bookletATA27 v2

Aim of this handbook
Purpose:
Prevent unnecessary removals of ELAC and SEC thanks to a
better understanding of:
o ELAC and SEC systems (EFCS)

o ATA 27 Failure message and ECAM Warning generation
Provide guidelines and tips to the Maintenance team for a

quicker and more efficient fault resolution
Please note:
This handbook is valid for the A320 Family aircraft.
These instructions do not amend or supersede any

information contained in Trouble Shooting Manual and Aircraft
Maintenance Manual.
This document will not be updated on regular basis.
Enquiries related to this handbook should be addressed to:
Airbus Customer Services

Flight Control Systems A320 Family
SEEL5
DL-CE-DPT-SEEL5@airbus.com
1
REVISION INFORMATION / CONTENT
Revision information:
New or revised paragraph/pages are highlighted by a vertical bar in the left

hand margin of the table of content (page 3 and 4).
This booklet contains:
A reminder on computer reset with caution and method (Chapter 2.).
A reminder on how to find the adequate TSM task corresponding to a

given fault (Chapter 3.)
A method (guideline) to maximise efficiency of the ELAC/SEC system

trouble-shooting (Chapter 4.)
Recommendations applying in case of difficult and lengthy trouble-

shooting (Chapter 5).
Many examples of typical failure cases illustrating these general advices

(See Index of Examples in page 6 & 7).
2
CONTENT
Table of content Page
0 Index of examples
1 Introduction
1.1 EFCS architecture 9
1.2 Maintenance feature 10
1.3 Available maintenance information 12
1.4 Glossary 14
2 Computer Reset
2.1 General consideration 16
2.2 Reset method 17
3 Find the correct TSM task

3.1 Identification of the correct TSM task
o How to proceed 20
o Tips 21
3.2 Fault Examples
o Failure Message potential trouble makers 22
Elevator servocontrol faults
Aileron and spoiler servocontrol faults
IR1 Failure
o Correlation with the adequate E/W 25
F/CTL ELAC2 PITCH FAULT & F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT
CHECK PRIORITY WIRING
o Flight Control page display and Trouble-Shooting 28
4 Advanced Trouble-Shooting guidelines

4.1 Advanced T/S procedure
o Why an advanced T/S procedure? 31
o Advanced procedure flowchart 32
3
CONTENT
Page
4 Advanced Trouble-Shooting guidelines (cont)

4.2 Pre-analysis
o Specific cases not requiring T/S 34
AFS: ELAC x
AFS: ELAC 2 with APU under MMEL
ALT LAW with APU under MMEL
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT with SEC2 under MEL
Discriminate reset & genuine failure
ALT LAW consecutive to computer reset
ACCLRM fault with ELAC1 / SEC2 / SEC1 under MEL
Aileron & Spoiler servocontrol POS transducer fault under MEL
o PFR verification & cleaning 42
4.3 Detailed analysis
o Faults without Failure Message 45
Pressure Switch issue
o How to use PLR and AIRMAN 47
Descriptions
Example 1: Fault linked to elevator servocontrol
Example 2: Fault linked to ADR
Example 3: Fault linked to spoiler servocontrol
Example 4: Multiple XDCR failures
o TFU linked to a TSM task 53
5 Difficult Trouble-Shooting
5.1 General recommendations
o Intermittent failure 56
o Wiring check 57
5.2 Typical faults
o Discrete interface / grounded signal 59
o Damaging failure 61
o F/CTL ALTN LAW & F/CTL DIRECT LAW 63
5.3 Useful tool for T/S
o Swapping tool (bundle) 68
4
0
Index of examples
5
Index of examples
E/W or Maint. Status Failure Message Refer to page:
F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT L B AIL MODE VLV 33CE3 62/63
ELAC1 COM OR WIRING FROM L B AIL

F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT 25
POS XDCR 33CE3
ELAC1 MON OR WIRING FROM L B AIL
F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT 25
POS XDCR 33CE3
F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT L B AIL POS XDCR 33CE3 25
F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT L(R) B(G) AIL POS XDCR 33CEx 42
F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT ELAC2 AIL ORDER DISAGREE 44
F/CTL ALTN LAW multiple failure message 39/42/64/65/66/67

F/CTL DIRECT LAW multiple failure message 64/65/66/67
F/CTL ELAC/SEC x FAULT ELAC/SEC x 39
ELAC2 OR INPUT OF CAPT ROLL CTL
F/CTL ELAC2 FAULT 44
SSTU 4CE1
F/CTL ELACx FAULT No Failure message 46/47
ELAC2 OR WIRING FROM L G ELEV
F/CTL ELAC2 PITCH FAULT 24
POS XDCR 34CE1
ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV
POS XDCR 34CE3
ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM R ELEV POS
MON XDCR
F/CTL ELACy PITCH FAULT No Failure message 46/47
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT L G ELEV POS XDCR 34CE1 24
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3 29
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT

No failure message but L G/R Y servo is
with SEC2 under MMEL and 37
boxed on status display
only one engine running
6
Index of examples
E/W or Maint. Status Failure Message Refer to page:
ELAC/SEC x COM/MON OR BUS3/2
F/CTL Maint. Status 26
FROM IR1/2/3
F/CTL Maint. Status IR1/2/3 - BUS3/2 26
F/CTL Maint. Status IR1/2/3 26

SEC2 OR WIRING FROM L G ELEV
POS XDCR 34CE1
ELAC/SEC x COM/MON OR BUS3/2
FROM ADR1/2/3
F/CTL Maint. Status ADR1/2/3 - BUS3/2 50
F/CTL Maint. Status ADR1/2/3 50
F/CTL maint. Status CHECK PRIORITY WIRING 28

SEC1 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
F/CTL maint. status 44
ACCLRM 1 12CE1
ELAC1 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
ACCLRM 2 12CE2
SEC2 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
ACCLRM 3 12CE3
ELAC2 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
ACCLRM 4 12CE4
F/CTL SIDESTICK PRIORITY CHECK PRIORITY WIRING 28
F/CTL SIDESTICK PRIORITY +
CHECK PRIORITY WIRING 28
F/CTL maint. Status
F/CTL SPLR FAULT L (R) SPLRx POS ERROR 31CEx 51
F/CTL SPLR FAULT R(L) SPLRx POS XDCR 3yCEz 25/42/51
SEC2 COM OR WIRING FROM R
F/CTL SPLR FAULT 25
SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4
SEC2 MON OR WIRING FROM R
F/CTL SPLR FAULT 25
SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4
F/CTL SPLR FAULT R SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4 25
AFS: ELAC x 35/36
7
1
Introduction
8
EFCS Description
EFCS architecture
9
EFCS Description
Maintenance features
3
2 ELAC
2
ELAC
1 ELAC
1
ELAC SEC
EFCS 1 FCDC 1 FCDC 2 EFCS 2
FWC, CFDIU
ECAM Warning Failure message

(E/W) generation generation
Failure Message and ECAM Warning (E/W) are

defined by each FCDC (in parallel) based on
information from all ELACs and SECs.
Failure Message and E/W are different whether the FAULT is

detected by one or more computers.
This correlation is enabled by the FCDCs.
10
EFCS Description
COM / MON construction

Background:
ELACs and SECs consist of 2 units completely segregated.
Each unit acquires sensors / peripherals and computes independently
the servocontrol orders (Aileron, Spoiler and Elevator). However, each
units has a specific function:
- COM unit is in charge of the servocontrol COMMAND
(computed order is sent to the servocontrol).
- MON unit is in charge of the servocontrol MONITORING
(computed order is not sent to the servocontrol but is used to
check the servocontrol movement and servoing achieved by
COM unit).
Benefits for maintenance:
As each unit of the ELACs & SECs receives and monitors sensors
/inputs independently, hence, the FCDCs receive the inputs from 10
different units. This enables a more accurate fault correlation.
3
2 ELAC
2
ELAC
1 ELAC
1
ELAC SEC
COM
MON
EFCS 1 FCDC 1 FCDC 2 EFCS 2
Failure Message and E/W are different whether the FAULT is

detected by one or several computers.
This correlation is enabled by the FCDCs.
11
Available Maintenance Information
Fault Symptoms
A fault is characterized by two levels of information (symptoms):
E/W and status display: The purpose of those indications is to

inform the flight crew about system failure. They are not
designed for Trouble Shooting purpose.
Failure Message: They are intended to the maintenance staff.
Maintenance staff has to focus on Failure Message to
initiate the Trouble Shooting, not on the E/W.
Trouble Shooting shall preferably be initiated using the

Failure Message and not using the E/W or information
from the lower ECAM F/CTL page.
NOTE
ECAM Warnings could be useful for maintenance

team providing that they are adequately correlated
with Failure Messages.
12
Available Maintenance Information
Trouble-Shooting Data (TSD)

Background:
For many systems, analysis of the TSD enables to provide
complementary information on the failure. However, EFCS has
been built so as to provide the most accurate level of information in
the failure message.
Example of EFCS TSD decoding:
TROUBLESHOOTING DATA
1435 27-93-34 UTC / ATA chapter number

FAIL 01 1 0 02 0A.3F.36
INP1 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx FAIL (failure details):
INP2 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx -01: failure number within the last flight leg
STS1 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx -1: failure counter (number of occurrence)
STS2 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx -0: external failure
STS3 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx -02: FWC flight phase
STS4 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx -0A.3F.36: byte1.byte2.byte3 of failure
code
Decoding of the failure code: 0A.3F.36
ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV POS XDCR 34CE3
The failure code is the exact translation of the failure message in a

coded language. It does not contain additional data.
The best and sufficient entry point to trouble-shoot an EFCS fault is

the failure message (PFR, PLR, LLR) properly correlated with the
applicable ECAM Warning.
13
Glossary
ACCLRM Accelerometer
ACS Alternating Current Supply
ADR Air Data Reference
AFS Automatic Flight System
AIL Aileron
AP Auto Pilot
CFDIU Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit
CFDS Centralized Fault Display System
DMC Display Management Computer
E/W ECAM Warning
EFCS Electrical Flight Control System
ELAC Elevator Aileron Computer
ELEV Elevator
F/CTL Flight Control
FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrator
FDIU Flight Data Interface Unit
FWC Flight Warning Computer
IR Inertial Reference
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
MEL Minimum Equipment List
P/B Push Button
P/SW Pressure Switch
PFR Post Flight Report
PLR Previous Leg Report
PTU Power Transfer Unit
SEC Spoiler Elevator Computer
SERVO Servo control
SV Solenoid Valve
T/S Trouble Shooting
TFU Technical Follow-up
TSD Trouble Shooting Data
TSM Trouble Shooting Manual
VLV Valve
XDCR Transducer
14
2
Computer Reset
15
Computer Reset
2.1) General considerations
Computer reset shall not be considered as a trouble-shooting

action. Reset might enable to clear intermittent failure permitting
to dispatch the aircraft and thus having a positive effect at short
term on the aircraft operational reliability.
However, reset is not a durable fix and risk of failure re-

occurrence is very high. Refer to Intermittent failure page 57.
In general, unless failure is recorded in the SIL 00-028,

Airbus encourage operators to address the fault at the
earliest convenient opportunity in accordance with the
applicable TSM task.
16
Computer Reset
2.2) Reset method
Some F/CTL failures are latched by the flight control computers. These
failures might require reset with low hydraulic system pressures (all 3
systems).
Reset method vs E/W Refer to TSM 27-00-00-810-818-A
E/W Reset method
- Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems) (*)

F/CTL ELACx FAULT (*)
- ELAC C/B reset >5s or P/B reset (OFF then ON)
- Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems) (*)

F/CTL SECx FAULT (*)
- SEC C/B reset >5s or P/B reset (OFF then ON)
F/CTL ALT LAW - Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems)

F/CTL DIRECT LAW - ELAC C/B reset >5s or P/B reset (OFF then ON)
F/CTL SIDE STICK PRIORITY - ELAC P/B reset (OFF then ON)
F/CTL FCDCx FAULT - FCDC C/B reset > 5s
Other ECAM Warning - ELAC or SEC P/B reset (OFF then ON) (**)
(*) If fault is experienced during safety test (at power up)

(**) ELAC or SEC reset depending on the computer in charge of concerned surface servoing refer
to page 9.
C/B list
Computer Applicable C/B
15CE1 (Normal supply)

ELAC 1 16CE1 (Stand by supply): For electrical shut down, this C/B must be open if at
least one hydraulic system is still pressurized.
ELAC 2 15CE2
21CE1 (Normal supply)

SEC 1 22CE (Stand by supply): For electrical shut down, this C/B must be open if at
least one hydraulic system is still pressurized.
SEC 2 / 3 21CE2 / 21CE3

FCDC 1/2 20CE1 / 20CE2
17
3
Find the correct TSM

task
18
Find the correct TSM task
3 .1
Identification of the
correct TSM task
19
3.1) Identification of the correct TSM task
How to proceed
Refer to: Failure

Enter the Failure Message in Message = potential
AirN@v trouble-makers p23
to 25
If necessary, select the Refer to: p21

TSM task corresponding to
the Class of the Failure
Message
Make sure the Failure

Message is associated with This enables to take advantage of the
the correct E/W FCDC correlation capabilities.
(each couple Failure Message + E/W
has a specific TSM task)
Find the appropriate TSM Refer to: Correlation with the

task adequate E/W p21 / p26-27
How to use AirN@v
In AirN@v, use the advanced tools: Start Troubleshooting

and open the submenu CFDS Fault Messages or Fault
Pattern. Then follow the above procedure.
20
3.1) Identification of the correct TSM task
Tips
Differentiate class1 an class2 messages:

A same failure message might be either:
Class 1 Failure Messages associated with an ECAM Warning
Class 2 Failure Messages associated with a maintenance status F/CTL
Check failure symptoms of the selected TSM task:
Fault
symptoms
21
3 .2
Fault examples
This paragraph aims at illustrating why it is essential to make

sure TSM task applies to the reported fault symptoms. This
enables to direct maintenance crew towards the most probable
trouble-makers.
Failure message potential trouble makers

o Elevator servocontrol faults
o Aileron & Spoiler servocontrol faults
o IR1 Failure
Correlation with the adequate E/W

o F/CTL ELAC2 PITCH FAULT & F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT
o CHECK PRIORITY WIRING
Flight Control page and trouble-shooting
22
3.2) Fault examples: Failure Message potential trouble makers
Elevator servocontrol faults
Failure messages associated with L G servocontrol piston rod transducer
Fault
Case detected Failure Message Most probable component involved
by
ELAC2 OR WIRING
L G ELEV ELAC 2 ELAC 2 or wiring to
1 ELAC 2 FROM L G ELEV SERVO XDCR first terminal block
POS XDCR 34CE1 SEC2
SEC2 OR WIRING
L G ELEV ELAC 2 SEC 2 or wiring to
2 SEC 2 FROM L G ELEV
SERVO XDCR first terminal block
POS XDCR 34CE1 SEC2
Servocontrol or
ELAC 2 and L G ELEV POS XDCR L G ELEV ELAC 2
3 SEC 2 34CE1 COM E2/S2 SERVO XDCR wiring to first
SEC2 terminal block
Note: L G ELEV SERVO XDCR = Left Green Servocontrol Transducer
In general, each failure message incriminates the LRUs and/or the

wiring which is the most likely at the origin of the FAULT.
NOTE
If ELAC2 and SEC2 detect the same FAULT (case 3), the FAULT
comes from the servo transducer or the common part of the wiring.
Avoid computer removal.
23
Aileron & Spoiler servocontrol faults
Failure messages associated with AIL L B servo piston rod transducer
Fault Most probable component

Case detected Failure Message involved
by
ELAC 1 ELAC1 COM OR WIRING FROM L B ELAC 1 COM or wiring to first terminal
1 COM AIL POS XDCR 33CE3 block
ELAC1 ELAC1 MON OR WIRING FROM L B ELAC1 MON or wiring to first terminal
2 MON AIL POS XDCR 33CE3 block
ELAC1
Servocontrol or wiring to first
3 COM & L B AIL POS XDCR 33CE3
terminal block
MON
Failure messages associated with R SPLR 5 servo piston rod transducer
Fault Most probable component

Case detected Failure Message involved
by
SEC2 COM OR WIRING FROM R SEC2 COM or wiring to first terminal
1 SEC2 COM
SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4 block
SEC2 MON OR WIRING FROM R SEC2 MON or wiring to first terminal
2 SEC2 MON
SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4 block
SEC2 COM Servocontrol or wiring to first

3 & MON
R SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4
terminal block
In general, each failure message incriminates the LRUs and/or the wiring
which is the most likely at the origin of the FAULT.
NOTE
If both units of computer detect the same FAULT (case 3), the FAULT
comes from the servo transducer or the common part of the wiring.
Avoid computer removal.
24
IR1 Failure
If there is a failure of the IR1 or IR1 wiring, three different Failure Messages can be
elaborated by the FCDC depending on where the Fault is located and which
computers detect the fault.
IR1 network structure:

ELAC 1 SEC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 2
COM COM COM COM

MON MON MON MON
SEC 3
First BUS 3 BUS 2

terminal
block IR1
Failure messages built by the FCDC:
Most probable component

Case IR1 Fault detected by Failure Message
involved
One computer unit ELAC1 COM OR Computer or wiring to
1 Ex: ELAC1 COM BUS3 FROM IR1 first terminal block
Two computer units on the same

IR1 or wiring to first
2 BUS IR1 BUS3
terminal block
Ex: ELAC1 COM & SEC 1 COM
Two computers on BUS3 and two

3 computer on BUS2
IR1 IR1
Each Failure Message incriminates the LRU and/or the wiring which
is the most likely at the origin of the FAULT.
25
3.2) Fault examples: Correlation with the adequate E/W
F/CTL ELAC2 PITCH FAULT & F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT
Fault
ECAM
Case detected Most probable component involved
Warning
by
F/CTL ELAC2 L G ELEV ELAC 2 ELAC 2 or wiring to

1 ELAC 2
PITCH FAULT SERVO XDCR first terminal block
SEC2
L G ELEV ELAC 2 SEC 2 or wiring to first

2 SEC 2 F/CTL
SERVO XDCR terminal block
SEC2
These logics and design principles have been used to ELAC

elaborate applicable TSM
ELAC2 and F/CTL ELEV L G ELEV 2 Servocontrol or wiring
3 tasks.SEC
Each fault symptom corresponds to a specific TSM task
2 SERVO FAULT SERVO XDCR to first terminal block
SEC2
Correlating failure message with the corresponding ECAM Warning aims

at identifying the best T/S task.
NOTE
1. In case of F/CTL ELEVATOR SERVO FAULT, no computer shall be

removed (in accordance with TSM).
2. If the PFR shows F/CTL ELAC2 PITCH FAULT E/W followed by
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT E/W, this indicates SEC2 has
subsequently detected a FAULT on the same servo. Accordingly,
fault comes from the servocontrol or the common part of the wiring.
For FAULT correlation, use preferably the F/CTL ELEV SERVO
FAULT E/W as this will lead you to a more accurate Trouble
Shooting task.
26
3.2) Fault examples: Correlation with the adequate E/W
CHECK PRIORITY WIRING
Case Detected by Failure Message ECAM Warning Probable cause
At least, one CHECK PRIORITY F/CTL SIDE STICK

1 ELAC WIRING PRIORITY
ELAC1, ELAC2, wiring
At least, one CHECK PRIORITY SEC1, SEC2, SEC3,

2 SEC WIRING
F/CTL
wiring
At least, one
CHECK PRIORITY F/CTL SIDE STICK Common wiring, push
3 ELAC and one
WIRING PRIORITY and F/CTL button
SEC
In this case, all components of the system can

be involved. But it is more probable that the
In this case, ELAC FAULT comes from the common part of the
removal shall be system: push button or common wiring.
avoided
These logics and design principles have been used to elaborate applicable TSM
tasks. Each fault symptom corresponds to a specific TSM task.
Correlating failure message with the corresponding ECAM Warning

aims at identifying the best T/S task.
27
3.2) Fault examples: Flight Control page display and Trouble-Shooting
Mode monitoring on pitch axis

Interpretation of the information supplied by
the F/CTL page
UTC PH ATA WARNING

1406 02 270000 F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT
UTC PH ATA FAULT MESSAGE
1406 02 279334 L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3
Failure Message incriminating

the Left Blue Elevator mode
Left Green Elevator Servo transducer
Control boxed on the F/CTL
page status display
Failure message provides the correct information for Trouble Shooting (L B Servo
faulty). However the L G servo is boxed on the F/CTL page.
Why L G servo is boxed on the F/CTL page?

Due to the failed L B Elev mode transducer, ELAC2 and SEC2 are not able to
check that the L B servo is correctly in damping mode. As per design, it has
been chosen not to actuate the L G servo to avoid possible force fighting with
the L B servo.
Trouble-shooting shall not be initiated using Status display on the F/CTL

page. The maintenance staff has to use the failure message.
28
4
Advanced Trouble-
Shooting guidelines
29
Advanced Trouble-Shooting guidelines
4 .1
Advanced T/S
procedure
Why an Advanced T/S procedure?

Advanced procedure flowchart
30
4.1) Advanced T/S procedure
Why an advanced procedure?
Some failures, particularly intermittent ones, might lead to

different fault patterns notably depending on their duration,
nature, etc ...
For instance, an intermittent failure may not be systematically

detected by all the involved computers inducing inaccurate fault
correlation and thus rendering trouble-shooting more difficult.
Also, opportunity has been taken to document specific fault

symptoms that might cause incorrect interpretation/action of
maintenance team.
This booklet section details an advanced T/S procedure

permitting to increase the trouble-shooting efficiency.
Adherence to these guidelines will:

facilitate identification of the most pertinent TSM task
permit to fix more quickly a fault
prevent useless computers/parts removals that might
result from lengthy trouble-shooting
31
4.1) Advanced T/S procedure
Advanced procedure flowchart

Pre-analysis
Identify failure
symptoms yes Failure not requiring T/S
(E/W & Failure (MEL, reset, AFS )?
Message) No need of T/S
no
PFR verification &

cleaning
Refer to: Pre-analysis
p33 to 43
Detailed analysis no E/W associated

with a Failure
Message
Dedicated TSM task yes
no Failure incriminating the yes

same LRU in PFR/PLR
/AIRMAN ?
no Failureyes
incriminating the
Refer to: Detailed several XDCR in PFR/PLR
analysis p44 to 53 /AIRMAN ?
yes
Identify if possible
more accurate failure
symptoms by
correlation
Use AirN@v to find

an appropriate TSM
task
Adhere to TFU T/S advices block

when appropriate.
32
4 .2
Pre-analysis
Specific cases not requiring T/S

o AFS: ELAC x
o AFS: ELAC 2 with APU under MMEL
o ALT LAW with APU under MMEL
o F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT with SEC2 under MEL
o Discriminate reset & genuine failure
o ALT LAW consecutive to computer reset
o ACCLRM fault with ELAC1 / SEC2 / SEC1 under MEL with
one engine running
o Aileron & Spoiler servocontrol POS transducer fault under
MEL
PFR verification & cleaning
33
4.2) Pre-analysis: Specific cases not requiring T/S
AFS: ELAC x
Design principle
As long as the ELACs are capable to achieve the Auto Pilot (AP) order, they send to
Auto Flight System (AFS) computers a discrete signals which allows the AP
engagement.
AFS: ELAC x indicates that one of the computers belonging to the Auto Flight System
does not receive anymore its AP engagement authorization discrete inputs from the
ELAC.
This might be an indication of:
a genuine failure of the discrete input interface
or the consequence of the inability for ELAC to perform AP order.
Examples: inability for ELAC to perform the pitch servo loop:
1. UTC PH ATA WARNING
1403 06 290000 HYD B SYS LO PR
1403 06 290000 HYD B ELEC PUMP LO PR
1403 02 279334 AFS:ELAC1
2. UTC PH ATA WARNING

1316 02 270000 F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT
1316 02 273451 L B ELEV SERVO VLV 34CE3
1316 02 279334 AFS: ELAC1
On the two above examples, ELAC1 cannot take over the pitch axis leading to the
inability of the ELAC1 to correctly perform the AP order. Consequently AP
authorization discrete inputs are not sent by the ELAC1 and AFS: ELAC1 is
displayed.
TSM content:
AP Engagement Authorization discrete inputs are monitored by the ELAC (wrap up).
An ELAC discrete input emission failure would be self-detected by the ELAC leading
to ELAC FAULT. AFS: ELAC1 failure message is thus unlikely attributable to the
ELAC.
Do not use AFS: ELAC1 or AFS: ELAC2 Failure Messages to substantiate an

ELAC removal.
If Failure Message is confirmed on ground, apply corresponding TSM task.
34
AFS: ELAC2 with APU under MMEL

Design principle
PFR is open 3mins after the first engine start (if a new flight number was entered).
APU under MMEL:
When the APU is under MMEL, more than 3mins are in general required to start the
second engine. During this time frame, the ELAC2 is not to be able to achieve / take-
over pitch axis as either the yellow or the green hydraulic system is not available.
As per design, ELAC2 does not sent its AP engagement authorization discrete output
to the AFS until second engine is operative, this leading the failure message AFS:
ELAC2 to be recorded in the PFR.
Example:
Engine 1 > GREEN
hydraulics
Engine 2 > YELLOW

hydraulics
Situation Consequence Explanation

Y hydraulic not available
1. Engine 1 started
ELAC 2 not able to take over the ELACs are capable to achieve
2. Engine 2 still off
pitch axis and do not send it AP pitch control if both ELEVs &
3. PTU inhibited
engagement authorization discrete THSA are available
(parking brake on)
outputs to the AFS.
Note: same type of rationale can be built whether engine 1 is off.
No trouble-shooting is necessary for this failure message.

Do NOT replace the ELAC2.
NOTE
1. This above is covered by a note in the Operational Procedure of the

NOTE
MMEL.
2. In normal configuration, AFS: ELAC2 does not appear because the
second engine is started before the 3mins. In case of single engine
taxi the PTU inhibition is cancelled before the 3mins are exhausted
(when parking brake removed).
35
ALTN LAW with APU under MMEL

Design principle
Among other reasons, the E/W F/CTL ALTN LAW might be generated if none of the
ELACs are available in pitch axis.
This E/W is inhibited in flight phase 01 and 10.
Flight phase 02 will start 3mins after start of the first engine if flight plan is entered via
MCDU (F/CTL ALTN LAW will also be recorded in the PFR).
APU under MMEL:
When the APU is under MMEL, more than 3mins are in general required to start the
second engine.
During this time frame, the ELAC2 is not to be able to achieve / take-over pitch axis as
either the yellow or the green hydraulic system is not available.
Also, if blue hydraulic system is not switched on, ELAC1 is also not to be able to
achieve / take-over pitch axis.
E/W F/CTL ALTN LAW may thus trigger at the beginning of flight phase 02 as a result
of the unavailability of both ELACs to achieve pitch control.
Example:
ELACs are capable to
1. Engine 1 started Y hydraulic not available
achieve pitch control if
2. Engine 2 still off ELAC 2 not able to take over
both ELEVs & THSA are
3. PTU inhibited (parking brake on) the pitch axis.
available
B hydraulic not available

4. Blue hydraulic pump off
ELAC 1 not able to take over
the pitch axis.
Both ELACs unavailable

to achieve pitch control.
ECAM Warning F/CTL ALTN LAW appears at the beginning of PH02
E/W no longer
inhibited.
ECAM Warning F/CTL ALTN LAW will disappear as soon as 2nd engine is
operative or Blue hydraulic system is available.
This failure symptom does not require T/S.
36
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT with SEC2 under MEL

during taxi with one engine running
Background:
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT warning might appear on ECAM when SEC2 is under MEL
during taxi if:
PTU is inhibited
only one engine is operating
.
Example:
Engine 1 > GREEN
hydraulics
Engine 2 > YELLOW

hydraulics
SEC 2 under MEL

SEC 2 not able to servo the R Y and
1. SEC 2 under MEL
the L G servo
Y hydraulic not available ELACs are capable to achieve pitch

2. Engine 2 off
ELAC 2 not able to take over the control if both ELEVs & THSA are
3. PTU inhibited
pitch axis available
Neither SEC2 nor ELAC2 can

L G Servo is boxed on the status display and the ECAM
control the L G STCL despite the
Warning F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT appears availability of the G hydraulic
Note: same type of rationale can be built whether engine 1 is off.
ECAM Warning F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT will disappear as soon as

PTU operates or 2nd engine is operative.
This failure symptom does not require T/S.
NOTE
This is covered by a note in the Operational Procedure of the MEL
37
Discriminate reset versus genuine failure

Background:
Signature of an ELAC or SEC reset (via Push Button) is similar to a genuine failure.
Accordingly, reset can only be identified by an analysis of the PFR.
Reset of E/W Failure Message
ELAC x F/CTL ELAC x FAULT ELAC x

SEC y F/CTL SEC y FAULT SEC y
How to identify a reset:

Above mentioned FAULTs when occurring subsequently to another ATA27 E/W are
very likely attributable to a reset.
Example:
Associated with Failure
UTC PH ATA WARNING Message
2351 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT
2359 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC 1 FAULT
2351 02 279334 ELAC1 COM OR WIRING TO L B ELEV SERVO VLV 34CE3
2359 02 279334 ELAC1
Signature of an
A few minute
ELAC1 reset
after the original
fault
T/S has to be performed based on the earlier Failure Message. In this example:
ELAC1 COM OR WIRING TO L B ELEV SERVO VLV 34CE3
If the maintenance staff identifies a FAULT due to a reset, there is no need of

further maintenance action for this specific failure entry. Furthermore, this
failure shall not be used to substantiate a computer removal.
38
F/CTL ALTN LAW consecutive to computer reset

Background:
E/W F/CTL ALTN LAW might be generated as consequences of multiple computer
reset:
- Reset of both ELACs
- Reset of all the SECs
How to identify a reset: Indication recorded in the PFR
Reset of E/W Failure Message
F/CTL ELAC 1 FAULT

ELAC1
ELAC 1 + 2 F/CTL ELAC 2 FAULT
ELAC2
F/CTL ALTN LAW
F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT
SEC 1
F/CTL SEC 2 FAULT
SEC 1+2+3 SEC 2
F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
SEC 3
F/CTL ALTN LAW
Example:
UTC PH ATA WARNING
2351 02 270000 F/CTL SPLR FAULT
2359 02 270000 F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT
2359 02 270000 F/CTL SEC 2 FAULT
2359 02 270000 F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
2359 02 270000 F/CTL ALTN LAW
2351 02 279334 SEC2 COM OR WIRING FROM R SPLR5 POS XDCR 32CE4
2359 02 279334 SEC1
2359 02 279334 SEC2 Signature of
2359 02 279334 SEC3 SEC1+2+3 reset
ALT LAW is a
consequence of these
resets.
If the maintenance staff identifies a FAULT due to a reset, there is no need

of further maintenance action for this specific failure entry.
39
Accelerometer fault with ELAC1 / SEC2 /

SEC1 under MEL
data
SEC 1
ACCLRM 1
If ELAC1 is under MEL, applicable Circuit

Breaker is opened. Accelerometer 1 is no
ELAC 1 under MEL longer powered due to system architecture.
data SEC1 that acquires the accelerometer data
ELAC 1 will subsequently detect a loss of
accelerometer signal.
supply The PFR will show Failure Message SEC1
OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 1 12CE1
Circuit Breaker
POWER SUPPLY
ACCLRM Typical PFR

Case MEL without
power supply E/W Failure message
ELAC1
F/CTL ELAC1 FAULT
1 ELAC 1 ACCLRM 1 SEC1 OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 1
F/CTL
12CE1
No MEL ELAC2
F/CTL ELAC2 FAULT
2 for ELAC ACCLRM 3 SEC2 OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 3
F/CTL
2 12CE3
SEC1
F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
3 SEC 1 ACCLRM 2 ELAC1 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
F/CTL
ACCLRM 2 12CE2
SEC2
F/CTL SEC2 FAULT
4 SEC 2 ACCLRM 4 ELAC2 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
F/CTL
ACCLRM 4 12CE4
1. Accelerometer fault mentioned here-above does not requires T/S if the

corresponding computer is confirmed under MMEL.
2. PFR obtained under MMEL configuration are also not adequate to trouble-
shoot the failure at the origin of the MMEL opening.
40
Aileron & Spoiler servocontrol position

transducer fault under MEL
When an AILERON or a SPLR servocontrol is put under MMEL, it is required to

disconnect and secure the servocontrol connector. The ELAC or the SEC will
however continue monitoring the concerned unit and in particular the XDCR.
A failure message induced by this connector disconnection will be generated.
Typical PFR
Case MEL
E/W Failure message
Aileron F/CTL AIL SERVO

1 L(R) B(G) AIL POS XDCR 33CEx
Servocontrol FAULT
Spoiler
2 F/CTL SPLR FAULT R (L) SPLRx POS XDCR 3xCEx
Servocontrol
1. The failure message mentioned here-above does not requires T/S if the
corresponding servocontrol is confirmed under MEL.
2. PFR obtained under MMEL configuration (containing the above-mentioned
faults) are also not adequate to trouble-shoot the failure at the origin of the
MMEL opening.
41
4.2) Pre-analysis: PFR verification & cleaning
At first, it is essential to make sure that the PFR available to initiate the
trouble-shooting contain the original failure.
PFR generated subsequently to MMEL application are useless for T/S.
Example:
UTC PH ATA WARNING
2351 02 270000 F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT Possible MMEL?
UTC PH ATA FAULT MESSAGE Check using AIRMAN
2351 02 279334 L G AIL POS XDCR 33CE1
Original failure to be trouble-

MMEL consequential
shot
failure
1. If a PFR contains fault symptoms that can be obtained when a MMEL

item is invoked (refer pages 35, 36, 40 and 41), it is recommended to
check the status of the aircraft at the time of PFR print out in order to
confirm whether or not the aircraft was operated under MMEL.
2. If PFR was generated while aircraft was under MMEL, some failures do
not require trouble-shooting (refer pages 35, 36, 40 and 41). For trouble-
shooting (if applicable), failure at the origin of the MMEL opening shall be
identified via AIRMAN or PFR/PLR.
42
4.2) Pre-analysis: PFR verification & cleaning
PFR might contain failure that have been produced by computer reset (P/B or
C/B reset).
These failures do not require trouble-shooting and must not be considered to
make a decision on the trouble-shooting action.
Example 1:
UTC PH ATA WARNING
2351 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC2 FAULT (2)

2351 02 279334 ELAC2 OR INPUT OF CAPT ROLL CTL SSTU 4CE1
2354 02 279334 ELAC2
Signature of an ELAC2
reset
Example 2:
UTC PH ATA WARNING

2351 02 270000 F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT Signature of an ELAC1
2357 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC1 FAULT and ELAC2 reset via
2358 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC2 FAULT C/B
2358 02 270000 F/CTL ALT LAW ALT is a consequence
2357 02 270000 F/CTL of both ELAC
unavailability
2351 02 279334 ELAC2 AIL ORDER DISAGREE
2357 02 279334 ELAC1
2357 02 279434 SEC1 OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 4 12CE4
2358 02 279334 ELAC2
2358 02 279434 SEC2 OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 3 12CE3
Original failure shall be identified for trouble-shooting i.a.w. TSM

(refer pages 38 to 39)
Reset indication shall be disregarded.
43
4 .3
Detailed analysis
Faults without Failure Message

oPressure switch issue
How to use PLR and AIRMAN

oDescriptions
oExample 1: Fault linked to elevator servocontrol
oExample 2: Fault linked to ADR
oExample 3: Fault linked to spoiler servocontrol
oExample 4: Multiple XDCR failures
TFU linked to a TSM task
44
4.3) Detailed analysis: Faults without Failure Message
T/S procedure if there is no Failure

Message associated to a given E/W
Dedicated TSM tasks permitting to address E/W not associated with

a Failure Message can be found in AirN@v.
Some of these tasks are incriminating Pressure Switches and FWCs

as a possible cause.
Refer to the next page, for

further explanations
NOTE
It is advisable to check if the E/W has already occurred in PLR /

AIRMAN. If E/W was previously associated with a failure message,
trouble shooting procedure related to this maintenance message has
to be carried out.
45
4.3) Detailed analysis: Faults without Failure Message
Pressure Switch issue

Design & Principle:
ELAC: For each hydraulic system, the ELACs acquire the hydraulic
status using three different sensors: two pressure switches
(P/SW) and one pressure transmitter (P/XMTR).
Hydraulic status built by the ELACs is voted using the three
pieces of information.
FWC: Flight Warning Computer (FWC) hydraulic information is based on

one P/SW information.
Spurious E/W caused by erroneous P/SW information:
ELAC not available for pitch

(due to low pressure detected by the ELAC)
P/SW 1 ELAC FCDC

Per design: no
Failure Message
High press. ELAC senses
a Low press.
P/SW 2
Low press.
FWC sees:
High press. Generation of the E/W
ELAC not available F/CTL ELAC PITCH
FWC for pitch FAULT.
P/XMTR
Low press.
Proper identification of the fault symptoms and adherence to the TSM will
direct trouble-shooting towards the failed P/SW or FWC.
46
4.3) Detailed analysis: How to use PLR and AIRMAN

Descriptions
If the aircraft is experiencing recurring fault symptoms, analysis of previous PFR,
PLR and AIRMAN data might provide valuable information to increase T/S
efficiency.
In particular, this review might enable:
to identify if different failure modes have been experienced
and, whenever possible, to select a more appropriate TSM task.
How to proceed:
a. Find failure messages incriminating same LRU in
PFR/PLR/AIRMAN
b. Find failure messages incriminating other XDCR
Refer to:
Example 1 Fault linked to elevator servocontrol p48
Example 2 Fault linked to ADR p49
Example 3 Fault linked to spoiler servocontrol p50
Example 4 Multiple F/CTL XDCR failures p51-52
If a similar fault has already occurred, the maintenance staff:

shall avoid repeating the same step of TSM task
may try to find a more accurate TSM task using the other Failure
messages present in PFR / PLR / AIRMAN.
NOTE
Exploring the aircraft fault history (previous PFR / PLR / AIRMAN) also
enables to check trouble-shooting already accomplished and avoid
repeating same step of the TSM task.
47

Example 1
Fault linked to elevator servocontrol:
Elevator servocontrols are controlled and monitored by one ELAC & one SEC.
It might happen that intermittent failures at the level of the servocontrol be not
detected by both computers.
For background & principle refer to: elevator

Example: servocontrol faults in chapter 3. p23 and p26
Original fault symptoms:

F/CTL ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT
ELAC2 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3
If in previous PFR / PLR / AIRMAN, one of the following fault has already occurred:
E/W Failure message
F/CTL SEC2 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT SEC2 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3
It can be concluded that the component at the origin of the fault is certainly the
common LRU (in this case L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3) or the common wiring.
Using the Failure Message L B ELEV MODE XDCR 34CE3 will lead you to a more
accurate TSM task.
When several Failure Messages involving the same LRU are shown in
PFR/PLR/AIRMAN... comparison of the TSM task content enables to
identify more precisely the common point.
48

Example 2
Fault linked to ADR
ELAC 1 SEC 1 ELAC 2 SEC 2
COM COM COM COM

MON MON MON MON
SEC 3
First BUS 3 BUS 2

terminal
block ADR1
For background & principle refer to:

p25
Example:
Original fault symptoms
ELAC1 COM OR BUS3 FROM ADR1
If previous PFR / PLR / AIRMAN show one of the following faults:
E/W Failure message

F/CTL ADR1
F/CTL ADR1 BUS3
It can be concluded that the component at the origin of the fault is certainly the
common LRU (in this case ADR1) or the common wiring.
Using the Failure Message ADR1 or ADR1 BUS3 will lead you to a more accurate
TSM task.
49

Example 3
Fault linked to spoiler servocontrol:
SV
Spoiler
SEC
servocontrol
XDCR
Fault symptoms A:
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
L (R) SPLRx POS ERROR 31CEx
Possible causes:
SEC,
Wiring from SEC to servovalve
Wiring from position transducer to SEC
Spoiler servocontrol
Fault symptoms B:
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
L (R) SPLRx POS XDCR 31CEx
Possible causes:
SEC,
Wiring from position transducer to SEC
Spoiler servocontrol
Analysis
The comparison of the possible causes listed in the TSM tasks enables to rule out the
Wiring from SEC to servovalve. It incriminates more precisely the spoiler servocontrol
transducer interface.
50

Example 4
Multiple XDCR failures - Description:
Each ELAC & SEC supplies their corresponding XDCR. These power supply
circuitries are called Alternating Current Supplies (ACS). If an ACS fault occurs, the
affected ELAC/SEC XDCRs are no longer powered. They are declared faulty by the
concerned computers.
Number of XDCR
Failure Messages
Case Most probable component involved
reported on PFR
/ PLR / AIRMAN
ELAC XDCR 1 XDCR, feedback

wiring, or ACS
Single XDCR Failure
1 Message XDCR 2
wiring to first
terminal block
ACS Wiring
Feedback XDCR 3
Wiring
ELAC XDCR 1
Computer or ACS
Two or more XDCR
2 Failure Message XDCR 2 wiring to first
terminal block
XDCR 3
If there is more than one Failure Message ELAC/SEC x or WIRING TO

XDCR in PFR, an ACS fault can be suspected. TSM (as shown here-after)
enables to identify the most appropriate TSM task
51

Examples 4
Multiple XDCR failures Typical PFR:
UTC PH ATA WARNING

1313 02 270000 F/CTL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT
1313 02 279334 ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV POS XDCR 34CE3
1313 02 279334 ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM R ELEV POS MON XDCR
When two XDCR Failure Taken independently these

Messages fed by the same failure messages lead you to
ACS are displayed in the PFR, different TSM tasks.
TSM enables to identify a
specific TSM task.
Extract of TSM task 27-90-00-810-813:

TSM already proposes such failure message correlation:
NOTE
Review of the PLR and AIRMAN enables to make sure that no other
XDCR fault linked to the same ACS has been previously experienced.
52
4.3) Detailed analysis: TFU linked to a TSM task
TFU linked to a TSM task

Background:
A TFU might be linked to a particular fault symptoms in AirN@v. Maintenance

advice block might contain useful information for trouble-shooting.
How to find a TFU linked to a TSM task:
TFU linked to the ECAM

Warning F/CTL ELAC 1
PITCH FAULT
TFU linked to the CFDS

Fault Message ELAC1 OR
WIRING TO L G ELEV
SERVO VLV 34CE1
If a TFU is linked to the TSM task, follow, if applicable, the

recommendations contained in the Maintenance advice paragraph of
the TFU.
53
5
Difficult Trouble-
Shooting
54
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
5 .1
General
recommendations
Intermittent failure
Wiring Check
55
5.1) General recommendations: Intermittent failure
Intermittent failure
Some failures are intermittent and thus not reproducible on ground.
Trouble-shooting accomplishment is rendered more difficult as

efficiency of the corrective action cannot be confirmed.
In these cases, it is necessary to properly follow-up and monitor the

aircraft in order to make sure that the fault has been properly cured.
Intermittent failure requires an accurate follow up of the aircraft.
Tight follow up of the aircraft (including review of the maintenance

record, PLR, AIRMAN) enables to avoid repeating same step of the
TSM (for instance, multiple ELAC or SEC removals).
NOTE
If an intermittent failure occurred three times, it is advisable to

apply the fault isolation of the corresponding TSM task step by
step until final resolution.
56
5.1) General recommendations: Wiring check
Wiring check
Wiring check:
It consists of:
1. Continuity check,
2. Quality of the connections,
3. Short circuit / Insulation tests,
4. Resistance check.
How to interpret resistance measurement:
Resistance check has to be preferred for intermittent failure (better

than continuity). It may highlight possible corrosion, improper contact
or improper connector locking, contamination, moisture ingress, etc
Compare the resistance of the adjacent wires (Two adjacent wires

have in general the same length and same gauge)
A discrepancy of a few ohms can be a valid indication / positive

finding for an intermittent failure (For calculation of the normal
resistance value, refer to Standard Manual : resistance per meter).
Do not hesitate to shake moderately the wires while performing the

test. The resistance value should not fluctuate.
NOTE
To see the resistance fluctuations prefer use an analogical
ohmmeter with a needle (a digital ohmmeter may reduce
these fluctuations and make them invisible on the screen).
57
5 .2
Typical faults
Discrete interface / grounded signal

Damaging failure
F/CTL ALTN LAW & F/CTL DIRECT LAW
58
5.2) Typical faults: Discrete interface / grounded signal

Background:
Computers send (receive) discrete signals to (from) other computers. Some failures
mode might be such that an erroneous information can be spread in the concerned
discrete network.
LRUx
Principle: MON COM
Ground sent by the
Open circuit signal received
faulty SEC2 COM
Ground signal received
DSO x DSO y
DSI x DSI y DSI x DSI y
MON COM MON COM

ELAC 2 SEC 2
Ground detected by Removing SEC2 will remove the

ELAC2 COM ground point
For the concerned DSI, ELAC2 detects a COM/MON discrepancy. Failure message
will incriminate ELAC2 or wiring from LRUx while SEC2 is at fault.
Most of the time the failure is not detected by the faulty computer (SEC2 in this case).
If a failure of the discrete links is suspected, TSM task 31-32-00-810-932 is

cross-referenced in the applicable TSM task.
This task consists in removing one by one all possibly involved computers to
identify the faulty one (see example here-after).
NOTE
1. In case of an intermittent failure of the discrete links, the fault may not
be reproduced on ground. In this case replace one by one the involved
computers.
2. As far as F/CTL computers are concerned, discrete inputs corrupted
by internal computer fault are more frequently caused by SECs (failure of
lightning diodes located on discrete inputs).
59
5.2) Typical faults: Discrete interface / grounded signal

Example of TSM task:
TSM task 31-32-

00-810-932 cross-
referenced
DSO 09 of ELAC1 is
connected to SEC1 & SEC2
As per TSM task 31-32-00-810-932, SEC1 & SEC2 must be removed from their
rack and the effect on the failure verified.
60
5.2) Typical faults: Damaging failure
Damaging failure
Some failures (in particular failures - short-circuit - on wiring

involving solenoid supply) can damage computers.
Consequently, computer swapping may temporally fix the failure

until the new computer get damaged.
When a failure can possibly damage computers, TSM task

contains a caution requesting not to swap computers.
First step of the TSM task consists in checking that there is no
short circuit in the wiring interface
Refer to the next page

depicting an example of
TSM task involving solenoid.
When instructed by TSM, checking the wiring for a possible short

circuit before replacing the computer is highly recommended. This
enables to prevent multiple and useless computer replacements.
61
5.2) Typical faults: Damaging failure
Damaging failure
Example of a TSM task involving solenoid:
Caution: to avoid
swapping.
First step of the

TSM task is a check
of resistances for a
possible short
circuit.
62
5.2) Typical faults: F/CTL ALTN LAW & F/CTL DIRECT LAW
F/CTL ALTN LAW and F/CTL DIRECT LAW ECAM Warnings are in general a
consequence of multiple failures.
These E/W are displayed to inform the pilot on the level of Flight Control
protection available to control the aircraft.
- F/CTL ALTN LAW indicates that reduced protections are available.

- F/CTL DIRECT LAW indicates that no protections are available.
They do not bring valuable information for T/S purpose.
Correlation of a given failure with E/W F/CTL ALTN / DIRECT LAW might not be
possible as all possible failure configurations leading to Flight Control Law
reversion have not been documented in the TSM.
In addition, when a law reversion occurs in flight, Flight Control Law status will
evolve during the flight as follow:
- F/CTL ALTN LAW becomes F/CTL DIRECT LAW upon landing gear
extension
- F/CTL DIRECT LAW switches to F/CTL ALTN LAW after touch-down.
Note: In some cases, E/W AUTO FLT AP OFF will trigger if Auto Pilot was
engaged and law reversion is not compatible with AP engagement.
When F/CTL ALTN / DIRECT LAW are reported, PFR shall be

reviewed and faults at the origin of the law reversion have to be
identified and troubleshot individually.
NOTE
A description of the failure combination leading to F/CTL ALTN /
DIRECT LAW reversion can be found in the in FCOM Chapter DSC-
27-20-20.
A copy of this table is provided in the next page.
63
List of failures leading to F/CTL ALT LAW and/or F/CTL DIRECT LAW
F/CTL ALTN LAW F/CTL DIRECT LAW

Extract of FCOM Chapter
DSC-27-20-20
64
AUTO FLT AP OFF

Example 1:
Double ELAC Ail order
disagree failure
inducing the
1. F/CTL ALTN LAW unavailability of both
due to ailerons
unavailability of
both ailerons
2. F/CTL DIRECT
LAW at landing
gear extension
3. F/CTL ALTN LAW
at aircraft touch
down
Extract FCOM
Only the failure messages ELAC2 AIL ORDER DISAGREE and ELAC1 AIL ORDER
DISAGREE are valuable for trouble-shooting purpose.
The flight control law reversion is a consequence of these 2 failure messages.

65

Example 2:
1. F/CTL ALTN
LAW due to
SLAT LOCKED
(assumed to be
in clean)
2. F/CTL DIRECT
LAW at landing
gear extension
3. F/CTL ALTN
LAW at aircraft
touch down
F/CTL SLAT LOCKED
Extract FCOM
Only the F/CTL SLATS LOCKED requires trouble-shooting (using failure messages
SLT 1/2 OVERSPEED RH CHECK SLT MECH DRIVE).
The flight control law reversion is a consequence of the SLATS LOCKED event.

66
5 .3
Useful tool for T/S
67
5.3) Useful tool for T/S
The Swapping tool

Principle
The swapping tool is an equipment developed by Airbus which simulates on

ground a swapping between two Servo Controls. The swapping tools swap
all Inputs / Outputs from one servocontrol to another servocontrol.
Computer
Servo 1
1
Swapping
tool
Computer
Servo 2
2
Applicable references:
Elevators AMM 27-34-00-760-001
Ailerons AMM 27-14-00-760-001
Like a computer swapping which can prove that a computer is or not at the
origin of a fault, the swapping tool can enable to identify if a Servo Control or
the wiring is at the origin of a Fault.
Advantages of using the swapping tool:

avoid servocontrol removal task while Trouble Shooting
minimize/optimize wiring check
68
5.3) Useful tool for T/S
The Swapping tool

Examples
69

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Aim of this handbook

o ELAC and SEC systems (EFCS)

Provide guidelines and tips to the Maintenance team for a

This handbook is valid for the A320 Family aircraft.

These instructions do not amend or supersede any

This document will not be updated on regular basis.

Enquiries related to this handbook should be addressed to:

Airbus Customer Services

New or revised paragraph/pages are highlighted by a vertical bar in the left

This booklet contains:

A reminder on computer reset with caution and method (Chapter 2.).

A reminder on how to find the adequate TSM task corresponding to a

A method (guideline) to maximise efficiency of the ELAC/SEC system

Recommendations applying in case of difficult and lengthy trouble-

Many examples of typical failure cases illustrating these general advices

1.2 Maintenance feature 10

1.3 Available maintenance information 12

2.2 Reset method 17

3 Find the correct TSM task

4 Advanced Trouble-Shooting guidelines

4 Advanced Trouble-Shooting guidelines (cont)

o TFU linked to a TSM task 53

F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT L B AIL MODE VLV 33CE3 62/63

ELAC1 COM OR WIRING FROM L B AIL

F/CTL AIL SERVO FAULT ELAC2 AIL ORDER DISAGREE 44

F/CTL ALTN LAW multiple failure message 39/42/64/65/66/67

F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT

F/CTL Maint. Status IR1/2/3 26

F/CTL Maint. Status ADR1/2/3 50

F/CTL maint. Status CHECK PRIORITY WIRING 28

EFCS 1 FCDC 1 FCDC 2 EFCS 2

ECAM Warning Failure message

Failure Message and ECAM Warning (E/W) are

Failure Message and E/W are different whether the FAULT is

COM / MON construction

EFCS 1 FCDC 1 FCDC 2 EFCS 2

Failure Message and E/W are different whether the FAULT is

A fault is characterized by two levels of information (symptoms):

E/W and status display: The purpose of those indications is to

Trouble Shooting shall preferably be initiated using the

ECAM Warnings could be useful for maintenance

Trouble-Shooting Data (TSD)

Example of EFCS TSD decoding:

1435 27-93-34 UTC / ATA chapter number

ELAC1 OR WIRING FROM L B ELEV POS XDCR 34CE3

The failure code is the exact translation of the failure message in a

The best and sufficient entry point to trouble-shoot an EFCS fault is

Computer reset shall not be considered as a trouble-shooting

However, reset is not a durable fix and risk of failure re-

In general, unless failure is recorded in the SIL 00-028,

E/W Reset method

- Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems) (*)

- Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems) (*)

F/CTL ALT LAW - Low hydraulic system pressure (all 3 systems)

F/CTL FCDCx FAULT - FCDC C/B reset > 5s

(*) If fault is experienced during safety test (at power up)

15CE1 (Normal supply)

21CE1 (Normal supply)

SEC 2 / 3 21CE2 / 21CE3

Find the correct TSM

Refer to: Failure

If necessary, select the Refer to: p21

Make sure the Failure