in a crisis, with each
member states were unwilling to provide the pursuing different strategies, with their own
resources required (Roberts and Zaum 2010: national interests in mind, further increasing
8). This situation has only worsened since the risk of a crisis escalating.
the 2008 global financial crisis. This makes It would, however, be an exaggeration
further empty promises more likely, unless to claim that the UN has had no successes.
national interests are at stake. The OPCWUN joint mission to resolve
The primary reason for lack of engage- the 2013 Syrian chemical weapon crisis
ment in international crisis diplomacy is has been highly successful. In a little over a
states national interest. This is particularly year 96per cent of Syrias chemical weapon
an issue with the P5 members of the UNs stockpile has been destroyed (OPCW 2014).
Security Council, all of whom carry a veto Meanwhile in South Sudan, despite a rocky
on any UN action. UN attempts to resolve start, the peacekeepers have been protect-
the crisis in Syria and Ukraine will be in ing 80,000 civilians while the crisis unfolds
danger of being vetoed by Russia, who has (Gowan 2014: 45). While the success of these
significant national interest in the first and is missions is to be applauded as they undoubt-
actively involved in the second. Russia began edly saved lives, both were smaller parts of
its own military intervention in September larger conflicts, and the deployment and suc-
2015. This is firmly on the side of the Syrian cess of the missions did not directly affect the
government, and targets all opposition forces, outcome of that conflict or the national inter-
including the Islamic State. This can be con- ests of any of the P5.
sidered a proxy war with the US, which seeks
to remove Assad from power (Cotton 2015).
Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum describe Key Points
the UN as a selective security institution,
when examining how it responds to cri- The development and use of Responsibility to
ses (Roberts and Zaum 2010: 7). It is often Protect and the move to link a states sovereignty
used by major powers to solve some crises, to its responsibility to its citizens has had a sig-
nificant impact on the debate regarding interven-
while it is ignored by them during others.
tion, both for and against.
The P5 are much more willing to act on what Regional organisations are seen to have a much
Richard Gowan describes as second-order bigger part to play in the resolution of regional
problems in Africa than on those in Eurasia crisis.
or the Middle East (Gowan 2014: 49). This Despite changes in the international system,
damages the UNs legitimacy as a crisis man- national interest still play a vital role in determin-
agement institution. It wasnt always so. The ing what, if any, action will be taken.
PRACTICAL TOOLS OF CRISIS them. However, as soon as sanctions are con-

MANAGEMENT sidered for a major power, those imposing the
actions begin to think about their own national
Policy makers have a range of tools at their interest first and crisis resolution second.
disposal to resolve a crisis, the choice and The weakness of sanctions as a tool for cri-
effectiveness of each one will depend on the sis diplomacy is that unless correctly targeted
specific crisis and the tools of implementation. they can be very damaging to innocent groups
The overall objective of the tools is to change within a state without achieving their stated
the behaviour of the actors involved through objective. Those targeted by the sanctions are
either influence or interaction, and they fall invariably in a position of power where they
can pass on the cost to others, usually their
into non-military and military categories.
own citizens. The effectiveness of sanctions
Sanctions and embargoes are non-military
against states also depends on the nature
tools that are frequently used in crisis diplo-
of the regime they are targeting. The more
macy. The use of sanctions increased drasti-
authoritarian a regime, the more able it is to
cally in the 25 years following the end of the
spin the increased cost and suffering caused
Cold War (Wallensteen 2007: 240). They are
by the sanctions as the aggressive actions of
used to influence a state or actor into chang-
the international community. The danger that
ing their behaviour. Sanctions and embargoes
sanctions will harm innocent civilians instead
can be applied to almost anything. The most
of the regimes they are supposed to be target-
common are financial, import/export licences,
ing increases the risk that the enforcer will
arms and travel. As well as being chosen for fall into the sanctions termination trap they
the crisis in hand, each one will be imposed cannot stop the sanctions in fear of appear-
to achieve a specific change in the actors ing to back down yet their moral authority is
behaviour. Their effectiveness is mixed, and severely damaged by the harm that is being
the contribution a sanction regime had on any done to innocent civilians (Thakur 2013: 83).
subsequent change is contentious. Financial The damage that sanctions can cause was
sanctions have been placed on Iran to resolve demonstrated when the UN imposed eco-
the ongoing nuclear crisis. When these were nomic sanctions on Iraq after its invasion of
increased in 2012 (UK Government 2012) the Kuwait. These sanctions devastated the econ-
effect was dramatic: Irans oil revenue plum- omy and caused terrible suffering to the Iraqi
meted and its GDP shrank by $160 billion people through malnutrition and outbreaks of
(Coles 2013). Is it a coincidence that shortly disease (Gordan 2011: 315). This led to a call
after this shock the negotiations resumed? for more research into how sanctions could be
There is no firm agreement on the cause. used to deliver the required impact but with-
Financial sanctions were imposed on Russia out hurting civilians. Smart sanctions were
in response to its involvement in the Ukraine the outcome of this research, and were hailed
crisis. Will these be effective? There are sig- as an elegant and powerful solution (Gordan
nificant differences between Iran and Russia; 2011: 331). They are designed to target spe-
the latter is much more integrated in the world cific areas in a bid to hurt regimes or groups
economy, and provides nearly 30 per cent of the within a state, and can vary in scale from travel
EUs supply of gas (Noack 2014). It is unsur- bans on specific individuals to embargoes of
prising then that the sanctions did not target the entire industries, such as arms. The success
gas industry. This perfectly demonstrates one of smart sanctions has been mixed often
of the major obstacles to the use of sanctions they still had effects on innocent civilians,
in crisis diplomacy. Sanctions on smaller, less for example, arms embargoes can cripple the
economically connected states can be applied self-defence capabilities of victims (Gordan
with little to no financial risk to those applying 2011: 332). There is perhaps a danger that
by naming them smart sanctions the debate or where there is a history of violence or
on their impact has been partially silenced. oppression on one side, are examples of
Further research and work needs to be done to when independent mediation is needed. The
continually improve smart sanctions. crisis following South Sudans independence
While sanctions can be effective, their use is one such example; the long-standing divi-
in the Ukraine crisis highlights one of the sions and angry history which exists makes
fundamental problems in crisis diplomacy unassisted negotiations unlikely.
in the modern world. When one of the actors There are problems with the use of negotia-
involved in the crisis is a major world power, tion and mediation in crisis diplomacy, which
then the tools of crisis diplomacy are limited stem from the factors that must be present for
by that actors power. In the Ukraine exam- them to be effective: identifying parties and
ple, sanctions have been used against Russia, compatible interests. In most situations the
but the exclusion of the gas industry per- identification of parties is straightforward, but
haps shows that their limited use reveals an in the more complicated crisis that the world
international community that is unable, or is is now facing there are situations where this
unwilling, to go further in resolving the crisis presents a problem. The Syrian and Ukraine
because of their national interests. crises demonstrate this. In Syria it has been
The use of sanctions relies on other states noted by commanders and policy makers that
to abide by them, and traditionally the US the opposition to Assad is made up of a huge
and EU as the major economic powers had array of different actors, all with different
the greatest effect on a sanctions regime. This ambitions and levels of influence. Identifying,
position is still secured; however, with the and then selecting, which group to try and
rise of the BRICS, the dominance of the US engage in mediation with Assad presents a
and EU is reducing. This has the knock-on difficult almost impossible problem. The
effect that whether the rising powers abide by situation in Ukraine also sees a multitude of
the sanctions or not will have a greater and different groups arranged against Kiev, with
greater impact. the added difficulty of Russian forces being
involved while all the time the Russian gov-
ernment refuses to admit this. How can suc-
cessful mediation take place if a significant
Negotiation and Mediation
portion of one side claims not to be involved
Negotiation and mediation should be consid- at all?
ered the ideal way for crisis diplomacy to be Negotiations and mediation can be affected
conducted (see Chapters 17 and 18 in this by other factors within the international sys-
Handbook). As a result it is the arena where tem. The International Criminal Court issued
skilled diplomats can have their most impor- a warrant for Muammar Gaddafis arrest
tant role and impact. Negotiation is the pro- three months after the NATO-led mission
cess of combing conflicting positions into a had started (ICC 2011), while the mediation
joint agreement (Zartman 2009: 322). teams were still attempting to find a resolu-
Mediation is the process used by disputants tion to the violence. By issuing an arrest
to resolve their differences with the help of warrant for war crimes, the ICC may have
an outside party. This is done by searching damaged the mediation efforts by reducing
for a mutually acceptable solution and to Gaddafis willingness to deal. Successful
counter a move towards winlose strategies negotiation mediation by the international
(Kressel 2006, 726). Mediation works in situ- community requires a much more systematic
ations where an outside actor is needed to and joined-up approach.
bridge an almost intractable divide. Crisis born Negotiation and mediation are not reserved
out of long-standing tribal or ethnic divisions, for conflicts alone. Non-military crises such
as epidemics require careful negotiation to flexible options. In Cubas case if Kennedy

ensure the crisis is contained. These nego- had ordered airstrikes, as some were advising
tiations will deal with issues such as access him, this had the potential to quickly escalate
to areas of a country, discussing concerns the crisis to a point where a full-scale mili-
with local communities, and gaining support tary confrontation was inevitable. The use of
for inoculation campaigns. An extra level of a blockade allowed other tools to be used,
complexity is added due to the higher num- while keeping the option open for later air-
bers of NGOs involved in these crises, who strikes if they were deemed necessary. When
are very often the first ones on the ground and the use of force is authorised in a crisis situ-
provide the majority of the personnel. ation it is important that it doesnt end the
The underlying problem with negotiation negotiations or mediation efforts. As soon as
and mediation is that they require all the military operations start it becomes much
actors involved in the crisis to participate, harder for negotiations and mediation to suc-
and it needs the international community to ceed. This is why they must be closely linked
be willing to negotiate with those involved. to one another, with force being used with a
The Islamic State crisis demonstrates this clear objective. In the case of Libya, while
perfectly. Islamic State is not interested in NATO forces were conducting airstrikes the
negotiating, and even if it was, its conditions African Union (AU) was tasked with contin-
would be incompatible and unacceptable uing efforts for a diplomatic solution. It soon
with all others involved in the crisis. With the became abundantly clear that there was no
murder of American and British hostages, it real linkage between the two efforts; AU
is unlikely that either the US or UK would requests for additional funds from the EU
consider negotiating with Islamic State. were delayed for weeks, and proposals were
quashed (DeWaal 2012). The use of force in
Libya, initially to defend Benghazi but later
Use of Force used much more widely, certainly embold-
ened the rebels, and eventually enabled them
The use of force is the ultimate back-up to to overthrow the regime. In the same way as
the other tools available in crisis diplomacy. the ICC warrant made Gaddafis willingness
With the continued advancement of military to negotiate less likely, the support the rebels
technology and the still disproportionate received may have diminished their readiness
level of military power held by Western to negotiate.
powers, especially the US, the force options There are, however, crises when the only
available are wide ranging. Air power and response is the use of force. The rise of the
long-range missiles were the primary weap- Islamic State in 2014 would appear such
ons in Libya, whereas ground troops were an example. The mishandling of sectarian
deployed in the 2013 Mali crisis. Use of diversion and the disfranchisement of Sunni
force in a crisis does not necessarily have to Muslims by the al-Maliki government which
mean an outbreak of combat, but rather that created the circumstances that allowed for IS to
military tools are used to prevent actions by spread so rapidly through Northern Iraq require
the actors involved. The blockade in the long-term solutions. However, the immediate
Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of this. crisis of IS rampaging across Iraq, committing
The American blockade bought time for mass killings and brutalizing civilians, could
other crisis diplomacy tools to resolve the only be met with force, supplying weaponry
situation. It also demonstrates one of the to the Kurdish Peshmerga, and targeted air and
fundamental factors of crisis diplomacy, one drone strikes to assist their efforts.
that is particularly important when consider- If force is used in support of one side of
ing the use of force: that one must maintain the crisis then they are invariably bolstered
by that support, like in Libya. In situations Key Points

where there are multiple actors allied with
The use of sanctions should be carefully tailored
the intervening force, it can enhance one of
to the specific crisis. Broad sanctions have the
them over another. For example, it could be
potential to cause massive harm to civilian
argued that the support that the US is giving populations.
to the Iraqi Kurds in their fight against IS Negotiations and mediation should be engaged
also brings the possibility of an independent in at every level of a crisis.
Kurdish state a step closer. Military force remains the ultimate back-up to
Since the Iraq War, the use of force by the other tools used in crisis diplomacy. It should
Western states has become increasingly be used sparingly and only when absolutely
unpopular domestically. While airstrikes necessary. Its use should not signal the end of
from manned aircraft and drones are still negotiations.
tolerated because they are seen to carry These tools should be used together as part of an
overall strategy for resolving the crisis.
almost no risk of casualties to service per-
sonnel, there has grown a real aversion to
boots on the ground. This reluctance to use
the full range of military assets at their dis- THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
posal demonstrates once again the problem FOR CRISIS DIPLOMACY
of national interest in crisis diplomacy. The
risk of soldiers returning in body bags makes With the rise of intrastate conflicts and crises
full military intervention in a crisis extremely involving non-state actors, the field of crisis
dangerous politically. Problems emerge when diplomacy is becoming more complex. The
the actors involved are states with significant crises that are facing the international com-
military capabilities capable of shooting munity will need the concerted efforts and
down drones or aircraft, or a nuclear deter- support of states, and international and
rent. There is essentially no chance of force regional organisations. There needs to be a
being used in Ukraine by the international much more joined-up approach to the use of
community, even if this were to be the most different crisis diplomacy tools and a longer
effective solution. Similarly, it is unlikely term view of the effects that these can have.
that air power will be used in Syria against The interconnectedness of modern crises
the Assad regime due to its highly developed must be better understood and accounted for.
air defence system. While hindsight is a wonderful thing, lessons
The use of force in crisis diplomacy is should be learned from the Libya and Syria
something that should never be considered Islamic state crises. The international com-
lightly, and is not a solution by itself. Simply munity helped in Libya, but did not in Syria.
destroying the regime, or group, will not The prolonged nature of the Syrian crisis
resolve the underlying cause of the crisis. enabled the rise of Sunni extremists from
For example, the Libyan intervention cannot which the Islamic State was born and the
now be considered a success story. NATO enduring crisis that they created.
assisted in removing the Gaddafi regime, All the crisis management tools that have
yet the situation that remains is one of multi- been discussed serve a role; their use must
ple warring factions, extra-judicial killings, be on a case by case basis with strategies and
and chaos (Fadel 2014). Fundamentally, objectives defined for the specific crisis at
the use of force should always be accom- hand. More importantly, with the increasing
panied by an equally supported diplomatic multipolar nature of the international system,
strategy they should work together to brought on as a result of the rising powers
resolve the crisis. Relying on weaponry beginning to flex their international muscles,
alone wont work. there must be a concerted effort to build an
established consensus on the major aspects of The definition of international crisis has
crisis management and how they interact, and changed, and the states, organisations and
how the international community can greater actors involved in crisis diplomacy need to
support these efforts. recognise this shift and adapt and evolve the
Sanctions must be better integrated into tools they use to resolve modern crises. Future
the diplomatic process rather than simply research on crisis diplomacy should focus on
punishing regimes, their use must be more the interconnectedness of crisis. Work should
focused on creating incentives to engage in be done to examine what the resolution of a
dialogue. The suffering these sanctions can crisis will create and this should be closely
cause to innocent civilians must be better linked with post-crisis management to ensure
integrated into their planning. that the solution of one crisis does not inad-
The concept of Responsibility to Protect vertently lead to another. Additionally,
is seen by many as a positive step forward despite the work done to redefine crisis diplo-
in terms of humanitarian intervention. There macy it is still too often seen as concerning
are, however, very real concerns as to when armed conflicts. This must be addressed, as
and how it should be used, or not used. Its the world is facing more crises that do not
utilisation in the Libyan case and the possi- fall into this category Ebola, HIV, climate
ble overreach of NATO forces has presented change, economic instability. These have
challenges for supporters of the principle. the potential to be far more devastating than
The Libyan case demonstrates the difficulty many armed conflicts. Crisis diplomacy must
of separating R2P from the national interests look at how best to resolve these crises.
of the states involved. However, its accept-
ance by the UN and the subsequent enshrine-
ment in the UN Charter means that states
will no longer be able to hide behind sover- NOTE
eignty when committing brutal acts on their
own people, is seen by many as a positive 1 Kosovo, 5000 dead (Erlanger, 1999), East Timor,
150,000 dead (Jones 2008: 193) and Rwanda, 1
step (UN Charter, n.d.). The use of R2P and
million dead (Jones 2008: 190).
force in crisis diplomacy must be accompa-
nied by substantial plans and commitments
of resources to post-crisis management. The
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38
Coercive Diplomacy
Peter Viggo Jakobsen
INTRODUCTION That the practice of coercive diplomacy is

old and used routinely does not make it well-
No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force understood or popular, however. Some readers
can ever claim to be both intelligent and peaceful. probably find it strange, even inappropriate, for
No diplomacy that would stake everything on per-
a handbook on diplomacy to contain a chapter
suasion and compromise deserves to be called
intelligent. (Morgenthau 1948: 565) on coercive diplomacy. The concept of coer-
cive diplomacy is often regarded as an oxymo-
Coercive diplomacy, the use of military ron because military coercion and diplomacy
threats and/or limited force in support of are seen as mutually exclusive alternatives
diplomatic negotiations, is as old as the employing different instruments and serving
institution of diplomacy. Thucydides very different ends. Whereas military coer-
describes several instances where Athens cion relies on threats and limited use of force
and Sparta use military threats as part of (sticks) to coerce adversaries to do something
their negotiation strategies in his account of against their will, diplomacy relies on nego-
the fifth century BC Peloponnesian War; tiation, positive inducements (carrots) and
Frederick the Great is attributed the statement assurances to solve conflicts peacefully and
that diplomacy without military power is to develop friendly relations among nations
like music without instruments; American as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
President Theodore Roosevelt believed in Relations (1961) puts it. Use of military threats
speaking softly while carrying a big stick; and force is commonly regarded as evidence
and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan found that diplomacy has failed and as undermining
that: if diplomacy is to succeed, it must be the prospects of diplomatic success.
backed both by force and by fairness This perception is not unfounded since
(Annan 1998). coercive diplomacy has a relatively poor track
Coercive Diplomacy 477
record. Recent studies analysing Western use This chapters review of the coercive
of coercive diplomacy find seven successes in diplomacy field focuses on works meeting
22 attempts (Art and Cronin 2003: 387) and six three requirements. First, they must
successes in 36 attempts respectively (Jakobsen include both sticks and carrots in their
2010: 291), and that use of force was required conceptualisation of the strategy and study
in most cases. This modest success rate has their interaction. Second, they must define
convinced some scholars that coercive diplo- the objective of the strategy as war avoidance,
macy should not be attempted at all (Ganguly that is, as a strategy that actors employ in
and Kraig 2005). This widespread view that order to achieve their goals without resorting
coercive diplomacy often has unsuccessful to war. Third, they must aspire to be policy
outcomes may also stem from the fact that relevant and seek to bridge the gap between
the concept is less understood and less stud- theory and practice that is characterising
ied than the related concepts of peace, war and much contemporary international relations
diplomacy, which are all at the core of large, theory (Jentleson 2002; Walt 2005). In
well-established research programmes com- keeping with this Handbooks focus on
plete with university departments, educational diplomacy, this chapter scrutinizes the
programmes, research centres and think tanks. coercive diplomacy literature analysing how
Whereas you can get an MA, a PhD or a chair military threats and symbolic/limited use of
in peace, war or diplomacy studies, the same force can be used in tandem with diplomatic
is not true with respect to coercive diplomacy. instruments (carrots and assurances) to
Moreover, scholars and practitioners studying resolve crises and conflicts short of war.
and practising the art of coercive diplomacy These rules of engagement exclude the
disagree among themselves on terminology, much larger literatures which focus solely
on the amount of force allowed, and on the on military coercion involving the use of
requirements for success (see Table 38.1). The threats and limited force or carrots and
only thing they do agree on is that coercive assurances, or regard carrots and sticks as
diplomacy is a high-risk, hard-to-use strategy competing instruments. These writings will
with a limited chance of success in war threat- only be included to the extent that they have
ening confrontations (Bratton 2005; Jakobsen influenced the coercive diplomacy literature
2011). (See Chapter 37 in the Handbook.) in focus here.
Table 38.1 Comparing diplomacy, coercion and war

Strategy Diplomacy Military coercion Full-scale war
Dimension Coercive diplomacy Compellence/ coercive war
Instruments Persuasion, positive (Military) threats and/or Military threats and use Decisive or brute
incentives and symbolic use of force of limited force force
assurances coupled with carrots
and assurances
Purpose Peaceful settlement Obtain compliance without Obtain compliance Impose compliance
of disputes escalating beyond without defeating the through military
symbolic use of force enemy defeat
Requirements Adversary cooperation Adversary cooperation and Adversary cooperation Control: adversary
for success and overlapping overlapping interests and overlapping cooperation and
interests interests common interests
not required
Source: Jakobsen (2015)

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY THE Wests efforts to prevent a Soviet attack on

ANALYTICAL CONCEPT Western Europe during the Cold War. The dif-
ference between coercive diplomacy and com-
Alexander L. George (2003: 464), who devel- pellence is that the latter also allows for the
oped the concept, conceived it as part of a pro-active use of military threats and limited
broader influence theory that combines threats force in order to coerce the target to do some-
and use of symbolic force (sticks) with posi- thing, for instance give up territory. Russias
tive inducements (carrots) and reassurances. almost bloodless annexation of the Crimea in
The name of the game is to influence to 2014 is a case in point as the Russian govern-
avoid war rather than to defeat or control to ment relied on the implied threat of full-scale
win (see Table 38.1). The stick is employed in invasion (brute force) to coerce the Ukrainian
support of diplomacy to enhance the prospects government to withdraw its forces from the
of a negotiated settlement. Its use should Crimean peninsula without a fight. George
therefore be kept to a minimum and coupled refers to such pro-active use of military threats
with carrots and reassurances. Threats should as blackmail (see Figure 38.1), whereas
only be employed reactively to stop or undo Schelling would categorize it as compellence.
undesirable actions (for instance military In Georges formulation, the stick is seen
attacks) already undertaken by an opponent. as constitutive of and necessary, but rarely
This reactive use of threats distinguishes coer- sufficient, for coercive diplomacy success: a
cive diplomacy from other threat-based strate- mutually acceptable negotiated settlement.
gies such as deterrence and compellence. A The stick is necessary to instil fear of unac-
deterrent threat is issued pro-actively in order ceptable escalation in the minds of the target
to prevent the target from acting in the first leadership in order to get it to the negotiation
place, for example to prevent a military attack. table. But is it also necessary to give the target
Deterrent threats constituted the core of the carrots to allow it to comply with the coercers
Blackmail (George)
(Aim: initiate target
action)
Compellence
(Schelling)
(Aim: get target to
alter its behaviour)
Coercive diplomacy
(George)
(Aim: stop or undo action
Military Coercion
undertaken by target)
(Use of military
threats in general)
Deterrence
(Everyone)
(Aim: ensure that
target does NOT
alter its behaviour)
Figure 38.1 Conceptual overview

Source: adapted from Jakobsen (1998: 12) for this chapter. Reproduced with permission from Palgrave Macmillan.
demands without losing face and to reassure moved through since coercive diplomacy
it that compliance will not result in additional was born as a separate field of inquiry during
demands and more threats in the future. the Cold War.
Key Points The Cold War: Avoiding Nuclear

Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy com-
War and Controlling Escalation
bining military threats and symbolic use of force George got interested in coercive diplomacy
with carrots and reassurances in order to resolve when he conducted a classified study at the
war-threatening crises and armed conflicts short
Rand Corporation seeking to identify the
of full-scale war.
conditions under which the US could esca-
Coercive diplomacy theorists seek to bridge the
carrotstick gap characterising much of the lit- late its use of air power in Vietnam (Operation
erature on crisis and conflict management. Rolling Thunder) without risking nuclear
Carrots, reassurances, military threats and symbolic war with the Soviet Union and China (George
use of force are not alternatives but interdependent 1965). This study later formed the basis for
instruments that can reinforce or undermine each the classic, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
other depending on the circumstances. (George etal. 1971). Thomas Schelling also
sought to understand how military threats
and limited use of force could be used for
bargaining purposes so that nuclear war
THEORIES AND PRACTICE THE could be avoided. He coined the term com-
EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD pellence and identified five necessary condi-
tions for coercive success that has since
The principal determinant shaping the field formed the basis of all military coercion
of coercive diplomacy has been the desire to theories, including the coercive component
assist US policy makers in avoiding war and of Georges concept (see Box 38.1).
keeping the use of force to a minimum. The Whereas Schelling never operational-
link between theory and practice has been ised his theory and was reluctant to use it as
intimate, which is why this section presents a basis for advising the US government on
the evolution of the field as driven by the how to conduct Operation Rolling Thunder
principal policy challenges characterising the (Kaplan 1983: 3306), George explicitly
three different strategic eras the world has sought to develop a policy-relevant theory
Box 38.1 Schellings five conditions for coercive (compellence) success
1 The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that the costs of non-compliance
will be unbearable.
2 The threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary; he/she must be convinced that the coercer has the
will and the capability to execute it in case of non-compliance.
3 The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4 The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
5 The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding the resort to
full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying
unilaterally to take what it wants by force.
Source: Schelling (1966: 1, 34, 6976, 89). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 245) with permission from Oxford University Press.
that could help US policy makers manage military coercion focused far more on deter-
real-life crises. He and his associates iden- rence than on coercive diplomacy or compel-
tified five contextual factors that should be lence during the Cold War.
taken into consideration when the use of
coercive diplomacy was contemplated and
nine success conditions favouring its use (see Key Points
Box 38.2). They rejected the unitary rational
actor assumption that Schellings theory was Coercive diplomacy was developed with the ambi-
based on in favour of empirically derived tion to assist US policy makers to resolve their
behavioural models of the adversaries in Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union.
The fear of nuclear escalation led to the emphasis
order to reduce the risk that cultural misun-
on war avoidance, minimum use of force and
derstandings and psychological biases would peaceful conflict resolution.
cause coercive diplomacy to fail (George
etal. 1971; George and Simons 1994).
The emphasis on war avoidance and esca- The Humanitarian 1990s: The
lation control so visible in the writings of
Quest for Coercive Credibility
both George and Schelling was a natural con-
sequence of the Cold War context. The risk The scope for using military coercion changed
that a crisis would draw in the United States completely with the collapse of the Soviet
and the Soviet Union and escalate into a ther- Union. Military threats and force could now be
monuclear war meant that full-scale use of used on a far greater scale without the risk of
force was seen as too risky by most thinkers great power confrontations and nuclear escala-
and policy makers. As a result, the study of tion, but the perceived national interest and
Box 38.2 George and Simons coercive diplomacy framework
Contextual factors
1 Global strategic environment

2 Type of provocation
3 Image of war
4 Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy
5 The isolation of the adversary
Conditions favouring success
1 Clarity of objective
2 Strength of motivation
3 Asymmetry of motivation*
4 Sense of urgency*
5 Strong leadership
6 Domestic support
7 International support
8 Adversary fear of unacceptable escalation*
9 Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis*
*These four conditions are considered particularly significant for success.
Source: George and Simons (1994: 2714, 2878, 292). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 245) with permission from
Oxford University Press.
hence motivation for doing so was lower since line of thinking (see Box 38.3). Drawing on
every crisis and conflict was no longer regarded the works of George and Schelling, it sought
as part of a larger struggle for global power. to enhance threat credibility and potency by
Instead, crisis and conflict management efforts emphasising the need to threaten the opponent
were increasingly justified by humanitarian with quick defeat or denial of objectives and
concerns and so-called humanitarian inter- the need to issue deadlines for compliance.
ventions came to the fore (Liberia, Northern Failure to heed these recommendations was
Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East regarded as a recipe for failure. This refinement
Timor, Sierra Leone). In this context, coercive of coercive diplomacy allowed for far greater
diplomacy emerged as a strategy of choice for use of force than George. Jakobsen defines use
coalitions of states (mostly led by the United of force as limited and as part of a coercive
States) who wanted to stop human suffering diplomacy strategy as long as it does not force
caused by intra-state conflicts, but were reluc- compliance upon the target but leaves the latter
tant to put their troops in harms way to do so. with a choice between continued resistance or
Yet as Georges framework underlines (see compliance. Isolated use of air and sea power
Box 38.2), coercive diplomacy rarely succeeds would in accordance with this definition count
if the asymmetry of motivation favours the as limited use of force regardless of the num-
target, and threat credibility proved difficult to ber of munitions expended (Jakobsen 1998:
establish for the Western powers, who made no 1417). Following George it also emphasised
attempt to hide their fear of casualties or their the need to couple the stick with carrots and
reluctance to use force (Jakobsen 1998). assurances to enhance the scope for negotiated
The difficulties highlighted by the increased solutions, and this insistence set it apart from
resort to humanitarian coercion triggered the much larger debate that was triggered by
a new scholarly interest in the concept. the heavy reliance on coercive air power char-
Unsurprisingly, the problem of establishing acterising US crisis and conflict management
credibility took centre stage in these studies, during this era (Byman and Waxman 2000;
and Georges insistence on keeping the use Pape 1996). The air power debate was prob-
of force to a minimum came under fire from lematic from a coercive diplomacy perspective
scholars viewing graduated escalation strate- because it ignored the crucial role that carrots
gies as a recipe for failure. In their view, the and assurances played in Western crisis and
best way to avoid war was to threaten the conflict management (Jakobsen 2000).
adversary with military defeat (Freedman
1998; Jakobsen 1998; Pape 1996). There was
no point in reducing threat credibility and Key Points
potency by keeping the use of force to a mini- The end of the Cold War facilitated the use of
mum now that the risk of great power war had coercive diplomacy by removing the risk of great
receded. Jakobsens ideal policy illustrates this power war and nuclear escalation.
Box 38.3 Jakobsens ideal policy
1 A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny their objectives quickly with little cost.
2 A deadline for compliance.
3 An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
4 An offer of inducements for compliance.
Source: Jakobsen (1998: 4). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 246) with permission from Oxford University Press.
It proved very difficult for Western-led coalitions and North Korea and Iran stepped up their
to use coercive diplomacy to end humanitarian nuclear programmes.
suffering. Coercive diplomacy scholars reacted to
These problems led to new studies advocating this change in US foreign policy by recom-
greater use of force than Georges original con- mending a greater reliance on diplomacy.
ceptualisation allowed for.
The concern from the 1990s that US coercive
diplomacy was undermined by a transparent
The War on Terror: More Coercion unwillingness to use force (see Box 38.3) was
Than Diplomacy now replaced by the concern that it was being
undermined by excessive use of force. Thus
The attacks on the World Trade Center and Art and Cronin (2003) edited a major study of
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (9/11) US post-Cold War coercive diplomacy arguing
removed the reluctance to use force and the that George had been right to insist that coer-
fear of casualties that had shaped the conduct cive diplomacy should allow for symbolic use
of American-led coercive diplomacy in the of force only. Similarly, Jentleson and Whytock
1990s. The Bush Administration declared (20056) proposed a new framework empha-
war on terrorist groups and rogue states that sising that the coercers strategy should focus
sponsored terrorism and sought to acquire on the importance of proportionality between
weapons of mass destruction (The White ends and means, reciprocity and economic as
House 2002: 1315), employed brute force opposed to military coercion (see Box 38.4).
to defeat and overthrow the regimes in Jentleson and Whytock argued on the basis of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and threatened to do an empirical case study that threats of regime
the same to Iran, North Korea and Libya. change were counterproductive, and that the
While effective with respect to removing the Bush Administration was wrong in claiming
two regimes, the brute force option involved that Libyas decision to give up its weapons
high costs. The American decision to go to of mass destruction in 2003 had been caused
war in Iraq in 2003 triggered widespread by the fall of Saddam Hussein and American
international condemnation and alienated threats of regime change. The need for a bal-
many traditional friends and allies. Moreover, anced approach to coercive diplomacy was
the United States soon found itself fighting also emphasised by other scholars (Blechman
insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and Brumberg 2010; Jakobsen 2012b).
Box 38.4 Jentleson and Whytocks coercive diplomacy framework
Coercer strategy
1 Proportionality between ends and means.

2 Reciprocity linkage between the coercers carrots and the targets concessions.
3 Coercive credibility threats must be perceived to enhance costs of non-compliance.
Targets domestic politics and economy
1 Is internal political support and regime security served by compliance or resistance?

2 What are the economic costs of compliance versus resistance?
3 Do domestic elites act as circuit breakers or transmission belts for the coercive pressure?
Source: Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06: 515). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 248) with permission from Oxford University
Press.
The era also witnessed a greater interest in and South China Seas suggest that we are
obtaining a better understanding of the targets, entering a new strategic era where confronta-
since a poor understanding of their culture, tions among the worlds (nuclear armed) great
motivations, vulnerabilities, capacity for counter- powers will become more frequent. These
coercion, mindset and decision-making pro- confrontations are unlikely to result in new
cesses was regarded as a major source of the Cold Wars in either Europe or East Asia as
problems that the United States was facing in some have suggested (Legvold 2014; Lucas
its war against terror (see Box 38.4). The result 2014; Mearsheimer 2010; Room for debate
was a number of works emphasising (strate- 2012). The Cold War only involved two super-
gic) cultural awareness, the development of powers and was global in scope. The new era
psychological profiles, and actionable intel- has a higher number of great powers, who,
ligence as necessary requirements for coer- except for the United States, have a primarily
cive diplomacy success (Byman and Waxman regional outlook and reach. They are also
2002; Bolland 2006; Crenshaw 2003; Morgan more interdependent economically than the
2003; Tarzi 2005); considerations that also fea- United States and the Soviet Union ever were.
tured prominently in the booming literature on These features suggest a more regionalised
counterinsurgency. Jentleson and Whytocks world order where conflict in one region is
focus on the targets domestic politics and eco- unlikely to spill over into another, but where
nomic elites is indicative of this trend. They more regional confrontations occur as declin-
highlighted the importance of these actors ing status quo powers seek to resist demands
by demonstrating empirically how Libyas from the rising powers for a greater say in the
surprise decision to give up its weapons of running of regional affairs. Since this dynamic
mass destruction programmes in part could be is most likely to exacerbate the current insta-
explained by the pressure that economic elites bility plaguing Sub-Saharan Africa and the
hurt by international sanctions had exerted area stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, the
on Libyas leader Gaddafi to persuade him to future practice of coercive diplomacy is likely
terminate these programmes. to feature elements from the Cold War, the
1990s and the war on terror as all the main
challenges and opponents characterising these
Key Points eras interact in the era we are entering.
The resort to coercive diplomacy will
The heavy US reliance on brute force in response increase for the simple reason that the number
to the 9/11 attacks prompted coercive diplomacy of actors willing and capable to use military
scholars to make the case for a more balanced coercion and force in pursuit of their objectives
approach relying on both carrots and sticks.
is rising. The rise of new regional powers and
Practical difficulties with respect to understand-
ing adversary behaviour and their capacity for
the proliferation of militant non-state actors
counter-coercion resulted in research highlight- with regional/global reach, such as al-Qaeda,
ing these challenging requirements for success. the Islamic State, Hizbollah and al-Shabaab,
will increase the number of challenges that
status quo oriented actors will employ coer-
A Hybrid Future: More Actors, cive diplomacy to resolve. They will do so for
Greater Complexity, New a mixture of the reasons already spelled out
Challenges above: a strong interest in war avoidance, fear
of (nuclear) escalation, a reluctance to use
Russias annexation of the Crimea and its force and put troops in harms way to stop
active support for separatists in eastern mass violations of human rights, or a strong
Ukraine in 2014 and Chinas growing asser- determination to threaten and use force to
tiveness over sovereignty issues in the East protect national security.
The increasing number of actors and their others are already visible. A key challenge
different nature (state and non-state) will fur- arising from the changing distribution of
ther complicate the use of coercive diplomacy. global power and increasing number of actors
Sometimes the principal opponent will be (state and non-state) capable and willing to
nuclear armed as was the case in the Ukraine use force to challenge the status quo is the
crisis between the Western powers and Russia; need to move away from the US-centric bias
sometimes the opponent will be a much weaker that has characterised the study of coercive
fragile state. At other times, it will be non-state diplomacy since its inception during the Cold
actors using coercion and force in pursuit of War. The number of studies examining how
political, ideological or criminal objectives. other actors than the United States employ
Yet the opponent may also be a hybrid, that coercive diplomacy and other forms of mili-
is, a coalition of actors spanning these three tary coercion is growing (Aras 2009; Ohnishi
categories that employs a variety of overt and 2012; Thies and Bratton 2004; Zhao 1999
covert military (conventional, irregular and 2000), but more are needed in order to give
terrorist), economic and political methods in us a better understanding of how and to what
an integrated way to achieve their objectives extent cultural factors, regime/actor-type var-
(Hoffman 2009). While this is not entirely new, iables and different views of war produce
it complicates the use of coercive diplomacy, behaviours that differ from the ones pre-
forcing the coercer to target a higher number dicted by a rational actor model.
of actors and hostile actions simultaneously. In addition to addressing context specific
The Ukraine crisis erupting in 2014 is a case challenges, coercive diplomacy scholars must
in point as Russia skilfully integrated the also address the generic problems that have
actions of Ukrainian separatists in the Crimea hampered theoretical progress in the field
and Eastern Ukraine with its own use of con- since its inception. They include a failure to
ventional, irregular, political, economic, cyber integrate qualitative and quantitative meth-
and informational means in order to coerce the ods, vague definitions of key concepts and
Ukrainian government to end its rapproche- variables, and lack of systematic and rigor-
ment with the EU and NATO and accept its ous empirical analysis of generally accepted
place in a Russian sphere of influence. propositions (Bratton 2005; Jakobsen 2011;
Larson 2012). Yet the single most impor-
tant challenge facing the study and practice
Key Points of coercive diplomacy is how to get its cen-
tral finding across: that strategies combining
The emerging strategic era features all the actors sticks, carrots and assurances have a far better
and challenges that have characterised the three track record with respect to resolving crises
previous ones.
and conflict short of war than strategies rely-
The rise of hybrid opponents using all their
ing solely on sticks or on carrots and assur-
means of power in unexpected and asymmetric
ways will greatly complicate the effective use of ances (Art and Cronin 2003; Blechman and
coercive diplomacy. Wittes 1999; Davis 2000; George and Simons
1994; Greffenius and Jungil 1992; Jakobsen
1998, 2010; Snyder and Diesing 1977).
This key finding has thus far been over-
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR shadowed completely by coercive diploma-
THEORY AND PRACTICE cys low rate of success. This has given rise
to the widespread perception that coercive
As in the past, the emerging strategic era will diplomacy is an oxymoron and that use of
create new and context specific policy chal- military threats and use of force undermines
lenges. Some of these are as yet unknown, diplomacy and the prospects for peace.
The practice and study of coercive diplo- Byman, D.L. and Waxman, M.C. (2002) The
macy prove this perception wrong. It clearly Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign
shows that skilful use of coercive diplo- Policy and the Limits of Military Might.
macy can resolve crises and conflicts short Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
of full-scale war when the conditions are Crenshaw, M. (2003) Coercive Diplomacy and
the Response to Terrorism, in R.J. Art and
right. Unfortunately, our understanding of
P.M. Cronin (eds), The United States and
these conditions remains wanting in several Coercive Diplomacy. Washington, DC: US
respects. More research and scholarly atten- Institute for Peace Press, pp. 30557.
tion are needed if we want to realize more of Davis, J.W., Jr. (2000) Threats and Promises.
the potential for peaceful conflict resolution Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
that coercive diplomacy does hold. Press.
Freedman, L. (1998) Strategic Coercion, in L.
Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts
and Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS pp. 1536.
Ganguly, S. and Kraig, Michael R. (2005) The
20012002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing
I would like to thanks the editors and Gary
the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Security
Schaub Jr. for useful comments on an earlier Studies 14 (2): 290324.
draft. George, A.L. (1965) Some Thoughts on
Graduated Escalation. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND.
George, A.L. (2003) The Need for Influence
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39
Revolutionary Diplomacy
David Armstrong1
INTRODUCTION 1949, the USA, for various reasons, withheld

recognition until 1978, as it had done earlier
The first use of the term revolutionary diplo- with the Soviet Union. Here I shall be focus-
macy was, almost certainly, in a series of ing upon a different usage of the term revo-
volumes commissioned by the US Senate in lutionary diplomacy, one denoting states
1888, whose aim was to document the diplo- whose relations with other states are revolu-
matic correspondence of the American tionary because they are based on fundamen-
Revolution.2 In this context the term simply tally different principles than those on the
referred to the communications of the basis of which states traditionally conduct
American revolutionaries with France, Spain their relations with each other (see Chapter
and other countries. Similarly, states enjoy- 10 in this Handbook).
ing formal diplomatic relations with a state Orthodox diplomacy is based on principles
undergoing a revolution against an estab- developed over the last five hundred years,
lished government inevitably confront mainly by the leading European powers.
numerous issues in determining whether and Here, the underlying assumption is that states
at what point they should transfer their offi- form a sort of international society marked
cial recognition of that state from one gov- by certain common interests, norms, rules
ernment to another. Some adopt the simple and institutions. Given that the fundamental
principle that recognition should be accorded criterion for membership of this society is
to the government that is clearly exercising the sovereign status of its members their
effective control while others take a range right to govern themselves as they choose
of political factors into account. For exam- the societal aspects of this community of
ple, while the UK moved rapidly to recognise states are inevitably somewhat more lim-
the new Communist government of China in ited than, for example, those prevailing in a
national community, with a common culture ideologically derived black-and-white views

and laws enforced by police and upheld by of the world rather than the subtle flexibil-
courts. Rules and enforcement mechanisms ity required of Satows diplomats. Although
in what Hedley Bull refers to as the anar- there are many such animals as cool headed
chical society of states are more limited and revolutionaries, it would be hard to find one
revolve around upholding the basis of inter- possessing even half of Nicolsons6 list of
national society sovereignty itself. Hence diplomatic qualities. Finally, the idea that
diplomacy, as an institution of international diplomats represent not merely their own
society, has the purpose of enabling states countries but the common interests of inter-
to find peaceful means of negotiating and national society as a whole has little reso-
resolving their differences without compro- nance with revolutionaries, who, if they have
mising their sovereign equality. In this sense a conception of international society, see it as
diplomats function, in effect, as the personal an oppressive, unequal and immoral structure
embodiment of this society: they stand for the of power.
sovereign states which are its members. The intrinsic conceptual antagonism
The leading works on diplomacy all between diplomacy and revolution is reflected
attempt to derive their understanding of the in the mutual perceptions of the individuals
key features of diplomacy from this underly- who are the prime actors in each process. Even
ing notion of a society of states (see Chapter such a moderate revolutionary as Thomas
8 in this Handbook). Satow,3 for example, Jefferson saw diplomacy as the pest of the
defines diplomacy as the application of intel- peace of the world and believed there to be lit-
ligence and tact to the conduct of official rela- tle point in sending Americans abroad to per-
tions or, more briefly still, the conduct of form diplomatic tasks because, being honest
business between states by peaceful means. republicans, they would inevitably be outwit-
Nicolsons ideal diplomat possessed an envi- ted by less virtuous Europeans.7 Similar sen-
able list of personal qualities: truth, accu- timents were expressed by Washington, John
racy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, Adams and others. The underlying concern
loyalty. For Berridge,4 diplomacy is the here was essentially the same as can be found
conduct of international relations by negotia- in many revolutionary states: fear that the
tion rather than force, propaganda or recourse revolutionary society might be contaminated
to law, and by other peaceful means (such as by too much contact with foreigners who did
gathering information or engendering good- not share its ideals, which made diplomacy
will) which are directly or indirectly designed automatically suspect. Even as late as 1885 an
to promote negotiation. De Callires5 clas- American Senator could still lament:
sic work specifically relates the practice of
diplomacy to the existence of a community of This diplomatic service is working our ruin by creat-
ing a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies.
states in Europe, a usage followed by Watson,
The disease is imported by our returning diplomats
who talks of diplomacy as involving the and by the foreign ambassadors sent here by mon-
adjustment of the differing interests of states archs and despots to corrupt and destroy our
through bargaining and compromise and American ideals.8
through an awareness not merely of reason of
state but of raison de systme or of the inter- So deeply ingrained in the American psyche
ests of international society as a whole. was this distrust of diplomacy that it was not
The revolutions that I am considering here until well into the twentieth century that the
are not about the smooth running of anything United States felt able to devote significant
but about fundamental change. They fre- resources to the development of a profes-
quently invoke violent rather than peaceful sional diplomatic service (see Chapter 26 in
means of achieving change and proceed from this Handbook). And if such sentiments could
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY 489
be so widespread in the least ideological of the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of

the major revolutionary states, they inevita- possessions and the good faith of treaties.
bly emerged with even greater force in revo- The prosperity and harmony of Europe, he
lutions that proceeded from more doctrinaire continued, were intimately linked to a com-
mind-sets, such as the French Revolution and munity of interests of all kinds, of internal
the various revolutions inspired by Marxism administration, of gentle and calm manners,
or Islam. of well-informed opinions, and of a benefi-
For their part, diplomats were no less cent and pure religion, which groups them
hostile towards certain revolutions. A study all in a single family of nations. This could
of the American Foreign Service during the be threatened not only by the Revolution but,
years after the Bolshevik Revolution, for Kaunitz perceptively added, by the necessary
example, has shown how the American diplo- counter-measures that would have to be taken
mats developed a profound antipathy towards against it.10 The work of diplomats was, for
the Soviet Union, whose diplomats they saw example, inevitably affected by the increasing
as bent upon subversion.9 Even more seri- attention paid by the international community
ously, so far as their professional sensibilities to the internal affairs of states: one by-product
were concerned, the Americans believed the of the international counter-revolution after
Soviets to be systematically undermining the 1789. This may perhaps be seen as an early
basic principles that had governed the diplo- sign of what were to be increasingly important
matic system to that point. If, as appeared to phenomena in the next 200 years: the grow-
be the case to the American diplomats, their ing role of non-state actors in many aspects
Soviet counterparts saw diplomacy merely of international affairs and the correspond-
as another arena of global class struggle, this ing expansion of the international arena from
made a mockery of any conception of diplo- the narrow confines of formal diplomacy to
macy as a means of bringing about compro- numerous public domains.
mises and other kinds of peaceful settlement
of international disputes (see Chapter 27 in
this Handbook). Key Points
Apprehensions of this kind were first
expressed with regard to the French Diplomacy as an institution of an international
Revolution. Although European international society is founded on the principle of sovereignty,
relations before 1789 could hardly be said but both the idea of an international society and
conventional diplomacy are challenged by revo-
to have been a model of harmony and good-
lutionary states.
will, there was a widespread belief that states The early and continuing US distaste for diplo-
conducted their affairs within certain self- macy shows that even the least ideological of rev-
imposed limitations and in accordance with olutionary states had problems with diplomacy.
generally understood principles of chivalry There were hostile reactions to the French
and courtesy which derived from the aristo- Revolution by conservative forces and interna-
cratic code of honour shared by all European tional society itself was affected.
leaders and were embodied in the institution
of diplomacy. The French Revolution was
thought by many to place all this in jeop-
ardy. In the words of the Austrian Chancellor, THE REVOLUTIONARY VIEW
Kaunitz, in a note to Austrian diplomats in OF DIPLOMACY
July 1791, the spread of the spirit of insub-
ordination and revolt was so menacing that Revolutionary states are not identical and the
all governments needed to make common problems some of them have caused for the
cause in order to preserve the public peace, institution of diplomacy are not unique to
revolutionary situations. There have, for and revolutionary states have been foremost
example, been many violations of diplomatic in imposing restrictions on the freedom of
immunity by states that could in no sense be diplomats to travel within their host countries
termed revolutionary. Therefore, to talk of and to make contact with the local popula-
a general phenomenon of revolutionary tion. When revolutionary states undergo a
diplomacy is inevitably to oversimplify a period of internal terror, as was the case with
more complex reality. With that proviso, it is France, Russia and China, amongst others,
nonetheless possible to discern certain recur- diplomats may find it virtually impossible
ring problems in the interaction between to engage in the most innocent of conver-
revolutionary states and diplomacy. sations with the locals whose lives may be
The first, which has already been alluded endangered simply by virtue of having been
to, derives from the contrast between the con- seen talking to foreigners.12 Even in more
trasting normative assumptions and world normal times the diplomats ability to com-
views that underpin revolution and diplo- municate with individuals may be severely
macy. Numerous revolutions, including the constrained, as a former British ambassador
French, Soviet, Cuban, Chinese and Iranian, to Moscow discovered: The normal role of
proceeded from an ideology that conceived the foreign diplomatist, which is essentially
of the world in transnational rather than inter- to get to know the important people and to
state terms. In theory, at least, the world was gain their co-operation by discussion and
seen as divided into peoples or classes or personal influence was almost wholly ruled
believers and unbelievers rather than states, out.13 Conversely, revolutionary diplomats
which are interpreted by various revolution- have gone to some lengths to pursue peo-
ary ideologies as false or unnatural ways of ples diplomacy, or to develop links with fel-
dividing humanity. There is an obvious con- low believers in their receiving country, most
trast between such views and the diplomats comprehensively when Moscow dominated
conception of themselves as the personifica- the world communist movement.
tion of the sovereign state. Similarly, the com- Numerous other petty restrictions, all aris-
mon revolutionary notion of an inevitable ing from the same fear of contamination by
conflict between the ideas and classes repre- counter-revolutionary forces, may also add
sented by the revolution and the forces that to the difficulties faced by diplomats. For
are hostile to the revolution because it threat- example, for many years foreign diplomats
ens their demise is clearly incompatible with in the Soviet Union had to organise all their
the underlying principle of diplomacy that domestic requirements, from a theatre ticket
states share a common interest in the con- to a plumbing job, through a single govern-
tinued smooth functioning of international ment department, the Burobin.
society that enables them to accept a set of A related problem, in the sense that it arises
common rules, norms and institutions and from the same suspicion of foreigners and, by
seek consensual means of resolving their dif- association, those citizens of the revolution-
ferences. In Engels words: diplomats of all ary state who consort with them, is evident in
countries constitute a secret league as against the frequent unwillingness of revolutionary
the exoteric public and will never compro- states to entrust the conduct of their foreign
mise one another openly.11 relations entirely to professional diplomats,
This fundamental difference of principle who might lack the necessary ideological
is at the heart of the many specific problems commitment. The French Revolution was the
that revolutions have caused for diplomacy. first of many revolutionary states to decide to
If the revolutionary state has an intrinsic send out trustworthy political agents to keep
suspicion of foreigners this is hardly likely a watchful eye on French diplomats, argu-
to make the task of the diplomat any easier ing that it is important that those who are
involved in the general administration of the saw no reason to put up with this and politely
Republic do not serve merely with probity; it pointed out to him that diplomatic relations, which
Cuba and the UK enjoyed, were between states
is necessary that the agents of the Republic
and should exclude ideological polemic or the
are its most zealous and ardent partisans and export of political theory.17
that removal from the revolutionary scene
combined with unavoidable contact with anti- The same envoy experienced a somewhat
revolutionary foreigners might dilute their worse discourtesy when Chinas charg
enthusiasm for the Revolution.14 These agents daffaires during the Cultural Revolution
were the forerunners of the political commis- greeted him by spitting in his face.18
sars who accompanied Soviet diplomats and, The use of diplomacy for propaganda pur-
in a more extreme version, the Red Guards poses is merely one facet of a potentially more
who replaced Chinese diplomats during the serious problem: that diplomats may perceive
Cultural Revolution, when they were charged their prime function to be that of spreading
with implementing Chairman Maos revo- the revolutionary cause. The suspicion that
lutionary diplomatic line. Chinas Peoples revolutionary diplomats may be actively
Daily newspaper hailed the Red Guard dip- engaged in internal subversion has bedevilled
lomats as proletarian diplomatic fighters, relations between revolutionary and non-
whose role was to show a dauntless revolu- revolutionary states since Oliver Cromwells
tionary spirit, a firm and correct political ori- emissary to Spain pronounced the imminent
entation, an unconquerable fighting will.15 arrival of the Spanish revolution on his first
From the perspective of conventional dip- day there.19 Even where diplomats are not
lomatic practice the greatest problem arises engaged in revolutionary activities in their
from the revolutionary view of diplomacy as receiving state itself, they may sometimes
merely another form of struggle against the use their embassy as a base for proselytis-
world-wide enemies of the revolution. Even ing the revolution elsewhere. One notorious
as late as 1964 a Soviet handbook on diplo- case here involved the French revolutionary
macy could argue: diplomat, Gent, who was sent to the United
States in 1793 with instructions to foster
The theoretical foundation of Soviet diplomatic anti-monarchical sentiments in those parts of
activity is a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the
North America that were still controlled by
international situation, of the laws of social devel-
opment, of the laws of class struggle a Marxist- Spain and England. Although he regarded
Leninist evaluation of international events and the France as a friend of the United States, his
formulation of a line of diplomatic struggle on this activities clearly hindered American efforts
basis is a powerful element in Soviet diplomacy.16 to remain neutral in the revolutionary wars
and he was expelled. Similarly, the French
This issue manifested itself in several distinct representative in Madrid in 1795, Mangourit,
ways. First, encounters with such diplomats after making various undiplomatic comments
inevitably had a very large propaganda com- about the Spanish king, was obliged to with-
ponent, which exacerbated the task of reach- draw after only seven months, while other
ing agreement through negotiation. Even French diplomats saw their role primarily as
one-to-one meetings could be affected in this one of spreading the new revolutionary val-
way, as illustrated in the culture clash evident ues.20 Missionary activities of this kind have
in the first meeting between the British been a part of the diplomacy of many other
Consul General to Vietnam and his Cuban revolutionary countries including most com-
opposite number in 1966: munist states and Iran. As Trotsky argued of
He addressed me didactically on the principles
his fellow Bolsheviks, they do not belong to
of Marxism-Leninism and the inevitability of the the diplomatic school. We ought rather to be
triumph of communism throughout the world. I considered as soldiers of the revolution.
Key Points overt or disguised struggle between social-

ism and capitalism. The revolutionary pur-
Recurring problems from the time of Cromwell in
pose of participating in such negotiations
the interaction between revolutionary states and
was to exploit them for propaganda pur-
diplomacy include subversive activities by the
revolutionaries and restrictions on the work of poses, with the aim of putting their enemies
conventional diplomats. on trial before world opinion, as Trotsky
There are contrasting normative assumptions candidly explained in 1917, in discussing
and world views of revolutionary and non- his tactics at the forthcoming BrestLitovsk
revolutionary states. conference. Demonstrating an early aware-
Revolutionary diplomacy suffered early problems ness of the opportunities presented by tech-
in France, the Soviet Union and China. nological developments in communications,
he noted that the details of all negotiations
would be taken down and reported by radio-
telegraphists to all peoples, who will be the
RELATIONS WITH BOURGEOIS judges of our discussions; the overall objec-
STATES tive was to reveal the truth about the diplo-
macy of all imperialists.22
Revolutionary regimes frequently go through The manoeuvres of the Bolsheviks dur-
a period when their hold on power is uncer- ing November 1917 perfectly illustrated
tain and their legitimacy challenged by their their belief that diplomacy was revolutionary
predecessors and other contenders. In such struggle by other means. They had published
circumstances there is often a tendency for the secret treaties and now issued a call for an
such conflicts to spill over into other coun- armistice on terms that no belligerent power
tries and for revolutionary diplomats to com- could possibly accept. When their appeal met
promise their positions by becoming involved with its inevitable lack of response, they used
with perceived enemies of the revolution this as propaganda against the allied govern-
who have escaped to other countries. Even ments. In a radio broadcast on 28 November
where the revolutionary state refrains from to the peoples of the belligerent countries,
such conduct itself, it may find its diplomats they made traditional (reactionary) diplo-
targeted by its enemies abroad, as was the macy an explicit target of their attacks.23
case of a number of White Russian assassina- When world revolution failed to mate-
tions of Soviet diplomats during the 1920s.21 rialise the Soviets made some adjustments
A related problem in recent years has been to their approach to diplomacy, opting for
the tactic of kidnapping and sometimes kill- a general observance of the conventional
ing diplomats by revolutionary groups norms of diplomacy in their formal relations
opposed to established governments as a with other states, while continuing to support
means of disrupting the governments exter- world revolution through their alternative
nal relations. diplomatic arm, the Comintern. But their
The ideologically based conviction that negotiating tactics showed little fundamen-
international relations with non-revolutionary tal change since they remained convinced
states must of necessity consist of a form of that those they were negotiating with were
struggle pending the universal triumph of the implacable enemies. As one reporter noted of
revolutionary cause has seriously affected Molotovs attitude during the 1947 London
diplomatic relations. This was particularly the Foreign Ministers meeting: He is innately
case where the Soviet Union was concerned. suspicious. He seeks for hidden meanings
In the early days of the Bolshevik regime the and tricks where there are none. He takes it
Soviets assumed that all encounters with the for granted that his opponents are trying to
West would inevitably take the form of an trick him and put over something nefarious.24
The generally negative attitude of the Soviets between them tended to descend to levels
towards negotiations probably also resulted below that of their relations with supposed
in their frequently noted tendency to treat any ideological enemies.
offered concession as a sign of weakness and
to immediately raise the stakes. Diplomatic
relations with foreign powers, in the words of Key Points
an American ambassador to Moscow, tended
to be seen by the Soviets as armistice rela- Internal conflicts in revolutionary states can
tions, pending renewal of open battle.25 spill over into other countries, especially where
The negotiating style of Communist China opponents of a particular revolution have fled to
neighbouring countries.
in its first three decades often paralleled that
There have been attacks on diplomats both in
of the Soviet Union, suggesting that this was the revolutionary states where mobs have burnt
essentially a product of ideological precondi- down embassies and on the diplomats from the
tioning rather than Russian national culture. revolutionary states by exiles opposed to the
During the Cultural Revolution (196672) revolution.
the Chinese went far beyond even Soviet con- The negotiating styles of the Soviet Union and
ceptions of diplomacy as a form of struggle. China were marked by suspicion and negativity.
One observer characterised their approach to
diplomacy during this period as unremitting,
implacable effort by diplomatic guerrilla
warfare, in contrast to the orthodox version REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE
of diplomatic negotiations, which he saw as INSTITUTION OF DIPLOMACY
based on a natural desire for a common out-
come by the accommodation of some mutual Although revolutionaries are not alone in
conflict and by the development of a com- their ability to disregard the rules and conven-
mon understanding.26 tions of diplomatic relations, their ideologies
Revolutionary states sometimes attempted may legitimate systematic abuse of the insti-
to distinguish between their relations with tution of diplomacy. Expulsion of diplomats
other such states and the rest of the (non- for supporting terrorist activity or for import-
revolutionary) world. Talleyrand was the first ing arms in the diplomatic bag, for example,
to attempt such a distinction between French have frequently involved diplomats from
relations with other republics, notably the states founded on revolutions. Similarly, vio-
United States, with whom it was possible to lation of the fundamental norm of diplomatic
conclude solemn treaties of friendship and immunity has often occurred in revolutionary
relations with old regime states with whom states for instance when Iran held American
only temporary conventions concerning diplomats hostage after the 1979 revolution
political and commercial interests were pos- there. Islamic law itself formally acknowl-
sible. Typically, this was seen by Talleyrand edges the principle of diplomatic inviolabil-
as an expedient way of overcoming revolu- ity27 (see Chapter 16 in this Handbook).
tionary aversion to diplomacy, but the policy However, in the interpretation of the Ayatollah
took an extreme turn in 1795, when only Khomeini this principle took a poor second
the United States and Switzerland received place to the need to guard against control
representatives of full ambassadorial status. by foreigners and to the even more all-
Similarly, the Soviet Union used the phrase embracing interests of Islam. Khomeini
international relations of a new type to refer established what amounted to a separate
to diplomacy among members of the socialist diplomatic system to ensure that his edicts
camp. On the other hand, when revolutionary were implemented.28 The Chinese Cultural
states fell out with each other, the acrimony Revolutionaries were even more dismissive
of the standard diplomatic conventions, studied amateurism in its approach to foreign

asserting diplomatic immunity is a product relations, including keeping many missions at
of bourgeois norms. Interestingly, however, consular level only. During the early years of
when the possibility of holding foreign diplo- the French Revolution, proposals were put for-
mats hostage was debated by the French rev- ward to replace the then current range of diplo-
olutionaries, it was done in the context of matic titles with the single title nonce de France
fears that other governments might not (French nuncio), while other questions of eti-
respect the rights of French envoys.29 In other quette were carefully scrutinised with a view to
words, when the French Assembly consid- arriving at politically correct alternatives.32
ered hostage taking, it did so as a means of Diplomatic ranks in the Soviet Union were
enforcing compliance by other states with the abolished in 1918, being replaced with the
established principles of international law. single title of Polpred (plenipotentiary). At
Indeed some of the worst violations of diplo- the same time the Bolsheviks made known
matic immunity during the French Revolution their intention to treat equally all foreign dip-
were perpetrated by its opponents, as when lomats regardless of their ranks. However, as
Austria captured and imprisoned two fully early as 1922, Andrei Sabanin, a member of
accredited French diplomats in 1793.30 the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
Perhaps the central point here is that revolu- (NKID), had noted the disadvantages of the
tions help to create an atmosphere in which Soviet policy with regard to diplomatic ranks,
respect for the conventions of international arguing that it put Soviet diplomats in an
society tends to diminish on all sides. impossible position, since they were unable
The impact of revolutionary states on rules to claim the status (and associated benefits)
and conventions has been felt even in rela- to which they were entitled under bour-
tively trivial areas, such as dress and etiquette. geois diplomatic norms.33 This plea, from
Both American and French diplomats went to one of the few Russian diplomats practising
some lengths to demonstrate republican sim- before October 1917 to have been allowed to
plicity in their attire. And when a would-be- continue, was followed in 1924 by a partial
helpful French diplomat tried to advise the bow to the inevitable: the distinction with
first American diplomats sent to Paris to pay the title of ambassador was bestowed upon
more heed to observing existing diplomatic certain Polpreds. In a more recent case, when
formalities, John Adams brusquely informed Colonel Gaddafi renamed the Libyan embas-
him that the dignity of North America does sies Peoples Bureaux in 1979, this was ini-
not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or tially objected to by many receiving states and
any of the subtleties of etiquette; it consists not accepted by a few, who were concerned
solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of that such embassies might have a similarly
mankind and the interests of the nations of unorthodox view of their functions.34
Europe. Similarly, when Litvinov, who was
sent to London by the Bolsheviks to try to
obtain British recognition, was not accorded Key Points
the status that would have been due to a prop-
erly accredited diplomat, he claimed like There have been specific examples of the abuse
of diplomacy such as importing arms in the dip-
Mr Trotsky, I do not attach much impor-
lomatic bag, supporting terrorist acts in receiving
tance to matters of etiquette and unnecessary countries and holding diplomats hostage.
formalities.31 Revolutionary diplomats contempt for various
The matter of diplomatic titles has also exer- diplomatic formalities include dress, ceremonials
cised the minds of revolutionaries over the and etiquette.
last 200 years. For many years after winning Revolutionary states have searched for alterna-
independence, the United States maintained a tive diplomatic titles and ranks.
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN revolutionary states since other factors,

DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE including technology and the imperatives of
the modern democratic state, have probably
As the discussion to this point suggests, revo- played a greater part, but some impact is
lutions and revolutionary states pose a multi- undeniable. The same may be said of the
faceted challenge to diplomacy: a challenge larger picture of the evolution of international
that has its roots in the fundamental ideologi- society in its entirety. As Paul Sharp suggests,
cal incompatibility between the two but that international societies in one sense are sites
can extend to a wide ranging abuse of diplo- of continual arguments about how life is and
matic privileges, a disregard for various dip- ought to be organised.37 The increasing
emphasis on seeking collective solutions to
lomatic niceties and a distrust by the
numerous problems including those identi-
revolutionary leadership of even its own
fied by revolutionary states in multilateral
professional diplomats. Faced with such a
negotiations is part of this process and one
sweeping assault on the basic principles of
which, to some extent, may be seen as one of
classical diplomacy, non-revolutionary gov-
the long term consequences of revolutions.
ernments have had little choice but to respond
This, however, is not the whole picture
in ways which also undermined the tradi-
since diplomacy has also had a significant
tional role of the diplomat. These included,
impact upon revolutionary states. A common
for instance, a greater tendency to rely on
experience of such states in the immediate
summit diplomacy with the masters of the
aftermath of their revolution has been the dis-
revolutionary diplomats on the assumption covery that, whatever their longer term aspi-
that there was little point in negotiating with rations to transform the world in their own
individuals who lacked the freedom and image, for the present they had little choice
status their non-revolutionary counterparts but to accept international society on its own
possessed (see Chapter 19 in this Handbook). terms unless they desired total isolation. The
There have also been developments of what paradigmatic case here was Soviet Russia. On
one might classify as track 2 diplomacy, 14 January 1918, the Bolsheviks arrested the
where unofficial meetings of private individ- Rumanian Ambassador to Russia but, faced
uals from the revolutionary state and its non- with a unanimous protest by the entire diplo-
revolutionary opponents have discussed their matic corps on the grounds that this violated
differences, the first such meeting taking rules respected for centuries by all govern-
place in 1960 after the shooting down of the ments, they released him on the following
American U2 spy plane over the Soviet day.38 This was the first of numerous adapta-
Union.35 In addition, all states have been tions of Soviet diplomacy to the international
obliged to play the new game of public diplo- society within which it found itself unavoid-
macy, to prepare against terrorism and sub- ably located. At first such changes, which
version and to engage in the relentless ranged from adopting the conservative cloth-
propaganda war that was a basic element in ing styles of diplomats to agreeing in treaties
revolutionary diplomacy36 (see Chapter 35 in not to promote revolution, were explained
this Handbook). They have also felt obliged by Soviet ideologues as necessary tactical
to respond in kind to restrictions placed manoeuvres in a world that was still domi-
upon their own diplomats by revolutionary nated by enemies of the Revolution. In other
states. On balance, therefore, the impact of words, Moscow was, in theory, pursuing a
revolutionary states upon the institution of dual policy in which the objectives remained
diplomacy has been profoundly negative. the same but temporary concessions had to be
No single change in diplomatic practices made to take account of certain unfortunate
may be attributed solely to the impact of realities. It was not until the Gorbachev era in
the 1980s that Soviet leaders felt able openly conventions of diplomacy, in most cases
to acknowledge that there might actually be they found it difficult to conduct their formal
some intrinsic value in the international rules relations by other means. Revolutions have
and conventions which they had initially threatened and, to a limited extent, changed
adopted as a cynical tactic. As Gorbachevs diplomacy but the institution has survived.
foreign minister, Shevardnadze, explained:
we should not pretend, Comrades, that
norms and notions of what is proper, of what Key Points
is called civilized conduct in the world com-
munity do not concern us. If you want to be Varying responses of non-revolutionary states
accepted in it you must observe them.39 to the challenges posed by revolutionary states
It is easy to see why diplomacy has been include a greater emphasis on summit diplomacy,
public diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy.
a particular target of revolutionary states.
There has been a broad impact of revolutions on
Especially in its eighteenth and nineteenth international society, including collective responses
century forms, diplomacy represented every- to some of the issues raised by revolutions.
thing that revolutionary states tend to stand There have been violations of diplomatic immunity
against. It was an activity carried out by aris- by several states, including Iran in 1979, despite
tocrats who saw themselves as the physical Islamic injunctions against such violations.
incarnation of international society and the Once a revolutionary group wins leadership of
upholders of international order and whose a state it unavoidably forms part of a world
role was to endeavour to achieve agreement of other states and finds some acceptance
and compromise solutions through secret of the established practices of the rest of the
negotiations that were to be conducted in world is unavoidable a process one can term
socialisation.
accordance with well-established rules of
courtesy and etiquette. Furthermore, tradi-
tional diplomacy belongs in a world gov-
erned by such assumptions as reason of state,
the primacy of foreign policy over domestic CONCLUSION
considerations and the rights of great powers.
In its fundamental principles, in its form and This chapter has considered the impact of
in its content, therefore, diplomacy could be states which, following a revolution, attempt
seen as the antithesis of revolutionary values to transfer their revolutionary doctrines to
and the encounter between the two has been their international relations. The specific
consistently uneasy. effects of this endeavour have included a
Yet it has been virtually impossible for rev- generally suspicious attitude towards the
olutionary states to avoid becoming involved institution of diplomacy by the revolutionary
in conventional diplomacy. However transna- states and a corresponding concern by estab-
tional or universal their conception of them- lished states that the revolutionary state
selves, they have been unable to escape the might seek to export its doctrines and prac-
only kind of identity that legitimised their tices. From as early as the English Civil War,
existence in the eyes of others: sovereign revolutionary states have seen themselves as
statehood, a status that conferred benefits as representing some larger entity, whether that
well as obligations. But statehood entailed be the opponents of monarchy, the rights of
membership of a society of sovereign states peoples to live as free nations, the working
whose chief medium of communication is class or, in Islam, the umma the community
through diplomacy. Whatever public and of believers. In all of these cases diplomacy
private reservations revolutionary states may has been seen as a form of struggle by the
have had about the operational norms and revolutionary states. The responses by the
established powers have at times led to NOTES AND REFERENCES

armed conflict, as in the case of the French
revolutionary wars, or to the more complex 1 Most of this chapter is drawn from my discussion
range of confrontations that characterised the paper, Revolutionary Diplomacy, for the Leicester
Cold War. The many other impacts of revolu- University Centre for the Study of Diplomacy
(1996) as well as two earlier books, Revolutionary
tion on diplomacy have included violations Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United
of diplomatic immunity and contempt by the Front Doctrine (California University Press, 1977)
revolutionaries for many of the formal and Revolution and World Order (Clarendon
aspects of diplomacy. Press, 1993).
One rather pressing question to which 2 Frances Wharton (ed.) The Revolutionary
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States
this discussion gives rise is whether Islamist (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1889).
extremism in general and the so-called Three volumes.
Islamic State (IS) in particular form the lat- 3 Lord Gore-Booth (ed.), Satows Guide to Diplomatic
est chapter in the ongoing saga of revolution- Practice, 5th edition (London: Longman, 1979).
ary diplomacy. A consistent theme in some 4 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice
(London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).
Islamist writings since the seventh century 5 Franois de Callieres, The Practice of Diplomacy
has been a particularly bellicose interpreta- (London: Constable & Co, 1919).
tion of the doctrines of jihad as requiring 6 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford
struggle against all non-believers until all the University Press, 1939).
world is united in a single caliphate.40 The 7 F. Gilbert, To the Farewell Address (Princeton:
Princeton university Press, 1961), 72, and B.
notion of a caliphate is itself a denial of the Spivak, Thomas Jefferson, Republican Values and
principle that there can be several distinct Foreign Commerce, in N. Graebner (ed) Tradition
Muslim states, which, of course, is the claim and Values: American Diplomacy 17901865
to legitimacy of IS. (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1985), 38.
While there can be no denying that IS may 8 Cited in W. F. Illchman, Professional Diplomacy in
the United States 17791939 (Chicago: Chicago
be seen as representing the latest twist in the University Press, 1961), 27.
long tale of revolutionary challenges to the 9 Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence. The
prevailing world order, there are several rea- American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union and
sons why it is extremely unlikely to rise to the Cold War 19331947 (Chicago: Chicago
the level of threat posed by the French and University Press, 1980), 28, 42.
10 A. Sorel, LEurope et la revolution franaise, 21st
Russian revolutions. First, all members of edn. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 18851902), ii, 233.
the international society of sovereign states 11 Cited in F. Petrenko and V. Popov, Soviet Foreign
share the same interest in preventing any seri- Policy: Objectives and Principles, (Moscow, 1981), 25.
ous contender to an alternative order. Second, 12 For one account of this during the purge in the
as it has in the past, international society is Soviet Union, see H. Eeman, Inside Stalins Russia.
Memoirs of a Diplomat 19361941 (London:
in the process of developing both violent Triton Publishing Co, 1977), 45.
and non-violent means of dealing with the 13 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few or the Human
various forms of Islamist extremism. Finally, Background to Diplomacy (London: Hollis and
when the murderous tactics of IS have caused Carter, 1952), 374.
even Al-Qaeda to protest, it is unlikely that 14 J. Kaulek (ed.), Papiers de Barthlemy (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1886), iii, 2634.
any serious attempt will be made to engage 15 Cited in P. Ardant, Chinese diplomatic practice
in negotiations with IS. While nothing is during the Cultural Revolution, in J. A. Cohen
impossible, it is hard to envisage a scenario (ed.), Chinas Practice of International Law: Some
where the outside world decides to employ Case Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP,
diplomacy with a more civilised IS embarked 1972), 86128.
16 V. A. Zorin, Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
upon the normal processes of socialisation of the USSR: the Bases of Diplomatic Service
rather than continuing to work towards its (Moscow, 1964), reproduced in US Congress
total destruction. Senate Committee on National Security and
International Operations, The Soviet Approach 27 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats

to Negotiations (US Government Printing Office, Under Islamic Law, American Journal of
Washington, 1969), 85. International Law, July 1980, 74, 60833.
17 John Colvin, Twice Around the World. Some 28 D. Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London:
Memoirs of Diplomatic Life in North Vietnam and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 133.
Outer Mongolia (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 56. 29 A. Mathiez, The French Revolution (New York:
18 Ibid. Russell and Russell, 1962), 215.
19 J. W. Thompson and S. K. Padover, Secret 30 A. Sorel, LEurope et la revolution franaise, i, 106.
Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography, 1500 31 A. E. Senn, Diplomacy and Revolution (Notre
1815 (New York: Ungar, 1963), 823. Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1974), 44.
20 Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, The reign of the 32 F. Masson, Le Dpartement des Affaires trangres
charlatans is over: the French Revolutionary pendant La Rvolution 17871804 (Paris, 1877),
attack on diplomatic practice, Journal of Modern 155 and J. Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford:
History, 65 (Dec. 93), 70644. Blackwell, 1987), 17980.
21 Andrew Selth, Against Every Human Law. The 33 Cited in J. F. Triska and R. M. Slusser, The Theory,
Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy (New South Wales: Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (Stanford:
ANU Press, 1988), 19. Stanford UP, 1962), 210.
22 Cited in T. J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: 34 B. Sen, A Diplomats Handbook of International
The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations 19171930 Law and Practice, 3rd edn. (Dordrecht: Nijhoff
(London: Sage, 1979), 152. Publishers, 1988), 29.
23 J. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 35 http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-
(London: Oxford UP, 1951), i, 11. diplomacy-a-short-history/
24 Cited in G. A. Craig, War, Politics and Diplomacy 36 Sir Peter Marshall, The Dynamics of Diplomacy
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 242. (The Diplomatic Academy of London, 1990), 11.
25 United States Department of State, Foreign 37 Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International
Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
193339 (US Government Printing Office, Press, 2009), 34.
Washington 1952), 224. 38 Franciszek Przetacznik, Protection of Officials of
26 Kenneth T. Young, Adversary Negotiation Peking Foreign States According to International Law
Style in Pekings Approach to Negotiation. Selected (The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 25.
Writings, Subcommittee on National Security and 39 International Affairs (Moscow), Oct. 1988, 23.
International Operations of the Committee on 40 Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History, Doctrines
Government Operations of the US Senate (US and Practice (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969), 54. University Press, 2008), 923.
40
Conference Diplomacy
Paul Meerts
INTRODUCTION weaken the final agreement in such a way

that it will be harmless to their interests and
Conference diplomacy can be defined as thereby ineffective for the collective whole.
multiparty diplomatic negotiation, where Most conferences nowadays are focal
diplomatic negotiation can be regarded as an points in a long-term ongoing negotiation
exchange of concessions and compensations process, often in the framework of an inter-
in a framework of international order accepted governmental organization such as the United
by sovereign entities (Meerts 2015: 11) (see Nations, African Union, Gulf Cooperation
Chapter 17 in this Handbook). Multiparty Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
means complexity, which will have positive Organization of American States, or the
and negative effects on the process of give Organization for Security and Cooperation in
and take between the representatives of the Europe (Walker 2004). Being structured and
parties involved (Crump and Zartman 2003). with a history of precedents as well as a per-
One positive effect is the inclusion of stake- spective of the future, these conferences form
holders that is, those countries and other relatively stable structures that allow for more
concerned parties such as intergovernmental or less successful outcomes by protecting the
and non-governmental organizations that processes (Meerts 2015: 313). The example
have an interest in the negotiation process at of the European Union as an intergovernmen-
hand. Including the relevant actors will tal and supranational organization shows how
enhance the probability that the conferences important this is for effective decision-making.
outcomes will be implemented. The negative However, such organizations have an interest in
side of inclusion, however, is the ability of being relevant on their own merits. They might
spoilers among the stakeholders to prevent an thus give priority to their own needs, instead
outcome that is undesirable to them, or to of those of the community that they represent.
Not all conference diplomacy is undertaken The multilateral organization protects the nego-
within the framework of international organi- tiation processes and this protection enhances
zations. In cases of conflicts, where negotia- the effectiveness of negotiation as an alternative
tion will rather be defined as war by peaceful to warfare.
means, conferences can be a one-time event Formal sessions help to keep the order; informal
sessions are essential for the give and take and
that is not embedded in an international organ-
thereby enable progress in the negotiation process.
izational structure. In this case, the negotia-
tion process will be relatively unprotected and
thereby more vulnerable to power dynamics.
Although unhampered by a bureaucratic struc- THE EVOLUTION OF CONFERENCE
ture, the process in such one-time events has DIPLOMACY
to manage without organizational protection,
making it vulnerable to failure. Although con- Tracing the evolution of international diplo-
ference diplomacy is multilateral by definition, matic negotiation from early times shows
bilateral, trilateral, and plurilateral negotiations how some aspects became a regulated multi-
are essential components of its processes. lateral process that supported conference
Plurilateral negotiating, which involves bar- diplomacy. It is evident from ancient clay
gaining among several, but not too many, tablets that negotiators in the Middle East
negotiators, will normally be done away from some 5,000 years ago were negotiating and
the table, either in corridors or behind closed exchanging treaties. In those early times,
doors in small rooms, but it might well happen diplomatic negotiations were bilateral meet-
in the conference room during breaks, in so- ings between absolute rulers or the councils
called huddles. Huddles are flexible groups of city-states, which sometimes negotiated
of negotiators that continuously change, try- directly, but normally sent their envoys to
ing to prepare for successful progress during bargain with the other party. In Renaissance
the formal sessions. This interchange between Italy, the city-states not only used special
formality and informality is an important representatives, but also established more or
characteristic of conference diplomacy, as are less permanent diplomatic posts in each oth-
the notions of procedural frameworks, which ers towns. Diplomacy thus became more
involve such factors as rules and regulations, regulated, and regulations are, this chapter
time and timing, power and persuasion, and contends, beneficial for effective negotiation.
diplomatic behavior and political statements Machiavelli, who is often portrayed as a
(Kaufmann 1996). manipulative diplomatic player, nonetheless
This chapter examines conference diplo- saw the importance of regulating diplomatic
macy by looking at its evolution, the procedures relations. Diplomacy thus slowly but surely
and processes of international negotiation, the became more complex, as more adversaries
role of negotiators and the countries and organ- had to deal with more conflicts between
izations that they represent, and negotiators them. Negotiation was not always enough to
strategies and tactics, as well as the prospects settle disputes, however, so mediators were
for conference diplomacy in the near future. asked to help the opponents to solve their
mutual problems (see Chapter 18 in this
Handbook). These third parties were negotia-
tors who either had no stake in the conflict,
Key Points or were non-contending stakeholders who
Conference diplomacy is a multilateral diplomatic wanted the conflict to end. The next step was
negotiation process that is often part of an ongo- diplomatic negotiations in which more than
ing negotiation process within a multilateral two parties participated. The most famous of
organization. the early conferences were those held in
Conference Diplomacy 501
Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 ended
War in the Holy Roman Empire of German the First World War and became a major
nations, as well as the Eighty Years War event in the history of diplomacy. As with
between the Kingdom of Spain and the the Vienna conference, representatives of
Republic of the United Netherlands. hundreds of sovereignties presented their cre-
The Peace of Westphalia changed the dentials in Paris, but only five were included
meaning of sovereignty. It was concluded in in the inner circle: the United States; France;
1648 through a series of bilateral negotiations Great Britain; Italy; and Japan. Moreover, the
in the cities of Mnster and Osnabrck, and negotiation was de facto trilateral, as Japan
it declared for the first time that all countries did not really participate and Italys role was
were legally equal. Westphalia is widely seen comparatively weak. Other countries had a
as the mother of all diplomatic conferences more important role to play in Paris than in
and the beginning of the era of procedural Vienna, and voiced their concerns in separate
frameworks, because it helped to create more meetings. In that sense, a multilateral process
effective negotiation processes as an alterna- surrounded the exclusive zone of the inner
tive to warfare (Holsti 1991). Essentially, the circle comprising the five major players. Some
conference was an assembly of conferences outsiders were particularly successful in
that is, the parties came together in official overruling the principle of self-determination,
ceremonial meetings and, while these acted including Romania and Poland, which were
as focal points, the real bargaining took place regarded as functioning as buffers against the
elsewhere, most of the time in secret (see Soviet Union and were therefore allowed to
Chapter 36 in this Handbook). In the case of annex huge territories with non-nationals such
Westphalia, the countries negotiated in each as Hungarians and Ukrainians. Others, such
others places of residence, often indirectly as the fledging major powers of Germany and
through Italian mediators sent by the Pope the Soviet Union, were kept outside the nego-
and Venice. These officials, who studied the tiation process. This exclusion from the con-
letters handed over to them by the ambassa- ference had grave consequences for the future
dors who took part in the Westphalia negotia- and demonstrates that inclusion helps to cre-
tions, often pressed for changes to make the ate an effective negotiation process, whereas
demands more acceptable to their opponent. exclusion can be the source of ineffective
Two hundred years later, the Congress of implementation.
Vienna (181415) became the first plurilateral The League of Nations (191946) could
negotiation, although not yet multilateral, as be regarded as the first fully fledged multi-
the number of real negotiating parties was kept lateral negotiation process. It did some good
at five: Russia; Austria; Prussia; Great Britain; work in resolving territorial questions after
and (as a latecomer) France. Interestingly, the the First World War, but in the security field
rulers realized that they should not exclude a it did not live up to expectations. Until the
major power like France, even if France had mid-twentieth century, bilateral, trilateral,
lost the war. Excluded, however, were the and plurilateral negotiations dominated the
other interested countries and parties. They political and diplomatic scene, like those in
were consulted, but the five did not allow Munich in 1938 with Germany, Italy, Great
them to be part of the decision-making pro- Britain, and France, and during and after the
cess. The outsiders were kept busy by salons, Second World War with the United States,
operas, ballets, balls, excursions, and fireworks the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It
that kept them away from the inner circle, was only with the San Francisco Conference
who decided for them. Some middle powers, in 1945, which created the United Nations,
such as Bavaria, were allowed some influence that a reasonably effective multilateral
when they acted as go-betweens. diplomatic conference came into existence
(Holsti 1991). Its strong plurilateral nucleus, which it has to be deposited with the secre-
the United Nations Security Council, helped tariat. The secretariat translates the text into
to reduce complexity and enhance efficiency. the conferences formal languages and circu-
Through the institutionalization of rules lates the text as an official document. The
and regulations, such organizations enhanced texts sponsors give an oral introduction, after
the effectiveness of conference diplomacy which there is a debate. Amendments and
and the processes of international nego- sub-amendments might be introduced, circu-
tiation, while also securing and sanctioning lated, and debated and voted upon. A negotia-
their implementation. The growth in the num- tion working group of country representatives
ber and quality of international organizations and conference staff could be installed by the
strengthened diplomacy as an instrument in president of the conference, and its outcomes
managing international affairs through nego- will be debated and voted upon by the ple-
tiation instead of warfare (Meerts 2015). nary. After a decision has been taken, delega-
tions might wish to explain their votes or
interpret the resolution (Kaufmann 1996).
Key Points The negotiation process can be divided into
stages, but these will not follow each other in
Changes occurred in the understanding of sov- a neat sequential way. Indeed, negotiations
ereignty and the need for sovereignties to work tend to be circular that is, negotiations pro-
together because of interdependency. ceed in a certain direction, then fall back to
There was growth in the number of diplomatic
an earlier stage, usually because countries are
conferences and the creation of international
hesitant to make decisions early. To negoti-
organizations stabilizing international relations
between sovereign states. ate is to take risks, and diplomats are rarely
As the number of participating states has a risk-takers, particularly in complex confer-
negative impact on a negotiation processs effec- ence situations where their political bosses
tiveness, the dilemma of inclusiveness and exclu- and their parliament are absent, yet have to
siveness comes to the fore. be consulted before a negotiation process
comes to an end. This, together with the
multitude of issues and actors involved, plus
the many rules of procedure and a complex,
THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY sometimes nontransparent international insti-
CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY: PROCESS, tution, ensures that the negotiation process in
PEOPLE, AND POWER diplomatic conferences is slow and painful.
Moreover, elections in democratic countries
can topple governments, and even if they do
Process
not, it is often wise to stall the negotiation
Diplomatic conferences are complex and process for a few months before elections,
complicated. They require a process, or rules or go to the other extreme and hasten its
of procedure, to guide the proceedings of the conclusion. There can also be shifts in the
main actors in the conference that is, the international arena that might have a nega-
negotiating parties delegations, groupings of tive influence on the proceedings, although
parties (caucuses), formal and informal medi- sometimes the opposite can also be true.
ators and facilitators, president of the overall In practice, the negotiation process starts
meeting, the chairs of sub-meetings, and last with a pre-negotiation phase, followed by an
but not least the secretariat. A draft text has to exploration phase, selection phase, decision-
be prepared in consultation with others. It making phase, and a post-agreement or
will then be circulated among those who were implementation phase. In many organiza-
not involved in the informal drafting, after tions these cycles are connected to earlier
negotiation processes, as well as to future The main decision-making procedures

ones. The process is part of a wider political are unanimity, consensus, and voting. Under
process, involving other issues, present, past, unanimity, all parties will have to give a
and future. The chronology is of great impor- positive vote to the final contract; under
tance. The shadow of the past that is, posi- consensus, some parties might abstain;
tive or negative experiences with the other and under voting, there can be simple or
parties can either drive the negotiation for- qualified majority voting. The procedure
ward or stall it, and even destroy it. Emotional of decision-making can have an enormous
issues can block progress, even if these issues impact on the substance of the agreement,
are rooted in the distant past. Examples of a especially if there are numerous parties with
negative shadow of the past can be found in different expectations. The more parties
traumas such as the defeat of the Serbs against there are, the stricter the rules should be for
the Turks in Kosovo in 1389, the slaughtering the organization to be an effective decision-
of the Armenians in 1915, or more recently making apparatus. Under consensus, parties
the events in the Balkans during the breakup have veto rights and can therefore easily spoil
of the former Yugoslavia. In some past cases, the process. This spoiling can be limited by
including the defeats of the French nobility introducing decision-making by qualified
by the British longbowmen at the battles of or even simple majority voting, as opposing
Crcy, Poitiers, and Agincourt (in 1346, 1356 countries might then be sidelined. However,
and 1415), the events have been digested and even if one group of countries can outvote
have become ongoing good-humored sport the others, the countries will normally
between French and British diplomats. In pretend that consensus has been reached.
other cases, however, past events, such as the Neither countries nor people like to lose face.
Japanese atrocities during the Second World The United Nations Security Council is an
War, have not been forgotten by the Koreans interesting example of a combination of a
and the Chinese, and linger over present-day consensus and a voting system. A Security
negotiations. Council resolution will be adopted if nine of
After the pre-negotiation process, which the fifteen members are in favor, provided
is often the most difficult phase, when adver- that there is no veto against it.
saries sometimes have to be dragged to the There are many different ways to approach
negotiation table, a process of exploration will the process of negotiation (Jnsson 2001).
follow. This process of exploration is very The linear way presented above is very
much influenced by culture. Some cultures are Western, as if negotiation is a chess game,
very results-oriented and negotiators will feel with an opening, mid-, and endgame. In
that they are wasting their time if the real bar- China, however, there is the perception that
gaining phase has not begun. Other cultures the negotiating process should rather be
see it as vital for a good outcome to take a lot seen as a spiral, in a circular way, connected
of time in getting to know the subject matter to events in the past and the future. Other
and the interests and personalities of the oppo- countries focus on the overlapping interests
nents. A mismatch between these perceptions of the parties, and the question of to what
might derail the whole negotiation. The same extent there is common ground (Ikl 1964).
is true for the selection phase, which is a mix- It is also possible to see the negotiation as
ture of exploration and bargaining that avoids a process of concession-making. In Russian
finite decision-making. Decision-making con- culture, concession by one party is often seen
cludes the negotiation process as such. Finally, as a sign of weakness, while in US culture,
there is the post-negotiation phase, in which concession-making is regarded as a rational
the agreement will have to be ratified and way to connect to the other party and to push
implemented. things forward.
People Although diplomats are representing their

country or institution, their nationality is
A second aspect of diplomatic conferences slowly but truly becoming of less importance.
concerns the role of people. Individual nego- They get to know each other, so the usual
tiators can influence the outcome of the pro- stereotypes, while not withering away, lose
cesses in conference diplomacy. People their political significance. Perhaps this is the
matter. Of course, this depends very much on greatest value of the huge conference diplo-
their position in the conference proceedings, macy system: through day-by-day contacts in
which country they represent, and how high a strong common context, the shadow of the
they are in the hierarchy of their delegation past has become more and more irrelevant.
and ministry. It also depends on the culture One explanation for why the common dip-
from which the negotiators come. In cultures lomatic culture faded between Westphalia
with huge power differences, the negotiators and todays global system is that profes-
position will be stronger than in egalitarian sional diplomatic negotiators have always
cultures. The same is true for diplomats from been under threat from politicians, whether
so-called high-context cultures and those sovereign dynasties in the past, or elected and
from individualistic societies (Cohen 1997). non-elected professional politicians today.
The role that diplomats hold in conferences Slowly but surely the politicians moved into
has varied over time. Diplomats in bygone the realm of conference diplomacy. As one of
centuries were, in theory, even more depend- the first politicians at the negotiating table,
ent on their masters than they are today. After Tsar Alexander I of Russia mingled with dip-
a failed negotiation, the absolute ruler might lomatic negotiators such as Charles Maurice
decide to behead the negotiator, or at least to de Talleyrand, Klemens von Metternich, Karl
have his beard shaved off. In reality, however, August von Hardenberg, and Henry Robert
it might well be that the professional diplomat Stewart Castlereagh. They were de jure min-
of the past was more influential than his politi- isters, and thus politicians, and they were
indeed agents of their imperial and royal
cal master. For example, during the Westphalia
masters, or their parliament. De facto, how-
Conferences (1648), the absolute rulers were
ever, they commonly decided on the fate of
far away in their capitals and could hardly
Europe, with the Tsar as the odd man out.
connect with their representatives, not least
During the course of the eighteenth century,
because the civil war was raging around the
the politicians became more and more influ-
cities of Mnster and Osnabrck. Furthermore,
ential, but there was still no clear separation
the diplomats had much in common: they between them and the diplomatic negotiators.
spoke the same language (Latin), and had In Paris in 1919, however, with the presence
common norms and values of chivalry. of US President Woodrow Wilson, French
Remarkably, despite the many challenges to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, and
professional negotiators discussed above, this British Prime Minister David Lloyd George,
common culture shared by European diplo- the rulers themselves obtained a dominant
mats during the Westphalian period can be rec- place at the table.
ognized within the diplomatic corps of today From the Paris conference onwards, poli-
(see Chapter 14 in this Handbook). Some 300 ticians started to push the diplomats aside,
years later, there is a common diplomatic so that they increasingly became agents who
negotiation culture in the world. Diplomats relied on the mandate of their chiefs (see
speak a common language (English, although Chapter 7 in this Handbook). On the one hand,
French is still strongly present), but more this is favorable for the negotiation process in
importantly, they understand that give and a conference diplomacy setting, as the high-
take are absolutely vital. est in rank can take decisions without much
consultation with their constituencies, thus conferences and in several cases they margin-
enhancing decision-making and making it alize diplomatic negotiators to the extent that
more effective. On the other hand, however, one can question how meaningful the future
it is disadvantageous, as these decisions might diplomat will be. Conference diplomacy
be taken on the spur of the moment, as was might become undiplomatized, meaning
clearly visible in Paris and during negotiations that common conference norms and values
in Munich and Yalta, as well as during the top- might be ameliorated and diplomatic culture
level meetings during the Cold War. If the weakened, resulting in negotiations becom-
chemistry between leaders is good, as it was ing less smooth, more bureaucratized, and
between US President Ronald Reagan and perhaps more politicized. This could lead
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to less-effective international negotiation pro-
the negotiations will proceed in a positive cesses, more stalemates, and more unresolved
direction. Both leaders, for example, con- conflicts. The positive impact of the devel-
vinced their own delegations to start mean- opment of protective regimes might thus be
ingful negotiations, although their underlings undone by the erosion of the processes them-
were very hesitant about doing so. This is selves (Hale etal. 2013).
all the more interesting because the political
visions of the two leaders were diametrically
opposite. Yet they had a common personal Power
feeling, and this proved to be more important.
Other examples include the good chem- A third aspect of contemporary conference
istry between French President Franois diplomacy concerns the issue of power. The
Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut differences in power between parties in dip-
Kohl, or at least a kind of common under- lomatic conferences are, of course, of great
standing even if they have completely importance in understanding why the process
opposite opinions such as between Russias has led to a certain outcome. Power, how-
President Vladimir Putin and German ever, is not one-dimensional. A country can
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Yet there are also have huge power resources, but that does not
examples of leaders who dislike(d) each other, mean that it can apply this power to any situ-
such as French President Jacques Chirac and ation on the ground. There is also situational
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. As power. This concept can be relevant to the
politicians often have strong egos, the neces- process of negotiation, which is itself a situ-
sity to defend their reputation might lead to ational process. This means that diplomats
egotiation (Meerts 2015: 21942), a situa- can enhance their structural resources
tion in which the face of the political leader through process power, such as looking for
takes precedence over the interests of the allies and support from domestic and interna-
country. tional constituencies, being well informed
Modern communication technology might and experienced, or being charismatic and
undermine the position of the diplomatic legitimate. Too much power difference can
negotiator: it enhances the growing grip of be problematic, but some difference in power
the political leader on his or her diplomatic can be helpful for reaching satisfactory con-
agents, and it increases transparency, which clusions (Zartman and Rubin 2000).
limits the professional negotiators autonomy Dominant powers can have both negative
over the negotiation process, not least because and positive roles in diplomatic conferences.
ordinary civil servants and non-state actors They can exclude parties, which may lead to
can participate or influence negotiations (see unresolved conflicts, as the excluded parties
Chapter 44 in this Handbook). These new might not be willing to comply in implement-
actors seem to be everywhere in diplomatic ing the agreements. Yet dominant powers can
also be the motor behind diplomatic confer- dangers and consequences of interventions.
ences, which would otherwise end in the They recognize the potential for entrapment.
middle of nowhere. So-called middle powers Powerful actors use and misuse diplomatic
can help to smooth relationships between the conferences for their own interests. Yet these
more and the less powerful (see Chapter 23 conferences allow the smaller powers to gain
in this Handbook). However, if the great pow- some shelter against the stronger countries
ers cannot and do not want to cooperate, dip- overt power. When part of a conference,
lomatic conferences will be of no avail (see smaller powers cannot be totally overlooked,
Chapter 22 in this Handbook). In many cases, hence the smaller countries interest in the
the great powers do not really care about the process of European conference diplomacy.
conflict at hand; rather, they are anxious They are an institutional part of the nego-
about the power balance between them and tiation process and, although their position
other dominant players in the world. The can be more or less ignored at the very end,
downfall of the Soviet Union gave rise to a being ignored completely will not be likely.
unipolar world, in which the United States If Germany, France, and the United Kingdom
assumed that there was no other power to agree on the necessity for certain steps, not
counterbalance it. As a result, the United much can be brought against them. Decisions
States believed it had to be the reality on the will be made according to their wishes. If
ground that acted as a barrier against further they cannot agree, however, the process of
power expansion, with wars in Afghanistan European conference decision-making will
and Iraq as a consequence. Powerful coun- come to a dead end, and countries will have to
tries can get entrapped by weaker opponents. wait for, or work on, the political or economic
A rational decision to take action might lead context to change. The strength of the inter-
to an irrational situation in which the less national organization thus plays an important
powerful state gains a hold over the more role in equalizing the power differences of the
powerful. Entrapment, then, is a decision- member states through common rules, regu-
making process in which [actors] strengthen lations, understandings, and values. It pre-
their commitment to a previously chosen, vents the major powers from forcing smaller
although failing, course of action to justify powers into agreements that weaker member
or recover their prior investments (Brockner states do not like. This, in turn, enhances the
and Rubin 1985: 5). confidence of the small countries and most
Diplomatic conferences help to soften EU members are small in a fair outcome,
power asymmetry among the negotiating therefore enhancing the effectiveness of the
parties. The rules and regulations, common negotiation processes.
norms and values, and perhaps the organiza-
tional culture of the institution might prevent
the powerful nations from running amok. Yet Key Points
in the end, it is politics that decides the out-
come of diplomatic conferences. If the per- There are different stages in the negotiation pro-
manent members of the UN Security Council cess, such as exploration and decision-making.
are at odds with each other, nothing will The lengths of these stages vary by culture.
The position, character, experience, and ego of
move. The situation in Syria since 2011 is
negotiators have quite an impact on the flow and
an example of the impossibility of putting an outcome of the negotiation process.
end to the fighting if the interested great pow- Power is important and can be structural and
ers have more opposing than common inter- situational. In some cases situational power
ests. Non-intervention in Syria is also a signal proves to be more effective than structural power
of the enhanced awareness of the Security resources, thereby enhancing the chances of
Councils permanent members about the minor parties being the winner.
PERSPECTIVES ON CONFERENCE Understanding the importance of diplomacy

DIPLOMACY: PRESENT AND FUTURE in establishing a powerful position in Europe,
Cardinal de Richelieu founded the first diplo-
One of the earliest examples of negotiation matic academy in 1626. Negotiation seminars
analysis is The Art of Negotiating with for diplomats were, however, slow to develop.
Sovereign Princes, by the French diplomat While many diplomatic academies were
Franois de Callires (Callires 1716). After established after the Second World War with
the Second World War, research on negotia- an exception being the diplomatic academy of
tion increased. A range of academics tried to Vienna, which was established in 1754 as the
qualify or quantify the processes of interna- Oriental Academy training on conference
diplomacy was in short supply. There were
tional negotiation, both inside and outside
seminars for commercial negotiation, but the
diplomatic conferences. The main aim of all
first seminars for diplomats only appeared in
these studies is to explain the outcome by the
the 1960s, mainly in the form of simulation
process that unfolded. This approach was, and
games. It was only in the 1990s that real dip-
still is, problematic. There are so many factors
lomatic negotiation training came to flour-
of influence, from the characteristics of the
ish, and even today it is a scarce commodity.
process itself, the people and parties involved,
Interestingly enough, one would expect prac-
to the organizational and power-related con-
titioners to help researchers to understand the
text in which these negotiations flow to their
intricacies of diplomatic bargaining, while
end-stage. Moreover, research on these fac-
researchers would then instruct the trainers,
tors continues to be difficult to conduct. A who could thereby train new practitioners.
fundamental issue remains the practitioners This is, however, not the case. These three
unwillingness to allow researchers (and train- specializations practitioners, research-
ers) to sit in on real negotiation processes. ers, and trainers stand alone and seldom
Another problem concerns methodology: for exchange their findings. Simulated negotia-
example, the impact of culture on the tions are of great help, and attempts to come
researchers analysis and on the trainer in as close as possible to reality are quite suc-
diplomatic negotiation. It is hardly possible to cessful, but in the end it is not the real thing.
have a value-free approach. Perhaps this is not Nevertheless, for those who want to get a feel
disastrous in itself, so long as those involved for conference diplomacy, the family board
are well aware of their biases. Moreover, game Diplomacy is the best experience one
these various problems can be addressed in can get, although friendships might be dam-
international academic conferences, negotia- aged forever (Sharp 1978). It is said to be the
tion programs, and through international favorite board game of Henry Kissinger!
academic journals such as International As for conference diplomacy itself, its
Negotiation. For example, the Processes of future role is not expected to diminish.
International Negotiation (PIN) program tries Indeed, it will be of greater significance in the
to explain the mechanics of conference diplo- coming years, as its alternative warfare is
macy by mainly qualitative analysis, while the becoming more and more costly in terms of
Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) pro- human and material losses. While two-thirds
gram focuses more on the quantitative aspects. of the conflicts in the last 50 years have been
Training for conference diplomats is decided through conference diplomacy, one-
essential in order for them to be as effec- third was ended by military victory by one
tive as possible in defending the interests party over the other (Mack 2007: 35). This
of their country or organization. Parallel to trend of the growing significance of ending
research on negotiation, seminars on training conflicts through words instead of weapons
diplomats have gradually come to the fore. is expected to continue in the coming decades
(Conflict Barometer 2012: 23). However, the media, in a more modern and forthcoming
the nature of diplomatic negotiation and con- way, which will not be easy. Public diplomacy
ference diplomacy will change. Diplomats is of the essence here, as the populace back
are expected to play a less prominent role, home, and sometimes the politicians as well,
outflanked by politicians on the one hand have no real understanding of the possibilities
and ordinary civil servants on the other and impossibilities of the negotiation process.
(Melissen and van Staden 2000). Moreover, Last but not least, conference diplomacy
one sees the growing influence of non-state itself will have to be reformed, and this
actors, from non-governmental organizations might prove to be the most difficult task of
to individuals working through social media. all. This can be seen with the ongoing prob-
The impact of these constituencies on confer- lems in reforming the UN Security Council,
ence diplomacy will grow accordingly, and, the EUs struggle to restructure itself in order
along with more transparency, diplomatic to be more effective after enlargement, and
negotiations will be more boxed in and lack the failed attempts to make the Association
the relative autonomy needed to be effective. of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
In view of the observations above, a few more effective in the face of Chinese moves
recommendations are useful. First, it would to claim islands in the South China Sea.
be wise to give researchers and trainers Reforming the conferences themselves is dif-
access to real negotiation processes in diplo- ficult. It involves political will, and political
matic conferences. By studying the flow of will depends on synergy among the member
these processes and the diplomats behavior, states interests, and the (im)balance between
valuable material for analysis and thereby for cooperation and competition. The worlds
training new practitioners can be obtained. growing interdependence stresses the need
Additionally, these negotiation experts for closer cooperation. In order to cooper-
could be used as process consultants during ate more effectively, conference diplomacy
conference diplomacy sessions, as miscom- is still one of the most important instruments
munication, mismanagement of the proceed- in helping to create some world order. This
ings, and bad strategies and tactics are major order is not self-evident and eternal. Every
problems in negotiation. Conferences often international order must sooner or later face
fail because of negotiators inability to over- the impact of two tendencies challenging its
see the situation and to understand the real cohesion: either a redefinition of legitimacy
significance of their opponents internal and or a significant shift of the balance of power
external positions. (Kissinger 2014: 365). It is up to conference
Second, the diplomat might specialize fur- diplomacy to manage these changes.
ther and become the main communicator in the
process of merging the interests of countries
and organizations into one outcome by which Key Points
all the parties can abide. This means that the
diplomat will have to connect more effec- Practitioners, researchers, and trainers should try
tively with other civil servants and representa- to work more closely together in order to enhance
tives who operate in the international arena, the effectiveness of conference diplomacy.
It would be useful to find some kind of arrange-
instead of focusing so much on diplomatic
ment that will harmonize relationships among
colleagues, which might breed group-think, politicians, diplomats, and civil servants.
becoming too inward-looking. If diplomats do The effectiveness of many diplomatic conferences
not become more outward-looking, they will and organizations will have to be enhanced for
make themselves irrelevant in the future. them to remain important international players,
Third, diplomats will have to manage their but as they often have to reform themselves, not
political masters and their constituencies, and much can be expected from this modernization.
CONCLUSION Conflict Barometer (2012). Heidelberg Institute

for International Conflict Research. http:/
www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/
Conference diplomacy is a paradox: it is the
ConflictBarometer_2012.pdf
most legitimate and inclusive mode of diplo-
Crump, L. and Zartman, I.W. (2003). Multilateral
matic negotiation and therefore the most Negotiation and the Management of Com
representative, but the multitude of actors plexity. International Negotiation, 8 (1): 15.
limits its effectiveness. Conference diplo- Hale, T., Held, D. and Young, K.L. (2013).
macy is of great importance. The future Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing
depends on the decisions that countries and When its Most Needed. Chichester: John
organizations take concerning, for example, Wiley.
climate change, the global economy, and the Holsti, K.J. (1991). Peace and War: Armed
internal and external conflicts that abound. Conflicts and International Order, 16481989.
Negotiations inside and outside diplomatic Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ikl, F. (1964). How Nations Negotiate. New
conferences are the most effective tool for
York: Harper & Row.
dealing with the opposing and concurring
Jnsson, C. (2001). Conceptualizations of the
needs of all the parties involved. Both the Negotiation Process. Paper for the 4th Pan-
number of issues and parties are growing. European International Relations Conference,
Conference diplomacy started some 300 Canterbury (UK).
years ago, but established its organizational Kaufmann, J. (1996). Conference Diplomacy.
format only 100 years ago. It is therefore a London: Macmillan.
relatively recent phenomenon in human his- Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. New York:
tory. It is enormously helpful in protecting the Penguin Press.
vulnerable process of international negotia- Mack, A. (2007). Human Security Brief: Featuring
tion from failure, thereby creating a legitimate a Special Report. Vancouver: Simon Fraser
University.
and valid alternative to violence.
Meerts, P.W. (2015). Diplomatic Negotiation:
Essence and Evolution. The Hague:
Clingendael Institute.
Melissen, J. and van Staden, A. (2000).
REFERENCES Inleiding, in: Melissen, J. (ed.), Europese
Diplomatie in de Schaduw van Westfalen.
Brockner, J. and Rubin, J.Z. (1985). Entrapment Assen: Van Gorcum.
in Escalating Conflict: A Social Psychological Sharp, R. (1978). The Game of Diplomacy.
Analysis. New York: Springer. London: Arthur Barker.
Callires, F. de (1716). De la manire de ngocier Walker, R.A. (2004). Multilateral Conferences:
avec les souverains. Paris: M. Brunet (English Purposeful International Negotiation.
translation (1983). The Art of Diplomacy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
New York: Addison Wesley Longman). Zartman, I.W. and Rubin, J.Z. (eds) (2000).
Cohen, R. (1997). Negotiating Across Cultures: Power and Negotiation. Ann Arbor, MI:
International Communication in an University of Michigan Press.
Interdependent World. Washington, DC: US
Institute for Peace.
41
City Diplomacy
Michele Acuto
DIPLOMACY, BY CITIES? associate diplomacy, as practice as much as

an institution, to cities.
It is now commonplace, well beyond studies In this chapter I argue that the idea of city
of architecture and planning, to hear the diplomacy (van der Pluijm and Melissen
claim that more than half of the worlds 2007) is an apt testing ground for the intersec-
population lives in urban areas and that by tion between diplomatic and urban practices.
2050 this might grow to as much as two- When considering the intricate possibilities of
thirds of humanity.1 Today cities are seen as city diplomacy we confront the limitations of
critical engines driving the global economy, our traditional views of international relations
global information flows and the worldwide (as the domain of the international system)
mobility of goods and people. We can now and of our established diplomatic institutions
comfortably argue that urban issues overlap
(as the structure of mediated politics among
extensively with some key areas of interna-
nations). City diplomacy helps us expand this
tional affairs. For quite some time, just a few
narrow horizon, reacquaint ourselves with
scholars of international relations theory (IR)
and global governance have recognised this the long dure of world politics, and appre-
(Alger 1990; Hobbs 1994; Amen etal. 2011; ciate the networked patterns that cities are
Acuto 2010). The growing global emphasis weaving in international affairs. To make this
on cities is also taking place beyond the dis- argument the chapter explores the long affair
cipline where the fascination for the urban between cities and diplomacy, the challenges
age is rampant (Brenner and Schmid 2014). in studying city diplomacy, the advances and
A critical question for the diplomatic studies limitations of practices of city diplomacy and
community is therefore whether we can concludes with observations about its future.
City Diplomacy 511
CITIES AND DIPLOMACY: A LONG diplomacy remained a heterogeneous affair

AFFAIR until the post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna
in 1815. Nation-states have therefore only
Many contemporary accounts of the interna- been the (nearly) exclusive diplomatic actors
tional activities of cities tend to focus on the for less than two centuries. Even then cities
present and future. Talk of the urban age and (and other sub-national entities) have contin-
of the possibilities of smart, networked or uously maintained regular paradiplomatic
innovative cities all too often obscures the (Aldecoa and Keating, 1999) contacts on
past that led to this urbanised world. By con- disparate matters, ranging from environmen-
trast, planning, geography and urban studies tal management (through organisations such
often account for the long-lived impact of as United Cities and Local Governments, or
cities. One of the great contemporary urban- UCLG) or nuclear disarmament (through
ists, Peter Hall, dedicates countless pages to Mayors for Peace) (see Chapters 7, 8 and 49
illustrate the intertwined evolution of cities in this Handbook).
in civilization (1998) and to how some cities Studying city diplomacy, then, tells us a
in particular, those he termed world cities broader story of world politics than much of
(Hall 1966), are now critical nodes in aggre- the discipline of IR: cities have historically
gating and mobilising the human condition. conducted diplomatic activities, such as com-
Likewise, Peter Taylor illuminates the possi- munication and representation, far beyond
bility of putting cities first in the descrip- the life of the nation-state Westphalian sys-
tion of civilisations and international orders. tem. We can speak of a city diplomacy
As Taylor argues in his book Extraordinary (following from Nicolson 2001 and Jnsson
Cities, cities are and have always been linked and Hall 2005) here because: (1) city rep-
to other cities and other places, and this con- resentatives are connecting and negotiat-
nectivity is not just a feature of present-day ing internationally on behalf of (political)
conditions, but of millennia of geopolitical constituencies; (2) this involves embassies
tangos with states, empires and global pro- and envoys, as well as heads of (local) gov-
cesses (Taylor 2013). Cities, in short, are a ernment; and (3) it involves mediation and
permanent feature of (world) politics. agreement by cities both between third party
As I have argued elsewhere with my col- actors as well as on their own behalf.2 In this
league Parag Khanna (Acuto and Khanna sense, early modern Italian city-states played
2013), to appreciate the political role of the city a critical role in the development of these
in the twenty-first century, we must remem- core notions of diplomatic relations. Frigo
ber that cities are arguably humanitys old- (2000) provides solid evidence that in the
est diplomatic actors. Ancient Mesopotamian Italian peninsula, Florence, Mantua, Modena
and Anatolian cities engaged in regular or city kingdoms like Naples, developed
exchanges of envoys to establish mutual rec- diplomatic instruments and foreign relation-
ognition and trade missions. Medieval and ships with each other. There is a heritage of
Renaissance diplomacy was similarly domi- diplomatic activities developed over many
nated by city-states, particularly in Italy and centuries that is reflected in contemporary
northern Europe with the Hanseatic League, diplomatic studies of economic diplomacy,
whose intense diplomatic competition and small state diplomacy, religious diplomacy
interactions helped to undermine the Holy and international negotiation and mediation
Roman Empire, while fuelling the commer- (see Chapters 45, 24, 47, 17 and 18 in this
cial revolution and voyages of exploration Handbook). Similarly, studies of earlier dip-
across the Atlantic and to Asia. Even after the lomatic activities by cities include security
1648 Treaty of Westphalia, widely marked and secret diplomacy (see Chapter 36 in this
as the transition to sovereign nation-states, Handbook). Robert Finlays account of Venice
Besieged (2008) documents the intricate and Netherlands Institute of International Affairs
refined diplomatic web of the Serenissima has undertaken some preliminary explorations
(the Republic of Venice) throughout its spice of city diplomacy (van der Pluijm and Melissen
trade wars, clashes with other Mediterranean 2007), seeking to categorise the modalities
city-states, and diplomatic manoeuvring and domains in which cities perform interna-
during the OttomanHabsburg conflict. In tional relations. Likewise, in the US, Chad
short, while often presented as new, inno- Alger (2010) has unpacked the formation of a
vative and future-oriented, city diplomacy is few early inter-state organisations of local
in practice a stable feature of world politics governments, like the International Union of
beyond international relations. Local Authorities (IULA) or Metropolis, spe-
This is, however, only a partial and cifically examining their relation to the UN
Northern-biased account of the long history system. Overall, the scholarship on the exter-
of city diplomacy. As with the issue of power nal relations (Alger 1990) of cities is scat-
and the demand for comprehensive review of tered across a few academic disciplines other
the urban imprint on global governance, the than IR. And within IR, systematic attention to
historiography of city diplomacy is conspicu- the intersection between cities and the core
ously absent from libraries and class reading institutions of diplomacy, as understood in this
lists. The ultimate book on the deep legacy Handbook, is only tangential to other geopo-
of cities on the formation, change and ulti- litical considerations.
mately future of diplomacy remains to be That said, some of the paradiplomacy
written, and likewise the city diplomacy of debates of the 1990s, albeit rarely theoris-
the countries included in the Global South ing city diplomacy per se, left important
(Parnell and Robinson 2012) is badly in need theoretical propositions which can inform
of closer, systematic and critical attention. the study of city diplomacy. In the context of
these discussions on the foreign relations of
sub-national entities, Brian Hocking (1993)
Key Points introduced a particularly relevant perspective
on the growing influence of non-traditional
The international role of cities is well acknowl- diplomatic actors. While criticising the idea
edged in disciplines other than International of paradiplomacy he described the political
Relations theory (IR), but a systematic political geography of diplomacy as a multilayered
analysis of this is lacking.
context, within which states and non-central
Many contemporary diplomatic instruments and
governments can project their interests at
practices, such as economic diplomacy and secret
diplomacy, have a heritage in earlier city diplomacy. both the international and national level.
Similar to Geoff Wisemans idea of polylat-
eral diplomacy (2010) as the international
relations between governmental and non-
THE SCHOLARSHIP AND ITS LIMITS official entities, Hocking (1993: 3) described
international relations as a multilevel political
The major challenge that diplomatic analysts environment spanning subnational, national
face at present is the limitations of a scholar- and international arenas, where the achieve-
ship on city diplomacy. When looking for ment of goals at one level of political activity
explicit analysis of the diplomatic practices of demands an ability to operate in the others.
cities (not just international connections, Shedding new light upon the complexities of
branding or networking), researchers gener- diplomacy in the variegated political land-
ally face a paucity of analysis. To date, just a scape of the late twentieth century, this view
handful of authors and institutions have dealt offers interesting possibilities for studying
directly with this topic. For instance, the the diplomacy of cities.
City Diplomacy 513
This is not to say, however, that broader the logic and the factors that drive local gov-
analyses of cities external relations are of ernments transnational activities may differ
no use to understanding the diplomatic role from those of nation-states, and constitute a
of cities. It is important to acknowledge that new force in twenty-first-century world poli-
there is some solid, albeit often overlooked, tics (also see Gordon 2013 and Setzer 2014).
literature on the capacity of cities to link Likewise, Simon Curtis (2011) illustrates how
across state boundaries with peers, non- the rise of global cities challenges IR schol-
governmental entities and multilateral bod- ars to consider how many of the assumptions
ies. This is not limited to urban studies and that the discipline makes about the modern
historical accounts of cities and civilisations. international system are being destabilised.
Rather, it is in geography that a prolific set These are just some of the works by young
of scholars, like Michele Betsill and Harriet interdisciplinary scholars that are blazing a trail
Bulkeley (2004), have engaged with the role for the current (and next) generation of inter-
of transnational municipal networks, or sim- national and diplomatic scholars. We can now
ply city networks in environmental politics. embrace the complexity of city diplomacy,
This body of literature, mostly developed its networked impact and the many pressing
in the early 2000s, points to how cities are questions that the rise of cities in world affairs
developing networked urban connectivity in is putting on the front pages of many key jour-
global governance in order to cope with the nals in the field. So, as the public as well as
limitations of the international system and major international actors turn their attention
the constraints of economic downturns. to the role of mayors in world affairs, we are
Considering the implication for global envi- now required to offer a scholarly and under-
ronmental governance by, not just in, global cit- standable assessment of the diplomatic capac-
ies (like Los Angeles), Bulkeley and Schroeder ity of cities. The extent, collective impact and
(2012: 744) have sought to demonstrate the influence of city networks on global govern-
need to go beyond the great divide, arguing that ance is largely limited to case studies and
roles of international actors (as state or non- rare comparative investigations: we now need
state) and forms of authority (public or private) more systematic and critical appraisals of the
are not pre-given, but [are] determined through actual impact of city diplomacy.
the process of governing a statement that hits
at the heart of the assumption that diplomacy
is a nation-state affair. This once again echoes Key Points
the reality sketched by Hocking, and the com-
plex diplomatic engagements in which cities In, and beyond, IR city diplomacy is still a scat-
are entangled. In this sense, a focus on city tered and anecdotal scholarship.
diplomacy opens up exciting possibilities for Yet, some theoretical developments are now well
rooted in human geography and the study of city
meaningful and transferable considerations for
networks.
IR as a whole, not simply diplomatic studies. There is an encouraging new generation of city
Following this pathway, younger inter- diplomacy scholars emerging in IR.
disciplinary scholars have recently ventured
prolifically into the creation and international
politics of city networks. This is now a useful
and provocative collection of emerging work CITIES AND DIPLOMATIC
that could make the study of city diplomacy INSTITUTIONS
even more relevant to academic and policy
research. For instance, Taedong Lee (2013) The emerging research, public interest and
and Sofie Bouteligier (2012) unpack the inner historical roots of the urbanisation of society
dynamics of city networks, and illustrate how all point to the possibilities for a productive
scholarship of city diplomacy. However, we this burgeoning cadre of more-than-local

should not assume that these academic limi- municipal officers. If we want to step beyond
tations mean there is a lack of city diplomacy rhetoric and develop a critical and useful
practice. On the contrary, cities in developing scholarship of city diplomacy, it is crucial to
and developed countries have to date sus- start by mapping how this practice compares
tained city diplomacy efforts across a wide with discussions within diplomatic studies
range of global challenges. For instance, about the essence of diplomacy (Jnsson
United Cities and Local Government and Hall 2005). In order to do so, I rely here
(UCLG), which covers over 1000 cities and on a brief overview of the role of cities vis-
155 national urban networks, has had for -vis two sets of the main diplomatic institu-
nearly a decade a formal Committee on tions contained in this Handbook: embassies
Development Cooperation and City (see Chapter 12 in this Handbook) and inter-
Diplomacy, tasked with proposing and devel- national recognition.
oping policies on issues related to local gov-
ernment international development
cooperation and international relations. Embassies, Foreign Offices and
Amidst other tasks, the Committee has been Ambassadors
liaising directly with the OECD to set up a
structural mechanism to monitor the effec- Cities have been showcasing a limited but
tiveness of aid on local governments through- steady capacity to develop a number of diplo-
out the world. UCLG has now a substantial matic institutions, which are similar in form
advocacy role on the OECD Working Party to embassies and diplomatic corps, and which
on Aid Effectiveness and the United Nations are now part of cities international outreach
Development Cooperation Forum, and like- and international organisation. To begin with,
wise it has had continuing lobbying efforts while rarely associated with them, cities have
for greater city input in the Sustainable a variety of bodies that in form and function
Development Goals process. The network present very close parallels to the diplomatic
aims to condense and communicate key staples of the embassy and the foreign
policy messages on aid from the vast UCLG office (see Chapter 5 in this Handbook). In
membership, sustain participation in interna- major global cities, such as Tokyo or Paris,
tional conferences and meetings, and foster these are represented by dedicated interna-
common efforts. This highlights how cities tional relations offices tasked specifically
are not only individual diplomatic actors, but with promoting the city abroad and forging
rather, as many other international players in cross-national connections. These offices take
this Handbook, can also create transnational the shape of either paradiplomatic branches
structures like city networks that have the of the city council or, in an increasing number
ability, as per UCLGs mission, to represent of instances, publicprivate bodies set up spe-
and defend the interests of local governments cifically for promotion, public diplomacy and
on the worlds stage. networking purposes. For example, in the
While encouraging, these efforts often British capital, the Mayor of London in April
remain rather limited to discussions between 2011 launched London & Partners, which is a
municipal officers, or between cities, inter- not-for-profit publicprivate partnership, with
national organisations and business entities. additional support from key commercial part-
Little space is left for evaluation of their ners like the Barclays group. It was set up to
overall effectiveness, especially in concert link the remits of the capitals three promo-
with academic research. Moreover, little is tional agencies Think London, Study
being done to satisfy the demand for sys- London and Visit London into one single
tematic diplomatic training to better prepare public diplomacy body for London, capable
City Diplomacy 515
of representing the city with one voice to all York that have engaged numerous cities and
audiences in the UK and internationally, and international business actors.
therefore building the citys international rep- The experience of London and New York
utation and global business network (see points to a broader trend. While cities have for
Chapter 35 in this Handbook). a long time focused on city-to-city coopera-
Different from (and in addition to) more tion only (in particular in the last century), the
traditional paradiplomatic activities, these practices of city diplomacy and city network-
institutions at the city level focus on cultural- ing generally are now expanding beyond the
economic activities rather than systematis- sister city approach, demonstrating greater
ing networks of cooperation or promoting catalytic diplomacy (Hocking 2004) ini-
political connections. Not surprisingly, the tiatives aimed at pooling a variety of actors,
self-professed mission of London & Partners governmental and non-government, towards
is to tell Londons story brilliantly. It is an urban agenda for international affairs.
important, then, to acknowledge how cities
have become increasingly proficient at fos-
tering business, commercial, inter-municipal, International Recognition,
and more broadly non-traditional interna- Summitry and Collaboration
tional linkages beyond just setting up policy
collaborations. International endeavours, whether by states
Another example of the cities developing or other actors, demand two-way communi-
their own diplomatic institutions is New York cations and the establishment of a common
Citys global arm. Formerly The Sister City playing field on which to mediate the
Program of the City of New York, Inc., the estrangement (Der Derian 1987) among
now New York City Global Partners, Inc. is international players. Cities are not exempt
a not-for-profit body set up in 1962 by the from this need for international recognition,
Mayors Office for International Affairs to another key institution of diplomacy. Once
connect the City of New York with other again there is evidence here of cities playing
leading world cities by promoting exchange a prominent role in world politics.
among policymakers and citizens alike. So, This starts with an urban shift away from
while the Office for International Affairs is just national politics. Amidst many interna-
designed to maintain international linkages, tional bodies, the European Commission is,
Global Partners Inc. tends to focus more on for instance, increasingly targeting cities as
forging and fostering (profitable) connec- important (para) diplomatic actors and cor-
tions with a wider array of non-governmental nerstones of the EUs subsidiarity principle
actors. The programme was originally based even in external affairs. For example, the
on the model of Sister Cities International, a 2012 EUChina Mayors Forum promoted
non-profit citizen diplomacy network active an EUChina Urbanisation Partnership to
since 1956, and was developed to systematise address urbanization challenges in China
relationships with Beijing, Budapest, Cairo, through cooperative EUChina efforts
Jerusalem, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, between stakeholders at national, regional
Rome, Santo Domingo and Tokyo. In 2006, and local levels. The Forum was convened in
the programme was restructured and renamed the spirit that: Given the array of challenges
to engage with additional foreign cities and they face in adapting to the urban century,
extend more explicitly into the business sector, China and Europe have a strong interest in
engaging in substantive programming with working together to build better cities. While
more than one hundred cities, fostering not still representative of a national (or regional)
only city-to-city cooperation but also student project on, rather than by, cities, this is one
exchange, and international summits in New of the many instances of enrolment and thus
recognition of local government in processes local leaders awareness concerning water and
aimed at reinforcing international coopera- sanitation and called on national governments
tion and stability. The Forum included EU for more effective sustainabilitypartnerships
and Chinese mayors and a variety of del- the Consensus not only advocates urban
egations of city planners, local businesses solutions with central governments, but also
and NGOs, and was devised to share expe- undertakes comprehensive assessments and
rience in sustainable, integrated and efficient inventories of water policies to facilitate city
urban solutions. While purely consultative, diplomacy exchanges. Examples such as the
peer-to-peer connections, paradiplomatic Water Consensus indicate the increase in
exchanges between local governments and mayor-sponsored regimes, particularly the
urban stakeholders, involving, for instance, ones that in addition to their regulatory pur-
the Chinese Association of Mayors and the poses also aim to pool resources in order to
European Covenant of Mayors in a range of expand the policy-making capacity of the
cross-sector activities and multi-player events, group and individual cities.
all hold important potential to manage geopo- Cities are increasingly demanding that
litical shifts and EastWest relations. While international audiences take them and their
the state level often suffers directly the turbu- worldview much more seriously, while sub-
lence of geopolitics, at the city level technical, stantiating these requests with clear diplo-
exchange and collaboration networks can per- matic outcomes like the Water Consensus.
sist similarly to track II initiatives now com- The sprawl in city-based networking and
mon in diplomacy. In this spirit, the Forum the growing enmeshment of city politics
tackled a number of the challenges that mod- with key transnational actors like the World
ern cities face, such as increasingly mobile Bank certainly suggest that cities are play-
urbanites, increased traffic and problems of ing an ever-increasing role in safeguard-
waste management. Likewise, it revealed ing urban security. Equally, it testifies the
possible avenues for city-driven cooperation recognition of cities by multilateral bodies,
between China and Europe in meeting the and not just states, reinforcing the capacity
demands of Chinas urban billion. of cities to be meaningful actors in inter-
Increased international recognition for city national processes. The recently launched
diplomacy has also been the result of vast Global Network for Safer Cities (GNSC) is
summitry activities by cities since the early a case in point. Led by the United Nations,
nineties (see Chapter 19 in this Handbook). the GNSC aims to equip local authorities and
Beyond the potential influence of top-down urban stakeholders with the tools to deliver
initiatives like the EUChina Mayors Forum, and maintain urban security. GNSC follows
cities themselves have been very industrious the footsteps of successful examples of city-
in maintaining regular international fora, and to-city cooperation like the C40 Group or
even more importantly in producing exten- Eurocites, which are today quite active com-
sive and sometimes innovative international ponents in the international response to issues
frameworks (for cooperation but also standard like climate change, inequality and diversity.
setting) out of these. As I have argued else- The UN systems attention is demonstrating
where (Acuto 2013a), an example of this type here not only recognition, but also trust in
of regime-building capacity is the Istanbul the capacity of cities to deliver international
Water Consensus an initiative by Istanbul frameworks (regimes and institutions) that
Mayor Kadir Topbas and ICLEI that now emphasise the networked influence of cities
gathers more than 1,000 cities across more in global governance.
than 56 countries. Building on the Local Pooling their network power, cities seem to
Government Declaration on Water of 2006 be increasingly capable of responding to press-
(promoted by Mexico City) which expressed ing challenges arising locally and globally.
City Diplomacy 517
For instance, GNSC is progressively formalis- As with many other subnational diplomatic
ing the large pool of cities (77 in 24 countries), actors, the diplomatic role of cities raises the
and the UN is already providing technical problem of representation. In some cases,
support in terms of improving urban safety. city leaders are elected by constituencies that
Likewise, global networks can have a web- include not only national citizens, but also
bing networked effect at a national and local urban residents more generally. For instance,
level: GNSC has already received firm com- in the UK, registered European Union resi-
mitments for national sub-networks on Safer dents generally bear the same rights as citi-
Cities in several key countries affected by zens in electing mayors (as in the Greater
urban insecurity like Mexico, Colombia and London Authority), and in Sweden voting
South Africa. GNSC is not alone in this effort. for local elections is allowed for all foreign
For example, the European Forum on Urban residents with a three years residence. This is
Security has been connecting municipalities not the norm, but representation is also com-
and non-governmental actors in the sphere plicated by the fact that, owing to the political
of urban safety ever since 1987, and with nature of their positions, most active mayors
250European members it is a solid network- in international affairs would not be consid-
ing entrepreneur in prompting joint training ered legitimate international representatives
and city-to-city learning. of their metropolises by all of their constitu-
ents (see Chapter 21 in this Handbook).
Critical for a more complete understand-
Key Points ing of the diplomatic impact and capacity of
cities is also a more systematic study of their
Cities have (para)diplomatic branches compara- international legal dimension (see Chapter
ble to classic diplomatic corps institutions, but 15 in this Handbook). Work by Israeli law-
the overall trends are pushing towards more yer Yishai Blank (2005) on the city and the
and more quango international affairs bodies
world represents a rarity for its legalistic
focused more specifically on public diplomacy.
account of localities as a normative mediator
Cities have a growing recognition by states and
multilateral organisations as legitimate actors in between the world and the state and for its
international cooperation. analysis of how metropolises intersect with a
This recognition is coupled with a growing buy-in variety of spheres of international law. Yet
for their capacity to forge networked structures these considerations are extremely limited
for cross-regional collaboration. and demand closer attention by the diplo-
matic community. Issues of legality, repre-
sentation and normative mediation stand at
the heart of those processes of international
CITY DIPLOMACY: PAST, PRESENT, legitimacy, regime building and transnational
FUTURE AND BLINDSPOTS collaboration and will define the diplomatic
influence of cities in the current global order.
Embassies, summits, public diplomacy, This leads to one last important theo-
regimes and mediated activities all point to the retical blindspot that demands closer atten-
mounting evidence, and success, of city diplo- tion: the issue of power. Undoubtedly, the
macy in the present world order. Nonetheless, growing interest in urban issues as part
if in aggregate the diplomatic role of cities of global sustainability, development or
scores quite favourably in terms of traditional security discussions affects the study and
diplomatic institutions, there remain some practice of international relations and diplo-
substantial diplomatic blindspots that neither macy. A small example of this is that the
the city diplomacy literature or practice seem United Nations Secretary General recently
to address with much accuracy. appointed former New York Mayor Michael
Bloomberg who has been chairing the influ- in policymaking at the international level
ential global network of cities called Climate is endowing them with influence formerly
Leadership Group (C40) to become the UN reserved for diplomatic officials at the state
Special Representative for Cities and Climate level. The trend toward urbanisation seems
Change. Although evidence from initiatives unlikely to lose speed in the near future, and
like C40 or institutions like the UN indicates so mayors will likely continue to increase
that cities are having a growing influence on their policymaking clout. Thus analytical
international affairs this consideration is, at frameworks for studying international rela-
the moment, rarely followed by its logical tions and global governance must adapt to
counterpart, the question of power. Do cities a new reality: one where non-state actors,
have growing power over international rela- including cities and their leaders, are exert-
tions and diplomatic affairs? And, equally, ing increasing influence over the means and
what are the sources, media and modes of goals of international diplomacy.
cities power in world politics? As a recent Were we to end our assessment of the dip-
book edited by Simon Curtis (2014) points lomatic capacity of cities at the institutions of
out, we need to pay closer attention to the the embassy and the foreign office, the pic-
mechanisms that are empowering cities ture painted above would most definitely be
to stand the ground of other international a rather partial and structuralist one. On the
actors and stake rightful claims to take part contrary, the diplomatic practices of cities,
in global governance. This means charting a even more than their ambassadorial capacity,
clearer agenda to understand the power that are well entrenched in global challenges and
cities have to partake in both traditional (e.g. transnational processes and well rooted into
UN) and non-traditional (e.g. city networks) the international system. As I suggest above,
international processes. As such, diplomatic city diplomacy has a long-lived history and a
scholars should pay equal attention not only pervasive network presence in global govern-
to cities power over international affairs (in ance. Yet, the systematic appreciation of cit-
terms of coercive clout), or power to influ- ies in diplomatic studies, if not more broadly
ence diplomatic processes (in terms of poten- in IR, rarely goes beyond the rhetoric of the
tial capacity). Rather, there is also mounting urban age and some sporadic attention to
evidence that cities can leverage a form of the negotiations of city networks. This is an
power with other cities, NGOs and business evident limitation: the state of the art of city
(in terms of shared coercion and potential) diplomacy, in academia and policy research,
a network power (Acuto 2010) that, while is lagging far behind the momentous emer-
not so soft as it might appear, is a critical gence of cities as international actors. The
tool for diplomatic influence. Overall, all too wind might be changing, but there is still
often the popularity of cities is only matched much theoretical and empirical terrain to be
by superficial attention to the global trends covered.
of urbanisation, forgetting the (long) past of
city diplomacy, barely unpacking its (exten-
sive) international practices, and turning a Key Points
blind eye to thornier issues such as legality,
The legal status and legal implications of city
representativeness and power.
diplomacy are at present largely overlooked with
Once we have acknowledged the limita- possibly critical accountability and political con-
tions and blindspots of current inquiries into sequences.
city diplomacy, we can then start focusing There is a need for a more systematic assessment
a more systematic eye on how the role of of city diplomacys range of coercive and soft
mayors in the twenty-first century is chang- powers (power over, to and with) in international
ing, and how the participation of city leaders processes.
City Diplomacy 519
CONCLUSION City networks are now a pervasive reality in

global governance, and city diplomacy raises
By looking back at the past of city diplomacy a plethora of critical and influential questions
we can appreciate a story that stretches far for the practice of international relations and
deeper into the history of civilisation than the for the contemporary shape of world politics.
study of the international system might sug- City diplomacy, seen from this angle, is at the
gest. The diplomatic entrepreneurship of same time a reminder of the heritage and the
cities reminds diplomatic and international present possibilities of diplomatic studies.
studies of a key necessity: moving beyond the
classic notions of international system and
diplomacy is a near mandatory step in order
to appreciate the complexity of the emer- NOTES
gence of cities in world politics. This move is
1 Rather than providing an extensive list of refer-
not necessarily a rejection of IRs core tenets:
ences on the rate of urbanisation, see the work
cities do interact with, and in many instances by David Satterthwaite and the International Insti-
benefit from, the system of state-centric institute of Environment and Development (IIED) at
tutions and processes that is still shaping http://pubs.iied.org/10709IIED.html (last accessed
much of world politics. Likewise, cities do 8 September 2014).
2 For brevity, I am not including in this chapter the
mirror, and seek recognition from, the inter-
instances whereby city diplomacy takes place
national system (Bouteligier 2012). within the spatial constraints of the city itself, as in
If we contemplate present city diplomacy the case of the Olympics or Expos. I have elaborated
we are then confronted with a changing, but on this case more extensively in Acuto (2013b).
somewhat hopeful, scenario. Cities have a
demonstrated track record in terms of transna-
tional networking, agenda-setting and resource
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42
Citizen Diplomacy
M e l i s s a C o n l e y Ty l e r a n d C r a i g B e y e r i n c k
INTRODUCTION of citizen diplomacy. It is understandable

that a profession that has enjoyed relative
Diplomacy has traditionally been defined as exclusivity is reluctant to embrace the con-
the work of diplomatic officers sanctioned and cept that anyone can be a citizen diplomat.
sent by their home country to represent it As Cooper (2013: 41) points out, the push to
abroad. Hedley Bull (1977: 1701) outlines extend the status of diplomat is fraught with
diplomacys main functions as facilitating contestation. To call oneself a diplomat as in
communication, negotiating agreements, gath- the case of citizen diplomacy is very sub-
ering intelligence and minimising friction in jective and arguably even flimsy.
the practice of international relations between The term citizen diplomacy is relatively
states. It has long been the major institution for new, gaining wider currency after being used
conducting relations between states. by Hillary Clinton (Gregory, 2011: 360). It
Though the practice of diplomacy has raises the question of whether those with-
always been adaptive, it has recently had to out official diplomatic status are engaging in
flex sharply to accommodate the changes diplomacy in any meaningful sense or if the
brought by globalisation and technologi- term citizen diplomacy is merely a loose
cal change (Kerr and Wiseman, 2012). One metaphor for everyday people engaging in
change is the increasing discussion of citi- cross-border relations. For example, Gregory
zen diplomacy. Generally defined: Citizen (2011: 359) does not consider most cross-bor-
diplomacy is about how citizens as private der relationships to be citizen diplomacy and
individuals can make a difference in world chooses instead to define this as cultural inter-
affairs (McDonald, 1991: 119). nationalism (see Chapter 8 in this Handbook).
Those who practise traditional diplomacy This chapter will outline how citizen diplo-
have not universally embraced the concept macy has developed and what citizen diplomacy
actors do. It explores emerging trends in citizen diplomats have the responsibility for manag-
diplomacy and ways in which it can be theoret- ing government-to-government relations and
ically understood. Due to the contested defini- communication with foreign publics (public
tion of citizen diplomacy, two understandings diplomacy). Over time, and especially with the
will be discussed: as a metaphor to describe communications revolution, the public diplo-
people who participate in cross-border interac- macy aspect of officials work has become very
tions (citizen-led citizen diplomacy) and as a significant (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook).
term used when private citizens are involved in Recognising traditional diplomacy as the
state-sanctioned diplomatic interactions (state- sole driving force of international relations
led citizen diplomacy). This chapter shows that is, however, problematic when considering
citizen diplomacy is a highly contested term the many different examples of cross-cultural
that may or may not add to our understanding exchanges throughout history. For example, the
of the impact of people-to-people contact on Greeks used proxenoi, or the citizens of other
diplomacy. city-states domiciled in Athens, to represent
other governments interests in Athens (Black,
2010: 20). As Black states, part of the history
Key Points of diplomacy is the account of how far these
processes have been conducted through, or
The classification of some actors as citizen diplo- under the control of, the formal mechanism of
mats is contentious. diplomacy. In practice, this has always been the
The term citizen diplomacy can be used either case only to a limited extent (Black, 2010: 14).
as a metaphor for those who are involved in
A contentious example of citizen diplo-
international interactions in some way (citizen-
macy is when George Logan, a private US
led citizen diplomacy) or, more narrowly, to refer
to the use of citizens in more traditional forms of citizen, negotiated the de-escalation of
diplomacy (state-led citizen diplomacy). Franco-American tensions in Paris in 1798.
His actions led France to lift its embargo and
release US ships and seamen. Despite the
positive outcome of this interaction, the US
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZEN passed the 1799 Logan Act which prohibits
DIPLOMACY private citizens from undertaking diplomatic
negotiations (Chataway, 1998: 269).
People have always interacted across borders It may have been more possible to restrict
and this has long been a part of how countries citizens international role when it was rela-
and foreign publics have viewed each other tively difficult for anyone not affiliated with
(Sharp, 2001: 143). Over the centuries, inter- the state to travel abroad due to logistic and
community and interstate relations have been financial constraints. However, citizens now
shaped by a variety of actors, including unof- have more opportunities to participate in
ficial ones. In addition to the traditional role cross-border interaction due to relatively
of diplomats as officially representing their inexpensive international travel and commu-
state, a range of actors such as traders, mis- nications technology. These developments
sionaries, authors and artists have contrib- have led to debate on the role of citizen diplo-
uted both positively and negatively to how macy and how it should be defined.
their countries are viewed abroad.
Not surprisingly, governments have had
a strong preference for valuing official dip- Citizen Diplomacy as a Metaphor
lomats as the true bearers of a states image
and message over everyday citizens who are One way to understand citizen diplomacy is
involved in cross-border interactions. Official as a loose term for cross-cultural interaction:
Citizen Diplomacy 523
the work people do to connect across 2008: 182), there are situations where citizens
national differences directed at building are specifically selected by the state to partici-
the kinds of understandings, relationships, pate in some type of diplomatic activity.
and actions needed to build a more peaceful There are examples of states involving
and prosperous world (The Coalition for citizens in diplomatic forums over many
Citizen Diplomacy, quoted in Hovey and decades, such as involving 42 civil soci-
Weinberg, 2009: 45). ety organisations in the United Nations San
The vague nature of this definition means Francisco Conference (Marshall, 1949: 856)
that the term citizen diplomacy can be applied or US President Eisenhower bringing together
to a wide range of actors. It is through such US and Soviet citizens to discuss relations
wide-reaching definitions that the terms dip- between their countries at the 1959 Dartmouth
lomat and diplomacy have come to be asso- Conference (McDonald, 1991: 206). States
ciated with cultural and sporting activities and often encourage citizen diplomacy in situa-
the notion that anyone, and thus everyone, tions where there are limited official relations,
abroad can be a diplomat for their country for example between the US and Cuba or
(Black, 2010: 12). The definition can even North Korea (Hovey and Weinberg, 2009: 45).
sometimes be stretched to encompass local Contemporary state-sanctioned cross-border
citizens who interact with foreigners in their citizen interaction can be seen on topics such as
own country as well as people who participate climate change, child soldiers and many others
in social action that is visible on a global stage. where civil society actors are invited by offi-
Officials who consider themselves to be cials to form part of international discussions
proper diplomatic actors can view this and negotiations. A high-profile example is the
development in an extremely negative light UNFCC on climate change where civil society
(Marshall, 1949: 83). Not unlike the use of organisations, scientific experts and individual
war as a metaphor in phrases such as the war citizens are involved in discussions.
on drugs, the term citizen diplomacy has This type of citizen diplomacy was born
widened the activities with which diplomacy from the realisation in the early 1960s that
is associated, thus making it a metaphor for traditional diplomacy cannot fix everything
a person or activity that in some way affects (Sharp, 2001: 132). The resulting reorientation
states foreign interests (Black, 2010: 13). As of diplomacy to include more non-state actors
Melissen (2013: 436) states, citizen diplomacy has allowed traditional diplomats to benefit
can be a metaphor for the democratization of from expert advice and the ability to be closer
diplomacy, with multiple actors playing a role to their own publics (Shale, 2006: 197). While
in what was once an area restricted to a few. concerns remain about the potentially abra-
sive effects and difficulties of controlling the
actions of those who are only loosely affiliated
Involvement of Citizens in with the state, as practice is evolving today,
non-state and non-official actors are playing an
Official Diplomacy
increasingly large role (Melissen, 2013: 450).
By contrast, traditional actors would gener-
ally only use the term citizen diplomacy in
instances where civil society actors are for- Key Points
mally involved in official diplomatic activity. The actions of private citizens have long played
Despite resistance to such involvement from a role in interstate relations, despite a preference
those who believe that involving civil society by states for officially-sanctioned diplomacy.
actors adds too many unpredictable and Ease of travel and communication have led to
uncontrollable elements to diplomatic pro- a growing role for private citizens in relations
cesses forged over centuries (Williams etal., between states.
ACTIVITIES, ROLES AND ACTORS whether they can or should form some relation-
IN CITIZEN DIPLOMACY ship with these activities. By allowing citizens
who take part in cross-border interactions to be
The debate about the meaning of citizen distantly associated with their state, a practice
diplomacy has implications for understand- that states have little say in to begin with, states
ing the activities, roles and relationships of can potentially benefit from any positive image
actors in citizen diplomacy. that their citizens convey through close inter-
action with foreign individuals. An example of
such co-option can be government use of track
People-to-People Contact two diplomacy where non-officials engage in
dialogue which is independent of, but linked
Defining citizen diplomacy in its broadest with, the state (McDonald, 1991: 119).
sense as a metaphor means that many actors There are a number of examples of state-
and their actions can be thought of as being funded activities that bring citizens from
part of it. People-to-people contact across different countries together such as the US
borders can occur in a wide range of areas Fulbright and Peace Corps programmes and a
including international tourism, international range of scholarships and international visitor
sports matches, academia, business and cul- programmes (Gregory, 2011: 3512). Such
tural exchanges (Rana, 2011: 260). There is programmes are predicated on the belief that
no limit on the citizens who can potentially be people-to-people contact can lead to long-
involved whether through study abroad, youth lasting and deep connections with the poten-
exchanges, sister city relationships, inter-faith tial to create a strong bond between countries.
dialogue and many other ways. However, there is a limit to how far states
This type of people-to-people contact can should try to insert themselves into these
have a demonstrable impact on how a coun- people-to-people interactions. A clear benefit
try is viewed by citizens of other countries. of citizen-led citizen diplomacy is its ability to
Personal experience is a big factor in forming remain untouched by government officials, or
positive or negative views on other countries. at least to be regarded as such. Its strength is
Sustained, long-term and authentic interac- the perception that interaction is not based on
tion with foreign nationals is a very important strategic interests and is not an advertising or
factor in national image in an information- political campaign (Sharp, 2009: 287). In sup-
saturated world where you are what you port of this, Gregory (2011: 353) suggests that
seem (Copeland, 2009: 161). citizen diplomacy is best used by states to to
A good example of this type of citizen understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour;
diplomacy is the role played by expatri- build and manage relationships, and influence
ates simply by living and interacting abroad thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their
(Gregory, 2011: 359). Their relatively long interests and values. No matter what form
residence in a country and regular interaction citizen diplomacy takes, much of its legiti-
with locals means that they can influence how macy and impact comes from the belief that
their country is viewed. From the perspec- the messages being conveyed are authentic
tive of official diplomats, this is potentially and untouched by government officials.
a resource to help socialise foreign popula-
tions to new ideas before and after diplomatic
efforts (Hochstetler, 2013: 176). Citizen Involvement in Official
Given that it would be impossible for a state
Diplomacy
to control the myriad people-to-people inter-
action that occurs through tourism, education As well as encouraging or exploiting people-
and other exchange, the question for states is to-people contact by its citizens, states can
go further and sanction private citizens to in traditional diplomacy can play a role.
play some type of diplomatic role (state-led Regardless of how citizen and state-led
citizen diplomacy). Examples can be explicit, diplomacy seeks to engage foreign publics
such as when states invite non-officials to rep- and governments, both rely on the presence
resent their country in negotiations, or implicit, of someone who, in one way or another, is
as in the case of ex-officials meeting with seen as a representative of their country. The
other governments where some continuing simple presence of this person can influence
official connection is assumed. Sharp (2001: how that country is regarded by foreign indi-
13741) identifies five ways in which citizens viduals and governments. As Gopin (2009:
can become citizen diplomats: as a go- 1612) states, the citizen diplomat embodies
between; as a representative of a sectoral, symbol. A person comes from one civiliza-
regional or local economic interest; as a lobby- tion and enters into another, with everyone
ist or advocate; as a subverter or transformer of fully aware that this person is crossing over
existing policies; or as an autonomous agent. boundaries of tension, distrust, and conflict.
All except the last may be state-sanctioned. The act of arrival itself and the presence in the
Involving private citizens in diplomatic new civilization becomes a symbolic gesture.
activity has a number of benefits for states.
For example, by virtue of not being directly
affiliated with a government body, citizen Key Points
diplomats can facilitate indirect communica-
tion between governments that do not com- People-to-people contact between citizens
municate officially. There are clear benefits can have benefits including forming deep and
to states in using independent individuals to long-lasting relationships that are perceived as
authentic and untouched by government.
hold talks with enemy countries.
There are a number of examples of state-sanctioned
States can also benefit from bringing citizen involvement in official diplomacy where
citizens expertise in a certain area to nego- citizens assist the state with their expertise.
tiations and meetings. Citizens, whether
individuals or through organised groups, can
bring valuable technical expertise and detail
to negotiating teams. This can even extend to EMERGING TRENDS AND CHANGES
foreign citizens; an interesting example of this TO THE PRACTICE OF CITIZEN
is the non-profit organisation Independent DIPLOMACY
Diplomat (2015), which provides diplomatic
advice and services to governments including The neat division between citizen and offi-
assisting states to sanction private citizens cial diplomacy is being challenged by changes
from other countries to represent them in dip- to modern diplomatic practice. Citizen diplo-
lomatic processes. macy should be understood in the context of
It appears that governments are increasing broader trends that have seen the move from
their investment in and acceptance of such club to network diplomacy (Thakur, 2013).
activities. They have perhaps decided that the Using this definition, club diplomacy, or
benefits of involving citizens in diplomacy classical diplomacy, refers to a time when
outweighs the risk that as private citizens diplomats met primarily with other govern-
they may advocate for a cause that is not nec- ment officials and the occasional business
essarily government-sanctioned. person. In contrast, in network diplomacy a
If the goal of diplomacy is to create a greater number of actors are involved in
conducive environment to pursue a coun- policy-making processes with a devolution of
trys national interest, both people-to-people power traditionally concentrated by the state
contact and some involvement by citizens to many more actors (Heine, 2013: 603).
In other words, diplomacy has transformed thwarted, as can be seen with China, by poor
from a stiff waltz of rituals and protocol domestic policies and actions (Seib, 2012:
among states alone to become a jazzy dance 119). Longer-term and unregulated interac-
among coalitions of ministries, companies, tion with everyday citizens can help to main-
churches, foundations, universities, activists, tain a countrys positive image.
and other wilful, enterprising individuals who Citizen diplomacy has the advantages
cooperate to achieve specific goals (Khanna, of transparency, responsiveness and wide
2011: 22). As Seib (2012: 106) puts it, application (Sharp, 2001: 147). There are
[b]alancing recognition of historical context actors in and outside of the government who
with the pressures generated by new infor- have come to realise that citizen diplomacy
mation and communication technologies will can address some cross-border issues in ways
require a new approach to the construction of that traditional diplomacy cannot (Williams
diplomacy and to being a diplomat. et al., 2008: 189). For example, citizen
This means that traditional diplomats are diplomacy operationalised through non-
now more likely to spend more of their time government organisations and interest groups
on public diplomacy in an attempt to broad- has achieved great success in addressing the
cast messages and reach a much wider audi- issues of landmines, international crimes,
ence; the development and growing use of child soldiers, explosive remnants of war and
communication tools is making traditional rights for disabled persons.
diplomacy more responsive to citizens con- Even though todays diplomatic landscape
cerns (Hochstetler, 2013: 188). Sharp and is being influenced by the growing num-
Wiseman (2012: 119) go so far as to say ber, expanding role and increasing influence
public diplomacy is now so central to diplo- of non-state actors, the practice of tradi-
macy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as tional diplomacy is not being crowded out or
a sub-set of diplomatic practice. replaced by citizen diplomacy; instead, it is
This change to the practice of traditional working to supplement and support its more
diplomacy is important for citizen diplo- traditional twin (Thakur, 2013: 77). Both
macy (Copeland, 2009: 169): the convergence citizen and traditional diplomacy can use
between the two means there is a growing strategies traditionally reserved for the lat-
acceptance of official engagement with citizen ter but, as Copeland (2009: 162) states, their
diplomats to fill the gaps found between local content, purpose, and practice are evolving.
and foreign publics and traditional diplomatic While this is understandable, in that the two
practices. This is being acknowledged by some entities goals may be the same, their roles
traditional diplomatic actors. For example, US are not the same (Gregory, 2011: 357).
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went as As alluded to by Gopin (2009: 164), nei-
far as calling on students to become citizen ther traditional nor citizen diplomacy can be
ambassadors when using social networking effective in achieving state goals without the
to build partnerships and expose and fight the other. There are also many actors in addi-
oppression that followed presidential elections tion to states interacting in an increasingly
in Iran (Sharp and Wiseman, 2012: 172). networked web of national and international
Citizen diplomacy helps deal with the dis- diplomacy (Thakur, 2013: 84). For example,
trust among publics of traditional diplomats both citizen-led diplomacy and more tradi-
and diplomacy in general, born out of the tional approaches to diplomacy have been
relative secrecy in which communications needed to make progress on arms control
have traditionally been carried out. While issues, such as small arms, indicating that
government-led public diplomacy can be official diplomacy is still an important part
a good tool to promote a countrys image of a countrys diplomatic toolkit (Williams
abroad, maintaining positive images can be etal., 2008: 194).
Key Points and what is not (Sharp, 2001: 143). This

approach supports the modern day changes
The transition from club to network diplomacy
that are taking place in the practice of diplo-
has created closer interaction between diplomats
macy. The reality may be between these two
and foreign publics.
Changes in diplomatic practice mean a growing approaches.
place for citizen diplomacy to fill the gaps found Taking another look at Bulls (1977: 1701)
between publics and traditional diplomatic prac- functions of diplomacy between states
tice. (facilitating communication, negotiating
agreements, gathering intelligence and mini-
mising friction in international relations), it
is clear that citizen diplomacy can also be
UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN used to carry out diplomatic functions. Not
DIPLOMACY THROUGH THEORETICAL only have both types of citizen diplomacy
APPROACHES and traditional diplomacy worked together to
fill gaps in each others work, but they have
In order to understand what diplomacy is also worked to address the needs of newly
today it is important look at what diplomacy opened avenues of interaction. According to
meant in its most classical sense. By looking Williams etal. (2008: 1878), the most nota-
at diplomatic practice throughout history, it ble feature of the new diplomacy has been
is clear that citizen diplomacy is in fact the partnership formed between key govern-
merely enjoying a revival: it is on top of this ments and civil society to achieve common
that what is now understood to be traditional humanitarian aims. Partnerships between
diplomacy is built. As such, ways of thinking government and civil society have proven
about diplomacy only need to be revisited to be very useful and allow these two pre-
and revised in order to develop a way of viously separate actors to adjust strategies,
thinking about a diplomatic practice that is goals and thinking based on the work of the
applicable to todays context, rather than other, bringing about a more streamlined and
completely made anew. efficient use of resources.
In considering arguments about what The proper development and use of
diplomacy is and what role citizens can and citizen diplomacy tools is important because
do play a role in it, Sharp (2001) outlines two [d]iplomats are only part of the process by
approaches with which to conceptualise the which information is obtained, and often
craft: no change and all change. The no are not the most important part (Black,
change approach views the world as being 2010: 14). This fundamental change in how
divided into sovereign states, which are its diplomacy is practised requires fundamental
most powerful actors, and finds these states reappraisal of missions, skills and structures
to be the most authentic expression of politi- transformation, rather than adaptation, in
cal interests available. As such, the no change institutions, methods and priorities (Gregory,
approach maintains that only those who offi- 2011: 354). It is for this reason that citizen
cially represent states can be considered to be diplomats, as Sharp (2001: 148) says, should
diplomats (Sharp, 2001: 142). This approach, be courted, coddled and educated by
as suggested by the name, prizes official traditional diplomatic actors and institutions.
interaction above all else. By contrast, from Citizen diplomacys revival should be
the all change perspective, [t]echnology, understood in the wider context of the expand-
democracy, and education are combining to ing opportunities there are for interaction as a
erode the sovereignty of the modern territo- result of globalisation (Chataway, 1998: 271),
rial state and the sovereignty of those who including the deep and widespread impact of the
determine what is to be regarded as important revolution in information and communication
technology and travel. According to Copeland from the other. The inevitable and continu-
(2009: 170): Globalization is causing the ing change to how diplomacy is thought of is
center of diplomatic gravity to move, as it greatly due to the successes of citizen diplo-
were, down the mountain, shifting the action macy in many areas. This change has led to the
off the peaks and into the populated valleys reconceptualisation of diplomacy to include at
out of the chancellery and into the street. least some aspects of citizen-led diplomacy.
In the face of the changing practice of
diplomacy, there is an ongoing debate about
Key Points the continued importance of traditional diplo-
macy and the growing role of citizen diplo-
Two ways to conceptualise changes to diplomatic macy. While Chataway (1998: 272) believes
practice are no change, which favours tradi- that traditional diplomacy is slowly becom-
tional diplomatic practice, and all change, which ing obsolete in the face of rising citizen
prefers the changes being made to diplomacy.
diplomacy, this chapter has argued that tra-
Citizen diplomacy can combine with traditional
ditional diplomacy is instead taking on more
diplomacy to fulfil diplomatic needs.
diverse roles and co-opting citizen diplomacy
into its practice. As Copeland (2009: 178)
states, diplomacy needs the construction of
CONCLUSION a bigger, better tent with larger, more diverse,
crowds inside. This new tent is needed for
Diplomacy has always been a cornerstone of states to fulfil traditional and new roles as
the way societies interact. It is the definition well as for citizen and state-led diplomacy to
of what constitutes a diplomat and diplomacy work efficiently together.
that is highly contentious. This is uncomfort-
able in a field that craves strict definitions.
This chapter has offered examples of what REFERENCES
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43
Celebrity Diplomacy
Mark Wheeler
INTRODUCTION policymaking and the social media, there has

been a reconfiguration of international public
This chapter examines the rise of transnational opinion from elite interest to grassroots
forms of celebrity diplomacy the representation.
employment of well-known or famous Invariably, this use of celebrity diplomats
individuals to publicize international causes is presented as an anti-democratic phenom-
and to engage in foreign policy decision- enon in which celebrities are accused of
making circles. International governmental reinforcing global NorthSouth stereotypes
organizations (IGOs) including the United by academics working within the fields of
Nations (UN) have a long-standing tradition political communications, media studies
of appointing Goodwill Ambassadors and and development studies (Kellner, 2010;
Messengers of Peace. In turn, non- Polman, 2011; Kapoor, 2012).Conversely,
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Relations scholar Andrew
the Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children, F. Cooper conceives celebrity diplomacy
have been represented by celebrity advocates. as an alternative form of agency in which
These developments emerged from a transition stars fill the void in public trust vacated by
from state-centric to public diplomatic state- the international political classes (Cooper,
people and peoplepeople initiatives (see 2008). Within this schema, celebrity diplo-
Chapters 35 and 42 in this Handbook). A new macy contrasts with Westphalian traditions
currency of public diplomacy has occurred founded on the values of state security and
in which emotion and rhetoric help shape the hard power. Consequently, proponents of
outcome of international affairs. Moreover, celebrity diplomacy claim that stars provide
with the rise of 24/7 news programming and a greater openness in diplomatic endeavours,
the accompanying CNN effect on foreign thereby constructing a consensus for local,
Celebrity Diplomacy 531
supranational and global initiatives. These This has been presented as being part of a
types of track-2 diplomacy mean that stars Realist discourse in which matters of ethics
not only bring public attention to international and emotional value are secondary to the com-
activities but can apply pressure for meaning- plexities of the global state system. Moreover,
ful change in foreign policymaking. These public diplomacy in which governments
concerns accord to Joseph Nyes concept of influence international attitudes regarding their
soft power, which refers to the ability to affect national images remained defined by state
reform through the processes of attraction interest and power. While the communication
rather than coercion or payment (Nye, 2004). of intercultural interests existed beyond the
This chapter will analyse, assess and traditional forms of diplomacy, governmental
explain whether celebrity diplomats have ministers, embassy diplomats and consular
effected a politics of attraction through officials used public relations strategies to
which they may legitimize their positions effect agendas within the international media.
within the global public sphere. Such soft Further, cultural, arts and exchange based dip-
power potential will be unpacked to ask if lomatic initiatives were developed by state-
celebrities can effectively lend their weight sponsored institutions such as the United
to transnational forms of diplomatic engage- States Information Agency (USIA), the British
ment. Consequently, this chapter will situ- Council, the Voice of America and the British
ate celebrity diplomacy within a broader Broadcasting Corporations (BBC) World
view of the concepts associated with public Service (Cull, 2010).
diplomacy; provide case studies in relation However, as the nature of media coverage
to IGOs, NGOs and go it alone forms of has expanded with the rise of 24/7 global
humanitarian initiatives (Bono, Bob Geldof); news programming in which the decentraliza-
and will discuss the creditability (or not) of tion and fragmentation of opinion has inten-
these types of celebrity-driven affective sified, these traditions of diplomacy are being
capacities. As Geoffrey Wiseman notes, we challenged (see Chapter 8 in this Handbook).
are investing our emotions, our time and our Moreover, the rise of social media networks
money in celebrity activities and [need to places a greater emphasis on interactive and
know] whether this is a sound investment person-to-person communications. These
(Wiseman, 2009: 5). This chapter argues that developments have been tied together with
celebrity diplomacy is an important phenom- a democratization of foreign policy in which
enon which cannot be ignored as it is creat- global concerns are placed on the popular
ing new forms of diplomatic endeavour in the agenda. Therefore, a new public diplomacy
arena of international affairs. has emerged in the wake of alternative com-
munications through which non-state actors
(NSAs) and civil society organizations
(CSOs) have promoted cultural interchanges
CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY AS PART OF to mobilize public interest to advance their
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY causes (Melissen, 2011).
In this respect, a new currency of public
The traditions of diplomacy have been seen as diplomacy emerges in which emotional rhet-
a coordination of state interests with broader oric and values become key bargaining tools.
conceptions of collective security and eco- Geoffrey Pigman comments that CSOs,
nomic power. The mechanisms of bargaining including non-governmental organizations
and cooperation have been utilized as a diplo- (NGOs) such as Greenpeace, use direct
matic currency for example by British action techniques to become newsworthy and
Foreign Office mandarins, ambassadors and achieve public visibility. Pigman also notes
United States (US) State Department officials. that so-called eminent person diplomats
have made their presence felt on the inter- goals (Tsaliki et.al., 2011: 300). Through
national stage through developments such as their charismatic authority they complement
the Elders Programme to raise public aware- the work of NGOs to establish a discourse
ness and affect diplomatic responses about within the global civil society about such
the war in Darfur (Pigman, 2010: 889). This organizations activities.
initiative was constructed by the musician In turn, Andrew Cooper maintains that if
Peter Gabriel and the Virgin Media entrepre- public diplomacy is married to more open-
neur Sir Richard Branson and included the ended versions of individual agency, then
late South African President Nelson Mandela traditional forms of state-centric diplomacy
and former US President Jimmy Carter. are eroded (Cooper, 2008: 2). He argues that
Within this sub-category, Pigman com- celebrity diplomacy creates a new space in
ments that celebrities have influenced which stars provide a conduit between the
humanitarian initiatives (for example, public and foreign affairs to overcome the
through Live Aid, Live-8, and numerous disconnect which has occurred as official
charities in telethons), and that the United diplomats have sought to husband informa-
Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) and UN tion rather than share it (Cooper, 2008: 113
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 14). Consequently, celebrities can provide
have used Goodwill Ambassadors (Pigman, points of identification to mobilize public
2010: 97). This proliferation of celebrity rep- opinion for diplomatic reform. Therefore,
resentations reflects a broader set of social, Cooper identifies celebrity diplomacy as an
political and international changes within alternative form of agency (see Chapter 7 in
diplomatic practices. As Pigman points out this Handbook) which has the potential to
(2010: 967): define international communication agendas:
It makes sense to consider the activities of these The power of agency and its adaptive capa-
individuals as diplomacy because, importantly at bilities is captured by the continued rise of
least when they are successful they and the mes- Angelina Jolie Jolie has exhibited many of the
sages that they bear are received by the interlocu- potential strengths, in part because of her ability to
tor with which they wish to communicate. They mix art and real life. Starring in adventure films in
are accredited as having standing and legitimacy exotic locations provided added credibility to her
by the counterparts to whom they seek to negoti- frontline activity as a UN Goodwill Ambassador
ate. They are engaging in the core diplomatic func- and her more recent ventures into freelance diplo-
tions of representation and communication and matic activity. It also reflected an immense amount
by doing so they play a key role in mediating of personal growth caused by [her] grow-
estrangement between other actors. ing appreciation of what her role could be.
(Cooper, 2008: 116)
Therefore, celebrity activists have shifted the
focus away from state-directed types of Cooper contends that celebrities not only
public diplomacy to bring attention to more draw public attention and actively promote
cosmopolitan concerns related to global citi- causes but are ideational figures who frame
zenship and mutual solidarity. Lisa Tsaliki, and sell ideas within the international com-
Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos and Asteris munity (Cooper, 2008: 10). This enables them
Huliaras argue that celebrity activists can to employ their rhetorical power within the
bridge the gap between Western audiences centres of diplomatic power, such as the US
and faraway tragedies by using their fame to Department of State and the United Nations.
publicize international events (Tsaliki et al., Cooper defines this as the Bonoization of
2011: 299). Celebrity diplomats provide a diplomacy, suggesting that celebrity advo-
creditable lead through the non- cates, such as the U2 singer Bono (Paul
confrontational reordering of political and David Hewson), have placed causes such as
economic forces in the service of global world debt on the international agenda.
Further, he argues that decision-makers can HISTORICAL AND

benefit from the favourable public opinion CONTEMPORANEOUS FORMS OF
engendered through such an association CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED
with celebrities. This mutuality of interests NATIONS, NGOS AND FREELANCE
means that celebrities can gain an unprece-
ACTIVISTS
dented amount of face-to-face time with
leaders, meaning that stars may advance their
causes. Pigman makes a useful distinction between
Coopers celebrity diplomacy thesis those celebrities who have represented a supra-
accords with Joseph Nyes concept of soft national institution and others who have
power as it suggests that change occurs endorsed international causes, such as Live Aid
through attraction rather than carrots or or Product RED (Pigman, 2010: 87). In the
sticks (Nye, 2004). In terms of nation states, case of the former, there is a significant history
this power derives from the legitimacy of a of celebrity endorsement concerning IGOs and
societys culture, political ideals, and poli- NGOs. This has been complemented by the
cies directed towards other countries. At rise of more freelance forms of celebrity diplo-
the more individualist level, Cooper con- macy, such as Bob Geldofs emotive response
tends that celebrity diplomats have utilized to the famines in Ethopia with the initial crea-
the politics of attraction to legitimize them- tion of Band Aid and release of the Feed the
selves within the global public sphere and World charity single leading to the Live Aid
to access networks of power (Cooper, 2008: Global concerts in 1985.
10). This soft power potential has meant When UNICEF appointed the movie actor
celebrity diplomats have lent their weight Danny Kaye in 1954 as its first Ambassador-
to sell transnational campaigns within a at-large, it was the start of the UNs policy to
commercially driven news media. In this employ celebrities to raise funds, affect dip-
manner, celebrities have utilized their star lomatic agendas and draw attention to devel-
power to affect pressure upon diplomats, opment causes. As Mr UNICEF Kaye,
international policymakers and national lead- and his fellow Goodwill Ambassador Peter
ers. Therefore, it remains necessary to con- Ustinov, were seen as good international
sider the activities, roles and techniques that citizens who could engender a thick layer
celebrities have used in order to examine the of goodwill for UNICEF (Ling, 1984: 9).
nature and extent of their influence within the The celebrity who provided the template for
diplomatic arena. this glamorous conformity was Audrey
Hepburn (Cooper, 2008: 18). She made visits
to Ethiopia and Somalia with little fear for
her personal safety, met African Leaders and
Key Points
took causes to the US Senate. Hepburn used
Traditional forms of diplomacy are being chal- her fame to promote UNICEFs humanitar-
lenged by the rise of public diplomacy. ian causes and refused to take political sides
The rise of global communications means that by insisting the worst violence in Africa was
international public opinion is a growing resource widespread poverty (Ling, 1984: 20).
which is contested by both elite and grassroots As celebrity activity in the 1980s and
organizations.
1990s increased, with the further employ-
Celebrity diplomacy has emerged as there has
been a democratization of the foreign policy ment of Goodwill Ambassadors by UNICEF
process. and other agencies, notably the Office of
Celebrity diplomacy shares a number of charac- the United Nations High Commissioner for
teristics with soft power, such as the politics of Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health
attraction. Organization (WHO), celebrities decided to
become politically engaged. In this transform- epitomized Annans belief that through
ative era of celebrity diplomacy stars felt that celebrity diplomacy the UNs mission for
they should use their fame to expose human universalism would be enhanced.
rights injustices. This led to several UN These forms of transnational star activism
Goodwill Ambassadors, including Richard have moved beyond the institutional con-
Gere and Mia Farrow, going distinctly off- fines of the UN as NGOs have used global
message when they criticized the organi- celebrities to publicize their activities and
zations moral stance. Another Goodwill direct media attention to issues. For instance,
Ambassador, Harry Belafonte, even accused Jolie has worked independently from the UN
George W. Bush of being the greatest terrorist and has collaborated with Peter Gabriel in
in the world when visiting the late Venezuela his Witness Programme, which documents
President Hugh Chavez. human rights abuses and establishes poli-
When Kofi Annan was appointed as the cies for international justice. Similarly, the
UN Secretary-General in 1997, he oversaw singer Annie Lennox has accompanied her
a public relations revolution which engaged role as a United Nations Education Science
in the wide-scale employment of Goodwill and Culture Organization (UNESCO)
Ambassadors. He believed celebrities could Goodwill Ambassador with active support
influence international public opinion to for Amnesty International, Greenpeace and
support the UNs goals of idealism and uni- Burma UK. The American Red Cross utilizes
versalism. Moreover, the usage of celebrity a 50-member Celebrity Cabinet that includes
diplomacy intensified with Annans creation Jamie Lee Curtis, Jane Seymour, L.L. Cool J.
of Messengers of Peace drawn from famous and Jackie Chan.
individuals who could perpetuate the aims of In matching up the celebrity with the
the UN Charter. For instance, George Clooney NGO, the fit between the motivations of a
became a Messenger of Peace because he celebrity and a charity is a priority. One of the
supported NGO projects in war-torn Darfur. most successful linkages occurred when the
He was seen to be effective in fronting a late Princess Diana became an advocate for
humanitarian campaign forged from a coali- the banning of landmines when she agreed to
tion of groups ranging from political liber- endorse the Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
als, the African-American community and She had become involved with MAG when
the Christian Right. In 2007, he co-founded representing UK Red Cross as part of her
a non-profit organization called Not on Our responsibilities as the wife of Prince Charles.
Watch to bring resolution to the conflict in However, she realized her image of glamour
Darfur and draw attention to human rights with compassion could deliver a message for
abuses in Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe. which she had a very personal concern. In
In raising the UNs profile for liberal making her trips to Angola and Bosnia to pub-
internationalism, the most spectacular suc- licize the landmines issue, Princess Dianas
cess is the film actress Angelina Jolie whose enthusiasm for the cause was evident from
image was transformed from a Hollywood her comment that: This is the type of format
wild-child to a credible celebrity diplomat. Ive been looking for (Cooper, 2008: 26).
Undoubtedly, she knows that her fame, Yet events and media perceptions also
beauty and photogenic qualities can attract shaped how the landmines message was pub-
the worlds media to promote the causes licized and received. Princess Diana was due
she endorses. Yet, Jolies emotive responses to attend the first major ceremony concern-
were seen to be legitimate when she pub- ing the banning of landmines on 1 September
lished her diaries about her visits to refugee 1997 when she was killed in a car crash in
camps, which appeared to be serious and Paris. However, she was so closely associ-
well-informed. Therefore, Jolies activism ated with the cause that her influence on the
campaign proved to be instrumental even Cooper contends that he is an anti-diplomat

after her death. Bob Geldof had some time who smashes through the niceties of diplo-
before this understood that a royal seal of macy to achieve his goals (Cooper, 2008: 52).
approval, in his case from Prince Charles and His verbal belligerence and desire for per-
Princess Dianas attendance at the opening sonal recognition has been countered by his
of his 1985 Live Aid show, was necessary to genuine sense of compassion, organizational
provide credibility for the entire enterprise of skills and realization of the power of public
aid (Geldof, 2005). spectacle. It is noted that Geldof, whatever
Geldofs globally televised Live Aid shows responses he arouses, has demonstrated a
reconfigured the publics attitude towards long-term commitment to his endeavours.
charities by demonstrating that fundraising Further, U2 became a major international
could be desirable. On 24 October 1984, the act on the back of their appearance within
BBC News correspondent Michael Buerk the globally televised Live Aid concerts and
filed a devastating report about the widespread their front-man Bono has utilized his fame
starvation of Ethiopian refugees in camps at to break down the spheres of entertainment
Korem. In the resulting outpouring of pub- and global advocacy to become the celebrity
lic grief the horrified Geldof, the front man spokesman on human rights.
of a fading post-punk band The Boomtown Bono has been responsible for tilting much
Rats, became an unlikely celebrity humani- of the focus of celebrity advocacy toward
tarian. He cajoled 45 UK pop stars includ- poverty in the developing states of the global
ing Bono, George Michael and Sting to form economy (Cooper, 2008). He has placed an
Band Aid, which recorded a charity single emphasis on direct action and building effec-
Do They Know its Christmas (1984). The tive institutions, while using his fame to gain
record raised millions of pounds. This led to an inside track to lobby governments. The
Geldof quite forcefully persuading celebri- rock singer is the co-founder and remains the
ties such as Bowie, Paul McCartney, Mick public face of the One Campaign and DATA
Jagger, Lionel Ritchie and Elton John, along (Debt, Aids, Trade Africa) which promote the
with bands including Dire Straits, Queen, U2 ending of extreme poverty, the fighting of the
and The Who, into performing at the simul- AIDs pandemic and international debt relief.
taneous Live Aid concerts in London and He was also instrumental, along with Jeffrey
Philadelphia on 13 July 1985. Sachs, Bobby Shriver and Paul Farmer, in the
The media spectacle brought the plight of construction of Product RED, which com-
the starving Ethiopians to the attention of two bined celebrity activism with corporate social
billion viewers across 160 countries and chal- responsibility (Nike, Apple, Gap) to support
lenged them to contribute to the cause, not the Global Fund in its fight to stem the spread
least due to Geldofs impatience. Because the of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in
BBC failed to effectively advertise the phone Africa.
numbers available for public donations, only As a regular speaker at the G8, the Davos
a relatively small amount of money had been World Economic Forum and World Bank
raised. Consequently, Live Aid is remem- meetings, Bonos views on aid and debt
bered for Geldofs (in)famous outburst on a relief for developing nations have garnered
pre-watershed channel which has inaccurately the attention of world leaders, senior poli-
gone down in folklore as Give me the Fucking cymakers, NGOs, the media and the public.
Money! Live Aid raised a global total of 50 Consequently, he has utilized his position as
million and Geldofs indignant behaviour was a global performer to bring politicians and
seen to be crucial to its success (Gray, 2005). corporate executives together (Jackson, 2008:
Geldofs anger has been a key determinant 218). Undoubtedly, Bono has demonstrated
in his approach to international relations. tenacity in establishing political alliances not
only with liberal figures such as Bill Clinton QUESTIONING THE WORTH OF
and Bill Gates but with George W. Bush CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY
and Jesse Helms, the late arch-conservative
Senator from North Carolina. He attended The critiques of celebrity diplomacy have sev-
Republican as well as Democratic National eral dimensions. Some celebrity diplomats are
Conventions to extend his message and mobi- accused of debasing the quality of interna-
lize support for his causes. In this manner tional debate, diverting attention from worthy
he achieved cross-party consensus for the causes to those which are sexy and failing
Jubilee 2000 debt relief alliance in Africa and to represent the disenfranchised. They are
placed the issue firmly on the political agenda criticized for being superficial and unac-
in Washington. These forms of political expe-
countable. Concerns are raised that Goodwill
dience have been necessary to achieve the
Ambassadors trivialize the UNs mission.
greater good of aid reform.
Mark D. Alleyne argues that the UNs deploy-
Cooper notes how Bono has used his fame
ment of Goodwill Ambassadors has been elit-
to gained entrance to the corridors of power
ist and ethno-centric. He maintains that the
by appealing to modern leaders such as Tony
employment of celebrities was part of a gen-
Blair and Bill Clinton due to their fascination
eral malaise in which a desperate UN incorpo-
with popular culture (Cooper, 2008: 38). Yet,
rated public relations techniques into its
as he has engaged with compromised leaders
marketing so that the international media
such as George W. Bush and Blair, alongside
would provide it with a favourable coverage
illiberal figures such as Vladimir Putin, Bono
has been accused of being an impotent bard (Alleyne, 2005: 176). Essentially, Alleyne
of the powerful (Monbiot, 2005). Others argues that this is a shallow approach to solv-
have suggested that Bonos proclamations ing crises, reinforcing ethnic stereotypes by
have been a good way of selling tickets for his perpetuating an imbalanced view of need and
band and assuaging Western consumer guilt. offering a primarily meliorative approach,
With the increase in celebrity diplomacy, the giving succour to the incapacitated rather than
worth of such activism has been questioned hope for a better life through programmes of
and its impact on cultural and political prac- education, consciousness-raising and cultural
tices has become more controversial. affirmation (Alleyne, 2003: 77).
Moreover, Lisa Richey and Stefano Ponte
contend the celebrity activism that occurred
Key Points in relation to Band Aid was commoditized
into Brand Aid. This meant that major cor-
Celebrity diplomacy has been associated with
IGOs such as the UN and most especially the porations and celebrities combined to support
UNICEF Goodwill Ambassadors scheme. charities aimed at African poverty. As these
There was an exponential increase in UN apparently ethical forms of behaviour sell
Goodwill Ambassadors when former Secretary- suffering to the public, Richey and Ponte
General Kofi Annan engaged in a public relations argue that aid causes have become brands to
revolution designed to promote the UNs liberal be bought and sold in the global marketplace.
international values. Product RED marked the point wherein there
Increasingly, NGOS such as Amnesty and was a fusion of consumption and social causes
Greenpeace have developed ambassadors
so that, the primary goal of RED is not to
schemes.
Freelance celebrity diplomats such as Bob Geldof
push governments to do their part, but to push
and Bono have grown in importance through consumers to do theirs through exercising
charitable records, globally televised concerts their choices (Richey and Ponte, 2011: 334).
and their use of their fame to enter into key Consequently, Richey and Ponte argue
decision-making arenas. that this apparent altruism provides another
means through which corporations may mar- police the boundaries of the publics imagi-
ket themselves in relation to the growing nation (Yrjl, 2011: 187; Dieter and Kumar,
concerns of lifestyle, culture and identity. 2008).
Thus, corporations such as Amex and Armani Such criticisms suggest that this cluster
(sponsors of Product RED) gained from of celebrity activists remain North-centric
developing responsible practices so that actors. Jemima Repo and Riina Yrjl main-
they can brand themselves to a wider contain that the values of celebrity diplomacy
sumer base. However, by focusing the pub- preserve global stereotypes. Principally,
lic attention on the plight of distant others Bono, Geldof and Jolie are represented
they deflect the focus away from their own as selfless Western crusaders dedicated to
dubious behaviour in exploiting cheap labour alleviating the suffering of Africans who
forces in developing states. In this respect, exist outside of the civilized processes of
celebrities lend credence and validate such development, progress, peace and human
ethical corporate behaviour. security. Therefore, celebrities and Africa
Within this schema, Ilan Kapoor contends operate under assumed roles which are pre-
that the ideological underpinnings of celebrity sented as part of a wider discourse about
advocacy are not so much about humanitarian- the natural order of world politics (Repo
ism as about perpetuating a post-democratic and Yrjl, 2011: 57). Celebrity diplomacy
political system which may be characterized indicates an underlying cultural imperialism
by neo-liberalism, self-promotion, brand mar- which has abused the Third World [so that]
keting and the reinforcement of elite-centred the latter becomes [a stage] for First World
politics (Kapoor, 2012). Thus, Geldof and self-promotion and hero-worship, and [the]
Bonos involvement in Live-8 is criticized for dumping ground for humanitarian ideals and
sloganizing poverty, deflecting the publics fantasies (Kapoor, 2011).
attention away from the viability of aid and However, despite the validity of these criti-
being co-opted by an unaccountable politi- cisms, a more nuanced approach to celeb-
cal class (Polman, 2011). Concurrently, anti- rity diplomacy is required. For instance, in
poverty campaigners such as Making Poverty a commercially dictated global media, the
History argue that Live-8 wilfully undermines escalation of UN Goodwill Ambassadors and
their messages of Justice not Charity, steals Messenger of Peace Programmes was one
the media agenda and depoliticizes the cause of the few realistic responses open to Annan
through its construction of a dependency cul- and his successor Ban Ki-Moon, along with
ture (Monbiot, 2005). NGOs, to promote the international com-
Therefore, this has meant that instead of munitys activities (Kellner, 2010: 123). The
Geldof and Bono acting as humane philan- ability of celebrity advocates to bring focus
thropists, in reality they have reinforced the to international campaigns, to impact on
Wests neo-colonial rule over the Global diplomatic agendas and to advocate global
South. According to Andrew Darnton and principles has been of significant worth in
Martin Kirk, the Live Aid Legacy has estab- seeking resolution in a period of sustained
lished an inequitable relationship between international conflict.
Powerful Givers and Grateful Receivers
(Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 6). This dominant
paradigm has meant that aid will magically Key Points
release the victims from the shackles of Celebrity diplomats have been accused of trivial-
Southern societies. Within this apparently izing the debates about poverty and humanitarian
benevolent narrative the focus on the indig- reforms.
enous peoples needs rather than the facili- They serve to reinforce a dominant Western
tation of their creativity has been used to paradigm that indigenous people are victims.
They have been understood as supporting the reforms. Thus, in soft power terms, the poli-
values of global capitalism, reinforcing the power tics of attraction within celebrity-led cam-
of cultural imperialism and assuaging consumer paigns such as Make Poverty History and
guilt. Product RED have facilitated greater forms
Celebrity diplomats have a greater degree of of agency to alleviate global suffering.
autonomy than their critics realize and are nec-
Further, the dialogue between celebrities and
essary to publicize key issues in a commercially
driven global media.
the public has allowed for new opportuni-
ties for public diplomatic engagement. This
has reflected a willingness within audiences
to accept celebrities as authentic advocates
CONCLUSION due to the publics identification with stars.
Consequently, the celebritization of interna-
In analysing celebrity involvement in diplo- tional politics must not be simply dismissed
matic initiatives, a mixed picture has as an erosion of the diplomatic order but
emerged. UN Goodwill Ambassadors and should be understood as part of the transfor-
Messengers of Peace, NGO endorsers and mation processes which are occurring within
famous activists have used their star power to public diplomacy.
affect pressure upon diplomats, international
policymakers and national leaders. As the
critiques of celebrity advocates have indi-
cated, there are dangers in over-simplifying REFERENCES
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44
Digital Diplomacy
Eytan Gilboa
INTRODUCTION and diplomatic legations have created, devel-

oped and adopted new Digital Diplomacy
Information and communication technologies (DD) strategies designed to connect cultures,
(ICTs) have created a global connectivity that increase awareness, and advocate policy posi-
has challenged diplomacy but also created tions (Sarukhan etal., 2012).
opportunities for more effective and innova- Much of the existing research on DD is
tive practice. This connectivity has facilitated limited and has been conducted mostly on
two-way communication between govern- the American experience and public diplo-
ments and foreign publics, between peoples macy (PD) (Digital Diplomacy Bibliography,
and governments, and between and among 2014; Gilboa, 2016a) (see Chapter 35 in this
peoples. Diplomats can now reach and engage Handbook). This isnt surprising because the
large audiences, and citizens can influence for US was the first to adopt DD, has been con-
eign policy and diplomacy as never before. ducting the most intensive DD in the world and
They can also employ ICTs for listening to the American scholars have dominated research
wishes, praise, criticism and reservations of in this field. Yet, the massive concentration of
both domestic and foreign audiences. Although research and analysis on the US experience is
states still remain the dominant actors in inter- limited because it may have missed signifi-
national relations, networking the informal cant national and cultural differences and idi-
sharing of information and services among osyncrasies. Many examples and illustrations
individuals, groups and institutions having a in this chapter are taken from the American
common interest has altered the global case, but they exist in somewhat less devel-
power structure. Adjustment of governments oped formats in the diplomatic establishment
to ICTs was slow but now foreign ministries of many countries.
Digital Diplomacy 541
DEFINITIONS utilization for empowering citizens, promot-

ing greater accountability and building capac-
DD is a relatively new term created by the ity is statecraft (cited in Larson, 2010).
need to explain and analyze the effects of As PD is an integral part of diplomacy and
ICTs, especially the internet and social media, foreign policy, equating DD only with PD is
on the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. misleading because DD serves other signifi-
Scholars and practitioners havent yet found a cant areas of diplomacy. Equating DD with
definition of DD that all can agree on. DD is diplomacy is also misleading because diplo-
often equated, contrasted, or confused with macy is conducted in several areas where
terms such as ediplomacy, cyber diplomacy, ICTs are absent, such as negotiations and
virtual diplomacy, real-time diplomacy, meetings between leaders and diplomats
networked diplomacy or social diplomacy. with government officials and heads of com-
Secretary of State John Kerry (2013) equated panies and organizations. DD also shouldnt
DD with diplomacy: the term digital be equated with ediplomacy, because DD
only provides ICTs for the implementation
diplomacy is almost redundant it is just
of ediplomacy programs. The most useful
diplomacy, period. While DD is increasingly
approach to DD is to view it as an instrument
dominating traditional government-to-
of diplomacy, based on ICTs and serving
government relations and new government-to-
both traditional and new foreign policy goals
people and people-to-people relations, non-
of states and non-state actors.
digital diplomacy still covers many more areas
and issues.
A frequently used definition refers to DD as
the use of the Web, ICTs, and social media tools EVOLUTION
to engage in diplomatic activities and carry out
foreign policy objectives (Sandre, 2013: 9). DD has developed in several stages defined
DD is conducted via digital-based platforms by vision, rapid technological innovations
and tools including websites, blogs, social net- and organizational adoptions by foreign min-
works and smartphones. The web networks of istries. Already in 1968, Leonard Marks, the
Facebook and Twitter have become especially Director of the US Information Agency, envi-
popular channels for communication between sioned a global computer network that would
politicians and officials and the public, and dramatically connect people in the world
between and among peoples. Hence the terms: (Cull, 2013: 1234). Thirty years later, the
Facebook diplomacy and Twiplomacy. Center for Strategic and International Studies
DD is often equated with PD because the published a report generated by a group of
latter is extensively employed to reach diverse scholars, diplomats, journalists and business-
audiences (Gilboa, 2016b). Initially, in 2002, men predicting that the internet would become
the State Department (State) introduced the the central nervous system of international
term ediplomacy, and created a special office relations (Robison & Fulton, 1998). Dizard
to plan and organize relevant programs in (2001) wrote one of the first books on digital
eight different areas, only one of which was diplomacy and complained about the slow,
PD. The others were knowledge management, reluctant adjustment of State to the challenges
information management, consular communi- and opportunities of the information age.
cation and response, disaster response, inter- This approach, however, turned around
net freedom, external resources and policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US
planning (Hanson, 2012a). Cohen argued that decided that the battle for the hearts and
DD utilization for effective and innovative minds of people, especially in the Middle
communication and advocacy is PD, while East, would have to be a central component
of their response to the attacks (Hallams, EFFECTS

2010; Hayden, 2012). In 2002, Secretary of
State Colin Powell established the first task- Diplomats and scholars have argued that DD is
force of ediplomacy which later became the only a new instrument designed to achieve the
Office of ediplomacy (Hanson, 2012b). Until traditional goals of diplomacy. The counter
2009, however, this unit was very small, with argument is that it has caused a paradigmatic
a staff of six employees focusing on the use shift, completely changing the environment
of ICTs for internal purposes. and conduct of diplomacy and the role of dip-
Powells successor, Condoleezza Rice, lomats (Graffy, 2009; Seib, 2012; Bjola and
introduced Transformational Diplomacy, Holmes, 2015; Sandre, 2015). Ross (2011) has
which included a major plan for more and bet- suggested that ICTs have disrupted interna-
ter use of ICTs across the Department of State. tional relations by creating and using new and
In 2006, she established the Digital Outreach innovative channels for diplomatic activity.
Team (DOT) to counter misinformation and The information revolution has changed
explain US policies through direct engagement
the balance of power between governments
with the Muslim world. The breakthrough
and citizens. Institutions became less power-
came under her successor Hilary Clinton, who
ful and the people became more powerful.
adopted a far-reaching vision of DD programs
It has multiplied and diversified the number
and tools under the umbrella of her Twenty-
of actors and interests involved in foreign
first-century Statecraft initiative (Lichtenstein,
policymaking, and has created opportuni-
2010; Sandre, 2015). Clintons approach well
ties for collaboration among them. Foreign
matched the overall characterization of Obama
ministries have more tools to disseminate
as the first American digital president.
more information, more effectively and
Diplomacy 1.0 refers to the passive pres-
entation and consumption of content, pri- more quickly. At the same time, citizens are
marily via email and websites. This format demanding more transparency and accounta-
characterized the DD pursued during the bility, and are debating foreign policy choices
administration of President George W. Bush. with policymakers and among themselves.
Diplomacy 2.0, coined in 2008, primarily ICTs inspired the emergence of citizen
refers to interactivity, sharing user-generated diplomacy ordinary citizens representing
content via platforms such as blogs, forums, their country and even negotiating with the
Wikipedia, Flicker, and the social media officials and citizens of other countries (see
networks of Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, Chapter 42 in this Handbook). This way, DD
YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and Google+. enables politicians and officials to monitor
In Diplomacy 1.0, communication went ver- and listen to domestic and foreign percep-
tically and only in one direction, from gov- tions of their policies and programs.
ernments downward; in Diplomacy 2.0 it has DD is also an effective tool to bypass the
been interactive and horizontal. controlled media in authoritarian states. During
the initial phases of the vicious civil war in
Syria, US ambassador Robert Ford exten-
Key Points sively used the US embassys Facebook page
to bypass the Syrian governments heavy cen-
The evolution of DD was slow due to the stiff
sorship. He wanted to reach as many ordinary
organizational structure and norms of foreign
ministries.
Syrians as possible and tell them the truth about
Dramatic events such as the 9/11 terror attacks, the atrocities (Barry, 2011). DD has been also
and visionary foreign ministers such as Secretary very effective in humanitarian aid and the cri-
of State Hilary Clinton, inspired better and faster sis management of natural disasters such as the
DD practices. earthquakes in Haiti and Japan (Harris, 2013).
DD is more effective for reaching young be cautious and consistent with overall pol-
people, who are more versed in ICTs than icy. On the other hand, DD requires fast and
older people. About half of the worlds popula- sometimes spontaneous responses to devel-
tion is under 30 and lives on-line. Ministries of oping events. If diplomats have to wait too
Foreign Affairs have initiated and implemented long for authorization, they lose the conver-
projects to meet this challenge. The State sation and are excluded from the discussion.
Department created a program to help young Consequently, diplomats have become much
international activists to seek reforms. In 2008, more independent and assertive. This has led to
Facebook was used to organize a strong inter- fruitful engagement but also to blowbacks, the
national protest against the FARC guerrillas in unintended adverse results of a political action
Colombia. The protest led to the establishment or situation. In November 2013, the British
of the Alliance of Youth Movement, a platform Ambassador to Lebanon, Tom Fletcher (2014),
for similar cyber activism (Cartalucci, 2011). wrote a letter to mark the 70th anniversary of
the Lebanese republic. He listed achievements
but also antagonized many Lebanese by offer-
Key Points ing some unsolicited critical advice.
Veteran diplomats think that DD has gone
The debate about the effects of DD on diplomacy too far, is too risky and should be limited.
cuts across both scholars and practitioners.
Other diplomats admit that DD is risky,
There is more agreement now that DD has sig-
especially in social media, but is still worth
nificantly changed the diplomatic landscape and
isnt merely one new tool of diplomacy. pursuing because the alternative is to for-
feit a critical instrument (Wichowski, 2013;
Sandre, 2015). The solution is to better train
diplomats to use DD and trust them to make
DD AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE an effort to avoid mistakes and to increase
collaboration and consultation between the
DD has altered the role of diplomats. One of traditional and the DD diplomats, both at
the main functions of diplomats has always the embassy level and between embassy and
been to gather information about the places headquarters. Diplomats have always needed
they serve in. Since much of this information to be aware of cultural and religious sensitivi-
is now available on the internet, this function ties, but today this imperative is even more
has become less significant. Yet, human significant because once a message is posted
intelligence didnt disappear when new on Facebook or Twitter, it quickly spreads all
sophisticated spying technologies, such as over the world. Foreign Service manuals can
satellites, were developed and activated. help to reduce the risks, but they tell diplo-
Likewise, diplomats still directly receive sen- mats mostly what not to do. They all require
sitive information from policymakers that isnt significant revisions and adjustments to DD.
available from open sources, and are there- DD has inspired innovations such as the
fore in a much better position to assess the Virtual Student Foreign Service (2014),
importance and validity of the information which began in 2009 and was designed to
that is available on the internet. engage civil society in the work of the gov-
DD has atomized the Foreign Service and ernment by harnessing the expertise and
created tension between diplomats stationed digital excellence of US citizen students. The
abroad and foreign ministries (Sarukhan etal., students have contributed skills and creativ-
2012). The Foreign Service is very hierarchi- ity entirely remotely to numerous projects in
cal. Official statements and activities in the areas such as human rights, environmental
field require authorization from headquarters protection and economics, sponsored by several
which could take days, because they have to departments and agencies.
DD has also inspired the establishment of 2014, about three quarters of world leaders
virtual embassies. In 2007, Sweden opened had a Twitter account compared to only half
the first virtual embassy in the virtual world in 2012. Leaders and government agencies
of Second Life (http://secondlife.com/). It including embassies use Twitter to document
more resembles the routine work of the cul- their most significant daily activities, to com-
tural attach office as it offers information municate with foreign and domestic audi-
about Swedish culture, tours of museums ences, to answer questions and comments,
and on-line courses. In 2011, the US opened and to exchange views in open forums with
a virtual embassy in Teheran, Iran, which their colleagues and counterparts. In the net-
broke diplomatic relations with the US after worked world, diplomats have to be out-
the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis (Ryan and standing communicators.
Frantz, 2014: 8). This virtual embassy was Any foreign policy, particularly of great
designed to create a direct channel of infor- and intermediate powers, is too complex to
mation and dialogue with the Iranian public. explain in 140 characters. It is difficult to
In the absence of its ability to establish dip- succinctly compose but easy to read and fol-
lomatic relations with Arab states, in 2013 low. Twitter forces diplomats to distill their
Israel founded its first virtual embassy on governments message to its essence. Twitter
Twitter to promote dialogue with the popula- is best to send quick messages or to amplify
tion of six gulf countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, them. It is also best for gathering informa-
Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates tion on leaders and major political, economic
and Abu Dhabi. In these cases, the virtual and social processes. Leaders and foreign
embassies substituted the functions of real ministers use Twitter to promote longer pres-
embassies in states where normal diplomatic entations that they place in blogs or in other
relations couldnt be established or were bro- forums. Tweets are used to initiate a commu-
ken. The virtual embassies had only limited nication with foreign leaders, and move them
success. The US virtual embassy in Teheran to the traditional government-to-government
didnt help to inspire a widespread resistance diplomacy. In May 2012, the Swedish for-
to the Iranian extreme theocracy, and Sweden eign minister, Carl Bildt, was unable to con-
closed its virtual embassy in 2013. nect with the foreign minister of Bahrain,
Khalid Al Khalifa. He tweeted him and got
an immediate response on Twitter and on the
Key Points phone (Sandre, 2013: 28).
Re-tweets amplify messages. Three com-
DD has created a dilemma for the Foreign Service munities in foreign countries are especially
because it requires fast responses which could be
relevant: the local media, the diplomatic
careless and counterproductive.
On the other hand, it offers opportunities to
community and the home state diaspora.
establish innovative mechanisms for diplomacy Ministries and embassies push national media
such as virtual embassies and, in the case of the outlets in foreign countries to cite as many
US, a Student Foreign Service. tweets as possible, written and transmitted by
agencies as well as by embassies and other
diplomatic legations. The diplomatic com-
munity in any country often follows what
TWIPLOMACY colleagues are tweeting and disseminating
messages to their own audiences. This prac-
Twitter was developed in 2006 and has tice is especially effective when countries
become a very popular DD instrument collaborate on certain issues or adopt similar
(Sandre, 2013, 2015; Bastianello, 2014). In opinions.
A few examples demonstrate Twiplomacy AUDIENCES

(Sandre, 2013: 303). British foreign minister
William Hague initiated a Meet the Foreign Traditional diplomacy was used only in con-
Secretary channel to improve his relations nection with foreign governments and peo-
with domestic and foreign audiences. He ples. DD is much broader and is used to reach
solicited tweets on questions such as the idea, and engage three types of audiences: internal,
innovation, or trend that will have the greatest domestic and foreign. Internal audience refers
impact on the world in the next 20 years, or the to people and units inside the ministry of for-
priorities the Foreign Office should adopt for eign affairs and other relevant agencies. The
the next year. Susan Rice, the US Ambassador domestic audience is citizens and residents of
to the UN, was the first to use Twitter from the a country. The foreign audience is people in
closed doors of the UN Security Council, and another country or around the world.
became one of the most followed diplomats Foreign ministries first used DD for internal
in the world. When in 2010 Dino Patti Djalal purposes. It helped to better coordinate policies,
became the Indonesian Ambassador to the US, programs, responses and initiatives with other
he said he would be Indonesians first Twitter branches of the foreign policy and national
Ambassador. In two years he got around security establishment. It also significantly as
100,000 followers and became the most fol- sisted the steering, oversight and evaluation of
lowed ambassador in Washington. When diplomatic activities. The Department of State
Michael McFaul became US ambassador to developed several DD tools for internal com-
Russia in 2011, he pioneered the use of Twitter munication and coordination (Hanson, 2012a),
as an embassy tool. He explained that Twitter based on digital concepts such as Wikipedia
allowed him to interact with a high school stu- and Facebook. Search was established in 2004
dent in Vladivostok or a minister in the Russian and functions as a documentation archive.
government without having to go through the Communities@State was inaugurated in 2005
Russian government (Landler, 2014). and contains issue specific blogs. Diplopedia
In 2009, the US employed Twitter to encour- was established in 2006. It looks like Wikipedia
age protests in Iran against the regimes rig- and performs similar functions of providing
ging of the presidential elections. The effort, information on people, events, processes and
however, boomeranged because the Basij par- so on. Sounding Board was founded in 2009
amilitaries used Twitter to identify, hunt and and serves as a platform to solicit ideas and
execute protesters (Burns and Eltham, 2009). innovation directly from States employees.
Sometimes, information alone cant cope Established in 2011, Corridor, like LinkedIn, is
with violent repression, and social media can a professional networking site.
even become a double-edged sword. In the globalization and information age,
the traditional distinction between domestic
and foreign policy and between domestic
Key Points and foreign audiences has become blurred
(see Chapter 5 in this Handbook). In the
Twiplomacy is used for several purposes but past, the life of ordinary citizens was not
mostly for fast and concise exchanges. affected by developments and events in other
Diplomats who know best when and how to use
parts of the world they were not interested
Twitter become popular, attract many followers
and have more opportunities to influence lead-
in foreign affairs, didnt know much about
ers and public opinion. Yet, chatting on social them and trusted their leaders to formulate and
media is difficult to record and evaluate, and implement the right policies. Today, all these
Twiplomacy is seen in several countries, like elements have changed. The life of citizens is
China, as intrusive. affected by world events and people want to
know more and to participate in discussions all over the world, is now a significant source
about foreign policy. of information worldwide (Byrne and
In view of these transformations, policy- Johnston, 2015). The interactive social media
makers employ DD, especially social media, created public diplomacy 2.0 (Dale, 2009).
for several functions: to investigate what the PD is pursued via several instruments such as
public thinks about foreign policy choices; to advocacy, media relations, cultural diplomacy,
educate the public about foreign policy and international exchanges, international broad-
international relations; to explain challenges casting, nation-branding and international pub-
and alternative means to address them; and lic relations. Most of these instruments include
to cultivate public support for policies they a digital component. For example, interna-
have selected. This use of DD could be called tional exchanges are conducted in a traditional
domestic DD. The Canadian Department of way, but if participants in a specific program
Foreign Affairs and International Trade was interact among themselves and with sponsor-
the first ministry of foreign affairs to consult ing institutions via Facebook or Twitter, they
the domestic public via DD and other means create digital international exchanges (Ryan
on foreign policy priorities (Potter, 2008: 126). and Frantz, 2014: 7).
Very few studies have examined the
organizational and planning aspects of DPD.
Key Points Zhang (2013) identified four phases in DPD
strategic issue management: (1) ferment-
DD is employed to reach and engage three differing; (2) proactive; (3) reactive; and (4) new
ent audiences: internal, domestic and foreign.
fermenting. Social media are largely tacti-
The challenge is how to formulate and transmit
cal tools in the first and the last phases, and
messages that would meet the different needs
and interests of each audience. may become strategic tools in the proactive
and reactive phases, in which diplomats may
use them to reinforce a favorable viral trend,
build an agenda, or respond to a conflict.
DIGITAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (DPD) Park and Lim (2014) found that Japan had
a strong internal DPD network infrastruc-
DPD reaches foreign audiences. ICTs have ture achieved through dispersed connections
significantly affected the practice and theory and partnerships, while Korea had a central-
of PD because they have created a global ized network, including a limited number of
arena for direct information dissemination dominant actors. This comparative analysis
and interactivity. Almost all states and non- of DPD is rare. Kersaint (2014) is also an
state actors maintain websites and blogs to exception. She closely compared the DPDs
present their history, policies, values, culture, of the US and Germany and identified both
science and other achievements as well as differences and similarities.
positions on current affairs and policies. Several studies found poor and ineffective
During diplomacy 1.0, ICTs provided actors utilization of DPD. Nurmi (2012) revealed
with ample opportunities to present them- that the Finnish missions abroad failed to
selves in creative textual and visual formats exploit DPD for dialogue and interactivity,
designed to cultivate positive support or attack and instead employed them as traditional
opponents. The cumulative effect of using media. Grincheva (2012) used the rhetorical
ICTs for self-promotion has created compet- lenses of the European discourse on cultural
ing e-images. NGOs and terrorist organiza- agenda and found that the UK DD hardly
tions have been particularly effective in using went beyond the traditional cultural promo-
ICTs to promote their causes and actions. tion. Natarajan (2014) examined uses of nar-
Wikipedia, written by ordinary citizens from ratives in Indias PD and concluded that DPD
should be used only within the context of a it seems that the medium, rather than critical
larger set of diplomatic practices. interests, has become the main message. DD
Considerable research was conducted on offers tools. Selection of a tool has to be
the DPD of President Barack Obama. Khatib based on clear goals and strategies, otherwise
etal. (2012) examined efforts to engage Arab it would be floating directionless. DD doesnt
audiences in Obamas Cairo speech of June replace traditional government-to-govern-
4, 2009. They exposed the limits of DPD in ment diplomacy and the new media doesnt
trying to engage hostile audiences. Ciolek replace the traditional media (newspapers,
(2010) analyzed the use of Facebook by radio and television). There is a clear need
the US embassy in Jakarta to engage young for a balance between traditional diplomacy
Indonesians in dialogue about Obamas visit and DD, between soft and hard power,
to Indonesia in 2010. In just a few months, between the new and the traditional media
the Facebook pages for the embassy and two and between governments and citizens.
consulates had more fans than all other US DD can be used for both good and ill pur-
embassies and missions combined. Hayden poses. DD seems to punish moderation and
etal. (2013) investigated information gener- amplify the messages of extreme and vio-
ated by the US embassy Facebook sites in lent movements. Terrorist organizations have
Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan in the 2012 effectively used social media to recruit fight-
presidential elections. Much of the communi- ers and supporters, raise funds, glorify actions,
cation on these sites were praise and blame challenge rules and norms and delegitimize
of Obama and American political institu- states and regimes (Weimann, 2014). This
tions. All these studies, however, present only practice can be vividly seen in the appalling
isolated and disconnected islands of research. use of social media since 2014 by the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist organi-
zation. Despite the innovative DD efforts of
Key Points the State Departments Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism and Communication, it
DPD is the most researched area in DD. Re seems that the West hasnt yet been able to
searchers have used similar methods: quantita- mount an effective DD counter campaign.
tive content analysis of messages, responses and Julian Assanges WikiLeaks and Edward
exchanges, interviews with policymakers and
Snowdens revelations about abuses in the
diplomats, and data collection and analysis with
American military and national security sys-
techniques employed in internet studies.
The different and interesting studies, however, tem demonstrate how ICTs can be used to
have not yet produced cumulative knowledge. damage and embarrass the foreign policy and
The main reason for this deficiency is the absence national security establishment (Cull, 2011).
of a clear and rigorous research agenda. They also demonstrate the importance of the
traditional media even in the information age.
Both Assange and Snowden assembled and
posted a large volume of secret information
LIMITS AND CHALLENGES on the web, but used newspapers and net-
works to reach elites and gain credibility.
The enthusiasm around DD has obscured Measuring the impact of DD is difficult
several lingering challenges and problems. (Wallin, 2013). Several organizations and
DD isnt a magic solution to weaknesses in private companies have established DD
the formulation and implementation of for- monitoring systems and built big data banks.
eign policy. DD has to be connected not only These sources provide interesting statisti-
to people but also to strategic purposes and cal information on the spread and popular-
national communication strategies. At times, ity of social media accounts and networks.
Each focuses on certain dimensions of DD. using the term Diplomacy 3.0, but others
Twitalyzer (2014) developed a 0-to-100 index prefer terms such as networking. For the
that combines influence, number of followers Department of State, Diplomacy 3.0 is one
and frequency of message writing. Burson- essential pillar of foreign policy with the
Marsteller (2014) monitors and analyzes other two being defense and development.
Twitter accounts of leaders and governments. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the ini-
Agence France Presse (2014) established in tiator of the Stockholm Initiative for Digital
2012 the e-diplomacy hub for monitoring, Diplomacy, thinks that Diplomacy 3.0 means
visualizing, analyzing and measuring the replacing national DD and social media with
presence and influence of diplomatic actors collaborative international effort and multilat-
on Twitter across the globe and in real time. eral digital diplomacy (Sandre, 2014, 2015).
Technical counting of contacts, the number Scholars have argued that networks are
of followers on a Facebook page of a ministry much more significant than a specific tech-
or an embassy, the number of times people use nology or platform (Zharana et al., 2013).
content, or the number of re-tweets are insuf- Any transition from diplomacy 2.0 to another
ficient to verify engagement processes and phase will have to resemble the quantum leap
content. If the same people follow each other, found in the transition from diplomacy 1.0 to
they wont reach the diverse audiences they diplomacy 2.0. Diplomacy 3.0 will exist only
claim to have been engaging with. Twitter can after social media has been further developed
only be an effective DD tool when it leads to or even replaced by a newer technology or
an open conversation, not to a monologue. conceptual paradigm.
Sending messages has become easier but Scholars and diplomats argue that the most
also challenging. Leaders and organizations powerful nations in the future will be those
use ICTs as alternative channels to push the with the most connections and those at the
same message. But the best use of ICTs is to center of the most networks, rather than those
offer information, context and analysis that with the largest armies. Similar statements
otherwise isnt available. Leaders are still were made after the end of the Cold War,
sending one message in a native language but given the current high levels of intra- and
for the domestic audience and another in interstate violence, these assessments may be
English to foreign audiences. This practice is premature. Even if Slaughter (2009) is cor-
quickly and easily exposed and doesnt work rect and connectedness is power, there is
anymore. When so many people and organi- still much to investigate into how different
zations employ DD, the challenge is how types of connections and networks are initi-
to keep a consistent message, how to avoid ated, developed and maintained.
sending content that people dont want and DD provides new tools for diplomats to
how to add a personal tone to an official posi- make foreign policy and diplomacy more
tion. With so many networks, the challenge is efficient, more inclusive and more engaging.
also how to select a specific platform to send a In using DD, however, diplomats must be
specific message, such as Facebook, Twitter, careful not to undermine traditional relation-
YouTube, Pinterest, Flickr, or Google+. ships. In certain situations, face-to-face com-
munication is the preferred method not DD
(Vanc, 2012). Based on scholarly research
and practical experience, several experts have
CONCLUSION suggested useful guidelines for the cautious
and effective utilization of DD. These prin-
Experts have claimed that Diplomacy 2.0 is ciples could help to address the limitations
already obsolete but the next phase is con- and challenges of DD (Glassman, 2008; Cull,
fused and being debated. Several are already 2011: 7; Sandre, 2013: 6070; Sandre, 2015).
DD is an exciting developing field for both Cartalucci, Tony (2011). Googles revolution
research and practice. Research on DD, how- factory Alliance of Youth Movements:
ever, is especially difficult because ICTs are Color Revolution 2.0. Global Research,
invented, developed, modified and applied February 19. Retrieved 5/12/14. http://www.
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a l l i a n c e - o f - y o u t h - m o v e m e n t s - c o l o r-
patterns of diplomacy that need constant
revolution-2-0/23283
monitoring and updating. Research on DD is Ciolek, Melanie (2010). Understanding social
also challenging because it requires a com- medias contribution to public diplomacy:
plex multi-disciplinary effort, new and inno- how Embassy Jakartas Facebook outreach
vative methods and frameworks for analysis, illuminates the limitations and potential
and much greater collaboration between for the State Departments use of social
scholars and practitioners. There are many media. CPD Paper. Los Angeles: USC Center
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b e s t - s t u d e n t - p a p e r- 2 0 1 0 - c p d - p a p e r-
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Cull, Nicholas J. (2011). WikiLeaks, public
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45
Economic Diplomacy
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
INTRODUCTION this new reality, national diplomatic systems

(NDS) are also changing (see Chapter 5 in
Globalisation and shifting power balances this Handbook).
between the West and other countries, partic- Given this context, this chapter raises sev-
ularly those in the Asia-Pacific region, are eral questions about economic diplomacy.
creating new incentives for governments eve- Is economic diplomacy defined differently
rywhere to rethink the balance between their across disciplines and across countries? What
different national interests. In addition, press- debates underlie the re-emergence of eco-
ing global issues, such as climate change and nomic diplomacy in foreign affairs? How do
scarcity of natural resources (for example, governments adjust their strategy and prac-
water, energy and minerals) are growing chal- tice in this field? And what are the conse-
lenges for governments (see Chapter 49 in quences for national diplomatic systems and
this Handbook). Economic diplomacy is cen- foreign policy at large?
tral to all these issues. Although it is certainly To answer these questions, this chapter
not a new phenomenon, the end of the adopts a diplomatic studies perspective and
Western-dominated era of free-market capi- argues that the concept and practice of eco-
talism marks a new episode in its conceptual nomic diplomacy is becoming more com-
and practical evolution. The revolution in prehensive, covering at least three types of
communications technologies acts both as a diplomatic activity: trade and investment
facilitator of and a challenge to such change promotion (commercial diplomacy); negotia-
(see Chapter 44 in this Handbook). As institutions on economic agreements (trade diplo-
tions at the domestic and the multilateral macy); and development cooperation. As
level, such as ministries of foreign affairs governments seek new and innovative ways
(MFAs) and the World Bank, are adapting to to advance decision-making in these fields,
Economic Diplomacy 553
the practice and institutional organisation economic approach to foreign policy, while
of economic diplomacy is undergoing sig- simultaneously converting their growing eco-
nificant change. Such change is not unidi- nomic muscle into political leverage (see
rectional, however, and there is significant Chapter 34 in this Handbook). For rising
variation in countries national diplomatic powers, great power economic diplomacy
systems, that is, the set of institutions and is a means to realise power transition and
actors, configured for the management of a reshape the global order (Zhang, 2014) (see
states international environment (Hocking, Chapters 28 and 29 in this Handbook). While
2013: 1267). The chapter also argues that, China is the most recent example of this,
although a broader network of sub-state and Britain, the United States, the European
non-state actors is becoming involved in eco- Union (EU) and Japan have followed similar
nomic diplomacy, the state remains the pri- paths.
mary actor. Government officials continue to Clearly, when seen from a diplomatic stud-
represent and mediate the interests of busi- ies perspective, economic diplomacy serves
ness as well as civil society interests to politi- both economic and politico-strategic goals.
cal and public entities abroad. However, in Thus a comprehensive definition of eco-
this process the balance between advocating nomic diplomacy would see it as an umbrella
narrow sectoral interests and the more gen- term that refers to both the use of political
eral concerns of domestic citizens and global means as leverage in international nego-
public goods remains a precarious one. tiations with the aim of enhancing national
economic prosperity, and the use of eco-
nomic leverage to increase a countrys politi-
Key Points cal stability. Activities subsumed under this
umbrella term range considerably, from trade
Economic diplomacy is certainly not a new phe- and investment promotion (including through
nomenon, but globalisation and shifting power
economic missions and intelligence sharing)
balances are making it a more important diplo-
and negotiations on economic and financial
matic instrument in foreign affairs for govern-
ments throughout the world. agreements, to inducements such as develop-
Economic diplomacy is becoming increasingly ment assistance and coercive measures like
comprehensive, as both strategy and practice. economic sanctions.
Also from a diplomatic studies perspec-
tive on economic diplomacy it is useful to
mention some distinctions and what is not
EVOLVING THINKING ON ECONOMIC emphasised. Economic diplomacy is distinct
DIPLOMACY: A COMPREHENSIVE from business diplomacy in that a public sec-
APPROACH tor agent a government agency, an official
or a political figure is the principal actor
In recent years governments have strength- (see Chapter 46 in this Handbook). While the
ened the economic aspects of foreign policy. private sector is either actively or passively
For many developed countries in the West, involved, businesses or their representatives
more attention to national economic interests are not the focus of analysis. An econo-
is a sensible response to increased competi- mists approach to economic diplomacy is
tion from emerging economies, growing also distinctive for its focus on quantitative
financial constraints, and demands for trans- costbenefit analyses that adopt an economic
parency, accountability and result-driven logic to identify where and when economic
policies at home. For the governments of diplomacy works. This includes analyses of
developing countries, economic diplomacy is the effectiveness of one or more instruments,
primarily a means to build a coherent of economic diplomacy between particular
(groups of) countries, or of specific indus- not with others denotes not mere diplomatic
trial sectors or goods. Such economic stud- signalling (see Chapter 6 in this Handbook)
ies often investigate geographical patterns in but constitutes real attempts to avoid isolation,
international trade and diplomacy by use of create coalitions and to improve stability
the so-called gravity model to trade (see, for for example, the bilateral relationship of
example, Van Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010). China and Japan and their respective rela-
While economic diplomacy can have a mul- tions to neighbouring countries in the Asia-
tidisciplinary focus with contributions from Pacific, which both regional powers seek
rich research traditions, this chapter follows to court. Both Beijing and Tokyo employ a
the approach taken by most MFAs: that is, it variety of economic diplomacy instruments,
addresses the subject from a diplomatic stud- including comprehensive economic partner-
ies perspective that emphasises a qualitative ship agreements and development coopera-
approach and an inherent political logic. tion projects, in an attempt to strengthen their
In practical terms in recent years, indi- relative position towards the other. A similar
vidual governments of developed countries, game is being played by the EU and Russia
from Germany to Australia, have refocused in their bilateral relationship and neighbour-
on core strategic and economic interests and hood region.
strengthening relationships with key part- In economic diplomacy, broadly conceived,
ners. This is apparent from governments economic/commercial interests and political
strategy documents1 and greater investments interests reinforce one another and should
in economic diplomacy capabilities, includ- be seen in tandem. Economic diplomacy is
ing the opening of more representations with thus an umbrella term, involving several
an economic focus and the appointment of strands that may be more economic or more
diplomats with economic credentials (to political in purpose (Okano-Heijmans, 2013:
promote trade, investment and cooperation esp. 2733; Bayne and Woolcock, 2013:
in the field of innovation or agriculture, for esp. 213). Moreover, it includes a range of
example). Governments have also strength- activities that are largely economic in char-
ened economic diplomacy activities, such as acter, such as commercial diplomacy (that is,
economic missions led by high-level politi- generic and sector/company-specific trade
cal figures to promising markets, and nego- and investment promotion) as well as trade
tiations on bilateral and regional economic diplomacy (i.e. negotiations between two
agreements, including free trade agreements. or more countries that support economic
In the multilateral context, economic diplo- transactions and trade and/or investment
macy is also high on the agenda. More gen- agreements). But economic diplomacy also
erally, developed and developing countries involves more politically-motivated attempts
note the growing importance of economic to influence others, either through positive
and financial diplomacy and the challenge engagement (the premier example being
of state capitalism.2 This is hardly surpris- development or economic cooperation) or by
ing as governments in latecomer countries less benign means, such as sanctions.
commonly play an important role in indus- The question of whether and when it is
tries that are operated by the private sector; legitimate or desirable for governments to
for example, in sectors such as water man- engage in economic diplomacy or not contin-
agement, energy, agriculture and harbour ues to be a matter of fierce debate, in which
development. scholars of varying backgrounds emphasise
For all countries, the growing challenges diverging points. In general, it is probably
of security and stability are another reason to fair to say that the role of a governmental
invest in economic diplomacy. Building closer network as a broker towards other govern-
ties or partnerships with some countries and ments is less disputed than direct financial or
other government support to their own busi- Taken together, these two distinctive fea-
nesses in their activities abroad. Concerns tures of economic diplomacy make decision-
about fair competition and level-playing making in economic diplomacy an extremely
field are often heard from economists, both complex process. More than any other form
to criticise others for supporting domestic of diplomacy, the management of economic
companies as well as to legitimise their own diplomacy involves a variety of state actors
government support by other than financial at the national, provincial and local levels.
means. Political scientists emphasise that no Furthermore, a significant number of non-
fair or equal standard can be created for all state actors, including an extremely diverse
countries; the differences between countries private sector as well as civil society organi-
levels of development, political and economic sations, have a stake in the governments eco-
systems, types of home industries, natural nomic diplomacy.
endowments, and political power of influence
are simply too big. These divergences also
explain the different conceptualisations and Key Points
practices of economic diplomacy between
countries and regions, and are an important There are different economic and political moti-
reason why there can be no one-size-fits-all- vations to employ economic diplomacy in foreign
approach to economic diplomacy. affairs, especially between developed and devel-
oping countries.
Within diplomatic studies, economic
Whether or not and when it is legitimate or desir-
diplomacy is distinguished from other able for the government to engage in economic
forms of diplomacy in two ways (Woolcock diplomacy continues to be a matter of fierce
and Bayne, 2013: 38990). First, MFAs debate.
are not necessarily leading the decision- Decision-making in economic diplomacy is a
making processes. Economic diplomacy complex issue because there is a diversity of
also involves various line ministries such state and non-state stakeholders which aim for
as those involved in economic affairs, agri- different economic and political outcomes.
culture and infrastructure, as well as deve
lopment cooperation and climate change.
The second distinguishing feature of eco-
nomic diplomacy is its significant link with THE NEXUS BETWEEN COMMERCE,
private sector bodies. This is a natural result TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
of the fact that the direct beneficiaries of eco-
nomic diplomacy are, to a significant degree, As governments are actively re-emphasising
non-government agencies that is, small and economic diplomacy in their foreign policy,
medium-sized enterprises as well as big busi- there is a common trend towards developing
ness. Importantly, the goals sought by these stronger linkages between three strands of
two beneficiaries government entities on economic diplomacy: trade diplomacy, com-
the one hand, and the private sector on the mercial diplomacy and development cooper-
other differ substantially. While private ation. These economic diplomacy tools are
sector entities principally aim for economic employed most regularly in times of relative
merit, most governments and for that matter peace, that is, when there is no need to resort
non-governmental agencies and civil society to more extreme instruments such as sanc-
organisations, strive for so-called global pub- tions or, worse still, declarations of war.
lic goods, such as robust institutions to man- Commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and
age climate change, scarce natural resources development cooperation were largely sepa-
(water and energy, for example) and interna- rated until the 1990s, when the more devel-
tional stability. oped countries in the West largely dominated
global political and economic affairs. The trade questions, market access issues and
more recent trend, however, has been back to trade missions; and providing partner search
greater linkages between the three (see Figure and networking support (Jones-Bos et al.,
45.1). In Europe and the United States, this 2012: 137). These tasks can be performed
change is spurred by the growing presence by specialised trade and investment sup-
and influence of a group of countries that is port offices at home and/or by embassies or
not necessarily inclined to follow the rules other representations abroad. The location of
and conventions of the game of international important new markets and production bases
politics and economics that developed in the thus guides government decisions to focus
aftermath of the Second World War. For their activities on a certain country or region, as do
part, latecomer countries, including Asian, the depth and breadth of economic relations
post-colonial and transition states, have for a and the involvement of the other countrys
long time openly adhered to the comprehen- government in the market. In other words, the
sive approach to economic diplomacy. This more substantial the links between the public
may be explained by the viscosity of global and private sectors in a particular country, the
governance and international political and greater the incentive for others to invest in
financial institutions, and therefore the commercial diplomacy in relations with that
greater dependency of the governments of country.
emerging countries on economic tools and Development cooperation can be an
commercial relations to strengthen their posi- expression of economic diplomacy in two
tion in international relations. rather distinct, although not mutually exclu-
Of the various economic diplomacy sive ways, when seen from the perspective of
strands, commercial diplomacy probably has the country providing such assistance. First, it
the broadest consensus and the most devel- can be employed with the primary aim to pro-
oped body of literature. Economic diplomacy mote more political objectives such as good
is sometimes even equated with commercial governance, democracy or human rights.
diplomacy, particularly by those who have This approach has been adopted by European
a dominantly economic take on the subject. countries: their activities have often been
Trade and investment promotion at both the commissioned to non-governmental agencies
general level and more specifically, via busi- and geographically focused on the African
ness advocacy is a task that all governments continent. Another approach, which is more
perform in some way. In general terms, the readily adopted by non-Western and new
three key activities are: providing (market players in the field, largely emphasises eco-
and technology) intelligence; offering con- nomic objectives. The rhetoric is one of add-
crete hands-on assistance, including with ing to the economic strength of the recipient
and providing assistance, by linking assis-
tance to trade and investment. To emphasise
the mutual gains, this is commonly labelled
economic cooperation rather than develop-
ment assistance/aid. While Japan in the 1970s
was an early example of this approach, the
Japanese government has partly adjusted its
policies in order to appease Western concerns
of tied aid that is, of using development
policies to promote its own private sector
Figure 45.1 The trinity in economic interests. The rise of new players with similar
diplomacy approaches to Japan of old including China,
Source: Authors compilation. India and Brazil now puts Japan in a middle
position, as a country that aims for both eco- evidences a shift in this direction (European
nomic and political objectives. Pressured Commission, 2015).
by new players and financial constraints at As strategies and practice evolve in all
home, European countries are evolving in a three strands of economic diplomacy, link-
direction that resembles that of Japan, albeit ages between the various fields are multiply-
coming from the opposite end. Slowly but ing. The conflation of trade and investment
steadily they are overcoming the long-held promotion (commercial diplomacy) and
taboo that development and profit can go development cooperation has been character-
hand in hand, and becoming more mercantil- istic of many non-Western players and is now
ist themselves. becoming increasingly apparent including in
Trade diplomacy has become a popular countries like Denmark and Australia. But
policy instrument for governments since development issues also increasingly feature
the 1990s. This conforms with the argument in trade agreements, which come to involve
that governments are more likely to employ much more than economic issues alone.
economic tools for political and foreign Economic partnership agreements, for exam-
policy purposes during periods of systemic ple, have been conceived next to free trade
change. The scare of economic crises in agreements as a way to move beyond issues
various parts of the world prompted coun- of trade alone, and may also involve coopera-
tries to work together in different ways, and tion in the field of energy and environment,
the failure of the multilateral trade nego- science and technology, trade and investment
tiations in the World Trade Organization promotion and tourism.
(WTO) Doha round further contributed to
this trend. Trade diplomacy thereby shifted
focus from unilateral liberalisation backed Key Points
up by WTO commitments to preferential
In the evolution of economic diplomacy, the
liberalisation through bilateral and (inter) three strands of commercial diplomacy, trade
regional free trade agreements. Importantly, diplomacy and positive incentives are becoming
the motivations to engage in such talks are increasingly interlinked.
not just economic ones such as trade liberali- Trade and investment promotion remains the
sation, preferential market access and trade most traditional task of economic diplomacy and
diversion. Rather, and increasingly so, they is becoming more important as different forms of
involve a variety of economic, political, legal capitalisms meet.
and geostrategic considerations. Negotiations In developed countries in the West, the idea that
have come to involve issues of norm setting, development cooperation can go hand in hand
rivalry for influence, strengthening of part- with trade and development promotion is once
again gaining acceptance.
nerships, and resource allocation. Hence, the
Negotiations about international trade rules are
concept of trade diplomacy, rather than trade proliferating at the regional and bilateral level,
policy. This politicisation of trade diplomacy and are becoming more politicised.
has been most apparent in the Asia-Pacific,
where negotiations on trade, investment and
financial agreements play a major role in the
competition for influence (see, for example, DIPLOMATIC ACTORS AND
Das, 2014 and Chapter 29 in this Handbook). ORGANISATION
While the European Union, on behalf of its
member states, remains largely committed Although the state is by no means the only
to economic goals, aiming for economically actor in economic diplomacy, it remains the
high-quality and deep agreements, its lat- most central one. Vast differences exist, how-
est strategy document of October 2015 also ever, in the extent to which governments are
active in the field of economic diplomacy, as ministries and semi-governmental agencies

well as in how the interlinkages between involved in the field of economic diplomacy
politics and economics are strategised and include those in charge of trade and economic
institutionalised. affairs, agriculture, infrastructure, as well
Which responsibilities a state takes up in as development cooperation and climate
the field of economic diplomacy differs sub- change. No matter the level of development
stantially between countries. In countries that or the politico-economic culture of a country,
adhere to a stricter separation between state all share the continuous challenge of optimis-
and market mostly developed, neoliberal ing extremely complex decision-making pro-
market economies governments generally cesses in economic diplomacy.
take a back seat, playing the role of facilita- In an attempt to improve coordination
tor. In countries at an earlier stage of devel- between the various dimensions of foreign
opment, governments tend to adopt a greater economic affairs, governments have tried
role, including steering and guiding certain to overcome the traditional and pragmatic,
sectors of the economy. This is no different but unnatural, separation between politics
from earlier times when European countries and economics, or between MFAs and other
started to develop in the nineteenth century. departments involved. In some countries this
But the level of development is not the only resulted in a more or less formal arrange-
indicator of the extent of state involvement ment between the MFA and the economic
in the market. Differences also exist between or trade departments, of which the so-called
countries and regions. A common characteris- Concordat in the Netherlands is one exam-
tic of governments of many Asian countries, ple (Serry, 1999). This agreement notwith-
for example, is the fact that they strategically standing, the Dutch Department for Foreign
allocate resources to spur growth of a vastly Economic Affairs continues to be an odd-
diverse private sector at home and abroad. man-out in both the MFA and the Ministry
This may be the largest difference compared of Economic Affairs. As a result, it has moved
with countries in the Middle East and Russia, back and forth several times between the two
where state-owned natural resource industries ministries. For much the same reasons, in
dominate the private sector making for a nar- the 1980s and 1990s a number of countries
row, state-led economic diplomacy focused on including Australia, Canada and Argentina
the energy sector. Variations between Asian amalgamated the foreign office with the trade
states, in turn, lie in whether the strong role department. That this is also a less than ideal
of the state is organised in formal ways such way to deal with the challenge is illustrated
as in China, Vietnam and Singapore or more by the comment of an Australian diplomat,
informally as in Japan, South Korea and who said that this was a shotgun marriage,
Indonesia (Okano-Heijmans, 2012: 2757). but ultimately well worth it (quoted in Mills,
When unpacking the various players that 2013: 407). (Australia took amalgamation
comprise the state as an actor in economic further see below.) In South Korea, a simi-
diplomacy, it is instructive to think in terms of lar merger took place in 1998 but was undone
the national diplomatic system (NDS) that ten years thereafter.
is, a set of institutions and actors, configured A more recent trend concerns the merg-
for the management of a states international ing of the offices responsible for foreign
environment (Hocking, 2013: 1267). MFAs affairs, trade and development. In Australia
and the network of overseas representation the conservative government, when led by
are one characteristic feature that has assumed Prime Minister Tony Abbott, amalgamated
particular significance within this system. the Australian Agency for International
But they operate in an increasingly complex Development (AusAID) with the Department
network that manages foreign affairs. Other of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). In the
Netherlands and Denmark, where the MFA bilateral (Melchior etal., 2013: 63), whereas
took up responsibility for development coop- in the United States, the Office of the Trade
eration years ago, foreign trade was added in Representative (USTR) has a direct link to
recent years. The rationale offered was that the President and his Cabinet as it is part of
alignment of policies will improve policy the Executive Office.
coherence on priority issues and will result The renewed emphasis on economic diplo-
in the greater overall impact of efforts. An macy is also a driver of adjustments that many
unanticipated result, however, has been that governments are making in their diplomatic
organisations that traditionally concerned network. New representations embassies,
themselves with development cooperation are consulates (-general) and/or trade repre-
now also making their voice heard on trade sentative offices are opened in large coun-
policy.3 The government therefore increas- tries where presence in the capital city alone
ingly needs to consider the voice of domes- does not match economic potentialities (see
tic stakeholders engaged in development in Chapter 12 in this Handbook). This is a partic-
international trade negotiations. A similar ularly interesting trend in those countries that
process of institutionalising links between are scaling down representation abroad more
commerce, trade and development in foreign generally, such as the Netherlands. At the
affairs has been taking place in Canada. Here, same time, new initiatives are being developed
foreign affairs and trade had amalgamated to limit the number of closures, such as asking
decades ago, and development was added in fees for economic diplomacy activities includ-
2014. Also the EU, which holds trade negoti- ing matchmaking for companies. Japan,
ating authority for its 28 member states, now for its part, is adding to its number of repre-
formally links trade and development, stating sentations despite financial constraints more
that its policies aim to put trade at the service broadly, with a particular focus on new posts
of development and poverty reduction.4 in Africa. Despite having formal diplomatic
In those countries where the various eco- ties with more African countries than China,
nomic diplomacy strands are merged, there however, it has fewer diplomats stationed on
is, as before, a minister with responsibility the continent than its giant neighbour. For
for international development and another its part, France is a frontrunner in emphasis-
minister responsible for trade. Both minis- ing the role of territorial (local) collectivities,
ters powers derive from those of the minis- complementing that of the state. The assets of
ter of foreign affairs, however. They are thus French regions are deemed significant in terms
subordinate to the foreign minister, even if of international competitiveness and attrac-
for practical reasons the development and tiveness. Amongst others, this has resulted
trade ministers are allowed quite a degree in activism by the EU as a trade negotiator
of latitude. When looking at trade negotia- to include geographical indications in trade
tions in particular, one finds that countries agreements as a way to protect trade names
have come up with diverging solutions to and trademarks used in relation to food prod-
enhance coordination between ministries ucts identified with a particular region.
and to ensure that non-economic issues are While the above illustrates the challenges
also considered. In the European Union, the of managing interests and responsibilities
chief negotiator and his staff are all from between ministries, economic diplomacy
the Directorate-General for Trade, while the obviously involves many more actors than
chief negotiator of trade negotiations in Japan representatives of nation-state govern-
is always an MFA official. Norway takes a ments alone. Economic diplomacy involves
middle road, by putting the foreign minis- government-to-government relations, but
try in charge of multilateral trade issues and is increasingly also about the build-up of
having the Ministry of Trade taking care of government-to-business networks and the
opening up of these networks for the private and as consumers of government facilitation
sector and for the economy at large. As in (in the case of commercial diplomacy) or as
other fields of diplomacy, the e-revolution executors of government policy (in the case
greatly contributes to the brokering and of development cooperation).
information gathering by practitioners of
economic diplomacy.5 A network of relevant
actors can generate an overall capacity to Key Points
search, find, analyse and disseminate the kind
of strategically relevant information that most MFAs, as key players in the National Diplomatic
private actors do not readily possess. Political System, are adapting to the evolving dimensions
will is of course another vital ingredient of economic diplomacy and incorporating various
elements of it, especially as it concerns responsi-
and, indeed, a necessary condition. So is the
bility for trade and development.
recognition that a sophisticated economic Choices for how to reorganise the extremely
diplomacy offers possibilities for a countrys complex decision-making process in economic
private sector and its foreign policy goals. diplomacy depend in part on the level of devel-
The extreme diversity of the private sec- opment and the politico-economic culture of a
tor stands in stark contrast to the limited particular country.
capabilities of governments, however. After Although many non-state actors including the
all, the interests of small and medium-sized diverse private sector and a variety of civil society
enterprises differ substantially from those organisations have a stake in economic diplo-
of large companies that have greater finan- macy, they do not necessarily have a significant say.
cial and network capacity to perform certain
economic diplomacy functions themselves.
And this is not all: other actors, including
chambers of commerce, business federations ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY TOWARDS
and civil society organisations, make their THE FUTURE
voices heard on economic diplomacy. Their
aims may include calls for sustainable trade, One important side-effect of the global and
reducing the power of big business, greater financial crisis that started at the end of the
transparency of government, and attention to 2000s, is that it discredited Western standards
human rights and labour standards. for other countries. The laissez faire-style
The fact that non-state actors have a stake capitalism and economic diplomacy as a
in economic diplomacy, however, is not to means to primarily further political and eco-
say that they have a significant say. Trade nomic liberal values (such as free market capi-
diplomacy, for example, is said to continue talism, liberal democracy and civil liberties)
to consist primarily of private negotiations thereby lost much of its appeal. Instead, a
between trade ministry officials represent- more comprehensive approach that pragmati-
ing particular governments, while business cally links trade, investment and development
and civil society interests are still mediated for economic and strategic purposes is gaining
and represented, for the most part, by gov- ground. This trend is reinforced by the grow-
ernment diplomats (Pigman and Vickers, ing power and influence of China, as well as
2012). Likewise, while non-state actors have India, Brazil and others and confirmed by the
a significant stake in commercial diplomacy renewed emphasis in recent years in European
and in development cooperation, they do not countries on a new economic diplomacy that
actually take part in negotiations with foreign emphasises national economic interests.
public counterparts. Rather, they are better The redistribution of global power in the
characterised as pressure groups, trying to twenty-first century is also having an impact on
steer government policy in a certain direction, economic diplomacy in the field of economic
governance. First, the trend is towards more coincidence that economic diplomacy is
bilateral and regional economic diplomacy, at gaining in importance once again as the inter-
the expense of multilateralism. Trade negotia- national system is shifting from a multilateral
tions, for example, are moving away from the towards a multipolar order (Rood et al.,
truly multilateral talks under the auspices of the 2015). Confronted with the viscosity of
WTO and resulting in a strengthening of com- global governance and international political
petitive multilateralism. Separately, EU coun- and financial institutions, the governments of
tries are becoming partners and competitors in emerging countries primarily employ eco-
commercial diplomacy. A second change that the nomic diplomacy rather than political influ-
evolution of economic diplomacy is having on ence or military force to strengthen their
economic governance concerns the emergence position. This is leading to Western countries
of new governance structures, at least partly at rethinking the balance between their different
the expense of existing ones. As an example of national interests, resulting in a renewed
the latter, consider the comment of one expert in emphasis on their economic diplomacy.
the field of development cooperation that South As a result of this there is an increased
Korea in 2010 may well have been the last non- emphasis on pragmatic linkages between
Western country to join the Organisation for commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and
Economic Co-operation and Developments development cooperation in developed coun-
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee tries. This is recognisable in policies at home
(DAC) an organisation that risks losing rel- and abroad, as well as in the reorganisation
evance as a club of traditional donors.6 New gov- of government institutions, where MFAs
ernance structures established in 2014 include are increasingly taking up responsibility for
the New Development Bank, initiated by the trade and development. For their part, late-
BRICS-countries, and the China-led Asian comer countries have long weighed political
Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Although considerations more substantially in their
these institutions still face major practical and economic diplomacy, pragmatically linking
strategic challenges, they are probably the two trade, investment and development.
most prominent examples of what may be new In an increasingly competitive world
multilateral economic diplomacy in the making. where political and economic power is in
flux and financial constraints are increasing,
countries need to make clear decisions about
Key Points where their priorities lie. While a comprehen-
sive approach to economic diplomacy should
The global and financial crisis that started at the not be mistaken for killing three birds with
end of the 2000s discredited Western ways as one stone, it can be instrumental in turning
standards for other countries, including in the tomorrows challenges into todays oppor-
field of economic diplomacy.
tunities. Making environmental protection a
In economic governance, multilateralism is losing
feature of economic diplomacy, and focusing
ground against more bilateral and regional eco-
nomic diplomacy and new governance structures activities on industries that contribute to this
are being created. cause, is one way of doing this. Established
powers in the West have reason to protect the
political-economic model and fundamental
values that took years to develop, but they
CONCLUSION should not be afraid to comply with necessary
adjustments to the structural design of global
Historically, economic diplomacy takes a economic governance. At the domestic level,
more prominent place in foreign policy this means that a long-term, thought out strat-
during periods of change. It is thus no egy is required in order to be successful. If
the revival of economic diplomacy is to keep Perspective_2014_22-Growing_Economic_

a benign character, however, governments Diplomacy_in_ASEAN.pdf
are well advised to invest in new economic European Commission (2015) Trade for All:
governance structures and to limit their eco- Towards a More Responsible Trade and
nomic diplomacy to activities where the gov- Investment Policy. Brussels: Directorate-
General for Trade, October. Available online
ernment has real added value; that is, where
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
domestic economic interests intersect with 2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf
the basic needs of citizens throughout the Hocking, Brian (2013) `The ministry of foreign
world in terms of security and prosperity. affairs and the national diplomatic system,
in: Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds),
Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories
NOTES and Practices. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 12340.
1 See, for example: Shaping Globalization
Jones-Bos, Rene, Stephan Raes and Ramin
Expanding Partnerships Sharing Responsibility: Kader (2012) Value for money: a network
A Strategy Paper by the German Government, approach to Dutch economic and commercial
Berlin, 2012; and The Coalitions Policy for For- diplomacy in the USA, International Journal
eign Affairs, Canberra, September 2013. of Diplomacy and Economy, 1 (2): 13446.
2 The Foreign Ministry at a tipping point, unpub- Melchior, Arne, Jo Thori Lind and Christine Mee
lished Post-Conference Report of The Foreign Lie (2013) Norway, Asia and the Global Value
Ministry of the Future Conference, Brussels, Chains: Asias Growth and Norways Economic
1011 July 2011. Links to Asia. Oslo: NUPI Report, December.
3 Meeting with a Dutch MFA official, May 2014.
Available online at: http://www.nupi.no/
4 Official website of the European Union: http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
c ontent/downl oad/494691/1644338/
development/. version/2/file/NUPI+report+Asia+Final.pdf.
5 The implications of the internet revolution on Mills, Greg (2013) Trade and investment
diplomacy at large are discussed in Chapter 44 in promotion, in: Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge
this Handbook. Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), The Oxford
6 At present the OECD-DAC consists of 29 mem- Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford:
bers, comprising the United States, Japan, South Oxford University Press, pp. 40218.
Korea and European countries. Okano-Heijmans, Maaike (2012) Power shift:
economic realism and economic diplomacy
on the rise, in: Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik
Kremer and Katharina Harmat (eds), Power
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46
Business Diplomacy
Huub Rul and Tim Wolters
INTRODUCTION increasingly depend on educational, techno-

logical, and industrial infrastructures built
Globalization has a major impact on how mul- by host governments (p. 403). Especially
tinational national corporations (MNCs) are in emerging or recently emerged economies,
organized nowadays. Statistics from the United governments are key stakeholders in the
Nations Conference on Trade and Development economy, and without their support operat-
(UNCTAD) show that the number of Foreign ing successfully in these economies is almost
Direct Investments (FDIs) has risen in the last impossible. MNCs that are able to get this
30 years (UNCTAD, 2011). Doing business support, and as a result access these opportu-
internationally requires MNCs to deal with nities, will enjoy a greater competitive advan-
various local requirements, national laws, and tage (Schuler etal., 2002). However, getting
international agreements, negotiated by differ- access to business opportunities is just one
ent international groups such as the International aspect. In order to operate successfully in the
Labour Organization (ILO) and the World long term, MNCs need legitimacy: a gen-
Trade Organization (WTO) (Saner and Yiu, eralized perception or assumption that the
2005). MNCs need the capability to cope with actions of an entity are desired, proper, or
complex interactions with multiple stakehold- appropriate within some socially constructed
ers such as foreign government representatives system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). tions (Suchman, 1995: 574). For this, MNCs
Despite todays globalized economy, it is should negotiate and make compromises with
still governments that play an important role local governments, while simultaneously tak-
in providing access to business opportunities ing into account the wishes and demands of
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman etal., the international and national NGOs that
1999). Indeed, Luo (2001) states that, from oversee international firms in conducting
an MNCs perspective, its foreign operations business (Saner and Yiu, 2005).
Business diplomacy 565
Saner etal. (2000) explain which develop- To survive in todays international business land-
ments have caused these complexities. First scape, MNCs need to create legitimacy by inter-
of all, the public has become more critical acting and building upon positive relationships
and demanding towards corporate govern- with all stakeholders.
ance. Their voice can have a great influence MNCs should therefore engage in business
diplomacy.
on an MNCs reputation and therefore cannot
be ignored. This effect is enhanced now that
the public has unlimited access to all kinds of
communication channels, news sources, and BUSINESS DIPLOMACY DEFINED
business information (Rul, 2013). Second,
emerging markets such as Indonesia, China, In the context of this chapter, we consider
Russia, India, Turkey, and Brazil will entail business diplomacy and corporate diplomacy
challenges that MNCs need to take into as describing the same concept. From now
account, such as weak institutional settings, on, business diplomacy will be termed a
cultural aspects, and strong government roles synonym for corporate diplomacy.
(Saner et al., 2000). The third development Business diplomacy as a concept is relatively
concerns the emergence of a variety of NGOs new in the literature (see Chapter 45 in this
and communities. Saner etal. emphasize that Handbook). At the end of the twentieth century,
environmental standards and working condi- it began to be dealt with at an academic level.
tions should be taken into account in order to One of the first references originates from the
prevent conflicts that can damage an MNCs early 1990s in an International Relations pub-
image. Rul (2013) adds an explanation of lication by Strange (1992). She recognized the
what might have caused the complexities increasing importance of firms and market
MNCs face in todays business environment. forces in world politics and described new,
He argues that developed markets are fre- emerging forms of diplomacy. Strange (1996)
quently entered by developing market MNCs. claims that governments are losing author-
This has fueled fear among businesses and ity and impact, despite paradoxically that the
governments in developed economies. This number of government rules and regulations
increased competition heightens the necessity in different aspects of societies has increased.
for firms to build upon positive relationships Markets are dominating and the role of large and
in foreign business environments, even in international firms is so significant that govern-
developed, easy to access markets. Second, ments are competing to have them within their
governments, MNCs, and NGOs need to col- national borders. As a consequence firms have
laborate in order to cope with global chal- entered the diplomatic arena as an actor.
lenges such as reducing poverty, climate The concept was also noted in International
change, and building sustainable economies. Management and International Business
In order to survive in this complex and rapid studies (London, 1999; Saner et al., 2000;
changing business environment, international Muldoon, 2005; Saner and Yiu, 2005),
businesses need to engage in business diplo- Behavioral Science studies (Ordeix-Rigo and
macy (Saner et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005; Duarte, 2009), Communication Management
Rul, 2013). studies (Macnamara, 2011) and the General
Management literature (Amann etal., 2007).
However, consistency about what exactly is
business diplomacy has still not emerged.
Key Points Until the 1980s diplomacy was defined in
Globalization has changed the roles and relation- terms of a dialogue or the formal communication
ships between MNCs, governments, NGOs, local between states (e.g. Watson, 1982; Berridge,
pressure groups, and society. 1995). In this view only states are recognized as
diplomatic actors. This changed when the cold between corporations and society (pp. 67).
war ended and the global economy took off According to Saner et al. (2000), business
(see Chapters 2 and 8 in this Handbook). New diplomacy management involves influencing
actors entered the diplomatic arena such as economic and social actors to create and seize
supranational organizations (e.g. the European new business opportunities; working with
Union), or multilateral organizations (United rule-making international bodies whose deci-
Nations, World Trade Organization, IMF, sions affect international business; forestall-
World Bank), non-governmental organizations ing potential conflicts with stakeholders and
(Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, minimizing political risks; and using multiple
The Red Cross), and last but not least large international forums and media channels to
international businesses such as oil compa- safeguard corporate image and reputation
niess, financial companies, technology compa- (p. 85). In accordance, Saner and Yiu (2005)
nies and many others. Due to their size, impact, state, Business diplomacy pertains to the
or public support, they have become diplomatic management of interfaces between the global
actors in their own right (Rul, 2013). In this company and its multiple non-business coun-
context, Heine (2008) observes a shift from the terparts (such as NGOs, governments, politi-
club model of diplomacy, where diplomats cal parties, media and other representatives of
mostly meet with host country government civil societies) and external constituencies
officials, to a network model of diplomacy, (p. 302). As a final example, Macnamara (2011)
with a much larger body of and a more diverse states that corporate diplomacy would require
set of players with whom diplomats have to corporations to engage in ongoing dialogue
engage, among others representatives from with publics guided by specific principles and
companies. This view implies a broader defi- with mechanisms in place to balance power,
nition of diplomacy than the cold-war one. amortize conflicts, facilitate negotiation, and
Melissen (2005) includes citizens and civil maintain relationships even in the face of out-
society in foreign countries as well in the defi- right disagreement (p. 321).
nition of diplomacy (see also Chapter 42 in this What at least seems central to these defi-
Handbook). Central to the question of what nitions of business diplomacy and corporate
diplomacy actually is are the aspects represen- diplomacy is the acknowledgment of a stake-
tation and communication. holder perspective of companies rather than
Overall, in the literature, the terms busi- a shareholder perspective. On other aspects,
ness diplomacy and corporate diplomacy however, such as the goals of business diplo-
are not generally recognized and only a macy, its contexts, and how business diplo-
limited number of scholars have applied macy differs from existing concepts such as
these terms. For example, Ordeix-Rigo and lobbying or corporate political activity, the
Duarte (2009) define corporate diplomacy as existing literature is far from clear.
a process to develop a corporations power This is also reflected in the way scholars
and legitimacy (p. 561). In their work, an describe the person who is conducting business
organization is considered as a member in diplomacy. Some scholars consider a busi-
a stakeholder network instead of a profit- ness diplomat to be a business environment
making entity. In his book on corporate manager (Saner etal., 2000; Muldoon, 2005)
diplomacy, Steger (2003) states, Corporate or an organizational change manager (Saner
diplomacy is an attempt to manage sys- etal., 2000; Saner and Yiu, 2005), or consider
tematically and professionally the business business diplomacy to be a leadership style
environment in such a way as to ensure that (London, 1999) or a strategic management tool
business is done smoothly, basically with (Monteiro, 2013). This confusing picture asks
an unquestioned license to operate and an for a thorough analysis of what exactly is busi-
interaction that leads to mutual adaptation ness diplomacy and for a clear definition.
Related Concepts Holzinger, 2008: 3). In this sense, CPA, CPS,

and SPM describe similar phenomena.
Although the concepts of business diplomacy MNC global governance emphasizes that
may not be widely recognized and well defined, stakeholder commitments of MNCs go well
the literature on the businessgovernment beyond simply complying with the laws and
relationship, or business as political actors, is regulations (Detomasi, 2007). The author
quite extensive and informative to the schol-
states: An indication that MNCs increas-
arly conversation on how to define business
ingly accept broader stakeholder obligation
diplomacy. The most important related con-
is the current emphasis many of them place
cepts are: corporate political activity (Hansen
on developing or renewing their public com-
and Mitchel, 2000; Hillman et al., 2004;
mitment to the broad domain of corporate
Hadani, 2011; Lux etal., 2012; Dahan etal.,
social responsibility (CSR) (p. 223). By tak-
2013; etc.), corporate political strategy (Keim
ing stakeholder interests into account, MNCs
and Baysinger, 1988; Baron, 1997; Hillman
can reduce their political, social, and media
etal., 1999; Hillman, 2003), strategic political
risks and obtain better local market insights.
management (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008),
Eventually, this can improve an MNCs com-
MNC global governance (Levy and Prakash,
2003; Detomasi, 2007; Kourula and Laasonen, petitive advantage. Muldoon (2005) stresses
2010), MNChost government relationships the relevance of the terms corporate social
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Moon and responsibility (CSR) and corporate citizen-
Lado, 2000; Luo, 2001; Bartkus and Davis, ship. The author explains that the extent to
2008; Skippari and Pajunen, 2010), and polit- which MNCs engage in stakeholder commit-
ically oriented corporate social responsibility ment significantly determines the success of
(Shirodkar et al., 2013). We will briefly dis- an organization. This effect seems to be get-
cuss these concepts. ting stronger as NGOs are increasing in num-
Corporate political activity (CPA) rep- ber and size (Kourula and Laasonen, 2010).
resents a strategy whereby firms attempt The concept of MNChost government
to influence government policymaking, to relationships covers a wide range of the lit-
advance their strategic goals; [and that] firm erature regarding relationship building. The
owners may benefit from it (Hadani, 2011: importance of MNChost government rela-
945). Corporations use political activities tionships is recognized by Boddewyn and
to avoid or influence expensive regulations Brewer (1994). According to these authors,
and safeguard potential sales (Hansen and these relationships are critical for an MNCs
Mitchell, 2000). Corporations engage in CPA potential to expand internationally as host
practices more and more often as they increas- governments control the parameters of locali-
ingly expand their business operations across zation, production, and investment. Building
borders in which more political actors and upon MNChost government relationships is
institutions are involved (Hillman etal., 2004). a process in which governments and MNCs
Corporate political strategies (CPS) are also need each others resources to achieve their
directed at influencing public policy outcomes economic goals (Luo, 2001).
in order to create the best possible business Politically oriented CSR activities, are
climate for the firm (Keim and Baysinger, defined as:
1988; Baron, 1997; Hillman et al., 1999;
Hillman, 2003). Strategic political man- broadly consisting of corporate actions that are
politically-oriented, but simultaneously aiming to
agement (SPM) refers to the set of strategic
achieve at least one social objective, either in the
actions that are planned and enacted by firms short-term or the long-term. In effect, we argue
for purposes of maximizing economic returns that although these activities are communicated as
from the political environment (Oliver and CSR activities, the underlying goal in implementing
these is to influence public policy or to seek country, and more and more in foreign coun-
political resources (Shirodkar etal., 2013: 2). tries) to benefit the firm, whereas business
diplomacy is concerned with the creation of
This concept of politically oriented CSR long-term, positive relationships with foreign
activities can best be seen as a combination government representatives and non-
between CSR and CPA. governmental stakeholders (economic and non-
Having discussed concepts related to busi- economic) in order to create legitimacy in a
ness diplomacy, it helps to define what busi- foreign business environment (p. 39). Lobbying
ness diplomacy exactly is. is an element of CPA and serves here as a tool
for influencing public policymakers. Activities
such as lobbying and campaign contributions
have a specific, short-term focus and are there-
Defining Business Diplomacy
fore excluded from the definition of business
In order to develop a clear and complete defi- diplomacy (Rul etal., 2013a).
nition of business diplomacy, it is important to We also recognized a certain degree of
understand how concepts are related. As men- overlap between business diplomacy and
tioned in the beginning of this section, we CPA. Both concepts are aimed at influenc-
consider business diplomacy to be a synonym ing parties in the external environment of the
for corporate diplomacy. The same applies to organization. However, this is where the simi-
CPA, CPS, and SPM: all three concepts larity stops. The concepts MNChost govern-
describe the same process and related element relations and global governance can best
ments. For the purpose of simplification, the be regarded as elements of business diplo-
term CPA will be used as a common denomi- macy. In order to create legitimacy and obtain
nator to describe all three concepts. In our a license to operate, MNCs need to build upon
research on business diplomacy (Rul et al., relationships with host governments and for-
2013a), we explained that business diplomacy eign non-governmental actors. Figure 46.1
differs from CPA. CPA mainly focuses on shows how the previously discussed concepts
influencing public policymakers (in the home are related to business diplomacy.
Cooperative
relationship
Corporate Political Activity/ building w. Host-
Corporate Political Strategy/ government
Strategic Political Management representatives
Policy shaping
(influencing political Long-term
MNC Global
decisions) through lobbying, MNCHost
Governance
campaign contributions, government
(CSR)
and definition? relations
Business Diplomacy/
Corporate Diplomacy
Figure 46.1 Business diplomacy and its related concepts (Rul etal., 2013a)
As a result of our structured literature and government representatives aimed at

analysis (Rul et al., 2013a), Rul (2013) the promotion of home country business in
proposed the following definition: Business foreign countries by using diplomatic chan-
diplomacy is the representation and commu- nels (Rul, 2013). Commercial diplomacy
nication activities deployed by international is often considered to be the same as eco-
businesses with host government representa- nomic diplomacy (Mercier, 2007). Indeed,
tives and non-governmental representatives both have an overarching economic objective
in order to establish and sustain a positive (Potter, 2004). However, economic diplo-
relationship to maintain legitimacy, and a macy has a general focus and is concerned
license to operate (p. 41). Businesses may with economic policy issues and trade agree-
have all the legal rights necessary to operate ments (Woolcock, 2013), whereas commer-
in a foreign business environment, but may cial diplomacy is much more specific and
not be welcomed and accepted by the local particularly focused on business support
community and society. Legitimacy in this (Yiu and Saner, 2003; Kostecki and Naray,
context of business diplomacy means that a 2007; Mercier, 2007; Naray, 2008; Okano-
business firm is accepted by the local com- Heijmans, 2010).
munity and society by which it is surrounded
physically.
Business diplomacy has three focus points Key Points
that distinguish it from other related con-
cepts: its focus on foreign governments and The term business diplomacy is not generally
non-governmental stakeholders, its focus on recognized; it is a relatively new term.
the establishment and nurturing of long-term Related concepts are corporate political activ-
ity, corporate political strategy, strategic politi-
positive relationships, and its focus on the
cal management, MNC global governance, and
creation of legitimacy in a foreign business MNChost government relationships.
environment as the ultimate goal. Business diplomacy differs from these concepts
Now we have defined business diplomacy in that its focus is on foreign governments
we can distinguish it from related types of and non-governmental stakeholders, it involves
diplomacy, namely commercial diplomacy establishing and sustaining long-term positive
and economic diplomacy. relationships, and its ultimate goal is to create
Lee (2004) defines commercial diplomacy legitimacy in a foreign business environment.
as the work of a network of public and pri- Unlike economic and commercial diplomacy, busi-
vate actors who manage commercial relations ness diplomacy is a business-driven approach.
using diplomatic channels and processes
(p. 51). Commercial diplomacy considers the
interests of both business and government.
Successful commercial diplomacy gains THE EMERGENCE OF BUSINESS
access to new markets and serves the home DIPLOMACY
country economy, and the idea that success-
ful international business is just a matter of Globalization has considerably changed the
a clear business strategy and good business international business landscape and MNCs.
management is nave and outdated (Rul, Rising demands from the surrounding busi-
2013: 19). So, while business diplomacy can ness environments have increased the role
be described as a business-driven approach and responsibilities of corporations, espe-
in maintaining long-term relationships with cially when operating internationally
foreign government representatives and (Monteiro, 2013). Survival in todays com-
non-governmental stakeholders, commercial plex business environment no longer depends
diplomacy is driven by a network of business on an MNCs efficiency and competitiveness
only (Muldoon, 2005). Other important fac- local interest groups increasingly put
tors that will determine the continuity of the demands on MNCs, it is no longer sufficient
organization are managing complex interac- to rely solely on the experiences of former
tions with governments, multilateral institu- diplomats. Instead, firms must develop dip-
tions, and social movements. According to lomatic know-how from within and help their
Muldoon (2005), MNCs need to build upon own global managers acquire competence as
long-term cooperative stakeholder relation- business diplomacy managers (Saner et al.,
ships, thereby implementing strategies that 2000: 88). Business diplomacy know-how
address social and environmental concerns. should be dispersed throughout the organiza-
In accordance, Nartey (2013) states: By tion by global business managers. Global
understanding who the stakeholders are and companies can improve their effectiveness by
strategically forming ties to engender coop- setting up a business diplomacy management
eration and reduce conflict with these stake- function and by developing and utilizing
holders, the firm favorably shapes its competent business diplomacy managers
nonmarket environment to facilitate market- (Saner etal., 2000: 80).
based operations and benefits (p. 10). There
is a shift from a shareholder view to a stake-
holder model in MNCs, and in order to Key Points
obtain a license to operate, MNCs should
respond to the expectations of various stake- Doing business successfully in todays interna-
holders and thus engage in business diplo- tional business environment requires MNCs to
macy (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte, 2009). These move away from one-sided shareholder models
and, instead, become active members of stake-
authors explain that corporate diplomacy
holder networks.
entails that a firm actively participates in MNCs should develop knowledge about and
society, thereby contributing to wealth crea- skills on how to conduct diplomacy.
tion, employment, and quality products and
services. Through corporate diplomacy, firms
can increase their power and legitimacy.
Muldoon (2005) recognizes the public affairs BUSINESS DIPLOMACY IN MNCS:
function as the diplomatic engine to manage EMPIRICAL STUDIES RESULTS
a corporations reputation in the global
landscape: Although several researchers have stressed
the relevance of business diplomacy (Saner
The corporate public affairs profession has evolved et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005; Saner and Yiu,
over the last decade or so from its traditional role as
an internal PR agency focusing primarily on corpo- 2005; Amann et al., 2007; Ordeix-Rigo and
rate communications and media relations to a Duarte, 2009; Macnamara, 2011; Monteiro,
multifaceted and strategic corporate function that 2013), it is not actually clear from the litera-
encompasses public policy and issues management, ture how MNCs engage in it. We reduced this
government and investor relations, corporate phi- knowledge gap in the literature by conducting
lanthropy and community relations, business ethics,
corporate social responsibility and citizenship, and empirical research into how MNCs conduct
crisis management. (Muldoon, 2005: 354) business diplomacy in practice (Rul et al.,
2013a).
The importance of business diplomacy is In order to create an in-depth understand-
recognized by only a few MNCs, and most ing of this relatively underexplored topic, we
global companies hire former political diplo- designed an exploratory qualitative study in
mats to manage the complex interactions which eight large Dutch MNCs were sur-
with foreign government representatives veyed. We operationalized the concept of
(Saner et al., 2000). As international and business diplomacy and distinguished six
dimensions: business diplomacy intensity, which means, methods, and channels (e.g.
policy clarity, breadth, responsibility, means social meetings, public forums, seminars,
deployment, and resource availability. local government debates, media channels,
Business diplomacy intensity reflects the ethics, sponsor activities, etc.) are used by the
extent to which a company actively estab- firm for business diplomacy.
lishes and sustains positive relationships Finally, business diplomacy resource
with foreign government representatives and availability reflects the extent to which the
non-governmental stakeholders. This dimen- company uses multiple firm resources (e.g.
sion indicates how intensively the company financial, time, knowledge) for establishing
executes business diplomacy. and sustaining these relationships.
The second dimension, policy clarity, By means of in-depth interviews we con-
reflects the extent to which an MNC has a ceived a rich picture of how business diplo-
clear and organization-wide policy on how to macy is enacted by and embedded in MNCs.
establish and sustain these relationships. This Our research findings suggest that seven out
dimension indicates whether there are for- of eight MNCs conduct business diplomacy
mal/written rules for business diplomacy, or intensively. None of the eight MNCs applies
whether informal/unwritten guidelines exist. a clear organization-wide policy for business
Business diplomacy breadth reflects the diplomacy. Instead, general guidelines for
extent to which establishing and sustaining business diplomacy and business values and
these relationships is done by every company principles were set in place for these mat-
representative. This dimension also indicates ters. The research findings also showed that
whether employees consider themselves as in none of the eight MNCs were all employ-
representatives of their organization when ees involved in establishing and maintaining
they are in contact with foreign govern- positive relationships with foreign govern-
ment representatives and non-governmental ment representatives and non-governmental
stakeholders. stakeholders, such as international interest
Business diplomacy responsibility reflects groups and local communities. Although
the extent to which the companys responsi- business diplomacy is seen here as a manage-
bility for establishing and sustaining positive ment responsibility, all eight MNC respond-
relationships with foreign government repre- ents emphasized that all employees need to
sentatives and non-governmental stakehold- consider themselves as representatives of
ers lies with its headquarters or within the the organization when they are in contact
foreign subsidiaries, or whether they are both with stakeholders of the business, and hence
partly responsible. This dimension indicates should adhere to the general codes of con-
whether business diplomacy is set by the duct. Such codes may, for example, prescribe
headquarters for the whole organization (cen- that employees have to interact in a respect-
tralized), whether a framework of guidelines ful way with local communities and may not
is set by the headquarters in which a foreign get involved in illegal activities. Furthermore,
subsidiary has some degree of freedom to act, the research findings showed that in all eight
or whether subsidiary executives are free to MNCs the responsibility for business diplo-
decide upon how to conduct business diplomacy is mainly decentralized to the foreign
macy (decentralized). subsidiary level. The MNC respondents in the
The fifth dimension, means deployment, study explained that the foreign subsidiary
reflects the extent to which the company managers had the best insight into their local
deploys a diversity of means for establish- markets and stakeholders. For this reason,
ing and sustaining positive relationships the foreign subsidiaries have a certain degree
with foreign government representatives and of freedom in adapting business diplomacy
non-governmental stakeholders. It indicates to the specific characteristics of their local
business market. MNCs deploy a wide range Relations, and Public Affairs are concerned
of means for business diplomacy: meetings, with such activities. Our study also reveals
forums, direct stakeholder dialogues, events, that the MNC respondents recognize the value
industry associations, social partnerships, and of business diplomacy training programs.
social projects. Although all eight MNCs Such training programs should involve, for
invest time and financial resources in busi- example, geopolitical analysis skills, stake-
ness diplomacy, there are no specific training holder analysis skills, intercultural communi-
programs that teach managers how to set up cation skills, and negotiation skills. Yet, there
and maintain stakeholder relationships. is an absence of such training programs in
The first thing we noticed during the inter- these eight MNCs.
views was that seven out of eight MNCs Several researchers have already con-
recognized and defined business diplomacy ducted research into what encourages firms
as an important long-term activity, aimed at to become active influencers of government
establishing and sustaining legitimacy in all policies. For example, Lux et al. (2011)
foreign business environments, meaning that and Hillman et al. (2004) explored whether
business operations are accepted by the local firm-, industry-, and institutional-level factors
environment and society. Empirical research influence a firms engagement in the political
by Amann et al. (2007) has also illustrated arena to influence policymaking processes.
the importance of business diplomacy for Rul et al. (2013b) conducted a study into
managing external pressures in todays busi- the determinants of business diplomacy. The
ness environment. Illustrative in-depth case authors explored whether firm characteristics,
studies on four companies have shown that industry type, and institutional development
irrespective of the level of external pressure, influence the approach and organization of
MNCs with a diplomatic attitude are defi- business diplomacy. In this quantitative study
nitely better able to manage external pres- the same six business diplomacy dimensions
sures and obtain a license to operate than as in our other study (Rul etal., 2013a) were
those with a tough, conflict-risking attitude. measured by surveying 50 Western (United
Amann et al. (2007) conclude that MNCs States and Western Europe) MNC subsidi-
need to look beyond short-term profit maxi- aries in Asia. The research findings of Rul
mization. Instead, MNCs should take the et al. (2013b) suggest that firm-level char-
political landscape and media into consid- acteristics and industry type determine the
eration. MNCs should notice and understand approach and organization of business diplo-
stakeholder issues and develop adequate macy for some dimensions. The study results
means for solving them. The opposite, such reveal inter alia that firm size is positively
as denial as the first reaction, misinformation, related to policy clarity, meaning that larger
no sense of urgency, absence of a stakeholder MNCs are more likely to have a clear busi-
dialogue, lacking credibility and dearth of ness diplomacy policy than smaller MNCs.
proactivity build-up goodwill before things This means that first of all they do have a
may go wrong, are still quite prevalent in policy on the goals of and the way how to
todays corporate world, regardless of their conduct business diplomacy that is clearly set
obvious drawbacks (p. 48). Through busi- and accessible for all organization members.
ness diplomacy, future incidents can be man- The authors also examined whether the
aged more successfully. type of MNC affects the approach and
Our study (Rul et al., 2013a) showed organization of business diplomacy. For that
that none of the eight MNCs had an actual purpose, they used the typology of Bartlett
business diplomacy function or depart- and Ghoshal (1989), in which the level of
ment. Instead, departments like Government local responsiveness and global integration
Affairs, Corporate Communications, Public declares whether a firm is characterized as
transnational, multinational, global, or inter- empirical study of Monteiro (2013) showed

national. Their results imply that the level that the firm-specific context (country of ori-
of global integration is positively related to gin, culture, dimension, sector, etc.) should
business diplomacy intensity, breadth, means be taken into account because these modera-
deployment, and resource availability. Local tors affect the relevance level of the business
responsiveness is positively related to busi- diplomacy tool in managing the foreign busi-
ness diplomacy breadth and responsibility, ness environment.
suggesting that MNCs with a higher level of
local responsiveness have a broader approach
towards establishing and sustaining positive Key Points
relationships with foreign government repre- Little empirical research has been conducted
sentatives and non-governmental stakehold- into business diplomacy. The existing empirical
ers, and that the responsibility is more often research has so far focused on the importance,
centralized to the headquarters level. The the execution, and the determinants of business
latter conclusion contradicts our qualitative diplomacy.
research findings (Rul etal., 2013a), in which By measuring six business diplomacy dimensions,
all eight MNC respondents indicated that the our research (Rul etal., 2013a) created in-depth
business diplomacy responsibility lies at the insight into how business diplomacy is enacted
subsidiary level so that it can be adjusted to by and organized in MNCs.
the specific characteristics of their local mar- Empirical study findings furthermore suggest
that the execution of business diplomacy is
kets. In the quantitative research of Rul etal.
determined by firm-, industry-, and institutional-
(2013b), no evidence was found of a relation- level factors.
ship between the institutional setting of a host
country and the approach and organization of
business diplomacy. Our study findings (Rul
etal., 2013a) do suggest that industry-specific CONCLUSION
factors determine the degree of intensity with
which MNCs conduct business diplomacy. The goal of this chapter was to deepen our
During the interviews we observed that par- understanding of the relatively untapped con-
ticularly MNCs that operate in sensitive cept of business diplomacy. We started out by
industries, such as financial services or the highlighting the evolving circumstances in
oil business, conduct business diplomacy todays complex and rapidly changing inter-
intensively. The MNC respondents explained national business environment. Due to glo-
that large projects in these industries directly balization, changes are taking place in the
affect populations, and hence are always roles and relationships between businesses,
associated with foreign governments and governments, and non-governmental organi-
NGOs. Our findings furthermore suggest that zations (NGOs). This has tremendously
the intensity also depends on the institutional impacted the way of doing business interna-
settings of the countries in which they oper- tionally as business operations are closely
ate. MNCs that operate in weak institutional monitored by a multitude of stakeholder
settings recognize that personal networks are groups. Operating successfully among these
essential for survival. Hence, they are more complexities requires multinational organi-
likely to conduct business diplomacy inten- zations (MNCs) to become diplomatic actors
sively. One MNC in our study only oper- and interact with host governments, NGOs,
ates in three Western European countries in and pressure groups. Therefore, MNCs should
which the institutional settings are highly develop business diplomacy knowhow and
developed. Business diplomacy is conducted skills, such as geopolitical analysis skills,
with low intensity in this MNC. Indeed, the stakeholder management skills, intercultural
communication skills, and negotiation skills. Bartlett, C.A. and Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing
Business diplomacy can be defined as the Across Borders: The Transnational Solution.
representation and communication activities Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press,
deployed by international businesses with 5772.
host government representatives and non- Berridge, G.R. (1995). Diplomacy: Theory and
Practice. London: Prentice Hall.
governmental representatives in order to
Boddewyn, J.J. and Brewer, T.L. (1994).
establish and sustain a positive relationship to International-business political behavior:
maintain legitimacy and a license to operate. new theoretical directions. The Academy of
The big question is how? How do global Management Review, 19 (1): 11943.
companies manage these complexities and Dahan, N.M., Hadani, M. and Schuler, D.A.
pressures, and how do they set up these rela- (2013). The governance challenges of
tionships? It is rather difficult to answer these corporate political activity. Business and
questions since hardly any empirical research Society, 52 (3): 36587.
has been conducted in this direction. Results Detomasi, D.A. (2007). The multinational
of our empirical study were presented in this corporation and global governance:
chapter and have enhanced and enriched our modelling global public policy networks.
Journal of Business Ethics, 71 (3): 32134.
understanding of how business diplomacy is
Hadani, M. (2011). Institutional ownership
enacted by and organized in MNCs. monitoring and corporate political activity:
Still, there is a great need for further in- governance implications. Journal of Business
depth, case study-based research into how Research, 56 (7): 94450.
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macy around the world. In addition, future Disaggregating and explaining corporate
research will focus on: how small and political activity: domestic and foreign
medium-sized firms establish positive, long- corporations in national politics. American
term relationships with multiple stakeholder Political Science Review, 94 (4): 891903.
groups as they expand their business across Heine, J. (2008). On the manner of practising
borders; different types of business diplo- the new diplomacy. pp. 27187. In: Cooper,
A. F., Hocking, B., & Maley, W. (eds). Global
macy; risks of business diplomacy; the actors
Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?
involved in business diplomacy; business Houndmills (UK)/New York (USA): Palgrave
diplomacy instruments; and the determinants Macmillan.
and outcomes of business diplomacy. Hillman, A.J. (2003). Determinants of political
strategies in US multinationals. Business &
Society, 42 (4): 45584.
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47
Religion and Diplomacy
David Joseph Wellman
INTRODUCTION When examining the religious dimension

in the analysis and practice of diplomacy, it
This chapter seeks to outline the evolution of is important to first distinguish between two
the contributions scholars have made toward broad categories of analysis. The first cat-
analyzing the religious dimension of egory, which comes under the rubric of reli-
International Relations (IR) and its implica- gion and diplomacy, refers principally to the
tions for the practice of diplomacy. To this influence of religion on the practice of track-
end, this chapter will present the following: one diplomacy among nation-state actors. The
scholarly sources of information that influ- second category, faith-based diplomacy, gen-
ence the study of religion and diplomacy; the erally refers to the practice of diplomacy on
primary challenges IR and Diplomacy the part of track-two actors in the form of reli-
Studies confront when studying religion and gious institutions, religiously affiliated NGOs
diplomacy; the contribution of Religious and/or individual practitioners of a religious
Studies to constructing diplomatic strategies; tradition. While these two categories provide a
recommendations for contemporary state- useful initial framework for analysis, in prac-
based diplomatic practices around religion; tice they often do not operate discretely.
and the role of religion in a new sustainable This chapter is informed by the work of Paul
diplomacy which reflects the worldview of Sharp, put forward in his volume Diplomatic
Ecological Realism. This chapter will argue Theory of International Relations (Cambridge,
that having a sophisticated understanding of 2009). Sharp defines the work of diplomats as
religion and its influence on political actors, being embodied in three injunctions: be slow
cultures, institutions and the work of promot- to judge, be ready to appease, and doubt
ing transnational cooperation is essential for most universals.1 He notes that the work
twenty-first-century diplomats. of diplomacy takes place in a space that is
separate from the space nation-states or groups predisposed to viewing their discipline in
that diplomats themselves inhabit, and is most secular terms, a fact which can be traced
successful when it acknowledges the realities back to what he refers to as the Westphalian
of peoples differences and separateness, rather presumption, leading theorists to the conclu-
than their similarities and togetherness2 (see sion that religious and cultural pluralism
Chapter 1 in this Handbook). Sharp frames cannot be accommodated in international
his own analysis of a diplomatic tradition of public life.6 Thomas observes that the 1648
thought in light of Martin Wights three clas- Treaty of Westphalia, which brought the
sifications of international theories: radicalism, Thirty Years War to an end, ended the legiti-
rationalism and realism, arguing that diplomats macy of religion as a source of international
must be able to manage three types of relations. conflict through recognizing the state as the
These include encounter relations (between dominant actor, usurping the former role of
people meeting for the first time), discovery the Catholic Church.7 As a result, Thomas
relations (between people seeking to find out argues, the dominance of raison detat
more about and enjoying closer relations with (reason of state) was established as the foun-
each other), and re-encounter relations (where dational principle of relations among nation-
people stay in touch, but keep one another at states, leaving behind religion as the basis of
arms length).3 For Sharp, all of these relations foreign policy.8
require acknowledging the reality of pluralism, The origin of modern systematic efforts
both in terms of the fact that relations between to examine the religious dimension in the
different groups of people are different, and analysis and practice of track-one and track-
that the membership of international society two diplomacy can be traced to a number of
itself is defined by the pluralism of its char- sources, including scholars who have exam-
acter. In this milieu, notes Sharp, the diplomat ined the anthropological, cultural and his-
works as a professional stranger who seeks to torical dimensions of domestic and regional
become familiar with and to those with whom political systems and their ultimate influence
they have relations.4 Sharps definition of the on relations among nation-states. With the
work of diplomats is quite useful in framing 1994 publication of Douglas Johnston and
the work of interrogating the religious dimen- Cynthia Sampsons edited volume, Religion,
sion of diplomacy, in both descriptive and pre- The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, a num-
scriptive ways. This conclusion is underscored ber of these strands of inquiry converged.9
by Sharps noting that we should not expect The authors featured in that volume pro-
religions and religious thought to be enemies of vided a number of compelling arguments
diplomacy and the relations it sustains.5 This underscoring the utility of considering the
chapter will argue that Sharps description of influence of religion on IR, with clear pre-
diplomacy and the framework of analysis he scriptions for the practice of diplomacy.
provides offer useful insights that illumine why Johnston himself argued that a post-Cold War
successfully engaging the religious dimension analysis of international relations necessi-
of transnational relations is essential for both tated a consideration of international conflict
practitioners and scholars of diplomacy. that privileges the influence of communal
identity, including race, ethnicity, national-
ity and ultimately religion.10 At the same
time, Johnston emphasized that pathways
RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY: ORIGINS to cooperation among nation-states could
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD be promoted through the identification of
shared spiritual convictions or values, which
According to Scott Thomas, scholars of emerge from religion as it is practiced and
IR and diplomacy have been historically understood by national populations and their
Religion and Diplomacy 579
representatives.11 Johnston emphasized that to be known as the postsecular approach to

such an analysis does not present an either- analyzing relations between nation-states,
or choice between a secular or religious which privileges the resilience of religious
understanding of relations among nation- traditions in modern life and thus in the prac-
states. Rather, such an approach necessitates tice and analysis of IR and diplomacy.
an integration of political, economic and
security concerns with those of the moral
claims which emerge from religions as they
are practiced and understood by the citizens RECOGNIZING THE COMPLEXITY
of each respective national population.12 OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS
Religion, the Missing Dimension of CULTURE IN IR AND DIPLOMACY
Statecraft also contained a powerful cri- SCHOLARSHIP
tique of what Edward Luttwak referred to
as the Enlightenment prejudice of the long Practitioners and scholars of international pol-
dominant realist or realpolitik approach itics who engage the religious dimension must
to IR analysis.13 According to Luttwak, the grapple with the complexity of analyzing reli-
secularist-materialist assumptions of real-
gion itself, as it is understood by both scholars
politik, which have persisted well beyond and practitioners of religion alike. Religious
political realisms Cold War heyday, have led Studies is among the most disciplinarily
many scholars of IR and diplomacy to fail to diverse fields in the humanities. Scholars of
consider the influence of religion in relations religion include those who pursue active roles
among nation states due to two factors. The in the fields of anthropology, linguistics, histo-
first of these, Luttwak argues, is grounded riography, art, sociology, philosophy, theol-
in the desire of many foundational thinkers ogy, ethics, and culture, among others. As a
of IR theory to have their discipline viewed result, normative understandings of what reli-
as a hard science, where power can be meas- gion is, as well as how it impacts the lives of
ured in quantitative ways, most commonly individuals and communities, requires sub-
in military, economic, or geopolitical terms. stantial contributions from a multiplicity of
Luttwak holds that the second factor in play disciplinary perspectives. At the same time,
is a historically intellectual bias among many understanding the influence of religion on the
scholars of international politics against the population of a nation-state and its diplomatic
validity of religion as an abiding influence representatives requires conceding that many
in advanced societies, resulting in a world- different manifestations of religious belief and
view which privileges what he calls a dog- understanding across a broad political/ideo-
matic secularism. According to Luttwak, logical spectrum can co-exist simultaneously,
this worldview emerges from the mistaken even within one movement of one tradition in
Enlightenment prediction that the progress a single nation-state. Such real complexities
of knowledge and the influence of religion initially undermine the efforts of many schol-
were mutually exclusive.14 The conversation ars and practitioners of diplomacy to easily
that emerged in the wake of the publication categorize or predict the predispositions of any
of the Johnston and Sampson volume crys- one actor or community with regard to the
talized in December of 2000, when the jour- influence of religion in their lives, or upon
nal Millennium published an issue devoted their political worldview or praxis.
to the subject of religion and international A further challenge for scholars and prac-
relations that proved to be a watershed docu- titioners of diplomacy is the work of distin-
ment.15 This publication captured the atten- guishing between the influence of religion
tion of a much broader audience regarding on political actors who are practitioners of
the importance of what has ultimately come a tradition versus the influence of religious
culture on an entire population, including An additional challenge posed to scholars

both practitioners and non-practitioners. The and practitioners of diplomacy who engage
term religious culture refers to a particular religion is the task of distinguishing the ways
dimension of the social milieu in which all practitioners interpret their tradition. These
people live; it is most often distinguished by lenses can range across a broad scale; from
geographic locale, ethnicity and nationality. highly doctrinal understandings which cleave
Religious culture teaches individuals and to the normative teachings of elite religious
communities to understand and use language leaders and theologians, to highly folkloric
and metaphors, and conveys moral norms beliefs and practices which radically depart
that originated from dominant religious tradi- from mainstream, broadly-acknowledged
tions that remain vital and intelligible. This is truth claims, and all points in between. The
true even if those who engage such language, pitfalls of accepting a one-dimensional static
metaphors or ethical claims understand definition of any religious tradition and
themselves to be entirely secular. As a politi- assuming it is normative has arguably been the
cal phenomenon, religious culture can come source of some of the most spectacular blun-
into play in the following contexts: (1) in the ders of late twentieth and early twenty-first-
use of religious symbols or language by a century Western foreign policy, most notably
national government or other actors to con- in terms of actors associated with Christian
vey particular meaning or justify ostensibly religious cultures failing to understand the
secular actions in the eyes of domestic popu- role of Islam in the lives of their Near Eastern
lations or international actors; (2) through the counterparts (see also Chapter 31 in this
use of religious language and/or imagery as Handbook). In the absence of a sophisticated
a vehicle for conveying meaning and value understanding of the religious dimension in
among members of a specific domestic or the lives of people on the ground, the dynamic
transnational population; (3) as an appeal by nature of religion as it is actually understood
the state or influential individuals or groups and lived out defies the efforts of diplo-
to ethical norms drawn from what were origi- mats to easily anticipate political outcomes.
nally religious sources (particularly, but not Examples of this include: (1) the inability of
exclusively, the dominant religious tradition Western policy makers to distinguish between
of a particular nation-state); (4) through the the religio-historical aspirations of Sunni and
cultivation by national leaders of the per- Shii Muslims in Iraq; (2) the failure to antici-
ception that the state acts in concert with, or pate the evolving interpretations of Islam and
out of sincere respect toward, the dominant their relationship to political praxis among
religious institutions and traditions of the Afghani Mujahideen and later the Taliban;
nation-state; and (5) via the governmental and (3) the surprise many Western analysts
use of both actual and perceived connectivi- expressed by what they initially interpreted to
ties with religious institutions or fidelity to be the irrational behavior of Iranian religio-
broadly acknowledged religious traditions political leaders before and after the fall of the
to fortify the legitimacy of state leadership Shah.
and its apparatuses in the eyes of the national
population. In light of the importance of reli-
gious culture, scholars and practitioners of
diplomacy who wish to understand the influ- THE CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS
ence of religion on domestic and transna- STUDIES TO CONSTRUCTING
tional exchanges are therefore compelled to DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES
not only interrogate the influence of religion
on elite political actors, but also on the lives Because of the breadth and depth of knowl-
of ordinary people on the ground. edge necessary to understand religion and its
influence on both individuals as well as that histories of religion and their attendant
national populations, the time has now come impact on culture and political life are con-
to systematically broaden the sources of structed by individuals. These individuals
information practitioners and scholars of are reflecting on symbolic beings emerging
diplomacy draw on in their analyses. They from circumstances produced by competing
must concede that just as one must draw on mythical narratives. For example, in regard to
the work of economists in order to produce a Islam one must carefully distinguish between
sophisticated analysis of international poli- what we can know about Muhammad the
tics, so too must scholars and practitioners of man, what he has come to symbolize to the
diplomacy now acknowledge the importance ongoing construction of Islamic jurispru-
of approaching their discipline in light of the dence, and the way he is understood by highly
work of scholars of religion. diverse and divergent Muslim populations.
With this claim in mind, I was invited to The anthropologists of religion pointed out
present a workshop on religion and diplo- the need for diplomats to be aware of posi-
macy for the largest undergraduate depart- tionality, which refers to the fact that substan-
ment of Religious Studies in the United tive conclusions drawn about political actors
States.16 After presenting a synopsis of my and populations are always made in light
most recent work, I posed a question to the of observing people and movements in and
assembled group of scholars. I asked them from particular geographic and social loca-
what information they would want diplo- tions. In other words, diplomats must resist
mats and scholars of diplomacy to inte- the temptation to craft generalizations about
grate into their work in order that it reflect broad cross sections of a population based
a sophisticated understanding of religion. only on the observation of particular groups.
Their answers produced a set of questions At the same time, positionality calls atten-
that they believe diplomats should be asking tion to the fact that diplomats themselves will
about religion as it exists in the countries they draw particular conclusions based on their
are engaging. They also included a number own social locations and specific experiences.
of observations about the nuances of under- The anthropologists went on to make a num-
standing religion that must be acknowledged ber of observations about the necessary field
by any diplomat who wishes to engage the work that they believe diplomats must engage
religious dimension of culture and its atten- in if they are to come away with truly useful
dant influence on the political lives of those understandings of the role of religion in the
who live within a particular religious culture. political and cultural formation of any popu-
Their advice, which I will now present under lation. They observed that special attention
disciplinary categories, outlines what can be must be devoted to try to understand how peo-
seen as a set of recommendations for diplo- ple understand themselves. This can be done,
mats and scholars of diplomacy. they noted, by carefully and unobtrusively
The historians of religion wished to observing people in their everyday lives
remind practitioners and scholars of diplo- particularly in the way peoples lives interface
macy that historical narratives which engage with and respond to the religious cultures they
religion like all historical narratives are inhabit. Thus, the anthropologists argued that
made by highly subjective individuals whose diplomats must engage in a deeper level of
own social locations must first be critically fieldwork and possess proficiency level lan-
examined before their conclusions can be guage skills. In addition, they recommended
integrated into policy formation. The histo- that diplomats acknowledge how their ques-
rians also pointed out that modern religious tions reflect their own identities, concerns and
historiographies are neither pre-modern nor pre-existing beliefs about the population and
modern, and are never linear. They noted its traditions being examined.
The theologians and ethicists of religion interpretations of the same tradition. Many
recommended that diplomats focus their scholars and practitioners of diplomacy who
attention on both the inter-religious and intra- struggle to interpret and predict the rhetoric
religious conflicts in the populations they are and actions of non-normative, fundamental-
examining. Any prominent group associated ist interpretations of a tradition do so because
with one interpretation of a religious tradition they begin their consideration of a tradition
today may or may not be in power tomorrow, through the lens of an extremists theological
and their particular interpretation of their own interpretation, without first understanding the
tradition may or may not be normative or root of the tradition from which the extrem-
even considered constructive by the majority ists position has departed.
of people they represent or claim to represent. Finally, the scholars of sacred texts
For this reason, credible religio-political anal- implored scholars and practitioners of diplo-
ysis must also include a sophisticated under- macy to not begin with sacred texts in their
standing of the implicit theological positions efforts to understand what practitioners of a
of any group being examined, including the religious tradition actually believe. The first
degree to which dominant theological posi- problem with such an approach is rooted in
tions are associated with exclusivist claims the many challenges of accurately translating
(i.e. one particular group claiming to rep- sacred texts. Secondly, there is the necessity of
resent the only true religion). At the same becoming familiar with the significant body of
time, diplomats could benefit from under- knowledge required to understand the history
standing the degree to which the current and diversity of the texts interpreters and the
leadership of a nation-state and their possible dominant and non-dominant interpretations
successors are theologically and politically that are linked to them. Thus, for the purpose
committed to promoting sustainable interre- of diplomacy, religions themselves cannot
ligious engagement among communities of be defined by their sacred texts, even though
different religious traditions. Religious diver- the narratives which specific movements and
sity among the members of ruling parties and groups choose to employ when justifying their
their adversaries could be viewed as a poten- moral claims often reference them. In truth,
tial advantage for long-term influence in a determining how and why particular individu-
government and even a region, especially if als are favored to interpret texts over others
such diversity is based on coalitions that have and the role of the sacred texts in a community
been formed non-coercively. These same are actually more important for understanding
theological categories will also be of great the religious dimension of the political lives of
help to diplomats who seek to understand a group than the texts themselves. For this rea-
the ethical claims and guiding moral norms son, an astute analysis of the current conversa-
of any group influenced by a specific reli- tions about a text or the popular extra-textual
gious culture. This knowledge could poten- conversations associated with the sacred text
tially be of great assistance when assessing can serve as an invaluable window into what
the most fruitful paths to bring people to the a community values, expects, fears, or desires.
negotiating table, and even assessing how
negotiations might more quickly be brought
to a place which Andrea Bartoli refers to as
ripeness17 (see Chapters 17 and 18 in this RELIGION AND THE CONTEMPORARY
Handbook). Only after the above questions PRACTICE AND ANALYSIS OF
are answered about the historically normative DIPLOMACY
interpretations of a religious tradition in any
particular nation-state can a political analyst In examining the ways religion informs the
hope to understand the more fundamentalist practice of track-one diplomacy, one must
consider the role of religion and religious Dayton Accords. Even more subtle to many
culture on multiple levels. While some is the role of the common Christian religio-
nations will designate religious figures as cultural identity shared by the membership of
special envoys or ambassadors, others will the European Union, and its impact on both the
select the location of diplomatic missions to diplomatic relations among EU member states
reflect either the normative religious claims and with those outside the EU borders most
of the host country, or the religious identity particularly with the Islam-identified nation-
of their own nation. Approaches to inter-state states of North Africa and Turkey.
negotiation styles may also reflect religious While many other observations can be
moral claims or sensibilities associated with made regarding the past and present roles
religious cultures. Other track-one diplo- of religion in the practice of diplomacy,
matic practices reflect sensitivities to the the level of religious illiteracy that persists
reality of religion or religious culture. The among architects of foreign policy suggests
place of religion in shaping diplomatic state the need to reimagine the role of the twenty-
practice regarding protocol or etiquette is one first-century diplomat. This role would name
example of this, be it in the form of wearing the diplomat as one who has been given a
religiously respectful clothing when called greater capacity to impact foreign policy
for, the serving of appropriate food reflecting formation in light of his or her ability to
religious laws, or other inter-personal prac- interpret and convey a sophisticated under-
tices that reflect both understanding of and standing to senior policy makers of the role
respect toward the religious faith or religious of religion and religious culture in the lives
culture of ones counterparts. of ordinary people on the ground. This role
On a broader, national level, one must reflects the advantages Sharp describes as
consider the relationship of religion and being afforded the diplomat, who inhabits
diplomacy in nations whose political iden- a space that lends itself to observing and
tity is profoundly and institutionally linked naming facts that are not readily apparent to
to a religious identity. Saudi Arabias ruling those they represent. Recent events unfold-
House of Sauds direct relationship with the ing in the Near East alone underscore the
Wahhabist interpretation of Sunni Islam (a value of such a new role. The rise of Daesh
derivation of Salafism) is a clear example (ISIL) should arguably not have come as
of this. This is particularly true with regards the surprise it appears to have been to many
to Saudi Arabias relations with its regional Western analysts, nor should the manner and
Muslim neighbors, who are unlikely to be degree to which the territorial integrity of
able to uncouple the exclusivist claims of Iraq, Syria and Yemen have been impacted
Wahhabism from the way Saudi Arabias by competing actors whose identities are
foreign policy and the diplomatic efforts that significantly shaped by different movements
represent it are received and understood. Less within Islam. All of these developments
obvious to some is the influence of religion have an explicit and profound religious
in relationships and approaches to diplomacy dimension in their roots, their evolution
cultivated among nations whose religious and in the future implications of what is
cultures are Christian. It can be argued, for unfolding. The role of Saudi Arabia, through
example, that Serbias and Russias shared its muscular exportation and diffusion of a
Orthodox Christian identities created a con- non-normative expression of Islam, is intrin-
nectivity which served to deepen their rela- sically connected to many of these develop-
tionship and approach to diplomacy in the ments a fact which remains misunderstood
post-Soviet era; a connectivity which could or even unknown to many who continue to
be seen as subsequently impacting the United principally view relations among nations
States approach to its role in crafting the through a secularist-materialist lens.
Key Points praxis: the restoration of the political order

that has suffered from war and injustice, and
The study of religion is complex by its very nature.
the reconciliation of individuals and social
Understanding religion and its subsequent influ-
groups19 (see Chapter 10 in this Handbook).
ence on the practice of diplomacy requires the
input of anthropologists, linguists, historiogra- While the ethical dimension of secular
phers, sociologists, philosophers, theologians and diplomacy presents its own set of assumptions,
ethicists, among others. practices and goals, the moral norms central
Examining the influence of religion on the prac- to the practice of faith-based diplomacy dis-
tice of diplomacy requires analysis of the influ- tinguish themselves from their secular coun-
ence of religion as it is practiced and serves to terparts in that they are openly acknowledged
influence nation-state leaders and their repre- as directly connected to the religious identity
sentatives, as well as the way religious culture of the religions practitioners. The religious
can influence an entire population, including identity of those who practice faith-based
those who understand themselves to be entirely
diplomacy can offer some tangible advan-
secular.
tages, if in fact the actors in question are
Understanding religion in the context of diplo-
macy requires an understanding of the normative, perceived to be politically neutral. The cred-
traditional components of a religious tradition. ibility of those practicing diplomacy from a
One cannot claim to understand extremist ver- faith-based position is also often enhanced by
sions of a tradition unless one first understands their being associated with a cross-culturally
the normative or mainstream expression of the respected set of values associated with their
religion itself. religious tradition.20 At the same time, some
Analyzing the influence of religion on the prac- practitioners of faith-based diplomacy have
tice of diplomacy requires acknowledging that the advantage of being tangibly connected to
one movement or one interpretation of a reli- multiple communities that are crucial to the
gious tradition by a political actor does not
promotion of long-term peace building in the
necessarily provide insights into the tradition as
region of the conflict being mediated.
it is understood or practiced by an entire national
population, its diversity of practitioners, or multi-
plicity of interpretations.
FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY IN
TRACK-TWO DIPLOMACY
FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY
One of the more well-known Western-based
Faith-based diplomacy can initially be under- NGOs associated with faith-based diplomacy
stood as the practice of diplomacy on the part is the World Council of Churches (WCC).
of track-two actors which can come in the Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the WCC is
form of religious institutions, religiously affil- one of the most important institutional out-
iated NGOs and/or individual practitioners of growths of the European ecumenical move-
a religious tradition, though faith-based diplo- ment. Representing over 500 million Christians
macy is also present in track-one diplomacy worldwide, the WCCs membership includes
as well. According to Scott Thomas, faith- most of the worlds Orthodox churches, as
based diplomacy can be distinguished well as scores of Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran,
from traditional models of peacemaking and Methodist and Reformed congregations, with
conflict resolution by its holistic approach to member churches in Africa, Asia, the
the sociopolitical healing of conflict.18 Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East
Thomas notes that faith-based diplomacy also and Oceana. Because the WCC represents
distinguishes itself from traditional diplomacy such a large and diverse transnational constitu-
through its emphasis on the ethical claim of its ency, its programs and policy statements
provide the international community with Faith-based diplomacy can also be prac-
well-vetted contributions from an explicitly ticed on an intimate scale, an approach that
faith-based perspective to international dis- holds the potential to engender a transna-
courses on human rights, economic develop- tional impact. One example of this approach
ment, ecological sustainability, defense can be found in the Parents Circle Family
spending, indigenous rights and the rights of Forum (PCFF), a joint PalestinianIsraeli
women, among the broad array of its social organization comprising 600 Jewish, Muslim
justice focused efforts. The WCC has long and Christian families, all of whom have lost
maintained a presence at the United Nations, a family member as a result of the prolonged
where its policy statements have found their conflict. Established in 1995 by Yitzhak
way into the language of UN resolutions. Frankental and a group of bereaved Israeli
The Italian Catholic Community of families, the PCFF initially began in coopera-
SantEgidio is a powerful example of a com- tion with a group of Palestinian families from
munity devoted to the practice of faith-based Gaza, who identified with the call to prevent
diplomacy. Founded in 1969 in Rome, the further bereavement through dialogue, toler-
Community of SantEgidio served in a cen- ance, peace and reconciliation.21 When the
tral role in the mediation efforts that led to the ties between these groups were cut off by the
end of the civil war in Mozambique, as well as second Intifada, the PCFF continued its work
making important contributions to peacemak- by establishing connections between Israeli
ing efforts in Algeria, the Balkans, and the families and Palestinian families in the West
Democratic Republic of Congo. The track-two Bank and East Jerusalem. The PCFF oper-
mediation efforts that the Community employs ates out of the belief that joint activities have
stand in marked contrast to many normative shown that reconciliation between individuals
approaches to diplomacy. In their efforts in and nations is possible, and that reconcilia-
Mozambique, representatives of SantEgidio tion is a prerequisite to building a sustainable
described their approach to the work of media- peace. While the PCFF does not officially
tion as one that was pursued from a position provide a stated position on the political reso-
of absolute powerlessness, forcing the actors lution of the conflict, most members favor
in conflict to take responsibility for the work a two-state solution. The PCFF is managed
of peacemaking. As a non-governmental body, jointly by a professional staff of Israelis
which is not subject to the same pressures and Palestinians working in two offices, the
or time constraints of many nation-states, Palestinian office in Elram and the Israeli
SantEgidio was able to invite representatives office in Ramat Efal, Tel Aviv.22
from both sides of the Mozambiquan conflict The Amman-based Royal Strategic Studies
to Rome, to enter into an open ended process Centre (RISSC) provides an intra-religious
which did not engender many of the common approach to faith-based peace building among
methods of coercion employed by third party Muslims. An independent research entity
track-one mediators. The philosophy of the affiliated with the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute
Community of SantEgidio is that war is the for Islamic Thought, the RISSC is an inter-
mother of poverty. Hence, the Communitys national Islamic non-governmental institute,
work also includes a substantial effort to whose work focuses on protecting, preserving
combat poverty, and through its actions pro- and propagating what it describes as a tra-
mote its goal of embodying its interpretation ditional, orthodox, moderate interpretation
of the Gospel narrative, which features an of Islam, in an effort to provide a consen-
understanding of Jesus as one who modeled sus based counterpoint to claims by Islamic
non-violence, a belief in prayer and the power groups that many mainstream Muslims would
of persuasion from a position of ostensible interpret as extremist, and thus far afield of
powerlessness. historically agreed upon Islamic beliefs
and ethical claims. The Three Points of the there are certainly others that fall under the
Amman Message offers three core claims category of track-one efforts. One clear
which define an inclusive, non-sectarian inter- example is the phenomenon of heads of state
pretation of Islam: (1) the validity of all eight who profess to craft their approach to diplomacy
Mathhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shii and out of a set of convictions and moral claims
Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology; rooted in a professed faith tradition, whether or
of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism); and of tradi- not the nation they represent is institutionally
tional Salafi thought, which provided a con- committed to representing a religious tradition.
cise and broadly inclusive definition of who One example of this could arguably be seen
is a Muslim; (2) that mainstream, traditional in the US presidency of Jimmy Carter, who
Islam forbids takfir (declarations of apostasy) rhetorically framed his commitment to
between Muslims; and (3) a Mathahib-based peacebuilding in the Middle East and tying aid
set of preconditions for the issuing of fatwas, to the human rights records of its recipients to
thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate the moral claims of his own interpretation of
edicts in the name of Islam. Christianity. However, while on a broad scale
There are many other examples of institu- one can cite enough clear examples to come to
tions, NGOs and individuals who practice provisional conclusions about the driving
faith-based diplomacy. As one considers these, motives of particular heads of state, such
it is helpful to broaden normative definitions observations can also be contested. To what
of diplomacy to include a more comprehensive degree Irans approach to international relations
understanding of what diplomacy is and what (and subsequently diplomatic practices) reflects
it could be. Citizen diplomats, aid organiza- the Muslim identity and Islamic moral claims
tions, and domestic efforts at peace and rec- of its leaders, and to what degree they simply
onciliation across boundaries of religious reflect the same secular pragmatisms one can
difference that have transnational implications identify in the actions of non-religiously
arguably all fall within this category. In this identified states, is difficult to quantify. The
regard, faith-based diplomacy holds the poten- value of scholars of religion and scholars and
tial to go well beyond an exclusive engage- practitioners of diplomacy working together to
ment with actors who identify themselves as examine questions such as these suggests
practitioners of a specific religious tradition. itself quite clearly in this case and many others
Faith-based diplomacy also opens the door to a like it.
different discourse and diplomatic praxis with
regards to naming and acting on ethical claims.
Simultaneously, those who practice faith-
based diplomacy who wish to engage the root Key Points
causes of poverty, ecological unsustainability, Faith-based diplomacy distinguishes itself from
racism, or gender discrimination effectively traditional diplomacy through its emphasis on
are obliged to acknowledge that comprehen- the ethical claim of its praxis: the restoration of
sive and sustainable solutions to these chal- the political order that has suffered from war and
lenges are, by necessity, transnational. injustice, and the reconciliation of individuals and
social groups.
Faith-based diplomacy opens the door to a
discourse and diplomatic praxis that directly
engages the work of naming and acting on
FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY IN
ethical claims, which are readily apprehensible
TRACK-ONE DIPLOMACY to a broad cross section of a national, or even
transnational population.
While many clear examples of faith-based The credibility of those practicing diplomacy
diplomacy are evident in track-two diplomacy, from a faith-based position is often enhanced if
they are perceived as being politically neutral, or candidate for a new language of diplomacy
by their being associated with a cross-culturally is found in the common ecosphere and the
respected set of values drawn from their religious transnational bioregions that straddle the bor-
tradition. ders of individual nation-states. These shared
realities on the ground are being revealed
through the common threats posed by cli-
mate change, transnational resource scarcity,
A NEW DIPLOMATIC WORLDVIEW: and the intricacies of human migration tied
RELIGION, ECOLOGICAL REALISM to other cross border realities such as pov-
AND A NEW LANGUAGE OF erty and the human labor requirements of
DIPLOMACY agriculture. Crafting new approaches to for-
eign policy and the practice of diplomacy in
The prospect of critically analyzing the tre- light of these realities is the foundation of a
mendous diversity of perspectives within new method of analyzing relations between
even one religious tradition and its impact on nation-states that I call ecological realism
the political worldviews of its practitioners is (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook).
daunting. The inability to generalize about Ecological realism understands relations
competing and divergent interpretations of between nation-states as an ecocentric rather
religion, their contradictory historical, theo- than an anthropocentric endeavor, one that
logical and ethical claims, and the multiplic- defines long-term power in terms of a nation-
ity of ways that such beliefs are manifested states and bioregions capacity for ecologi-
in political exchanges can ostensibly thwart cal sustainability, rather than exclusively
any efforts to create easy consensus across through its monetary or military capacities.
boundaries of difference. At the same time, This diplomatic worldview acknowledges
to acknowledge such realities would seem to that regardless of national identity, all people
comprehensively undermine any lingering require potable water, arable land and breath-
efforts to view IR (or for that matter the able air, and the long-term preservation of all
analysis and practice of diplomacy) as a sci- three of these resources cannot be achieved
entific discipline. This of course opens the in the absence of a sustained level of trans-
door to acknowledging the truth of Paul national cooperation. For this reason, eco-
Sharps assertion that the knowledge that logical realism groups nation-states together
informs the practice of diplomacy is intrinsi- first and foremost in terms of their common
cally qualitative, by virtue of the highly plu- bioregions, rather than exclusively through
ralistic realm in which it operates. human-drawn borders.23
Thus, one must ask this question: given the The ecological resilience of human com-
pluralistic reality in which diplomacy takes munities in the context of the global ecologi-
place, how do diplomats best approach the cal crisis is dependent upon the willingness
work of cultivating an environment which of national governments and individuals to
promotes consensus, cooperation and peace- substantially change long established behav-
building? Identifying a common language iors. Such changes will require tremendous
and common goals are arguably central to courage and transnational coalition building,
this task. While the historic language of on the level of sub-state diplomacy as well as
diplomacy was a European one French relations between nation-states. The role of the
a modern sustainable diplomacy must find a diplomat will be pivotal in achieving this goal.
lingua franca and set of objectives that does Most current consumption patterns, waste dis-
not privilege one culture, geographic region, posal methods, definitions of value and eco-
or religious tradition over the other (see nomic systems all privilege short-term gain
Chapter 20 in this Handbook). One strong over long-term sustainability. The transition
to a sustainable diplomacy informed by the 13 Edward Luttwak, The Missing Dimension, in

insights of ecological realism will require Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson, eds.
Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft,
a level of willingness and creativity that an
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 910.
exclusively secular-materialist worldview is 14 Ibid.
hard pressed to invoke. This is because the 15 See the Bibliography for all the contributions to
ecological crisis is not just a material crisis the Millennium volume.
it is a crisis that arguably contains a spiritual 16 The department of Religious Studies of
DePaul University is composed of 19 full-time
dimension. Applying a sophisticated under-
historians, anthropologists, linguists, ethicists and
standing of the religious traditions that have theologians, and includes scholars of Judaism,
influenced political cultures and motivated Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and a
individuals will be central to the diplomatic number of Indigenous Traditions. The workshop
task at hand: leveraging extant religious moral being referenced took place at DePaul University,
Chicago, on June 5, 2009.
claims that honor the ecosphere in the work
17 Bartoli, Andrea, Christianity and Peacebuilding,
of increasing transnational cooperation. Such in Coward, Harold and Gordon S. Smith, eds,
moral claims exist in a diversity of forms in Religion and Peacebuilding, Albany, NY: State
every religious tradition. The success of such University of New York Press, 2004, 14768.
efforts will require substantially increasing 18 Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of
Religion and the Transformation of International
the level of cooperation and coordination
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-
between practitioners of track-one and track- First Century, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
two diplomacy. A disciplinary commitment to 2005, 184.
deepen the religious literacy of the practition- 19 Ibid.
ers of diplomacy of every type will be central 20 Ibid, 185.
21 For more on the work of the PCFF, see their website,
to achieving this goal.
www.theparentscircle.com (accessed 28/8/14).
22 Ibid.
23 For a more detailed description of Ecological
Realism see Wellman, David Joseph, The Promise
NOTES of Sustainable Dipomacy: Refining the Praxis of
Ecological Realism, in Constantinou, Costas M. and
James Der Darian, eds, Sustainable Diplomacies,
1 Sharp, Paul, Diplomatic Theory of International
Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2545.
Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009, 296.
2 Ibid, 309.
3 Ibid, 10.
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48
Military Diplomacy
S e e S e n g Ta n
INTRODUCTION competition, all of which involved significant

diplomatic skill and effort, were arguably as
Military diplomacy has often been described central as deterrence to ensuring that nuclear
as an oxymoron. Militaries exist to wage war did not break out between the Soviets
wars or deter them by force whereas diplo- and the Americans (Stein, 1991).
macy involves the use of negotiation and The ending of the Cold War led to the
dialogue to achieve national goals. The idea drawdown of military forces worldwide
of armed warriors, the epitome of what albeit the Asia Pacific has proved a notable
scholars call hard power, engaging in the exception and growing attention to threats
diplomatic arts, or soft power, might indeed to societies of a nonconventional and often
seem incongruous to some (George, 2014; transnational nature. In response, national
Nye, 2004). However, not resorting to the use defence establishments and militaries have
of force or the threat of it to realize ones had to redefine their mission and retool
political and military objectives is a strategy themselves in support of their expanded roles
long appreciated by military leaders. In The (Huntington, 1993; Moskos et al., 1999;
Art of War, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu Wong, 2001). There has also been a marked
reckoned the subduing of ones enemy with- increase in the involvement of militaries
out using force as the supreme art of war worldwide in activities and arrangements that
(Sun Tzu, 1963: 778). Britains wartime are putatively diplomatic in approach. While
leader, Winston Churchill, famously opined the absence in the post-Cold War era of an
that talking (or jaw jaw in his words) is explicit enemy posing a common and unam-
preferable to warring (Evans, 2012: 35). biguous strategic threat to all has undoubt-
During the Cold War years, reassurance, edly facilitated international peace and
restraint and mutually agreed norms of stability, it has also engendered a collective
sense of uncertainty over who precisely ones such a complex extent today that it is at times
friends and foes are (Baylis etal., 2014; Fris, difficult to differentiate between what prop-
2013). Military diplomacy therefore serves as erly constitutes military and civilian. In a key
a useful enterprise through which states and sense, this development is a function of the
their militaries interact with one another and increasingly holistic and hybridized nature
presumably learn more about others capa- of international conflict as well as the com-
bilities and intentions. plexity of security environments in which
This chapter briefly examines the follow- militaries have to operate today (Baldwin,
ing about military diplomacy: how it has 1995; Elhefnawy, 2004; Tan, 2005, 2015).
been defined in the literature and how it dif- While the distinction between military diplo-
fers from the ancillary idea of defence diplomacy and defence diplomacy should none-
macy; how it has been variously applied by theless be maintained, suffice to say for our
countries and militaries and for what ends; immediate purposes that many if not most of
how it has been increasingly applied in and the ostensibly civilian facets of defence
through multilateral modalities; and, finally, diplomacy such as the Munich Security
its limitations. Conference or the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
either include the active participation of
uniformed personnel or incorporate military-
Key Points to-military activities (Capie and Taylor,
2010a; Ischinger, 2014; Tan, 2012). Hence,
Not using force or the threat of it to achieve ones to speak today of military diplomacy as prac-
political and military goals is a time-honoured tically synonymous with defence diplomacy,
strategy. even as we acknowledge their conceptual
Militaries today participate in diplomatic activi-
distinctiveness, is not entirely farfetched.
ties and arrangements as part of their adaptation
Just as there is no universally accepted
to the changing strategic environment and their
evolving mission. definition for defence diplomacy (Mulloy,
2007), the same could be said of military
diplomacy. Broadly speaking, military diplo-
macy involves the deliberate application by
DEFINING MILITARY DIPLOMACY a nation of its military assets and resources,
in nonviolent ways and in bilateral or mul-
A useful place to begin this discussion is to tilateral settings, to attain positive outcomes
highlight what others think military diplo- for its security. An authoritative study, con-
macy is not. As concepts go, military diplo- trasting the related enterprise of defence
macy and defence diplomacy, often used diplomacy with the traditional military roles
interchangeably in the academic literature, of defence, deterrence, compellance or inter-
are not quite the same even though they vention, has defined it as the peacetime
clearly overlap. Du Plessis (2008) has per- cooperative use of armed forces and related
suasively argued that military diplomacy infrastructure as a tool of foreign and
consists strictly of military-to-military security policy (Cottey and Forster, 2013: 6)
meaning, the armed forces rather than the a description that befits military diplomacy
civilian ministries and agencies that support as well. Increasingly, it has also come to be
them relations and arrangements, whereas seen as an enterprise that aims to contribute
defence diplomacy is a broader category that to the security of the nations and/or com-
includes both the uniformed and civilian munities with which the initiating nation is
components of the defence establishment. As engaging (Tan and Singh, 2012). The contri-
sensible as this analytical distinction is, mili- butions in question could range from the pro-
tary diplomacy has nonetheless evolved to vision of assistance in support of the efforts
Military Diplomacy 593
by needy countries to develop their armed of other states; build crisis-proof bilateral
forces (capacity building) to consider- relationships through establishing bilateral
ably more challenging tasks such as prevent- networks and improving mutual understand-
ing conflicts from arising among opposing ing; and build the capacity of other states and
groups (preventive diplomacy) to set- their militaries to contribute to shared tasks
tling conflicts and disputes that have arisen (Wesley, 2011). That said, if strategy, accord-
(conflict resolution) (Cottey and Forster, ing to the British strategist Basil Liddell Hart,
2013; Zyck and Muggah, 2012). An early is principally about the allocation and appli-
post-Cold War attempt at a comprehensive cation of military means to fulfil the ends of
definition of military or defence diplomacy policy (Liddell Hart, 1967: 321), then nei-
comes from the British Government, which ther the conservative nor transformative ver-
argued in 2000 that its armed forces must sions of military diplomacy fall far from the
be trained and equipped to dispel hostil- tree of strategy, so to speak.
ity, build and maintain trust and assist in the Moreover, while the accent of military
development of democratically accountable diplomacy is on cooperation and reassurance,
armed forces [elsewhere], thereby making a it does not automatically follow that competi-
significant contribution to conflict prevention tion and deterrence therefore have no place
and resolution (UK Ministry of Defence, in military diplomacy. After all, it has been
2000). A concrete example of the North employed by countries to counterbalance
Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) focus their adversaries through strengthening coop-
on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolu- eration with their allies and security partners
tion is the formation of its Comprehensive and sourcing for new ones (Clinton, 2011;
Crisis and Operations Management Centre Manning, 2013; Swistek, 2012). In the case of
(CCOMC). Based at Mons in Belgium, India, it has been argued that countries such
the centre furnishes military (and civilian) as Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea
military expertise on crisis identification, and Vietnam occupy a prominent place in
planning, operations, reconstruction and sta- New Delhis strategic thinking because those
bilization capabilities (Simn, 2014: 224). countries either have antagonistic relations or
Thus understood, the goals of military uneasy relations with China, and as such are
diplomacy can either be conservative or trans- appropriate partners with whom India should
formative. While states may desire the same engage using military diplomacy (Jha, 2011).
end interstate peace and stability the paths For a global power such as the United States,
they take to realize that could differ markedly. the importance of military diplomacy has
The British and NATO examples cited in the grown even as Americas military footprint
preceding paragraph suggest the use of mili- has diminished in many parts of the world
tary diplomacy by states to achieve particular as a consequence of defence cuts and greater
transformative ends, namely, to democratize reliance on its allies to carry a bigger share
civilianmilitary relations in target countries of their joint security responsibilities than
and ensure their armed forces are demo- they might have hitherto done (Lord and
cratically accountable. On the other hand, Erickson, 2014; Obama, 2014). In the face
military diplomacy is also used by states for of such constraints, military diplomacy has
largely conservative or pragmatic purposes. allowed the United States to keep a decent
One analyst has offered at least six prag- semblance of its forward presence through
matic ends: build interoperability and capac- maintaining access points with countries that
ity among allies and partners; build strategic are receptive to Washingtons policies (Shea,
depth in ones regional backyard; gain influ- 2005). For example, under the 1990 memo-
ence in countries where the military is a key randum (and its 1998 addendum) signed
actor; better apprehend the strategic cultures between the United States and Singapore
concerning the formers use of the latters The goals of military diplomacy include both the
facilities, Singapore grants the US military conservative/pragmatic (e.g., build capacity and
access to the air base at Paya Lebar, the naval interoperability, improve mutual understanding)
base at Changi, and the port of Sembawang and the transformative (e.g., resolve conflicts,
where Commander, Logistics Group Western develop democratically accountable armed forces).
Military diplomacy aims to be inclusive and reas-
Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) the unit
suring without rejecting the more exclusive logics
responsible for coordinating US Pacific of competition and deterrence.
Command (PACOM) military exercises is
based (Tan, 2014).
Notwithstanding the more conservative
uses described above, it is safe to say, how- DOING MILITARY DIPLOMACY
ever, that military diplomacy has increas-
ingly assumed a more inclusive conception Military diplomacy comprises a wide range
of security wherein security is pursued of activities. Activities that befit military
with and not simply against others (Haacke diplomacy include: bilateral and multilateral
and Morada, 2010; Ponsard, 2007). For contacts between senior commanders and
instance, it has been argued that the aim of service chiefs; the appointment of defence
military diplomacy is to increase interstate attachs to foreign countries; bilateral
stability and security by changing attitudes defence cooperation agreements; training of
and perceptions of decision makers (Jha, foreign military personnel; provision of
2011: 48). Similarly, others have noted that expertise and advice on the democratic con-
the emphasis in military-to-military engage- trol of armed forces, defence management
ments have shifted over the years from the and military technical areas; contacts and
provision of assistance to needy countries exchanges between military personnel and
for building their own defence forces to units, and ship visits; placement of military
collaboration and the mutual promotion of personnel in the armed forces or defence
harmony and peace and building trust in ministries of partner countries; deployment
the strategic environment shared by engag- of training teams; provision of military
ers and recipients (Bateman etal., 2013). In equipment and other material aid; and bilat-
this respect, military diplomacy provides eral or multilateral military exercises for
countries with an alternative strategy to training purposes (Cottey and Forster, 2013).
coercive diplomacy (see Chapter 38 in this The significance which states attach to mili-
Handbook), whose utility has increasingly tary diplomacy today is evidenced by the
come under question (Art and Cronin, 2003; quality of assets and quantity of resources
Jentleson, 2006). they are willing to commit to the enterprise.
For instance, going well beyond protocol,
alcohol, and cholesterol the standard joke
Key Points about defence attachs of yore the strategic
importance today of attachs to helping their
Often used interchangeably, military diplomacy governments and defence establishments
and defence diplomacy are, however, not the realize their political and military objectives
same. In recent times, civilian facets of defence is such that countries now regularly send
diplomacy have nonetheless seen greater
only their best and brightest military people
involvement by their military counterparts, com-
abroad (Shea, 2005).
plicating further the distinction between those
two types of diplomacy. States engage in military diplomacy to
Military diplomacy involves the peacetime coop- strengthen ties with other likeminded states.
erative use of military assets and resources as a The idea here is to develop mutually benefi-
means of a countrys foreign and security policy. cial relationships with the armed forces of
countries some with whom they might even ties, it has been argued that the expansion of
be competing economically or engaged in regular contact between military elites and at
soft balancing to contribute to a stable inter- the lower levels would raise the benefits of
national and regional environment (Chong engagement for both Beijing and Washington
et al., 2008). The formation in 2010 of the while increasing the costs to both should ties
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus or be severed (Harold, 2013). In other words, as
ADMM-Plus by the Association of Southeast a strategy of engagement, the success of mili-
Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organi- tary diplomacy relies on the logic of frequency
zation formed in 1967, with eight of its dia- of contact and communication. According to
logue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, Admiral Mike Mullen, the former chairman
New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, strategic trust
United States) is an instance of Southeast comes about through more frequent discus-
Asian countries seeking to enhance their sion, more exercises, [and] more personnel
security regionalism through strengthening exchanges (Mullen, 2011).
military-to-military ties with outside powers Finally, states engage in military diplo-
and stakeholders (Capie and Taylor, 2010b; macy with the aim to establish and enhance
Tan, 2013). not only the professionalization of the armed
States also engage in military diplomacy forces of target countries but, crucially, their
to develop confidence, trust and transparency democratic accountability. According to a
with past, present or potential rivals they seek British Member of Parliament and shadow
to reassure or over which they want to keep a defence secretary, military diplomacy is about
watchful eye. It is used to build and enhance the minimization of hostility, the building
cooperative capacities with partners new and and maintenance of trust and the provision of
old, as well as with former foes (Swistek, assistance in the development of democrati-
2012). As a former US Pacific Command cally accountable armed forces and military
chief once remarked, the problem with coun- strategies (Murphy, 2012). Likewise, the
tries caught up in security dilemmas has less Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
to do with their respective force structures of the Armed Forces (DCAF) has identified
than with the shared proclivity of their lead- the facilitation of defence or security sector
ers for zero-sum, balance of power mind sets reform, the establishment of peace support
and ambiguous intentions (Blair and Hanley, operations in conflict and post-conflict thea-
2001). While the specific aims and objectives tres that involve military and civilian partici-
of nations participating in military diplo- pation, and the development of arms control
macy might differ, the crux is that they work and disarmament mechanisms and confidence
together to develop an environment of peace and security building measures in response to
and trust (Muthanna, 2011: 3). For exam- security problems posed by changing secu-
ple, military-to-military ties between Russia rity environments as the elements of military
and the United States have particularly been diplomacy (DCAF, 2007). The resumption by
aimed at overcoming the barriers to trust the United States of its International Military
from years of staring at each other across the and Education Training (IMET) programmes
Fulda Gap (Holinger, 2007: 59). Similarly, with Indonesia, which Washington had sus-
in the case of Vietnam and the United States, pended following allegations of human
military-to-military ties between the two rights abuses by the Indonesian military in
former foes have benefited from the evolv- East Timor in the late 1990s, was effected
ing cooperative partnership between the with reform of the Indonesian national mil-
National Defense University in Washington, itary (TNI) clearly in mind and in the con-
DC, and the National Defence Academy in text of Indonesias democratic transition
Hanoi (Stern, 2012). In the case of ChinaUS (International Crisis Group, 2001).
On the other hand, military diplomacy by security bilateralism as a result of its Cold
has also been employed not as a driver to War architecture of bilateral alliances and
bring about political change but offered as a bilateral security relationships (Acharya,
reward for continued change. For example, 1990), the Asia Pacific has in recent years
former US defence secretary Leon Panetta hosted a growing experiment with security
told a Shangri-La Dialogue audience in 2012 multilateralism (see Chapter 29 in this
that America would be prepared to establish Handbook). But rather than the institutional
military ties with Myanmar if the country singularity embodied in Europe by the
were to continue with its democratic reforms European Union (EU), multilateralism in the
and improve its human rights record. To that Asia Pacific is akin to what Francis Fukuyama
end, it has been suggested Myanmar could (2007), commenting on the global institutional
be invited to participate in US-sponsored landscape, has termed multi-multilateralism:
military exercises such as Cobra Gold in burgeoning webs or concentric circles of
Thailand, the maritime Cooperation Afloat interlocking and overlapping ties and arrange-
Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises ments (Frost, 2008; Green and Gill, 2009;
or the US Navys Pacific Partnership pro- Tan, 2009; Tow, 2002). A concrete example is
gramme (Hiebert, 2012). Britains planned the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an
resumption of military ties with Myanmar annual gathering of foreign ministers (as well
has similarly identified reform of its armed as defence officials) from twenty-six Asia
forces, the Tatmadaw, and continuation of the Pacific countries and the EU, the ADMM-
peace process begun by President U Thein Plus, the eighteen-country forum of defence
Sein as the key reasons behind its decision ministers, the East Asia Summit (EAS), a
(Hiebert and Nguyen, 2013). leaders-led forum whose membership corre-
sponds with that of the ADMM-Plus, and the
Shangri-La Dialogue, a semi-official (or
Key Points Track 1.5) annual confab of defence lead-
ers, practitioners and intellectuals. In addition
Military diplomacy comprises a wide range of to these, military-to-military engagements
activities conducted bilaterally and multilaterally. have proliferated all over the Asia Pacific
Military diplomacy is used to enhance ties with
region to the extent that analysts, accurately
friendly states, build transparency and trust with
or otherwise, have resorted to labels such as
rival states, professionalize and develop democrati-
cally accountable armed forces, and reward and webs and communities to describe those
strengthen ongoing democratic transitions. emerging relationships (Blair and Hanley,
2001; Tan and Singh, 2012). The US Pacific
Command (US PACOM), for instance, is
pursuing military-to-military activities within
MULTILATERALIZING MILITARY existing bilateral frameworks, while encour-
DIPLOMACY aging the development of more multilateral
venues and new strategic partnerships with
One of the more intriguing developments Asia-Pacific countries (Keating and
regarding military diplomacy has to do with McCaffrey, 2007).
the growing patterns of multilateral interac- Some see utility in such a complex
tion and cooperation among militaries. As a architecture for avoiding gridlock when
multilateral collective defence organization, negotiations which become toxic in one
NATO is a natural institutional locus for mul- institutional setting can presumably con-
tilateral military ties (Schimmelfennig, 2005). tinue unhindered in another more salubri-
On the other hand, as a region long defined ous setting (Cha, 2011). Others have warned
against the potential dangers of duplication forces has been described as a significant
and overlap in an increasingly crowded enabler, providing the region with capac-
domain of security cooperation (Bisley, ity, training, resources and a framework for
2009; Taylor, 2011; Tow and Taylor, 2010). regional security cooperation (Wheeler and
More often than not, defence practitioners Weinstock, 2007).
tend to view those multilateral arrangements
as consultative mechanisms for countries to
resolve differences and clarify misunder- Key Points
standings. Mechanisms such as the ADMM-
Plus help to prevent miscalculations, and Military diplomacy in the Asia Pacific has devel-
entrench a culture of peaceful resolution of oped into a multilateral enterprise.
disputes in the region, while the opportu- Despite serious reservations with the multi-
multilateral character of Asia Pacific security
nities they furnish for increased interac-
cooperation, the ADMM-Plus, US PACOM-based
tion and networking form the basis for and other multilateral modalities have facilitated
exploring new areas of cooperation (Tan, and enhanced military-to-military cooperation
2002). In the face of common security chal- among regional countries.
lenges, states have few better options than
to develop multilateral approaches and hab-
its of cooperation which require effective
policy coordination and, more often than THE LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY
not, military-to-military cooperation (Blair DIPLOMACY
and Hanley, 2001). For example, it has been
argued that the ADMM-Plus serves as an However, the conduct of military diplomacy
easy and natural venue for defence leaders does not automatically or always lead to
to get to know one another and share infor- improved ties. Despite Chinas longstanding
mation. It also serves as a vehicle for joint pauk phaw (fraternal) relationship with
exercises on counterterrorism, humanitarian Myanmar and its provision of arms to the
assistance and disaster relief (HADR), mari- latter, mutual distrust persists between both
time security, military medicine, and peace- countries and their armed forces (Hiebert and
keeping (Bower, 2013). In June 2013, the Nguyen, 2013). Moreover, countries at times
ADMM-Plus undertook exercises in HADR hold divergent perspectives on the goals of
and military medicine in Brunei, where their military relationship. As a leading
Chinese and American troops conducted democracy and global military power, the
joint training for the first time. In September United States is used to transparency and
2013, ADMM-Plus exercises in counterter- expects it in the context of its military rela-
rorism and maritime security were held in tionship with, say, China. As such, Americans
Indonesia and Australia respectively. In see their military ties with the Chinese as an
February 2014, the ADMM-Plus conducted opportunity to apprehend how Peoples
a table-top exercise on peacekeeping opera- Liberation Army (PLA) elites think, convey
tions in the Philippines. Arguably, what American expectations, and deter by show-
the capacity building arrangements within casing their advanced capabilities. On their
the ADMM-Plus have also enabled is an part, the Chinese, unused to transparency and
embryonic regional capability in preventive indeed suspicious of it, see their ties with the
diplomacy ironically, the very thing the Americans as an opportunity to learn how
ARF has not been able to implement (Tan, better to modernize their own military with-
2011). In the same way, the US PACOMs out revealing their own weaknesses (Harold,
engagement with Southeast Asian armed 2013).
Key Point Bateman, Sam, Anthony Bergin and Hayley

Channer (2013) Terms of Engagement:
Military diplomacy has not always contributed to Australias Regional Defence Diplomacy.
enhancing strategic trust and improving relations Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
between and among countries. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens,
eds (2014) The Globalization of World Politics:
An Introduction to International Relations,
6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CONCLUSION Bisley, Nick (2009) Building Asias Security,
Adelphi Paper 408. Abingdon, Oxon:
The goals of military diplomacy have been Routledge for the International Institute for
about conservation as much as innovation. Strategic Studies.
This serves as a cautionary note against unre- Blair, Dennis C. and John T. Hanley, Jr. (2001)
alistic expectations regarding what it can From wheels to webs: reconstructing Asia-
achieve, particularly where transformative Pacific security arrangements, The
Washington Quarterly 24 (1): 717.
military diplomacy is concerned. Yet the same
Bower, Ernest (2013) Engagement in the Indo-
holds true of pragmatic or conservative mili-
Pacific: the Pentagon leads by example,
tary diplomacy aimed at mitigating the nega- Southeast Asia From the Corner of 18th and
tive consequences of security dilemmas. As K Streets 4/17, 22 August. Washington, DC:
evidenced by its rise and popularity in the Center for Strategic and International
post-Cold War era, military diplomacy is more Studies, pp. 14.
appropriate for risk-based security situations Capie, David and Brendan Taylor (2010a) The
than threat-based ones. That said, in regions Shangri-La Dialogue and the
like the Asia Pacific where tensions between institutionalization of defence diplomacy in
regional powers could rise as a consequence of Asia, The Pacific Review 23 (3): 35976.
on-going maritime and territorial disputes, Capie, David and Brendan Taylor (2010b) Two
cheers for ADMM+, PacNet 51, 20 October.
military diplomacy has arguably been used by
Cha, Victor D. (2011) Complex patchworks:
countries to enhance partnerships and build
U.S. alliances as part of asias regional
coalitions against their competitors. Where architecture, Asia Policy 11: 2750.
military diplomacy ends and mutual defence Clinton, Hillary (2011) Americas Pacific
cooperation against a common threat begins is century, Foreign Policy, 11 October (http://
to imply that military diplomacy is defined by www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/
the aims and intentions behind particular americas_pacific_century).
activities rather than the activities themselves. Chong, Desmond, Philip Khoo and Amos Yeo
(2008) Shaping policy space: defence
diplomacy in the 3rd generation RSAF,
Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed
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49
Environmental Diplomacy
S a l e e m H . A l i a n d H e l e n a Vo i n o v V l a d i c h
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS ecological discourse, along with outlining

major agreements (Track 1) that became turn-
The term environmental diplomacy remains ing points in the evolution of modern environ-
nascent and contested in terms of definitions. mentalism and sustainable development.
For International Relations relations scholars, The term environmental diplomacy
the definitional frame is around negotiations acquired currency after the formation of the
between nation-states on environmental gov- United Nations Environment Programme
ernance. However, for interdisciplinary schol- (UNEP) in 1973, given the prominence that
ars of environmental studies, the term has a environmental issues received soon thereaf-
broader meaning around negotiations con- ter. However, it could be argued that envi-
cerned with conflict resolution over natural ronmental diplomatic efforts could be traced
resources as well as instrumental use of the back to the International Convention for the
environment in resolving disputes and building Regulation of Whaling which was initially
peace (see Chapter 17 in this Handbook). Just signed by 15 nations in 1946 and came into
as views of diplomacy are evolving from an force in 1948. The broader use of the term
exclusive focus on Track 1 (between state became common after the 1992 United
representatives) process to a more inclusive Nations Conference on Environment and
Track 2 enterprise (between stakeholders), Development (UNCED), popularly known
so too must the views on environmental as the Earth Summit (or the Rio Summit,
diplomacy (see Chapters 2 and 8 in this after its venue: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). The
Handbook). For the purposes of this Hand- advent of this international forum bringing
book, we will endeavor to posit a more inclu- together world leaders prompted attention
sive and expansive view of environmental from scholars in fields such as international
diplomacy (Track 2) that is gaining traction in law, political science, and regional planning.
Lawrence Susskind, the founder of the MIT- Speth, 2005). We can name three key under-
Harvard Public Disputes Program, published lying components of any environmental con-
the book Environmental Diplomacy in 1994 flict which are in synch with the literature on
which gave broader appeal to the term and sustainable development: environmental pro-
its usage (the second edition of the book was tection; economic development; and social
published 20 years later; Susskind and Ali, justice. These are represented in Figure 49.1
2014). In its original connotation, Susskind in terms of their connectivity and a typology
had intended the term to encompass multilat- of conflicts that each connection implies.
eral environmental agreements and how best Value conflicts (A), which are highlighted
to negotiate them in the context of broader by the clash of environmental protection pri-
international security priorities. Diplomacy orities and economic development priorities,
was conceived very much in the tradition are the most common kind of conflicts at the
of Westphalian interactions between nation- international level where environmental trea-
states. Thus environmental diplomacy in this ties being negotiated often get stalled. Often
conventional view was also considered in the there are fundamental political ideologies on
context of interactions between nation-states which the conflicts are predicated. Resolving
on environmental policy. The term connoted these conflicts requires us to negotiate the
the resolution of any international disputes monetary and non-monetary values associ-
over managing the global environment (such ated with natural systems as well as consider
as the Antarctic Treaty) or a proactive treaty what level of risk or insurance value we may
process to manage the global commons (such place on the occurrence of uncertain environ-
as with ozone depletion or climate change). mental harm. Building energy infrastructure,
However, the contemporary usage of the term roads, business parks, and so on may be
has broadened to consider ways of resolving how we consider these conflicts at the local
environmental conflicts that emanate from level but these same local-level issues can
efforts at conservation prioritization. At times be operationalized at the international level
the term is also used to consider pathways by through treaties that may place constraints on
which the environment can instrumentally development for the sake of environmental
be used in diplomatic activities between protection. Indeed, a majority of environ-
adversaries a genre of literature in this mental treaties would fall in this category.
arena is also referred to as environmental The United Nations Framework Convention
peace-building. on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example,
Environmental conflicts occur at the inter- boils down to how much economic develop-
section of ecology and society and are thus ment should be qualitatively constrained by
bound by natural systems constraints on the kind of energy usage or land-use policies
the one hand and social values on the other. for development in order to protect long-term
What is important to note is that environ- natural processes from being eroded. Despite
mental conflicts are about governing ecosys- calls for greater democratization of the pro-
tems and the value we may want to place in cesses around climate governance (Stevenson
conserving such common resource domains and Dryzek, 2014), the overall tone of the
for the future generations. Ecologists have debate remains aligned with classic North
a long-term perspective of the future and a South divisions albeit that definitions of
more holistic understanding of global prob- who remains in each camp are changing with
lems and therefore they avoid the trap of dis- the rise of middle-powers such as the BRICS
counting the future more than do economists, countries (Held etal., 2014) (see Chapter 23
whose accounting processes pose tremen- in this Handbook). Diplomatic efforts around
dous challenges for environmental conflict the UNFCCC also had to negotiate the terms
resolution and decision making (Ali, 2003; of risk assurance as they pertained to different
Environmental Diplomacy 603
Environmental
protection
A B
Value conflict Identity conflict
ENVIRONMENTAL
DIPLOMACY SPACE
Economic Social
Distribution conflict
development justice
Figure 49.1 Anatomy of environmental conflicts and concomitant opportunities for

diplomacy
Source: adapted from Ali (2004).
scenarios of impact and the ability of various Distribution conflicts (C): with scarce natu-
sides to adapt to climatic change. ral resources, there is bound to be a zero sum
Identity conflicts (B) around environmen- aspect to some environmental conflicts (where
tal issues stem from perceived social biases one party loses for another to win). How
within human societies that are often manifest scarce resources get allocated, especially water
in disproportionate environmental harm being resources in the context of riparian communi-
borne by minority communities. These con- ties based on some norms of social justice, is
flicts are also presented in terms of indigenous the most challenging aspect of environmental
politics and how natural systems constitute an diplomacy. The classic case in this regard is
integral part of the identity of particular popu- one of downstream versus upstream riparian
lations. Conflicts between indigenous people communities, within nation-states or across
and environmentalists around conservation borders. For example, does Ethiopia deserve
lands are particularly significant in this arena to keep its water since most of the rainfall
(Dowie, 2005). However, identity can also be occurs on its land that feeds the Nile or does
configured on the basis of a history of injus- Egypt deserve a greater share of the water
tice that is exacerbated by inequality. Such since Egyptian societies first found means of
features of identity that are often a legacy of harnessing the water for broader commerce
pernicious norms of class and creed also make and are most dependent on it? Colonial agree-
their way into resource allocation processes. ments and voluntary standards such as the
Resource nationalism within nation-states 2004 Berlin Rules from the International Law
leading to civil war in parts of sub-Saharan Association offer a backdrop for such diplo-
Africa are perhaps the most acute examples macy but are rarely consequential on their
of such linkages between natural resources, own. Such matters usually require linkage with
identity, and conflict. other non-environmental diplomatic efforts as
well in order to augment the bargaining spec- At the state level a policy window had
trum (Islam and Susskind, 2012). emerged and government action, which had
once been impossible, became inevitable and
part of the electoral process (Speth, 2005).
Key Points The US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Council on Environmental
There is definitional variance in using term envi- Quality (CEQ) were established, the Clean
ronmental diplomacy by disciplinary background Air and Water Acts were passed, and fed-
of scholarship. eral courts were overwhelmed with lawsuits
It is important to note an expansive and inclusive
brought by a new generation of environ-
definition given the development of diplomatic
mental advocacy organizations. This led to
discourse to include both Track 1 and Track 2
processes. Congress establishing far-reaching and tough
Despite different disciplinary backgrounds there deadlines for industry.
is a shared focus on negotiation in studies on
environmental diplomacy.
International Environmental
Issues and Global Negotiations
THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL The establishment of the United Nations
DIPLOMACY AND EMERGENT Environment Programme (UNEP) was a
THEMES landmark achievement of the first
International Conference on the Human
Environmental diplomacy had its origins in Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972.
conventional views of diplomatic processes The mandate of UNEP originally was to be
whereby nation-states negotiated with each the leading global environmental authority
other on bilateral or multilateral agreements. that sets the global environmental agenda,
However, since environmental issues have that promotes the coherent implementation
multiple levels of engagement and the con- of the environmental dimensions of sustain-
nections between local and global are more able development within the United Nations
inextricable, we argue that environmental system and that serves as an authoritative
diplomacy is part of a broader genre of dis- advocate for the global environment.1 Thus
course on environmental conflict resolution. the role it was meant to play was largely one
As J. Gustave Speth (2005), the former head of a coordinating agency for the UN system.
of the United Nations Development Program, The 1970s was also a time when global-
points out, the emergence of environmental scale environmental issues attracted popu-
concern in the 1960s had several distinguish- lar attention, prompted by several reports
ing features. Initially this concern was local and publications on the topic, particu-
and state-driven in scope; the drivers at first larly the seminal Club of Romes Limits to
were not global local air and water pollu- Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972) and,
tion, strip-mining, highway construction, most consequentially, the United Nations
noise pollution, dams and streams channeli- Conference on the Human Environment, held
zation, clear-cutting, hazardous waste dumps, in Stockholm, Sweden in June 1972. Some
local nuclear power plants, exposure to toxic authors (Linnr and Selin, 2013) argue that
chemicals, oil spills, and suburban sprawl. In the Stockholm Conference had a real impact
the US these concerns culminated in the pas- on the environmental policies of the European
sage of the US National Environmental Community; for example, it laid out a foun-
Policy Act in 1969 and in the first Earth Day dation for how environmental advocacy, or
a few months later. environmentalism, was operationalized
within international organizations. This also proponents as the inalienable right of each state to
led to further comprehension of global cli- the full exercise of authority over its natural wealth
and the correlative right to dispose of its resources
mate change, and eventually paved the way
fully and freely. For many developing countries this
to European consensus on agreements such right is regarded as an essential condition of their
as the Kyoto Protocol. national independence and of their ability to decide
Key outcomes of the Stockholm Conference on basic political and economic arrangements.
were: a major declaration (known as the
Stockholm Declaration), containing 26 prin- The enshrining of sovereignty over natural
ciples related to the environment and devel- resources was clearly noted as a voice against
opment; an Action Plan; and a Resolution. postcolonial influence by the colonizers.
Among the principles, the Stockholm However, the challenge facing any global
Principle 21 has become an important part of environmental agreement is that at some
the following international treaties: the 1985 level sovereignty has to be eroded to allow
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the for trans-boundary ecological concerns to be
Ozone Layer; the 1979 Convention on Long- realized. This essential tension between
Range Transboundary Air Pollution; the social justice and self-determination of coun-
1972 London Convention on the Prevention tries versus the common good of global envi-
of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and ronmental decision-making would remain a
other Matter; the 1982 UNCLOS Article 193; defining feature of future environmental
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity diplomacy.
(CBD); and the 1992 United Nations The second part of Principle 21 defines
Framework Convention on Climate Change a two-fold responsibility for states. One
(UNFCCC) (Lynch, 2014). is to prevent transboundary environmen-
However, the output from the conference tal impacts which might lead to substantial
was constrained by the dominant paradigm of harm. Another is to prevent activities which
national sovereignty trumping transboundary entail significant risk of transboundary harm
concerns. This was most definitely manifest (Pallemaerts, 1992). Thus, in the context
in Principle 21 of the resolution, which brings of state activities which have transbound-
together two ideas of different historical and ary impacts, the precautionary principle
geo-political origins, and reflects divergent appears to flow naturally from the admoni-
perspectives held respectively by the devel- tion in Stockholm Principle 21 that states are
oping and industrialized states: responsible for ensuring that activities
within their jurisdiction and control do not
[The] States have, in accordance with the Charter cause harm to the environment of other states
of the United Nations and the principles of interna- or of areas beyond the limits of national
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
jurisdiction. Some 20 years later the pre-
resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies 2 cautionary principle appeared as the pre-
cautionary approach in Principle 15 of the
This principle was initiated to transform Rio Declaration (United Nations, 1992):
what the South perceived as an unfair inter-
In order to protect the environment, the precau-
national economic and legal order created by tionary approach shall be widely applied by States
former colonial regimes. Schachter (1977) according to their capabilities. Where there are
describes this first part of Principle 21 as threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
follows: full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
In recent years no normative principle has been environmental degradation.
more vigorously asserted by the less-developed
countries than that of permanent sovereignty over The precautionary principle, along with
natural resources, a concept generally defined by its the Stockholm Principle 21, is another
significant normative component used in lens that we present in this chapter allows
international negotiations to balance eco- the paradigm to be considered at multiple
nomic preferences with the carrying capacity scales.
of natural systems. Only ten years after the
Stockholm conference, in the 1980s, a series
of reports began to pull the various tradeoffs International Consensus,
between economic development and environ- Epistemic Communities, and
mental conservation into a coherent agenda Network Governance
for international action. The term sustaina-
ble development, which had previously been According to Speth (2005) there are some ten
given currency by The Club of Rome, began factors that led to international consensus
to be used by the United Nations as the para- around environmental issues as part of the
digm to gain global consensus on the trade- broader range of international diplomatic
offs between economic development and efforts: depletion of the stratospheric ozone
environmental action. The UN General layer; climate change due to greenhouse gases;
Assembly established the World Commission loss of crop and grazing land due to desertifi-
on Environment and Development (WCED) cation, erosion, and conversion of land to non-
in 1983 and asked the former Prime Minister farm uses; depletion of the worlds tropical
of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to chair forests, leading to loss of forest resources and
the body with a mission to craft a major serious watershed damage; mass extinction of
report on sustainable development. The species from global loss of wildlife habitat and
Brundtland Commission, as it was subse- the associated loss of genetic resources; rapid
quently known, prepared a comprehensive population growth, burgeoning third world
report within four years and published it as cities, and ecological refugees; mismanage-
Our Common Future (United Nations, 1987). ment and shortages of freshwater resources;
This book became widely used as an educa- overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution
tional tool worldwide and paved the way for in marine environment; threats to human
the United Nations Conference on health from organic chemicals, particularly
Environment and Development (UNCED) endocrine disruptors; and acid rain and the
otherwise known as the Rio Summit which effects of a complex mix of air pollutants on
was held in Brazil in 1992. fisheries, forests, and crops.
Unlike the Stockholm Conference, the Rio This menu of thematic areas, listed by
Summit agenda included the deliberations Speth, was moved forward by a relatively
on four specific treaties pertaining to climate small international community of leaders in
change, desertification, biodiversity, and for- science, government, the United Nations, and
ests. The first three were formally adopted at civil society, which 20 years later was given the
the summit while no agreement was reached name epistemic community by Peter Haas
on having an international agreement on in his landmark study of the Mediterranean
forests. Environmental groups and govern- Action Plan (Haas, 1992). The term implies
ments alike were concerned in general that that knowledge has a central role in improv-
an international treaty on forests would dilute ing the quality and sustainability of the
the efficacy of stronger local programs in this consensus-building process. These epistemic
arena. The aphorism think global act local communities had to contend with ideologi-
is emblematic of this tension on when to focus cal rifts on environmental governance which
on international macro-cooperation and when were largely aligned around state versus
to operate at a local level for community- market forces of economic development.
driven solutions. Approaching environmen- Between the 1930s and 1970s, there was a
tal diplomacy from the conflict resolution dominance of the state-centric coordination
mechanism for resource management that environment and pave the way for adaptive
was determined by both the world wars and and effective governance. Epistemic commu-
then the Cold War period. Security was deter- nities, which are able to dissociate themselves
mined by the state apparatus and trumped from political bickering and catalyze coopera-
all other forms of international relations or tion, are a type of network that is particularly
community-level interactions. In the 1980s, important for addressing environmental gov-
the emergence of market forces began to take ernance problems (Haas, 1992).
shape, particularly hybrid models of eco- Similar to the contending pathways of
nomic markets and state-centric governance environmental security discourse, the same
in China. The turn of the millennium has seen feature can be viewed as a strength or a weak-
the emergence of a new paradigm for diplo- ness, depending on which pathway (process)
macy, which brings in public and private sec- will be chosen to reach the goal. The network
tor forces through more integrative network approach to environmental governance,
mechanisms. The United Nations allowance which in essence is the overarching means
for participation at treaty forums of major through which environmental diplomacy can
groups, which are often non-governmental be operationalized (government and civil
advocacy organizations such as labor unions, organizations), also has strengths and weak-
human rights groups, environmental organi- nesses. The main argument favoring network
zations, and universities, is a manifestation governance over traditional, command-and-
of this network-centered governance process control regulation or market regulation is
(Khagram and Ali, 2008). that network governance can better deal with
The pernicious impact of the Cold War and intrinsic uncertainty and with decision mak-
some state-centered policies on the environ- ing under conditions of bounded rational-
ment were widely documented as commu- ity (limited information) (Haas, 2004). Such
nist countries opened up to greater research conditions specifically apply to the cases with
inquiry (Shapiro, 2001). Because of the fundamental conflict between spatial scales,
apparent failure on the part of the state-centric global versus local, where network institu-
coordination to govern complex environ- tions can both create synergy between differ-
mental problems (Darst, 2001), new modes ent competencies and sources of knowledge
of governance have been proposed in recent and encourage individual and collective learn-
years (Newig etal., 2010). In one such mode, ing, thereby making it easier to address com-
known as the network model, multilevel plex and interrelated problems (Haas, 2004;
political networks composed of stakeholders Dedeurwaerdere, 2013). Environmental
interested in the same issues can take shape. policy makers often operate under conditions
The networks are organized with the purpose of uncertainty: they may not understand the
of negotiating and agreeing on solutions. An technical aspects of the issues they are regulat-
example of how such networks can develop ing. Their limited understanding affects their
and facilitate environmental diplomacy is ability to define the interests of the state and to
exemplified by the Salzburg Initiative, develop suitable solutions for scales larger than
undertaken by the Dana Greeley Foundation the local (e.g. cross-boundary or cross-regional
for Peace and Justice in 1989, whereby 25 environmental regulation). Environmental cri-
diplomats and scholars were convened to ses also exacerbate uncertainty for decision
suggest reforms in environmental govern- makers (Haas, 1992). To reduce uncertainty,
ance which were subsequently endorsed by decision makers seek expert knowledge and
stakeholders from more than 50 countries advice on issues such as: the scale of environ-
(Susskind, 1994). By integrating stakeholders mental problems; cause-and-effect relation-
from different sectors, governance networks ships between ecological processes; and how
can provide an innovative, learning-oriented (science-based) policy options will play out.
Environmental governance in general and The development of UNEP and the role of inter-
network-centered coordination in particular national commissions and conferences, such as
face challenges characterized by complexity the Stockholm Conference, in the emergence of
and uncertainty, which are inherent in issues environmental diplomacy.
associated with the environment and sustain- The tension between whether to act globally for
environmental agreements or focus on local action,
ability (Newig etal., 2007). Furthermore, deci-
which arguably can be resolved by considering
sion making and conflict resolution that assume multiple scales of conflict resolution processes.
the supremacy of science are likely to alienate The development of `epistemic communities and
developing countries at the global scale and the their respective contributions to more effective
public at the local scale, where stakeholders all environmental diplomacy.
too often complain about disparities in scientific
and technical expertise. For example, a small
community organization standing for the rights
of indigenous forest conservation does not have ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS AND
the capacity to digest voluminous environmen- SCIENCE
tal impact statements of industrial forestry
projects (see Chapter 51 in this Handbook). As noted earlier, our view of environmental
Like other phenomena and circumstances, diplomacy encompasses a broader vision of
even natural disasters and crises can be conflict resolution processes involving envi-
viewed from different perspectives. On the ronmental factors and how various tools can
one hand, environmental crises exacerbate be employed to benefit diplomacy in this
uncertainty and could potentially result in context. Environmental Conflict Resolution
community panic and lead to a reluctance (ECR) has emerged as a specialized field
for internal community consensus or national within the broader realm of Alternative
diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, cri- Dispute Resolution (ADR), and many of the
ses have the potential to lead to cooperation tools and analytical frames used in this con-
and the search for new solutions, as there is text are also applicable to environmental
greater need to address a particular need that diplomacy. While ECR focuses on finding
may require collaborative processes. Positive pathways to avoid litigation in specific envi-
exchanges and trust-building gestures can be ronmental regulatory disputes, environmen-
a consequence of realizing common envi- tal diplomacy encompasses the full frame of
ronmental threats. Often, a focus on com- analytical and behavioral processes that lead
mon environmental harms (or aversions) is various parties towards a sustained coopera-
psychologically more successful in leading tive outcome. The convergent element in
to cooperative outcomes than focusing on these two fields that are situated at different
common interests, which in turn may lead to scales is the role environmental science can
competitive behavior (Ali, 2003). play in negotiation and moving parties closer
to consensus.
Key Points Since the term environmental conflict first
appeared in the 1960s, our understanding of
Among the important points to note in the the role of science in consensus building has
evolution of environmental diplomacy are been gradually changing. Starting as a purely
the following: neutral source of authority, a venue for dis-
The legislative origins of environmental diplo- covery, and an independent mechanism of
macy in the United States and Europe; accountability, the role of science has slowly
The key thematic areas for ecological concern been co-opted into society whereby it can be
that historically led to the current range of global socially constructed as a shield rather than an
environmental diplomatic efforts. agent of some indelible truth. The entire field
of Science and Technology Studies, which commit to sharing scientific information as

has its own Handbook of record (Jasanoff et a means of educating, rather than intimidat-
al., 2001; Hackett etal., 2007) developed as a ing, stakeholders. If these conditions are met,
result of this realization. Creating an illusion scientific analysis may sustain dialogue, ena-
of arbitrating between alternative policy view- bling stakeholders to develop a constructive
points or choices, science is often employed understanding of the various perspectives on
instead as a tool for political persuasion. an environmental conflict.
Furthermore, it can be more and more fre- There are also some specific struc-
quently observed that in difficult or intractable tured tools which can supplement the role
cases, scientific uncertainty, complexity, and of science in environmental diplomacy.
disagreement can prolong conflict, exacer- Participatory Modeling (PM) is one approach
bate poor relationships, and actually provide a that is gaining a lot of attention. PM is a gen-
rationale for avoiding resolution (Martin and eral approach to involving stakeholders in the
Richards, 1995; Ozawa, 2006). modeling process and is designed to assist
In her notable article, Science in environ- in decision making, conflict resolution, and
mental conflicts, Ozawa (1996) asks whether general management of the process (Voinov
science can play a role in resolving environ- and Gaddis, 2008, Voinov Vladich, 2012). It
mental conflict and answers affirmatively. has been a particularly valuable tool in fur-
Ozawa observes that, during the 1980s, as a thering environmental diplomatic efforts. PM
byproduct of innovations in decision making is driven by the goals of the stakeholder group
(which included direct negotiations between and is not limited to the use of any specific
individuals and representatives of groups modeling tools or requirements to ask par-
engaged in environmental disputes), an alter- ticular types of management questions. The
native role for science emerged. In some goal of the PM approach is to make the mod-
environmental mediation cases, parties now eling development process transparent and
explicitly agree that the technical information share the excitement of modeling with the
and analysis necessary to understand current stakeholders. This, in turn, makes it possible
conditions and to identify possible options to: educate stakeholders about the processes
for action is one of the first topics on the and functions of the environmental system;
agenda (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Ali, solicit input and data about the system; define
2003; Voinov Vladich, 2012). Thus, scientific scenarios, types of output, and the uses of the
analysis has become a tool in the negotiation model; and create a constructive environment
process. Almost from the start, stakeholders for negotiation and consensus building.
discuss what kinds of technical knowledge PM is a powerful tool for decision mak-
are pertinent; moreover, the results of the ing. Under the PM approach, a series of mod-
scientific analysis are openly discussed and els are built, with citizens participation at
subject to agreement (Ozawa and Susskind, various stages of the project. As part of the
1985). They note that for science to play a model-development process, information is
facilitative role in conflict resolution, the collected, the information is tested against
decision-making process must be deliberately information obtained from residents, and
structured to ensure the following: all stake- assumptions and data sets are translated into
holders must have access to scientific exper- the formal language of models (Argent and
tise and analysis; a period of time should be Grayson, 2003; Voinov et al., 2004; Brown
explicitly set aside to address political con- Gaddis et al., 2007; Bowden et al., 2008;
cerns to prevent participants from clinging to Voinov Vladich, 2012).
technical positions with the aim of obtaining Another tool that can supplement the role
political gains; and experts invited to par- of science in environmental diplomacy is
ticipate in the decision-making process must Mediated Modeling (MM). It is a non-spatial
form of participatory modeling that focuses environment, conflict resolution, and diplo-
on building a conceptual model together with macy. Instead of trying to tease out environ-
stakeholders (Van den Belt, 2004). It assumes mental causality in political conflicts, such as
an extended deep involvement on the part of a civil war, and thereby accentuate the impor-
relatively small number of stakeholders who tance of conservation, one can also try and
are committed to long-term participation. The see how environmental issues can play a role
process creates common ground for discussion, in cooperation regardless of whether they
develops trust between participants, and helps are part of the original conflict. For example,
discipline deliberation and decision making. the causes of the Darfour crisis in Sudan
The focus on building the model yields a shared were hotly debated in the literature, with
understanding of the system and its dynam- environmental determinists arguing that
ics, and makes it possible to analyze temporal desertification and climate change were to
trends and trade-off scenarios. The use of geo- blame, while other scholars of African gov-
graphic information systems (GIS) to provide ernance were arguing that ethnic and politi-
a spatial dimension to diplomatic processes cal issues were causal factors. Even if the
and change perceptions of conflicts among cause for conflict was about identity rather
negotiators is also gaining traction (Lovett and than environment, the issue of desertification
Appleton, 2007; Jasani etal., 2009). is a common threat to both sides and could
Ultimately, the instrumental use of sci- thus be a diplomatic means of bringing par-
ence in these processes must also link with ties to the negotiating table.
the broader perceptions among negotiators Such an approach has been termed environ-
that ecological factors have the potential for mental peace-making (Conca and Dabelko,
fostering cooperative behavior and hence 2003). The main premise of environmental
peace-building. peace-making is that there are certain key
attributes of environmental concerns that
would lead acrimonious parties to consider
Key Points them as a means of cooperation. Thus envi-
ronmental issues could play an instrumental
Environmental diplomacy requires an under- role even in cases where the conflict does not
standing of broader underpinnings of environ- involve environmental issues. The theoretical
mental conflicts. basis for this approach has been presented in
Science has an important role to play as an
the literature on environmental planning (Ali,
arbitrator in environmental diplomacy but has
2003, 2007), and can also find its roots within
its limitations based on how stakeholders will
always try to socially construct the relevance of the international relations literature, albeit it
scientific data. has rarely been explicitly noted in ecological
Participatory Modeling and Mediated Modeling, terms (Stein, 1993). Indeed, an active role by
coupled with spatial analysis techniques, are new environmental planners is important to gal-
tools that can be employed to facilitate environ- vanize action and to help in the realization
mental diplomacy. of environmental issues in peace-building.
Table 49.1 shows ways in which environmen-
tal planners can approach this task.
Social scientists trying to study causal rela-
ENVIRONMENTAL PEACE-BUILDING tionships of any kind must contend with the
problem of endogeneity the direction of
There is yet another way of invoking the causality. Hence environmental cooperation
environment in conflict resolution that would and the resolution of larger conflicts must
address the concerns of the skeptics who be considered in this light as well. Is envi-
dont recognise the connections between the ronmental cooperation a result of conflict
Table 49.1 Consensus catalysis by environmental planners

Concept Approach Action Initiative Function
Framing conflict Provide informationInstitute long-term Joint audits of Establishes neutral
as a dilemma on joint harms of engagement environmental criteria cognitive base
of common noncooperation between parties and data collection for discussion of
aversion to monitor for ecosystem based derivative issues
environmental harms planning efforts
Linking Provide a bargaining Negotiate comprehensive Interdisciplinary Enlarges the pie for
environmental opportunity for agreements rather commissions for positive solutions
concerns to sides where none than individual problem solving that are and adds flexibility
other issues was perceived to contracts on specific facilitated by a mutually for integrative
exist issues agreeable mediator bargaining
Using Provide forums for Develop conservation Peace parks, good neigh- Provides a mutually
environmental joint participation plans that would bor compacts on satisfying experience
concerns as a in conservation be inclusive of riparian conservation, for parties to
trust-building initiatives adversaries and sister city lesson exemplify rewards
tool drawing arrangements of cooperation
Source: (Ali, 2003)
mitigation or is it leading to conflict reduc- common interests can also lead to com-
tion itself? The temporal analysis can often petition whereas common aversions have
be so closely intertwined that the causality a greater propensity for prompting group
confounds researchers. However, it may be cooperation (Ridley, 1998).
argued that the process is much more dia- A skeptical take on environmental peace-
lectical in nature. Environmental issues can building would highlight the view that coop-
be an important entry point for conversation eration on environmental issues between
between adversaries and can also provide a adversaries would be relegated to low politics
valuable exit strategy from intractable dead- and might not translate into a larger resolu-
locks because of their global appeal. However, tion of the conflict. In this view, environmen-
they cannot be taken in strategic isolation tal conservation would at best be a means of
and are usually not a sufficient condition for diplomatic maneuvering between mid-level
conflict resolution. Thus technical coopera- bureaucrats and at worse be a tool of co-opta-
tion over environmental issues may help to tion by the influential members of a polity.
develop a level of trust in sharing knowledge Such critics give examples of cooperation on
and open avenues for Track2 diplomacy that water resources between adversarial states
in turn may lead to peace dividends. like India and Pakistan or Jordan and Israel
The key to a constructive approach in without translating into broader reconcilia-
environmental peace-building is to dispense tion (Lowi, 1995). Thus it could be argued
with linear causality and instead consider that water and environmental issues are not
the conflict de-escalation process as a non- important enough to play an instrumental
linear and complex series of feedback loops. role. However, a more positive framing of the
Positive exchanges and trust-building ges- case might reveal that water resources in this
tures are a consequence of realizing com- context are so important that even adversar-
mon environmental threats. Often a focus ies must show some semblance of coopera-
on common environmental harms (or aver- tion over them.
sions) is psychologically more successful in Furthermore, the instrumental impact of
leading to cooperative outcomes than focus- environmental issues in building peace must
ing on common interests (which may lead be considered over longer time horizons.
to competitive behavior). This is because The process by which environmental issues
can play a positive role in peace-building Cooperation is more likely when environmental
is premised on a series of steps: a unified degradation is presented as a common aversion,
information base on a mutual environmen- rather than trying to force environmental coop-
tal threat; recognition of the importance of eration as a common interest which may lead to
cooperation to alleviate that threat; a cogni- competitive behavior.
tive connection and trust development due
to environmental cooperation; continued
interactions due to environmental neces-
sity; clarification of misunderstandings CONCLUSION
as a result of continued interactions; and,
finally, de-escalation of conflict and result- Environmental diplomacy has evolved consid-
ant peace-building. erably as a concept and ambit of diplomatic
Given the necessity for certain environ- practice from the time when the United
mental resources and a growing realization Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
that environmental issues require integrated was struggling to be considered on par with
solutions across borders, the likelihood for other UN bodies in the 1970s (Tolba and
their instrumental use in peace-building has Rummel-Bulska, 2003). Yet, many more chal-
gone up in recent years. There is a growing lenges both at the local and global scales
commitment to bioregionalism, or the real- remain for environmental diplomacy to realize
ization that ecological management must its full potential. Despite the fact that since the
be defined by natural delineations such as 1972 Stockholm Convention the global nature
watersheds and biomes (ecological systems of environmental degradation has initiated the
which support life), rather than through arbi- global, UN-based treaty making approach as a
trary national borders. Numerous joint envi- main pillar to sustainability, some authors
ronmental commissions between countries argue that the quest for global solutions for the
and jurisdictions have taken root all over degradation of transnational ecosystems is
the world in this regard. We have seen this unworkable and theoretically ill-grounded
played out in various ways at international (Corti, 2002). They challenge the belief that
forums where bioregionalism and common there is a positive relationship between the
environmental sensitivities have transcended geographical scope of international action and
traditional notions of state sovereignty. the utility of environmental regimes. Critics
Regional environmental action plans such as argue that except for treaties focused on very
those in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, specific chemical eradication like the Montreal
the Caribbean, and the Red Sea are exam- Protocol, the actual impact of environmental
ples in this regard. While we are a long way agreements has been minimal.
from having global governance of environ- Moreover, the value of global treaties has
mental issues, the momentum is clearly in been challenged by a growing realization
the direction of giving environmental pro- (starting from the Founex Report of 19723 (de
tection that directly impacts human lives Almeida, 1972)) of the link between Third
and livelihoods the same moral ascendancy World poverty, environmental degradation,
as human rights. and Northern consumption. The tendency of
the North to maintain industrialized coun-
tries lifestyles through resource control
and monetary mal-distribution is seen by
Key Points South countries as a cause of their environ-
Even where environmental factors are not part mental degradation, widespread poverty, and
of the conflict they can be used instrumentally underdevelopment (Lynch, 2014). As Anil
for peace-making. Agarwal points out, there are many factors
which are linked to the Souths plight: Which Ultimately, we might want to consider a
questions should [the world] try to solve first. more inclusive Track 2 international envi-
Why ozone layer depletion or climate change ronmental diplomacy through the lens of
or biodiversity conservation? Why not the negotiating global public goods a view
international financial system, terms of trade that scholars from different disciplines
or poverty, all of which have deep ecological would agree upon. Scott Barrett presciently
linkages with the environmental problems of alerted us to this prospect through the lens of
the South? (Agarwal, 1992). game theory in 2003 with his notable work
Another factor challenging global treaties Environment and State Craft: The Strategy
are natural disasters. The Japanese Fukishima of Environmental Treaty-making. To be
catastrophe violates the Stockholm Principle self-enforcing, Barrett cautioned that any
21, the Rio Declaration Principle 15 (the pre- environmental agreement must be both indi-
cautionary approach), and the Brundtland vidually rational in the context of sovereignty,
Report Our Commmon Future (which char- as well as collectively rational in the context
acterizes sustainable development in terms of governing common resources. Although
of meeting present needs without compro- many of the generic lessons on environmen-
mising the ability of future generations to tal consensus-building provided at the con-
meet their needs). Equally importantly, the clusion of our narrative can be applied across
Fukishima disaster is a health threat for cur- diplomatic efforts and treaties, we must not
rent and future generations (Caldicott, 2013). forget that there are key differences in terms
On December 21, 2012, the United of the underlying incentive mechanisms for
Nations General Assembly passed a momen- each agreement. For example, riparian dis-
tous resolution to reform the United Nations putes where the upstream nation has more
Environment Programme (UNEP) an power will require bargaining extant to the
organization that had been established with water conflict itself to resolve, whereas coop-
much hope 40 years earlier to improve gov- eration over water quality in a lake may be
ernance of the global ecological commons. easier to achieve given the common aversion
The resolution upgraded the organization of resource degradation.
to universal membership and provides for What is true at the macro-level of interna-
stable and increased financial resources tional relations is also true at the micro-level of
from the regular budget of the UN. Before environmental conflict resolution processes.
this change, UNEP had only 58 countries In this chapter we have attempted to provide
represented on its governing council; this a broader context for environmental diplo-
change allows for full participation from all macy which is appropriate for a handbook.
UN member states in the workings of UNEP. Environmental diplomacy will always have
As the administrator of several multilateral scientific underpinnings and there is clearly
environmental agreements, UNEP has a a level of analytical rigor which research can
crucial role to play in any reform efforts to bring to refining this field of international rela-
allow for environmental diplomacy to functions. Many more doctoral dissertations need
tion more constructively. The UNEP reform to be written to further inform and refresh the
effort so far has been modest and not revolu- debate on mechanisms for reforming the envi-
tionary by any means. Suggestions to estab- ronmental diplomatic system. While global
lish a specialized UN agency similar to the governance systems remain elusive, environ-
World Health Organization were not adopted. mental diplomacy can at least provide a proto-
However, there was a clear recognition that type for how human institutions can transcend
there are serious problems with the current tribalism, catalyze peace-building and sustain-
system, and that a more adaptive process of able development, and gain further acceptance
correction is needed. within the annals of diplomacy.
NOTES vip2.uvm.edu/~ran/Reports/07-06-06_RAN_
Interim_Report_PY3.pdf
1 Noted on the UNEP website: http://www.unep. Brown Gaddis, E.J., Vladich, H., and Voinov, A.
org, accessed March 22, 2015. (2007). Participatory modeling and the
2 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on dilemma of diffuse nitrogen management in
the Human Environment, 1972, accessed online a residential watershed. Environmental
from the UNEP archives: http://www.unep.org/ Modelling & Software, 22 (5): 61929.
Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentI Caldicott, H. (2013). The impact of the nuclear
D=97&ArticleID=1503 crisis on global health. Australian Medical
3 A conference held in Founex, Switzerland in 1971
Student Journal, 4 (2).
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Conca, Ken and Dabelko, Geoff, eds (2003).
particularly focused on concerns from develop-
ing countries regarding asymmetries in environ- Environmental Peace-building. Baltimore,
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consumers of resources and polluters. Corti, G. (2002). All commons are local: the
Antarctic Treaty System as a regional model
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50
Sports Diplomacy
Stuart Murray
INTRODUCTION vehicle to promote development, social

awareness and human rights. Sporting events
The interplay between sport, international can also significantly boost a states public
relations and diplomacy is a long, complex diplomacy profile (see Chapter 35 in this
and fascinating one. Like music or art, sport Handbook). If, for instance, a government
is a universal language that can transcend wins the rights to host a megaevent such as
acrimonious diplomatic relationships, offer the World Cup, billions of foreign percep-
high profile pathways for dialogue beyond tions about the host country can be enhanced
the negotiating table and, idealistically, unite over a period of weeks. In the pluralistic,
disparate nations and their publics through a modern diplomatic environment sport can
mutual affection for physical exercise, com- positively attract others to the attributes of
petition and games. As Nelson Mandela the host country and in this sense it is a
(2000) noted: potent soft power tool. However, for cynics
and sceptics, sports diplomacy is amorphous,
sport has the power to change the world. It has idealised, often exploited by politicians or
the power to inspire. It has the power to unite rogue actors and nothing more than a parody
people in a way that little else does. Sport can
of international relations; war minus the
awaken hope where there was previously only
despair. Sport speaks to people in a language they shooting, to use Orwells popular observa-
can understand. tion about international sport. Sporting events
are regularly hijacked by states to demon-
For such individuals, and institutions such as strate various types of superiority, from their
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) athletic prowess to a particular ideology. In
or the British civil society organisation its Hobbesian guise, sport is also plagued by
(CSO) Beyond Sport, sport can be used as a corruption, graft, violence, cheating, racism
or blatant displays of jingoistic pageantry. As kinds have long been drawn to sport and
such, sport is hardly diplomatic. Moreover, sporting competitions. As Allison (1993: 17)
sport is insignificant in an anarchic, zero sum notes, many types of governments:
international relations system dominated by
hard power concerns, the use of armed force have endorsed international sporting competition
as a testing ground for the nation or for a political
or economic policy aimed at influencing the
system. German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Soviet and
behaviour of other states. Cuban Communists, Chinese Maoists, western
This debate about the role of sports capitalist democrats, Latin American juntas all
diplomacy alludes to a common error when have played the game and believed in it.
conceptualising sports diplomacy: over-
simplification. This chapter contends that to Such occurrences are most evident in the
understand sports diplomacy it is first neces- megaevent theatres, quadrennial global tour-
sary to review, re-conceptualise and critique naments such as the Olympic Games. On the
the role that sport, sportspeople and sport- surface and for the few weeks that they
ing events play in international relations and occur, these are great festivals of sport; how-
diplomacy. To this end, two new categories ever, they also afford states tremendous dip-
of sports diplomacy are introduced: the tra- lomatic opportunities. Obviously they
ditional and version 2.0. Limitations, con- provide a shop window for host nations to
troversies and certain dark realities of sports show off, be it their athletic prowess, organi-
diplomacy are then discussed. The chapter sational capacities, culture, values or ideol-
concludes with some observations about the ogy. The right to host such an event can also
possible future of sport diplomacy. be seen as a reward for good international
citizenship and one that creates significant
avenues for public diplomacy. As Grix and
Key Points Lee (2013) suggest, the politically savvy
governments of China (2008 Olympic
The relationship between sport and diplomacy Games), South Africa (2010 World Cup) and
often generates debate.
Brazil (2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics)
Many prominent figures argue that sport is a
coveted megaevents as relatively cheap
remedy for some of the major problems of this
era. For others, sport is a false promise. means of improving their image, credibil-
To move beyond these positions is to re- ity, stature, economic competitiveness and
conceptualise sports diplomacy. (they hope) ability to exercise agency on the
international stage. Over the course of the
tournament, billions of people tune in, and if
the diplomatic posture, brand and message
TRADITIONAL SPORTS DIPLOMACY are thoughtfully crafted, foreign publics can
be engaged and influenced, not to mention
When thinking of traditions in sports diplo- the trade opportunities that arise or the finan-
macy, its most obvious form is as a tool that cial gains that host nations can enjoy.
governments consciously and sporadically Megaevents can also be used to reduce ten-
employ to achieve foreign policy goals. sions, consolidate political relationships or
Sport, in other words, is a diplomatic means bring old enemies together, as was the intent
to foreign policy ends (see Chapter 5 in this behind the 2002 World Cup, co-hosted by
Handbook). Jackson and Haigh (2008: 354) Japan and South Korea.
argue that when this happens, sport is co- However, disdain for a host nation can
opted by politics. Well aware of the power of also be expressed via megaevents or if so
sport to mediate, sublimate or, in more egre- inclined a nation can boycott and say, sim-
gious cases, increase separation, states of all ply, were not playing. During the Euro
Sports Diplomacy 619
2012 football tournament, for example, the More often than not sporting contests gen-
British, Germans, Swedes and the European erate ad-hoc summits for high profile politi-
Union (EU) boycotted any matches played in cians or leaders to meet informally. Various
Ukraine because of the host nations selec- leaders of bitter rivals India and Pakistan, for
tive justice in the case of the jailed Ukrainian instance, have repeatedly met on the sidelines
opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. Viviane of cricket matches between their national
Reading, the EU Justice Commissioner, teams. These cricket diplomacy meetings
pointed out that you cannot close your eyes have occurred since the early 1980s as a way
on human rights, even during a great sport- of decreasing tensions over nuclear ambi-
ing celebration (BBC News, 2012). In more tions, Kashmir, terrorism or any number of
extreme cases, a nation can withdraw alto- other disputes. Similarly, the presidents of
gether, as was the case when the US boycotted long-time adversaries Turkey and Armenia
the 1980 Moscow Olympics in response to met during two historic World Cup qualify-
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a ges- ing matches between their national teams
ture reciprocated by the Soviet Union and in 2008 and 2009, a gesture that helped the
thirteen satellite states four years later at the eventual diplomatic reconciliation between
1984 Los Angeles Games. In the build-up to the two countries. Likewise Dilma Rousseff,
megaevents, there is usually an equal focus Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and Jacob
on the politics of the host nation as there is Zuma all enjoyed a chat in the VVIP room
on the sport. before, during and after the half-time break
Traditional sports diplomacy is also a ver- of the 2014 World Cup Final. On such occa-
satile tool within bilateral relationships. For sions, international sport generates produc-
one, international sporting competition can tive and informal opportunities for leaders of
allow states to test possible policy shifts and states to come together.
bring leaders together. The best known exam- Another form of traditional sports diplo-
ple of this is Ping-Pong diplomacy, which macy is the occasional use of sportspeople to
occurred after a warm, chance and well- complement or amplify a states diplomatic
publicised meeting between American player message. The Americans perhaps best embody
Glenn Cowan and the then Chinese World this practice, first employing the famed
Champion Zhuang Zedong at the World Table sprinter Jesse Owens as a goodwill ambas-
Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan, in sador to nations with questionable attitudes
March 1971. Shortly after, the US not-for- toward racial integration in the 1960s. More
profit National Committee on USAChina recently, the State Department has employed
Relations suggested that the American team dozens of sports envoys. Two openly gay
should tour China. The proposal was then athletes Billie Jean King (a retired tennis
embraced by the Chinese and US govern- player) and Caitlin Cahow (a hockey player)
ments, initially to test if the publics of both figured prominently in the US delegation
countries would accept the normalisation of for the opening and closing ceremonies of the
diplomatic relations (a good, early example 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Their inclusion
of sport as a vehicle for public diplomacy). was both a response and challenge to Russias
The US teams subsequent visit in April of draconian anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
the same year was a tremendous success and Transgender (LGBT) policies. China has also
paved the way for National Security Adviser used specialist sports emissaries. Before the
Henry Kissingers visit to China in July 1971 2008 Olympic Games, the giant basketball
and later President Nixons visit in 1972. At player Yao Ming was able to attract millions
the conclusion of Nixons trip, the Shanghai of Chinese fans to the National Basketball
Communiqu was issued and the Sino-US Association (NBA) and, vice-versa, expose
diplomatic relationship rebooted. millions of Americans to the new China.
During his time with the Houston Rockets Megaevents are prized by states as they offer
(20022011), reporters from China followed multiple public diplomacy opportunities.
his every move, American fans wore Chinese In a traditional, bilateral sense sporting matches
national team jerseys and many arenas wel- can create leadership summit opportunities for
comed the humorous, genial giant with engagement beyond entrenched foreign policy
positions.
dragon dances. As James Sasser, the former
US Ambassador to China, noted, Yao Ming
gave the Chinese people and China a human
face in the United States (in Zhang, 2013:
229). Ambassadors for sport can serve a valu- SPORTS DIPLOMACY VERSION 2.0
able role in dramatically amplifying a states
diplomatic message. To effectively describe sports diplomacy ver-
It can be argued, however, that traditional sion 2.0 is to first contextualise it in the
sports diplomacy is somewhat limited. For modern diplomatic environment. Since the
one, and compared with the number of peo- end of the Cold War, international relations
ple that play professional sport, the num- have flattened and pluralism has gradually
ber of celebrity sports diplomats that states brushed aside the Westphalian notion of a
employ is relatively small. This is because state monopoly on diplomacy (Friedman,
sport, sportspeople and sporting events are 2007: 51). These days, diplomacy is no
co-opted by governments only if they serve a longer a stiff waltz among states alone but
states national interests or help realise a for- a jazzy dance of colourful coalitions with
eign policy goal. In this traditional context, ambassadors and diplomats acting as manag-
sports diplomacy is but a means to a foreign ers of such plural networks (Khanna, 2011:
policy end. Sport, in other words, is viewed 22). In the modern diplomatic environment,
through the embassy window (Wilson, large CSOs, multinational corporations,
1962: 122). The practice of traditional sports inter-governmental organisations (IGOs),
diplomacy is also arguably inconsistent and and even influential celebrities, can be
elitist, with high profile leaders exploiting thought of as distinct and significant diplo-
high profile tournaments, matches or sports matic actors. Therefore, Hockings multi-
people in choreographed pieces of theatre. stakeholder paradigm, where diplomacy is
Certain aspects of traditional sports diplo- an activity concerned with the creation of
macy will endure; however, these are increas- networks, embracing a range of state and
ingly being complemented and in some non-state actors, aptly describes the charac-
cases supplanted by a new form of sports ter of modern diplomacy (2006: 13). In this
diplomacy, a version 2.0 if you like. This is context, sports diplomacy 2.0 is facilitated by
a more inclusive, amateur form that reflects traditional diplomats working alongside
and embodies state, non-state and public CSOs, IGOs, sportspeople and corporations.
partnerships colluding via the horizontal and These networks use sport to engage, inform
vertical networks characteristic of twenty- and create a favourable image among foreign
first-century diplomacy. publics, governments and organizations, to
shape their perceptions in a way that is
(more) conducive to the sending govern-
Key Points ments foreign policy goals (Murray and
Traditional sports diplomacy is a tool that gov- Pigman, 2013: 4).
ernments occasionally use to achieve foreign Perhaps because most Americans love
policy goals. innovation and sports, as well as their pio-
If sport serves a diplomatic function beyond the neering spirit, the American State Department
game it is often exploited by governments. was the first player to experiment with a
more sustainable, amateur and inclusive form around games and exercise. According to
of sports diplomacy. A proactive 2.0 form Ecorys (2014), an external consultancy firm
emerged at the turn of the last century when hired to evaluate the success of the initiative,
America sought to boost its public diplomacy the programme exceeded all initial key per-
profile abroad and complement other soft formance indicators. The programme ran for
power tools (such as Voice of America or the seven years (20072014) and during this
Fulbright scholar program) with exchanges time over 25 million children and young
built around sport. The State Departments people were enriched; 55 national policies,
flagship initiative is SportsUnited, which strategies and legislative changes were influ-
aims to build ever-strengthening relations enced and over 250,000 practitioners (teach-
between the United States and other nations ers, coaches and leaders) trained in over 21
[and] which uses the universal passion for countries (Ecorys, 2014: 2).
sports as a way to transcend linguistic and By sheer volume II was a success and, in
sociocultural differences (Sports Diplomacy, the sports diplomacy 2.0 context, the FCO
n.d.). Remarking on the initiative, former successfully managed and coordinated a net-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) work of actors, created a favourable impres-
noted that: sion amongst millions of people overseas and
learned important lessons for the future of
our sports exchanges are the most popular other sport and development programmes
exchanges we do. When I go to other countries
(Ecorys, 2014: 11). Moreover, the pro-
and we talk about what kind of exchanges that
people are looking for, very often a leader will say, gramme shied away from using high profile
how about a sports exchange? politicians and professional sports people
preferring amateurs such as teachers, coaches
On the other side of the Atlantic, the British and children.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) It is not only Western nations that are
provides a second, richer example of sports engaging in sports diplomacy version 2.0.
diplomacy 2.0. States, CSOs, foreign pub- Zhang (2013) reminds us that China has a
lics, players, coaches, etc., have formed a long history of old and new sports diplomacy.
network bound and driven by a common Likewise, Japan invests heavily in domestic
interest in sport and the right to play. Seeking and international football in order to over-
to capitalise on the London 2012 Olympic come imperial stereotypes and better reflect
Games, the FCO coordinated a network the a level worthy of its economic power and
British Council, UNICEF, UK Sport, Comic overall achievements after 40 years of post-
Relief, Laureus Sport for Good Foundation, war peace and prosperity (Manzenreiter,
the Youth Sport Trust, and individual donors 2008: 417). And, finally, Cubas public
which designed and implemented a sports diplomacy continues to focus on sports as a
legacy programme called International vitally important mechanism for furthering
Inspiration (II). At heart, the programme the causes of the Cuban revolution and gar-
sought to enrich the lives of children and nering international admiration and respect
young people of all abilities, in schools and (Bunck, 2013: 236).
communities across the world, particularly in From the above examples, certain charac-
developing countries, through the power of teristics of this new type of sports diplomacy
high quality and inclusive physical education are evident. Version 2.0 retains some ele-
(PE), sport and play (International ments of the old (the continued use of sports
Inspiration, 2014). In other words, II hoped envoys, for example); however, the practice
to get more children playing sport by educat- is no longer sporadic, inconsistent, elite and
ing, funding and helping schools and govern- reactive. Rather, it is proactive, regular and
ments develop sustainable programmes built inclusive. Sport is used by governments as
a vehicle to proselytise the values that cer- communication and representation; they
tain nations often champion. For example, have interests and agendas to pursue; they
Australias Department of Foreign Affairs have charters, constitutions, presidents and
and Trades new sports diplomacy pro- mission statements which define their objec-
gramme focusses on participation, gender tives and guide their interactions; and they
equality, discipline and teamwork.1 Instead have institutional structures, rules, norms
of being geared around elite-to-elite theatre, and flags, which they use in a highly self-
version 2.0 targets and embraces the amateur conscious effort to brand themselves and
levels of sport, not just the megaevents and their sport (Murray and Pigman, 2013: 14).
superstars. The attraction for governments is Considering the benefits a megaevent can
partly practical. Sports diplomacy 2.0 is rela- generate for host nations anything from new
tively low-risk, low-cost and high profile infrastructure to public diplomacy opportuni-
(Keech and Houlihan, 1999: 112). Moreover, ties these international sporting regimes
by engaging with new methods, the culture are immensely powerful, and states will go
of a states diplomacy can be less aloof, her- to great lengths to secure certain tourna-
metic and dead and more innovative, effec- ments. Paying exorbitant amounts of money
tive, public and even fun (Ramsay, 2006: just to bid for the tournament, states covet
273). Perhaps the most significant lesson to the Olympics or World Cup just as athletes
be drawn from the above examples is that and national teams would a medal or trophy.
traditional diplomatic institutions are but one Little wonder that senior representatives from
actor among a cast of others. In the British the IOC or FIFA presidents are given the red
case, the FCO participated, coordinated and carpet treatment wherever they go.
facilitated; but it did not direct. The same can be said of the role certain
To further understand the concept of sports superstar athletes play in international rela-
diplomacy, regimes, clubs and individuals tions, off the pitch, court or running track.
can be thought of as diplomatic actors. A Borrowing from Coopers work on celeb-
postpositivist theory one that encompasses rity diplomacy, Roger Federer, Usain Bolt
a broader range of actors and processes or Leo Messi can be considered as celeb-
than a state-centric, rationalist understand- rity sporting diplomats, people who [use]
ing of diplomacy facilitates such an exer- the attention they receive to focus the cam-
cise (Pigman, 2013: 78). Seen through this eras on international issues (Cooper, 2008:
lens, powerful non-state actors such as the 7). Messi, for instance, acts as a Goodwill
International Olympic Committee (IOC), Sports Ambassador at Team UNICEF, using
multinational corporations, security, televi- his profile to raise awareness of childrens
sion and media outlets, teams and prominent rights, health, education and sport all over
sporting heroes, national sports associations the world. In a postpositivist view, even clubs
and CSOs all continuously and diplomati- such as Messis F.C. Barcelona, the New
cally interact to make international sport pos- York Yankees or Manchester United (with its
sible in the first place (Pigman, 2013: 78). 650 million fans) can also be considered as
The actors that constitute these vast sporting significant diplomatic actors in contempo-
networks have been briefly studied. Murray rary international affairs according to Rofe
and Pigman (2013), for example, argue that (2014: 1136).
powerful administrative institutions such as The list of actors in international sport is
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) a long one non-profit CSOs such as the
and the Fdration Internationale de Football Beyond Sport Foundation, the MNCs that
Association (FIFA) can be thought of as sponsor sport on a global scale and the tel-
para-diplomatic actors. They practise core evision companies that screen events are also
diplomatic functions such as negotiation, notable diplomatic players. This acceptance
illustrates several vital points for those inter- sport. For the most part, sports diplomacy
ested in sports diplomacy 2.0: the interna- aims to foster peace and unity, not conflict
tional sporting system is extremely complex, and (more) separation.
much more than simply megaevent tourna- For sports diplomacy to realise its poten-
ments or a superstar basketballer touring tial, however, a frank appraisal of its limita-
Africa under the auspices of the UN in the tions is important. This is not to support its
off-season. Sports diplomacy can be thought detractors but to encourage thinking, collabo-
of a series of domestic and international net- ration and scholarship on ways to overcome
works that continuously interact and often or at least negate certain received truisms
overlap in order to make sport possible in the about sport, international relations and diplo-
first place. To boost public diplomacy efforts, macy. Below, six limitations are presented
governments are increasingly tapping into (although the list is by no means exhaustive).
these networks. First, the rhetoric this chapter began with
that sport has the power to change the world
could suggest that sport is some magical
Key Points remedy that has hitherto been neglected or
ignored by theorists and practitioners. This
Sports diplomacy 2.0 programmes emphasise is quite incorrect. It is self-evident that sport
government partnerships with non-state actors alone cannot eliminate poverty in Africa,
such as CSOs, IGOs, sportspeople and corpora- encourage gender equality, womens rights or
tions.
the right to play in traditional, fundamentalist
In the past, states co-opted sport in a sporadic,
societies. These types of sport-development
inconsistent fashion centred around securing or
participating in megaevents. By contrast, sports or sport-for-peace projects have been going
diplomacy 2.0 is regular, inclusive and embraces on for decades with limited or mixed results.2
the amateur levels of sport. Such projects will continue but they are
In the twenty-first century, sporting regimes, increasingly being subsumed under broader
clubs and individual celebrities can be thought of sports diplomacy strategies orchestrated by
as powerful, non-state diplomatic actors. diplomats. As a result, the capacity for sport
to contribute, in part, to alleviating some of
the major problems of our time will improve.
Second, sport and politics do mix, like it
THE LIMITATIONS OF SPORTS or loathe it. For idealists, sport has a spir-
DIPLOMACY itual power (Redeker, 2008: 499) and exists
in a hallowed realm above (Allison, 1993:
Compared to some of the major issues in 5) government, untainted by the divisiveness
twenty-first-century international relations of politics. The reality of the relationship
terrorism, poverty and climate change, to between sport, diplomacy and politics sug-
name but a few sports diplomacy is a gen- gests otherwise. In the lead up to the 2014
erally positive phenomenon. Granted, many Sochi Winter Olympics, for example, Russia
states will continue to use sport to further was accused by many states of graft,3 illegal
self-serving national interests and foreign dumping of construction waste, forced evic-
policy goals. However, it is important to tions, bizarre anti-LGBT policies and dis-
remember the core, diplomatic components putes with Circassian nationalists demanding
of sports diplomacy: to overcome separation Russia apologise for its genocidal policies of
between disparate peoples, nations and states the nineteenth century. All the while, how-
and to reduce misunderstandings between ever, Russia insisted that sport and politics
them and us by demonstrating that stran- should not mix (just as the Chinese govern-
gers speak a shared, universal language of ment claimed during the lead up to the 2008
Beijing Olympics) and that concerned lead- nationalism, sometimes in a manner unbe-
ers, states and members of the global public fitting of diplomacy. During the 2004 Asian
should focus on the sport. Such rhetoric is Cup hosted by China, for example, the
problematic. Sport and politics have always Japanese team was hounded everywhere they
mixed and always will. In the pluralistic, played. Chinese spectators heckled the play-
twenty-first century the mixing of sport ers, sang anti-Japanese songs from the war
should be considered as a given. of liberation and displayed banners reading
Russias typical behaviour also alludes to Look into history and apologize to the Asian
a third limitation of sports diplomacy: the People, or Return the Diaoyu (Senkaku)
temporal reality of megaevents. These huge Islands! (Manzenreiter, 2008: 423). In this
tournaments are a unique feature of interna- case, sport contradicted a core diplomatic
tional relations. No other event has the ability function: the minimisation of friction in
to unify and rally states, CSOs, global pub- international affairs.
lics and media, who often use the tourna- In addition, sport and violence are some-
ment as a vehicle to express dissatisfaction times inextricably linked. In the past, terror-
with the host nation. However, any political ists have used sport as a way of spreading
and diplomatic opportunities occur before the anti-diplomatic messages to vast, global
event. When the actual games begin, sport audiences. Jackson and Haigh (2008: 351)
takes over and concerns over shoddy human note that, between 1972 and 2005, 171
rights records, corruption, the plight of the sport-related terrorist attacks have been
oppressed and so on are immediately for- logged. The most egregious example was
gotten. For example, the pressure on Russia the 1972 Munich Games tragedy when
before the Sochi Winter Olympics evaporated eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and
as soon as the first starters pistol was fired. eventually murdered by Black September, a
Positive, diplomatic messages and pres- radical Palestinian organization. A week after
sure were lost to sport during and after the the incident the group issued the following
tournament. Just weeks after the 2014 Sochi statement:
Winter Olympics closing ceremony, Russia
A bomb in the White House, a mine in the
began meddling in Ukrainian politics (just as
Vatican, the death of Mao-Tse-tung, an earth-
they did in Georgia after the 2008 Olympics) quake in Paris could not have echoed through the
and it played a vital role in the annexation of consciousness of every man in the world like the
Crimea and the war waged by so-called sepa- operation at Munich the choice of the
ratist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. In a matter Olympics, from a purely propagandistic viewpoint
was 100 percent successful. It was like painting
of weeks, the megaevent is over, concerns are
the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be
forgotten, the global public begins salivating seen from the four corners of the earth. (In
over the next glamorous festival of sport and Toohey, 2008: 434)
the host nation is left to behave as it did before
the event. The challenge for those interested Just as sports can disseminate and repre-
in further developing sports diplomacy is to sent positive values about unity, fair play and
overcome the temporal nature of megaevents harmony, there has sometimes been an unde-
and build real, lasting diplomatic legacies niable association between sport and terror-
during and after significant tournaments. ism, war, violence and separation.
A fourth limitation of sports diplomacy Fifth, this occasional disconnect between
is that just as sport can bring people and sporting idealism and reality is given fur-
nations together it can also drive them apart. ther credence by briefly discussing the dip-
It can increase estrangement, in other words. lomatic qualities of sporting administrators
In international sport, the anthems, flags and their behemoth organisations. In the
and sense of tribe all heighten feelings of formal world of diplomacy, Satow (2009:
61722) attaches great importance to dig- [a] disconnect between competitors used as
nity, self-control, empathy (to listen and not national representatives and the bulk of their
fellow sportsmen and women. Those chosen to
to talk), calmness, fairness, humility, virtue
become sports envoys embody the aspirational
and so on. Professional diplomats are also version of sport that governments imagine and are
accountable to both the sending and receiv- thus unrepresentative of real sport.
ing state and are legally bound to the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Success in sport does not equate to suc-
and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular cess in diplomacy. Compared with the num-
Relations. Conversely, international sporting ber of senior sportspeople that play and
organisations and their staff are not bound have played, only a few are considered fit
by any such rules or norms. As such, large, for envoy or ambassadorial work. Many
influential sporting organisations such as will never be considered at all. Moreover,
FIFA, the IOC or the International Cricket perhaps many sportspeople wouldnt want
Council (ICC) often make headlines for the job. The case of the boxer Mohammed
behaviour, customs and practices that are Ali, who had no quarrel with them Viet
hardly diplomatic (at least in terms of how Cong, comes to mind. Sports envoys such
Satow and others have imagined it). The Salt as David Beckham handsome, charming
Lake City bribery scandal, where six IOC and instantly recognisable seem to be the
officials who accepted gifts and hundreds exception rather than the rule. Former NBA
of thousands of dollars from local officials superstar player Dennis Rodmans odd, alco-
were sacked, serves a historic case in point hol fuelled 2014 outburst at a CNN reporter
(The Guardian, 1999). More recently, FIFAs who questioned his motives during his third
behaviour has come under intense scrutiny visit to the basketball loving North Korean
from the BBC, the Sunday Times newspa- dictator Kim Jong-un revealed a stark truth:
per and the Swiss Government (FIFAs HQ not every sportsperson can be a sports
is in Zurich). As one, they have accused diplomat.
FIFA of ticket scandals, vote-rigging during The six limitations mentioned above help
presidential elections (incumbent President, to confirm that there can be a dark side to
Joseph Sepp Blatter, was the only can- sport. However, the same can be said of diplo-
didate in the last election) and bribery and macy. Like diplomacy, the failures of interna-
negligence, particularly over the award of tional sport seem to attract more interest than
the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, a tiny desert its successes. Egregious examples such as the
nation of two million people with a dreadful Fascist Games (the 1936 Olympics and 1938
human rights record and summer tempera- World Cup, which Mussolinis black shirts
tures that exceed 50C. The FIFA President won, incidentally) are well known, and per-
and his all-powerful Executive Committee haps account for the trepidation many gov-
engage in one-way communication with the ernments recently showed about consciously
public, any negotiation with states that bid mixing sport and politics. Consequently,
for the World Cup is rather one-sided and and as noted, the traditional co-option of
who or what does FIFA actually represent? sport by states has often been rather clumsy,
Indeed, can FIFA, the IOC or the ICC be opportunistic, short-lived and centred at the
considered diplomatic at all? As noted ear- elite level. Relatively speaking, however, it
lier, further research is required to answer should be remembered that examples of bad
such questions. sports diplomacy are the exception rather
Such questions relate to the sixth and than the norm. If an objective perspective is
final limitation: the diplomatic calibre of the adopted, the observer will realise that sport
sports diplomats themselves. As Murray and often celebrates the best of humanity and
Pigman (2013: 8) note, there seems to be: generally brings people together.
CONCLUSION epartment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Sports

D
Law eJournal, ISSN1836-1129.
2 See R. Levermore and A. Beacom (2012) Re-
As this chapter demonstrates, there have been assessing sport-for-development: moving beyond
many innovations in the theory and practice mapping the territory, International Journal of
of modern diplomacy. Sport, music, culture Sport Policy and Politics, 4 (2): 125, 137.
and art, for example, are no longer niche or 3 The Sochi winter games cost US$50 billion. By
comparison, the London summer Olympics came
backwater institutions but attractive, untapped in at US$12 billion.
and potent soft power tools. All are universal
languages, where no words are spoken. Their
power to unite is only just being discovered.
As such there is much work to be done on
sports diplomacy. This chapter, for instance,
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and the end of apartheid, The Round Table: Society, 11 (4): 42942.
The Commonwealth Journal of International UNICEF, n.d., Team UNICEF, New York City,
Affairs, 8 (349): 10921. viewed 16 August 2014, http://www.unicef.
Mandela, Nelson (2000) Address to the 1st org/sports/
Laureus World Sports Awards, online video, Wilson, Edmund (1962) Classics and Commer-
viewed 5 June 2014, http://www.laureus. cials. New York: Vintage Books.
com/content/nelson-mandela-speech- Zhang, Qingmin (2013) Sports diplomacy: the
changed-world Chinese experience and perspective, The
Manzenreiter, Wolfram (2008) Football diplo- Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 8 (304):
macy, post-colonialism and Japans quest for 21133.
51
Science Diplomacy
Daryl Copeland
INTRODUCTION of doing so can be reversed only through the

provision of adequate resources and the eleva-
The soft power of science has the potential to tion of SD to the status of an international
reshape global diplomacy. (Ahmed Zewail) policy, institutional and diplomatic priority.2
In recent years the role and place of interna-

tional science and technology (S&T) and of
science diplomacy (SD) in particular have UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE
attracted only limited interest on the part of DIPLOMACY
international affairs analysts and diplomatic
practitioners alike. In part as a result, progress Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for
tomorrow. The important thing is to not stop ques-
in addressing wicked1 global issues such as tioning. (Albert Einstein)
climate change, diminishing biodiversity, spe-
cies extinction, resource scarcity, environmen- Science, diplomacy and international policy
tal crises, and a daunting array of other are often regarded as uneasy bedfellows.
epidemic threats and challenges which now Science is widely perceived as complex and
imperil life on the planet, has been disappoint- impenetrable. Diplomacy is often viewed as
ing. The capacity to apprehend and manage elitist and ineffective.3 International policy is
S&T-driven global issues has not grown suffi- an ambiguous, esoteric term of which the gen-
ciently, and without a greater effort by govern- eral public is barely aware. It is little wonder,
ments, international organizations and other therefore, that SD remains relatively obscure
SD actors, insecurity and underdevelopment and is widely ignored. Nevertheless, SD is
will flourish. SD has been treated as a mar- important and is becoming more so in an
ginal practice, and the damaging consequences increasingly heteropolar4 world order where
Science Diplomacy 629
the vectors of power and influence are charac- method of knowledge production, and is an
terized more by difference than by similarity effective emissary of essential values such
and S&T based challenges are multiplying. as evidence-based learning, merit, openness
At the highest level of analysis, SD can best and sharing. As a specialized sub-set of pub-
be understood as a diplomatic technique by lic diplomacy (PD),8 science diplomacy is
which S&T knowledge is freed from its rigid also a significant generator of soft power.9
national and institutional enclosures, thereby It is this potent, and through the increas-
releasing its potential to address directly the ing use of social and digital media often
drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity.5 technologically-enabled form of attraction

Unlike its constituent elements of science which can intimately connect SD to national
and diplomacy, the expression science diplo- image, reputation and brand.
macy is a relatively new and unfamiliar term, In addition to addressing many of the
and a consensus on its definition has yet to be planets most urgent challenges, SD can also
forged. Nina Fedoroff, the Science Advisor to contribute, through its use of neutral, non-
former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, ideological language, to the mitigation of
describes SD as: the use of scientific collabo- international political differences when regu-
rations among nations to address the common lar diplomatic channels are strained, blocked
problems facing 21st century humanity and or non-existent.10 Even at the height of the
to build constructive international partner- Cold War, for instance during the Cuban
ships.6 While the phrase science diplomacy Missile Crisis, Soviet and American scien-
implies some sort of unified whole, the term tists maintained programmes of collaboration
is most commonly presented as consisting of in areas such as polar, atmospheric, health
three distinct areas: informing foreign policy and deep sea research, plus radioactive waste
objectives with scientific advice (science in disposal. Similarly, Western scientists have
diplomacy); facilitating international science sustained or established contact with their
cooperation (diplomacy for science); and, Cuban, North Korean and Iranian counterparts
using science cooperation to improve interna- despite the existence of formidable political
tional relations between countries, regions or and economic barriers. Most recently, during
organizations (science for diplomacy).7 the conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine,
These three categories, while widely US and Russian scientists have continued to
accepted and used, tend to overlap and have work closely on Arctic issues, in crewing and
some weaknesses as heuristic tools. Many managing the International Space Station,
international S&T issues cannot easily be and on negotiating the multilateral nuclear
pigeon-holed: attempts to manage climate pact with Iran (2015) and Syrian chemical
change have involved science advice (both to weapons disarmament (2013).
governments and the UN Secretary-General), Science diplomacy can also help maintain
science for diplomacy (the reports of the relations at times of tensions between friends.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change For example, in 1985 the government of New
(IPCC)) and diplomacy for science (the meet- Zealand formally banned visits by potentially
ings of the Conference of the Parties (COP)). nuclear-armed warships.11 In response, the
Other science-based issues, however, such US government, while leaving the ANZUS
as weapons inspections or fisheries monitor- treaty in place, withdrew security guarantees
ing and surveillance, fall more convincingly from its traditional ally, downgraded its dip-
under a single heading (science for diplo- lomatic relations, and excluded New Zealand
macy). For these reasons, as an umbrella term from the Five Eyes intelligence sharing
SD must be used with some care. arrangement, which also included the UK,
That said, SD usefully combines inter- Australia and Canada. It was a surprisingly
national political agency with the scientific nasty row, and bilateral relations were not
fully normalized until 2014. Still, through it technological innovation) or New Zealand13
all, the US base in Christchurch, which pro- (agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, bio-
vides forward supply and logistical support security and phytosanitation) have wisely
for American scientific research activities in chosen to specialize. In general, less devel-
Antarctica, remained fully operational, and oped countries are at a disadvantage due to
cooperation between US and NZ scientists limitations on S&T capacity.14 Developing
continued without interruption. countries tend to be consumers of technical
Science diplomacy is sometimes conflated cooperation programmes, but when it comes
with international scientific cooperation, a to genuine technology transfer, successful
mistake which has given rise to some confu- examples are harder to come by. Also, the
sion. The distinction, however, is clear. While prospects for SD are often contextual, and
the latter is sometimes commercially oriented thus can vary with time and place. For exam-
and often occurs without direct state partici- ple, it is difficult to imagine initiating SD
pation, the former is animated by its direct activity at this time with the Islamic State, or
relationship to government interests and with the Taliban government of Afghanistan
objectives. In the case of international scien- when it was hosting al-Qaeda.
tific cooperation, private sector or civil society Not all science diplomacy is devoted to the
partners work together to produce, for example, achievement of pacific ends, as was illustrated
better medications, cleaner water, improved by the programmes of covert collaboration
hygiene or more disease-resistant crops. involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, North
In contrast to international science coop- Korea, China and Libya on nuclear-explosive
eration, SD involves state interests. When and missile-propulsion technologies orches-
these interests diverge, the outcomes may be trated by Pakistani physicist Abdul Qadeer
asymmetrical, particularly if broader nego- (A.Q.), Khan. Science and technology offer
tiations are involved. In other cases, interests keys to security and development, but are also
and objectives converge. As regards outcomes capable of generating insecurity, environmen-
beneficial to all parties, many examples can be tal devastation and war. Nevertheless, the key
drawn from a swathe of international scientific assumption underlying scientific thought
programmes and exchanges undertaken dur- that all events are caused, that misery is not
ing the second half of the last century. These fated, that the answers are out there and that
have included not only the extensive array of all problems can eventually be solved under-
Cold War programmes, but also the highly score its positive and transformative potential.
successful US/G-8/ NATO-led efforts12 to
employ members of shrinking defense science
establishments and to decommission facilities Key Points
used for the construction of weapons of mass
destruction after the collapse of the USSR. The worlds most pressing threats and challenges to
Contemporary negotiations on issues such as peace and prosperity are rooted in science, driven
the terms and conditions of resource access by technology and immune to military solution.
Science diplomacy is well-suited to address these
or environmental protection in a NorthSouth
issues, and was prominent during the Cold War,
context provide another example of success.
but today has become marginal, with armed
There, however, the results have sometimes force entrenched as the international policy
been more one-sided. instrument of choice.
Not all countries possess the same level of While science diplomacy offers a preferable
SD capacity. Large, rich, developed states, way forward towards a more sustainable and
such as the US, UK and France, can engage resilient future, science and technology may also
in a wide spectrum of activity, but smaller give rise to heightened insecurity and underde-
states, such as Switzerland (commercial velopment.
HOW HAS SCIENCE DIPLOMACY served as the first US Ambassador to France,

DEVELOPED HISTORICALLY? 177685. Science and technology played
central roles in the European imperial and
If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoul- colonial enterprises of the nineteenth cen-
ders of giants. (Isaac Newton) tury, and in the two World Wars and the
Cold War of the twentieth. During and since
The term science diplomacy emerged those centuries, Europe, the USA, and for a
during the 1990s. Science and diplomacy, half century the USSR, have dominated the
however, may be seen to have played a criti- world of international S&T.17 That locus of
cal role together in shaping perceptions and geographic leadership, as reflected in publi-
dominant world views, and to have contrib- cations and the pathfinding work of, among
uted to the strength and durability of nations many others, Darwin, Pasteur, Mendel, and,
and empires throughout recorded history. later of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and
Long before the Greco-Roman period initi- Oppenheimer,18 is gradually being eroded by
ated the rise of the West, great strides in discoveries originating in other parts of the
medicine, astronomy, engineering and math- world. Although by most measures still far
ematics were made in the ancient Near East, behind, countries such as Japan and Korea
China and in India. Further scientific pro- have made great strides, while India, China
gress continued in the Mediterranean, where and the ASEAN members, as well as Brazil
mainly Greek thinkers like Pythagoras, and South Africa, are all beginning develop
Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, their capacities for leadership and innovation
Archimedes and Ptolemy made the links in S&T.19
between science, power and politics more Even if not referred to as such until rela-
explicit. From the end of the Western Roman tively recently, SD per se and as practised by
Empire, as the Dark Age enveloped Europe, international organizations, foreign ministries
and even more so after the long decline and and science-based agencies can be traced to
eventual fall of Byzantium, the centre of sci- the middle reaches of of the twentieth century.
entific enquiry and experimentation shifted In 1931, for example, a number of countries
to the Arab/Islamic world, and remained decided to launch an umbrella organization
there through the medieval period until the for scientific organizations world-wide, the
late Middle Ages.15 At about that time, the International Council of Scientific Unions
pendulum swung back to Europe. With the (ICSU), known now as the International
Renaissance eras Scientific Revolution Council of Science.20 A second early exam-
(Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler), Age of ple is the European Organization for Nuclear
Enlightenment (Newton, Pascal, Franklin, Research (CERN)21, which was founded in
Descartes), and the great voyages of explora- 1954 and whose work continues today with
tion (Cook, Bougainville) science and tech- recent discoveries such as the Higgs Boson
nology took off and innovation soared to God Particle. Although managed by 20
unprecedented heights. European member states, scientists from
Science and diplomacy became more over 600 universities and research institutes
explicitly intertwined when Britains Royal around the world are regularly offered access
Society, founded in 1660, appointed Henry to CERNs facilities. Another signature suc-
Oldenburg as its first foreign secretary cess is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,22 with 52
in 1723.16 This preceded by 78 years the signatories and a long record of achievement.
appointment of Britains first foreign min- In a few instances, SD has also been
ister. Benjamin Franklin, who in addition facilitated by well-resourced individuals,
to being a founding father of the American such as the American philanthropist Cyrus
Revolution was also a scientist and inventor, Eaton, who in 1957 hosted a meeting of
22 scientists23 in the village of his birth foreign publics were wound down or drasti-
Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada. The impe- cally reduced by Western countries. Post-9/11,
tus for the first Pugwash Conference was the there has since been some recovery, but there
publication in 1955 of a manifesto prepared remains a long way to go to compensate for
by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, and lost capacity at a time of growing demand.
signed by many of the leading scientists of Ironically, compared to present levels of
the day. That document invited scientists of activity, both PD and SD, at least in the senses
all ideological persuasions to address the of science in diplomacy and science for
threat to civilization posed by thermonuclear diplomacy outlined above, enjoyed their hey-
weapons. Over time the remit of the Pugwash day during Cold War. During that period, PD
meetings has broadened to include other and SD were more than anything else about
weapons of mass destruction, and the confer- winning hearts and minds in a competitive
ences now attract the attention of a variety of ideological and territorial context, yet there
politicians and senior government officials.24 was an important distinction. While much of
Today, many inter- and non-governmental the mainstream PD content was highly prop-
institutions and agencies engage in SD. agandized, SD offered an alternative form of
The African Scientific Institute25 was cre- engagement for advancing the vital arms con-
ated in 1967 to facilitate pan-African sci- trol and non-proliferation agendas. Science
entific cooperation. In 1996, all countries was seen as a neutral, non-political milieu
with territory and/or interests in the Arctic which could be used to mitigate ideological
agreed to establish the Arctic Council,26 a differences. In the early 1970s, SD played
body dedicated to advancing the goals of an early and central part in the restoration of
environmental protection and sustainable USChina bilateral relations and continues to
development. Other important even if not be used as a reliable way of producing con-
always well-known examples include: the crete results from broader negotiations.
International Institute of Applied Systems During the Cold War, SD played an impor-
Analysis (IIASA);27 the International Atomic tant role in achieving arms control and dis-
Energy Agency (IAEA);28 the Consultative armament agreements, for example, the
Group on International Agricultural Research Non-Proliferations Treaty, the Strategic Arms
(CGIAR);29CRDF Global;30 UNESCO;31 the Limitation Agreements, plus conventions
International Centre for Theoretical Physics on biological and chemical weapons. It also
(ICTP);32 The World Academy of Science produced important environmental agree-
(TWAS);33 the Inter Academy Council ments, including the Montreal Protocol on
(IAC);34 SciDev.Net;35 Scientists Without Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and
Borders;36 the International Network for the CanadaUS acid rain treaty. The Law of the
Government Science Advice,37 and the Sea Convention defined the rights and respon-
OECD Global Science Forum.38 sibilities of states with respect to their use of
Nevertheless, the creation of multilateral the worlds oceans, and established guidelines
scientific organizations does not necessar- governing the environment, the management
ily correlate with solving global problems. and use of marine resources, and economic
Indeed, there have been significant setbacks, exploitation. And just after the Cold War, in
and during the past few decades the overall 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment
frequency and intensity of science diplomacy and Development (UNCED), delegates
has declined markedly. After the Cold War, agreed on Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration
many of the well-established international pro- on Environment and Development, the
grammes that had promoted science (and edu- Framework Convention on Climate Change,
cation and culture) as part of a broader public the Convention on Biological Diversity, and
diplomacy strategy to positively influence the Statement of Forestry Principles.39 As the
difficulties with the Kyoto Protocol illustrate, environmental conservation and protection,
the subsequent record has been far less impres- the pace of international progress has slowed,
sive40 (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook). resources have been cut and underperformance
Disappointing and uneven progress in has become the dominant theme.
SD since the Cold War notwithstanding, the
efforts of some countries do stand apart. US
international science policy, for example, WHY ARE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
has in recent years included the Presidential AND INNOVATION IMPORTANT TO
appointment of Science Envoys; the expan- CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
sion of the State Departments American
RELATIONS?
Association for the Advancement of Science41
and Jefferson Fellows programmes; enlarge- Science knows no country, because knowledge
ment of the network of Science Counsellors belongs to humanity and is the torch which illumi-
and attaches at missions abroad; the estab- nates the world. (Louis Pasteur)
lishment of a high level of internal science
advice; and the receipt of strong support The need to strengthen and build SD is now
from specialized, science-based NGOs.42 greater than ever and will require a fundamen-
The UK,43 with its extensive Science and tal re-ordering of international policy priori-
Innovation Network; Switzerland,44 with ties and resources. Science, technology and
Swissnex, its public-private partnership; innovation are now central to all aspects of our
the EU;45 France;46 China;47 Japan;48 and; lives and are at the heart of the processes asso-
Korea,49 as well as several other countries, ciated with globalization. The abundance of
have also moved forward with ambitious SD information generated through connectivity
programmes. Among less developed coun- and networks is widely believed to be chang-
tries, more could be done by making better ing everything.50 Nevertheless, at the level of
use of existing diplomatic infrastructure, for social and political discourse, the profound
instance by establishing mission-based net- consequences associated with S&T together
works of international S&T representatives. with their implications for SD are accorded
Many of the principal achievements of SD relatively little attention. The focus of the
continue to be in the policy domain of arms great powers remains on their armed forces
control, disarmament and monitoring. And and military diplomacy even though there
several major states, including Germany, are no military solutions to the wicked issues
Russia and Canada, have demonstrated sur- presented by climate change, genomics, bio-
prisingly little interest in SD. technology and the rise of cyberspace.
Today, long-term, equitable and sustain-
able development, rather than defence, is
becoming the basis of security. Anger, resent-
Key Points
ment and recourse to violence and extremism
Beginning in the ancient Near East, China, India, often arise from exploitation, disenfranchise-
through the Greco-Roman period, and later in ment, poverty and exclusion. Achieving secu-
the Islamic world, Europe and the Americas, the rity is bound up with solving these problems,
combination of science and diplomacy has been
and the solutions depend on SD harnessing
present in global affairs for millennia.
S&T to the attainment of development objec-
Science diplomacy, and the establishment of
international S&T institutions and NGOs, reached tives. In fields such as urbanization, public
its apogee during the Cold War, but activities health, environmental protection and remedi-
have diminished in the interim. ation, agriculture, food and water, population
Following a striking record of achievement in and demographics, hygiene and energy, the
areas such as arms control, disarmament and impact of science and technology, combined
with good governance, greater economic independence from politics and government.
equality and social justice, are key. And good On the many occasions when diplomats or
governance results, in part, from adopting politicians gather to discuss international pol-
values and procedures which enable progress icy, the substance of their discussions rarely
in science for example, openness, merit includes S&T. When scientists get together to
and evidence-based decision making. These exchange views on topics of shared interest,
qualities underpin the advance of democracy their discussions rarely touch upon matters of
and human rights and enjoy a high degree of diplomacy or international policy. The skill
universal applicability. Through SD and the sets, activities, time frames and cultural ori-
sense of cooperation, collaboration and soli- entations of the two groups differ markedly.
darity which its practice almost inevitably Few people have managed to straddle the
engenders, this sense of universal applicabil- worlds of diplomacy and science effectively.
ity can be communicated to others, thereby These worlds exist almost as two solitudes.
strengthening the prospects for tackling the Major hurdles would remain even if scien-
wicked issues identified above.51 tists, politicians, diplomats, foreign ministries
S&T and indeed SD, as noted above, are and multilateral institutions were more favour-
not always on the side of the angels. They ably disposed towards one another. When
can provide tools for those who threaten it comes to S&T, R&D and innovation, the
peace and obstruct justice. Troubling though perspectives and interests of the public sec-
groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as tor, private sector, NGOs and the academic
some increasingly authoritarian states, may community are not always aligned or com-
be, however, the threats they pose remain plementary. More often they are competitive
small compared to those which SD aspires to or contradictory. For the private sector, the
address. Indeed, it is mainly the militarized over-arching goal is to maintain exclusive
response presently adopted by the great pow- ownership and control over essential S&T
ers which affords religious extremism and intellectual property (patents, trademarks and
political violence the opening to become copyrights limit transfer of technology and
major problems. SD, in contrast, offers the spread of innovation). For the constituent ele-
prospect of removing the sources of the legit- ments of what President Eisenhower famously
imate discontent which terrorists and authori- described as the Military Industrial Complex,52
tarian regimes attempt to exploit. the issues are budget protection, public policy
As a global enterprise, it is clear that sci- advocacy and the influence over the research
ence, technology and innovation are directly agenda (many governments are still spend-
relevant to finding solutions to some of the ing more on defence research than on health
worlds most pressing problems. There research).53 Add to that the militarization of
exists, however, a fundamental difficulty: international policy more generally,54 and the
within most international policy institu- size of the problem becomes clear.
tions, S&T issues are almost invisible. With Absent a shift away from defence research
few exceptions, foreign ministries, develop- towards public and civic applications (for
ment agencies and indeed most multilateral instance health, transportation, alternative
organizations lack sufficient scientific and energy, environmental protection, conserva-
technological expertise, the cultural pre- tion) and a shift in emphasis in international
disposition, and the R&D network access relations from defence to diplomacy and deve
and links required to understand and man- lopment, progress will remain impossible.55
age S&T issues effectively. And although The relationship between S&T, on the one
scientists increasingly work together and hand, and diplomacy and international pol-
share information among themselves, the icy, on the other, needs to be reconstructed
scientific community seems to cherish their to produce greater areas of shared space and
functional overlap. Anxiety over the unknown High dividends would accrue to the appli-
on the part of the diplomats, and discomfort cation of unorthodox thinking about how best
with politics and diplomacy on the part of the to engineer more productive S&T teamwork
scientific community, must be overcome and through SD. Creative use could be made of
give way to a pattern of closer association, open source problem solving, collaborative
cross-fertilization and the habits of regular intelligence,57 web-based policy development
exchange and interaction. In part through the and global value chains. In order to leverage
creation of connections, networks and col- international S&T cooperation, institutional
laborative commons, the two solitudes must linkages and publicprivate partnerships
be brought together. As is happening else- between governments, corporations, think
where in the worlds of commerce and pub- tanks, universities and NGOs need to be bet-
lic administration, the lateral and the supple ter resourced and encouraged. With enhanced
must replace rigid hierarchy and authoritarian planning and closer coordination, interna-
interpersonal relations. By way of an instruc- tional research institutions, science academies
tive model, Silicon Valley style skunkworks56 and intergovernmental science networks could
merit closer examination. As we have seen, play a larger role in pursuing these objectives.
science was once more deeply embedded in To that end, it would be useful to embrace
diplomacy than is the case today. That inti- dynamic new actors and forces which would
macy should be re-instated, but on a much go well beyond the tapping of usual suspects.
larger and more comprehensive scale. This could include involving private philan-
S&T capacity in diplomatic and multilat- thropists and foundations, venture capital
eral institutions must be broadened, deep- firms and small and medium sized enterprises.
ened and, where it does not exist, built up And, as a final element, all measures intended
from scratch. This can in part be achieved to improve performance in science diplomacy
through the injection of more and bet- and international S&T would require rigorous
ter expert scientific advice directly into the benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation.
policy development and decision-making Psychologist Hans Eysenck once remarked
throughout the apparatus of government that: Tact and diplomacy are fine in interna-
and the international governance process. tional relations, in politics, perhaps even in
Accessible, more easily intelligible sci- business; in science only one thing matters,
ence communications should be developed. and that is the facts. While that may be so, it
Such synergistic outcomes could be further would nonetheless benefit both the scientific
encouraged through career specialization and and diplomatic communities to recognize
more purposeful use of the promotion and that they share at least some fundamental
recruitment processes. Perhaps the fastest objectives: each strives to use reason and
way to build capacity would involve the pro- rational argument to establish norms and to
vision of incentives, programmes of training bring order, structure and systemic function
and professional development, plus expanded to their otherwise disparate and disorderly
secondments and exchanges. Unnecessary realms. That is a significant, if in large part
obstacles and constraints would have to be unrecognized, commonality and represents
removed, and replaced by a commitment to a point of departure for strengthening SD
information sharing and critical thinking, and thus the prospects for more peaceful and
tolerance for dissent and an openness to the prosperous international relations.
management of risk (as opposed to its aver- What the world needs now is develop-
sion). After all, the goal is not the creation of ment and security. These two sides of the
failsafe systems, but to engineer a system of same coin are best achieved through more
bureaucratic process that is safe and can be science, better technology and accelerated
learned from when it fails. innovation internationally. Towards that end,
and as a response to the negative attributes and-heteropolarity-challenge-adaptation. For

of globalization including the tendency to alternative models of world order beyond the
received wisdom concerning a return to multipo-
socialize costs while privatizing benefits, and
larity, see also Kupchan (2012), Bremmer (2012)
the abetting of polarization at all levels SD and Haas (2008).
can make an indispensable contribution. 5 For an excellent summary of the relationship
between science and diplomacy, see Nichols
(2015).
6 See Fedoroff (2009).
Key Points 7 A useful synopsis is offered in New Frontiers in
Science Diplomacy. London: The Royal Society,
A wicked issue CUTS all ways; unlike terrorism, 2010. Available at http://royalsociety.org/uploaded
political violence or religious extremism, these Files/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/
threats and challenges are imperilling the planet. 2010/4294969468.pdf
In an increasingly heteropolar world order, the 8 See http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/
capacity to generate, absorb and use S&T will 9 See Nye (2004).
play a critical role in solving problems, reducing 10 This characteristic helps to explain the current
inequality, resolving differences and advancing focus within US foreign policy on expanding sci-
security and development prospects. ence diplomacy with the Arab and Islamic worlds,
and aptly illustrates the use of science for diplo-
Science and technology, on the one hand, and
macy. See, for example, Lord and Turekian (2007).
diplomacy and international policy, on the other, An extraordinary, but all too rare, multilateral
exist in floating worlds which rarely intersect. example is the SESAME Synchrotron project in
Performance could be improved by injecting Jordan, where Palestinians, Israelis, Iranians, Turks
expert scientific advice into the international and Cypriots all cooperate in co-management.
policy development process, by making greater See Llewellyn Smith (2012). Another interesting
use of scientific collaboration in pursuit of dip- project of the type is the Square Kilometer Array,
lomatic objectives, and by better harnessing the which is at present advancing construction of the
activities of foreign ministries and multilateral worlds largest, most powerful radio telescope.
institutions in support of advancing the scientific See https://www.skatelescope.org/
11 See http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/nuclear-
agenda.
free-nz
12 On the little-known Global Partnerships Program,
see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Partner-
ship_Against_the_Spread_of_Weapons_and_
Materials_of_Mass_Destruction
NOTES 13 See Gluckman (2012). New Zealand has also con-
vened a network of science advisors (see http://
1 A wicked issue is by my reckoning one which www.globalscienceadvice.org/) and recently
CUTS all ways (C for cross-sectoral; U for unre- launched a new SD initiative featuring small
solved; T for transnational; S for science-based). developed economies. See http://twas.org/article/
These attributes render the management of such small-countries-strong-voices
issues notoriously difficult. 14 There have, however, been some notable strides
2 For a general overview of science diplomacy, see forward involving the BRICS and South-South
Davis and Patman (2014). cooperation, with South Africa playing a key role.
3 Although these preconceptions remain See Republic of South Africa (2014).
entrenched, the 201011 WikiLeaks Cable- 15 Were it not for the dedication of Muslim schol-
gate episode, which revealed US diplomats ars in transcribing and translating much of the
hard at work, 24/7, as well as the tragic attack Greco-Roman scientific legacy, large tracts of
in 2012 on the American Consulate in Beng- that would have been lost, and Western science
hazi have in recent years helped to dispel some would today be a very different enterprise.
of the myths. See http://uscpublicdiplomacy. 16 See http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/letter-field/
org/pdin_monitor_article/taking-stock-wikileaks- 2015/royal-society-foreign-secretary-and-interna-
and-cablegate-%E2%80%9Cnapster-moment tional-relations
%E2%80%9D-government 17 In the immediate aftermath of World War
4 On heteropolarity, see http://www.policyschool. II, the competitive position of the USA
ucalgary.ca/?q=content/diplomacy-globalization- was greatly strengthened by the selective
immigration of some 1500 German scientists, 33 See http://twas.org/

many of whom had been engaged in weapons 34 See http://www.interacademycouncil.net/
development. 35 See http://www.scidev.net/global/
18 This is obviously an incomplete and highly gen- 36 See https://scientistswithoutborders.org/
der imbalanced list. Many women scientists, for 37 See http://www.globalscienceadvice.org/
example, have won the Nobel Prize (including 38 See http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/oecdglobal
Marie Curie and her daughter Irene Juliot-Curie); scienceforum.htm
Indira Gandhi recognized the importance of S&T 39 See http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html
in sustainable development and the Green Revo- 40 See: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.
lution, and she supported the development of php; http://www.rtcc.org/2015/02/16/kyoto-
nuclear science and technology in her quest to protocol-10-years-of-the-worlds-first-climate-
enlarge Indias international power and influence; change-treaty/
and Secretary Madeline Albright brought science 41 See http://www.aaas.org/
advice into the State Department. The role of 42 See https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/
women in the history of science and diplomacy diplomacy-21st-century; http://www.science
deserves separate and full treatment. d i p l o m a c y. o r g / a r t i c l e / 2 0 1 4 / s c i e n c e - a n d -
19 See Steinbock (2007). technology-adviser-us-secretary-state; http://
20 Through partnerships with national scientific bod- www.state.gov/e/stas/2013/213741.htm; https://
ies and international science unions, the ICSU www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/
functions as a research and information clear- sciencediplomacy
ing house dedicated to addressing some of the 43 See https://www.gov.uk/government/world/
worlds most difficult challenges, including climate organisations/uk-science-and-innovation-
change, sustainable development, management network
of the global commons, and so forth (see http:// 44 See Schlegel, Flavia (2014). Swiss Science Diplo-
www.icsu.org/). National, regional and global sci- macy. Science and Diplomacy. 24 March. http://
ence academies perform a vital function within the www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/
scientific community, and represent an under-uti- swiss-science-diplomacy; Willard, Jed (2011).
lized resource for governments and international Diplomacy meets Science in Boston. boston.
organizations. See http://www.sciencediplomacy. com. 08 November. http://www.boston.com/
org/perspective/2015/academies-s cience-key- business/blogs/global-business-hub/2011/11/
instruments-science-diplomacy when_diplomacy.html
21 See http://home.web.cern.ch/ 45 See Moedas, Carlos (2015). The EU Approach to
22 See http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm Science Diplomacy. European Commission. 01
23 Seven of the scientists were from the United June. http://eeas.europa.eu/science_diplomacy/
States, three each from the Soviet Union and index_en.htm; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
Japan, two each from the United Kingdom and 2014-2019/moedas/announcements/eu-approach-
Canada, and one each from Australia, Austria, science-diplomacy_en
China, France, and Poland. See http://thinker- 46 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of
slodge.org/history/pugwash-conferences-on- France (2013). 08 April. Report: Science Diplo-
science-and-world-affairs/?doing_wp_cron=135 macy for France. http://www.f rance-science.org/
1644558.6959650516510009765625 Report-Science-Diplomacy-for.html
24 See http://pugwash.org/ 47 See Wilsdon, James, etal. (2013). Beijings inno-
25 See http://asi-org.net/ vation Diplomacy. The Guardian. 09 October.
26 See http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-
27 See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ science/2013/oct/09/science-policy
28 See https://www.iaea.org/ 48 See Sunami, Atushi, et al. (2013). The Rise of
29 See http://www.cgiar.org/ Science and Technology Diplomacy in Japan. 14
30 See http://www.crdfglobal.org/program-areas/ March. http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/
science-engagement/science-diplomacy/about- 2013/rise-science-and-technology-diplomacy-in-
science-diplomacy japan
31 See http://en.unesco.org/; http://www.unesco. 49 See Arkin, Fatima (2015). South Korea pushes the
org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/ envelope in science diplomacy. SciDev.Net. 21
single-view-sc-policy/news/the_interparliamen- June. http://www.scidev.net/asia-pacific/science-
tary_forum_on_science_technology_and_inno- diplomacy/feature/south-korea-pushes-the-
vation_policy_for_the_mediterranean_region/#. envelope-in-science-diplomacy.html
Vbuv_7U4fm4 50 See Mason, Paul, 2015. The end of capitalism has
32 See https://www.ictp.it/ begun. The Guardian. 17 July. http://www.the
guardian.com/books/2015/jul/17/postcapitalism- SUGGESTED READINGS

end-of-capitalism-begun?CMP=Share_iOSApp_
Other
51 This axiom appears to have been unknown to Atkinson, George (2006). Science and tech-
the former Conservative Government of Canada, nology: a bridge between cultures and
who muzzled their diplomats and scientists, nations. eJournalUSA, 11 (3): 4.
imposed deep cuts on science-based depart- Copeland, Daryl (2009). Guerrilla Diplomacy:
ments and slashed spending on research and Rethinking International Relations. Boulder:
development (R&D). See: Linnitt, Carol (2013). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Prologue; Intro-
Harpers attack on science. Academic Matters. duction; Chapters 213.
May. http://www.academicmatters.ca/2013/05/ Copeland, Daryl (2011). Science diplomacy:
harpers-attack-on-science-no-science-no-
whats it all about? CIPS Policy Brief No. 13.
evidence-no-truth-no-democracy/; http://www.
November. http://cips.uottawa.ca/wp-
cbc.ca/radio/ideas/science-under-siege-part-
1-1.3091552 content/uploads/2011/11/Copeland-Policy-
52 Eisenhowers 1961 farewell address is essential Brief-Nov-11-5.pdf
viewing. Today The complex consists of the three Copeland, Daryl (2013). Diplomacy. Globa
original components the uniformed armed ser- lization and heteropolarity: the challenge
vices, Congress and the defence industries plus of adaptation, CDFAI Policy Papers.
special interest groups, right-wing think tanks, August. http://www.cdfai.org/idevice
and elements of the media/entertainment indus- papers/DiplomacyGlobalizationHetero
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international policy. See https://www.youtube.
Copeland, Daryl (2013). The Syria effect.
com/watch?v=CWiIYW_fBfY
Globe and Mail. 3 October. http://www.cgai.
53 The US government spends more on defence
research than all other types of research com- ca/inthemediaoctober32013
bined. See Congressional Research Service Copeland, Daryl (2015). Will Canada be the
(2013). Federal Research and Development country that dumbed itself to death?
Funding: FY 2013. CRS Reports for Congress. 05 iPolitics. 1 September. http://www.cgai.ca/
December. http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/07/ inthemediaseptember12015
congression-research-service-catalog/ Copeland, Daryl, Turekian, V.C., Macindoe, S.,
54 See Freeman, Chas. (2015). Too Quick on the Lloyd S. Davis, L.S., Patman, R.G. and
Draw. 13 June. http://chasfreeman.net/too-quick- Pozza,M. (2014). The emergence of science
on-the-draw-militarism-and-the-malpractice-of-
diplomacy. In Lloyd S. Davis, Robert G.
diplomacy-in-america/
Patman (eds) S cience Diplomacy: New Day or
55 Defence research does, from time to time, pro-
duce innovations of great civil consequence, such False Dawn, pp. 324. Singapore: World
as the Internet and GPS. Unfortunately, however, Scientific. Available at www.worldscientific.
much of the investment disappoints or otherwise com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8658 (accessed
ends badly Ballistic Missile Defence, the F-35 12 March 2016)
strike fighter, and a many, many more expen- Douglas, Heather (2013). Canadian science
sive failures. See Thompson, Loren (2011). How under attack. The Scientist. 2 April. http://
To Waste $100 Billion: Weapons That Didnt www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/article
Work Out. Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/ No/34958/title/OpinionCanadian-Science-
sites/lorenthompson/2011/12/19/how-to-waste-
Under-Attack/
100-billion-weapons-that-didnt-work-out/
Hassan, Mohamed, et al. (2015). Academies
56 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skunkworks_
project of science as key instruments of
57 For a sampling of some striking visual representa- science diplomacy. Science and Diplomacy.
tions, see https://www.google.hr/search?q=colla 10 March. http://www.science
borative+intelligence&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source= d i p l o m a c y. org/perspective/2015/
univ&sa=X&ei=fvKIVfW4A4es7AbJjaXoDQ&ved= academies-science-key-instruments-science-
0CDIQsAQ&biw=1440&bih=751 diplomacy
Johnson, Chalmers (2012). Abolish the CIA! Congressional Research Service (2013). Fed-
TomDispatch. 05 August. http://www. eral research and development funding: FY
tomdispatch.com/post/175578/best_ 2013. CRS Reports for Congress. 5 Decem-
of_tomdispatch%3A_chalmers_johnson,_ ber. http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/07/
the_cia_and_a_blowback_world/ congression-research-service-catalog/
Kuhn, Thomas (1962). The Structure of Davis, Lloyd and Patman, Robert (eds) (2014).
Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn.
Chicago Press. Singapore: World Scientific. http://www.
UK Government (2013). G8 science ministers worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/
statement. 12 June. https://www.gov.uk/ 10.1142/8658
gover nment/publications/g8-science - Fedoroff, Nina (2009). Science diplomacy in
ministers-statement-london-12-june-2013 the 21st century. US Department of State.
Wagner, Caroline (2002). The elusive partner- 09 January. http://www.state.gov/e/
ship: science and foreign policy. Science and stas/2009/116182.htm
Public Policy. 29 (6): 40917. http://www. Freeman, Chas (2015). Too quick on the
ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/ draw. 13 June. http://chasfreeman.net/
spp/2002/00000029/00000006/art00002 too-quick-on-the-draw-militarism-and-the-
World Bank (2010). STI Global Forum 2009: malpractice-of-diplomacy-in-america/
Science, Technology, and Innovation Capac- Gluckman, Peter, et al. (2012). How a small
ity Building Partnerships for Sustainable country can use science diplomacy. Science
Development. Washington DC. 1011 and Diplomacy. 24 May. http://www.
December. http://web.worldbank.org/ sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2012/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSTIGLOFOR/ h o w - s m a l l - c o u n t r y - c a n - u s e - s c i e n c e -
0,,menuPK:3156763pagePK:64168427pi diplomacy
PK:64168435theSitePK:3156699,00.html Haas, Richard (2008). The age of nonpolarity.
RealClearPolitics. 16 April. http://www.
realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/04/the_
age_of_nonpolarity.html
Kupchan, Charles (2012). Getting ready for a
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52
Indigenous Diplomacy
J. Marshall Beier
INTRODUCTION times, overwhelmingly so. It is perhaps not

surprising, then, that the majority of the ink
Diplomacy is a term readily recognized spilled on the subject and it is considerable
and already imbued with content. Although, has approached it in terms more or less
as the various contributions to this Handbook consistent with this dominant understanding
show, there is considerable nuance and com- of what diplomacy is, what it is for, and who
plexity behind it, some of which might even its practitioners may be.
be surprising to some readers, there is never- Set in this context, inquiry into Indigenous
theless a core of practices that come to mind peoples diplomacies could seem like an add-
when the term is invoked and which go a on, a curiosity. In point of fact, however, the
long way toward defining it in public imagi- opposite is true. What many may be accus-
naries. In the main, diplomacy is most tomed to thinking of as diplomacy is actu-
commonly associated with interactions ally a very narrow slice of human possibility
between states. It is typically understood to in the interaction between political commu-
involve negotiation and perhaps machina- nities. Inseparable from sovereign author-
tion between sovereign entities. It is often ity vested in the territorial state, its seeming
set in opposition to war in the toolkit of ubiquity belies both its own historical speci-
statecraft, both being instruments of states ficity and the fact of multiple and overlap-
global political interactions, but with diplo- ping forms of political community that
macy cast more in the realm of routine coexist with and exceed it. More than just
affairs and war the extreme and, it is hoped, historical counterpoints, the many and varied
exceptional recourse only after diplomacy diplomacies of Indigenous peoples the world
has failed. The stakes of diplomatic prac- over defy aggregation under a single rubric.
tices may thus be felt quite acutely and, at Drawing instead from unique historical and
Indigenous Diplomacy 643
ideational traditions, they are not reducible Important critical contributions of the last
to one another as some set of alternative pro- two decades have produced openings through
grammatics or practices. Reversing the gaze, which the field of Diplomatic Studies might
then, we might more rightly say that the dom- have been expected to redress the relative
inant understanding of diplomacy is just one neglect of Indigenous diplomacies. Though
among a much wider and richer multiplic- there has been little such redress to date, what
ity of traditions, among which are the many follows nevertheless relies on these open-
Indigenous diplomacies of our world. ings in speaking back to students and schol-
The use of the plural here matters a great ars of diplomacy. Despite the persistence
deal. In its singular form, diplomacy col- of state-centric narratives and conceptual
lapses a vast field of historical and con- commitments which, as noted above, con-
temporary human experience into a single tinue to dominate quotidian notions of diplo-
signifier that has come to be associated with macy as well as of its location, content, and
state-centered diplomatic practice. The result agents/practitioners critical interventions
is that other diplomacies (Beier and Wylie reveal a more complicated picture. Much
2010; Young and Henders 2012) are margin- of this has turned on the very visible rise of
alized, even rendered invisible. That said, civil society, norm entrepreneurship and other
some other diplomacies may more readily forms of transnational activism and interaction
be assimilated to dominant discourses than which have forged new kinds of relationships
others for their proximity to or congruence (Cooper and Hocking 2000; Hocking 2004)
with key aspects of hegemonic practices and and, short circuiting established diplomatic
renditions. For instance, public diplomacy, institutions, have proved able to manifest sub-
which has drawn increasing interest in recent stantive political outcomes such as, for exam-
years, populates diplomatic practice with ple, prohibitions on antipersonnel landmines
different sorts of agents and eschews some and, more recently, cluster munitions. More
of the usual circuits of state diplomacy, but fundamentally, the indeterminacy of stat-
retains much in the way of its core logics, ist conceptions of diplomacy (Constantinou
organizing principles, and validity claims. 2006; 2013) has been explored in ways that
Indigenous diplomacies, on the other hand, reverse the onus when it comes to assessing
frequently operate in entirely sui generis the authenticity of Indigenous diplomacies
ways and challenge us to break with many of as diplomacies. What follows should be read
the fundamental assumptions and conceptual with this ethos of indeterminacy in mind lest
commitments by which we are accustomed Indigenous diplomacies be held to standards
to rendering diplomatic practices intelligi- and validity claims of hegemonic rendering
ble as such. Accordingly, though they may and which may be anathema to the terms on
seem quite remote from the main preoccu- which they are otherwise founded.
pations of scholarly inquiry into diplomatic
theory and practice, they are revealing of the
imposed limits of those dominant approaches
and what they leave unexamined. Put another LOCATING INDIGENOUS
way, besides presenting a more fulsome DIPLOMACIES
terrain of political possibilities than those
encoded in dominant approaches, Indigenous It is tempting, and perhaps unavoidable, to
diplomacies also expose something of the begin discussion of Indigenous diplomacies
deep-rooted political commitments of the with the historic establishment of the United
mainstream that function to naturalize what Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
turns out to be quite parochial in important Issues and other watershed developments in
senses. global governance involving Indigenous
peoples in recent years. Brought to fruition in networks concerned with both trade and reso-
the first of two consecutive UN International lution of disputes (see de Costa 2009). Two
Decades of the Worlds Indigenous Peoples hemispheres away, on Turtle Island (North
19952004 and 20052014, respectively America), The Great Law of Peace of the
the Permanent Forum was formally Haudenosaunee Confederacy regulated and
established under the auspices of the UN sustained two centuries of peaceful inter-
Economic and Social Council in 2000 and action among previously warring peoples,
convened for the first time in May 2002. Half unraveling only under shocks and pressures
a decade later, in September 2007, the UN associated with having been drawn into con-
General Assembly adopted the Declaration flict between European colonial powers fol-
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, more lowing contact.
than a quarter century in the making, though In these examples, as elsewhere, vibrant
against the conspicuous dissenting votes of systems of exchange and attendant mecha-
four settler states with large Indigenous nisms for managing conflict operated through
populations: Australia, Canada, New diplomacies founded on Indigenous peoples
Zealand, and the United States.1 Remarkable own cosmological commitments and the par-
for its equal Indigenous and state representa- ticular lifeways enabled by them. As with all
tion, the Permanent Forum reflects the diplomacies, these embedded their own sys-
increasing effectuality of Indigenous diplo- tems of ethics, protocols, and observances.
macies in hegemonic circuits and fora of And like any other diplomacies, they had
global governance since at least the early- their problematic aspects as well something
1990s, expressed in, among other things, which it is equally important to acknowl-
recognition and meaningful engagement by edge lest we slip into performing the sorts
the Organization of American States and the of erasures that may just as easily arise from
International Labour Organization, as well as romanticizing others into unreality as from
more focused campaigns and initiatives such less benevolent essentialisms. Like all human
as the high-profile efforts of the Labrador political practices, Indigenous diplomacies
Innu to curtail NATO low-level flight train- entail their own drawbacks and limitations.
ing over their lands or the consolidation of The point, then, is not to claim them as nec-
Sami rights in Nordic Europe in the same essarily better though in some instances
period. and respects they may well be but, rather, as
These and other relatively recent develop- equally valid. It is to reveal them as bona fide
ments should not be taken to mean, however, resolutions to the problem of political order
that Indigenous diplomacies are somehow between peoples and, as such, constitutive
new or that Indigenous peoples presence and of a multiplicity of missing stories, elided by
practices in inter-national politics have only the singular hegemonic story of state-centric
lately been established and proffered. Much diplomacy.
to the contrary, Indigenous peoples have Equally important, the relevance of
practiced diplomatic interaction with and Indigenous diplomacies does not end with the
through the European-imposed international colonial encounter. In their post-contact eras,
system since the earliest days of contact and Indigenous peoples, though confronted with
along circuits distinctively and exogenously the violences, deprivations, and dispossession
constituted both before and since. Long of colonialism, neither abandoned traditional
before the arrival of Europeans, Indigenous diplomacies nor eschewed those of European
Australians, for example, maintained com- derivation. In contexts such as that of the
plex systems of contact and exchange with Haudenosaunee, Indigenous cosmologies
other peoples in accordance with an ethos were often amenable to imagining coexist-
of mobility that gave rise to transnational ence without assimilation or conversion. Not
having been steeped in a commitment to the achieved some acknowledgement as such by

European conception of sovereignty as insep- the Netherlands, the US, and others despite
arable from the territorial state, and therefore official objections from Canadian authorities
unfettered by an ontologically located con- (see Smith 2010). Perhaps most important in
ception of exclusive sovereign authority, for this connection, then, is the role treaties have
many Indigenous peoples there was no inher- had in setting the terms of expectations held
ent contradiction in the idea that two differ- in the relationships between peoples.
ent forms of political life could coexist in the A striking example of this is found in the
same environs. This perspective, together case of the mission of the Haudenosaunee
with its own form of manifest diplomatic to the League of Nations. Part of a broader
practice, was expressed most famously in the history of Indigenous peoples diplomatic
Gusweta, or Two Row Wampum treaty. The engagements with states, including del-
Two Row Wampum is marked by a beaded egations to the royal courts of Europe (see,
belt, fashioned as the physical record of the for example, Carlson 2009), Six Nations
1613 treaty between the Haudenosaunee and (Haudenosaunee) of the Grand River repre-
the Dutch newcomers, which had two rows sentative Levi General Deskaheh made an
of purple beads interspersed with three rows unsuccessful 1921 appeal to the British crown
of white beads, representing the joint accord to intervene in defense of Haudenosaunee
that there was room enough on the river for sovereignty against Canadian incursions
both peoples. (see Belanger 2007; Woons 2014). The Six
As suggested by the case of the Two Row Nations position was explicitly founded on
Wampum treaty, Indigenous peoples have the prior recognition of its sovereignty by
adapted and engaged in the diplomatic con- both the British and the Dutch. Deskaheh
ventions of the colonizers as well. Indeed, subsequently made diplomatic overtures
treaty making was (United States) and has to the latter, seeking the Netherlands sup-
continued to be (Canada) central to the codi- port as an ally, by virtue of the Two Row
fication of relations between Indigenous Wampum treaty, for Haudenosaunee admit-
peoples and newcomers in North America. tance to the League of Nations. In deference
This is not insignificant since treaties are to opposition by state members, however,
international legal instruments between sov- the Haudenosaunee bid for admission was
ereign entities and given that sovereignty is rejected (Niezen 2003: 316). Attaining
not an inherent property but an inscription objectives has, of course, never been the sine
performed through reciprocal recognitive qua non of authenticity in diplomatic prac-
gestures such as, among other things, mutual tice, and thus speaks more to the persistence
entry into treaties. To be sure, these have fre- of advanced colonial ideologies and power
quently been fraught processes even in the circulations than to the legitimacy of an
moments of their founding (see, for exam- Indigenous subject position in global politics.
ple, Hannah 1993; Price 1994; St Germain Though ultimately unsuccessful, Deskahehs
2009). Even so, they continue to condition mission, like so many others undertaken by
relations between Indigenous peoples and Indigenous peoples before and since, plied
settler states, their enduring legal effect the interstices between Indigenous and
confirmed by courts domestic and interna- European diplomacies and was explicitly
tional notwithstanding that they may have founded upon established practices and prec-
been abrogated by contracting states in some edents of IndigenousEuropean diplomatic
cases. The Two Row Wampum, for instance, interaction.
is cited as the basis for recognition of the It was in this same spirit that two Lakota
Haudenosaunee passport as a valid interna- representatives of the Teton Sioux Nation
tional travel document and, indeed, it has Treaty Council, Tony Black Feather and
Garfield Grass Rope, arrived at the United border areas of the Brazilian Amazon have
Nations in Geneva in August 1982. The established relationships with international
Treaty Council was established in 1895 by the NGOs and some foreign governments (see
Oglala Lakota Chief He Dog, institutionaliz- Vecchione-Gonalves 2009). In these and
ing a body for advancing international diplo- myriad other ways, Indigenous peoples adapt
macies on behalf of the Tetuwan Oyate, or both sui generis and hegemonic diplomacies
Lakota Nation, of the Northern Great Plains to contemporary exigencies of their coexist-
of North America. Its emissaries thus carried ence with states and the states system (see
forward nearly a century of formalization of a also Chapters 1, 3, and 8 in this Handbook).
much longer-held and practiced Lakota diplo-
matic tradition when they attended the Palais
des Nations in Geneva for the first meeting Key Points
of the United Nations Working Group on
Indigenous Populations. Lacking the mate-
rial supports of state representatives, they Though less attention has been paid to them
travelled the city on foot, relied on a home- than to state forms, Indigenous peoples the
world over have established sui generis traditions
less shelter for accommodation, and ate at a
of diplomacies that long predate colonialism and
soup kitchen.2 But, together with representa- which function to sustain political order and
tives of other Indigenous peoples around the relations between discrete political communities.
world, they also entrenched an Indigenous Indigenous diplomacies are as varied as
presence at the UN which endures to this day Indigenous peoples, each embedding their own
in the UN Permanent Forum. systems of ethics, protocols, and observances,
Not limited to international institutions and cannot be reduced to a singular set of prac-
and fora of global governance, Indigenous tices or traditions.
peoples are diplomatically engaged in direct In many cases, Indigenous diplomacies have been
relationships with states and other signifi- historically amenable to relations of coexistence
cant global actors. In the US, for example, with colonial newcomers and these traditions
have endured in Indigenous peoples relations
the Yankton have united with Lakotas from
with states and through institutions and pro-
the Cheyenne River, Rosebud, and Standing cesses of global governance.
Rock reservations in opposition to the con-
troversial Keystone XL pipelines planned
route through South Dakota, centering claims
to sovereignty and treaty rights in the legal DISCERNING INDIGENOUS
and ethical bases of their campaign. Though DIPLOMACIES
operating largely within the confines of a
single state, the importance of the Yankton While it is important to acknowledge the
and Lakota intercession on an issue that has ongoing history of Indigenous diplomacies
very publicly pitted Congress against the various articulations with and through the
Obama Administration cannot be gainsaid. state-centric international system, too heavy
Elsewhere, and decidedly crossing state an emphasis on this is both a limited and
boundaries, British Columbia First Nations potentially limiting perspective on what
have developed institutional mechanisms and marks their significance. The problem here is
a strategy of interlocution with Chinese busi- that the inherent power relations of the
ness interests that unsettle sovereign claims encounter may not be brought fully into relief.
of the Canadian state whilst invigorating Certainly, the privileged place of states and of
those of First Nations (see Montsion 2015). the hegemonic institutions and practices of
Similarly, drawing on their own unique tra- international diplomacy are conspicuous
ditions, Indigenous peoples living in the enough. Less evident, though, are the ways in
which dominant and conventional understand- Recognizing this, Kevin Bruyneel (2007)
ings of diplomacy rely on under-interrogated argues that Indigenous peoples reside in a
conceptual commitments, common senses, third space of sovereignty, neither fully
and habits of thought. Among these is a par- within nor fully without the state. Although
ticular understanding of sovereignty and of its it is problematic to generalize in a way that
expression in the territorial state as the only risks collapsing many rich and varied tradi-
viable or, at least, the highest form of political tions into a single category as Indigenous
community. The danger, then, is that the per- diplomacies, this third space positional-
ceived validity of Indigenous peoples global ity is nevertheless something that differenti-
political subjecthood may be assessed with ates them from state forms and practices, as
reference to particular characteristics of social well as which begins to give some glimpses
or political organization presumed as analo- into the possibilities, foreclosed by hegem-
gous or nascent expressions of the dominant onic ideas and commitments, enabled by
state form. Such a move is to allow them. As Manuela Picq (2013: 121) observes,
Eurocentricity to define the terrain of engage- Indigenous politics offer radically different
ment between societies, including between insights into the international because they
Indigenous ones themselves. Simultaneously, engage forms of governance constituted out-
it is to disparage and to effect erasure of forms side, and to a large extent before, the modern
of political community constituted outside of state. Moreover, [i]t is because indigenous
such arrangements. In short, it is to implicitly forms of governance transcend state-centrism
privilege hegemonic expressions of social and they are able to abstract sovereignty from its
political organization by way of making Westphalian limitations (Picq 2013: 124).
appeal to them as the arbiters of a meaningful Indigenous sovereignty derives its validity
diplomatic practice. claims and political legitimacy from commit-
At the same time, the fact is that state sover- ments rooted not in modernity but in cosmolo-
eignty has claimed a veritable monopoly over gies that do not lend easily to the parceling off
political authority on a global scale. Indigenous of either the material or the ideational worlds.
forms of political community may sustain It therefore resists confining an understanding
accommodation of this circumstance with of diplomacy to interactions between or with
varying degrees of ease, or bereft of it entirely, states alone. The result is a more complicated
but none may escape the imposed ubiquity of understanding of the political and a more ful-
the state and state logics mapped over their some range of practical political possibilities.
own environs. Still, we risk an impoverished An apt illustration is found, once again,
understanding of the substance and charac- in the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace,
teristics of Indigenous diplomacies where we which prescribes means to sustain relations
concede too much to the state, centering it between people, not just peoples. The Great
as their main referent instead of treating it as Law is perhaps most recognizable to domi-
one among many. The outlook sketched in the nant sensibilities and, no less, to scholars
Two Row Wampum treaty is instructive in this of disciplinary International Relations as an
regard. Besides the obvious implication that inter-national treaty and, indeed, it has even
the river could spatially accommodate two been read quite persuasively as an example
peoples, the treaty expressed the mutual com- of a well-functioning security regime (see
mitment to coexistence of distinct lifeways. Crawford 1994). At the same time, however,
This also typifies the orientation of Indigenous it is much more than this. Woven together
diplomacies writ large inasmuch as they are intrinsically, not merely in omnibus fashion,
not determined by the fact of the states pres- are provisions for the conduct of relations
ence but, again, have sources and origins that between peoples but also for more seemingly
both predate and exceed it. domestic concerns dealing with in-group
rights and responsibilities, the role of clans more complex than what is at work in state
in social life, the proper conduct of funer- diplomacies: simultaneously advancing indi-
ary observances, and more, including much vidual rights as women and collective rights
that might appear quite mundane. As David as Indigenous people they work to resist the
Bedford and Thom Workman (1997) argue, generalization of the Indigenous male experi-
the Great Law is fundamentally a document ence and a purely collective rights rendering
about living well in which the spheres of Indigenous diplomacies.
of life are inseparably related. It articulates What these and myriad other examples
a formulation of diplomacy antithetical to highlight, is that Indigenous diplomacies
enclosure of the international as high do not rely for their validity on conformity
politics, separated, per Realist-inspired with hegemonic conceptions of diplomacy,
ideational commitments, from the politics how and where it is practiced, or by whom.
of the good life (Wight 1966). Importantly, Nor are they reducible to an instrumental
it is also firmly established as lived experi- response to the (advanced) colonial state
ence both before and since colonial contact and the states system. Rather, their validity
and therefore confirms not only the viability derives from long established traditions con-
but the vibrancy of diplomacies and attendant sonant with endogenous cosmologies and
forms of political community other than and lifeways. Indeed, those that might appear to
predating the modern state. have enjoyed the greatest success vis--vis
Able to operate outside the confines of an hegemonic circuits of power may, in fact,
imagined state monopoly on sovereign sub- be among the most limited on autonomously
jecthood but still amenable to engaging it, defined terms if what is taken to be the arbiter
Indigenous diplomacies speak to and sustain of success is expressed on the basis of fidel-
a much broader terrain of political projects. ity to dominant understandings of the location
Seen from this perspective, the dominant, of politics and political authority. As Rauna
singular understanding of diplomacy is Kuokkanen (2009) argues, for example, the
revealed as, among other things, a technol- remarkable degree of influence and juridi-
ogy of erasure, hiding from view what turn cal autonomy achieved by the Sami has, in
out to be significant political projects and important senses, worked to obfuscate power
actors at the interstices between the local relations in ways that turn out to be quite con-
and the global. Importantly, their influence servative and status quo oriented. That said,
and effect is not limited to their own imme- Kuokkanen also points out a certain fidelity
diate contexts, but is felt in the accustomed in this to Sami tradition, a notable feature of
realms of state diplomacies as well. Kichwa which is expressed in a strategy of adaptation
women in Ecuador, for example, have both and withdrawal that moderates militancy.
adapted and shaped international legal norms Beyond its specific details, it thus serves
in ways that affirm Indigenous people as also as a salutary reminder of the impera-
accountable subjects under international law, tive that we sustain affirmation of Indigenous
directly rather than through the state (Picq diplomacies in the plural, taking care always
2013: 132). In the context of an ongoing land to foreground their heterogeneity (see also
claims struggle in Canada, Laura Parisi and Chapters 7 and 42 in this Handbook).
Jeff Corntassel (2009) show how Indigenous
womens diplomacies are inseparable from
spiritual, familial, and community relation-
ships. This gives rise to practices with deep Key Points
social embeddedness and which are there-
fore highly resilient. They also respond to an Indigenous diplomacies arise from distinct cos-
intersectionality of subject positions that is mologies that frequently eschew modernitys
sharp delineation of different spheres of social story here. According to Wilmer, the ascend-
life and, accordingly, resist understandings of ance of an essentially rights-based norm of
diplomacy that center interactions between or self-determination over realpolitik as a core
with states. ordering principle of the international system
Able to access a fuller range of political interac- has made it more amenable to the normative
tion, Indigenous diplomacies help to highlight
claims of Indigenous peoples pertaining to,
projects and practices undertaken between the
local and global, thereby populating the world of
among other things, autonomy and redress
diplomacies with a much broader array of acting of historical and ongoing colonial injus-
political subjects. tices. But while the changes Wilmer identi-
fies are undoubtedly relevant to the questions
above, they may be more so in the manner
of enabling factors or perhaps necessary,
but not sufficient, conditions. Karena Shaw
THE RISE OF GLOBAL INDIGENISM (2002) cautions against centering them in
accounts of the achievements of contempo-
As noted above, Indigenous diplomacies rary Indigenous diplomacies, since to do so
have been increasingly effectual in major is once again diminutive of Indigenous peo-
institutions and fora of global governance ples own global political subjecthood, essen-
since the early 1990s, a trend concretely tially attributing the belated audibility of their
exemplified in watershed developments such voices to the largess of states. Besides once
as the establishment of the UN Permanent again effecting erasure, this also risks missing
Forum. As also pointed out, however, other important changes central to the context
Indigenous diplomacies are not new but, of Indigenous diplomacies themselves in
rather, newly noticed. What, then, accounts particular, the rise of global indigenism.
for the sudden apparent traction of these If normative changes in the interna-
diplomacies and mainstream recognition of tional system of the sort Wilmer describes
Indigenous peoples as possessed of at least removed some impediments to the audibil-
qualified (by status quo standards of assess- ity of Indigenous diplomacies, the develop-
ment) global political subjecthood? How do ments of recent decades have been moved by
we make sense of the very different (if still important realignments of Indigenous global
not fully compeer) reception of Tony Black political subjecthood of which Deskahehs
Feather and Garfield Grass Rope in Geneva diplomatic efforts were a harbinger. Despite
some six decades after, and still within living their long traditions, through the first cen-
memory of, Deskahehs abortive mission to turies of the post-contact era, Indigenous
the League of Nations, let alone of todays diplomacies were effectively contained
Indigenous delegates to the Permanent by states and the states system as bilateral
Forum? Here too, we must take care to relationships wherein Indigenous peoples
approach the issues at hand mindful of the various claims to state power were, for the
subject standpoint from which we perceive most part, held in relative isolation from
them if the aim is to understand Indigenous one another. This is not to say that long-
diplomacies on their own terms and not established systems of diplomatic interac-
merely to recast them as what dominant dis- tion between Indigenous peoples somehow
courses need them to be. ceased to function (though the arrival of
In an important early scholarly contribu- colonial powers was certainly disruptive of
tion that speaks directly to the questions them in many cases). But their various points
posed above, Franke Wilmer (1993) argues of interface with a hegemonic states system
that changes in the operant norms of the that achieved global reach through the colo-
international system are a key part of the nial project were, for centuries, and largely
of necessity, typically idiosyncratic and dis- Institutionalized in transnational organizations

crete. Even in cases where alliances were including, among others, the International
formed between Indigenous peoples, these Indian Treaty Council, the Indigenous Peoples
tended to be referred toward a specific locus of Africa Coordinating Committee, and
of state power rather than to the states sys- the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, it mili-
tem as a whole. Thus, the colonial state was tates against enclosure and containment of
able to adopt a strategy of the smothering of Indigenous diplomacies and their relegation
Indigenous sovereign political subjecthood, to the intra-state level of domestic politics.
enclosed in bilateral relationships whence This has opened new circuits of influence and
it could not be more broadly performed in effected points of entry to hegemonic sites and
the same manner as state sovereignty is per- access to hegemonic actors of global govern-
formed into existence. ance through which more locally based organ-
Deskahehs mission signaled a qualitative izations like the Teton Sioux Nation Treaty
change. While the Haudenosaunee sought to Council can enact diplomacies.
press their case directly with the British and These developments and the rise of global
later looked to the Dutch for support, the mis- indigenism more generally bespeak robust
sion to the League of Nations constituted an global political subjecthood which, in turn,
approach at the system level one intended derives from the functioning non-state forms
to be addressed to all states that were part of political community in which it is rooted.
of the League. Though ultimately rebuffed, They also reveal a sophisticated and dynamic
Deskahehs mission evinced resistance world of inter-national diplomatic interac-
against reduction of Haudensaunee claims to tion almost entirely overlooked by scholars
a domestic political issue, whilst the opposi- of foreign policy and diplomacy. Importantly,
tion met from state members of the League is however, it has not been overlooked by states.
consistent with the stakes attending any rec- No longer able simply to evade acknowledg-
ognitive gesture that might lend legal valid- ment of Indigenous global political subject-
ity to a claim to sovereignty. It also marked a hood increasingly conspicuous in emergent
shift from predominant bilateralism toward a and dynamic networks of inter-national dip-
more multilateral outlook by Indigenous peo- lomatic interaction and exchange, states have
ples in their diplomatic relations with states. become increasingly attentive to Indigenous
Much more difficult to imagine (let alone diplomacies at the UN and elsewhere. Some
build and sustain) in Deskahehs time are states (settler states, in particular) may evince
the complex networks of horizontal connec- greater sensitivity to the implications of this
tions established since between Indigenous than others. But when status quo sovereign
peoples worldwide. These operate alongside power begins to engage where it has previ-
and complement the multilateralism practiced ously been at pains to avoid engagement,
in myriad vertical relations with states both something important has changed. And the
directly and through the hegemonic institu- real significance of this inheres once again in
tions of global governance. This second sys- the norms by which sovereignty is performed
tem of multilateral diplomacies connecting into being through mutual recognition: taking
Indigenous peoples has become increasingly notice of Indigenous diplomacies is in some
important since the last decades of the twen- measure to implicitly acknowledge forms
tieth century and a new global indigenism has of political community other than the state
emerged from the network of networks that has as authentic and viable and as the basis of
taken shape in the sum of these interactions, bona fide global political subjecthood (Beier
drawing on diplomatic practices and histories 2007). It is, at the same time, to unsettle the
of mutual contact and exchange between and normative/ideational basis upon which their
amongst peoples that long predate colonialism. exclusion has historically depended.
While it would seem a change of historic and on terms of states making. And to the
significance might very well be underway, extent that the terms of intelligibility in these
it is also possible to overstate its material encounters are founded on ideas, assump-
implications in a world in which sovereign tions, practices, and conventions that do
right is jealously guarded. The struggle over not do well to accommodate and may even
the very name of the UN Permanent Forum be inhospitable to diplomacies rooted in
on Indigenous Issues not Peoples, which Indigenous cosmologies, something of their
could more readily be taken to signify sov- distinctiveness may again be compromised
ereign political communities and which was or rendered inaudible. It is noteworthy in this
steadfastly resisted by states on that basis regard that Indigenous peoples delegations
reflected something of this even at the time to the UN have their seats in the Permanent
of its founding. More recently, controversy Forum, not the General Assembly.
erupted in late 2014 over the refusal by UN Nevertheless, in acknowledging Indige
member states to adopt the position of the nous diplomacies and, by extension, the
Permanent Forum denouncing the Doctrine authenticity of Indigenous global political
of Discovery, on the strength of which myr- subjecthood, states have already conceded
iad violences, dispossessions, and depreda- something. For students, scholars, and practi-
tions of colonialism were predicated. There tioners of diplomacy, its rendering in the sin-
have been and continue to be many such gular and along hegemonic lines is no longer
struggles and that is unlikely to change. sustainable. Among other things, a much
It is also important to recognize how sov- wider terrain of possibilities is revealed in
ereign power may reassert itself, at times terms of sites, practices, and active political
organically and at others quite deftly, even in subjects. The effect is to make our under-
the midst of what might appear a watershed standing of diplomacies much more com-
or transformative moment in Indigenous- plex and complicated, but also much richer
state relations. The recognitive gestures so and suggestive of a broader range of politi-
foundational to sovereignty may be accorded cal possibilities. The inter-national, from
somewhat more significance than is war- this perspective, is populated by many more
ranted once we take account again of endur- actors along multivalent circuits of intersec-
ing unequal power circulations. Indeed, Glen tion and interaction and drawing on diverse
Coulthard (2007; 2014) reveals how the set- histories and sui generis traditions producing
tler states of North America abide recogni- unique resolutions to the problem of political
tion of Indigenous peoples inasmuch as the order. It also tells us a great deal about the
centering of the colonial state is asserted political commitments encoded in dominant
anew as the site of authority whence rec- understandings of diplomacy commitments
ognition is conferred and with this the that are themselves worthy of sustained criti-
colonial relations of domination are also cal introspection (see also Chapters 11 and
reconfirmed and sustained (see also Simpson 49 in this Handbook).
2014). Recognition in this sense relies
upon the innate authority of sovereign power
expressed through the state form of political
community. Something of this is inherent Key Points
also in the strong and imperious influence of
the state along hegemonic circuits of global The increasing effect of Indigenous diplomacies
governance. Such is its imprint that, as noted in recent years, though perhaps better enabled by
earlier, Indigenous diplomacies, though they concomitant normative and structural changes in
exceed it, also cannot avoid addressing state the states system, have their primary determi-
power and must frequently do so in fora nants in the rise of global indigenism.
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the Constantinou, Costas M., On homo-diplomacy,
enduring ability of sovereign power to reassert Space and Culture 9:4 (2006), pp. 35164.
itself even in gestures of recognition and, no less, doi: 10.1177/1206331206290135.
in how we may inadvertently cast Indigenous Constantinou, Costas M., Between statecraft
diplomacies in ways influenced by dominant and humanism: diplomacy and its forms of
common senses and conceptual commitments. knowledge, International Studies Review
15:2 (2013), pp. 14162. doi: 10.1111/misr.
12037.
Cooper, Andrew F. and Brian Hocking, Gov-
NOTES ernments, non-governmental organisations
and the re-calibration of diplomacy, Global
1 All four countries have since endorsed the Society 14:3 (2000), pp. 36176. doi: 10.
principles of the Declaration without formally
1080/13600820050085750.
endorsing the instrument itself, thus effecting a
legal firebreak against its invocation in domestic Coulthard, Glen S., Subjects of empire: indig-
courts. enous peoples and thepolitics of recogni-
2 Charmaine White Face, Teton Sioux Nation Treaty tion in Canada, Contemporary Political
Council, interviewed at Rapid City, South Dakota, Theory 6:4 (2007), pp. 43760. doi: 10.1057/
16 August 2005. palgrave.cpt.9300307.
Coulthard, Glen Sean, Red Skin, White Masks:
Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
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53
Pariah Diplomacy
Hussein Banai
Pariahs are actors whose behavior constitutes seeks to signify is thus premised on a set of
a source of disorder in international society. normative standards for what being a pariah
Pariahood is an inter-subjective designation, negates. In other words, the designation of an
signifying the relationship between certain individual, a group, or a state as a pariah
modes of conduct and prevailing interna- typically signifies the qualities and modes of
tional orders, which are in turn reflective of behavior at odds with the rules and/or expec-
the (im)balances of power. Such practice is tations of membership in a given setting (be
routine by both the great powers and states at it a class, an organization, or a society). The
the periphery of world politics. Pariah diplo- status and fate of those pariahs acting in vio-
macy testifies to the methods by which extra- lation of laws and statutes is clear enough.
legal and disorderly conduct whether by
Here, the synonym outlaw is perhaps
members of international society or those
more illuminating in describing the range of
standing outside of it are justified or
behaviors in question and the kinds of legal
impressed upon other sovereign entities in
international politics. remedies necessary for punishing and deter-
The term pariah is as inexact as it is ring them. The matter becomes decidedly
menacing. According to the Oxford English murkier, however, if the term is used to sig-
Dictionary, it refers to a member of a nify behavior at odds with prevailing norms
despised class of any kind; someone or and values (Sharp, 2009: 207). In this case,
something shunned or avoided; a social out- the synonym rogue defined as a person
cast (OED Online). As a signifier, pariah is or thing that behaves in an aberrant, faulty,
always dependent on contextual evidence and or unpredictable way (OED Online) best
background explanations for its meaning; the captures the legal but nonetheless disruptive
object of its signification(s) i.e. what it mode of behavior.
Pariah Diplomacy 655
In this chapter, I use the term pariah as a of that arrangement in the first place? But if
spectrum encompassing both of these mean- we conceive of diplomacy more broadly as
ings: behavior in contravention of binding a method of building and managing rela-
legal commitments as well as shared, but tionships of enmity and friendship in world
non-binding, norms and values. Broadly politics (Bjola, 2013: 8), then the answer
defined, pariahs are actors whose behavior to this question is simple enough: even the
constitutes a source of disorder in interna- most isolated of pariahs must find a way to
tional society. But this definition still poses communicate their justification for their dis-
more vexing questions and concerns: given orderly behavior, to seek out empathy and
the anarchical nature of international soci- even sympathizers, and to present an alterna-
ety, on whose authority does the designa- tive narrative for their actions. Indeed, such
tion ultimately rest and why? Must there be practice is routine by both the great powers
a consensus on and about such designations and those quasi-states at the periphery of
among members of society? Indeed, since the world politics (Jackson, 1990). Pariah diplo-
dawn of human civilization, and through var- macy, therefore, testifies to the methods by
ious iterations of regional and international which extra-legal and disorderly conduct
societies, disorderly actions (variously iden- whether by members of international society
tified as barbaric, uncivilized, or rogue) or those standing outside of it are justified
have been carried out not only by outsiders or impressed upon other sovereign entities
seeking to challenge the status quo (Watson, in international politics. It is no more the
1992: 4776), but also by dominant powers exclusive purview of pariahs than public
seeking to shape the values and customs of diplomacy or shuttle diplomacy are of the
international society from within (Buzan and public or shuttles, respectively.
Little, 2000: 243343; Keene, 2002: 120 This chapter considers the nature and func-
44). Pariahood is an inter-subjective desig- tions of pariah diplomacy using the inter-
nation, signifying the relationship between national society framework of the English
certain modes of conduct and prevailing School. The latter approach is particularly
international orders, which are in turn reflec- insightful in terms of its focus on the histori-
tive of the (im)balances of power. As such, it cal evolution and social functions of various
speaks to both a disorderly mode of conduct institutions, norms, rules, and identities in
as well as the condition of isolation (however the constitution of international relations.
limitedly) in international society.1 The following, then, is organized around
What is the implication of pariahood for the English Schools concerns as regards the
the institution and practice of diplomacy, legitimacy and maintenance of order in inter-
then? At first glance, it would appear that national society (due to space considerations
diplomacy understood as either the man- I do not take up the implications for world
agement of relations between sovereign states society in this chapter). The first section
(Nicolson, 1939), the facilitation of dialogue offers a set of explanations for why pariah
among sovereign entities (Watson, 1983), the diplomacy is an especially unique challenge
mediation of estrangement (Der Derian, to the maintenance of international order,
1987), or the administration of relations and what can be done to attenuate some of
of separateness (Sharp, 2009) would be its more dangerous effects. The second sec-
anathema to pariahs. For if the object of dis- tion considers the nature of pariah diplomacy
orderly behavior is precisely to challenge and with respect to the ever-changing standards
undermine the prevailing rules, norms, and of legitimacy in world politics. The aim here
values of membership in international soci- is to reflect on pariah diplomacy not merely
ety, then why honor the legitimacy of a key as a form of diplomacy practiced by pariahs,
primary institution (Bull, 1977: 15677) but rather as a uniquely subversive mode
of exerting interests, values, and identities restrictions on their freedom of action [that]
employed by sovereign states of different is reciprocal (Bull, 1977: 64). Pariah diplo-
standings in international society. The third macy does not necessarily challenge these
and last section then seeks to describe and dif- interests and values in principle, but merely
ferentiate the functions of pariah diplomacy seeks to compel or persuade members of
between status quo and revisionist, sovereign international society of an alternative basis
entities in international society. Although the for coexistence. This is why, as it was argued
framework employed and discussed here can earlier, it would be a mistake to regard pariah
easily be applied to non-state entities as well, diplomacy as standing outside of interna-
out of deference to clarity and concision it tional society altogether. It often suits the
will mostly be discussed in reference to sov- specific agendas and interests of some states
ereign states. and statesmen to portray countries like Iran
or outfits such as Hamas as fundamentally
offensive to the nature of international
Key Points society but that ignores the fact that such
states or groups hardly ever object to the
Pariahs are actors whose behavior constitutes a elementary goals of social life. What they
source of disorder in international society.
in fact do object to are the unfair terms (to
Pariahood is an inter-subjective mode of conduct
their aims and values) under which they are
and not an objective state of being.
Pariah diplomacy testifies to the methods by made to coexist with others. But that is an
which extra-legal and disorderly conduct are jus- altogether different matter.
tified or impressed upon other sovereign entities As regards the rules of proper behavior,
in international politics. however, pariah diplomacy does indeed con-
stitute a sufficient challenge to international
order. States and non-state groups that seek to
challenge the legitimacy of prevailing norms
PARIAH DIPLOMACY AND and values often do so by refusing to conduct
INTERNATIONAL ORDER their relations in the manner that, from their
perspective, is advantageous to others, and
Pariah diplomacy presents a distinctive set of hence reinforces the unjust terms of relations.
problems for the maintenance of interna- Pariah diplomacy achieves this by exploiting
tional order. To better understand the range various bilateral, regional, and international
of challenges presented by pariah behavior in forums as occasions for subverting and delib-
international society, it is perhaps best to erately undermining established diplomatic
revisit Bulls (1977) three sources of order: protocols, especially as regards institutional
common interests; rules of proper behavior; decorum and interpersonal communication
and effective institutions. It is clear from the (e.g. heads of states and senior diplomats
preceding discussions that pariah behavior is have been known to hammer their shoes on
to a significant extent born out of competing, podiums, engage in ad hominem attacks,
irreconcilable interests. Certainly, competing even to physically threaten the safety of fel-
interests are part and parcel of international low diplomats). In extreme cases, such as
politics, and in and of themselves they do not during the hostage crisis in Iran, the norm of
account for enmity among states or pariah diplomatic immunity may itself be discarded
behavior. But what Bull has in mind is a in order to dramatize a regimes utter dis-
sense of common interests in the elementary pleasure with the formal rules of diplomatic
goals of social life such as independence conduct. But such occasions remain rare
and sovereignty, stability [sic] of agree- among states (non-state terrorist networks,
ments, or the willingness of states to accept of course, truly stand outside the bounds of
international society in this regard), for states in international society. Pariah diplomacy, in
must in the end stay in contact with the out- this sense, provides as much an opportunity
side world in some way, shape, or form. Even for pariah states to assert their sovereign pre-
a state as reclusive as North Korea has to find rogatives, as it allows the other members of
ways to communicate its wishes to its neigh- international society to communicate to pari-
bors and the world community, if for noth- ahs the likely consequences of their actions
ing else than to simply confirm, from time for others and themselves.
to time, the good health and maintenance of
power of the ruling elite.
Lastly, pariah diplomacy undermines inter-
Key Points
national order by challenging the efficacy of
international institutions, of which diplomacy Pariah diplomacy does not necessarily chal-
itself is a particularly significant one. The lenge interests and values in principle, but
primary institutions of international s ociety merely seeks to compel or persuade members of
the balance of power, international law, international society of an alternative basis for
diplomacy, war, and the great powers by no coexistence.
States and non-state groups that seek to chal-
means constitute a just or even an egalitarian
lenge the legitimacy of prevailing norms and
order among states, as Bull famously argued values often do so by refusing to conduct their
(1977: 839). Questions of justice and equal- relations in the manner that, from their perspec-
ity are in fact secondary concerns to the much tive, is advantageous to others, and hence rein-
more intractable and elementary problem of forces the unjust terms of relations.
coexistence in international society. Order Pariah diplomacy undermines international order
is rightly regarded by Bull and the adher- by challenging the efficacy of international insti-
ents of the English School as a foundational tutions, of which diplomacy itself is a particularly
value precisely because it speaks to the fact significant one.
of pluralism of interests, values, and actions
in the society of states. This intrinsic plural-
ism, in turn, is exemplified in and engaged
with the primary institutions of international PARIAHOOD AND INTERNATIONAL
society. Pariah diplomacy, whether exercised LEGITIMACY
by status quo or revisionist sovereign enti-
ties, argues for an alternative distribution of The constitutive and regulative impact of
power, reforms in international law, a diplo- norms on international behavior has long
matic set up commensurate with the aspira- been a central preoccupation in the study of
tions of its wielders, justificatory narratives international relations (Kratochwil, 1989;
for war, and the reconsideration of the rela- Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink,
tionships between the great powers. 1998; Checkel, 1999). In particular, scholars
Much of this dynamic is of course depend- have been interested in how the evolution or
ent on the nature of issues in dispute. Andrew devolution of norms in international society
Hurrell (2007) has identified five broad cat- might affect the legitimacy of certain interna-
egories of issues affecting global order tional orders across time and space (Bull and
today: nationalism and identity politics, Watson, 1984; Franck, 1988; Hall, 1999;
human rights and democracy, war and col- Foot et al., 2003; Gelpi, 2003). Curiously,
lective security, economic globalization although the implications of such shifts and
and inequality, and ecological challenges. linkages for the conduct of diplomacy are
Pariah-like behavior by states and non-state obviously significant, they remain relatively
groups relating to each of these issue areas underexplored in diplomatic studies. Pariah
is at once a symptom and a cause of disorder diplomacy is a mode of behavior that poses a
challenge to prevailing international orders the benefits of full membership accorded to

and their bases of legitimacy. Before explor- other states due to their conduct toward their
ing in greater depth the nature and functions own citizens and/or the threats posed to the
of pariah diplomacy, therefore, it is important prevailing norms of international legitimacy
to understand its genesis in relation to the (Litwak, 2000; Bain, 2003; Simpson, 2004).
predominant norms of legitimacy in interna- This is where the disproportionate influence
tional society. of the great powers on the norms of legiti-
Legitimacy is integral to the constitution macy becomes apparent, however, for there
of international society. According to Ian is no shortage of states meeting such criteria,
Clark, The core principles of legitimacy but who are nonetheless exempt from con-
express rudimentary social agreement about sequences of their conduct because of their
who is entitled to participate in international strategic ties to powerful states. Consider the
relations, and also about appropriate forms cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia, for instance.
in their conduct (2005: 2). But who decides Since the advent of the Islamic Republic
on the participants and the terms of engage- in Iran, the United States and its Western
ment between them? How is legitimacy European allies have labeled Iran a pariah
derived, and on whose authority does it rest? state based on its record of human rights
Answers to these questions vary according abuses at home, its support for militant and
to the theoretical orientation of respondents. terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and
Broadly speaking, there are those for whom Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and its clandestine
the distribution of power has a direct impact pursuit of nuclear energy. But just as in the
on the norms of legitimacy (i.e. the norms of case of other countries it has usually shared
legitimacy are influenced by the most power- such a classification with Iraq (under Saddam
ful states) (Dunne, 2001; Bukovansky, 2002), Husseins regime), North Korea, Libya (under
while others believe that necessity, common Muammar Qaddafis regime), Syria (under
interests, and shared values variously com- the Assad family regime), and Cuba. Irans
bine to form the bases of legitimacy in inter- behavior has not been that different from that
national society (Bull, 1977; Clark, 2005). of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a staunch
Wide consensus exists, however, on the con- ally of the United States in the Middle East.
tingent nature of the normative contexts in Not only does the Kingdom score more
which international legitimacy is constructed. poorly than Iran on human rights and govern-
The criteria for legitimacy change according ance issues, and according to American offi-
to the shifting considerations of power and cials is the foremost state-sponsor of jihadist
the normative imperatives of international terrorism in the world (Walsh, 2010), but it
society. This is attested to by, for example, also has openly boasted of having easy access
the varying degrees of respect accorded to the to Pakistans nuclear arsenal, which they have
principle of non-intervention during and after helped finance over the years (Urban, 2013).
the Cold War, and in the aftermath of terror- Yet, Saudi Arabia has thus far been exempt
ist attacks against the United States on 11 from the pariah, rogue, or outlaw desig-
September 2001, respectively. In each case, nation by the United States and its European
as internationally held norms and values partners.
change[d], they create[d] coordinated shifts It follows, then, that the designation of
in state interests and behavior across the sys- states as pariahs or rogues is less a matter of
tem (Finnemore, 1996: 23). adherence to standards of legitimacy than it is
Most significantly, these changes have a about the utility of a given state to the over-
direct bearing on the terms of responsible all stability of certain international orders.
membership in the society of states. The This is especially so given that, as Clark per-
so-called pariah states are excluded from ceptively argues, these formulations can be
regarded as a self-conscious attempt to create REPRESENTATIONS OF PARIAH

a tiered or hierarchical international society, DIPLOMACY
constituted by a core and a periphery, or more
loosely by insiders and outsiders (Clark, What is the significance of all this to the
2005: 177). This does not mean that behav- practice of pariah diplomacy? As mentioned
ioral norms and expectations of rightful con- earlier, pariah diplomacy is not merely a ref-
duct are mere guises for the naked pursuit of erence to the uses of the diplomatic method
material or ideological interests. To the con- by pariahs; rather, it is a particular mode of
trary, it is a testament to the inherent difficulty diplomacy utilized by pariahs and non-
in attaching singular identities and essential- pariahs alike in order to justify extra-legal
ist characteristics to any state in international and disorderly conduct in international soci-
society. More importantly, in terms of the sta- ety. Behavior contrary to the expectations or
tus of states, it points to the existence of two standards of international conduct and coop-
parameters of legitimacy based on rightful eration, however, is nearly always explained
membership and rightful conduct, which do by the offending parties as commensurate
not coexist easily in a world of ever-shifting with the principles of international legiti-
interests and alliances (Clark, 2005: 189). macy. It is through the diplomatic exchange
This duality also obscures our view of rogue of ideas, positions, grievances, and aspira-
conduct by middle and great powers, which tions that the merits behind claims to legiti-
are typically regarded as members-in-good- macy are debated, suppressed, or acceded to.
standing in international society. The domes- In international diplomacy, status quo states,
tic legitimacy of such regimes due largely revisionist states, and non-state groups chal-
to their democratic political institutions and lenging the legitimacy of prevailing orders
robust regime of constitutional rights does construct the dominant frameworks through
not necessarily correspond to their external which pariah behavior is channeled. For this
behavior. In fact, the recent history of inter- reason, understanding the constellation of
national society is littered with instances normative arguments in which struggles for
of Western states overthrowing democratic establishing international legitimacy take
regimes, waging wars under false pretenses, place is central to the concerns of pariah
plundering natural resources, committing diplomacy.
war crimes and acts of terror, and undermin-
ing international law, to name only the most
obvious infractions (Chomsky, 2000). In each Status Quo Pariah Diplomacy
case, the label pariah is an accurate descrip-
tion of behavior if not obviously of status. Status quo powers are both limited and
empowered in their actions by the prevailing
rules and norms of international society. As
Key Points Bull aptly observed, Great powers contrib-
ute to international order in two main ways:
Pariah diplomacy is a mode of behavior that by managing their relations with one
poses a challenge to prevailing international another; and by exploiting their preponder-
orders and their bases of legitimacy. ance in such a way as to impart a degree of
The criteria for legitimacy change according to
central direction to the affairs of interna-
the shifting considerations of power and the
normative imperatives of international society.
tional society as a whole (Bull, 1977: 200).
The designation of states as pariahs or rogues is On the one hand, they must act as advocates
less a matter of adherence to standards of legiti- and enforcers of certain dominant norms
macy than it is about the utility of a given state to (such as non-intervention or nuclear non-
the overall stability of certain international orders. proliferation) that are not only important to
the maintenance of order, but which also rationale for rogue behavior or risk suffer-
undergird the legitimacy of status quo ing the consequences (George, 1991; Art and
authority in international society. This places Cronin, 2003).
a special burden on the autonomy of status The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 is
quo powers since they must act as model a particularly instructive example of pariah
states, embodying the best practices of diplomacy by a status quo power. The
membership in the society of states. On the sequence of diplomatic maneuvers employed
other hand, status quo powers can twist and by the George W. Bush administration to
bend the established rules and norms of con- rally international support for regime change
duct in pursuit of naked interests, or simply in Iraq have been subject to numerous criti-
to ensure a favorable balance of power. cal studies from both academic and policy-
Pariah diplomacy, as a representative mode oriented perspectives, and therefore require
of disorderly conduct, is a natural comple- little more than an overview here. What
ment to the latter. made the Bush administrations diplomatic
The exercise of pariah diplomacy by approach particularly controversial was its
status quo powers is indeed as old as the formulation on the basis of the so-called
lifespan of modern international society Bush Doctrine; namely, the notion that in
itself. From royal decrees handed down by the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September
the newly established resident embassies 2001, the United States reserved the right to
in early Renaissance Europe (Mattingly, carry out preemptive strikes against those
1955) to European imperial mandates cover- nations that provide aid or safe haven to ter-
ing roughly 85 percent of the globe at their rorism (Bush, 2001). The war against Iraq,
height (Said, 1993: 8; Hobson, 2012) to Cold however, quickly disabused international
War and post-9/11 great power practices of society of any misapprehensions about the
regime change and preemptive strikes real strategic objectives behind the Bush
(Bacevich, 2002; Guzzini, 2002) through it Doctrine. The so-called global war on ter-
all, pariah diplomacy has been a central fea- ror provided the United States with the
ture of status quo states desire to dominate opportunity to realign international security
and dictate the terms of engagement with concerns with those of American national
other states. The chief utility of diplomacy in security priorities, and to do so free of any
this sense is to communicate to others (a) why international legal restraints or regard for
the status quo in question is exempt from the multilateral ties and institutions.
norms of orderly conduct expected of other The implications of Americas pariah
states, and (b) what the consequences of diplomacy for regional instability were
resistance by other states toward the unlawful immediate and continue in all their sound
or rogue action of the status quo powers aims and fury to this day. They were and remain
would be. The former imposes on diplomats even more consequential, however, in terms
the burden of proving to the international of their longstanding damage to the legiti-
society at large how disorderly conduct (usu- macy of international institutions and to
ally, but not limited to, the outbreak of war) the currency of international humanitarian
is in this instance a necessarily evil meant regimes governing the conduct of states and
to defend the fundamental primary values non-state actors in times of war and during
and norms of international life such as self- post-conflict transitions. For although the
determination, open exchange of goods and United Nations Security Councils rejection
people, and peaceful coexistence. The latter of the American rationale for the invasion of
task more closely approximates the functions Iraq presented, on account of fabricated evi-
of coercive diplomacy in that it compels dence, by Americas top diplomat at the time,
other states to either accept the status quo Secretary of State Colin Powell was clearly
a demonstration of its proper functioning, Fred Halliday perceptively observed of revo-

it nevertheless also exposed how easily its lutionary states:
judgment in matters of war and peace could
Revolutions proclaim a new form of diplomacy, in
be sidestepped. What is more, Americas
part in the expectation of a near-simultaneous set
resort to pariah diplomacy not only forged of insurrections in other countries. In practice,
ahead with an ad-hoc, albeit meager, coali- revolutionaries doubt the need at all for diplomacy,
tion of the willing (fashioned out of, in for- in the sense of regular inter-state relations. This
mer Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds theme, the denial of the relevance of diplomacy,
recurs in many revolutions and has at least three
eternal words, a new Europe less compla-
different components: the belief in the near simul-
cent than the much vaunted but now-decadent taneity of the imminent world revolution and
old Europe), but in fact introduced a set hence the opportunity to avoid contact with non-
of rogue practices e.g. rendition, torture, revolutionary states; disdain for what is seen as a
indefinite detention, extrajudicial assassina- quintessential ancient rgime and elitist practice;
and a belief in the benefits and practicability of
tions, invasive surveillance of domestic and
open, people-to-people relations as distinct from
foreign citizens and world leaders, etc. the secret and anti-popular world of diplomacy.
which have since become adopted and rou- (Halliday, 1999: 95)
tinized by other powers. Status quo pariah
diplomacy is especially damaging to interna- Of course, not all revolutionary states are
tional order because it combines the capacity created equal. The Soviet Union as a revolu-
to undercut established norms and practices tionary regime had far more global ambitions
in international society with the determina- than its analogues in Venezuela, North Korea,
tion to realize a new order based on the stra- China, Iran, or Libya ever did. Even still, that
tegic priorities of the status quo power. revolutions bring about a new form of diplo-
macy, and do so with a mixture of disdain
and envy for the established practices of
interstate diplomacy, is a running theme in
Revisionist Pariah Diplomacy
international society.
Revisionism, premised as it is on the need for An excellent case in point of revolution-
change to established ways of engaging in ary pariah diplomacy would be the Islamic
and managing relationships, is a disruptive Republic of Iran. In the immediate aftermath
force in international politics. Revisionary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979,
states and groups are by historical circum- a group of Islamic revolutionaries calling
stance and function pariahs in international themselves Students Following Imams [i.e.
society. Their raison dtre is to challenge Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini] Line scaled
the authority of status quo states, and hence the walls of the American Embassy in Tehran
the underlying structure of norms and and took 52 American diplomats and person-
regimes that reinforce their status. Revisionist nel hostage for 444 days. The so-called Iran
diplomacy, then, is pariah diplomacy par hostage crisis transformed Irans image and
excellence. Throughout international history, standing in world affairs from an island of
revisionist diplomacy has mainly been the stability, in President Jimmy Carters unsus-
preserve of revolutionary states like the pecting words, to a rogue theocracy openly
United States, France, Russia, China, North challenging the legitimacy of Western-led
Korea, Iran, Cuba, Libya, Venezuela, and so international order. Yet, while the Islamic
on. Each revolutionary regime, however, has Republic of Iran violated a bedrock norm of
to immediately come to terms with a nettle- international diplomacy that of diplomatic
some conundrum upon its ascent to power: to immunity it did not, and could not, dispense
endorse or not to endorse the institution and with the practice of diplomacy altogether;
practice of interstate diplomacy. As the late nor could the United States and the rest of the
international community completely ostra- belie the utility of Irans pariah diplomacy
cize Iran or wholly ignore its new demands to the preservation of the arbitrary powers of
and diplomatic posture. Indeed, in the years the clerical establishment and their respec-
following the advent of the Islamic Republic, tive networks of patronage ruling over Iran.
not only has Iran forged political, economic, Indeed, the chief objective of pariah diplo-
and cultural ties with both industrialized macy in the case of revolutionary states is
and developing nations around the world, its the survival of the ruling elite acting as the
strategic profile as a resource-rich regional guardians of The Revolution. According
power capable of projecting its interests and to Halliday, Both the advance of revolution
values in the Middle East and beyond has left and that of counter-revolution are governed
most states with no option but to recognize its by change in the internal constitution of
brand of diplomacy. states (Halliday, 1999: 139). The durabil-
It is important to recognize, then, that ity of pariah diplomacy, therefore, is largely
regimes and actors like those of the Islamic dependent on the complex interplay between
Republic and Ayatollah Khomeini (and his revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
successor) pose a challenge to the prevail- objectives.
ing norms of international legitimacy not Other key revisionist cohorts with a pro-
because they wish to be regarded as pari- clivity for pariah diplomacy are aggrieved
ahs, but because they seek new regional and non-state actors with the capacity to suf-
international orders that complement their ficiently harm and hence affect interstate
strategic interests and values. Diplomacy is relations. A variety of paramilitary groups,
the tool used by such states to justify their liberation movements, religious extrem-
interests, and, correspondingly, to under- ists, or transnational political networks are
mine the rationale behind those of status at any given time challenging the authority
quo powers. Indeed, this is a well-rehearsed of states and international institutions across
dynamic in the relationship between Iran and the globe. Although largely confined to the
the United States since at least the period periphery of international society, non-state
of the hostage crisis. The recalcitrant pos- pariah actors do at times engage in covert
ture of Iranian diplomacy is meant to draw and public talks with states around issues of
attention to both Iranian and regional injus- mutual concern. From the Tamil Tigers in
tices suffered at the hands of American and Sri Lanka to the Taliban in Afghanistan to
European interests. Indeed, when put in his- Lebanese Hezbollah to the Irish Republican
torical perspective such grievances are not Army in Ireland to the Revolutionary Armed
wholly without merit: the CIA-engineered Forces of Colombia (or FARC), pariah diplo-
overthrow of Irans democratically elected macy has proved to be an indispensable tool
premier, Mohammad Mossadeq, and sub- of managing relations between states and
sequent American backing of the autocratic non-state groups seeking either recognition
Pahlavi monarchy; American backing of and/or new terms of engagement.
Saddam Husseins Iraq during the IranIraq The methods by which non-state actors
war; rejecting Irans offers of goodwill vis- conduct pariah diplomacy differ significantly
-vis the release of American hostages in from those employed by states. Given the fact
Hezbollah custody; placement of Iran in an that such groups are nearly always regarded
axis of evil alongside Iraq and North Korea, by states as threats to national or even inter-
in spite of Irans tangible cooperation against national security (especially in the case of
the Taliban in Afghanistan; and sanction- transnational terrorist organizations), most of
ing Iran for its nuclear activities. But these their diplomatic activities are carried out in
historical grievances, more detrimental to secret and through third party intermediaries.
the Iranian people than the Islamic regime, They face similar challenges to revisionist
state actors in that they must constantly bal- CONCLUSION

ance survival with their professed ideologi-
cal aims; but in contrast to state actors they As a moniker for disorderly behavior, there
carry the additional burden of doing so with- is, in the final analysis, very little that is inex-
out a national or coherent constituency. This act about the term pariah. States and non-
means that they must also wage a public state actors whose actions disrupt and
diplomatic campaign to air their grievances challenge the routine practices and estab-
and justify their actions, all in the hopes of lished institutions of international society
securing some measure of sympathy from respectively, do so out of a desire to alter the
the public. Since the advent of the Internet, prevailing order of relations among different
these efforts have taken the form of digital constituencies. To be a pariah, therefore, is to
audio-visual messages targeted at specific engage in extralegal and disorderly behavior
audiences. Groups that employ violence as a toward the established norms, rules, and
means of achieving their objectives even if institutions of international society. Such
they are clearly associated with a national or actions, as the preceding hopefully has made
ethnic liberation cause tend to see dimin- clear, need not necessarily place any state or
ishing results in their public outreach efforts, group outside of the bounds of international
however, as states are particularly adept at society.
securitizing non-state groups. One of the central arguments of this chap-
In the final analysis, it is important to note ter has been that pariah-like behavior is in
that revisionist pariah diplomacy in both fact a routine fact of life in international
state and non-state forms is regarded as an society. This is attested to by the frequency
unsavory practice, particularly because its and intensity with which so-called pariah
purveyors are entities with outsider status in actors use diplomacy a primary institution
international society. Challenging an estab- of international society to register their
lished order of international relationships, if grievances and justify their actions. As the
it is not backed up by a clearly justified set different examples of status quo great pow-
of moral and empirical claims or superior ers such as the United States and revisionist
power, is unlikely to overcome the range of weak states such as the Islamic Republic of
legal and extralegal privileges at the disposal Iran demonstrate, pariah diplomacy is itself
of members-in-good-standing in interna- a feature (albeit an irregular one) of inter-
tional society. national life. For this very reason, however,
its propensity for inflicting harm and engen-
dering enmity should never be discounted.
Key Points Pariah diplomacy is a very dangerous and
often destructive mode of diplomacy, nearly
In international diplomacy, status quo states, always a way station on the way to war (see
revisionist states, and non-state groups challeng- also Chapters 4, 8, 10, 15, 21, and 39 in this
ing the legitimacy of prevailing orders construct Handbook).
the dominant frameworks through which pariah
behavior is channeled.
Status quo pariah diplomacy is especially damag-
ing to international order because it combines
the capacity to undercut established norms and NOTE
practices in international society with the deter-
mination to realize a new order based on the 1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for help-
strategic priorities of the status quo power. ing me clarify the two distinct, yet overlapping,
Revisionist diplomacy is pariah diplomacy par ways in which the designation can be under-
excellence. stood. My hope is that the third section of the
chapter provides sufficient evidence of the intri- Clark, Ian (2005) Legitimacy in International
cate linkages between the two uses, and hence Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
provides a vindication of my plea for treating Der Derian, James (1987) On Diplomacy.
pariahood as a spectrum encompassing both. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dunne, Tim (2001) Sociological Investigations:
Instrumental, Legitimist, and Coercive Inter-
pretations of International Society, Millen-
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Index
Abduh, Muhammad 387 Amarna Letters 80, 83, 149, 386

Abdlaziz, Sultan 389, 390 ambassadors: city diplomacy 51415
aboriginal art 117 as doyen 263
accession diplomacy 313 non-resident missions 2612
Actor Network Theory (ANT) 24 ambiguous communication 857
Acuto, Michael 464 American diplomacy 31935
Acuto, Michele 51020 American Presence Posts (APPs) 331
ad hoc summits 239 Amsterdam Treaty 308
Adams, Charles Francis 326 Amstrup, Niels 424
Adams, John 494 Ancient Greece 198, 295, 631
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca 92103, 283 Andean Group 313
advocacy, agency 978 Andean Pact 381
Aeschines 14 Anna-Lindh-Foundation 393
aesthetics 114 Annan, Kofi 420, 467, 476, 534
Affonso I, Nzinga Mbemba 45 Antarctic Treaty 631
African diplomacy 398413 anti-diplomacy 247
African Group of Negotiators (AGN) 409 celebrity diplomacy 535
African National Congress (ANC) 214, 404, 415, 417, US 320, 326
41819 apartheid 404, 405, 4067, 41415, 418
African Peace Facility (APF) 409 Appadurai, Arjun 116
African Scientific Institute 632 Aquinas, 282
African Security and Peace Architecture (ASPA) 409 Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) 3945
African Union (AU) 405, 406, 40710, 419, 4212, 471 Arab League 391, 406, 467
agency 92103 Arab National Congress 390
celebrity diplomacy 530 Arab Spring 310, 395
ethics 124, 125, 1267 Arafat, Yasir 83
summitry 237 Aramaic language 81, 244
Aggestam, Karin 22030 Archetti, C. 140
Agra Summit 234 architecture 11516
Ahtisaari, Martti 213 Arctic Council 632
aid programs 284 Arias, scar 302
Africa 4034 aristocratic fraternity 1078
embassies 151 Aristotle 128, 243
Aix la Chapelle Treaty 269 arms control 285
Akehurst, Michael 188 Armstrong, David 48798
Akkadian language 81, 244 Aron, Raymond 100, 278
al Bashir, Omar 404 art exhibitions 117
Al-Jazeera 392 art history 24
ALADI Reciprocal Credit Convention 381 artefacts see gifts
Alger, Chad 512 Arthashastra 149
Ali, Saleem H. 60116 the Arts 11422
alienation 106 return of objects 117
Allen, Danielle 243 Arusha peace talks 107, 212
Alleyne, Mark D. 536 Ashley, Richard 58
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 298, 302 Ashton, Catherine 310, 31112
Alliance of Youth Movement 543 Asia-Europe (ASEM) 341
Allison, Graham T. 93, 95, 422 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 288
Allison, L. 618, 623 Russia 341
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 608 summit 236
Amann, W. 572 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 355
INDEX 667
Association Internationale Africaine (AIA) 48 Bevin, Ernest 236

Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Bey of Tunisia 49
288, 313, 361, 507 Beyerinck, Craig 5219
East Asia 365, 368 Beyond Sport 617
Russia 341 Bhabha, Homi 112
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) bilateral agreements 205
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) bilateral embassy 1512
3623, 368, 595, 596, 597 bilateralism 428
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Industrial Revolution 164
Regional Forum (ARF) 362, 367, 368, 596 partnership 3534, 358
Asuncin Treaty 381 Bildt, Carl 544, 548
asylum 203 Bilgin, Pinar 389, 390
Atlantic Charter 233 biometrics 168
Atlantic Community Initiative 276 bioregionalism 612
atomic diplomacy 273, 274, 276 bipartisanship 323
attractive diplomacy 3556 Bisley, Nick 279
attribution theory 89 Bismarck, Otto von 489, 243, 270
Augustine of Hippo 14 Bjola, Corneliu 12332, 362, 459
autonomist collectivization 37780 Black, A. 140
Avenell, Edward 46275 Black, Jeremy 522, 523, 527
Aziz, Tariq 247 Black Sea Economic Cooperation 341
Blair, Tony 237, 239, 276, 330, 536
Bachrach, Peter 283 Blank, Yishai 517
back-channel negotiations 458 Bloomberg, Michael 518
Baghdad Pact 391 Boddewyn, J. J. 567
Bailes, Alyson J. K. 294307 body language 80, 825, 867, 245
Bailey, Thomas A. 319, 321, 324, 325 Bogost, Ian 119
balancing, developing states 427 Bolsheviks 4912, 494, 495
Balfour, Lord 270 Bolton, John R. 98
Ball, George 237 Bono 531, 532, 5356, 537
Banai, Hussein 65465 Book of the Consulate of the Sea 164
Banco del Sur 381 Bosworth, Stephen W. 320
Bandung Conference 414 Botero, Giovanni 138, 282, 290
bandwagoning 427 bounded rationality 56
Baratz, Morton 283 Bourdieu, Pierre 99, 110, 112
Barbaro, Ermolao 19 Bouteflika, President Abdelaziz 406
Barder, Brian 12930 Bouteligier, Sofie 513
Barfield, Claude 365 Boxer Rebellion 269
bargaining 56, 589 boycotts 619
Barrett, Scott 613 Bozeman, Adda 57
Bartoli, Andrea 582 Brahimi Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 268
Bastos, Fabrcio H. Chagas 37284 breach of relations 2634, 265
Bayard, Thomas A. 326 Brenthurst Foundation 422
Becket, Thomas 232 BrestLitovsk conference 492
Bedford, David 648 Bretton Woods Institutions 380
Begin, Menachim 84, 87 Bretton Woods system 429
Beier, Marshall 111, 64253 Brewer, T. L. 567
Beijing Conference on Women 172 BRICS Bank 381
Beisner, Robert 326 BRICS (Brazil Russia India China South Africa) 290,
Berlin Conference 49, 233, 399 340, 354, 355, 358, 4212, 447, 470
Berlin Congress 270 Briguglio, Lino 425
Berlin Wall 87 broad multifunctional approach 425
Berridge, G. R. 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 238, 239, Brochure Talk 251
243, 488 Brundtland Commission 606
Bessmertnykh, Alexander 337 Bruyneel, Kevin 647
best possible alternative to a negotiated agreement Bryant, A. 140
(BATNA) 210 Bulkeley, Harriet 513
668 INDEX
Bull, Hedley 94, 105, 106, 1089, 185, 18990, 279, Churchill, Winston 2334, 237, 239, 272, 327, 453, 591
488, 521, 527, 656, 657 Cicero 14
Bunker, Ellsworth 327 Ciolek, Melanie 547
Burges, Sean, W. 37284 circumlocution 82
Burke, Edmund 32, 33, 123 citizen diplomacy 5219
Burton, John 4545 city diplomacy 51020
Bush Doctrine 660 civil protection 167
Bush, President George H. W. 84, 2345, 247, 338 civil society organizations 523, 555, 617
Bush, President George W. 235, 239, 330, 534, 536, civilian power 74, 313, 325
542, 660 civility 108, 246, 438
business diplomacy 553, 56476 clarity, communication 857
Butler, Nicholas Murray 188, 1901 Clark, Ian 68, 74, 6589
Butterfield, Herbert 57 classical realism 556, 589, 61
Byzantine Empire 162, 336 clientelism 4045
Byzantium 116 climate change 4089, 431, 523, 602, 629
Climate Leadership Group (C40) 518
Callaghan, Jim 236 Climate Vulnerable Forum 426
Calleya, Stephen 42334 Clinton, David 18596
Cambridge School 29 Clinton, Hillary 74, 325, 328, 521, 526, 542, 621
Cameron, David 235, 467 Clinton, William 278, 327, 536
Camp David Mideast negotiations 212, 223 Clooney, George 534
Capitulations 174, 389 club diplomacy 179, 333, 5256, 566
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 377 Club of Rome 604, 606
Caribbean Community and Common Market clumping bamboo diplomacy 366, 367
(CARICOM) 429 co-optive power 72
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) 429 co-production of knowledge 1346
Carlowitz Congress 233 Code of Euric 164
Carr, E. H. 187, 192, 279 codebreaking 452
Carrie, Rene Albrecht 278 coercive diplomacy 57, 84, 191, 3556, 47686, 660
Carrington, Lord 416 cognitive approaches 55, 57, 589
Carroll, Lewis 252 cognitive theory 89
Carter, President Jimmy 234, 237, 325, 586, 661 Cohen, Raymond 82, 834, 85, 86, 88, 242, 245, 246, 438
Carty, Antony 138 Cohen, Robin 400
Castell, Manuel 443 Cold War 7
Castlereagh, Lord 268, 269 African diplomacy 4013
Castro, Fidel 377 coercive diplomacy 478, 47980, 483, 484
Castro, Ral 83 communication 277
catalytic diplomacy 515 developing states 4245
Cecil, Lord Robert 271 East Asia 3634
celebrity diplomacy 386, 5309 end 325, 403
Central National Security Commission (CNSC) 353, 357 informal contact 265
Chaco War 375 middle powers 283
Chamberlain, Joseph 345 military diplomacy 591
Chamberlain, Neville 233, 236, 462 negotiations 214
Chan, Stephen 41422 public diplomacy 440
Chapnick, Adam 282, 290 science diplomacy 629, 630, 632
Chaumont Treaty 2689 Secretary-General 285
Chavez, Hugo 108, 376 small states 298
Chen Zhimin 34860 Southern African diplomacy 416
Chernobyl 457 US military force 2734
Chernomyrdin, Viktor 338 collective sanctions 278
Chiang Kai-shek 274 collectivization, autonomist 37780
Chinese diplomacy 34860 colonialism 3953
ChineseAfrican relations 4035 Africa 399400
Chona, Mark 416 Colson, A. 139
Chou En Lai 414 Comintern 492
INDEX 669
comit diplomatique 32, 33 Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) 168

commercial diplomacy 552, 5556, 569 consular corps 171, 181
Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) 212 consular diplomacy 16170, 456
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 304 Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) 168
Common Consular Instruction (2002) 166 consular-on-line website (CoOL) 169
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 308, 309, 311 consulates 16170
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 309 consul origins 162
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting developing states 426
(CHOGM) 416, 417, 41920 continuous negotiation 15, 42, 50
communication 7991, 114, 258 Convention of El Pardo 164
agency 967 Cooper, Andrew F. 284, 288, 289, 521, 530, 532, 5356
ambiguous 857 Cooper, David 291
American diplomacy 3323 Cooper, Robert 689
Arts 117 cooperation: consular 1667
Cold War 277 diplomatic corps 174
conference diplomacy 505 cooperative partnerships, China 354
digital diplomacy 54051 Copeland, Daryl 100, 524, 526, 528, 62841
language 24254 cordialidade 377, 383
mediation 222 Cornago, No 13346
Middle East diplomacy 386 Corntassel, Jeff 648
public diplomacy 441, 4436 Cornut, J. 141
summits 232, 2345, 23940, see also information corporate citizenship 567
and communications technology (ICT) corporate diplomacy 565, 566, 568
communicative action 88 corporate pluralization 352
communism 350, 357 corporate political activity (CPA) 567, 568
Communist International (Comintern) 274 corporate political strategies (CPS) 567, 568
communities of practice 1412 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 5678
Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations corps diplomatique 19, 31, 41, see also diplomatic
(CELAC) 382 corps
Compact of Free Association (CFA) 428 Correa, Rafael 376
compellence 478, 47980 Cortes, Hernn 45
compensation 21314 Corwin, Edward S. 321, 323
composite diplomacy 36 cosmopolitan culture 105
Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Coulthard, Glen 651
Centre (CCOMC) 593 Council on East Asian Community 366
comprehensive diplomacy 352 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 604
conceptual history 2838 Council of Europe, Russian diplomacy 345
Concert of Europe 269, 271 Council for Security Cooperation Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) 367
concertacin approach 3758, 379, 380, 383 courtesy 82
concession: conference diplomacy 503 courtesy meetings 238
stage 213 Craig, Gordon 268, 278
concurrent accreditation 153 cricket diplomacy 619
conference diplomacy 499509 crisis diplomacy 46275
Conference of the Parties (COP) 629 crisis management 234
confidentiality 93, 452 crisis negotiation 97
Confucius Institute 3556 critical approaches 55, 5760
Congress System 232, 269 critical international relations 202
consensus 503; environmental diplomacy 606 Crocker, Chester 418
Constantinou, Costas M. 110, 1327, 30, 31, 32, 401, Crocker, Ryan 329, 330
96, 10910, 134, 136, 1378, 248, 464 Cuban Missile Crisis 82, 84, 93, 95, 97, 214, 264,
construction (or reframing) 213, 214 3223, 457, 458, 464, 471
constructive ambiguity 82, 85 cultural diplomacy 117, 440
constructivism 104, 283, 291 Middle East 393
agency 95 Russia 3424
American diplomacy 3245 cultural internationalism 521
public diplomacy 446 Cultural Revolution 491, 4934
670 INDEX
culturalist approaches 55, 57, 5960 Digital Outreach Team (DOT) 542
culture, diplomatic 10413 digital public diplomacy (DPD) 541, 5467
Curtis, Simon 513, 518 diploma 31, 32, 33
cyber diplomacy 88 Diplomacy 1.0 542, 546
Diplomacy 2.0 542
da Silva, Lula 288 Diplomacy 3.0 548
Dabashi, Hamid 387, 391, 395 diplomatic anxiety 38991
Dalai Lama 356, 404 diplomatic bags 453
dAlembert, Jean le Rond 30, 32 diplomatic community 171
Darnton, Andrew 537 diplomatic corps 31, 32, 17184
David, Steven 4012 institutionalisation 107
Davis, Julian 286 diplomatic credentials 398
Dawes plan 271 diplomatic immunity see immunity
Dayton Accords 327 diplomatic letters 244
de Callires, Franois 15, 106, 107, 108, 172, 189, 243, Diplomatic Lists 179
488, 507 diplomatic recognition 257
de Certeau, Michel 88, 136 diplomatic relations, between states 25767
de Gaulle, Charles 276, 277 Diplomatic Studies 1789
de Holanda, Srgio Buarque 377 diplomatic titles 494
de Klerk, President F. W. 415, 418 diplomatica 31
de Mello, Eduardo Brigidi 288, 289 diplomatique 32, 33
de Tocqueville, Alexis 320, 324, 333 diplomatization 1623
deans 173, 1745 Diplopedia 545
decentralization 163 discovery relations 578
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 47 discursive approaches 88
decoding messages 80 disintermediation 151
defence budgets: Great Powers 275, 276, 277 Disraeli, Benjamin 233
Latin America 376 distribution conflicts 603
defence diplomacy 592 Dittmer, Jason 10413
deforeignisation 67, 75 diversification, developing states 426
del Castillo, Carlos Prez 372 Dizard, Wilson 541
delegated representation 1678 dollar diplomacy 273
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) 595 Doran, Charles 279
democratic corporatism 296 Doty, Roxanne Lynne 58
democratic mirror 289 double agents 96
democratization 438, 447 double anthropology 44
Demosthenes 14 double government 323
Deng Xiaoping 350, 351, 356, 358 double hand 41
don, Chevalier 31 Downer, Alexander 456
Department for International Development (DFID) 74 droit des gens 202
Der Derian, James 40, 41, 44, 45, 48, 96, 1056, 247, Du Plessis, Anton 592
385, 515 du Rosier, Bernard 14
Derbez, Luis Ernesto 373 Dubois, Laurent 478
developed small states 424 Ducher, Gaspard Joseph Amand 34
developing countries, embassies 1512 Duffy, Gavan 248
developing states diplomacy 42334 Dulles, John Foster 83, 86
development, Latin America 3812 Dumas, Alexandre 42, 43
development cooperation 552, 5557 Dunn, David Hastings 23141, 46275
Dewey, John 128 Durrell, Lawrence 175
Dhlakama, Alfonso 417
di Carlo, Giuseppina Scotto 249 e-diplomacy 88
diagnosis stage 21112 Early Modern period, immunity 200
Diana, Princess 5345 Earth Day 604
diaspora, African 400 East Asia Summit (EAS) 341, 596
Diderot, Denis 30, 32, 124 East Asian diplomacy 36171
digital diplomacy 89, 74, 88, 54051 Eaton, Cyrus 6312
INDEX 671
Ebola outbreak 464, 473 English School 945, 104, 105, 106, 108, 127, 1789,
eco-religion 23 283, 655, 657
ecological realism 577, 5878 enlightenment 28, 29, 245, 579
Economic attachs 163 Enloe, Cynthia 99
Economic Commission for Latin America and the enticing opportunity 225
Caribbean (ECLAC) 378 entrepreneurship, EU 315
Economic Community of Central African States Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) 6089
(ECCAS) 40910 environmental diplomacy 60116
Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 409 environmental governance 6078
Economic Community of West African States environmental protection 602
(ECOWAS) 409, 468 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 604
Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) 392 environmental security 426
economic crises 464, 560 epistemic community 6067
economic development 602 equanamitas 14
economic diplomacy 55263 espionage 13940
Africa 402 esprit de corps 311, 315
East Asia 362, 3647 ethics 12332
Russia 3401 lying 459
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia ethnology 24
(ERIA) 366 Ethos of Equality 209
economic sanctions 56, 466, 46970 etymology 29, 30, 313, 36
economics: African diplomacy 401 Euro-Asian Economic Union (EAEU) 339
China 350 Eurocentricism 40, 41, 44, 288, 647
developing states 425, 427 European Coal and Steel Community 308
Latin America 376, see also defence budgets European Economic Community 308
Ecumenical Councils 232 European External Action Service (EEAS) 141, 236,
Edelstam, Harald 94 30913, 361
Eden, Anthony 86, 453, 457 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 393
ediplomacy 541, 542 European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) 631
egotiation 505 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 308
Eight Nation Alliance 269 European Union 63, 689, 30818, 361
Einstein, Albert 628, 632 Africa 409
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 327, 523, 634 agency 100
elderly people 431 Arts 116
Elders Programme 532 Britain 276
electronic media 87 city diplomacy 51516, 517
Elgin Marbles 117 conference diplomacy 499
embassies 14960 consulates 1667, 1689
city diplomacy 51415 crisis diplomacy 470
functions 1578 defence policy 276
immunity 201 developing states 430
new forms 153 diplomatic corps 175, 176, 181
performance enhancement 1556 economic diplomacy 557, 559
virtual 544 language 251
emerging powers 447 Middle East 393
eminent person diplomats 5312 permanent missions 154
Eminent Persons report 419 public diplomacy 441
emotional work 120 Russian diplomacy 3389
emotions 246 small states 296, 2979, 3025
conference diplomacy 503 sports boycotts 619
public opinion 321 summitry 235
encoding messages 80 Europeanisation, EU 314, 31516
encounter relations 578 Evans, Gareth 284, 290
endogeneity 610 Evans Hughes, Charles 271
energy diplomacy, Russia 3412 Evans-Pritchard, 180
Engels, Friedrich 490 everyday diplomacy 23
672 INDEX
Ewin, R. E. 125 free trade areas, Africa 410

exceptionalism 320 French Revolution 187, 201, 202, 489, 4901, 494, 497
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 367 Frey, Linda S. 197206
expatriates 524 Frey, Marsha L. 197206
expeditionary diplomacy 3289 Friedman, Thomas 247
extraordinary rendition program 459 Friendship Treaty 363
extraterritoriality 200, 202 Frigo, Daniela 511
Eysenck, Hans 635 Froman, Michael 323
Fukishima disaster 613
Facebook 99, 541, 5423, 547, 548 Fukuyama, Francis 596
faith-based diplomacy 23, 577, 5846 functionalism 2023
Fanon, Frantz 39, 43, 48 fungibility 273
fantasy 11819
Fdration Internationale de Football Association G8 Summits 231, 277, 288, 327
(FIFA) 622, 625 China 355
Fedoroff, Nina 629 Russian diplomacy 338, 341
Fee, S. 24 G20 Summits 235, 288, 341
Ferdinand, Archduke Franz 454 Brazil criticism 3723, 377
fetial law 199 China 355
Feyerabend, Paul 13 St Petersburg 81
Fick, Carolyn 46 G-77 4289
financial resources, United States 273 Gabriel, Peter 534
Finlay, Robert 511 Gaddafi, Muammar 128, 387, 3934, 404, 408, 467,
First Nations 646 470, 471, 472, 483, 494
Fischer, Fritz 279 Gaddis, John Lewis 325
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence 350 game theory 56, 89, 248, 613
Fletcher, Tom 543 agency 94, 95
Ford, Robert 542 negotiations 213, 214
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) 353 Gandhi, Mahatma 15
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 156, 621, 622 Gates, Robert M. 328
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 427, 430, 564 Geldof, Bob 531, 533, 535, 537
foreign policy 16, 17, 301, 6778, 257 gender: indigenous diplomacy 648
African diplomacy 399 Russian diplomacy 3456
boundary erosion 6971 womens rights 301
crisis diplomacy 463 gender analysis, mediation 227
developing states 4278 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 190, 429
East Asia 3623 Geneva Summit 327, 416
economic diplomacy 553 genres of man 44, 45
Latin America 378, 381 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 140, 610
Twitter 544 George, Alexander 268, 47880, 481
US 320, 322, 3245 Ghandi, Rajiv 417
foreign policy analysis (FPA) 94, 95 gifts 11617
Foreign Policy Concept 338, 339 African diplomacy 399
Foreign Service, developing states 426 Houwangbolai 349
Foreign Service Acts 328 Gilboa, Eytan 282, 285, 286, 54051
Foreign Service Institute 328 Glaspie, April 247
Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) 328 Glennon, Michael J. 323
Forest Diplomacy of the Iroquois 172 Glissant, Edouard 41
formulation stage 21213 Global Compact 73
fortress model 116 global governance 60
Forum of Small States (FOSS) 302 Global Network for Safer Cities (GNSC) 51617
Foucault, Michel 29, 88, 247 Global Peace Index 302
Fox, William T. R. 271 globalisation 68, 74
Franklin, Benjamin 33, 319, 329, 631 business diplomacy 564, 569
Fraser, Malcolm 416, 419 citizen diplomacy 5278
Frederick the Great 476 crisis diplomacy 462
Free Trade Area of the Americas 382 economic diplomacy 552
INDEX 673
EU 314, 31516 high policy 69

public diplomacy 441 Hirohito, Emperor 84
wicked issues 62841 Hirschman, Albert 57
Goldstein, Erik 2323 historicising of history 29
Good Friday Agreement 212, 242 Hitler, Adolf 233
good governance 404 Hobbes, Thomas 455
Goodwill Ambassadors 530, 532, 5334, 5368, 619 Hocking, Brian 6778, 444, 445, 512, 513, 515, 558, 620
Gopin, Marc 525, 526 Holbein the Younger, Hans 118
Gorbachev, Mikhail 236, 274, 325, 336, 337, 457, Holbrooke, Richard 327
4956, 505 holistic approach 445, 446
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission 338 holistic diplomacy 151
Gowan, Richard 468 Homans maxim 21314
Granovetter, Mark 177 homodiplomacy 10910
Great Law of Peace 644, 6478 homogenization 328
Great Power diplomacy 26880 honesty 15
Gregory, Bruce 521, 524, 526, 527 honorary consuls 153
Grotius 200 Houwangbolai 349
Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) program 507 Hu Jintao 355, 3567
guerrilla diplomacy 100 Hudson, Valery 95
Guicciardini, Francesco 15 Huijgh, Ellen 43750
Gulf War 235, 247, 260, 276 Huliaras, Asteris 398413
Gullion, Dean Edmund A. 438 human rights 47
gunboat diplomacy 373 African diplomacy 404, 405, 4067
American diplomacy 325
Haas, Peter 606, 607 celebrity diplomacy 534
Haass, Richard 283 law 251
Habermas, Jrgen 88, 443 sports boycotts 619
Habib, Philip 327 humanistic tradition 137, 138
habitus 112 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 597
Hague, William 545 humanitarian interventions 481, 531, 535
Haigh, Stephen 618, 624 Hurd, Ian 192
Haitian revolution 468 Hurrell, Andrew 657
Hall, E. T. 243 Hussein, Saddam 86, 88, 247, 274, 276, 330, 428, 482
Hall, Martin 95
Hall, Peter 511 Iannone, Pablo 1423
Hall, T. H. 246 ideal policy 481
Halliday, Fred 661, 662 idealism, American diplomacy 324
Hammarskjld, Dag 97, 285 identity: conflicts 603
Hampton, Timothy 118 Middle East 391
Han dynasty 349, 363 Iliad 198
Hardy, Michael 192 immunity 94, 197206, 453
Harriman, Averell 83 diplomatic corps 1745
Harry Potter 119 impartiality, mediation 224
Hart, H. L. A. 1889 impression management 114
Hasbara 392 income volatility 426
Haudenosaunee 644, 645, 6478, 64950 Independent Diplomat 525
Hayden, Craig 547 indigenous diplomacy 64253
headquarters agreement 154 indigenous people 136
health of leaders 4534 aboriginal art 117
Heath, Edward 238 colonialism 44, 45, 46
Heine, Jorge 288, 333, 566 identity conflicts 603
Henrikson, Alan K. 31935 Industrial Revolution 164
Hepburn, Audrey 533 information and communications technology (ICT) 151,
heterology 133, 1368 54051
Hey, Jeanne A. K. 424 institutionalist approaches 314, 316
high commissioners 261 integration: public diplomacy 4446, see also
high culture 115 construction (or reframing)
674 INDEX
integrative diplomacy 315 public diplomacy 442, see also digital diplomacy;
intentionality 80 social media
interests section 265 interstitial organisations 315
intergovernmental organizations 189, 285 intranets 151
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 629 Iran hostage crisis 174, 493, 544, 656, 6612
intermediaries 2645 Iraq War 247, 249, 274, 276, 330, 386, 482, 660
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 248 Iroquois Condolence Council 110
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 330 Irwin, Graham W. 3989
International Commission on Intervention and State Islamic law 493
Sovereignty (ICISS) 286 Islamic religion 580, 581, 583, 5856
International Conference on Human Rights 4067 Islamic State (IS) 623, 462, 467, 468, 471, 472, 497, 547
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 601 Istanbul Water Consensus 516
International Council of Science 631 Italo-Ethiopian War 400
International Criminal Court (ICC) 193, 287, 386, 404, ius gentium 199
420, 470
international crisis 463 Jackson, Steven J. 618, 624
International Crisis Group (ICG) 3923 Jacovides, Andrew 192
International Governmental Organizations (IGOs): Jakobsen, Peter Viggo 47686
celebrity diplomacy 530 James, Alan 238, 25767
conference diplomacy 499500 James, C. L. R. 467
immunity 2045 Jarrett, Mark 271
International Inspiration (II) 621 Jasanoff, S. 135
International Institute on Aging 431 Jay, John 321
International Labour Organization (ILO) 564 Jayasuriya, K. 74
international law 934, 18596 Jazbec, Milan 424
consulates 1645 Jefferson, Thomas 34, 324, 326, 329, 332, 333, 488
immunity 201 Jentleson, B. W. 482, 483
language 251 Jervis, Robert 95
Latin America 376 Jesuits 434
Middle East diplomacy 386 Johnson, Lyndon B. 457, 462
negotiation 209 Johnson, Samuel 301, 33
International Law Association 603 Johnston, Douglas 5789
International Law Commission 150 Jolie, Angelina 534
International Military and Education Training (IMET) 595 Jnsson, Christer 7991, 95, 243
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 355, 417, 430 Jordaan, Eduard 287, 290
International Olympic Committee (IOC) 617, journalism, diplomatic language 252
622, 625 Juncker, Jean-Claude 312
international political economy (IPE) 287 Jung, Dietrich 387, 393
international relations (IR) 1622, 29
agency 946 Kaldor, Mary 225
cities 510, 51213, 519 Kapoor, Ilan 537
citizen diplomacy 522 Katzenstein, P. 296
crisis diplomacy 462 Kaunda, Kenneth 415, 416, 418, 419, 422
culture 104 Kaunitz, Chancellor 489
international recognition 226 Kautilya 149, 282
neorealist theory 269 Kaye, Danny 533
public diplomacy 446 Kennan, George F. 320, 321
relative power 380 Kennedy, John F. 92, 97, 454, 457, 458, 471
religion 577, 579, 587 Kennedy, Robert 458
small states 300 Keohane, Robert 279
International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) 512 Kerekou, Major Mathieu 402
International Whaling Commission 2989 Kerr, Pauline 110, 36171
Internet 88 Kerry, John 330, 541
American diplomacy 3323 Keystone XL pipeline 646
consulates 169 Khanna, Parag 511
economic diplomacy 560 Khatib, Lina 547
embassies 158 Khomeini, Ayatollah 493, 6612
INDEX 675
Khrushchev, Nikita 82, 97, 246, 457 Liddell Hart, Basil 593
Kinter, William 465 lifeworld 889
Kirk, Martin 537 lingua franca 81, 244, 587
Kissinger, Henry 15, 16, 42, 556, 83, 856, 126, 243, 325, Linguet, Simon-Nicolas-Henri 32
327 Lippmann, Walter 245, 443
conference diplomacy 507, 508 Lipson, Leslie 465
Geneva talks 416 Lisbon Treaty 309, 310, 311
Great Powers 279 Litvinov, Maxim 275
ping-pong diplomacy 619 Live Aid 532, 533, 535, 537
secrecy 455 living letter 125
time pressure 466 living systems 23
knowledge 13346 lobbying, American diplomacy 331
co-production 1346 Locarno Pact 271
knowledge-management theories 140 Lock-Pullan, Richard 23141
Komori, Yasumasa 366 Loeffler, Jane 116
Korean War 350, 363 Logan Act (1799) 522
Kornprobst, Markus 5466 Logan, George 522
Koselleck, Reinhart 2930, 32, 34 Lom Conventions 308
Kozyrev, Andrei 337 London & Partners 51415
Kreamer, C. M. 24 longue dure 3857, 510
Kuokkanen, Rauna 648 Lose, Lars 889
Kurbalija, J. 135, 140 Louisiana Purchase 326
Kuznets, Simon 424 low policy 69
Kyoto Protocol 214, 605, 633 loyalty 12430
Luo, Y. 564, 567
Lahore Summit 234 Luttwak, Edward 579
Lakota Nation 646 lying 459
Lancaster House Conference 238
landmines 286, 441, 5345 Maastricht Treaty 276, 308, 313
language 24254 Macedonian crisis 176
Akkadian 81, 244 Machel, President 416, 417
Aramaic 81, 244 Machiavelli, Niccol 15, 106, 1256, 138, 278, 282,
shared meaning 81, 82, 244 295, 500
Sumerian 81, see also communication Machiavellian strategy
laptop ambassadors 153, 158 Macmillan, Harold 414
Las Casas, Bartolom de 44, 45, 46 Macmillan, Margaret 2323
Latin America hybrid approach 379 Madison, James 321
Latin American diplomacy 37284 Magalhes, Jos Calvet De 3940, 41
Latour, Bruno 24, 142 Magliveras, Konstantinos 398413
Laurent, Franois 202 Mahabharata 21
Lavrov, Sergey 340, 342 Mahan, Captain Alfred Thayer 324
law see international law Major, John 337
Law of the Sea Convention 632 Maley, William 45161
Leader, Joyce 107 managerialism 156
League of Nations 4950, 188, 191, 501 Mandela, Nelson 404, 415, 417, 418, 41920, 617
Ethiopia 400 Mao Zedong 350, 351, 491
formation 271, 295 market power, US 274
Haudenosaunee mission 645, 64950 Marks, Leonard 541
proposals 282 Marshall Aid 273
Soviet Union 275 Mason, George 33
Lee, D. 569 Mazrui, Ali 489
Lee, Taedong 513 Mbeki, Thabo 404, 407, 419, 420, 421, 422
legations 149 McCann, Colum 242
Leira, Halvard 2838, 1612 McCarthy, Joseph R. 319
Lennox, Annie 534 McConnell, Fiona 10413
Leopold, King 48 McDonald, John W. 521, 523, 524, 15
liberation geography 387 McLaughlin, C. 24
676 INDEX
McNamara, J. 566 Modern era 2013

McNamara, Robert 464 modernity, Middle East 389, 390, 391, 393, 394
meansends method 15 Mogherini, Federica 310, 312
Mearsheimer, John 2789 Molotov, Viatcheslav 492
media: celebrity diplomacy 530 Monroe Doctrine 324, 373
D-notices 452 Monroe, James 326
diplomatic language 252 Morales, Evo 376
hubs, American diplomacy 332 morality 15
Russian diplomacy 343 Moravcsik, Andrew 56
media diplomacy 87, 119 Morgenthau, H. J. 16, 17, 556, 1878, 476
Mediated Modeling (MM) 60910 Morris, Gouverneur 33
mediation 22030; crisis diplomacy 4701 Moscow Conference 272
formal and informal 221 motivational ripeness 225
timing and success definition 2256 Mugabe, Robert 404, 415, 416, 41718, 420
mediators 97 Muldoon, J. P. J. 567, 570
Medieval diplomatic thought 14, 30 Mullen, Mike 595
Medvedev, President 342 multilateral arrangements, consulates 168
Meerts, Paul 499509 multilateral bargaining 211
Megoran, N. 110 multilateral diplomacy: China 353, 3545
Melissen, Jan 523, 531, 566 East Asia 362, 3647
Mercosur 374, 377, 3812 language 81
Merke, Federico 375, 377 multilateralism: African diplomacy 40510
Merry, Anthony 329 developing states 427, 431
Messengers of Peace 534, 538 middle powers 284, 287, 288, 291
meta-theory 3, 105 military diplomacy 5967
metropolitan diplomacy 40, 45 multinational national corporations (MNCs), business
Metternich, Klemens von 232, 26970 diplomacy 56474
Mexican Water Treaty 205 multipolarity, balanced/unbalanced 279
microstates 424, 4278, 429 multi-stakeholder diplomacy 309, 31415, 316
Middle Ages, immunity 199200 Munich Olympic Games 624
Middle East diplomacy 38597 Murphy, Robert M. 329
middle power diplomacy 28193 Murray, Stuart 61727
Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) 286 music 11617
migration 623 Mussolini, Benito 400, 454
MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, (South)Korea, Turkey and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 325
Australia) 447 mutually enticing outcome (MEO) 210
military diplomacy 368, 427, 591600 mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) 210, 225
military force: coercive diplomacy 47686 mytho-diplomacy 14
crisis diplomacy 4712
Military Industrial Complex 634 Napoleonic Wars 2689
Millennium Development Goals 287 Nartey, L. J. 570
Millennium Summit 327 Nasheed, Mohamed 426
Miller, Benjamin 279 Nasser, President Gamal Abd-El 86, 391, 392
mimicry 112 Natarajan, Kalathmika 5467
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 534 national cultures 104
Mingxing, Yang 252 National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC)
minimal agreeing formula 213 352
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 745, 430 national diplomatic system (NDS) 745, 558
Arts 11516, 117 National Security Council (NSC) 322
economic diplomacy 5589 nationalism, US 320
embassies 1556 native communities 24
intranets 151 natural disasters 426, 608, 613
Russian diplomacy 337, 340, 3416 natural law theory 201
Mitchell, C. 225 Navari, Cornelia 7, 26880
Mitzen, Jennifer 245 Nazi Germany, looting of paintings 117
Mobutu Sese Seko, President 402 Ndebele state 49
modern diplomacy 279 near-symmetry 209
INDEX 677
negative sovereignty 401 non-resident missions 2612, 263

negotiation 79, 20719 non-state public diplomacy 4423, 4456, see also
agency 97 citizen diplomacy
conference diplomacy 499509 nonverbal communication: technology 88, see also
crisis diplomacy 4701 body language
structure 21011 normative power 315
negotiation theorists 104 normative theory 61
negotium 1415 middle powers 281, 2823, 284, 28690
neighbourhood diplomacy 313 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 382
neo-conservative policy think tanks 104 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 276, 441,
neoliberalism 381, 404 465, 467, 471, 472, 593, 596
neopatrimonialism 403 Prague summit 81
neorealist theory 269 Russian diplomacy 338
network diplomacy 333, 525 novels 115, 118
Russian 33940 nuclear diplomacy 273, 274, 276, 325, 367
Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) 366 nuclear disarmament 284
network governance 6078 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 284, 287
networks: business diplomacy 566 Numelin, Ragnar 23
consular 163 nuncius 125
digital diplomacy 548 Nurmi, Maria 546
embassies 153 Nye, Joseph 283, 355, 391, 440, 531, 533
foreign policy 723 Nyerere, Julius 401, 415, 416, 418
Neumann, Iver B. 21, 22, 41, 88, 106, 108, 110, 11422,
141, 143, 1612, 250, 3867, 390, 392, 3934 Obama, Barack 7, 81, 83, 290, 323, 325, 330, 332, 547
New Agenda Coalition 284 Obasanjo, Olusegun 419, 420, 422
New Development Bank (NDB) 354, 355 objectivity, mediation 2256
new diplomacy 346; colonialism 49 Oest, Kajsa Ji Noe 427
New International Economic Order (NIEO) 405 official development assistance (ODA) 284, 427
new international security agenda (NISA) 69, 70 official secrets 452
New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) Oglesby, Donna Marie 24254
404, 407, 421 oil industry, Middle East diplomacy 386, 391
New York City Global Partners, Inc. 515 Okano-Heijmans, Maaike 55263
Newton, Isaac 631 Olympic Games 618, 619, 622
Nice Treaty 308, 309 ONeill, Thomas P. 331
niche diplomacy 285 ontological insecurity 283
Nicolson, Harold 40, 41, 47, 67, 155, 207, 454, 457, 488 open diplomacy 4545
Nietzsche, F. 30 Open Door Policy 324
Nixon, Richard 856, 325, 327, 350, 455, 458, 619 openness, developing states 427
Nkomo, Joshua 415, 416 Operation Iraqi Freedom 4278
Nkrumah, Kwame 414 Opium Wars 349
non-action 85 Opondo, Sam Okoth 3953
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 414, 417, 418 Oppenheim, Lassa 179, 189
non-diplomatic offices 265 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 4001, 4058, 414
non-government organizations (NGOs): business Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
diplomacy 5645, 567, 573 Development (OECD) 284, 514, 561
celebrity diplomacy 530, 531, 534 Organization of American States 154, 373
crisis diplomacy 471 General Assembly 378
economic diplomacy 555 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
international law 1934 (OPEC) 391
language 251 Organski, A. F. K. 269
Middle East 392, 395 Oriental Academy 507
middle powers 286 Orwell, George 243, 617
permanent missions 154 Other 133, 1378, 391
Russian diplomacy 343 Ottawa Convention 285
non-professionals 158 Ottoman Empire 270, 388, 38990
non-redundancy 82 African diplomacy 398, 399
non-resident ambassadors 153, 158 outsourcing, consulates 16970
678 INDEX
Owen, David 416, 453 Pigman, Geoffrey 5312, 533, 622, 625
Oyo Empire 399 ping-pong diplomacy 350, 364, 619
Ozawa, C. P. 609 Pinheiro-Ferreira, Silvestre 202
Plaza Accord 277
Paal, Douglas 362 plenipotentiary action 150
Pace, Roderick 424 Plischke, Elmer 39, 237
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) 366 pluralism 190; religion 578, 587
Paine, Thomas 33, 324 Podany, A. H. 244
paintings 11415, 116, 117, 118 politics 301
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 392, 406 politics of attraction 531
Palestinian Authority 193 polylateral diplomacy 286, 512
Palit, A. 364, 365, 366 polylateralism 442
Palmerston, Lord 87, 97 Pomorska, Karolina 311
Panetta, Leon 596 Ponte, Stefano 5367
Panitchpakdi, Supachai 372 popular culture 115, 11820
Pankin, Boris 337 popular diplomacy, Middle East 3913
papal diplomatic corps 1712, 173 popular front movements 274
paradiplomacy 74, 511, 512, 51415 positionality 581
Pardo, Arvid 430 positive-sum agreements 213, 214
Parents Circle Family Forum (PCFF) 585 positivism 201
pariah diplomacy 65465 postcolonial diplomacy 396
Paris peace conference 231, 2323, 235, 327, 501, postcolonialism: Africa 400, 404
5045 return of objects 117
Parisi, Laura 648 postmodern eclecticism 70
parliamentary diplomacy 186 post-positivism 96, 248
Partial Nuclear Test Ban 83 postsecular approach 579
participatory democracy 286, 438 post-structuralism, agency 94, 96
Participatory Modeling (PM) 609 Potsdam Conference 327
partnership bilateralism 3534, 358 Pouliot, Vincent 97
Pasarin, Ana Mar F. 16170 poverty: developing states 427
Pasteur, Louis 633 SantEgidio 585
peace agreements 208 Powell, Colin 542
implementation 2256 power: China 353, 3556
quality and durability 226, 227 conference diplomacy 5056
secrecy 455, see also mediation; negotiation EU 314, 31516
Peace of Westphalia 125, 136 middle power democracy 28193
peace spoilers 2245 negotiations 207, 209, 211
peace treaties 2723 relative 380
peace-building: environmental 61012 structural 3801, see also soft power
middle powers 285, 291 power cycle theory 279
peace-keeping, Great Powers 2689 power relations, mediation 224
peace-making 97 power sharing, consuls 165
Pearl Harbor 321, 349 practice theory 956, 250
Pecquet, Antoine 31, 172 practice turn 94, 956, 110
ple mle rule 329 practicetheory nexus 24, 89
Peloponnesian War 281, 476 praetor peregrinus 162
people-to-people contact 524 pragmatic multilateralism 354
Peres, Shimon 392 Prebisch, Ral 378
perestroika 336, 338 precautionary principle 6056
performative aspect 21 preventive diplomacy 593
Permanent Court of International Justice 188 principal mediation 2224
permanent missions 14960, 163 principal-agent theory 95
personalization 99, 101 Principle 21 605
Peter, Tsar 336 private sector, economic diplomacy 555
photography 120 proactive diplomacy, China 353, 3567
phron e sis 12830 problem-solving see construction (or reframing);
Picq, Manuela 647, 648 negotiation
INDEX 679
process analysis 279; negotiations 21115 ecological 577, 5878

Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) program 507 Great Powers 2789
Product RED 533, 535, 5367, 538 mediation 222
professionalization 989, 139, 158, 331, 3856 microstates 427
consuls 162 secrecy 454
culture 1079 small states 296
propaganda 438, 440, 495 Realpolitik 59, 135, 579, 649
propaganda war 99 reciprocity, American diplomacy 324
prostatai 161 Reconciliation Walk 110
protecting power 263, 265 reflection-in-action 2, 12830
protocol 834 reflective thinking 128
diplomatic corps 174 refugees 623
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 329 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
proxemics 86 (RCEP) 362, 3646
proxenoi 1612, 522 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 40910
Pruitt, D. 225 regional integration 429
psychoanalysis 24 Regional Integration Agreements (RIA) 429
public diplomacy 73, 150, 362, 43750, 495, 526, 643 regionalism, Latin America 381
celebrity 530, 531 Reinsch, Paul 35
digital 540, 541, 5467 relative power 380
Russia 3424 religion 23, 57790
science 629, 632 African diplomacy 399
public sphere 394 colonialism 424
public-private partnerships 286 culture 1056, 10910
Puchala, Donald 2878 Middle East 393
Pugwash Conference 632 Russian diplomacy 336, 342
pure mediation 2224 summitry 232
Putin, Vladimir 81, 84, 275, 341, 342, 345, 536 religious culture 580
Putnam, Hillary 1278 remoteness, developing states 425
Putnam, Robert D. 95, 248 Renaissance 118, 136
immunity 200
Qian Qichen 351 RENAMO 212, 417
Qin dynasty 3489 Repo, Jemima 537
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review representations 120
(QDDR) 328 resident missions 261, 2623
Quadruple Alliance 2689 resilience, developing states 427
quiet diplomacy 45161 resolving formula 213
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 286, 2889, 419, 421,
Rabin, Yitzhak 83 467, 472
radio: Middle East 392 Responsibility While Protecting (RwP) 289
public diplomacy 440 Revisionism, pariah diplomacy 6613
Russian diplomacy 343 revolutionary diplomacy 48798
raison de systme 7, 19, 126, 178, 488 Rice, Condoleezza 331, 542
raison dtat 15, 19, 42, 126, 136, 138, 178, 452, 578 Rich, Norman 278
Ramphal, Shridath 416 Richardson, James 463, 4656
Rana, Kishan 14960, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 249, Richelieu, Cardinal 15, 40, 423, 45, 126, 20910, 507
252, 524 Richey, Lisa 5367
Ranke, Leopold von 31 Richmond, Oliver 226
rational actor model 422 right of legation 49
rational choice 55, 56, 589, 60 Rio Declaration 605
negotiations 209 Rio Summit 601, 606, 632
rationalism 245 Riordan, Shaun 106
rationalist game theory see game theory ripeness 210, 225, 582
re-encounter relations 578 Risse, T. 284
reactive diplomacy, China 353, 3567 Rogers Act (1924) 163, 328
Reagan, Ronald 325, 505 Rogers, Thorold 34
realism: American diplomacy 324 Romans 199, 200
680 INDEX
Rome Treaty 308 security diplomacy, East Asia 362, 3678

Roosevelt, Franklin D. 233, 324, 327, 332, 4534, 458 security point 207, 210, 211, 212, 214
Roosevelt, Theodore 326, 476 Seib, P. 441, 526
Root, Elihu 35 Seitz, Raymond 236
Ross, Alec 333 Selassie, Haile 400, 402
Rossotrudnichestvo 3423 semiotics 89
Rostow, Eugene 1901 Seneca 14
Rowland, Tiny 417, 421 Sennett, Richard 23
Roy, Stapleton 246 September 11th 166, 321, 373, 393, 482
Royal Society 631 digital diplomacy 5412
Royal Strategic Studies Centre (RISSC) 5856 pariah diplomacy 660
Rul, Huub 56476 public diplomacy 441
Ruggie, John G. 93 Seplveda, Gins de 44
Rumsfeld, Donald 661 serial summits 239
Russell, Bertrand 632 Svres syndrome 390
Russian National Committee for Pacific Economic Shanghai Cooperation Organization 277, 340, 354
Cooperation (RNCPEC) 341 Sharp, Paul 110, 1327, 945, 99, 104, 105, 106, 108,
Russian post-Soviet diplomacy 33647 17184, 245, 246, 495, 507, 525, 526, 527, 5778, 587
Ryswyck Congress 232 Shaw, Bernard 187
Shaw, Karena 649
Sabanin, Andrei 494 Shevardnadze, Eduard 3367, 496
sacred texts 582 Shils, Edward 452
Sadat, Anwar 84, 87 shuttle diplomacy 234, 394, 395, 416
Said, Edward 40, 51 side effects 15
Saint Domingue slaves 468 signalling 7991, 266
SALT I 234 signature buildings 11516
SALT II 237 silence 80, 82
Salzburg Initiative 607 silent diplomacy 404
Sampson, Cynthia 578, 579 Simon, Herbert 56
San Francisco Conference 81, 249, 272, 327, 501, 523 Simpson, Gerry 272
sanctions 273, 278, 466, 46970 Single European Act (SEA 1986) 308
Saner, R. 5645, 566, 570 Sister Cities International 515
SantEgidio 585 Six Day War 84
Sasser, James 620 Skinner, Quentin 29
Satow, Ernest 1, 108, 137, 179, 189, 488, 6245 slavery 44, 45, 468, 400
Schachter, O. 605 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 302, 425, 426
Schelling, Thomas 84, 478, 47981 small state diplomacy 294307
Schengen Agreement 169 Small Vulnerable Economies 425
Schn, Donald A. 128 smart sanctions 46970
Schuman plan 276 Smith, Ian 401
Schwarz, David 465 Smith, Michael 30818
Schweller, Randall 249 Smuts, Jan 271, 282
science diplomacy (SD) 62841 Sochi Winter Olympics 6234
science fiction 11819 social class 1079
science and technology (S&T) 62835 social justice 602
Scott, Biljana 247 social media 88, 99, 526
Scott, James C. 251 celebrity diplomacy 530
Scott, Norman 250 knowledge 140
Searle, John R. 2489 public diplomacy 442, see also digital diplomacy;
secrecy 13940 Facebook; Twitter
secret diplomacy 45161, 511 social power 301
security: collective 269 Socrates 14
developing states 4256 Sofer, Sasson 107, 109, 127
environmental 426 soft power 283, 287
foreign policy 69 celebrity diplomacy 531, 533
summits 231 China 3556
INDEX 681
EU 311, 315; structural diplomacy 313, 314, 315

Middle East 391 structural power 3801
public diplomacy 4401 structuralism 287
science 628, 629 Stubb, Alexander 83
Solidarity 12930 subjectivity, mediation 225
solidarity diplomacy 289 sublime diplomacy 3935
South American Defence Council 377 Suez crisis 457
South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) Suez War 86
405, 418 Sugihara, Chiune 94
South-South Cooperation 289 Sumerian language 81
Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit diplomacy 72, 327
289, 415, 419, 421 summitry 23141, 51516
Southern African diplomacy 41422 Sun Tzu 591
sovereignty 186, 2023 sunk costs 89
China 354 superpowers 271, see also Great Power diplomacy
consuls 166 Susskind, Lawrence 602, 607
crisis diplomacy 467 sustainable development 404, 606, 613
indigenous diplomacy 647 sustainable diplomacy 23
language 247 Svensson, Isak 223
Middle East 389 symbiosis 1378
negative 401 symbolic power 99
Treaty of Westphalia 501 symmetry/asymmetry: American diplomacy 325
SpanishAmerican War 324 mediation 224
special missions 14960, 2623, 265, 327 negotiations 209
Speth, J. Gustave 604, 606
Spies, Yolanda 28193 tact 108
spirituality 10910 Tafari, Ras see Selassie, Haile
sports diplomacy 61727 Talleyrand-Prigord, Charles Maurice de 126, 493
version 2.0 6203, 626 Tan, See Seng 368, 591600
sports envoys 61920, 625 targeted sanctions 278
stakeholder relationships 73 Taylor, A. J. P. 269, 278
Stalin, Joseph 2745, 327 Taylor, Ian 405
Star Trek 119 Taylor, Ken 174
statecraft 16, 18, 40, 42, 5466, 133, 137, 13841 Taylor, Peter 511
Arthashastra 149 techne 412
religion 23 technology: agency 97, 98
status quo powers 65961 American diplomacy 3323
Stearns, Monteagle 326 communication 878
Steger, U. 566 conference diplomacy 505
Steiner, George 246, 250 consulates 1689
Stengers, Isabelle 142 digital diplomacy 54051
Stern, Sheldon M. 457 espionage 140
Stetter, Stephan 38597 knowledge 133, 135
Stevens, J. Christopher 331 public diplomacy 4412, 445
Stockholm Conference 6046, 612 Russian diplomacy 343
Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes summits 2345, 240
(SIPRI) 376 television 878, 119, 392
Strange, Susan 380, 565 terrorism 495
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 325 American diplomacy 321
strategic denial 428 consulates 168
strategic diplomacy 313, 314 consuls 166
strategic multilateralism 3545 crisis diplomacy 462
strategic partnerships, China 354 envoy immunity 205
strategic political management (SPM) 567, 568 foreign policy 69
strategy 15, 5466 Islamic State 623, 462, 467, 468, 471, 472, 497
without strategist 58 Munich Olympic Games 624
682 INDEX
secrecy 456 city diplomacy 51617, 518

social media 547 creation 249
War on Terror 373, 441, 4823, 6601, see also crisis diplomacy 465, 4679
September 11th developing states 423, 426, 4289, 4301
Teton Sioux Nation Treaty Council 6456 diplomatic relations 2601, 262
Thatcher, Margaret 236, 237, 416 environmental diplomacy 606, 607
theater metaphor 88 GNSC 51617
theoria 134 Goodwill Ambassadors 530, 532, 5334, 5368
Third World small states 424 Handbook 285
Thomas, Scott 578, 584 indigenous diplomacy 6434, 646, 649, 6501
Thorhallsson, Baldur 294307 language 246
Thucydides 281, 295, 476 legal staff 189
Tickner, Arlene 3789, 380 Middle East 393, 396
Todorov, Tzvetan 45 peace-keeping forces 298, 301
Tordesillas Treaty 375 peace-making 97
Total Strategy 417, 418 permanent missions 153
tourism, Middle East 393 religion 585
Toussaint Louverture, Franois-Dominique 46 Russian diplomacy 343
Touval, Saadia 222, 224 Secretary-General 285
trade agreements, East Asia 3645 small states 294, 296, 297302
trade diplomacy 552, 5557, 560 summitry 235
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 323 Trusteeship Council 295
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 323, 362, 3646 Twitter 545
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) United Nations Charter 50, 1901, 220, 272, 278, 407
323, 366 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) 532, 533
transculturation 42 United Nations Conference on Disarmament 286
transformational diplomacy 331, 542 United Nations Conference on Environment and
transitional justice 394 Development (UNCED) 601, see also Rio Summit
transnational diplomacy 3923 United Nations Conference on Human Environment 604
transnational networks 286 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
treaties of Capitulations 164 (UNCLOS) 430
triangular diplomacy 325 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Troppau Congress 269 (UNCTAD) 424, 4289, 564
Trotsky, 491, 492, 494 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 62, 3945
Trouillot, Michel Rolph 47 United Nations Economic and Social Council
Truman, Harry 327 (ECOSOC) 343
Tsaliki, Lisa 532 United Nations Education Science and Culture
Tsvangirai, Morgan 420 Organization (UNESCO) 352, 406, 534
twinning relationships 322 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 601,
Twitter 88, 99, 541, 543, 5445, 548 604, 612, 613
Two Row Wampum treaty 645, 647 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Tyler, Melissa Conley 5219 Change (UNFCCC) 4089, 523, 602
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 249, 405, 4069
unanimity 503 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Ungerer, C. 284, 285, 290 (UNHCR) 395, 532, 533
Union of South American Nations (Unasur) 382 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 395
United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) 514 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 63, 188, 191,
United Front 2745 249, 282, 289, 295, 301, 408, 419, 428, 468, 502
United Nations 96 conference diplomacy 506
Africa 404, 405, 406, 407, 410 Resolution 1325 227
American diplomacy 3245 United States Agency for International Development
Australian membership 117 (USAID) 74, 328
beginnings 272, 327, 5012 United States Enhanced Border Security Act (2002) 168
Britain 276 United States Foreign Commercial Service 163
celebrity diplomacy 530 United States Information Agency (USIA) 440
China 3567, 358 United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) 596, 597
INDEX 683
United StatesRussia Bilateral Presidential Commission 338 Webster, Noah 33

universalism 336 Wellman, David 23, 57790
urbanism 511, see also city diplomacy West, Rebecca 689
Uribe, Alvaro 376 Westphalia Treaty 232, 501, 504, 511, 578
Ustinov, Peter 533 Wheeler, Mark 5309
utilitarianism 281, 290 whole-of-government approach 329
whole-of-society approach 325
value conflicts 602 Whytock, C. A. 482, 483
van der Merwe, H. W. 418 wicked issues 6970
van Ham, P. 70 Wicquefort, Abraham 125
Vanhoonacker, Sophie 311 Wight, Martin 186, 190, 578
Vattel, Emmerich de 125, 201 WikiLeaks 88, 140, 459, 547
Vyrynen, Raimo 428 Williams, Jody 523, 526, 527
Vedrine, Hubert 99 Williams, Phil 71, 463, 4645
verbal skills 802 Wilmer, Franke 649
Verona Congress 269 Wilson, President Woodrow 233, 270, 324, 327, 332,
Versailles Treaty 271, 453, 455 453, 455
vicarii 125 Wiseman, Geoffrey 104, 105, 17184, 247, 286, 512,
Victoria Falls Conference 416 526, 531
video games 119 Wittgenstein, L. 5
Vienna Congress 107, 136, 220, 231, 269, 501 Wivel, Anders 427
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) wives of diplomats 99
94, 14950, 153, 164, 165, 169, 192, 2589, Wolfe, Tom 329
4389, 476 Wolters, Tim 56476
espionage 139 Workman, Thom 648
immunity 2034 World Bank: Africa 404
Vienna Rglement (1815) 172, 173 China 355
Vienna Treaty 269, 271 developing states 424
Vietnam War 323, 462, 463, 479 World Commission on Environment and Development
virtual embassies 544 (WCED) 606
Virtual Student Foreign Service 543 World Council of Churches (WCC) 5845
Visa Information System (VIS) 168 World Cup 617, 618, 619, 622, 625
visas, consulates 166, 167, 1689 world diplomacy 23
Vital, David 424 World Fair (Paris) 389, 390
Vladich, Helena Voinov 60116 World Health Organization (WHO) 533
Volkan, V. D. 24 World Trade Center attacks see September 11th
von Clausewitz, Carl 282 World Trade Organization (WTO) 190
von Ribbentrop, Joachim 126 Africa 404
voodoo 46 business diplomacy 564
voting, conference diplomacy 503 China 352, 358
vulnerability, developing states 4245, 427 developing states 424, 425, 429
East Asia 364, 365
Wagman, Ira 538 economic diplomacy 557, 561
Wallerstein, Immanuel 391 Paraguay 37980
Walsh, Sinead 251 Russia 341
Walsingham, Sir Francis 452 World War I 390, 438, 440, 454, see also Paris peace
Waltz, Kenneth 269, 463 conference
Wang Yi 357 World War II 2713, 328, 452
war criminals 225 Wright, Jonathan 134
Warring States period 348, 350 Wriston, Henry M. 328
Washington Conference 271 Wu Jianmin 353
Washington, President George 323, 324 Wynter, Sylvia 44
Watson, Adam 7, 67, 123, 126, 176, 177, 178, 191 Xi Jinping 83, 355, 357, 358
way out (WO) 210
Weber, Cynthia 58 Yalta conference 272, 4534
Weber, Max 379 Yao Ming 61920
684 INDEX
Yates, William 457 Zhang, Juyan 546

Yeltsin, Boris 337 Zhang, Qingmin 620, 621
Yom Kippur War 845 Zhou dynasty 348, 363
Young, Andrew 416 Zhou Enlai 83, 85, 234, 350, 351
Young, John 238, 239 Zionist movement 387, 390
Yrjl, Riina 537 Zoellick, Robert 3723, 377
zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) 212, 213
Zarakol, Ayse 288 Zonova, Tatiana 33647
Zartman, I. William 20719, 222, 224, 225 Zuma, Jacob 290, 404, 41920, 421
zero-sum agreements 213

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The SAGE Handbook of

Michele Acuto, University College London

At SAGE we take sustainability seriously.

Introduction: Understanding diplomatic practice 1

PART I DIPLOMATIC CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 11

1 Theoretical perspectives in diplomacy 13

2 A conceptual history of diplomacy 28

3 Diplomacy and the colonial encounter 39

4 Statecraft, strategy and diplomacy 54

5 Diplomacy and foreign policy 67

6 Diplomacy, communication and signaling 79

8 Diplomatic culture 104

9 Diplomacy and the arts 114

10 Diplomatic ethics 123

11 Diplomatic knowledge 133

PART II DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONS 147

12 Embassies, permanent missions and special missions 149

13 Consulates and consular diplomacy 161

14 The diplomatic corps 171

15 Diplomacy and international law 185

16 Diplomatic immunity 197

17 Diplomacy and negotiation 207

18 Diplomatic mediation 220

19 Diplomatic summitry 231

20 Diplomatic language 242

PART III DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 255

21 Diplomatic relations between states 257

22 Great power diplomacy 268

23 Middle power diplomacy 281

24 Small state diplomacy 294

25 European Union diplomacy 308

26 American diplomacy 319

27 Russian post-Soviet diplomacy 336

28 Chinas diplomacy 348

29 Diplomacy in East Asia 361

30 Latin American diplomacy 372

31 Middle East diplomacy 385

32 African diplomacy 398

33 Southern African diplomacy 414

34 Developing states diplomacy 423

PART IV TYPES OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 435

35 Public diplomacy 437

36 Quiet and secret diplomacy 451

37 Crisis diplomacy 462

38 Coercive diplomacy 476

39 Revolutionary diplomacy 487

40 Conference diplomacy 499

41 City diplomacy 510

42 Citizen diplomacy 521

43 Celebrity diplomacy 530

44 Digital diplomacy 540

45 Economic diplomacy 552

46 Business diplomacy 564

47 Religion and diplomacy 577

48 Military diplomacy 591

49 Environmental diplomacy 601

50 Sports diplomacy 617

51 Science diplomacy 628

52 Indigenous diplomacy 642

53 Pariah diplomacy 654

1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN DIPLOMACY COSTAS M. CONSTANTINOU AND

2. A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY HALVARD LEIRA

3. DIPLOMACY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER SAM OKOTH OPONDO

4. STATECRAFT, STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY MARKUS KORNPROBST

Introduction: Understanding diplomatic practice 1

38.1 Conceptual overview 478

4.1 Five perspectives on statecraft, strategy and diplomacy 55

38.1 Schellings five conditions for coercive (compellence) success 479