Contents

KAPALONG v MOYA .......................................................................................................................................... 2

PASIG CITY v ........................................................................................................................................................ 4
MARIANO v COMELEC ...................................................................................................................................... 6
SAN NARCISO v MENDEZ ............................................................................................................................... 11
JIMENEZ v BAZ .................................................................................................................................................. 14
CAMID v OFFICE OF THE PRES ...................................................................................................................... 20
SEMA v COMELEC ............................................................................................................................................ 27
EN BANC ......................................................................................................................................................... 27
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597.................................................................................................... 27
D E C I S I O N ................................................................................................................................................. 27
The Facts ....................................................................................................................................................... 28
ALVAREZ v GUINGONA .................................................................................................................................. 45
KAWALING v COMELEC ................................................................................................................................. 50
LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC .................................................................................................................... 55
TAN v COMELEC ............................................................................................................................................... 63
NAVARRO v ERMITA ....................................................................................................................................... 73
RESOLUTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 73
ORDILLO v COMELEC ...................................................................................................................................... 96
TANADA v TUVERA ....................................................................................................................................... 100
MIRANDA v AGUIRRE .................................................................................................................................... 105
LATASA v COMELEC ...................................................................................................................................... 118
 KAPALONG v MOYA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988

MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG, thru its Mayor, PORFIRIO F. ROYO Vice Mayor, TOMAS D. MANZANO,
Municipal Councilors VALERIANO CLARO, CARIDAD A. DORONIO FELICULO ESTRADA, GEORGE PEDRO
JAIN, LIDO E. MONOY SALVADOR PASPE and AGUEDO ROTOL petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX L. MOYA, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX, and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STO. TOMAS, thru its Mayor, ANICETO SOLIS, Vice-Mayor LEOPOLDO RECTO,
Municipal Councilors DOMINGO CAGADAS, WENCESLAO CASTRO, WILDA ESPIRITU, PASTOR
FERNANDEZ, MACROSQUE PIMENTEL, DOMINADOR SOLIS, JOSE TAGHOY and ALFONSO VALDEZ, and
Municipal Treasurer JOSE AVENIDO, respondents.

Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for petitioners.

Simeon N. Millan Jr. for respondent Santo Tomas.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking: (a) the reversal (annulment) of the
February 17, 1975 Order of the then Court of First Instance of Davao denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
475; and the March 17, 1975 and July 10, 1975 Orders of the same Court denying petitioner's motions for
reconsideration; and (b) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing respondent Judge to desist from taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 475.

From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent Municipality of Santo
Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner. For many years and on several
occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private
respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was
taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao,
presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement
of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
475.

On March 7, 1974, petitioner filed its Answer (Rollo, pp. 1417).

On November 22, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the lower court
and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas (Ibid., pp. 18-22), which was opposed by private
respondent (Ibid., pp. 23-26). On December 12, 1974, petitioner filed its reply to the opposition (Ibid., pp. 27-30),
after which respondent Judge, in an Order dated February 17, 1975, denied the motion to dismiss (Ibid., pp. 34-36).

On March 3, 1975, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 37-40), but in an Order dated March 17,
1975, the same was denied by respondent Judge and so was the Second Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 42-
43), in an Order dated July 10, 1975 (Ibid., p. 44). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 1-10).

The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 1975, resolved to require the respondents
to answer and to issue a temporary restraining order (Ibid., p. 49). In compliance therewith, private respondent filed
its Answer on October 28, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 53-57). In the Resolution dated November 3, 1975, the parties were
required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 65). Petitioner filed its Memorandum on December 10, 1975
(Ibid., pp. 68-76), and private respondent on January 5, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 77-85). Petitioner raised four (4) issues, to
wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MATTER OF SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE IS A POLITICAL QUESTION;

3. WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 242 SUPERSEDED REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6128; AND

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

The instant petition is impressed with merit.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
(15 SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of
Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must
perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have
dismissed the case.

On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is administrative in nature
and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the government, and not in the courts whose power
is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).

Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be patties in a
civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since
private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge
should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders of

February 17, 1975, March 17, 1975 and July 10, 1975 of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 475
is DISMISSED. The restraining order previously issued by this Court is made permanent.
 PASIG CITY v
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

CITY OF PASIG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of
the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The
City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan
and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on
the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in
Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites
scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-
016) 3 and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention
of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. 4 According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.

In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two
municipalities. 5 Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.

The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the
plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast therein. 6 Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be
suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the
creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not
come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad
v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, 7 that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending
the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico
are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico.
Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. 8 Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such
barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 9 we held that

The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare.

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the
same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction
of the City of Pasig.

Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition
of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its
petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination
before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections, 10 we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the
fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us
cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so
that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli,
then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion.
Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and
indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to
recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary
dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND
No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the
creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered
held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and
the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 MARIANO v COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano,
Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner
assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized
city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and
the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or
forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between
the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions. 2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to
avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled
out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's
land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A.
No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of
fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its
exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we
are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
 Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should
be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a
means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as
in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To
require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code
is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a
vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral
type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be
the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco,
103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo
v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51
states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence.
The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which
provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
 No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive
terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay
decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998
and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal
mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit
the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering
that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall
thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing
districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the
bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting
R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede
legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index,
or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SAN NARCISO v MENDEZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R.

ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY,
FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA,
TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and FRANCISCA A.
BAMBA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region,
Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON;
COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U.
NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and
CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.

Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.

Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon,
by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero,
Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.

Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the
Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May
1959. 1

By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality
beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that "(t)he
conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House
of Representatives."

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil
Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the
respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices. 3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 4 the
petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent
powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner
municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties
and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San
Narciso.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special
defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given
life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from
questioning the creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San Andred had been in existence
since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo
warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State
acting through the Solicitor General. 6

On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer
action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.

On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had
become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of
the law, reading thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was
inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities
and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. 7

In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court 8 finally dismissed the petition 9 for lack of cause of action on what it
felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal
districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A.
7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied
petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue that in issuing the orders of 02 December 1991 and
17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be
attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional
act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11

Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of
Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their rights
and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved." 12 Evidently, then, the petitioners intend
to submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to
show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the inquiry is focused on the
legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit
proceeding. 14 It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" 15 and commenced by the Solicitor
General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may, under certain
circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the
court. 17 The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this
initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another." 18 While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of
the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality
or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.

At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the
Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act

No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend
that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had
acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of
Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order
No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost
thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of
the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the
failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can
abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding
20
assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider
the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in
fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created
in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than
six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded
the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case.
On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174
classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No.
33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative
order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San
Andres for the province of Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance
(adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made,
would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed
at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be
conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
 JIMENEZ v BAZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, VICE-MAYOR ROBINSON B.

LOMO, COUNCILORS TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANO ADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE
SULLANO, MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO, BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, and
ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, ROBINSON B. LOMO, TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANO ADORABLE, MARIO APAO,
ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO, MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO, BENJAMIN DANO, and
CRISPULO MUNAR, in their private capacities as taxpayer in the Province of Misamis Occidental and in the
Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and BENJAMIN C. GALINDO and BENHUR B. BAUTISTA, in
their private capacities as taxpayers in the Province of Misamis Occidental and the Municipality of Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL
REGION, OROQUIETA CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN through its MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD,
VICE-MAYOR BASILIO M. BANAAG, COUNCILORS CONCEPCION E. LAGA-AC, MIGUEL F. ABCEDE,
JUANITO B. TIU, CLAUDIO T. REGIL, ANICETO S. MEJAREZ NAZIANCINO PAYE, JOSE P. BANQUE,
NUMERIANO B. MARIQUIT, and FEDERICO QUINIMON, and THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
through the PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL and its members, VICE-GOVERNOR
FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, BOARD MEMBERS MARIVIC S. CHIONG, PACITA M. YAP, ALEGRIA V. CARINO,
JULIO L. TIU, LEONARDO R. REGALADO II, CONSTANCIO C. BALAIS, and ERNESTO P. IRA, and THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, through its Chairman, HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT through its Secretary, HON. LUIS SANTOS (now HON. CESAR SARINO), and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, through its Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE (now
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ), and The Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG (now HON. FRANKLIN DRILON),
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta
City, 1 affirming the legal existence of the Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of
its boundary for the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant
to 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The full text of the Order reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258

CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN,

IN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, and pursuant to the provisions of Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, there is hereby created, in the Province of Misamis
Occidental, a municipality to be known as the municipality of Sinacaban, which shall consist of the
 southern portion of the municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, more particularly described and
bounded as follows:

On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 84
30'W., 7,250 meters to point 2 which is on the bank of Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan
River branch 2,400 meters southwesterly to point 3, thence a straight line S 87 00' W, 22,550
meters to point 4, where this intersects the Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west,
by the present Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; and on the south by the present Jimenez-
Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of the municipal waters which the municipality of
Sinacaban shall have pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code, (Description
based on data shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion of Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).

The municipality of Sinacaban contains the barrios of Sinacaban, which shall be the seat of the
municipal government, Sinonoc, Libertad, the southern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the
sitios of Tipan, Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior, Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon, Kamanse,
Kulupan and Libertad Alto.

The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus the portion thereof included in the
municipality of Sinacaban.

The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist upon the appointment and qualification of the
mayor, vice-mayor, and a majority of the councilors thereof. The new municipality shall, however,
assume payment of a proportionate share of the loan of the municipality of Jimenez with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as may be outstanding on the date of its organization, the
proportion of such payment to be determined by the Department of Finance.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
forty-nine, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the fourth.

(SGD.) ELPIDIO
QUIRINO
President of the
Philippines

By the President:

(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTA

Executive Secretary

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of
Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, 3 based on the technical description in
E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of
Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.
This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated
February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows: 4

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until it intersects Tabangag Creek at the
back of the Macabayao Elementary School. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the
Macabayao River at upper Adorable. Follow the Macabayao River such that the barrio of
Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of Jimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente,
Donan, Estrella, Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban. (Emphasis added)

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, 5 the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held
that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no
power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), 134. 6 The Provincial Board denied in its
Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. 7

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its
Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and
the Executive Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8the
power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive
order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez
prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial
Board be enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void;
that the decision dated October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board be set aside for having been
rendered without jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be enjoined from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds by Sinacaban; that the Department of Budget and Management be enjoined from allotting public funds to
Sinacaban; and that the Executive Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision over said municipality.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the following:

A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal juridical entity, duly created in accordance with
law;

B. If not, whether it is a de facto juridical entity;

C. Whether the validity of the existence of the Municipality can be properly questioned in this action
on certiorari;

D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which had recognized the existence of the municipality for
more than 40 years is estopped to question its existence;

E. Whether the existence of the municipality has been recognized by the laws of the land; and

F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board had acquired finality.

On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding of this Court that the petition must be denied
and judgment is hereby rendered declaring a STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban
shall continue to exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision dated October
11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and
Jimenez, Misamis Occi. as null and void, the same not being in accordance with the boundaries
provided for in Executive Order No. 258 creating the municipality of Sinacaban; dismissing the
petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs and damages. With respect to the
counterclaim, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation survey of the boundary of
Sinacaban within 60 days from the time the decision shall have become final and executory and
another 60 days within which to submit their report from the completion of the said relocation survey.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself
even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before its existence was
questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same
being reserved to the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo
warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by
entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that any question as to the legal
existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160), which provides:
 Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC.
Hence this petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if
it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has
standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in
this case has been reiterated in a number of cases 9 later decided. However, we have since held that where a
municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its
creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 10 this Court considered the
following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban,
was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly
30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling
in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3)
the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court
and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed
to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets
of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24,
1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit
against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court,
as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part,
Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This
provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities. 11
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This
requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the
requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on
January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the Municipality
of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

Third. Finally, Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in
1950 the parties entered into an agreement whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory
of Jimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called barangays) therein mentioned.
What it says is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The
reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The
trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality
and consequently the question to which the municipality the barangays in question belong.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios belonged to Jimenez, while certain
other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the survey.
Jimenez contends, however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the agreement as embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises the question whether the Provincial
Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had the power to declare
certain barrios part of one or the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effect would be to amend the area as
described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban.

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the applicable law was 2167 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in
which such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned
shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the
municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the Executive Secretary],
whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities
situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an
agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the
Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an
administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of
boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment. 13 If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical
description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the
Provincial Board. Its action is in accordance with the Local Government Code of 1983, 79 of which provides that in
case no settlement of boundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province. In
1989, when the action was brought by Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The governing law is now the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), 118-119.

Jimenez's contention that the RTC failed to decide the case "within one year from the start of proceedings" as
required by 79 of the Local Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Article VIII, 15 of the
Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. For even granting that the court failed to decide
within the period prescribed by law, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the
judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 CAMID v OFFICE OF THE PRES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong,
Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as
actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming
about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court
four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its
legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree.

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As
discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive
Order No. 107.4

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had
failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his
powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special
civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having
been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.7

After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A
majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative
power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of
the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local
governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of
the Municipality of Andong.

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,11 suing as a private
citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the
Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to
serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its
own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen
(17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public
officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic)
honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of
Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim
Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means."16

In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the
Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive
Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics
Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059)
strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong,
and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the
immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18

The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates eighteen
(18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among
the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities
are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga
del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del
Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in
Compostela Valley.20

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing
municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially
in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As
appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG
to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support
to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the
internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim
Local Officials" of Andong.22

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already
been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is
our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the
municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the municipality of
San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as
unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads:

Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.25

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of
the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality.
This point shall be further explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not
a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of
factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids astonishing factual allegations pertaining to
the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has
had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function
of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.

The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles
governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may
exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford
title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection
on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly
incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England,
which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of
that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic
Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal
authority.

In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no
charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of
a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as
to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its
corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not
have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the
factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that
was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make
the necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
countenanced.

It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is
the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate
cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still
exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps
the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit
or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of
the Certification to Camids central argument is forlornly strained.

These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to
municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d)
of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of
Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves
as the municipalitys "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening.

The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing
out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was
declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders.
The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by
this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez
as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of
Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted
municipality.

This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its
sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and
our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations.

To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to
the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to
create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for many
years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in
actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including
Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President
Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which
had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful.

Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The
Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the
municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive
order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court
dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive
Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken
up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.38

In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the
Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was
not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a
municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de
facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at
the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that
an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but
only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41

Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been
organized prior to the Courts decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan
and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American
authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is
unconstitutional.43 But the Courts final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto corporation. 1awphi1.nt

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute
creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some
other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan
was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute
to give color of authority to its creation.44

The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate
powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the
relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of
Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to
the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential
promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo
Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo
Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial
action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the
Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal
personality, it can not be a party to any civil action."48

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential
treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres,
Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia.
Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of
the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for
lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.

In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal
status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at barthat San Andres was in
existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive
order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete
nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique
status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those
executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended
the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading of San
Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground
of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the
implication of the provision as follows:

Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d)
in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55

The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and
Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949
executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the
Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the
Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the
effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de
jure municipality." 58

The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised
in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in
this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a
municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity,
its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been
challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of
the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth
class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt
there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24,
1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit
against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court,
as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part,
Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.59 1awphi1.nt

From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled
that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but
not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was
recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal
defects to title these municipalities had labored under.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the
fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to
affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in
effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due
l^vvphi1.net

to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its
municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of
obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it
of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades
are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by
Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to
support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61thus obviously conceding that
the municipality is at present inoperative.
1awphi1.nt

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied
upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to
the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by
the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any
other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are
mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively.

How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the
DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling
in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG
certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities
enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through
statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen
(18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen
(18) other municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm
or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by
presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities
such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet
were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved
in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific
legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities
derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or
from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. 1a\^/phi 1.net

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a
hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of
the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and
Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably continue to
exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.

If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and
not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by
their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative
solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the
basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its
judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful
ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in,
and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 SEMA v COMELEC
EN BANC

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,

Respondents.

x------------------------x

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.[2]

The Facts

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato Cityand eight
[3]
municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created
under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is
not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held
in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao.MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is
hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

xxxx

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the
Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve
their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents:Provided, that
where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for
appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional
Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next
local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at
the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with
 law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato
as a part thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October
2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March
2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative
District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March
2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only
of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution
No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question
as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
[9]
with Cotabato City).

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the
exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the
COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the
status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No.
7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative
district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power
to create or reapportion legislative districts.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the
merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative,
not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot
with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as
representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she
was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen
added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district
for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not
reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power
to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not
meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of
a legislative district within a city.[13]

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her
claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment
on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v.
[14]
Salas stated that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160)
affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate
the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
 (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the
propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a
national law; and

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the province
contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking
into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which
encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c)
recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can
create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which
has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the
following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need
of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their
respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by
Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution
granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment
to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated
in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [18] Thus, Sema
proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards
x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of
RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause; and

(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively
abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007)
and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10
and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted
in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to
submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.

The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November
2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No.
177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of
Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by
Congress of the appropriate law.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits

 (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act
201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to
compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes
cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do
not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of
election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]

Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May
2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This
case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be
included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed
with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the
recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the
power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted
by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any
provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province,
or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of
a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same
time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the
negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and

fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among

the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,

and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a

party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent

territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one

representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment

of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting
x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
 This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts
is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent
membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its
organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the
Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people

of the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The
Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x
x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always
elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a
regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national
funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x x x.

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature
of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district
for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City

as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates
that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent

territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at

least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

 Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to

more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one

Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants

and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The

number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city,

whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission

on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

(Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is
automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further
support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot
provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.

The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces
of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayaoand providing for congressional representation in
the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative, thus:

The Constitution ordains:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and
twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province
shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment
within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact
territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,
through the creation of a province for each province shall have at least one member in the
House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a
province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory
thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to
 those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from
the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment
therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province

may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative

districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of

fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional

representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements. [32] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts
indirectly through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the
legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the
1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created
by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from
Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which
cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that each province shall have
at least one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional
principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any
other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a
province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of
Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress
has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon
its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census
taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first
legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that
[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160,
namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square
kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or
more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House
of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national
law provides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one

representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional
Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every
province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and

(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of
Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or
cities within the ARMM.

The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the
absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:

Justice Carpio:

So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their

own representatives [?]

Atty. Vistan II:[35]

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.

Justice Carpio:

So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore,

they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress

agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.

Justice Carpio:

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x

[only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x

to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?

Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.

xxxx

Justice Carpio:

So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000)

representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible,

correct?

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional
autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that
certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create
or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress
itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional
assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be
created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a province
created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual
membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide.Incidentally, in the present
14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of
Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at
least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves
only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need
now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new
provinces.

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article
X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin
its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the
framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the
ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the
creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of
municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as
mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and
barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates
that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative
powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly
and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative
district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of
Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
 ALVAREZ v GUINGONA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS
P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON.
DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON.
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his
capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, respondents.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed
by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.

Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the
Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.

Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required
under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.

Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with
Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo
Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government
and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.

On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were
conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable
report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.

On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was
approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.

Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was
introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.

On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee
submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator
Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member
of the Committee on Local Government.

On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as
Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered
voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering
that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.

The annual income of a local

government unit includes the IRAs

Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty
Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual
income in the following manner:

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for P 20,379,057.07

1991
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for P 21,570,106.87
1992
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P 15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P 13,109,560.47
===============

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average
annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.

The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates
Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income
but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part
of the income of Local Government Units.

It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.

Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income
requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and
decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of
substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but
not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila,
is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own
pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now
operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for
reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.7Availment of such
resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its
own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of
internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of
the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as
provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than
twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the
IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part
of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as
the source of much needed funds.

For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among
others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.

Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund
or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code
that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".12

Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when
it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in
Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants,
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Emphasis ours).14 Such order,
constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the
courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute,
or other laws.15

II

In the enactment of RA No. 7720,

there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243
was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on
April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only
of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative
process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.

Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and
duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the
Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee
on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action
on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of
the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx xxx xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into
consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it
would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
 House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. .
. .18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality.19Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 KAWALING v COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the
City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City
Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor."1

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16,
2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.4

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed
on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on
the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval
of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342),
this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional,
contending, in essence, that:
 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b)
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5

Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created
Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly
discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.

We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342.

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy
for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has
passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.8 This Court, however, may declare a
law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond
reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11

Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which
provides, inter alia:

"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." (Emphasis ours)

The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code),
thus:

"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria
set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends
that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall
not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the
original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such
division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.

Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already
qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which
we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,12 this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made
it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the
exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable,"13 and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical. "14

Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours)

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the
City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act
sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has
been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the
title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger.
Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An
Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of
Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two
municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein.15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect,16 and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."18

Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC
for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.

Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the
"approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz:

"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of
its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the
present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of
this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after
the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself
expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of
the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:

"SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general and local circulation."

The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on
September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the
publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the
reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its
approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication
is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule
the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well
within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.

In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:

"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."
(Emphasis ours)

Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from
the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix
"another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law.

Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with Section 65
(effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code.
This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject
should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we
stated in Taada:
 "ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on
the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise
provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)

To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication,
which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.

Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed
Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate
his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with
its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence.6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12thCongress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like the
Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner
League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the
League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-
intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as
Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds,
like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
 (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without
the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100
million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood
bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign
them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective
on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of
laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being
applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely
in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a
fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes.
Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they
prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the
letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the
cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section
450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality
into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress
cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a
city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations
in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through
a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent
Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress
become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the
next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills
had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the
filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at
the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no
adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities,
have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on
the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal
protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those
entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities,
even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their
income is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the
time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms,
Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at
a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
 We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and
may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples
are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent
to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings,
or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The
challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an
activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter
the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the
public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any
abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11thCongress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.
 TAN v COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA
MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE
HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents.

Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23,
1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for
January 3, 1986. Said law provides:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province
of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of
the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the
President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.

SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein provided,
the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.

SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly
mandated that
 See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.

Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis
for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:

SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and
income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)

Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court was in recess
and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986,
averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but
that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such
exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del N rte, namely: the Cities of Silay,
Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B.
Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional
issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they
asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have
rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.

Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial
petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-

... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist from
issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.

Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental
other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in
accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent
Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time
making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a
patent legal nullity;

And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to
desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of
such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).

Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any
official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.

During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this case (dated
December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla. Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer
for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require
respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the
challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said
law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of
the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to
enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they
submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del
Norte.

Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in
the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:

1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable
leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'.
It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive,
however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are
not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.

2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the
former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for
acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. ...

3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the
inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be
allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that
purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be
assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its
birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves.
To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even
frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the
majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local
autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an
accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned
from provisions in pari materia.

Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar.
Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the
new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations
that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new
province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser
than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that
Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of
Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that
a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of
canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of
Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the
total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall
be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del
Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations,
respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation
of the new province is now a "fait accompli."

In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to by the parties
herein or stand unchallenged.

Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros Occidental has not
disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986
as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental
dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be
directed by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should
not longer deserve further consideration.

Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation
of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill,
the following:

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural
boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing
an area of 285,656 hectares more or less. (Emphasis supplied).

However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the
boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as
follows:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and
constituted into a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L.
Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land area
as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area
and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.

Land Area

(Sq. Km.)

1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8

2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
 3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9

4. Manapla......................................................................112.9

5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5

6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6

7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0

8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4

9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5

10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3

11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)

This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve
him.

(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ

Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).

Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipality of Don Salvador
Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the
component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of
Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land
area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91).
One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the land area of Calatrava,
Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square
kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the total
land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla,
Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers
using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of
the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).

No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the original
provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and
twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of
Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the
first officials of the new province.

However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above provision. The
statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected."

It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the
new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit
that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation
of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should
have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites,
the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case
before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by
this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has
been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually rapid creation of the
instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and
discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever
branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter
inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if
such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal
be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply
would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought
to its attention.

On the merits of the case.

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more
significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at
bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided
or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain
and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of
Negros del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but
eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can
justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and
implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept
that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed,
respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended
to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and
disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from
one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.

We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and
wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not
the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of
judicial inquiry.

Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most
enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by
petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt
scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite
held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned
in the resolution of this case.

What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their
reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus
The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said
case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would
constitute the new municipality.

This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are
the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or
units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise
its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should
be correctly interpreted.

The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be
taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by
respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a
distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which We now consider
applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on
Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein
assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and
Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some
of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case.

Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present Court. The reasons in
the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views
then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains
persuasive value.

The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of
greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a
division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and
lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit
contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than
three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result
in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the
division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental
and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new
province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of
these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the
intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No.
3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the
plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval
of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to
participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in
the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat
the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa
to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other
people necessarily affected.

In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the
areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong
challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-
serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as
much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.

Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros
Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the
municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen
sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros
del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and
dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of
Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners,

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do
not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province
maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases
necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially
altered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary
substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit
which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the
contrary is true.

It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere
discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case
of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now
state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing
political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the
purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.

In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be
issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all
the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court
make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the
provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a
new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas
Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new
province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte
because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction
should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications
currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been
impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court
of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of
funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the
significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the
Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.

It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and
D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This
assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more
than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking
into account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del
Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the
province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is
not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is
even the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be
considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect,
and fallacious.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the
Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b)
touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p.
307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League
vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is
the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word
contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can
be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with
"land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature
(82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber
Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of
the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and
made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in
a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning
of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p.
909).

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow,
extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province
(such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.

Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the
introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve
"pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing
its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).

It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved
without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge
on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the
motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of
a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant
people.

Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and
even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to
preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful
commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the
hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy
destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the
petitioners herein.

WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.
 NAVARRO v ERMITA
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. G.R. No. 180050

BERNAL, and
RENE O. MEDINA, Present:
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NACHURA,
EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
President of the Philippines; Senate of BRION,
the Philippines, represented by the PERALTA,
SENATE PRESIDENT; House of BERSAMIN,
Representatives, represented by the DEL CASTILLO,
HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ABAD,
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, VILLARAMA, JR.,
representing the mother province of PEREZ,
Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR MENDOZA, and
GERALDINE ECLEO SERENO, JJ.
VILLAROMAN, representing the new
Province of Dinagat Islands,
Respondents,

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T.
MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,
HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY,
JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M.
LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M.
BAGUNDOL,
Intervenors.
Promulgated:

April 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:
 For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010
filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of
judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.

To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the
relevant antecedents

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).[2] On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the
Local Government Code (LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes.[4] With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial
officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.[5]

On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No.
175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.[6] The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.[7]

Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another
petition for certiorari[8] seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had
a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.

Constitution, Article X Local Government

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
 (i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision[9] granting the petition.[10] The Decision declared
R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the
creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of
its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, [t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being
beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the
law.[11]
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the
said motions.[14]

Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit
their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These
motions were eventually noted without action by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]

Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides

RESOLUTION NO. 8790

WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously

components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December
2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its
creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for
congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No.
8670 dated 16 September 2009;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al.
rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional
for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of
the Supreme Court;

WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of
Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the
candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4)
names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of
the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have
already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining
period before the elections on May 10, 2010.

NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the
Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:

a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system
configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate
provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte.

But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of
Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of Representatives,
Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the
names of the candidates for the said positions.

Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for
the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
District of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only
candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte,
will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the
candidates for the said position[s].

Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote
for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of]
 Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for
Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of
Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the whole Province of Surigao
del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice
Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the
elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will result in [a]
failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice
Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands)
of Surigao del Norte.

c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for
the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte
(with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxxx

SO ORDERED.

They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose
positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010
Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the
declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355.Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices
would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice
governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants
representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case
inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the
latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the
services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4)
projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12,
2010 Resolution would attain finality.

In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act
of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the
intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum
land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File
and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that
the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and
that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution,
citing several rulings[17] of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice
of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple
resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao
del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as
Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of
the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this
controversy.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.

At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry
of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our

esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for
reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the
May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by
the Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for
reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.[18] It
should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their
motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their
motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not
rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness
of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors
interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention
and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration
of the said resolution.

With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that
this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is
actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent
portion of the Resolution reads:

c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b
above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives,
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for
movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More
importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy
as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind,
there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.

It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way
back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this
case. While it may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than
real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain
finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would
only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or
adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply
have remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they have been elected.

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional cases are often public
actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to
this interest in the constitutional question raised.[19]
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with
finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the
May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique
circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because
their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of
such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them
being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for
protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not
only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this
controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20]The second exception attends this
case.

This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[21] where technicalities of
procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for
intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in
the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and
weight of the issues involved.

Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right
that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts
should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and
ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[22]

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. [24] In this case, the
compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be
adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the
correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this
manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to
decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the
first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.

It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The
criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three
criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.

Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts
from congressional debates are quoted hereunder

HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought

CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic
viability of the new local government unit, the new province?

xxxx

HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House
version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and
population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level
which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will naturally increase
because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being
converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be
able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the
economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.

Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for
overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the
provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will attract
immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the concern
of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling
them, Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand, you will never be able to become a
province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any reason
for economic viability.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?

 HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers

HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah,
square kilometers.

HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency
and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.

HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there
is only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on
subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency.

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.

HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer
there precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one
man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are needed.

Secondly, when you say delivery of basic services, as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are
sections of the province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because
they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by
compressing the land area and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying
to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver basic services
and to make it more efficient in administration.

CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able
to do it without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.

HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go
on a minimum income level, then we say, this is the trigger point at which this administration
can take place.[25]

Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as
provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.

For a Barangay:

LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous
territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays
may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above
requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted
to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate
action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the
sangguniang bayan concerned.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang

panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.

(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress,
subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.

(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous
cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the
cultural community is located.

(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:

(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in
municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may
be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population
of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a
barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than
the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.

Municipality:

LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred
thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers
as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by

metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the
municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular
municipalities.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not
be created unless the following requisites are present:

(i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as
certified by NSO; and

(iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers,
as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.

City:

LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless
the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00),
for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring
income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with
an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements.All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.

Provinces:

LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
 (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring
income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an
area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land
area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component
cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands,
it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if
the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC,
although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of
the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity
of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of
local autonomy.

Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the national government to the local government units.

This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR[26] and in the Whereas clauses of
Administrative Order No. 270,[27] which read

WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals;

WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to
convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all the
provisions of the said Code; and

WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the
concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as
provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the
implementing rules and regulations; x x x

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010
Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an
intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist
of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made
to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with
contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-
reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential
option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is
scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats
the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area
requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.

Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,[28] with respect to his

CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.

HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished
Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two
years ago and has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the
only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor
the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government.

So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the
creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.

At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have
said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen.
Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this
bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in
writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold
of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new
province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.

Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother
province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.

So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create
another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen
to Palawan? We wont have one million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be
about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the development will be
hampered.

Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2,
1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.

On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:

Dear Congressman Chiongbian:

We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House
No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No.
155, which is pending for second reading.

Thank you and warm regards.

Very truly yours,

That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate has
adopted another position.

So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the only bill
that is involving the present Local Government Code that we are practically considering; and this
will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be
[an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to manifest
that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other provinces. That
the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the province, lets say, on
the basis of the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I dont see
why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are
seeking.

So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved
version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the Conference
Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill. And they have been
approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the
cudgel of the House approved version.

So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the wish of
the House, but because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and
that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with
regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we
not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to
create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are
far away from civilization.

Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their
situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial
conglomerations.One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is
in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to
travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty
kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance. And from the
North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they
have enough resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I am after their
welfare in the future.Who am I to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am
looking at the future development of these areas.

As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee
what the creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it
will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now,
they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the
AID people are asking me, What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you
need it? Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine
those people have to travel that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as
from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger
than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they dont have the population
because thats a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more opportunities here.

So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the
development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am
concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my
people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved because
we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the
house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on
top of that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take
that into account.

Thank you for giving me this time to explain.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the
legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there
was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was incorporated in toto,
but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator
Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced.

But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book,
Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the
objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We
will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an
open mind definitely when we come into it.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic
stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our province is
quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts and I feel it should be five
now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed proposing to divide the
province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those
areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that
is RagayGulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay,
very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested with
NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.

Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to
these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial
governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would like to stimulate
growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where
administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in the law where maybe
we can treat it with special considerations.

Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as
provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only composed
of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao,
there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in
Batanes province?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.

CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one
congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga
ako ngayon.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of
63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe thats one stimulant where
growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we
hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just leave it to
legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like to divide, we
submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila
yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government
Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they
will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
 So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a
generalization.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because
of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the
area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a particular area, say, to a
municipality, achieve the same purpose?

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually,
tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20%
of the area.

Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and
Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six,
but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a
bigger area, very much bigger.

That is the budget in process.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with
sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very carefully. [29]

The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest
intention of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas
by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the

national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and
local revenue.[30]

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the
law,[31] or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature
of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be
deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of
members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533[32] of the LGC. As Section
533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby
ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also
mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit
 Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain
decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337,
had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of
the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of
local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with
respect to the creation of provinces.Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee
in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the
chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by
the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of
provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly
stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To
be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all
the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the
LGC when the IRR was formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction,
entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,[34] but to legislative construction as well, especially with the
inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight
Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of
the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to
be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can
only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into
law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
 Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a
province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by
necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is
not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.Rather than looking at the
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is
ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As
we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal
branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great
departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to
interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts
ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product
of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is
infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on
October 29, 2010;

2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20,
2010;
 3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May
12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election
of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and

4. The petition is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 ORDILLO v COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial
Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue),
Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay
Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and
DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and
REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B.
BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO
GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and
Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO,
FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN
BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO
MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM,
OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be
included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then, alone,
legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991. : nad

Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued
a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive
Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. - nad

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing
the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting
the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force
and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and
the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents
as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case. - nad

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then,
be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly
whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the
cities composing the Autonomous Region. chan roble s virtual law lib rary
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only
from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies the
Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people. :-c ralaw

Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the
Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of
the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article
XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's
(Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code).
If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it
takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a
larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region
being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the
Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone
and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was
never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I,
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao
and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city
above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000;
Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio
City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990
Census (Manila Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied
with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as
Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the
respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions
which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region. :-cralaw

To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the
case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes
approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in
all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion stated in his
Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
 ". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as mandated by
R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province
of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic
Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of
the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous
region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on
whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that
only one province or one city is to constitute it.
chanro bles virtual law lib rary

Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be
included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections,
insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the
Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order
No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared
to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
 TANADA v TUVERA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-
315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
 e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
 MIRANDA v AGUIRRE
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V.

BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in
his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as
Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial
Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial
Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela
into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago
ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE
CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent
thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory
of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes
and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
 Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute
the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any
Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to
vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other
elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such
provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of
provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a
proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the
petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago
City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also
contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The
Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it
is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component
city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of
Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member
of the provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed
qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local
Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They
defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a
result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule
that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result
of its enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present
petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent
of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of
Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as
mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A.
No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of
Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are
residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of
their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on
the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its
appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines
judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable
issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v.
Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a
plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have
the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply
with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The
proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution
need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to
provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the
Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units belongs to Congress.8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which
the Constitution vested in Congress.9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate
of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from
an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of
Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the
downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close
analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator -
- - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate the
rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people
power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in
the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of
the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the
local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one,
the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed
under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of
the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that
will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out
these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-classified Santiago City
from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational
would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the political culture and
administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent
component city will revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial
land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or
advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal
revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue
solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such
as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A.
No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds
for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because
of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City
Governments share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c],
R.A. No. 7160).
 The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to
ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope
of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A.
No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial
requirements with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No.
7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No.
7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of
R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city
(Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise,
the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No.
7160).

It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a
plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not
be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the
status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially
diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or
LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date.

x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the
political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A.
No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This
power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite
clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in
the status of Santiago as a city.Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was
a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from
the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as
the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if
the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government
unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x."
 With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the
Constitution imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be
approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the
said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These
requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite
of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more
plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the
contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by
a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said
law or ordinance fixes another date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the
Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area
are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence,
section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested
by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is
required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the
pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess
committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct
people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that
these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality
concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate
the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few
politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of
its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed,
Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2)
years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators
expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been
no significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the
downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say
the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city
that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the
province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they
voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the
Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a
plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was
called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the amendment
"after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee Report
No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only
the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN
AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its
principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of
the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As
an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a local
political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an island
in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions
in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision
over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which
is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by
the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to
convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No. 971
of the Committee on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of
House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of
interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we were
with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years
ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we are deleting that
word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on
what happened between then and now that has made us decide that the City of Santiago should cease to be
independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the
provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a
majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some
degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political will, then so
be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I
will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment is
that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a
plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were
opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city -- is
that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent
city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the
matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on
January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law
takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader -- is that, at
this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be added
to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the
provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in
the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial
leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not the
whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency,
the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to
fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be
given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two-
and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that phrase-- the
citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are
changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the
conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by
Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill
and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a
component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
 This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming from
the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that provision wherein
we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting that
this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the members
of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a
plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only
to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is
concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this is the best
compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE
SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF
THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A
MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE
WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL
CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my
amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela --
but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a
resident and registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that
we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters
affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from
Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly
become his great fan for the evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to
be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the
province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think
that we should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual
amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on House
Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of
the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a
plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of
Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking
down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose
behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the
time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other
officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-
President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte
was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor
Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery
was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte
during the elections - the unashamed use of naked power and resources - contributed in no small way to arousing peoples
power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino
today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of,
viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally
void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the
Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three
cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra,
Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and
Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution
that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros
Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the
whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the
whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to
only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.

Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when
allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component cities without need
of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the
election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment
to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly
situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component
cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent
component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered
independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration
by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to
vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of
San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and
prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It
is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote
in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.

It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of
Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship
speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was
consistent with its status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali
Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining xxx where voters
of one component city can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another component
city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other
charters of component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist
from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
 LATASA v COMELEC
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003]

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO

SUNGA, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to challenge the
resolution issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27,
2001 in SPA Case No. 01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa,
respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due course to the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur
Province in the May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted,
and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on September 8,
2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of
Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was
mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath
as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14,
2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had
already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running
for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the
said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
[1]

that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor
of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as
mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false
[2]

representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001elections since this will be
the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
 Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001. [3]

On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a
violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.[4]

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001, which remained unacted upon
[5]

until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex
Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers
From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected
Mayor if He Wins the Elections. Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner
[6]

on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent
Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion which essentially sought the annulment of
[7]

petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.

On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor
of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after [8]

an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing partys remedies after proclamation would be to file a
petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is
something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning
that petitioner himself was already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible
to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy, after the phrase I
am eligible, petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:
*
Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor. [9]

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate
to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
[10]

The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of
procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional mandate: whether
or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created
City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those
who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it
limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that
the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom
of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact,
they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further re-election for local and legislative
officials. The members, instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
[11]

Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term:

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this
draft Constitution, we are recognizing peoples power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new
kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom
they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who
have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very skilled and good at
legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly
competent and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for
Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.

Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of congressional or
senatorial seats. We want to broaden the peoples choice but we are making prejudgment today because we
exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office that the
officials must have not have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the future
participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may be only in some areas, but we are saying that they
are going to be barred from running for the same position.

Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his skills
and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he
is going to be barred from the same kind of public service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with respect to
many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their
country.

If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let
us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that
their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after
serving the public for number of years.[12]

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas
Ople stated during the deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent re-
elections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in
their positions and to accumulate these powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x[13]

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government
post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. [14]

In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.However, he asserts that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality.
Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying
for the same local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit
or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land are shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
island. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. [15]

Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this
[16]

reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local
government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is
based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the
local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government unit concerned; and

(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions;
and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). [17]

On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:

Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a component city to be
known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x

Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall
continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected
officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.

As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes and
bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for
the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are
the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon this Court involving
the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who became the mayor
[18]

by operation of law and who served the remainder of the mayors term should be considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Private
respondent in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor,
he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more
terms. This Court therein held that when private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the
incumbents death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served
a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must be one
for which [the official concerned] was elected.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the
position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local government unit. The nature of the
responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor
does not hold office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case, petitioner,
upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, continued to hold office as chief
executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and economic rights
of Digos as local government unit, but no substantial change occurred as to petitioners authority as
chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor
[19]

from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and
discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an
election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and
declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to
the order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had
already served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner therein cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May
1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of
the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily
relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed
office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive
of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court was confronted with the issue of whether or not an
[20]

assumption to office through a recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-
term limit rule. Private respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive terms as
mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his opponent. In June
1998, his opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, private
respondent won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the ground that he
had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.This Court held therein that private
respondent cannot be construed as having been elected and served for three consecutive terms. His
loss in the May 1998 elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a private citizen. The
same, however, cannot be said of petitioner Latasa in the present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC, the principal issue was whether or not private respondent
[21]

Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa
convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent
mayor, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the ground
that he cannot run for the said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that
the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and
that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before
the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service
of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before
the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived
as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively.Indeed, the law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of
the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC, he should be
[22]

deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held
in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the candidate with
the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. As an obiter, the Court
merely mentioned that the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be
said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise
or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected. The same, however, cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for
an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to
hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be
declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election a nullity. In the
[23]

present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335
votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that
[24]

particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
which should be filled by succession. [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.