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ANSWERS TO BAR

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
IN
CRIMINAL LAW
ARRANGED BY TOPIC

(1975 2003)

Edited and Arranged by:

Janette Laggui-Icao and Alex


Andrew P. Icao
(Silliman University College of Law)

From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN


CRIMINAL LAW by the UP LAW COMPLEX

July 26, 2005

Page 1 of 374
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are recipients of deliberately distorted notes from other unscrupulous law schools and

students. Share to others this work and you will be richly rewarded by God in heaven. It

is also very good karma.

We would like to seek the indulgence of the reader for some Bar Questions

which are improperly classified under a topic and for some topics which are

improperly or ignorantly phrased, for the authors are just Bar Reviewees who have

prepared this work while reviewing for the Bar Exams under time constraints and

within their limited knowledge of the law. We would like to seek the readers

indulgence for a lot of typographical errors in this work.

The Authors July

26, 2005
Table of Contents
Preliminary Title............................................................................................................1
Art 2; General principles....................................................................................7
Felonies..........................................................................................................................14
Art 3; Definitions.............................................................................................14
Art 4; Criminal Liability..................................................................................19
Art 6; Stages of execution................................................................................26
Art 7; Light felonies.........................................................................................29
Art 8; Conspiracy.............................................................................................30
Justifying & Exempting Circumstances................................................................39
Art 11; Justifying circumstances......................................................................39
Art 12; Exempting circumstances....................................................................55
Mitigating Circumstances......................................................................................... 62
Aggravating Circumstances......................................................................................70
Alternative Circumstances........................................................................................85
Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies.................................................................86
Art 16; Degree of participation........................................................................86
Art 19; Accessories..........................................................................................94
Anti-fencing law..............................................................................................96
Penalties.......................................................................................................................102
Penalties.........................................................................................................102
Indeterminate Sentence Law..........................................................................111
Probation Law................................................................................................116
Art 29; Destierro............................................................................................ 125
Art 29; Preventive imprisonment...................................................................126
Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment...................................................................127
Art 45; Confiscation.......................................................................................128
Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; crimes punishable.............................................128
Art 48; Aberratio ictus/ error in personae/ prater intentionem.......................130
Art 48; Complex crimes.................................................................................133
Art 49; Error in personae...............................................................................139
Art 62; Habitual delinquency.........................................................................141
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors.........................................................143
Extinction of Criminal Liability............................................................................149
Art 89; Corporate officers..............................................................................149
Art 89; Novation............................................................................................149
Art 89; Death of accused/ offended party......................................................150
Art 89; Payment.............................................................................................152
Art 89; Pardon................................................................................................153
Art 90; Prescription of crimes........................................................................154
Civil Liability.............................................................................................................162
Art 100; Effect of acquittal............................................................................162
Art 101; Persons liable for acts committed by minor or insane.....................162
Art 102; Subsidiary liability; inkeepers/ employers......................................162
Art 104; Civil liability; components..............................................................164
Art 104; Civil liability; restitution.................................................................165
Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal......................................................165
Crimes Against National Security and the Law of Nations............................168
Art 122; Piracy...............................................................................................168
Art 123; Qualified piracy...............................................................................168
Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State.......................................... 170
Art 124; Arbitrary detention..........................................................................170
Art 125; Delay in the delivery of detained persons.......................................171
Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling..................................171
Art 129; Unjust procurement of search warrant............................................ 172
Crimes Against Public Order................................................................................. 174
Art 134; Rebellion......................................................................................... 174
Art 134-A; Coup detat.................................................................................. 177
Art 136; Conspiracy to commit rebellion......................................................178
Art 141; Conspiracy to commit sedition........................................................178
Art 146; Illegal Assembly..............................................................................179
Art 148; Direct assault...................................................................................180
Art 151; Resistance and disobedience...........................................................187
Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail........................................................188
Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence........................................................191
Art 160; Quasi-recidivism..............................................................................191
Crimes against Public Interest............................................................................... 193
Art 164; Mutilation of coins; bills excluded..................................................193
Art 168; Illegal possession of false notes......................................................193
Art 169 & 171; Forgery & falsification.........................................................193
Art 171; Falsification of public documents..................................................194
Art 172; Use of falsified documents..............................................................198
Art 177; Usurpation of Official Functions.....................................................199
Art 181; False testimony................................................................................199
Art 183; Perjury............................................................................................. 200
Art 184; Subornation of perjury.....................................................................202
Art 200; Grave scandal..................................................................................203
Art 201; Obscene publications.......................................................................203
Crimes Committed by Public Officers.................................................................204
Art 203; Public Officers.................................................................................204
Art 208; Maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution........................204
Art 210; Bribery.............................................................................................205
Art 211; Indirect bribery.................................................................................209
Art 213; Frauds against the public treasury...................................................209
Art 213; Illegal exaction................................................................................211
Art 217; Malversation.................................................................................... 211
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners.....................................................218
Art 226; Removal of documents....................................................................221
Crimes Against Persons...........................................................................................223
Art 246; Parricide...........................................................................................223
Art 247; Death & Physical injuries under exceptional circumstances 225 Art 248; Murder228
Art 249; Homicide.........................................................................................238
Art 251; Death in tumultuous affray..............................................................243
Art 255; Infanticide........................................................................................245
Art 256; Abortion...........................................................................................245
Art 256; Unintentional abortion.....................................................................246
Art 266; Physical injuries...............................................................................247
Art 266-A; Rape.............................................................................................249
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security...................................................257
Art 267; Kidnapping/ Illegal detention..........................................................257
Art 269; Unlawful arrest................................................................................262
Art 275; Abandonment of a person in danger................................................262
Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling.......................................................................262
Art 282; Grave threats....................................................................................263
Art 286; Grave coercion.................................................................................265
Art 287; Unjust vexation................................................................................270
Crimes Against Property.........................................................................................272
Art 293; Robbery........................................................................................... 272
Art 308; Theft................................................................................................ 282
Art 310; Qualified theft..................................................................................290
Art 312; Usurpation of real property & real rights........................................292
Art 315; BP 22...............................................................................................294
Art 315; Estafa...............................................................................................297
Art 319; Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property..............................313
Art 320; Arson............................................................................................... 314
Art 328; Malicious mischief..........................................................................318
Art 332; Absolutory cause.............................................................................319
Crimes Against Chastity..........................................................................................321
Art 333; Adultery...........................................................................................321
Art 334; Concubinage....................................................................................323
Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness......................................................................324
Art 337; Qualified seduction..........................................................................326
Art 344; Extinction of criminal liability in crimes against chastity...............328
Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons........................................................329
Art 347; Simulation of birth...........................................................................329
Art 349; Bigamy............................................................................................ 329
Art 350; Marriage contracted against the provisions of the marriage law
.......................................................................................................... 333
Art 351; Premature marriages........................................................................334
Crimes Against Honor.............................................................................................335
Art 353; Libel.................................................................................................335
Art 355; Libel by theatrical exhibition...........................................................339
Art 358; Oral defamation/ slander.................................................................339
Art 359; Slander by deed...............................................................................341
Art 363; Incriminatory machination..............................................................341
Quasi-Offenses...........................................................................................................343
Miscellaneous.............................................................................................................345
Corpus delicti.................................................................................................345
Entrapment/ instigation..................................................................................345
Finality of Judgements...................................................................................350
Special Penal Laws...................................................................................................352
Anti-wire tapping act.....................................................................................352
Carnapping.....................................................................................................352
Child abuse; RA 7610....................................................................................354
Dangerous Drugs Act.....................................................................................355
Hazing............................................................................................................358
Highway Robbery..........................................................................................358
Hijacking........................................................................................................359
Illegal possession of firearms.........................................................................361
PD 46.............................................................................................................362
PD 534; illegal fishing...................................................................................362
PD 704...........................................................................................................363
PD 9; Illegal possession of bladed weapons..................................................363
Plunder; prescription of crimes; prescription of right to recover properties
.......................................................................................................... 364
RA 1379; prescriptive period for forfeiture...................................................364
RA 3019.........................................................................................................365
RA 6713; coverage........................................................................................372
RA 7438.........................................................................................................373
Subversion......................................................................................................373
Preliminary Title

Art 2; General principles; Criminal law; characteristics


1988 No. 1:
a)What are the limitations upon the power of congress to enact penal
laws? c) State the characteristics of criminal law and explain each.
Answer:
a) The limitations upon the power of congress to enact penal laws are as
follows:
1. Congress cannot enact an ex post facto law.
2. Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder.
3. Congress cannot provide for a cruel punishment. However,
other limitations may be considered like:
1. Congress cannot enact a law which shall punish for a condition. Congress shall punish an act
an3 not the condition or status. (?) (Robinson vs. California).
2. Congress should consider Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "penalties
that may be imposed. No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
prior to its commission."
c) The characteristics of criminal law are as follows:
1. GENERALITY That the law is binding upon all persons who reside to sojourn in the
Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color, creed, or personal circumstances.
2. TERRITORIALITY That the law is applicable to all crimes committed with in the limits of
Philippine territory, which includes its atmosphere interiors waters and maritime zone (Art. 2).
3. PROSPECTIVITY That the law does not have any retroactive effect, except if it favors the
offender unless he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22) or the law otherwise provides.
Article 2 if the Revised Penal Code however provides for the following exception:
a) "Treaty stipulations or by a law of preferential application"
Art 2; General principles; diplomatic immunity
1975 No. III
The American Consul accredited to the Philippines while driving his car recklessly and
imprudently along Roxas Boulevard bumped a pedestrian who was crossing the street and the
latter died as a consequence of his injuries. Prosecuted in court for the crime of homicide thru
reckless imprudence, the Consul claimed diplomatic immunity, alleging that he is not subject to
Philippine laws and regulations. Is his defense tenable? Why?
Answer
Under the principle of public international law, only sovereigns or heads of states, ambassadors,
ministers plenipotentiary and ministers resident enjoy diplomatic immunity. Consuls do not
enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution (Rep. Act No. 75, Schenecherberger v. Moran, 63
Phil. 250).
Art 2; General principles; features of principles of criminal law 1978 No.
I-a
Discuss concisely the cardinal features of principles of criminal law. Give an exception to each
principle and explain the same.
Answer
The Cardinal principles of Criminal Law are generality; territorially and prospectivity.
Generality means that a penal law applies to all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principles of public international law and treaty stipulations. A penal
law does not therefore apply to duly accredited foreign Ambassadors and Ministers in the
Philippines since under international law they enjoy diplomatic immunity. Territoriality means
that a penal law is enforceable within the territory of the Philippines. However, under Article 2
of the Revised Penal Code, its provisions shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of the
Philippines against those, among others, who should commit an offense while on a Philippine
ship or airship. The exception will apply if the Philippine ship or airship is registered under the
laws of the Philippines. The registered Philippine ship at the time of the commission of the
crime must be in the air space not within the jurisdiction of a foreign country. Prospectivity
means that a penal law does not have any retroactive effect. Otherwise, it will become an ex
post facto law. However, if a penal law is favorable to the accused, it may be given retroactive
effect, unless the accused is an habitual delinquent or the law otherwise expressly provides.
Art 2; General principles; laws defining classes of crimes 1978 No. I-
b
Penal laws define distinct classes of crimes. Discuss and elucidate on their distinctions.
Answer
In general, penal laws refer to the Revised Penal Code and special laws. Crimes punished in
the Revised Penal Code are called felonies and those punished in special laws are called
offenses. A felony as a rule is an act mala in se which is wrongful from its very nature while
an offense is an act mala prohibits, which is a wrong only because of the law punishing it. The
Revised Penal Code also classifies felonies as intentional, if dolo or malice is present, and
culpable, if there is culpa or fault. According to gravity, felonies are grave, if the penalty is
capital or afflictive in any of its periods; less grave, if the penalty in its maximum period is
correctional; and light, if the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or
both.
Art 2; General principles; schools of thought in criminal law 1996 No. 1
1} What are the different schools of thought or theories in Criminal Law and describe each
briefly.
2) To what theory does our Revised Penal Code belong? Answer;
1) There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) the classical theory, which
simply means that the basis of criminal liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the
penalty is retribution which must be
proportional to the gravity of the offense; and (b) the positivist theory, which considers man as
a social being and his acts are attributable not just to his will but to other forces of society. As
such, punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be blamed; law and jurisprudence
should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the underlying reasons would
be inquired Into.
2) We follow the classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in
tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in
our Code,
Art 2; General principles; territoriality; exceptions 1982
No. 1
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code states that the provisions of the said Code shall be
applicable to crimes committed not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, but
also outside thereof, in the five (5) instances mentioned therein. What are the underlying
reasons behind, or rationale for, each of those five (5) instances? Explain fully one by one.
Answer
The five instances provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code in which its
provisions are applicable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and the
underlying reasons behind each of said instances are the following:
1. When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship. For this
exception to apply, the Philippine ship or airship must be registered under Philippine laws. As
such it is considered an extension of Philippine territory.
2. When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines or
obligations and securities issued by the government. The reason is to protect Philippine
Currency notes and obligations or securities issued by the government in order to preserve the
financial credit and stability of the government.
3. When the offender should be liable for acts committed with the introduction in the Philippines
of obligations and securities mentioned in paragraph 2. The reason is to protect the economic
interests of the Philippines as the introduction of such forged or counterfeit obligations and
securities into the country is as dangerous, if not more, as the forging or counterfeiting of the
same.
4. When the offender, while being a public officer or employee should commit an offense in the
exercise of his functions. The offense committed by the public officer affects the integrity of
the office and is against public administration of the Philippines. The law should follow the
public officer wherever he may be. If such is not punished by the laws of the country where
the public officer is at the time of its commission, or is not triable by its courts, the absence of
this exception would not make the provisions of the Code applicable since the crime is
committed outside of Philippine territory.
5. When the offender should commit any of the crimes against the national security and the law of
nations. The reason is to safeguard the existence of the state.
Art 2; General principles; territoriality 1994
No. 12:

Page 10 of 374
Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe
and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe
in Calamba, Laguna.
1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?
Answer:
1) No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the bigamous marriage was contracted or
solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal
Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of
criminal law governs the situation.
Art 2; General principles; territoriality, generality, irretrospectivity 1998 No I.
What are the three cardinal features or main characteristics of Philippine Criminal Law? |5%1
Answer:
The three main characteristics of Philippine criminal law are:
1) Generality or its being binding to all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory subject
to certain exceptions;
2) Territoriality or its having force and effect only within Philippine territory, subject to certain
exceptions also;
3) Irretrospectivity or its application only to acts and omissions committed/incurred after the
effectivity of the law.
Art 2; General principles; territoriality; exception 1986 No.
1:
Aaron is the defendant in a civil case being tried in the Manila Regional Trial Court
Together with his lawyer, Aaron went to Singapore to take the deposition' of a witness who.
Aaron hoped, would support his defense. The deposition was taken in a function room of the
Singapore Hotel before Mr. Aguila, the Philippine Consul General. Neither plaintiff nor his
counsel attended the proceeding. After the deposition taking, Aaron, not satisfied with the
results, persuaded Aguila to make substantial changes in the transcripts of stenographic notes.
Aaron offered $5,000.00 in Singaporean currency which Aguila readily accepted. Leona,
vacationing daughter of Aguila, was given $200.00 by Aaron when she made the alterations in
the transcripts. The deponent, with neither notice nor knowledge of the alterations, signed the
deposition.
May Aaron, Aguila, and Leona be prosecuted in a Philippine court for offenses
punishable under our Revised Penal Code? What are the offenses, if any? Explain.
Answer:
Only Aguila can be prosecuted before the Philippine Court. Being the Philippine Consul
General in Singapore, as a public officer, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code can be
given extra-judicial application, as the crime committed by him is related to the duties of his
office. Aaron and Leona, being private persons, cannot be prosecuted before the Philippine
Court because regarding the offenses committed by them, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be given extra-territorial application.

Page 11 of 374
Aguila committed bribery and Aaron corruption of a public officer. Leona committed
falsification of a public document as a principal by direct participation and Aaron as a principal
by inducement. (Art. 2, Revised Penal Code).
Art 2; General principles; territoriality; jurisdiction over vessel 2000 No I
After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a
Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the
Pacific", an overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although
Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When M/V
"Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel
turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An Information for homicide was
filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the
Information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has
no jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of
Philippine territory and on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs.
Fowler, 1 Phil 614)
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in
Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.
Felonies
Art 3; Common law crimes 1988
No. 1:
b) Are there common law crimes in our jurisdiction? Answer:
b) There are none. The rule is, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, there is no
crime if there is no law punishing it,
Art 3; Criminal intent 1978
No. I-d
Is malice or criminal intent an essential requisite of all crimes? Explain.
May criminal intent be presumed to exist? Discuss.
Answer
Malice or criminal intent is not an essential element in all crimes. It is essential only in
crimes which are mala in se. In an offense which is mala prohibita, criminal intent is not an
element Criminal intent is presumed to exist if the act is unlawful. However, in some crimes, a
specific intent cannot be presumed because it is an integral element thereof. For example, in
frustrated homicide, the specific intent to kill is not presumed. If it is not proved, the crime
will not be frustrated homicide but serious physical injuries.
Art 3; Dolo vs culpa
1978 No. I-c
Discuss the distinctions between dolo and culpa. Give an example of
each. Answer
"Dolo" implies deliberate intent. It is equivalent to malice. "Culpa" means
fault, that is, there is no intent or malice. The wrongful act is the result of imprudence,
negligence, lack of skill or lack of foresight. A felony is committed by means of dolo or culpa
and must be voluntary,
Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 1997
No. l:
Distinguish between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita. May an act be
malum in se and be, at the same time, malum prohibitum?
Answer.
Crimes mala in se are felonious acts committed by dolo or culpa as defined in the Revised
Penal Code. Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense, except when the crime results from
criminal negligence. On the other hand, crimes mala prohibita are those considered wrong only
because they are prohibited by statute. They constitute violations of mere rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum at the same time. In People v. Sunico,
et aL. (CA 50 OG 5880) it was held that the omission or failure of election inspectors and poll
clerks to include a voter's name in the registry list of voters is wrong per se because it
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard it is considered as malum in se.
Since it is punished
under a special law (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is considered malum
prohibitum.
Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 2001
No VII
b) Briefly state what essentially distinguishes a crime mala prohibita from a crime mala
in se. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Crimes mala prohibita are distinguished from crimes mala in se as follows, to wit:
In crimes mala prohibita, the acts are not by nature wrong, evil or bad. They are
punished only because there is a law prohibiting them for public good, and thus good faith or
lack of criminal intent in doing the prohibited act is not a defense.
In crimes mala in se, the acts are by nature wrong, evil or bad, and so generally
condemned. The moral trait of the offender is involved; thus, good faith or lack of criminal
Intent on the part of the offender is a defense, unless the crime is the result of criminal
negligence. Correspondingly, modifying circumstances are considered in punishing the
offender.
Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 2003
No I
Distinguish, in their respective concepts and legal implications, between crimes mala in se and
crimes mala prohibits. 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In concept:
Crimes ma/a in se are those where the acts or omissions penalized are inherently bad,
evil, or wrong that they are almost universally condemned.
Crimes mala prohibita are those where the acts penalized are not inherently bad, evil, or
wrong but prohibited by law for public good, public welfare or interest and whoever violates
the prohibition are penalized.
In legal implications:
In crimes mala in se, good faith or lack of criminal intent/ negligence is a defense, while
in crimes mala prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a defense; it is
enough that the prohibition was voluntarily violated.
Also, criminal liability is generally incurred in crimes mala in se even when the crime
is only attempted or frustrated, while in crimes mala prohibits, criminal liability is generally
incurred only when the crime is consummated.
Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are appreciated in
imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala prohibita, such circumstances are not appreciated
unless the special law has adopted the scheme or scale of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code.
Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita: criminal intent
1988 No. 2:
a) Distinguish crime mala in se from crimes mala prohibita.
b) May a crime be committed without criminal intent? Explain. Answer:
a) There are three distinctions between mala in se and mala prohibita:
1. A crime mala in se is a natural wrong. On the other hand, an offense mala prohibita is a wrong
only because it is prohibited by law;
2. In the commission of a crime mala in se, intent is an element whereas in the commission of an
offense mala prohibits, criminal intent is immaterial; and
3. Crimes mala in se are punished by the Revised Penal Code although the Revised Penal Code
may cover special laws while offense mala prohibita are punished by special laws.
b) A crime may be committed without criminal intent in two cases:
1. Offense, punishable as mala prohibita; an
2. Felonies committed by means of culpa.
Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita: motive vs intent
1999 No IV
(a) Distinguish " mala in se" from " mala prohibita"; "motive" from "intent". (3%)
(b) When is motive relevant to prove a case? When is it not necessary to be established? Explain.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
(a)In "mala in se", the acts constituting the crimes are inherently evil, bad or wrong, and hence
involves the moral traits of the offender; while in "mala prohibita", the acts constituting the
crimes are not inherently bad, evil or wrong but prohibited and made punishable only for
public good. And because the moral trait of the offender is Involved in "mala in se".
modifying circumstances, the offender's extent of participation in the crime, and the degree of
accomplishment of the crime are taken into account in imposing the penalty: these are not so
in "mala prohibita" where criminal liability arises only when the acts are consummated.
"Motive " is the moving power which impels a person to do an act for a definite result; while
"intent" is the purpose for using a particular means to bring about a desired result. Motive is
not an element of a crime but intent is an element of intentional crimes. Motive, if attending a
crime, always precede the intent.
(b) Motive is relevant to prove a case when there is doubt as to the identity of the offender or
when the act committed gives rise to variant crimes and there is the need to determine the
proper crime to be imputed to the offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive when the offender is positively identified or the criminal
act did not give rise to variant crimes.
Art 3; Mala prohibita or special laws; generally only consummated stage punished
2000 No XVI
Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr. Rico Yto, a private Individual, went to the
office of Mr. Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented themselves as agents of
Moonglow Commercial Trading, an Importer of children's clothes and toys. Mr. Gabisi and
Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs the
necessary Import Entry and
Internal Revenue Declaration covering Moonglow's shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto
submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a commercial invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn
Import Duty Declaration which declared the shipment as children's toys, the taxes and duties of
which were computed at P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the aforementioned documents with the
Manila International Container Port. However, before the shipment was released, a spot check
was conducted by Customs Senior Agent James Bandido, who discovered that the contents of
the van (shipment) were not children's toys as declared in the shipping documents but 1,000
units of video cassette recorders with taxes and duties computed at P600,000.00. A hold order
and warrant of seizure and detention were then issued by the District Collector of Customs.
Further investigation showed that Moonglow is non-existent. Consequently, Mr. Gabisi and Mr.
Yto were charged with and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which makes it
unlawful among others, for public officers to cause any undue Injury to any party, including the
Government. In the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. In their motion for reconsideration, the accused alleged that
the decision was erroneous because the crime was not consummated but was only at an
attempted stage, and that in fact the Government did not suffer any undue injury.
a) Is the contention of both accused correct? Explain. (3%)
b) Assuming that the attempted or frustrated stage of the violation charged is not punishable, may
the accused be nevertheless convicted for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code
under the facts of the case? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the contention of the accused that the crime was not consummated is correct, RA. 3019 is
a special law punishing acts mala prohibita. As a rule, attempted violation of a special law is
not punished. Actual injury is required.
b) Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, a complex
crime. ...
Art 3; Motive vs intent 1996
No. 1
3) Distinguish intent from motive in Criminal Law.
4) May crime be committed without criminal intent? Answer;
3) Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; whereas intent is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect such results. Motive is not an essential element
of a felony and need not be proved for purpose of conviction, while intent is an essential
element of felonies by dolo.
4) Yes, a crime may be committed without criminal intent If such Is a culpable felony, wherein
Intent is substituted by negligence or imprudence, and also in a malum prohibitum or if an act
is punishable by special law.
Art 3; Motive vs intent 1984
No. 5
(a) Distinguish intent from motive.
(b) When does proof of motive become a crucial consideration in a criminal prosecution?
(c) What categories of crime do not require criminal intent? Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
(a) Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result; intent is the
purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Intent is an element of a crime,
whereas motive is not.
(b) It becomes a crucial consideration in criminal prosecution when there is doubt as to whether or
not the accused committed the crime.
(c) 1. felonies committed by means of culpa. 2. offenses punishable as mala prohibita.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
1. Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result while intent is the
purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Motive is not an element of the crime
while intent is an element of the crime committed by dolo.
2. Proof of motive is a crucial consideration in a criminal prosecution if there is doubt whether the
accused committed the crime or not or whether the evidence on the commission of the crime
is circumstantial or inconclusive, or the identity of the accused is in question.
3. Criminal intent 'is not required in felonies committed by negligence or impudence and in
offenses which are mala prohibita.
Art 3; Motive vs intent 1978
No. II-a
Is motive indicative of criminal intent? Is lack of motive proof of innocence? When is it
necessary to prove motive? Explain your answers.
Answer
Motive may be indicative of criminal intent. The fact that the accused were losing heavily in
their business operations indicated the motive and therefore the intent to commit arson for the
purpose of collecting the insurance on their stock of merchandise. (U.S. u. Go Foo Suy, 25
Phil. 125). However, it is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable evidence
from which it may deduced that the accused was the malefactor. (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil.
468; People vs. Martinez, 106 Phil 597). Lack of motive is not necessarily proof of innocence
because motive is not an essential element of the crime. A crime may be committed just for the
sake of committing it due for example to the extreme moral perversion of the accused. (People
vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255). It is necessary to prove motive when the identity of the person accused
of committing the crime is in dispute (People vs. del Rosario Murray, 105 Phil. 591), or when
there are no eyewitnesses to the crime and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of
persons (People vs. Mario, CA G.R. No. 371-R, July 21, 1949).
Art 4
1996 No. 4:
1) Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from
Bicol and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are
passengers of the bus, jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the
pavement of the road, were ran over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus
tailing the Superlines Bus.
Can Alexander be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely
unaware that the two jumped out of the bus? Explain.
Answer:
1) Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act
of running was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a
felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the
latter to escape from or avoid such danger and In the process, sustains injuries or dies, the
person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (US vs. Valdez,
41 Phil, 1497; People vs. Apra, 27 SCRA 1037.)
Art 4
1996 No. 9:
Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter was able to parry it with his hand, causing
upon him a two-inch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not able to hack Anacleto further
because three policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he did not drop his bolo.
Vicente was accordingly charged by the police at the prosecutor's office for attempted
homicide. Twenty-five days later, while the preliminary investigation was in progress,
Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of symptoms of tetanus infection on the two-inch
wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the following day.
Can Vicente be eventually charged with homicide for the death of Anacleto? Explain.
Answer:
Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus
infection which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient
supervening cause. Vicente's felonious act of causing a two- inch wound on Anacleto's right
palm may still be regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's death because without such
wound, no tetanus infection could develop from the victim's right palm, and without such
tetanus infection the victim would not have died with it.
Art 4
1997 No. 2;
While the crew of a steamer prepared to raise anchor at the Pasig River, A, evidently impatient
with the progress of work, began to use abusive language against the men. B, one of the
members of the crew, remonstrated saying that they could work best if they were not insulted.
A took B's attitude as a display of insubordination and, rising in a rage, moved towards B
wielding a big knife and threatening to stab B. At the instant when A was only a few feet from
B, the latter, apparently believing himself to be in great and immediate peril, threw himself into
the water, disappeared beneath the surface, and drowned.
May A be held criminally liable for the death of B?
Answer;
Page 20 of 374
Yes. A can be held criminally liable for the death of B, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides in part that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In U.S. vs. Valdez 41
Phil. 497. where the victim who was threatened by the accused with a knife, jumped into the
river but because of the strong current or because he did not know how to swim, he drowned,
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for homicide of the accused because, if a person
against whom a criminal assault is directed believes himself to be in danger of death or great
bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the assailant is responsible for the homicide in case death results by drowning.
Art 4
1999 No II
During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits happened to fire his gun upward in
the ceiling without meaning to kill anyone. The owner of the house who was hiding thereat was
hit and killed as a result.
The defense theorized that the killing was a mere accident and was not perpetrated in
connection with, or for purposes of, the robbery.
Will you sustain the defense? Why? (4%)
No, I will not sustain the defense. The act being felonious and the proximate cause of the
victim's death, the offender is liable therefore although it may not be intended or different from
what he intended.
The offender shall be prosecuted for the composite crime of robbery with homicide, whether
the killing was intentional or accidental, as long as the killing was on occasion of the robbery.
Art 4
2001 No I
Luis Cruz was deeply hurt when his offer of love was rejected by his girlfriend Marivella one
afternoon when he visited her. When he left her house, he walked as if he was sleepwalking so
much so that a teenage snatcher was able to grab his cell phone and flee without being chased
by Luis. At the next LRT station, he boarded one of the coaches bound for Baclaran. While
seated, he happened to read a newspaper left on the seat and noticed that the headlines were
about the sinking of the Super Ferry while on its way to Cebu. He went over the list of missing
passengers who were presumed dead and came across the name of his grandfather who had
raised him from childhood after he was orphaned. He was shocked and his mind went blank for
a few minutes, after which he ran amuck and, using his balisong, started stabbing at the
passengers who then scampered away, with three of them Jumping out of the train and landing
on the road below. All the three passengers died later of their injuries at the hospital.
Is Luis liable for the death of the three passengers who jumped out of the moving train?
State your reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he was committing a felony when he started
stabbing at the passengers and such wrongful act was the proximate cause of said passengers'
jumping out of the train; hence their deaths.

Page 21 of 374
Under Article 4, Revised Penal Code, any person committing a felony shall incur
criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In this case, the death of the three passengers was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of Luis' felonious act which created an immediate sense of danger in the minds
of said passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it by jumping out of the train. (People vs.
Arpa, 27 SCRA 1O37; U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497}
Art 4
2001 No II
Maryjane had two suitors - Felipe and Cesar. She did not openly show her preference
but on two occasions, accepted Cesar's invitation to concerts by Regine and Pops. Felipe was
a working student and could only ask Mary to see a movie which was declined. Felipe felt
insulted and made plans to get even with Cesar by scaring him off somehow. One day, he
entered Cesar's room in their boarding house and placed a rubber snake which appeared to be
real in Cesar's backpack. Because Cesar had a weak heart, he suffered a heart attack upon
opening his backpack and seeing the snake. Cesar died without regaining consciousness. The
police investigation resulted in pinpointing Felipe as the culprit and he was charged with
Homicide for Cesar's death. In his defense, Felipe claimed that he did not know about Cesar's
weak heart and that he only Intended to play a practical joke on Cesar.
Is Felipe liable for the death of Cesar or will his defense prosper? Why?
(5%} SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Felipe is liable for the death of Cesar but he shall be given the benefit
of the mitigating circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
which was committed (Art. 13, par. 3, RPC).
When Felipe intruded Into Cesar's room without the latter's consent and took liberty
with the letter's backpack where he placed the rubber snake. Felipe was already committing a
felony. And any act done by him while committing a felony is no less wrongful, considering
that they were part of "plans to get even with Cesar".
Felipe's claim that he intended only "to play a practical joke on Cesar" does not
persuade, considering that they are not friends but in fact rivals in courting Maryjane. This case
is parallel to the case of People vs. Pugay, et al.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Felipe is not liable because the act of frightening another is not a crime. What he did
may be wrong, but not all wrongs amount to a crime. Because the act which caused the death
of Cesar is not a crime, no criminal liability may arise therefrom.
Art 4
2003 No V.
The conduct of wife A aroused the ire of her husband B. Incensed with anger almost
beyond his control, B could not help but inflict physical injuries on
A. Moments after B started hitting A with his fists, A suddenly complained of severe chest
pains. B, realizing that A was indeed in serious trouble, immediately
brought her to the hospital. Despite efforts to alleviate A's pains, she died of heart attack. It
turned out that she had been suffering from a lingering heart ailment. What crime, if any, could
B be held guilty of? 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B could be held liable for parricide because his act of hitting his wife with fist blows
and therewith inflicting physical injuries on her, is felonious. A person committing a felonious
act incurs criminal liability although the wrongful consequence is different from what he
intended (Art. 4, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
Although A died of heart attack, the said attack was generated by B's felonious act of
hitting her with his fists. Such felonious act was the immediate cause of the heart attack,
having materially contributed to and hastened A's death. Even though B may have acted
without intent to kill his wife, lack of such intent is of no moment when the victim dies.
However, B may be given the mitigating circumstance of having acted without intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code).
Art 4
1976 No, VII-a
X and Y ran amuck on board a train and killed ten persons. Four persons out of fear jumped out
of the train while the same was running and died. Are X and Y liable for the deaths of the four
persons who jumped out of the train? Reason.
Answer
X and Y are also liable for the deaths of the four persons who jumped out of the train. By
running amuck on board the train and killing ten persons, the acts committed by X and Y are
felonious and they are responsible for the direct, natural and logical consequences thereof.
(Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). These acts of X and Y created fear in the minds of those four persons
which caused them to jump out of the running train which resulted in their deaths. The rule is
that if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which cause such
person to try to escape and in so doing injures himself, the person who creates such state of
mind is responsible for the injuries which result. (People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17; People vs.
Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037; U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 PhiL 1497).
Art 4
1994 No. 5;
Bhey eloped with Scott. Whereupon, Bhey's father, Robin, and brother, Rustom, went to Scott's
house. Upon reaching the house, Rustom inquired from Scott about his sister's whereabouts,
while Robin shouted and threatened to kill Scott. The latter then went downstairs but Rustom
held his (Scott's) waist. Meanwhile Olive, the elder sister of Scott, carrying her two- month old
child, approached Rustom and Scott to pacify them. Olive attempted to remove Rustom's hand
from Scott's waist. But Rustom pulled Olive's hand causing her to fall over her baby. The baby
then died moments later.
Is Rustom criminally liable for the death of the child? Answer:
Yes, Rustom is criminally liable for the death of the child because his felonious act was the
proximate cause of such death. It was Rustom's act of pulling Olive's hand which caused the
latter to fall on her baby. Had It not been
for said act of Rustom, which is undoubtedly felonious (at least slight coercion) there was no
cause for Olive to fall over her baby. In short, Rustom's felonious act is the cause of the evil
caused. Any person performing a felonious act is criminally liable for the direct, natural and
logical consequence thereof although different from what he intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RFC;
People vs, Pugay, et al, GR No. 74324, Nov. 18, 1988).
Art 4
1975 No. IV
The accused ran amuck aboard a moving train and killed eight persons. Terrified by the
happening four passengers jumped oat of the train and died as a result of their fall. Can the
accused be held liable for the death of the four although he did not even know that they
jumped? Why?
Answer
The accused can be held liable. Because by running amuck aboard the train and killing eight
persons, he committed acts which are felonious. The death of the four passengers who jumped
out of the train because they were terrified by the happening is the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the running amuck of the accused- (Art. 4, par, 1, Revised Penal Code; People
v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037),
Art 4; Impossible crimes 1976
No. IX-a
X, a domestic servant of Y has been nurturing a grudge against him for long. One day, while Y
was seated on his favorite rocking chair, X suddenly fired a volley of shots towards Y. It
turned out, however, that Y has been dead from a severe stroke an hour ago. For what crime
can X be held liable? Reasons.
Answer
X is liable for an impossible crime of murder. The reason is the inherent impossibility of killing
Y since he has been dead due to a severe stroke one hour before X shot him. The acts of
execution would have been a crime against persons were it not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment. (Art. 4, par. 12, RPC). Subjectively, X is a criminal although objectively,
no crime is committed. X cannot be liable for trespass to dwelling because being a domestic
servant, his entrance to the house of Y cannot be against the will of the latter.
Art 4; Impossible crimes 1993
No. 12:
Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation
of perjury.
Answer;
2) Impossible crime - Killing a dead person.
Art 4; Impossible crimes 1994
No. 10:
JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They
asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed with automatic
weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in
the house of Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at her room. Fortunately,
Elsa was not around as she attended a prayer meeting that evening in another barangay in
Laurel.
JP, et al, were charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court at
Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of
finding them guilty of attempted murder.
If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal? Answer:
If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of attempted
murder and instead find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in relation
to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal,
but likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa's absence
from the house is a physical impossibility which renders the crime intended Inherently
incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4,
par. 2 practically useless as all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted or frustrated felony (Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52).
Art 4; Impossible crimes 1998
No XIV.
Buddy always resented his classmate, Jun. One day. Buddy planned to kill Jun by mixing
poison in his lunch. Not knowing where he can get poison, he approached another classmate,
Jerry to whom he disclosed his evil plan. Because he himself harbored resentment towards Jun,
Jerry gave Buddy a poison, which Buddy placed on Jun's food. However, Jun did not die
because, unknown to both Buddy and Jerry, the poison was actually powdered milk.
1, What crime or crimes, if any, did Jerry and Buddy commit? [3%]
2. Suppose that, because of his severe allergy to powdered milk, Jun had to be hospitalized for
10 days for ingesting it. Would your answer to the first question be the same? [2%]
Answer:
1. Jerry and Buddy are liable for the so-called "impossible crime" because, with intent to kill,
they tried to poison Jun and thus perpetrate Murder, a crime against persons. Jun was not
poisoned only because the would-be killers were unaware that what they mixed with the food
of Jun was powdered milk, not poison. In short, the act done with criminal intent by Jerry and
Buddy, would have constituted a crime against persons were it not for the inherent inefficacy
of the means employed. Criminal liability is incurred by them although no crime resulted,
because their act of trying to poison Jun is criminal.
2. No, the answer would not be the same as above. Jerry and Buddy would be liable instead for
less serious physical injuries for causing the hospitalization and medical attendance for 10
days to Jun. Their act of mixing with the food eaten by Jun the matter which required such
medical attendance, committed with criminal intent, renders them liable for the resulting
injury.
Art 4; Impossible crimes 2000
No XVII
a} What is an impossible crime? (2%)
b) Is an impossible crime really a crime? (2%)
c) A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X. who
happened to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four
culprits peppered the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally
destroyed X's room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and
nobody was hit or injured during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any crime?
Explain. (3%)
d) Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her parents to- bring
and fetch her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note demanding P500,000.00 from
Carla's parents in exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent the ransom note by mail.
However, before the ransom note was received by Carla's parents, Enrique's hideout was
discovered by the police. Carla was rescued while Enrique was arrested and incarcerated.
Considering that the ransom note was not received by Carla's parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of "Impossible Crime to Commit Kidnapping" against Enrique.
Is the prosecutor correct? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or property, were if
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC),
b) No, an impossible crime is not really a crime. It is only so-called because the act gives rise to
criminal liability. But actually, no felony is committed. The accused is to be punished for his
criminal tendency or propensity although no crime was committed.
c)Yes. A, B. C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X
with the use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime Is to be
imposed only if the act committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised
Penal Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals
(215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an impossible
crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though
different from what was intended,
d) No, the prosecutor Is not correct in filing a case for "impossible crime to commit kidnapping"
against Enrique. Impossible crimes are limited only to acts which when performed would be a
crime against persons or property. As kidnapping is a crime against personal security and not
against persons or property, Enrique could not have incurred an "impossible crime" to commit
kidnapping. There is thus no impossible crime of kidnapping.
Art 6; Desistance
2003 No III.
A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the
money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch
of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack.
Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C's
mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out
of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran
outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the
place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons.
8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's
money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as
component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy
being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have
planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime.
Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all,
already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal
plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not
spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried
to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in
pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and
commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both
are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall
not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all
acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se
punishable.
The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the
discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before
all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but
desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the
verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness.
Art 6; Stage of execution 1976
No. III-b
X, a physician, wanted to kill his wife. He gave her food with poison. After eating the food, the
wife became unconscious. Bothered by his own conscience, X gave her medicine to counteract
the effects of the poison and the wife was saved. X is prosecuted for frustrated parricide. Is he
guilty of the charge? Reason,
Answer
X is not liable for frustrated parricide. Although he has already performed all the acts of
execution to kill his wife, because she ate the food with poison which he gave her, she however
did not die due to the medicine which he administered, after she became unconscious and
because his conscience
bothered him. The death of the wife, therefore, did not result due to a cause which depended
upon the voluntary will of X. In a frustrated felony, the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (Art. 6, 2nd par,
RPC).
Art 6; Stage of execution; desistance 1985 No.
5
Intending to kill his estranged wife Myrna, Anthony mixed poison in her coffee which would
have normally killed her. After drinking the coffee, Myrna felt nauseated and vomitted.
Appalled by the suffering and helplessness of his wife, Anthony took pity on her and gave her
an antidote. Myrna recovered completely after ten(10)days.
Discuss with reasons the criminal liability, if any, of Anthony. May he invoke desistance in his
favor?
Answer:
Anthony will not be liable for frustrated parricide. Although the wife, Myrna, had drank the
poisoned coffee, and all the acts of execution to kill her were already committed, she did not
however die due to the antidote administered by Anthony. The crime was therefore not
produced due to the voluntary act of Anthony. In a frustrated felony, the acts of execution have
been performed which would produce the felony as a consequence but nevertheless do not
produce it by causes independent of the will of the offender. So, if the perpetrator himself
prevented the consummation of the crime, it is not frustrated. In that sense, when Anthony gave
the antidote to his wife, when he saw her suffering after drinking the poisoned coffee, such act
may be considered desistance in killing her, although as a rule, desistance refers to acts of
execution. The facts of the problem merely state that after the administration of the antidote,
the wife recovered after ten (10) days. It may be presumed that she was ill during that period.
Since there is no mention of medical attendance nor incapacity from work, the offense will be
slight physical injuries under Par. 2 of Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art 6; Stage of execution; homicide 1979 No.
XV
X and Y had a heated altercation and then exchanged blows. X pulled out a knife and stabbed Y
in the abdomen. Y ran away but before he could reach his house was struck by lightning and
died. The Fiscal filed homicide against X. Decide.
Answer
X is not liable for homicide but for the crime constituting the stabbing of Y in the abdomen.
Since the injury was mortal, the liability of X is for frustrated homicide. The death of the
victim was caused by the lightning which struck him. Altho a felony was committed by X
such was not the direct and proximate cause of the death of Y. The lightning was an efficient
intervening cause (People vs. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503). The rational of the rule is that the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused (People vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138).
Art 6; Stage of execution; when punishable 1977 No.
I-b
Acting under the impulse of hunger, Jose tried to steal the two-pesos (2) bill in the
breast pocket of a stranger. But before he could get the money, he was seen and eventually
apprehended by a policeman. Later on, Jose was charged of the light offense of attempted
theft for P2.00. Was Jose correctly charged considering that light offenses are punishable only
when consummated? State four reasons.
Answer
Jose was correctly charged for a light felony of attempted theft of P2.00 because theft is a
crime against property and is punishable even though it is not consummated. (Art. 7, R.P.C.).
Art 7; Light felonies
1988 No. 2:
c) When are light felonies punishable and who are liable in light felonies? Answer:
c) Light felonies, according to Article 7 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable
"only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against
persons or property."
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the following are criminally liable for light
felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices,
Art 8; Conspiracy
1976 No. I-b
X, Y, and Z fired their guns almost simultaneously at the principal victim, resulting in his death
and his driver. Is there conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the crime? Reason.
Answer
There is conspiracy among the accused X, Y and Z. The fact that the three fired almost
simultaneously at the principal victim shows that they have acted in concert pursuant to a
common criminal objective. (Define conspiracy). There is, therefore, a unity of action and
intention (People v.San Luis, 86 Phil 485), To establish conspiracy, proof of previous
agreement is not necessary. It is enough that if at the time of the commission of the crime, all
the accused have the same purpose and were united in its execution. (People v. Binasing, et al,
63 O.G. 5208).
Art 8; Conspiracy
1977 No. II-a
When L, a notorious robber in the neighborhood, was apprehended by an irate crowd and while
L was being held from behind by M, N stoned L, hitting him on the head. O hit him on the knee
with a piece of wood, and P stabbed him on the chest, which stabbing was the cause of the
death of L. Said acts were committed almost simultaneously to the surprise of M. What
criminal liability, if any, was incurred by M, N, O and P? Reason fully.
Answer
M has no criminal liability for what N, O and P did because their acts surprised him and, hence,
M was not aware of what they would have done. The criminal liability of N, O and P is
individual and not collective. The facts of the problem show that these offenders did not act
concertedly in pursuance of a common purpose. They had no knowledge of each other's
criminal intent. There is no unity of action and intention to hold that the act of one is the act of
all Mere "simultaneousness" of acts does not of itself indicate concurrence of will nor the unity
of action and purpose, which are the basis of the opportunity of two or more persons. (People
vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664),
Art 8; Conspiracy
1980 No. IV
"H" made a bet of P10 with "I" in a game of "beto-beto". "H" won but "I" refused to pay the
amount. A dispute arose between them, which culminated in a fist fight. "J", the father of "H",
and "K", the brother of "H", intervened.
When the fight began, "H" held the hand of "I", "J" seized the front part of "I's" shirt, and
while they were dealing blows on one another, "K" came with a "balisong" and stabbed "I"
inflicting upon him a mortal wound.
"H", "J", and "K" were charged with Homicide. Is it proper to hold all the accused
responsible for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by "K"?
Answer
It is not proper to hold H and J liable for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by
K because of the absence of conspiracy. He and J are not co-principals of K in the killing of
Page 30 of 374
the victim. The liability of H, J and K is not collective but

Page 30 of 374
individual They have not acted conceitedly for the realization of a common criminal objective.
H and J who dealt blows on the victim without causing any physical injury could be liable for
ill-treatment. (Art. 266, par. 3, R.P.C.)
Art 8; Conspiracy
1988 No. 11:
b) At a pre-wedding celebration where plenty of people were milling and walking about or
standing close together, a mad killer shot up the wedding party. The three appellants were
convicted by the owner court as co-conspirators of the killer because they were allegedly with
him before, during, and after the shooting. It was proven conclusively that the appellant were
friends of the killer; that they went together with the killer to the celebration; and that they left
at the same time with the killer, after the shooting. However, the appellants had no guns and
passively witnessed the shooting, without intervening in the killing in any way nor shielding
killer.
Is there conspiracy among them? Why? Answer;
(b) There is no conspiracy among them because as the problem has stated, they passively
witnessed the shooting. No overt act was committed therefore the element that the conspiracy
must be proved as the essence of the crime itself is n9t present.
Art 8; Conspiracy
1990 No. 1:
Aki and Ben, while walking together, met Caloy. There was an altercation between
Ben and Caloy so that Ben chased and stabbed Caloy with a knife hitting his right arm thereby
causing slight physical injury. Ben desisted from further assaulting Caloy, but Aki lunged at
Caloy and felled him this time with a bolo which mortally wounded Caloy. Thus, he died.
a) What is the criminal liability of Aki? How about that of Ben? Explain your answers.
b) Assuming conspiracy is established, will your answer in problem (a) be the same? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
a) Aki is liable for homicide because, while it is clear that he intentionally caused the death of
Caloy, none of the circumstances attendant to murder are present. Intent to kill is clear as Aki
lunged at Caloy, after the latter was inflicted a wound at the right arm, and gave him a mortal
wound.
Ben is guilty only of slight physical injuries as it is evident from the wound he inflicted upon
Caloy that he did not Intend to kill the latter. Also, there was no other act on the part of Ben to
show such intent.
b) No, there being no conspiracy each will be liable for their own individual act. This time both
will be liable for homicide because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all (People v.
Damaso, G.R Nos. L-30116-7, 20 November 1978).
Art 8; Conspiracy
1991 No. 9:

Page 31 of 374
During a fiesta, Simeon Marco, brandishing a knife, asked Constancio whether he was the one
who slapped his (Simeon's) son the year previous. Vicente [father of Constancio) shouted at
Constancio and his other son, Bienvenido, telling them to run away. When Bienvenido passed
by Rafael Marco (brother of Simeon), Rafael stabbed him. Bienvenido parried the blow but
fell down, his feet entangled with some vines. While Bienvenido was lying on the ground,
Rafael continued to stab him, inflicting slight injuries on the shoulder of Bienvenido, after
which Rafael stood up. At that moment, Dulcisimo Beltran (no relation to the Marco brothers),
came out of nowhere and, together with Simeon, stabbed Bienvenido. Both of them inflicted
fatal wounds resulting in the death of the victim,
a)Discuss the criminal liability of Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael.
b) Supposing Dulcisimo is a convict out on parole, will the aggravating circumstances of quasi-
recidivism be appreciated against him?
Answer:
a) Simeon and Dulcislmo will be liable for the death of Bienvenido as the fatal injuries
sustained by the victim were inflicted by the two.
Rafael is not liable for slight physical injuries as conspiracy was not present, and there was no
apparent intent to kill when he inflicted the slight physical injuries on the arm of the victim.
Alternative Answer:
Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael will all be liable under the principle of conspiracy, where the act
of one becomes the act of all.
Art 8; Conspiracy
1992 No. 3:
As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco,
Special Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his
revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter.
Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol,
shot and wounded Yabang.
a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was
there conspiracy and treachery? Explain.
b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested
Answer:
a) If they have to be criminally liable at all each will be responsible for their individual acts as
there appears to be no conspiracy, as the acts of the three were spontaneous and a reflex
response to Yabang's shooting of Sergio. There was no concerted act that will lead to a
common purpose.
Art 8; Conspiracy
1993 No. 6:
As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden
and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied
Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists;
and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury
Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe,
Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal blow.
1) Would you sustain his claim? Why?
2) What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with reasons.
Answer;
1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and
hence, liable collectively. The act of one is the act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among the offenders can be clearly deduced or inferred from the
manner they committed the killing, demonstrating a common criminal purpose and intent.
There being a conspiracy, the individual acts of each participant is not considered because their
liability is collective.
2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery ...
Art 8; Conspiracy
1994 No. 9:
At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street,
Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but
suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino.
Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino
died,
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide.
1) Is there conspiracy in this case?
2) Can the court appreciate the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band?
Answer:
1) Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against
the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims. The
existence of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders acted in
commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal
design to inflict harm on their victims.
Art 8; Conspiracy
1996 No. 2:
2) Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning,
robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living.
While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one
of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a
thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the
house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his
family.
a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit? Explain.
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the
latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what
crime did the four commit? Explain.
c) Under the facts of the case, what aggravating circumstances may be appreciated against the
four? Explain.
Answer:
2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex
crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders
committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the
house" where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators.
Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special
complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995}
b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide ... (implied: there is still conspiracy)
Art 8; Conspiracy
1997 No. 4:
A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves
with knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters
from their destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on
foot to the house of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's lookout. C and D stood
guard outside the house. Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the
knowledge of the others. A stealthily entered the house and stabbed
F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards another direction.
Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting
F. Thereafter, A exited from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting
taxicab and motored away.
G died. F survived.
Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F? Answer:
A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B,
C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they
cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G
since the former was completely unaware of said killing.
For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A
who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for
conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common
criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F's escape. D, however,
although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could
enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he
did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended
toward the same end (People vs. Tomoro, et al 44 Phil. 38),
In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical
injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F.
Art 8; Conspiracy
1998 No XVI.
Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will
hide behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work.
Arturo will come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind.
On the appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley.
When Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the
criminal liability of Arturo, if any. [5%]
Answer:
Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a
co-principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur
criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly
devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that
Juan killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done
pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty
on him may be that of an accomplice only (People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us.
Medrano, 114 SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually participate in the shooting of
Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed.
Alternative Answer:
Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing of Joel. Conspiracy
itself is not punishable unless expressly provided by law and this is not true in the case of
Murder. A co-conspirator must perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy.
Art 8; Conspiracy
2003 No III.
A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the
money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they
knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight,
A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to thrust
his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled,
while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B.
The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the
participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons. 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's
money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as
component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy
being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have
planned and agreed on the
sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law
that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A
and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not
spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried
to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in
pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and
commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both
are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall
not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all
acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se
punishable.
The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the
discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before
all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but
desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the
verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness.
Art 8; Conspiracy; extent of criminal liability
1986 No. 3:
Mahigpit is the general manager of Blue Chips Co. He fired Alibugha, Bulagsak, Bisyoso, and
Mabisyo for gross incompetence The following day, the four dismissed employees happened
to meet by chance at a restaurant, a block from the residence of Mahigpit. Then and there, the
four hatched a plan to beat up Mahigpit so he would not be so harsh to his personnel in the
future. Immediately, thereafter, the four proceeded to Mahigpit's house. After being allowed to
enter, a heated discussion ensued. Mahigpit ordered the four to leave his house immediately.
Thereupon, Alibugha and Bulagsak started raining blows on Mahigpit while Bisyoso held him
by his arms. Mabisyo proceeded to the second floor of the residence where he chanced upon
Katulong, the housemaid of Mahigpit. Katulong saw what was going on and rushed to a
window shouting for help. Mabisyo hit Katulong on the head with a metal flower vase. The
four then fled from the house. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Mahigpit dead
on the floor of the sala and Katulong, also dead, near the window on the second floor.
Alibugha, Bulagsak, Bisyoso, and Mabisyo were charged with murder on two counts. The
Fiscal stated that the two offenses were characterized by conspiracy and, therefore, all the
accused should be equally guilty for all the consequences of their criminal acts. Is the Fiscal
correct? Explain.
Answer:
Regarding the death of Mahigpit, only Alibugha, Bulagsak, and Bisyoso are criminally liable.
They acted pursuant to a conspiracy to beat the deceased whose death is the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the crime agreed upon to be committed. Mabisyo is not liable for the
death of Mahigpit because
although he participated in the plan to beat him, he did not personally perform any overt act
as his contribution to realize the common criminal objective.
Regarding the death of the housemaid, only Mabisyo will be liable. The others are not
criminally liable as the death of the housemaid is not covered in the conspiracy nor is it a
necessary consequence thereof.
Art 8; Conspiracy; implied conspiracy 2003
No IV.
(a) State the concept of "implied conspiracy" and give its legal effects.
4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)An "implied conspiracy" is one which is only inferred or deduced from
the manner the participants in the commission of crime carried out its execution. Where the
offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime, meaning that their acts are
coordinated or synchronized in a way indicative that they are pursuing a common criminal
objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy and their criminal liability shall be
collective, not individual.
The legal effects of an "implied conspiracy" are:
1 ). Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime will be considered
conspirators;
2).Only those who participated by criminal acts in the commission of the crime will be considered
as co-conspirators; and
3).Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission of the crime, without any act of criminal
participation, shall not render one criminally liable as co-conspirator.
Art 8; Conspiracy; implied conspiracy
1998 No VIII.
1. What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? [3%]
Answer:
1. The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the
commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent
any agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent
and a common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or
deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be
deemed the act of all.
Art 8; Conspiracy; Robbery with serious physical injuries
1992 No. 7
Efren, Greggy and Hilario. wearing fatigues and carrying unlicensed firearms, barged into the
residence of Arnulfo Dilat at Scout Lazcano St. (Before making their entrance, they gave
instructions to their companion Sakay to stand watch outside). Once inside, they announced
that they were members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) on an official mission. Inside
the master bedroom, they demanded from Luningning, the wife of Arnulfo, cash and jewelries.
After receiving the jewelries but before the money could be handed to them, they heard their
companion Sakay shouting: "Pulis! Pulis!" Panic-stricken,
Efren shot Arnulfo who was seriously injured. Greggy and Hilario picked up the jewelry box
whose contents spilled all over the floor as they rushed out. Before they could make good their
escape, however, the police blocked their way, one of them clutching Sakay by the collar. They
were forthwith brought to the Police Headquarters nearby.
Discuss the individual and collective criminal liabilities of Efren, Greggy, Hilario and
Sakay.
Suggested Answer:
There appears to be conspiracy amongst the four offenders; in which case the act of
one becomes the act of all. Ergo, they are all liable for the consequent crime, which is robbery
under Art. 299, special complex crime of robbery with serious physical injuries, committed in
an inhabited house, by pretending to be persons in authority. There is no band as only three
are armed.
Sakay, who seems to have participated only as lookout, still will be liable as principal because
of the conspiracy. Even if there is none, he is criminally liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
The crime is definitely consummated as offenders have complete disposal of the subject matter
of the offense.
Justifying & Exempting Circumstances
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of relative 1989 No. 5:
Boy Bala was a notorious gang leader who had previously killed a policeman. The Chief of
Police ordered his vice squad headed by Captain Aniceto, to arrest Boy Bala and should he
resist arrest, to shoot and kill him. Acting upon an informer's tip, Aniceto and two (2) of his
trusted men went to the Corinthian nightclub where they saw Boy Bala dancing with a hostess.
Without any warning, Aniceto shot Boy Bala who slumped on the dance floor. As Aniceto
aimed another shot at Boy Bala, the brother of the latter, Pedro, who was seated at a table
nearby, got hold of a table knife and stabbed Aniceto killing him instantly. The Chief of Police
filed a homicide case against Pedro for the death of Aniceto. On the other hand, Pedro filed a
complaint for murder against the Chief of Police for the death of Boy Bala alleging that the
issuance of the shoot-to-kill order was illegal and the Chief of Police was liable as a principal
by inducement. How tenable are the respective claims of the Chief of Police and Pedro?
Explain.
Answer:
The charge for murder against the Chief of Police for the death of Boy Bala is not tenable.
Although, the Chief of Police is the superior on Captain Aniceto who shot Boy Bala in cold
blood, he cannot be held accountable for .the act of Aniceto. His order was specific; to arrest
Boy Bala and should he resist arrest, to shoot and kill him. Aniceto did not act in compliance
with this order. He shot Boy Bala without warning, without even attempting to make an arrest.
Consequently, it could not be said that the killing of Bala by Aniceto was induced by the Chief
of Police so as to make the latter criminally liable as a co-principal by inducement. The liability
for the death of Bala is individual and not collective.
On the other hand, the charge of homicide against Pedro for the stabbing of Aniceto is likewise
not tenable. Pedro acted in legitimate defense of relative, he being the brother of Boy Bala. All
the requisites of this justifying circumstance are present. Thus:
1. There was unlawful aggression. At the time that Pedro stabbed Aniceto, the latter had already
shot at Boy Bala and was in the act of shooting him for the second time. The aggression is
unlawful although Aniceto is a police officer and Boy Bala is notorious gangster. By shooting
Boy Bala without warning instead of attempting to arrest him first, Aniceto became an
unlawful agressor.
2. There was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Pedro to prevent or repel unlawful
aggression. The use of a knife against a gun for defense is reasonable.
3. Assuming that Boy Bala had provoked that attack on his person by Aniceto because of his
having earlier killed a policeman, it does not appear that Pedro, the one making the defense
had taken any part in said provocation.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of stranger 1984 No. 4
Despite denial of a rally permit from the City Mayor, a group of students from different
schools held a rally at Liwasang Bonifacio. At the rally site, they were met by members of the
WPD Dispersal Unit, armed with truncheons, water hose, etc.
When student A saw a policeman striking a fellow-student, B, with a truncheon, he hit the
forearm of the policeman with an empty bottle of Coke in order to prevent the latter from
further hurting B. At this point, other policemen came, subdued A and arrested him.
For what crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Cede may A be charged? If A is
liable for any crime, what circumstances would mitigate or aggravate his liability under the
given facts? Explain,
Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
None. When the policeman struck B with a truncheon, he goes beyond the limits of his
powers. Consequently, A who employed adequate means to prevent the policeman from
hurting B could not be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries considering
that he merely acted in defense of a stranger.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
A is not liable under the Revised Penal Code. He is entitled to defense of stranger, which has
the following-requisites: 1) unlawful aggression, 2) reasonable necessity to prevent or repel it,
3) the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment of any evil motive. (Art. 11, par.
3, Rev. Penal Code People vs. Lara CA 43 O.G. 3152). The policeman who hit the student B
with a truncheon, while the students were at the rally site, abused or exceeded his authority. In
this case, the policeman would be an unlawful aggressor. A acted on impulse by striking the
policeman on the forearm with an empty coke bottle to prevent him from farther hurting B.
From the facts of the case B was already injured by the policeman when A hit him and the
means employed under the circumstances would be reasonable. A was, not actuated by revenge,
resentment or any evil motive.
Alternative Answer
A can be held liable for simple resistance When the policeman hit B with a truncheon the
presumption is he acted in fulfillment of his duty as a peace officer to maintain and preserve
order in the rally site. However, the act of the policeman can be considered sufficient
provocation to A for him to bit the policeman on the arm with a coke bottle to prevent him from
further hurting B. A can invoke such mitigating circumstance. The crime committed is not
direct assault as a policeman is an agent of a person in authority and the act of A under the
facts cannot constitute manifest defiance to the authority of the law. {U.S. vs. Tabiana,
37 Phil. 975) The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the rank of the policeman is also
present. (People vs. Regala, 113 SCRA 613 [1982] )
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of stranger 2002 No
XV.
B. A chanced upon three men who were attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the men,
was about to stab B with a knife. Not knowing that B was actually the aggressor because he
had earlier challenged the three men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was about to stab B. May
A invoke the defense of a stranger as a justifying circumstance in his favor? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of stranger since he was not
involved in the fight and he shot C when the latter was about to stab
Page 40 of 374
B. There being no indication that A was induced by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive
in shooting C, his act is justified under par 3, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; euthanasia
1990 No. 3:
a) In mercy killing, is the attending physician criminally liable for deliberately turning off the life
support system consequently costing the life of the patient? State reasons.
b) How about in an instance when in saving the life of the mother, the doctor sacrificed the life of
the unborn child? Explain your answer.
Answer:
a)The attending physician is criminally liable. Euthanasia is not a justifying circumstance in
Philippine jurisdiction.
b) There is no criminal liability on the part of the doctor because his acts are justified under
Article 11(4) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: The following do not incur any
criminal liability: x x x 4) any person, who in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act
which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present: First: That
the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than
that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it."
Alternative Answer:
There is no criminal liability on the part of the doctor because his acts are justified under
Article 11(5) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: "The following do not incur any
criminal liability: x x x (5) Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office."
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; fulfillment of duty 2000 No
VI
a) Lucresia, a store owner, was robbed of her bracelet in her home. The following day,
at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a neighbor, 22-year old Jun- Jun, who had an unsavory
reputation, came to her store to buy bottles of beer. Lucresia noticed her bracelet wound
around the right arm of Jun-Jun. As soon as the latter left, Lucresia went to a nearby police
station and sought the help of a policeman on duty, Pat. Willie Reyes. He went with Lucresia
to the house of Jun- Jun to confront the latter. Pat. Reyes introduced himself as a policeman
and tried to get hold of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away. Pat. Reyes chased him and fired
two warning shots in the air. Jun-Jun continued to run and when he was about 7 meters away,
Pat, Reyes shot him in the right leg. Jun-Jun was hit and he fell down but he crawled towards
a fence, intending to pass through an opening underneath. When Pat. Reyes was about 5
meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-Jun hitting him at the right lower hip. Pat. Reyes
brought Jun- Jun to the hospital, but because of profuse bleeding, he eventually died. Pat
Reyes was subsequently charged with homicide. During the trial, Pat Reyes raised the defense,
by way of exoneration, that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is the defense tenable?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Page 41 of 374
a) No, the defense of Pat. Reyes is not tenable. The defense of having acted in the
fulfillment of a duty requires as a condition, inter alia, that the Injury or offense committed be
the unavoidable or necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty (People vs.
Oanis, et.al., 74 Phil. 257). It is not enough that the accused acted in fulfillment of a duty.
After Jun-Jun was shot in the right leg and was already crawling, there was no need for
Pat, Reyes to shoot him further. Clearly, Pat. Reyes acted beyond the call of duty which brought
about the cause of death of the victim.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense
1992 No. 3:
As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special
Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his revolver at
Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong,
Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol, shot and wounded
Yabang.
a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was
there conspiracy and treachery? Explain.
b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested
Answer:
a)The acts of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito are justified under pars. 1 and 2 of Article 11, RPC, that
is, self-defense or defense of a stranger, as they have reason to suspect that Yabang might not
be satisfied in killing Sergio ONLY, the three being friends and companions of the victim.
Hence, they are entitled to protect their own lives and limbs from the unlawful aggression of
Yabang. Alternatively they have the justified right to defend a stranger (Sergio) whose life at
that moment might still be saved by ganging up on Yabang to prevent the latter from any
further attack by the latter. In either case reasonable necessity of the means employed and lack
of sufficient provocation are present
b)Yabang is liable for Homicide for the killing of Sergio as the attack was frontal (Alternative:
Murder, because of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in terms of
weapon). Sergio, being a suspected killer, is no justification to be killed by Yabang (People vs.
Oanis).
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense
1977 No. I-a
When A saw B rushing towards him holding a bolo and poised to strike him, he immediately
picked up a pointed iron bar and believing that his life was in danger as B was close enough, he
made a trust on B hitting him on the stomach which caused the death of B thereafter. The truth,
however, is that B was merely trying to play a joke on C who was then behind A. Is A
criminally liable for the death of B? State your reasons.
Answer
A is not criminally liable because he acted in self-defense due to mistake of facts. As the facts
of the problem state, A thrust the pointed iron bar on B, hitting him on the stomach as he
believed that his life was in danger because B was close enough when he rushed towards A
holding a bolo and poised to strike him. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488). Under the
circumstances, he had no time or opportunity to verify whether B was only playing a joke on C
who was behind
A. Hence, his mistake of the facts was without fault or carelessness. He had no alternative but
to take the facts as they appeared to him to justify his act. So A acted in good faith without
criminal intent.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1978 No.
IV-b
B repeatedly stabbed A with a kitchen knife. A managed to escape with minor injuries, and to
run away from B who continued to pursue him. A, upon reaching the safety of his house, took
a scythe with which to defend himself against B. Thus armed, A went out of his house and
dared B to come forward and fight. In the ensuing struggle, A killed B. Charged with
homicide, A claimed self-defense. Is A entitled to the justifying circumstance? Decide and
give your reasons.
Answer:
A is not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There is no unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim B. There are two stages in the fight. The first stage was when B
stabbed A repeatedly with a kitchen knife, who managed however to escape and ran away,
pursued by B. When A reached the safety of his house, he was already safe from the unlawful
aggression of B and so such was deemed to have ceased. When A took a scythe inside his
house and while thus armed he went out of his house and dared B to come forward and fight,
be became therefore the challenger. From the facts, a struggle ensued, which implies that the
challenge of A was accepted by B, which is an agreement to fight and hence there can be no
unlawful aggression. (People vs. Astilla, CA- GR No. 4391 6 Velayo's Digest, page 124).
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1979 No.
VI
X, a private citizen, saw two masked men break into a drug store across his home. He
telephoned the police to come. Without waiting for the police, he went outside his house with
a pistol and tried to intercept the thieves. He told them to stop but they did not. He fired
several shots at them, wounded them and caused their hospitalization for 20 days. May the
thieves file any criminal case against X? May X invoke the defense of the person or rights of a
stranger?
Answer
The thieves can file a criminal action against X. In defense of the person or property of a
stranger, the elements of (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the person defending must not be induced by
revenge, resentment or any other evil motive, must be present. In self-defense of property, the
doctrine is that the attack on the property must be coupled with an attack upon the person of
the possessor of the property. (People vs. Apolinar, CA 38 O.G. 2870). The same rule should
apply to defense of the property of a stranger since the first two elements of defense of a
stranger are also the first two elements of self-defense, that is unlawful aggression and
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or to repel it. The means employed by
X in firing several shots at the thieves was not reasonable as there was no attack upon the
person of the owner of the drugstore or of any person present therein. Nor can there be
defense of the person of a stranger since unlawful aggression is absent.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1980 No.
III
"F" and "G" quarreled. "F" attacked "G" with a club two or three times, but "G" was able to
parry the attack. "G" did not move backwards but struck back
hitting "F" on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up from the ground, causing "F's"
death.
"G" was charged with Homicide. If you were the Judge, would you find "G" guilty as
charged?
Answer
If the term "quarreled" implies an agreement to a fight, G would be guilty of the crime charged.
He cannot invoke, self-defense because if there is an agreement to fight there would be no
unlawful aggression. Any attack is considered as a mere consequence of the agreement to fight.
On the other hand, if the word "quarreled" involves only a verbal altercation, G would not be
guilty because F committed unlawful aggression when he attacked G three times with a club.
When G struck back hitting F on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up on the ground,
he acted in self-defense because the aggression of F was still present and the pipe was the only
means available to him in defending his person as he was acting under the instinct of self-
preservation. The assumption is that G did not give any sufficient provocation which
immediately preceded the attack made by F.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1981 No. 3
"A" is the wife of "B", but she and "X", her former boyfriend, were having an illicit relation.
One afternoon, "B", unnoticed by "A", followed his wife to a motel and saw her enter a room
and close the door. After the lapse of some minutes, "B" managed to get in and found "A" and
"X" lying together in bed. With his knife, "B" lunged at "X " but the latter parried the thrust
and was able to wrest the weapon from "B" and stabbed the latter to death.
Prosecuted for Homicide, "X" invoked the justifying circumstance of self- defense in killing
"B".
Would you uphold the defense? Explain briefly. Answer
X cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. An essential requisite of
self-defense is unlawful aggression. The act of B in assaulting X when he found him and A,
B's wife, lying together in bed in a room of the motel is natural and lawful, as it was made by
B, the deceived and offended husband in order to defend his honor and rights. X should have
known that having illicit relations with A, a married woman, X being her former boy friend,
he was performing an unlawful and criminal act that would expose him to the vengeance of
the offended husband. The act of B in assaulting X under the circumstances cannot constitute
unlawful aggression (U.S. vs. Merced 39 Phil. 198). Furthermore, in view of his illicit
relations with A, B's wife, and the situation in which B found them, lying together in bed,
would constitute sufficient provocation to B for him to attack X. The third requisite of self-
defense which is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is,
therefore, also absent.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1982 No. 2
"A", intending to kill "B", attacked the latter with a bolo. "In trying to defend himself with a
piece of wood by parrying the blows delivered by "A", "B" hit "C", an onlooker, on the head,
as a result of which "C" died. Is "B" liable for "C'"s
death under the legal provisions that "although the wrong done be different from that
intended?" Explain your answer.
Answer
B is not liable for C's death because he acted in self-defense. The legal provision that "although
the wrong done be different from that intended" contemplates the commission of a felony and
the wrong done is the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof even though not intended.
Had B acted in incomplete self-defense, then this provision would apply, because there is
mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus. In the case of self-defense, however, which is a
justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, hence B would not incur any criminal or
civil liability.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1982 No. 3
"A" intending to kill "B", shot the latter with a gun at close range. Although hit but not mortally
wounded, "B" grappled with "A" for the possession of the gun until "B" succeeded in wresting
it from his adversary. Immediately thereafter, "B" fired the gun at "A" whom he killed.
Prosecuted for homicide, "B" interposed self- defense. The prosecution however contended
self-defense was untenable because "A" had already been disarmed. Decide, explaining fully
your decision.
Answer
The contention of the prosecution that self-defense was untenable because A had already been
disarmed must be sustained. The reason is there is no more aggression to be prevented or
repelled. Upon almost identical facts, in the case of People vs. Dayag et al, 98 SCRA 851
(1980) the Supreme Court held that as the victim was killed after the accused had wrested the
gun from the former, since there was no more aggression to stop or repel as the victim was shot
and killed when he was already unarmed and defenseless, self-defense cannot be invoked,
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1985 No. 9
Feeling homesick and terribly missing his wife after a long absence, Ronald, without notice,
came home from Saudi. Arriving at their residence, he immediately proceeded to their bedroom
where he saw his wife lying on their bed under a mosquito net locked in embrace with his
compadre Dante Ayala He immediately drew his gun but was beaten to a draw by Dante whose
bullet felled him.
Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald, Dante set up self-defense but was nevertheless
convicted.
(A) Comment on the validity of Dante's conviction.
(B) In the above given case, supposing Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife, while Dante
was on top of the latter, thus killing both of them, will you grant him the benefit of Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain.
Answer:
(A) The conviction of Dante was valid. He cannot claim self-defense as there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. When Ronald drew his gun upon surprising
his wife locked in embrace with his compadre Dante
while lying on their bed at their residence, his act was natural and lawful as it was made by a
deceived and offended husband. The act of Dante in maintaining illicit relations with the wife
of his compadre was unlawful. (U.S. v. Merced 89 Phil. 189).
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense
1987 No. VII:
Pedro confronted Jose one morning near the latter's house and angrily inquired why he let
loose his carabaos which destroyed his plants. Pedro saw that Jose was armed with a dagger
tucked on his waist and thinking that Jose would react violently. Pedro immediately drew his
revolver. Instinctively, Jose grabbed the gun from Pedro's hand and a struggle for possession
of the gun ensued, as a result of which the gun was thrown one meter away. Pedro jumped for
the gun, and Jose unsheathed his dagger and stabbed Pedro at the base of his neck, causing the
latter to fall down. Jose ran away as he was afraid Pedro's relatives might kill him. He was
apprehended three days later in another barrio. Fortunately, Pedro survived after 40 days of
hospitalization. The gun turned out to be without live bullets. During the trial for frustrated
homicide against Jose, Pedro testified that he drew his gun even while he knew it had no
bullets, merely to scare Jose, and he jumped for it when it was thrown away for the same
purpose. Jose pleaded self-defense. The Fiscal argued that Jose's act of running away is
evidence of guilt and negates self-defense. He also said that, in any event, there was no
reasonable necessity of the means employed namely, stabbing with a dagger - because
Pedro's gun had no bullets.
Decide the case.
Answer:
Jose is entitled to self-defense.
Considering the circumstance of the case, unlawful aggression, the first element of self-
defense is present. Pedro loose his carabaos which destroyed his plants and he then loose his
carabaos which destroyed his plants and then immediately drew his revolver which Jose
instinctively grabbed from Pedro's hand. In the struggle for the possession for the revolver, it
was thrown one meter away, and when Pedro jumped for the gun, Jose unsheathed his dagger
and stabbed Pedro who fell down. Jose ran away. The intimidating attitude of Pedro when he
drew his revolver constitutes imminent unlawful aggression. Jose did not give any
provocation to Pedro. Pedro was in a violent mood and in the mind of Jose, was armed, with
revolver, in hand, and what Jose did in grabbing the gun was to prevent an aggression that is
expected (People vs. Domingo CA 13 Rep. 1355). Stabbing Pedro with a dagger was the only
available means to prevent the expected aggression considering that Jose acted by following
his instinct of self-preservation. The flight of Jose after stabbing Pedro cannot be considered
as evidence of guilt because he did so as he was afraid the relatives of Pedro might kill him.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense
1993 No. 11
1] Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate, escaping from jail and ordered the latter to surrender.
Instead of doing so, Filemon attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear, Filemon missed In his
first attempt to hit Pat. Negre, and before he could strike again, Pat. Negre shot and killed him.
Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain.
2) Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot, and Filemon ran away without parting with his
weapon. Pat Negre pursued Filemon but the latter was running so fast that Pat Negre fired
warning shots Into the air shouting for Filemon to
stop. Inasmuch as Filemon continued running Pat, Negre fired at him hitting and killing him.
Is the plea of self-defense sustainable? Why would you then hold Pat, Negre criminally liable?
Discuss.
Answer;
1) Yes. self-defense can be claimed as there is an Imminent and great peril on the life of Negre.
2) No, self-defense is no longer sustainable as there is no more peril on his life; Yes, excessive
force Is used.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of honor 1998
No XV.
One night, Una, a young married woman, was sound asleep in her bedroom when she felt a
man on top of her. Thinking it was her husband Tito, who came home a day early from his
business trip, Una let him have sex with her. After the act, the man said, "I hope you enjoyed
it as much as I did." Not recognizing the voice, it dawned upon Lina that the man was not
Tito, her husband. Furious, Una took out Tito's gun and shot the man. Charged with homicide
Una denies culpability on the ground of defense of honor. Is her claim tenable? [5%]
Answer:
No, Una's claim that she acted in defense of honor, is not tenable because the unlawful
aggression on her honor had already ceased. Defense of honor as included in self-defense,
must have been done to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. There is no defense to speak
of where the unlawful aggression no longer exists.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of honor 2002 No XV.
A. When A arrived home, he found B raping his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away.
A took his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, A claimed he acted in defense
of his daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any mitigating
circumstance or circumstances? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's honor in having killed B since the
rape was already consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence, there was no aggression
to defend against and no defense to speak of.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of a grave offense to a descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1983 No. 2
Considering that the Revised Penal Code provisions on justifying circumstances apply to
anyone "who acts in defense of his person or rights," can there be self-defense when there is
simply an aggression against one's property, not coupled with an attack against his person?
Explain.
Answer
No. Self-defense will be incomplete. Under the Civil Code there is unlawful aggression on the
property rights of another. But to constitute self-defense of property two other elements must
be considered, namely, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression and
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending his property. People v.
Apolinar (38 O.G. 2079 ) held that there is no self-defense of property if the attack on the
property is not coupled with an attack on the person of the owner or possessor of the property.
If for example, the owner shot the aggressor altho his person was not attacked, self-defense of
property will not be present, altho there is unlawful aggression on his property right, because
the means adopted to repel the aggression is not reasonable. (People vs. Navaez (1983) 121
SCRA 403)
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1996 No. 6:
1) A security guard, upon seeing a man scale the wall of a factory compound which he was
guarding, shot and killed the latter. Upon investigation by the police who thereafter arrived at
the scene of the shooting, it was discovered that the victim was unarmed. When prosecuted for
homicide, the security guard claimed that he merely acted in self-defense of property and in
the performance of his duty as a security guard.
If you were the judge, would you convict him of homicide? Explain. Answer:
1) Yes. I would convict the security guard for Homicide if I were the Judge, because his claim
of having acted in defense of property and in performance of a duty cannot fully be Justified.
Even assuming that the victim was scaling the wall of the factory compound to commit a crime
inside the same, shooting him is never justifiable, even admitting that such act is considered
unlawful aggression on property rights. In People vs. Narvaes, 121 SCRA 329, a person is
justified to defend his property rights, but all the elements of self-defense under Art. 11, must
be present. In the instant case, just like in Narvaes, the second element (reasonable necessity of
the means employed) is absent. Hence, he should be convicted of homicide but entitled to
Incomplete self-defense.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1977 No. II-b
While C was approaching his car, he saw D slowly driving it away. So he shouted at D
to stop but D instead accelerated his speed. To prevent his car from being car-napped, C drew
at once hit revolver and fired at D who was by then about twenty meters away, fatally hitting
him on the head. When charged for the death of D, C interpose the defense of his rights to
property. If you were the judge, will you acquit or convict C? State your reason.
Answer
If I were the Judge, I would convict C. There is no defense of his right to property
because although D drove the car of C away and he did not stop in spite of his shouts for him
to do so, D had not attacked him. To be entitled to complete self-defense of property, the
attack on the property must be coupled with an attack upon the person of the owner or
possessor of said property. (People vs. Apolinar, CA 38 O.G. 2870).
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property

Page 50 of 374
1990 No. 4:
In the middle of the night, Enyong heard the footsteps of an intruder inside their house. Enyong
picked up his rifle and saw a man, Gorio, with a pistol ransacking Enyong's personal effects in
his study. He shot and killed Gorio.
a) Is Enyong criminally liable for killing the robber Gorio? State your reasons.
b) Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he was running away from Enyong's house with his
television set, what is Enyong liable for? Explain your answer.
Answer;
a) Enyong is not criminally liable because he was acting in defense of property rights. Under the
case of People v. Narvaez (G.R Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 389} defense of
property need not necessarily be coupled with aggression against persons.
b)There is criminal liability this time with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. Under the case of People v. Narvaez, defense of property can be availed of even
when there is no assault against a person. It is recognized as an unlawful aggression.
Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; unlawful aggression & mistake of
fact
2003 No II
The accused lived with his family in a neighborhood that often was the scene of frequent
robberies. At one time, past midnight, the accused went downstairs with a loaded gun to
investigate what he thought were footsteps of an uninvited guest. After seeing what appeared to
him an armed stranger looking around and out to rob the house, he fired his gun seriously
injuring the man. When the lights were turned on, the unfortunate victim turned out to be a
brother- in-law on his way to the kitchen to get some light snacks. The accused was indicted for
serious physical injuries. Should the accused, given the circumstances, be convicted or
acquitted? Why? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The accused should be convicted because, even assuming the facts to be true in his
belief, his act of shooting a burglar when there is no unlawful aggression on his person is not
justified. Defense of property or property right does not justify the act of firing a gun at a
burglar unless the life and limb of the accused is already in imminent and immediate danger.
Although the accused acted out of a misapprehension of the facts, he is not absolved from
criminal liability.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Considering the given circumstances, namely; the frequent robberies in the
neighborhood, the time was past midnight, and the victim appeared to be an armed burglar in
the dark and inside his house, the accused could have entertained an honest belief that his life
and limb or those of his family are already in immediate and imminent danger. Hence, it may
be reasonable to accept that he acted out of an honest mistake of fact and therefore without
criminal intent. An honest mistake of fact negatives criminal intent and thus absolves the
accused from criminal liability.

Page 51 of 374
Art 11; Justifying vs exempting circumstances 1978 No.
II-b
Justifying and exempting circumstances have some similar effects but are different concepts.
Discuss their similarities and distinctions.
Answer
In justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, and the actor does not incur any
criminal nor civil liability. In an exempting circumstance, a crime is committed but there is
absent in the person of the offender any of the elements of voluntariness, and so he is not
criminally liable but is civilly liable except in the exempting circumstances of accident and
lawful or insuperable cause. To recapitulate, in a justifying circumstance, the act is lawful and
hence, there is no crime committed. In an exempting circumstance, the actor does not incur
any criminal nor civil liability. In an exempting circumstance, the offender is not criminally
liable because the act is not committed voluntarily but he is civilly liable because the source
of the obligation which is the crime is present.
Art 11; Justifying vs exempting circumstances 1998 No
IV
1. Distinguish between justifying and exempting circumstances. [3%] Answer;
1. In justifying circumstances:
a) The circumstance affects the act, not the actor;
b) The act is done within legal bounds, hence considered as not a crime;
c) Since the act is not a crime, there is no criminal;
d) There being no crime nor criminal, there is no criminal nor civil liability. Whereas, in
an exempting circumstances:
a) The circumstance affects the actor, not the act;
b) The act is felonious and hence a crime but the actor acted without voluntariness;
c) Although there is a crime, there is no criminal because the actor is regarded only as an
instrument of the crime;
d) There being a wrong done but no criminal, there is civil liability but no criminal liability.
Art 11; Mistake of fact 1977
No. I-a
When A saw B rushing towards him holding a bolo and poised to strike him, he immediately
picked up a pointed iron bar and believing that his life was in danger as B was close enough, he
made a trust on B hitting him on the stomach which caused the death of B thereafter. The truth,
however, is that B was merely trying to play a joke on C who was then behind A. Is A
criminally liable for the death of B? State your reasons.
Answer
A is not criminally liable because he acted in self-defense due to mistake of facts. As the facts
of the problem state, A thrust the pointed iron bar on B,
hitting him on the stomach as he believed that his life was in danger because B was close
enough when he rushed towards A holding a bolo and poised to strike him. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong,
15 Phil. 488). Under the circumstances, he had no time or opportunity to verify whether B was
only playing a joke on C who was behind
A. Hence, his mistake of the facts was without fault or carelessness. He had no alternative but
to take the facts as they appeared to him to justify his act. So A acted in good faith without
criminal intent.
Art 11; Mistake of fact 1988
No. 10:
(b) Five laborers were hired by Manuel Diong to harvest coconuts from a plantation which he told
them belonged to him. Unknown to them, the ownership of the land was in dispute, and the
registered owner subsequently filed a case of qualified theft against them.
How would you defend them? Explain briefly.
Answer:
b) I would defend them by citing U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488) on mistake of facts
and charge the owner with violation of Article 282 on grave threats. In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, the
accused was exempted from criminal liability because he performed an act which would be
lawful had it been true as he believed that "Grave, threats. Any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of
any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer. ..".
Art 11; Mistake of fact 1985
No. 6
Pat. Josue, a member of the INP Western Police District, together with two
(2) other policemen, was chasing Katindig, a notorious police killer. Katindig entered a nearby
dimly lighted warehouse. Josue and his companions continued pursuing him. When they
reached the mezzanine, Josue saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes, holding what
appeared to be a long rifle. When the man suddenly stood up and faced Josue and his
companions, Josue fired at the man hitting him fatally. It turned out, however, that the deceased
was the warehouseman who was holding a mere lead pipe.
Discuss Pat. Josue's criminal liability for the said killing stating your reasons.
Answer:
Patrolman Josue will not incur any criminal liability. He can invoked in his favor mistake of
facts due to good faith. Under the circumstances, Patrolman Josue shot the victim in the honest
belief that he was the notorious police-killer whom they were chasing until he entered a dimly
lighted warehouse. In the mezzanine of the warehouse, Patrolman Josue saw a man crouching
behind a pile of boxes holding what appeared to be a long rifle. The patrolman fired at the man
when he suddenly stood up and faced him. He had no opportunity to verify first the identity of
the victim before acting. He acted, therefore, without criminal intent and had the facts turned
out to be true, as Patrolman Josue believed them to be, that is, that the victim was the notorious
police-killer, that act committed would be lawful.
Art 11; Qualifying circumstances as elements of a crime 2003 No
IV.
(b) When would qualifying circumstances be deemed, if at all, elements of a crime?
4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b). A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an element of a crime when -
1). it changes the nature of the crime, bringing about a more serious crime and a heavier penalty;
2). it is essential to the crime involved, otherwise some other crime is committed; and
3). it is specifically alleged in the Information and proven during the trial.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A qualifying circumstance is deemed an element of a crime when it is specifically
stated by law as included in the definition of a crime, like treachery in the crime of murder.
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; accident 1981 No.
1
"A" and "B", both civilian guards, were seated inside the guardhouse. While "A" was
cleaning his service pistol, "B" snatched it. In the ensuing struggle for the possession of the
weapon. "A" succeeded in wresting it from the hand of "B". But then the pistol exploded with
the bullet hitting the breast of "C", another civilian guard, who died as a consequence of the
gunshot wound.
Is "A " criminally liable for the death of "C''? Why?
Answer
A is not criminally liable. Since his service pistol was snatched by B, in trying to regain its
possession, A was in the lawful exercise of a right. When A succeeded in wresting the pistol
from the hand of B and it exploded with the bullet hitting C, A cannot incur any criminal
liability as he was performing a lawful act. Even under the Civil Code, he is justified to employ
reasonable force to repel the unlawful deprivation of his property, (Art. 429, Civil Code).
Criminal intent is not present nor is there negligence under the circumstances. The death of C
was, therefore, accidental. (People vs. Bindoy 56 Phil. 15).
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; accident 1989 No.
2:
Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's gun, a high-powered M-16 rifle, to hunt wild pigs. Nicandro
was accompanied by his friend, Felix. On their way to the hunting ground, Nicandro and Felix
met Pedro near a hut, Pedro told them where to hunt. Later, Nicandro saw a pig and then shot
and killed it. The same bullet, however, that killed the pig struck a stone and ricocheted hitting
Pedro on his breast. Pedro later died. May Nicandro be held liable for the death of Pedro?
Explain.
Answer:
Nicandro may be held liable for the death of Pedro. While Pedro's death would seem to be
accidental, the requisites of exempting circumstance of accident are not all present. Said
requisites are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it (Art. 12, par. 4, RPC).
When Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's high powered M-16 rifle and used it for hunting wild
pigs, he committed the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as he does not appear to have
either a license to possess a high-powered gun or to carry the same outside of his residence. At
the time he shot at the wild pig, therefore, Nicandro was not performing a lawful act.
Furthermore, considering that the M-16 is a high-powered gun. Nicandro was
negligent in not foreseeing that bullets fired from said gun may ricochet.
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; Article 332
2000 No XI
A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night out with his friends, took the
coconut shell which is being used by B as a bank for coins from inside their locked cabinet
using their common key. Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their home in the
presence of his friends.
What is the criminal liability of A, if any? Explain. (3%)
Is A exempted from criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for
being a brother of B? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) A is criminally liable for Robbery with force upon things.....
b) No, A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because said Article applies only to
theft, swindling or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery.
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; insanity 1991 No.
7:
A raped X. In the process, X resisted and slapped A. Angered, A grabbed a stone and hit X. She
was dying when A consummated the sexual attack. A psychiatrist from the National Center for
Mental Health testified that he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations on
A and found him to be suffering from a mental disorder classified under organic mental
disorder with psychosis. A's father testified that A was playful but cruel to his brothers and
sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for low sums, wandered naked sometimes, and
oftentimes did not come home for extended periods of time. The prosecution on the other hand,
presented an array of witnesses to prove A that was lucid before and after the crime was
committed and that he acted with discernment. After trial, the court convicted the accused and
sentenced him to "life imprisonment" considering that under the Constitution death penalty
could no longer be imposed.
Given the conflicting testimonies as to sanity of the accused, was the trial court correct in
ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstances in this case? Is the sentence of "life
imprisonment" a correct imposition of penalty?
Answer:
Yes, the court is correct in ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstance. While there was
testimony that A was suffering from a metal disorder, the testimony of A's father disclosed that
A had lucid intervals. Because what is presumed is sanity, not insanity, it is to be presumed that
A was sane when he committed the crime. Consequently, evidence being wanting that A is
completely deprived of reason at the moment of committing the crime, he should
be liable. Besides, the crime committed and the acts done by the accused in the commission of
the crime hardly reconciles with Insanity of the offender, as rape presupposes evident
premeditation.
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; minority 1998 No
IV
2. John, an eight-year old boy, is fond of watching the television program "Zeo Rangers."
One evening while he was engrossed watching his favorite television show, Petra, a maid
changed the channel to enable her to watch "Home Along the Riles." This enraged John who
got his father's revolver, and without warning, shot Petra at the back of her head causing her
instantaneous death. Is John criminally liable? [2%]
Answer;
2. No, John is not criminally liable for killing Petra because he is only 8 years old
when he committed the killing. A minor below nine (9) years old is absolutely exempt from
criminal liability although not from civil liability. (Art. 12, par. 2, RPC).
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; minority 2000 No
IV
While they were standing in line awaiting their vaccination at the school clinic, Pomping
repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate in
Grade 5 at the Sampaloc Elementary School. Irritated, Katreena turned around and swung at
Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the ball pen hit the right eye of Pomping which bled
profusely. Realizing what she had caused. Katreena immediately helped Pomping. When
investigated, she freely admitted to the school principal that she was responsible for the injury
to Pomping's eye. After the incident, she executed a statement admitting her culpability. Due to
the injury. Pomping lost his right eye.
a) Is Katreena criminally liable? Why? (3%)
b) Discuss the attendant circumstances and effects thereof. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
a) No, Katreena is not criminally liable although she is civilly liable. Being a minor less than
fifteen (15) years old although over nine (9) years of age, she is generally exempt from
criminal liability. The exception is where the prosecution proved that the act was committed
with discernment. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with
discernment.
The presumption is that such minor acted without discernment, and this is strengthened
by the fact that Katreena only reacted with a ballpen which she must be using in class at the
time, and only to stop Pomping's vexatious act of repeatedly pulling her ponytail. In other
words, the injury was accidental.
b) The attendant circumstances which may be considered are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting circumstance under Article
12. paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code, where she shall be exempt from criminal liability, unless it was
proved that she acted with discernment. She is however civilly liable;
2. If found criminally liable, the minority of the accused as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
A discretionary penalty lower by at least two (2) degrees
than that prescribed for the crime committed shall be imposed in accordance with Article 68.
paragraph 1, Rev. Penal Code. The sentence, however, should automatically be suspended in
accordance with Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 8369 otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act
of 1997";
3. Also if found criminally liable, the ordinary mitigating circumstance of not Intending to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under Article 13, paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code;
and
4. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act.
Art 12; Exempting circumstances; uncontrollable fear 1979 No.
V
X, engaged in illegal gambling, was accused of bribing Y, a policeman. X's defense was fear
of reprisal from the police in case of non-payment of bribe money. He testified that when he
attempted to stop giving bribe money to Y, the police raided his establishment without warrant
for half a dozen times. Y also threatened to plant incriminating evidence on him. X was also
manhandled by Y on the pretext of resisting arrest. X would park his police jeep in front of his
house obviously to drive away his regular customers. X's defense is that he bribe Y under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Please decide.
Answer
X's defense that he bribed Y, a policeman, under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury, is untenable. This exempting circumstance can be appreciated if a
person is compelled to commit a crime by another through intimidation. It is also essential
that the person intimidated must not have any opportunity for escape or to avoid the threat.
The facts of the problem show that X could have easily reported to the authorities the alleged
acts of harassment committed by the policeman. Lastly, the fear must not be speculative or
fanciful but must be actual or real. All the acts testified to by X do not show any actual or
direct intimidation on the part of Y in case of non-payment of the bribe.
Art 12; Minority; effect on accuseds liabilities 1984 No.
2
In what specific ways does the Revised Penal Code exhibit due regard for the minority of an
accused;
(a) in the determination of is criminal liability
(b) in the determination of the degree of his culpability
(c) in the imposition of penalties upon him Answer:
A, Furnished by Office of Justice Palma (a) Re: Criminal liability of a
minor
Under Art. 12 of the RPC: A person under nine years of age is exempt
from criminal liability.
A person over nine years of age and under fifteen is also exempt from criminal liability, except
when he acts with discernment in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Art. 80 of the RPC, which suspends the
sentence of minor delinquents. Under Art. 80 of RPC, whenever a minor under 16 years of
age at the date of the commission of the offense, a grave or less grave felony, is accused
thereof, the court after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing
judgment of conviction shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to
the custody or care of a public or private benevolent or charitable institution, established under
the law for the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent
children, or to the custody or care of any responsible person until such minor shall have
reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper.
However, under P.D. 1179, which amended P.D. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code),
which in turn, under Articles 189 and 192, thereof {P.D. 603), amended Art. 80 of RFC, the
suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offenders covers minors over nine years
and under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense who acts with
discernment. If he acts without discernment, then he is exempt from criminal liability.
(b) Re: Degree of Culpability
Minority is treated as a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 of the RPC, Under said article, a
minor is a person under 18 years of age, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Article 80 (as amended by P.D. 603, as amended by P.D,
1179.)
But the rule is now settled that minority under 18 years is a privileged mitigating circumstance
under Art 68 of the RPC, which provides for the imposition of penalty one or two degrees
lower than that prescribed for the offense.
(e) Re: Imposition of Penalties on Minors Article 68 of RPC provides:
When the offender is a minor under 18 years and his case is one coming under the provisions
of the Code (RPC), the following rules shall be observed:
1.Upon a person under 15 but over 9 years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason
of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that provided by law for the crime
which he committed.
2.Upon a person over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
The provisions of P.D. 603, as amended by P.D. 1179, on suspension of penalties in the
case of youthful offenders (under 18) are also applicable.
A. Comments and Suggested Answer
The specific ways provided by the Revised Penal Code regarding the minority of an accused
follow:
a) In the determination of his criminal liability
A minor 9 years of age and under at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from
criminal liability,
A minor over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime is also exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted with discernment. (Art. 12,
Rev. Penal Code as amended by Art. 189, P.D. 603 amended by P.D. 1179)
A minor 15 years and under 21 years of age is dealt with like an adult offender:
(b) In the determination of his degree of culpability
A minor under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to a
privileged mitigating circumstance, (Art. 68 Rev. Penal Code, People vs. Jose et a! (1975) 71
SCRA 273). A minor 18 years and under 21 years of age is not entitled to a mitigating
circumstance, whether ordinary or privileged.
c) In the imposition of the penalty
A minor over 9 years and under 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
who acted with discernment, is entitled to a discretionary penalty lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime committed. If he is 15 years and under 18 years of
age, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed in the proper period.
Under P.O. 603 as amended by P.D. 1179, the imposition of the sentence may be suspended
upon the application of the minor if found guilty after trial. If granted by the court, the minor is
ordered committed to an institution until he reaches the age of majority. If the minor during
confinement has been found to be incorrigible, he is returned to the court for the
pronouncement of the sentence. He shall be credited in the service of the sentence the full time
spent in actual confinement and detention in said institution. The benefit of this provision shall
not apply to a minor who has already enjoyed suspension of sentence nor to one convicted of
an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. The minor is under 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime (P.D. 1179) and at the time of the trial (People vs.
Casiguran L 43387, Nov. 7, 1979) Art 80 of the Rev. Penal Code has been expressly repealed
by Presidential Decree 1179 which amended Presidential Decree 603. Under Art. 189 thereof
said minor who acted with discernment shall be proceeded against under Art, 192 of said
Presidential Decree as amended.
Art 12; Minors; liability 1995
No. 7:
Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the
store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky
complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly
Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death.
Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran
out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as
Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor
and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was
17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the
houses of Victor and Ricky.
1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie.
Answer:
1. All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The acts of
Ricky in stabbing Mang Pandoy to death, of Rod in .boxing the salesgirl to prevent her from
helping Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in chasing the

Page 60 of 374
salesgirl to prevent her in seeking help, of Victor in scooping up money from the cash box,
and of Ricky and Victor in dashing to the street and announcing the escape, are all indicative
of conspiracy.
The rule is settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery
with homicide, unless the accused tried to prevent the killing (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA
218). Further, the aggravating circumstance of craft could be assessed against the accused for
pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy,
Although Rod is only 14 years old, his act of boxing Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang
Pandoy is a clear sign of discernment, thus he cannot invoke exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 3, RPC. Rod and Ronnie are, however, entitled to two and one degrees
lower, respectively from the penalty of the principal under Art. 68. RPC.

Page 61 of 374
Mitigating Circumstances
Art 13; Mitigating and aggravating; when not considered 1975 No.
VI
In what cases are mitigating and aggravating circumstances not
considered in the imposition of the penalty?
Answer
a) If the penalty is single and indivisible.
b) If the offense is punished by a special law.
c) If the penalty provided in an ordinance is a fine.
d) In felonies committed by negligence or imprudence.
e) If the offender is a Muslim or a non-Christian, (Sec. 106, Rev, Adm. Code; People v. Moro
Disim-ban, L-1746, Jan. 31, 1951).
Art 13; Mitigating circumstance; voluntary surrender 1996 No.
3
1)Hilario, upon seeing his son engaged in a scuffle with Rene, stabbed and killed the latter. After
the stabbing, he brought his son home. The Chief of Police of the town, accompanied by
several policemen, went to Hilario's house, Hilario, upon seeing the approaching policemen,
came down from his house to meet them and voluntarily went with them to the Police Station
to be investigated in connection with the killing. When eventually charged with and convicted
of homicide, Hilario, on appeal, faulted the trial court for not appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Is he entitled to such a mitigating
circumstance? Explain.
Answer:
1} Yes, Hilario is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The crux of the
Issue is whether the fact that Hilario went home after the incident, but came down and met the
police officers and went with them is considered "Voluntary surrender," The voluntariness of
surrender is tested if the same is spontaneous showing the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities. This must be either (a) because he acknowledges his
guilt, or (b) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his
search and capture. (Reyes' Commentaries,
p. 303). Thus, the act of the accused in hiding after commission of the crime, but voluntarily
went with the policemen who had gone to his hiding place to investigate, was held to be
mitigating circumstance.(People vs. Dayrit, cited in Reyes' Commentaries, p. 299)
Art 13; mitigating circumstance; voluntary surrender 1999 No I
When is surrender by an accused considered voluntary, and constitutive of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A surrender by an offender is considered voluntary when it is
spontaneous, indicative of an intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities.
To be mitigating, the surrender must be:
(a) spontaneous, i.e., indicative of acknowledgment of guilt and not for convenience nor
conditional;
(b) made before the government incurs expenses, time and effort in tracking down the offender's
whereabouts; and
(c) made to a person in authority or the latter's agents.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; analogous circumstances 1979 No. IV
X is charged with (1) assaulting a policeman, and (2) serious physical injury thru reckless
imprudence. The prosecution evidence shows that X, while driving his car, ran through a red
light, hit a bystander along a street curve that caused his hospitalization for more than 30 days
and when arrested by a policeman, assaulted the arresting officer. The defense evidence shows
that three (3) days before the incident, X saw a doctor for treatment of a recurring back
problem. He was prescribed valium. X declared that on the day of the incident, the valium had
strange effects on him and that he completely lost control of himself. A medical expert
testified that drowsiness, fatigue, ataxia, and confusion are the normal side effects of valium.
He added that hyperexcitability, though rare, was a possible side effect. If you were the judge,
how would you decide the case?
Answer
If I were the judge, I would hold X criminally liable. Loss of control of X as a result of the
administration of the valium is not an exempting circumstances since there is no deprivation
of freedom of action nor of intelligence. At most X would be entitled to a mitigating
circumstance analogous to passion or illness since there is loss of self-control and reason.
(Art. 13, par. 10).
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; applicability in special laws 1981 No.
6
An accused was charged with Illegal Possession of a caliber .45 pistol. Upon arraignment, he
pleaded "guilty" to the charge and invoked his plea as a mitigating circumstance.
Can the court consider that plea as a mitigating circumstance in imposing the proper penalty
on him? Why?
Answer
The plea of guilty cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance. Alleged possession of a
firearm is punished by a special law. The imposition of the penalty provided in a special law
rests upon the discretion of the court. Furthermore, the plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, is appreciated only in a divisible penalty. It
cannot be applied to a penalty which is indeterminate, that is, not divisible into periods of
fixed duration, which is the penalty provided in special laws like the law punishing illegal
possession of firearms.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; applicability in special laws 1989 No. 8:
Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the
offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years. Upon
arraignment, he entered the plea of guilty.
a) In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied?
b) If you were the judge trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres?
Answer:
The plea of guilty cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in this case. The
imposition of the indeterminate penalty in a special law rests upon the discretion of the court.
Also, the pleas of guilty as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code is
appreciated only in a divisible penalty. It cannot be applied to a penalty which is not divisible
into periods of fixed duration, like the penalty provided in special laws.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; immediate vindication 1988 No.
13:
(a) The victim Dario went to the Civil Service Commission at about 11:00
a.m. to have some documents signed, and because his efforts were frustrated, he angrily remarked in
the presence of the accused Benito that the Civil Service Commission is a hang-out of thieves.
The accused felt alluded to because he was then facing criminal and administrative charges
on several counts involving his honesty and integrity, and pulling out a gun from his desk, he
shot Dario, inflicting a fatal wound. Benito is now invoking the mitigating circumstances of
immediate vindication of grave offense.
Decide the case.
Answer:
(a) The mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication of grave offense cannot be considered
because to be applicable, Article 13 par. 5 requires that: "Mitigating circumstances. xxxx 5.
That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito) his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees."
Instead, the circumstances of passion or obfuscation should be considered. Benito
should be charged with frustrated homicide with the mitigating circumstances of passion.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; immediate vindication 2000 No
II
Osang, a married woman in her early twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the floor of
their nipa hut beside the seashore when she was awakened by the act of a man mounting her.
Thinking that it was her husband, Gardo,who had returned from fishing in the sea, Osang
continued her sleep but allowed the man, who was actually their neighbor, Julio, to have sexual
intercourse with her. After Julio satisfied himself, he said "Salamat Osang" as he turned to
leave. Only then did Osang realize that the man was not her husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed
a balisong from the wall and stabbed Julio to death. When tried for homicide, Osang claimed
defense of honor. Should the claim be sustained? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Osang"s claim of defense of honor should not be sustained because the aggression on
her honor had ceased when she stabbed the aggressor. In
defense of rights under paragraph 1, Art. 11 of the RPC, It is required inter alia that there be
(1) unlawful aggression, and (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it. The unlawful aggression must be continuing when the aggressor was injured or
disabled by the person making a defense.
But if the aggression that was begun by the injured or disabled party already ceased to
exist when the accused attacked him, as in the case at bar, the attack made is a retaliation, and
not a defense. Paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Code does not govern.
Hence, Osang's act of stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was finished, is
not defense of honor but an immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her,
which is only mitigating.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; incomplete self-defense 1990 No. 4:
In the middle of the night, Enyong heard the footsteps of an intruder inside their house.
Enyong picked up his rifle and saw a man, Gorio, with a pistol ransacking Enyong's personal
effects in his study. He shot and killed Gorio.
a) Is Enyong criminally liable for killing the robber Gorio? State your reasons.
b) Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he was running away from Enyong's house with his
television set, what is Enyong liable for? Explain your answer.
Answer;
a) Enyong is not criminally liable because he was acting in defense of property rights. Under the
case of People v. Narvaez (G.R Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 389} defense of
property need not necessarily be coupled with aggression against persons.
b)There is criminal liability this time with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. Under the case of People v. Narvaez, defense of property can be availed of even
when there is no assault against a person. It is recognized as an unlawful aggression.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; minority 1985
No. 1
Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor
offender to a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be considered
as a mere ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be immediately sentenced
and made to serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of being placed under suspended
sentence.
Discuss.
Answer
Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition of the
penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time of the
commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon conviction. So
under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as amended) a minor under
18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial, if found
guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the sentence. The only instance where
there is no suspension of the sentence in spite of minority is that provided in Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code where the minor under 16 years old at the time of the commission of a
light felony if found guilty, the sentence is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been
expressly repealed by Presidential Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a
matter of fact, the Supreme Court held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there
are only two instances where there can be no suspended sentence, to wit: 1) if the offense
committed by a minor is punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2) if the minor is 18 years
and above at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; minority; vindication 1993 No.
18:
B, who is blind in one eye, conspired with M, a sixteen year old boy, with C, who had been
previously convicted of Serious Physical Injuries, and with R, whose sister was raped by X a
day before, to kill the latter. B, C and R were armed with .38 caliber revolvers, while M
carried no weapon and acted only as a look out. They proceeded to the house of X riding in a
motorized tricycle. Thereupon, C, on instruction of B to give X no chance, shot X who was
then sleeping. Indicted for Homicide, as the information alleges no qualifying circumstance,
specify the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, and explain In whose favor, and
against whom, must they be considered.
Answer:
1. Mitigating circumstances:
a) B is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 8 of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code;
b) M is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code;
c) Vindication of a grave offense in favor of R because his sister was raped by X a day before the
shooting, and even if there was an interval of one [1) day between the rape and the killing.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; no intent to commit so grave a wrong;
intoxication
2000 No XIV
Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing
during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in
Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their
celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered
firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's
refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing
lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's
yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious
and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated
argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight,
Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down
Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and
nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started
started throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that
he would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with
Jaja's
.45caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was
following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously,
a) What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%)
b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you
set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%)
c) If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide
because a single act caused a less grave and a grave felony (Art. 48. RPC)....
b) If I were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, I will use the following defenses:
(1) That the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as they
merely intended to frighten Jepoy;
(2) That Jonas committed the crime in a state of intoxication thereby impairing his will power or
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his act. Non-intentional intoxication is a mitigating
circumstance (People us. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600 (1997); Art. 15, RPC.).
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; plea of guilty 1999 No
X
(a) In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating, what requisites must be complied with? (2%)
(b) An accused charged with the crime of homicide pleaded "not guilty" during the preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Court. Upon the elevation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court the Court of competent jurisdiction, he pleaded guilty freely and voluntarily upon
arraignment. Can his plea of guilty before the RTC be considered spontaneous and thus
entitle him to the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty under Art. 13(7),
RPC? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the requisites are:
1. That the accused spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged;
2. That such plea was made before the court competent to try the case and render judgment; and
3. That such plea was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
(b) Yes, his plea of guilty before the Regional Trial Court can be considered spontaneous, for
which he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. His plea of not guilty
before the Municipal Court is immaterial as it was made during preliminary investigation only
and before a court not competent to render judgment.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; plea of guilty and voluntary surrender 1997 No 5:
After killing the victim, the accused absconded. He succeeded in eluding the police
until he surfaced and surrendered to the authorities about two years later. Charged with
murder, he pleaded not guilty but, after the prosecution had presented two witnesses
implicating him to the crime, he changed his plea to that of guilty.
Should the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty be considered in
favor of the accused?
Answer;
1. Voluntary surrender should be considered as a mitigating circumstance. After two years, the
police were still unaware of the whereabouts of the accused and the latter could have
continued to elude arrest. Accordingly, the surrender of the accused should be considered
mitigating because it was done spontaneously, indicative of the remorse or repentance on the
part of said accused and therefore, by his surrender, the accused saved the Government
expenses, efforts, and time.
Alternative Answer:
Voluntary surrender may not be appreciated in favor of the accused. Two years is too long a
time to consider the surrender as spontaneous (People us. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658). For sure the
government had already incurred considerable efforts and expenses in looking for the accused.
2. Plea of guilty can no longer be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because the
prosecution had already started with the presentation of its evidence (Art. 13, par. 7. Revised
Penal Code).
Art 13; Mitigating; voluntary surrender; plea of guilty 1992 No.
5
Upon learning that the police wanted him for the killing of Polistico, Jeprox decided to
visit the police station to make inquiries. On his way, he met a policeman who immediately
served upon him the warrant for his arrest. During the trial, in the course of the presentation of
the prosecution's evidence, Jeprox withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty.
Can he invoke the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
Jeprox is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as his going to the
police station was only for the purpose of verification of the news that he is wanted by the
authorities. In order to be mitigating, surrender must be spontaneous and that he acknowledges
his guilt.
Neither is plea of guilty a mitigating circumstances because it was qualified plea;
besides, Art. 13, par. 7 provides that confession of guilt must be done before the prosecution
had started to present evidence.
Aggravating Circumstances
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances 1996 No.
2:
2)Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning,
robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living.
While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one
of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a
thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the
house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his
family.
a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit? Explain.
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the
latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what
crime did the four commit? Explain.
c) Under the facts of the case, what aggravating circumstances may be appreciated against the
four? Explain.
Answer:
2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex
crime of Robbery with Rape...
b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because the killings were by reason (to prevent
identification) and on the occasion of the robbery. The multiple rapes committed and the fact
that several persons were killed [homicide), would be considered as aggravating
circumstances. The rapes are synonymous with Ignominy and the additional killing
synonymous with cruelty, (People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA; People vs. Plaga, 202 SCRA 531)
c) The aggravating circumstances which may be considered in the premises are:
i) Band because all the four offenders are armed;
ii) Noctumity because evidently the offenders took advantage of nighttime;
iii) dwelling; and
iv) Uninhabited place because the house where the crimes were committed was
"at a desolate place" and obviously the offenders took advantage of this circumstance
in committing the crime.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of confidence 1981 No. 5
"H" and "W" are husband and wife living in an apartment within the University belt. They
took in "S", a male student-townmate, as a boarder. Before long, "W" and "S" fell in love with
each other until one day "H" caught them in bed.
If you were the Investigating Fiscal to whom "H" complained, what aggravating circumstance
or circumstances would you allege in your Information for Adultery against "W" and "S"?
Why?

Page 70 of 374
Answer
If I were the Fiscal, I would allege as an aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed with abuse of confidence. Evidently, S was taken in as a boarder by the spouses M
and W because he was their townmate. Such engendered trust and confidence in the
relationship of the Spouses with S. By committing adultery with W, abuse of confidence was
availed of by S in the commission of the crime, since he took advantage of the favorable
position in which he was placed by the injured party as boarder in their house. (U.S. vs.
Barbicho 12 Phil. 616).
Dwelling cannot be alleged as an aggravating circumstance because the wife and the paramour
were living in the same house where they had a right to be. (U.S. vs. Distrito et al 23 Phil. 23).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of superior strength 1978 No. III-
b
A wealthy 65-year old landed proprietor (haciendero) with failing eyesight and
defective hearing who has been a tubercular patient for the last 10 years, was robbed and
killed in cold blood while asleep. A was found guilty as principal, B and C as his accomplices.
In passing sentence, the judge considered abuse of superior strength as aggravating
circumstance correctly appreciated against the three. Explain.
Answer:
There is no abuse of superior strength since A participated in the commission of the
crime as principal and B and C as accomplices. This is inconsistent, since the offenders did
not take advantage of their combined strength in the commission of the crime. (People vs.
Cortes, 56 Phil. 143).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of superior strength; dwelling 1976 No. I-a
At about midnight, A, the accused, attacked fatally an unarmed, 4 feet, 11 inches girl with a
hunting knife while she was alone in her room. What aggravating circumstance or
circumstances were present in the commission of the crime? Reason.
Answer
Abuse of superior strength and dwelling. There is abuse of superior strength because
the girl was defenseless since she was unarmed and A was armed with a hunting knife, which
is a deadly weapon. The abuse of superiority of A lies in his sex and the weapon he used,
from which the woman would be unable to defend herself (U.S. u. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612).
Dwelling is also an aggravating circumstance because the girl was attacked in her room. The
facts of the problem do not show that she has given any provocation. (People v. Pakah, 81
Phil. 426),
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty 1985 No 4
A case of MURDER was filed against MN for killing XY, solely on the basis of a finding that
XY sustained more than 200 stab wounds, only three of which were fatal.
Discuss the propriety of the charge filed against MN. Answer:

Page 71 of 374
The charge for Murder against MN is not tenable. Any qualifying circumstance of murder
cannot be inferred but must be proved satisfactorily and conclusively as the act itself. The fact
that the victim sustained more than 200 stab wounds, of which only three were fatal, does not
indicate cruelty as a qualifying circumstance of murder. Cruelty requires deliberate
prolongation of suffering of the victim. The number of wounds in itself does not show cruelty
as it is essential to prove that the wounds were inflicted unnecessarily while the victim was
alive to prolong his physical suffering. In cruelty, the wrong done in the commission of the
crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission of
the crime. Cruelty cannot be presumed (People vs. Artienda 90 SCRA 944).
Scoffing or outraging at the corpse of the victim cannot also be invoked as the facts do not
show that wounds were inflicted when the victim was already dead or in what part of the body
were the wounds inflicted. Besides, being a qualifying circumstance, it cannot also be
presumed.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty 1988
No. 13:
(b) The robbers killed a mother and her baby, then threw the body of the baby outside the
window.
Can the aggravating circumstances of "cruelty" be considered in this case? Reasons.
Answer:
(b) Cruelty cannot be considered in this case because the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
requires deliberates prolongation of the suffering of the victim. In this case, the baby was dead
already so that there is no more prolongation to speak of.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty; relationship
1994 No. 8:
Ben, a widower, driven by bestial desire, poked a gun on his daughter Zeny, forcibly undressed
her and tied her legs to the bed. He also burned her face with a lighted cigarrete. Like a
madman, he laughed while raping her.
What aggravating circumstances are present in this case? Answer;
a) Cruelty, for burning the victim's face with a lighted cigarrete, thereby deliberately augmenting
the victim's suffering by acts clearly unnecessary to the rape, while the offender delighted and
enjoyed seeing the victim suffer in pain (People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316).
b) Relationship, because the offended party is a descendant (daughter) of the offender and
considering that the crime is one against chastity,
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime,
unlawful entry
1997 No. 3:
The accused and the victim occupied adjacent apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit
of one big house. The accused suspected his wife of having an illicit relation with the victim.
One afternoon, he saw the victim and his wife together on board a vehicle. In the evening of
that day, the accused went to
bed early and tried to sleep, but being so annoyed over the suspected relation between his wife
and the victim, he could not sleep. Later in the night, he resolved to kill victim. He rose from
bed and took hold of a knife. He entered the apartment of the victim through an unlocked
window. Inside, he saw the victim soundly asleep. He thereupon stabbed the victim, inflicting
several wounds, which caused his death within a few hours.
Would you say that the killing was attended by the qualifying or aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime and unlawful entry?
Answer:
1. Evident premeditation cannot be considered against the accused because he resolved to kill the
victim "later in the night" and there was no sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution, to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
2. Treachery may be present because the accused stabbed the victim while the latter was sound
asleep. Accordingly, he employed means and methods which directly and specially insured
the execution of the act without risk himself arising from the defense which the victim might
have made (People vs. Dequina. 60 Phil. 279 People vs. Miranda, et at. 90 Phil. 91).
3. Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no showing that the accused deliberately
sought or availed of nighttime to Insure the success of his act. The Intention to commit the
crime was conceived shortly before its commission (People vs Pardo. 79 Phil, 568).
Moreover, nighttime is absorbed in treachery.
4. Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as the accused
entered the room of the victim through the window, which is not the proper place for entrance
into the house (Art. 14. par. 18. Revised Penal Code, People vs. Baruga 61 Phil. 318).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; generic vs qualifying 1984 No.
13
From the standpoint of legal, effect and weight, how would you distinguish generic
aggravating from qualifying circumstances?
Answer:
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
which is not so in qualifying circumstance.
2. A qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the
information whereas a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even though not
alleged.
3. A generic aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to the maximum hut not beyond that
provided by law, whereas a qualifying aggravating circumstance changes the nature and even
the name of the offense to one more serious.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
Generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances are distinguished as to legal effect and
weight, as follows:
1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
which is not so in a qualifying circumstance.
2. A qualifying circumstance cannot be proved unless alleged in the information whereas a
generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even though not alleged.
3. A generic aggravating not offset has the effect of increasing the penalty to the maximum but
not beyond that provided by law. A qualifying circumstance changes not only the nature but
also the name of the crime and the offender becomes liable for the new offense which is more
serious in nature.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; kinds 1999 No
IX
(a) Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances and state their effect on the penalty of
crimes and nature thereof. (3%)
(b) Distinguish generic aggravating circumstance from qualifying aggravating circumstance.
(c) The charge against the accused was raised to murder on the basis of the allegation in the
Information of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation both of
which circumstances were supported by evidence. Murder was proved during the trial but the
accused proved the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Should the accused be entitled to the minimum of the penalty for murder?
(3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can generally apply to all crimes, and
can be offset by mitigating circumstances, but if not offset, would affect only the maximum of
the penalty prescribed by law;
2. Specific aggravating or those that apply only to particular crimes and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances:
3. Qualifying circumstances or those that change the nature of the crime to a graver one, or brings
about a penalty next higher in degree, and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances;
4. Inherent aggravating or those that essentially accompany the commission of the crime and does
not affect the penalty whatsoever.
(b) Generic aggravating circumstances:
1. affects only the imposition of the penalty prescribed, but not the nature of the crime committed;
2. can be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances;
3. need not be alleged in the Information as long as proven during the trial, the same shall be
considered in imposing the sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
1. must be alleged in the Information and proven during trial;
2. cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances;
3. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; must be alleged in the information 2000 No VI
b) Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho fraternity, was killed by Pocholo, a member of the
rival group, Sigma Phi Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for homicide before the Regional Trial
Court in Binan, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution was able to prove that the killing was
committed by means of poison in consideration of a promise or reward and with cruelty. If you
were the Judge, with what crime will you convict Pocholo? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Pocholo should be convicted of the crime of homicide only because the
aggravating circumstances which should qualify the crime to murder were not alleged in the
Information.
The circumstances of using poison, in consideration of a promise or reward, and cruelty
which attended the killing of Rico could only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances since none of them have been alleged in the information to qualify the killing to
murder. A qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the Information and proven beyond
reasonable doubt during the trial to be appreciated as such.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; need to be alleged
1982 No. 18
"A" is prosecuted for homicide under proper information. At the time of the trial, it was
established that the crime was committed with treachery, premeditation, at nighttime and with
abuse of superior strength.
(a) If you were the judge, what crime should you convict "A" of? Why?
(b) How would you dispose of the circumstances stated above?
Answer
(b) Treachery, premeditation, nighttime, abuse of superior strength do not appear to be
alleged in the information. Treachery, (which absorbs nighttime and abuse of superior
strength) and evident premeditation will be considered as generic aggravating circumstances.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; nighttime; band
1994 No. 9:
At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street,
Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but
suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino.
Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino
died,
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide.
1) Is there conspiracy in this case?
2) Can the court appreciate the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band?
Answer:
2) No, nighttime cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no
indication that the offenders deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the
commission of the crime or that they took advantage of nighttime (People vs. De los Reyes,
203 SCRA 707). Besides, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Padre Faura Street is well-
lighted.
However, band should be considered as the crime was committed by more than three armed
malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court decision, stones or rocks are considered deadly
weapons.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism 2001 No
III
Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft
when he was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last case, the trial Judge
considered against the accused both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The accused
appealed and contended that in his last conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him a
finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency are correctly
considered in this case because the basis of recidivism is different from that of habitual
delinquency.
Juan is a recidivist because he had been previously convicted by final judgment for theft
and again found guilty for Robbery With Homicide, which are both crimes against property,
embraced under the same Title (Title Ten, Book Two] of the Revised Penal Code. The
implication is that he is specializing in the commission of crimes against property, hence
aggravating in the conviction for Robbery With Homicide.
Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty when an offender is
convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is correctly considered ...
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism
1983 No. 8
Three persons A, B and C were found guilty of homicide. Each of them had been
previously convicted of an offense: A for robbery; B for estafa; and C for frustrated murder.
In the homicide case, against whom may the aggravating circumstance of recidivism be
appreciated. Why?
Answer
Only against C. The reason is homicide for which A, B and C were found guilty is embraced
in the same title of the Code as frustrated homicide, for which C had been previously
convicted. Recidivism is a personal cause which should affect only C to whom it is attendant.
(Art. 62, par. 3)
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs habitual delinquency 1986
No. 5:
Give at least four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism. Can a person be a
habitual delinquent without being a recidivist? Explain.
Answer:
The four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism are:
1. In habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, which are robbery, theft, estafa, falsification,
serious and less serious physical injuries. In recidivism, the crimes are embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code.
2. In recidivism, no period of time is fixed between the former conviction and the last
conviction. In habitual delinquency, conviction of any of
the specified crimes must take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release.
3. In recidivism, it is enough that there be a second conviction of any crime embraced in the same
title of the last or the first crime. In habitual delinquency, there must be at least a third
conviction of any of the specified crimes.
4. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance and if not offset serves to increase the penalty.
Habitual delinquency provides for the imposition of an additional penalty.
There may be habitual delinquency without recidivism if the three convictions refer to crimes
not embraced in the same title Code, like, robbery in the first conviction, a crime against
property, falsification, the second conviction, a crime against public interest and serious
physical injuries, the third conviction, a crime against persons.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs habitual delinquency 1983 No. 3
X already had three previous convictions by final judgment for theft when he was found guilty
of robbery with homicide. In the last case, the trial judge considered against X both recidivism
and habitual delinquency,
X appealed, contending that conviction for one crime cannot twice be considered against the
accused, once for the purpose of using it as basis for a finding of recidivism, and again, to
establish habitual delinquency.
Resolve with reasons.
Answer
The appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency have different legal
effects. In the conviction for robbery with homicide, recidivism is appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because the previous convictions for theft are embraced in the same
title of the Code as robbery with homicide, which are crimes against property. Habitual
deliquency is also considered because of the three previous convictions by final judgment for
theft, for the imposition of the additional penalty.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs quasi-recidivism 1998 No
VIII.
2. Distinguish between recidivism and quasi-recidivism. [2%] Answer:
2. In recidivism -
a) The convictions of the offender are for crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal
Code; and
b) This circumstance is generic aggravating and therefore can be effect by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
Whereas in quasi-recidivlsm -
a) The convictions are not for crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code,
provided that it is a felony that was committed by the offender before serving sentence by
final judgment for another crime or while serving sentence for another crime; and
b) This circumstance is a special aggravating circumstance which cannot be offset by any
mitigating circumstance.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism; habituality
1989 No. 4:
Andres was earlier convicted of adultery and served an indeterminate penalty, the maximum
term of which did not exceed two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correctional. A month after his release from prison, he was charge with the crime of serious
physical injuries. Later, Andres was again charged with homicide punishable by re-elusion
temporal. He entered a plea of guilty in the homicide case. May the aggravating circumstances
of recidivism and/or habituality (reiteracion) be appreciated against Andres? Explain.
Answer:
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism cannot be taken against Andres, For this
circumstance to exist, it is necessary that
1. The offender is on trial for an offense;
2. He was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime;
3. Both the first and second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code; and
4. The offender is convicted of the new offense (Art. 14, par. 9 RPC).
At the time of his trial for homicide, Andres was not previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Adultery, which is his only
previous conviction by final judgment is a crime against chastity, and therefore is not embraced
in the same title of the Code as homicide, which is a crime against person.
As for the charge of serious physical injuries, although serious physical is also a crime against
person, it appears that he had not as yet been convicted, much less by final judgment, of the
charge at the time that he was facing trial for homicide.
The aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion can likewise not be taken against
Andres because in order that this circumstance can exist, it is necessary that he was facing trial
for homicide.
The aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion can likewise not be taken against
Andres because in order for this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that
1. The accused is on trial for an offense;
2. He previously served sentence for another offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty, or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty than that for the new
offense;
3. He is convicted of the new offense.
In the case at bar, Andres had previously served sentence only for one offense, that of adultery,
but the penalty for adultery (prison correctional) is lighter than the penalty for homicide
(reclusion-temporal). Consequently, there is no aggravating circumstance of habituality or
reiteracion.

Page 80 of 374
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism; motor vehicle; treachery 1993
No. 18:
B, who is blind in one eye, conspired with M, a sixteen year old boy, with C, who had been
previously convicted of Serious Physical Injuries, and with R, whose sister was raped by X a
day before, to kill the latter. B, C and R were armed with .38 caliber revolvers, while M
carried no weapon and acted only as a look out. They proceeded to the house of X riding in a
motorized tricycle. Thereupon, C, on instruction of B to give X no chance, shot X who was
then sleeping. Indicted for Homicide, as the information alleges no qualifying circumstance,
specify the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, and explain In whose favor, and
against whom, must they be considered.
Answer:
2. Aggravating circumstances:
a) The aggravating circumstance of recidivism under paragraph 9, Article 14 should be considered
against C if alleged in the Information (People vs. Peter Cadevida, et al, G.R No. L-94528.
March 1, 1993).
b) The aggravating circumstance of motor vehicle under paragraph 20 of Article 14 of the Code,
all the accused having used a motorized tricycle;
c) Treachery should be aggravating against all of the accused including M who acted as a lookout
because all of them were present when X was shot [Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code). X was sleeping when shot to death.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery
1979 No. XI
X was slapped by Z in front of many people. X went to his house, got a knife and waited for Z
who was gambling in the upper floor of a house. When Z came down the house, X approached
him from behind to stab him. Somebody shouted to warn Z and Z was able to turn around on
time to parry the stab of X. The two fought each other until Z, while in process of retreating,
fell in a canal, face upward. X then mounted him and succeeded in stabbing Z fatally. Is there
treachery?
Answer
Treachery is not present While it is true that X approached Z from behind to stab him, Z,
however, was not deprived of any opportunity to defend himself because of the warning from
somebody and as a matter of fact because of it he was able to turn around in time to parry the
stab of X. He was not deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. The stabbing of the victim
by X who mounted him when he fell in a canal face upward as a result of the fight which
followed when the victim was able to parry the stab of X does not constitute treachery since it
was a mere continuation of the fight. It was spontaneous and a mere incident of the fight,
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery
1980 No. XV
In the course of a fight, the accused assaulted the victim with a knife inflicting upon the latter a
serious- cut on his left arm prompting the said victim to run and flee. He was pursued by
the accused. After having fled for a short

Page 81 of 374
distance, the victim fell on the ground, face downward, and before he could stand, the
accused delivered a fatal stab with his knife on the back of the victim.
What crime did the accused commit? Answer
Since the accused assaulted the victim with a knife in the course of a fight, it cannot be said
that the attack was treacherous because the victim would have been placed on his guard.
(People, vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473; People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCKA 345). Besides, from the
location of the wound of the victim, which was on his left arm, it can reasonably be inferred
that the attack was frontal. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved conclusively as
the crime itself. So, the inception of the attack was not attended by treachery. When the victim
after having been seriously wounded ran and was pursued by the accused, fell on the ground,
face downward, was fatally stabbed on the back, the accused acted spontaneously. The stabbing
at the back was a continuation of the fight, and if the fight is continuous, even if treachery is
present at the latter stage of the fight, treachery cannot be appreciated as attendant (People vs.
Canete, 44 Phil. 478).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery 1984 No.
14
Aside from the procedural requirements, what are the other requisites for treachery to be
considered as a qualifying circumstance?
Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
1. By employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offenders
safety front any defensive retaliatory act on the part of the offended party.
2. By the fact that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
chosen.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
The other requisites of treachery as a qualifying circumstance aside from the procedural
requirements are:
1.Employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offender's
safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means no
opportunity is given to the latter to defend himself or retaliate, and
2.Such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. (People
vs, Barnayo, L-64164, June 22, 1934, 129 SCRA 725),
Art 14; Aggravating Circumstances; treachery 1993 No.
6:
As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden
and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied
Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists;
and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury
Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe,
Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal blow.
1) Would you sustain his claim? Why?
2) What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with reasons.
Answer;
1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and
hence, liable collectively. ...
2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery because the offenders, taking advantage
of their superiority in number, rendered the victim defenseless and without any chance to
retaliate, by tying his hands at his back before attacking him. Treachery exists at least in the
second and final stage of the attack, after the offenders caught up with the victim.
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery & abuse of superior strength 1992
No. 3:
As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special
Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his revolver at
Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong,
Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol, shot and wounded
Yabang.
a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was
there conspiracy and treachery? Explain.
b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested
Answer:
a) Treachery cannot likewise be appreciated as there was no conscious adoption of means,
methods or form to facilitate the commission of the felony.
b) Yabang is liable for Homicide for the killing of Sergio as the attack was frontal (Alternative:
Murder, because of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in terms of
weapon). Sergio, being a suspected killer, is no justification to be killed by Yabang (People vs.
Oanis).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery, nighttime, superior strength and
uninhabited place
1982 No. 6
"A", a suitor of girl "B", saw the latter at about midnight walking along a dark and deserted
alley near her house. "A" sneaked up to her, grabbed her breasts from behind, kissed her, and
at the same time raised her dress. At that moment, a noise was heard frightening "A", who
immediately ran away.
If you were the fiscal, for what crime would you prosecute "A"? Would you allege treachery,
nighttime, superior strength and uninhabited place as aggravating circumstances? Reasons.
Answer
The crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. Stealthily kissing, embracing and fondling the
breast of complainant and raising her dress constitute lewd or lascivious acts. (People vs.
Yabut, CA G.R, No. 2550-R Aug. 5, 1960). More so, as the acts were committed at
midnight and in a dark and
deserted alley altho near the house of the girl. Treachery is not present because this aggravating
circumstance applies only to crimes against persons. Acts of lasciviousness is a crime against
chastity. Nighttime is not present because the facts do not show that the accused took advantage
of the darkness of the night to facilitate the commission of the crime to insure immunity from
capture. Superior strength is not aggravating because mere physical superiority is not taking
advantage of superior strength. It is necessary to prove the relative strength of the parties
(People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil 385). Uninhabited place is also not present because the place of the
commission of the crime was near the house of the offended party and the fact that A heard
some noise which frightened him show that the place was not uninhabited. Besides, the facts do
not show that the place was purposely chosen for the easy and uninterrupted accomplishment
of the crime (People vs. Luneta et at., 45 O.G. 2832).
Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery; evident premeditation; nocturnity
1991 No 10:
In an information for Murder against A, B, and C, the prosecution alleges Treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and the following generic aggravating circumstances: (l) nocturnity.
(2) abuse of superior strength, and (3} employing means to weaken the defense. At the trial, the
prosecution, without objection from the de oficio counsel for the accused, proved evident
premeditation. It likewise successfully proved the qualifying and the generic aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information.
a) For the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon the accused, may
the court take into account evident premeditation and the other generic aggravating
circumstances?
Answer:
a) Yes, as far as evident premeditation is concerned, but only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
Since treachery absorbs nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and employing means to weaken
the defense, they can no longer be considered as additional circumstances.
b) Supposing that treachery was not proved, may evident premeditation, which was duly proved,
be considered as the qualifying circumstances?
Answer:
b) No, since it was not alleged in the information; qualifying circumstances not alleged if proved
during trial will only be considered as generic.
c) If the prosecution failed to prove treachery and did not offer any evidence to prove evident
premeditation, does acquittal of the accused follow?
Answer;
c) No, but liability will only be for homicide, as there is no circumstances to qualify it to
murder.
Alternative Circumstances
Art 15; Alternative circumstances; intoxication
1978 No. VII-b
A, not being used to liquor, became drunk at a party. When he reached home, with the help of
his friends, B, and C, his wife .W berated him so harshly, and a violent quarrel ensued. He
squeezed her neck, banged her head against the wall and kicked her repeatedly in the stomach.
The next day, W vomitted profusely and died thereafter. Cause of death was established to be
hemorrhage cause by A's assault upon his wife. During the trial, A's counsel argued that A did
not have the intention to kill his wife and alleged intoxication as an exempting circumstance.
Decide with reasons.
Answer
The intoxication was not habitual as A was not used to liquor. He only became drunk during a
party and so the intoxication was not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is not
exempting but an alternative mitigating circumstance. Since intoxication involves loss of
reason and self-control, A could not have any intention to kill his wife. A is liable for parricide.
The mitigating circumstances of intoxication and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that which resulted cannot, however, be appreciated in his favor to lower the penalty by one
degree because the penalty for parricide consists of two single and indivisible penalties which
are reclusion perpetua to death. (Art 246; Art. 63, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Monleon, 74
SCR A 263).
Art 15; Alternative circumstances; intoxication 2002 No
I
A was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After having had a drink too many, A and B had a
heated argument, during which A stabbed B. As a result, B suffered serious physical injuries.
May the intoxication of A be considered aggravating or mitigating? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The intoxication of A may be prima facie considered mitigating since it was merely
incidental to the commission of the crime. It may not be considered aggravating as there is no
clear indication from the facts of the case that it was habitual or intentional on the part of A.
Aggravating circumstances are not to be presumed; they should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt
Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies
Art 16; Degree of participation 1976
No. II-a
X, after promising Y to give him P10,000.00, induced the latter (Y) to kill Z, who at
the time was vacationing in an isolated island in the sea which can easily be reached by a boat
W, who owns the only motor boat in the locality, offered to transport and actually transported
Y to said island. Upon reaching the island, Y killed Z, Indicate whether X, Y and W is a
principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime. Reason.
Answer
X is a principal by inducement. By promising to give Y P10.00 to kill Z, which is an agreement
for a consideration, the inducement was made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime. Further, the facts show that Y has no personal reason to kill Z except
the inducement, which is therefore, the determining cause for the commission of the crime by
Y. (People v. Kiichi, 61 Phil. 609).
Y is a principal by direct participation because he killed Z pursuant to the inducement or
agreement for a consideration and he, therefore, personally took part in the execution of the act
constituting the crime, (Art. .17) par. 1).
W is neither a principal nor an accomplice. Although W offered and actually transported y to the
island where Z was vacationing as he owns the only motor boat in the locality, the facts of the
problem do not show that W has any knowledge of the criminal design nor purpose of Y. To
be a principal by indispensable cooperation, it is essential that there be either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of
the crime. This means participation in the same criminal resolution of Y, the principal by
direct participation. W is not a principal by direct participation because he did not participate
directly in the execution of the act constituting the crime. Clearly, he also is not a principal by
inducement because he did not induce Y to kill Z. W is not an accomplice because he has also
no knowledge of the criminal design of Y, the principal by direct participation. If W has
knowledge of the criminal purpose of Y then he will be a principal by indispensable
cooperation because he cooperated in the commission of the crime by Y, which is the
transporting of Y to the island in his boat which is the only one in the locality, without which
the crime would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17, par. 3).
Art 16; Degree of participation 1984
No. 1
A kidnapped a boy and demanded a ransom of P100,000 from the boy's parents. In
time, the ransom was paid and the victim was released.
When X (A's adopted sister) learned that A was being hunted by the police for
kidnapping, she took him into her house and concealed him. A was thus able to elude the
police.
Did X incur any criminal responsibility? Explain. Answer.
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
X has no criminal liability. She is not a principal because she did not take part in the commission
of the act, or induce another to commit, or cooperated in the commission of the offense by another
act without which it will not have been accomplished. (Art. 17, 12 RPC).
Neither is she an accomplice because she did not cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18).
She is not also an accessory because, although she harbored, or concealed or assisted in the
escape of the principal, the crime is not treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life
of the Chief Executive or the author thereof is known to be habitually guilty of same other
crime (Art, 19 (3): R.P.C.).
A. Comments and Suggested Answer
X did not incur any criminal liability. X learned that A was being hunted by the police for
kidnapping and so being an adopted sister, she took A in her house and concealed him, thus
enabling him to elude the police. X cannot be a principal nor accomplice because her
participation is subsequent to the commission of the crime. Being a private person, she is also
not an accessory, as the crime of kidnapping is not included among the cases, where such
private person harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime who is guilty
of treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief Exe-cutive or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. (Art. 19, par. 3, Revised Penal Code),
Art 16; Degree of participation 1987
No I:
Juan had a land dispute with Pedro for a number of years. As Juan was coming down his
house, he saw his brother, Rodolfo attack Pedro with a bolo from behind. Rodolfo was about
to hit Pedro a second time while the latter was prostrate on the ground, when Carling, Pedro's
son, shouted, "I'll kill you." This distracted Rodolfo who then turned to Carling. Rodolfo and
Carling fought with their bolos. While the two were fighting, Juan shouted to his brother
Rodolfo: "Kill them both, they are our enemies," Carling suffered a number of wounds and
died on the spot. Pedro who was in serious condition was rushed to the hospital. He died five
days later for loss of blood because the blood purchased from Manila which could have saved
him, according to the doctor, did not arrive on timer Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, told his
sons to hide in Manila and he gave them money for the purpose. When the police investigators
saw Jose, he told the police investigators that Juan and Rodolfo went to Mindanao.
What crimes, if any, did (a) Rodolfo, (b) Juan and (c) Jose commit? Explain your answer and
state whether the acts committed are accompanied by circumstances affecting criminal liability.
Answer:
a)Rodolfo committed murder regarding the killing of Pedro since Pedro was attacked from
behind. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The mode of
attack deprived Pedro of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. Rodolfo is also liable for
homicide regarding the killing of Carling, Pedro's son. as that is the result of a fight, both of
them being armed with bolos.
Although Pedro died five days later, since the blood purchased which would have saved him
did not arrive on time, Rodolfo is still liable for the death of Pedro as that is the direct, natural
and logical result of the wound inflicted by him.
b)Juan, the brother of Rodolfo, has no criminal liability. What he shouted to Rodolfo "Kill them
both, they are our enemies," when Rodolfo and Carling were fighting, was not the only reason
why Carling was killed; and hence, he cannot be a principal by inducement. The doctrine is to
be a principal by inducement, the inducement must be the only reason why the crime is
committed. (People vs. Kiichi et. al. 61 Phil. 609).
c)Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, is an accessory to the crime of murder committed by Rodolfo
because he assisted him to escape to Manila. But he is not criminally liable because of his
relationship to Rodolfo (Article 20). He is not an accessory to the crime of homicide, because
this crime is not included in treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief
Executive or the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime if the
accessory is a private person. However, this is moot and academic because of the relationship
of Jose to Rodolfo.
Art 16; Degree of participation 1989
No. 15:
Emilio and Andres were walking home from the farm at 8:00 o'clock in the evening
when they met Asiong whom Emilio suspected as the one who stole his fighting cock two (2)
days before; Emilio confronted Asiong and after a heated discussion, a bolo fight between the
two (2} ensued. Asiong sustained fatal wounds and died. Emilio asked Andres to help him
carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes. After burying Asiong, Emilio picked
up tbe jute bag Asiong was then holding and found inside P600 which Emilio and Andres
divided each getting P300. A week after the investigation by the police, a complaint was filed
in the Office of Provincial Fiscal against Emilio and Andres for robbery with homicide with
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place. If you were the fiscal, what
information or informations will you file against Emilio and Andres? What are their respective
criminal liabilities?
Answer:
If I were the fiscal, I would file two separate informations against Emilio and Andres, one for
homicide with Emilio as principal and Andres as accessory, and another for theft against both
Emilio and Andres as principals. This is so because of the following reasons:
1. The killing of Asiong by Emilio is homicide. It is not attended by any qualifying circumstance
of murder. It was a killing at the spur of the moment, in the course of a bolo fight, as an
aftermath of a heated discussion.
2. Neither was the killing by reason of or on the occasion of a robbery. There was no intention of
either Emilio or Andres to rob Asiong either prior to or in the course of the killing. The taking
of Asiong's P600 was only an AFTERTHOUGHT, after the killing was already perpetrated.
There is no causal or other connection between the act of killing and the act of taking the
money-
3. Andres is liable as an accessory in the homicide case because he had no participation either as
co-principal or accomplice in the killing of Asiong who died solely because of the wounds
inflicted on him in his bolo-fight with Emilio, the principal. However, when Andres agreed to
help Emilio carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes, thus concealing or
destroying the body of the crime (corpus delicti) to prevent its discovery, he became an
accessory to the crime of homicide (Art. 19, RPC),
4. With respect to the taking of the P600.00 which Emilio and Andres divided between
themselves, they committed the crime of theft as co-principals. Theft because with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons no force upon things, they took
personal property of another without the latter's consent. They acted with unity of purposes
and intention, thus making them co-principals by direct participation..
Art 16; Degree of participation 1994
No. 6:
Tata owns a three-storey building located at No. 3 Herran Street. Paco, Manila. She wanted to
construct a new building but had no money to finance the construction. So, she insured the
building for P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for monetary consideration, to
bum her building so she could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and Yongsi burned the
said building resulting to its total loss.
1) What crime did Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi commit?
2) What is their respective criminal liability? Answer:
1) Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi committed the crime of destructive arson because they collectively
caused the destruction of property by means of fire under the circumstances which exposed to
danger the life or property of others (Art, 320, par. 5, RPC. as amended by RA No. 7659).
2) Tata is a principal by inducement because she directly induced Yoboy and Yongsi, for a price or
monetary consideration, to commit arson which the latter would not have committed were it
not for such reason. Yoboy and Yongsi are principals by direct participation (Art. 17, pars. 21
and 3, RPC).
Art 16; Degree of participation 2000
No XIV
Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing
during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in
Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their
celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered
firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's
refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing
lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's
yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious
and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated
argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight,
Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down
Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and
nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started
started throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that
he would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with
Jaja's
.45 caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was
following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously,
a) What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%)
b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you
set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%)
c) If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with
homicide ...
c) I would convict Jonas as principal by direct participation and Jaja as co-principal by
Indispensable cooperation for the complex crime of murder with homicide. Jaja should be held
liable as co-principal and not only as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas' criminal design
even before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that criminal design by
providing the firearm.
Art 16; Degree of participation {affects nature of crime committed} 1987 No.
XIV:
A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all
leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a businessman from Agusan. As
instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and demanded P100,000.00. When
Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with the butt of his gun, Pedro gave the
amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the PC Command to tell them what
happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman. Orlando told him that D and E,
week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and threatening to kill his son and wife
should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would make good their threat, he gave the
money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on his way to the PC to report what
happened.
(a) What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit?
If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are
different. Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money.
(c) Did Gorio commit any crime? Answer:
a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that
they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their
demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in
the taking of the money with intent to gain.
b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the
killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000
demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave
threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the
intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and
conditional.

Page 90 of 374
c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery
committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and
E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his
intervention in the activities of D and E.
Art 16; Degree of participation; 1989
No. 6:
Mario, a law student, wanted to avenge the death of his brother, Jose, in the hands of Pedro and
his gang. So, Mario talked to Dalmacio, known tough guy, to kill Pedro by promising him
P50,000 to be paid after he had accomplished the killing. Dalmacio agreed. Since Pedro was to
appear in court the following day at 9:00 a.m. at the city hall to attend the hearing involving the
death of Jose, Mario told Dalmacio to carry out the plan at that exact time in the court room, to
which Dalmacio assented. At 8:50 a.m., Mario went to see Captain Malonso of the Police
Department and told him that Dalmacio would kill Pedro at9:00 a.m. at the city hall. He asked
Captain Malonso to prevent it and so the latter rushed to the city hall but arrived at 9:05 a.m.
when Dalmacio had already killed Pedro. Is Mario liable as co-principal with Dalmacio for the
killing of Pedro? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Mario is a principal by inducement. By promising to give P50,000.00 to Dalmacio, which is an
agreement for a consideration for the purpose of avenging his brother's death the inducement
was made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. Furthermore,
the facts show that Dalmacio has no personal reason to kill Pedro except the inducement, which
is therefore the determining cause for the commission of the crime by Dalmacio.
Mario's change of mind and heart at the last minute, which did not, after all, prevent the
consummation of the crime, because it was too late, does not alter the course of his criminal
liability as a co-principal by inducement. Desistance from carrying out a criminal design is no
defense if such desistance has not actually and successfully prevented the commission of the
crime.
Art 16; Degree of participation; accessories who are exempt 1982 No. 5
"A" committed the crime of murder. His father, "B", the chief of police of "X" town, who had
knowledge of "A"'s commission of the crime, concealed his son to evade arrest and
prosecution. Is "B" guilty as accessory to the crime or murder? Is "B" guilty of some other
crime? If he is, what crime did he commit? If not, why not? Reasons.
Answer
B is not guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder committed by his son whom he
concealed to evade arrest and prosecution. The reason is B is a relative of A and under Art. 20
of the Revised Penal Code is exempt from criminal liability as an accessory except if he
profited or assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the commission of the crime, B,
however, should be guilty of prevaricacion or derelection of duty for having failed maliciously
to institute the prosecution for the punishment of A, his son, whom he knew to have committed
a crime as B is an officer of the law charged with the prosecution of offenses.

Page 91 of 374
Art 16; Degree of participation; accomplice
1980 No. V
"L" pointed a .45. caliber revolver at "M" without good reason. There ensued a struggle
between the two for the weapon. "N", a female companion of "L" approached the combatants
and quickly wounded "M" in the chest with a knife, as a consequence of which "M" died
almost instantly.
Can "L" be convicted as an accomplice? Answer
L is not liable as an accomplice. An accomplice must be aware of the criminal design of the
principal and must perform acts, whether previous or simultaneous, showing his approval or
concurrence to said criminal design. The facts of the problem clearly show that while L ,and
M were struggling for the possession of the revolver, N, the female companion of L,
approached the combatants and wounded M in the chest with a knife which caused his death.
L had no knowledge of what N would do, and he did not perform any act subsequent to the
stabbing to show that he approved of what N did. (People vs. Cajandab, 52 SCRA 161)
Art 16; Degree of participation; principal by inducement
1981 No. 4
In the course of an argument over a parcel of land, which each one claimed as his own, "B" hit
"A" on the face. A week later, "C", father of "A", and "B" were disputing the ownership of the
same property. Coming from behind, "A" clubbed "B" on the head causing him to topple
unconscious to the ground. Then "C" told "A": "that serves him right." Postmortem
examination disclosed that "B" died instantly from the blow he received on the head,
"A" and "C" were charged by the Prosecuting Fiscal for the death of "B".
Is "C" criminally liable as a principal by inducement for the death of "B"?
Why? Answer
C is not a principal by inducement. The requisites of a principal by
inducement are: (1) that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the said
commission of the crime induced. (People vs. Omine Kiichi 61 Phil. 609; People vs. de la
Cruz, L-30912, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 385). The facts of the problem show that when C
told A after A clubbed B's head causing him to topple unconscious to the ground that serves
him right, A had already committed the crime of killing B. So, the utterances of C cannot be
the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, A had a reason of his own
in committing the crime. (People vs Caimbre et al 110 Phil 370; People vs. Castillo et al 17
SCRA 721). There was no inducement.
Art 16; Degree of participation; Principal by inducement 2002 No
II
A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done to A by C. A promised B a reward.
B was willing to kill C, not so much because of the reward promised to him but because he also
had his own long-standing grudge against
C, who had wronged him in the past. If C is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by
inducement? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement because the reward he promised
B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about criminal liability of
a co-principal, the inducement made by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have
been committed. The facts of the case indicate that 0, the killer supposedly induced by A, had
his own reason to kill C out of a long standing grudge.
Art 19; Conviction of principal before conviction of accessory 1978 No.
III-a
An accessory's liability is subordinate to that of the principal. Is it necessary that the principal
should first be found and declared guilty before the accessory can be held liable? Discuss.
Answer
It is not necessary that the principal be first found guilty before the accessory can be held
liable provided the evidence is clear as to the commission of the crime. What is controlling is
the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the principal "may be" found
guilty and not the English translation which speaks of the author being "guilty" of treason,
parricide, murder, etc, (People w. Billon, CA 48 O.G. 1391). This was reiterated in the more
recent case of People vs. Inovero, CA No. 04426-27 CR Feb 5, 1968, 65 O.G, 748, where it
was held that the death of the principal does not preclude the conviction of an accessory in a
murder case. What death extinguishes is the criminal liability of the principal but not the
crime committed, and the accessory, having something to do with the commission of the
crime, must suffer its consequence. (Also, People vs. Nueva, 74 O.G. 1424),
Art 19; Conviction of principal before conviction of accessory 1981 No, 8
Is it necessary that the principal of a crime be convicted first before one may be found guilty
and punished as an accessory?
Explain your answer.
Answer
It is not necessary that the principal be convicted before the accessory be found guilty and
punished. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the law (Art. 19, Revised Penal Code) requires that
the principal be convicted before one may be punished as an accessory. As long as the corpus
delicti is conclusively proved and the accessory's participation is established he can be held
criminally responsible and meted the corresponding penalty. (People vs. Inovero. CA 63 O.G,
3160). The Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code was held to prevail, which does not require
that the principal be guilty, unlike in the English text. (People vs. Villon, CA 48 O.G. 1931).
Art 19; Degree of participation; accessory 1986 No.
16:
Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two
days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food.
Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the
door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where
the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot
with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon
hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme,
however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme
collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine
cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas
heard rumors that
the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead. Dimas thought of
asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt, but on second
thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00.
The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide
aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an
accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law (PD No. J612).
d) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain,
(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer:
(3) If I were the counsel of Dimas, I would maintain that he could not be liable as an accessory to
the crime of homicide attributed to Bobot because he had no knowledge of its commission.
Regarding the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, he can maintain that he bought the
tins of sardines in good faith without any knowledge that these were the proceeds of the crime
of theft.
(4) Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber
where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were
the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them
for a profit. (impliedly, he is not liable as an accessory)
Art 19; Degree of participation; accessory 1983 No.
4
A proposed to B that they rob a certain store, to which B agreed. Later, however, B undertook
the robbery alone and made off with P2,000 cash.
The following day, after making some shallow explanation, B apologized to A and gave the
latter P500, which A somewhat grudgingly accepted.
What is A's liability, if any, and the legal basis thereof? Answer
A is liable as an accessory. Altho A proposed that robbery be committed in a certain store,
such proposal is not punished by law. So if B, to whom the proposal was made committed the
robbery alone, only he will be liable for the robbery. But since A received from B P500 which
he knew to be part of the amount of P2,000, which was robbed, A is liable as an accessory
because he profited from the proceeds of the commission of the crime.
Alternative Answer. A is liable for the offense of fencing. The reason is A with intent to gain for
himself, received, possessed and kept an article or object of value which he knew to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery. (Presidential Decree No. 1612) Money is an
article of value.
Art 19; Degrees of participation; accessories & fence 1998 No
VII.
King went to the house of Laura who was alone. Laura offered him a drink and after
consuming three bottles of beer. King made advances to her and with force and violence,
ravished her. Then King killed Laura and took her jewelry.
Doming, King's adopted brother, learned about the incident. He went to Laura's house, hid her
body, cleaned everything and washed the bloodstains inside the room.
Later, King gave Jose, his legitimate brother, one piece of jewelry belonging to Laura. Jose
knew that the jewelry was taken from Laura but nonetheless he sold it for P2,000.
What crime or crimes did King, Doming and Jose commit? Discuss their criminal liabilities.
[10%]
Answer;
King committed the composite crime of Rape with homicide as a single indivisible offense, not
a complex crime, and Theft. ...
Doming's acts, having been done with knowledge of the commission of the crime and
obviously to conceal the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, makes him an accessory to
the crime of rape with homicide under Art. 19, par. 2 of the Rev. Penal Code, but he is exempt
from criminal liability therefor under Article 20 of the Code, being an adopted brother of the
principal.
Jose incurs criminal liability either as an accessory to the crime of theft committed by King, or
as fence. Although he is a legitimate brother of King, the exemption under Article 20 does not
include the participation he did, because he profited from the effects of such theft by selling the
jewelry knowing that the same was taken from Laura. Or Jose may be prosecuted for fencing
under the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (PD No. 1612) since the jewelry was the proceeds of theft
and with intent to gain, he received it from King and sold it.
Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1987
No. X:
Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received from the Provincial Treasurer of the Province five (5)
brand new typewriters for use in the municipal treasurer's office. Each typewriter is valued at
P10,000.00. Since Pedro needed money for the hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four (4)
of the typewriters to his friend, Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for P2,000.00 each or
a total of P8,000.00. Rodolfo as a general merchant knew that one typewriter could easily be
between P6,000.00 to P10,000.00, and for this reason he readily agreed to buy the four
typewriters, Rodolfo then resold the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus, making a profit of P16,000.
Two months after the transaction, Pedro was audited and the investigation as to his
accountabilities led to the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters from Pedro,
(a) What crime did Pedro commit?
(b) Is Rodolfo liable as an accessory or for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law?
Answer:
b) Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law as this law refers only to the buy
and sell of articles of value which are the proceeds of robbery and theft, Rodolfo is liable as an
accessory to the crime of malversation as he purchased the typewriter for P2,000. each only
although he knew it could easily be sold for P6,000, to P10,000, Therefore he profited or
assisted the principal to profit from the effects or proceeds of the commission of the crime.
Art 19; Anti-fencing
law 1992 No. 4:
At the height of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo at around midnight, Aniceto joined some
neighbors in evacuating his family, a few possessions and two horses to higher ground.
Miguel, taking advantage of the darkness and the confusion, got one of the horses and asked
his friend Doro to accompany him to Angeles City where he sold the same to an acquaintance
Peping. Searching for his horse, Aniceto found it, with identifying brand intact, in the
possession of Peping who refused to surrender the same saying that he had paid good money
for it. Whereupon, Aniceto reported the matter to the police who promised to accompany him
to the Prosecutor's office.
c) May Peping be indicted under the Anti-Fencing Law? Explain. Suggested
Answer:
c) Peping should be held liable for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, P.D, No. 1612. He
brought the horse which he should have known to have been derived from robbery or theft. The
horse was duly branded; this should have forewarned Peping. Besides, he should have
demanded a certificate of ownership from Miguel.
Art 19; Anti-fencing
law 1981 No. 17
Without asking for any document of ownership, "A" bought from "B", a person who claimed
to be a "balik-bayan" from Saudi Arabia, a 1980 model National TV set for P500.00. Two days
later, a policeman visited "A" and informed him that the TV set he had bought from "B", who
already confessed to the robbery, was stolen from the house of "C". Claiming that he bought
the TV set in good faith, "A" refused to surrender it to "C", So "A" was charged under the
Anti-Fencing Act of 1979 (Presidential Decree No. 1612).
Is "A" criminally liable under this Act? Why?
Answer
"A" is criminally liable under the Anti-Fencing Act of 1979. Under this law, mere possession
of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the object of robbery of
theft shall be prime facie evidence of fencing. Fencing is committed if a person who with
intent to gain for himself or another shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which he knows or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of robbery or theft. The law involves second hand articles. A purchased the 1980 model
National TV set as a second hand item. His failure to ask any document of ownership and if
"B" was indeed a "balikbayan" whether he brought the TV set with him when he returned to
the Philippines as evidenced by a carrier manifest since the TV set certainly cannot be hand
carried, and since the price was considerably cheap, are circumstances which show that he
should have known that the TV set was a proceed of robbery or theft.
Art 19; Anti-fencing
law 1985 No. 12
While waiting for his car, AB was approached by CD, who offered him a new set of auto
mechanic tools coating P3,000.00 for only P500. AB paid CD
P500 and thereafter gave the brand new set of tools as a birthday gift to his godson, an auto
mechanic. It turned out later that CD is the object of a police manhunt upon complaint of his
employer for the theft of more than 100 sets of similar tools. Threatened with criminal
prosecution for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law, he consulted you as to his probable
criminal liability for the said transaction.
Put down in writing your advice and explanation on his query. Answer:
Fencing is the act of any person, who with intent to gain for himself, or for another shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of or shall buy and sell or in any other
manner deal in any article, item or object or anything of value, which he knows or should be
known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (P.D. No.
1612), Considering that CD was a total stranger to AB, that the former was the one who
approached the latter to sell auto mechanic tools costing P3.000 for only P500, that CD was not
in the business of selling auto mechanic tools nor was he representing any store engaged in
such business, AB should have been placed on guard that the object purchased by him was the
proceed of the crime of robbery or theft. AB should be liable for fencing. I would advice him to
show his good faith in purchasing the auto mechanic toolsthat he requested from CD, the
seller, a receipt, with a warranty to defend his ownership from a claim of any person
whatsoever.
Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1986
No. 16:
Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two
days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food.
Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the
door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where
the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot
with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon
hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme,
however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme
collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine
cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas
heard rumors that the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead.
Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt,
but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00.
The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide
aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an
accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law (PD No. J612).
(1) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain,
(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer:
(4) Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from
Aber where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those
were the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold
them for a profit.
Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1990
No. 7:
Oscar owns and operates a gift and jewelry shop. Pilar sold to him for P1,000.00 a five [5]
carat diamond ring which she stole.
a) May Oscar be held criminally liable under the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612)? Explain
your answer.
b) How can Oscar acquire immunity from criminal prosecution for purchasing the diamond ring
from Pilar and thus enable him to sell the same to the general public for a profit? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
a)Yes, he is liable for fencing. The price is unconscionable. This shows that he would have
known of the fact that the ring was stolen. Section 2 of P.D. 1612., the Anti-Fencing Law of
1979, provides that: a. "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, shall buy, receive x x x, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article x x x of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft".
b) Oscar should secure a clearance/permit to sell the second-hand ring from the proper INP
station commander pursuant to Section 6, P.D. 1612. The said section states that any person
who fails to secure the clearance or permit, upon conviction, shall be punished as a fence.
Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1995
No. 5:
1. What are the elements of fencing?
2. a) What is the difference between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery? Explain.
(b) Is there any similarity between them? Answer:
1. The elements of fencing are:
(a) a crime of robbery or theft has be en committed;
(b) accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item ,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of said crime;
(c) the accused knows or should have known that said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

Page 100 of 374


(d) there is. on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
2.a) One difference between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery is the penalty
involved; a fence is punished as a principal under P.D. No. 1612 and the penalty is higher,
whereas an accessory to robbery or theft under the Revised Penal Code is punished two
degrees lower than the principal, unless he bought or profited from the proceeds of theft or
robbery arising from robbery in Philippine highways under P.D. No. 532 where he is punished
as an accomplice, hence the penalty is one degree lower.
Also, fencing is a malum prohibition and therefore there Is no need to prove criminal intent of
the accused; this is not so in violations of Revised Penal Code.
(b) Yes, there is a similarity in the sense that all the acts of one who is an accessory to the
crimes of robbery or theft are included in the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the accessory in
the crimes of robbery or theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or as
a fence under P.D. No. 1612. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, 234 SCRA 63]
Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1996
No. 7:
2) Flora, who was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry, was prosecuted for the
violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, for having been found to be
in possession of recently stolen Jewelry valued at P100,000.00 at her jewelry shop at Zapote
Road, Las Pinas, Metro Manila. She testified during the trial that she merely bought the same
from one named Cecilino and even produced a receipt covering the sale. Cecilino, in the past,
used to deliver to her jewelries for sale but is presently nowhere to be found. Convicted by the
trial court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, she argued (or her acquittal on appeal,
contending that the prosecution failed to prove that she knew or should have known that the
Jewelries recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Answer:
2) No, Flora's defense is not well-taken because mere possession of any article of value which
has been the subject of theft or robbery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (P.D.No.
1612). The burden is upon the accused to prove that she acquired the jewelry legitimately. Her
defense of having bought the Jewelry from someone whose whereabouts is unknown, does not
overcome the presumption of fencing against her (Pamintuan us People, G.R 111426, 11 July
1994). Buying personal property puts the buyer on caveat because of the phrases that he should
have known or ought to know that it is the proceed from robbery or theft. Besides, she should
have followed the administrative procedure under the decree that of getting a clearance from
the authorities in case the dealer is unlicensed. in order to escape liability.

Page 101 of 374


Penalties
Art 25; Penalties
1988 No. 3:
a) State the two classes of penalties under the revised Penal Code. Define each.
b) May censure be included in a sentence of acquittal? Why or why not? Answer:
a) The two classes of penalties under Article 25 of the Revise Penal Code are as follows:
1. Principal
2. Accessory
A principal penalty is defined as that provided for a felony and which is imposed by court
expressly upon conviction.
An accessory penalty is defined as that deemed included in the imposition of the principal
penalty.
b) Censure may not be included in a sentence of acquittal, because a censure is a penalty.
Censure is repugnant and is essentially inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal (People vs.
Abellera, 69 Phil. 623.)
Art 25; Penalties
1997 No. 7:
A was convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Since the amount Involved did not exceed P200.00, the penalty prescribed by law for estafa is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. The penalty prescribed by law for
falsification of public document is prision mayor plus fine not to exceed P5,000.00.
Impose the proper prison penalty. Answer:
The proper penalty Is ANY RANGE WITHIN prision correccional (six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years) as MINIMUM, to ANY RANGE within prision mayor maximum (ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years) as MAXIMUM. This is in accordance with People
us, Gonzales, 73 Phil, 549, where It was ruled that for the purpose of determining the penalty
next lower in degree, the penalty that should be considered as a starting point is the whole of
prision mayor, it being the penalty prescribed by law, and not prision mayor in its maximum
period, which is only the penalty actually applied because of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty next lower in degree therefor is prision correccional and it is within the
range of this penalty that the minimum should be taken.
Art 25; Penalties
1997 No. 8:
Assume in the preceding problem that there were two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance. Impose the proper prison penalty.
Answer:
There being two (2) mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the
proper prison penalty is arresto mayor (in any of its periods, ie. ranging from one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months) as MINIMUM to prision correccional in its maximum
period four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years as MAXIMUM. Under
Art. 64, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, when a penalty contains three periods, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with Article 76 and 77 of the same Code, and there are
two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, the penalty next
lower in degree should be imposed. For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty next lower in degree should be determined without regard as to whether the basic
penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum
period as circumstances modifying liability may require. The penalty next lower in degree to
prision correccional. Therefore, as previously stated, the minimum should be within the range
of arresto mayor and the maximum is within the range of prision correctional in its maximum
period.
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1997 No. 6:
A and B pleaded guilty to the crime of parricide. The court found three mitigating
circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, lack of Instruction and lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed. The prescribed penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death.
Impose the proper principal penalty.
Answer:
The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Even if there are two or more mitigating
circumstances, a court cannot lower the penalty by one degree (Art.
63.par. 3, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 685). In U.S. vs. Relador 60 Phil.
593, where the crime committed was parricide with the two
(2) mitigating circumstances of illiteracy and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, and
with no aggravating circumstance, the Supreme Court held that the proper, penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1977 No.
IV-a
During the trial for homicide, the defense was able to prove four generic mitigating
circumstances while the State was able to prove only one aggravating circumstance.
Offsetting the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, there still remain three mitigating
circumstances. So the judge imposed a penalty lower by one degree than the penalty provided
by law. Did the judge err in imposing a penalty lower by one degree than the penalty provided
by law? State your reasons.
Answer
The Judge erred in imposing the penalty lower by one degree. Article 64 par. 5 which
prescribes the penalty next lower in degree if the imposable penalty is divisible as is the penalty
for homicide which is reclusion temporal, applies if there are two or more mitigating
circumstances present without any attending aggravating circumstance. (People v. Soriano, 70
Phil. 334; People v, Dayrit, 108 Phil. 100). However, in a case decided by the Court of Appeals,
par. 5 of Article
64 was applied where there were three mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating after one mitigating- was made to offset the aggravating circumstance. The
decision was by a division of five (People v. Gamboa, O.G, 1947). The Supreme Court
decisions are obviously controlling.
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1982 No. 7
Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The accused, 17 years of age, committed the
crime of frustrated homicide while under the state of passion and obfuscation and acting in
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased against Ms wife. Accused
thereafter surrendered voluntarily immediately after the commission of the offense, and
pleaded guilty at the trial. What is the proper penalty to be imposed upon him? In your answer
disregard the civil liability but consider the Indeterminate Sentence Daw. Explain fully the
procedure adopted in the computation of the penalty.
Answer
The proper penalty to be imposed upon A is Arresto Mayor in its Minimum period. Frustrated
Homicide is punished by one degree next lower than Consummated Homicide, Since the
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, one degree next lower will be prision mayor, which
is the penalty for Frustrated Homicide. The accused was 17 years old when he committed the
crime. Such minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance. Prision Mayor should be lowered
by one degree under Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code which will be Prision Correctional.
Voluntary Surrender and Voluntary Plea of Guilty will reduce again the imposable penalty by
one degree as there was no aggravating circumstance present and the imposable penalty is
divisible in nature (Art. 64, par. 5 R.P.C.) So Prision Correctional will be lowered by one
degree which is Arresto Mayor. The maximum imprisonment in Arresto Mayor is six months.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply under Section 2 thereof because the term of
imprisonment in the penalty does not exceed one year. Since passion and obfuscation and
immediate vindication of a grave offense were also present whether based on the same fact or
on different facts Arresto Mayor is to be imposed in the minimum period as there is no
attending aggravating circumstance.
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1985 No. 2
Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally
at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however,
missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously.
(A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons.
(B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty
will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss.
(C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and
Batas Pambansa 76?
Answer:
(B) As a judge, I will first consider the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code
for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The penalty is for the more serious
crime to be imposed in its maximum period, (Art 48, Revised Penal Code).
The age of Arthur at the time of the commission of the crime, which is 17 years, is a
privileged mitigating circumstance. Under Art. 68, par. 2, Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty is to be lowered by one degree.
There being two mitigating circumstances which are voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty, being divisible, is attain to be
lowered by one degree. (Art. 64, par. 5, Revised Penal Code).
The imposable penalty, lowered by two degrees, will be the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence. The mini-mum will be one degree next lower than the maximum. (Act. 4103 as
amended, Indeterminate Sentence Law).
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1989 No. 9:
Jose is charged with bigamy. The Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of prision mayor
for this offense. The information filed against Jose alleged one aggravating circumstance. Upon
being arraigned, he entered the plea of guilty and invoked the additional mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which the trial fiscal admitted. If you were the judge
trying the case, from what range of the prescribed penalty would you determine the proper
penalty (to constitute the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence) to be imposed on Jose?
Answer:
I would take the maximum term of the Indeterminate sentence from the range of prision mayor
in its minimum period. This is so because while there are two ordinary mitigating
circumstances present, one of them is offset by an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, it
is as if the crime is attended by only one ordinary circumstance and this will result in the
imposition of the minimum period of the penalty prescribed by law.
The presence of two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances will give rise to a privileged
mitigating circumstance only if there is no aggravating circumstance present and the penalty
prescribed by law is divisible. In this case, while the penalty of prision mayor is divisible, and
while there are two ordinary mitigating circumstances present, there is an aggravating
circumstance. This precludes the reduction of the penalty by one degree lower inasmuch as
the two ordinary mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1991 No.
12:
Rolando was charged with murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. The trial court convicted Rolando, but lowered the penalty by one
(1) degree because of the attendance of three (3) ordinary mitigating circumstances and the
absence of any aggravating circumstance. The court then imposed an indeterminate sentence
of 6 years 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Is the penalty correct?
Answer:
Technically and legally, the sentence of 6 years and one day to 17 years and one day is correct.
Since there are three mitigating without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided for
by law should be reduced by one degree, that is, prision mayor (maximum) to reclusion
temporal (medium), which will be the MAXIMUM of the indeterminate sentence. Otherwise
stated, the maximum will have a range of 10 years and one day (the starting point of prision
mayor maximum) up to 17 years and four months (the end of reclusion temporal medium).
Since the maximum sentence imposed by the Judge is 17 years and one day, it is well within
the maximum range.
The minimum of six years and one day is also within the range of the next lower in degree of
prision correctional maximum (4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 6 years) up to prision mayor
medium (8 years, 1 day to 10 years).
Alternative Answer:
Since there are three mitigating circumstances which justify the lowering of the penalty by one
degree, and only the presence of two mitigating circumstances will be enough to lower the
penalty by one degree, the excess of one mitigating circumstance should justify the Judge to
impose the minimum of the minimum (4 years, 2 months, 1 day) and the minimum of the
maximum (10 years, 1 day).
Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances
1995 No. 10:
Homer was convicted of homicide. The trial court appreciated the following modifying
circumstances: the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and the mitigating circumstances
of passion and obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong, illiteracy and voluntary
surrender. The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal the range of which is
twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years.
Taking into account the attendant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused.
Answer:
It appears that there is one aggravating circumstance (nocturnity), and four mitigating
circumstances (passion and obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed and voluntary surrender). Par. 4, Art. 64 should be applied. Hence there will be off-
setting of modifying circumstances, which will now result in the excess of three mitigating
circumstances. This will therefore justify in reducing the penalty to the minimum period.
The existence of an aggravating circumstance, albeit there are four aggravating, will not justify
the lowering of the penalty to the next lower degree under paragraph 5 of said Article, as this is
applicable only if THERE IS NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE present.
Since the crime committed is Homicide and the penalty therefor is reclusion temporal, the
MAXIMUM sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be the minimum of the
penalty, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. The MINIMUM penalty will thus be the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision mayor in its full extent (6 years and 1 day to 12 years).
Ergo, the proper penalty would be 6 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day, as
maximum. I believe that because of the remaining mitigating circumstances after the off-setting
it would be very logical to impose the minimum of the MINIMUM sentence under the ISL and
the minimum of the MAXIMUM sentence.
Art 25; Penalties; concurrent service of sentence
1982 No. 8
What penalties, among those mentioned in the Revised Penal Code, may be served
concurrently and what penalties cannot be served concurrently? Explain.
Answer
Penalties which may be served concurrently: Perpetual or Temporary absolute disqualification
or perpetual or temporary special disqualification, public censure or suspension from public
office. These penalties may be served with imprisonment. Penalties which cannot be served
concurrently; Imprisonment like Reclusion Temporal and Prision Mayor which must be served
successively, one after the other, in the order of severity.
Art 25; Penalties; death; effect of modifying circumstances
1980 No. VII
Convicted of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, an accused was sentenced to
death. On automatic review to the Supreme Court, his counsel pleaded the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender which were not offset by any
aggravating circumstance and prayed that the penalty be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
existence of said modifying circumstances was, in fact, established.
Is the contention legally tenable? Answer
The intention is not legally tenable. Death is a single and indivisible penalty. Under Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, it could be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances which attended the commission of the crime. (People vs. Amit, 32 SCRA 95).
The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender cannot have the affect
of reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Art 25; Penalties; factors to consider 1991
No. 11:
Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case, and based on the evidence presented and the
applicable law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2) accused. Indicate the five (5) steps
you would follow to determine the exact penalty to be imposed. Stated differently, what are
the factors you must consider to arrive at the correct penalty?
Answer;
1, Determine the crime committed;
2, Stage of execution and degree of participation;
3. Determine the penalty;
4. Consider the modifying circumstances;
5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable or not.
Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 1991 No. 7:
A raped X. In the process, X resisted and slapped A. Angered, A grabbed a stone and hit X. She
was dying when A consummated the sexual attack. A psychiatrist from the National Center for
Mental Health testified that he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations on
A and found him to be suffering from a mental disorder classified under organic mental
disorder with psychosis. A's father testified that A was playful but cruel to his brothers and
sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for low sums, wandered naked sometimes, and
oftentimes did not come home for extended periods of time. The prosecution on the other hand,
presented an array of witnesses to prove A that was lucid before and after the crime was
committed and that he acted with discernment. After trial, the court convicted the accused and
sentenced him to "life imprisonment" considering that under the Constitution death penalty
could no longer be imposed.
Given the conflicting testimonies as to sanity of the accused, was the trial court correct in
ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstances in this case? Is the sentence of "life
imprisonment" a correct imposition of penalty?
Answer:
The sentence of "life imprisonment" is not a correct imposition of penalty for the rape: it
should be reclusion perpetua, the technical designation of the penalty for the crime under the
Revised Penal Code. It is not correct to use the term "life imprisonment" because the accessory
penalties to reclusion perpetua does not follow the penalty of "life imprisonment".
Furthermore, in reclusion perpetua the duration is stated to be for 30 years.
Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 1994 No. 4:
1) Differentiate reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment.
Answer;
1) Reclusion perpetua is that penalty provided for In the Revised Penal Code for
crimes defined in and penalized therein except for some crimes defined by special laws which
impose reclusion perpetua, such as violations of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic
Act 7659 or of PD 1860; while life imprisonment is a penalty usually provided for in special
laws. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty [40]
years under Republic Act 7659, while life imprisonment has no duration; reclusion perpetua
may be reduced by one or two degrees; reclusion perpetuates accessory penalties while life
imprisonment does not have any accessory penalties (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459,
People vs. Panellos, 205 SCRA 546).
Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 2001 No
VII
a) After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of
Murder, the victim having sustained several bullet wounds in his
body so that he died despite medical assistance given in the Ospital ng Manila. Because the
weapon used by Benjamin was unlicensed and the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
found to be present. Judge Laya rendered his decision convicting Benjamin and sentencing
him to "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment".
Are "reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment the same and can be imposed
interchangeably as in the foregoing sentence? Or are they totally different? State your reasons.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life
Imprisonment are totally different from each other and therefore, should not be used
interchangeably.
Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, with a fixed
duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries it with accessory
penalties.
Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no
fixed duration of imprisonment and without any accessory penalty.
Art 25; Penalties; subsidiary penalty 1989 No.
7:
Pedro was convicted of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence for
bumping the car of Jose and the court of sentenced him to pay a fine of P3,000. Pedro failed to
pay the amount of the fine for he was insolvent. Later, the court ordered the incarceration of
Pedro so that the latter could serve subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the fine. Pedro filed a
petition for habeas corpus alleging that his confinement is illegal. Will the petition prosper?
Give your reasons.
Answer:
The petition for habeas corpus will prosper. Subsidiary penalty is not an accessory
penalty which inheres to a principal penalty and may therefore be imposed even if it is not
expressly provided in the sentence. It is a penalty in lieu of the penalty imposed in the
sentence. Hence, unless the judgment or sentence expressly provides for subsidiary
imprisonment, the culprit cannot be made to undergo the same {People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil.
639).
In this case, the court merely sentenced Pedro to pay a P3,000.00 fine. It was only LATER that
the Court ordered the incarceration of Pedro to serve subsidiary imprisonment AFTER Pedro
failed to pay the amount of the fine. Subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed unless it is
expressly provided in the sentence.
Art 25; Penalties; successive service of sentence 1980 No. VI
(b) An accused was found guilty of double murder and was meted out two sentences of
reclusion perpetua. How would the accused serve the sentences?
Answer
(b) The rule is if two or more penalties in view of their nature cannot be served
simultaneously, such must be served successively in the order of severity in accordance with
the scale of the severity of penalties provided in Art. 70 R.P.C., but in no case is he to serve
more than three times the most severe penalty, and which is not to exceed 40 years. If the
penalties are the same, such is to be considered as the most severe penalty. (Aspra vs. Director
of Prisons, 85 Phil. 737), In the problem, two penalties of reclusion perpetua were imposed
upon the accused. In view of their nature, these penalties cannot be served simultaneously.
Reclusion perpetua has a duration of thirty years, Multiplied by 3 (three times the most severe
penalty) the result is 90 years. The accused should serve however imprisonment not exceeding
40 years, (Art. 70 R.P.C.)
Art 25; Penalties; three-fold rule 1985
No. 7
Finding Carlos Torres guilty of ROBBERY as charged, Judge Cruz nevertheless dismissed the
case against him it appearing from the evidence that Carlos Torres had already been previously
convicted in fifteen (15) other criminal cases and sentenced to a total penalty of 305 years,...
his HONOR ruling that anyway the total penalty which he may be compelled to serve cannot in
any case exceed forty (40) years under the "three-fold rule".
Comment on the legality of His HONOR'S aforesaid pronouncement.

Page 110 of 374


Answer:
The dismissal of the robbery case by Judge Cruz is improper and irregular. Dismissal is
inconsistent with the finding of guilt of the accused. The duty of the Court is to apply the law
and to impose the penalty provided upon the accused found guilty of the crime charged. The
reason that the accused, Carlos Torres, had been previously convicted in fifteen (15) other
crimes and sentenced to a total penalty of three hundred five (305) years and the total penalty
that the accused may be compelled to serve cannot exceed forty (40) years under the three-
fold rule, does not find application in law. The threefold rule applies to the service of the
penalties and not in the imposition of the penalties. (People vs Escares 102 Phil. 677).
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1975
No. VII
The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is "to uplift and redeem valuable human
material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
unusefullness". Explain how the law achieves that purpose.
Answer
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for an indeterminate sentence which has a
minimum and a maximum. After the prisoner has served the minimum, depending upon his
conduct and behavior during confinement, he may be released on parole. The law, therefore,
encourages the prisoner to reform. Once released on parole, provided the conditions are not
violated, he will no longer serve the remainder of the sentence. The law hence treats the
accused first as an individual and second as a member of society. It shortens his term of
imprisonment, depending upon his behavior.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1983
No. 11
A convict serving sentence for robbery escaped from the penitentiary and killed a rival gang
member. Found guilty of homicide, he was given a straight prison term. He moved for
reconsideration, contending that not being a habitual delinquent, he was entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.
Decide with reasons.
Answer
The convict is not entitled to an indeterminate sentence because when he committed the crime
of homicide he escape from the penitentiary while serving the sentence for robbery. Section 2
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law enumerates the cases in which the law cannot apply and one
of those is if the offender escaped from confinement or evaded his sentence.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1988
No. 4:
a) State the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Answer:
a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies in cases where the penalty imposed is more than
one year and the ISL shall apply where there is a minimum penalty which is not lower than the
penalty next lower in degree provided by law

Page 111 of 374


and the maximum not higher than the maximum penalty provided by law in cases of felonies
but when it comes to statutory offenses it must be lower than the minimum penalty provided
by law and not higher than the maximum penalty provided by law except in the following
cases as provided by section 2 of Art. 4103:
1. life imprisonment
2. those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason
3. to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage
4. to those convicted of piracy
5. those who are habitual delinquents
6. to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence
7. to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof
8. to those whose maximum term of- imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section
5 hereof.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1989
No. 8:
Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the
offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years. Upon
arraignment, he entered the plea of guilty.
a) In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied?
b) If you were the judge trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres?
Answer:
a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in this case. By express
provision of said law (section 1) it is applicable to offenses punished by special laws. The
indeterminate sentence in such cases shall consist of a maximum term which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by the special law and a minimum term which shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
If I were the judge trying the case, I would impose a penalty consisting of any duration not less
than 5 years as minimum term and any duration not more than 10 years as maximum term. It
could be five years and 1 day to 7 years; 7 years, six months and 1 day to 9 years; or any other
sentence where the minimum term is not less than 5 years and the maximum term not more
than 10 years.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1990
No. 12;
a) Carlos was charged and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30,000. He sought a reconsideration of the
penalty on the ground that he should be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Decide with reasons.
b) Suppose that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration he applies for probation. If you
were the judge, will you grant the same? Explain your answer.
Answer;
a) Carlos is not entitled to avail of the Indeterminate Sentence Law because Section 2 of said
law specifically disqualifies and disallows application thereof to persons sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1991
No, 6:
A was charged with homicide. During the trial, un-contradicted evidence consisting of medical
certificates were presented showing that the accused had sustained injuries in ten (10) previous
occasions while engaged in fisticuffs with different persons. He was also confined at the
National Mental Hospital for mental ailment diagnosed as "homicidal and suicidal instincts."
During his second confinement thereat, he escaped. Upon conviction, the prosecutor objected
to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law contending that the accused is a habitual
delinquent and an escapee from the National Mental Hospital.
If you are the Judge, rule on the objection. Answer:
The objection should be overruled. A could not be legally considered a habitual delinquent.
Habitual delinquency cannot be validly invoked without being alleged in the Information and
proven during the trial. Besides there is no indication that A was convicted within ten (10)
years from last conviction or release, three times or oftener of the crimes of robbery, theft,
estafa, physical injuries or falsification.
Being an escapee from the Mental Hospital will not disqualify him from the
application of the ISL as Section 2 thereof contemplates having escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence. Confinement presupposes imprisonment by virtue of a final judgment.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1994
No. 11:
Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a special law. The penalty prescribed is not less
than six years but not more than twelve years. No modifying circumstance attended the
commission of the crime.
If you were the judge, will you apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law? If so, how
will you apply it? Answer;
If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
the last sentence of Section 1 Act 4103, specifically provides the application thereof for
violations of special laws.
Under the same provision, the minimum must not be less than the minimum provided therein
(six years and one day) and the maximum shall not be more than the maximum provided
therein, i.e. twelve years. (People vs. Rosalina Reyes, 186 SCRA 184)
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1999 No
VIII
Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the
offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten [10) years. Upon
arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the
Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? If you were the Judge trying the case, what penalty
would you impose on Andres? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied because the minimum imprisonment
is more than one (1) year.
If I were the Judge, I will impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum penalty prescribed by the same. I have the discretion to impose the penalty within
the said minimum and maximum.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1999 No
XII
Under what circumstances is the Indeterminate Sentence Law not applicable? (2%)
A was convicted of illegal possession of grease guns and two Thompson sub-machine guns
punishable under the old law [RA No,4] with imprisonment of from five (5) to ten (10) years.
The trial court sentenced the accused to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years and one (1) day.
Is the penalty thus imposed correct? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to:
1. Persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment;
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year;
9. Those who, upon the approval of the law (December 5, 1933). had
been sentenced by final Judgment;
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.
The penalty imposed, being only a straight penalty, is not correct because it does not
comply with the Indeterminate Sentence Law which applies to this case. Said law requires that
if the offense is punished by any law other than the
Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum penalty fixed by the law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum penalty prescribed by the same.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 2002
No III
A. How are the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence for offenses
punishable under the Revised Penal Code determined? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
Indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly imposable under the same Code after
considering the attending mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances according to Art, 64 of
said Code. The minimum term of the same sentence shall be fixed within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime under the said Code.
B.Under the law, what is the purpose for fixing the maximum and the minimum terms of the
indeterminate sentence? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The purpose of the law in fixing the minimum term of the sentence is to set the grace
period at which the convict may be released on parole from imprisonment, unless by his
conduct he is not deserving of parole and thus he shall continue serving his prison term in Jail
but in no case to go beyond the maximum term fixed in the sentence.
Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law; exceptions 2003 No
XIII.
When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law be inapplicable? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to:
(1) those persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua;
(2) those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
(3) those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
(4) those convicted of piracy;
(5) those who are habitual delinquents;
(6) those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
(7) those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated
the terms thereof;
(A) those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year;
(9) those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of
this Act; and
(10) those whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro.
Art 25; Probation Law 1984
No 11
Under the probation law, the filing of an application for probation "shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal."
Is this waiver mandatory or irrevocable? Explain. A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
Despite the provision in the Probation Law that the filling of an application for probation "shall
be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal", it has been held that such a waiver is not
irrevocable, hence an accused may withdraw his application for probation and instead opt to
pursue appeal from conviction. (Yusi
v. Morales, 121 SCRA 853). For the purposes of probation what the law gives more importance
to is the offender, not the crime (To v. Cruz Pano, 120 SCRA 8). In line with the public policy
behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the moment a
convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal and probation spring from the
same policy, considering justice, humanity and compassion {Yusi v. Morales, Supra).
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
The waiver provided in the Probation Law is not irrevocable. The offender may still withdraw
his application for probation and file an appeal if the period to do so has not yet prescribed.
Probation Law is interpreted liberally in favor of the accused. It is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of its provisions. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy
considerations of justice, humanity and compassion. If it appears that the application for
probation was improvidently filed by the offender who was assisted by counsel de oficio and
not by his counsel of record who was in a better position to consider fully the strength of a
possible appeal, being fully familiar with the case, the waiver rule cannot be considered
irrevocable. (Yusi et al vs. Judge Morales L-61958, April 28, 1983, 121, SCRA 653).
Art 25; Probation Law 1989
No, 20:
"A" was charged with theft and upon arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge. He was
detained for failure to post bail. After "two (2) months, a decision was rendered, sentencing "A"
to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day as a minimum, to one (1) year
and one (1) month as maximum, and to pay the offended party the amount of P700, On January
16, 1985, the very day the sentence was read to "A," the Judge issued a Commitment Order
addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden. On January 28", 1985, "A applied for probation but his
application was denied on the ground that the sentence of conviction became final and
executory on January 16, 1985, when "A" commence to serve his sentence, a) Is "A" eligible
for probation? b) What is the purpose of the probation law?
Answer:
a) A is still eligible for probation since he filed his application for probation within 15 days from
the promulgation of the judgment. Under the Probation Law; the accused may apply for
probation WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL which is 15 days from
promulgation or notice thereof.
The judge committed an error in issuing a Commitment Order on the same day of
promulgation. A commitment order for the convict to begin serving his sentence can be
validly issued only if the period for perfecting an appeal has expired with no appeal being
taken. The fact that in compliance with such-order, which is void, the accused commenced to
serve his sentence does not bar him from availing himself of the benefits of the Probation
Law.
It is true that under the new Rules on Criminal Procedure it is provided that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the accused has applied for
probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120). But Section 9 of the same Rule provides that "nothing in this
Rule shall be construed as affecting any existing provision in the law governing suspension of
sentence, probation or parole."
The probation law does not speak of filing an application for probation BEFORE judgment
has become final. It only speaks of filing the application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR
PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is nothing in the Probation Law that bars an accused who
has commenced to serve his sentence from filing an application for probation provided he
does so WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL.
What the Probation Law provides is that no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment or conviction. It does not
say that no application shall be entertained if the judgment has become final because the
convict has commenced to serve his sentence.
b) The purposes of the Probation Law are:
1. to promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
2. to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
3. to prevent the commission of offenses.
Art 25; Probation Law 1990
No. 12;
a) Carlos was charged and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30,000. He sought a reconsideration of the
penalty on the ground that he should be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Decide with reasons.
b) Suppose that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration he applies for probation. If you
were the judge, will you grant the same? Explain your answer.
Answer;
b) I will not grant the application for probation as it is clear in the Probation Law that the
benefits thereof shall not apply to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, (P.D. 1990).
Art 25; Probation Law 1991
No. 13:
a) Boyet Mar was charged with consented abduction by a 17-year old complainant. The accused
made wedding arrangements with the girl, but her
parents insisted on the prosecution of the case. To avoid further embarrassment of a court trial
for him and the girl, the accused entered a plea of guilty. He then filed a petition for probation
before serving sentence, but the court denied the petition on the ground that "it would be better
for the accused to serve sentence so that he would reform himself and avoid the scandal in the
community that would be caused by the grant of the petition."
The accused served sentence but he brought the matter to the Supreme Court in a
petition for certiorari.
Did the trial court act correctly in denying the petition for probation? Answer:
The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta us. Leviste, 92 SCRA 719, the Judge
precisely denied the petition for probation on the same excuse stated in the problem. The
Supreme Court held that an accused must fall within any one of the disqualifications stated in
Section 9 of P.D. 960 in order to be denied probation,
Art 25; Probation Law 1993
No. 2:
Juanito was found guilty of Robbery by the RTC of Manila and sentenced to four (4} Years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to eight (8) years and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum. Juanito appealed to the Court of Appeals
which found him guilty only of Theft and sentenced him to a straight penalty of one (1) Year.
The decision of the appellate court was promulgated in May, 1993.
1) Is Juanito entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law which became effective on Jan. 3, 1978?
Why?
2) Suppose the prison term imposed by the RTC in the above example is only two (2) years as
minimum to six (6) years as maximum and Juanito did not appeal. When he applied for
probation. It was discovered that in March, 1960, a Municipal Court has sentenced him to a
six-month imprisonment for less serious physical Injuries which he fully served. May his
application for probation be granted? Reason out.
Answer;
1) Juanito is not entitled to probation because the law, as amended, requires the filing of the
application within the period for perfecting an appeal.
2) He is not entitled to the Probation Law because Section 9 (c) provides that probation shall not
be extended to those "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punishable by Imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day or a fine of not
more than P200.00."
Art 25; Probation Law 1981
No. 9
Isidro, 21, was convicted of Consented Abduction and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as maximum. Isidro did not appeal but
he filed a petition for probation. The probation officer recommended favorable action on the
application stating that the accused did not intend to cause a grave wrong and had the
potential of a good probationer.
The trial court denied probation on the ground that it would be better for the accused to
serve his sentence so that he could reform himself and correct his selfish tendencies.
Admittedly, Isidro does not fall within any of the classes of disqualified offenders under the
Probation Law.
Would you sustain the action of the trial Judge in a Certiorari case assailing it? Reasons.
Answer
I will not sustain the action of the trial judge. His denial of the application for probation
because it would be better for the accused to serve his sentence so that he could reform himself
and correct his selfish tendencies was arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. He should have
considered the recommendation of the Probation Officer which was made after a post
investigation of the offender in accordance with the Probation Law, that the offender was
entitled to probation because he had not intended to commit a grave wrong when he
committed the
crime of consented abduction and that he had the potential of a good probationer.
(Balleta Jr. vs. Judge Leviste, 92 SCRA 715 (1979).
Art 25; Probation Law 1984
No. 15
On a plea of guilty, X was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence and was
sentenced to a prison term. The judgment made no pronouncement regard* ing his civil
liability. X forthwith applied for probation,
The following day, the private prosecutor, who was not given the chance to present evidence
on X's civil liability, filed a motion to set the case for the reception of said evidence. Although
supported by the fiscal, the motion was denied by the judge on the ground that it was filed out
of time. According to the judge, "the prosecution should have asked for leave to prove the
civil liability of the defendant before judgment was rendered, not thereafter, for a hearing for
that purpose after judgment would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and
would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law."
Was the denial of the motion in accordance with law? Explain. Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
No, The denial of the motion was not proper. In Bud-long vs. Apalisok (122 SCRA 935), it
was held that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. The suspension of the
sentence imposed on the accused who is granted probation, has no bearing on his civil
liability.
The court must hear the civil aspect of the case where accused pleads guilty and at the same
time.
In the example given, the judgment was not final. Hence, the court should have re-
opened the case for reception of evidence in support of the civil aspect. It would be contrary
to the rule against multiplicity of suits should the private prosecutor be compelled to institute
a separate civil action for the recovery of the civil liability, either on the concept principle of
ex-delicto or ex-quasi-delicto, since the same acts may be both considered as delict or quasi-
delict giving rise to civil liability.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
The denial of the motion was not in accordance with law. The granting of probation affects
only the criminal liability of the offender. This is shown by the statutory definition of probation
which is a disposition under which the defendant after convicton and sentence is released
subject to the conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of the probation officer.
The "conviction and sentence" phrase shows that probation affects only the criminal aspects of
the case. The suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused who is granted probation has
no bearing on his civil liability. There is no legal basis in the conclusion of the trial court that a
hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused would nullify the order of suspension of the
sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law. The denial of the motion
would violate the right of the complainant to due process. The motion was filed on the day after
the judgment of conviction was rendered and hence before it became final. Besides the civil
liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the crime committee. It is personal to the
offended party. (Burlong vs. Apalisok L-60151 June 24,1983, 122 SCRA 935).
Page 120 of 374
Art 25; Probation Law 1985
No. 2
Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally
at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however,
missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously.
(A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons.
(B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty
will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss.
(C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and
Batas Pambansa 76?
Answer:
(C) Arthur may apply for and be entitled to probation if the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence does not exceed six years and one day. (Pres. Decree 968 as amended
by Pres. Decree 1257 and Batas 76).
Art 25; Probation Law 1986
No. 6:
Aristides was found guilty by the trial court of challenging Bodinus to a duel and scoffing at
Bodinus because of the latter's refusal to accept the challenge. The court sentenced Aristides to
a penalty of imprisonment from four months and one day to two years and four months. In the
dispositive portion of the decision, the court found Aristides entitled to probation and
suspended the execution of the sentence for a period of two years. Aristides did not appeal the
decision.
State the purposes of the Probation Law and explain whether or not the action of the Judge
promotes or serves these purposes.
Answer:
The purposes of the Probation Law are:
1. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of the offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
2. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence;
3. To prevent the commission of offenses.
The action of the judge certainly promotes or serves these purposes because it gives a
first time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society, through a process of
reformation, which is better achieved, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals. The
accused is afforded to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record.
However, probation cannot be granted without an application filed by the offender after
conviction and sentence. Besides, if probation is granted, mandatory and optional conditions
must be provided in the order of the court,

Page 121 of 374


Art 25; Probation Law 1988
No. 4:
b) Who are the offenders disqualified from availing themselves of the benefits of the probation
law (P.D. 968, as amended)?
Answer:
b) The following offenders are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the
Probation Law:
1. those sentenced to serve maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
2. those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security of the public order;
3. those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and or a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos;
4. those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this decree; and
5. those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this decree
applicable pursuant to Section 33 of P.D. 968.
Art 25; Probation Law 1995
No. 3:
In a case for violation of Sec. 8, RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
accused Vincent was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of
guilt and drunkenness not otherwise habitual. He was sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with the accessory penalties provided by
law, plus costs. Vincent applied for probation. The probation officer favorably recommended
his application.
1. If you were the Judge, what action will you take on the application? Discuss fully.
2. Suppose that Vincent was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to a maximum
penalty of ten (10) years. Under the law, he is not eligible for probation. He seasonably
appealed his conviction. While affirming the judgment of conviction, the appellate court
reduced the penalty to a maximum of four (4) years and four (4) months taking into
consideration certain modifying circumstances. Vincent now applies for probation.
How will you rule on his application? Discuss fully. Answer:
1. If I were the judge, I will deny the application for probation. The accused is not entitled to
probation as Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, PD NO. 968, as amended, specifically mentions that
those who "are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years"
are not entitled to the benefits of the law.
2. The law and jurisprudence are to the effect that appeal by the accused from a sentence of
conviction forfeits his right to probation.(Sec. 4, PD No. 968. as amended by PD 1990;
Bernardo us. Balagot; Francisco vs. CA: Llamado vs. CA; De la Cruz vs. Judge Callejo, CA
case).
N.B. to No. 2.
This is the second consecutive year that this question was asked. It is the sincere belief of the
Committee that there is a need to re-examine the doctrine. Firstly, much as the accused wanted
to apply for probation he is proscribed from doing so as the maximum penalty is NOT
PROBATIONABLE. Secondly, when the maximum penalty was reduced to one which allows
probation it is but fair and just to grant him that right because it is apparent that the trial judge
committed an error and for which the accused should not be made to suffer. Judicial tribunals in
this jurisdiction are not only courts of law but also of equity. Thirdly, the judgment of the
appellate court should be considered a new decision as the trial court's decision was vacated;
hence, he could take advantage of the law when the decision is remanded to the trial court for
execution (Please see Dissenting opinion in Francisco vs. CA).
It is suggested, therefore, that an examinee answering in this tenor should be credited with
some points.
Art 25; Probation Law 1997
No. 9:
The accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation in sixteen (16) informations which were
tried jointly and was sentenced in one decision to suffer In each case a prison term of one (1)
year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional. Within the
period to appeal, he filed an application for probation under the Probation Law of 1976, as
amended. Could he possibly qualify for probation?
Answer:
Yes. In Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384, the Supreme Court held that in case of
one decision imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the prison terms should not be
taken into account for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the accused for the
probation. The law uses the word "maximum term", and not total term. It is enough that each of
the prison terms does not exceed six years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as
the penalties imposed, when taken Individually and separately, are within the probationable
period.
Art 25; Probation Law; applicability 2003
No XIV.
Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the
penalty imposed upon him to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately sustained
Juan's conviction but reduced his sentence to a maximum of four years and eight months
imprisonment. Could Juan forthwith file an application for probation? Explain. 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Juan can no longer avail of the probation because he appealed from the judgment
of conviction of the trial court, and therefore, cannot apply for probation anymore. Section 4
of the Probation Law, as amended, mandates that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Art 25; Probation Law; barred by appeal
2001 No XVII
A, a subdivision developer, was convicted by the RTC of Makati for failure to issue the
subdivision title to a lot buyer despite full payment of the lot, and sentenced to suffer one year
Imprisonment. A appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was
dismissed. May A still apply for probation? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, A is no longer qualified to apply for probation after he appealed from the judgment of
conviction by the RTC. The probation law (PD 968, as amended by PD1990) now provides that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction (Sec. 4, PD 968).
Art 25; Probation Law; effect of application 1992 No.
9:
Johnny Gitara was convicted of the crime of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He
was imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 2 months and 1 day as
minimum and six years as maximum, both of prision correctional and was ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P3,000.00. He filed an application for
probation upon the promulgation of the judgment.
What is the legal effect of his application for probation on the judgment of conviction? Does
said application interrupt the running of the period of appeal?
Suggested Answer:
The filing of the application for probation is considered as a waiver of the right of the accused
to appeal; the decision has become final. In view of the finality of the decision there is no
period of appeal to speak of,
Art 25; Probation Law; effect of discharge 1983 No.
17
When a person convicted by final judgment is placed on probation and finally discharged after
the probation period, is he still required to satisfy his pecuniary liabilities under the Revised
Penal Code? Why?
Answer
Under the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1257) if the person who is placed on probation is finally discharged, such will operate to fully
discharge the offender of his liability for the fine imposed. Under Art. 38 of the Revised Penal
Code, fine is one of the pecuniary liabilities of the offender. The other pecuniary liabilities
which are reparation for damages caused and indemnification for consequential damage. (Art
38, Supra) which constitute the civil liability of the offender, are not extinguished because
probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. This is clearly evident in the "conviction
and sentence" clause of the definition of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
(Budlong vs. Judge Apalisok L60151, June 24, 1983) (Note: The question should have referred
to the civil liability of the offender as that seems to be the intention of the examiner)
Art 25; Probation Law; entitlement to probation; appeals 2002 No
IV.
A was charged with homicide. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to six (6)
years and one (1) day in prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Prior to his conviction, he had been found guilty of
vagrancy and imprisoned for ten (10) days of arresto manor and fined fifty pesos (P50.00). Is
he eligible for probation? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he Is not entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law (PD 968, as amended) does
not extend to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years (Sec. 9a).
It is of no moment that in his previous conviction A was given a penalty of only ten
(10) days of arresto mayor and a fine of P50.00.
B. May a probationer appeal from the decision revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, an order granting or denying
probation is not appealable.
Art 25; Probation Law; qualifications for probation 1994 No.
17:
On February 3, 1986, Roberto was convicted of arson through reckless imprudence and
sentenced to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On February 10, 1986, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Several months later, he filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on the ground that he
is applying for probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and
considered the appeal withdrawn.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case were remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a
"Motion for Probation" praying that execution of his sentence be suspended, and that a
probation officer be ordered to conduct an Investigation and to submit a report on his
probation.
The judge denied the motion on the ground that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1990,
which took effect on July 16,1986, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Is the denial of Roberto's motion correct? Answer;
Yes. Even if at the time of his conviction Roberto was qualified for probation but that at the
time of his application for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation.
The qualification for probation must be determined as of the time the application is filed in
Court (Bernardo vs. Judge, etal. GRNo. L86561,Nov, 10. 1992; Edwin de la Cruz vs. Judge
Callejo. et al, SP-19655, April 18, 1990, citing Llamado vs. CA, et al, GR No. 84859, June 28,
1989; Bernardo us. Judge Balagot, etal, GR 86561, Nov. 10, 1992).
Art 29; Destierro
1982 No. 15
May an accused person sentenced to destierro be credited with a portion of the time during
which he had undergone preventive imprisonment?
If not, why not? If in the affirmative, what portion of the time of preventive imprisonment
should be credited to him?
Answer
An accused sentenced to destierro can be credited with a portion of his period of
preventive imprisonment in the service of the sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty
because destierro as a penalty involves also deprivation of liberty although partial. (People vs.
Bastasa et al, 88 SCRA 184).
Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1980
No. VI
(a) Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, offenders who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment. An
accused was sentenced to "destierro" for having killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances. He had been preventively detained for a period of almost twelve years. Would
he be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 in so far as his preventive imprisonment is concerned?
Answer
(a) Article 29 as amended by R.A. No. 6127 provides that an offender who has undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time of the period of his preventive imprisonment if he has
agreed in writing to observe the rules of discipline applied to convicted prisoners and four-
fifth if there is no written commitment. The penalty of destierro involves also deprivation of
liberty (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172). The problem does not show whether there is a
written commitment. So, the deduction of the full period of preventive imprisonment cannot
technically be applied. However, the period of preventive imprisonment is almost 12 years.
Hence, even if four-fifth thereof of 12 years is applied, the result will be more than 8 years.
The duration of destierro is from 6 months 1 day to 6 years. The accused therefore is entitled
to be released because the period of his preventive imprisonment exceeds the penalty of
destierro imposed upon him.
Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1983
No, 10
Having caught A in flagrante delicto doing the sex act with his [B's] wife, B shot and killed A
while the latter was still in the compromising act. B was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for
murder after a protracted trial. It was only on appeal that he was given the proper penalty of
destierro under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
During the pendency of the case, the accused was under preventive detention which lasted for
about eight years.
(a) In serving his sentence, is B entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment? Explain.
(b) What is the philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro for the above
crime?
Answer
a) A can be credited for his preventive imprisonment. Destierro as a penalty involves also
deprivation of liberty. (People vs.. Bastasa (1979) of 6 O.G. 6844)
Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1994
No. 3:
1) When is there preventive imprisonment?
2) When is the accused credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment, and when is he
credited with 4/5 thereof?
Answer;
1) There is preventive imprisonment when [a) an offender is detained while the criminal case
against him is being heard, either because the crime committed is a capital offense and not
bailable, or even if the crime committed was bailable, the offender could not post the required
bail for his provisional liberty.
2) An accused is credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment if he voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by the rules of the institution imposed upon its prisoners, provided
that:
a) the penalty imposed on him for the crime committed consists of a deprivation of liberty;
b) he is not disqualified from such credit for being a recidivist, or for having been previously
convicted for two or more times of any crime, or for having failed to surrender voluntarily for
the execution of the sentence upon being so summoned (Art. 29, RPC).
Where the accused however did not agree he would only be credited with 4/5 of the time he
had undergone preventive Imprisonment.
Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1978
No. IV-a
A bus driver was found guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence. He was
sentenced "to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs". The driver was insolvent and could not pay
the fine.
May the driver be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment? Explain, Answer
No, because subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine, is not expressly
provided in the sentence. (People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil. 639).
Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1980
No. VIII
"P" was sentenced from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00.
May "P" be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine?
Answer
P cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment. Art. 39 par. 3 (R.P.C.)
provides that there is no subsidiary imprisonment if the principal penalty is higher than prision
correccional. The penalty of 6 years 1 day to 12 years and
1 day is higher than prision correccional which has a maximum of 6 years only. The mere
addition of 1 day to 6 years is already higher than prision correccional and in such a case there
can be no subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine. (Rosario vs. Director of Prisons,
L-03463, March 6, 1950)
Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1983
No. 13
Charged with estafa in September 1983, the accused was found guilty and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000, aside from the
indemnification of the victim, with subsidiary imprisonment for both fine and indemnity in
case of insolvency.
Was subsidiary imprisonment properly imposed? Explain. Answer
Subsidiary imprisonment was not properly imposed because the principal penalty which is 4
years, 2 months 1 day of prision correcional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as maximum, is higher than prision correcional. (Art, 39, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code) Besides,
there is no subsidiary imprisonment for indemnity, as subsidiary imprisonment is limited to
non-payment of fine. (Art. 39 as amended by Act 5465)
Art 45; when not subject to confiscation 1987 No
XV:
Jose, Pedro and Juan, robbed ABC Bank of P200,000 and using a stolen car, immediately
proceeded to Quezon City. The police recovered the money and the car. After the trial, during
which the bank lawyer intervened as private prosecutor, the court convicted Jose, Pedro and
Juan of robbery and ordered the forfeiture of the money (P200,000.00) and the car in favor of
the government as proceeds and instrument of the crime, respectively. The bank lawyer
received copy of the judgment, but did not do anything. Jose, Pedro and Juan did not appeal
the judgment, and began service of sentence. Two months later, realizing that the court did not
order the return of the money to the bank, the bank lawyer filed a motion for modification of
the judgment and prayed that the money be ordered returned to the bank. Two months later,
Armando, the owner of the stolen car, learned of the judgment even much later. He comes to
you seeking your well considered opinion on whether it is still possible to recover his car.
(a) As legal counsel, what will you tell him? Explain briefly.
(b) Under the facts given, would the bank be entitled to the return of the money? Why?
Answer:
a) As legal counsel, I would advise Armando to file a civil action for the recovery of his car
against its legal custodian. The car was stolen and therefore it belonged to Armando, an
innocent party, who has not participated in the commission of the robbery by Jose, Pedro and
Juan. The car, is therefore, not subject to confiscation.
Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; crimes punishable 1988 No.
3:
c) What offenses, if any, may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present?
Explain.
Answer:
c) At present, no offense may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at
present. The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death penalty and the abolition affects even
those who has already been sentenced to death penalty. Therefore, unless Congress enacts a
law, no offense may be punished with the death penalty at present. But until today, Congress
has not yet passed a law to this effect.
Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; exceptions thereto 1998 No
XIII.
1. Under Article 47 of RA. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed In all cases in
which it must be imposed under existing laws. What are the exceptions to the imposition of
the death penalty? [3%]
Answer:
1. The death penalty shall not be imposed although prescribed under existing laws:
(1)When the accused is less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense;
(2) When the accused is more than 70 years of age already;
(3)When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority
vote for the imposition of the death penalty is not obtained.
Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; heinous crimes 1995 No.
1:
1. (a) When was the constitutional proscription against the imposition of the death penalty lifted?
(b) When is the execution of the death penalty suspended under the Revised Penal Code?
(c) When is the death penalty commuted under the same Code?
2. (a) What are heinous crimes?
(b) Name ten (10) specific heinous crimes. Answer:
1. (a) The constitutional proscription against the imposition of the death penalty was lifted with
the enactment of RA 7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crimes Law, which took effect
fifteen (15) days after publication on December 16, 1993,that is on December 3l, 1993
(People vs. Martin Simon, 234 SCRA 555).
(b) Death penalty shall not be executed (a) upon a woman within three years after date of the
sentence, (b) while she is pregnant, (c) upon a person over 70 years old (Art. 83 RPC), or (4)
upon a convict who becomes insane after final sentence (Art. 79, RPC).
(c) When the convict reaches the age of 70 years the death sentence is commuted to reclusion
perpetua (Art. 83, RPC).
2. (a) Heinous crimes are those which are punishable by death for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their Inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
(b) The ten specific heinous crimes are:
1 Treason
2. Qualified Piracy
3 Qualified Bribery
4. Parricide
5. Murder
6. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
7. Robbery with Homicide 8 Destructive Arson
9. Rape committed by two or more persons, or with a deadly weapon or with homicide
10. Plunder
Art 47 & 83; death penalty; heinous crimes 1997 No
10:
(a) What do you understand by the so-called heinous crimes?
(b) What are the instances when the death penalty could not be imposed, although it should
otherwise ordinarily be meted out?
Answer:
(a) Heinous crimes are those grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity, are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society. They are punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment to death.
(WHEREAS CLAUSE. RA. 7659)
(b) 1. When the guilty party is below 18 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime or when the offender is more than 70 years of age.
2. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the penalty, in which case the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
Art 48; Aberratio ictus 1993
No. 12:
Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation
of perjury.
Answer;
1) Aberratio ictus - A fired a gun at his father to kill him but hit instead a stranger.
Art 48; aberratio ictus

Page 130 of 374


1996 No. 2:
1) At the height of an altercation, Pedrito shot Paulo but missed, hitting Tiburcio instead,
resulting in the death of the latter. Pedrito, invoking the doctrine of aberratio ictus, claims
exemption from criminal liability.
If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Answer:
1) If I were the Judge, I will convict Pedrito and find him guilty of the complex crime of
Homicide with Attempted Homicide. The single act of firing at Paulo resulted in the
commission of two felonies, one grave (homicide) and the other less grave (attempted
homicide) thus falling squarely under Art. 48, RPC; hence, the penalty would be for the more
serious crime (homicide} in its maximum period (17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years).
Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) could not be used as a defense as it is not an exempting
circumstance. Pedrito is liable under the principle of Art. 4, RPC, which makes a person
criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act,
Art 48; Aberratio ictus vs error in personae
1994 No. 2;
1) Distinguish aberratio ictus from error in personae. Answer:
1) Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when a felonious act missed the person against
whom it was directed and hit instead somebody who was not the intended victim. Error in
personae, or mistake in identity occurs when the felonious act was directed at the person
intended, but who turned out to be somebody else. Aberratio ictus brings about at least two (2)
felonious consequence, ie. the attempted felony on the intended victim who was not hit and
the felony on the unintended victim who was hit. A complex crime of the first form under Art.
48, RPC generally result. In error in personae only one crime is committed,
Art 48; Aberratio ictus, error in personae & praeter intentionem
1989 No. 1:
What do you understand by aberratio ictus; error in personae; and praeter intentionem? Do they
alter the criminal liability of an accused? Explain.
Answer:
Aberation ictus, error in personae and praeter intentionem are the three ways by which a
person may commit a felony although the wrongful act done is different from that which he
intended.
In aberratio ictus, there is a mistake in the blow meaning to say that the offender intending to
cause an injury to one person actually inflicts it on another because of lack of precision, as far
for example when A, intending to kill B, fires his gun at the latter but because of poor aim or
lack of precision, he hits C instead, who suffers serious physical injury.
In error in personae, there is a mistake in the identity of the victim, as for instance, when A,
intending to kill B, his enemy lay in ambush for the latter to pass along a dark alley. Because of
the darkness, A fired his gun at a person

Page 131 of 374


passing by, thinking him to be B. It turned out that the person shot was C, A's father.
In praeter intentionem, the injurious result is greater than that intended by the offender, the act
exceeds the intent, as for instance, where A, without intent to kill, strikes B with his fist at the
back of the head, causing B to fall down with his head hitting the asphalt pavement, resulting
in the fracture of his head that caused his death.
The presence of these circumstances will alter the criminal liability of the accused. Thus:
In aberratio ictus, two offenses are actually committed by the offender, that which he intended
to commit and that which he actually committed. But if these two offenses are both either grave
or less grave, since they are produced by one single act, a complex crime will result.
In the case of error in personae, the offender shall be guilty of the crime actually committed by
him, but the penalty to be imposed shall either be the penalty for the crime actually committed
or that for the crime intended to be committed. Which ever is lower, but the same will be
imposed in its maximum period.
In the case praeter intentionem, the offended, will incur criminal liability for the felony actually
committed by him, but he will be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of not having intended
to commit so grave a wrong as that which he committed.
Art 48; Aberratio ictus, Error in personae & praeter intentionem
1999 No VI
What do you understand by aberratio ictus: error in personae; and praeter intentionem? Do
they alter the criminal liability of an accused? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when the offender delivered the blow at his
intended victim but missed, and instead such blow landed on an unintended victim. The
situation generally brings about complex crimes where from a single act, two or more grave or
less grave felonies resulted, namely the attempt against the Intended victim and the
consequence on the unintended victim. As complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious
crime shall be the one imposed and in the maximum period. It Is only when the resulting
felonies are only light that complex crimes do not result and the penalties are to be imposed
distinctly for each resulting crime.
Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender actually hit the person to
whom the blow was directed but turned out to be different from and not the victim intended.
The criminal liability of the offender is not affected, unless the mistake in identity resulted to a
crime different from what the offender intended to commit, in which case the lesser penalty
between the crime intended and the crime committed shall be imposed but in the maximum
period (Art. 49, RFC).
Praeter intentionem or where the consequence went beyond that intended or expected. This is a
mitigating circumstance (Art. 13. par. 3, RPC) when there is a notorious disparity between the
act or means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, i,e., the resulting felony could
not be reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the of fender from the act or means employed by
him.
Art 48; aberratio ictus; attempted murder with homicide 2000 No
XIV
Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing
during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in
Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their
celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered
firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja
that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's
refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing
lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's
yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious
and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated
argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight,
Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down
Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and
nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started
throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he
would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .
45 caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was
following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously,
a) What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%)
b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you
set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%)
c) If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with
homicide because a single act caused a less grave and a grave felony (Art. 48. RPC).
Attempted murder Is a less grave felony, while consummated homicide is a grave
felony: both are punishable by afflictive penalties.
Art 48; Complex crime; incriminatory machination with unlawful arrest 1977 No.
III-b
A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo
shirt of a student and then arrested the student for illegal possession of marijuana cigarette. For
what crime or crimes will the police officer be liable? Reason fully.
Answer
The police officer will be liable for the complex crime of incriminatory machination with
unlawful arrest. (People v. Alagao, et al., L-20721, April 30, 1966). The placing of marijuana
cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of the student is incriminatory machination,
which is "planting evidence". The arrest of the student for illegal possession of the marijuana
cigarette is unlawful arrest.
The two acts followed closely each other. Incriminatory machination is the means to commit
unlawful arrest and is, therefore, a complex crime.
Art 48; Complex crimes; applies only to felonies; estafa & bp 22
1987 No. VIII;
Jose purchased roofing materials worth P20,000.00 from PY & Sons Construction Company
owned by Pedro, and paid the latter a check in the said amount. The following day, Pedro
deposited the check, but it was returned dishonored because it was drawn against a closed
account. Notwithstanding written demands, Jose failed to make good said check. Atty.
Saavedra, counsel for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg, 22. Atty. San Pascual, counsel for Jose, claimed that if his
client was at all liable, he could only be liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and not
for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and
because Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty.-The investigating fiscal, on
his resolution, stated that only one crime was committed, namely, the complex crime of estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
because the single act of issuing the bouncing check constitutes two offenses, one under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
If you were the Provincial Fiscal asked to review the matter, how would you resolve it?
Answer:
The resolution of the investigating fiscal is erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and the violation of BP 22. A complex crime
refers only to felonies which are punished in the Revised Penal Code. Batas 22 which
punishes the offense of issuing a worthless check is a special law. The contention of Atty. San
Pascual, counsel of Jose that his client should be liable only for Batas 22 and for estafa under
the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and because Batas 22 is more
favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty cannot also be sustained. Batas 22
specifically provides that liability under said act is without prejudice to any liability for estafa
under the Revised Penal Code. The check issued by Jose in payment of roofing materials from
PY and Sons was worthless. Said bouncing check having been issued in payment of a
simultaneous obligation constitutes estafa under the Revised Penal Code and also the offense
punished under Batas 22. There is no identity of offenses. Damage is not an element of the
offense punished in Batas 22 whereas in estafa damage is an element. Estafa is an act mala in
se in which requires intent as an element while the offense punished in Batas 22 is an act mala
prohibita where intent is not an element.
Art 48; Complex crimes; applies only to felonies; illegal possession of firearms
1975 No. I
A shot and killed D with an unlicensed firearm. The Fiscal filed charges against A one for
Homicide and another for Illegal Possession of Firearm. The defense counsel contended that
only one charge should have been filed the complex crime of Homicide with Illegal
Possession of Firearm as the use of the
unlicensed firearm was a necessary means to commit the homicide. Is the contention
meritorious? Why?
Answer
a) The contention of defense counsel is not meritorious, A complex crime refers only to felonies.
(Art. 48, Revised Penal Code, People vs. Araneta, 48 Phil. 650). The offender will be liable
for two crimes. One for homicide, which is a felony punished in the Revised Penal Code, and
another for illegal possession of firearm, which is an offense punished in a special law.
b) People vs. Alger, 92 Phil 227.
Art 48; Complex crimes; Coup detat & rebellion & sedition 2003 No
X.
(b) Can there be a complex crime of coup d'etat with rebellion? 2%
(c) Can there be a complex crime of coup d'etat with sedition? 2% SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
(b) Yes, if there was conspiracy between the offender/ offenders committing the coup d'etat and the
offenders committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one would be the crime of the
other and vice versa. This is possible because the offender in coup d'etat may be any person
or persons belonging to the military or the national police or a public officer, whereas
rebellion does not so require. Moreover, the crime of coup d'etat may be committed singly,
whereas rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly
constituted government. Since the two crimes are essentially different and punished with
distinct penalties, there is no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.
(c) Yes, coup d'etat can be complexed with sedition because the two crimes are essentially
different and distinctly punished under the Revised Penal Code. Sedition may not be directed
against the Government or non-political in objective, whereas coup d'etat is always political in
objective as it is directed against the Government and led by persons or public officer holding
public office belonging to the military or national police. Art. 48 of the Code may apply under
the conditions therein provided.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime of coup d'etat cannot be complexed with the crime of rebellion because both
crimes are directed against the Government or for political purposes, although the principal
offenders are different. The essence may be the same and thus constitute only one crime. In this
situation, the two crimes are not distinct and therefore, may not be proper to apply Article 48 of
the Code.
Art 48; Complex crimes; either must not be slight 1989 No.
3:
Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his service pistol inside his house when it fell from his
hand and fired. The bullet hit a neighbor on the stomach and a second neighbor on the leg.
The injuries sustained by the two neighbors required thirty-five (35) days and nine (9) days of
medical attendance, respectively. The investigating fiscal later filed an information for
frustrated homicide and slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Rodolfo,
Is the charge correct? Explain.
Answer:
The charge is not correct.
One single act of accidental shooting cannot give rise to two felonies. One of which is
intentional and the other negligent. Frustrated homicide presupposes intent to kill. The facts
do not show any intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo. At most, he was careless, and therefore
only negligent.
Two separate crimes of serious physical injuries (against the first neighbor whose injuries
requires 35 days of medical attendance), and slight physical injuries (against the second
neighbor), both through reckless imprudence, were committed by Rodolfo. Although both of
these offenses were the result of one single act, a complex crime is not committed because it is
only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies that a complex
crime may be committed under the first clause of article 48, RPC, Slight physical injuries is not
a grave or less grave felony.
Art 48; Complex crimes; either must not be slight: prescription 1980 No. X
"T" was charged in an Information with the complex crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Damage to Property in the sum of P700.00 and Slight Physical Injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence. The incident which gave rise to the quasi-offense
occurred on November 14, 1979. The accused was charged on March 14, 1980.
Should the resulting offenses be considered a complex crime subject to one penalty?
Answer
The resulting offenses cannot be considered as a complex crime. The slight physical injuries
which resulted from a single act of imprudence which occurred on Nov. 14, 1979, prescribed
already when the accused was charged on March 14, 19SO. Slight physical injuries, being a
light felony, prescribes in two months, (Art. 90, R.P.C.). Another reason is that a complex
crime exists if a single act results in two grave or less grave felonies. If one of the resulting
felonies is light, like slight physical injuries, as stated in the problem there can be no complex
crime. (Lontok vs. Gorgonio, L-37396 April 30, 1979)
Art 48; Complex crimes; nature 1999
No XV
(a) A, actuated by malice and with the use of a fully automatic M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a
group of persons who were seated in a cockpit with one burst of successive, continuous,
automatic fire. Four (4) persons were killed thereby, each having hit by different bullets
coming from the sub-machine gun of
A. Four (4) cases of murder were filed against A.
The trial court ruled that there was only one crime committed by A for the reason that, since A
performed only one act, he having pressed the trigger of his gun only once, the crime
committed was murder. Consequently, the trial judge sentenced A to just one penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Was the decision of the trial judge correct? Explain. (4%)
(b) What constitutes a complex crime? How many crimes maybe involved in a complex crime?
What is the penalty therefor? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When the offender made use of an automatic
firearm, the acts committed are determined by the number of bullets discharged Inasmuch as
the firearm being automatic, the offender need only press the trigger once and it would fire
continually. For each death caused by a distinct and separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct
criminal liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as
producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.
(b) A complex crime is constituted when a single act caused two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is committed as a necessary means to commit another offense
(Art. 48, RPC). At least two (2) crimes are involved in a complex crime; either two or more
grave or less grave felonies resulted from a single act, or an offense is committed as a
necessary means for committing another, The penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed and in its maximum period. (Art. 48, RPC)
Crimes against persons; homicide, infanticide; parricide; murder 1999 No XVI
Who may be guilty of the crime of parricide? (3%)
A killed: (1) a woman with whom he lived without benefit of clergy, (2) their child who was
only two days old, (3) their daughter, and (4) their adopted son.
What crime or crimes did A commit? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Any person who kills his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or his
ascendants or descendants, or spouse, shall be guilty of parricide. (Art. 246, RPC)
(b) A committed the following crimes:
1. Homicide or murder as the case may be, for the killing of his common- law wife who is not
legally considered a "spouse"
2. Infanticide for the killing of the child as said child is less than three (3) days old. (Art. 255,
RPC) However, the penalty corresponding to parricide shall
be imposed since A is related to the child within the degree defined in the crime of parricide.
3. Parricide for the killing of their daughter, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as long as she is
not less than three (3) days old at the time of the killing.
4. Murder for the killing of their adopted son as the relationship between A and the said son must
be by blood in order for parricide to arise.
Art 48; Complex crimes; Ordinary complex crime vs special complex crime 2003 No X.
(a) Distinguish between an ordinary complex crime and a special complex crime as to
their concepts and as to the imposition of penalties. 2%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) In concept -
An ordinary complex crime is made up of two or more crimes being punished in distinct
provisions of the Revised Penal Code but alleged in one Information either because they were
brought about by a single felonious act or because one offense is a necessary means for
committing the other offense or offenses. They are alleged in one Information so that only one
penalty shall be imposed.
A special complex crime, on the other hand, is made up of two or more crimes which are
considered only as components of a single indivisible offense being punished in one provision
of the Revised Penal Code.
As to penalties -
In ordinary complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed and
in its maximum period.
In special complex crime, only one penalty is specifically prescribed for all the
component crimes which are regarded as one indivisible offense. The component crimes are
not regarded as distinct crimes and so the penalty for the most serious crime is not the penalty
to be imposed nor in its maximum period. It is the penalty specifically provided for the special
complex crime that shall be applied according to the rules on imposition of the penalty.
Art 48; Continuing offense vs Delito continuado 1994 No.
4:
2) Differentiate delito continuado from a continuing offense. Answer;
2) Delito continuado, or continuous crime, is a term used to denote as only one crime
a series of felonious acts arising from a single criminal resolution, not susceptible of division,
which are carried out in the same place and at about the same time, and violating one and the
same penal provision. The acts done must be impelled by one criminal intent or purpose, such
that each act merely constitutes a partial execution of a particular crime, violating one and the
same penal provision. It involves a concurrence of felonious acts violating a common right, a
common penal provision, and Impelled by a single criminal impulse (People vs. Le-desma, 73
SCRA 77).
On the other hand, a continuing offense is one whose essential ingredients took place in more
than one municipality or city, so much so that the criminal prosecution may be instituted and
the case tried in the competent court of any one of such municipality or city.
The term "continued crime" or delito continuado mandates that only one information should
be filed against the offender although a series of felonious acts were performed; the term
"continuing crime" is more pertinently used with reference to the venue where the criminal
action may be instituted.
Art 48; Continuous crimes 1976
No. VIII-a
X filed 50 complaints of estafa with the Fiscal's Office against his employee, Y, claiming that
Y misappropriated sums of money on various dates representing the amounts he collected on
different dates from Ms (X's) customers. All in all, the Fiscal filed 50 informations for estafa
in court. Y questioned the filing of 50 different informations of estafa against him on the
ground that the charges were components of one crime as this was impelled by a single
criminal intent. Is Y's contention tenable? Reason.
Answer
Y's contention is not tenable. The 50 different informations for estafa filed against Y refer to
misappropriations of money on various dates representing amounts collected on different
dates from the customers of X. Misappropriation on each date is a separate crime of estafa
because it is motivated by an independent criminal impulse. Misappropriations on different
dates constitute several cases of estafa because each misappropriation is generated by a
distinct criminal resolution. This case refers to material plurality of crimes as the different acts
committed on different dates have separate criminal resolutions which should result in
different crimes which are judicially independent. The charges cannot be mere components of
one crime impelled by a single criminal intent because the misappropriations were committed
on various dates and not on the same occasion. The different criminal acts have different
criminal intent or resolutions. In a continuous crime, the criminal acts arise from a single
criminal intent or resolution which is not susceptible of division. (Gamboa, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 72 O.G. 3658),
Art 49; error in personae 1983
No. 12
Julius planned to do away with Mario, a business rival. With a bolo in hand, Julius waited in
ambush at a dark alley where Mario used to pass every night on his way home. When a figure
came by, Julius struck him with the bolo again and again, thinking that he , was Mario. It
turned out that the victim was Julius' own father who had the same general appearance as
Mario.
What crime was committed? Citing applicable legal principles, for what crime should Julius
be punished?
Why?
Answer
The crime committed is parricide. The problem refers to mistake in identity because the crime
intended which is the killing of Mario, a business rival, is different from the crime committed,
which is the killing of the father of Julius, the
offender. Under Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender, however, will be punished
for the crime intended, which is murder, as the victim was ambushed at right and therefore
treachery attended the killing of the victim, the penalty of which is to be imposed in its
maximum period. The reason is the penalty for the crime committed which is parricide
prescribes a penalty higher than murder which the accused intended to commit
Art 49; error in personae 1986
No. 7:
Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence,
inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided
to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father
went to his room, lambasted and fired him in the presence of several members of the office
staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at
the exit of the parking lot where his father always passes at the close of each working day.
A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction
of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to
Roberto, the victim of his fire was Taga-hatid, a company messenger whom the father had
instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities.
(a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that
the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel
insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating
circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain.
(b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense
committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain
why you have decided to impose this penalty.
Answer:
a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was
ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure
specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the
person attacked might make.
b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be
imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is
different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is
parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended
is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime
committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2,
Revised Penal Code).
Art 49; error in personae; murder & parricide 1986
No. 7:

Page 140 of 374


Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence,
inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided
to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father
went to his room, lambasted and fired him in the presence of several members of the office
staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at
the exit of the parking lot where his father always passes at the close of each working day.
A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction
of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to
Roberto, the victim of his fire was Taga-hatid, a company messenger whom the father had
instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities.
(a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that
the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel
insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating
circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain.
(b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense
committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain
why you have decided to impose this penalty.
Answer:
a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was
ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure
specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the
person attacked might make.
b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be
imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is
different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is
parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended
is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime
committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2,
Revised Penal Code).
Art 62; Habitual delinquency 1991
No, 6:
A was charged with homicide. During the trial, un-contradicted evidence consisting of medical
certificates were presented showing that the accused had sustained injuries in ten (10) previous
occasions while engaged in fisticuffs with different persons. He was also confined at the
National Mental Hospital for mental ailment diagnosed as "homicidal and suicidal instincts."
During his second confinement thereat, he escaped. Upon conviction, the prosecutor objected
to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law contending that the accused is a habitual
delinquent and an escapee from the National Mental Hospital.

Page 141 of 374


If you are the Judge, rule on the objection. Answer:
The objection should be overruled. A could not be legally considered a habitual
delinquent. Habitual delinquency cannot be validly invoked without being alleged in the
Information and proven during the trial. Besides there is no indication that A was convicted
within ten (10) years from last conviction or release, three times or oftener of the crimes of
robbery, theft, estafa, physical injuries or falsification.
Being an escapee from the Mental Hospital will not disqualify him from the
application of the ISL as Section 2 thereof contemplates having escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence. Confinement presupposes imprisonment by virtue of a final judgment.
Art 62; Habitual delinquency & recidivism 2001
No III
Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft
when he was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last case, the trial Judge
considered against the accused both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The accused appealed
and contended that in his last conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him a finding
of recidivism and, again, of habitual delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency are correctly
considered in this case because the basis of recidivism is different from that of habitual
delinquency.
Juan is a recidivist ...
Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty when an offender is
convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is correctly considered because Juan had
already three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft and again convicted for
Robbery With Homicide. And the crimes specified as basis for habitual delinquency includes,
inter alia, theft and robbery.
Art 62; Habitual delinquency vs recidivism 1986 No.
5:
Give at least four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism. Can a person be a
habitual delinquent without being a recidivist? Explain.
Answer:
The four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism are:
1. In habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, which are robbery, theft, estafa, falsification,
serious and less serious physical injuries. In recidivism, the crimes are embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code.
2. In recidivism, no period of time is fixed between the former conviction and the last conviction.
In habitual delinquency, conviction of any of the specified crimes must take place within 10
years from the last conviction or release.
3. In recidivism, it is enough that there be a second conviction of any crime embraced in the same
title of the last or the first crime. In habitual delinquency, there must be at least a third
conviction of any of the specified crimes.
4. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance and if not offset serves to increase the penalty.
Habitual delinquency provides for the imposition of an additional penalty.
There may be habitual delinquency without recidivism if the three convictions refer to crimes
not embraced in the same title Code, like, robbery in the first conviction, a crime against
property, falsification, the second conviction, a crime against public interest and serious
physical injuries, the third conviction, a crime against persons.
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors 2003 No
VIII.
(a) A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with the
crime 3 months later. He was 23 when he was finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of
preparing to serve a jail term, he sought a suspension of the sentence on the ground that he
was a juvenile offender Should he be entitled to a suspension of sentence? Reasons. 4%
(b) Can juvenile offenders, who are recidivists, validly ask for suspension of sentence? Explain.
4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No, A is not entitled to a suspension of the sentence because he is no longer a minor at the time
of promulgation of the sentence. For purposes of suspension of sentence, the offender's age at
the time of promulgation of the sentence is the one considered, not his age when he committed
the crime. So although A was below 18 years old when he committed the crime, but he was
already 23 years old when sentenced, he is no longer eligible for suspension of the sentence.
(b) Yes, so long as the offender is still a minor at the time of the promulgation of the sentence. The
law establishing Family Courts, Rep. Act 8369, provides to this effect: that if the minor is
found guilty, the court should promulgate the sentence and ascertain any civil liability which
the accused may have incurred. However, the sentence shall be suspended without the need of
application pursuant to PD 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"
(RA 8369, Sec. 5a), It is under PD 603 that an application for suspension of the sentence is
required and thereunder it is one of the conditions for suspension of sentence that the offender
be a first time convict: this has been displaced by RA 8369.
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603 1977 No.
III-a
The accused was seventeen (17) years old when he was charged of grave coercion. Because of
protracted trial, he was already twenty-one (21) years old when the decision was promulgated
convicting him of the offense charged the accused asked for the suspension of his sentence
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603 for he was a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense. If you were the judge, will you suspend the sentence or not? State your reasons.
Answer
If I were the Judge I would not suspend the sentence. The benefits of Article 80 as modified by
Presidential Decree 603, as amended, would apply only to minors under eighteen years old not
only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of the trial. (People v.
Celespara, 82 Phil. 399; People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127). The law provides that if the Court
grants the request of the minor found guilty of the offense charged for the suspension of the
pronouncement of the sentence, said minor is ordered committed to an institution under the
supervision of the Department of Social Services "until such minor shall have reached his
majority x x x". This means that if he is already of age at the promulgation of the sentence, he
cannot be committed anymore.
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603
1985 No. 1
Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor offender to
a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be considered as a mere
ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be immediately sentenced and made to
serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of being placed under suspended sentence.
Discuss.
Answer
Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition of the
penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time of the
commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon conviction. So
under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as amended) a minor under
18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial, if found
guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the sentence. The only instance where there is
no suspension of the sentence in spite of minority is that provided in Article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code where the minor under 16 years old at the time of the commission of a light felony
if found guilty, the sentence is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been expressly
repealed by Presidential Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a matter of
fact, the Supreme Court held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there are only
two instances where there can be no suspended sentence, to wit: 1) if the offense committed
by a minor is punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2) if the minor is 18 years and above
at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial.
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603
1980 No. XII
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, what is the controlling criterion to determine
whether or not an accused is a youthful offender so as to entitled him to suspension of
sentence? Is there any difference between the Revised Penal Code and the Child and Youth
Welfare Code in so far as suspension of the sentence of a juvenile offender is concerned?
Answer
Under the Youth and Child Welfare Code, the youthful offender must be under eighteen years
old not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of the trial so as to
be entitled to suspension of sentence. (People va. Casiguran, L-45387, Nov. 7, 1979) Under
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the youthful offender who is found guilty after trial, must
file an application for the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence, which the Court
may grant if the interest of the minor and of the public so requires. Under Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code which covers a minor under 16 years of age at the time of the
commission of a grave or less grave felony and at the time of the trial, which was expressly
repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the suspension of the pronouncement of the
sentence upon the minor where there is evidence of guilt is automatic.
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; youthful offender
1995 No. 7:
Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered
the store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky
complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly
Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to
death. Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When
Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As
soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box.
Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and
Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later
found in the houses of Victor and Ricky.
1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie.
2. Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to suspended sentence under The Child and Youth
Welfare Code? Explain.
Answer:
1 . All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide....
2. No, because the benefits of suspension of sentence is not available where the youthful
offender has been convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, pursuant to
P.D. No. 603, Art. 192, The complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under Art. 294 (1), RFC [People vs. Galit. 230 SCRA 486).
Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603
1986 No. 16:
Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two
days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some
food. Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges
of the door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room
where the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked
Bobot with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon
hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme,
however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme
collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine
cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas
heard rumors that the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead.
Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt,
but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00.
The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide
aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an
accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law (PD No. J612).
d) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
(3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain,
(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer:
(1) If I were the counsel of Aber, I would question the validity of the charge. Robbery with
homicide is not proper crime because there was no breaking of the door but only its hinges.
(People vs Lising CA 62 OG. 9879) The crime is theft. Since Aber was only l6 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime he should be prosecuted under the Youth and Child
Welfare Code, where in case of conviction, he could apply for suspension of sentence. If
granted, during confinement upon his good behavior, he would be entitled to be discharged.
Aber cannot be liable for the killing of Cosme because he has no part in its
commission.
(2) If I were the counsel of Bobot, I would invoke his age at the time of the commission of the
crime for the application of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The crimes committed are
theft and homicide. Regarding the homicide, Bobot can maintain that Cosme hit him with a
club and continued to do so forcing Bobot to attack him in the face. He can also invoke the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that which resulted.
(3) If I were the counsel of Dimas, I would maintain that he could not be liable as an accessory to
the crime of homicide attributed to Bobot because he had no knowledge of its commission.
Regarding the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, he can maintain that he bought the
tins of sardines in good faith without any knowledge that these were the proceeds of the crime
of theft.
(4) If I were the Judge, I would convict Aber and Bobot for the crime and theft. The breaking of
the hinges of the door is not the breaking of the door as provided in the law. So the crime
committed is not robbery. Only Bobot will be liable for the death of Cosme. Aber has no
participation in his death aside from the fact that the crime is not a necessary consequence of
the plan to steal food in the store. Besides the act of Aber in trying to pull Bobot away from
Cosme is an attempt to prevent Bobot from injuring Cosme. In the crimes of theft and
homicide, only nighttime and dwelling are aggravating. Evident premeditation is inherent in
theft which is a crime against property. It cannot be considered in homicide as there is no
showing of any previous planning to commit it. However, both Aber and Bobot being 16 and
17 years respectively at the time of the commission of the crime should be proceeded under
the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, if still under 18 years at the time of the
trial. If convicted, they could apply for the suspension of the sentence, and if granted, they
would be committed to an institution until they reach the age of majority If they behave
properly during confinement, they would be returned to the court to be discharged; but if they
proved themselves to be incorrigible, then for the imposition of the sentence.
Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber
where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were
the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them
for a profit.
Art 80; PD 603; confidentiality of records of minor offenders 1978 No.
X-b
Jose, a teenager of 16 years, was found guilty of homicide. Because of his age, he was held to
be a youthful offender pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and instead of
passing sentence, the judge ordered him committed to the government rehabilitation center in
Tanay, Rizal. Jose was released after a year and a half because of good behavior. He later
applied for and was appointed to the position of clerk in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Among the papers he submitted was an application form under oath in which Jose stated he had
never been charged with, much less convicted of, any crime, in complete disavowal of his
previous conviction.
What offense/offenses did Jose commit? State your reasons. Answer
Jose did not commit any offense. Under Presidential Decree No. 603 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1179, the records of his case are deemed privileged, and there is no
liability for perjury or for concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him
for any purpose. (Art. 200)
Art 80; PD 603; youthful offenders
1975 No. XX
What is a youthful offender as defined in Presidential Decree No. 603 amending Article 80 of
the Revised Penal Code? If you were a judge and found a youthful offender guilty of a crime,
how would you sentence him?
Answer
A youthful offender is one who is over nine years old and under 21 years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense.
If a youthful offender is found guilty, if I were the judge, I would defer his sentence and
suspend all proceedings after determining the imposable penalty and his civil liability, if any, I
would then order the minor committed to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare or to
any training institution operated by the government until ho reaches 21 years or for a shorter
period as I might deem proper after considering the reports of the Department of Social Welfare
or of such training agency under whose care the minor was committed. (Art. 192, Presidential
Decree No. 603).
If the youthful offender is found incorrigible or his continued stay in the training institution is
found inadvisable and is returned to the court, the judgment would be pronounced. The
youthful offender shall be credited in the service of the sentence with the full time spent in
actual confinement. (Art. 197, Presidential Decree No, 608). If he behaved properly during
confinement, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, his case will be
dismissed (Art. 196, Presidential Decree Ho. 608), but it shall not obliterate his civil liability
for damages. (Art, 198, Presidential Decree No. 603).
Extinction of Criminal Liability
Art 89; Criminal liability; corporate officers 1986
No. 2:
Two hardware stores are located two blocks apart along Avenida Rizal in Manila. One
store is named Glorious Hardware Co. while the other is Glorioso and Sons Hardware, Inc.
Two hundred bags of cement ordered by Glorious Hardware were brought by the driver of Hi-
Cement Corporation to Glorioso and Sons. The driver inquired from the manager of Glorioso
and Sons, a certain Pedro Mendoza, whether that company ordered the cement, Mendoza
answered "Yes" and directed the driver to the warehouse of Glorioso and Sons where their
laborers unloaded the cargo.
Learning of the misdelivery, Jose Roxas, manager of Hi-Cement went to Glorioso and Sons
and met with Pablo Glorioso and Cesar Glorioso, President and Vice-President, respectively,
of the firm. Roxas explained that the cement belonged to his company and that the cargo was
intended for Glorious Hardware. Roxas showed them the purchase order and other documents
indicating that Glorious Hardware had already paid for the cement. Pablo and Cesar assured
Roxas that they would look into the matter.
A month passed but Glorioso and Sons did not return the bags of cement. Unknown to Pablo
and Cesar, manager Mendoza sold the cement to another dealer Estafa charges were filed
against Pablo Glorioso, Cesar Glorioso, and Pedro Mendoza. Pablo and Cesar contended that
they took no part in the misappropriation committed by Mendoza and, at any rate, as corporate
officers they are not liable for the acts of other corporate officers.
Discuss if the three accused persons may be held criminally liable. If so, in what capacity or
capacities? Explain.
Answer:
Only Pedro Mendoza, the Manager will be liable for estafa. A corporate officer cannot be
liable for the acts of another corporate officer except if he directly took part or aided in the
commission of the felonious Act. Pablo and Cesar Glorioso, President and Vice-President,
respectively, of the firm had no knowledge of the sale of the bags of cement by the Manager
Pedro Mendoza (People vs. Montilla CA520G.4327).
Art 89; Criminal liability; novation 1988
No. 14:
(b) Raul Doria gave in trust two acrylic paintings to Amar Solo to be sold on commission basis
for P20,000. Failing to sell them to George Ty, Amar consigned the paintings to Alcanto
Gallery. In the same month, Amar retrieved one painting and tried to return in to Raul who
refused to receive it without the other painting. The other painting was bought by Mr. Lomot
whose check, which Amar gave to Raul, bounced, so that Amar paid Raul his own check of
P6,500.00 promising in writing to pay the P3,500-00 balance less his commission.
Is Amar liable for estafa? Why?
How about Mr. Lomot, what crime, if any did he commit?
ANSWER:
(b) Amar is not liable for estafa but is liable for violation of BP 22, There is only civil
liability because as long as no case has been filed in court, an obligation can still be novated.
In this case there was novation.
Mr. Lomot is liable for violation of BP 22.
Art 89; Extinction of civil liability; death of accused after judgment 1981 No. l0
"M" is a Municipal Treasurer convicted for Malversation of Public Funds in the amount of
P10,000.00. He was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years,
six months and twenty-one (21) days also of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the
Municipality in the amount of P10,000.00.
"M" appealed the decision of the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals.
Pending the appeal, "M" died of heart attack.
Will "M's" death extinguish his civil liability? Why?
Answer
M's death did not extinguish his civil liability. The obligation to indemnify the
government for the amount malversed survived because the death occurred after final
judgment as rendered by the Court of First Instance. In the case of People vs. Sendaydiego, et
al (L-33252-54, Jan. 20, 1978, 81 SCRA 124), it was held that an accountable public officer
may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability. In the problem given, the death of M extinguished his criminal liability. But the
appeal will continue with respect to his civil liability as if no criminal case has been instituted
against him, thus making applicable Art. 30 of the Civil Code. In other words, as affirmed in
the case of People vs. Tirol, (L-30538, Jan, 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558) the appeal will continue
to determine the criminal liability of the deceased accused as the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate may be liable.
Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liabilities; death of accused pending appeal
1992 No. 1
Librado was convicted of malversation for which he has imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment with the following accessory penalties provided by law - a fine of P6,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; perpetual special disqualification;
indemnification to the government in the amount of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs.
If he dies pending appeal, what is the legal effect of his death on his criminal and pecuniary
liabilities?
Suggested Answer:
Under Art. 89, RPC, and jurisprudence (People vs. Jose, 71 SCRA 273, People vs.
Alison 44 SCRA 523; etc.), death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and
civil liabilities. Civil liability includes pecuniary liabilities, such as fine. Hence, the same,
together with the disqualification and the costs are extinguished.
Alternative Answer:

Page 150 of 374


In Petralba vs. Sandiganboyan, 200 SCRA 644, however, extinction of criminal liability arising
from the death of the accused pending appeal likewise extinguishes the pecuniary liability such
as fine, but not the civil liability, such as the indemnification of P6,000.00 in the instant case.
The same is a claim of the government against the estate but ONLY IF THE OFFENSE CAN
BE PROVED in the appellate court. In other words, the latter should still decide the appeal as
far as the civil liability of P6,000.00 is concerned.
Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liabilities; death of offended party 2000 No V
a) For defrauding Lorna, Alma was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan. After a protracted trial, Alma was convicted. While the case was pending appeal in the
Regional Trial Court of the same province, Lorna who was then suffering from breast cancer,
died. Alma manifested to the court that with Lorna's death, her (Alma's) criminal and civil
liabilities are now extinguished. Is Alma's contention correct? What if it were Alma who died,
would it affect her criminal and civil liabilities? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No. Alma's contention is not correct. The death of the offended party does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the offender, because the offense is committed against the
State [People vs. Misola, 87 Phil. 830, 833). Hence, it follows that the civil liability of Alma
based on the offense committed by her is not extinguished. The estate of Lorna can continue
the case.
On the other hand, if it were Alma who died pending appeal of her conviction, her
criminal liability shall be extinguished and therewith the civil liability under the Revised Penal
Code (Art. 89, par. 1, RPC). However, the claim for civil indemnity may be instituted under the
Civil Code (Art. 1157) if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law,
contracts, quasi- contracts and quasi-delicts (People vs. Bayotas 236 SCRA 239, G.R. 152007,
September 2. 1994),
Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liability; death of accused 1990 No. 5:
Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and he was ordered to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify Letty in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to support their offspring. Pending appeal in the Supreme Court,
Rico died. His widow, Bernie, moved for a dismissal of the case.
a) What is the legal effect of Rico's death on his criminal liability?
Explain your answer
b) How about on his civil liability? State your reasons. Answers;
a) The criminal liability of Rico is extinguished on the basis of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that: " How criminal liability is extinguished - Criminal liability is
totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment,

Page 151 of 374


b) The civil liability of Rico survives. (People v. Sendaydiego, January 20, 1978. 74 O.G, 4371;
People v, Tirol G.R No. L-30588, January 31, 1981; People
v. Naboa, et al.,132 SCRA 410).
Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liability; death of accused 1987 No.
XI:
PM, a rich businessman, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the
Regional Trial Court, and to pay the heirs of the victim the total amount of P250,000.00.
While has appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, PM died. The defense counsel
manifested that PM's death extinguished not only the criminal liability but also the pecuniary
liability because the death occurred before the final judgment, since the case was pending
appeal. He invoked Art 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability is
totally extinguished: I. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before the final judgment."
As a Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General, do you agree with the defense counsel's
argument?
Answer:
As Solicitor General, I will not agree to the argument of the defense counsel that the death of
PM while his appeal was pending extinguished not only his criminal liability but also his
pecuniary liability Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the pecuniary
liability of the accused is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurred before
the final judgment", refers to his liability to pay the fine. (People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA
120). The civil liability, however, survives the death of the offender because death is not a
valid cause of the extinguishment of civil obligation. (Torijos vs. Court of Appeals 67 SCRA
394).
Art 89; Extinction of criminal liability; payment 1985
No. 15
Garcia, an importer, succeeded in convincing his bank to release his importation under a trust
receipt agreement he signed last January 15, 1985. Upon maturity of the trust receipts on
February 5, 1985, Garcia paid the bank in check which was however dishonored. Informed of
the said dishonor, Garcia paid only 60% of the amount of his check and refused to pay the
balance despite demands.
(A) On the basis of the foregoing facts, what may Garcia be prosecuted for? Reasons.
(B) What is the effect of the 50% payment made by Garcia on his criminal liability? Discuss.
Answer:
(B) Partial payment does not extinguish criminal liability because a criminal offense is
committed. (Javier vs. People 40 O.G. 67).
Art 89; Extinction of criminal liability; total and partial 1988 No.
5:
a) How is criminal liability totally extinguished?
b) How is criminal liability extinguished partially?
Explain briefly.
Answer:
a) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of total extinction of
criminal liability:
1. Death of the convict as to personal penalties, as to the pecuniary liabilities, liability therefore is
extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment.
2. Service of Sentence
3. Amnesty
4. Absolute pardon
5. Prescription of the crime
6. Prescription of the penalty
7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 344.
b) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of partial extinction of
criminal liability:
1. Condition pardon
2. Communication of sentence
3. Good conduct allowances during confinement
4. Parole
5. Probation
Art 89; Pardon; effect thereof; reinstatement 1994 No
15:
Linda was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa, through falsification of public document.
She was sentenced accordingly and ordered to pay, among others, P5,000.00 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded.
The case reached the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of conviction. During the
pendency of Linda's motion for reconsideration in the said Court, the President extended to her
an absolute pardon which she accepted.
By reason of such pardon, she wrote the Department of Finance requesting that she be restored
to her former post as assistant treasurer, which is still vacant. ,
The Department ruled that Linda may be reinstated to her former position without the
necessity of a new appointment and directed the City Treasurer to see to it that the sum of
P5,000.00 be satisfied.
Claiming that she should not be made to pay P5,000.00, Linda appealed to the Office of the
President.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and held that acquittal, not absolute pardon. Is
the only ground for reinstatement to one's former position and that the absolute pardon does not
exempt the culprit from payment of civil liability.
Is Linda entitled to reinstatement? Answer;
No, Linda is not entitled to reinstatement to her former position inasmuch as her right thereto
had been relinquished or forfeited by reason of her conviction. The absolute pardon merely
extinguished her criminal liability, removed her disqualification, and restored her eligibility for
appointment to that office. She has to re-apply for such position and under the usual procedure
required for a new appointment. Moreover, the pardon does not extinguish the civil liability
arising from the crime. (Monsanto vs.Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191); see Art. 36, RPC)
Art 90; Prescription of crime; commencement 2000 No
VII
One fateful night in January 1990, while 5-year old Albert was urinating at the back of
their house, he heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and playmate,
Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina, Ara's stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-
year old Ara to death. Albert saw Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it Inside the trunk of
her car and drive away. The dead body of Ara was never found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc City. For fear of his life,
Albert did not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives, about what he witnessed. Twenty and
a half (20 & 1/2) years after the incident, and right after his graduation in Criminology, Albert
reported the crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years. Can the
state still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & 1/2 years? Explain,
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
Yes, the State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & 1/2
years. Under Article 91, RPC, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. In the case
at bar, the commission of the crime was known only to Albert, who was not the offended party
nor an authority or an agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI authorities only
when Albert revealed to them the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription
of 20 years for homicide commenced to run only from the time Albert revealed the same to
the NBI authorities.
Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1993
No. 1:
B Imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a lot, in special power of attorney
naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to a
bank using the special power of attorney to obtain a loan of P8,500.00. On the same day, both
the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds. Because of B's failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold
to X in whose name a new title was issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the property
was already registered in the name of X because of an ejectment case filed against him by X.
1) If you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or crimes would you charge B? Explain.
2) If you were the counsel of B, what would be your defense? Discuss. Answer;
1) The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of public document.
2) My defense will be prescription because the crime was committed in 1964 and almost twenty
nine years had already elapsed since then. Even if we take Falsification and Estafa
individually, they have already prescribed. It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery,
the fact that the crime was discovered in 1964 will be of no moment because the offended
party is considered to have constructive notice on the forgery after the Deed of Sale where his
signature had been falsified was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds (Cabral vs.
Puno, 70 SCRA 606).
Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1994
No. 13:
Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a
prosecution witness, testified that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument.
While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila burned down and the entire records of
the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was again called to
the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he
was abroad when the crime took place.
The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony
favorable to the defendant in a criminal case.
1) Will the case against Andrew prosper?
2) Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final on January 10, 1987. On June 18. 1994 a case
of giving false testimony was filed against Andrew. As his lawyer, what legal step will you
take?
Answer:
1) Yes. ...
2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription. The crime of false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the
accused in the principal case, was acquitted on January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty
prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art. 180, par. 4, RPC.
Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the
case against Andrew was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was
decided with finality on January 10, 1987 and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime
commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is more than five (5) years.
Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1995
No. 2;
Joe and Marcy were married in Batanes in 1955. After two years, Joe left Marcy and settled in
Mindanao where he later met and married Linda on 12 June 1960. The second marriage was
registered in the civil registry of Davao City three days after its celebration. On 10 October
1975 Marcy who remained in Batanes discovered the marriage of Joe to Linda. On 1 March
1976 Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy against Joe.
The crime of bigamy prescribed in fifteen years computed from the day the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. Joe raised the defense of
prescription of the crime, more than fifteen years having elapsed from the celebration of the
bigamous marriage up to the filing of Marcy's
complaint. He contended that the registration of his second marriage in the civil registry of
Davao City was constructive notice to the whole world of the celebration thereof thus binding
upon Marcy.
Has the crime of bigamy charged against Joe already prescribed? Discuss
fully, Answer:
No. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is computed from the
time the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. The
principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies to land or property disputes should not
be applied to the crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus when Marcy filed a
complaint for bigamy on 7 March 1976, it was well within the reglamentary period as It was
barely a few months from the time of discovery on 10 October 1975. (Sermonia vs. CA, 233
SCRA 155)
Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1997
No. 12:
A was charged in an information with the crime of grave oral defamation but after trial, the
court found him guilty only of the offense of simple slander. He filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that, under the law, the crime of simple slander would have
prescribed in two months from commission, and since the information against him was filed
more than four months after the alleged commission of the crime, the same had already
prescribed.
The Solicitor General opposed the motion on two grounds: first, in determining the
prescriptive period, the nature of the offense charged in the Information should be considered,
not the crime proved; second, assuming that the offense had already prescribed, the defense
was waived by the failure of A to raise it in a motion to quash.
Resolve the motion for reconsideration.
Answer;
The motion for reconsideration should be granted.-
a) The accused cannot be convicted of the offense of simple slander although it is necessarily
included in the offense of grave slander charged in the information, because, the lesser offense
had already prescribed at the time the information was filed (People us. Rarang, (CA) 62 O.G.
6468; Francisco vs. CA, 122 SCRA 538; Magat vs. People. 201 SCRA 21) otherwise
prosecutors can easily circumvent the rule of prescription in light offenses by the simple
expediment of filing a graver offense which includes such light offense.
b) While the general rule is the failure of an accused to file a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash,
the exceptions to this are: (1) no offense was charged in the complaint or information; (2) lack
of Jurisdiction; (3) extinction of the offense or penalty; and (4) double jeopardy. Since the
ground invoked by the accused in his motion for reconsideration is extinction of the offense,
then it can be raised even after plea. In fact, it may even be invoked on appeal (People us.
Balagtas)
Art 90; Prescription of crimes 2001
No XVI
On June 1,1988, a complaint for concubinage committed in February 1987 was filed
against Roberto in the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavlte for purposes of preliminary
investigation. For various reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when the Judge of said court
decided the case by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since the crime was committed in
Manila. The case was subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of Manila but it was dismissed on
the ground that the crime had already prescribed. The law provides that the crime of
concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years.
Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain, (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
No, the Fiscal's dismissal of the case on alleged prescription is not correct. The filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, although only for preliminary investigation,
interrupted and suspended the period of prescription in as much as the jurisdiction of a court in a
criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, not by the result of proof. (People vs. Galano. 75
SCRA 193)
Art 90; Prescription of crimes; interruption of prescriptive period 1977 No.
IV-b
On June 1, 1960, a complaint for falsification of private document committed on March 1,
1960, was filed against V with the Municipal Court of Polo, Bulacan for preliminary
investigation. For one reason or another it was only on July 2, 1972, that the Municipal Court
decided the case by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction as the crime was committed in
Quezon City. So the case was filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City but the case was
dismissed for the reason that it had already prescribed. Actually, falsification of private
document prescribes in ten years. Do you agree with the action taken by the City Fiscal?
Reason fully,
Answer
I do not agree with the action taken by the City Fiscal of Quezon City because the crime has
not yet prescribed. The complaint for falsification of a private document committed on March
1, 1960 filed in the Municipal Court of Polo, Bulacan on June 1, 1960 interrupted the running
of the period of prescription of the crime. The doctrine is that the filing of a complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it is merely for the purpose of preliminary investigation, where the
offense charged is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court interrupts the period of prescription.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the interruption of prescription by the filing
of the complaint or information and does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in court
for preliminary examination or investigation or for action on the merits. The delay in the
decision of the case by the Municipal Court which was promulgated on July 2, 1972 only was
beyond the control of the offended party and in accordance with a case recently decided by the
Supreme Court should not deprive the offended party of his right to obtain vindication. (People
v. Galano, L-42925, January 31, 1977, citing People v. Olarte, 75 SCRA 193).
Art 90; Prescription of crimes; slander 1987 No.
III:
Maria called Lydia names and slapped her at the dance floor in the presence of many people
because she suspected that Lydia was flirting with her boyfriend. The following day, Lydia
filed with the Fiscal's Office a complaint for slander by deed against Maria. After preliminary
investigation, the Fiscal forgot all about the case until the 179th day, which was a Saturday,
from the commission of the crime. Since the following day was a Sunday, the fiscal filed the
information in court on Monday, the 181st day from the commission of the crime. After trial,
the Judge convicted Maria. She engaged another lawyer who on appeal asserted that the crime
of slander by deed had prescribed because it was filed in court one day after the six-month
period of prescription under Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The Fiscal argued that since the
180th day fell on a Sunday, he could file the information the following Monday. He also said
that, in any event, Maria waived the defense of prescription because she did not raise it during
the trial of case.
Decide the case. Answer:
The crime of slander by deed has already prescribed as it was tiled one day after the six month
period of prescription. The rule is if the last day of the period of prescription of a crime falls on
a Sunday, as in the problem, the information cannot be filed on the next working day, which is
Monday as that will
lengthen the period of prescription, which will not be favorable to the accused. (Yapdiangco vs.
Bartolome 122 SCRA 713). The contention of the Fiscal that Maria waived the defense of
prescription because she did not raise it during the trial of the case is untenable. It has already
been settled that prescription, although not raised in the trial may be invoked on appeal.
(People vs. Balagtas 105 Phil-1362; People vs. Castro 95 Phil 462).
Art 90; Prescription of crimes; when to file if last day falls on a Sunday or holiday
1983 No. 15
When the last day of the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information
falls on a Sunday or any other holiday, may it be filed in court on the next working day? Why?
Answer
The information cannot be filed on the next working day following the last day of the
prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information which falls on a Sunday or on a
holiday. Statutes of limitations in criminal cases are granted by the State as an amnesty and are
liberally construed in favor of the accused. The provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
or of the Rules of Court cannot apply as it will lengthen the period of prescription of the crime.
(Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino L28841, June 24, 1983)
Art 94; Extinction of criminal liability; pardon of offended party 1976 No.
II-b
X seduced Y, a minor. He was prosecuted for seduction. After pleading for forgiveness, Y
without even consulting her parents, pardoned X. Did the pardon extinguish the criminal
action against X? Reason. What about his civil liability? Reason.
Answer
The pardon of X by Y who is a minor did not extinguish the criminal liability of X, To
extinguish the criminal liability of the offender in the crime of seduction and similar private
crimes, the pardon of the offended party who is a minor must have the concurrence of her
parents. The reason is seduction strikes at the family's honor and inflicts injury not only to the
offended party but also to her parents {People v. Lacson, Jr., CA 56 O.G. 9460). Since she is a
minor, she is still under patria protestas. The civil liability is also not extinguished, for the same
reason, since there is no express waiver (Art. 23, RPC). Besides, in the crime of seduction, not
only the offended party but also her parents are entitled to moral damages. (Art. 2219, Civil
Code, People v. Fontanilia, G.R. No, L-25354, June 28, 1968), The right to support cannot also
be renounced. (Art. 321, Civil Code).
Art 94; Extinction of criminal liability; pardon, when available 1990 No.
8:
Rina, who was a suspended Clerk of Court, was convicted of malversation and was sentenced
to imprisonment, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and to indemnify the government in the same
amount. Pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, she was extended an absolute pardon by the
President. Thus, she applied for reinstatement, payment of backwages, and absolution from
payment of the fine and indemnify.
Decide the issue with reasons.

Page 160 of 374


Answer:
Rina cannot apply for reinstatement, etc. as there was no effective pardon by the President. It
is basic that pardon can only be granted after final conviction (Barrioquinto v, Fernandez, 85
Phil. 642).

Page 161 of 374


Civil Liability
Art 100; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 2000
No V
b) Name at least two exceptions to the general rule that in case of acquittal of the
accused in a criminal case, his civil liability is likewise extinguished. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Exceptions to the rule that acquittal from a criminal case extinguishes civil liability,
are:
1. When the civil action is baaed on obligations not arising from the act complained of as a
felony;
2. When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or acquittal is on the ground that guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, New Civil Code);
3. Acquittal due to an exempting circumstance, like Insanity;
4. Where the court states in its Judgment that the case merely involves a civil obligation;
5. Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of a separate civil action;
6. In cases of independent civil actions provided for in Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the New Civil
Code;
7. When the judgment of acquittal includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist (Sapiera vs. CA, 314 SCRA 370);
8. Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted (Sapiera vs. CA. 314 SCRA 370).
Art 101; Civil liability; PD 603; persons liable for acts committed by minor or insane
1975 No. XVIII
Who are civilly liable for the act of the insane or minor exempt from criminal liability?
Answer
Under par, 1 of Art. 101, those civilly liable for the act of the insane or minor exempt from
criminal liability are those who have such person under their legal authority, guardianship or
control except if there was no fault or negligence on their part. Under Presidential Decree No.
603, the civil liability of a youthful offender shall devolve upon his father, and in case of his
death or incapacity, upon his mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
(Art. 201).
If they are insolvent, the insane or minor shall respond with his property which are not exempt
from execution.
Art 102; Subsidiary liability; hotel owner
1977 No V-a
T lodged in the Maharlika Hotel without notifying the management of the hotel of the goods he
brought along with him. Neither did he follow the directions
of the hotel with respect to the care and vigilance over said goods. One evening, the bellboy of
the hotel poked a gun on T and divested him of his goods.
Assuming that the said bellboy absconded, may the owner of the hotel be made subsidiarily
liable for the restitution of said goods, or to pay the value thereof? Reason fully.
Answer
The owner of the hotel is subsidiarily civilly liable for the restitution of the goods or to pay the
value thereof. The nature of the business of the hotel is to provide not only lodging for the
guests but also security to their persons and effects. The necessity for this security is apparent
from the provisions of Articles 1998-2003 of the new Civil Code and Article 102 of the
Revised Penal Code. The security mentioned is not confined to effects delivered to the hotel
management for safekeeping but also to all effects brought in the hotel. The reason is that the
hotel management has supervision and control over their inns and the premises thereof. (De los
Santos v. Tam Kheng, CA 58 O.G. 7693). Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides for subsidiary civil liability of the innkeeper for any robbery through violence or
intimidation committed by the innkeeper's employees as in the problem which is committed by
the bellboy of the hotel.
Art 102; Subsidiary liability; innkeepers, owners of establishments 1986 No. 8:
Aristarchus, a resident of Iloilo, checked in at the Manila Hotel while attending to some
business in Manila. Heeding the notice posted in his room requesting the tenants to deposit
their valuables in one of the hotel's deposit boxes near the reception counter in the lobby,
Aristarchus deposited P10,000.00 cash in one of the hotel's deposit boxes. As he was about to
go up to his room, armed men entered the lobby, told everybody to lie flat on the floor, and
divested the guests of their money and valuables. They also forcibly opened the safety deposit
boxes, scooped out their contents and fled. Aristarchus sued the hotel claiming that the hotel is
subsidiarily liable for the P10,000.00 deposited in the safety deposit box and for P5,000.00
taken from his wallet while he was lying face down on the floor.
Is the hotel subsidiarily liable? Explain. Answer:
Manila Hotel is not subsidiarily civilly liable. Although Aristarchus has complied with
the notice of the hotel regarding the depositing of his money in one of the hotel's deposit
boxes, the hotel is not liable as such were lost because of robbery committed with violence or
intimidation against persons. (Art 102 par. 2, RPC)
Art 103; Subsidiary civil liability; employers 1998 No
XI.
Guy, while driving a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Max, bumped Demy, a
pedestrian crossing the street. Demy sustained injuries which required medical attendance for
three months. Guy was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries.
Convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Guy was sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of
three months of arresto mayor and ordered to indemnify Demy in the sum of P5,000 and to pay
P1,000 as attorney's fees.
Upon finality of the decision, a writ of execution was served upon Guy, but was returned
unsatisfied due to his insolvency. Demy moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against Max.
The latter opposed the motion on-the ground that the decision made no mention of his
subsidiary liability and that he was not impleaded in the case.
How will you resolve the motion? [5%] Answer:
The motion is to be granted. Max as an employer of Guy and engaged in an industry
(transportation business) where said employee is utilized, is subsidiarily civilly liable under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Even though the decision made no mention of his
subsidiary liability, the law violated (Revised Penal Code) itself mandates for such liability and
Max is deemed to know it because ignorance of the law is never excused. And since his
liability is not primary but only subsidiary in case his employee cannot pay. he need not be
impleaded in the in the criminal case. It suffices that he was duly notified of the motion for
issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution and thus given the opportunity to be heard.
Art 103; Subsidiary liability; employer 1988
No. 6:
Juan Cruz, driver of a cargo truck owned and operated by VICMICO a sugar central, while
driving recklessly caused Jorge Abad to fall from the truck resulting in injuries which caused
his death. Juan Cruz was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence and was ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased Abad P12,000. The respondent judge issued an order granting a
motion for execution of the civil service liability of the accused Juan Cruz, but the return of the
Sheriff showed that the accused was insolvent. Petitioners, heirs of the deceased Abad, now
filed a motion for execution of the employers subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. Respondent judge denied the motion, stating that the employer VICMICO, not
having been notified that his driver was facing a criminal charge, a separate action had to be
filed. Hence, a petition for mandamus was filed.
Decide the case.
Answer:
Mandamus will lie. There is no need for a separate civil action because the driver was
convicted (Martinez vs. Barredo). All you need is a motion for execution with a notice to the
employer that states compliance with the requisites imposed by Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code (that there is employer- employee relationship, that the employer is engaged in an
industry and that the driver is insolvent).
Art 104; Civil liability; components 1978
No. II-c
Discuss the components of civil liability arising from crimes. Do these components exist in all
crimes? Explain.
Answer
The components of civil liability are restitution, reparation for damages caused and
indemnification for consequential damages. These components do not exist in all crimes. For
example, if the crime is not against property, like less serious physical injuries, there is no
restitution nor reparation for damages
caused. In the crime of occupation of real property, which is a crime against property, these
three forms of civil liability may exist, that is, there must be restoration of the property
occupied, reparation for any damages caused, and indemnification for any damages suffered by
the commission of the crime.
Art 104; Civil liability; restitution 1975
No. VIII
A stole the car of B and later sold it to C, who purchased the car in good faith, for valuable
consideration, and without any knowledge that it was stolen. A was subsequently convicted for
the theft of the car and the judgment became final and executory. B thereafter filed a petition
in the criminal case that an order be issued directing C to return the car to him (B) but C
opposed the petition alleging that he bought the car in good faith and that the proper relief is for
B to file a separate civil action before the proper court where the ownership of the car may be
litigated. The court granted B's petition and ordered C to return the car to
B. Is the court order correct? Why?
Answer
a) The order of the court is correct. The civil liability of the accused in the crime of theft, which is
against property, includes restitution of the thing stolen, even if it be found in the possession
of another who acquired it in good faith, (Art. 106, Revised Penal Code). The order of
restitution may be made in the same criminal case upon petition of the complainant. There is
no need for a separate civil action. (Reyes v. Ruiz, 27 Phil. 478).
Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1984
No. 6
Does acquittal in a criminal case carry with it exemption from civil liability?
Explain.
Answer;
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
Except in those instances where the law provides for the prosecution of the criminal
action independently of the civil action, about the only known case where the accused may be
exempted from civil liability is the case of his acquittal from the criminal responsibility and its
judgment in court accordingly makes a pronouncement that the basis for civil liability does
not exist.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
Acquittal in a criminal case carries with its exemption from civil liability when there is a
declaration in A final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise does not
exist (Sec. 3 C Rule 111, Rules of Ct.) (Tan vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., et a1 91 Phil. 672) In
the following cases, acquittal in the criminal action does not carry with it exemption from civil
liability: 1) When the acquittal is on the ground that the guilt of the accused has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt (Art 29, Civil Code); 2) When the acquittal is due to an
exempting circumstance except accident and lawful or insuperable cause (Art 12, Rev, Penal
Code); 3) in cases of quasi-delict (Art 2177 Civil Code) 4) when the finding of the court in
acquitting the accused is that there is only civil responsibility and not criminal responsibility
(De Guzman et al vs. Alva et al 51
O.G. 1311) 5) in case of independent civil action under articles 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code)
Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1988
No. 5:
c) If an accused is acquitted, does it necessarily follows that no civil liability arising from the
acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment?
Explain briefly.
Answer:
c) If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising
from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment except: If there is an
express waiver of the liability; and if there is a reservation of file a separate civil action (Rule
107; Padilla vs. CA People vs. Jalandoni),
Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1975
No. V
As a rule, if the offender in a criminal case is acquitted, his civil liability is also extinguished.
What are the exceptions?
Answer
a) If the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, Civil
Code).
b) If the acquittal is due to non-imputability or an exempting circumstance.
c) In independent civil actions for torts under Articles 31, 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code.
d) In case the civil action is based on a quasi-delict under Article 2177 of the Code.
e) In case the judgment in the criminal action does not declare that the fact upon which the civil
action might arise does not exist (Rule III, Sec. 3. par. c).
Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 2000
No IX
A was a 17-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. B
was driving a car along busy Espana Street at about 7:00
p.m. Beside B was C. The car stopped at an intersection because of the red signal of the traffic light.
While waiting for the green signal, C beckoned A to buy some cigarettes. A approached the
car and handed two sticks of cigarettes to C. While the transaction was taking place, the traffic
light changed to green and the car immediately sped off. As the car continued to speed
towards Quiapo, A clung to the window of the car but lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. The car did not stop. A suffered serious injuries which eventually caused his death.
C was charged with ROBBERY with HOMICIDE. In the end, the Court was not convinced
with moral certainty that the guilt of C has been established beyond reasonable doubt and,
thus, acquitted him on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Can the family of the victim still recover civil damages in view of the acquittal of C?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, as against C, A's family can still recover civil damages despite C's acquittal. When
the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence {Art. 29, CC).
If A's family can prove the negligence of B by preponderance of evidence, the civil
action for damages against B will prosper based on quasi-delict. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, about pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi- delict [Art. 2176, CC). This is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code [Arts, 31, 2176, 2177, CC}.
Crimes Against National Security and the Law of Nations
Art 122; Piracy
1977 No. V-b
While V was soundly asleep in his fishing boat then moored in the Pasig River near Jones
Bridge, Manila, W beat V to unconsciousness and thereafter took his cash and valuables. What
crime did W commit? Give your reasons.
Answer
Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes piracy in Philippine waters and refers to any vessel or
watercraft which includes boats used for fishing. Under the decree, piracy is committed not
only by attacking or seizing any vessel but includes the taking away of the personal belonging
of a passenger irrespective of the value thereof by any person. Since W beat V to
unconsciousness while he was sound asleep in his fishing boat then moored in the Pasig River
near the Jones Bridge and. then took his cash and valuables, the crime committed by W is
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532.
Art 123; Qualified piracy 1986
No. 10:
The interisland vessel, M/V Sweet Aspirations, while travelling from Davao City to Jolo, was
blown by a powerful typhoon towards the coast of Sabah. While anchored within two, miles off
the coast of Sabah, it was accosted by four armed men - Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio and
Archimedes - who arrived on board a motorized kumpit. The armed men fired Armalites at the
interisland vessel, boarded it, and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry. A
passenger by the name of Barnabas took advantage of the confusion to settle an old grudge
with an enemy, entered the cabin of that enemy and killed him.
Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio, Archimedes, and Barnabas were eventually apprehended by men of
the Philippine Constabulary. All five of them were prosecuted for qualified piracy before the
Regional Court of Tawi-Tawi.
(a) Were Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio, and Archimedes correctly charged before a Philippine court with
qualified piracy? Explain your answer.
(b) Was Barnabas correctly" charged before a Philippine court with qualified piracy? If yes,
explain. If not, enlighten the Fiscal and the Judge on the matter.
Answer:
(a) Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio and Archimedes are correctly charged with qualified piracy. Being
committed within two miles off the coast of Sabah, it is deemed commuted in the high seas
which is any body of water beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines even though such
may be within the waters of a foreign country. Under the Revised Penal Code, one of the
qualifying circumstances of Qualified Piracy is seizing a vessel by firing and boarding a
vessel while in the high seas. (Art. 125, par. 1)
Alternative Answer:
Since the facts of the problem only state that the accused fired at the interisland vessel, boarded
it and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry, such do not indicate seizure of the
vessel. So simple piracy is the crime committed, which however is also triable before the
Philippine Court since it was committed in the high seas.
(b) Because Barnabas is merely a passenger of the vessel .attacked by the pirates, he cannot be
liable for piracy. Besides, piracy in the high seas is committed only by a stranger to the vessel.
The crime committed by Barnabas is murder, which is triable before the Philippine Court,
since it was committed on board a Philippine vessel.
Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State
Art 124; Arbitrary detention 1975
No, XIX
How is arbitrary detention committed? What are the legal grounds for detention?
Answer
Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who deprives another of his
liberty without legal grounds. The legal grounds for detention are: 1) commission of a crime;
2) violent insanity; 3) any illness requiring compulsory confinement, (Art. 124, Revised Penal
Code).
Art 124; Arbitrary detention 1980
No. XI
Patrolman Cruz, acting under orders of the Municipal Mayor, who wanted to put a stop to the
frequent occurrence of robbery in sitio Masukal, patrolled the place. At about midnight, seeing
three persons acting suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house and entering the same, he
arrested them without warrant and took them to the municipal building where they were
detained in jail for about five hours before they were released.
Patrolman Cruz was accused of arbitrary detention. If you were the Judge, would you convict
him of the crime charged ?
Answer
Patrolman Cruz cannot be accused of arbitrary detention. Since the three persons acted
suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house at midnight, and entered the same, the policeman
was justified to arrest them even without a warrant, considering the circumstances of the case,
mainly, since he was patrolling the place upon orders of the Mayor to put a stop to frequent
occurrences of robberies therein. The three persons were arrested in a suspicious place at
midnight and under suspicious circumstances that they were about to commit a crime or breach
of peace. Good people do not ordinarily lurk in uninhabited places at midnight. (U.S. vs.
Santos, 36 Phil. 853)
Art 124; Arbitrary Detention 1992
No. 12:
Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago community in a police car with SPO3 Caloy Itliong,
blew his whistle to stop a Nissan Sentra car which wrongly entered a one-way street. After
demanding from Linda Lo Hua, the driver, her driver's license, Menor asked her to follow them
to the police precinct. Upon arriving there, he gave instructions to Itliong to guard Lo Hua in
one of the rooms and not to let her out of sight until he returns; then got the car key from Lo
Hua. In the meantime, the latter was not allowed to make any phone calls but was given food
and access to a bathroom.
When Menor showed up after two days, he brought Lo Hua to a private house and told
her that he would only release her and return the car if she made arrangements for the delivery
of P500,000 in a doctor's bag at a certain place within the next twenty-four hours. When
Menor went to the designated spot to pick up the bag of money, he suddenly found himself
surrounded by several armed civilians who introduced themselves as NBI agents.

Page 170 of 374


a) What criminal offense has Menor committed? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
a) Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary Detention) he being a public officer who
detained a person without legal grounds. Violation of a traffic ordinance by entering a one-
way street is not a valid reason to arrest and detain the driver. Such only merits the issuance of
a traffic violation ticket. Hence, when Lo Hua was ordered to follow the police officers to the
precinct (confiscating her license to compel her to do so), and confining her in a room for two
days and prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a clear case of deprivation of personal liberty.
Giving her food and access to the bathroom will not extinguish or mitigate the criminal
liability.
Menor is further liable for robbery, because money or personal property was taken, with intent
to gain, and with intimidation. The peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically forced her to submit
to the monetary demands of the major.
b) May Itliong be held likewise criminally liable?
Suggested Answer;
b) Itliong is equally liable with Menor the felony of arbitrary detention, either by conspiracy
or indispensable cooperation. He cannot successfully put up the defense of obedience to a
superior order, as the same was done for a lawful purpose.
Art 125; Delay in the delivery of detained persons 1990 No.
11;
Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She was detained at
the police precinct, underwent investigation, and released only after 48 hours
a) Patrolman Bart liable for any offense? Explain your answer.
b) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and grappled with patrolman Bart, is she criminally liable
thereby? State your reasons.
Answer:
a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code - Delay on the
Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities.
b) She is criminally liable for slight disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code -
Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person.
Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling 1989 No.
10:
Alberto, Bernado and Carlos were looking for a person named Virgilio whom Carlos
suspected of stealing his fighting cock. Alberto and Bernardo were policemen, while Carlos
was a caretaker of fighting cocks. Carlos requested Alberto and Bernardo, then in uniform, to
accompany him to Virgilio's house to look for the fighting cock. Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos
went to Virgilio's house. When the policemen knocked on the door, Virgilio's wife, Maria,
opened it. The policemen told Maria that they came to inquire about a lost fighting cock.
Before Maria could utter a word, the trio barged inside, the house. Once inside, the policemen
told Maria that Carlos was suspecting her husband, Virgilio, to have

Page 171 of 374


stolen his fighting cock, Maria protested and immediately required the three to leave. The
policemen refused. Instead, they started searching the house for the fighting cock over the
objections of Maria who said that she would file a complaint against them after her husband
comes from work. As they did not see any fighting cock, the three left. What crimes, if any, did
Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos commit?
Answer:
Alberto and Bernardo, being policemen, committed the crime of VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
(Art. 128, RPC). There are three ways by which a public officer or employee may commit this
crime, namely;
1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner, The door having been opened by
Maria, although Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos barged inside the house before Maria could
utter a word, they did not enter against Maria's will, there being no opposition or prohibition
against entrance whether express or implied. Without the consent is not against the will
(People vs. Sane, CA 40 OG Supp 5, 113),
2. By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such
owner. Maria, had objected to the search for the fighting cock inside her dwelling, but despite
said objection, the policemen searched the house. This makes them criminally liable for the
second way of committing the crime of VIOLATING OF DOMICILE.
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after
having been required to leave the same. Although the policemen were ordered to leave the
house, they did not enter it surreptitiously, meaning clandestinely or secretly.
Insofar as Carlos is concerned, not being a public officer or employee, he cannot commit the
crime of VIOLATION OF DOMICILE. He is not guilty of trespass to dwelling, either because
he did not enter the dwelling AGAINST THE WILL of the owner, which is the essential
element of Trespass.
Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling 2002 No
VI.
A What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The differences between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling are;
a. The offender in violation of domicile is a public officer acting under color of authority; in
trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person or public officer acting in a private
capacity.
b. Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different ways: (1) by entering the dwelling of another
against the will of the latter; (2) searching papers and other effects Inside the dwelling without
the previous consent of the owner; or (3) refusing to leave the premises which he entered
surreptitiously, after being required to leave the premises.
Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by entering the dwelling of
another against the express or implied will of the latter.
Art 129; Unjust procurement of search warrant
1975 No. XII
Under Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, any public officer who shall procure a search
warrant without "just cause" shall be punished by fine and imprisonment. What do you
understand by "just cause"?
Answer
"Just cause" means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in presenting it, is legally just
and proper, (U.S. v. Vallison, 28 Phil. 580).
Crimes Against Public Order
Art 134; Rebellion
1988 No. 9:
a) An armed group, avowed to overthrow the duly constituted authorities, captured five
officers' and five members of the armed forces and held them in their mountain lair for
seventy-five days and then voluntarily released them in consideration of the promise of
medical treatment to be given to some of their comrades who were under detention by the
authorities.
What crime or crimes had been committed? Reasons. Answer:
(a.l) Rebellion was committed because their purpose was to overthrow the government and all
other acts committed in the further of this purpose are absorbed by rebellion.
(a.2) The armed group committed the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in
violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. ..".
Art 134; Rebellion
1991 No. 2:
a) May a ranking leader of the NPA who has taken up arms against the government be
simultaneously prosecuted for violation of Section 1 of RA. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Act)
and for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended?
Answer;
Yes, because the two offenses are punished under separate laws.
Besides, the elements of the two offenses differ.
Art 134; Rebellion
1998 No III
On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board
his car traveling along the National Highway of Laguna, Joselito and Vicente shot him on the
head resulting in his instant death. At that time. Joselito and Vicente were members of the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army and they killed the governor upon orders of their
senior officer. Commander Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente, they were ordered to kill
Governor Alegre because of his corrupt practices.
If you were the prosecutor, what crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? [5%J
Answer:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente with the crime of rebellion,
considering that the killers were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army
and the killing was upon orders of their commander; hence, politically-motivated. This was the
ruling in People us. Avila, 207 SCRA 1568. involving identical facts which is a movement
taken judicial notice of as engaged In rebellion against the Government.
Alternative Answer:
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente for the crime of murder as the
purpose of the killing was because of his "corrupt practices ", which does not appear to be
politically motivated. There is no indication as to how the killing would promote or further
the objective of the New Peoples Army. The killing is murder because it was committed with
treachery.
Alternative Answer:
The crime should be rebellion with murder considering that Art. 135 of the Revised Penal
Code has already been amended by Rep. Act No. 6968, deleting from said Article, common
crimes which used to be punished as part and parcel of the crime of rebellion. The ruling in
People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1994), that rebellion may not be completed with common
crimes committed in furtherance thereof, was because the common crimes were then
penalized in Art. 135 together with the rebellion, with one penalty and Art. 48 of the Rev.
Penal Code cannot be applied. Art. 135 of said Code remained exactly the same when the case
of Enrile vs, Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990) was resolved. Precisely for the reason that Art. 48
cannot apply because the common crimes were punished as part of rebellion in Art. 135, that
this Article was amended, deleting the common crimes therefrom. That the common crimes
were deleted from said Article, demonstrates a clear legislative intention to treat the common
crimes as distinct from rebellion and remove the legal impediment to the application of Art.
48.
It is noteworthy that in Enrile vs. Salazar (supra) the Supreme Court said
these:
"There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to
raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that if cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of
illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in
this matter, which is purely with in its province,"
And significantly the said amendment to Art. 135 of the Rev. Penal Code was made at around
the time the ruling in Salazar was handled down, obviously to neutralize the Hernandez and the
Salazar rulings. The amendment was sort of a rider to the coup d'etat law, Rep. Act No 6968.
Art 134; Rebellion & Coup detat
1991 No. 1;
In the early morning of 25 October 1990, the troops of the Logistics Command (LOGCOM) of
the AFP at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo headed by their Operations Officer, Col. Rito
Amparo, withdrew firearms and bullets and, per prior agreement, attacked, in separate teams,
the offices of the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and other offices, held hostage the
Chief of Staff of LOGCOM and other officers, killed three (3) pro-Government soldiers,
inverted the Philippine flag, barricaded all entrances and exits to the camp, and announced
complete control of the camp. Because of the superiority of the pro- Government forces, Col.
Amparo and his troops surrendered at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of that day.
a) Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the crime of coup d'etat (Article 134-A, Revised
Penal Code or of rebellion?
Answer:
a) Under the facts stated, the crime committed would be coup d'etat (Republic Act No. 6988
incorporating Art. 134-A).
However, since the law was' not yet effective as of October 25, 1990, as the effectivity thereof
[Section 8) is upon its approval (which is October 24, 1990) and publication in at least two [2]
newspapers of general circulation, the felony committed would be rebellion.
Comment:
If the answer given is coup d'etat, substantial credit should be given as the tenor of the question
seems to indicate that coup d'etat as a felony was already existing.
b) Distinguish rebellion from coup d'etat Answers: Answer:
b) Rebellion distinguished from coup d'etat:
1. AS TO OVERT ACTS:
In rebellion, there is public uprising and taking up arms against the Government. In coup d'etat,
public uprising is not necessary. The essence of the crime is a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of
the Government, or any military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities
or facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of government power;
2. OBJECTIVE OR PURPOSE:
In rebellion, the purpose is to remove from the allegiance of the Philippines, the whole
or any part or the Philippines or any military or naval camps, deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress from performing their functions. In coup d'etat the objective is to seize or diminish
state powers.
3. PARTICIPATION
In rebellion, any person. In coup d'etat, any person belonging to the military or police or
holding public office, with or without civilian participation.
Art 134; Rebellion; absorption of other crimes 1990 No.
15;
a) Ka Jacinto, who is an NPA commander, was apprehended with unlicensed firearms and
explosives. He was accordingly charged with illegal possession of said firearms and
explosives. He now questions the filing of the charges on the ground that they are deemed
absorbed in a separate charge of rebellion filed against him. Decide the issue.
b) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the unlicensed firearms, shot and killed his neighbor in an
altercation. May the charge of murder and Illegal possession of firearms be deemed absorbed
in the separate charge of rebellion filed against him? Resolve the matter with reasons.
Answer:
a) The charge of illegal possession of firearms and explosives is deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, such possession being a necessary means for the perpetration of the latter crime.
(Elias v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659).
b) The charges here could not be absorbed in the separate charge of rebellion as it is clear that the
act of murder, coupled with the possession of an unlicensed firearm, was not in furtherance of
the rebellion.

Art 134; Rebellion; theory of absorption 1982 No.


19
Explain the theory of "absorption" in rebellion*
Answer
"Absorption" in rebellion is enunciated in the leading cases of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 and People perpetrated in furtherance of rebellion, a political offense, perpetrated in
furtherance of rebellion, a political offense, assumes the political complexion of rebellion of
which it is merely ingredient and consequently cannot be punished separately from rebellion, or
complexed with the same to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. In law such an offense is
part and parcel of the rebellion itself and cannot be considered as giving rise to separate crime.
However, this doctrine is modified now by Article 142-A, incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code by Presidential Decree No. 942, which provides that if by reason of or on the occasion of
a rebellion, an offense more serious than rebellion is committed, the offender is to be punished
for the more serious offense, and the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period. Murder
is unquestionably more serious than rebellion as it is punishable by death. So, if during a
rebellion, murder is committed to further the ends of rebellion, the murder cannot be absorbed
in rebellion. The penalty for murder in this case will be imposed in its maximum period as
provided in Art. 142-A. (PD 942 was repealed by EO 187)
Art 134-A; Coup detat 1998
No V.
1. How is the crime of coup d'etat committed? [3%]
2. Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm.
What crime or crimes did he commit? [2%]
Answer:
1. The crime of coup d'etat is committed by a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, military camps and installations, communication networks, public utilities and
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, carried out singly or
simultaneously anywhere in the Philippines by persons belonging to the military or police or
holding public office, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of
seizing or diminishing state power. (Art 134-A, RPC).
2. The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use of
an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No.
8294).
Art 134-A; Coup detat
2002 No XIX.
A.If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation and threat against a vital military installation for the purpose of seizing
power and taking over such installation, what crime or crimes are they guilty of? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the
crime of coup d'etat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, because
their attack was against vital military installations which are essential to the continued
possession and exercise of governmental powers, and their purpose is to seize power by taking
over such installations.
B.If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the leader thereof? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them,
signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf
of the group shall be deemed the leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135, R.P.C.)
Art 136; Conspiracy to commit rebellion 1994 No.
14:
VC, JG. GG and JG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government. VG was recognized as
the titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were held and the plan was finalized. JJ,
bothered by his conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have
conspired to overthrow the government. Father Abraham did not report this information to the
proper authorities.
Did Father Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was committed?
What is his criminal liability?
Answer;
No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because the conspiracy involved is one to
commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person criminally liable
under Art 116, RFC. And even assuming that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father
Abraham is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7, as his failure to report can
be considered as due to "insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and inviolability of a
confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in criminal liability to the co- conspirators, but
not to a person who learned of such and did not report to the proper authorities (US vs.
Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People vs. Atienza. 56 Phil. 353).
Art 141; Conspiracy to commit sedition 1987 No.
XII:
A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers who deserted their command in Mindanao.
Jose and Pedro, two big landowners, called A, B, C, D, and E to a conference. Jose and Pedro
proposed to these former soldiers that they recruit their comrades and organize a group of 100
for the purpose of challenging the government by force of aims in order to prevent the
enforcement or implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province. Jose and
Pedro
promised to finance the group and to buy firearms for the purpose. The former soldiers agreed.
After Jose and Pedro left, A, the leader of the former soldiers, said that in the meanwhile he
needed money to support his family. D suggested that they rob a bank and agreed to carry out
the plan on the 15th day of the month. Unknown to all of them, as they were conferring with
Jose and Pedro and as they were planning to rob the bank,. Rosauro, a houseboy, was within
hearing distance. On the pretext of buying cigarettes, Rosauro instead went directly to the
Police and told them what transpired. All the former soldiers, as well as Jose and Pedro, were
arrested.
(a) What crime, if any, did the former soldiers commit?
(b) What about Jose and Pedro? Answer:
a) The former soldiers committed the crime of conspiracy to commit sedition. What Jose and
Pedro proposed to the soldiers that they recruit their comrades and organize a group of
100 for the purpose of challenging the government by force of arms in order to prevent the
implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province is to commit sedition. Proposal
to commit sedition is not punished. But since the soldiers agreed, a conspiracy to commit
sedition resulted which is now punishable. Conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters
agree (People vs. Peralta 25 SCRA 759; People vs. Tiongson 12 SCRA 402).
b) Jose and Pedro will also be liable for conspiracy to commit sedition since they are members of
the conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all. If the soldiers did not agree to their
proposal, they would not incur any criminal liability because there is no proposal to commit
sedition.
Art 146; Illegal Assembly 1985
No. 14
At a meeting of about fifty (50) residents of Bo. Ta-talon, Quezon City, Juan, whose son was
shot by the marines, told the residents that it was hopeless to seek redress from the authorities
and that the only recourse was to topple it by force. Among those in the meeting were four (4)
Burly looking men in civilian clothes but with sidearms, all of whom stayed up to the end of
the meeting. They even participated therein by edging and cheering Juan. Quezon City
policemen arrived and they arrested Juan together with Pedro and Jose who were with Juan on
the platform. The four (4) armed persons, however quietly disappeared when the policemen
arrived.
(A) As a prosecutor, what case will you file against Juan, Pedro and Jose? State your reasons.
(B) Would your answer be the same if the four (4) armed men turned out to be intelligence
operatives of the Philippine Constabulary ? Explain your answer.
Answer:
(A) As a prosecutor, I will file against Juan, Pedro and Jose, a charge of Illegal Assembly under
Art. 146 as amended by P.O. 1834. What Juan told the residents during the meeting, that "it
was hopeless to seek redress from the authorities and that the only recourse was to topple it by
force," is an act of propaganda against the government in order to destabilize the government
or to undermine the authorities by eroding the faith and loyalty of the people,
(B) The answer is still the same as when the four burly men participated in the meeting by "edging
and cheering" Juan while he was speaking, the crime of Illegal Assembly was already being
committed.
Art 148; Direct assault 1976
No. VII-b
X, a Division Superintendent of Schools of the Bureau of Public Schools, while working in his
office was given a fist blow on the left temple by. Y. As a result of the blow, he suffered
contusion in his head. The assault upon X by Y was due to a standing grudge of Y for blocking
his promotion. Is Y guilty of assaulting a person in authority ?
Answer
Y is liable for direct assault upon a person/in authority. A Division Superintendent of Schools is
a person in authority because under the law, he is directly vested with jurisdiction since he is
given the power of general superintendence over the schools in his division, with the right to
appoint municipal school teachers and to fix their salaries, aside from the fact that public policy
demands adequate protection to those engaged in education which is a state function. The fist
blow was given while X was in the performance of his duties. The first blow resulting in
contusion constitutes the qualifying aggravating circumstances of laying hands upon a person
in authority. (Art. 148, RPC; People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil 671).
Art 148; Direct Assault 1985
No. 2
Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally
at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however, missed
his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously.
(A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons.
(B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty
will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss.
(C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and
Batas Pambansa 76?
Answer:
(A) If I were the investigating fiscal, I would file against Arthur an information for the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The motorcycle cop is an agent of a person
in authority. Firing at the peace officer is attacking him, one of the modes of committing
Direct Assault. (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code). Since a third person was hit instead, resulting
in his instantaneous death, the single act of shooting resulted in two grave felonies, to wit,
direct assault and homicide, a compound complex crime. (Art 48, Revised Penal Code).
Art 148; Direct Assault 1987
No. V.

Page 180 of 374


Jose was charged with slight physical injuries before a Municipal Trial Judge. He listened
attentively as the Judge read the sentence. When the Judge reached the dispositive portion and
pronounced Jose guilty, the latter was enraged, got hold of an ashtray, and threw it at the Judge
hitting him in the eye. As his defense lawyer Pedro attempted to restrain him, Jose boxed him
and knocked him down. The judge became blind in one eye as a consequence.
What crime or crimes did Jose commit?
Answer:
Jose is liable for Qualified Direct Assault with Serious Physical Injuries. The throwing
of the ashtray at the Judge hitting him in the eye is laying of hands on the Judge who is a
person in authority while in the performance of duties, Jose is also liable for qualified direct
assault when he boxed his defense lawyer, knocking him down while in the act of restraining
him Under Batas 873 a lawyer is considered a person in authority if assaulted while in the
performance of duties.

Page 181 of 374


Art 148; Direct
assault 1993 No. 17
Pablo, disobeying a judicial order, was punished by an RTC Judge of Manila for contempt. He
waited for the judge to go out into the street. Upon seeing the Judge, Pablo hurriedly
approached him, and without saying a word struck him with his fist causing a slight contusion
on the face of the judge. Rex came to the rescue of the judge but because he was taller and
bigger than Pablo, the latter used a knife in attacking Rex. Pablo limited his assault to the arms
of Rex, inflicting lesiones graves which incapacitated Rex from labor for forty five
(45) days.
If you were the prosecutor called to institute a criminal action against Pablo, with what crime
or crimes would you charge him? Explain.
Answer;
The crime of direct assault upon a person in authority with respect to the slight contusion on
the face of the Judge,
Direct assault with serious physical injuries with respect to the assault on
Rex.
Art 148; Direct Assault vs Resistance and disobedience 2001 No
XV
A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad at X, one of his pupils, because
of the latter's throwing paper clips at his classmates, twisted his right ear. X went out of the
classroom crying and proceeded home located at the back of the school. He reported to his
parents Y and Z what A had done to him. Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school
building and because they were running and talking in loud voices, they were seen by the
barangay chairman, B, who followed them as he suspected that an untoward incident might
happen. Upon seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed him out to his father, Y, who
administered a fist blow on A, causing him to fall down. When Y was about to kick A, B
rushed towards Y and pinned both of the latter's arms. Seeing his father being held by B, X
went near and punched B on the face, which caused him to lose his grip on Y. Throughout this
incident, Z shouted words of encouragement at Y, her husband, and also threatened to slap A.
Some security guards of the school arrived, intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so that they
could be investigated in the principal's office. Before leaving, Z passed near A and threw a
small flower pot at him but it was deflected by B.
a) What, if any, are the respective criminal liability of X Y and Z? (6%)
b) Would your answer be the same if B were a barangay tanod only?
(4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER;
X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the physical injuries
inflicted on B, the Barangay Chairman, to be only slight and hence, would be absorbed in the
direct assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in authority (Art. 152, RPC) and in this case,
was performing his duty of maintaining peace and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault With Less Serious Physical Injuries
for the fist blow on A, the teacher, which caused the latter to fall down. For purposes of the
crimes in Arts. 148 and 151 of the Revised Penal
Code, a teacher is considered a person in authority, and having been attacked by Y by reason
of his performance of official duty, direct assault is committed with the resulting less serious
physical injuries completed.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an accomplice to the complex
crimes of direct assault with less serious physical injuries committed by
Y. Her participation should not be considered as that of a co-principal, since her reactions were
only incited by her relationship to X and Y. as the mother of X and the wife of Y.
b) If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying hand on him, being an agent of a
person in authority only, would constitute the crime of Resistance and Disobedience under
Article 151, since X, a high school pupil, could not be considered as having acted out of
contempt for authority but more of helping his father get free from the grip of B. Laying hand
on an agent of a person in authority is not ipso facto direct assault, while it would always be
direct assault if done to a person in authority in defiance to the latter is exercise of authority.
Art 148; Direct Assault with murder 2000
No VIII
b) Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in
Barangay Camias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver a speech to start the dance.
While A was delivering his speech. B, one of the guests, went to the middle of the dance floor
making obscene dance movements, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone present to a
fight. A approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and
peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his back
twice when A turned his back to proceed to the microphone to continue his speech. A fell to
the ground and died. At the time of the incident A was not armed. What crime was committed?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. A, as a Barangay
Captain, is a person in authority and was acting in an official capacity when he tried to
maintain peace and order during the public dance in the Barangay, by admonishing B to keep
quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. When B, instead of heeding A's
advice, attacked the latter, B acted in contempt and lawless defiance of authority constituting
the crime of direct assault, which characterized the stabbing of A. And since A was stabbed at
the back when he was not in a position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in
the stabbing. Hence, the death caused by such stabbing was murder and having been
committed with direct assault, a complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed
by B.
Art 148; Direct Assault with murder
1995 No. 6:
2. Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud where he resided. Renato, a resident
of the neighboring Barangay Guihaman, also operated a mobile rice thresher which he often
brought to Barangay Napnud to thresh the palay of the farmers there. This was bitterly
resented by Pascual, One afternoon Pascual, and his two sons confronted Renato and his men
who were operating their mobile rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A heated
argument ensued. A barangay captain who was fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to
appease Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent confrontation. However, Pascual resented
the intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him to death.
What crime was committed by Pascual? Discuss fully. Answer:
2. Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority
(Arts. 148 and 249 in relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a
person in authority and if he is attacked while in the performance of his official duties or on the
occasion thereof the felony of direct assault is committed.
Art. 48, RPC, on the other hand, provides that if a single act produces two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Here, the single act of the offender in hacking
the victim to death resulted in two felonies, homicide which is grave and direct assault which is
less grave.
Art 148; Direct Assault with murder; explosion 1991 No
4:
Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNPJ officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a
civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's
banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by
a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and
their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that they are all under
arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats.
The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat:
its explosion killed Y and Z.
What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit?
Suggested Answer:
C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with direct
assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified by
explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z.
No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a
civilian.
This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E,
otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all.
Additional Answer:
Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as
amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable
under said Decree.
Art 148; Direct assault; indirect assault 1989 No.
11:
Edgardo, a policeman, accompanied by Florencio went to serve a warrant of arrest on
Emilio, a professional boxer, at the hitter's apartment. Upon seeing Edgardo, Emilio
immediately boxed him. Edgardo fell flat on the floor. As
Florencio tried to help Edgardo on his feet, Emilio also boxed Florencio. The injuries inflicted
upon Edgardo and Florencio required medical attendance for nine (9) days. What crime or
crimes were committed by Emilio? Give your reasons.
Answer:
If Emilio was not aware that Edgardo was a police officer who was going serve a warrant of
arrest on him, Emilio would be guilty only of slight physical injuries on two counts, one against
Edgardo and the second against Florencio.
If Emilio knew Edgardo as a policeman and of the latter's purpose to serve a warrant of arrest
on him, and that is why he boxed Edgardo, then he will be guilty of either DIRECT ASSAULT
UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY or RESISTANCE OR DISOBEDIENCE TO AN AGENT
OF A PERSON in authority,
depending on the degree of force employed by him. A person who attacks, employs force
makes a serious intimidation or makes a serious resistance against a person in authority or his
agent, if at the time of the assault the latter is engaged in the actual performance of his official
duties, the offended party knowing that the person he is assaulting is a person in authority or
his agent, it liable for the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT. A policeman is an agent of a person in
authority.
As for Florencio, the crime committed by Emilio against him would be indirect Assault
provided that Emilio has committed DIRECT ASSAULT against Edgardo, This is so because
any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of
the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of the crime of DIRECT
ASSAULT, is criminally liable for the crime of INDIRECT ASSAULT. However, if Emilio is
guilty only of RESISTANCE or disobedience as against Edgardo; then his crime against
Florencio would only be slight physical injuries.
Art 148; Direct assault; person in authority 1977 No.
VI-a
When the barangay chairman was presiding over the barrio meeting regarding cleanliness of
the community, he was immediately assaulted by his creditor whom he has not paid for a long
time despite his repeated promises to pay. The barangay chairman suffered serious physical
injuries. The creditor also assaulted a stranger who came to the aid of the barangay chairman.
If you were the fiscal, what crime or crimes will you file against the creditor? Reason fully.
Answer
1) Under Article 152, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, a barangay chairman is a person
in authority. Since he was assaulted by his creditor while he was presiding over a barrio
meeting, the assault was committed while the barangay chairman was actually engaged in the
performance of his duties. The motive of the creditor in assaulting the barangay chairman is
therefore immaterial Since the barangay chairman suffered serious physical injuries, the
creditor will be liable for a complex crime of direct assault with serious physical injuries. The
direct assault is qualified since the creditor laid hands upon a person in authority. (Art. 148,
R.P.C. U.S. v. Balagot, 40 Phil. 385).
2) The creditor also committed direct assault upon the stranger who came to the aid of the
barangay chairman because the stranger in doing so was an
agent of a person in authority since the barangay chairman is a person in authority. Any person
coming to the aid of a person in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority,
(Art. 152 as amended by Rep. Act No. 1978). The scope of Art. 149 which punishes indirect
assault is modified by Rep. Act No. 1978.
Art 148; Direct Assault; teachers and professors 2002 No
VII.
A, a lady professor, was giving an examination. She noticed B, one of the students,
cheating. She called the student's attention and confiscated his examination booklet, causing
embarrassment to him. The following day, while the class was going on, the student, B,
approached A and, without any warning, slapped her. B would have inflicted further injuries on
A had not C, another student, come to A's rescue and prevented B from continuing his attack. B
turned his ire on C and punched the latter. What crime or crimes, if any, did B commit? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for slapping the professor, A, who was
then conducting classes and thus exercising authority; and another one for the violence on the
student C, who came to the aid of the said professor.
By express provision of Article 152, in relation to Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, teachers and professors of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance are deemed persons in authority for purposes of the crimes of direct assault and of
resistance and disobedience in Articles 148 and 151 of said Code. And any person who comes
to the aid of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
Accordingly, the attack on C is, in the eyes of the law, an attack on an agent of a person in
authority, not just an attack on a student.
Art 148; Persons in authority/ agents of persons in authority 2000 No
VIII
a) Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in authority? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Persons in authority are persons directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission.
Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed persons in authority. (Article 152, RPC)
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election
or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of public order, the
protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman,
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority (Art. 152, RPC),
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the Rev. Penal Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional
duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (P.D. No.
299, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873).
Art 151; Resistance and disobedience 1990 No.
11;
Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She was
detained at the police precinct, underwent investigation, and released only after 48 hours
a) Patrolman Bart liable for any offense? Explain your answer.
b) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and grappled with patrolman Bart, is she criminally liable
thereby? State your reasons.
Answer:
a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code - Delay on the
Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities.
b) She is criminally liable for slight disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code -
Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person.
Art 151; Simple resistance 1979
No. VII
While on patrol, X, a policeman, spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, X accosted Y
suspecting him to be a long wanted criminal on the basis of appearance. Y had no identification
papers but he gave his name and address. X told Y he would be brought to headquarters for
questioning. When Y refused, X told him to remove his coat so he could find if he has a tattoo
on his left forearm, a mark of the wanted criminal X was hunting, Y refused again and resisted
all efforts of X by pushing and pulling him. X charged Y with assault. Do you agree?
Answer
The crime committed is not assault but simple resistance. The policeman was on patrol when
he spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, where he had no reason to be. X was hunting a
wanted criminal. A duty of a policeman is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the
disposal of judicial or executive authorities. One means to achieve this end is the identification
of the alleged lawbreaker. (U.S. vs. Sanches, 27 Phil. 442). A peace officer might arrest for
examination persons walking in the street at night when there's reasonable ground to suspect
that a felony is committed although there is no proof thereof (People vs. Santos, 36 Phil, 853).
Y was not arrested but only accosted on suspicion of being a long wanted criminal because of
his appearance. X's request that Y would be brought to the headquarters was refused and Y
also refused that he remove his coat to find out if he has a tattoo in his left forearm, a mark of
the wanted criminal whom X was hunting. X was therefore acting in the legitimate
performance of his duties. Y pushed and pull X in resisting his efforts to find out whether he
has a tattoo. The acts committed by Y however do not" constitute assault but simple resistance
because such do not indicate manifest defiance to the authority of the law (US, vs. Tabiana, 37
Phil. 515, People vs. Baesa, CA 55 O.G. 10291).
Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail 2002
No VI.
B. A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital for emergency medical treatment. His
followers, all of whom were armed, went to the hospital to take him away or help him escape.
The prison guards, seeing that they were outnumbered and that resistance would endanger the
lives of other patients, deckled to allow
the prisoner to be taken by his followers. What crime, if any, was committed by A's
followers? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A's followers shall be liable as principals in the crime of delivery of prisoner from Jail
(Art. 156, Revised Penal Code).
The felony is committed not only by removing from any jail or penal establishment any
person confined therein but also by helping in the escape of such person outside of said
establishments by means of violence, intimidation, bribery, or any other means.
Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail & Infidelity in custody of prisoners & Evasion
of service of sentence
1989 No. 13:
Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail bond for his provisional liberty pending
trial of his case, he was detained in the city jail. On the date of the hearing of the estafa case,
Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for the trial. Daniel
removed the handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside the
courtroom. As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a
cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously moved
out of the room and escaped, Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a while, then
went down the stairs and lost themselves in the crowd. What crime or crimes were committed
by Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons.
Answer:
1. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime of EVASION THRU NEGLIGENCE, one of the
forms of Infidelity in the custody of Prisoner (Art. 224),, the essential elements of which
offense are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer.
(2) That he has in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoners by final
judgement.
(3) That such prisoner escaped from his custody thru his negligence.
All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, is a public
officer. As the escort for Ernani in the latter's trial, he had custody of charge of a detention
prisoner, Ernani's escape was thru his negligence because after removing Ernani's handcuffs
and allowing him to sit in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he should have taken the
necessary precautions to prevent Ernani's escape by keeping an eye on him. Instead, he
provided the opportunity for the escape by talking with a lawyer and not keeping watch over
his prisoner.
2. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the crime of DELIVERING PRISONERS
FROM JAILS (Art. 156), which is committed by any person who either removes from any jail
or penal establishment any person confined therein, or WHO HELPS the escape of such
person by means of violence, intimidation, bribery of OTHER MEANS. The act of Meynardo
in giving to Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the latter's escape by OTHER
MEANS.
3. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally liable for any offense. The detention
prisoner who escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If he were a convict by final
judgment who is serving a sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty and he escapes
during term of his sentence, he would be liable for EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
(Art. 157).

Page 190 of 374


Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence 1975 No.
XIII
The accused was found guilty of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and was deported.
After four months, he returned to the Philippines. The fiscal prosecuted him for Evasion of
Service of Sentence but the defense contended that the accused is not guilty of the charge
because he did not break out of a jail. Is the defense tenable? Why?
Answer
a) The defense is tenable. Evasion of sentence is jail breaking. (Tanega v. Masakayan, 19 SCRA
564). So, it does not apply to the accused who was deported and who returned to the
Philippines in violation of the sentence, since deportation is not imprisonment. (17.5. v. Laio
Hoc, 36 Phil. 867).
b) If the deportation was an act of the Chief Executive completely of the judgment of conviction,
then, there can be no evasion of sentence.
Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence 1998 No
X.
Manny killed his wife under exceptional circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of destierro during which he was not to enter
the city.
While serving sentence, Manny went to Dagupan City to visit his mother.
Later, he was arrested in Manila.
1. Did Manny commit any crime? [3%]
2. If so, where should he be prosecuted? [2%] Answer:
1. Yes. Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence when he went to Dagupan
City, which he was prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro.
A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded when the convict enters any of
the place/places he is prohibited from entering under the sentence or come within the
prohibited radius. Although destierro does not involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a
deprivation of liberty. (People vs. Abilong. 82 Phil. 172).
2. Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in Manila where he was arrested. This is so
because evasion of service of sentence is a continuing offense, as the convict is a fugitive
from justice in such case. (Parulan vs. Dir. of Prisons, L-28519, 17 Feb. 1968)
Art 160; Quasi-recidivism
1983 No. 7
X, an unlettered prisoner serving sentence for homicide, killed a co- prisoner with evident
premeditation, after which he voluntarily surrendered to the prison guard and confessed his
wrongdoing.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the murder charge.
After a brief trial to ascertain beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused and the
presence or absence of modifying circumstances, the trial judge imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for murder in its maximum period [death], disregarding the mitigating
circumstances established by the defense.

Page 191 of 374


(a) Did the judge act correctly? Why?
(b) If the murder was committed outside of prison before X began to serve his sentence for
homicide, would your answer be different? Reasons.
Answer
a) The judge acted correctly. The reason is because X was a quasi- recidivist as he killed his
fellow prisoner while he was serving the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160 Rev. Penal Code)
The penalty for the second crime is to be imposed in its maximum period without regard to the
attending mitigating and aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Bautista (1978) of 2 O.G.
2117)
b) The same answer because there is quasi-recidivism since the offender who was convicted by
final judgment of homicide committed the second felony, which in this case is murder, before
beginning to serve the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160 Rev. Penal Code)
Art 160; Quasi-recidivism
1991 No. 9:
During a fiesta, Simeon Marco, brandishing a knife, asked Constancio whether he was the one
who slapped his (Simeon's) son the year previous. Vicente [father of Constancio) shouted at
Constancio and his other son, Bienvenido, telling them to run away. When Bienvenido passed
by Rafael Marco (brother of Simeon), Rafael stabbed him. Bienvenido parried the blow but
fell down, his feet entangled with some vines. While Bienvenido was lying on the ground,
Rafael continued to stab him, inflicting slight injuries on the shoulder of Bienvenido, after
which Rafael stood up. At that moment, Dulcisimo Beltran (no relation to the Marco brothers),
came out of nowhere and, together with Simeon, stabbed Bienvenido. Both of them inflicted
fatal wounds resulting in the death of the victim,
a)Discuss the criminal liability of Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael.
b) Supposing Dulcisimo is a convict out on parole, will the aggravating circumstances of quasi-
recidivism be appreciated against him?
Answer:
b) No, because quasi-recidivism under Art. 160, RPC occurs when the accused commits a felony
while serving or about to serve sentence (or if he escapes from prison]. A parolee who
commits a felony cannot be a quasi- recidivist,
Crimes against Public Interest
Art 164; Mutilation of coins; bills excluded 1988 No.
9:
c) Two Japanese were passing through immigration and customs preparatory to their departure for
Japan at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. A bundle of P2,000 peso bills was discovered
in one of them, and to prevent their being delayed, his companion took the bundle of bills and
then and there tore up the bills.
As City Fiscal of Pasay, what crimes, if any, would you charge the two Japanese? Explain.
Answer:
c) The two Japanese cannot be charged of any crime. They committed no crime.
Article 164 of the Revised Penal Code on mutilation of coins cannot be applied to the
Japanese because said article refers to coins and not to bills.
Art 168; Illegal possession of false notes 1999 No
XIII
(b) Is mere possession of false money bills punishable under Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code? Explain. (3%)
(c) The accused was caught in possession of 100 counterfeit P20 bills. He could not explain how
and why he possessed the said bills. Neither could he explain what he intended to do with the
fake bills. Can he be held criminally liable for such possession? Decide. (3%}
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) No. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone without an intent to use it, is not
punishable. But the circumstances of such possession may indicate intent to utter, sufficient to
consummate the crime of illegal possession of false notes.
(c) Yes. Knowledge that the note is counterfeit and intent to use it may be shown by the conduct of
the accused. So, possession of 100 false bills reveal:
(a) knowledge that the bills are fake; and (b) intent to utter the same.
Art 169 & 171; Forgery & falsification 1999
No XIII
(a) How are "forging" and "falsification" committed? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Forging or forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument
payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true and genuine document; or by erasing,
substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
Falsification, on the other hand, is committed by:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1977
No. VIII-b
A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is
P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the landowner
will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official receipt to be
given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him, the true
amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire amount of
P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file against the
teller? State your reasons.
Answer
As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction
or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner
that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00 the
teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by
law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of
taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of
tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute
malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher,
60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to
misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S.
Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an
independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the
excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation.
Art 171; Falsification of private document
1989 No. 12:
Oscar, a former welder and painter at the Caloocan Motor Works owned by Arturo, went to the
Downtown Hardware Store where Arturo gets materials on credit, and presented to its
manager a typewritten order for two (2) cans of "Dietsler" car paint. The signature of Arturo
on the order was falsified. After receiving the paint, Oscar sold them and kept the proceeds
therefrom. If you were the investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against
Oscar? Explain.
Answer:
The proper charge against Oscar is Falsification of a Private Document.
This is so for the following reasons:
By forging the signature of Arturo on the typewritten purchase order for two cans of car paint,
Oscar committed the crime of falsification. The document falsified by him, however, is a
private document. A typewritten purchase order is neither a public, official or commercial
document. It is a private document. Falsification of a private document, however, is not a crime
unless there is damage or intent to cause damage. When Oscar used the falsified private
document to obtain the two cans of paint from the hardware store, the element of damage arose,
thus consummating the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT.
Precisely because damage is an essential element of the crime of falsification of a
private document, Oscar cannot be convicted of the complex crime of ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT. Only one
single crime of FALSIFICATION OF PRIVTE DOCUMENT is committed here. The damage
to another is caused by the commission of said crime. The intent to defraud in using falsified
private document is part and parcel of said crime and cannot give rise to the crime of estafa,
because damage, which is also an essential element of estafa, is caused by, and becomes the
element of, the crime of falsification of private document. The crime of estafa is not
committed, as it cannot exist without its own element of damage.
If the private document in the case was falsified, not to induce the offended party to
part with something of value but to cover up or conceal a defraudation previously made, then
the crime committed would be ESTAFA, The falsification would be absorbed in said offense,
the element of damage in one being the same as that required in the other.
Art 171; Falsification of private document 1975 No.
XV
The accused was a bookkeeper in a department store. He purchased on credit several items in
the store and signed chits for them. In order to avoid paying for the foods, he did not record in
his personal account with the store the items he purchased and tore up the chits he had signed
What crime, if any, did he commit? Why?
Answer
Falsification of a private document by omission. It is the duty of the accused as
bookkeeper to record in his personal account with the store the items he purchased. By tearing
the chits which he signed for the purchases, damage is present. (People v. Dizon, 47 Phil.
360).
Art 171; Falsification of private document 1982 No.
12
"A", son of "B", knowing that "X" owed "B" Pl,000.00 which had already matured, wrote a
collection letter to "X", falsifying "B'"s signature in the letter which "A" himself delivered to
"X" without "B" 's knowledge. "X" paid the amount to "A" and thereupon appropriated the
money for his personal use. Upon learning of the action of his son, "B" filed a complaint
against the former. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute "A"?
Answer
If I were, the Fiscal I would prosecute A for the crime of falsification of private
document. Altho, the falsification was used as a means for A to misappropriate the amount
delivered to him by X, a complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a private document is not committed because the element of damage in estafa
is the same damage which is an element of falsification of a private document. (People vs.
Dizon, CA 48 O.G. 168). The crime is not estafa because without the falsification of the
private document A would not have committed the defraudation. There is no complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of a private document. In spite of the relationship there is criminal
liability. Relationship is an absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa and malicious
mischief only.
Art 171; Falsification of private document 1991 No.
3:
In a civil case for recovery of a sum of money filed against him by A, B interposed the
defense of payment. In support thereof, he identified and offered in evidence a receipt which
appears to be signed by A On rebuttal, A denied having been paid by B and having signed the
receipt. He presented a handwriting expert who testified that the alleged signature of A on the
receipt is a forgery and that a comparison thereof with the specimen signatures of B clearly
shows that B himself forged the signature of A
a) Is B liable for the crime of using a falsified- document in a judicial proceeding (last paragraph
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)?
b) If he is not, what offense or offenses may he be charged with? Answer:
a) No, B should not be liable for the crime of using a falsified document, under the last paragraph
of Art. 172, Revised Penal Code. He would be liable for forgery of a private document under
the second mode of falsification under Art. 172, Revised Penal Code. Being the possessor and
user of the falsified document he is presumed to be the forger or falsifier and the offense of
introducing falsified document is already absorbed in the main offense of forgery or
falsification.
b) B should be charged for the crime of falsification of a private document, since the document
falsified is a private document and done with intent to cause damage. Although there was an
attempt on the part of B to defraud A thru the use of the false document, such deceit cannot
give rise to estafa because this crime cannot co-exist or be complexed with the crime of
falsification when the document falsified is a private document.
Additional Answer;
b) If he testified on the genuineness of the document, he should also be held liable under Art.
182, which is false testimony in civil cases.
Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1988 No.
14:
(a) Andrea signed her deceased husband's name in endorsing his three treasury warrants which
were delivered to her directly by the district supervisor who knew that her husband had already
died, and she used the proceeds to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his
burial. She knew that her husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value
of which exceeded that value of the three treasury warrants, so that the government suffered no
damage. Andrea's appeal is based on her claim of absence of criminal intent and of good faith.
Should she be found guilty of falsification? Discuss briefly.
ANSWER:
(a) Andrea should be held guilty of falsification of public documents. Her claim of
absence of criminal intent and of good faith cannot be considered because she is presumed to
know that her husband is dead. The element of damage required in falsification does not refer
to pecuniary damage but damage to public interest.
Executive clemency can however be sought for by Andrea.
Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1992 No.
11
Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in Macao, having applied with a recruitment agency to
work in Kuwait, went to Quezon City Hall to procure a Community Tax Certificate, formerly
called Residence Certificate. He stated therein that his name is Leo Tiampuy, A Filipino citizen
born in Binan, Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an
employee in the office recognized him and reported to her boss that the information written in
the Community Tax Certificate were all lies.
Treat each of the above contentions separately.
a) Shortly thereafter, an information was filed against Dee Kiam alias Tiampuy. What crime, if
any, may he be indicted for? Why?
Suggested Answer;
a) Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of Falsification of a Public Document committed by a
private individual under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 171 thereof. A
residence certificate is a public or official document within the context of said provisions and
jurisprudence. Since Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts (Art. 171,
par. 4), and he being a private individual, he is culpable thereunder.
b) The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it did not allege that he had the
obligation to disclose the truth in the Community Tax Certificate; that the same is a useless
scrap of paper which one can buy even in the Quiapo underpass and that he had no intent of
deceiving anybody, much less the government. If you were the trial judge, would you grant
the motion to quash the information on the basis of Dee Kiam's allegations?
Suggested Answer:
b) Falsification of public documents under Arts. 171 and 172, RFC, does not require
that the document is required by law. The sanctity of the public document, a residence
certificate, cannot be taken lightly as being a "mere scrap of paper". Intent to cause damage,
or actual damage, is not an indispensable requisite for falsification of public document.
Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1993 No
10:
L, a Municipal Mayor, issued an appointment in favor of his legitimate son. S, as meat
inspector in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. He also issued a certification that S is not
related to him within the third degree of consanguinity. The Civil Service Commission
approved the appointment.
L, was charged and found guilty of falsification of public document. In his appeal, he
argued that his conviction is erroneous because he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth
about his relationship with the appointee and that he was in good faith as he later on revoked
the appointment.
Resolve his plea, supporting your resolution with reasons. Answer:
The conviction is correct. L had the legal obligation to issue a certification to the effect that the
appointee is not related to him within the third degree of consanguinity (Laino vs.
Sandiganbayan). The revocation of the appointment did not extinguish the incipient criminal
liability of L, the crime having been already consummated. Besides, good faith may not be
invoked in the crime of falsification of a public document as criminal intent and the will to
commit the crime are presumed to exist unless the contrary appears (Manuel Siquuian vs
People. 171 SCRA 223).
Art 171; Falsification; presumption of falsification 1999 No
XIII
(d) A falsified official or public document was found in the possession of the accused. No
evidence was introduced to show that the accused was the author of the falsification. As a
matter of fact, the trial court convicted the accused of falsification of official or public
document mainly on the proposition that "the only person who could have made the erasures
and the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be benefited by the alterations thus
made" and that "he alone could have the motive for making such alterations".
Was the conviction of the accused proper although the conviction was premised merely on the
aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(d) Yes. the conviction is proper because there is a presumption in law that the
possessor and user of a falsified document is the one who falsified the same.
Art 172; Use of falsified documents 1987 No.
VI:
M was forced by a policeman to sign a document entitled "Sinumpaang Salaysay" in which M
implicated X as the brain behind the robbery of a bank where P500,000.00 were lost. The
document was prepared by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank's lawyer, who was present
when the policeman asked M to sign the document. As M refused to sign it, the policeman held
him by the neck and forced him to sign, which he did as he was afraid he might be bodily
harmed. During the hearing of the robbery before the Fiscal's Office, B submitted the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence, on the basis of which X was included in the information
filed by the Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he repudiated the document and told the court there was no truth to
its contents as he was merely forced to sign it.
(a) May M be held liable for perjury?
(b) Did lawyer B commit any crime when he used the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence.
Answer
b) The lawyer would be liable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code for the
offense of introducing a false document in a judicial proceeding, as he knew the same to be
false.
Art 177; Usurpation of Official Functions 1985
No. 8
While his marriage to Sylvia was subsisting, Rollie took Cynthia, who had been legally
separated from her husband, to Ramon Abad, who, in priestly attire and posing as Fr. Chavez of
the Aglipayan Church, solemnized their marriage. After the marriage, Rollie took Cynthia to
Baguio on a week-long honeymoon.
As a fiscal and based on the foregoing facts, what charge or charges will you file and
against whom? Discuss.
Answer:
As a fiscal, I will file a charge of Usurpation of Official Functions against Ramon
Abad. He merely posed as a priest of the Aglipayan Church and was not therefore authorized
to solemnize a marriage. Solemnization of a marriage is an official function. (U.S. v.
Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109).
Against Rollie, the charge will be a marriage contracted in contravention of law which is
penalized in Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code as an Illegal Marriage, It cannot be
bigamy as the marriage with Cynthia did not have all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, (People v. Peralta CA-GR No. 13130-R, June 30, 1955).
Art 181; False testimony 1994
No. 13:
Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a
prosecution witness, testified that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument.
While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila burned down and the entire records of
the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was again called to
the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he
was abroad when the crime took place.
The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony
favorable to the defendant in a criminal case.
1) Will the case against Andrew prosper?
2) Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final on January 10, 1987. On June 18. 1994 a case
of giving false testimony was filed against Andrew. As his lawyer, what legal step will you
take?
Answer:
1) Yes. For one to be criminally liable under Art. 181, RFC, it is not necessary that the criminal
case where Andrew testified is terminated first. It is not even required of the prosecution to
prove which of the two statements of the witness is false and to prove the statement to be false
by evidence other than the contradictory statements (People vs. Arazola, 13 Court of Appeals
Report, 2nd series, p. 808).
2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription. The crime of false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the
accused in the principal case, was acquitted on
January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under
Art. 180, par. 4, RPC.
Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the
case against Andrew was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was
decided with finality on January 10, 1987 and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime
commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is more than five (5) years.
Art 183; Perjury
1978 No. VIII-a
A was defendant in a collection suit for an unpaid loan extended to him by
B. In his answer under oath, A swore he did not owe B anything, much less did he borrow any
amount from him. The court found A's answer to be false and rendered judgment for B. A was
later charged with, and prosecuted for, perjury for making a false statement under oath.
Decide, state your reasons. Answer
A is not liable for perjury. Verification of the answer is not required by law (People vs. Tupasi,
36 O.G. 2038). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court also held that a verified answer
pertinent to the issue is absolutely privileged (Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, et al. L-8088, July 31,
1978). Perjury is any sworn false statement on any material matter made before a person
authorized to administer oath whenever the law so requires, (Art. 183, R.P.C.)
Art 183; Perjury
1984 No. 8
A executed an affidavit in support of a criminal complaint for estafa he filed against B. After an
amicable settlement under which A was paid the swindled amount, he made another affidavit
wherein he detailed events totally inconsistent with the facts narrated in the first affidavit.
Later, B filed a complaint for perjury against A with the Fiscal's Office and presented in support
thereof the two contradictory affidavits of A. No other evidence was submitted.
If you were the investigating fiscal, how would you resolve the case?
Why? Answer:
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
The complaint should be dismissed. The respondent or accused cannot be
convicted of the crime of perjury solely on the basis of his contradictory sworn statements. It is
further necessary to prove which of the two statements is false by evidence other than the
contradictory statements.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
If I were the fiscal, I would dismiss the complaint for perjury. There is no perjury
solely on the basis of two contradictory statement. There must be further evidence to show
which of the two sworn statements is false. (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902).
Art 183; Perjury

Page 200 of 374


1987 No. VI:
M was forced by a policeman to sign a document entitled "Sinumpaang Salaysay" in which M
implicated X as the brain behind the robbery of a bank where P500,000.00 were lost. The
document was prepared by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank's lawyer, who was
present when the policeman asked M to sign the document. As M refused to sign it, the
policeman held him by the neck and forced him to sign, which he did as he was afraid he
might be bodily harmed. During the hearing of the robbery before the Fiscal's Office, B
submitted the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence, on the basis of which X was included in
the information filed by the Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he repudiated the document and told the court there was no truth to
its contents as he was merely forced to sign it.
(a) May M be held liable for perjury?
(b) Did lawyer B commit any crime when he used the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence.
Answer
a) M is not liable for perjury. He did not sign the document freely and voluntarily but due to the
force employed by the policeman. Perjury refers to deliberate distortion of truth. The facts of
the problem do not state that the documents was signed before an officer authorized to
administer oath. It is, therefore, doubtful that the facts would constitute perjury.
Art 183; Perjury
1991 No. 18:
A, who was the client of B (a lawyer), signed a retainer agreement for the payment of attorney's
fees. After B rendered satisfactory service, A refused to pay the attorney's fees. B sued. In her
verified answer, A alleged that she did not owe money to plaintiff B nor did she engage his
legal services. These statements under oath were false.
B filed a criminal complaint for perjury against A, and an information was filed in court. If
you are the lawyer for accused A, what Is your defense, if any?
Answer:
I will move for the dismissal of the complaint for perjury. The falsity of sworn statement must
be required or authorized by law (Flordeliz v. Himalalaon, 84 SCRA 277).
Art 183; Perjury
1996 No. 13;
Sisenando purchased the share of the stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two installments,
making him the majority stockholder thereof and eventually, its president. Because the
stockholders who sold their stocks failed to comply with their warranties attendant to the sale,
Sisenando withheld payment of the second installment due on the shares and deposited the
money in escrow instead, subject to release once said stockholders comply with their
warranties. The stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded the sale in question and removed
Sisenando from the Presidency of the Estrella Corporation, Sisenando then filed a verified
complaint for damages against said stockholders in his capacity as president and principal
stockholder of Estrella Corporation. In retaliation, the

Page 201 of 374


stockholders concerned, after petitioning the Securities and Exchange Commission to declare
the rescission valid, further filed a criminal case for perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the
latter perjured himself when he stated under oath in the verification of his complaint for
damages that he is the President of the Estrella Corporation when in fact he had already been
removed as such.
Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando be held liable for perjury?
Explain.
Answer;
No, Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury because It cannot be reasonably
maintained that he willfully and deliberately made an assertion of a falsehood when he alleged
in the complaint that he is the President of the Corporation, obviously, he made the allegation
on the premise that his removal from the presidency is not valid and that is precisely the issue
brought about by his complaint to the SEC. It is a fact that Sisenando has been the President
of the corporation and it Is from that position that the stockholders concerned purportedly
removed him, whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his removal. There is no willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood which is a requisite of perjury,
Art 183; Perjury
1997 No 14:
A, a government employee, was administratively charged with immorality for having an affair
with B, a co-employee in the same office who believed him to be single. To exculpate himself,
A testified that he was single and was willing to marry B, He Induced C to testify and C did
testify that B was single. The truth, however, was that A had earlier married D, now a
neighbor of C.
Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty of subordination of perjury? Answer
No. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful falsehood asserted by him is not material to
the charge of immorality. Whether A is single or married, the charge of immorality against him
as a government employee could proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a
defense to the charge of immorality, hence, not a material matter that could influence the
charge.
There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The crime is now treated as plain perjury
with the one inducing another as the principal inducement, and the latter, as principal by direct
participation (People vs. Podol 66 Phil. 365). Since in this case A cannot be held liable for
perjury, the matter that he testified to being immaterial, he cannot therefore be held
responsible as a principal by inducement when he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C is not liable as principal by direct participation in perjury, having testified on
matters not material to an administrative case.
Art 184; Subornation of perjury 1993
No. 12:
Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation
of perjury.
Answer;
3) Subornation of perjury - Procuring another to swear falsely and testify under circumstances
rendering him guilty of perjury.
Art 200; Grave scandal 1996
No. 15:
Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed
naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives
holding office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and,
with the use of powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually,
her sunbathing became the talk of the town.
1) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain,
2) What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. Answer:
1) Pia did not commit a crime, The felony closest to making Pia criminally liable is Grave
Scandal, but then such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against
decency and good customs. In the first place, it was not done in a public place and within
public knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally
and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude.
2) The business executives did not commit any crime. Their acts could not be acts of
lasciviousness [as there was no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town,
resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the business executives, and besides
such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule.
Art 201; obscene publications 1993
No. 8:
Juan and Petra are officemates. Later, intimacy developed between them. One day, Juan sent to
Petra a booklet contained in a pay envelope which was securely sealed. The booklet is
unquestionably indecent and highly offensive to morals. Juan was thereafter charged under par.
3 of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 969, which provides that the
penalty of prision mayor or a fine from P6,000 to P12,000, or both such imprisonment and fine
shall be imposed upon those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. Is Juan guilty of the crime charged?
Reasons.
Answer:
No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged because the law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the
protection of public moral and not only the moral of an individual.
Crimes Committed by Public Officers
Art 203; Public Officers; definition 1999
No VII
(a) Who are public officers? (2%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
(a) Public Officers are persons who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class (Art. 203, RPC)
Art 208; maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution & Robbery 1992 No. 6:
Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the
Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng, age
16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in the
home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them up
with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani narrated
how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he kept on
threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about what was
happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties with her
body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were subjected to a lot
of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them ran away. Nani got
married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the humiliation of appearing in
their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story saying that no housegirl ever
stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan".
b) After SPO2 Cirio Cellado heard the story of the two girls, he took aside Mrs. Cortes and made
this proposition: "Let me tell you what I plan to do. Since the D.O.M. is probably well-known
in his community, he will not want his reputation tarnished, I'll tell him that you have reported
him to us and you are all set to file criminal charges against him at the Prosecutor's Office.
But if he will give us P50,000.00, you may be persuaded not to file the suit anymore. Actually,
after he gives that amount, which he surely will, I shall visit him regularly for more. We shall
then divide equally the money we shall get from him.
Suppose Cellado proceeds to carry out his plan and is caught by his Chief with
incontrovertible evidence, what action or actions may be brought by his superiors to penalize
him and to recover whatever sums of money he may have received from his victim?
Suggested Answer:
b) Cellado should be charged of robbery because he took personal property from, Donido, with
intent to gain, with intimidation on the person of the latter. The money passed into the hands of
Cellado involuntarily because of fear (intimidation) on the part of the offended party, Donido.
Likewise, Cellado can be held liable under Art. 208, RPC, he being a public officer who
maliciously refrained from instituting prosecution against violators of the law. An agent of
a person in authority charged with the
apprehension and investigation of a crime is an integral part of the prosecution of offenses.
Art 208; Negligence or tolerance in prosecution of offenses 1991
No. 20:
A, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigations of two criminal cases: (1) for rape against X, and
(2) for estafa against Y. Unknown to the complainants, both respondents were schoolmates of A
in their high school years in Lanao del Norte. Despite the overwhelming evidence against X, A
dismissed the rape case. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Y, A did not file the
information for estafa because according to him, the folder of the case to which were attached
the dishonored checks and other documents offered in evidence by the complainant was stolen.
Contrary to such claim, the folder was kept in a safe in his house.
What offense or offenses under the Title on Crimes Committed By Public Officers of Book
Two of the Revised Penal Code may A be charged with?
Answer:
Art. 208 is violated, that is maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution for punishment
of violators of the law. Likewise, the prosecutor is liable under Art. 226 for removing and
cancelling public document entrusted to his custody.
Art 210; Bribery
1975 No XI
A municipal judge, in consideration of Pl,000.00 given him by the complainant and at the
latter's request, rendered a decision convicting the accused. If you were the fiscal, would you
prosecute him for bribery or for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment? Why?
Answer
If I were the fiscal, I would prosecute him for bribery. By receiving money from the
complainant and at his request, rendering a decision convicting the accused, the judge, for a
consideration, performed an act related to the duties of his office. Such constitutes bribery.
The facts do not sustain the offense of knowingly rendering unjust judgment. First, it does not
appear that the judgment is unjust, that is against the law and the evidence and second, even if
it is assumed it is unjust, it also does not appear that the judge rendered the judgment knowing
it is un-just, that is, maliciously and in bad faith. (U.S. v. Gacutan, 28 Phil. 100),
Art 210; Bribery
1977 No. VIII-a
A policeman told the overspeeding driver whom he arrested that he will release him without
any case being filed if he will give him P10.00. The driver refused, and instead filed a case of
attempted bribery against the policeman. Did the driver file the proper case? State your reasons,
Answer
The driver did not file the proper case. There is no attempted bribery because of the nature of
the crime. To solicit a bribe is not punished in Art. 210 which refers to the agreeing to perform
or not to perform an act in consideration
of a gift or promise. Par. 3 of said article punishes the act of receiving a gift or accepting a
promise if given or promised to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it
was his official duty to do.
Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1993
No. 3:
Arevalo, a judge who heard a civil case, received gifts from Maricel, the plaintiff therein, but
rendered judgment in favor of Julie, the defendant therein. Who are criminally liable, and for
what crime or crimes? Explain.
Answer;
1) Arevalo, the Judge, is liable for Indirect bribery (Art. 210 RPC) and for violation of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standard (Sec. 7 (d) RA 6713 and also PD 46).
2) Maricel is liable for corruption of public officer (Art, 212, RFC and PD
46).
Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1985
No. 18:
While manning the traffic lights at the intersection of Espana and Washington Streets,
Patrolman Torres ordered BB to stop his taxi, threatened to arrest him and confiscate his
driver's license allegedly for speeding and reckless driving. Conversant with the dirty ways of
some traffic officers, BB pulled out his wallet, picked up his driver's license with the hidden
P20.00 bill inside the same and handed it to Patrolman Torres, Thereafter, Patrolman Torres
returned SB's license and allowed him to go.
What criminal prosecution may be filed against Pat, Torres and/or BB under the
circumstances? Discuss.
Answer:
Patrolman Torres should be charged with bribery and BB the driver for corruption of a public
officer, in the supposition that the driver was speeding and for reckless driving. The money was
given by the driver so as not to be arrested and for his driver's license not to be confiscated. But
if the driver was not speeding nor was there reckless driving but the policeman threatened to
arrest him and confiscate his driver's license, the giving of the P20.00 bill would be due to the
intimidation employed by the policeman. In this case, the policeman will be liable for robbery
thru intimidation. The driver will not incur any criminal liability.
Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1983
No. 14
A building contractor offered a bribe to an engineer employed in the Ministry of public
Works and Highways. The latter refused the offer, not because of moral scruples but because
he thought he was being entrapped.
(a) What crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Code were committed and by whom?
Give the basis of the liability or non-liability of both the building contractor and the engineer.
(b) Did either or both offerer and offeree commit any offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act [Republic Act No. 3019}? Why?
Answer
a) The building contractor is liable for attempted corruption of a public officer because the
bribe offered was not accepted by the engineer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
who is a public officer. (Art. 212 Rev. Penal Code) The engineer does not incur any criminal
liability. The reason for the refusal is immaterial.
Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 2001
No X
Deputy Sheriff Ben Rivas received from the RTC Clerk of Court a Writ of Execution in
the case of Ejectment filed by Mrs. Maria Estrada vs. Luis Ablan. The judgment being in
favor of Estrada, Rivas went to her lawyer's office where he was given the necessary amounts
constituting the sheriffs fees and expenses for execution in the total amount of P550.00, aside
from P2,000.00 in consideration of prompt enforcement of the writ from Estrada and her
lawyer. The writ was successfully enforced.
a) What crime, if any, did the sheriff commit? (3%)
b) Was there any crime committed by Estrada and her lawyer and if so, what crime? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The sheriff committed the crime of Direct Bribery under the second paragraph of
Article 210, Revised Penal Code, since the P2,000 was received by him "in consideration" of
the prompt enforcement of the writ of execution which is an official duty of the sheriff to do.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
a) On the premise that even without the P2,000, Sheriff Ben Rivas had to carry out the writ of
execution and not that he would be implementing the writ only because of the P2,000.00, the
receipt of the amount by said sheriff may be regarded as a gift received by reason of his office
and not as a "consideration" for the performance of an official duty; hence, only indirect
Bribery would be committed by said sheriff.
b) On the part of the plaintiff and her lawyer as giver of the bribe-money, the crime is Corruption
of Public Officials under Article 212, Revised Penal Code.
Art 210; Bribery; direct 1990
No. 9;
a) Melda, who is the private secretary of Judge Tolits Naya. was persuaded by a litigant, Jumbo,
to have his case calendared as early as possible for a consideration of P500. May she be held
criminally liable for this accommodation? Explain your answer.
b) What will be the criminal liability of Melda if she volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya to
rule in Jumbo's favor without asking any consideration? Explain your answer.
Answer:
a) The answer would depend/be qualified by the implication of the phrase "to have his case
calendared as early as possible".
If the phrase is interrupted as an unjust act and in violation of the rule to give priority
to the older cases, then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which does not
constitute a crime but is unjust. He may also be held liable
under Section 3(e) of RA. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended: "x x x
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits".
If you interpret the phrase as a non-violation of the rules and regulations then he can only be
held liable for direct bribery.
b) Melda is not criminally liable because the act of volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act.
It is the act of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act does not fall under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code on Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211 of the RPC
on Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 3(a) of RA. 3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official to violate rules
and regulations.
Art 210; Bribery; immunity from liability of bribe-giver 1978
No. X-a (2)
A public official is liable for prosecution under the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" if
he directly or indirectly requests or receives any gift or other pecuniary benefit from any
person for whom he has secured or will secure any government permit or license in
consideration of such help. In a case, the fiscal prosecuted both the bribe-giver and the public
official under the Act. The bribe- giver engaged your services as his counsel.
What action will you take in his defense? Explain. Answer
As counsel of the bribe-giver, I would advise him to take advantage of the immunity given to
the bribe-giver under Presidential Decree No. 749 by testifying for the prosecution.
Art 210; Bribery; immunity from liability of bribe-giver 1984
No. 7
Under what conditions is a bribe-giver immune from criminal prosecution?
What is the scope of his immunity?
Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
1. When the information refers to consummated offense of bribery.
2. When the information and testimony of the giver are necessary for the conviction of the
accused public official.
3. When such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State.
4. When the informant has not yet been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The givers of bribes and their accomplices are exempt from prosecution or punishment
for the offense with reference to which their information and testimonies were given.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
A bribe giver is immune from criminal prosecution if the following requisites are present: 1)
the information must refer to consummated bribery; 2) the information and testimony are
necessary for the conviction of the accused
public officer; 3) such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; 4)
such information and testimony can be corroborated on material points; and 5) the informant
or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The informant or witness shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense to
which the information or testimony where given and this immunity may be enjoyed by such
informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered the bribe to the public official or is an
accomplice for such bribe giving or even in cases where the information and testimony are
given against a person who is not a public officer but who is a principal or accomplice or
accessory in the commission of the bribery.
Art 211; Indirect bribery 1997
No. 16:
A, who is the private complainant in a murder case pending before a Regional Trial Court
Judge, gave a judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of assorted canned goods and
bottles of expensive wines, easily worth P10.000.00. The judge accepted the gift knowing it
came from A.
What crime or crimes, if any, were committed? Answer:
The Judge committed the crime of Indirect bribery under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal
Code. The gift was offered to the Judge by reason of his office. In addition, the Judge will be
liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the receiving of gifts by pubic officials and
employees on occasions like Christmas.
Art 213; Frauds against the public treasury 1988 No.
12:
(b) A city official ordered one million pesos (P1M) worth of T-shirts at public expense for the
underprivileged residents of his city. After full payment with city funds was made, it was
discovered that only a fourth of the T-shirts had been delivered and that the rest of the
deliveries were so-called "ghost deliveries."
Answer:
(b) (1) The city official is liable for violation of Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that:
Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses,The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine
ranging from P200 to P10,000 shall be imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the
making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property of
funds, shall enter into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use of any
other scheme, to defraud the government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other impost, shall be guilty of
any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those
authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by
him officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or
objects of a different nature from that provided by law.
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of
Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied; and violation of:
(b) (2) Act 3019 sec. 3 (g) which provides that:
Corrupt practices of public officers "IN ADDITION" to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful."

Page 210 of 374


Art 213; Illegal exaction 1975
No. IX
A municipal treasurer received P500.00 from a taxpayer but neglected to issue the
corresponding receipt. Is he criminally liable? Why?
Answer
The law provides that the failure of the Municipal Treasurer to issue a receipt for the amount
paid as a tax must be "voluntary" in order that illegal exaction may be committed. (Art. 213,
par. 2). The mere fact, however, that he "neglected" to issue the receipt would not make him
necessarily liable because in a crime against public officers like illegal exaction, negligence is
not mere laxity but laxity in the performance of duties approximating fraud and malice or the
negligence must be shown to be positively and clearly inexcusable. (People v. Bernas, CA 53
O.G. 1106).
Art 213; illegal exaction vs estafa 1977 No.
VIII-b
A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is
P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the
landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official
receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him,
the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire
amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file
against the teller? State your reasons.
Answer
As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction
or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner
that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00
the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by
law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of
taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of
tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute
malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher,
60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to
misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S.
Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an
independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the
excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation.
Art 217; Malversation
1975 No. XVI
Can a private person commit malversation? If so, in what instances? Answer
In two cases, to wit: 1) if the private person conspired with an accountable public officer in
the misappropriation of public funds or property in his custody; 2) if a private person
misappropriates any insular, provincial or municipal funds or property of which he has charge
in any capacity. (Art. 222, Revised Penal Code).
Page 211 of 374
Art 217; Malversation
1977 No. VIII-b
A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is
P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the
landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official
receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him,
the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire
amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file
against the teller? State your reasons.
Answer
As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction
or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner
that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00
the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by
law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of
taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of
tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute
malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher,
60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to
misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S.
Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an
independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the
excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation.
Art 217; Malversation
1978 No. VIII-b
Upon examination of the accounts of a municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
(formerly Bulacan), the auditor found a shortage of Pl,000.00. When informed of the
shortchange, the treasurer took out P1,000.00 from his wallet and turned over the amount to
the auditor, who accepted the same. One month later, the treasurer was charged with, and
prosecuted for, malversation. His defense was that he had balanced his accounts.
Decide with reasons.
Answer
The treasurer is not liable for malversation. Because, when the shortchange of Pl,000.00 was
discovered and the treasurer was notified, he at once took out Pl,000.00 from his wallet and
turned over the amount to the auditor who accepted the same. There is, therefore, no prima
facie evidence of malversation. (U.S. vs. Feliciano, 15 Phil. 149).
Art 217; Malversation
1987 No. X:
Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received from the Provincial Treasurer of the Province five (5)
brand new typewriters for use in the municipal treasurer's office. Each typewriter is valued at
P10,000.00. Since Pedro needed money for the hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four (4)
of the typewriters to his friend,
Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for P2,000.00 each or a total of P8,000.00. Rodolfo
as a general merchant knew that one typewriter could easily be between P6,000.00 to
P10,000.00, and for this reason he readily agreed to buy the four typewriters, Rodolfo then
resold the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus, making a profit of P16,000. Two months after the
transaction, Pedro was audited and the investigation as to his accountabilities led to the
discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters from Pedro,
(a) What crime did Pedro commit?
(b) Is Rodolfo liable as an accessory or for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law? Answer:
a) Pedro committed malversation. The five (5) brand new typewriters
received by him from the Provincial Treasurer for use in the Municipal Treasurer's Office
were under his custody for which he was accountable as Municipal Treasurer. Selling four (4)
of the typewriters to Rodolfo, a general merchant, because he needed the money for the
hospitalization of his son constitutes misappropriation as he applied the same for his personal
benefit.
Art 217; Malversation
1988 No. 12:
(a) A public official charged with purchasing rice stocks under government subsidy falsely
reported that his stocks of rice worth P17 million on board two barges sank off a neighboring
island on their way to their destination and were completely lost. Meanwhile, the rice was
surreptitiously sold to rice warehouses in the provinces.
What is the criminal liability of this government official? Explain.
Answer:
(a) The government official being an accountable officer can be charged with malversation thru
falsification of official documents.
Art 217; Malversation
2001 No IV
Accused Juan Santos, a deputy sheriff in a Regional Trial Court, levied on the personal
properties of a defendant in a civil case before said court, pursuant to a writ of execution duly
Issued by the court. Among the properties levied upon and deposited Inside the "evidence
room" of the Clerk of Court for Multiple RTC Salas were a refrigerator, a stock of cassette
tapes, a dining table set of chairs and several lampshades. Upon the defendant's paying off the
judgment creditor, he tried to claim his properties but found out that several Items were
missing, such as the cassette tapes, chairs and lampshades. After due and diligent sleuthing by
the police detectives assigned to the case, these missing items were found in the house of
accused Santos, who reasoned out that he only borrowed them temporarily.
If you were the fiscal /prosecutor, what would be the nature of the Information to be
filed against the accused? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the fiscal/prosecutor, I would file an Information for Malversation against Juan
Santos for the cassette tapes, chain and lampshades which he, as
deputy sheriff, levied upon and thus under his accountability as a public officer. Said properties
being under levy, are in custodia legis and thus impressed with the character of public property,
misappropriation of which constitutes the crime of malversation although said properties
belonged to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
Juan Santos misappropriated such properties when, in breach of trust, he applied them to
his own private use and benefit. His allegation that he only borrowed such properties is a lame
excuse, devoid of merit as there is no one from whom he borrowed the same. The fact that it
was only "after due and diligent sleuthing by the police detectives assigned to the case", that
the missing items were found in the house of Santos, negates his pretension.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
An Information for Theft may be filed, considering that the sheriff had already deposited
the properties levied upon in the "evidence room" of the Clerk of Court and may have already
been relieved of his accountability therefor.
If Juan Santos was no longer the public officer who should be accountable for the
properties levied upon and found in his house, his taking of such properties would no longer
constitute Malversation but Theft, as there was taking with intent to gain, of personal property
of another without the consent of the latter.
Art 217; Malversation
2001 No V
Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were former warehousemen of the Rustan
Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG sequestered the assets, fund and properties of the
owners-incorporators of the store, alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten wealth" of the
Marcos family. Upon their application, Reyes and Santos were appointed as fiscal agents of the
sequestered firm and they were given custody and possession of the sequestered building and
its contents, including various vehicles used in the firm's operations. After a few months, an
inventory was conducted and it was discovered that two (2) delivery vans were missing. After
demand was made upon them, Reyes and Santos failed to give any satisfactory explanation
why the vans were missing or to turn them over to the PCGG; hence, they were charged with
Malversation of Public Property. During the trial, the two accused claimed that they are not
public accountable officers and, if any crime was committed, it should only be Estafa under
Art. 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
What is the proper offense committed? State the reason(s) for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
The proper offense committed was Malversation of Public Property, not estafa,
considering that Reyes and Santos, upon their application, were constituted as "fiscal agents" of
the sequestered firm and were "given custody and possession" of the sequestered properties,
including the delivery vans which later they could not account for. They were thus made the
depositary and administrator of properties deposited by public authority and hence, by the
duties of their office/position, they are accountable for such properties. Such properties, having
been sequestered by the Government through the PCGG, are in custodia
legis and therefore impressed with the character of public property, even though the properties
belong to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans were
missing, is prima facie evidence that they had put the same to their personal use.
Art 217; Malversation
1996 No. 5;
Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received,
as municipal treasurer, from the Department of Public Works and Highways, the amount of
P100,000.00 known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation, betterment, and Improvement
(CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in Masinloc, Zambales, a project
undertaken on proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the fund was already exhausted
while the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a representative of the
Commission on Audit conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to account for the
Pl00,000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth, who was charged with malversation of public funds, was
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but was nevertheless convicted, in the same
criminal case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal, Elizabeth argued that her conviction
was erroneous as she applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a public purpose with out violating
any law or ordinance appropriating the said amount for any specific purpose. The absence of
such law or ordinance was, in fact, established.
Is the contention of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain. Answer:
Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) was erroneous, is legally tenable because she was charged for malversation of
public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code but was convicted for Illegal use of
public funds which is defined and punished under Art. 220 of said Code. A public officer
charged with malversation may not be validly convicted of illegal use of public funds
(technical malversation) because the latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it
necessarily Include the crime of malversation. The Sandiganbayan should have followed the
procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and order the filing of the proper
Information. (Parungao us. Sandiganbayan. 197 SCRA 173.) From the facts, there is no
showing that there Is a law or ordinance appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose.
As a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that The absence of such law or ordinance
was, in fact, established." So, procedurally and substantially , the Sandiganbayan's decision
suffers from serious Infirmity.
Art 217; Malversation
1999 No XI
What constitutes the crime of malversation of public funds or property?
(2%) How Is malversation distinguished from estafa?
A Municipal Treasurer, accountable for public funds or property, encashed
with public funds private checks drawn in favor of his wife. The checks bounced, the drawer
not having enough cash in the drawee bank. The Municipal
Treasurer, in encashing private checks from public funds, violated regulations of his office.
Notwithstanding restitution of the amount of the checks, can the Municipal Treasurer
nevertheless be criminally liable? What crime did he commit? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Malversation of public funds or property is committed by any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall take or misappropriate
or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, (Art, 217, RPC)
Malversation differs from estafa ...
Yes, notwithstanding the restitution of the amount of the check, the Municipal Treasurer will be
criminally liable as restitution does not negate criminal liability although it may be considered
as a mitigating circumstance similar or analogous to voluntary surrender. (People vs.
Velasquez, 73 Phil 98), He will be criminally liable for malversation. However, if the
restitution was made immediately, under vehement protest against an imputation of
malversation and without leaving the office, he may not be criminally liable.
Art 217; Malversation
1994 No. 16
Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an armalite rifle (Ml6) and a Smith and Wesson
Revolver. Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI Director made an inspection of all the firearms issued.
Randy, who reported for work that morning, did not show up during the inspection. He went on
absence without leave (AWOL). After two years, he surrendered to the NBI the two firearms
issued to him. He was charged with malversation of government property before the
Sandiganbayan.
Randy put up the defense that he did not appropriate the armalite rifle and the revolver for his
own use, that the delay in accounting for them does not constitute conversion and that actually
the firearms were stolen by his friend, Chiting.
Decide the case. Answer:
Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is accountable for the firearms
they issued to him in his official capacity. The failure of Randy to submit the firearms upon
demand created the presumption that he converted them for his own use. Even if there is no
direct evidence of misappropriation. his failure to account for the government property is
enough factual basis for a finding of malversation. Indeed, even his explanation that the guns
were stolen is incredible. For if the firearms were actually stolen, he should have reported the
matter immediately to the authorities. (People vs. Baguiran , 20 SCRA 453; Felicilda us.
Grospe, GR No. 10294, July 3, 1992)
Art 217; Malversation
1990 No, 2;
Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of the town, was also the treasurer of a charity ball of
the church. Because he was short of payroll funds for the
municipal employees, he used part of the church funds to replenish the payroll funds with the
Intention of returning the same when the public funds came.
a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under the revised Penal Code? State your reasons,
b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the church funds, may he be held criminally liable
thereby? Explain.
Answer:
a) No. The church funds used by Dencio do not constitute public funds which are the
proper subject of malversation. Neither does said funds constitute the so-called private funds,
which could be the proper subject of malversation under Article 222, Revised Penal Code
which pertain to private property placed in the custody of public officers by reason of their
office.
Art 217; Malversation & Estafa 1986
No 21:
Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat, both policemen, responded to a call for assistance
from Maglimayon, the owner of a bar along Mabini Street. It appears that Maligalig, a
customer, had been creating trouble in the bar, prompting the owner to request him to leave.
Maligalig pulled a gun and shot Maglimayon, Slightly wounded, Maglimayon reached for his
own gun but before he could shoot, other customers subdued Maligalig.
Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat questioned the protagonists and got an admission
from Maligalig that the gun he used was unlicensed. On the other hand, Maglimayon
produced the license and permit for his firearm.
Hamak confiscated Maligalig's firearm. Salat asked for Maglimayon's firearm, explaining that
he had to bring it to the police headquarters for examination but promised that he would return
it to Maglimayon in five days.
(a)Hamak sold the firearm of Maligalig. What offense, if any did Hamak commit? Give the
elements of the offense as part of the explanation in your answer.
(b) Salat gave away Maglimayon's firearm as a gift to his girlfriend. What offense, if any, did
Salat Commit? Explain.
Answer:
(a) Hamak will be liable for malversation. Since the firearm was unlicensed, then it should be
confiscated by the Government as what Hamak did. Such partake of the nature of public
property with Hamak, a public officer, having the custody thereof. (People vs. Magsino CA 50
O.G. 678),
The elements of malversation are:
1. The offender is a public officer
2. He has the custody or control of public funds or property by reason of his office.
3. He is accountable for these public funds or property.
4. He appropriates, takes, misappropriates, consents, or through abandonment or negligence,
permits another to take the same (Art. 217, Revised Penal Code).
(b) Salat committed estafa. He received the licensed firearm from the owner who is a private
person with the promise to return it after it has been examined in the police headquarters. The
fact that he gave it to his girlfriend constitutes misappropriation as he has the obligation to
return it to the owner.
Art 217; Malversation & estafa 1999
No XI
How Is malversation distinguished from estafa?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Malversation differs from estafa in that malversation is committed by an accountable
public officer Involving public funds or property under his custody and accountability; while
estafa is committed by non-accountable public officer or private individual involving funds or
property for which he is not accountable to the government.
Art 217; Malversation thru falsification of public document 1980 No.
IX
"Q", a postmaster, stole a treasury warrant payable to "R" valued at P30, increased the amount
to P230.00 by adding the figure "2" before "3", and forged "R's" name as well as that of "S",
making it appear that "R" had endorsed the warrant to "S" and then later cashed it. "Q"
thereafter misappropriate the amount represented by the altered warrant.
Of what complex crime would you hold "Q" liable?
Which crime would control the penalty to be imposed on him, assuming that he is
found guilty?
Answer
The facts of the problem are similar to those in the case of People vs. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636
altho in this case the postmaster Q was the one who stole the treasury warrant payable to R and
who raised the amount stated therein from P30.00 to P230,00 and forged R's name as well as
that of S making it appear that R had endorsed the warrant to S. In the problem, the fact is
stated that the postmaster cashed the forged treasury warrant and misappropriated the amount
represented in the altered warrant.
Falsification of a public document (treasury warrant) is committed because of the alteration of
the amount appearing in the treasury warrant, a genuine document am] by causing it to appear
that "R", the payee, endorsed the document to "S" and "S" encashed it which is false. (Art. 171
pars. 2 and 6, R.P.C.) The falsification was committed to facilitate the misappropriation by Q of
the proceeds of the treasury warrant, which are public funds, Q, therefore, committed the
complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public document.
The more serious crime, which in this case is the falsification, will control the penalty,
which is to be imposed in its maximum period. In a complex crime, the penalty is for the more
serious crime, to be imposed in its maximum period. (Art. 48 R.P.C.)
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1996 No.
14:
A chief of police of a municipality, believing in good faith that a prisoner serving a ten-day
sentence in the municipal jail, would not escape, allowed said prisoner to sleep at the latter's
house because the municipal Jail was so congested and there was no bed space available.
Accordingly, the prisoner went home to sleep every night but returned to jail early each
morning, until the ten- day sentence had been fully served.
Did the Chief of Police commit any crime? Explain.
Answer:
The Chief of Police is guilty of violation of Art. 223, RPC, consenting or conniving to evasion,
the elements of which are (a) he is a public officer, (b) he is in charge or custody of a prisoner,
detention or prisoner by final judgment, (c) that the prisoner escaped, and (d) there must be
connivance.
Relaxation of a prisoner is considered infidelity, thus making the penalty ineffectual; although
the convict may not have fled (US vs. Bandino, 9 Phil. 459) it Is still violative of the provision.
It also includes a case when the guard allowed the prisoner, who is serving a six-day sentence
in the municipal Jail, to sleep in his house and eat there (People vs. Revilla).
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1981 No.
15
"D", a detention prisoner for Homicide, escaped while working at the guest house of a
provincial governor, which at the time was being rented by the province. The detainee worked
at the guest house pursuant to a note of the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden
asking for five men to work in the guest house. The note did not mention the names of the
prisoners under surveillance, who picked the men to compose the work party.
Would you find the Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden guilty of Infidelity in the
Custody of Prisoners?
Answer
The Provincial Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden cannot be guilty of Infidelity in
the Custody of Prisoners. This crime is committed in two ways, to wit: (1) by a public officer
who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge (Art. 223, Rev. Penal
Code) and (2) by a public officer in whose custody on charge a prisoner has escaped by reason
of his negligence (Art. 224, Rev. Penal Code).
Under the first mode, connivance in the escape of the prisoner on the part of the public officer
is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of infidelity in the custody of the
prisoner. No connivance in the escape of the detention prisoner "D" from the custody of the
Provincial Guard charge with the duty of keeping prisoner under surveillance can be deduced
from the note of the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden asking for five men to work
in the guest house as the note does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the
guest house. The provincial guard was the one who picked the men to compose the work
party.
Nor is the crime committed under the second mode. Since negligence resulting in evasion is
definite laxity amount to deliberate won performance of duty. If there is negligence
committed, it must be that of the Provincial Guard who is the public officer charged with the
custody and guarding of the prisoner "D" (Alberto vs. Judge de la Cruz, L-31939, June 30,
1980. 98 SCRA 406).
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1979 No.
X
X is serving a 6-year prison term. In his fourth year in prison, he discovered that the
judge committed a mistake in giving him a 6-year sentence when the law he violated called
for a 3 years imprisonment only. Y, the jail guard and a law student chucked X's contention
and found it correct X did not want to go to court anymore as he did not have any money to
hire a lawyer to file habeas corpus and he had lost faith in the competence of judges. X then
informed Y he would just escape and the latter did not object. As soon as Y turned his back X
sprinted out of his cell. What crime was committed?
Answer
Y, the jail guard, is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner and X, for evasion of
sentence. The jail guard is a public officer who has the custody of X, as prisoner. But not
objecting to the intention of X to escape, who in fact did as soon as Y turned his back, Y either
connived or consented in the escape of the prisoner X, (U.S. vs. Bandino, 29 Phil. 429). The
presumption is that the sentence by final judgment which was being served by X was correct.
If the court committed an error in sentencing him to an erroneous prison term, that must be
remedied according to law. Surely, the remedy is not to commit an act which is felonious as
that will disesteem any final judgment rendered by the court.
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1997 No.
11:
During a town fiesta. A, the chief of police, permitted B, a detention prisoner and his
compadre, to leave the municipal jail and entertain visitors in his house from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00
p.m. B returned to the municipal jail at 8:30 p.m.
Was there any crime committed by A? Answer;
Yes, A committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a detention
prisoner. As Chief of Police, A has custody over B. Even if B returned to the municipal Jail at
8:30 p.m. A, as custodian of the prisoner, has maliciously failed to perform the duties of his
office, and when he permits said prisoner to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment, he
consents to the prisoner escaping the punishment of being deprived of his liberty which can be
considered real and actual evasion of service under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code
(People vs. Leon Bandino 29 Phil. 459).
Alternative Answer:
No crime was committed by the Chief of Police. It was only an act of leniency or
laxity in the performance of his duty and not in excess of his duty (People vs. Evangelista
(CA) 38 O.G. 158),
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners & Delivery of prisoners from jail & Evasion
of service of sentence
1989 No. 13:
Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail bond for his provisional liberty pending
trial of his case, he was detained in the city jail. On the date of the hearing of the estafa case,
Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for the trial. Daniel
removed the handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside the
Page 220 of 374
courtroom. As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom, Ernani, with the help
of a

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cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously moved
out of the room and escaped, Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a while,
then went down the stairs and lost themselves in the crowd. What crime or crimes were
committed by Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons.
Answer:
1. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime of EVASION THRU NEGLIGENCE, one of the
forms of Infidelity in the custody of Prisoner (Art. 224),, the essential elements of which
offense are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer.
(2) That he has in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoners by final
judgement.
(3) That such prisoner escaped from his custody thru his negligence.
All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, is a public
officer. As the escort for Ernani in the latter's trial, he had custody of charge of a detention
prisoner, Ernani's escape was thru his negligence because after removing Ernani's handcuffs
and allowing him to sit in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he should have taken the
necessary precautions to prevent Ernani's escape by keeping an eye on him. Instead, he
provided the opportunity for the escape by talking with a lawyer and not keeping watch over
his prisoner.
2. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the crime of DELIVERING PRISONERS
FROM JAILS (Art. 156), which is committed by any person who either removes from any jail
or penal establishment any person confined therein, or WHO HELPS the escape of such
person by means of violence, intimidation, bribery of OTHER MEANS. The act of Meynardo
in giving to Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the latter's escape by OTHER
MEANS.
3. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally liable for any offense. The detention
prisoner who escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If he were a convict by final
judgment who is serving a sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty and he escapes
during term of his sentence, he would be liable for EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
(Art. 157).
Art 226; Removal of documents 1991
No. 20:
A, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigations of two criminal cases: (1) for rape against X, and
(2)for estafa against Y. Unknown to the complainants, both respondents were schoolmates of A in
their high school years in Lanao del Norte. Despite the overwhelming evidence against X, A
dismissed the rape case. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Y, A did not file the
information for estafa because according to him, the folder of the case to which were attached
the dishonored checks and other documents offered in evidence by the complainant was
stolen. Contrary to such claim, the folder was kept in a safe in his house.
What offense or offenses under the Title on Crimes Committed By Public Officers of Book
Two of the Revised Penal Code may A be charged with?
Answer:

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Art. 208 is violated, that is maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution for
punishment of violators of the law. Likewise, the prosecutor is liable under Art. 226 for
removing and cancelling public document entrusted to his custody.
Crimes Against Persons
Art 246; Parricide
1982 No. 16
"A", a prominent and high official, had illicit relationship with "B", a girl very much below his
social standing. A child was born to them as a result thereof. "A" killed the child, over three
days old, so as to conceal his dishonor.
(a) What crime did'"A" commit?
(b) Does relationship in this case constitute a privileged mitigating circumstance?
(c) How would you answer the questions (a) and (b) if the child were less than three days old?
Answer
(a) "A" committed parricide as this crime is committed even though the relationship of the father
"A" with the child, over three days old, is illegitimate.
(b) The answer is no because relationship in parricide is inherent, aside from the fact that it is not
provided in the Code as a privileged mitigating circumstance?
(c) If the child were less than three days old, the crime would be infanticide. Relationship of "A"
the illegitimate father, is not privileged mitigating. Art, 255, provides for such privileged
mitigating circumstance if the offender is the mother and the child was killed to conceal her
dishonor.
Art 246; Parricide
1996 No. 16;
In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila, abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky, who was
then only three years old. Twenty years later, an affray took place in a bar in Olongapo City
between Pedro and his companions, on one hand, and Ricky and his friends, upon the other,
without the father and son knowing each other. Ricky stabbed and killed Pedro in the fight,
only to find out, a week later, when his mother arrived from Manila to visit him in jail, that the
man whom he killed was his own father.
1) What crime did Ricky commit? Explain.
2) Suppose Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, but he nevertheless killed him
out of bitterness for having abandoned him and his mother, what crime did Ricky commit?
Explain.
Answer:
1) Ricky committed parricide because the person killed was his own father, and the law punishing
the crime (Art. 246, RPC) does not require that the crime be "knowingly" committed. Should
Ricky be prosecuted and found guilty of parricide, the penalty to be imposed is Art. 49 of the
Revised Penal Code for Homicide (the crime he intended to commit) but in its maximum
period.
Alternative Answer:
Ricky should be held criminally liable only for homicide not parricide because the relationship
which qualified the killing to parricide is virtually absent for a period of twenty years already,
such that Ricky could not possibly be aware
that his adversary was his father. In other words, the moral basis for imposing the higher
penalty for parricide is absent.
2) The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is his
father, because the moral basis for punishing the crime already exists. His having acted out of
bitterness for having been abandoned by his father may be considered mitigating.
Art 246; Parricide with unintentional abortion; complex crime 1994 No.
7:
Aldrich was dismissed from his Job by his employer. Upon reaching home, his pregnant wife,
Carmi, nagged him about money for her medicines. Depressed by his dismissal and angered
by the nagging of his wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his fist. She fell to the ground. As a
result, she and her unborn baby died.
What crime was committed by Aldrich? Answer:
Aldrich committed the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. When Aldrich struck his
wife, Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of maltreatment under Art, 266, par. 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, Since Carmi died because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is
criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 of the same
Code. Since the unborn baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to
cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich committed unintentional abortion as defined in Art.
257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced two grave or less grave felonies, he
falls under Art, 48, RPC, ie. a complex crime (People vs. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA 401).
Art 246; Parricide; homicide 1997
No. 17:
A, a young housewife, and B, her paramour, conspired to kill C. her husband, to whom she was
lawfully married, A and B bought pancit and mixed it with poison. A gave the food with poison
to C, but before C could eat it. D, her illegitimate lather, and E, her legitimate son, arrived. C.
D and E shared the food in the presence of A who merely watched them eating. C, D and E
died because of having partaken of the poisoned food.
What crime or crimes did A and B commit? Answer:
A committed the crime of multiple parricide for the killing of C, her lawful husband, D, her
illegitimate father, and E, her legitimate son. All these killings constitute parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code because of her relationship with the victims.
B committed the crime of murder as a co-conspirator of A in the killing of C because the
killing was carried out by means of poison (Art. 248. par. 3, Revised Penal Code). But for
feloniously causing the death of D and E, B committed two counts of homicide. The plan was
only to kill C.
Art 246; Parricide; proof of marriage 1978
No, VI-a
Juana was charged with parricide, i.e., poisoning her husband Justo with whom she had seven
(7) children, the eldest, 21 years old and the youngest, eleven (11). The act of poisoning was
proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the prosecution failed to present the marriage certificate
to prove Juana's marriage to
Justo, The trial judge rendered a judgment of conviction. Juana appealed on the ground that the
marriage was not proven. Decide with reasons.
Answer
The appeal of Juana on the ground that the marriage was not proven is meritorious. The best
proof of marriage is the marriage certificate. Failure of the prosecution to present the marriage
certificate to prove Juana's marriage to Justo was fatal, unless there was oral evidence to prove
it and not objected to (People vs. Remegio Cruz, 108 Phil 288),
Art 247; Absolutory cause; less serious physical injuries under exceptional
circumstances
1977 No. VI-b
The husband having discovered his wife in sexual intercourse with her paramour, immediately
fired upon the latter inflicting on him less serious physical injuries. The same bullet that hit the
paramour also hit a stranger killing him instantly. 1) Did the husband incur criminal liability in
wounding the paramour? 2) Will you make the husband liable for the death of the stranger?
Reason out your answers to the two questions.
Answer
1) The husband did not incur criminal liability because the injuries inflicted upon the paramour
are not serious. This is considered an absolutory cause (Art 247 R.P.C.).
2) The husband is also not liable for the death of the stranger since the stranger was killed by the
same bullet which hit the paramour for the reason that the husband in shooting at the paramour
who suffered merely less serious physical injuries did not incur any criminal liability. In a case
decided by the Supreme Court, the assault made by the offended husband was made in order
to defend his honor and rights by punishing the offender of his honor and is deemed to be in
the exercise of a lawful right. (U.S. v. Merced, 39 Phil. 198, 203), The death of the stranger
would therefore be due to an accident, which is exempting.
Art 247; Death & Physical injuries under exceptional circumstances
1988 No. 7:
Pedro Orsal and the wife of accused Juan Santos started having illicit relations while the
accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar Examinations and his wife was left behind
in Davao City. In the morning of July 15, 1984, the accused went to the bus station in Davao
City to go to Cagayan de Oro City to fetch his daughter, but after he failed to catch the first
trip in the morning, and because the 2:00 o'clock bus had engine trouble and could not leave,
the accused, after passing the residence of his father, went home and arrive at his residence at
around six o'clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching his home, the accused found his wife
Laura, and Pedro Orsal in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Pedro Orsal
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused, who
has then peeping above the built in cabinet in their, room, jumped down and ran away. He
went to the house of his PC soldier-friend, and neighbor, got his (soldier's) M-16 rifle and
immediately, it was almost 6:30 p.m. then, went back to his house. Not finding his wife there,
he went to the hangout of Pedro Orsal and found the latter playing mahjong there. The accused
fired at Pedro three times with his rifle, hit him and
two bystanders. Pedro died instantaneously of wounds in the head, trunk, and abdomen. The
two bystanders were seriously injured but survived.
a) Can Juan Santos be held guilty for homicide for the death of Pedro Orsal? Explain.
b) What offense did Juan Santos commit with regard to the two bystanders? Explain.
c) What offense, did the wife of Juan Santos commit, if any why?
Answer
a)Juan Santos cannot be held guilty of homicide for the death of Pedro Orsal. Instead, Juan is
liable for violation of Article 247 "Death inflicted under exceptional circumstances because
there was one continuous act, (People vs. Abarca).
b) With regards to the two bystanders, Juan Santos committed the crime of serious physical
injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. (Art. 247 Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Abarca).
Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 1985 No. 9
Feeling homesick and terribly missing his wife after a long absence, Ronald, without notice,
came home from Saudi. Arriving at their residence, he immediately proceeded to their bedroom
where he saw his wife lying on their bed under a mosquito net locked in embrace with his
compadre Dante Ayala He immediately drew his gun but was beaten to a draw by Dante whose
bullet felled him.
Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald, Dante set up self-defense but was nevertheless
convicted.
(A) Comment on the validity of Dante's conviction.
(B) In the above given case, supposing Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife, while Dante
was on top of the latter, thus killing both of them, will you grant him the benefit of Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain.
Answer:
(B) If Ronald shot Dante and his wife while Dante was on top of the latter, killing both
of them, Ronald can avail of the benefit of Article 247, Revised Penal Code). The basic
element of this article is that the unfaithful wife and her paramour were surprised by the
offended husband during the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. To an
ordinary, prudent person who surprised a man lying on top of his wife in their marital bed
such act in the mind of the husband would mean nothing else but sexual intercourse.
Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 1991 No.
14;
At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of 10 November 1990, upon his arrival from Cebu
City, Marco surprised his wife. Rosette, and her former boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in the
act of illicit copulation. Raul got his revolver and, upon seeing the revolver, Marco ran toward
the street, took a pedicab and proceeded to the house of his brother, a policeman, from whom
he borrowed a revolver. With the weapon, he returned to his residence. Unable to find Raul
and Rosette, Marco proceeded to a disco jointly owned and operated by Haul. It was
already 11:00 o'clock that evening when he arrived at the joint. Upon seeing Raul with two (2)
male companions, A arid B, drinking beer at one of the tables, Marco fired two (2) shots at
Raul, who was hit on his forehead with one of the bullets; the other bullet hit A, injuring him
on his stomach. As a consequence of the gunshot wound, Haul died instantaneously. Due to
the timely medical attention given to him, A survived; he was, however, hospitalized for 45
days, Marco was prosecuted for Murder for the death of Raul and for frustrated murder in the
case of A. The informations in both cases allege the qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime.
You are Marco's lawyer. What would be your defense(s)? Answer:
The defense with respect to the death of Raul is death under exceptional circumstances [Art.
247, People vs. Aborca 153 SCRA 735). Although the killing happened one hour after having
surprised the spouse, that would still be within the contest of "immediately thereafter".
With respect to the wounding of the stranger, the defense of lawful exercise of a right is a
justifying circumstance. Under Article 11, par. 5 could be invoked. At the time accused shot
Raul, he was not committing a felonious act and therefore could not have been criminally liable
under Art. 4, RPC.
Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 2001 No
XIII
A and B are husband and wife. A is employed as a security guard at Landmark, his shift
being from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. One night, he felt sick and cold, hence, he decided to go
home around midnight after getting permission from his duty officer. Upon reaching the front
yard of his home, he noticed that the light in the master bedroom was on and that the bedroom
window was open. Approaching the front door, he was surprised to hear sighs and giggles
inside the bedroom. He opened the door very carefully and peeped inside where he saw his
wife B having sexual intercourse with their neighbor C. A rushed inside and grabbed C but the
latter managed to wrest himself free and jumped out of the window, A followed suit and
managed to catch C again and after a furious struggle, managed also to strangle him to death. A
then rushed back to his bedroom where his wife B was cowering under the bed covers. Still
enraged, A hit B with fist blows and rendered her unconscious. The police arrived after being
summoned by their neighbors and arrested A who was detained, inquested and charged for the
death of C and serious physical Injuries of B.
a) Is A liable for C's death? Why? (5%)
b) Is A liable for B's injuries? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, A is liable for C's death but under the exceptional circumstances in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code, where only destierro is prescribed. Article 247 governs since A surprised
his wife B in the act of having sexual intercourse with C, and the killing of C was
"Immediately thereafter" as the discovery, escape, pursuit and killing of C form one
continuous act. (U.S. vs. Vargas, 2 Phil. 194)
b) Likewise, A la liable for the serious physical injuries he inflicted on his wife B but under the
same exceptional circumstances in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same
reasons.
Art 247; death under exceptional circumstances 1978 No.
IX-a
Juan came upon his wife and Isabelo in a secluded place covered with underbush. His wife was
getting up while Isabelo was standing and zipping up his pants. Isabelo took to his heels when
he saw Juan, who chased him with a balisong knife. Unable to catch up with Isabelo, Juan
returned to his wife and, completely obfuscated by what he had seen, stabbed her repeatedly
with the knife, killing her immediately.
Juan's defense at the trial was his having surprised his wife under circumstances
indicative of carnal intercourse with Isabelo, and claimed that he should be acquitted.
Decide with reasons.
Answer
Parricide is committed. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable as the wife was
not surprised committing sexual intercourse with Isabelo. When Juan came upon his wife and
Isabelo, his wife was getting up and Isabelo was standing zipping up his pants, (People vs.
Gonzalez, 39 Phil 66).
Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances; destierro 1983 No,
10
Having caught A in flagrante delicto doing the sex act with his [B's] wife, B shot and killed A
while the latter was still in the compromising act. B was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for
murder after a protracted trial. It was only on appeal that he was given the proper penalty of
destierro under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
During the pendency of the case, the accused was under preventive detention which lasted for
about eight years.
(a) In serving his sentence, is B entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment? Explain.
(b) What is the philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro for the above
crime?
Answer
b) The philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro is that it is
intended more for the protection of the offender rather than as a penalty (People vs. Coricor 79
Phil. 672) which is to remove the offender from the vicinity and to protect him from acts of
retaliative or reprisal principally from the relatives of the deceased spouse (People vs. Lauron
CA 67 O.G. 7369)
Art 248; Murder
1987 No I:
Juan had a land dispute with Pedro for a number of years. As Juan was coming down his house,
he saw his brother, Rodolfo attack Pedro with a bolo from behind. Rodolfo was about to hit
Pedro a second time while the latter was
prostrate on the ground, when Carling, Pedro's son, shouted, "I'll kill you." This distracted
Rodolfo who then turned to Carling. Rodolfo and Carling fought with their bolos. While the
two were fighting, Juan shouted to his brother Rodolfo: "Kill them both, they are our
enemies," Carling suffered a number of wounds and died on the spot. Pedro who was in
serious condition was rushed to the hospital. He died five days later for loss of blood because
the blood purchased from Manila which could have saved him, according to the doctor, did
not arrive on timer Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, told his sons to hide in Manila and he
gave them money for the purpose. When the police investigators saw Jose, he told the police
investigators that Juan and Rodolfo went to Mindanao.
What crimes, if any, did (a) Rodolfo, (b) Juan and (c) Jose commit? Explain your answer and
state whether the acts committed are accompanied by circumstances affecting criminal liability.
Answer:
a) Rodolfo committed murder regarding the killing of Pedro since Pedro was attacked from
behind. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The mode of
attack deprived Pedro of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. Rodolfo is also liable for
homicide regarding the killing of Carling, Pedro's son. as that is the result of a fight, both of
them being armed with bolos.
Although Pedro died five days later, since the blood purchased which would have saved him
did not arrive on time, Rodolfo is still liable for the death of Pedro as that is the direct, natural
and logical result of the wound inflicted by him.
b)Juan, the brother of Rodolfo, has no criminal liability. What he shouted to Rodolfo "Kill them
both, they are our enemies," when Rodolfo and Carling were fighting, was not the only reason
why Carling was killed; and hence, he cannot be a principal by inducement. The doctrine is to
be a principal by inducement, the inducement must be the only reason why the crime is
committed. (People vs. Kiichi et. al. 61 Phil. 609).
c) Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, is an accessory to the crime of murder committed by Rodolfo
because he assisted him to escape to Manila. But he is not criminally liable because of his
relationship to Rodolfo (Article 20). He is not an accessory to the crime of homicide, because
this crime is not included in treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief
Executive or the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime if the
accessory is a private person. However, this is moot and academic because of the relationship
of Jose to Rodolfo.
Art 248; Murder
1993 No. 6:
As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden
and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied
Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists;
and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury
Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe,
Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal
blow.
1) Would you sustain his claim? Why?
2) What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with reasons.
Answer;
1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and
hence, liable collectively....
2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery because the offenders, taking advantage
of their superiority in number, rendered the victim defenseless and without any chance to
retaliate, by tying his hands at his back before attacking him. Treachery exists at least in the
second and final stage of the attack, after the offenders caught up with the victim.
Art 248; Murder
1999 No V
Define murder. What are the elements of the crime? [3%]
The accused, not Intending to kill the victim, treacherously shot the victim while the victim
was turning his back to him. He aimed at and hit the victim only on the leg. The victim,
however, died because of loss of blood. Can the accused be liable for homicide or murder,
considering that treachery was clearly involved but there was no attempt to kill? Explain your
answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which otherwise would constitute only homicide,
had it not been attended by any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery or taking advantage of superior strength, or with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise;
3. By means or on the occasion of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles,
or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
(b) The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was unlawfully killed; (2) that such a killing was
attended by any of the above-mentioned circumstances;
(3)that the killing is not parricide nor infanticide; and (4) that the accused killed the victim.
The accused is liable for the death of the victim even though he merely aimed and
fired at the latter's leg, "not intending to kill the victim", considering that the gunshot was
felonious and was the proximate cause of death. An offender is liable for all the direct, natural,
and logical consequences of his felonious act although different from what he intended.

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However, since specific intent to kill is absent, the crime for said death is only homicide and
not murder (People vs. Pugay and Samson, 167 SCRA 439)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The accused is liable for the death of the victim in as much as his act of shooting the victim at
the leg is felonious and is the proximate cause of death. A person performing a felonious act is
criminally liable for all the direct, natural, and logical consequences of such act although
different from what he intended. And since such death was attended by treachery, the same
will constitute murder but the accused should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that which was committed
(Art. 13(3), RPC)
Art 248; Murder
2001 No VI
Mang Jose, a septuagenarian, was walking with his ten-year old grandson along Paseo
de Roxas and decided to cross at the intersection of Makati Avenue but both were hit by a
speeding CRV Honda van and were sent sprawling on the pavement a meter apart. The driver,
a Chinese mestizo, stopped his car after hitting the two victims but then reversed his gears and
ran over Mang Jose's prostrate body anew and third time by advancing his car forward. The
grandson suffered broken legs only and survived but Mang Jose suffered multiple fractures
and broken ribs, causing his instant death. The driver was arrested and charged with Murder
for the death of Mang Jose and Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence with
respect to the grandson.
Are the charges correct? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the charges are correct.
For deliberately running over Mang Jose's prostrate body after having bumped him and
his grandson, the driver indeed committed Murder, qualified by treachery. Said driver's
deliberate intent to kill Mang Jose was demonstrated by his running over the latter's body
twice, by backing up the van and driving it forward, whereas the victim was helpless and not in
a position to defend himself or to retaliate.
As to the serious physical injuries sustained by Mang Jose's 10-year old grandson, as a
result of having been hit by the speeding vehicle of said driver, the same were the result of
reckless imprudence which is punishable as a quasi- offense in Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries is
correct. The penalty next higher in degree to what ordinarily should be imposed is called for,
since the driver did not lend help on the spot, which help he could have given to the victims.
Art 248; Murder &
Arson 1985 No, 17
B set the house of A on fire by way of revenge against the latter. B did not know that A was
inside. A died because of the fire,
(A) What crime or crimes did B commit?

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(B) Suppose B knew that A was inside, what crime or crimes did B commit?
(C) Suppose before setting it on fire, B entered the house and killed A. Then B set the house on fire
to hide the body of A. What crime or crimes did B commit?
Explain your answers.
Answer:
(A) B will be liable for the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided in
Presidential Decree No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. The case of People v.
Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1960)that the arson absorbed the death, is no longer controlling.
(B) If B knew that A was in the house when it was set on fire, the crime will be murder. The fire is
the qualifying circumstance.
(C) If B killed A before the house was set on fire, two crimes are committed, murder and arson.
The arson was committed to conceal the crime of murder.
Art 248; Murder & Theft 1984
No. 19
Melencio gave Janet, a call girl, P5,000 as blood money with the understanding that
she would poison a business executive in the course of a tryst. She did so. But before she left
the scene of the crime, she got the victim's expensive watch, gold ring and wallet containing
about P5,000.
What crime or crimes were committed and by whom? Reasons. Answer
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma, Janet
committed two crimes:
1. murder: as qualified by circumstance of consideration of a price or reward, or by means of
poison, or with evident premeditation, and
2. theft: If the motive is to kill and the taking of the valuables is committed thereafter, the crimes
committed are homicide and theft (People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 2487, as cited in Gregorio,
Fundamentals).
B. Comments and Suggested Answer
1. Melencio and Janet are liable for murder. Melencio is a principal by inducement and Janet
is a principal by direct participation. Murder is the crime committed because the killing was in
consideration of & price and by means of poison. Either will be sufficient to qualify the crime
of murder.
2. Janet will also be liable for theft. As an afterthought she got the victim's expensive watch, gold
ring and wallet containing about P5,000. Melencio will not be liable because the theft was not
included in the inducement nor is it a necessary consequence thereof.
Art 248; Murder (through use of fire) & Arson & Homicide 1989 No.
14:
Diego and Pablo were both farmers residing in Barangay Damayan. On one occasion, Diego
called Pablo to come down from his house in order to ask
him why he got his (Diego's) plow without permission. One word led to another. Diego, in a fit
of anger, unsheathed his bolo and hacked Pablo to death. Pablo's 9-year old son, Mario, who
was inside the house, saw the killing of his father. Afraid that he might also be killed by Diego,
Mario covered himself with a blanket and hid in a corner of the house. To conceal the killing of
Pablo, Diego brought Pablo's body inside the house and burned it, Mario was also burned to
death. What crime or crimes did Diego commit?
Answer:
Diego committed two crimes (1) homicide for the death of Pablo and (2) the special complex
crime of arson with homicide as provided in PD 1613 for the burning of the house and the
death of Mario.
The hacking of Pablo to death is homicide, the killing not being attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder. It was killing in the course of a quarrel.
The burning of the house to conceal the killing of Pablo is a separate crime.
Were it not for the death of Mario, this separate offense would have been arson. But inside the
house was unknown to Diego, the resulting crime is under PD No. 1613, because the death
resulted from the arson. If by reason or on the occasion of the arson, death results, the offense
is the special complex or arson with homicide (Sec. 5, PD 1613, which expressly repealed Art.
320 and consequently the ruling case therein, People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1950).
If Diego knew that Mario was inside the house when he set it on fire, the crime committed,
instead of arson, would be MURDER, with fire as the qualifying circumstance.
Art 248; Murder vs homicide 1982
No. 14
"A" and "B" were both astride the same carabao, the latter being behind the former. "X",
intending to kill "A", aimed his gun at "A" and fired, inflicting a fatal wound on the chest
which produced "A'"s death. "X" shot "A" again, but this time the bullet hit and passed through
"A'"s left arm, causing less serious physical injuries, then lodged itself in "B'"s heart, causing
his death. What crime or crimes is "X" guilty of?
Answer
X committed murder regarding the killing of A because he was shot deliberately while
astride with B on a carabao without giving him any chance to defend himself. Treachery is
therefore present. X committed homicide regarding the lulling of B as the second shot hit A
who was already dead and the bullet lodged in B's heart. The intention of X was to kill A and
not B.
Art 248; Murder vs illegal detention 1978
No. V-b
Juan and Pedro harbored a long-standing grudge/ resentment against Jose who eloped
with their sister, Maria, and later abandoned her. They laid meticulous plans to kill him. After
weeks of waiting, their chance came when late one night, they cornered Jose as he was
coming out of a disco-beer house in Makati, Metro Manila. The two forcibly shoved him into
a waiting car and droved to Tagaytay City, where they kept Jose hog-tied in a 2 x 3 meter
room. Two (2) days later, they killed Jose and dumped his body into ravine.
What was the crime/crimes committed by Juan and Pedro? Discuss
briefly.
Answer:
Murder, since the purpose of Juan and Pedro was to kill the victim. The
detention of the victim for two days before he was killed was merely incidental. (People vs.
Camo, 91 Phil. 240; People vs. Ong, 69 SCRA 174).
Art 248; Murder vs illegal detention 1996
No. 4:
2) Fidel and Fred harbored a long standing grudge against Jorge who refused to marry their
sister Lorna, after the latter got pregnant by Jorge. After weeks of surveillance, they finally
cornered Jorge in Ermita, Manila, when the latter was walking home late at might. Fidel and
Fred forcibly brought Jorge to Zambales where they kept him hog-tied in a small nipa house
located in the middle of a rice field. Two days later, they killed Jorge and dumped his body into
the river.
What crime or crimes did Fidel and Fred commit? Explain. Answer:
2) Fidel and Fred committed the crime of Murder under Art 248, RPC . the killing being
qualified by evident premeditation. This is due to the long standing grudge entertained by the
two accused occasioned by the victim's refusal to marry their sister after Impregnating her.
In People vs. Alfeche. 219 SCRA 85, the intention of the accused is determinative of the crime
committed. Where the intention is to kill the victim and the latter is forcibly taken to another
place and later killed, it is murder. There is no indication that the offenders intended to deprive
the victim of his liberty. Whereas, if the victim is kidnapped, and taken to another situs and
killed as an afterthought, it is kidnapping with homicide under Art. 267, RPC.
Art 248; Murder with direct assault 1995
No. 6:
2. Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud where he resided. Renato, a resident
of the neighboring Barangay Guihaman, also operated a mobile rice thresher which he often
brought to Barangay Napnud to thresh the palay of the farmers there. This was bitterly
resented by Pascual, One afternoon Pascual, and his two sons confronted Renato and his men
who were operating their mobile rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A heated
argument ensued. A barangay captain who was fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to
appease Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent confrontation. However, Pascual resented the
intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him to death.
What crime was committed by Pascual? Discuss fully. Answer:
2. Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority
(Arts. 148 and 249 in relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a
person in authority and if he is attacked while in the performance of his official duties or on the
occasion thereof the felony of direct assault is committed.
Art. 48, RPC, on the other hand, provides that if a single act produces two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Here, the single act of the offender in hacking
the victim to death resulted in two felonies, homicide which is grave and direct assault which is
less grave.
Art 248; Murder with direct assault; explosion 1991 No
4:
Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNPJ officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a
civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's
banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by
a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and
their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that they are all under
arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats.
The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat:
its explosion killed Y and Z.
What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit?
Suggested Answer:
C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with
direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified
by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z.
No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a
civilian.
This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E,
otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all.
Additional Answer:
Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as amended
by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable under said
Decree.
Art 248; Murder, by
treachery 1995 No. 6:
1. On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman suddenly found himself surrounded by four
men. One of them wrestled the police officer to the ground and disarmed him while the other
three companions who were armed with a hunting knife, an ice pick, and a balisong,
repeatedly stabbed him. The policeman died as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted
by his assailants.
What crime or crimes were committed? Discuss fully. Answer:
1. All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, (which absorbed
abuse of superior strength) as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was totally
defenseless. Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the assailants. Direct assault
would not complex the crime, as there is no showing that the assailants knew that the victim
was a policeman; even if there was knowledge, the fact is that he was not in the performance
of his official duties, and therefore there is no direct assault.
Art 248; Murder/ hijacking/ frustrated coercion
1978 No. VII-a
A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was
still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered
the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death.
What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer
Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in
flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep.
Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang
Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the
refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China
instead of to Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death.
Alternative Answer
Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had
not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing.
Art 248; Murder;
explosion 1991 No 4:
Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNP) officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a
civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The
latter's banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was
intercepted by a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of
A and B and their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that
they are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the
PNP motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the
PNP motorboat: its explosion killed Y and Z.
What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit?
Suggested Answer:
C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with
direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified
by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z.
No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a
civilian.
This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E,
otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all.
Additional Answer:
Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as
amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable
under said Decree.
Art 248; Murder; treachery 1991
No. 5:
A, a 76-year old woman, was brought to the hospital in a coma with slight cerebral
hemorrhage. An endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to facilitate her breathing. B, a
hospital janitor, who had no business in the emergency room, for reasons known only to
himself, removed the plaster holding the tube in place. A doctor saw him and told him to get
out of the room. The plaster was replaced. But when the doctor was gone, B came back and
removed the tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed in the mouth. Only the timely
arrival of the nurse prevented the patient's death. The patient was then transferred to another
hospital where she died the next day of cardio-respiratory arrest. Is B criminally liable? If you
believe so, what crime was committed by B, if any?
Answer:
Yes, B is criminally liable for Murder (qualified by treachery) because the death of A
appears to be the proximate cause of the overt acts of B.
A died of cardio respiratory arrest which evidently was brought about by the convulsion and
bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal by B of the endoctracheal tube twice.
The two acts of B can be considered as the result of one criminal design.
In People vs. Umaging, 107 SCRA 166, the Supreme Court ruled that removal of the
endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because the patient did not die.
Art 248; Murder; treachery/ error in personae 1986
No. 7:
Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence,
inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided
to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to
leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father went to his room, lambasted and fired
him in the presence of several members of the office staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran
out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at the exit of the parking lot where his father
always passes at the close of each working day.
A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction
of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to
Roberto, the victim of his fire was Tagahatid, a company messenger whom the father had
instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities.
(a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that
the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel
insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating
circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain.
(b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense
committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain
why you have decided to impose this penalty.
Answer:
a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was
ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure
specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the
person attacked might make.
b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be
imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is
different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is
parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended
is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime
committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2,
Revised Penal Code).
Art 249; Homicide through negligence 1988 No.
11:
a) In the course of funeral procession, a young mourner who was marching in front of the
funeral hearse, momentarily stooped down to tie her shoelaces which had become untied. The
driver of the hearse, who was driving at 5 miles an hour, was then looking at the stores by the
roadside and did not see her. He continued to drive on and ran over the girl. When the people
around shouted and gestured, he backed up and ran over the girl a second time, killing her.
If you were the parent of the girl-victim, what crime would you charge, if you think a crime
had been committed, and against whom? Explain your answer briefly.
Answer;
(a) Only the driver could be charged of homicide thru reckless imprudence or homicide thru
simple negligence which preclude conspiracy against those who shouted and gestured.
Art 249; Homicide vs murder 1982
No. 14
"A" and "B" were both astride the same carabao, the latter being behind the former.
"X", intending to kill "A", aimed his gun at "A" and fired, inflicting a fatal wound on the chest
which produced "A'"s death. "X" shot "A" again, but this time the bullet hit and passed
through "A'"s left arm, causing less serious physical injuries, then lodged itself in "B'"s heart,
causing his death. What crime or crimes is "X" guilty of?
Answer
X committed murder regarding the killing of A because he was shot deliberately while
astride with B on a carabao without giving him any chance to defend himself. Treachery is
therefore present. X committed homicide regarding the killing of B as the second shot hit A
who was already dead and the bullet lodged in B's heart. The intention of X was to kill A and
not B.
Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries 1990 No.
1:
Aki and Ben, while walking together, met Caloy. There was an altercation between
Ben and Caloy so that Ben chased and stabbed Caloy with a knife hitting his right arm thereby
causing slight physical injury. Ben desisted from further assaulting Caloy, but Aki lunged at
Caloy and felled him this time with a bolo which mortally wounded Caloy. Thus, he died.
a) What is the criminal liability of Aki? How about that of Ben? Explain your answers.
b) Assuming conspiracy is established, will your answer in problem (a) be the same? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
a) Aki is liable for homicide because, while it is clear that he intentionally caused the death of
Caloy, none of the circumstances attendant to murder are present. Intent to kill is clear as Aki
lunged at Caloy, after the latter was inflicted a wound at the right arm, and gave him a mortal
wound.
Ben is guilty only of slight physical injuries as it is evident from the wound he inflicted upon
Caloy that he did not Intend to kill the latter. Also, there was no other act on the part of Ben to
show such intent.
b) No, there being no conspiracy each will be liable for their own individual act. This time both
will be liable for homicide because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all (People v.
Damaso, G.R Nos. L-30116-7, 20 November 1978).
Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries 1992
No. 2:
Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a street fight. Lino then suddenly drew his balisong
and lunged at Okito. In an effort to break up the fight, Tommy tried to snatch the balisong from
Lino but not before the latter had inflicted a wound on Okito. As Lino withdrew the weapon
and attempted to stab Okito a
second time, Tommy tried to grab the weapon again. In so doing, his left forearm was slashed.
As he succeeded in snatching away the balisong with his right arm, it flew with such force,
that it hit Nereo, a passerby who was seriously injured.
Explain your answers fully.
a) What is the criminal liability of Lino with respect to Okito, Tommy and Nereo?
Suggested Answer:
a) As far as Okito is concerned. Lino is liable for frustrated homicide, assuming that the wound
suffered by Okito is such that for reasons or causes independent of the will of Lino [such as
timely medical attention) Okito would have died. If the injury is not serious enough, the
liability is only attempted homicide. Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of a deadly
weapon. For the injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable only for physical injuries
(serious, less serious or slight, depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently there is no
intent to kill.
For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious physical injuries as the wounding of Nereo was
the natural and logical consequence of Lino's felonious act.
b) In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to Nereo? Suggested
Answer:
b) Tommy is exempted from criminal liability for the injury to Nereo as he was performing a
lawful act with due care and the Injury was caused by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4), or that he
was in lawful exercise of a right, [Art. 11, par. 6), that is, defense of a stranger.
Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries
1994 No. 20:
At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay.
Mamerto's son, saw Dante and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his
abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was about to
escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were it not for the timely medical
attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him
for 25 days.
What crime or crimes did Dante commit?
Answer:
Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay,
and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated
homicide ...
Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay because he had already
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the intended felony of
homicide were it not for causes independent of the act of Dante. Dante had the intent to kill
judging from the weapon used, the manner of committing the crime and the part of the body
stabbed. Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto.
There appears to be no intent to kill because Dante merely assaulted Mamerto without using
the knife.

Page 240 of 374


Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries; intent to kill inherent in use of firearm
2003 No VI.
In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some customers inside a night club became
unruly, guns were fired by a group, among them A and B, that finally put the customers back to
their senses. Unfortunately, one customer died. Subsequent investigation revealed that A's
gunshot had inflicted on the victim a slight wound that did not cause the deceased's death nor
materially contribute to it. It was B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A
contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to slight physical injury. Would you
agree? Why? 6%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. I beg to disagree with A's contention that his liability should be limited to slight
physical injury only. He should be held liable for attempted homicide because he inflicted said
injury with the use of a firearm which is a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a
firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 123 [1990])
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, I would agree to A's contention that his criminal liability should be for slight
physical injury only, because he fired his gun only to pacify the unruly customers of the night
club and therefore, without intent to kill. B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased
may not be imputed to A because conspiracy cannot exist when there is a free-for-all brawl or
tumultuous affray. A and B are liable only for their respective act
Art 249; Homicide vs robbery with homicide 1983 No.
6
Insulted by the manager of the bank where he was employed as security guard, A, enraged,
shot the former, who died on the spot. As A was about to leave the bank premises, he noticed
the vault open. He entered it, forced open a locked container and got the jewelry therein.
If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute A?
Explain.
Answer
Homicide and Robbery. It is not robbery with homicide because the purpose of A, the security
guard, was not to commit robbery. It is not murder because the aggression was preceded by
the insult of the manager which enraged the offender. So the killing was attended by passion
which negates the presence of treachery. The taking of the jewelries was an afterthought as the
offender entered the vault only when he noticed it was open when he was about to leave the
bank premises. The jewelries were in a locked receptacle which he forced open while inside
the bank premises. This is robbery with force upon things under Article 299, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Art 249; Homicide/theft
1976 No. VIII-b

Page 241 of 374


X killed Y in a fit of anger. While in the act of disposing of, or concealing the body, he found
some money in one of the victim's pockets and took it. What crime has X committed? Reasons.
Answer
Two crimes are committed by X namely, homicide and theft. Since the purpose of X was not
to commit robbery, the crime cannot to robbery with homicide, (US. vs. Villorente, et at., 30
Phil 59). Since X killed Y in a fit of anger, the motive for the crime is clear. The taking of the
money in the pockets of the victim occurred after the killing, and as a matter of fact, while in
the act of disposing of or concealing the body. The taking was conceived only after the victim
was killed. Two separate crimes of homicide and theft are therefore committed. (People vs.
Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364; People vs. Glore, 87 Phil. 789).
Art 249; Homicide/theft
1989 No. 15:
Emilio and Andres were walking home from the farm at 8:00 o'clock in the evening
when they met Asiong whom Emilio suspected as the one who stole his fighting cock two (2)
days before; Emilio confronted Asiong and after a heated discussion, a bolo fight between the
two (2} ensued. Asiong sustained fatal wounds and died. Emilio asked Andres to help him
carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes. After burying Asiong, Emilio picked
up the jute bag Asiong was then holding and found inside P600 which Emilio and Andres
divided each getting P300. A week after the investigation by the police, a complaint was filed
in the Office of Provincial Fiscal against Emilio and Andres for robbery with homicide with
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place. If you were the fiscal, what
information or informations will you file against Emilio and Andres? What are their respective
criminal liabilities?
Answer:
If I were the fiscal, I would file two separate informations against Emilio and Andres, one for
homicide with Emilio as principal and Andres as accessory, and another for theft against both
Emilio and Andres as principals. This is so because of the following reasons:
1. The killing of Asiong by Emilio is homicide. It is not attended by any qualifying circumstance
of murder. It was a killing at the spur of the moment, in the course of a bolo fight, as an
aftermath of a heated discussion.
2. Neither was the killing by reason of or on the occasion of a robbery. There was no intention of
either Emilio or Andres to rob Asiong either prior to or in the course of the killing. The taking
of Asiong's P600 was only an AFTERTHOUGHT, after the killing was already perpetrated.
There is no causal or other connection between the act of killing and the act of taking the
money-
3. Andres is liable as an accessory in the homicide case because he had no participation either as
co-principal or accomplice in the killing of Asiong who died solely because of the wounds
inflicted on him in his bolo-fight with Emilio, the principal. However, when Andres agreed to
help Emilio carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes, thus concealing or
destroying the body of the crime (corpus delicti) to prevent its discovery, he became an
accessory to the crime of homicide (Art. 19, RPC),
4. With respect to the taking of the P600.00 which Emilio and Andres divided between
themselves, they committed the crime of theft as co-principals.
Theft because with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons no
force upon things, they took personal property of another without the latter's consent. They acted
with unity of purposes and intention, thus making them co-principals by direct participation..
Art 249; Homicide; execution by firing squad 1979 No.
XIV
X, is a death convict. On the day set for his electrocution, a power failure occurred. The
Director of Prisons then ordered that X be executed by firing squad. A, B and C were chosen
by him to constitute the firing squad. A, B, and C shot to death X as per order of their
Director. What crime, if any, was committed by the Director and A, B and C?
Answer
Homicide is committed. Since the victim was a death convict, he therefore expected
his death. However, the order of the Director of Prisons that X be executed by a firing squad
was unlawful. Altho there was no criminal intent to kill the convict M the Director of Prisons
was performing a duty for the execution of the convict, the means employed was not as
provided by law. Presumably, the order that the convict be executed by a firing squad was
made at the spur of the moment because of the power failure. It was spontaneous and not
deliberate. A, B, C chosen to constitute the firing squad are liable as principals by direct
participation since the order being clearly unlawful, they were not bound to obey it. The
Director of Prisons is liable as principal by inducement.
Art 249; Homicide; information for homicide but murder is proven 1982 No.
18
"A" is prosecuted for homicide under proper information. At the time of the trial, it was
established that the crime was committed with treachery, premeditation, at nighttime and with
abuse of superior strength.
(a) If you were the judge, what crime should you convict "A" of? Why?
Answer
(a) If I were the judge, I would convict A of homicide as that is the crime charged in the
information.
Art 251; Death in tumultuous affray 1985
No. 10
After engaging in a drinking spree at Celia's birthday party, a turbulent commotion took place
in Celia's premises involving no less than forty (40) guests during which occasion Tito was
killed by shots fired from a .45 cal. pistol. The fiscal filed a case of "Death in
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY" against all the participants in the melee.
Do you agree? Reasons.
Answer:
The charge of "Death in Tumultuous Affray" against all the participants in the melee is not
proper. In a tumultuous affray the actual killer of the person killed is not known. Then the one
liable will be the person known to have inflicted serious physical injuries upon the victim. If
he is also not known, the one liable will be the person known to have employed violence
upon the victim. Death in a tumultuous affray under Article 261 of the Revised Penal Code
applies if the killer
of the person killed in the course of the affray cannot be ascertained. (U.S. v. Tan-doc 40 Phil.
954).
Art 251; Tumultous affray 1997
No. 18:
During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in the public plaza. As a result of the
tumultuous affray, A sustained one fatal and three superficial stab wounds. He died a day after.
B, C, D and E were proven to be participants in the "rumble", each using a knife against A, but
it could not be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal Injury.
Who shall be held criminally liable for the death of A and for what? Answer:
B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having been proven to have
inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A, are criminally liable
for the latter's death. And because it cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the
mortal injury on A, there being a free- for-all fight or tumultuous affray. B, C, D, and E are all
liable for the crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Art 255; Infanticide
1982 No. 16
"A", a prominent and high official, had illicit relationship with "B", a girl very much below his
social standing. A child was born to them as a result thereof. "A" killed the child, over three
days old, so as to conceal his dishonor.
(a) What crime did'"A" commit?
(b) Does relationship in this case constitute a privileged mitigating circumstance?
(c) How would you answer the questions (a) and (b) if the child were less than three days old?
Answer
(a) "A" committed parricide as this crime is committed even though the relationship of the father
"A" with the child, over three days old, is illegitimate.
(b) The answer is no because relationship in parricide is inherent, aside from the fact that it is not
provided in the Code as a privileged mitigating circumstance?
(c) If the child were less than three days old, the crime would be infanticide. Relationship of "A"
the illegitimate father, is not privileged mitigating. Art, 255, provides for such privileged
mitigating circumstance if the offender is the mother and the child was killed to conceal her
dishonor.
Art 256; Abortion
1979 No. I
X and Y had been married for 5 years. They had no child due to X's impotence. X
learned that Y was having an affair with Z. In a confrontation, X came to know that Y was
pregnant. In a fit of rage, X pushed down Y, shoved his knee to her abdomen, and slapped her
several times until she lost consciousness. Y was rushed to a hospital where she had a
caesarian operation. The fetus was examined in utero, its head was fractured and it was
delivered stillborn. The evidence was in conflict as to the age of the fetus; the expert
testimony, however, concluded "with reasonable medical certainty" that the fetus had
developed to the stage of viability, i.e., that in the event of premature birth on the date of X's
assault, it would have had a 75% to 96% chance of survival. Y wants to know if X can be
charged with murder. Please give your opinion.
Answer
X cannot be charged with murder. Murder is the killing of a person with the attendance of any
of the qualifying aggravating circumstances provided in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender not related to the victim as in parricide. If the
person killed is a child less than three (3) days old, the crime committed is infanticide,
whoever the offender may be. (Art. 255, Revised Penal Code). The facts of the problem refer
to a fetus which was delivered stillborn. The cause was the fracture of the head undoubtedly
due to the acts of violence of X in shoving his knee on the abdomen of his pregnant wife and
slapping her several times. Murder is not committed but abortion. The death of the fetus when
expelled violently from the mother's womb, irrespective of its age, in legal contemplation is
abortion. (Viada, V, page 13. 5th ed.)
Art 256; Abortion
1979 No. XIII
X, a beauty queen was raped by three American Blacks. Out of extreme shame and
after 3 months, X went to Dr. YES and asked for an abortion. Dr. YES steadfastly refused
until X produced a bottle of iodine and informed him that if he would not abort her baby, she
would right then and there commit suicide. With hesitation but pitying X, Dr. YES performed
an abortion on X which was successful. Dr. YES was charged with intentional abortion.
Decide.
Answer
Dr. Yes is criminally liable for abortion, X's threat that if Dr. Yes would not abort her baby, she
would commit suicide is not an uncontrollable fear from which Dr. Yes could not escape. As a
matter of fact, Dr, Yes performed the abortion not because he feared that X would commit
suicide but because of pity. Such is not exempting because what Dr. Yes performed was not
involuntary.
Art 256; Unintentional abortion 1976
No. V-a
X, single, 21 years old, had a date with Y. After several meetings Y became pregnant. To hide
her dishonor, she attempted to commit suicide by jumping from a tall building. Fortunately, she
was saved by by-standers who saw the incident. Because of the fall she incurred several
injuries and contusions and suffered an abortion. Is she liable for the abortion she caused upon
herself? Reasons.
Answer
Y is liable for unintentional abortion thru reckless negligence. Her act of attempting suicide by
jumping from a tall building is not felonious and she incurred no criminal liability although
she survived. However, the jumping from the tall building was voluntary and the violence was
incidental to the fall which resulted in injuries causing her abortion. The abortion was not
intentional, but she could have foreseen under the circumstances that by jumping from the tall
building, the fall might cause her death or result in her abortion. One is responsible for such
results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except thru
culpable abandonment. {US v. Maleza, et al. 14 Phil. 469). There is, therefore, negligence.
(People v. BAnas, Jr., (UNREP) II CA Rep. 1135).
Answer depends on reasoning of examinee as to whether committing suicide is a lawful or
unlawful act. Art 4, RPC.
Art 256; Unintentional abortion 1986
No. 12:
Kaakitakit, the beautiful wife of Nahahabag, is terminally ill and bedridden with cancer.
Kaakitakit begs her husband Nahahabag to assist her in committing suicide to end her
suffering. Nahahabag agreed and bought a bottle of sleeping pills. He brought the bottle to his
wife and gave her a glass of water to down the pills. Kaakitakit took the pills but because she
did not take sufficient quantity and due to the timely arrival of her attending physician, she
survived the suicide attempt. Moreover, because of resort to faith healing, Kaakitakit
miraculously recovered from the cancer. However, unknown to either husband or
wife,
Kaakitakit was already three months pregnant when she took the sleeping pills resulting in the
expulsion of the fetus.
The Fiscal prosecuted both Kaakitakit and Nahahabag for unintentional abortion. Is the charge
correct? Explain.
Answer:
The charge of unintentional abortion is not correct. This crime is committed by means of
violence upon a pregnant woman as a result of which she aborted. The taking of the pill is not
an act of violence. It was taken by the wife not to abort but to end her suffering from cancer, of
which she was terminally ill.
Art 266; Physical injuries; inflicted by teacher on pupils 1981 No.
16
"T" is a public school teacher. One of her pupils, "B", tripped another classmate "C", causing
"C" to fall on the floor and suffer a contusion on the forehead. So, "T", with her bamboo
pointer, whipped "B" on the thigh, which produced a linear bruise.
If you were the Judge before whom a Slight Physical Injury case was filed against "T", how
would you decide the case?
Select the correct answer from the following, and explain:
(1) I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher exercises parental
authority over her pupils.
(2) I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was farthest from
"T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually used to punish "B" was
moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or malevolent intent.
(3) I will convict "T" because the State should exercise utmost vigilance to assure that teachers
should refrain from inflicting corporal punishment.
(4) I will convict "T" because teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis cannot
inflict any corporal punishment even though moderate.
(5) I will convict "T" because if no physical injuries resulted the act is still penalized by the
Revised Penal Code as ill-treatment.
Answer
(1)I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher exercises parental
authority over her pupils.
The teacher, under the Civil Code, exercises substitute parental authority over the students. As
such, the teacher can discipline the pupil in the same manner that the parent does to the child.
(2)I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was farthest from
"T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually used to punish "B" was
moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred and malevolent intent.
The whipping of the student for the act she had done in tripping another classmate, who
suffered contusion on her forehead because she fell on the floor, was to discipline her. The
teacher did not, therefor act, with criminal intent. That nature of the injuries suffered by the
student, linear bruises on the thigh, show
that the teacher merely intended to discipline her. She was not motivated by ill- will, hatred or
malevolent intent.
Art 266-A; Rape
1979 No. XII
Adan and Eve were lovers but their relationship turned sour. Adan tried to win back Eve but to
no avail. Almost hopeless, Adan went to see two of his friends, Bruno and Cora. Adan asked
the two to accompany him to the house of Eve. He told the two: "This is my last attempt of
reconciliation. I must succeed even if I have to rape Eve." The trio proceeded to the house of
Eve using the car owned and driven by Bruno. When they reached the house, Adan went up,
Cora stayed near the gate as lookout and Bruno remained in the car, Adan failed to win back
Eve and true to his threat raped her. He went down the house, informed Bruno and Cora about
the incident and they thereafter went to a Disco Club and danced the night away. Will a charge
of rape prosper against the three?
Answer
Adan, Bruno and Cora can be charged with rape. Adan as a principal by direct participation,
Bruno and Cora as accomplices. When Bruno and Cora brought Adan to the house of Eve, they
knew of the criminal design of Adan which is to rape Eve if there would be no reconciliation.
Cora acted as a look-out and Bruno remained in the car while Adan went inside the house.
They there-lore performed acts showing their approval or concurrence to the criminal design of
Adan, which facilitated the commission of the crime. There is no conspiracy because concerted
acts have not been performed to realize the same criminal objective.
Art 266-A; Rape
1985 No. 11
Ernesto, a rejected suitor of Madonna, waited one evening for the latter to come out of
her school. Catching Madonna by surprise, Ernesto succeeded in forcing Madonna to his car
and thereafter drove off for his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He kept Madonna in his
parents' house solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. Frustrated after three (3)
days, Ernesto succeeded, after kissing her, fondling her breast and touching her private parts,
in forcibly having carnal knowledge of Madonna once everyday for the next three (3) days.
On the 7th day, Madonna was rescued by the police authorities.
What crime or crimes did Ernesto commit? State your reasons. Answer:
Ernesto committed serious illegal detention and three (3) rapes. As long as there is restraint of
liberty, Illegal Detention is committed. Since the offended party is a woman, the crime is
serious illegal detention. (Art. 267 Revised Penal Code). Madonna was deprived of her liberty
for six days although in the first three days Ernesto kept the offended party in the house of his
parents solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. (People vs. Crisostomo et. al.,
46 Phil. 775).
In the next three days, by forcing Madonna, Ernesto had sexual intercourse with her
once a day. Rape is not a continuous crime and so three rapes are committed. A complex crime
is not committed because the serious illegal detention is not a means necessary to commit
rape. Besides rape can be committed even without serious illegal detention. (People vs. Beraal
131 SCRA 1984).
Art 266-A; Rape
1987 No. II:
AJ, a medical student, was a boarder in the house of Mr. and Mrs. M who had a good-looking
25-year old retarded daughter with the mental age of an 11- year old girl. One day when the
couple were out, Perlita, the retarded daughter, entered AJ's room, came near him and started
kissing him. He tried to avoid her. "But she persisted. They had sexual intercourse. This was
repeated every time Perlita's parents were out until Perlita got pregnant. Mr and Mrs. M filed a
complaint of rape against AJ who claimed that it was Perlita who seduced him; that Perlita was
intelligent, clearly understood what she was doing; and that since Perlita was already 25 years
old did not herself file the complaint, her parents had no personality to file the complaint for
rape.
How would you resolve the case? Answer:
The contention of AJ cannot be sustained. Sexual intercourse with Perlita, who is a mental
retardate, although 25 years old but with a mental age of 11-year old girl is rape. She is the
same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. (People vs. Sunga L-
456S3 June 24, 1985). Since she is suffering from an incapacity, being incompetent on account
of her mental age, the parents have the right to file the complaint for rape.
Art 266-A; Rape
1995 No. 11:
1. Gavino boxed his wife Alma for refusing to sleep with him. He then violently threw her on the
floor and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. As a result Alma suffered serious
physical injuries.
(a) Can Gavino be charged with rape? Explain.
(b) Can Gavino be charged with serious physical injuries? Explain
(c) Will your answers to (a) and (b) be the same if before the incident Gavino and Alma were
legally separated? Explain.
2. Three policemen conducting routine surveillance of a cogonal area in Antipole chanced upon
Ruben, a 15-year old tricycle driver, on top of Rowena who was known to be a child
prostitute. Both were naked from the waist down and appeared to be enjoying the sexual
activity. Ruben was arrested by the policemen despite his protestations that Rowena enticed
him to have sex with her in advance celebration of her twelfth birthday. The town physician
found no semen nor any bleeding on Rowena's hymen but for a healed scar. Her hymenal
opening easily admitted two fingers showing that no external force had been employed on her.
Is Ruben liable for any offense? Discuss fully. Answer;
1. (a) No. A husband cannot be charged with the rape of his wife because of the matrimonial
consent which she gave when she assumed the marriage relation, and the law will not permit
her to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense (Sate us. Haines, 11 La. Ann. 731
So. 372; 441 RA 837).
[b) Yes, he may be guilty of serious physical injuries. This offense is specially
mentioned in Art. 263 [4], paragraph 2 which imposes a higher penalty for the crime of
physical injuries in cases where the offense shall have been committed against any of the
persons enumerated in Art 246 (the crime of parricide).

Page 250 of 374


(c) No, my answer will not be the same.
If Gavino, and Alma were legally separated at the time of the incident, then Gavino could be
held liable for rape.
A legal separation is a separation of the spouses from bed and board (U.S. vs. Johnson, 27
Phil. 477, cited in II Reyes, RFC, p. 853. 1981 edition),
In the crime of rape, any crime resulting from the infliction of physical injuries suffered by the
victim on the occasion of the rape, is absorbed by the crime of rape. The Injuries suffered by
the victim may, however, be considered in determining the proper penalty which shall be
imposed on the offender. Serious physical injuries cannot be absorbed in rape; it can be so if
the injury is slight.
2. Ruben is liable for rape, even if force or intimidation is not present. The gravamen of the
offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age (People vs. Dela Cruz,
56 SCRA 84) since the law doesn't consider the consent voluntary and presumes that a girl
below twelve years old does not and cannot have a will of her own. In People us. Perez, CA
37 OG 1762, it was held that sexual intercourse with a prostitute below twelve years old is
rape.
Similarly, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation as the important
consideration is not the emission but the penetration of the female body by the male organ
(People vs. Jose 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Carandang. 52 SCRA 259).
Art 266-A; Rape
1996 No. 12:
The complainant, an eighteen-year old mental retardate with an intellectual capacity between
the ages of nine and twelve years, when asked during the trial how she felt when she was
raped by the accused, replied "Masarap, it gave me much pleasure."
With the claim of the accused that the complainant consented for a fee to the sexual
intercourse, and with the foregoing answer of the complainant, would you convict the accused
of rape if you were the judge trying the case? Explain.
Answer;
Yes, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the victim is a mental retardate with an
intellectual capacity of a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid
consent to the sexual Intercourse. The sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape
because the level of intelligence is that of a child less than twelve years of age. Where the
victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or Intimidation is not essential to constitute rape.
(People us. Trimor, G,R. 106541-42, 31 Mar 95) As a matter of fact, RA No. 7659, the Heinous
Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by adding the phrase "or is demented."
Art 266-A; Rape
2000 No X
Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way home to Quezon City which was driven by Roger,
Flordeluna noticed that Roger was always placing his car freshener in front of the car aircon
ventilation but did not bother asking Roger why. Suddenly, Flordeluna felt dizzy and became
unconscious. Instead of bringing her to Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to his house in
Cavite where she was detained for two (2) weeks. She was raped for the entire duration
Page 251 of 374
of her detention. May Roger be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal
detention? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal
detention. Roger may be charged and convicted of multiple rapes. Each rape is a distinct
offense and should be punished separately. Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse
Flordeluna; the detention was only incidental to the rape.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal
detention, since the detention was incurred in raping the victim during the days she was held.
At most, Roger may be prosecuted for forcible abduction for taking Flordeluna to Cavite
against the latter's will and with lewd designs. The forcible abduction should be complexed
with one of the multiple rapes committed, and the other rapes should be prosecuted and
punished separately, in as many rapes were charged and proved.
Art 266-A; Rape & acts of lasciviousness
1992 No. 6:
Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the
Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng,
age 16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in
the home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them
up with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani
narrated how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he
kept on threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about
what was happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties
with her body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were
subjected to a lot of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them
ran away. Nani got married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the
humiliation of appearing in their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story
saying that no housegirl ever stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang
D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan".
a) What crime has Col. Donido committed against Nani? What crime has he committed against
Chabeng? Explain fully.
Suggested Answer:
a) Against Nani, the crime committed by Col. Donido is rape, because he had sexual
intercourse with her with the attendant circumstance of force and intimidation, (Art, 335, par.
1). As far as Chabeng is concerned, since Col. Donido only took liberties on her body, short
of sexual intercourse, he is liable of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336, RPC which is
committed by any person who commit acts of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex,
under any of the circumstances in Rape.
Art 266-A; Rape with homicide & theft
1998 No VII.
King went to the house of Laura who was alone. Laura offered him a drink and after
consuming three bottles of beer. King made advances to her and with force and violence,
ravished her. Then King killed Laura and took her jewelry.
Doming, King's adopted brother, learned about the incident. He went to Laura's house,
hid her body, cleaned everything and washed the bloodstains inside the room.
Later, King gave Jose, his legitimate brother, one piece of jewelry belonging to Laura. Jose
knew that the jewelry was taken from Laura but nonetheless he sold it for P2,000.
What crime or crimes did King, Doming and Jose commit? Discuss their criminal liabilities.
[10%]
Answer:
King committed the composite crime of Rape with homicide as a single indivisible offense, not
a complex crime, and Theft. The taking of Laura's jewelry when she is already dead is only
theft.
xxx
Art 266-A; Rape; acknowledgement of offspring 1982
No. 11
"A", "B" and "C" took turns in raping a woman "X". If all of them were finally convicted,
would it be correct for the judge to order each of them to acknowledge and support the
offspring of "X"? Reason.
Answer
It would not be correct for the judge to order each of the accused to acknowledge the
offspring of X because it is impossible to determine the paternity thereof. (People vs. de Leon
et al., L-2094, April 1950), It would be correct, however, for the court to order each of them to
support the offspring as anyone of them may be the father and that each and everyone of them
is directly responsible that an unwilling mother may give birth to an undesired offspring as
each and everyone of them contributed to and cooperated in giving birth to the child. (People
vs. Velo et aL, 80 Phil 438).
Art 266-A; Rape; attempted 1983
No. 5
With lewd design, an illiterate newsboy forced a 16-year old girl to lie on the grass and
tried to make love to her, but no penetration was effected because of the valiant resistance of
the victim.
What crime was committed? What mitigating circumstance, if any, would you appreciate in
favor of the offender? Explain.
Answer
Attempted rape. When the newsboy forced the girl to lie on the grass and tried to make love to
her, his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her. But there was no penetration because
of the resistance of the girl. So all the acts of execution to produce the crime of rape were not
performed due to a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the offender.
There is no mitigating circumstance. Although the newsboy is illiterate, that in itself is not
mitigating. Lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the
full significance of all acts constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
(People vs. Geronimo (1973) 55 SCRA 246) Besides, in crimes against chastity, like rape lack
of instruction or low degree of intelligence is not mitigating (People vs. Lopez L14347, April
29, 1960)
Art 266-A; Rape; Effect of affidavit of desistance
1993 No. 14:
1) Ariel intimidated Rachel, a mental retardate, with a bolo into having sexual Intercourse with
him. Rachel's mother immediately filed a complaint, supported by her sworn statement, before
the City Prosecutor's Office. After the necessary preliminary investigation, an information was
signed by the prosecutor but did not contain the signature of Rachel nor of her mother. Citing
Art. 344 of the RPC (prosecution of the crimes of rape, etc.), Ariel moves for the dismissal of
the case. Resolve with reasons.
2) After the prosecution had rested its case, Ariel presented a sworn affidavit of desistance
executed by Rachel and her mother stating that they are no longer interested in prosecuting the
case and that they have pardoned Ariel.
What effect would this affidavit of desistance have on the criminal and civil aspects of the
case? Explain fully.
Answer:
1) The case should not be dismissed. ...
2) The affidavit of desistance will only amount to the condonation of civil liability but not
criminal liability hence the case should still proceed.
Art 266-A; Rape; male victim 2002
No IX.
A. A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and there, through threat and intimidation,
succeeds in inserting his penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is As criminal liability? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an act of sexual assault against B, by
inserting his penis into the anus of the latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault under par. 2 of Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, "when the offender's penis is inserted into his mouth or
anal orifice."
B.A with lewd designs, took a 13-year old girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there had sexual
intercourse with her. The girl did not offer any resistance because she was infatuated with the
man, who was good-looking and belonged to a rich and prominent family in the town. What
crime, if any, was committed by A? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A committed the crime of consented abduction under Article 343 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
The said Article punishes the abduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age,
carried out with her consent and with lewd designs. Although the problem did not indicate the
victim to be virgin, virginity should not be understood in its material sense, as to exclude a
virtuous woman of good reputation, since
the essence of the crime is not the injury to the woman but the outrage and alarm to her family
(Valdepenas vs. People,16 SCRA 871 [1966]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A committed "Child Abuse" under Rep. Act No. 7610. As defined in said law, "child
abuse" includes sexual abuse or any act which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being, whose age is below eighteen (18) years.
Art 266-A; Rape; marriage of accused with offended party 1982 No 9
"A", "B" and "C", helping one another, raped a woman "X" three times, each of them taking
turns in having sexual intercourse with her. Accordingly, three rape cases were filed against
"A", "B" and "C": Case 1, wherein "A" had sexual intercourse with "X"; Case 2, wherein "B"
had intercourse with "X"; Case 3, wherein "C" had intercourse with "X". While the cases were
pending trial, "A" married "X". What effect has this marriage on the criminal liability of "A",
"B" and "C" in each of the three cases? Explain.
Answer
The marriage of A with X will extinguish his criminal liability in the rape committed by A upon
X. The criminal liability of B and C as co-principals in the rape committed, by A upon X for
having helped A in committing the crime is also extinguished because under Article 344 R.P.C.
such marriage will benefit also the co-principals. The criminal liability of A in the rapes
committed by B and C upon the offended party is not extinguished because these rapes are
separate and independent from the rape committed by A.
Art 266-A; Rape; necessity of medical examination 1978 No.
VI-b
Bella, a 25-year old owner of a beauty shoppe was sleeping in her house one
afternoon. Her husband was in the office while their children were in school. Knowing that
Bella was alone, Basilio, a former rejected suitor, went up the house, proceeded to the room
where Bella wit asleep. Then, threatening Bella with a bladed weapon, and in spite of her
protests and resistance, Basilio had forcible sexual intercourse with Bella.
During the trial, no medical certificate was presented since Bella refused to submit to a
medical examination. Basilio was convicted on the strength alone of Bella's testimony. Basilio
appealed and contended that the rape was not proven beyond reasonable doubt due to the
failure of the prosecution to present the medical certificate to show vaginal lacerations.
Decide with reasons,
Answer
The sentence of conviction must be affirmed. Medical examination of the victim is not always
necessary in rape cases. Whether the charge will prosper depends upon all evidence, (People
vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 809).
Art 266-A; Rape; new acts considered as rape 2002 No
VIII.
A. What other acts are considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending the Revised
Penal Code? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The other acts considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 are:
1. having carnal knowledge of a woman by a man by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority,
2. having carnal knowledge of a demented woman by a man even if none of the circumstances
required in rape be present; and
3. committing an act of sexual assault by inserting a person's penis into the victim's mouth or anal
orifice, or by inserting any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
B. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape from a crime against honor, a private offense, to
that of a crime against persons. Will the subsequent marriage of the offender and the offended
party extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. By express provision of Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
subsequent valid marriage between the offender and offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed, although rape has been reclassified from a crime
against chastity, to that of a crime against persons.
Art 266-A; Rape; who must file
1993 No. 14:
1) Ariel intimidated Rachel, a mental retardate, with a bolo into having sexual Intercourse with
him. Rachel's mother immediately filed a complaint, supported by her sworn statement, before
the City Prosecutor's Office. After the necessary preliminary investigation, an information was
signed by the prosecutor but did not contain the signature of Rachel nor of her mother. Citing
Art. 344 of the RPC (prosecution of the crimes of rape, etc.), Ariel moves for the dismissal of
the case. Resolve with reasons.
Answer:
1) The case should not be dismissed. This is allowed by law (People us. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11). It
is enough that a complaint was filed by the offended party or the parents in the Fiscal's Office.
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security
Art 267; Illegal detention vs Grave Coercion
1999 No III
(a) Distinguish coercion from illegal detention. (3%)
What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer.
(3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: in
coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or serious intimidation
approximating violence, without authority of law, to prevent a person from doing something
not prohibited by law or to compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong; while in Illegal detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a
person, thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there was no intent to
lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is not
committed.
Art 267; Illegal detention vs murder
1978 No. V-b
Juan and Pedro harbored a long-standing grudge/ resentment against Jose who eloped with their
sister, Maria, and later abandoned her. They laid meticulous plans to kill him. After weeks of
waiting, their chance came when late one night, they cornered Jose as he was coming out of a
disco-beer house in Makati, Metro Manila. The two forcibly shoved him into a waiting car and
droved to Tagaytay City, where they kept Jose hog-tied in a 2 x 3 meter room. Two (2) days
later, they killed Jose and dumped his body into ravine.
What was the crime/crimes committed by Juan and Pedro? Discuss
briefly. Answer:
Murder, since the purpose of Juan and Pedro was to kill the victim. The
detention of the victim for two days before he was killed was merely incidental. (People vs.
Camo, 91 Phil. 240; People vs. Ong, 69 SCRA 174).
Art 267; Illegal detention vs murder
1996 No. 4:
2) Fidel and Fred harbored a long standing grudge against Jorge who refused to marry their sister
Lorna, after the latter got pregnant by Jorge. After weeks of surveillance, they finally cornered
Jorge in Ermita, Manila, when the latter was walking home late at might. Fidel and Fred
forcibly brought Jorge to Zambales where they kept him hog-tied in a small nipa house located
in the middle of a rice field. Two days later, they killed Jorge and dumped his body into the
river.
What crime or crimes did Fidel and Fred commit? Explain. Answer:
2) Fidel and Fred committed the crime of Murder under Art 248, RPC . the killing being
qualified by evident premeditation. This is due to the long standing grudge entertained by the
two accused occasioned by the victim's refusal to marry their sister after Impregnating her.
In People vs. Alfeche. 219 SCRA 85, the intention of the accused is determinative of the crime
committed. Where the intention is to kill the victim and the latter is forcibly taken to another
place and later killed, it is murder. There is no indication that the offenders intended to deprive
the victim of his liberty. Whereas, if the victim is kidnapped, and taken to another situs and
killed as an afterthought, it is kidnapping with homicide under Art. 267, RPC.
Art 267; Kidnapping
2002 No XVI.
A and B were legally separated. Their child C, a minor, was placed in the custody of A
the mother, subject to monthly visitations by B, his father. On one occasion, when B had C in
his company, B decided not to return C to his mother. Instead, B took C with him to the United
States where he intended for them to reside permanently. What crime, if any, did B commit?
Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B committed the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 271, in
relation to Article 270, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Article 271 expressly penalizes
any parent who shall take from and deliberately fail to restore his or her minor child to the
parent or guardian to whom custody of the minor has been placed. Since the custody of C, the
minor, has been given to the mother and B has only the right of monthly visitation, the latter's
act of taking C to the United Slates, to reside there permanently, constitutes a violation of said
provisions of law.
Art 267; Kidnapping and serious illegal detention 1991 No,
15;
A charged B with the crime of rape. While the case was pending in court, B, together with his
mother and brother, overpowered A while riding a tricycle, dragged her inside a carinderia
owned by them and detained her for two (2) days. They demanded that she sign an affidavit of
desistance and reimburse B the sum of P5,000.00 which he paid to his lawyer in the case. She
was released only after she signed the affidavit asking for the dismissal of the case and
delivered to B P 1,000.00. She promised to deliver the balance of P4,000.00 thirty (30) days
later. What crime or crimes was/were committed by B, his mother, and brother?
Answer:
This is Kidnapping with Ransom which Is kidnapping or illegal detention committed by a
private person for the purpose of extorting ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is serious.
Art 267; Kidnapping and serious illegal detention 1997 No.
15:
A and B. conspiring with each other, kidnapped C and detained him. The duo then called up
C's wife informing her that they had her husband and would release him only if she paid a
ransom in the amount of P10,000,000 and that, if she were to fail, they would kill him. The
next day, C, who had just recovered from an illness had a relapse. Fearing he might die if not
treated at once by a doctor, A and B released C during the early morning of the third day of
detention.
Charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention provided in Article 267, RPC, A and B
filed a petition for bail. They contended that since they had
voluntarily released C within three days from commencement of the detention, without having
been paid any amount of the ransom demanded and before the institution of criminal
proceedings against them, the crime committed was only slight illegal detention prescribed in
Article 268, RPC.
After hearing, the trial court found the evidence of guilt to be strong and therefore denied the
petition for bail.
On appeal, the only issue was: Was the crime committed kidnapping and serious
detention or slight Illegal detention?
Decide. Answer:
The crime committed by A and B is kidnapping and serious illegal detention because
they made a demand for ransom and threatened to kill C if the latter's wife did not pay the
same. Without the demand for ransom, the crime could have been slight illegal detention only.
The contention of A and B that they had voluntary released C within three days from the
commencement of the detention is immaterial as they are charged with a crime where the
penalty prescribed is death (Asistio vs. San Diego. 10SCRA673).
They were properly denied bail because the trial court found that the evidence of guilt in the
information for kidnapping and serious Illegal detention is strong.
Art 267; Kidnapping or illegal detention 1979
No. VIII
Madam X was approached by Y after she had parked and locked her car near her home. Y
grabbed her arm and with a screwdriver told her to unlock her ear. Y told X "we are going in
my car". Frightened, X instead handed her car key to Y. While Y was looking for the right key,
the police came and arrested Y. Y was charged with attempted kidnapping. Is the charge
correct?
Answer
The charge of attempted kidnapping is not correct. Kidnapping or illegal detention implies
deprivation of the liberty of another. The facts of the problem do not show any manifest
intention on the part of Y to kidnap Madam X. The acts performed by Y are not direct overt
acts indicative of intent to deprive Madam X of her liberty. The utterance of Y to X that "we are
going in my car" maybe for a purpose other than to restrain X of her liberty. Coercion is
committed because grabbing the arm of X by Y and telling her to unlock her car with a
screwdriver are acts of violence or intimidation which caused fear in the mind of X, which
made her act against her will.
Art 267; Kidnapping/Illegal detention 1978
No V-a
Discuss how the crime of illegal detention is committed. When does illegal detention become
serious? When qualified?
Answer
Illegal detention is committed by a private person who shall kidnap or detain another or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty. The essential element is the actual confinement or
restraint of the victim or the deprivation of his liberty. (People vs. Suarez, 82 Phil. 484; People
vs. Ablaza, 30 Phil. 178).
Illegal detention is serious, if any of the following circumstances is present: 1} If the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2) If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4} If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or public officer.
Illegal detention is qualified if it is committed for the purpose of exhorting ransom from the
victim or any other person.
Art 267; Kidnapping/Serious illegal detention 1985 No.
11
Ernesto, a rejected suitor of Madonna, waited one evening for the latter to come out of her
school. Catching Madonna by surprise, Ernesto succeeded in forcing Madonna to his car and
thereafter drove off for his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He kept Madonna in his parents'
house solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. Frustrated after three (3) days,
Ernesto succeeded, after kissing her, fondling her breast and touching her private parts, in
forcibly having carnal knowledge of Madonna once everyday for the next three (3) days. On
the 7th day, Madonna was rescued by the police authorities.
What crime or crimes did Ernesto commit? State your reasons. Answer:
Ernesto committed serious illegal detention and three (3) rapes. As long as there is restraint of
liberty, Illegal Detention is committed. Since the offended party is a woman, the crime is
serious illegal detention. (Art. 267 Revised Penal Code). Madonna was deprived of her liberty
for six days although in the first three days Ernesto kept the offended party in the house of his
parents solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. (People vs. Crisostomo et. al.,
46 Phil. 775).
In the next three days, by forcing Madonna, Ernesto had sexual intercourse with her
once a day. Rape is not a continuous crime and so three rapes are committed. A complex crime
is not committed because the serious illegal detention is not a means necessary to commit
rape. Besides rape can be committed even without serious illegal detention. (People vs. Beraal
131 SCRA 1984).
Art 267; Kidnapping; stage of execution 1996 No.
8
1} Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he is
courting so that he may succeed to raping her and eventually making her accede to many him.
Vicente asked for more money which Edgardo failed to put up. Angered because Edgardo did
not put up the money he required, he reported Edgardo to the police.
May Edgardo be charged with attempted kidnapping? Explain. Answer;
1) No, Edgardo may not be charged with attempted kidnapping inasmuch as no overt act to kidnap
or restrain the liberty of the girl had been commenced.

Page 260 of 374


At most, what Edgardo has done In the premises was a proposal to Vicente to kidnap the girl,
which is only a preparatory act and not an overt act. The attempt to commit a felony
commences with the commission of overt act, not preparatory act. Proposal to commit
kidnapping is not a crime.

Page 261 of 374


Art 269; Unlawful arrest 1977
No. III-b
A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo
shirt of a student and then arrested the student for illegal possession of marijuana cigarette. For
what crime or crimes will the police officer be liable? Reason fully.
Answer
The police officer will be liable for the complex crime of incriminatory machination with
unlawful arrest. (People v. Alagao, et al., L-20721, April 30, 1966). The placing of marijuana
cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of the student is incriminatory machination,
which is "planting evidence". The arrest of the student for illegal possession of the marijuana
cigarette is unlawful arrest. The two acts followed closely each other. Incriminatory
machination is the means to commit unlawful arrest and is, therefore, a complex crime.
Art 275; Abandonment of a person in danger 1977 No.
XI-a
One early morning while the physician was jogging in the Rizal Park, he saw a man in danger
of dying. He ignored to give help to the dying man because he was in a hurry to go home as he
will still drive his children to school, After an hour, the man died which death could have been
prevented had he been attended to by the physician. For what crime, if any, is the physician
liable? State your reason.
Answer
The physician is not liable for abandonment of a person in danger under par. 1 of Art. 275.
Rizal Park cannot be considered an uninhabited place since it is within the radium of one
kilometer from where inhabited buildings are located. Besides Rizal Park at that early morning
would be teeming with joggers and other persons aside from the physician. Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain held that a place is uninhabited if there is no population or group of
persons, (March 9, 1883, 28 JUR Crim. 216).
Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling 1979 No.
II
X was awakened by a loud noise coming from the first floor of his house. He went down and
discovered that the screen door to the kitchen had been cut and the door itself opened. He
called the police. When they arrived, they saw Y lying on the sala. They arrested Y but found
no weapon, burglary tool or stolen goods in his person. They examined the whole house and
found everything in order. No valuable was missing. Can the crime of attempted robbery be
charged against Y? If not, what crime did he commit?
Answer
The crime committed is consummated qualified trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280, Revised Penal
Code). The-intention of Y in entering the house of X was indeterminate. For this reason, it
cannot be attempted robbery because the overt acts committed had no direct and immediate
relation to robbery. (People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703). Since the screen door of the kitchen
had been cut and the door opened, the entrance was against the will of the owner.
Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling 1981 No.
2
Patrolman "A" caught "B" one night in the act of removing the glass jalousies of the window
of the house of "C", which was closed. "B" had already detached three glass blades. "A"
arrested "B" and booked him for "Attempted Robbery."
Do you agree? If not, and if you were the investigating Fiscal, with what offense would you
charge "B"? Give your reasons for either answer.
Answer
I do not agree with A who booked B for attempted robbery. If I were the Fiscal, I would charge
B for attempted trespass to dwelling. In an attempted felony, the offender begins the
commission of a felony by overt acts which must have a direct connection with the felony. It is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense. The
removal of the three glass blades of the jalousies have no direct connection with the crime of
robbery by force upon things. The purpose of removing the glass blades to enter the house was
still indeterminate. But certainly in making the opening, the intention of the offender was to
enter the house against the will of the owner of the house. (People vs. Lamahang 61 Phil. 703).
So, the crime for which B should be charged, is attempted trespass to dwelling.
Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling; rule of absorption/ complexion 1994 No. 20:
At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay.
Mamerto's son, saw Dante and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his
abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was about to
escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered Injuries which, were it not for the timely medical
attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him
for 25 days.
What crime or crimes did Dante commit?
Answer:
Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay,
and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide
because when the trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious offense, trespass
to dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime, and the former constitutes an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling (People vs. Abedoza, 53 Phil.788).
Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay.... Dante is guilty of less serious
physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto...
Art 282; Grave threats 1987
No. XIV:
A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all
leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a
businessman from Agusan. As instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and
demanded P100,000.00. When Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with
the butt of his gun, Pedro gave the amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the
PC Command to tell them what happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman.
Orlando told him that D and E, week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and
threatening to kill his son and wife should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would
make good their threat, he gave the money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on
his way to the PC to report what happened.
(a) What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit?
If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are different.
Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money.
(c) Did Gorio commit any crime? Answer:
a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that
they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their
demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in
the taking of the money with intent to gain.
b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the
killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000
demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave
threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the
intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and
conditional.
c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery
committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and
E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his
intervention in the activities of D and E.
Art 282; Grave threats 1988
No. 10:
a) Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in the foothills which he planted to lanzones. On
his last visit there he was shocked to discover that his land had been taken over by a group of
15 families whose members had forcibly driven away his caretaker, had appropriated the fruits
for themselves, and were now threatening to kill him should he try to eject them.
What crime should Jorge charge these 15 families? Explain. How
would you defend them? Explain briefly.
Answer:
a) Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes namely:
1} Violation of Article 282 which provides that "Grave threats. Any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime shall suffer..." and
2) Violation of Article 312 which provides that: "Occupation of real property or usurpation of real
rights in property. Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging
to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be
punished by a fine from P50.00...".
Art 282; Grave threats; when absorbed in usurpation of real property
1989 No. 17:
"A" and "B", both farmers, entered the land owned by "X" and planted palay thereon. When
"X" came to know about it, he confronted "A" and "B" and inquired why the latter occupied
his land and planted palay thereon. "A", with a bolo in hand, replied that the land belongs to
the family of "S", and not to "X" and at the same time said, "If you touch this land and my
palay, blood will flow on this ground." Because of said remark, "X" went to the Chief of
Police and complained. The Chief of Police filed a complex crime of Usurpation of Real
Property with Grave Threats. What crime or crimes were committed?
Answer:
The crime committed by A and B is squatting under PD 772 and not usurpation of Real
Property because in the latter crime, there must be violence against or intimidation of persons
employed in taking possession of any real property or in usurping any real rights in property
belonging to another (Art, 312, RPC). In this case, it appears that A and B entered X's land
without the owner's consent or against his will but without any violence against or
intimidation of persons.
The crime of squatting is committed by any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial
or any other purposes.
The threat uttered by A not having been used IN THE TAKING OF POSSESSION of the land,
it is not absorbed in the crime of SQUATTING, When A threatened X that blood will flow if
X touches the land and his palay, he committed the crime of grave threats by threatening
another with the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime. Only A is criminally liable for
the crime of grave threats.
Art 286; Furstrated coercion/ murder/ hijacking
1978 No. VII-a
A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was
still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered
the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death.
What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer
Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in
flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep.
Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost
similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused
was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of the pilot to comply with the
order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder,
because the accused shot the pilot to death.
Alternative Answer
Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had
not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing.
Art 286; Grave coercion 1978
No. VII-a
A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was
still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered
the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death.
What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer
Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in flight"
as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No.
6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio,
95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of
the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to
Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death.
Alternative Answer
Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had
not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing.
Art 286; Grave coercion 1979
No. IX
X, a police captain, arrested Y on suspicion of robbery. X interrogated Y bat Y denied
knowledge and participation in any crime of robbery, X then ordered Z, his assistant, to
torture Y. As a result of the torture, Y confessed despite his innocence. What crime, if any, was
committed by X?
Answer
X is liable for grave coercion. He is a principal by inducement. The person arrested on
suspicion of robbery was not yet a prisoner since the facts do not show that he was already
booked and detained in jail at the time of his investigation. So maltreatment of a prison is not
committed. Since Z, the assistant of X, was ordered to torture Y and as a result Y confessed
despite his innocence, grave coercion is committed, as the order is unlawful
Art 286; Grave coercion 1981
No. 12
The goats of "G" entered the garden of "H" and destroyed the vegetables growing thereon. "H"
caught the animals and tethered them near the hut. Soon
"G" arrived and told "H" to release the goats as they were his. "H" refused; telling "G" to pay
first for the value of "H's" damaged vegetables.
With threats of bodily harm, "G" compelled "H" to turn the goats loose. What
crime was committed by "G", if any? Why?
Answer
G committed grave coercion. Coercion is committed not only by violence but also by
intimidation, like threat of bodily harm which compelled H to turn the goats loose, whether it
was just or unjust. G had not acted under authority of law or exercise of a lawful right since the
goats of G destroyed the vegetables growing on the garden of H, who refused to release the
goats tethered near his hut until G pay first for the value of the damaged vegetables. (U.S. vs.
Mena 11 Phil. 543),
Art 286; Grave coercion 1998
No II.
Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials. He saw Roy wearing the said
necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to him the necklace as it belongs to him, but Roy
refused. Isagani then drew his gun and told Roy, "If you will not give back the necklace to me,
I will kill you!" Out of fear for his life and against his will, Roy gave the necklace to Isagani,
What offense did Isagani commit? (5%1 Answer;
Isagani committed the crime of grave coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by
means of serious threats or intimidation, to do something against the latter's will, whether it be
right or wrong. Serious threats or intimidation approximating violence constitute grave
coercion, not grave threats. Such is the nature of the threat in this case because it was
committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon.
The crime is not robbery because intent to gain, which is an essential element of
robbery, is absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani.
Art 286; Grave Coercion vs illegal detention 1999 No
III
(a) Distinguish coercion from illegal detention. (3%)
What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer.
(3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: in
coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or serious intimidation
approximating violence, without authority of law, to prevent a person from doing something
not prohibited by law or to compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong; while in Illegal detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a
person, thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there was no intent to
lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is not committed.
Art 286; Grave coercion vs maltreatment of prisoner 1999 No
III
(b) Forcibly brought to the police headquarters, a person was tortured and maltreated by agents of
the law in order to compel him to confess a crime imputed to him. The agents failed, however,
to draw from him a confession which was their intention to obtain through the employment of
such means,
What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer.
(3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Evidently, the person tortured and maltreated by the agents of the law
is a suspect and may have been detained by them. If so and he had already been booked and
put in jail, the crime is maltreatment of prisoner and the fact that the suspect was subjected to
torture to extort a confession would bring about a higher penalty. In addition to the offender's
liability for the physical injuries inflicted.
But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the police headquarters to make him admit the crime
and tortured/ maltreated to make him confess to such crime, but later released because the
agents failed to draw such confession, the crime is grave coercion because of the violence
employed to compel such confession without the offended party being confined in jail. (US vs.
Cusi, 10 Phil 143)
It is noted that the offended party was merely "brought" to the police headquarters and
is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime committed would be
maltreatment of prisoners.
Art 286; Grave coercion vs robbery 1989
No. 16:
"A", by using force, grabbed the bicycle of "B" and ran away. The following day, "B" asked
"C" to get back his bicycle from "A" and promised to pay him P100 if successful, "C" agreed.
"C" went to "A's" house but it was locked from inside. Since "A" refused to let "C" in, "C"
kicked the door open, confronted "A" and with a dagger in hand, told "A" to give "Bs bicycle.
Intimidated, "A" gave the bicycle to "C" who, in turn, gave it to "B". "B" paid "C" P100 for his
efforts. What crime or crimes did "A", "B" and "C" commit, if any?
Answer:
B is not liable for any crime. Although he promised to pay C P100 if the latter would get back
his bicycle from A, he did not induce C to commit any crime. He had no participation in any
plan to take back the bicycle by unlawful means. C's act of kicking open "A's" door and
intimidating "A" to return the bicycle is C's act alone for which he will individually be liable.
There is even no showing that B approved of C's act. While A paid C the P100.00 he promised
upon the return of his bicycle, it does not appear that he knew the manner and method by which
C recovered the bicycle from A.
C committed grave coercion, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling when he
forced his way into A's house and recovered the bicycle from A at dagger-point. This is so
because he compelled A by means of intimidation to do something against his will, whether it
be right or wrong, namely to give the bicycle to him. Since his purpose is to return the bicycle
to its rightful owner, there is no intent to gain that would make the crime robbery. The
elements of the crime of grave coercion are:
1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he
compelled him to do something against his will be it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of force as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party; and
3. That the offender did not act with authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right,
Art 287; Unjust vexation 1975
No, XIV
A disliked the long hair that his brother, B, was sporting. So one night, while B was asleep, A
cut short his brother's hair. Is A criminally liable? Why?
Answer
A will be criminally liable for unjust vexation. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of
Spain, it was held that cutting the hair of another to humiliate or ridicule him is slander by
deed. (Dec. Sup. Ct. Spain, April 13, 1896). In the case of People v. Motita, CA 59 O.G. 3020,
it was held that the common denominator between unjust vexation and slander by deed is the
act which annoys, vexes or irritates the offended party. Without any other concurring factor,
the offense would be merely unjust vexation as it is equated with anything which annoys or
irritates another. Surely, the act of A caused his brother annoyance and irritation. However
laudable the purpose may be, to perform an act against the will of another to his annoyance
and irritation and without justification is unjust vexation.
Art 287; Unjust vexation 1976
No. IX-b
X, a dashing bachelor of 18, fell in love with and started courting Y, a beautiful girl of 16. X's
offer of love was, however, unrequited by Y. So, X decided to waylay Y on the way home
from school One afternoon at the usual hour of Y's trek to her house, X had himself behind the
thick cogon grass. Moments later, a person in velvet blue, the favorite color of Y, appeared.
Sensing that his time has come, X sprang from his hideout, grabbed the person, and
commenced kissing the cheeks and other parts of the body. It turned out, however, that the
person is the twin brother of Y, a hermophrodite. Is X liable for any crime? Reasons.
Answer
X is liable for unjust vexation. The acts of X are annoying, irritating, vexatious and are
unjustified. However, the mere acts of kissing the cheeks and other parts of the body of the
twin brother of Y, the girl whom X was courting, and without his knowledge as to the identity
are not lascivious. As a matter of fact, even kissing a girl, and holding her tightly is only
unjust vexation. (People vs. Climaco, 40 O.G. 3186). Since X did the acts because his offer of
love was unrequited by Y, his motive was not lustful but merely to spite her or to force her to
accept his love. (People vs. Anonuevo, CA 35 O.G. 2018). If X was impelled by lust, he
would have touched the breast and the private parts of the offended party. (People vs.
Buenafe, 54 O.G. 610).
Art 287; Unjust vexation vs acts of lasciviousness 1994 No. 1;
1) When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's breast considered only unjust vexation
instead of acts of lasciviousness?
Answer;
1) The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising either out of passion or other
motive and the touching of her breast as a mere incident of the embrace without lewd design
constitutes merely unjust vexation (People us, Ignacio. CA GRNo. 5119-R, September 30,
1950). However, where the kissing,

Page 270 of 374


embracing and the touching of the breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the same
constitute acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Percival Gilo, 10 SCRA 753).

Page 271 of 374


Crimes Against Property
Art 293; Ordinary robbery committed on a highway vs highway robbery under PD
532
2000 No XV
a) Distinguish Highway Robbery under Presidential Decree No. 532 from Robbery committed on
a highway. (3%)
b)A, B, C, D and B were in a beerhouse along MacArthur Highway having a drinking spree. At
about 1 o'clock in the morning, they decided to leave and so asked for the bill. They pooled
their money together but they were still short of P2,000.00. E then orchestrated a plan
whereby A, B, C and D would go out, flag a taxicab and rob the taxi driver of all his money
while E would wait for them in the beerhouse. A. B, C and D agreed. All armed with
balisongs, A, B, C and D hailed the first taxicab they encountered. After robbing X, the driver,
of his earnings, which amounted to P1,000.00 only, they needed P1 ,000.00 more to meet their
bill. So, they decided to hail another taxicab and they again robbed driver T of his hard-earned
money amounting to P1,000. On their way back to the beerhouse, they were apprehended by a
police team upon the complaint of X, the driver of the first cab. They pointed to E as the
mastermind. What crime or crimes, if any. did A, B, C, D and B commit? Explain fully. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)Highway Robbery under Pres. Decree 532 differs from ordinary Robbery committed on a
highway in these respects:
1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is committed indiscriminately against persons
who commute in such highways, regardless of the potentiality they offer; while in ordinary
Robbery committed on a highway, the robbery is committed only against predetermined
victims;
2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the offender is a brigand or one who roams in
public highways and carries out his robbery in public highways as venue, whenever the
opportunity to do so arises. It is ordinary Robbery under the Revised Penal Code when the
commission thereof In a public highway is only incidental and the offender is not a brigand:
and
3) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is frequency in the commission of the robbery in
public highways and against persons travelling thereat; whereas ordinary Robbery in public
highways is only occasional against a predetermined victim, without frequency in public
highways,
b) A. B, C, D and E are liable for two (2) counts of robbery under Article
294 of the Rev. Penal Code; not for highway Robbery under PD 532. The offenders are not
brigands but only committed the robbery to raise money to pay their bill because it happened
that they were short of money to pay the same.
Art 293; Robbery
1987 No. XIV:
A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all
leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a businessman from Agusan. As
instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and demanded P100,000.00.
When Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with the butt of his gun, Pedro
gave the amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the PC Command to tell
them what happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman. Orlando told him
that D and E, week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and threatening to kill his son
and wife should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would make good their threat,
he gave the money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on his way to the PC to
report what happened.
(a) What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit?
If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are different.
Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money.
(c) Did Gorio commit any crime? Answer:
a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that
they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their
demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in
the taking of the money with intent to gain.
b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the
killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000
demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave
threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the
intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and
conditional.
c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery
committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and
E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his
intervention in the activities of D and E.
Art 293; Robbery
2001 No XIV
A and B are neighbors in Barangay Nuevo I, Silang, Cavite. A is a barangay Kagawad
and known to be a bully, while B is reputed to be gay but noted for his industry and economic
savvy which allowed him to amass wealth in leaps and bounds, including registered and
unregistered lands in several barangays. Resenting B's riches and relying on his political
influence, A decided to harass and intimidate B into sharing with him some of his lands,
considering that the latter was single and living alone. One night, A broke into B's house, forced
him to bring out some titles and after picking out a title covering 200 square meters in their
barangay, compelled B to type out a Deed of Sale conveying the said lot to him for P1.00 and
other valuable considerations. All the while, A carried a paltik caliber .45 in full view of B, who
signed the deed out of fear. When A later on tried to register the deed, B summoned enough
courage and had A arrested and charged in court after preliminary investigation.
What charge or charges should be filed against A? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The charge for Robbery under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed
against A. Said Article provides that any person who, with intent to defraud another, by
means of violence or intimidation, shall compel him to
sign, execute and deliver any public instrument or document shall be held guilty of robbery.
The paltik caliber .45 firearm carried by A was obviously intended to Intimidate B and
thus, used in the commission of the robbery. If it could be established that A had no license or
permit to possess and carry such firearm, it should be taken only as special aggravating
circumstance to the crime of robbery, not subject of a separate prosecution.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
On the premise that the Deed of Sale which A compelled B to sign, had not attained the
character of a "public" instrument or document, A should be charged for the crime of
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code for having
intruded into Bs house, and for the crime of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of same Code,
for compelling B to sign such deed of sale against his will.
Art 293; Robbery & Art 208 maliciously refraining from instituting
prosecution
1992 No. 6:
Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the
Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng, age
16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in the
home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them up
with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani narrated
how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he kept on
threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about what was
happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties with her
body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were subjected to a lot
of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them ran away. Nani got
married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the humiliation of appearing in
their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story saying that no housegirl ever
stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan".
b) After SPO2 Cirio Cellado heard the story of the two girls, he took aside Mrs. Cortes and
made this proposition: "Let me tell you what I plan to do. Since the D.O.M. is probably well-
known in his community, he will not want his reputation tarnished, I'll tell him that you have
reported him to us and you are all set to file criminal charges against him at the Prosecutor's
Office. But if he will give us P50,000.00, you may be persuaded not to file the suit anymore.
Actually, after he gives that amount, which he surely will, I shall visit him regularly for more.
We shall then divide equally the money we shall get from him.
Suppose Cellado proceeds to carry out his plan and is caught by his Chief with
incontrovertible evidence, what action or actions may be brought by his superiors to penalize
him and to recover whatever sums of money he may have received from his victim?
Suggested Answer:
b) Cellado should be charged of robbery because he took personal property from, Donido,
with intent to gain, with intimidation on the person of the
latter. The money passed into the hands of Cellado involuntarily because of fear (intimidation)
on the part of the offended party, Donido.
Likewise, Cellado can be held liable under Art. 208, RPC, he being a public officer who
maliciously refrained from instituting prosecution against violators of the law. An agent of a
person in authority charged with the apprehension and investigation of a crime is an integral
part of the prosecution of offenses.
Art 293; Robbery through violence or intimidation of persons 2002 No
XIV.
A.A entered the house of another without employing force or violence upon things. He was seen
by a maid who wanted to scream but was prevented from doing so because A threatened her
with a gun. A then took money and other valuables and left. Is A guilty of theft or of robbery?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A is liable for robbery because of the intimidation he employed on the maid before the
taking of the money and other valuables. It is the intimidation of person relative to the taking
that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead of simply theft The non-employment of force upon
things is of no moment because robbery is committed not only by employing force upon
things but also by employing violence against or intimidation of persons.
B. A fire broke out in a department store, A, taking advantage of the confusion, entered the store
and carried away goods which he later sold. What crime, if any, did he commit? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the goods on the occasion of
and taking advantage of the fire which broke out in the department store. The occasion of a
calamity such as fire, when the theft was committed, qualifies the crime under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Art 293; Robbery thru force or intimidation against persons
1987 No. IX:
Posing as a detective in the Manila Police and flashing a police badge, Jose, jobless and
without any known address and occupation, told Manding and Liling, who were then sitting in
a dark corner in the Luneta Park, that he was placing them under arrest for vagrancy and
taking them to the police station for booking. Manding and Liling protested, saying that they
were merely enjoying the evening alone, as they were sweethearts and both gainfully
employed. Jose told them that they can give their explanations at the Police Station. Not
wanting to be bothered and embarrassed, Manding offered Jose P200.00 to let them go. Jose
agreed, got the money, and left.
Explain whether under the facts given Jose committed any crime Answer:
Jose is liable for robbery. By posing as a detective with a police badge, telling Manding and
Liling, who were sitting in a dark comer in Luneta Park that they would be placed under arrest
for vagrancy and brought to the police station for booking and by not listening to the
explanation of Manding and Liling that they were sweethearts and gainfully employed which
Jose said they could explain in
the Police Station, created fear in the mind of the couple or a sense of mental distress in view of
the risk or evil or embarrassment that is impending. This fear continued in the mind of the
offended parties when they offered the P200 to Jose which he accepted and then received the
money.
Art 293; Robbery with force upon things 2000
No XI
A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night out with his friends, took the
coconut shell which is being used by B as a bank for coins from inside their locked cabinet
using their common key. Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their home in the
presence of his friends.
What is the criminal liability of A, if any? Explain. (3%)
Is A exempted from criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for
being a brother of B? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) A is criminally liable for Robbery with force upon things, because the coconut shell with the
coins inside, was taken with intent to gain and broken outside of their home, (Art. 299 (b) (2).
RPC).
b) No, A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because said Article applies only to
theft, swindling or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery.
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1977
No, VII-b
E, F, G and H, all armed, ransacked the house of I, a paralytic, and in the process, E shot I to
death when he refused to bring out his money. The shooting awakened the ten-year old son of
I who immediately rushed to his father, but he, too, was shot to death in cold blood. In the
meantime, F went to the room of the wife of I and had carnal knowledge with her through
force. Thereafter; E, F, G and H fled with their loot. What criminal liability did E, F, G and H
incur? Reason fully.
Answer
E, F, G and H are all liable for robbery with homicide since they constitute a band. The others
who were present at the time of the commission of the robbery did not prevent the killings of I
and his ten-year old son by E and the rape of the wife of I by F (Art 296, R.P.C.). The two
killings are merged in the composite, integrate whole that is, robbery with homicide, as the
killings were perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery (People v. Madrid, 68 Phil.
2), Although rape also accompanied the robbery, the legal definition of the crime is still
robbery with homicide but the rape is to be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
(People v: Ganal, et al., 85 Phil. 743; People v. Basea, 104 Phil. 136; People v. Mongado, et
aJL.t 28 SCRA 642).
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1980
No XVI
Five men, one of them armed with a carbine, entered the hut of an octogenarian, who was
living by himself, ransacked his things and took his carpentry tools and cash worth P100. "Y"
saw them going towards the hut and sensing their evil intentions called some friends to act as a
rescue party. As the
five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange
of gunshot between the two groups. Killed were one in the five- man team, and another in the
rescue party. The articles taken were recovered.
Four of the 5 men were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide. Their common defenses
were that they could not be convicted of the crime charged because (a) the killing occurred
after the consummation of the robbery;
(b) the octogenarian victim of the robbery was not the victim of the homicide; and
(c) the crime was committed by a band.
Evaluate the different defenses of the accused. Answer
1) Although the killing was committed after the consummation of the robbery, robbery with
homicide is committed because the killing was committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery. If the killing is prior or subsequent to the robbery so long as it is directly related
to the robbery, the crime committed is robbery with homicide, (People vs. Hernandez, 48
Phil. 48).
2) Even if the victim of the robbery is not the victim of the homicide, robbery with homicide is
committed because the law does not require that the person killed is the victim of the robbery.
(People vs. Barut, L-42666, March 13, 1979). As a matter of fact, even if the victim killed is a
mere bystander robbery with homicide is committed. (People vs. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120).
3) There seems to be a typographical error in the question. That band is a defense does not make
sense. Obviously, the question would refer to the defense that the accused did not constitute a
band. This is tenable because of the five accused, only one was armed with a carbine. There is
a band if more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery. (Art.
296, R.P.C.; People vs. Barut, supra). This is not, however, a defense because there is
conspiracy among the five accused as shown by the facts of the problem that "as the five men
were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange of
gunshots between the two groups." When homicide takes place on the occasion of the robbery,
all who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless they had endeavored
to prevent the killing. (People vs. Berudes, L-30966, Dec. 14, 1979)
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1988
No. 8:
a) An armed band tried to stop a passenger bus, and the driver who sensed that the band might
commit robbery; did not stop the bus but drove it faster. The members of the band then fired at
the bus, killing one passenger who was hit in the head.
b) As the malefactor were about to enter the house of A, the latter hid himself inside the ceiling.
Once inside the house, the malefactor took from A's wife cash and pieces of jewelry. One of
the malefactors stood on a table and fired his gun at the ceiling. After they had left A's wife
called for him and receiving no answer, she went up the ceiling and found him already dead.
What crime was committed? Explain.
c) In the course of robbery there was confusion and in the exchange of shots between the robbers
and the victims, one of the robbers happened to shoot one of his own companions.
What crime was committed? Explain. Answer:
a) They committed the crime of attempted robbery with homicide with band as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Attempted. ..
robbery committed under certain circumstances.When... on the occasion of an attempted
robbery a homicide is committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by
reclusion temporal
b) Robbery with homicide was committed by the malefactors. Article 297 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that "Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances.
When by reason. . .of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed the
person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal...".
c) The robber committed the crime of robbery with homicide in violation of Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "... when... on the occasion of an attempted robbery a
homicide is committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal. ..".
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1995
No. 7:
Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the
store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky
complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly
Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death.
Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran
out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as
Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor
and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was
17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the
houses of Victor and Ricky.
1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie.
Answer:
1 . All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The acts of
Ricky in stabbing Mang Pandoy to death, of Rod in .boxing the salesgirl to prevent her from
helping Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in chasing the salesgirl to prevent her in seeking help, of
Victor in scooping up money from the cash box, and of Ricky and Victor in dashing to the
street and announcing the escape, are all indicative of conspiracy.
The rule is settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery
with homicide, unless the accused tried to prevent the killing (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA
218). Further, the aggravating circumstance of craft could be assessed against the accused for
pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy,
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1996
No. 2:
2) Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the
morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were
living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that
one of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her
in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to
the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his
family.
a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit? Explain.
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the
latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what
crime did the four commit? Explain.
Answer:
2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed
complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the
offenders committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant
from the house" where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other
conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the
special complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995}
b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because the killings were by reason (to
prevent identification) and on the occasion of the robbery. The multiple rapes committed and
the fact that several persons were killed [homicide), would be considered as aggravating
circumstances. The rapes are synonymous with Ignominy and the additional killing
synonymous with cruelty, (People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA; People vs. Plaga, 202 SCRA 531)
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1998
No XVIII.
A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank, and when they were about to get out of the bank,
policemen came and ordered them to surrender but they fired on the police officers who fired
back and shot it out with them.
1. Suppose a bank employee was killed and the bullet which killed him came from the firearm of
the police officers, with what crime shall you charge A,
B. C and D? |3%|
2. Suppose it was robber D who was killed by the policemen and the prosecutor charged A, B and
C with Robbery and Homicide. They demurred arguing that they (A, B and C) were not the
ones who killed robber D, hence, the charge should only be Robbery. How would you resolve
their argument? (2%)
Answer:
1. A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime of robbery with homicide because the death of
the bank employee was brought about by the acts of said offenders on the occasion of the
robbery. They shot it out with the policeman, thereby causing such death by reason or on the
occasion of a robbery; hence, the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
2. The argument is valid, considering that a separate charge for Homicide was filed. It would be
different if the charge filed was for the composite crime of robbery with homicide which is a
single, indivisible offense.
Alternative Answer:
2. The argument raised by A, B and C is not correct because their liability is not only for
Robbery but for the special complex crime of Robbery with homicide. But the facts stated
impresses that separate crimes of Robbery "and" Homicide were charged, which is not correct.
What was committed was a single indivisible offense of Robbery with homicide, not two
crimes.
Art 293; Robbery with homicide 2003
No IX.
A learned two days ago that B had received dollar bills amounting to
$10,000 from his daughter working in the United States With the intention of robbing B of
those dollars, A entered B's house at midnight, armed with a knife which he used to gain entry,
and began quietly searching the drawers, shelves, and other likely receptacles of the cash.
While doing that, B awoke, rushed out from the bedroom, and grappled with A for the
possession of the knife which A was then holding. After stabbing B to death, A turned over B's
pillow and found the latter's wallet underneath the pillow, which was bulging with the dollar
bills he was looking for. A took the bills and left the house. What crime or crimes were
committed? 8%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The crime committed is robbery with homicide, a composite crime. This is so because
A's primordial criminal intent is to commit a robbery and in the course of the robbery, the
killing of B took place. Both the robbery and the killing were consummated, thus giving rise
to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The primary criminal intent being to
commit a robbery, any killing on the "occasion" of the robbery, though not by reason thereof,
is considered a component of the crime of robbery with homicide as a single indivisible
offense.
Art 293; Robbery with homicide vs homicide
1983 No. 6
Insulted by the manager of the bank where he was employed as security guard, A, enraged,
shot the former, who died on the spot. As A was about to leave the bank premises, he noticed
the vault open. He entered it, forced open a locked container and got the jewelry therein.
If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute A?
Explain.
Answer
Homicide and Robbery. It is not robbery with homicide because the purpose of A, the security
guard, was not to commit robbery. It is not murder because the aggression was preceded by the
insult of the manager which enraged the offender. So the killing was attended by passion which
negates the presence of treachery. The taking of the jewelries was an afterthought as the
offender entered the vault only when he noticed it was open when he was about to leave the
bank premises. The jewelries were in a locked receptacle which he forced open while inside the
Page 280 of 374
bank premises. This is robbery with force upon things under Article 299, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.

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Art 293; Robbery with rape 1999
No XVII
Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a residential house of things of value. They
succeeded in the commission of their original plan to simply rob. A, however, was sexually
aroused when he saw the lady owner of the house and so. raped her.
The lady victim testified that B did not in any way participate in the rape but B watched the
happening from a window and did nothing to stop the rape.
Is B as criminally liable as A for robbery with rape? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, B is as criminally liable as A for the composite crime of robbery with rape under Art. 294
(1). Although the conspiracy of A and B was only to rob, B was present when the rape was
being committed which gave rise to a composite crime, a single indivisible offense of robbery
with rape. B would not have been liable had he endeavored to prevent the commission of the
rape. But since he did not when he could have done so, he in effect acquiesced with the rape as
a component of the robbery and so he is also liable for robbery with rape.
Art 293; Robbery; homicide; arson 1995
No. 12:
Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from Saudi Arabia with considerable savings.
Knowing him to be "loaded", his friends Jason, Manuel and Dave invited him to poker session
at a rented beach cottage. When he was losing almost all his money which to him was his
savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he was being cheated by his friends. Angered by the
betrayal he decided to take revenge on the three cheats.
Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and gave them to his companions to
drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw his companions already sound
asleep he hacked all of them to death. Then he remembered his losses. He rifled through the
pockets of his victims and got back all the money he lost. He then ran away but not before
burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. The following day police investigators found among
the debris the charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the caretaker of the resort.
After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor charged Harry with the complex
crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery.
Was Harry properly charged? Discuss fully. Answer:
No, Harry was net properly charged. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate
crimes, namely: murder, theft and arson.
Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with evident premeditation, as there was considerable
lapse of time before he decided to commit the crime and the actual commission of the crime.
In addition, Harry employed means which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel and Dave.
Harry gave them the liquor to drink until they were drunk and fell asleep. This gave Harry the
opportunity to carry out his plan of murder with impunity.
The taking of the money from the victims was a mere afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry
committed the separate crime of theft and not the complex

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crime of robbery with homicide. Although theft was committed against dead persons, it is still
legally possible as the offended party are the estates of the victims.
In burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. Harry became liable for another separate crime,
arson. This act of burning was not necessary for the consummation of the two (2) previous
offenses he committed. The fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did not qualify Harry's
crime into a complex crime of arson with homicide for there is no such crime.
Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the complex crime of arson with
quadruple homicide and robbery. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate
crimes, murder, theft and arson.
Art 293; Robbery; multiplicity of crimes 1996
No. 8
2) Five robbers robbed, one after the other five houses occupied by different families located
inside a compound enclosed by a six-feet high hollow block fence.
How many robberies did the five commit? Explain.
Answer;
2) The offenders committed only one robbery in the eyes of the law because when they
entered the compound, they were impelled only by a single indivisible criminal resolution to
commit a robbery as they were not aware that there were five families inside said compound,
considering that the same was enclosed by a six-feet high hollow-block fence. The series of
robbery committed in the same compound at about the same time constitutes one continued
crime, motivated by one criminal impulse,
Art 293; Robbery; rape 1997
No. 19:
After raping the complainant in her house, the accused struck a match to smoke a cigarette
before departing from the scene. The brief light from the match allowed him to notice a watch
in her wrist. He demanded that she hand over the watch. When she refused, he forcibly grabbed
it from her. The accused was charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape.
Was the court correct? Answer:
No. the court erred in convicting the accused of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape. The accused should instead be held liable for two (2) separate crimes of robbery
and rape, since the primary intent or objective of the accused was only to rape the
complainant, and his commission of the robbery was merely an afterthought. The robbery
must precede the rape. In order to give rise to the special complex crime for which the court
convicted the accused.
Art 308; Theft
1976 No. III-a
X, a commission agent, without being authorized by his principal, pulled out several
typewriters and adding machines from the prospective buyers, who, after the period of trial of
said machines, decided not to buy them. Instead of returning the machines to the company,
X pawned them with the different
pawnshops for sums of money which he used for his own behalf. What crime has X
committed? Reason:
Answer
X committed the crime of theft. When X pulled out the typewriters and adding
machines from the prospective buyers, who, after the period of trial, decided not to buy them,
X, as commission agent, made them believe that he acted on behalf of his principal, who is his
employer, although in truth, he did not as he was not authorized. When he took away the
machines without the knowledge and consent of his principal, he had only acquired physical
possession of the same, (People v. Maglaya, 30 SCRA 606).
Art 308; Theft
1976 No. IV-a
X found in the street am