Sombong v CA G.R. No. 111876.

January 31, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to
the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be
discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty,
who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained
and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily
dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in
Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be
their guardian.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City, on the basis of petitioners complaint, filed an
information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in Quezon
City. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found.
Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasnt entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with
the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombongs favor and ordered the respondents to
deliver the child.
The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the
child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question,
what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will
the question of the childs welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves
child custody.
The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

Held: Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact,
is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus,
although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have
held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over
the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.
1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is
the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the
question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those
as to identity of person.
The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met her lost
daughter.
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be
distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical
and analytical.
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and
separate existence of petitioners child, Arabella, from that of private respondents foster child,
Cristina. According to one witness, there were several babies left in the clinic and it wasnt
certain if Arabella was given to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. Moreover, the way the respondents
obtained custody isnt material to the habeas corpus issue.
3. Private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of
the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to
the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of petitioner due to her lack
of a stable job and her separation from a married man.

Velasco v. CA July 7, 1995

FACTS:
a warrant of arrest was issued, against accused Lawrence Larkins in for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.a
certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her .Acting
on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators proceeded to the office
of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by
Alinea as her rapist.
Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila. On 22 November
1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina
forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued and directing
the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise
detained for some other cause.
"Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still
detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for
inquest. A complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea.
Larkins, through his, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the
evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of the
complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated nor
ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out
of the country or hiding away from the law. Larkins, through his new counsel, filed in an Urgent
Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based
on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. Court of Appeals issued a resolution
Ordering the respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court
on. And to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being restrained. The petitioners insist that the
respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already
been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They
further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may
bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing
the discharge of the detained person? It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail,
Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person
to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs Romero
This Court stated: DE Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the
lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)The filing of a petition or
motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import and effect as
the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of
bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion
for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the
Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the
said motion was a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had
firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person. The instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010

FACTS:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H.
Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police
District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper
disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave
Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against
PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody
unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office, petitioner,
who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein
respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause
why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the
release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however
stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP,
and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the
PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.

HELD:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors
is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers
concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to
show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in
the Constitution.

Adonis vs Tesoro June 5, 2013

Facts:
Alexander Adonis, a reporter, was convicted in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 for libel by the RTC
of Davao City Branch 17, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five months and one day
of arrest mayor maximum to four years six months and one day of prision correcional. Another
case, Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 remain pending at the RTC. On January 25, 2008, the
Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, which provided for the imposition of
fine as an alternative penalty for libel.
Alexander also became eligible for parole as of December 11, 2007, which order was received
by the NBP Davao in May 2, 2008. In view of the issuance of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No, 08-2008, Alexander filed a Motion to Reopen Case with the RTC Branch 17 praying
for his immediate release and modification of his penalty to payment of fine in accordance with
the circular.
The trial court granted his motion and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of P5, 000.00.
The trial court also issued an Order of Release, which was served to the respondent, but the
latter did not act on it, hence, he filed a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus before
the Supreme Court, praying that he be immediately released, and that the Supreme Court apply
its Administrative Circular 08-2008 in his favor. By letter of February 11, 2009, the respondent
informed the Court that Alexander had been released from confinement after acceptance of the
condition of his parole.
Issue:
WON Adonis is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus NO

Held: The petition is without merit.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and
as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining
relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when
the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ
of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six
(6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on
parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another
criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released
on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending
before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No.
48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore,
proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.
Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, citing
Fermin v. People, where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than imprisonment
under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January
25, 2008 and provides the guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition
of penalties in libel cases. The pertinent portions read as follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference
set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel
bearing in mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the
crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration
the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would
best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.
(Emphasis ours)
A clear reading of the Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular cannot be given retroactive
effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument
considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become final and executory; and he
had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence. Eventually, he was released from
confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.
Petition dismissed.

Chavez v.CA August 19, 1968

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together
with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused that
they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim,
took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution)
asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia
contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel
of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been
violated to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to
the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy

to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is
less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a
person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due
to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for
an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of
Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Enrile v. Salazar June 5, 1990

FACTS: In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar.
Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There
was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was
then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his
detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that
there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked
the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have
been charged against him is simple rebellion which is bailable.

Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He
claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the
case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from
the prosecutions office that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a
warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not been
complied with.

For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned
and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.

HELD: 1. No, The said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was
actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon
Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom
Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the
Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret
laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen
the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with
murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion
which is bailable.

2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty
minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the
prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it
conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by personally evaluating
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge
Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does
that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.

Sotto v. Director of Prisons May 30, 1962

Facts:
Together with Rocindo Brillantes, Eligio Iturralde and Alfredo Valencia, petitioner Eduardo Sotto
was convicted upon a plea of guilty, by the CFI of Zamboanga, for the crime of robbery, and
sentenced to serve an imprisonment of from 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 21
days of reclusion temporal; to return the articles robbed or pay the corresponding value of
P465.60 to the offended party Leona Kuan Tan, with the accessories of the law and to pay 1/4 of
the costs (CFICrim. Case No. 1873, Zamboanga City). He started serving his sentence on
December 17, 1953, and up to the date of his petition for habeas corpus, filed on December 8,
1958, he has already served an aggregate term of 4 years, 11 months and 21 days, excluding
good conduct time allowance, earned under article 97 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged in
his petition that the penalty imposed is excessive and not in accordance with law, as the proper
penalty imposable, for the offense charged in the information should be that of Article 302, and
not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code; that at the time of conviction, petitioner was a minor,
16 years old, and as such he was entitled to a penalty next lower than the one prescribed for the
crime committed, to wit, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, and that having served
sentence for a period of 4 years, 11 months and 21 days, he should already be ordered released
from custody and control of the Respondent Director of Prisons or his representative and that he
has no other adequate, legal and speedy remedy in law except the present proceeding. He,
therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to release him. Respondent, answering, alleged
in his special defense that admitting, but not granting that the sentence is not in accordance
with law, the petition for habeas corpus, is not the proper remedy.

Issue: WON Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy

Held:
1. HABEAS CORPUS; NOT TO BE MADE TO PERFORM FUNCTION OF WRIT OF ERROR. When a
court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the accused, its judgment, order
or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by Habeas Corpus, for this cannot be
made to perform the function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment, order or
decree was erroneous (Vda. de Talavera v. Supt. etc. 67 Phil., 538; Cruz v. Martin, Et Al., 75 Phil.,
11)
The trial court issued an Order the dispositive portion of which runs

"The petitioner is seeking relief from that error. This Court believes that the trial JudgeHon.
Pablo Villalobos who imposed the sentence in criminal case No. 1873, was right; and therefore,
this case of habeas corpus will not lie and same is here denied" .

Petitioner appealed, assigning as error of the trial court in not holding that the penalty imposed
upon the accused was excessive and contrary to law. Considering that the issues involved are
purely of law, the Court of Appeals certified the case to Us for determination. The Solicitor
General has not filed any brief.

At the bottom of the petition, the petitioner desires to revise errors of law or fact, if ever there
were such errors, which the trial court had supposedly incurred in the criminal case
aforementioned. It is already a settled rule that when a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and the person of the accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject
to collateral attack by habeas corpus, for this cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of
error, and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous (Vda. de Talavera
v. Supt. etc. 67 Phil. 538; Cruz v. Martin. Et. Al., 75 Phil. 11). In a recent case, (Cuenca v.
Superintendent, etc. L-17400, Dec. 30, 1961), this Court said

". . . This Court has repeatedly held that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, or a writ for
the purpose of review (Felipe v. Director of Prisons, 27 Phil. 378; Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,
G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285, prom. Feb. 24, 1960. 1 In the Pomeroy case, we stated that

With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of
habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function
as a writ of error. Hence, the writ will not lie to correct mere mistake of fact or of law which do
not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions, if the court has
jurisdiction over the crime and over the person of the defendant.
. . . The second error, on the other hand, attacks the Municipal Courts appreciation of the
number of appellants previous convictions for theft."

Again, this is merely an error of judgment by said court, which did not in any way affect its
jurisdiction, or could nullify its proceedings, but was correctible only by a seasonal appeal.

In the Felipe case, supra, we pointed out:

But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy provided for the correction of such errors. Courts
cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after a judgment of
conviction has been rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of the
sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by the trial court were in accordance
with the evidence disclosed by the record, or in order to pass upon the correctness of the
conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a
commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a
criminal case is conclusive of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it
appears that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of law or of
fact, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause
and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and
manner prescribed by law."

In the case at bar, the trial court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the cause, over the person of
the accused, and to impose the penalty provided for by law. What is here questioned is only the
correctness of the exercise of that jurisdiction. The mistake committed by the trial court, if any,
refers to the appreciation of the facts and/or in the appreciation of the law, which, in the light of
the authorities heretofore cited, cannot be corrected by habeas corpus.

The writ is denied, and the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
 Matter of Habeas Corpus of Kunting April 19, 2006

Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent
Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin, Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief,
to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian
Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City. Kunting was charged with four counts of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC.
Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame
for booking and custodial investigation. In a letter dated July 3, 2003, the Police Superintendent
and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that
Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-
IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP
-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the
issuance of a corresponding commitment order. On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn
over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor requesting for
representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City,
Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons:
(1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will
be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP
considering his importance to the ASG; and
(2) There is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in
Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of
operation of the ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated
its Order. In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent reiterated the request
to Chief State Prosecutor to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case. He
added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of
the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were
able to go scot-free. On March 15, 2005, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion
to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the
existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial against Kunting, which
was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order
of the RTC, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the
transfer of venue is resolved. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by
the Police Chief Superintendent and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief. He alleged that he was
never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in
Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in
the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June
2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping
incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He
was aware that the PNP-I requested the Chief State Prosecutor for representation to file a motion
with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City.
Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the
trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the
records as "for safekeeping purposes only."

ISSUE: The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by RTC Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued
and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense.
Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

Go Sr. v Ramos September 4, 2009

Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T.
Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy,
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
Chinese.

Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and
Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of
Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred
that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, erring that the complaint for deportation
initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he
is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese
father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act
625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that
Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go
to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The
petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureau of immigration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it
may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be
allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term
court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to
order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When
an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such
alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
 Kiani v. BID February 27, 2006

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the decision CA, dismissing the
appeal of Jeany-Vi G. Kiani, which assailed the Order of RTC, dismissing her Petition for Habeas
Corpus. Kiani was arrested for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. A Summary
Deportation Order revoking the visa issued to Kiani was then issued. The next day, Kianis wife
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The BIO officers contend that since Kiani has already
been charged and ordered deported the petition had become moot and academic.

ISSUE: Will WHC be availing if the detainee is lawfully charged later?

HELD: No. As held in Caballes v. CA, habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor
intended as substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari
or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might
be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason,
null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the
regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus
should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are
extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of
human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.
In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her
husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him. The filing of the Charge Sheet
cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest.

Matter of Habeas Corpus of Eufemia Rodriguez January 29, 2008

FACTS: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005
of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor
state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after
demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner
failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia)
were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to
the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2,
2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a
court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of
liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of
habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According to
petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of
habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will
determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family
who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for
the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the
properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of
collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo. Eufemia
and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner.
His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their
mothers deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11,
2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of
Eufemia or the illegality of respondents action.

ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.

RULING: Petition Denied. Application: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful
custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is
either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over
another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed
In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It
found that she was not.
Petition was DENIED.

Andal v People May 26, 1999

Facts:
Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim
of mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court
was ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was
made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.

Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: No.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of
violation of the petitioners constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain
this review. The jurisdiction of this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Rule 102, Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.

He may also avail himself of the writ where as a consequence of a judicial proceeding (a) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess.

In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the
supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.

Salientes v Abanilla August 29, 2006

Facts: Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's
parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son.

Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and
custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to produce and bring
before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from
restraint.

Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order of
the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of
restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise
denied.

Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.

Issue: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order

2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father

Ruling: 1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari Salientes: o the order is contrary to the
Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise o even assuming that there were compelling
reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has
the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his
own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own
child. Abanilla: o the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right
to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had
petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody
of minors o under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority
over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of
her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the
maternal grandparents. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody
of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain
why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial
courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. an interlocutory order is not
appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved
party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the
present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order.

2. Habeas corpus is available to the father Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran
and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the
custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his
right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. . Petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument for private respondents petition for custody. Moreover. Article 213 of the Family Code deals with
the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.
Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

Saulo v Cruz March 19, 1959

Facts:
After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with three criminal cases
(Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons,
robberies and kidnappings, Alfredo B. Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ of
habeas corpus has been presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on
November 12, 1958, to seek refuge therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian
Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18, 1958, since which date
he has remained in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
One of the two criminal cases for rebellion having been dismissed with respect to him on motion
of the prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases (Nos. 13681 and 39253). When
the corresponding order for his temporary release was served, the herein respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary commanded one of his subordinates to
withhold the release of Saulo on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Said criminal case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the Fiscal
of Manila, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Act, punishable by prision mayor to death, so that the said Court of First Instance might conduct
the corresponding preliminary investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary
investigation was still going on, that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, as already stated, on the ground that his detention,
without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is
illegal and void. Said court gave due course to the application and directed the respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above related and
alleged in the application, with the plea that "the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for
violation of Republic Act No. 1700 filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient
reason for continuing the detention of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for
his discharge under the case aforesaid."

Issue: Whether or not denial of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is illegal and void.

Ruling:
Petitioners appeal has been filed out of time. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was
filed eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower courts decision, denying the petition, was served
upon petitioners counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's return). As provided by Section 18,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24)
hours from notice of judgment: Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. An appeal
in habeas corpus case shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who
rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement
that the person making it appeals from the judgment rendered. The appeal is hereby
dismissed.